BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE NUMBER: 81

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 1998
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 18, 1961
• Content Type: PERRPT

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r e y o e 1 December 19
Reluctance of Communists to Publicize Castro's Confession of Allegiance to
oscow: ow ere as as ro s speec p cem er een pu czze In
u~'-TI; C"astro's statement that he is aMarxist-Leninist has not been printed
in Cuba, It took Moscow three days before a Tass dispatch from Havana -
was published, and then not in Pravda, hailing Castro as the "new Marxist-
Leninist". As of 11 December, no copy of the speech was available in
St3i:agoa~.~Chrler.~_xnuch.to the consternation of the Communist Party of Chile,
Mexico City was unable to get a copy of the speech as late as 14 December.
Clearly, the speech would lessen the appeal of the Fidel as the Latin ---
American wonder boy and would reveal him for what he has always been --
aweak puppet of Moscow.
Communist Ghina Blames Crop Failure on Mismanagement. The Canton ----
paper an ang ai y on u.gu.s ame a -percent drop in rice out-
put by a Kwax~gtun~g'~'rovince production brigade on maladministration in
which the brigade "made a mesa of things in the execution of policies."
The paper lbointed out that this had nothing to do with natural calamities
and said this example should focus attention on the failure of communes to
implement the new agricultural policies, This is the first instance noted in
which the regime has denied that weather was a factor in declining output
and placed the blame on poor organization and leadershi
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25
The V+Torld Council of Churches: The World Council of Churches, meeting
in ew e i in Quern ~er, vo ed to admit to membership the Russian
Orthodox Church. In its application for admission, the Russian Church
claimed it had 50, 000; 000 believers, served by 30, 000 priest s, 20, 000
parishes and seventy-three bishoprics. While these figures are believed
somewhat exaggerated!? their real significance is in relation to the size of
the Russian Orthodox Church in 1914, when there were 77, 76? churches and
prayer houses and I17, 916 priests. The Soviets appear to be caught between
the need to prove that their scientific atheism drive is successful, and at
the carne time to qualify a religious organization far membership in a
world religious body. In any treatment concerning the admission of the
Russian Church care should be taken not to attack or discredit the World
Council of Churches, which is a sincere and influential body. It can be
painted out, howevex, that the Russian Orthodox Church delegation has
not hesitated to parrot the Soviet Communist line, as it did at the Orthodox
Church Conference at Rhodes in September, thus"indicating, despite
its protestations, that it is under the thumb of the CPSU. Attention is
called to articles carried in Press Comment on the New Delhi meeting.
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 1$ December 1961
469. he '22nd ` S re 003-4 25X1 C10b
Back~~ggroun~d~: Khrushchev's public repudiation of Stalin at the 22nd CPSU
Congress Moscow, and the latest demonstration by Peking and Albania
that the CPSU no longer commands the unquestioning obedience of the Commun-
ist world, are having a profound effect on the fraternal parties throughout the
world. The latest denunciation of Stalin caught them by surprise; many delegates
`.o the Congress had laid wreaths on his tomb a day or two before the meetings
onvened. In some areas the effects of the Congress are already evident; in
others they may be gradual. Italy, the home of the largest Communist Party
outside the bloc, is one country where the results o~~Khrushchev's words and
Chows deeds (the sudden return to Peking) have already caused considerable
repercussions.
Palmira Togliatti obviously knew he would enc~uter trouble on these
matters in his own Central Committee, since its "revisionist" wing had long
been advocating reform and knew that Khrushchev himself had now given them
a great opportunity. In an attempt to ward off the storm, Togliatti struck the
first blow before L-he convening of his Central Committee plenum by having
the Party organ 1'Unita republish, in its edition of 5 November, excerpts from
an interview he ac given after the 20th Congress in 1956. Togliatti had been
severely criticized by Pravda for his remarks at the time. The following
were among the points o3~`Tg iatti chose to re-emphasise, under the heading
"Polycentric Nature of the System ":
"Regarding the equally important problem of assuring that past
evils are not repeated in the future, Togliatti.... stressedthe basic
factors: not only re-establishing socialist legality, but re-vitalizing
the party, reviving initiative among the mss .se s, encouraging
research, stimulating discussion in the field of theory and practice;-
in sum, giving socialist democracy a positive direction... The inber-
na1 political structure of the Communist movement has changed;
the need for an ever greater independence of decision has increased.
