BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050012-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 1998
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: February 12, 1962
• Content Type: PERRPT

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 Apprc
Briefly Noted
Chinese Communists Accused of Exploiting Situation in Ken : Jomo Kenyatta,
o au Mau fame an now President of (Kenya African National Union),
has sent an emissary with a letter of complaint to another point in Africa
(probably Dar Es Salaam in Tanganyika) addressed to Chinese Diplomatic
officials. Kenyatta allegedly says that he has received reports that Kenyan and
other East African students in China are poorly treated, ill-housed, ill-fed,
denied freedom of movement, and that they are taught only ideological subjects
rather than those they had come to mainland China to study. The emissary has
b en instructed, if he does not receive a satisfactory reply from the Chinese
ili.alomats, himself to arrange to proceed to Red China, to observe the situation
and report back to Kenyatta.
On 3 January the Vice-President of another Kenyan political party, KAD?.T
(Kenya African Democratic Union), characterized communism as the "greatest
single threat to an emergent African nation." He also said that the Communists
buy the individual with money and replace all forms of human dignity with the
myth of a Communist God. " He predicted that "once the British forces leave
Kenya we will have the Communist onslaught upon us.... In Kenya," and added,
"that independence for which we fought will be of no use when we are stooges
and quislings to the Communist world. " Specifically, he accused Kenyan
politician Oginga Odinga (as others before him have done), of being the recipient
of large sums of money from the Communist bloc. Communist China has
frequently been named as the donor. Odinga merely denies that he has been
receiving moneys regularly. He admits that he has accepted some money in the
past when it was needed for what he calls "very legitimate purposes. 11
Soviet Scientists Note Failures in USSR Training: Press Comment, 13 February
1962 i reproduced from the Current i est o the Soviet Press 1 Jan 62) a
translation of an article byte noted Soviet physicist, Igor evgenyevich Tamm,
which originally appeared in Izvesti a. It was concerned with finding and training
first-class research scientists. Several features of this article call for attention
In the first place, Tamm indicates that the Soviet Union is not doing a satisfactory
job of finding and training youzgscientists. Instead of inspiring and training your;
scientists, many of the best scientists are isolated in research institutes (i.e. in institutes performing defense research, etc.), while the scientific education
of future physicists and mathematicians is interrupted by (Khrushchev's) require-
meas that they do ordinary production work. (The ideological argument for
menial "productive work," as necessary for- cultivating communist attitudes and
discipline, was repeated on 25 December 1961 by CPSU Secretary flyichev) In
the second place, Tainm's article indicates great respect for western science,
both for individuals like Einstein (who for years was an infidel idealist in Soviet
eyes) and for institutions like MIT and Caltech; he emphasizes the importance
of a scientific project by saying that it was this that he spoke about in the U. S. A.
We can use Tamm's statements to show not onS.y that Soviet education fails to
develop thinking individuals schooled in the humanities (see Guil7.nce #491),
huc also that Communist doctrine interferes with scientific training,, and that
eminent Soviet scientists recognize the strength and vitality of western science.
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T' " " -- Briefly Noted
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490. Khrushchev, The Amateur Agronomist, Issues Orders to Farmers 25X1 C10b
Background: On 5 March Nikita Khrushchev is expected to address the
Centro ommi tee of the CPSU on the shortcomings of Soviet agriculture
and to make proposals for its improvement. The meeting will be the first of
the enlarged 330 member Central Committee named at the 22nd CPSU Congress
last fall. The subject of the March meeting of the Central Committee -
overtly, at any rate - will apparently center on this perennial problem. Since
the 22nd CPSU Congress, Khrushchev has been touring agricultural areas in
the USSR threatening and cajoling farmers in an effort to achieve sorely
needed productivity. He denounced the allegedly outmoded Soviet cropping
system known as the grass field (travopol e) rotation system. Exponents of
this system, he said in Moscow on ecember, become
"like priests who have no proof of God but require people to
believe in his existence. ... Ordinary people on collective
and state farms produce more grain, meat and milk than is
produced by experimental units that follow the prescriptions
of such scientists. Excuse my crudeness, but how can one
help saying 'What the hell do people want with this sort of
science ? "'(Animation in the hall; applause) ... "Scientists
have spoken here. They all listened attentively to the advice
of Academician Lysenko... but among the speakers there were
unfortunate scientists of whom one would like to say: 'Don't
discredit the good name of science; don't put science to shame.
