BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000200010002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 28, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

01-WEEKLY
PROPAGA.,10A G[IDA,LICE
..... MBER:1ob eL46( CoL y
................................
Central Propaganda Directiv
}Briefly Noted
617The Soviet Foreign Trade and Aid Progzarrt:~'?::~:~
; 618 NE AF, Mild Soviet Reaction to Banning of the
Algerian Communist Party
619 WH, a. Cuba Keeps Fomenting Rebellion in
Western Hemisphere
620EE WE, a. The Sixth East German Communist (SED ~~
Party Congress: International and
National Aspects
'ATTACHMENTS:
USIS Cuban infoguide 63-6 sent to all posts. OUO
(Briefly Noted) Death To the Peacemongers
(617.) Soviet Economic Credits and Grants
(619 WH, a.) Mounting Cuban Subversion in Latin
America 25X1C
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28 January 1963
617. The Soviet Forei n Trade and Aid Pram
B.ACISGTR'OUND?. / Y't: The following section includes, among
other things, explanations of attractions an strengths of Soviet aid,
particularly as viewed by leaders in developing countries. Such explana-
tions are intended to orient our staff employees and, should not be freely
given to assets as propaganda material. However, factual information
in this Background section is unclassified and may be used in propaganda.'/
The Soviet Union began in 1954 to extend aid to underdeveloped (non-
Communist) countries, supposedly to assist them in acquiring capital
cquipment: factories, roads, dams, refineries, and the like. Military
equipment--planes, tanks, torpedo boats, and even rockets--has also
been provided in quantity. It is estimated that by June 1962, $5. 6 bil-
lion in credits and grants had been extended, even though much less had
been used. Bloc trade with these countries in non-capital goods (e. S. ,
raw materials, food, consumer goods) also expanded rapidly. By 1962,
9000 Soviet technicians worked in 25 underdeveloped countries, which
were also sending largo numbers of civilian and military trainees to the
USSR. When Khrushchev speaks of peaceful economic competition, he
means not only a propaganda battle with the US over national economic
growth, but also an economic action struggle for influence in less de-
veloped areas.
VS and Soviet Aid and Trade Compared Fiscal year 1962 US aid
programs u y i9tL-JU June to a e 4i5billion. Virtually all
military aid ($1. 7 billion) and 9/16 of all non-military aid ($1. 9 out of
$3. 4 billion) took the form of free grants, with no repayment expected.
(The largest non-military grants, however, served to help make small
allied countries strong enough economically to support their defense
forces.) Most of this aid has now been delivered. Typically, US aid
programs stress measures which will improve local living standards,
and before the US supports large capital construction projects, careful
surveys are made to ensure that the project will prove economically
sound and useful to the local community. For example, the Alliance for
Progress emphasizes food, housing, education, technical assistance,
and the development of regional trade; the Latin American governments
are expected to make material contributions themselves, to carry out
tax and land reforms and to match economic progress by social progress.
Grants and loans from other developed Free World countries including
Japan now nearly equal US aid. Outside such Western and Japanese
government aid programs, much development work around the world
is based on International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD) loans, or on funds from private sources in the developer' Free
World countries. Western corporations also build local plants, which
tend eventually to come under local ownership. Trade between capital-
ist countries and less-developed countries is multilateral and ow-the
traditional basis of enlightened self-interest: each party exports what
is abundant and cheap and imports what is scarce and dear. Prices
are those prevailing in the world market, and goods are the same as
r} o tlo4r }g '' 2k0R*8'/PV d c1A T @3061 A000200010002-8
i? (617 Continued)
 (60reenI.F)or Release 2QQD/08/2z-?-C'If-PAR-03061A00020001000 Ruary 1963
Except for a few ceremonial gifts (about 5% of total Soviet aid),
all of the Soviet aid program is on a loan basis: Compared with West-
ern loan rates, Soviet interest charges are low, usually 2 1/2. %.
(Rates are 4 to 5% for most US government and IBRD loans. Many
Development Loan Fund loans run at 3 1/2%, with repayment in soft
currency.) On the other hand, repayment is usually expected within
12 years, instead of 20 or 30 years, sc that installments may be larger
at the time when the recipient will have most difficulty in paying. But
it is still hard to say how repayment to the Soviets will wcrk out in
practice, since few of their credits have as yet been repaid./A "credit"
here means an agreement to deliver goods on trust up to a stated value,
with later repayment with interes Indeed it is important to note that
a thjxgh,$3. 6 billion in Soviet non-military credits ha.d been ota?ned by
J;a.ly, 1962, ::a.nly bout 20% of these credits had actually been used. (Mili-
tary credits, which the recipient governments are usually anxious t:
exploit for immediate political purposes, and which can be expended:
on material out of stock or in large scale production, are a different
matter.) While the opening of a credit is under discussion, the Soviets
stress that "no strings are attached" and that the recipients themselves
will choose what they need; the extension of the credit. then follows with
all possible publicity. Later, when unpublicized negotiations begin on
specific projects, the recipients must face the fact that they must make
use of such equipment (often obsolete) as happens to be available in the
USSR, change their plans to suit Soviet engineers, and meet local pro-
duction.,costs. (The Soviets are now beginning to try to help by selling
Soviet exports locally and using the receipts as local contributions. )
Nevertheless, some large Soviet-aided projects have been built. The
Soviets, unlike the US government, encourage recipients--with little
difficulty:-to:undertake overambitious "prestige" projects, even though
these may be doomed to operate at a loss. The impact of Soviet aid is
magnified by their practice of concentrating on a few countries which
are strategically important (e. g. , Afghanistan) or which are fertile
fields for political influence (e. S. , Indonesia).
All Soviet foreign tra(,21e, of course, is monopolized by the Soviet
state and its organs. Here again, general agreements are first announced
with all possible publicity, and the actual purchases worked out later
fall well below the initial figure. Brazilian trade agreements with Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and the USSR for 1960 were carried out only to 55%.