'The entire system.... is becoming polycentric; one can no longer
speak of a single model for the communist movement, but rather
of pxogress accomplished by following roads which are frequently
different. ~,. problem for the entire movement arises from the criti-
nism of Stalin, the problem of bureaucratic degeneracy, suffocation
of democracy, of confusion between constructive revolutionary force
and the destruction of revolutionary legality, of the isolation of the
economic and political leaders from the life, the initiative, the
criticism and the cxeative activity of the masses. We would hail the
establishment among the communist parties in power of a contest to find
the best means of forever evading this danger. It is for us to develop
our methods and our road, to safeguard ourselves from the dangers
of stagnation and bureaucracy, to work out together the problems of
the liberty of the working masses and social justice, and then among
these masses to gain greater prestige and a larger following. "'
In explaining the significance of the new denunciation of Stalin and the
accusations against the anti-party group before the CPI's Central Committee
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 ,469. {Cont.) "? December 1961
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plenum (~10 November), Togliatti (who had unsus ectingly placed a. wreat on
Stalin's tomb before the opening of the Congress was implicitly critical of the
way in which the matter was handled. Why was it necessary to re-open this
chapter? To provide a detailed reply is not easy, particularly when one
doesn'# knew ail the details of the internal life of the CPSU, he said. Speaking
of the antiparty group whose opposition may have made the latest denunciation
of Stalin necessary, the PCI leader said:
~~Perhaps if more complete information on this attempt /Fiy the
anti -Party group to change the decisions of the 20th Congress7' had
been made available immediately or soon afterward, it would have
been helpful for the international communist movement. Claxity in
these mattexs never hurts. The more light there is the more safely
and rapidly one can proceed. "
And further i n the same vein:
"In the construction of acommunist society it is not only the base
that undergoes a transformation. The superstructure must also change,
the operating methods of the party, its link with the masses, its -
method of fulfilling its executive functions in the phase of develop-
ment which must be one of the extension of democracy and of the
creative initiative of the workers. In such a situation, the attachment
to the past and hatred of the new becomes the main obstacle. Here,
certainly is the real connection between the fundamental deci-sions of
the 22nd Congress and the renewed struggle against the 'anti-party'
group. "
"Perhaps for us these latest denunciations were no longer necessary,
perhaps also they created here and there strong feelings and doubts.
However, we must make an effort to understand the situation which
exists in the Soviet Union.... Such a denunciation is indispensable in
order to bar a return to a past which should be buried forever if -not
forgotten. "
On the dangers ensuing from the personality cult, the Italian Communist leader
warns:
"A political party which is inspired by Marxism and which must
carry out vast action among the masses cannot become monocephalic.
It should stimulate among its rank and file and also in its directorate,
debate, the development of a variety of leading personalities, a
continual exchange of opinion, without having every divergence lead
to discord and recriminations. "
Togliatti also tackled the key problem of the origins of the Stalinist
aberration and of finding means to avoid its recurrence. Under the heading,
"Carrying forward the critical research and analysis begun in 1956, soliciting
the collaboration and assistance of the comrades in the CPSU and in other
partie s'~, he said:
"How were such serious transgressions possible? And how can we
guarantee that they are not repeated?"
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 469. (Cont.) 1$ tlecember 1961
' Toglia~j~~.bjld~~toll'e~~1.s2~~~~~~.~ s~1~~~b~~Q494~~~4~~~03-4_
question which try to reduce everything to the negative qualities of Stalin him-
self. It seems that there were others who collaborated with Stalin in violating
the laws; and how does one explain that, despite Lenin's warnings, the party
paid no heed?
"We must go deeper, make an objective analysis of the development
of Soviet society not merely to justify what is being denounced at the
moment.... but to better understand things and to draw from them a
lesson for everyone. "
Togliatti then refers to his 1956 interview with the periodical Nuovi Argomenti
in which he attempted to make such an analysis, saying that t e reve a ions a
the 22nd Congress confirm his theories, It is necessary, ac~~ding to Togliatti,
to go back to the period beginning in 1934 with the crime against Kirov, since
it was then that an act emanating from the top of the party leadership occurred
which violated and destroyed socialist legality.
"We must admit that at this very mament and on the basis of these
successes, objective contradictions and difficulties of a new type arose
which the Stalinist leadership did not understand and thought it would
resolve by inaugurating a regime cf suspicion and of unjustified re-
pression. We must admit that Lenin was right when he said that success
itself could be one of the causes of bureaucracy. We must also go back
to the other precedents, to the Long years of civil war, of foreign
intervention and of terror which created a particular method of operating
and which explained how a portion of the group around Stalin became
transformed in a power group for whom every question was reduce d to
a clash of material force. Naturally these axe only general remarks
which should be verified on the basis of fact in ordex to place each
criticism and denunciation in the proper perspective contrasting it with
the tremendous positive work of economic construction accomplished
by the working masses under the guidance of the party and of the Soviet
Government, the foundation and construction of a new society and an
international policy of peace which found a resounding echo in the hearts
of the people, In 1956 we undertook to conduct such a research and
something was done by means of contacts with the leading comrades of
the Soviet party, the di spatch of research :relegations, journalistic
facilities, publication of inquiries and books of which you certainly are
cognizant. We must do more, soliciting new assistance both from the
Soviet comrades and from the scholars of other parties. The worst
thing which could occur for the entire movement would be to content
oneself with juxtaposition of praises and denunciations and letting it go
at that. Also in this regard the differences with the Chinese comrades
should be better defined by means of research, study and debate.
