NEHRU'S DISILLUSIONMENT OVER TIBET

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-02771R000300470002-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 1, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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11E301 I S DIZXLLUSIONMEN1 0
May 1959
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0 ET
nee India became a sovereign State and
d control over China, India's relations
r to the north have varied from
on to eool reserve.
daz there was a feeling of comradeship
a nation whiel* stood in the front rank of those who
olonialisas and Western domination. Per
of India the motive was a more importmt one
than 3ut on and was dictated by the conviction that
e program demanded peace and that good relP
a were a prime requisite
of this policy came in 1954 with the visit
u En-lai to New Delhi. This visit produced
.ration of the "Five Principles" (ranch Shila)
xistence. These were: respect for terri
non-aggression, non-interference in
internal affairs equality and peaceful
se were the principles that also formed
baits of agreed relations among Asian and African
ns at the 1955 Bandung Conference in Indonesia.
Later in 1954, Nehru made a visit to China and when he
turned it was evident that he felt a little worried over
the material progress there. Ne was noticably impressed
by the fact that in the matter of manpower alone China,
with a population of 600 million, was infinitely stronger
than India with 400 million.
It is, therefore, understandable th4t when the fish
ing broke out recently in Tibet informed Indian opinion
Wean* Salvanized and tense over the maneuvers of a powerful
aentralized and militant China. The situation is replete
with anxiety for India which ardently desires to live at
peace with all. There is little doubt that India would
early like to aid Tibet, but the tone of the propaganda
emanating from China has been decidedly menacing.
Instead of having a quiet, peaceful Tibet as a northern
zethbor, India is now bordered directly by a ruthless,
dynamic and boisterous China bent on achieving Communism
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as rapidly as pos ible. Thia is not only po1iti11y dis
quieting, but also presents a military problem to
which lee conaiderable magnitude. While the Him 14Yas
Present quite a formidable barrier to the movement of troops
they are ineffective against modern jet aircraft, and the
grotat cities of Delhi, Lucknow, Benares and Allahabad are
elI within 400 miles of the new frontler--just lesa than
one hour in a jet bomber.
There JAI ale* the poseibility that an zroused China
would try to penetrate into the Buddhist ditrtct of Ladakh,
in Kashmir, and ale() threaten interference in the affair
of Nepal whose king is being ardently wooed by Peking at
the present time.? The Chinese could invent any number of
pretexts for military adventure since the frontier hos
never been clearly defined in this wild, mountainous region
between China and India.
The anti-Chinese and antt-Connun15t feeling in Tibet
has existed for some years. In April, Lt. Gen. Chang Kuo-113.?
the Chinese military commander In Tibet, told o meeting of
the Communist-sponsored Preparatory Committee for the
Tibetan Autonomous Region that the Tibetan Government's oppo-
sition to Communist policies began oon after the Sin?
Tibetan Agreement of 1951 was signed. This agreement,
which the Tibetans had entered with goodwill, vas evidently
never intended by the Chinese to be anything but an easy
means of access to the territory they coveted.
The now exiled Dalai Lama said in a tate t he mde
Tespur on April 18 that the 17-point areennt had been
d under preeeare and that Chinese uzerainty had been
ed becauee "there was no alternative left to the
" But the agreement stated that Tibet would enjoy
nomy and, although the control of external affairs
o be in the hands of the Chinese Government, it was
agreed that there would be no interference by the Chinese
with Tibet's religion, customs and internal adm1nttrtion.
ver, thia was a mere aop to the Tibetas. As the
pointed out, "after the occupation of Tibet by
e armies, the Tibetan Government did not enjoy
of autonomy, even in internal mattere and the
rnment exercised full powers in Tibetan affair.
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rot
betan Province of Oyant
dt
956 by
Nyenjik.
WW1 more
the liberation of Tibet
lications, is viewed as
of a free people was
tder the pretext of liberation.
d t? Ours was a happy
solvent government and a contented
invasion in 1950 since
oited that we have been
ntellectual, spiritual and
torical perpective
the so-called
bet is the 1tet and most formid-
Chinese Prompted by the greed of
try for the vast area which
wealth in natural resouroen-
ation of our oil resources in
bet in a struggle that hu
centuries, Por let there be
'liberation' of Tibet is
but a newer form of brutal1 ruthless colonial
re dreaded than the old because here, the
only exploitation, but the complete absorp
pie --absorption or extermination are the
rnativee offered to the people of Tibet
1959, reale Nehru made it statement to
he anent. It wee necessarily a carefully
statent in which he tried to inject the utmost
in re bleress and calm, oohed in the most moderate
language Nevertheless, through these measured and careful
phrases it 10 possible to discern his disappointment and
even resentment, bordering on anger, at the treatment
secorded him and his government's role by the Communist
severnment of China with regard to the tragic events in
Tibet.
