PROBLEMS OF THE ODER-NEISSE LINE
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Publication Date:
May 1, 1957
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T
PROBLEMS OF THE ODER-NEISSE LINE
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1 May 1957
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PROBLEMS OF THE ODER-NEISSE LINE
Prepared, for
Prepared by
Date completed:
1 May 1957
Case number
K-4735
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PROBLEMS OF THE ODER-NEISSE:LINE
CONTENTS
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII0
Introduction
Historical Background.
Birth of the Oder-Neisse Line
The German Point of View
The Polish Point of View
Attitudes of US, Britain and Exile Groups
Soviet Attitude
page 1
13
VIII.
Possible Developments
13
IX.
Dilemma Facing US Policymakers
14
APPENDIX: Source References
15
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PROBLEMS OF THE ODER-NEISSE LINE
I. Introduction
The Oder-Neisse Line has produced more friction and holds
more potentialities for future conflict than any of the other
problems arising from the settlements made by the victorious
Allies at the end of World War II.
The Polish western frontier was established along a line
formed. by the Oder river west of Stettin to its junction with
the Western Neisse and. then to the frontier of Czechoslovakia.
This involved the transfer of an area of about 40,000 square
miles from German to Polish jurisdiction, and the deportation
of an estimated seven million Germans back to Germany.
The Germans do not regard the frontier as permanent and
claim that on both legal and. moral grounds it is unacceptable.
The Poles have demonstrated a strong determination to maintain
their hold on the area, strengthened, by Russia's recognition
of their claim.
The Western Allies have recognized Polish ownership de
facto but not de jure. The dispute concerns more than the
permanent locari-o of the German-Polish border. It is the
most recent development in a struggle that has been going on
for centuries. It involves differences of economic development,
political systems, religion, language and cultural patterns.
On its solution depend the political development and economic
stability of Eastern Europe, and future German relations with
other European powers, both East and West.
II. Historical Backrg ound
Although the Poles refer to the newly acquired area be-
tween the Oder-Neisse Line and. the Polish western frontier of
1939 as the "Recovered, Territories," it appears that their his-
torical claim is ill-founded. The Oder-Neisse area comprises
three main parts: (1) the former German part of Silesia
(the Austrian part of Silesia went to Czechoslovakia in 1919
and. Upper Silesia was divided. between Germany and. Poland. after
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a plebiscite in 1921); (2) part of Pomerania called by the
Germans Farther Pomerania or Hinterpommern, now known in Polish
as "Lake-Pomerania" or Western Pomerania; and (3) the eastern
part of the former province of Brandenburg, the Neumark. In
the 11th and. 12th centuries the area was a part of the kingdom
of the Polish dynasty of the Piasts and was inhabited by
various Slavic tribes, nat all Poles. Since this time it has
not been under Polish rule. V
German interest and activity in the Slavic East have
existed from very early times. The sparse population and
undveloped.pastoral economy of the region offered, in general,
little resistance to the German settlers who followed. German
military expansion. Beginning with the successful campaigns
of the Emperor Frederick Barbarosea in the 12th century, the
Germans regarded the lands east of the Oder as a natural theater
for German conquest, colonization and economic expansion.
During the succeeding centuries, German power in Eastern Europe
advanced or receded according to the relative strength and
weakness of the German and. Slavic political and military organi-
za:tions. In the Oder-Neisse region, however, German domination
was established at an early date and was continuous until the
past-World War II period.