Bloc purchases fluctuate widely from year to year, and O. ) not provide
a, reliable market. There have been reports that some of these pur-
chases have been clumped on world markets, lowering prices in the
smaller country's normal export areas. Soviet exports, like Bloc
goods for internal consumption, are apt to be poor in quality; the range
of choice may be limited, while at the same time models are not stan-
dardized, The procurement of spare parts may also be difficult and
costly; in January 1963, for example, a number of Argentine customers
of the Czech Skoda combine charged that they had lost a billion pesos
on defective equipment and time lost due to lack of parts. But trade
with the Soviets has. the very great advantage of not (in most cases) re-
quiring hard currency. (For an excellent summary of problems in
Soviet trade and aid, including specific examples, see the unclassified
Enclosure to State CW -438, 18 July 22 1962. )
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~~Z (617 Continued)
 (6.plpromff~r Release 2000lO8 061A000200010001h&uary 1963
Attractions of Soviet !id and Trail::. Despite drawbacks, many
leaders in less-,'evelc-ped nations seem to find Soviet offers attractive,
for the following reasons:
a. Loans, unlike grants, do not seem t-,. place the recipient
in the position of receiving charity; no moral obligation appears
to he created, no visiting Congressmen expect to be thanked.
l-,n,l few people believe that US grants are made without ulterior
motives.
b. If the local leadership is resolved to launch large capital
projects, US grants are usually unavailable, and superficially
the choice- appears to be between low-interest Soviet loans and
high-interest western loans. (Closer examination would often
cs how that longer-term western loans would be easier to repay,
especially Development Loan Fund loans.) The countries with
the most potential for Communist subversion are precisely those
which are least attractive to western private lenders.
c. The Soviets, at least in the early stages, seem ready
to extend loans without delays for exasperating surveys and in-
vestigations of usefulne ss, and without paternalistic supervision
of project execution.
d. Many leaders of underdeveloped countries would like
to copy the state planning features of Communist industrialization,
as more applicable to their chnditions than private enterprise,
and they believe that without'heavy industry, they will remain
in a permanent state of back*ar:dness, subject to the economic
control and political influence of imperialist governments.
Their whsle outlook is encumbered with memories of imperial
rule or gunboat diplomacy.
e. If these leaders are aware of the danger of subversion,
they are usually confident of their ability to contain it. And
there are some governments which are as concerned over
American as over Communist influence.
#. Even basically pro-Western leaders find it useful for
negotiation purposes to have m.alternative source of trade and
aid, enabling them, they believe, to play one side off against
the other. Friendly relations with the USSR may also serve
to appease domestic critics.
Objectives of Soviet Trade and Aid. Any estimate of Soviet inten-
tions must be speculative, but these intentions are becoming clearer.
Contrary to initial American beliefs, the main objective does not seem
to have been thee establishment of cover and bases for clandestine opera-
tions. While Communist subversion operations proceed apace through
local Parties and fronts, occasionally supported by Soviets under trade
and aid. cover, Soviet control of these movements could be exercised
even if there were no trade and aid programs. The Soviet campaign
must be seen in broader perspective.
The key issue is the establishment of new patterns. Khrushchev
believes that communism win -eventually prevail throuil ut the world,
not by military conquest, probably not even by mass agitation and pop-
ular revolution, but because communism operates more successfully
as a social and economic system. To him, the development of the
USSR is a practical demonstration of the superiority of communism
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over capitalism. As always with Marxism, there is the paradox that
what is supposed. to be inevitable can only be attained by means of all-
out efforts. In the case of the underdeveloped areas, these efforts aim
at replacing western economic and political ties with a -pattern of Soviet-
style inclu.strizlization, and of trade with the Soviet Bloc. Military aid
spreads Soviet doctrine, tactics, and equipment; the need for parts
for sophisticated arms guarantees that close relations will continue.
The use of loans instead of grants also helps establish a continuing re-
lationship. The seeds are thus planted for eventual Communist rule;
in Cuba, under special forced-draft conditions, the transition has al-
ready been accomplished. Unlike the US, the USSR does not need to
concern itself with social conditions or with making the underdeveloped
economies operate efficiently. "Objectively, " impractical Soviet-aided
projects and bloated arms programs sabotage the recipient economies.
But the habits of "hurrah planning, " Soviet guidance, and bilateral bar-
ter with the Bloc become established.
Other returns from the Soviet aid and trade program include:
a. Prestige for the USSR as a competitor with the US in the
foreign aid field. This helps not only in uncommitted areas, but
also in the competition for leadership in the Communist movement.
The Chinese are hopelessly outclassed, and in the past year have
attempted little.
b. Creation of friction and suspicion between the US and its
allies. The Soviets have pushed hard--though with little success--
tLo sell aid to countries like Greece and Turkey.
c. Encouragement to existing governments in less-developed
areas to adopt a eutral position or to support the Communist line.
d. Some slight impr-,vement in the Soviet standard of living,
especially as regards products such as coffee and cocoa. The
Soviets do not, however, scam to be running their program for
purposes of economic gain,
e. Possible political influence through threats to withdraw
aid. In the past trade or aid has been withdrawn from Australia,
Iran, and Yugoslavia, apparently as a punitive measure. But
there are dangers in this course of action, and it has not been
used until relations were already strained.
Weaknesses in the Soviet Trade and Aid Pronram. There are,
nevert., e,ss,, problems and wed nesses in t h;2 Soviet program, such as:
a. The machine tools and other capital equipment desired
by the underdeveloped nations are also priority articles for th..~
Soviet economy. A leading S_:viet official has complained that
the Bhilai steel plant in India, built with Soviet assistance, could
have been used in the USSR.
b. There appears to be widespread resentment amon the
Soviet people and in the Bloc over the sending of goods needed
at home. Odessa dockworkers reportedly struck in 1961 in pro-
test against shipments of butter to Cuba. Foreign aid means
deprivation, not new jobs, in the USSR. Elsewhere in the Bloc,
and especially to Peking, more aid for uncommitted countries
moans less for "socialist" states.
