SURVEY OF SOME COMMUNIST TACTICS AT INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-02771R000300020010-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 24, 1998
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: March 7, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

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SURVEY OF SOME COMMUNIST TACTICS
AT INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES
A. Tactics Preceding International Conferences
B. Tactics Within the Conference Halls
C. Tactics Outalde the Conference Halls
25X1A8a
Prepared by :
Prepared for.
Case Number
Date Completed: 7 March 1955
25X1A9a
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SURVEY OF SOME COMMUNIST TACTICS
A N`AtCONF:RS-
A. Tactics Preceding International Conferences
The Communists arrive at international conferences with
their objectives clearly defined. Their preparation of a
program goes as far as arranging a set sequence of speeches
to be used at a tactical moment.
Example. At the Geneva Conference, particularly during the
Korean sessions, the various Communist delegations
apparently participated in a planned sequence of
speeches. All Communist delegates appeared to
have advance copies of their colleagues' speeches.
The Communist-controlled front groups and press are sup-
plied in advance with the approved propaganda line. The Com-
munist themes are continually emphasized during the pre-
conference publicity.
Example. It is widely claimed that, prior to the Geneva
Conference, the Communists used. the leftist French
press as a fifth column and that the influence of
that press had produced in France a discouragement
which doomed the Conference from the start.
The Communists also contact various diplomatic personnel
of other countries scheduled to participate in the conferences,
and attempt to influence their attitude.
Example. Prior to the Berlin Conference, Soviet diplomats
talked with British and other Western diplomats,
emphasizing the line to the effect that the US was
the only obstacle to European settlement and that
Russia had no aggressive intentions. They also
stressed that the Conference would be doomed to
failure if the West were to insist that all-German
elections must precede German unification and peace
treaty.
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The Communist delegates and delegation staff are very well
ti
selected and are fully adequate for conference purposes.
Example. At the Geneva Conference, about one-third of the
entire Communist delegation could speak German; a
lesser number could speak French.
B. Tactics Within the Conference Halls
Once the Communist conference plan to set, any change in
the negotiations has to be referred back to headquarters, un-
less the highest-ranking Communists are present at the confer-
ence. When new directions arrive, they have to be obeyed to
the letter. The Communist line is likely to begin an a hard,
rigid position and gradually soften up as it develops a more
conciliatory tone. Each point, however, regardless of how
insignificant it may be, must be thrashed out in detail, ap-
parently to provide the Communist delegate with proof that he
has really "beat his head against a atone wall," before it is
conceded.
Examples. The 1944 negotiations in London for the establish-
ment of an emergency European Inland Transport
Organization, which involved nothing detrimental
to Soviet interests, dragged along until the Potsdam
Conference in 1945, when Stalin personally approved
the Soviet participation.
At the London Conference of the Council of Foreign
Ministers in September 1945, the phrase "in the
main" was contained in brief instructions. Weeks
of daily argument on this-phrase took place in
successive conferences concerning the Yugoslav-
Italian boundary. Eventually, the negotiators were
.,forced to suspend their meetings without agreement
on the terms of reference. Only then, did the
Soviet Government permit its delegation to approve
the inclusion of the controversial phrase.
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In the absence of new instructions, Communist delegates
reiterate their original positions even when confronted with
new points of view on the part of other members of the con-
ference. At times, reiteration constitutes a refuge for the
Communist delegate when he is unable to answer the opposition
or desires to stall for time.
Example. At the Berlin Conference, after the Western dele-
gates had agreed to the almost impossible terms
which the Soviets demanded for an Austrian peace
treaty, Molotov, taken by surprise, could only
fall back on reiterating familiar Communist argu-
ments, since he had no expectation or intention of
coming to an agreement over the treaty.
The various Communist delegations participating in a con-
ference operate jointly in accordance with a prearranged and
well-understood plan.
Examples. At Geneva, the various delegations made a series of
speeches evidently planned ahead as to exact sequence.
They likewise exhibited fairly ostentatious respect
for each other in matters of decorum and protocol.
At various ECAFE conferences, it has been the prac-
tice for various Communist delegates to propound
their presumably separate views, to be followed at
the end by "generous support" from the Soviet Big
Brother.
