The Soviet Mission Abroad

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-02646R000500370001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 114
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 23, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

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1. Soviet Foreign Policy and the Roles of
MFA and KGB in Soviet Representations
Abroad
Page No.
2. Overt Work of a Soviet Diplomatic Mission 3
3. CC/CPSU Comments on the Work of Soviet
Diplomatic Missions 4
4. Participation of the RIS Rezidenturas in
the Work of a Soviet Diplomatic Mission 8
B. COMPOSITION OF THE SOVIET DIPLOMATIC
MISSION ABROAD
a. His Party Position and Personal
Background 11
b. External Responsibilities
c. Internal Responsibilities
d. Relations with the KGB Rezidentura
e. Relations with the GRU Rezidentura.
f. The Ambassador's Personal Staff
2. Substantive Sections of a Soviet Diplomatic
Mission 28
a. The Political Section
b. The Cultural Section
c. The Press and Information Section
d. The Office of the Counselor for
Economic Affairs
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e. The Consular Section and Soviet
Consulates 36
f. Office of the Military Attache
g. Scientific and Technical Section
3. The Commercial Mission (TORGPREDSTVO)
4. Administrative Elements
a. Administrative Section
b. Embassy Physician
c. The Zavkhoz
d. The Bookkeeper or Accountant
e. Dezhurniy. Komendant
f. Chauffeurs
g. Char Force
h. Code Clerks
i. Spetskuriery
C. ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES
1. Working Hours and Daily Routine
2. Length of Duty Tours
3. Leave Practices
a. Home Leave
b. Extended Leave
c. Emergency Leave
d. Unusual Leave Patterns
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4. Finance 49
a. Budget 49
b. Secret Funds 50
c. Salaries and Allowances 50
5 Housing 51
6. Vehicles 52
7. Registry, Pouch and Cable Procedures 54
8. Supplies; Building Maintenance 56
9. Dependents 56
a. Working Wives 56
b. Position of Women in the Mission 58
C. Schooling of Dependent Children 59
10. Personnel Practives 60
a. Soviet Diplomatic Ranks 60
b. Promotions 62
c. Trainees and Probationers 62
11. Observance of Official Holidays 63
D. SECURITY PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES 65
1. General 65
2. Screening and Briefing of Personnel 65
a. Exit Commission 65
b. Briefing on Arrival at a New Post 66
3. Personnel Security and Discipline at the Post 67
a. General 67
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b.
The Regime of the SK
68
c.
Crimes and Misdemeanors
69
d.
Contact with Foreigners
71
4.
Physical Security
73
a. Defense Against Entry
73
b. Internal Communications in a
Soviet Embassy
73
c. Technical Security
74
d. Secure Areas
75
(1) The Referentura
75
(2) Other Secure Areas
79
(3) Other KGB and GRU Work Areas
80
e. Regulations on Classified Talk
80
E.
REPORTING FROM A SOVIET EMBASSY
81
1.
Types of Reports
81
a. The Annual Country Report
81
b. The Political Letter
84
c. The Monthly Chronicle
84
d. The Essay Report (Spravka)
84
e. The Country Guide Book
84
f. The Report of Conversation with a
Foreigner
85
g. The Quarterly and Semi-Annual Reports
85
2.
Routing of Correspondence to Moscow
85
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3.
Classification of MFA Documents
85
4.
Examples of Materials Carried in Soviet
Diplomatic Pouches
86
a. List of Items Sent by Pouch to MFA
Headquarters From a Soviet Embassy
86
b. List of Items from MFA Headquarters
Sent in a Pouch to a Soviet Embassy
87
5.
Weaknesses and Shortcomings in MFA Reporting
from a Soviet Diplomatic Mission
89
F.
THE PARTY ORGANIZATION IN A SOVIET DIPLOMATIC
MISSION
91
1.
General Considerations
91
2.
The Role of the Party in a Soviet Mission
98
3.
The Mestkom
99
4.
Study Groups
100
G.
MISCELLANEOUS ASPECTS OF A SOVIET DIPLOMATIC
MISSION
101
1.
The Atmosphere in a Soviet Diplomatic
Mission
101
2.
Social Life and Recreation
104
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A. INTRODUCTION
1. Soviet Foreign Policy and the Roles of the MFA and
KGB in Soviet Representations Abroad
The foreign policies of the Soviet State are established
not by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but by the Politburo of
the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(CPSU). The Politburo acts, of course, on the basis of infor-
mation and analyses provided it by a number of subordinate
ministries and State Committees, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MFA) being one among many. But the Politburo enjoys a complete
monopoly over the initiation and formulation of Soviet foreign
policy and directly controls its execution.
Since its inception, the Soviet regime, being the embodiment
of Communist ideology, has been dedicated to the world-wide
establishment of Soviet Communism. Thus, its foreign policy has
been essentially revolutionary; its objectives are hostile to
and destructive of the existing order in non-Communist states,
and its methods, unhindered by conventional morality, include
whatever may be effective within the practical limits of the
moment: manipulation through penetration agents and agents of
influence of the economic and political policies of foreign
governments, disruption, incitement of disorders, sabotage, kid-
napping, assassination, financial and other support of revolu-
tionary or opposition parties or groups, psychological warfare,
provocation and deception. No "relaxation of tension" has
changed this, although the possibilities open to the Soviets
today are very limited in many areas. But even where sweeping
change is clearly not feasible, Soviet foreign policy has as its
minimum objective the creation of a political climate which is
not actively hostile to the USSR, and within which the various
elements of the Soviet foreign policy machine are enabled to
work in relative freedom toward the ultimate subversion of the
host nation and related countries.
The organs of the Politburo which pursue such revolutionary
aims and use such methods are necessarily of a different order
from Western ministries of foreign affairs. The latter are
usually the central executive organs for foreign policy; they
help define policy, they attempt subtly to influence foreign
governments to favorable positions and they maintain routine inter-
national economic, political and cultural relations within an
accepted status quo. In the Soviet Union, bent on changing the
status quo, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs - which in fact
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does carry out traditional "diplomacy" - is not the Politburo's
primary action arm abroad; the KGB is. The.KGB enjoys position,
power and assets quite inconceivable in a Western framework,
because it is also the "sword" which keeps the One Party in
power. The KGB's special position includes a dominance over
the organizations of "diplomacy": the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and relation institutions.
The functioning of a Soviet embassy abroad can only be under-
stood if this background is grasped. Once it is, it can be
understood why, of the some 5,500 Soviets currently assigned to
official installations abroad (excluding military and economic
aid missions) about 3,000 are staff officers of the KGB and GRU.
Over half of all the Soviets permanently stationed in a given
country may be intelligence officers, while there is an average
of 75 percent of RIS officers among Soviets carried on official
diplomatic lists.