C. Repayment, in the case of some recipients of Soviet aid,
is problematic. Even though much of the military equipment sent
to Indonesia was at cut-rate prices, repayment is overdue, and it
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(617 Cont. )
 '(4~rvb" F) r Release 20QW08/ 061A00020001000 &uary 1963
is unclear at this writing how it will be made. In some cases,
the USSR has been ready t-? postpone repayment; this may earn
a brief return of g atitucle, but generally, the repayment quos-
tien is likely t^ be a fertile source of friction, especially since
most Soviet projects do not help the recipient to repay. The
Soviets could,take sanctions, such as political pressure and
seizure, to compel payment, but if they cd_o, this will destroy
the reputation for generosity and political disinterestedness
they are trying to create.
d. Debts sometimes give the debtor control over the credi-
tor. The latter, if he does not wish to write off a poor invest-
ment as a dead loss, is led to throw good money after bad, in
the hope of salvaging something. This is more true: where poli-
tical prestige is inv-lvecl than in ordinary business.
e. So far, the political dividends from Soviet aid have been
few. Despite all the aid extended them, Nasser and Q'asim have
persecuted local Communists. Large credits to Syria in 1957-8
produced no re wards. Although $810 million in aid was given
India, Chicom border attacks have ouste Krishna Menon and
pushed India into a more pro-western orientation.
f. Soviet capacities for trade and aid programs may be reach-
ing their limit, to the dissatisfaction of some customers. In 1962,
the v') lume of new credits decreased somewhat, although more
old ones were used. Most large new credit lines were extended
to Cuba, and both Guinea and Egypt went short on oil when tank-
ers were diverted to Cuba.
g. Only about 1/5 of Soviet non-military credits have actu-
ally been used. Thus while Soviet aid, including military, was
nominally $5. 2 billion from 1954 to mid-1961, actual aid was only
$1. 6 billion. This should be compared with western and Japanese
aid ]a-tween 56 and 1958 only of $7. I billion in government loans
and $11. 2 billion in various forms of private loan or investment.
Aside from this, western governments made free, rants of $9.7
billion in the same period, while between 1947 and 1961, the IBRD
lent $5.4 billion. The uselessness of Soviet initial credit figures
as a yardstick of Soviet aid is bound to become more widely known.
h. There seems to be little improvement in the quality of
Soviet Bloc products, or in the reliability of their delivery. Even
where Soviet products themselves are good by rion-Western stand-
ards, they get a bad name from the products and tactics of other
Bloc members, especially China. Formerly, the USSR was a
remote utopia to many, whereas now its crude products can be
seen at first hand.
i. As with the US aid program, frictions arise between Bloc
technicians and local populations. Here again, familiarity is
disillusioning, both for the locals and for the visiting experts.
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 Z8 January 1963
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25X1C10b 618 ME, AF. Mild $ovi4~t Reaction to Banning of the Al er n Communist Part
BAC':,'.CR CUND: On 2 9 November 1962 Premier Ben :3el7.a s government
announc,;u' za a Algerian Communist Party had been b_i_-nned; this followed
repeated warnings by the new Algerian regime that a multiparty system would
not be allowed in Algeria and that the existence only of the National Liberation
Front (FLN), which had so long fought for and won independence, would be
tolerated. The Communist Party, however, was singled out in the Premier's
remark that "We want no parties in Algeria that are run from abroad. "
Soviet reaction to this announcement has been very mild indeed. The
December 7 issue of Pravda, elaborating upon a statement made a few days
before by the Central Committee of the Communist Party, can be described
as feebly plaintive: it argued that the Algerian Communist Party had made
noteworthy contribution to the long struggle against France and had coop-
erated loyally with the FLN during the period of the fighting and after inde-
pendence had been gained; to ban the Party now, it claimed, was both ungrate-
ful and damaging to the unity of "all patriotic forces" in Algeria, implying
that its own peculiar brand of socialism is the program Algeria desires. The
Pravda article pleads that the "unjust measures" against the Algerian Com-
munists sts be revoked. Another Pravda protest was reported by Moscow
Radio on January 22 as expressing a Tim about anti-Communist "repressions"
in North Africa. "Tunisia is not the only state in which anti-Communist
measures are being applied," it noted. "The Algerian Communist Party
has recently been banned and earlier the Communist Parties in Egypt,
Morocco and Iraq were made illegal." The same article, in passing, notes
also that one of the Communist fronts in Iraq /The one less favored by the
USSR! is allowed to. operate and that "mass arrests" of communists are
being carried out in India.
The apparent reluctance to say anything which might really antagonize
Ben Bella indicates that the USSR wishes to continue good relations with the
present Algerian regime. The Pravda article could not resist, however,
taking an implicit dig at those who were forced to sit out a large part of
their exile during the war of independence in French prisons--of whom Ben
Bella was one--by saying "Despite brutal terror and repression, leaders of
the Algerian Communist Party remained on Algerian national territory
during the entire course of the armed struggle." It is also possible that
the Soviets are using this mild support to show their -displeasure with tie
Algerian Communists for not participating, at the 1962 Czechoslovak Party
Congress, in the general condemnation of Albania and of Chinese support
for Albania.
The USSR does not always react to harsh treatment of local Communist
Parties in this velvety manner. Sometimes it defends them, lightly, or
offers condolences. Previous examples of Kremlin reaction to foreign
government actions against local Communists, for example, are:
a) In the Central Committee report to the 21st Congress of the
CPSU on January 27, 1959, Khrushchev condemned attacks
on local Communists in the Middle East, saying that "it is
Approv fipJMe sQ e0 "W { 8 6c1ti 0100 ~Or02 -8o the
(618 AF,NF Continued)
 84Frbl~~&iease 200O(,p8/27 - - 1A0002000100011 ianuary 1963
b) The statement of the Moscow Conference of 81 Communist
Parties in December 1960 expressed "feelings of proletar-
ian solidarity to those who are languishing in prison torture
chambers, the glorious sons and daughters of the working
class and the democrats of the United States, Spain,
Portugal, Japan, West Germany, Greece, Iran, Pakistan,
the UAR,. Jordan, Iraq, Argentina, Paraguay, Dominican
Republic, Mexico, Union of South Africa, Sudan, and other
countries."