tre6sed the irresponsible by the
al Lama's statement made en entering
ed upon him. Nehru aiao rejected Peking
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wild chgea that India had "abdur e " the ?tbetn leader
and b him by force to rndia. t need not tell the
Plaids "that the Dalai Lama entered Indian
rely of his own volition. At no time had
that he should come to India."
not try to hide his bitterness at Peking
n he went on to say that a tragedy has been
enacted in Tibet. Passions have been let
de and "language used which cannot but
on and our relations with our northern
ted out that the situation may vell have
quences. What these consequences might
but behind Behruss calm phrftses there
who had firmly and even devoutly believed
in the fundamentals of the Bandung Conference
"Five On these elements be had
entire foreign policy as regards his relations
Ali thia lies in ruins at his feet and he is
6 to find another avenue of dignified approa h
India today is in :march of a new polloy
bted.17 be extremely difficult to devise.
icr ch will somehow endeavor to bridge
ave wilfully dug between themselves
tor whom Bandung had a real meaning and
ve Principleew were a veritable foundation
he world of international politics.
ra saidj cannot allow itself to be swep
tement of the moment onto a wrong course.
t up to him to make a similar appeal to
d Chtns but he did mention that he had
t d4 at the tone of the comments and
a by responsible people in China.
have used the language of the
th and propriety." Tie said he
.sin g in a nation with thou -
?d
d it and which has been
lite behavior.
d the C1ne3e a11egattot that the
ldin the Dalai Lama by force Ald
36authorities "should surely know
coUfltl7 and what our l'kwa and eon-
clod:, that of course, the Dalai Lama
a at ny tiio he wished and for any
ose. In view of hie previous
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or ac1 C1na and his ecY that it be admi ted
must have been difficult for
ants
mmi8t Chinese held e MASS rally
of 30,000 peo1e In Peking at which the epeakere accueed
ing in internal Chinese ufraire by
rebels. One speaker, Liu Ningel,
na Trade Unions Federation, inee-
for propaganda effect, warned
d Indian expansionists" that Com
-
never tolerate aggreseion egainst our
nee in our internal affairs." To
the pacific Mahatma Gandhi of
sheer hypocriey. The Communists)
he tactic of accusing others of
themselves ere doing.
As Nehru pointed out it is true that British policy
was one of expmaion into Tibet in the early years ot this
entury. As a resuit, the British did establish certain
extraterritori in Tibet and when India became
indePendent it inherlt?d these rights. But, Nehru insisted
when India became free she did not want to retain thee
rights. Soon after the Chineee arm4ea entered Tibet in
1950, the queetion of these rights was raised and India
rsadi4 gave then 4P. Army detachments were -ithdrawn
h installations and ret
and Indian postal and tele
heuses were handed over.
the /name Government has
the friendship or China.
it is a matter of the deepest regret and surprise to us
that charges should be made which are both unbecoming and
entirely void of !substance." Despite China's unwarranted
attack:, the Indian Government remains firmly ettaohed to
its polia of friendship towards China and hes plainly
stated that it will do nothing which would dieturb reia
tions between the two countriee.
there as is wideli knovne
out of its way to cultivate
him rea60134 Nehru said,
Nehru pointed to the ty of Chin'
*eITUOULng his conversatio ears ago wi
Premier Chou Enelai coneerning Tibet. Chou, be said, told
ht* that while Tibet had long been a part of the Chine
*tate, they did not consider it as a province of China.
therefore, they considered Tibet an autonomoue region 'thigh
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floor Chou turther told Wehru that it was
no to imagine that Chine was oir& to force
t. It would be difficult to imagA
contradiction between this statement and C1dnais
t on Tibetan freedom.
opinion haa undergone ct great change in
eountryls disappointment and resentment
seed in an editorial in the Aindustan
slAkt no
"A
heads low oday, the nelsmpaper maid.
on our border has paid the ulttmqte
emeriti to aspire to independence.
do not need reminder* from Pc4cing
nation of the ht.roic 600 million
111114mmaina ?I' the will to re -
ree million Tibetans. The world
nee of the Communist capacity to
hat kind with thoroughnems.n
at what irks the Indienk, most isthe
which the Chinese have L.ctsd
n a number of demande throughout Indio
forthright position with regard to
J4 s nal feelings cannot enter
le
by the requirements of
premier id foreign minister of a
# hie stetemoants he had
t like what China has done,
it for him to go beyond this
jeopardize lndials strategic
strategic peril and ham
blishment in Assam. As
rape of Tibet are cone
it has definitively wrecked
p1ea for 'understanding" and "coex-
Ankt.beyond India and the preatigp it
the other teeming millions of non-Communist
the Principles of Bandung were not
arently signified for the Communists.
se countries give every evidence
and disillusionment there hglve been just
6
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