The different regions of the Oder-Neisse territory did not
share an identical historical development. In Silesia, Ger-
mans settled sporadically in the region around the Upper Oder
valley as early as the 10th century, although effective coloni-
zation did. not begin until the 11th and 12th centuries. By the
beginning of the 13th century, the area had passed, from Polish
to German control. The new rulers encouraged German colonists
and during the following century extensive emigration from
the West brought almost all of Silesia under German settle-
ment, except the eastern portion of Upper Silesia, where numerous
Polish settlements survived the German influx to furnish the
largest group of Polish inhabitants in the Oder-Neisse area
today. Detached from Polish domination in the 13th century,
the area became the site of numerous principalities mostly
under Slavic dynasties which managed for a while to'maintain
a degree of semi-independence. At the beginning of the 15th
century, the princes turned to the Kingdom of Bohemia for pro-
tection. The occupation of the Bohemian throne by the Hapsburgs
in 1526 incorporated Silesia into the Empire. In 1740 Frederick
the Great of Prussia occupied Lower Silesia and obtained for-
mal. cession of it from the Hapsburgs. In 17+2 he took Upper
Silesia and the region became a Prussian province, which it
remained, except for Polish Upper Silesia in the period between
World War I and. II. ~/
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The part of Pomerania now included in the Oder-Neisse terri-
tory was ruled by a Slavic duke as a part of the Holy Roman
Empire in. the 12th century. The medieval period was character-
ized, by dynastic struggles complicated by the fact that the
Elector of Brandenburg claimed. the ruler's feudal allegiance.
Upon the death of the Slavic ruler without issue in 1637 his
holdings were claimed by Brandenburg, and eventually incorpor-
ated, as a province of Prussia. The Neumark province of Branden-
burg came under. German control in the 13th century when, under
the Order of the Teutonic Knights, it became one of the three
subdivisions of Brandenburg. In 1373 the Elector acquired. it
from. theOrder and it remained an integral part of his territory
until it was organized as a province of the Kingdom of Prussia,
which subsequently formed. part of the modern German state after
the unification of 1871. Thus although the three sections had,
been subject to various rulers, the territory has been substan-
tially German for centuries. ~_
The population of the region was predominantly German and
German-speaking although not exclusively so. The pre-World
War II population was estimated to be between. eight and a
half and ten million persons, of which not more than one and,
a half million were Poles. Only in Upper Silesia was there
a sufficient number of Poles present to give rise to a minority
problem. In general, the character of'Pomerania, Brandenburg
and Silesia was not to be distinguished from other parts of
northern Germany. i/
Until the 18th century the question. of nationality was
not important to the inhabitants of the area. Many in fact
did not know to what nationality they belonged. With the rise
of national states there began to be a more intense interest
in nationality and. ethnic characteristics. The Poles, after
the partitions of the 18th century, made a determined effort
to preserve the idea of a Polish national state and Polish
ethnic, religious and cultural traditions. The Germans, alarmed
at the success of the Polish campaign, took measures to
Germanize the regions, acquired. through the Polish partitions,
intensifying efforts to attract German settlers and establish
the German language.
The distinction between Germans and Poles was magnified.
by economic conditions. In Silesia, the industrial revolution
which began in the 18th century produced a complex of coal
mines, iron and, steel works, and, armament factories which in
the 19th century rivaled the Ruhr in wealth and productivity.
This development was largely the product of German capital and,
administration and Polish labor. In the industrial towns,
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mainly in the Upper Silesian region, the more prosperous groups
were the German owners and officials, while Polish peasants
who worked in the mines and as unskilled labor, lived in poverty
and squalor. The Germans came increasingly to regard the Poles
as inferior beings, incapable of rising to the German technical
or cultural level. In the agricultural areas, the caste dis-
tinction was not so plainly marked.
In addition to language and economic status, religion was
`traditionally a divisive force. While the Poles were predomi-
nantly Catholic, the Germans shared the Protestantism of North
Germany. In Silesia in the 16th century, Lutheranism and.
Calvinism won many adherents, particularly among the Germans in
some of the Lower Silesian towns. Protestantism continued to
exist although due to the Counter Reformation in the 17th century,
considerable numbers of Germans in the area became Catholic,
That religion became an issue between the two races is indicated
by the fact that in the 18th century in one small section of
Austrian Silesia around Teschen, the Poles stubbornly maintained
the Lutheran church as a means of resisting Catholic authority,
while in Prussian Silesia they increasingly supported Catholicism
to distinguish themselves from the Protestant Germans. l0
The conflict between Germans and. Slavs erupted with explo-
sive force in World. War I. The World War I peace settlements,
in general, favored Slavs over Germans. They left, however,
large German minorities within the new Slav states which were
to be a source of irredentist agitation.
