BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE NUMBER 60

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000100030013-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2000
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: February 27, 1961
• Content Type: PERRPT

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_ _ 'T7 February 1961
Briefly Noted
1. On March 7 the UNGA will reconveyie to take up manjr items left over
from the 1960 Agenda plus a bewildering confusion of affairs in the crises areas
of the world. Despite the fact that Gromyko, rather than Khrushchev, will head
the USSR delegation at the opening, 'we can expect and should be prepared for
fireworks on all the familiar subjects.,
2. The trial of Adolf Eichmann is now scheduled to begin in the next
few weeks. While we should, of course, in no way condone the Nazi era in
Germany we must keep in mind the inevitable use which the Soviets will attempt
to make of the occasion to smear the present West German government and its
officials, particularly Chancellor Adenauer.
3. A recent (23 February) characteristic speech by Premier Khrushchev
contained two claims which deserve further comment:
a. Khrushchev said that when the U. S. made the first atom
bomb, "The United States Imperialists began to carry out an atomic
policy of intimidating the Socialist countries and primarily the Soviet
Union. It was a difficult time for us. " Soviet nervousness from 1945
to 1949 (first Soviet A-bomb explosion) is perhaps understandable,
considering their paranoid belief that the rest of the world was encircling
them. But we would be interested to hear of any concrete cases during
that time when the U. S. followed a policy of trying to intimidate the USSR
with atomic weapons. Our recollection is that it was during that period
that the U. S. offered, in the Morgenthau Plan, to hand over all its
atomic materials to an international authority, ' provided that the
authority should have an effective inspection and control system.
b. Khrushchev said that when the U. S. "Imperialists" began to
talk of producing a hydrogen bomb, Soviet scientists "as the saying
goes, put that in their pie, wound it around their whiskers, worked a
bit, and created the hydrogen bomb before it was invented in the United-_
States. " It is true that there was some delay in going ahead on an Amer-
ican hydrogen bomb; President Truman did not authorize going ahead
until 31 January 1950, four months after the explosion of the first Soviet
A-bomb ended hopes of avoiding an atomic arms race. But the first
thermonuclear (hydrogen) explosion by the U. S. took place on 16 November
1952, and Malenkov first claimed that the Soviet Union possessed a
thermonuclear capability on 9 August 1953. Perhaps Khrushchev will say
that his old rival was hiding the Soviet light under a bushel, and that
there were actually Soviet thermonuclear explosions at an earlier date.
But this raises an interesting point: Malenkov's announcement followed
the signature of the armistice in Korea by 13 days; had the Soviets
possessed a thermonuclear capability during the Korean negotiations,
and particularly had they had it before the U. S. ex losio in November
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Briefly Noted - Continued '40 - - 1-1 _. _ Z) 'ebruary 1961
1952, they probably would have used it as a threat in support of the
Communist negotiators at Pannunjorn. Can it be that the USSR
deliberately concealed its power to avoid having the Chinese call for
using it as a bargaining weapon?????
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354. The USSR Against the UN
its efforts to neutralize the UN, the USSR has, from the opening day of the 15th
General Assembly in September until the death of Lumumba, followed a
calculated plan of action, denouncing and denigrating the efforts of the UN, with
particular reference to the Congo, and vilifying its Secretary General, Dag
Hammerskjold. It has used its veto to render UN action ineffective. It has
encouraged Afro-Asian countries to vote against resolute UN action. It has even
taken the unprecedented step of declaring the Secretary General persona non grata
and refused to deal with him. It has refused to pay its fair share of UN expenses.
At the same time, it has demanded a vast increase in Soviet nationals to be
employed in the UN Staff. It has, in short, attempted in every possible way to
render the UN ineffective, to emasculate the Secretariat, and to hold the UN and
its supporters xp to ridicule and contempt.
In the light of this pattern of action and intention, it is most significant
that the Security Council, in the early hours of 21 February, rejected by a vote
of 8 to 1 a Soviet resolution calling for Hammerskjold's ouster and demanding UN
withdrawal from the Congo, and immediately thereafter adopted by a vote of
9 to 0, with two abstentions (USSR and France), a resolution sponsored by Ceylon,
Liberia and the UAR, calling for: (1) strong condemnation of unlawful arrests,
deportations and assassination of political leaders in the Congo; (2) demanding
immediate cessation of such practices; (3) directing the UN to take all possible
steps, including the use of force as a last resort to prevent further occurrence of
such practices; and (4) authorizing an investigation to determine responsibility
and punishment for the perpetrators.
