BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 29, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 18, 1963
• Content Type: BRIEF

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DATES Od PROPAGA14DA INT3R.3ST
December Afro-Asian Organization for 'Economic Co-opera-
tion, 4th AAOEC, scheduled for Karachi, 1933.
1 Dec Assassination of KIROV, CPSU leader in Leningrad,
gives Stalin pretext to start great purge, 1934.
5 Dec USSR adopts new "Stalin" constitution providing
for universal suffrage, freedom of speech,press
and assembly, 1936.
9 Dec VJFDY executive committee meeting, Djakarta,
Dec. 9-15.
21 Dec Stalin born (1379).
26 Dec Mao Tse-tung born (1393 - 70 years).
January International Conference of Youth and Students
for Disarmament (t?FDY-sponsored); scheduled for
Florence, Italy, January 1934.
2 Jan Fidel Castro assumes power in Cuba, 1959.
15 Jan "Trial of the 12* first show trial of Stalinist
purge, including Zinoviev and Kamenev (initial
members Stalin ruling triumvirate during Lenin's
physical decline), 1935.
21 Jan Lenin dies, 1924 (born 22 April 1?70).
26 Jan Second Congress of Soviets meets: Stalin swears
allegiance to Lenin's policies, 1924.
31 Jan Leon Trotsky banished for life, 1929.
31 Jan Cuban Marxist-Leninist Government excluded from
participation inter-American system by Foreign
Ministers American Republics at Punta del Este,
1932.
1 Feb UNGA adopts resolution charging Chinese Communist
aggression in Korea, 1951.
2 Feb Estonian-Soviet Peace Treaty signed: Soviet
Government "forever renounces sovereign rights
over people and territory of Estonia," 1920.
14 Feb USSR and CPR sign treaty of alliance (Sino-
Soviet Friendship Pact) repudiating Soviet
Nationalist Treaty (14 August 1945), 1950.
14 Feb Khrushchev denounces Stalin in secret speech at
CPSU 20th Congress, 14-25 Feb. 1956.
C r n T " PA
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"own
PROPAGANDIST'S GUIDE TO COMMUNIST DISSZNSIONS
#16 28 October-S November 1963
Commentary
Principal Developments:
1. The Chinese fired another major blast at the Soviets,
a 10,000 wor People's Daily editorial on 2 ovem er, e
Truth About How e Lea ers of the CPSU Dave Allied Themselves
with India Against China," in reply to the 19 September Pravda
editorial on the subject. They bluntly accused the Soviet`-'
leadership of conjuring up Sino-Indian tension in order to ex-
ploit the boundary issue to sow dissension between China and
Asian-African countries. The highly tendentious version of the
"facts" of the d#Mpute and the chronology of Sino-Soviet rela-
tions regarding it strikingly illustrate the ultra-nationalistic
sense of self-righteousness which characterizes the Chinese out-
look. The Chinese taunt the Soviets with phrases such as "muni-
tions merchants" and "running a joint stock company with the US
imperialists," brand Soviet statements as "ludicrous" and "a
plain lie," and warn: "The Soviet leaders have betrayed the re-
volutionary cause of the Indian people; this account will be
settled sooner or later." The editorial concludes by asserting
that the Soviets no longer consider the imperialists to be their
enemy: now it is "the Marxist-Leninists, ... and China in par-
ticular." In a classic "pot-calling-kettle-black" final para-
graph, the Chinese charge: "Your Achilles heel is your lack of
respect for truth.... Those who have no respect for truth will
fail in the end!"
The Chinese press also carried two full pages (31 Oct. -
1 Nov.) of extracts from recent Soviet attacks on China with a
shrill editorial comment on the Soviet campaign (which has in-
cluded 430 items from 1 September to 27 October, for a total of
716 since 15 July!)
2. The only other major polemical tract of the period was
also on the Chinese side, a 16,000 word North Korean Nodong
Sinmun editorial on 20 October, "Let Us Defend a oc a ist
gip," which effectively -- and relatively dispassionately --
argued the Chinese case as applied to a smaller nation. It be-
gan by exhorting all Communists not to join in any Soviet move
to isolate the Chinese, -- and ended by calling on all to iso-
late the revisionists.
3. The Soviet Party, engrossed in the celebration of the
46th anniversary of its "October Revolution" on 7 November
(and perhaps reacting to the refusal of a number of pro-Soviet
parties to join in a move to isolate the Chinese, see below),
contributed very little to the war of words, beyond the replay
of a few supporting statements by representatives of relatively
(016 Commentary Cont.)
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(# Commentary Cont.)
unimportant parties (Colombia, Portugal, U.S.A.). The anniversary
celebration accentuated the positive -- i.e., fraternal friend-
ship and mutual assistance -- in all messages and speeches, with
the conflict ignored or dismissed optimistically (except for the
Albanians and, to a much less extent, the North Koreans).
4. The latest public references to the prospect of a con-
ference of all parties coming to our attention -- on both sides
(Rumanian, E. German', and New Zealand) -- emphasized the neces-
sity for careful preparations, inferentially over a long period
of time. There has been no information regarding possible dis-
cussions in Moscow at the time of the celebration.
5. A Japanese CP resolution pegged to the general elec-
tions not only outlined an "independent" line in full harmony
with the Chinese -- but went on to define "modern dogmatism" in
such a way as to apply it implicitly against the CPSU and the
Soviet-aligned bloc.
Significance:
Despite the enormously favorable conditions provided by the
46th anniversary of the "October Revolution," celebrated by all
Communists as the greatest step in the development of world
Communism, with pilgrimages to Moscow by representatives of all
major parties, the Soviets seemed to lose the initiative in the
conflict to the Chinese side during this period. Certainly the
battle of polemics was pushed vigorously only by the Chinese
side, and the bulk of available evidence indicates that the
Soviets have given up -- in the face of lack of support by im-
portant parties -- their effort to call an early conference of
the parties to force the Chinese into self-excommunication.
However, the picture is far from clear and it seems possible
that the Soviets are marking time pending the outcome of inter-
party discussions now going on in Moscow.
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CHRONOLOGY -- COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS
#16 26 October-8 November 1963
October 22 - The Japanese CP, in a CC plenum resolution on "The
resent Situation and the Party's Tasks Centering on the General
Elections" (not picked up in time for last issue of
Chronology), acknowledges the repercussions in Japan of the
"bitter disputes over the divergence of view on basic principles
in the international Communist movement" and establishes an
"independent" line which is in full harmony with the Chinese.
Calling for "struggle against modern revisionism, which is the
primary danger as was pointed out by the Moscow statement," and
also "fight against modern dogmatism, which has the character-
istic of arbitrarily giving a eneral po cy line for other
raterna parties. and-a-1-so o blindly o ow ng the policies of
other raterna parties," the implicitly turns the label
o
mo ern dogmatism" as well as "modern revisionis W against the
CIPBU and the ov et-aligned bloc. (Akahata) (E.g.,the 11fd1l'ow
other par es blindly- passage n the 28 October Nodong Sinmus
editorial reviewed below, section 3).
October 27 - Peking press features the above JCP resolution;
ex ens ve quo es rom an attack on the Tito reactionary revision-
ists in the Hanoi organ Nhan Dan (10 October?); and a 23 October
statement by M. H. Williams, a ional Committee Chairman of the
New Zealand C? stressing the CPNZ's "considered opinion that any
meeting o e world parties without adequate preparations in
conformity with the statement of the 81 parties ... would be
premature, and would almost certainly be abortive."
October 28 - People's Daily uses extensive extracts from the
20,Wword Ada"' nT-an -attack on Khrushchev described in
Chrono, Octo er ravda on 1 November indignantly reports
Peking publication ofttack.)
Leading East German propagandist Gerhard Eisler, Chairman
of the State Radio Comm tee, answers the letter of a listener
who refers to FCP boss Thorez's call for an international Com-
munist conference (Chrono, October 6): suggesting postponement,
he says cDnvocation of such a conference "naturally depends on
whether such a conference holds any prospects for reducing or
even removing the differences of opinion," and therefore "the
parties must clarify their positions by mutual consultations."
October 28 - North Korean Party daily Nodong Sinmun features a
-word ea' or a eaded "Let Us Defend the Socialist Camp,"
which comprehensively presents the North Korean views on the
conflict: -- essentially the Chinese position, somewhat tailored
to represent a smaller nation. It exhorts all Communists not
to be a part of any Soviet move to isolate the Chinese, defends
the Chinese side of the main issues, and ends by calling on all
to "revolutionize and unite," -- and to isolate all revisionists!
1 (#16 Chronology Continued)
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October 30 - Indonesian CP organ Haria Itakjnt,,in an editorial
suppor ing Sukarno 'S 'oufh Oath may speech- concludes in tune
with the C P: "It is no longer necessary to explain why a revo-
lutionary line can strengthen the, canse of Asia, Africa and
Latin America and boost the emerging forces, because through,
such a zLevQlutionary line all the anti-imperialist forces can be
organized and deal heavy blows to imperialism."
October 30 - West German daily Frankfurter Allgemeine carries a
sprom its Moscow correspondent repor ng unconfirmed
rumors" that the Kremlin had received a Chinese invitation to
resume their bilateral discussions in Peking. (To date, we have
seen no other report of such a development.)
October 31 - The Soviet Congress of the All-Union Central Council
o ra a J'nions m-e ng in Moscow adopts a resolution which
emphasizes that "Soviet trade unions angrily reject the clumsy
and groundless attacks by the CCP leadership on the CPSU, the
Soviet Government and our people."
People's Daily under the headline "Anti-China Outbursts in
the Soviet Press Become More Nasty and Fantastic," devotes an
entire page to extracts from recent Soviet press articles attack-
ing China, announcing that more will appear on the next day.
e
s'r ditorTS note" comments that extracts of earlier attacks had
been printed two months ago. "Since then, instead of exercising
any restraint, the Soviet press has been attacking China in a
more aggressive and disgusting manner.
According to incomplete statistics, attacks on the CCP
between 1 September and 27 October in national newspapers and
Journals alone number 430. The 286 items published between 15
July and 31 August, brings the total to 716, not including Soviet
press reprints of fraternal party attacks on the Cam.
The editor tells his readers that "Their abuses and lies
mount higher and higher.... The language they use becomes still
more foul and scurrilous." They "malign Comrade Mao Tse-tung"
more wantonly than before, lash out at his Marxist-Leninist
theories, China's line for building socialism, and China's for-
eign and domestic policies. Alleging that Chinese statesmen have
a slogan "Down with the whites;" they "even use such names as
'the Peking renegades' and 'wild duelists,' and talk about 'the
conscience of the Peking leaders being like sewage,' etc."
November 1 - People's Daily again publishes extracts from Soviet
attac iks, and prints T~ "fu-_r1-=-e-xr of the 29 September Djakarta
speec y PIUI Chairman Aidit (Chrono, September 29).
November 2 - Peking press publishes a 10,000-word People's Daily
editor Jaenti a "The Truth About How the Leaders o e
10, aIve A3lied Themselves with India Against china,," replying y ng to the
Sept em er rav a e or a I "A Serious Hotbed of Tension in
Asia" (publis e y People's Daily on 25 September) and the
21 September Soviet Governmen s a ement on same subject. Within
the framework of a transparently tendentious version of the
"facts" of the elease 19 border uAtlqnlltiQ &1WRia m ,~, 1;~~ fte"
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"the Asian-African countries which maintain strict neutrality")
the Chinese charge that the Soviet leaders (who "ignore the facts'
and who "have degenerated so far as to flout elementary logic")
are "sparing no effcrts to sow discord" and "working even harder
than the U.S. imperialists in supporting the Indian reactionaries:'
What Is their "real aim in conjuring up tension?"'