(Applause) "We would like to say to such people: 'How is it
that you, a scientist, a Doctor of Sciences, consider that you
are conducting your business on the basis of scientific data
when you buy fodder for your cattle in the experimental
institute from the State?' Where is the Party's leadership
in agriculture ? For seven years Comrade Zaporozhets, a
Communist, has been the director of this farm" (in Leningrad
Oblast). "I do not know whether such a manager can be
called a Communist. For you, Comrade Zaporozhets, next
year should be your graduation year. Either you retain your
Party ticket or you will have to hand it in and stop considering
yourself a Communist. If you fail to reorganize your t anage-
ment and do not make sure that land is efficiently used, you
will put yourself outside the ranks of the Party. "
The strong emphasis of the Soviet agricultural programs on incorporating
grass in the rotation system as a soil-improving crop follows the teachings
of a Russian soil scientist of Welsh extraction, V. R. Williams, Professor
Williams insisted that, in order to have the best possible effect on the soil and
crop yields, the sod crop must consist of a mixture of legumes (e. g. peas, beans)
and grasses. Where perennial grasses did not grow well, as on sandy soils, it
was recommended that crops such as lupine be grown for green manuring - for
plowing under as a fertilizer. But the efforts of the Soviet government to intro-duce of feAr aa;;dOrf ve encq}}l}~~~ter~be ti f/4.d6I1D(Fage
ddb'' a zcu ura au orxhe s were themselves
490. (Continued)
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490. Cont.) 12 February 1962
often responsible for failures in crop rotation by prescribing crop goals
inconsistent with the observance of the crop rotation cycle, often of 7 to 10 years
duration. Khrushchev has been denouncing those he regards as the wrong kind
of scientists (he admires Lysenko, who is discredited among most Western and
even some Soviet biologists) and has been urging drastic curtailment of the
practice of leaving land fallow to regain essential nutrients and mositure after
it has been planted to crops that deplete these resources. In the short run, this
device may perhaps bring a sharp increase in production and Khrushchev would
then have some fine statistical figure to prove the correctness of his agricultural
theories. However, these results would probably be temporary and might well
have been achieved at the cost of mining the soil and seriously depleting its fer-
tility for the future. Moreover, the Soviet drive to increase the proportion of
livestock that is collectively owned runs counter to the fact that one third of
Soviet livestock is still in private hands and is pastured on the land given over
to grasses. Thus members of collective farms have a vested interest in the
preservation of the grasslands.
At the root of the Soviet farm problem - as elswhere in the Communist
bloc - is the inability to provide the strong incentive for collective and state
farmers that individual farmers have, for instance, in many countries of the
non-Communist world. The typical farmer in the USSR or in any state working
under the Communist system sees no reason to work very hard or to exert the
kind of ingenuity that (to name a few examples) a C znadian or Australian wheat
grower, a New England dairy farmer, the cultivator of a Western European
vineyard, or an Iowa corn grower takes for granded. (If a good local example
is available to any field station or base, it should, of course, be used.) The chronic
shortage of fertilizer is also a constant problem. The result is that the Commu-
nist state is plagued by chronic food problems such as imbalance of the diet
(e. g. the USSR) or caloric deficiency (of which Communist China has for years
been the worst example) while in the free world there is a problem, far easier
to deal with, of food surpluses. There is always a Communist state (again,
for instance, China) desperately anxious to relieve the free world of some of
its food surpluses. 25X1 C1 Ob
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490. (Cont.) 12 February 19'62 25X1 C10b
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490.
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491. Education in the U. S.S. R1.
Back r-und: Recently, the National Science Foundation published
Nicholas a itt's exhaustive 856-page study entitled: "Education and
Professional Employment in the U. S. U.S.S.R. '" (Washington, U. S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1961).