From the Communist point of view, international conferences
constitute sounding boards for propaganda themes to be played
throughout the world. They exploit such opportunities to the
fullest.
Example. US speeches at the plenary sessions of the Geneva
Conference were drowned by well-planned revetition
of Communist themes by the Soviets, the Chicoms,
the North Koreans, and the Viet Minh, speaking in
turn.
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Communist delegates delay ad infinitum agreement on pro-
cedural matters in order to avoid including in (or excluding
from) the agenda matters of strong importance to the Communist
cause. Also, they attempt to gain acceptance of an agenda
which is in effect, a statement of their solutions to the
various items.
Examples. An indication of Soviet dependence on the technique
of delaying an agreement on the agenda was the sur-
prise that was engendered at the Berlin Conference,
when Secretary Dulles immediately accepted the
Soviet agenda and thus eliminated the necessity for
a proceaurai debate which had characterized all
previous conferences.
During the Korean peace talks, the Communists sub-
mitted the following item for inclusion in the
agenda, which item, if accepted, would have obvi-
ated the need for substantive discussion: "To
establish the 38th parallel as a military demarca-
tion line, the armed forces of both sides to with-
draw 10 kilometers from the 38th parallel and simul-
taneously complete the withdrawal from Korea within
a definite time limit. leaving the evacuated areas
demilitarized, and the civil authority would be
restored by 25 June 1950."
The opposition frequently attempts to introduce irrelevant
material in the conference. It insists on attempting to in-
clude matters extraneous to what the other delegations con-
sider to be the agenda. This is done usually for political
reasons or for the effect on the world opinion.
Examples. The Soviets repeatedly attempted to have the Chinese
Communists Included in the Berlin Conference, the
agenda of which dealt with German and Austrian prob-
lems only. The Soviets argued that Chinese Commu-
nist participation would help world peace. Actually,
a dozen Chicome were present at the Conference as
observers.
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At the Geneva Conference, there was a consistent
Communist attempt to force the consideration of
political matters prior to the military matters on
the agenda. The Communists also insisted on dis-
cussing Laos and Cambodia, although Vietnam was
the only subject of discussion.
Communist delegates frequently accuse other conference mem-
bers of crimes with which they themselves are about to be con-
fronted. They make a special attempt to bring up their own
grievances, real or imaginary, before any other delegation
has an opportunity to do no, in order to gain the edge on publi-
city.
Ex___ample. At the Potsdam Conference, the Soviets made bitter
and prolonged attacks on the presence of British
troops in Greece, the Dodecanese, Syria and Lebanon.
After the Westerners had been worn down by these
wrangles, the Soviets could more easily face the
Western protests against brutal Soviet tactics in
the Satellites. The Soviets thus encouraged their
supporters in Greece, upheld their reputation for
hostility to colonialism in the Middle East, and
weakened any coordinated Western effort to loosen
the Soviet grip on the Satellites.
The Communists frequently attempt to influence negotiations
by conducting military activities concurrently with the conference.
Exile. The assault on Dienbienphu was engineered on the
eve of the Geneva Conference. Viet Minh delegates
arrived at Geneva in triumph and some delegates who
had previously been thought to be Chicoms turned
out to be Viet Minh participants. Later, the Chi-
come blandly undertook delaying tactics at the very
time when Bidault was attempting to arrange a battle-
field truce for the Dienbienphu wounded
Communist delegates can be expected, particularly when an
impasse at the conference is reached, to make separate appeals
to various conference delegations, playing upon-their special
interests, hopes, or fears. One aim of this tactic is to divide
the opposition.
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Examples. At the Berlin Conference, the Soviets and the Chi-
come held out attractive trade possibilities to
the British and prospects for an easy Indochina
settlement to the French, for the purpose of gaining
agreement for the proposed Geneva Conference.
During the Geneva Conference, as the position of
the French in Indochina grew progressively worse,
the Viet Minh delegates made a separate approach to
Mendel France knowing that he was hard pressed by
French opinion.
Soviet Bloc delegates also play upon personality traits of
other conference members when they have sufficient knowledge
in slant their approach. They exploit their knowledge of opposi-
tion personalities to the fullest.