In connection with the development of communism in Italy and to avoid
any return to the period of Stalinist terrrors Togliatti stated the following:
"It is precisely in order to give and to have this guarantee ~gainst
Stalinist deviations? that we affirm the necessity.... of moving~oward
socialism by democratic means, adhering to the conditions of our
country and to the gains already realized by the working class and of the
people in the struggle against fascism. And in order to give and to have
such a guarantee we have taken pains above all to maintain and develop
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+~.? ,,.,r,,
the democratic character of our party, always promoting debarte; the
confrontation of ideas, and also always accepting debate a nd dis-
cussion with any adversary, bu.t in confronting without prejv.dice all
the new problems that pre sent themselves today, and in never Fearing
to move closer to xeality as it is. If there are mistakes to correct acrd
errors to denounce it is from this test that the corrections and denun-
ciations must develop. This is the line of conduct that we followed after
the 20th Congress...we cannot deny that this approach has given our
party its particular and original aspect in the broad camp of the world
communist movement.... W e have found nothing in Marx, in Lenin, in
Gramsci which contradicts or condemns our approach. We have always
asserted the need for the working class struggle and the party as
the vanguaxd of the working class to have their own characters comes---
ponding to the conditions and traditions of the country and a correspond-
ing line of political action. In this matter also decisions of the 20th
Congress are of great importance and particularly the affirmation of
the poli~ti.cai and organizational autonomy of each communist party. We
were among the first, outside of the Soviet comrades, to maintain that
t?day they can no longer be either a guide state nor a guide party, today
this fact is acceptable by all. "
The following day (11 November) Togliatti's internal opposition had its
say. Although their more extreme demands were obviously not reported in
the CPI newspaper 1'Unita what remained was enough to show that Togliatti's
hopes of limiting discu on were in vain. They said that the contribution of
the PCI to the victory of the Khrushchev line was weakened because of
excessive caution and procrastination:
that the struggle and dissent among the Communist parties re-
vealed by the 22nd Congress made it necessary to recognize the
diversity of situations existing in the USSR, China, Italy, France,
Yugoslavia and Cuba;
that polycentricity is the basic condition of real internationalism;
that closer tie s with other Euxopean Communist parties bare
essential;
that only by an open and public discussion of real problems is real
unity obtainable;
that there should be a return to Leninism also in matters of
international policy;
that the 22nd CPSU Congress represents the end of a ficticious
unanimity which had nothing to do with genuine ideological and political
unity;
that from time to time in regard to certain problems majority
and minority positions could be formed;
that regarding the essential question of national roads to social-
ism some of the positions adopted in the 22nd CPSU program are
insufficient. and do not repre sent a step forward (for example, when the
document says there is only one road to socialism since the general laws
of socialist construction are always and everywhere the same);
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 4b9. {Cont.) 18 December 1961
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and, finally, t at t e ceps s an most serious arm re su ng
from the cult of the individual was the substitution of coercive and
administrative measures for discussion of basic political questions
and, therefore, the use of party organs merely execute a line already de-
cided from above.
On 14 November, 1'Unita published a formal and innocuous summary of
the Plenum which glosse over he disagreements. The dissenters, however,
who were demanding that the date for the party congress be advanced to discuss
questions generated by the 22nd CPSU, could not be quieted. Another meeting
of the PCI Directorate took place an 17 and 18 November, and on 19 November
1'Unita carried, on its front pages, the following announcement from the CPI
irec orate:
"The PCI Directorate, taking into account the results of the recent
meeting of the Central Committee and the broad, lively and profitable
discussions which took place concerning comrade Togliatti's report,
stresses that the subjects discussed must and will be gone into more
deeply in order to enrich the discussions which are to take place in the
party and the workers' movement regarding the decisions taken at the
22nd C PSU Congress, and charges the Secretariat with the task of
drawing u.p and circulating to the entire party a public document for the
purpose of stimulating and guiding the activities of all comrades. The
proposal for advancing the party Congress will be submitted at the next
meeting of the Central Committee which is the only authority which can
decide. Regarding the proposal itself, the Directorate, which
unanimously voted against it believing that there were not sufficient
reasons for moving it ahead,. will report to the Central Committee. The
Central Committee wilt meet during the month of December.... "
Finally, on Z8 November, 1'Unita published the party's "approved docu-
ment" on the Z2nd CPSU Congress, cTu"ty signed by the PCI Secretariat. This
document indicated that the "revisionist" wing had been successful in obliging
Togliatti and company to accept many of ii~s positions, some of which con-
tained serious indictments of the PGI leadership itself eisring the Stalinist period.
Thus, the document stressed the co-responsibility of the PCI in promoting the
cult of the personality. The leadership was guilty of two errors:
a. the uncritical acceptance of Stalin's erroneous theory
regarding the inevitable and increasing bitterness of the class struggle
as a concomitant of socialist construction;
b. the practice of noting only the successes and of passing from
the recognition of the ability and merits of a revolutionary leader like
Stalin to the exaltation of his ~6erson and function.
In regard to the latter, while noting the progress which had been made since
the $th PCI Congress, in correcting these errors, the document noted:
"We must recognize that such advances are still insufficient. The
basic problem concerns the autonomy of the party in tie struggle to
achieve socialism by means of an original, democratic and national road.
"We must recognize that the autonomy of our party has been limited
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5 (Continued)
 469. (Cont.) 1$ December 1961
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ntioned a ove an y e ac tha our o n o i u
development have not always been given an explicit theoretical
formulation which could have contributed a more coherent perspective
and a gre ate r idealism . "
The xeport also stresses the need for closer liaison of parties operating
in the capitalist West. Liaison among parties must provide above all for the
development of bilateral and multilateral contacts among parties working under
analogous conditions.