Although the latter resolution did not specifically refer to the Secretary
General, Ambassador Stevenson pointed out that its clear implication supported
Hammerskjold by placing responsibility for implementation in his hands and by
reaffirming the previous Security Council and General Assembly resolutions
which rest responsibility with the Secretary General. It is significant to note
that, despite its long and vicious campaign against further UN action in the Congo,
the USSR did not dare risk a veto and merely abstained.
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355. Baghdad Press Condemns Radio Moscow
KA,a..r la, attacks are by no means
sen n'. p
t-10
participation in the Mosul uprising last year, a section of the Baghdad Press
countered by attacking Radio Moscow in turn for interfering in internal IraW
affairs. Al Ahd Jadid and Al Mustaqbal criticized the Swedish Communist Party
for sendincablegram to asim for defending the "anarchists, 11 extolling the
crime and trampling law under foot. The pro-Qasirn newspapers said, of Radio
Moscow: "Let the Soviet Radio know that we are free in combating anarchy and
anarchism without mercy in the internal field. Every one of us is free to conduct
his own,affairs in accordance with his particular social system. We ask the
friendly Soviet Radio: did its commentators listen to Baghdad Radio? did (it)
hear any attacks against (the) internal situation in Moscow ? we still do not
believe that Moscow Radio does not understand general conditions in our country,
the dastardly crimes committed by anarchists and terrible bloody plans prepared
by 'comrades' in dark cells. We believe that Radio Moscow understands this as
well as the just sentences passed by court martial on the bloody butchers. For
this reason we reprove it for its recent provocative comments which harm
friendly relations and mutual interests of the two nations. 11 If not actually cleared
with Premier Qasim beforehand,. it is virtually certain that the Baghdad Press
attack was acceptable to Qasim - or it would not have appeared, with the
publishers being allowed, as they are to continue to function. The attack, which
began on February 10, has continued and on 14 February these papers were
joined in the hue and cry by Al Sharq. In an editorial in Al Mustaqbal appearing
on the latter date, it was stated: 'r hen Communist gangs failed to induce people
to take a long jump with them, they went berserk and started to kill people
indiscriminately. 11 On the same day Al Sharq said that it was regrettable that an
official radio of a friendly nation should stick its nose in the internal affairs of
Iraq. It added that those who were sincere would not lend an ear to such cheap
intrigues. Still later (17 February), Al Ahd Jadid added: "All this shows that the
Communist movement in Iraq is part and parcel of the international Comintern
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im osed upon Communists who had been sentenced for their
 356. Revival of Lysenk.nfluence in the USSR
mediocre scientific ability, is a disciple of Ivan Michurin, a successful fruit
breeder with a complete lack of scientific training. Michurinistic biology, as
interpreted by Lysenko, conformed more closely to dialectic materialism than
did the classical theories of Mendel and in 1948 it was officially recognized by the
CPSU. This theory stressed the effect of environment and claimed it saw the
possibility of inheriting environmentally produced effects. Lysenkoism, as it
came to be called, was not only more in accord with Marxist-Leninist theories
but also conformed closely to the theories of Pavlov because it emphasized the
possibility of transforming plants and animals through environment, thus
providing a "scientific" basis for the Stalinist hope for the creation of a new
Soviet man.
In the last fifteen years of Stalin's life, Lysenko flourished (despite the
opposition of even some Soviet scientists) as the tsar of Soviet genetics, biology,
agronomy, and botany. From 1953 - 1957 (after Stalin's death), however, his
influence began towane. In 1956 he resigned as head of the All-Union Agricultural
Academy. But he has for the past few years been staging a comeback. The extent
of Lysenko's renaissance (perhaps only as a scarecrow) was not known until
recently when Professor 01shansky, deputy chairman of the All-Union Institute
and a long-time disciple of Lysenko's, was named Minister of Agriculture to
replace Vladimir V. Matskevich, a farm specialist from the Ukraine who had
long been associated with Nikita Khrushchev. The key factor in the situation,
apparently, is Khru.shchev's insistence upon radically high increases in Soviet
farm production which, though not as deficient as in Communist China, have
fallen far short of the oprimistic goals that Khrushchev and his colleagues have
set. Soviet scientists have, no doubt, been given an opportunity to view Lysenko
as an example of the fate (like Lysenko's) which awaits them if they do not toe
the Party line.