Example. At the London conferences of the Council of Foreign
Ministers in 1945, Molotov tried with great pertina-
city to trip up Secretary Byrnes when the latter in-
dulged in his proclivity for off-the-cuff remarks.
He baited England's Bevin by making him angry, and
then taking advantage of Bevin's trait of being
apologetic for his anger. Molotov also used petty
tactics to slight Bidault's pride, at a time when
the French felt sensitive, by neglecting to inform
him of schedule changes which he had arranged with
the other conferees.
Premier Chou En-lai, particularly, has been described
as an extraordinarily harsh bargainer. Master of'
repetitive argument, he possesses infinite patience.
At the conference table, he is crafty, deft, and
quick to spot holes in his opponents' arguments.
He is also described as a very good actor.
C. Tactics Outside the Conference Halls
The Communist delegations exhibit mutual solidarity. There
is little or no mingling with foreign groups beyond official
intercourse.
Example. At the Geneva Conference, the Communist delegations
stayikd close together. In the halls, they marched
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together in the approximate order of rank. Out-
aide the halls, they nearly never appeared singly
but stayed in groups of four or five.
The delegations include a sizeable number of guards and
the leaders are alway% under the protection of 'their security
Example. At Geneva, Communist delegates were extremely secur-
ity conscious. They employed body guards who, at
appropriate times, surrounded the delegates in an
established pattern of movement, resembling blocking
in football. Of the 300 Chicom delegates, about a
third were security men. As far as the maintenance
of control over individuals was concerned, the Chi-
come were the most security-conscious of all Commu-
nist delegations.
The relations between Communist delegations and the press
are marked by cordiality to selected press and news outlets
only. Press and other propaganda channels are well arranged
in advance of the conference. During conferences, Communist
delegations entertain leftist and neutral press and supply
them with special releases.
Examples. At the armistice talks in Panmunjon, Communist press
outlets were organic elements of the delegations.
This arrangement enabled the Communists to manipulate
the necessary publicity, so that press statements
often appeared simultaneously with the actual occur-
rence of an event. Proceedings at closed sessions
were at times leaked by the press outlets of the
Communist delegations.
Soon after the start of the Geneva Conference, the
Chicom delegation held a cocktail party for neutral
and Communist press representatives. This was fol-
lowed by various small dinners and movie presenta-
tions. Chicom information officers handed out
large quantities of free propaganda material designed
to enhance the prestige of new China.
Communist propaganda activites extend to other participating
delegations, as well as the press.
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Example. At the Geneva Conference, the Chicom delegation
presented to the chiefs.of other delegations hand-
somely bound collections of Chinese art. Other
delegates were sent copies of a somewhat less fancy
brochure with flattering photographs of Communist
China, emphasizing cultural achievements and economic
and industrial activities.
Chinese Communist delegates exhibit unusual pride and arro-
gance at international conferences, particularly when their
delegation chief delivers an address. Soviet representatives
usually remain in the background, allowing the spotlight to
fall on their puppet protagonists, but there are strong indica-
tions that the delegations of the Asian Satellites take their
instructions not from Communist China, but from the Soviets.
Example. At the Geneva Conference, the Chicome showed a
desire to "be equal" to the Russians. They made
bigger demands on the Swiss for hotel rooms, once
they determined he number requested by the Russians.
Also, when they discovered that the Russians brought
some of their food from the USSR, they had their
own food transported from China. There was no
doubt, however, that Molotov was the real master.
His headquarters were visited by the Viet Minh and
North Korean delegates much more often than Chou'e.
Molotov apparently passed instructions to these
delegations, directly, rather than through Chou.
Korean speeches bore evidence of having been
originally written in Russian.
The participation of Communist delegations at international
conferences is usually acoompanied by "side shows," such as
demonstrations, parades and mass meetings, conducted by Communist
front organizations. The embassies of the Communist countries
represented are likely to remain in the background. The degree
of activities by local leftist organizations usually indicates.
the extent of their penetration by Communist parties.
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Example. The actions of the Indonesian Ministry of Education
during the Afro-Asian Conference will likely reveal
the degree to which It is penetrated by the Communists.
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