The developments within the Italian Communist Party are events of
major significance in the Communist wrld which may well set a precedent for
the evolution of other Communist parties outside the bloc, for example: the
clemand for more internal democracy; for greater independence from the USSR;
for closer ties with the CP~s in Western Europe; and the challenges both
implicit and explicit to the party leadership. Already, Thorez, in France,
whose identification with Stalinism makes him particularly vu.lne rable at this
time, has made some pointed references to the "revisionism and opportunism"
of certain elements in the Italian Communist Party. 25X1 C10b
'" ^ '" (Continued)
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 469. {Cont. )
18 I?ecember 1961
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 470. A
,~~~~ F~~ea 12~
18 December 1961
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$ack round: On 9 December the British administered UN trust torritory
of Tanganyika was given its independence. Under the intelligent leadership
of the UK-educated Prime Minister, Julius Nyerere, the new state come s
into being ixi an atmosphere of relative political stability and racial harmony,
with the economy showing a slow but steady advance. This outstanding
background nzay be attributed in large part to Nyerere, who became Ghief
Minister in October 1960, after he had led the multi-racial Tanganyika African
National Union (TANU) to an overwhelming victory in national elections in
which TANU adherents won ?0 out of the 71 seats in the legislature. Nyerere
named two whites and an Indian to his cabinet t.o demonstrate his belief that
a t1nan-racial?1 policy can work in Africa. His government worked smoothly
and the transtian period to independence, under the guidance of the British,
was accomplished with relative ease.
Julius Nyerere, an outstanding African leader who has been described
by one British official as "fifty years ahead" of any other Tanganyika African,
is one of the many children (52 is probably a good estimate) of a chief of the
Zanaki tribe (the father had twenty-six wives), one of the smallest of the
approximately 120 tribes in Tanganyika. When he was twelve years old,
young Nyerere was sent to school at the Lake Victoria port of Musoma. He
showed early promise and graduated to a high school at Tabora in central
Tanganyika. While at Tabora, Nyerere was converted to Catholicism and
he remains one of the few African nationalist leaders who is a practising,
devout Christian. From Tabora, he went to the University College of East
Africa, where he studied from 1943 to 1945, obtaining a diploma in Education.
Returning to his old school at Tabora, he bought for four years before a
scholarship to the University of Edinburgh in Scotland came his way, He
stayed three years at Edinburgh, emerging with a master-af-arts degree
in History and Economics, an occasional slight Scottish burr, and an
awakening national consciousness. Back in Tanganyika in 1952, he resumed
his teaching career -this time at St. Francis High School at Dar es Salaam,
the capital, He began to take an increasing interest in an organization called
the Tanganyika African Association, formed i.xi 1929 by British civil servants
as a Social club for Africans. Nyerere had quite different plans for the
organization, however, and, after he had been elected its president i.xi 1953,
he rewrote its constitution to give it a political complexion and later renamed
it the Tanganyika African National Union, Within twelve months he had
raised the Union's membership to 250, 000 (it now exceeds 1, 000, 000), paid
a visit to the UN to plead independence for the Trust Territory, and been
elected to the Legislative Council. As 'I`a ng anyika's outstanding leader,
Nyerere conspicuously has not promised his 8, 500, 000 fellow-Africans that
independence will bring them pie-in- the-sky, but rather hard work and self-
sacrifice. Most (but not all) regard him rather like the Ghanaians, at one
time at any rate, regarded their Osagyefo (Deliverer), Nkrumah. To
Tanganyika's 76, 000 Indians, 20, 000 Europeans and as many Arabs, Nyerere
has held out the promise of equality under the la.w and security of their land
titles. These see in Nyerere their best chance for a productive future in their
adopted country.
(continued)
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 470. (Cont.) 18 December ].961
A" 35'~"src~~i~tda.ii~rs~i-~Igs~i4i~~$/~~a'ss~t~~iF~D~i~1@A~S~
exists. It centers on a dissident faction in the Tanganyika Federation of Labor
(TFL), which Nyerere has been trying to turn into a TANTJ-controlled
organization an the Ghanaian paktern, and on the African National Congress
(ANC). The TFL, led by Christopher Tuxnba, has an assortment of axes to
grind, notably the slow rate of Africanization of irxdustry and government.
The ANC, whose president is Zuberi Mtemvu but whose zeal leader may be
Michael Sanga, was ineffective until early this year. Beginning in January
1961, however, the party's stridently anti-Western line began to take effect
as it wan the support of some of the lower ranking African civil servants.
At about the same time, Mtemvu visited Feiping, and the ANC is now said
to receive funds from Communist bloc sources through extremists in Kenya.
Quite apart from this apposition, moreover, it is obvious that independence
will not salve the territory's basic weakstesses: the low level of economic
development, the paucity of competent leaders, and even Nyerere's awn
idealism and inexperience, particularly in foreign affairs. ?nce the
euphoria of independence has worn off, such problems as lethargy and 25X1 C10b
corruption are likely to assert themselves.
{c antinue d)
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 470. (Cont.
18 December 1961
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 18 December 1961
471. ~ T]~p~.'" ~~#~i08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03861A000100050003-4Z~X1G1Ub
Background: Since the eYad of October, the USSR has again moved to =~1
block the progress of European economic, political and military integration by
attempting to dictate the direction of policy in independent countries. In the
economic field, Austria has been warned that any move towards association with
the Common Market would be considered by the USSR as a violation of Austria's
neutrality pledge. The warning was based on the political aspects of the
European Economic Cormrnunity (EEC or Cornnzon ar et} which officials of the
Austrian g?vernrnent say can be eliminated and hence they can associate with
the Common Market purely on economic grounds. It should be noted, however,
that the USSR specifically states that economic alignment itself is contrary to
Austria's neutrality status as interpreted by the USSR. The Austrian's reply -
by pointing to the similar position adopted by archetypes of neutrality, Switzer-
land and Sweden.