Communist Parties outside the Communist Bloc cannot count on CPSU
support in their own struggles against suppression. For example, despite
President Nasser's adamant stand against indigenous Communists, massive
Soviet aid (military, economic, technical) has been pouring into the UAR for
years and still it comes. The Communists in Iraq have their ups and dowrn ;
sometimes they appear to be leading Premier Qasim, sometimes not, but
the Kremlin pursues its own ends, continuing military and economic aid
regardless of the fortunes of the Iraqi Communists. And in Algeria Bloc aid
is being sent to a government which has banned the local Communist organi-
25X1 C10b nation.
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25X1C10b 619 WHq a. Cutka Keeps Fomenting Rebellion in Western Hemisphere
BACKGROUND: On the very day that Khrushchev promised President
Kennedy _e wou withdraw his missiles from Cuba, Havana's radio was
urging the citizens of Venezuela to organize uprisings, revolts, insurrection
and rebellion emulating Cuba's revolution. Since that time Cuba's open
support of terrorist and subversive actions against constituted authority
throughout Latin America has become more blatant and belligerent.
Spokesman Che Guevara. For example, there was the interview Cuba's
guerrilla war are specialist rnesto "Che" Guevara gave to the London Daily
Worker last December (see Press Comment, 11 and 17 December 96Z; Tune,
December 1962). The Communist paper luepenciled Guevara's more
bellicose statements--they didn't jibe with Moscow's "peace" propaganda--but
Guevara's defiant and threatening views got wide attention in Latin America
where there was already evidence that Cuba was busy trying to export revolution.
Guevara claimed: "The Cuban revolution has shown that in conditions of
imperialist domination such as exist in Latin America, there is no solution
but armed struggle. Cuba has shown that small guerrilla groups, well led
and located at key points, can at as a catalyst of the masses, bringing them
into mass struggle. We say that this can be done in a large number of Latin
.me rican countries. "
In another statement suppressed by the Communist editors, Guevara said
that international communism's "most effective form of help" in Latin America
would be the "armed struggle already taking place in a number of Latin
American countries. It He singled out for special praise insurrection in
Venezuela, Guatemala, Paraguay, Colombia., Nicaragua, and Peru.
Comprehensive Militant Pro ram, In direct support of these views, Cuba,
has become a focal point for emisp ere-wide development of the leadership,
training, support, and stimulation of rebellion. Guevara's book on guerrilla
warfare, Latin America's "bible" of rebellion, has been widely distributed;
Havana's athletic meetings, student conferences, etc., attract the Hemisphe.re's
youth and become the training ground for cadre to lead uprisings and conduct
terrorist activities; propaganda and other support materials flow in a steady
stream and there is recent evidence of arms, ammunition and other weapons
being put into the pipeline of subversion in increasing volume. (See unclassified
attachment)
Castro's Position. Premier Castro removed any possible doubt that Cuba
is stimulating rebellious action throughout the Hemisphere in a speech delivered
incongrously, at a Congress of Women of the Americas in Havana., 16 January
1963, "The masses must be to en tote battle, 11 was his succinct declaration
of war. "That is the duty of the leaders and the revolutionary organizations,
To make the masses march, to launch the masses into battle." He hailed tho
examples of Algeria and South Vietnam, adding, '!They have sent the masses
into battle with correct methods, correct tactics: and they have brought the
greatest amount of the massea into the battle.'
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Taking note of the fact that some "harebrained theoreticians" (Soviets ?)
claim Cuba had a "peaceful change from capitalism to socialism," Castro
said "it was a combat transition. " "We do not deny the possibility of peaceful,
transition, but we are still awaiting the first case, " Castro added. "Let the
revolutionary theoreticians preach revolution without fear."
"Objective conditions" for the type of insurrection Cuba advocates, Castro
said, "exist in the majority of the Latin American countries," adding that the
road to revolution "is much easier in many Latin American corntries than it
was in Cuba." Speaking directly to the women at the Congress he said that
they, following the example of Cuban women, "must be revolutionary, " in this
way "defending peace. " He described Cuba's equality and freedom for women,
citing the women who paraded with Cuba's soldiers in the 2 January celebrate v
of the fourth anniversary of the Cuba regime.
Castro's view of "equality and freedom" may not be the example other
Latinos will want their women to emulate because in Cuba women are not
drafted for clerical, health, or social positions in the armed forces but as
combat troops. "Grim-faced women marched down the broad avenue," the
Christian Science Monitor reported 14 January 1963 (see Press Comment,
16 anuary , "burp guns "Ranging from their shoulders. They wore steel
helmets, military pants tucked paratroop-style inside their combat boots."
But this role for women obviously appeals to the Communist Party. As
evidence, the US Communist paper, The Worker, in its 16 December 1962
issue, praised "a 62-year-old grandmother in militia uniform, a pistol at her
side" who patrols the streets in one small Cuban town.
As a sop to the less militant-minded women attending the Congress of
Women, Castro threw in a. few references to health and welfare. Children's
centers and central dining halls (reviving memories of the once widely hailed
but now quietly abandoned communes of Red China) were cited as answers to
the problem of "how to free the women from domestic slavery." Castro
hailed Cuba's medical and nourishment programs for children. "Today, we
can say that not a single child is crippled by poliomyelitis," Castro main-
tained, "every child is guaranteed a quart of milk daily,? he boasted.
Factual reports do not support Castro's claims. A Cuban refugee report,
for example, cites an article by a Communist physician which reveals wide-
spread health problems in Cuba even claiming that Russian-made polio
vaccine, far from eliminating the disease as Castro claimed, actually caused
widespread sickness including permanent paralysis in some cases (see
Press Commettt, 16 January). Reports also maintain there are many cases of
tainted milk. However, there may be some basis for Castro's claim as of
16 January that "every child is guaranteed a quart of milk daily," because in
the ransom paid for the Bay of Pigs prisoners, thousands of pounds of
powdered milk may be included.