"To be blunt, the Soviet leaders are doing so because
they want to e - oviet boundary question
to sow ssension a weep na and other Asian-
African coun r es, divert a peop e In Asia and Africa
from e s rugg a against imperialism, and cover up
the U.S. imperialists' aggressive and warlike activities.
This is a betrayal of the anti-imperialist revolutionary
cause of the people of Asia, and, indeed, of the whole
world."
The article includes a 16-point resume of Sino-Soviet exchanges
over the Sino-Indian border conflict; brands Soviet statements as
ludicrous or just "a plain lie"; taunts the Soviets with phrases
such as "munitions merchants" and "running a joint stock company
with the U.S. imperialists"; accuses Soviet leaders of betraying
the Indian people, warning that "this account will be settled
sooner or later',; and finally charges them with using "inter-
national mass organizations" such as the World Congress of Women
in Moscow and the AAPSO conference in Moshi to "try to break up
the anti-imperialist united front."
The editorial concludes:
"It is becoming clearer and clearer that the Soviet
leaders no longer consider the Imperialists ea e y
the United States an he reactionaries o all coun-
tries to a their enemy. is the Marx s - n nists,
he revolutionary people, and China n par cu ar w o
are her enemy .. .
"We would like to advise the Soviet leaders not to
rejoice too soon. Revolutionary China can never be
isolated. The more brazenly you collaborate with
all imperialists and reactionaries, the more you
isolate yourselves. China cannot be discredited, for
the truth is on China's side. Your Achilles heel is
your lack of respect for truth. More an 90 percent
of the people of the worTff heed the truth. ... Those
who have no respect for truth will fail in the end."
All Chinese papers also carry an NCNA report on increased
Soviet economic and military support to India in opposition to
China: People's Daily captions this "The More Soviet Aid to
India, t e ore Fran c Its Anti-China Campaign."
A Yugoslav Tanyug report from Peking on "the appearance of
this est extremely bitter anti-Soviet document" says that
"?eking observers" have given it special attention as "one of
the severest attacks against the Soviet leadershi ." Tanyu
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"It is held to have two main aims: on the domestic
? scene to further anti-Soviet activity in a matter
which touches national sentiment; on the foreign
scene, a fresh effort to discredit the Soviet Union
among the newsy liberated, underdeveloped, and still
unliberated countries."
Tass reports from Bogota that the 29th plenary meeting of
the Co om ian C? "uraanimousiy -adopted a resolution condemning
the splitting activities of the CCP leaders," which "have
nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism."
NCNA reports from Rangoon that "Burmese public leaders in
their statements today s eirnly denounce the Indian overnment's
rejection
of a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary
question.,, were: "Secretary General of the Burma
National United Front Bo Mya Thwar"; "Member of the Politburo of
the Burma United Workers Party U Ba Hla Aung"; and "Member of the
Executive Committee of the All-Burma World Peace Committee
U Aing Ze."
November 3 - Pravda carries an article by Portuguese C? Secretary
ienerai Alvaro n al pegged to the SovietRevolution anniversary
wTh c escribes the "surprise and indignation" among Communists
of all countries at the "anti-Soviet campaign... supported by the
CC-0 leaders." However, he optimistically believes that the
friendship of the fraternal peoples will be unbreakable.
The Chinese press carries an NCNA report from Brussels that
"the Belgian Communists who uphold Marxism-Leninism Piave published
a sem -mon y, a eop e s oice, 77 Two i ssues were put out in
October.
November 4 - The Rumanian Party daily organ Scinteia publishes
an article by RumanI.in_Louncil of Ministers Chairman and Polit-
buro member Maurer (article also appeared more or less simultane-
ously in the October issue of theoretical journal Lupta de Clasa
and the November issue of Problems of Peace and Soc a sm World
Marxist Review) devoted to t e 3r anniversary of the Moscow
el-party con erence which condemns polemical attacks, insults,
and distortion of positions, and the imposition of the line or
decisions of one party on others. Maurer goes on to state that
the Rumanian party welcomes the CPSU's earlier proposal for
cessation of polemics and "supports persistent, patient work to
create the conditions for holding a new conference of Communis
_,7_ Fot t
and workers pa, ;; es si r_a a ex3:ing di_ f'e:8&ence '
of views
can be discussed among the leaderships of the parties."
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1ovenpbe - A Pravda article on the 46th anniversary by American
Lommuun. , s,enry " inston (a Negro) condemns those in Peking o
are try-Ing to speak on behalf of the 'colored peoples,"' of the
world, who '{undeistand that such an approach by the Chinese
leaders, Which smells of 'racism from a long way off, is the purest
demagogery intended t o c (i, siTve "the inhabitants of the countries
of Asia, Africa and Latin America." Winston asserts that the
Chinese "will not succeed in deceiving the peoples of the colored
continents," who "have become convinced that it is precisely the
Soviet Union that is the best friend of the oppressed peoples."
November 6 - A North Korean Nodong Sinmun article pegged to the
anniversary a Occ offer- evo u. ion, "Revolutionary Ideas
of October -- Banner; f Struggle for National Independence and
Liberation," emphasizes the role of revolution. "Some people
are spreading an absurd theory that today .. the main task of
the national liberation struggle in colonies has shifted from
a political problem to an economic one.... This will only serve
the neocolonialist policy of the imperialists."
November 7 - The 46th anniversary of the Soviet "October" Revo-
-o-n--rd-celebrated roug ou the Communist world as e
greatest revolution in the history of mankind" (Peking's words),
with the usual meetings, speeches, messages and editorials, The
emphasis was on the positive achievements of the Communist world
flowing from that Revolution, and (with the exception of the
Albanians and, to a much less extent, the North Koreans -- see
below) the great dispute was generally ignored or glossed over.
Even the People's Daily, which naturally introduced the Chinese
revolution as a con nuation of the October Revolution,"
emphasized that the Chinese people "will always remain the most
dependable brothers o t e soviet people. No ma ter what storm
may re in the world and what incident the imperialists and
reactionaries may provoke, they will never hesitate to unite and
fight shoulder to shoulder with the great Soviet people."
Not so with the Albanians, however. Zeri I Popullit's
editorial only paid tribute to the CPSU's achievements when
''led by J. V. Stalin," while it repeats the usual Albanian con-
demnation of "the Khrushchev group" which is attempting "to
darken the name and great work of J. V. Stalin in order to
revise Marxism-Leninism";which "is plunging ever deeper into the
morass of opportunism"; which has betrayed the Soviet people,
etc.; which is "brutally trampling on the revolutionary principles
of the Moscow documents," etc. In North Korea, the Nodong Sinmurx
editorial verged on the polemical as it stressed tha e
triumph of the October Revolution confirmed the complete victory
of Lenin's theory on proletarian revolution and proletarian
dictatorship and announced the final bankruptcy of the oppor-
tunism of the Second International which refused revolution and
preached re orm srn.
In Yugoslavia, the weekly Komunist carries an article
entitled ugo9Tav zeality and CEine policy" in reply to the
26 September Chinese People's Daily/Red Fla"Is Yugoslavia a
Socialist Country?" The nese a acts -on-socialist Yugoslavia,
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i't says, "uncover the untenability, irresponsibility, and harm-
fulness of the methods of Chinese 'polemics,' which even street
brawlers would not deign to employ." The article again makes
much of the fact that the Chinese once recognized Yugoslavia as
socialist and since 1956 .Rave reversed themselves despite Yugo-
slavia's further prcgrsE=c in strengthening socialist relations.
6 (##16 Chronology)
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CHRONOLOGIE -- DISSEPITIONS CGY4IUNISTES
Numero 16 26 octobre - 8 novembre 1963
22 octobre: Le PC japonais, Bans une resolution du plenum du CC sur
La situation presente a les t9ches du parti relatives aux elections
generates" (information non parvenue a temps au tours de la dernibre
edition de la Chronologie), reconnait les repercussions au Japon "des
disputes violentes au sujet des divergences d'opinion sur les princi-
pes fondamentaux du mouvement communiste international", et definit
une lipne "inddpendante", qui se trouve en pleine harmonie avec celle
des Chinois. Faisant appel en faveur "d'une lutte contre le r6vision-
nisme moderne ui est le danger principal ainsi ue la d6claration de
Moscou le soulignait , et en faveur galement dune lutte contre le
dogmatisme moderne, dont le trait est d imposer arbitrairement une
ligne de politique g n rate aux autres partis fraternels , ainsi que
de suivre aveuglement les politiques d'autres partis fraternels", le
PC japonais accuse implieitement de dogmatisme moderne et de"_"revi-
sionnisme moderne le PC de 1'Union Sovi tip et le bloc pro-sovie-
ticlure. (Akahata). (Voir passage "suivre aveuglement les autres par-
tis qui se trouve daps 1'Lditorial du 18 octobre du Nodong Sinmun
et examine plus bas, section 3).
27 octobre: La presse de Pdkin publie en manchette la rdsolution ci-
dessus du PC japonais; nombreuses citations dune attaque contre le
revisionnisme reactionnaire de Tito h Hanoi daps le journal Nhan Dan
(10 octobre ?); et une declaration du 23 octobre de M. H. Williams,
president du Comite national du PC neo-zelandais qui souligne que ce
parti "etait d'avis que toute convocation des partis mondiaux sans
preparation suffisante conformement aux declarations des 81 partis...
serait prematuree, et serait presque certainement sterile".
28 octobre: Le ruotidien du peuple donne de nombreuses citations d'un
article de 20 000 mots du ZIP albanais, attaquant Khrouchtchev, arti-
cle mentionne daps la Chronologie du octobre. (La Pravda du ter no-
vembre parle aver indignation de la reproduction par Pekin de l'atta-
que du ZIP).
Gerhard Eisler, propagandiste important de 1'Allemagne de 1'Est,
president du Comit6 d'Etat de la radio, repond a. la lettre dun au-
diteur qui parle de 1'appel fait par le chef du PC francais Thorez en
faveur dune conference communiste internationale (Chrono, 6 octobre):
en suggerant un ajournement, it declare que la convocation dune telle
conference "depend naturellement du fait de savoir si cette conference
possMde des chances de reduire ou d'eliminer les differences d'opinion",
et par consequent "les partis doivent preciser leurs positions au moyen
de consultations mutuelles".
28 octobre: Le quotidien du PC nord-coreen Nodong Sinmun publie un
dit~ torial de 16 000 mots intitule D fendons le camp socialiste" qui
presente 1'ensemble des vues des Nord-Coreens concernant le conflit:
essentiellement la position de la Chine, quelque peu remaniee pour
representer un petit pays. Elle exhorte taus les counistes de ne
particiier b. aucun mouvement sovietique tendant a isoler les Chinois,
h defendre le point de vue chinois sur les questions principales, et
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termine par un appel h tous de "pratiquer la revolution et s'unir" --
et h isoler taus lee rdvisionnistes!
30 octobre: L'organe du PC indonMsien, Harian Rakjat, dens un edito-
rial approuvant le discours de Soukarno, "Journde, du serment de la
jeunesse", conclut a 1'unisson avec le PC chinois: "I1 West plus nd-
cessaire d'expliquer pourquoi la lime Wvolutionnaire pent renforcer
la cause de l'Asie, de 1'Afrique et de 1'Ammrique Latine, et de ravi-
ver lea forces qui dmergent, car a 1'aide de cette politique r6voluti-
onnaire toutes lee forces anti-impdrialistes peuvent 9tre organisees
et peuvent porter des coups solides a l'imperialisme".
30 octobre: Le quotidien de 1'Allemsgne de 1'Ouest Frankfurter Allge-
meine publie un communique de son correspondant a Moscou mentionnant
"dens curs non confirmees" que le Kremlin a recu 1'invitation des
Chinois de reprendre leurs discussions bilat6rales a Pdkin. (A ce
jour, noun n'avons vu aucun autre communique a ce sujet).