M.r. DeWitt, noting that the Soviets treat education as but another tool
in their pursuit of world-wide power, says:
"Over the last four decades in the Soviet Union neither education
nor research has been an ivory tower, isolated from society. Soviet
education, from preschool to research traiz!~. ~. or advanced ..de grec s,
owes its existence to and sets its goals by the society it is called upon
to serve. It is but a mea is to an end: to rza;".: n.LJe the economic and
political power of the Soviet regime a-.-td to stre,hgther thereby its
international position in the struggle to establish communism through-
out the world........ .
"The development of Soviet education and specialized manpower
resources--should be viewed mainly in the context of total Communist
advances - political, economic, social and cultural......... Soviet
education derives its strength and, by the same token, its weaknesses,
from the fact that it is centrally planned and directed by the state,
which imposes norms of conformity upon the individual... "
The nature of Soviet education is characterized as follows:
"In the Soviet Union a high premium is placed upon technical and
specialized, rather than general, excellence. Science and technology
are particularly recognized as the foundation of national strength, and
consequently they receive emphasis on all levels of the educational
effort.... The quality of Soviet professional training in scientific,
engineering and applied fields today is, on substantial grounds,
comparable to that offered in the West. This is not true, however,
in all fields - especially where political ii.tervention is heavily felt
or where exclusively applied objectives prevail.'"
A major limiting factor in Soviet education, which may prove to be a
serious handicap in the long run, is phrased in the following terns.
s
"Soviet gains in developing speci lized professional manpower,
however, have been made at the exile se of broad. higher educational
opportunities in other areas - the a s, humanities and social
sciences. While the utility of a technical specialist to society is
undeniable, the preparation of the Soviet specialist, with his lack
of humanistic education and disregard for the cultural, ethical and
social valuer, cherished by the Wflest, limits him in participating in
the s lution of the important social and political problems which
divide the Soviet Union and the democratic world today.
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_ _ .. _. _ _ 491. (Continued)
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"In Soviet higher education, the development of professional
competence and technical rationality is divorced, perhaps quite
deliberately, from the a:quisiltlon of broad humanistic values, a
fact which makes the Sov et professional a tool, witting or unwitting,
in serving the aims of the Communist regime. Soviet higher
education succeeds in developing the human mind to the point of
high competence in many areas, but deprives it of its potential to
exercise independent and creative thought in the sphere of social
values. If the aim of education is to develop a creative intellect
critical of society and its values, then Soviet higher education is an
obvious failure. If its aim is to develop applied professional skills
enabling the individual to perform specialized, functional tasks, then
Soviet higher education is unquestionably a success, posing not only
a temporary challenge, but a major threat in the long-run struggle
between democracy and totalitarianism. "
The study reports that the total education base in the Soviet Union is still
far below that of the United States, with the median number of years of
completed schooling put at four in Russia, compared with eleven in the
United States. In 1958 the USSR adopted a much discussed and publicized
School Reform bill in which universal education for children was to be
extended to 10 years. A. short three years later we find that the majority
of Soviet youths will be pressed into the labor force with substantially less
schooling than the standards call for, namely eight years instead of ten.
Further, the number who are now being allowed to proceed into college is
only ten out of every one hundred who enter elementary school. In 1959,
higher education in the Soviet Union (with a population 50 million larger
than that of the United States) had 2,200,000 students, as compared to
3,600,000 in the United States. 25X1 C1 Ob
2
491. (Continued)
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1Z February 1962
492. Khrushchev, Kirov
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Background: Any move to relax long-standing totalitarian controls very
soon raises a problem: where is the new line to be drawn between that which is
permitted and that which is not? Once reform has be gun, it is hard to stop.