All elements of a Soviet embassy are known to have provided
cover for intelligence officers. Numerous Soviet ambassadors
have been reliably identified as intelligence officers earlier
in their careers. Whether they retain staff intelligence status
upon becoming ambassadors is not known, but it is more than
coincidence that many such ambassadors with established intel-
ligence backgrounds, particularly in political and subversive
operations, are now representing the Soviet Union in Africa and
the Near East where Soviet policy objectives emphasize subver-
sion rather than diplomacy, or even espionage. Political,
cultural, scientific, and economic counselor posts are more
often than not occupied by intelligence officers. Consular
offices have historically provided cover for KGB officers, and
in several Soviet installations all consular officers were known
intelligence officers. Outside as well as inside the embassy,
the press and information offices are heavily occupied by intel-
ligence officers. One defector estimated that 70 - 80 percent
of all TASS representatives are KGB or GRU. All other Soviet
governmental agencies having representation abroad are known to
have provided cover for Soviet intelligence. A recent survey
of AEROFLOT representatives revealed that over 70 percent were
known or suspect GRU officers. In a Near Eastern country the
head of the Baltic and Black Sea Company office was a KGB officer
who engaged in operations aimed at penetrating the local American
embassy. There are other such examples too numerous to mention.
Thus, all significant aspects of Soviet official activities
abroad are conducted either by KGB or GRU officers, or by other
Soviet officials who have been co-opted as agents of these
services, or by non-intelligence officers whose superiors or
close colleagues are intelligence officers or agents.
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Nonetheless, ever since the very beginning of the Soviet
regime, the Bolsheviks have been genuinely eager to maintain a
facade of respectability and of polite international intercourse
with non-Communist governments, even while they are simultane-
ously undermining those governments. The Ministry of Foreign
Affairs has, therefore, had a real function, but it should
always be viewed in the light of the underlying reality of the
revolutionary Soviet State. Its overt functions, as the pages
below will show, are similar to those of Western ministries of
foreign affairs. But Soviet "diplomacy," the overt part of the
MFA representation, should not be misconstrued as representing
the central means of execution of Soviet foreign policy in the
host country.
2. The Overt Work of a Soviet Diplomatic Mission
The chief responsibility of the Soviet diplomat is to
promote the overt Party line on a great variety of subjects, by
any and all overt and semi-overt means at his disposal. Concom-
itantly, the Soviet diplomat has the responsibility of gathering
a great variety of information on host-country topics, concerning
both internal and external affairs, from overt and semi-overt
sources.
As the term is used by the RIS - and by other professional
services throughout the world - the Soviet diplomat is not an
intelligence officer. Except in those cases where he is clandes-
tinely an RIS officer or has been co-opted by one or another of
the rezidenturas, the Soviet diplomat does not handle foreign
national agents. The Soviet diplomat does not seek contact with
foreigners except in order to comply with orders from his ambas-
sador, who in turn acts in response to specific directives. Thus
his cultivation is primarily for the purpose of attempting to
persuade foreigners to accept the current overt Party line on a
certain subject, or to elicit from them certain overt and semi-
overt information. Once established, of course, this contact is
often exploited by the KGB or GRU.
While they vary little from the tasks of all embassies, some
of the known overt functions of Soviet embassies are noted here:
- Delivering aides memoires and similar documents to
the host foreign office, and arranging protocol visits
between the ambassador (and other senior embassy
officers), and ranking officials of the host govern-
ment.
- Studying the host-country press, both that of the
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capital and of the provinces, for articles of
interest. This consumes a good part of each day.
The Soviet diplomat clips many of these and sends
them to the appropriate geographical area divi-
sions of the MFA headquarters, accompanied by an
analysis of the content. In a large embassy, the
individual officer may be charged with the respon-
sibility of covering a specific field, e.g.,
cultural events, whereas in a small embassy all
officers will be expected to watch over several
categories of information. KGB and GRU officers
under MFA cover spend little of their time at this
activity; it is the MFA officer who is burdened
with this task.
- Making contacts in various strata of host-country
society - in foreign office and governmental
circles, among business and industrial groups, in
press and journalistic circles, among writers and
other intellectuals. Such contacts are usually
made upon receipt of a directive from Moscow to
propagandize the Soviet position on a specific
subject, for example MLF or the nuclear test-ban.
The line taken is usually the same one which appears
in the overt Soviet press, in some cases tailored
according to the degree of sophistication of the
Soviet who is delivering it. (See paragraph A-4,
entitled Participation of the RIS Rezidenturas in
the Work of a -Soviet Diplomatic Mission for comments
on KGB variations on the official line.) At the
same time, the Soviet attempts to elicit from his
foreign contact overt and semi-overt information and
informed opinion on the subject at hand. Detailed
descriptions of the specific overt work of the
various sections of a Soviet mission will be found
under B-1, B-2 and B-3.
3. CC/CPSU Comments on the Work of Soviet Diplomatic Missions
The overt work of Soviet diplomatic missions was described
in Moscow in the early 1960s by members of the Politburo and the
CC/CPSU in lectures to a group of ranking officials from MFA
headquarters and Soviet embassies throughout the world. Some of
the points made were as follows:
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- Praise was given for the number of ideological
speeches (to foreign audiences) given or sponsored
during a certain period: 216 speeches in England;
150 in Poland; 115 in the United States; 35 in
Denmark; 30 in Norway; 20 in France, and a series
of weekly lectures given in Sweden.
- More effort was recommended in promoting Communism
in Japan, the African countries, Latin America,
and certain countries of Western Europe.
The circulation of materials explaining the objec-
tives of the 22nd CPSU Congress was urged by
encouraging mass publication in the local press
and by distribution of bulletins and hand-out
materials. Motion pictures, show window displays,
informative letters sent to individuals in the host
country, and radio and lecture programs were sug-
gested as additional means of promoting widespread
knowledge of the work of the 22nd CPSU Congress.
The embassy in New Delhi was complimented for
publishing the then-current Khrushchev report in a
million copies in 14 languages and for printing
5,000 articles in the press.
In 1961, 900 articles were published in the United
States press and 70 brochures were published there
in 700,000 copies.
- Dissemination of political literature was further
urged through the facilities presented by the
Commercial Missions abroad and through Mezhkniga
(International Book).
- Better reporting from embassies was stressed.
Although the Soviet Embassy in Rome was praised for
a diary system in which day-to-day contacts and
complete conversations were kept and transmitted to
MFA headquarters, it was judged that too little
emphasis had been placed on eliciting political
commentary and political information; more than half
of the reports from Italy concerned cultural matters.
Other needs in reporting were for full texts of host-
country governmental pronouncements; analysis of and
comments on host-country connections with NATO and
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the Common Market. Reporting in depth was urged on
all major international questions, i.e., disarmament,
the German question, liquidation of colonies and the
Franco-German accord.
A ranking member of a geographical area division of the MFA
made the following comments in the early 1960s concerning the
general work of embassies in the countries under his juris-
diction:
- In general, reporting from the various embassies is
satisfactory, and covers the problems with which
the area division is concerned. However, certain
shortcomings have been observed which require improve-
ment.