31 octobre: Le Congrbs sovieti ue du CC des Syndicats professionnels
se se rdunissant h Moscou a adopt une resolution qui souligne que "lee
syndicate sovidtiques rejettent avec core lea attaques naladroites
et non fondCes des leaders du PC chinois contre le PC de 1'Union So-
vidtique, contre le gouvernement sovietique et contre notre peuple".
Le'Quotidien du peuple, sous le titre "Les explosions anti-chi--
noises dans la presse sovi6tique deviennent plus udchantes et plus
fantastiques", consacre une page entiere a des passages d'articles
Scents de la presse sovittique attaquant la Chine, et annonce que
d'autres passages seraient public jour suivant. Une "note de
1'editeur" commente que des passages d'attaques faites precederirnent
ont AS publids it y a deux mois. "Depuis lors, an lieu de faire
preuve de moderation la presse sovietique a attaqud la Chine dune
manibre plus agressive et plus d go tante encore".
D'aprbs des statistiques incomplhtes, lee attaques dirigees con-
tre le PC chinois entre le ler septembre et le 27 octobre daps lee
journaux et periodiques seulement se montent a 130. Les 286 articles
puali6s entre le 15 juillet et le 31 aoft ambnent ce total a 716, sans
compter lee reproductions faites par la presse sovidtique des attaques
par lee partis fraternels dirigdes contre le PC chinois.
L'Lditeur dLclare h see lecteurs que "leurs abus et leurs menson-
Ges s'accumulent de plus en plus haul ... Les expressions qu'ils em-
pioient deviennent de plus en plus grossibres". Its "attaquent le
camarade Mao Tse-tung dune manibre plus impudence que par le passe,
s'en prennent . see theories marxistes-1dninistes, a la yolitique
chinoise your construire le socialisme, et aux po__itiques intdrieure
et 6trangbres de'la Chine. Pretendant que lee hommes d'Etat chinois
pr6conisent le slogan "Abet lee Blanca!", ils ont "meme recours a des
expressions teller que 'renQats de Pekin', 'duellistes sauvages', et
parlent de 'la conscience des leaders de Pekin qui est comme un egout',
etc..."
1 novem re: Le Quotidien du peuple publie de nouveau c_es extraits con-
tenant lee attaques sovi tiques et reproduit en entier le texte du dis??
tours fait le 29 septembre a Djakarta par le prdsident du PC indon&-
sien Aidit (Chrono, 29 septeuuore).
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novembre: La presse de Pekin publie un editorial de l0 000 mots
du Cuotidien du peuple intitule "La, vvrite au sujet de la maniere
dont les leaders du PC de 1'ilnion ovi ti ue se soot alli s avec 'In-
de contre la Chine , en r ponse a 1' ditorial du 19 septembre de
ravda P piniere de tension en Asie", (reproduit Bans le Quotidien
du -peuple le 25 septembre), ainsi que la declaration du gouvernement
sovi tique du 21 septembre sur le me`me sujet. Dans le cadre dune
version clairement tendancieuse concernaiit "faits" de la dispute de
frontiere entre 1'Inde et la Chine (faits "respectes" par les pays
afro-asiatiques qui maintiennent une neutralite stricte"), les Chi-
nois accusent les leaders sovietiques (qui "iioreiit les faits" et
qui ont "dLgenere au point de se moquer de la logique e16mentaire"),
ne mena-ent aucun effort pour semer la discorde" et "travaillent avec
-1us d'ardeur rn ie que les imperialistes americains a soutenir les re-
actioniiaires indiens". ~?uel est leer but reel b, chercher a faire dis-
parai"tre la tension?
"Pour titre francs, les leaders sovietiques le font car ils
cherchent exploiter la question de froiUbre sino-sovietique
en rue de seiner la dissen~ tion entre la CYiine et 1es autres pays
alro-as1 ati ues, de tour?le 1.e peuple en Asie et en i ague de
la lutte contre 1'imperialisme, et de cs.cher les activates
agressives et bellidueuses des.imperialistes americains. Ceci
est une trahison de la cause rLvolutionnaire aiiti-imperialists
du peuple de !'Asie, et certainement du monde tout entier".
L'article comporte uii resume en 16--point des Echanges sino-sovi-
etiques au sujet du conf1it de frontiere entre la Chine et 1'Inde;
declare que les declarations des Soviets sont .grotesques ou "de sim-
l4les mensonges"; attaque les Soviets a !'aide de phrases telles que
"marchands de munitions" et "operent une societe par actions co-rairme
avec les imperialistes amLricains"; accuse les leaders sovietiques
de trahir le peuple indien, declarant que "ce compte sera regle tot
ou tard; et finalement les accuse de se servir "des organisations
interiiationales de masse" telles que le Congres mondial des femraes a
lvioscou et celui de irOrganisation de la solidarite des peuples afro-
asiatiques a i'ioshi pour "t&cher de desagreger le front anti-imperia--
liste uni".
L'editorial conclut:
"I1 devient de plus en plus clair que les leaders sovietiques
ne considerent plus en tazt u'ennemis les imp.rialistes avec
les Etats-Unis a leur t to et les r actionnaires de tons Les
pays. Ce sont les marxistes-leninis-es, les peuples revolu-
tionnaires, et la Chine en particulier qui sont leurs ennerais...
"Nous voudrions conseiiler aux leaders sovietiques de ne
)as se~ejouir trop t3t_. La Chine revos.ucionnaire ne pourra
j amais ere isol e. Plus sera impudente vote collaboration
avec les iraperialistes et les reactionnaires et plus vows
vous isolerez vous-me^mes. La Chine ne peut titre discreditee,
car la vErite est du cote de la Chine. Votre talon d'Achilles
est votre marque de respect envers la verit . Plus de 90
Dour-cent des peuples du iioide s'irclinent devant la verite...
Ceux qui n ' ont was de respect pour I n verite subiront un
echec a la fin" .
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Tous les journaux chinois publient egalement un communique de
1'Agence-presse La Chine nouvelle sur l'aceroissement du soutien mi-
litaire et economique sovietique h 1'Inde en opposition a la Chine:
le ^uotidien du peuple le publie sous le titre: "Plus it y a d'aide
sovi tique 'a 1'Inde et plus la campagne anti-chinoise devient force-
nee".
Un communique yougoslave dans le Tanyug emanant de Pekin sur
"l'apparution du dernier document anti-sovietique dune violence ex-
treme" declare que "les observateurs de Pekin" lui ont attribue une
attention speciale en tant que "Tune des attaques les plus violentes
contre les leaders sov16tiques". Le Tanyug poursuit:
"On croit qu'i1 poursuit deux buts principaux: sur la
schne locale, poursuivre 1'activite anti-sovietique dans
one question qui atteint le sentiment national; sur la
sc6ne etranghre, un nouvel effort tendant a discrediter
1'Union Sovietique parmi les pays nouvellement liberes,
sous-developpes et parmi ceun qui ne sont pas encore liberes".
Tass communique de Bogota que le 29e reunion plenibre du PC de
la Co_ornbie "a adopte unanimement une resolution qui condamne les ac-
tivates destructives des leaders du PC chinois", qui "n'ont rien de
common avec le marxisme--1eninisme".
L'Agence-presse Chine nouvelle fait savoir de Rangoon que "les
leaders pubics birmans oat violemment denonce dens leur declaration
d'au~ourd'hui le gouv(irneraent de 1'Inde pour avoir rejete un reglement
pacifique de la question de frontibre sino-indienne". Se trouvaient
mentionnes: "le secretaire-general du Front national uni de la Bir-
manie Bo Mya Thz?iar"; "le membre du Politburo du Parti uni des travail-
leurs de la Birmanie, U Ba Hla Aung"; et "le membre du Comite execu-
tif du Comite pan-birman de la paix, U Aing Ze".
3 novembre: La Pravda publie un article du secretaire-general du PC
portugais Alvaro Cunhal, 'd l'occasion de la r volution sovi tique, qui
d creit 'la surprise et 1'indi3nation" des communistes de tous les pays
au sujet de "la campagne anti-sovietique... conduite par les leaders
du PC chinois". Cependant, it estihie avec optimisme que 1'amitie des
peoples fraternels restera indestructible.
La presse chinoise reproduit un co-unnunique de 1'Agence-presse
"Chide nouvelle" Ganant de Bruxelles selon sequel "les commun.istes
be].ges qui soutiennent le marxiste-1 ninisme pullient un journal a-
raissant deux fois par mois, la 'Voix du people". Deux num6ros ont
paru au mois d'octobre.
4+ novembre: Le quotidien du parti rouraain Scinteia pu11ie un article
du pr sident du Conseil des ministres roumain et membre du Politburo
Maurer (cet article est pare aussi plus ou moms simultaneuent Bans
le numero d'octobre du journal theorique Lupta de C1asa et dans le nu-
rnero de novembre des "ProblUes de la pair et du socialism "I revue
marxiste mondiale) consacr au 3e anniversaire de tta pie Conference
du parti a Moscou, qui condamize les poi miques agressives, les insul-
tes, les defor:iations de positions et 11imposition de la ligne ou des
decisions d'un parti aux autres partis. Maurer va jusqu'a declarer
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que le parti roumain acceuille la proposition faite a une date ante-
rieure par le PC de 1'Union Sovietique de teaser lea polemiques et
it approuve le travail persistant et patient de creer lea conditions
pour organiser une nouvelle conference des partis de travailleurs et
de communistes afin de permettre de discuter des divergences de vues
qui existent entre lea leaders de ces partis."
5 novembre: Un article de Pravda sur le 46e anniversaire par un comp
muniste americain Henry Winston un Nbgre) condamme ceux h Pekin qui
"cherehent h parler au nom des peuples de couleur qui "comprennent
qu'une pareiile attitude des leaders chinois, qui sent le racisme de
loin, eat de la pure demagogie dont le but est de tromper lea habitants
des pays de 1'Asie, de 1'Afrique et de 1'Am6rique Latine". Winston
affirme que lea Chinois "ne parviendront pas a tromper lea peuples des
continents de couleur" qui "sont devenus convaincus que c'est precise-
ment 1'Union Sovietique qui eat le raeilleur ami des peuples amis".
6 novembre: Un article de Nodong Sinmun de la Core du Nord a 6gale-
ment , h 1=occasion du 46e anniversaire de la r volution d octobre,
intitule "Idee revolutionnaire d'octobre -- Banniere de la lute pour
l'independance et la liberation nationales", souligne le rule de la
revolution. "Certaines personnes propagent une theorie absurde selon
laquelle aujourd'hui ... 1'attache principale Bans la lutte de libe-
ration nationale des colonies est passee d'un probleme politique h
un probleme economique... Ceci ne sert qu'aux fins de la politique
neo-colonialiste des imperialistes".
7 novembre: Le 46e anniversaire de la revolution sovietique d'octo'bre
est c 1 bre dans le monde comuniste en tant que la plus grande r vo-
lution dans 1'histoire de 1'homnne" (selon Pekin), avec sea reunions
habituelles, sea discours, sea messages, sea Lditoriaux, L'accent
etait place our lea resultats positifs obtenus dans le monde coniuniste
et emanant de cette revolution et (a l'exception des Albanais et, h
un moindre dere, des Nord-Coreens -- voir ci-dessous) la grande dis-
pute restait en general ignoree ou deguisee. Mme le Quotidien du
peuple, qui evidemment presenta la revolution nationale en tant que
ur"= econtinuation de la revolution d'octobre", souligna que le peuple
chinois "restera toujours le frere le plus fidele du peuple sovique.
Quels que soient lea orages qui puissent clater dans le monde et quels
que soient lea incidents que lea imperialistes reactionnaires puissent
provoquer, it n'hesitera jamais h s'unir et h combattre epaule contre
epaule avec le grand peuple sovietique".