History is full of cases in which an absolute leader, by sharing his responsibilities
for the sake of short-term goals, or to meet relatively minor emergencies,
has quickly lost all control of the situation: Charles I found that the Long
Parliament, which he summoned in 1640, was more powerful than he was;
Louis XVI had a similar experience with the Estates General in 1789; and
Napoleon III began to lose control when he adopted (1868) the policy of the
"Liberal Empire. " No doubt Khrushchev, is aware of this danger, as he had
not permittedany real change in the organization of Soviet power; he has not
permitted any real discussion within the CPSU. While intra-party factional
discussion is not the same as discussion between several democratically-based
(i.e., democratically elected) parties, it may well lead to open competition for
political support outside the Communist party apparatu.s. With all reservations
as to Leon Trotsky's own ultimate aims, Trotskyism represented the most
serious demand in Soviet party history for the right to differ with the party
leadership, and the right to argue for changes in party policy. If Khrushchev
now admitted that Trotsky had a right to differ with Stalin, he would also
implicitly admit that party members today have a right to differ with him.
Trotsky was not, of course, a liberal democrat. The best two-word
epithet for him would be, "romantic revolutionary. " During his career as a
Communist, Trotsky was always the spokesman for revolutionary action,
regardless of doctrinal or practical obstacles. Trotsky concluded, before
Lenin did, that it was not necessary to wait for Russia to pass through the Marx-
ian stage of capitalism; Russia could move immediately from Czarism to
Socialism, providing that the revolution was spread throughout the world. Much
of the time, Trotsky was at odds with orthodox Bolshevism; in one sense, he
deviated to the left, while in another respect he deviated to the right.
a. Trotsky was a left deviationist in that he tended to over-estimate
the prospects for immediate, international revolution, and to press
(before others wished to do so) for radical reorganization and national-
ization of the economy, under the policy of "primitive socialist
accumulation. " This policy, adopted later by Stalin, and still later
by Mao Tse-tung, meant forcing peasants to surrender their products
without real compensation; these products would serve to feed
industrial workers who were producing goods (machine tools, arms,
dams, steel mills, etc.) which the peasant could not purchase, and
which were of no value to him. Trotsky's doctrine of "Permanent
Revolution" -- I. e. , continuous. revolution the world over -- was also
a left deviation after Lenin gave it up as impractical.
b. On the other hand, partly because of his inability to be a mere
Appr$~ aIM I o sh ` , p B l~r ~r1d 4~Q1 ~ 4
and Trotsky
40. (Continued)
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49Z . (Cont.) 12 February 1962
when he was in control himself. He reinstituted discipline in the
army, directed the suppression of the Kronstadt Rebellion, argued
for the elimination of any free trade union activity, and voted for
the expulsion of the "Worker's Opposition" from the party.)
Once he had spread the idea that Trotsky was an enemy of the party, Stalin
used the "amalgam" technique to attack others by calling them Trotskyites. When
the break occurred with Tito in 1948, Tito was called a Trotskyite. The leading
figures in the trials in the 1930's, such as Kamenev, Zinoviev, and Bukharin,
were alleged to have conspired with Trotsky. Supposedly, the first object of
their conspiracy was the assassination of the leader of the Leningrad party
organization, S. M. Kirov, which took place 'on 1 December 1934.
Actually, most students of Soviet history now believe that Stalin himself
ordered Kirov's murder, thereby ridding himself of a subordinate who seemed
too popular and too independent-minded, as well as creating a pretext for the
Judicial murder of the old Bolshevik leadership. Some of these students, such
as George Kennan, believe that the murder and subsequent trials were partly
inspired by the example of Hitler's successful purge, conducted on 30 June 1934.
Khrushchev himself, while not explicitly accusing Stalin of having murdered
Kirov, has strongly implied as much. (See Attachment) But although Khrushchev
has made disclosures, his investigation has not progressed very far in the five
and a half years that elapsed between the 20th and 22nd Congresses.
Probably one reason for this lack of progress is that Khrushchev's own
innocence might become suspect if too much were known about the Kirov case.
We do know that Khrushchev, despite his recent criticism of the purges and of
'illegality, U and despite his suggestion in his 27 October 1961 speech that
"Perhaps we should erect a monument in Moscow to perpetuate the memory of
comrades who fell victim to arbitrary rule," himself did everything to further
the atmosphere of hysteria that prevailed in the purge era. (See Attachment)
We know that Khrushchev was in Leningrad on the day Kirov's bodyguard "died
in an accident;" he and Bulganin were two members of the official six-man
Kirov funeral commission. Three other members of this commission are
known to have died or disappeared in 1937, at the time when the NKVD men who
knew too much were being eliminated. Without going to any other witnesses,
or collecting any further evidence, Nikita Khrushchev himself could tell much
more about the Kirov case -- if he wanted to.