Castro also took note of the dispute within the socialist camp but affirmed,
"We are not going to throw fuel on the fire of these disagreements. " He urged
unity but claimed, "We shall exercise our right to think for ourselves." He
demonstrated adherence to the latter course not only in his slap at the
"harebrained" and "long-distance theoreticians telling us what happened here
without having ever come here," but also in his statements, "We do not
believe in the words of Kennedy" and "the crisis of the Caribbean is not
resolved . . . a war was avoided but peace was not won." All of these are
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direct rebuffs of Soviet policy and propaganda lines. Coupled with his avowal
of export of revolution and encouraging rebellion throughout the Hemisphere--
themes more in keeping with the Chinese Communist position--they add up to
a substantial slap in the face for the Soviets. He used this occasion to repeat
his rejection of the Soviet's agreement for on-site inspection of offensive
25X1C10b weapons, saying: "We did not consent to this, nor shall we consent to this.
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 Approved For Release 20O 8/27 : - 61 A000200010002,Vanuary 1963
620 EE, WE, a. The Sixth East German Communist (SED) Party Congress;
Interna l,r.
.,
,7 nr_.t_
na
n
BACKGROUND: Proceedings at the VIth Congress of the Socialist
Unity (Communist Party (SED) meeting in Berlin from 15-21 January 1963
fixed, among other developments, the position of three major issues in
the Communist world, namely: the Sino-Soviet conflict; the Berlin prob-
lem; and Ulbricht's immediate future.
Sino-Soviet Conflict. At the closing session of the SED's 6th Con-
gress, a legates c eere RUSHCHEV and Ulbricht as Communist China's
principal delegate sat with bowed head. While it is not known precisely
why Khrushchev chose to lead the Soviet delegation personally, it may
have been his determination to ameliorate the acute differences with the
Chicoms at the highest level, or to attach irrevocable blame for continued
controversy in the Communist world upon the Chinese. The Congress was
a natural meeting ground, permitting private exchanges among the partici-
pants without forcing either to risk an open rebuff to a special proposal for
consultations. The Chicoms, however, did not take the opening to send a
top ranking official; instead they sent Wu Hsiu-chuan, a Central Committee
member who is not even in the large Presidium. Khrushchev, although
speaking in firm terms supporting current Soviet policies, was moderate
and left the door open for rapprochement. He said that
"Differences of opinion can arise... but.. between communist
and worker parties they are merely a temporary episode.. .
one must not be guided by feelings. One must show patience...
"If we have differences of opinion on certain matters, quarrel,
immediately say that the socialist country whose leader does
not agree with us on a certain point is not a socialist country,
then we indulge in the crudest form of subjectivism... it does
not benefit us to emulate the church fathers and to banish and
outlaw anyone from socialism. "
He insisted that the Albanians must "renounce their erroneous views" if
they desired friendship with the fraternal parties, but he appealed to the
Chicoms to postpone their proposals for a conference of Communist Parties,
reasoning that
"there would clearly be little h.)pe of settling present differences
if such a conference were held right now... such a conference.. .
would lead to an aggravation and would entail the danger of a split. "
The Chic em response to Khrushchev's tactical appeal was an un-
compromising c arge t t t e
"fraternal party concerned" had not only failed to respond to
overtures from his party h,~.~
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an international conference essential, " but had followed a
practice "which violates the principles guiding relations among
fraternal countries and fraternal parties. . .with ever more
vigor. "
Among other attacks Wu said with regard to Yugoslavia,
"The modern revisionists represented by the renegades to the
working class, the Tito group of Yugoslavia, have surrendered
to imperialist pressure, are willingly serving imperialism and
are playing a role which the social-democratic parties are
unable to play, that of undermining the international unity of
the working class... "
The delegates' condemnation of Wu's speech was stormy; booing
-made it virtually impossible to hear many of his statements. The Con-
gress chairman at the session, Paul Verner, had to rap for order many
times and at one point called Wu out of order, rebuking him by saying
"We will not permit slanderous and provocative speeches to be
made at this Congress against the Yugoslav League of Communists. "
(applause)
Khrushchev himself, while using careful language, and noting some ideo-
logical differences, called Yugoslavia a Socialist country, thereby form-
ally sponsoring a country which had been excluded from the Communist
camp for some 14 years.
Veljko Vlahovic, addressing the Congress on behalf of the Central
Committee of the Yugoslav League of Communists, was warmly received
in contrast to the antagonistic reception given the Chinese delegate.
Avoiding areas of possible disagreement with the Soviets by limiting
himself to broad statements, the Yugoslav delegate applauded the "rea-
sonable steps taken by the Soviet government to remove the (Cuban) crisis,
attacked "those who irresponsibly attach the label of fear and cowardice
to this policy" and "who are orientated toward a new war, " supported total
disarmament, and affirmed his Party's belief that "peace can be insured
by the consistent application of the principles of peaceful coexistence... "
Khrushchev's treatment of problems faced by Communist Parties
at different stages of building socialism was temperate. Explaining the
Soviet line in t ire posture of an elder assing on the. wisdom of years in
something resembling a last will and testament, he reasoned.
""one must not judge the character of the political order in one
or another socialist country merely on the basis of the tem-
porarily prevailing erroneous opinions of its leaders...
"The countries of the socialist world system are now passing
through different phases in the building of the new society.
They are not alike in every respect... all this affords the
possibility of tackling certain problems in var ing,ways. Even
though this may not be an altogether agreeable aspect, it is a
practical fact and one cannot disregard it:',
a
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( ) January 1963
He singled out the Italian Communists as approaching "the most burning
problems of the day in an active and creative manner."
Soviet and Chinese intensive lobbying among the Asian, African and
Latin Am:_-rican Parties confirmed their entrenched positions more firmly--
the Soviets offering scholarships, economic and technical aid, while the
Chinese proffered advisers for more belligerent forms of revolution. But
reports indicate that most Parties from underdeveloped countries resisted
all overtures to make firm commitments to support either Moscow or
Peking.