- Too many reports non-political in nature are forwarded
to Moscow. One embassy's reporting was over 50 per-
cent cultural and educational in nature. While such
material may have a certain value, it has little
value as an aid to political analysis; and in general
such reporting is a waste of the time of the embassy
staffers who prepare it.
- There is too great a delay in reporting information
of significance. The embassy staff must realize what
is important and report it immediately. (The speaker
cited a certain piece of information which was
received at MFA headquarters, not from the embassy in
the country where the event happened but from one of
the Soviet correspondents in that country. He noted
that the MFA queried the embassy on the basis of the
correspondent's report, but still got no reply from
the embassy until more than two weeks later. The
speaker noted further in this regard that the report
which the embassy finally submitted was accompanied
neither by analysis nor appropriate suggestions for
action by Moscow or the field.)
- The MFA has the impression that its queries to the
embassies are too often regarded as being only pro
forma, to be answered, ignored, or answered only
after great delay, according to the whim of the
embassy staff. Each query to the field is sent in
response to a requirement from within the MFA, from
from the leadership of the MFA, or from "on high,"
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therefore each embassy must adhere to the suspense
dates cited in the queries.
- Many suggestions for propaganda actions forwarded
by the embassies are unsound. As an example, certain
embassies have proposed that the cosmonauts be
invited to their countries. MFA has responded with
questions as to which organizations in the foreign
country would issue the invitations and be respon-
sible for the cosmonauts during their visits, etc.,
but the embassies have failed to respond and the
matter has been left unresolved. Similarly, all
embassies request that noted Soviet artists be sent
to their countries, without taking into consideration
that there is only one Moscow State Circus, one
Moiseyev Ballet, one Richter, one Gilels, and so
forth.
- Reporting on local political figures is inadequate.
Such reporting too often lacks specific detail on
the individual's background and, worse, on his poli-
tical orientation and his attitude towards the USSR.
- The source of much reporting from embassies is too
limited. In most cases embassy reporting is based
on the local press, while what little good reporting
there is is derived from conversations with local
citizens. Sources of information must be widened to
include local private citizens, local government
officials and suchlike. Embassies are requested to
forward the full texts of official governmental
announcements and to report in full the pronounce-
ments of individual government officials.
- The embassies (in a given gepgraphical area) during
the year , forwarded some 2,000 reports of
conversation with foreigners. However, many of these,
reports were faulty. In many instances our comrades
failed to take the initiative in posing foreign
policy questions to the local citizens, and failed
to propagandize the themes of the 22nd Party Congress.
In many other cases it was clear that our comrades
understand incorrectly and interpret incorrectly the
foreign policy course of the Soviet government, and
thus prepare themselves inadequately for conversations
with foreigners. In certain instances, some comrades
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failed completely to touch on political themes.
- In many cases comrades have not gotten from local
citizens all the information which they could have.
For instance, in talking with a local citizen, it
becomes obvious that that citizen has information
about, or is a member of a certain organization.
Some comrades, however, have failed to ask such
questions as what type of work the organization is
doing, what sort of material it publishes, how well
it is known in the local country, and so forth.
In conclusion, the overt work of a Soviet embassy in any
country is to propagandize the CPSU line current at any given
time, by all overt and semi-overt means, and to collect a great
variety of overt and semi-overt information by other than clan-
destine means from the public press and by making contacts among
all possible strata of host-country society. In the course of
this work the Soviet diplomat is expected to write a great
volume of analyses of local events, to gather quantities of news-
paper clippings and to prepare reports of conversation with
foreigners; all of which are forwarded to the MFA in Moscow.
With the exception of clipping items from the host-country press,
this work is done by both the Soviet diplomat and, in his cover
capacity, by the KGB and GRU officer.
4. Participation of the RIS Rezidenturas in the Work of
a Soviet Diplomatic Mission
No description of the organization and functions of an
overt Soviet mission could be complete without comment on the
role which the KGB and GRU play in it. Outside the Soviet Bloc,
RIS personnel constitute well over half of the diplomatic staff
and even in MFA headquarters in Moscow it appears that almost
half of the personnel assigned to geographical area and support
divisions may be known or suspect RIS officers. There is an
entire cadre of RIS officers which employs MFA cover both abroad
and in the USSR, and which has grown increasingly since the end
of World War II until it now occupies well over half the diplo-
matic slots of the Soviet Foreign Ministry.
This being the case, what is the exact role of the RIS in
the work of a Soviet diplomatic mission? To what extent do RIS
officers participate in overt diplomatic work; does their parti-
cipation in overt work differ from that of the "straight" Soviet
diplomat; and by whom is their overt work directed? Briefly,
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the RIS officer who occupies a diplomatic slot does the same
type of overt work as his non-RIS diplomatic colleagues, but
only to the extent that his primary job, RIS work, permits.
The RIS officer under diplomatic cover is assigned his overt;
tasks directly or indirectly by the ambassador, who expects
him to do a certain amount of "straight" MFA work.
At the same time, the RIS officer under diplomatic cover,
as well as under Commercial Mission, news service and other
non-diplomatic cover, finds his cover duties in complete or
near-complete consonance with his RIS tasks and targets. In
general terms, the principal difference between the way the
MFA diplomat carries out his official duties and the RIS
officer his cover duties, is that the MFA diplomat tends to
restrict his contacts with foreigners to official and repre-
sentational occasions, while the RIS officer spends most of
his working hours outside the official installations, making a
great variety of contacts among the local population. On the
other hand, we have observed numerous occasions when an MFA
diplomat has "teamed up" with an RIS officer at an official
function, the diplomat conducting himself in a formal manner
while his RIS colleague moves busily about, seeking out
foreigners of interest to his rezidentura.
Concerning the propagandizing of a given CPSU "line,"
RIS - principally KGB - officers in "private" conversation
with foreigners are known to have taken a tack different from,
and at times at variance with, the line which other Soviets in
the host country and other parts of the world were taking.
These variants are often prefaced by a remark such as,"The
official line is so-and-so, but my private opinion is . . . ."
In every such case it is safe to assume that the speaker is
doing this in order either to spread "disinformation" or to
attract the attention of his listener in the hope that the
latter can be drawn into a relationship which can be exploited
operationally.
Rezidentura members participate in routine Party work within
the mission, and may also play minor roles in mestkom activity.
They pay rent for their living quarters, contribute their share
to the overall costs of the utilities if they reside in a
compound, and follow MFA accounting and travel regulations when
carrying out their overt functions. Members of the rezidenturas
are paid according to their cover grades, and receive their
local salaries at the same time and in the same manner as bona
fide officers and employees. However, it is equally obvious
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that they have ready access to operational and representational
funds far in excess to anything which the bona fide diplomat
enjoys. Despite the extent to which the RIS officer may parti-
cipate in the routine work of the mission, he - and particularly
the KGB officer - clearly considers himself to be superior to
his MFA colleagues; an attitude which hardly endears him to
others and heightens the atmosphere of hostility in the mission.