The problem of what to do with the rich Silesian. industrial
triangle proved to be one of the more difficult faced by the
peacemakers after World War I. Under Article 88 of the
Versailles Treaty, the assignment of Upper Silesia to Poland,
or Germany was to be determined by a plebiscite. The area
was placedunder an International Commission, composed of repre-
sentatives of Great Britain, France and Italy. Disorders broke
out between Polish volunteers, led by a Polish nationalist
named. Korfanty, and, remnants of the Germany Army (Freikorps)
in 1919 and again in 1920.
The plebiscite was held in March 1921. The majority of the
inhabitants voted, to remain with Germany. However, over 40
per cent of the population, concentrated in the southern and
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eastern countries, voted to join Poland. In May 1921, the Poles
rose in revolt against the plebiscite result. They were op-
posed by General Hofer and. the Freikorps. The resulting strife
worked considerable hardship on civilians and deepened enmity
on both sides. Order was restored by French and British troops
in. 1922. 11
The problem was submitted to a League of Nations committee
which decided that Upper Silesia should be divided in accordance
with the vote of the individual communes. This decision gave
the larger and richer part to Poland. It was also decided,
that for 15 years the unity of the region was to be preserved,
giving it some autonomy. By the Geneva Convention, existing
economic relationships were maintained or gradually modified
while new ones were being created. The Convention ran its full
1.5 years and. generally worked well, although both Germans and
Poles complained frequently to the neutral League administra-
tors. The period is of interest today as an example of a success-
ful German-Polish "condominium" in practice. 12..
Neither Poland nor Germany was satisfied with the World War
I boundaries. The Polish Corridor in particular was resented
by both. The sizable German minorities in Poland. remained.
German in orientation and were willing to be used by Hitler
as Fifth Columnists against the Polish government. Tension and
suspicion grew between the two powers during the inter-war years.
The occupation of Poland by the Germans during World. War II
was carried out with great thoroughness and relentless harshness.
The Polish population was a source of slave labor and, their
natural resources and industries were ruthlessly exploited.
In line with Nazi racist theories, the Poles were treated as
fR subhuman beings" (Untermenschen) which created additional
hatred of the Germans, and a determination to prevent German
aggression in the future. 13/
III. Birth of the Oder-Neisee Line
In considering what should be done with Germany after the
war., the three Allied powers were agreed that some form of
partition was justified as retribution for aggression and. to
deter its repetition.. The form of the partition to be adopted
was not defined. 24/ On the specific problem of the Polish
frontiers, Stalin made an early claim to the territory east
of the Curzon line. In return for Allied recognition of
Russian annexation of this area, he indicated. a willigness to
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agree to the acquisition by Poland. of German territory in the
West. Roosevelt and Churchill agreed. to this general design,
convinced. as they were of the desirability of breaking up
Prussia and. of strengthening Poland against any future German
aggression. Churchill wrote after the meeting of the Allies
in Teheran in November 1953: "personally I thought Poland.
might move westward, like soldiers taking two steps 'left close.'
If Poland trod, on some German toes, that could not be helped,
but there must be a strong Poland." In the formula put forward.
at the end of the meeting which summed. up the discussions,
it was stated, that "the home of the Polish state ... should, be
between the ... Curzon line and, the line of the Oder the
actual tracing of the frontier lines requires careful study,
and possibly d.iseritanglemeritof population at some point." 15
Acceptance by the Western Allies of the change in the border
and the transfers of large numbers of Germans from the area
was indicated, in statements by Churchill and. Roosevelt.