Berlin. In what was probably his mildest statement on this perennial
Khrushchev for once made no threats, gave no ultimatums, and
made no new proposals on the Berlin question. He went out of his way to
state that since the erection of the Berlin wall on 13 August 1961 the question
of a German peace treaty had become less acute:
"If we now consider the question from the point of view of the
direct interests of the socialist countries, the conclusion of
a German peace treaty is indeed no longer the problem it was
before protective measures were taken along the GDR and
West Berlin frontiers. "
He was more direct in his reference to the Berlin Wall in his talk to factory
workers in East Berlin (he deliberately absented himself from the Congress
to speak to the workers the day the Chinese delegate spoke), saying
"The imperialists wanted to swallow the GDR (Communist
East Germany) and for that reason tried to make things
economically difficult. The open border to West Berlin
helped them. That was why the sealing of this frontier was
a great victory for you.. "
While Khrushchev's statements on Berlin and a separate Bloc treaty
with East Germany were cautious, there was no implication that he was ac-
commodating the West. At the Congress Khrushchev cited the immense
US military capabilities, noted that an atomic war could be disasterous for
many countries including the US and the USSR, and specifically mentioned
the Soviet Union's giant 100-megaton bomb, which he said they could dare
to use only outside of Europe in view of its vast destructive strength. At
Eisenhuettensta t, he used his address to the :Last German workers to
again stress the military might of the USSR, saying
"The American imperialists know that we withdrew 40 rockets
from Cuba. But we have set up 80, probably even 120 rockets
in other places. "
Ulbricht. If Khrushchev headed the Soviet delegation to the SED
Congress in an attempt to advance the unity of the Communist movement
and reaffirm Soviet hegemony over it, he also went to give public support
to Ulbricht, who was presiding over a partial reorganization of SED organs.
Ulbricht, in his turn, gave full support to Khrushchev's positions. On the
important Berlin problem, for example, Ulbricht said:
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"... liquidation of the remnants of the war by peaceful
settlement of the West Berlin question cannot be done in
one stop but must be brought about in several stages. "
His opening attack on the Chinese Communists, while not mentioning them
by name in his references to the basic dispute, was unmistakable. Quot-
ing from the 1960 Conference (of the 81 Parties) on "avoiding war and main-
taining peaceful coexistence, " he said that those behind the Albanians
had not adhered to it, and praised "the consistent Marxist-Leninist policy
of Comrade Nikita Sergeyewich Khrushchev. " (Applause) But he did
attack China directly for its aggressive action in the Sino-Indian border
conflict, saying
"Unfortunately, neither we no! other governments of
socialist states were consulted or even informed about
the tackling (sic, trns.) of the Indian-Chinese frontier
conflict. We wish the Chinese comrades had adhered
to the agreed policy of peaceful coexistence also in
dealin$1 with frontier questions with India. "
On the domestic scene, significant personnel changes took place
in the higher echelons of the SED, although Ulbricht's public position re-
mained--for the time being- -unimpaired. The changes, which seem to
aim at increasing efficiency and bringing the SED's :organizational struc-
ture closer to the current Soviet pattern, stress the Party's role in the
field of economics, a sector long in need of improvement. These changes
may also pave the way for Ulbricht's eventual departure. There was no
sign of a softening of the regime's harsh economic policies, however,
nor was de-Stalinization paid more than lip service by Ulbricht or his
underlings. The seeds of future conflict on this score thus remain.
Khrushchev told the East German people that increased labor
productivity was the only means of improving their living standard, thus
supporting Ulbricht's new drive to squeeze more work out of the East
German workers for the same pay. He also reproved SED critics of
Ulbricht's agricultural program (thrown backwards by the enforced col-
lectivization of 1960), saying that the East German regime had accom-
plished "the most difficult task"--the collectivization of agriculture.
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/-Cuban Crisis: Background and treatment summary-7
USIA T, News Policy Note No. 2 -63
anuary 1963
Post-missile Cuba
On January 7 the United States and the Soviet Union delivered a joint letter
to U. N. Secretary General U Thant stating (1) that the two governments had not
been able to resolve all problems in connection with the Cuban crisis, but (2)
the degree of understanding reached between them was such that it is not
necessary for this item to occupy further the attention of the Security Council
at this time. "
With the end of the crisis which was first posed by the secret introduction
of Soviet missiles and other offensive weapons, the Cuban situation continues a.s
a hemispheric problem, and the OAS re-emerges as the principal multilateral
forum for handling it.
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 "Approved For Release 2000/08/27 :'CTA-RDP78-03061A000200010002-8
True. London
28 December 1962
LET US make 1963 the year of libera-
tion. Comrades, we have suffered
temporary setbacks in 1962 due to the
machinations of A n g l.o -'American
imperialists and their lackeys Khrush-
chev, Tito and Nehru. But we must
resolve to bury them (none of this bour-
geois cremation) in the New Year and our
revolutionary forces must bring freedom
to all the people of the world except
Chino and Albania which are the only
two free countries.
The enemies of the Chinese revolu-
tion are spreading slanders by accusing
it of being soft on Formosa, Hong Kong
and Macao. Cut the bigger enemies
must 'be tackled before we worry about
these useful colonial outposts.
To achieve this, Chairman Moo and
his wise advisers have made a plan which
will surprise and defeat the enemy
camp. It is all top secret, But it can be
revealed that the first priority would be
given to liberate Europe. Our British
comrades will be glad to know that Calais
is at last going to be restored to them
and taken away from the decadent de
Trite London
4 January 1963
Statement
by, t e office of the Clear; ~ d'Alfaires
ut titc People's Republic of China
On December '_;+, 1062, Tribune, a British
tv eekly, tutblished a forged letter attegcdl`' written by
Chou l:n Iai, Premier of the People's Republic of
China. 'tlte C)tlicc of the (ltar,. d'Aflaires of the
People's Reppuhhc of China in the 1. ailed Kingdom
hereby soIcnully states :.rtt the :,hove-said letter
published in T ri/'une: ,reekiy is an out-anJ-gut forgery
aimed at smearing the policies of the People's Re-
lwhlic of China and defaming the leaders of the
Chinese nation. The Odice of the Chars d'Atiaires
is deeply eonvineed that the mass of British people
will distinguish truth front faischood. Resorting to
this art of forgery and a slaiulerous letter serves only
to show ho)ti' tiespi chic andh:utteless these elements
hostile to the People's Republic of China have Lie-
graded thetnselve,.