B. COMPOSITION OF THE SOVIET DIPLOMATIC MISSION ABROAD
The Soviet diplomatic mission abroad is under the overall
supervision of the ambassador, who functions as coordinator of
all Soviet activities save intelligence operations in the host
country. In this capacity the ambassador is directly respon-
sible to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union for the day-to-day coordination of all overt aspects
of Soviet foreign policy in the country to which he is assigned.
The composition of the mission under the ambassador's supervision
is as follows:
- The ambassador's personal staff.
- The administrative staff of the embassy.
- The referentura (communications center and area where
the preparation of reports and similar work of the MFA
staff and the KGB and GRU rezidenturas is carried on).
- The Political Section.
The Cultural and Press and Information Sections (in
large embassies, two separate entities).
The Economic Section which in certain countries of
Africa, the Middle East and Asia, supervises the work
of the Soviet Military Aid Program personnel and the
Technical Aid Projects personnel.
- The Consular Section.
- The Military Attache's Office.
- The Commercial Mission
- The press correspondents (TASS, Novosti, Pravda, etc.)
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- The Scientific and Technical Section (found in a
very limited number of countries).
1. The Ambassador
a. The Soviet ambassador is appointed by, and is respon-
sible to the CC/CPSU. The MFA may recommend to the CC/CPSU a
given individual as ambassador, and obviously the MFA concurs
in the choice of an ambassador-designate by the Central Committee,
but the Central Committee (in actuality, the Politburo) appar-
ently makes its own choice and MFA concurrence is merely a
formality. Although well over half the number of Soviet ambas-
sadors currently serving abroad have been officials of the MFA
for over 10 years, a significant number had no experience in
diplomacy prior to their present assignments. Most of these
men were appointed directly from relatively high positions in
the Party apparatus, while a few came from high administrative
posts in the Soviet government. Of all Soviet ambassadors now
serving abroad, 11 are full members of the CC/CPSU.
The personal background and current standing in the Party
hierarchy of Soviet ambassadors, of course, varies; some are
more powerful than others; some enjoy considerable personal
prestige in high places in Moscow, while others are little more
than petty bureaucrats; and some have been "dumped" into their
present positions by the clique currently in power, in order to
remove from the Moscow scene men who represent a potential or
actual challenge to the power and authority of that clique.
Because of these differences, and because of differences in
personality, the conduct of Soviet ambassadors throughout the
world in dealing with foreigners differs widely; some appear to
be highly self-confident men who possess a considerable amount
of personal authority while others seem to be automatons totally
lacking in initiative.
At the same time, the Soviet ambassador, irrespective of
his personal position in Moscow, is permitted little latitude
when dealing with foreigners in the host country concerning
substantive matters relative to Soviet foreign policy. Each
Soviet ambassador is guided by, and is completely submissive to,
directives sent to him by the MFA leadership, acting on orders
of the CC/CPSU, or directly by the CC/CPSU; and these directives
establish the framework within which he and his staff are
permitted to operate. Depending on his own self-confidence,
engendered by a sure knowledge of his position with the ruling
clique (or lack thereof), initiative and personality, the Soviet
ambassador appears to be permitted a certain freedom in executing
these directives, but he knows clearly where the established
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limits lie. In many instances, Soviet ambassadors have given
evasive answers or have refused to answer questions on various
aspects of Soviet life and foreign policy put to them by members
of the host-country press and foreign office or by prominent
local citizens, all touching on subjects on which the ambassador
is known to have received no official guidance from Moscow.
Host-country foreign offices have presented Soviet ambassadors
with requests for urgent replies concerning important issues,
but when uncertain of the Party hierarchy's wishes in the
matter, ambassadors have refused to make even an interim reply
of any substance. Instead, they cabled the requests to Moscow
and remained silent until precise instructions were received.
There is no truly composite Soviet ambassador except in one
sense - his absolute responsiveness to the orders and wishes
of the Politburo of the CC/CPSU in executing the aims of Soviet
foreign policy in the country to which he is assigned. Whether
the Soviet ambassador appears to be urbane and sophisticated,
a truculent boor or a provincial bureaucrat out of the pages of
19th Century Russian literature, he is appointed to his post
because of a proven ability to carry out orders and, depending
on the political climate of the host country, to do so with
much or little imagination.
Many Soviet ambassadors appear to Western eyes to be singu-
larly ill-qualified for their tasks, often lacking any knowledge
of foreign languages, frequently appearing to have little or no
knowledge of the history, traditions and customs of the host
country, and at times conducting themselves in public in a
manner boorish, awkward and offensive to the local inhabitants.
It is obvious that these shortcomings have little or no meaning
for officialdom in the USSR as the Soviet ambassador is clearly
regarded by the highest echelons of the Soviet hierarchy as.being
fully capable of carrying out the directives and orders of the
CC/CPSU with regard to the proper conduct of Soviet foreign policy
in the country to which he is assigned. While the Soviet ambas-
sador does indeed hold general coordinating authority over all
the elements of the Soviet colony., his most immediate concerns
are the day-to-day conduct of Soviet foreign policy by the
various elements operating from the embassy; administrative
matters within the embassy; the conduct of CPSU affairs within
the embassy and the Commercial Mission; the daily lives and
conduct of all Soviet personnel assigned to the embassy.
The ambassador's work day usually begins with a lengthy
perusal of the local press. In those instances where the ambas-
sador cannot read the indigenous language, his interpreter/
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secretary (usually male) translates for him, reading articles
touching on Soviet interest. Since Soviet interest covers a
great range of topics, the translating/reading period may take
several hours. The ambassador frequently cables a report to
Moscow, at times to the MFA and other times directly to the
CC/CPSU, depending on the subject, giving a precis of an inter-
esting article and his comments thereon. If the ambassador
believes that the article does not warrant a cable, he will
forward it in the diplomatic pouch. (Although the ambassador
and his /non-RIS/ staff forward great numbers of articles taken
from the local press, we have noticed a tendency to send on
only those articles which are favorable to the Soviet Union, or
which at least indicate a present or growing pro-Soviet attitude
on the part of the local government or of certain important
segments of the local ' society . )
The balance of the ambassador's day can be divided into two
categories of work: diplomatic affairs and embassy affairs.