Churchill, in an interview with Polish Premier Mikolajczyk in
January 1944, told him that about seven million Germans living
between the German-Polish border and the Oder would be trans-
ported into Germany proper, a commitment which Roosevelt re-
affirmed. to Mikolajczyk in November 1944. 16
By February 1945, when the Big Three met at Yalta, the
Western Allies faced a dilemma. They needed Russian assurance
of help in the Pacific, but at the same time they became aware
of the problems involved. in the "disentanglement' of populations,
and the threat implied, by the Communist regime in Poland.
Churchill remarked: "It would. be a pity to stuff the Polish
goose so full of German food, that it died of indigestion." The
three heads of governments finally agreed that Poland must be
given substantial territory in the north and west and. that the
final delimitation of the western border should await the Peace
Conference. 17
Almost immediately thereafter the Polish Communist authori-
ties announced. that the administration of the country up to
the Oder and the Western Neisse had. been taken over b them.
At the meeting of the Big Three in Potsdam in July 195, the
US and Great Britain recognized. the Polish fait accompli by
agreeing that all the territory claimed by Stalin and, Bierut
for Poland. should, be und.er Polish administration, although the
three powers agreed again that final delimitation of the
border should. await the peace settlement. 18
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IV. The German Point of View
In an effort to make this territorial acquisition permanent,
the victors at once began the wholesale deportation of the
German inhabitants. Aggravated by the bitterness of the Poles,
who had, endured, the German occupation, and, the post-war shortages
of transportation, food., sanitary facilities and shelter, the
transfer was accomplished only with considerable hard.ship to
those involved. The forced expulsion, accompanied as it was by
loss of property and, physical suffering, in some cases unavoid-
able but in other cases increased by the harshness of revengeful
Poles, inevitably created. bitterness among the German expellees.
During the next two years, about seven million Germans returned.
to be absorbed. within the shrunken borders of Potsdam Germany.
About one million Germans remained. in Poland and. were accepted
by the Polish authorities as "autochthones" or an indigenous
population. 19 Thus the new Polish state avoided, the danger of
large, unassimilated minorities within its national borders.
However, the sense of a national grievance was not dispelled.
The expellees became a pressure group within Germany itself. 20
Organized. into a political party, the Expellees and. Victims
of Injustice (Block der Heimatvertriebenen and Entrechteten - BHE),
and various ethnic groups (Land.smannschaften), the exiles are cap-
able of wielding considerable influence in national politics.
They claim the right to return to their former homes on both
legal and, moral grounds. On legal grounds the Germans argue
that 'the British and. Americans only agreed to the expansion of
Poland, to the West on condition that a free and. democratic
Poland be established, a condition which has not been fulfilled.
They further claim that the Atlantic Charter excluded the possi-
bility of the annexation of German territory by the Poles. How-
ever, the Poles made it plain that they would, never accept the
inviolability of German territory and Churchill stated that
there would. be "no question of the Atlantic Charter applying to
Germany as a matter of right" or barring territorial adjustments
at the expense of Germany and, her allies. 21 To enforce their
moral right to the lost lands, the expellees have developed the
doctrine of the Recht auf die Heimat, the basic right of every
human being to his homeland. This concept has become a funda-
mental tenet of the exile groups and has been acknowledged. as
well by a number of Germans prominent in West German political
life. In addition to the right to one's homeland, the expellees
also claim that the initiative and hard work which the Germans
put into developing the eastern provinces have given them a
lasting equity in them. 22
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The expellees have given considerable thought as to how their
claims might some day be met. All responsible spokesmen agree
that war would provide no solution. Various plans have been
put forward., most of them based. on some sort of federal organiza-
tion which would permit ethnic groups recognition and some degree
of autonomy. The fact, however, that the problem of the revision
of the eastern border could, only be approached after the solution
of the far more serious problem of the reunification of Germany
itself has tended to discourage detailed, planning for this area. 23
Although the expellees represent the most active revisionist
force in Western Germany at present, two factors have worked to
moderate their demands. The first is the effort which has been
made to integrate them into the Federal Republic. Expellee govern-
ment officials were pensioned. or received, jobs comparable to those
they had. previously held. Federal legislation granted, special
financial aid, to West German employers who engaged expellee labor.