At the same time, ice. trade talks with Finland, ~-~the USSR made an agree-
ment for approximately 25 percent increase in Soviet-Finnish trade. This will
have the effect of increasing .Finland's economic dependence upon the USSR.
In the military field, the USSR attempted to obtain Finnish agreement to enter
into military consultations with them, consultations provided for under the
terms of the 1948 Finno-Soviet Treaty, which specifies tln~w..~?n3t i;s~esta~ished
that Finland or Russia ?xe._ in imminent danger of military attack, they should
consult on common defensive measures. 'This has, thus far, been successfully
avoided by Finland. In view of the frequent and specific references to the
formation of a NATO Baltic Command and to Danish and Norwegian cooperation
with West Germany and NATO, it is clear that the USSR is not only seeking to
keep Finland fully aware of her military comitments to the USSR , but also to
limit as far as passible further Scandinavian military cooperation with NATO
and the tither members of the North Atlantic Cornmu.nity. /'F'or the extent of
Russia's interference in Finland's-domestic political affairs see Bi-Weekly
Guidance #$~, Item #467.7
Roscoe Drummond, writing in the New York Herald Tribune for 8
December 1961, p. 27, says:
"The communists have fought European unification at every point.
When the United States proposed the 'Organization for European
Economic Ceflperation OEEC} to help administer the Marshall Plan
on a Europe-wide basis, the Soviets walked out and forced Poland and
Czechoslovakia to withdraw. At Moscow's bidding, the communist
parties of Western Europe and Britain have fought the Common
Market.... ~irushchev fears the European Common Market and, most
of all, an all-Atlantic economic community. "
The Communists in Western Europe have indeed fought all other moves and pro-
posals designed to further European unification in any field. Nor has the USSR
stopped here. In the economic field, it formed its own answer to the Common
Market, its Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA}. In the military
(Continued}
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 +,~
471. , (Cont..) '~ December 14b1
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field, i't farmed the Warsaw 1~act as its answer to NATO. In both CEMA and
the Warsaw ]Pact the participants are dominated by the TJSSR and are oriented
toward that country, the principal member and beneficiary. In NAT27 and the
Common Market all are equal partners, with full freedom of action within the
terms of the particular agreement, and all share equally in the benefits. 25X1 C10b
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 18 December 1961
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472. Khrushch.ev, the Old Stalinist, versus Mao, the New Stalinist
~~~
25X1C10b
Bac_~k_~ro~un_d: Political rivalry is a universal phenomenon to which the
Saviet~ of c is no exception. Under the surface of the Communist monolitTi,
various individuals seek to enhance their political power, and the struggle
often gains in intensity and bitterness from the circumstance that it takes
place sub rasa. We should never, therefore, underrate authentic indications
of rivaZ'ry wi~in the bloc. At the same time, however, we must avoid
various forms of wishful thinking, not exaggerating isolated details or giving
them a significance they cannot -- from what we know of the system -- possess,
Khruahchev rose in the ranks of the CPSU largely through his ruthlessness
in carrying out Stalin's policy, and through his simultaneous grasp of political
realities. In the Soviet system, which places a premium on the ability to
force others into action and on skill in political maneuver, Khrushchev's
success- is altogether natural. As early as October 1926, he anticipated
Stalin by calling for either total submission by the opposition /Trotskyites, etc,/
or the application of repressive measures. On the day after f~i~rov's murder, -'
Khxushchev, Kaganovich, and others signed a document launching the
campaign against the "enemies of the people", the stock indictment which
would later be used in the Great Purge -- and later still (in 1956} would be
denounced by Khruahchev as a violation of "all norms of revolutionary legality".
The Great Purge itself was an excellent example of Khrushchev's abili#.g` to
eambine the "right kind" of zeal with ruthlessnese:. Khrushchev's career seems
to have been closely associated with the early stages of Nikolai Ivanovich
$,e~$ov's. ~Yezhov, the rabid chief of the NKVD during the blood purge, had
been a member of Khrushchev's party organization in the Bauman District
of Moscow in 1931, and later in the Moscow City Party Committee, and Yezhov
accompanied Khruahchev and Molotov to the Ukraine in the summer of 1937
to obtain the submission of the Ukrainian party leadership. (See attachment
to Bi-Weekly Guidance #79, dated 20 Nov 61}. In May of that year Khruahchev
had shown Stalin he was ripe for spurge-time promotion by proposing the
following resolution:
"The Moscow Party Conference assures the Central Committee
of the Party and our vozhd, teacher, and friend, Comrade Stalin,
that there has not been and will not be mercy for the spies,
diversionists, and terrorists who raise their hand against the lives
of the toilers of the Soviet Union; that we will annihilate the spies
and diversionists also in the future and will not let the enemies
of the USSR live; and that for every drop of workers' blood the
enemies of the USSR will pay with ~~o=ds of blood of spies and
diversionists." (Pravda, May 3I, lys~~, quoted by Lazar Pistrak,
The Grand Tacticia'-'n , p. 153}
A year later, Khruahchev told the Ukrainians at their loth Party Congress:
"Our cause is a holy cause, And he whose hand trembles, who
stops half-way, whose knees shake before annihilating ten, a
hundred enemies, exposes the Revolution to danger. It is necessary
to fi ht a ies without mercy. Let us erase from the surface
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 472, (Cont. )
18 December 1961
ofi4p$~r~ ~t~'~Rr1~Q.~.~~a a1~~~~~.16s1~~~Q~~,~~.`~iQ~03-4
We warn that for every drop of honest workers' blood we will shed a
bucketful of the enemy's black blood, " (Bilshovik Ukrainy, No. ?,
1938, p. 11, quoted by Pistrak, p. 153, }
In December 1961, Khrushchev acknowledged that he had always been
and always would be a propagandist. After a careful study of Khrushchev's
statements during the purge period, Lazar Pistrak concludes:
"No Communist leader, dead or alive, showed greater verbal
zeal in tuneing this Purge into the greatest blood bath ever conducted
by any group of men against their own comrades. " {p. 155)
IVTor was Khrushchev innocent of the actual blood-letting itself, since as First
Secretary in the Ukrainian Republic CP he was quite aware of such mass
executions as those which took place ~a.t Vinnitsa {See attachment to Bi-Weekly
Guidance #79, dated 20 November 1961}.