When engaged in the former category, the ambassador calls on. and
receives ranking officials of the host foreign office and govern-
ment, leading members of political parties, prominent local
businessmen engaged in or interested in trading with the Soviet
Union, and the heads of delegations traveling to the Soviet Union;
appears at the principal ceremonies of the local Soviet Friend-
ship Society, and so on. The ambassador attempts on every such
occasion to propagandize the current Soviet foreign policy line,
and to elicit from the prominent local figures whom he meets
information based on requirements from Moscow. (This activity
is in no sense to be confused with the information-gathering
activities of the KGB and GRU rezidenturas. The ambassador and
the diplomatic /non-RIS/ staff attempt to elicit semi-overt
information from local persons of prominence in governmental.,
business, political and intellectual circles, and in turn to bring
these persons towards a pro-Soviet orientation. The KGB and GRU
rezidenturas gather hard, accurate, objective classified infor-
mation by classic covert means, and, in the case of the KGB
residency, manipulate agents of influence in high places in the
local society.)
b. External Responsibilities of the Ambassador
The frequency of a Soviet ambassador's appearances
outside the embassy on official business varies with the attitude
of the Soviet government toward the hos r , e.g., if the
government of the host country supports n an inter- 25X1A2g
national issue which the USSR opposes, the Soviet ambassador's
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protocol visits will decrease in frequency and often stop
altogether, until local attitudes have become more favorable
to the USSR, or until the crisis has passed. Conversely, in
countries outside the Bloc where the government is "neutral,"
pro-USSR or only superficially anti-USSR and/or the local
Communist Party is large, legal or vocal, the ambassador (and
his staff) will be seen with great frequency outside the
embassy, making all manner of protocol calls, attending a great
variety of receptions, and so on. On the other hand, the
ambassador is equally active in those countries which have long
maintained a pro-US posture, attempting to wean the most signi-
ficant elements of their population away from the United States
and toward a pro-Soviet or neutralist attitude.
In addition to calling on and receiving nationals of the
host country, the Soviet ambassador also visits and is visited
by ambassadors and ministers of the Bloc countries accredited
to the host government. In recent years the Soviet ambassador
often receives and is received by his Yugoslav counterpart but,
since approximately 1960, there has been very limited interchange
between the Soviet and Communist Chinese envoys. In discussions
between Soviet and Bloc ambassadors, the Soviet ambassador seeks,
among other things, to persuade his Bloc counterpart to maintain
a pro-Soviet line in all his dealings in the host country; and
we know that the Soviet ambassador reports all conversations
with Bloc representatives to Moscow immediately and in detail.
Aside from purely protocol calls such as the presentation
of letters of accreditation, any call which a Soviet ambassador
makes on any local governmental official or citizen of promi-
nence, and any invitation of a social or cultural nature issued
to local citizens in the name of the ambassador, is made for the
sole purpose of fulfilling a policy directive from Moscow. It
is, of course, understood that the KGB and GRU rezidenturas
profit heavily from "social" affairs held at the embassy and
attended by numbers of foreigners, since they afford excellent
opportunities for spotting, assessing and developing agent pros-
pects, as well as for meeting recruited agents. From the points
of view of the ambassador and the non-RIS diplomatic staff, how-
ever, these gatherings serve primarily as vehicles for propa-
gandizing the current Soviet line, for eliciting semi-overt
information and for influencing prominent local persons towards
a pro-Soviet orientation; all as directed by Moscow in specific
orders to the embassy.
c. Internal Responsibilities of the Ambassador
Within the embassy, the duties of a Soviet ambassador
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are extremely diversified and many-faceted. He is responsible
for the day-to-day conduct of Soviet foreign policy in the
host country; is chief of the kollektiv (the total number of
Soviet citizens employed in a given unit of production or
office, e.g., "the embassy kollektiv"; "the Commercial Mission
kollektiv"); guardian and trustee of Soviet property and funds
in the host country; and overseer of all activities of the
various units of the CPSU in the local Soviet colony. While
the ambassador clearly defers to the KGB rezident in matters
concerning the security of Soviet colony personnel, and refrains
from interfering in the strictly operational work of the KGB
and GRU residencies, in almost all other matters he regards
himself as the chief of the Soviet mission.
The following paragraphs describe the many activities in
which a Soviet ambassador is engaged inside the embassy. Those
experienced in the ways of Western ambassadors will find parts
of this picture incredible, but it is based on information
accurately reported by a variety of highly reliable sources.
As chief of the kollektiv, the ambassador is responsible
for the physical and moral well-being of all personnel
under his supervision. Because of the many hostilities
which arise among the members of the Soviet colony (see
the section entitled Atmosphere in a Soviet Diplomatic
Mission), the ambassador frequently finds himself in
the position of having to settle petty squabbles over
living quarters and minor perquisites; drunken fist
fights; vicious name-calling battles among the female
staff.over work allotments; and similar unpleasantnesses
which are part of the routine of Soviet embassy life.
The ambassador may choose to form an ad hoc committee
from among the staff to investigate one of these "uncul-
tured" transgressions, and order it to report its findings
to him; he may refer the matter to the Party committee
or the Trade Union committee; or he may settle the affair
himself. Whichever action he may take, the ambassador
is obliged to spend hours on end listening to complaints,
charges and counter-charges. In consonance with the
Soviet theoretical principle of equality, all personnel
have access to the ambassador for the purpose of airing
their grievances. There is no personnel officer per se
in a Soviet embassy, although the next--ranking MFA diplo-
mat sometimes serves in this capacity.
- Basing his instructions on directives received from the
CC/CPSU and the MFA, the ambassador assigns various tasks
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in the pursuit of Soviet objectives in the host country
to his staff. He briefs them at regular intervals, and
expects to receive a variety of reports (both written
and oral) on various substantive topics, as well as
reports on all meetings with foreigners, from them.
Since this activity constitutes the principal raison
d'etre of the bona fide MFA staff of the embassy, in
addition to the work of the ambassador himself in this
field, he spends a great deal of time at it, constantly
pushing and goading his staff to make more contacts among
the local citizenry, to clip more articles from the local
press, and to write more and better reports.
Owing in large measure to a constant shortage of foreign
currency in the USSR, every Soviet embassy throughout
the world operates on a very strict budget, in conse-
quence of which the ambassador, as principal custodian
of the "Soviet people's" money in the embassy, is obliged
to review every expenditure made by his staff. (It is
understood that neither the ambassador nor any other
member of the MFA staff has any right to control or review
the accountings of the KGB or GRU rezidenturas. He does,
however, have full authority over the expenditures and
accountings of the KGB and GRU staff which are made while
they are serving in their overt MFA cover jobs.) Thus
each ambassador spends hours on end with the embassy
bookkeeper, going over her entries, disputing a great
many expenditures as being excessive, and urging her not
to pay bills tendered her by the staff automatically,
but to force them to cut expenses. Every expenditure
made by the embassy staff in the host country must, by
regulation, be supported by a receipt from the seller,
and accompanied by a statement explaining the reason for
the expenditure and giving a detailed breakdown of the
various items comprising the total cost. As an example
of the ludicrous degree to which this regulation is
observed, one Soviet ambassador who was having a "repre-
sentational" suit made on the local market was obliged
to forward to Moscow the tailor's bill, itemized - to
the last kopek - as to cost of material, cost of buttons,
cost of lining and overall cost of labor.