Expellee craftsmen were encouraged to set up small factories to
continue their ancient crafts. The second moderating factor has
been the high level of economic prosperity the Federal Republic
has enjoyed since the outbreak of the Korean War. The boom in
West German industry has absorbed. most of the employable expellees,
many of whom are enjoying a higher standard, of living than they
did in their former homes. An economic recession could. reverse
this situation (since the expellees are less firmly established,
financially and, would be the first to be affected) and, greatly
increase the demand, for the return of the eastern territories.
To date the trend. has been towards integration of the expellees
into the West German Republic, and a diminishing desire to
recross the Oder. 24
Because expellee votes are politically important in Western
Germany, and. could be decisive, both the Christian Democrats
and, the Social Democrats have refused to recognize the present
border as permanent. However, the present government has not
yet evolved a coherent policy for dealing with the problem.
Adenauer recently made it clear that he would not negotiate any
settlement with the USSR involving recognition of the Oder-Neisse
line. In 1953 in an interview with the Associated. Press, he
suggested, that the German eastern territories could. perhaps be
administered as a German-Polish condominium or be placed, under
the United Nations. The refugees protested to such an extent
that Adenauer disclaimed having made the suggestion which has
not been mentioned, subsequently. The Ministry of Refugees and
Expellees, while dedicated. to the integration of the exiles into
the Federal Republic, has nevertheless consistently encouraged.
them to maintain their dialects, customs and traditions. It
has also subsidized, several institutions, dedicated, to the study
of eastern problems such as the East Europe Institute at the
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Free University in Berlin, the former Breslau Institute now lo-
cated in Munich, and the German Society for East European Informa-
tion, of which Klaus Mehnert is the secretary and. guiding spirit.
A number of similar study groups have been sponsored by the
Kaiser Ministry of All-German Affairs. 25
Recent reports that many of the "autochthones" are returning
voluntarily to Germany may indicate that although the German
government officially still claims rights in the Oder-Neisse lands,
the people are in fact becoming resigned to their loss. About
16,000 of the autochthonic Germans returned last year and it is
believed that as many as 9Q,000 may follow this year. A total of
160,000 have asked to leave and the Poles are facilitating their
departure. 26
It is difficult to assess the real strength of the popular
feeling in Germany for revision of the border. There is plainly
a strong desire for reunification of Germany. If this were
accomplished, the strength of the revisionist sentiment would, prob-
ably depend on a number of factors, including the condition of
the German economy and, the extent of German integration into
Western Europe.
The Soviet-dominated. East German regime has recognized the
Polish-German border as final--a decision of political expediency
which would not necessarily survive reunification with Western
Germany. 27
V. The Polish Point of View
To the Poles the present western border is immutable. They
feel that their ownership of the Oder-Neisse lands is justified.