Cependant, it n'en est pas de m6me pour lea Albanais. Zeri i
Popullit, Bans son editorial, ne salue la tache accomplie par le PC
de l'Union Sovietique que lorsqu'elle "se trouvait sous la direction
de J. V. Staline", tout en reptant les accusations habituelles des
Albanais du "groupe derouchtchev" qui cherche "h noircir le nom de
J. V. Staline et le grand travail qu'il a accompli, dans le out de fai-
re reviser le marxisme-1eninisme"; qui "s'enfonce plus profondGment
encore daps le marasme et dans 1'opportunisme"; qui a trahi le peuple
sovietique, etc...; qui "pietine brutalement lea principes revoluti-
onnaires des documents de Moscow", etc. En Core du Nord, 1'editorial
du Nodong Sinmun soulignait sur un ton tie politique que "le triomphe
de la r voles d'octobre confirme la victoire complete de la theorie
de Lenine sur la revolution proletarienne et sur la dictature proleta-
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rie_nne et annonce la banqueroute definitive de 1'opportunisme de la
deu:dhme internationale qui rejeta la revolution et precha le r for-
misme .
En Yougoslavie, l'hebdomadaire "Komunist" publie un article in-
titule "RCalit,6 yougoslave et politique chinoise" en r6ponse h P ar-
ticle du 26 septembre des journaux chinois le Quotidien du peuple
et le Drapeau rouge: "La Yougoslavie est-elle un pays socialiste?"
Les attaques chinooiises dirig6es contre la Yougoslavie socialiste,
declare Particle, "font voir que les methodes de polemique chinoise
sont intenables, irresponsables et nuisibles, et que mAeme les voyous
qui se battent dans les rues ne stabaisseraient pas h les employer".
L'article souligne de nouveau le fait que les Chinois avaient dans
le passe reconnu la Yougoslavie comme pays socialiste et que depuis
1956 its ont adopt6 l'attitude opposee malgr6 les progrbs faits par
la Yougoslavie pour renforcer les relations socialistes.
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CRONOLOGIA - - DISENSIONES COMUNISTAS
No 16
26 Octubre - 8 Noviembre 1963
22 Octubre: El PC japones, en una resolucion del Pleno sobre "La
situacj actual y las taras del partido alrededor de las elecciones"
(recibido demasiado tarde pars la edici6n anterior) reconoce las re-
pereusiones que han tenido en el Jap6n "las amargas disputas sobre
la divergencia de opiniones sobre principios bd.sicos en el movimiento
comunista internacional" y establece una linea "independiente" que
armoniza enteramente con la de los chinos. Demandando la "lucha con-
tra el revisionismo contempordneo, que es el peligro primordial seen
fue apuntado por la declaraci6n de Moscil", y tambi6n la "lucha contra
el dogmatismo contempordneo a tiene la caracterfstica de arbitra-
riamente sentar la 1 nea general de p of tics pars otros partidos fra-
ternos, y tambi n de seguir ciegamente las pol ticas de otros partidos
fraternostt, El PCJ indirectamente reciproca contra el PCUS y el bloque
alineado con los sovi6ticos ponidndoles la etiqueta del "dogmatismo
contempor eo as como del "revisionismo contempordneo". (Akahata)
V.-g. el trozo sobre "seguir ciegamente a otros partidos", en el edi-
torial de 28 de octubre de "Nodong Sinmun", comentado mds abajo, sec-
ci6n 3).
27 Octubre: La prensa de Pekin destaca la referida resolucion del
PCJ; extensos trozos de un ataque contra los revisionistas reaccio-
narios titistas en el 6rgano "Khan Dan" de Hanoi (10 de octubre?);
y una declaraci6n emitida el 23 de octubre por M. H. Williams, pre-
sidente del comit6 nacional del PC neozelandds, en el que subraya la
"meditada opini6n't del PCNZ "de que cualquir asamblea de los partidos
del mundo sin preparativos adecuados de conformidad con la declaraci6n
de los 81 partidos ... seria prematura y casi seguramente se malograrfa".
28 Octubre: El "Diario del Pueblo" utiliza extensos trozos del ataque
en 20.000 palabras del "Zeri I Popullit" albanes contra Kruschev, des-
crito en la Cronologfa de 4 de octubre. Pravda" el 10 de noviembre
imforma indignado la publicacibn en Pekin del referido ataque).
El principal propagandista germanoriental Gerhard Eisler, presi-
dente del Comit6 Estatal de Radio, contesta la carta de un radioyente
que se refiere al ilamado emitido por el cabecilla Thorez del PC fran-
c6s porque se ceIebre una conferencia comunista internacional (Crono-
logfa, 6 Octubre): sugiriendo una posposici6n, declara que la convo-
cac16n a una conferencia "naturalmente depende de si tal conferencia
ofrece perspectival de reducir o aun eliminar las diferencias de
opini6n", y por tanto "los partidos deberan esclarecer sus puntos de
vista en consultas mutuas".
28 Octubre: El 6rgano "Nodong Sinmun" de partido norcoreano destaca
un editorial de 16.000 palabras titulado "Defendamos el campo socia-
lista", en el que presenta inclusivamente las opiniones norcoreanas
sobre el conflicto -- esencialmente las opiniones de los chinos, adap-
tadas hasta cierto punto para cenirlas a una naci6n mds pequefia. Ex-
horta a los comunista a no formar parte de nunguna maniobra para
aislar a los chinos, defiende el lado chino en las cuestiones princi-
pales, y termina llamando a todos "r v o e rt
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30 0 ctubre: El organo "Harian Rakjat" del PC indonesio, en un edito-
rial en apoyo del discurso de Sukarno sobre el dam' is del juramento
juvenil", concluye en armonia con el PC chino: "Ya no es preciso
explicar por qu6 una Linea revolucionaria puede fortalecer la causa
de Asia, Africa y Latinoam6rica y dar impetu a Las fuerzas emergentes,
ya que a trav6s de tal Linea revolucionaria todas las fuerzas antim-
perialistas se pueden organizar y propinar fuertas golpes al imperi-
al.ismo .
30 Octubre: El diario germanoccidental "Frankfurter Allgemeine" pu-
blicsun despacho en el cual su corresponsal en Moscs informa "rumores
sin confirmaci6n" de que el Kremlin ha recibido invitaci6n de los
chinos en el sentido de reanudar sus conversaciones bilaterales en
Pekin. (Hasta la fecha no hemos visto ningdn otro informe de tal
cosa).
31 0ctubre: El Congreso del Consejo Central de Sindicatos de toda
la Uni Sovidtica reunido en asamblea en Mosed adopta una resoluti6n
que subraya que "los sindicatos sovidticos airadamente rechazan los
burdos e infundados ataques de los dirigentes del PC chino contra el
PCUS, el Gobierno sovi6tico y nuestro pueblo".
El "Diario del Pueblo", bajo el titular de "Los exabruptos anti-
chinos de la prensa sovi6tica se tornan mds asquerosos y fant6sticos",
dedica una Plana Integra a trozos tomados de articulos de prensa so-
v16ticos atacando a China, anunciando que otros aparecer6n al dia si-
guiente. La "nota del editor" comenta que extractos de ataques ante-
riores habfan sido publicados hace dos meces. "Desde entonces, en
lugar de ejercer algdn comedimiento, la prensa sovi6tica ha estado
atacando a China de una manera mAs agresiva y as uerosa .
De acuerdo con datos estadisticos incompletos, los ataques contra
el PC chino entre 10 de septiembre y 27 de octubre en diarios y otra
prensa nacional por.si solos ascienden a 430. Los 286 publicados en-
tre 15 de Julio y 31 de agosto llevan el total a 716, sin incluir los
reproducidos en la prensa sovi6tica de los partidos fraternos contra
el PC chino.
El editor informa a sus lectores que "sus abusos y mentiras se
acumulan mAs y mds ... El lenguaje que emplean se vuelven aun mds
sucio y procaz". "Calumnian al camarada Mao Tse-tung" con mds per-
versidad que antes, dan zarpazos a sus teorfas marxistas-leninistas,
a la Linea china para la construcci6a del socialismo y las pautas
chinas de conducta exterior e interior. Alegando que los estadistas
chinos tienen una consign de "Bajo los blancos", utilizan hasta epf-
tetos como los renegados de Pekin' y 'duelistas salvajes', y hablen
de 'la conciencia de los dirigentes de Pekin como semejante a las
aguas negras', etc."
1? Noviembre: De nuevo publics el "Diario del Pueblo" selecciones
de ataques sovi tiicos e imprime el texto completo del discurso de 29
de septiembre pronunciado en Jakarta por Aidit, presidente del PKI
(Cronologia, 29 septiembre).
2 Noviembre: La prensa de Pekin publica un editorial de 10.000 pala-
bras del Mario del Pueblo", titulado "La verdad de c6mo los diri-
gentes del PCUS se han aliado con India contra China en contestaci6n
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al editorial de "Pravda" de 19 de septiembre titulado "Grave semil-
lero de teesi6n en Asia" (publicado por el "Diario del Pueblo" el
25 de septiembre) y la declaraci6n del gobierno sovi6tico de 21 de
septiembre sobre el mismo tema. Dentro del marco de la versi6n
nitidamente tendenciosa de log "hechos" de la querella fronteriza
entre India y China (hechos "respetadoe" por "log passes afroasiati-
cos que mantienen estricta neutralidad") log dirigentes chinos acu-
san a log dirigentes sovidticos (que "hacen caso omiso de log hechos"
y que "tanto se han degenerado que se burlan de la 16gica elemental")
de "no economizar esfuerzos por sembrar la discordia" y "esforzarse
sun mds que los imperialistas norteamericanos en apoyo de log reac-
cionarios indios".
LCudl es su "verdadero prop6sito al concitar la tensi6n?"
"Para hablar can franqueza: log dirigentes sovi6ticos lo
estdn haciendo porque quie~explotar la cuesti fronteriza
Para sembrar is disension entre China otros alses afro
ass t cos, des ar al pueblo de Asia y Africa de la lucha
contra el imperialismo y encubrir las actividades agresivas
y belicistas de log imperialistas norteamericanos. Esto
constituye traici6n a la cause revolucionaria y antimperia-
lista del pueblo de Asia y, de hecho, de todo el mundo."
El articulo incluye un resumen de 16 puntos de log intercambios
chino-sovi6ticos con motivo del conflicto fronterizo chino-indio; de-
nuncia las declarations sovi6ticas comp ridiculas o "sencillamente
mentiras"; se mofa de log sovi6ticos con frases tales como "merca-
deres de municiones" y "empresarios de una sociedad an6nima con log
imperialistas norteamericanos"; acusa a log dirigentes sovi6ticos
de traicionar al pueblo Indio, advirtiendo que "dicha cuanta va a
arreglarse tarde o temprano"; y finalmente log acusa de emplear "or-
ganizaciones internacionales de masa" tales como el Congreso Mondial
de Mujeres en Moscd y la conferencia de la OSPAA en Moshi para tratar
de desbaratar el frente unido antimperialista".
Concluye el editorial:
"Se hace cada vez mds claro que log dirigentes sovi6ticos
ya no consideran como su enemigo a log imperialistas enca-
bezados por log Estados Unidos y a log reaccionarios de
todos log passes. Son log marxistas-leninistas, log revo-
lucionarios, y China en particular, log que son su enemigo...
"Quisi6ramos aconsejar a los dirigentes sovi6ticos no re o
cijarse demasiado pronto. China revolucionaria jamds
puede ser aislada. Mientras mds descaradamente colaboren
ustedes con todos log imperialistas y reaccionarios, Canto mds
se aislan a si mismos. China no puede ser desacreditada,
pues la verdad estd de parte de China. El tend6n de A uiles
de ustedes es su falta de respeto por la verdad. s del 90
por ciento de log pueblos de la tierra se atienen a la verdad...
Los que no tiene respeto a la verdad fracasarfn por fin".