In June 1953, Khrushchev (if we are to believe hixn) literally grappled
with Beria until his military co-plotters came to the rescue with tommy-gune,
Seeing a chance to isolate Malenkov in the Party, he had him branded as
advocating ashow-down in heavy industry in favor of consumer goods, and
as fearful of a Third World War. With two opponents out of the way, he then
reversed himself and used the anti-Stalin campaign to discredit his other
'`~ ivals. This change was, however, only another tactical move in altered
circumstances. A good Communist tactician takes the initiative and keeps
his opponents under a barrage of accusations of violating party morality;
meanwhile his followers and mouthpieces pick up and repeat the accusations,
even when they know that they are unfounded, or that counter-accusations, at
Ieast equally valid, could be made. Khrushchev showed his continued readiness
to employ "Stalinist" methods in the execution of M. D. Bagirov (announced
May 1956), during the Hungarian uprising in 1956 (with the subsequent execution
of Nagy), and in sanctioning: the assassination of Stefan Bandera in 1959
(confessed by the Soviet assassin, Bogdan Stashinsky, who recently fled to
V`dest Germany, fearing that he was about to be liquidated because, like the
assassixxs of Kirov, he knew too much.) Ixx May 1957, during a speech to a
group of writers, Khrushchev reverted to a figure of speech he had used in
the Ukraine in 193? (see above), saying that Soviet writers "should realize
that if they appose us, our hand will not tremble".
With his skill 9.rx tactics and his following in the party apparatus, and
barring unforeseen circumstances, Khrushchev should have no difficulty in
retaining control in the Soviet Union as Long as he retains his physical and
mental faculties. Recent personnel shifts in the Central Committee and the
Presidium of the CPSU resulted in no real surprises. No persons known
to be opposed to Khrushchev received advancement. Suslov, Brezhnev,
Kozlov, and Mikoyan have all shown complete acceptance of Khrushchev's
leadership in recent years.
In previous guidances we have pointed out economic and other problems
facing Khrushchev, Where Khrushchev's difficulties are becoming most
obvious is with certain other leaders of the Bloc, Hoxha and Mao, Khrushchev
does not have a personal apparatus inside the parties of these countries, and
his propaganda appeals do not strike a responsive chord in them. Still
revolutionaries, they are unable and unwilling to compete in debates on gross
2
continue d
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national product, and they regard with suspicion Khrushchev's propagandist
hope of swaying the western countries by threats and offers. In 1953 Nathan
Leiter pointed out one characteristic Communist belief:
"Bolsheviks fear and oppose the disposition to permit the borders
between oneself and the enemy to be fuzzy.... If this rule is violated,
bhe Party is threatened by dissolution into its hostile environment."
Today this principle seems to be given more respect in Peiping than in Moscow,
to Peiping's concern. Khrushchev did not originate "popular front" tactics,
but neither do the Chicoms venerate the "popular front" part of Stalin's legacy;
they well remember the ix debacle of 192?, when Chiang Kai-shek, withwYrom
they were working, purged them. The Sino-Soviet debate waxed hot in 1960
s.nd outwardly was patched up at the end of that year at the Moscow $1-Party
Conference. Now, at the 22nd Congress, Khrushchev (with his usual disregard
for the spirit of past agreements) has sought to reasse~tt Soviet supremacy
and, by his anti-Stalin campaign, to compel the other Communist parties to
submit. So far, his forcing play has not proved successful: the Chinese are,
so far, avoiding either submission or an outright break; the Albanians have,
in effect, made the break. Bath Chinese and Albanians have claimed that they
speak for the true international faith. The Chinese have also revived their
analogy of communism with the "East Wind", with its ominous overtones of an
anti-European Asian Communism, and they have stressed their closeness to
the African and Latin-American CP's.
Why is it important to Khrushchev to win this quarrel ?
1. Comz-nunist leadership in the Soviet Union tries to legitimize
itself by its claim to possession of the "correct Marxist-Leninist line".
If there are two Marxist-Leninist countries following different lines,
obviously at least one of them is not correct, and if they are both large
important countries, one has little more chance of being thought correct
than the other. Khrushchev has yet to gain international recognition as
a Commw.iist theoretician, while Mao has probably been more successful.