by their ancient occupancy of them and by their right to recom-
pense for the territories in the east annexed. by Russia at the
end of World. War II. They argue that their claim was recognized
by Allied. acceptance of Polish administration at Potsdam and that
the "final delimitation" to be made at the Peace Conference was
intended to confirm, not to alter substantially, the territorial
changes already agreed upon. The Poles further argue that the
mass deportation of Germans from the area, approved by the
Allies, means that the changes were intended to be permanent as
such drastic measures would hardly have been adopted. as a tem-
porary arrangement. 28
The integration of the "Recovered Territories" into the
rest of Poland was said to be one of the primary goals of the
first Polish post-war plan announced in 1917. 29 A special
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ministry for the "Recovered Territories" was established and
Polish settlers from the Eastern areas which were lost to Russia
and. from the densely populated parts of southern Poland, were
encouraged. to resettle the former German lands. Under the
Three Year Plan the western territories achieved a considerable
degree of recovery, both agricultural and industrial. The advent
of the Six Year Plan in 1949, which emphasized industrial rather
than agricultural production, the suppression of the Ministry
for the "Recovered Territories," and the drive to collectivize
the peasants slowed down the rate of agricultural progress. How-
ever, it soon became apparent that the growing industrial popu-
lation needed increased food supplies. In the winter of 1951-
1952 a new campaign was begun to encourage the resettlement of
the western area. 30 The effort is continuing, and, a recent policy
statement by Gomul a indicated that substantial economic conces-
sions are to be granted, including reductions in compulsory agri-
cultural deliveries, land leases on favorable terms, and financial
aid, for settlers. 31
In spite of relocation of refugees from the East and. of the
program of special inducements, the area now supports between
five and six million Poles in comparison to its pre-war popula-
tion of about 10 million Germans. A recent eyewitness description
of the Oder-Neisse territory states that many farms have been
abandoned. Agricultural production is admitted even by Communist
authorities to have declined from pre-war levels. Small indus-
tries, under the pressure of nationalization and heavy taxation,
also have decreased.. 2 The Germans have used, these facts to
bolster their arguments that the Poles are incapable of develop-
ing the area without German industry and, that it is, in any case,
wrong to expel the former owners only to allow the land. to lie
waste. The Poles have countered. with statements that the
situation has greatly improved since the destruction of the war-
time occupation and, that time and the high Polish birth rate
will make the territory fully productive. 33
The most important aspect of the newly acquired. area, however,
is the opportunity for industrial development which the Poles
now possess. With the Oder-Neisse territory, the Poles got sub-
stantial increases in-natural resources, the most important of
which are coal, lignite, zinc and lead ores, plus the industrial
complex of former German Silesia. The accession of new terri-
tory has changed the economic structure of Poland, from a pre-
dominantly agricultural country to one more nearly balanced.
between industrial and, agricultural production. At the same time,
the proportion of heavy to light industry has changed, to the
advantage of the former. The acquisition of the port of Stettin,
combined with the Oder river and the Silesian basin, constitute
an integrated system of industries and, transportation, offerin
the Poles the means of becoming an economically viable state.
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Both the first Three Year Plan and the subsequent Six-Year
Plan aimed. at developing heavy industry and. increasing the
nation's industrial production. The coal mines and factories of
Silesia played a significant part in this program. Although com-
plete statistics are lacking, it appears that coal production
in 1954 was almost equal to that of 1943. The Polish steel
industry and, the production of lead and zinc have developed. The
production of power and chemicals has increased.
The development of the industrial potential of the region,
particularly of the rich Upper Silesian industrial area, is
important not only to Poland but also to Czechoslovakia, Hungary
and. East Germany whose economies are linked with it. Czech and
Polish cooperation was recognized as essential after the war
and a beginning was made in the period. before the Communist re-
gime had secured complete control in Poland. and. before the coup
in Czechoslovakia. A treaty was signed in 1947 to establish a
Polish-Czechoslovak economic council to coordinate planning,
technical organization and investment. A treaty was also signed
with Hungary in May 1948.
The succeeding period of Communist government directed. from
Moscow altered, these relationships. The cooperation between
Czechs and Poles did not cease, in fact in some areas it increased,
but it was directed according to Russian rather than Satellite
interest. For example, work on the Oder-Danube canal which would
benefit Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary was dropped., although
construction continued of canals to join the Oder with the Vistula
and the Bug (lines of communication favoring Russian interests).