Todos log peri6dicos chinos publican tambi6n un informe de la
Agencia Nueva China sobre el incremento en la ayuda econ6mica y mi-
litar sovi6tica a India en oposici6n a China. El "Diario del Pueblo"
lo titula: "Cuanto mayor la ayuda sovi6tica a India, tanto m6s fre-
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nLtica su crpafia anti-China".
El informe de la agencia goslava Tanyug desde Pekin sobre
"la aparici6n de este ditimo documento antisovi6tico, de estremada
amargura", dicen que los "observadores en Pekin" le han prestado
especial atenci6n como "uno de los ataques r6s severos contra los
dirigentes sovi6ticos". Continda Tanyug:
"Se dice que tiene dos fines: en el escenario dom6stico
avanzar la actividad antisovi6tica en una forms que toca
al sentimiento national; en el escenario exterior, un
nuevo esfuerzo por desacreditar a la Uni6n Sovi6tica entre
los passes reci&n libertados, subdesarrollados y todavia
por libertar".
Tass informs desde Bogota que le XXIX Plenaria del PC colombiano
"undn.imememte adopt6 una resoluci6n condenando !as actividades es-
cisionistas de los dirigentes del PC chino", que "nada tienen en co-
radn con el marxismo-leninismo".
La Agencia Nueva China informs desde Rangdn que "dirigentes pdbli-
cos birmanos en sus declaraciones boy severamente condenaron el recha-
zo por parte del Gobierno indio de una soluci6n pacifica Para la
cuesti6n fronteriza china-india". Cita las de "el secretario general
del Frente Unido National de Birmania, Bo Mya Thwar"; el "miembro
del politbur6 del Partido Unido de los Trabajadores de Birmania";
y el "miembro del comit6 ejecutivo del Comit6 pro Paz Mundial de toda
Birmania, U Aing Ze".
3 Noviembre: "Pravda" publics un articulo del secretario general
del PC portugu6s Alvaro Cunhal con motivo del aniversario de la
Revoluci n sovi tica describiendo "la sorpresa e indignaci6n" entre
los co?iunistas de todos los passes ante la "campafla antisovi6tica...
apoyada por los dirigentes del PC chino". Sin embargo, 61 cree con
optimismo que la amistad entre los fraternos ser6, inquebrantable.
La prensa china publics un informe de la Agencia Nueva China
desde Bruselas en el sentido de que "los comunistas belgas que apoyan
el marxismo-leninismo ban publicado un semiinensuario, La Voz del
Pueblo y en octubre publicado dos editions.
4 Noviembre: E1 6rgano "Scinteia" del PC rumano publica un articulo
del presidente del Consejo de ministros rumano y miembro del polit-
bur6, Maurer (el articulo aparec16 m6.s o menos simult9neamente en el
ndmero de octubre del 6rgano te6rico "Lupta de Clasa" y el numero de
noviembre de "Problemas de la Paz y el Socialismo", la "Revista Nnm-
dial Marxista") dedicado al tercer aniversario de la conferencia de
81 partidos celebrada en Moscd, condenando los ataques- pol6raicos, in-
sultos y tergiversaci6n de opiniones y la imposici6n de las decisiones
de un partido sobre los dem6.s. 1viaurer declara a continuaci6n que el
partido rumano ve con agrado la propuesta anterior del PCUS por el
cese de las pol6micas y "apoya el trabajo paciente y persistente or
crear las condiciones pars la celebraci6n de una nueva conferencia
de partidos comunistas y obreros para que puedan ser debatidas las
actuales divergencias de opini6n entre las dirigencias de los parti-
dos".
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S Noviembre: Un articulo en "Pravda" sobre el 46? aniversario escri-
to por el comunista norteamericano Henry Winston (un negro) condena
a los que en Pek est tratando de hablar a nombre de los 'pueblos
de color'" del mundo, que "entienden que tal punto de vista de los
dirigentes chinos, que huele a racismo a gran distancia, es is. mds
Pura demagogia can intenc ion de engarlaar a los habitantes de Asia,
Africa y Am6rica Latina". Declara Winston que los chinos "no consegui-
r6n engaBar a los pueblos de los continentes de color", que "se ban
convencido que la Uni6n Sovi6tica es precisamente is. menor Amiga de
los pueblos oprimidos".
6 Noviembre: Un articulo de "Nodong Sinmun" de Corea del Norte con
motivo del 6? aniversario de la Revoluci6n de Octubre titulado "Ideas
revolucionarias de octubre -- bandera de lucha por la liberaci6n e in-
dependencia nacional", destaca el papel de la revoluci6n. "Algunas
gentes estan difundiendo una absurda teoria de que hoy... la principal
tarea de la lucha por la liberaci6n nacional en las colonial ha pasado
de un problems politico a ser uno econ6mico ... Esto servird solamente
a la politica neocolonialista de los imperialistas".
7 Noviembre: Se celebra el 46? aniversario de la Revoluci6n sovi6tica
de OctubreI Como "la mds grande revoluci n in la historic de la
humaniclad (palabras de Pekin) con las asambleas, discursos, mensajes
y editoriales de costumbre. El 6nfasis recay6 sobre las realizaciones
positivas en el mundo que emanan de dicha Revoluci6n y (excepci6n he-
cha de los albaneses y, a un grado mucho menor, los norcoreanos --
v6ase mAs adelante) la gran querella fue generalmente pasada por alto
completa o parcialmente. Hasta el "Diario del Pueblo", que por su-
puesto present6 la revoluci6n china como "continuaci6n de la Revolu?.
ci6n de Octubre", recalc6 que el pueblo chino permanecer6 como el
amigo mAs digno de confianza del pueblo sovi tiro. No imports qu6
tormenta se desencadene ni qu incidents puedan provocar los imperia-
listas y reaccionarios, nunca titubear6 en unirse al gran pueblo
sovi6tico y luchar bom:uro a hombro con 6l".
No asi los albaneses. El editorial de "Zeri I Popullit" rindi6
tributo a las realizaciones del PCUS cuando estaba "dirigido por J.
V. Stalin". repitiendo entretanto la acostunforada condena albanesa
del "grupo de Kruschev" que est6 tratando de "oscurecer el nombre y
la gran obra de J. V. Stalin para reviser el marxismo-leninismo";
que "se est6 hundiendo m6s y m6s en el pantano del oportunismo";
que estd brutalmente pisoteando los principios revolucionarios de los
documentos de Mosed", etc. En Cores del Norte, el editorial de
"Nodong Sinmun" se aproxim6 a los pol6mico en su 6nfasis de que "el
triunfo de is. Revoluci6n del Octubre confirm6 is completa victoria
de la teoria de Lenin de is. revoluc16n proletaria y la dictadura del
proletariado y anunci6 la bancarrota definitiva del oportunismo de la
Segunda Internacional que rechaz6 la revoluci6n y predic6 el reformis-
mo .
En Yugoslavia, el semanario "Komunist" publica un articulo
titulado "La Realidad yugoslava y la politica china", replicando al
articulo de 26 septiembre en el "Diario del Pueblo" y "Bandera Rota"
titulado "Es Yugoslavia pals socialista?" Los ataques chinos contra
Yugoslavia socialists, expresa, "desencubren lo insostenible, irres-?
ponsable y darlino de los m6tados de las 'pol6micas' chinas, que ni
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siquiera los pendencieros de calleja no se dignarian emplear".
El articulo otra vez presta gran atenci6n al hecho de que una vez los
chinos reconocieron a Yugoslavia como socialists y desde 1956 se han
renegado a pesar del mayor Progreso de Yugoslavia en el refuerzo de
las relaciones socialistas.
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18 November 1963
711. International Fronts Afflicted by Sino-Soviet Dissensions
25X1C10b
BACKGROUND: Since December, 1962, the Sino-Soviet ideo-
logical a e as erupted openly whenever the representatives
of Communist front organizations have gathered. From about
that time until shortly before the announcement of the
US-UK-USSR agreement on a partial nuclear test ban, the Chicoms
had for several months successfully disrupted international
assemblages of established front organizations. With some
initial success, they had also launched a drive to counter
Soviet influence in the underdeveloped world through the ex-
ploitation of established groups and attempts at establishing
new Chicom-dominated front organizations. The Soviets were
clearly unprepared at first to cope with the Chicom methods of
competing for leadership of the fronts.
Soviet strategy vis-a-vis the Chicom offensive in the
fronts shifted into high gear after the massive acrimonious
attacks from the Chicoms at and after the Fifth World Congress
of Women (WIDE, Moscow; 24-29 June). Apparently anticipating
that Chicom reaction to the test ban treaty would intensify
quarreling within the fronts, the CPSU's "Open Letter" (14 July)
to the Chicoms denounced the latter's disruptive tactics in
the "international democratic organizations" from the time of
the WFTU General Council meeting in Peking in June, 1960 up
to the June WIDF Congress. International front gatherings
s i n c e the publication of the "Open Letter" suggest that
within the existing fronts the Soviets have regained the
initiative and are outmaneuvering the Chicoms with a consider-
able measure of tactical success. For the moment the Chicomst
position is further isolated because the momentum in their
campaign for the take-over of existing Afro-Asian fronts or
the creation of additional competitive ones has apparently
slackened. In carrying the dissension into the fronts the
Chicoms have exposed, of necessity or by design, more clearly
than Tito did in 1949, these front organizations as Soviet-
controlled propaganda organizations in which polycentric ideo-
logical diversity cannot be tolerated.
Because the fronts, including and particularly AAPSO and
its offshoots, have become fully drawn into the Sino-Soviet
conflict, they have been seriously hampered for months in
carrying off the mission for which they were conceived: to
"front" for the World Communist Movement (WCM), as represented
by Communist Parties, in winning over to a variety of propa-
ganda causes the masses of workers, women, youth and students,
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scientists, "peace seekers," etc. Indeed, there is now suffi-
cient evidence that at least since the beginning of the year
the exploiting of neutrals, various shades of leftists, paci=
fists, fence-sitters, intellectuals and all the rest who are
susceptible to Communist blandishments, particularly in the
underdeveloped world areas, has per force been relegated to
secondary priority. This is not to mean that the fronts have
abandoned their basic missions -- not at all. The Sino-Soviet
conflict has taken its toll *ithin the fronts and the battle
for their proper Communist orientation has assumed top priority,
absorbing a major por on of the planning, scheming and activi-
ties within both contesting camps. This phenomenon offers great
opportunities for (overt and) covert exploitation.
The Sino-Soviet conflict has a particularly profound
effect on AAPSO and its affiliates. AAPSO's future depends
in large measure on whether the Chicoms are prepared to continue
their attempts to gain influence through this organization or
whether they will prefer to concentrate their efforts on Afro-
Asian conferences and organizations which they sponsor themselves
to the exclusion of the Soviets. In all probability the Chicoms
will continue to seek the second course, but for reasons of
prestige as well as re-insurance it is most improbable that
they will abandon AAPSO altogether. In any event, AAPSO's
image has not been enhanced by the exposure of its Communist
exploitation and its display of lack of solidarity. /Yee
unclassified attachment for details of front conflict7.
25X1C10b
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10 November 1963
712 AF,1' , cIH. Castro's F i.litary Aid to Algeria Backfires
LACI'P'P'CU~'~f: From the moment Fidel Castro assusaed power
in Cuaa, ilea five yea'. s ago, he has sought to p 2i.ny the role
of s_3iritual leader' of all leftist revolutionary forces in
L .t :n America. At t:~e same time, CKba has not only become the
ba t.a for the training of r^vciutio_,as.y cadres brought in from
other Latin ATaar. scan countries but h:a.s also served as tiha, pc.hnt
of origin for clande vine eipc:Y Cation of small arras, a=u-
n i tion, and e~.piosives to be used in guerrilla oper.ticns else-
where on the continent.
Normally, the country on the receiving end of this type
of export considers such activity an unwarranted inter: i'ence
in is internal of arrs and can be erpe:'I`;"ad t;, take c'ra is
diplomatic action. Tor this and other reasons, all but 5 of
the 21 Amer 4 can republics have in f .,,.--t severed diplomatic re-
lations with Cuba since the end of 1959.