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 357. ' 10th Anniversary oNwSigning o
'7 FebruarV 1961
armies in October 1950, and after resisting-unsuccessfully for six months, the
Tibetan Government was forced to sign a 17-point Agreement with Communist
China on 23 May 1951. This agreement provided that the existing political system
in Tibet would not be altered, that the Tibetan people had the right of exercising
regional autonomy, that in matters pertaining to various reforms in Tibet, there
would be no compulsion of the part of the Chinese Government and that the local
government of Tibet should carry out reforms of its own accord.
Violations of the Sino-Tibetan Agreement started almost immediately and
continued for eight years, culminating in the action dissolving the local
government of Tibet. The struggle against engulfment by the Chinese began in
1952 and culminated in the flight of the Dalai Lama in March 1959. Since the
occupation of 1950, most of the measures taken to place Tibet directly under
Peking's control and to make Tibetans embrace communism clearly violated the
1951 Agreement. Tibetan resistance to Communist China was sparked by the
Communists' coordinated political and military policy aimed at the communization
of Tibet.
While the immediate purpose of the political changes which were forcibly
imposed by the Chinese was to assure Pekingts absolute control over the regional
administration, they also had the further objective of setting the stage for a
comprehensive program of "social" reform which would transform Tibet into an
integrated, indistinguishable part of the socialized Chinese state. This is
-wnderstandable when one remembers that, in 1939, Mao Tse-tung laid down the
claim that scores of national minorities, including the Mongols, the Tibetans, the
Uighurs, the Koreans and many others, are fundamentally Chinese and belong
rightfully to China.
Communist China did not wait long to reveal that the real purpose behind
the invasion and direct control of Tibet was tc.. use the latter as a
weapon to carry out her plans for political and territorial expansion. Agents of
the Chicoms posing as Tibetan refugees, setting out from Tibet, started to
infiltrate into Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim as a prelude to the eventual penetration
of the border lands of India itself. Maps published by the Chinese Communist
Government represent considerable parts of Bi.rma, Bhutan, Nepal and India,
including portions of Kashmir, as Chinese territory. By the summer of 1959, the
Chinese Communists had increased the size of their troop concentrations along
the Indian-Tibetan frontier and there were continuing reports of Chinese
Communist penetrations of Bhutan, Sikkim, Uttar Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir
and along the border of Assam in the north east of India. Finally, the Chinese
People's Republic officially claimed nearly 40, 000 square miles of Indian
territory.
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358. Marxism - ox kn Ideo
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Background: Karl Marx was a Western European thinker, economist an
revolutionary, whose ideas were strictly a product of Nineteenth Century
European industrial and political-ideological developments. Lenin and his
Russian disciples were broadly products of the same intellectual, social, and
political background. Nevertheless, the Communists, in extending and promoting
their influence in Africa, Asia and Latin America, have managed to obscure
the strictly European origins of their thinking (as well as their material support)
and identify themselves as purveyors of "native-born", nationalist-sounding
solutions to the problems of the developing areas. The Chinese Communists are
aware of the difficulties in promoting a foreign ideology in these regions. In
their efforts to woo Africans, from the Bandung Conference to their current
programs, they have stressed that the Chinese are to be counted among the
"colored" peoples who comprise the vast majority of the world's population.
A major reason for the success of the Communists is that most of the
intellectual and political leaders of the developing countries are preoccupied with
the search for fast working panaceas and, at the same time, predisposed to reject
suggestions they think they can identify with the European colonial past. For this
reason, these leaders also tend to reject attempts to describe communism as a
new colonialism or a new imperialism. For them the terms colonialism and
imperialism have very specific referents, bringing to their minds arrogant
overlords of plantations or officious functionaries of some European regime.
The Communists apparently need only to stress the newness and difference of
their programs and to label those who call attention to communism's true aims
and background apologists for the past colonial rulers, to becloud the fact that
communism is equally foreign and European. Because the former colonial rulers
were usually anti-Communist, in addition to their other characteristics, the
Communists' tasks of identifying anti-communism with locally unpopular issues
is made easier.
Nevertheless, communism is a foreign, a European ("white") ideology,
and both Marx and Lenin denigrated the peasant, the mainstay of the societies of
Asia, Africa and Latin America. Although the Chinese Communists claim to
have corrected this error and appeal to the developing areas on the basis of their
having given the peasants a major Irole in their revolution, well-publicized facts
belie their claims (See Guidance #345). The Communist failure in the agricultural
sector in both Russia and China is conspicuous (See Guidance #347). Serious
planning and action programs in developing countries should be based not on the
adaption of Communist blueprints, but upon the situations that actually obtain
there. India's economic program combines, for example, a measure of
centralized planning and, at the same time, the encouragement of capital
Cormation and investment by the private sector.
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