Another reason for the lack of progress in the clarification of the Kirov
case and of the purges generally is the danger (see 1st para. above) that a
rehabilitation of Trotsky would weaken Khrushchev's control of the party. In
his 1956 secret speech, Khr.ushchev conceded that it had been necessary to
annihilate those who had broken with Trotskyism "and returned to Leninist
positions. 't But he also stated that Stalin had "played a positive role" in the
"ideological fight" against the Trotskyites and others "who proposed anti-
Leninist theses, who represented P. political line hostile to the Party and to the
cause of socialism. " Curiously, Khrushchev's 27 October 1961 speech, which
in many respects repeated the 1956 secret speech, made no reference of any
kind to Trotsky and Trotskyism. But in November, Konstantinov, the editor
of the Soviet theoretical journal Kommunist, accused the Albanian CP of holding
the Trotskyite view that rewolutioncaane imposed from outside a country;
~t}his view was also attributed to the Chinese Communist leaders.
implicitly,
tfg~ti14~1o4he of
the~. ~st#i-~ii 1~
o0o. 6fnlS1
2
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ebruary 1967
Prague conference of the old Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. This
article protrayed Lenin as the fighter for party solidarity against the disruptive
forces on the right and left wings -- including the Trotskyites -- and against
the indifference of Stalin. Pospelov's account suggested an analogy between
the deviant Menshevik-Left radical-Trotskyite forces of 1912 and the Chinese-
Albanian and Yugoslav factions of today. (Actually, Lenin's Prague conference
was a rump meeting of Bolsheviks, and Trotsky and Plekhauov, the old leader
of the RSDLP, boycotted the meeting because it was one-sided and threatened
Social Democratic unity.)
TheTrotskyites of today have not overlooked the questions which have
been raised by Khrushchev's disclosures on the murder of Kirov. At the end
of the 22nd CPSU Congress (perhaps encouraged by the lack of attack on
Trotskyism at that Congress),
Mme. Natalia Sedov, Trotsky's widow (since
deceased), sent Khrushchev the following message:
You have just disclosed the provocation committed by Stalin
against the old Bolsheviks, under cover of the assassination of
Kirov.
I request that you undertake the total, public revision of the
Moscow Trials, in which the primary defendants were Leon
Trotsky and my son Leon Sedov.
I request that you make a complete, public investigation of
the means employed by the GPU against Trotsky and of the
assassination of Leon Trotsky in Mexico, of the instigators and
executors of that crime.
I request that you inform me of the fate of my son, Sergei
Sedov, arrested in 1935, whose sole crime was that he was the
son of Leon Trotsky.
I request that you publish in the Russian language the com-
plete works of Leon Trotsky which were begun in Lenin's time,
and of which 22 volumes had already been published before Stalin
proscribed them, and before Stalin made his falsifications.
During the period of the purge trials, unofficial commissions were
formed in various countries to review the evidence of Trotsky's guilt. The
most famous and important of these commissions was headed by John Dewey,
the well-known American philosopher and educational theorist. On the basis
of the evidence that could be collected then in Mexico and the U. S. A. , the
Dewey Commission concluded that the Moscow trials were frame-ups and that
Trotsky and Sedov were not guilty of the charges made. The Commission's
conclusions were convincing then; they are much more so today. (For a full
description of the Dewey investigations, those able to obtain them should see
The Case of Leon Trotsky and Not Guilty, published in London in 1937 and1938
respectively. a e.?,v-'7ork Times urila Magazine of 28 January 1962 contaimd
an article on the su ect of this guidance by Harry Schwartz, "Trotsky's Ghost
Haunts Communism ; this has been reproduced in Press Comment, 31 Janua
1962.) r:Y5X1C10b
T '~ "' 4922. (Continued)
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