2. If the Chinese Communists should succeed in diverting some
of the remainder of the world CP's to a "communi; m for underdeveloped
areas", USSR communism would lose its claim to represent the "wave
of the future", thus would be placed in an isolated position between West
and East.
3. If industrialization is added to Chinese manpower, and the
Peiping regime is hostile, the Soviet Union ultimately will face a
severe military threat. The relatively empty areas of Siberia seem
destined to tempt the Chinese, who, moreover, already display an
alarming lack of respect for the danger of nuclear attack.
4. There is reason to think that considerations of personal
antipathy and personal prestige in competition with Mao play an
important role with Khrushchev..
Chinese policy appears "adventurist" in Soviet eyes; appeasement of
Chinese desires would commit the USSR to supporting the Chinese brethren
without any control over their escapades. Moreover, it is not the Communist
way to let things slide in the hope that something "will turn up". Instead, as
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Leites has pointed out, the Communist believes in cutting off undesired
developments "at their roots", In the Communist lexicon (as Leites argues),
the worst sins are to "yield." (i. e, , not just retreat tactically, which may
be wise, but accept an opponent's view), to fail to maintain pressuxe, and to
lose control of one's actions (or what comes to much the same, to act
unconsciously, without sober thought)> With such operating principles on
both sides, and in view of recent statements, Sino-Soviet tensions seem
likely to increase rapidly, rather than disappear at Khrushchev's command.
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 Approved For Release 20 P78-0~0,,6~'~~~$~~314
~$~1C~~(~.nce for Progress is an Alliance of the People
r ~n.w w.~.+.r r ^
Bac~k~xo_u_n~d: In the preamble to the Charter of Punta del Este, the
Amer ci an 1~epuT~lics proclaim their decision to "unite in a common effort to
bring our people accelerated economic progress and broader social justice".
~t gaes an to say that "the men and women of our hemisphere are determined
to gain access to knowledge and equal opportunity for all, to end those conditions
which benefit the few at the expense of the needs and dignity of the many".
Among the purposes of the Alliance for Progress are the following: "to
encourage programs of comprehensive a~ra~rian reform leading to the effective
transformation of unjust structures and systems o n tenure and use, with
a view to replacing latifundia and dwarf holdings by an equitable system of land
tenure; to eliminate adult illit~erac~; to increase life expectancy at birth, and
to increase the ability to leer-^ n~an~-produce by improving individual and public
health; to improve nutrition; to increase the construction of low-cast houses
or ow-income families. "
The charter specifies that national programs of economic and social
development should be based on the principle of self-help directed, among
other things, to the strengthening of the agricultural base, progressively
extending the benefits of the land to those who work it. It recommends that
measures should be adopted to establish or improve credit, technical assistance,
health and education, storage and distribution, cooperatives and farmers
assacia.tions, and community development. It recommends more effective,
rational and equitable mobilizati.an and use of financial resources through the
reform of tax structures, including fair and adequate taxation of large incomes
and zeal estate, and the strict application of measures to improve fiscal
administration. It finally recommends the improvement of systems of
distribution and sales in order to prevent monopolistic practices.
The land reform program carried aut in Venezuela and the Community
Development Program in Colombia, which has received the support of the Peace
Corps, are good examples of major efforts to carry out the basic aims of the
Charter of Punta del Este,.. In November 1961, the first Inter-American
Cooperative Conference was held in Bogota. This conference decided to organize
a uerx institution, the Cooperative Organization of the Americas (COA) as well
as an InterwAmerican Cooperative Finance Institution to provide low interest
medium- and long-term loans to cooperative organizations in La.tiu American.
it is expected that these two (private) organizations will serve as a powerful
mechanism for implementing the grass roots concepts contained in the charter
of Punta del Este, 25X1 C10b
 25X1C10b
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 1$ December 1961
30 " 50003-4 25X1 C10b
...
Background:
Summary: President Sukarno made a bellico se wee ch pn 30 Novembe r
announcing t a e would "liberate" West New Guinea (WNG) and pursue a policy
of "total confrontation". This is coupled with subsequent statements by high
officials alerting the armed farces to a state.af?r~s.dir~~s~'and the deployment
of troops and material. While these measures may in part represent an
inte~.tion to put pressure on the United States and Netherlands in favor of a
~3ro-Indonesian settlement, it is also ;probable that Sukarno ques~Lione the
efficacy of politics], efforts in settling his dispute with th.e Dutch over the area.
This threat to resort to force follows on~ the heels of debate on the question
b~yfore the UNGA which failed to reach agreement on any solution. The key
issue in the dispute is Indonesiats claim that it has sovereignty over WNG,
while the Dutch contest such a claim and seek a guarantee that the inhabitants
of the area be given an opportunity to exercise self determination.
History and ~.sis of Dispute: At the Dutch-Indonesian Round Table
Cr~nferenee o e epu is o ndoneaia achieved its independence and, with
the exception of WNG, all .Dutch East Indies possessions were transferred to
Indonesia under a federal form of government. It was agreed that the political
status of WNG would be determined by further negotiations to be undertaken
within one year. Within a few months Indonesia abandoned the federal system
of government in favor of a unitary structure.