The integration of East Germany into the Bloc economy has caused
bitterness in Poland. because the Germans are still regarded. with
suspicion. 35
While the acquisition of the Oder-Neisse territory improves
the economic prospects of the Poles, it has tied, them politically
more closely to the USSR. The USSR is the only great power which
has recognized, the line and. is, therefore, the principal Polish
reliance against German irredentism. How vulnerable this makes
the Poles to Russian pressure is illustrated by a news story,
appearing under a Warsaw dateline, 28 January 1957, stating that
the East German Communist leaders were reported. to have hinted.
to Polish officials that their attitude on the question of
Poland's western frontier might be affected by recent Polish
developments. Poles who believed the report thought it repre-
sented, an East German protest against the democratization of
Polish life and the recasting of Polish economic agreements
according to national rather than Bloc interest. 36 The story
subsequently was denied by both the German Democratic Republic
(GDR) and, the Polish foreign ministries and the "inviolability"
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of the present frontier was reaffirmed., but the fact that the
rumor circulated. in Warsaw shows how easily the issue may be
manipulated, by both the USSR and the East Germans to apply pres-
sure on the Poles. 37
The attitude of the Roman Catholic Church poses another prob-
lem for the Poles. The Vatican takes the position that the ques-
tion of the Oder-Neisse frontier should be settled by a peace
treaty. Recently, the Polish government newspaper stated. that
the Holy See's agreement to appoint bishops in the western terri-
tories did not mean that there had been any change in Vatican
policy toward recognition. It had claimed. that the Vatican's
action was "confirmation of the inviolability of the frontiers ...
on the Oder and Neisse and the Baltic." It is possible that the
announcement was a condition for the Vatican agreement on appoint-
ments. 38
VI. Attitudes of US,. Britain and Exile Groups
Since 1945, neither the US nor the British have recognized,
the Oder-Neisse line as final. They have restated, the Potsdam
position that the Polish administrati-on is provisional and. that
the frontier will be delimited finally only in conjunction with
a German peace treaty. Although no guarantees have been made to
Germany that the Western Allies would support her claims for a
return to the 1937 line, the lack of a definite policy possibly
has encouraged, some Germans to hope that such support might be
forthcoming. 39
The opinion that the Oder-Neisse lands are basically Slav,
not German, is shared not only by the Polish nation but also
by the Poles in exile. Some of the exile groups have joined,
exile Czechs and Hungarians in endorsing an Eastern European
Slav federation which would. control the Silesian industrial
triangle. CFO Others visualize a bloc of free eastern states
("Inter Maria") stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea to
include Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania, providing
protection against Germany and. Russia. Ll All the exiles'
proposals, however, agree on ,excluding the Germans from future
East European development.
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VII. Soviet Attitude
The USSR alone, of the great powers, has recognized the Polish
claim to the Oder-Neisse territories. Russia is well aware that
the Oder-Neisse problem gives it an effective lever of control
in its relations with the Poles and other Slav states. A German
demand for a return of even a portion of the territories is
represented as a threat of renewed German aggression. At present,
there is no indication that the Soviets are contemplating any
change in policy. However, it cannot be doubted, that they recog-
nize the issue as a useful counter in the struggle for political
power between East and West and as an effective propaganda theme
within the Bloc.
VIII. Possible Developments
The Oder-Neisse problem is significant because it is part of
the larger problem of peace in Europe. As far as US interests
are concerned., it is plain that Russia has the capability of direct
action which the US does not possess. Should Russia decide that
a German settlement is more useful to her than Polish adherence,
it is possible that she might make a deal with the Germans at the
expense of Poland. The offer of German reunification and. settle-
ment of the Oder-Neisse problem on Bonn's terms in return for a
withdrawal from NATO and. a declaration of neutrality would have
a tremendous appeal for many Germans. f Since the Polish com-
mitment to the Oder-Neisse line is irrevocable, such a solution
could.be expected to have a serious effect upon Soviet-Polish
relations.
In view of the present precariously balanced relationship
between the two, and Moscow's efforts to maintain the Satellite
empire intact, it is doubtful such a drastic change would be
made at this time. Furthermore, Russia appears to believe that
in time disruptive tensions among the Western nations will
cause NATO to disintegrate and, seems to be willing to wait for
this to happen as a solution.