Now, hoviever, Castro has expanded his subversive exports
beyond the 17estern Hemisphere, by shipping tanks and other
material to Algeria and was caught in flagrant intervention in
the border dispute between that country and Morocco. Morocco
swiftly retaliated by severing diplomatic relations.
Cuban Military Aid to Algeria.
As early as 13 October, the Cuban ship Aracelio Iglesias
was observed in the port of Havana loading a large quantity of
arms and ammunition covered with sacks of sugar. At the time
it was suspected that the cargo was destined for Algeria. On
14 October, Cuban refugees arriving in Madrid on a special
Cubana flight which traveled via Algiers stated-that their
plane carried cases of munitions which were off-loaded in
Algeria. During the week of 21 October, two Cubana planes car-
ried 170 Cuban military personnel to Algiers. Some of these
were jet pilots, others were ordnance specialists.
By the end of October, three Cuban ships had unloaded
supplies in Algeria, which included at least 20 Soviet tanks
an' unspecified quantities of rifles, machine guns, field guns,
bazookas, mortars and ammunition. In addition to the 179 tech-
nicians mentioned above who arrived by plane, one of the ships,
according to an Associated press despatch dated 31 October,
brought 333 Cuban technicians, who were issued Algerian battle
dress as soon as they left the ship.
Morocco, One of Cuba's Biggest Sugar Importers Severs
Relations. was no surprise, ere ore, that-Moroccan Yor-
ei n 11 mister, Ahmed Balafrej, announced on 31 October that his
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(712 Cont.) 18 November 1963
country had brolzen off diploiatic relations with Cuba because
"premier Fidel Castro had shipped Soviet arms to Algeria dur-
ing the Algerian-Moroccan border conflict."
Whether he acted on E4oscow's orders or on his own impulse,
Fidel Castro has alienated, politically and psychologically,
one of the best customer's of Cuba's perennially mismanaged
economy. In spite of this, Morocco has not and probably will
not cancel its trade agreement with Cuba. In 1930, with 161,000
metric tons, Morocco ranked third among free world importers of
Cuban sugar. In 1961 and 1932, it moved up to second place.
As of 30 June 1963, Morocco had already imported 120,003 tons,
and there are now indications that it may, during the current
year, import more sugar from Cuba than any other country in the
25X1 C1 Obnon-Communist world.
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1C November 1963
713 A ,FE,WH. Communist China's Trade with Non-Bloc Countries
BACKGROUND: The Chinese Communist attitude toward trade,
particularly wi h non-Communist countries, is first that it
can only be tolerated until internal self-sufficiency can be
achieved, and second, that maximum political and propaganda
capital must be extracted from the conduct of foreign economic
relations. The latter purpose is demonstrated by the CPR's
conduct of trade relations with countries of the Near East,
Africa and South America, where the value of the potential
commercial exchanges does not warrant the degree of formali-
zation (e.g. delegations back and forth, negotiation of terms,
etc.) involved. The prime motive appears to be the expansion
of Chinese influence on a world-wide basis with a concentra-
tion on those countries which have or may be encouraged toward
a pro-Communist or anti-Western bias. Examples are the trade
agreements made with Egypt following the attack on the Suez
Canal and with Cuba when its conflict with the United States
led to the cessation of the sugar-purchase agreement.
In Southeast Asia, Communist China has on several occa-
sions offered to supply newsprint to local newspapers at
considerable reductions in price. After the terms and con-
tracts are arranged and the local newspaper finds itself
dependent on the Chinese Communists for supplies of newsprint,
they also find themselves at the mercy of Red China on the
question of what they do or do not print in their newspapers.
In Africa, China has made trade agreements or arrangements
with Guinea, Mali, Ghana, Morocco and Tunisia. (Offers of
substantial trade and aid to the newly born African na ions
have impressed the representatives of some of them who have
found it difficult to differentiate between Communist China's
political as against its professed humanitarian motives.) In
the Middle East, China has trade agreements with Syria, Iraq,
the Yemen, and in South America with Brazil and Chile. Most
of these arrangements provide for the establishment in the
countries concerned of Chinese personnel as diplomatic offi-
cials, trade representatives or technical experts. When non-
Communist nations establish trade relations, permit the open-
ing of trade agencies and sanction visits from Red China's
trade delegations, these openings are used to engage in
political subversion and to strengthen ties with local Communist
parties and front organizations. In the past, Communist China
has channeled its trade with non-Bloc countries as far as
possible through firms, individuals or agents which were Com-
munist-controlled or pro-Communist; the profits from such
trade agencies were frequently used to finance Peking's
political and subversive activities in the country of the
trading agency.
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(71 Cont.) 1C November 1963
Trade Shift to non-Communist Countries? The Sino-Soviet
dispute has roug about fairly su s an a reductions in
trade between the CPR and the rest of the Communist orbit.
China has subsequently initiated efforts to improve its trading
position with non-Communist countries. In 1962 and 1963 Com-
munist Chinese delegations visited various Japanese and Western
equipment firms; although few contracts have been signed, the
delegations collected technical data and market information
and expanded contacts with Western manufacturers. These dele-
gations have supplemented China's regular sources of technical
and market information but it is questionable whether there
was any urgent need for data. Even in 1957, the CPR began to
make inquiries and solicit offers from non-Bloc suppliers of
machinery and equipment, including exporters of equipment for
complete Plants. Communist China has had the mechanisms to
know about market conditions and technical developments in the
free world to such an extent that its buyers have gained a
reputation for shrewdness, knowledgeability and for driving
a hard bargain.
Against this background, the many shopping delegations
that China has sent to Western Europe and Japan since 1960, in
addition to acquiring useful trade information, appears to be
part of a deliberate Chinese campaign to nurture a climate of
expectation of markets among free world businessmen. A clamor
for Chinese orders will strengthen Peking's bargaining position
when the time comes to negotiate contracts and permit China to
play off one supplier against another. It is also likely that
the Chinese Communists want to encourage Western businessmen to
bring pressure to bear on their own governments to loosen the
restrictions on trade in strategic commodities. Actually, any
sudden growth in orders placed with Western suppliers would
require intense efforts on the part of the Chinese to expand
the production of products for export to the free world. China
would probably find it extremely difficult to market enough
exports to balance any large increase in imports. The ac-
quisition of medium-term credits from Western suppliers would
have to be relied upon but only moderate amounts of such
credits seem likely to be available in the next two or three
years.
Large-scale diversion of Chinese trade from Bloc to non-
Bloc countries would also involve initial costs to the Chinese
in developing new markets for their exports and new sources
for their imports, and in making costly and time-consuming
adjustments to Western specifications for most machinery im-
ports. Such a diversion of trade would also presumably place
restraints on Chinese Communist foreign policy, including sub-
ordination of certain political goals and willingness to supply
technical data to foreign businessmen, to accept non-Bloc
technicians in China and to send her own technicians outside
China for training. The Chinese Communist attitude has been that
only if the need is urgent enough, is it proper as a temporary
expedient to cooperate with the capitalist enemy. (For example,
when the Chinese decided to buy complicated non-Bloc machinery,
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(713 Cont.) 1C November 1963
this decision included the acceptance of technicians -- the use
of technicians was included in the deals for French electric
locomotives, British airplanes, and French textile equipment.)
Status and Prospects of the CPR's foreign trade. The low
level o na s agricultural an industrial production and the
decision to prepay certain obligations to the USSR were the
major factors that caused a decline for the third consecutive
year in the total value of Chinese Communist foreign trade.
Almost all of the 1362 decline was accounted for by decreased
trade with other Communist countries. As the Sino-Soviet rift
developed, China has initiated policies preparing reorientation
of its foreign economic relations. As a result, trade with
non-Communist countries now accounts for about 50 percent of
total foreign trade, whereas in 1959 it accounted for only about
one third of the total. Assuming a continuation of present
Party and State relations between the USSR and Communist China,
dramatic changes in the level, direction and composition of
China's foreign trade are not expected in the next two years,
although the long-term prospect is for a gradual shift of
Communist China's trade away from the USSR and toward non-Bloc
countries.
Chinese Communist Trading Practices. Under these circum-
stances is mpera ve that nation-s-,ms and individuals
acquaint themselves in some detail with Chinese Communist
trading practices to protect their own economic interests but
also to minimize the extent to which Communist China can exploit
commercial and economic contacts to its own political advantage.
In the first place, it should be understood that the Sino-
Soviet rift is the major factor in Communist China's efforts
to seek economic relations with non-Bloc countries, and economic
relations between Communist China and the USSR was one of the
earliest areas of discord in the dispute. It is apparent that
if two Communist countries cannot trade on an amicable and
mutually advantageous basis, it is highly unlikely that a non-
Communist country will achieve a satisfactory trading relation-
ship with them.
Perhaps the outstanding example of the use of trade as
a political weapon is in relations between China and Japan.
Trade between the two countries declined sharply during the
Korean War but thereafter began to increase and by 1057 pro-
duced a useful surplus in China's favor. The trade was fos-
tered by a series of unofficial trade agreements between
Chinese state-trading corporations and groups of Japanese
companies. Prior to the Japanese elections in the spring of
1558, the Chinese Communists conducted an intensified drive
for trade with Japan and a contract was drawn up in Peking for
some $2CO million worth of industrial goods. However, imple-
mentation of the agreement was made subject to official approval
and ratification of the Japanese government, a proviso that
would involve de facto recognition of the Peking regime.
When official Mapanese ratification was not forthcoming, the
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(713 Cont. ) 18 November 1963
Chinese Communists broke all direct trade relations with Japan
and immediately cancelled all outstanding contracts without
notice. Many Japanese firms were left with serious financial
losses by this CPR maneuver.
A large Canadian import firm recently announced that
its interest in trade with Communist countries had virtually
disappeared because conditions of trade were so unsatisfactory.
The firm reported that it had received food shipped in rusty
cans, perfumes with unacceptable fragrances, typewriters with
foreign keys, crooked skis, light fixtures with misfitting
sockets, substandard textile goods and machines with damaged
couplings. It was also reported that Communist pricing prac-
tices were unacceptable. Products were generally priced lower
than those quoted on comparable goods by Western producers in
order to penetrate the market. However, on repeat orders
prices are raised, often without any advance notice to the
importer. Such actions are costly to Western businessmen who
determine their prices on the basis of quotations and who are
obligated to supply goods to their own customers on the basis
of the quotations. The importer in effect finds that he is
paying his customer to buy his goods!
Many international trading firms find that the Chinese
Communist state trading corporations insist on using their
form of contract for both buying and selling. There is a
striking difference between the wording of their contract
forms for purchase and for sale: the former binds the foreign
seller very tightly; the latter is, in effect, little more than
a general statement of intent. Further, changes are made
unilaterally giving maximum protection to the Chinese Communists.
In 1952, traders who held contracts with the Chinese
Communists for the delivery of agricultural produce suffered
another kind of default. After severe crop failures, Commu-
nist China not only failed to make shipments of agricultural
produce on the due date but also ignored requests for informa-
tion regarding shipping dates. Although they finally admitted
that they could not meet the contracts to supply goods, they
refused to say so in writing or to claim force majeure, which
would in turn have allowed many buyers to cance con racts
with their customers with little or no loss. Communist China's
trading partners in this case suffered financial losses simply
because the CPR could not admit that a Communist country had
not met its production quotas.
Communist China's poor record as a trading partner stems
not only from the fact that her trade is conducted, naturally,
from a Communist point of view, but also from the fact that
one of China's valued traditional assets was her large class
of reputable and knowledgable businessmen and merchants. Com-
munist China's own purges destroyed that class and with it
they destroyed much of China's historical capacity and facility
for international trade.