)eeentl'er 3 t , 1962.
Gaulle and Thorez. In this glorious task
of liberation we expect all our British
comrades to do their duty, and defend
the most perfect and the most glorious
revolution of China.
The injustice done to the great
German people by those imperialist
hyenas Churchill and Roosevelt must
also be undone, Our beloved comrade,
the Great Stalin, hod meant to do this
but the anti-Party group led by Khrush-
chev and his stooges frustrated him.
Now the time hc.s come to restore the
frontiers of Germany, to give them living
space just 'as we in China most humbly
seek for ourselves.
Comrades, t-me war-monger Nehru
with the support of his American masters
perpetuated a creme against the great
Portuguese people and their wonderful
leader Salazar by capturing Goo for set-
ting up a base against China. From now
on we shall work tirelessly to liberate
Goo and rejoin it with Portugal.
Some cowarc's are afraid of being
blown to bits by the nuclear bombs. This
is on 'anti-Marxist-Leninist view of
history. We preter not to live at all if
we' cannot live under the leadership of
the Communist ?arty and its revolu-
tionary programme. So do not let the
revisionists confuse you. Our slogan
should be "Better dead than not Red".
To educate the great British public,
to create political atmosphere conducive
to the permanent revolution; about which
our great comrace Trotsky talked, we
must go forward to victory. We must
demonstrate on jll conceivable occa-
sions. To do this we require banners and
flags. And for this we must thank the
Movement for China Friendship, the only
genuine public movement in Britain, for
keeping an inexhaustible and compre-
hensive supply of there tools of mass
revolution suitable for all occasions.
Finally, comrades, the capitalists
often interfere with our communications.
To be sure of the ideas of our beloved
leader Chairman Moo keep in constant
touch with the Movement for China
Friendship who con authoritatively'
expound the policies of our great revolu-
tion. Comrades, liberation is coming to
you whether you Ike it or not. So why
not accept it?
Long live the revolution! Long live
Chairman Moo!
Yours ircternolly,
C A 0 -EN LAI
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Total Soviet Economic Credits and Grants Extended
to Less-Developed Countries of the Free Wo.lda
January 1, 1954 - June 30, 1962
Area and Count
Total
Latin America
Argentina
Millions of US Dollars
3,560.1
400. 0
100. 0
300. 0
Middle East 876.9
Iraq - 182. 5
Syrian Arab Republic 150. 5
Turkey 9.6
United Arab Republic (Egypt) 508. 6
Yemen 25.7
Africa 433.7
Ethiopia
Ghana
Guinea
Mali
Somali Republic
Sudan
Tunisia
Asia
101. 8
95.. 4
71.1
55.4
57.2
Z5.0
27.8
Afghanistan
507. 0
Burma
7.1
Cambodia
6.2
Ceylon
30. 0
India
811. 1
Indone sia
368. 5
Nepal
10.4
Pakistan
33.2
Europe
76.0
3.1
Yugoslavia
b
72. 9
A... Not including military credits and grants.
b. NNo includ'n b4~ $281 m'Ilion in credits that were extended
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MOUNTING CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA
Among Cuba's many targets in the Western Hemisphere, the Govern-
ment of Venezuela has long been singled out for particularly vitriolic attacks.
Propaganda and support for the "model" revolutionary zeal of Venezuela's
Communists and Castro sympathizers have been combined with violence in
Venezuela--the pattern of Cuban supported Communist subversion for all of
Latin America.
Communists within Venezuela have not only welcomed aid from out-
side "fraternal comrades, " but have sent letters to other Communist Party
groups soliciting aid--one was published in the official organ of the US Com-
munist Party, The Worker, on 10 April 1962. While we don't know how many
Communist Parties responded, it is certain that Cuba did. In Cuba itself,
for example, an Institute for Cuban-Venezuelan revolutionary solidarity was
established in Havana in October 1962 and a "solidarity week" was observed;
and leaders of Venezuela's Communist Party commute to Cuba for official
encouragement, assistance, and propaganda support for subversive activi-
tie s.
President Betancourt declared war on Cuban/Communist subversive
elements on 16 October 1962. "Irrefutable testimony had been gathered that
the agents of Khrushchev and Fidel Castro are responsible for the murder-
from-behind of uniformed police and members of the armed forces, " he
said, as well as "fomenting and spurring on guerrillas and bandits. "
Cubans Linked with Sabotage
On the very day Khrushchev was telling President Kennedy he would
withdraw Soviet missiles from Cuba, Communists in Venezuela responded
to a Cuban "call-to-arms" by successfully carrying out a sabotage mission
against Venezuela's largest oil fields. They staged another oil field bomb-
ing 16 January. On 9 November 1962, Venezuela laid documentary evidence
before the Organization of American States linking Cuba with the sabotage and
denouncing inflammatory attacks and insurrection instructions being broad-
cast to Venezuelan Communists from a Cuban ship in nearby waters.
Cuban officials responded with effusive praise for Venezuela's rebel-
lious acts. In a speech celebrating the fourth anniversary of the Cuban re-
gime, Premier Fidel Castro declared:
"the Venezuelan people struggled and gave extraordinary
evidence of revolutionary spirit, led by the glorious
Communist Party of Venezuela and by the valiant mili-
tants of the leftist revolutionary movement. The im-
perialists were given evidence /sabotage of the oil
fields]' of what revolutionary solidarity is, and active
solidarity of revolutionaries who do not sit in their
doorways to wait for the corpse of their enemy to pass
by, of revolutionaries who understand that the duty of
all revolutionaries is to create the revolution."