- The ambassador himself may on occasion purchase locally
some item for use in the embassy at a "bargain" price
and then show it to his staff as an example of how money
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can be saved by shrewd shopping. In this connection,
the ambassador will often upbraid the zavkhoz ('building-
superintendent-cum-supply-officer) for not having
shopped about among all local dealers in. order to
obtain supplies at the best price.
- The ambassador takes a keen interest in all preparations
for the representational receptions held on 7 November
and 1 May, to which large numbers of foreigners are
inVited. With regard to the financial expenditures
involved in those receptions, the ambassador, usually in
the company of the zavkhoz and one of the senior (non-
RIS) staff members, reckons the amount of food which
each guest can be expected to consume, the type and cost
of each hors d'oeuvre to be served, the amount and cost
of spirits, wines and liqueurs to be consumed, and so
forth. Some ambassadors actually count the number of
shots in a standard-sized bottle of Soviet vodka and,
based on such reckoning, instruct the zavkhoz to set out
just enough bottles to satisfy the minimum anticipated
requirements of each guest. Some ambassadors take a
personal hand in arranging the furniture placed in the
public rooms of the embassy in preparation for receptions,
helping to move and shift various pieces "so that the
foreigners will be impressed." After such receptions,
some ambassadors have been known to go over the inventory
of supplies consumed, make note of what they consider to
have been wasted or superfluous, and order more careful
planning for future receptions.
The ambassador's intimate concern over possible waste or
extravagance on the part of his staff extends also to the
overall outfitting and maintenance of the embassy premises
and living quarters of the staff; to the maintenance of
the embassy motor pool, including POL consumption; and to
the general cleanliness of the embassy premises. In
certain instances the ambassador personally passes on the
acceptability of material to be used for drapes, and on
types, sizes and varieties of furniture. (One ambassador
carried a tape measure at all times, with which he went
about taking the measurements of all rooms in the embassy,
in order to be certain that space was not being wasted.)
Some ambassadors have discussed at considerable length
with their chauffeurs the number of times per month that
the ambassador's car should be washed, and which local
garage does the best job at the lowest price.
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The ambassador attends regular meetings of the Party
Bureau (the highest organ of the Party in a Soviet
colony, usually composed of Party activists from the
Party units of the embassy and the Commercial Mission),
but seldom holds any title, and votes and participates
in discussions as an ordinary member, without obvious
reference to his diplomatic rank. There are strong
indications, however, that prior to Party meetings he
meets with the Presidium of the local Party bureau,
and with them decides on the agenda to be presented to
the meeting. The ambassador and several of the promi-
nent Party activists in the embassy and Commercial
Mission have been known to agree on the choice of a new
secretary of the Party Bureau, whose name is then pro-
posed to the appropriate section of the CC/CPSU and if
accepted by it "democratically" nominated at the next
scheduled meeting and, of course, elected.
- While the ambassador often meets with the leaders of
Communist Parties in host countries where the Party is
legal, it is believed that such meetings are usually
only formal in nature, and that whatever control is exer-
cised by the CPSU over local Communist Parties is more
often carried out by members of the KGB rezidentura or
by delegates from the Foreign Department of the CC/CPSU
under official cover in the host country than by the
ambassador. The relationship of the Soviet ambassador
to the Communist Parties in Bloc countries is not covered
here.
The ambassador usually makes a point of inviting the
heads of various Soviet delegations visiting the host
country to call on him, and debriefs them on their impres-
sions of the host country, and seeks to learn from them
how what they have observed can be utilized by the
embassy in its work among the locals. The ambassador
also carefully attempts to elicit information concerning
changes in Moscow, and at the same time attempts to
impress his visitor (especially if the visitor is a
person of importance in the Soviet hierarchy) with the
success of the embassy's work, in the obvious hope that
the visitor will take back a favorable report to Moscow.
- The ambassador must personally supervise the preparation
of the annual budget, which is forwarded to the finance
division of the MFA over his signature, and is responsible
for the content of the Annual Report. Much of the work
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with which the Soviet ambassador concerns himself is
trivial in the extreme, and while many ambassadors are
extremely annoyed at having to do it, others seem to
be completely at home in a sea of bureaucratic trivia.
Such detailed attention appears to be necessary, however,
for the sense of responsibility often appears to rest
very lightly on the shoulders of many of those referred
to in Soviet terminology as "diplomatic workers." There
is widespread confirmation that in some embassies, if
the ambassador does not constantly check on the work of
even his lowest subordinates, goading, prodding and
pushing his staff to do a thorough job, the work at best
will be done sloppily and at worst not at all. In
consonance with international diplomatic practice, when
the ambassador returns to the Soviet Union on normal
leave or for consultation, the embassy is headed by a
charge dtaff aires ad interim, who is usually the senior
counselor of embassy and is sometimes the KGB rezident.
While in principle the charge performs the same functions
as an ambassador, both within the embassy and without,
in fact he often has considerably less authority. There
have been instances where a charge has not acted firmly
towards the embassy staff, discipline has deteriorated
badly and near-chaos has resulted.
d. Relations with the KGB Rezidentura
Approximately half of the Soviet ambassadors serving
abroad as of 1 January 1965 have intelligence backgrounds. Some
served in the KI (Komitet Informatsii - Committee of Information),
others were staff officers of either the KGB (or its predecessor
organizations) or the GRU, while still others were co-opted at
some point during their careers by one or the other service.
Some retain, as ambassadors, their formal affiliation with the
organs of Soviet Intelligence, and even if they do not, they are
intimately aware of the importance of the overall position of
the organs of Soviet Intelligence, and most are prepared to
accept the fact that the staffs of the KGB and GRU rezidenturas,
while nominally under the authority of the ambassador, are in
fact independent of that authority while engaged in strictly
operational activity.
In his book, Inside a Soviet Embassy, Aleksandr Kaznacheyev
described the relationship between the ambassador and the KGB
rezident as being at best formal and at worst hostile.
Kaznacheyev wrote that the KGB rezident refused to show the
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ambassador in Burma any reports received by the KGB rezidentura
from clandestine sources, a situation which the ambassador was
powerless to change.
Petrov, who was temporary KGB rezident in Australia at the
time of his defection in 1954, noted that he was forbidden by
KGB headquarters to show his ambassador any KGB traffic, or to
brief him with regard to any KGB activities in Australia.
Petrov also stated that the extremely hostile attitude of the
ambassador towards Petrov and the latter's wife, who was also
a KGB officer, contributed to their decision to defect.
The implications of the statements of both Petrov and
Kaznacheyev are, inter alia, that the KGB rezidentura is totally
independent of the ambassador, whose resulting hostile attitude
towards the rezident may at times lead to the latter's recall.