Another possibility is that the current relaxation of the
Soviet hold on Poland. may permit Warsaw and Bonn to work out a
general understanding on some common problems which would allow
the Poles to edge gradually out of the Soviet orbit. Such a
permanent, acceptable settlement appears to be an ind.ispensible
precondition for a higher degree of Polish independence. The
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Adenauer government's gradual approach to reestablishment of for-
mal relations with Poland, the rise in Polish-West German trade,
and the increasing numbers of Polish businessmen and, tourists
going to West Germany indicate such a development. A German-
Polish rapprochement would make the Poles less dependent on
Russia, would weaken the Soviet hold in Eastern Europe, and, im-
prove the prospects for a general European settlement. Such a
rapprochement, howe,ver,might also tend to draw West Germany
towards some form of neutralism and away from cooperation with
the West. 43/
IX. Dilemma Facing US Policymakers
The Oder-Neisse problem presents the US with a dilemma. Sup-
port of our ally, the West German Federal Republic, seems to
require, if not adherence to the German position, at least no
overt move against it. However, it is plainly to the interest
of the United. States to encourage Poland's move towards greater
independence from Soviet control.
The Oder-Neisse issue is one which has tied. Polish policy
closely to the USSR and, therefore, appears to be an area whose
exploitation might prove advantageous to the US. It has been
suggested, that a Western guarantee of Polish frontiers might
help the Poles gain greater freedom, although this might only
excite German intransigence without giving the Poles any real
security in exchange. However, a compromise containing some
face-saving concessions to Germany and. the expellees and., while
not completely supporting the present frontier at least abjured,
further partition of Poland or mass deportation of Polish
settlers, would perhaps encourage the Poles to feel that their
dependence on the Russian guarantee was not total. / The
outcome depends on the struggle for power between East and, West
and. on the evolving relationships within the Soviet Bloc.
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SOURCE REFERENCES
1. Wiskemann, Elizabeth, German is Eastern Nei hbours, Royal
Institute of International Affairs, Oxford University Press,
1956, Unclassified.
2. Ibid.
3. Britannica, Book of the Year, 1948, Unclassified.
4. Pollock and Thomas, Germany in Power and Eclipse, New York,
1952, Unclassified..
5. Ibid.
6. Arski, Stefan, The New Polish-German Border, Washington, 1947,
Unclassified.
7. Britannica, op. cit.
8. Thayer, Charles, Germany's Aspirations-in Eastern Europe,
1955, CIA Internal Use Only.
9. Wiskemann, op. cit.
11. Pollock and Thomas, op. cit.
12. Wiskemann, op. cit.
13. Ibid..
14. Thayer, op. cit.
15. Wiskemann, op. cit.
16. Ibid..
17. Ibid..
18. Ibid..
19. Ibid.
20. "Poland's German Frontier," The Economist, 22 Dec 56, Unclassified..
15
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21. Wiskemann, op. cit.
22. Thayer, off.. cit.
23. Ibid..
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid..
26. Baltimore Sun, "Germans Leave Areas in Poland," by Edward. C.
Burks, 20 Fermi, 57, Unclassified.
27. The Economist, op. cit.
28. Jordan, Z., Oder-Neisse Line, London, 1952.
29. National Intelligence Survey: Poland, Section 55, "National
Policies,-March 1952, estricted..
30. Wiskemann, op. cit.
31. Current Intelligence Digest, 14 Jan 57, Secret.
32.
330
34.
350
36.
New York Herald Tribune, 23 Feb 57.
Jordan, op. cit.
Ibid.
Wiiskemann, off. cit.
New York Times, "Warning to Poles on Border Hinted.," Sidney
Griison, 28-Jan 57.
37. FBIS USSR Survey, 14 Feb 47, Confidential.
38. Current Intelligence Digest, 10 Dec 56, Secret.
39. The Economist, op. cit.
40. Wiskemann, off. cit.
41. Thayer, off. cit.
42. Ibid.
43. The Economist, op. cit.
'79_s_hington Post, "New Warsaw-Bonn Relations Possible,"
Chalmers M. Roberts, 17 Mar 57.
44. The Economist,. cit.
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