A
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b 18 November 1963
714 NE,W$. Iran's "White Revolution"
25X1 C10
BACKGROUND: Iran's so-called "white revolution," directed
by the ruler of a 2500-year old monarchy who is dedicated to
agricultural and industrial reform, is a modern leap forward
for this feudal society. Contrary to revolutionary patterns
among most underprivileged nations today, this is a revolution-
by-law, conceived by the Shah and implemented by cabinet-level
government officials.
Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi's goal is to pull his four-
teenth century kingdom into a twentieth century world. The
drastic task requires drastic means. /Tee unclassified attach-
ment "Reform Program in Iran" for a description of reform plans
and problems. Also Press Comment 31 October for New York Times
article, magazine section, .ober.7 Rich in unexplored----
resources but suffering from an archaic agricultural and social
structure, Iran could not afford to await gradual enlightenment
and economic stimulus from increasing contacts with the outside
world. The Shah undoubtedly has also recognized that the reign
of the modern monarch is secure only if it rests on a solid
25X1C10b economic base and enjoys broad popular support.
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THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT WITHIN
INTM-NATIONAL Fa=
The Polemic Exchange
LL
Peking's hostile attitude to a nuclear
test ban is the culmination of the generally
negative approach of the Chinese leadership
to problems of the peoples' struggle for dis-
armament and peace.
("Against Falsification")
An editorial article published in Pravda (August 15)
re-
,
portedly based on an issuance ("Against L?alsi3'ication") of the
World Peace Council's Secretariat, traces the intransigence of
the Chicom stand on nuclear testing and on easing international
tensions from 1958. The WPC claims that, "... at the 1962 Con-
gress for General Disarmament and Peace the Chinese delegation
voted ... for the prohibition of nuclear tests ... and on its
return to Peking ... began to decry the results of the Congress."
However, apparently not until the WFFU Conference on the
Common Market (Leipzig, Dec. 14-17, 1962) did the Chicoms refuse
to end an international front meeting without a compromise,
Disagreement over the Soviet handling of its part in the Cuban
crisis and over Soviet policy on the Sino-Indian border dispute
undoubtedly helped provoke the Chicoms to maintain throughout
that conference an all-out attack on the "imperialist" Common
Market. Their "hard line" conflicted with the Soviet position.
The Chicoms replied to the Pravda article of August 15
saying that "... modern revisionists. dare not offend US
imperialism." "It is indeed painful for us to find that the
Secretariat of the WPC under the baton of the modern revision-
ists should have sunk so low as to become an organ propagating
the line of capitulation." - (Speech at 24 August
1963) Since December, 1962 the Chicoms have constantly repeated
that eventual completion of the "socialist revolution" is
threatened while imperialist nations maintain nuclear armaments
and while the proponents of the socialist struggle do not have
a nuclear capability. Hence, nuclear disarmament must be com-
plete; half-way measures preserve the great power monopoly of
nuclear weapons. The Chicoms condemn the Soviet Union's great
power chauvinism for its espousal of "peaceful coexistence" and
its agreement to cease nuclear testing in only three spheres
(air, water, space). Over and over again in 1963 the intensity
of their opposition to these policies has been illustrated,
inter alia, through the medium of the international fronts;
Peaceful coexistence refers to relation-
ship between States with different social
systems, and must not be extended to cover
the relationship between oppressed and
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and oppressor classes. At no time is it
possible for the oppressed nations and
peoples to coexist peacefully with the
imperialists... To ask the oppressed
nations and peoples to coexist peacefully
with imperialism is to force them to give
up their struggle and to keep them for
ever in the position of being oppressed and
enslaved. To tell the oppressed nations
and peoples to coexist peacefully with the
imperialists in order that one can enter
into a compromise of 'co-operation' with
the imperialists is tantamount to sacri-
ficing the fundamental interests of these
countries and peoples and serving the
interests of imperialism...
(WIDF, Fifth World Congress of Women, June, 1963)
This /partial nuclear test ban7 treaty
allows the aggressor the right of massacre
and denies the victims the right of self
defense.
(Ninth World Conference Against Atomic
and Hydrogen Bombs, August 1963)
The Chinese Trade Union Federation called the WFTU Secre-
tary General Saillant's favorable reception of the partial test
ban treaty representative of his personal views rather than of
WFTU. The day after the Chicoms had denounced Saillant's
approval of the treaty, Pravda defended the views he had ex-
pressed.
... Chinese leaders are ready -b sacri-
fice the health of millions of people and
that of generations to come. ...Their sole
concern is to justify the policy of the
Government of the Chinese People's Republic
which is doing everything it can to join in
the nuclear arms race.
("Against Falsification")
The Pravda article quotes the WPC as saying that the
Chicom de ega e s speech at Malmo in March, 1963 (convocation
of WPC Presidential Committee) is sufficient evidence to support
this allegation. Chong Shen-yu spoke of "the right of all States
to possess nuclear weapons and demanded 'action against a monoply
of nuclear weapons."' The Chicom response at Hiroshima was not
a denial. Rather they attacked a Soviet Vice President of the
WPC, a Pravda writer active in the peace movement, and a former
Soviet Secretary in the WPC Secretariat, to whom they attributed
the opinion "that under the threat of destructive thermo-nuclear
war, national liberation movements should not be attempted," and
further stated that
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under the baton of the modern revisionists,
has been giving less and less support to
the national liberation movement, and even
damaging it.
The Chicoms express the belief that liberation of all
national groups suppressed by colonialism or neo-colonialism
must be militantly pursued. They are dissatisfied with the
leadership that the existing fronts are providing, At the
Afro-Asian Lawyers Conference in Conakry (Oct. 15-22, 1962),
the Chicom delegate called to task those who use the "need for
breadth in the composition of the peace movement" as a shield
to hide their neglect of the national liberation movement.
The Soviets suggest that the Chicoms would like to liquidate
the peace movement, unified under the auspices of the VIPC, and
replace it with a "militant worldwide movement for peace on
the basis of the unity and militant spirit of the peoples of
Asia, Africa, and Latin America." That the Chinese want a
militant, anti-imperialist WPC is true. That they will give
up the effort to win European "peace fighters" to their side
is much less clear.
Chicom Tactical Moves in International Front Organizations:
A Bogge - own ens ve, in their a rugg e to wrest rom e
ov e s e r 1ea era p of the international communist move-
ment, the Chicoms are placing emphasis on persuading Asia,
Africa and Latin America to align with them. The Chicoms are
seeking support for their more militant policy lines from, inter
alias the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization
DSO) as well as roug other newly-created an proposed
A o Asian front organizations. To accomplish these aims, the
Chicoms are attempting to bloc the growth of Soviet influence
in the new groups and to make Soviet participation in them
impossible, and also to reduce the Soviets' power in those
groups in which they are already members. Plans conceived more
than three years ago to bring Latin American organizations into
the AAPSO complex now figure prominently in the Sino-Soviet
jockeying for position. The Soviets and Chicoms have hereto-
fore agreed that AAPSO should embrace Latin American groups.
Disagreement on how a 'lines should be implemented and on what
the main themes of this joint effort should be has impeded
actual accomplishment of such a merger. The Soviets have
sought to dominate the "Three Continent" solidarity alliance by
having Latin American organizers come in through the pro-Soviet
YIPC affiliates, whereas the Chicoms insist that the WPC, in
spite of its cooperation with AAPSO since that group's inception,
should not participate in "Three Continent" planning.
Chicom opposition to including the Soviet-dominated WPC
in the "Three Continent" project dates back at least to the
HC's 1961 Disarmament Conference in Stockholm. In February,
1933 at the Third AAPSO Conference in Moshi, Tanganyika --
which proved to be a predominently pro-Chinese affair -- WPC
representatives were not allowed to speak and were excluded
from the"Three Continene'solidarity committee work which pro-
posed that a"Three Continent"peace conference be held in Havana.
3
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appeals with racist overtones vis-a-vis the Africans, playing
themselves up as "dependt.?3le" in contrast to the Soviets whose
basic affinity, they claim, is with the imperialist "whites."
In fact, after the conference, the CPSU Open Letter of 14 July
accused the Chicoms of having stated to Soviet delegates at
Moshi that "whites have no business here."
Meanwhile, in the WPC itself, the Chicoms have withdrawn
their representatives from the secretariat and ceased to render
it financial aid, in reaction to the WPC's outright backing of
the test ban treaty. However, to assure that WPC counter-
measures do not isolate the Chicoms from the Afro-Asian and
Latin American WPC affiliates the Chicoms have persisted in
participating in the WPC's policy making meetings and inter-
national congresses.
Working on Indonesian soil, under the guise of Indonesian
sponsorship, the Chicoms repeated their Moshi performance with
success at the Afro-Asian Journalists Conference (AAJC) in
Djakarta (24 Apr - May) and a the Afro- an Writes Con-
ference (AAWC) in Djakarta/Danpasar, Bali (12-20 July).
ie C,- h representatives of the International Organization
of Journalists (IOJ) and of the Soviet Union were accorded
observer status only, despite their vehement protests. Thus,
with Indonesia playing the willing tool, the Chicoms relegated
the traditional leaders to the role of "outsiders," and limited
the Soviet ability to manipulate the proceedings to fit their
own objectives. Indeed, the conference called into being an
Afro-Asian Journalists' Organization and an Afro-Asian Journal-
ists, ureau, o ase in Indonesia,, which were to work
n epen entl'y of the IOJ. In other words, the Chicoms created
a parallel body and laid the groundwork for splitting of a
Soviet-controlled international front. On this occasion, they
also reiterated plans for a'Three Continent" link-uP of journal-
ists. The AAVTC made little reference in its proceedings to
its AA.?S0 parentage. Communist exploitation of its proceedings
revealed the same pattern as was displayed at the AAJC, with
the same pronounced Chicom slant and the same Indonesian support
for the position of the Chicoms.
The Moshi Conference recommended the convening of an Afro-
Asian trade union conference without specifying where and w
should e held. eanw e, Indonesian trade unions, with
obvious backing of the Chicoms had proposed a similar meeting
in Djakarta from which the Soviets apparently were to be ex-
cluded. But this scheme ran into problems.
The Soviets persuaded the AAPSO Executive Committee meet-
ing in Nicosia (9-12 September) to call for the holding of an
Afro-Asian trade union conference in Africa under the sponsor-
ship of the AAPSO Permanent Secretariat. The Indonesians and
Chicoms were opposed to this decision, declaring that they
would not feel bound by it. After long hesitation, the
Indonesians, under pressure from the Soviet Government and trade
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 un4K0V. R.HJ?,le1?e4d9 9/ff2 n gg AtfpP'7unal~Cgnec~'QO overnments
and trade unions, at the last minute admitted the Soviet trade
unions as co-sponsors of the preliminary Afro-Asian Labor
Confer-3-ace (AALC). The invitation extended to the Soviets for
the Djakarta conference reportedly was based on conditions that
AAPSO abandon its plan adopted at Nicosia and that the ''; U
cease its opposition to the Djakarta Conference. These condi-
tions could hardly be made binding on AA_PSO or WFTU; apparently,
they were a face-saving gesture to the Indonesian sponsoring
unions.
The preliminary AALC, meeting from 20" October to 2 November,
resolved to hold the full conference in Spring of 1963 with the
Soviets as co-sponsors. The meeting announced that delegations
to the full conference will be representatives of labor organi-
zations regardless of their political or religious convictions.
However, participating labor organizations must be against
imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism. All international
organizations which support the aims of the conference will be
allowed to attend.
In the meantime, at the 13th Soviet Trade Union Congress
attended by trade union representatives from some 90 countries,
which opened in Moscow also on 20 October, both W 'U Secretary
General Saillant and Soviet Congress chairman Viktor Grishin
implicitly condemned the Chicom attempts to form separate Afro-
Asian international organizations under Chicom control. Grishin
stated he favored international labor meetings as long as they
were based on the principle of proletarian internationalism
(i.e. based on class rather than race) but he cannot support
such conferences if they are organized on national distinctions
and without the participation of the trade unions of other
(i.e. non-Afro-Asian) countries, the Soviet trade unions and
the WFTU. Grishin added that otherwise such a conference will
only harm the international trade union movement, the interests
of the workers, and the Afro-Asian trade unions themselves.