While we continue to regard the statements of both Petrov and
Kaznacheyev as having been true at the time they made them,
there is considerable evidence in more recent years showing that
the present-day Soviet ambassador is kept well briefed by the
KGB rezident as to the work of his rezidentura; and that the
ambassador, in turn, respects the work of the rezidentura and
gets on well with the rezident. This can be explained, at least
in part, by the fact that so many ambassadors have intelligence
backgrounds themselves which was believed not to be the case in
the earlier period. More important, however, is the increasingly
important role which the organs of Soviet Intelligence, parti-
cularly the KGB, have assumed during the past decade in the exe-
cution of Soviet foreign policy - to the point today where RIS
personnel occupy most of the diplomatic slots of Soviet missions
outside the Bloc. The ambassador is thus obliged to rely heavily
on them, both to ensure that the overt work of the mission is
accomplished and for advice and guidance on matters of political
work in the host country.
Since his relationship depends so much on the personality
and background of both parties, no valid generalizations can be
made. Some recent examples may, however, assist an understanding:
- An ambassador told his staff that no matter what their
other tasks might be, all had one task in common - the
procurement of information. The ambassador emphasized
that it was their principal task to procure information.
Analysis of the activities of the embassy involved
showed clearly that the ambassador meant both the
collection of overt and semi-overt information by the
bona fide MFA staff, and the clandestine collection of
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covert information by both the KGB and GRU rezidenturas.
- An ambassador informed a newly-arrived KGB rezident
that the latter, a first secretary, was expected to
perform a definite MFA job during his tour with the
embassy. He instructed the rezident to take his time
before deciding on the cover position which he would
fill, but once having chosen it, to do a thorough job.
He noted that the rezident's predecessor had drifted
from one MFA cover job to another while assigned to the
embassy, thus drawing the attention of local counter-
intelligence to himself, and incurring the hostility of
members of the non-RIS embassy staff.
An ambassador insisted that the KGB rezident and. his
staff do more MFA work, particularly in the fields of
political and economic reporting. The rezident agreed
that they could do more MFA reporting than they had
been doing, but said that there were definite limits to
the amount of MFA work which they could do, reminding
the ambassador that the KGB rezidentura had its own
carefully defined tasks.
- A KGB staff officer under embassy cover informed an
ambassador that he and another KGB staffer were obliged
to return to Moscow on TDY within a week's time, and
asked the ambassador that neither be given any MFA work
prior to their departure. The ambassador, who knew
nothing of the trip and was short-handed at the time,
was annoyed but reluctantly agreed. The ambassador asked
no questions concerning the purpose of the trip, which
was for the purpose of consultation at KGB headquarters.
- Following the arrival of a newly-assigned KGB staffer
who had MFA cover, the rezident complained to the
ambassador that the man had been assigned to cover work
in the consulate, and that such work would not permit
the new staffer either enough free time or access to
locals of interest, to fulfill his KGB assignment. The
KGB rezident asked that the staffer be assigned instead
to the cultural section of the embassy, to which the
ambassador agreed.
- A KGB rezident told his ambassador about a developmental
operation in which he was involved, naming the prospec-
tive agent and describing the type of information to
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which he had access. The KGB rezident thereafter
continued to brief the ambassador on the progress of
the developmental operation, and gave the ambassador
a precis of information which he had obtained from the
agent. Another KGB rezident informed the charge ad
interim that he had been ordered by KGB headquarters
to cultivate two local citizens, whom he named, and
yet another informed his ambassador of an operational
plan involving the planned recruitment of a highly-
placed local citizen by two staffers of his rezidentura,
naming all concerned. Another KGB rezident, however,
who, preparing to return to Moscow PCS, informed the
ambassador that certain of his agent assets would be
turned over to members of his rezidentura. Although
the rezident did not give the ambassador the names of
the agents - nor did the ambassador ask for them -
the rezident identified the subordinates who would take
them over, and gave the ambassador the names of the
cities in which the agents lived.
Some KGB rezidents prove to be more cautious of walk-ins
than their ambassadors. One told his ambassador about
several, one of whom claimed to have material of intel-
ligence interest to the USSR. The rezident had feared
provocation and refused to touch the material which the
man offered, and sent him away. The ambassador commented
that the rezident should not have been so hasty, as the
walk-in might have had material of genuine interest.
The rezident defended his action weakly. Another KGB
rezident informed an ambassador of a letter which had
been received from a person living in the host country
who claimed to have secret information which he would
give to the Soviets. The KGB officer feared that the
letter was a provocation, but the ambassador (a genuine
MFA man) told the KGB officer to reply to the letter and
invite its writer to the embassy in order to determine
what it was that the man had.
The KGB rezident keeps his ambassador informed of security
matters. One rezident had received reports that a
member of the embassy's non-diplomatic staff had been
spending a considerable amount of time alone in the
capital city in an embassy vehicle. The rezident informed
the ambassador that the man's movements must be controlled
and his actions carefully observed. The ambassador agreed
without comment. Another informed his ambassador that a
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member of the embassy staff and his wife appeared to be
succumbing to "bourgeois temptations." The rezident
noted that he was watching the pair carefully and would
order their return to the USSR unless clear evidence
was developed that their attitudes had changed for the
better. The ambassador gave the rezident full permission
to do what he wished. A third KGB rezident informed his
ambassador that an engineer assigned TDY to a Soviet
Technical Aid Program project had been causing trouble
by his excessive drinking and chasing the wives of Soviets
assigned to the project. The rezident reported to the
ambassador that he had not yet recommended to KGB head-
quarters that the man be recalled, since the engineer's
derelictions thus far had been confined to Soviet-
controlled buildings and could not have been observed
by local counterintelligence. The rezident stated that
KGB head-
i
ng
there was no point at that time to inform
quarters of the man's actions, as the rezident's KGB
superiors would only instruct him to settle the matter
on the spot.
A KGB rezident complained to his ambassador that the
latter had been inviting the first secretary (a bona
fide MFA officer) and not him, the rezident, to receptions
given by host-country citizens and other foreigners.
The rezident noted that the ambassador's failure to
'
s access
invite the rezident was decreasing the rezident
to foreigners of potential value.
A KGB rezident informed his ambassador that a staff
officer of the rezidentura had just received a cover
promotion within the MFA. The rezident noted that the
recommendation for promotion had been made by him, the
rezident, in light of the staffer's long service in the
host country.
An ambassador (an MFA officer with no known RIS connections)
requested an acting KGB rezident, who had a good knowledge
of the local language, to translate a newspaper article
into Russian. The KGB officer declined, protesting that
he was already too busy with other work, whereupon the
ambassador ordered him to do the translation immediately.
- An ambassador requested to see the KGB rezidentura file
on the activities of an anti-Soviet organization in the
host country. The file was brought to him by an officer
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of the rezidentura, who then answered the ambassador's
questions concerning details contained in the file.
- A KGB rezident informed his ambassador of a problem of
recontacting a developmental agent candidate who had
been in contact with a previous KGB rezident. The
ambassador, an MFA officer with no known RIS affili-
ations, offered certain suggestions which were incor-
porated into the KGB staffer's recontact plan.