In his "call-to-rebellion" speech of 16 January, Castro repeated praise of
the zeal of the Communist militants in Venezuela. He claimed that "the ex-
ample of the heroic Venezuelan people is, for them (the "imperialists "), a
horrible nightmare. "
Slip f ose s, Cuban Anticipation in Painttn Robbery
The senscloss defiange of authority and terror sm perpetrated by
Cuban and Corn Communist sympathizers which Castro praises is il'lustrated in
Venezuela', it y Y -.av "'" ~~ #
j.antiu raid,n?}~ry, ba a arx~e.d 'V'ene-
zuian'terro3sts shouting Communist slogans rushed into an art museum in
Caracas,, herded a band of 409 school children into 1 gonna r, and escaped
with five French 44r gioniqt paintings, part of an exhibit of 111, 000 Years
of French Painting" on loan to Venezuela from France.. `A young student who
stood in front of one painting and declared, 'r1 -know who you are, and I'm
against you! " was shot and seriously wounded by the terrorists.
In the course of the banditry, the terrorists claimed they wanted to
show France "that the Communist Party is at war with the Venezuelan govern
ment. " They said the paintings would be used "at a political meeting" and
then returned unharmed. A manifesto circulated the following day. by an
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extreme-left group said the robbery was committed "in order to call the
attention of national and international public opinion to what is happening
in our country. " The manifesto left no doubt as to the sympathies of the
terrorists. It attacked the Venezuelan Government for its "anti-national
and pro-imperialist" attitude toward Cuba and concluded by expressing
support for the Cuban regime.
The Cuban regime inadvertently exposed its intimate knowledge of
the'art robbery. Venezuelan police recovere.d the paintings 19 January after
a gun battle with the bandits who were in route to deliver the paintings,
"pursuant to orders from our leaders, " to a member of the Venezuelan Con-
gress. However, two days later--on 21 January--Prensa Latina, the official
Cuban news agency, released a story from Havanasta- tie -,-"When the
famous paintings taken from the fine arts museum were returned t rid o1
Senator Arturo Uslar Pietri . . . " But the terrorists had been intercepted
by the police and did not return the paintings as planned. The Cuban propa-
gandist obviously failed to get the final report and wrote his account from
the original script. The Prensa Latina item reveals that Cuban officials
had intimate details of thetans a the terrorists who stole the paintings,
giving credence to the Venezuelan Government's other charges that the Com-
munist-pro-Castro terrorists are acting under direct orders from the Cuban
regime.
Robbing Banks Follows Stalin Example
In less-metropolitan areas of Venezuela, Communist terrorists are
even bolder. For example, there have been numerous reports of groups armed
with Czech sub-machine guns, attacking rural banks to get money to finance
terrorist and subversive operations. They and their Cuban instructors proved
thus faithful disciples of S t a I i n, who himself made a major contribution
to the theory and techniques of "how to rob a bank for the Party. " While
various biographies disagree on minor details, they record his role in a
June 1907 shoot-em-up raid on some bank messengers in Tiflis which netted
the Party an estimated 250, 000 to 350, 000 rubles. Stalin's band of raiders
was composed of men and women who used bombs to halt the bank messengers
and their armed guards killing or wounding 10 to 50 people in the process.
(Actual returns to the Party were small--the large denomination bills in the
loot were numbered in series making them and the securities and bonds im-_
possible to use inside 1 cassia. An attempt to pass the monty in international
markets led to arrests of several Party members including a future USSR
Foreign Secretary, Maxim Litvinov. )
The constant contact between Cuba and Venezuelan terrorists is re-
vealed further in a police report of 9 January on the arrest of four Commu-
nists as they were maintaining illegal radio contact with Cuba. The Vene-
zuela Interior Ministry announced that messages to Cuba dealt with the pro-
gress of violence and politics in Venezuela. Havana's Prensa Latina duti-
fully reported the news that "a clandestine Communist radio transmitter"
had been located but in contrast to its slip on the Venezuelan painting robbery,
this item was carefully edited to insure no mention of the fact that the clan-
destine transmitter was used for communicating with Cuba.
Cuba's Targets Area-Wide
Cuban involvement in subversive activities in other countries has
also been exposed. To cite but one other example:
Peru. A rising tide of Communist-directed violence in the interior
of Peru has been reported in recent webks. Several people have been killed
and millions of dollars worth of damage inflicted. The tide was climaxed
by the report of Peruvian Government officials on 7 January that a full=blown
Communist plot to take over the country had been discovered. Mass assassina-
tions of go ernrxnent, business and religious leaders coupled with attacks on
defense esta.biishxrxents and coordinated assaults on major industries were
part of the plot, 'Government Minister General Pagadpr Blondet told the press
that reports of the plot reveal it was directed from Havana,
The Peruvian press charged that Cuba was making a special attempt
to incite Peru's youth--many of whom are being invited to Cuba for. expense-
paid visits and training programs--to rebellion, As evidence, pamphlets
addressed to high school students were cited. The pamphlets contain speeches
by Fidel Castro encouraging rebellion and urging Peru's youth to arm them-
selves and act as guerrilla troops. In one of the pamphlets, according to
La Tribune in Lima, Castro is quoted as saying, "the uprising of youth, in
t ie sty'Iethat is practiced in Peru is the luminous tomorrow. "
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Cuba's "Foreign Aid" for the "Needy"
Havana's radio transmitters constantly fill the airwaves with inflarn-
matory appeals encouraging and fomenting insurrection throughout Latin
America, Instructions and further agitation are carried on through wide
distribution of Castro's guidance speeches describing how to be a good revo-
lutionary, "Cho" Guevara's "bible" on guerrilla warfare and other subver-
sive and propaganda materials, some of which are distributed via diploma-
tic channels in those countries still maintaining relations with Cuba.
Training for subversion, financial backing and arms and ammunition for
rebellion, terrorism and sabotage are supplied to the "needy" as Cuba's
special brand of "foreign aid" to Latin America. The tempo of Cuba's "aid"
for revolution, as the cases given above indicate, is steadily increasing.
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