Although still avidly pursuing their tactics of confronta-
tion with the Soviets the Chicoms have made slow progress in
setting up their rival organizations. In addition to the
establishment of the Afro-Asian Journalists' Organization, they
founded a so-called "Peking Center for the World Federation of
Scientific Workers (W' W)" in September, but its first con erence,
a Symposium o beat en ed by Asians, Africans and Latin Ameri-
cans will not be held until August 1964.
Soviet counter-offensive in the fronts. With its control
over the interne onal fronts challenged, t e Soviet Union has
shed the mask which usually hides that control. The USSf has
blatantly exhibited an array of Leninist tricks conceived to
counter Chicom incursions in the fronts and to stave off the
threat of Chicom-sponsored rival fronts.
The Soviet-directed fronts have taken steps which can only
be construed as a direct bid to prevent the Afro-Asian (Latin
American) Solidarity Movement from succumbing to Chicom influence.
5
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have been initiated to asz3rt the WPC's right to wave "the banner
for progressive nuclear cLsarmement" on those continents. In
reaction to the Indonesian proposal to hold an Afro-Asian Labor
Conference, the VI10 assembled its Afro-Asian affiliates at a
conference in Prague (July 27-25, 1963); and the Soviets used
diplomatic pressure vis-a-vis the Indonesian government (Also
see coverage under "Chicom Tactical Moves"). Upon the announce-
ment that Afro-Asian student and youth fronts would be formed,
the WErDY sent a delegation to tour Southeast Asia. Measures
to divert Afro-Asian attention from the "new fronts" have been
undertaken concurrently with moves to mitigate Chicom "splitting
activities" in the established international fronts.
The Soviet leaders in the fronts have resorted to post-
poning conferences to eliminate immediate opportunities for the
Chicoms to flaunt at front conferences their refusal to accept
the current Soviet interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. The
WPC Executive Committee Meeting, which had been scheduled for
Warsaw in June, was suddenly cancelled at the last moment, in
spite of the advanced stage that preparations had reached in
many countries.' Countless other events have been rescheduled
again and again (e.g.: Latin American Youth Conference, planned
for August in Santiago, Chile, postponed according to latest
reporting until March 1964; Women Workers (VIFTU) Conference,
Bucharest, planned well in advance for 14-19 October, etc.).
At those conferences that were held the Chicoms have been
outmaneuvered by the unrestrained use of Soviet power. The
Chicoms have accused the Soviets, not without some justification,
of using vote rigging and "heavy-handed" parliamentary procedures
to silence them at the WIDE Conference in June and at the AE.PSO
Executive Committee Meeting in Nicosia in September. When it
seemed that J'-JSP disagreement over the test ban treaty would
obstruct the convening at Hiroshima (5,7 August) of the Ninth
World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, the WPC
delegation submitted what NCNA (August 6) termed a "scheme ...
to deprive overseas delegates of their status as delegates."
The WPC officials proposed that the International attendees
participate as observers. NCNA pointed out that the TPC state-
ment was issued after the arrival of the Soviet delegation,
whose leader, G. Zhukov, demanded that the international session
of the World Conference not be hold, saying that the Soviet
Union would not participate in a conference in which it was
being tried as an "enemy of the people." NCNA concluded that the
JPC is merely a Soviet "puppet",since (prior to the Soviet
ac?ical Retreat -- after the Chicom exhibition at the
WPC's Executive Committee Meeting in March, the next meeting
had been designated for Warsaw, the first time since 1954
that a Council meeting had not been convened outside the Bloc.
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"United World Conference" get underway ay soon as possible.
Although Coviet efforts to prevent the convening of the inter-
national conference failed, the USSR's representatives did not
hesitate to abandon their earlier stand in order to defend
their position on the test ban treaty against the verbal
barrage of the Chicoms. The final resolutions of the conference
did not mention the treaty. Perhaps, partially in protest
against the expulsion of PNCNA correspondents from Prague (IOJ
Headquarters), the Chicoms boycotted the ICCJ's (International
Committee for Cooperation of Journalists -- an IOJ front)
"luxury" Mediterranean cruise as a further example of Soviet
capitulation to the ways and demands of "imperialism" (the
more important example of such behavior on the Soviet side being
the test ban teeaty). To make this same point they cited the
fact that the conference was to be "concerned only with pro-
fessional matters" and "devoid of political content." Mean-
while, Khrushchev's son-in-law, Izvestiya's editor, A.Ahdzubei,
and other Soviet figures, prominent in the-field of journalism,
took advantage of the Chicoms' absence and attended the session
aboard the Soviet vessel, the Litva.
The most decisive Soviet victory was at the AL'PSO Execu-
tive Committee Meeting, Nicosia, Cyprus (10-12 September). In
the spring at Moshi, the Chicom success seemed to trigger the
formation of a rival set of fronts under Chicom control. How-
ever, intensive Soviet preparations for the Nicosia meeting paved
the way for a successful Soviet come-back and there seems little
doubt that the Soviet line won most effective support. The
Soviet delegation was supported by observers from East Europe
and from international fronts, including the WPC and WIDF.
(TABS reported that the Chinese had tried to prevent these
observers from attending). Although the agenda had included an
item on the association of Latin American countries with AAPSO,
there was,,a conspicuous omission of any reference to the"Three
Continent conference which had recioved the support of the
Moshi Conference. It seems likely that, for the time being,
this project fall victim to the Sino-Soviet rivalry. Nicosia
certainly dimmed Chicom hopes of reading the Soviets out of
the Afro-Asian solidarity movement.
One indication that the Soviets are trying to press home
the advantage gained over the Chicoms at Nicosia is Moscow
Radio's new series of programs in its Arabic service describing
the aims and activities of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity
Committee. Featuring the importance of and more actively
engaging the Soviet affiliates in international organizations'
work may well signify a new trend toward reasserting Soviet
influence in the fronts. The attendance of the many foreign
delegations at the Soviet Trade Union Congress would seem to
point in this direction, especially since the Congress highlight-
ed the Droner arrangements which should govern the convening of
ttooting$ of international organizatcns.
7
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Reform ?rogram In Iran
The Iranian reform program aims to: increase efficiency
and productivity in all fields; break up the archaic agricul-
tural landholdings system; shift to industry some of the four-
fifths of the Iranian population now in agriculture; exploit
natural resources and raise the national literacy levels. To
.ccomplish these fundamental changes in the tradition-bound
social, economic and political life of Iran, attacks are being
made on five important sectors.
Land distribution is the most significant and controversial
of the re o'-".s. mits individual private ownership of land
to one village (defined as a center with less than 5,000 popu-
lation) in a country where nearly 50,000 villages are owned by
approximately 1,000 families. All land in excess of one village
must be either sold to peasants, to the government for resale
to the peasants or leased under specific conditions. Nearly
two-thirds of the 21 million population are peasants who have
traditionally share-cropped the land for one-fifth to four-
fifths of the harvest -- the share depended on whether the land-
lord furnished seed, fertilizer or farm animals.
The new peasant land-owner must join an agricultural co-
operative which will guide and assist him in planning and market-
ing his crops and assume certain of the former landlord's
functions until the small owner is self-sufficient. Lack of
trained personnel to establish the cooperatives and to plan for
current crops may result in a general decline of productivity
for the immediate future. Approximately 2,300 cooperatives have
been formed to date and approximately 10% of the one-owner vil-
lage lands have been redistributed.
?ayment to the landlords is to be completed within ten
years but the peasants are allowed fifteen years to pay off
their mortgages. The financial gap is to be partly overcome
by permitting landlords to buy shares in government owned fac-
tories.
Industrial reform laws of November 1962 provide for public
sale of governmen -owned factories (the proceeds are to support
the land reform program),collective bargaining, and worker
profit-sharing. Since Iran's economy is primarily agricultural,
the industrial program affects far fewer individuals, although
many of these are urban dwellers with greater political leverage
and sophistication.
Electoral reform has three main aims: to reduce tradi-
tions an or an government influence in election supervision;
to establish a modern voter registration system. and to speed
up elections. Charges of election rigging following a 1961 elec-
tion led the Shah to dissolve the Majlis (parliament) and to
rule by decree for 21 years. September 1963 elections of a new
Majlis (which reopened October 6 ) were freer under the new laws
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but not entirely open. Totally without precedent was the
election of eight w o m e n.
The Literacy Corps plan is the least controversial of
the reforms an is generally well received. It proposes to
recruit high school graduates for training and for teaching
peasants in rural areas, under army aegis. The first group
of some 1500 went out to the villages in April, 1963.
Forest Nationalization, a plan approved in January 1963,
is essentially a conserve on measure to protect Iranian for-
ests which have suffered uncontrolled depletion for centuries
and now cover about 12% of the land.
Public approval of the reforms was demonstrated by a
referendum vo a in January w ich gave the program 512
million "aye" votes against some 4,000 "nays." The reforms
were presented as a total package to be accepted or rejected
by public vote. Women were permitted to vote but their votes
were not counted -- a compromise with clerical objections
that votes for women violated Islamic law.
Financing. The general popularity of the reforms does
not assure t eir implementation. Financing such far-reaching
efforts in a country with an average annual family income of
$175 is a staggering problem. The cost of land distribution
alone has been estimated at some 70 billion rials ($930 million).
The factory-share scheme to pay landlords for their former
holdings has not proved popular. Receipts from new peasant
owners are slow and large expenditures are necessary to estab-
lish and equip the farm cooperatives. Iran is turning to all
sources for assistance. The USSR, for instance, granted a
$38.8 million credit and cooperation program -- the first time
any bloc country has done so. US economic assistance to Iran
continues at the rate of about $130 million per year.
Opposition to the reforms comes from several groups. The
ultra-co nsrva~ive Shia Moslems and their mullahs (clergy)fear
the loss of their consider a le power over the poorer class
Persian who will benefit most from the reforms. Their exploi-
tation of religious fanaticism led to violent riots in June
1333, protesting women's suffrage and land reform. Government
security troops forcibly put down the riot. Nearly 200 were
killed and Teheran's bazaar area suffered widespread property
damage. The result was a temporary setback for the reform
program.
Nomadic tribal groups in the southwest, whose range lands
are falling under a an distribution program, are using
guerrilla tactics to resist further encroachment. A govern-
ment order for forced disarmament and the threat of resettle-
ment have brought military clashes. The one million Kurdish
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tribesmen living in Iran are traditionally separatists and
resist central government control. If the Barzani Kurds in
neighboring Iraq obtain greater autonomy in their fight with
Baghdad, the Iranian Kure:-:7 might be encouraged to further as-
sert their independence.
Landlords dispos-es;-P ; of their villages and losing their
feudal pravilees also c..-im that reimbursement for their pro-
perty is insufficient. Tie government counters that the tax
assessment base of the pert three years has been used -- if
the landlords failed to c~.ject to a low tax evalution, they
cannot now object to the use of the same evaluation as a purchase
price.
?olitical opposition centers around the National Front
party, a loose grouping of educated urban dwe ers and tel-
ligentsia who concede the need for reform but object to the
Shah's authoritarian methods. Merchants subject to profit-
sharing plans and city workers who are chronically underemployed
are also drawn into this group. The illegal Tudeh (Communist)
?arty objects to the whole program because its success will de-
prive them of their major exploitable issue. The prospects for
increased living standards, growth of a middle class and the
defeat of illiteracy -- all accomplished under a pro 17estern
monarchy -- threaten nearly every tenet of communism and weaken
its appeal to peoples of underdevloped countries everywhere.
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