The TJ~itch viewed this as a violation of the Round Table Agreement, and
fruitless negotiations on the WNG question were held in 1950 and 1951. During
1951 the .Dutch designated the area "Netherlands New Guinea"". In 1956 Indonesia
formally included the area as the "Province of West Irian" in the territories of
its Republic. In resolutions introduced before the UNGA in 1954, 1955, 1956
and 1957 Indonesia sought to gain support for resumption of direct negotiations
but in each instance failed to receive the necessary two-thirds majority. Until
the current session of UNGA, no further UN action was undertaken.
Developments at the Current UNGA: On 26 September 1961, Nether-
1and~s Foreign xnis er uns propose o e UN a resolution providing for the
transfer of WNG sovereignty to its inhabitants under a UN administration -
culrninating in the ultimate exercise of self-determination by the people in inde-
pendence or some other alternative. The Netherlands further stated that it woul3
continue to contribute $30 million annually to the administration and
cultural development of the area. On 9 October, Foreign Minister Subandrio of
Indonesia rejected the Itch proposal alleging that the principle of self-determin-
ation assumes that WNG is not an integral part of Indonesia, whose people
echieved independence with the rest of Indonesia twelve years ago. Subandrio
nryted that the dispute should be settled by the parties themselves, but his
government would cooperate in temporary UN administration of WNG pending; its
return to Indonesia. Two attempts were made toward the adoption of compro,nise
resolutions, both of which, inter alia, called for a negotiated settlement between
the tw:~ parties. The first, sponsored by thirteen African nations (Brazzaville
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 474. (Cont.) 18 December 1961
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rou. r Fosed t at 1f t e e er an s and I~n onesia a of reac a an a ree-
ment by March of 1962, a UN commission would investigate the possibility of an
interim international administration of the area. The vote-was 53 in favor as
opposed to ~1 against with 9 abstentions, The second, a 9-power resolution
introduced by India, called for negotiations between the Netherlands and
Indonesia undex the aegis of the President of the General Assembly. It received
41 votes in favor with 40 against and 21 abstentions. $oth resolutions failed to
get the necessary two-thirds majority required for adoption. Thus, the
majority of the 103 UN members favored negotiations and supported the role
of the UN towards possible administration of the area.
Indonesian Reaction to UN Developments: Indonesian official and press
reaction a.s resen u o e lmsi ion on t e question.. Prior to the current
.~:_ssembly, the US had abstained when the WNG question carne to a vote in the
UN, Our recent voting in the UNGA, which Sukarno believes indicates that the
IJS "has favored the Dutch", was influenced by the Dutch offer to get out of the
zLrea, and their proposal to turn the area over to UN administration. These
ttivo factors were reflected in the .Brazzaville resolution, hence we voted for
it. Sukarno's immediate reaction was to deciaxe publicly on 30 November that
"it has become obvious that the West Irian question should be settled outside the
UN" and that the "struggle will largely depend on our armed forces". Subsequent
developments have included an internal pxopaganda campaign to support the
idea of liberating WNG by, force. Implementation of Indonesia's arms purchase
agreements with Yugoslavia and the Soviet-bloc (military credits mw total close
to $ 600 million) continues at a rapid pace. Finally the deploy-
ment of air force personnel and equipment to strategic bases from which an
attack on WNG could be m ou.nte d appears to be under way.
Dutch and West New Guinea Reaction: The Dutch have portrayed the
UN decision as a victory or em, u cri zcism of LunE
ha s been re earned in the Dutch press.
On 1 December the Dutch undertook symbolic steps when the partially
elected local council announced that the area henceforth should be known as
West Papua. A West Papuan flag was hoisted and a national antkem published.
The Council was established last April as the first step in a ten-year program
toward representative government for this area inhabited by some I8, 000
Dutch and Eurasian residents and 700, 000 Papuans.
Communist-bloc Attitude Toward Question: As might be expected, the
C~rnmu.nis s, par cu, ar y e ovie neon, ave tried to cultivate Sukarno,
and Khrushchev has actively supported Indonesia's claim to W~TG. 5ukarno's
reliance on the Soviet Bloc for rzr~ral and rnilitaxy support in any military
adventure he may undertake against the Dutch in WNG, has probably been
reinforced by his failure to attract sufficient support for his- WNG stand at the
Belgrade Conference of "Non-Aligned Nations" to have it included in the
Cc:nference's final Declaration. The Soviet Union must recognize the strategic
importance of Indonesia whose national boundaries now constitute a 3, 500 mile
arc dividing mainland SEA and the ]Philippines from the Australian continent.
A serious and determined attack on WNG by Indonesia would certainly result
in additional Soviet entrenchment in the area, with the Soviet seeking to ine-rease
Indonesian military capabilities and dispatching additional Soviet-bloc tech-
nicians and equipment. In addition, obvious advantages would accrue to the
Communists from the political and military problems an attack on WNG would
pose to the already heavily committed West in the unstable Southeast Asian area.
2
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v s ro em: Pre si nt Sukarno is an
extremely emotional, complex, and flamboyant individua]. Possessing a
massive ego, he is extremely sensitive to criticism from any quarter. The
fact that he has already magnified the issue, depicting it as the acid test of
nationalism vs colonialism (which he equates with Western imperialism)
militates against any peaceful settlement of the WNG que anon. 5ukarno~ s
ego may be of such magnitude that irresponsible military action might be
undertaken. simply to demonstrate to the West and neutxalist leaders that he,
Sukarno, is a force to be reckoned with. 25X1 C10b
pprove or a ease