One KGB rezident fawned on his ambassador, a man of
considerable prestige in high Party circles; he praised
the ambassador fulsomely and congratulated him constantly
on the success of his mission in the host country
(falsely, since the ambassador had been a boor, hated
by many of his staff because of his abusive treatment
of them, and regarded by host-country officials as an
ignoramus). In turn the ambassador in question was
very friendly with the KGB rezident, whose confidence
and advice he sought, to the detriment of the GRU rezident,
who was barely civil to the ambassador. After receiving
a note from the host foreign office concerning alleged
espionage activities on the part of a member of the
Soviet colony, this same KGB rezident and his ambassador
concluded that neither knew anything about it and that
it was a GRU operation. The KGB rezident took the
opportunity to disparage GRU methods of operation.
In other instances the relationship between ambassador and
$GB rezident (and in his absence, charge) has been of a
more formal nature, yet even in these cases it has been
obvious that the rezident has striven constantly to gain
and hold the respect and good will of the ambassador; and
it is equally obvious that the ambassador respected the
work of the KGB rezidentura, even though there may not
have been a warm relationship between the two men.
e. Relations with the GRU Rezidentura
In brief, the KGB rezidentura abroad is responsible
for the collection of clandestine political intelligence, the
conducting of covert political action programs, and for the
security of all Soviet installations and personnel. The GRU
rezidentura, on the other hand, is responsible for the gathering
of strategic military intelligence, and bears no overall respon-
sibility for physical and personnel security. The fact of these
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differences in responsibilities, particularly the KGB respon-
sibilities in the political field and its overall responsi-
bility for internal security, normally leads to a closer
relationship between the KGB rezidentura and the ambassador
than between the ambassador and the GRU rezidentura. The
ambassador's primary concern in the formation and execution
of Soviet foreign policy lies in the political field, and he
bears the overall responsibility for the personal and poli-
tical lives of all Soviet citizens under him. Thus, as
indicated above, the ambassador usually consults and seeks
the advice of,the KGB rezident much more often. than that of
the GRU rezident.
The following examples illustrate certain aspects of the
ambassador/GRU rezidentura relationship:
An ambassador complained to the KGB rezident that the
GRU rezident and his staff were reporting no information
to him, the ambassador.
During a meeting of the diplomatic staff of a Soviet
embassy, the ambassador noted that the ambassador of a
Bloc country in the host capital had pressed the Soviet
ambassador to have the GRU rezident provide the Bloc
ambassador with intelligence information. The ambassador
had refused to do this and also noted that the GRU
rezident had flatly refused to give any information
whatsoever to the Bloc embassy in question. The
counselor of the Soviet embassy added that the GRU
rezident had no information to give in any case.
A GRU staffer gave the ambassador a briefing on the state
of military preparedness of the host country. The infor-
mation was based largely on overt sources, with a small
amount from agents. The ambassador sent a summary
report to Moscow based on this briefing.
A newly-arrived deputy GRU rezident informed the charge
of his plans for a reception to be given at the embassy,
to which the deputy had invited the military intelligence
chiefs of the host country. The deputy rezident gave
the charge no details of the reception, nor did he
solicit the charge's comments or advice.
- A GRU rezident informed an ambassador that the deputy
rezident was under constant surveillance by the host
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S E T
security service; that he was denied subscriptions to
certain host-country publications on military subjects;
and that he was denied access to strategic military
areas to which Western attaches were granted entry.
- After receiving a directive through MFA channels, an
ambassador assigned a GRU officer the task of obtaining
information on host-country policies and reactions to
Soviet proposals on the halting of nuclear weapons
testing and on a proposed non-aggression pact between
the Warsaw Pact nations and NATO. In another country
in Europe, a GRU officer briefed his ambassador on GRU
requirements concerning the creation of a European
nuclear force.
- A GRU officer briefed his ambassador on how he handled
several walk-ins.
- A GRU staff officer informed his ambassador that he had
received a requirement from GRU headquarters to collect
biographical data, including information on hobbies and
other interests, on all leading officers and officials
of the host-country Ministry of Defense.
- A GRU rezident asked his ambassador to relieve a member
of the GRU rezidentura from certain embassy duties,
which the staffer had refused to perform. The ambassador
instead ordered the staffer to perform the duties and
when the staffer continued to refuse, ordered him to
return to Moscow immediately. Eventually the ambassador
was forced to withdraw his order, and the GRU staffer
completed his tour.
Observations and comments concerning the participation of
the KGB and GRU rezidenturas in the overt work of the embassy,
as well as in the internal life of the colony, will be found in
subsequent paragraphs.
f. The Ambassador's Personal Staff
The ambassador's personal staff consists of a male
secretary/interpreter, a female secretary (sometimes referred
to in larger Soviet embassies as zavkants /zaveduyushchyi kantse-
larii/or chief of the ambassador's secretariat), a chauffeur and
a cook.
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(1) The Secretary/Interpreter: The ambassador's
male secretary interpreter is often a young man,
married, who is a recent graduate of the Moscow State
Institute of International Relations (IIR) or similar
institution of higher learning, and who has a good
working knowledge of the principal language of the host
country. The principal duties of this man, who often
holds the diplomatic rank of attache or third secretary,
are to translate articles of interest in the foreign
press for the ambassador, and to serve as his interpreter.
In addition, the secretary/interpreter often functions
as the embassy's protocol officer, arranging all appoint-
ments with officials of the host foreign office and with
prominent citizens. (In larger posts one man is not
sufficient to handle all the work required, and the
Soviet embassy often has a special Protocol Section,
staffed by junior MFA officers.) The position of
secretary/interpreter to the ambassador provides access
to foreigners of interest, and is thus attractive to the
RIS. Many who have held this position have been identi-
fied as active intelligence officers, but many are
known to be non-RIS and appear to have been superior
errand boys, chosen largely because of their knowledge
of the local language. In view of the Soviet system of
internal security, some of these men are likely to be
KGB co-optees, perhaps under orders to observe the
actions and movements of their ambassadors, among other
things.
The ambassador's female secretary performs the usual
duties of typing reports in final form (but not cables,
which are written by hand by the ambassador and turned
over directly by him to the chief MFA code clerk), sorting
and delivering to him the ambassador's mail, and filing
and maintaining copies of all correspondence between the
embassy and various ministries of the host government.
Whether she is the wife of an embassy staffer hired
locally or is a secretary assigned from the MFA, this
woman often has at least a reading knowledge of the
principal language of the host country..
(2) Ambassador's Chauffeur and Cook: Theoretically,
each Soviet ambassador is assigned a personal chauffeur
and a cook. In practice, the chauffeur. - and the
ambassador's personal vehicle - are often shared with
other members of the diplomatic staff, especially in
small embassies (i.e., usually with bona fide MFA
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staffers; the KGB and GRU rezidents and their oper-
ational staff have their own vehicles). The ambas-
sador's chauffeur is also often chief of the embassy
motor pool, and as such is responsible for the care
and maintenance of the embassy vehicles. The chauf-
feur usually has no knowledge of foreign languages
and no RIS affiliation, although he may be a KGB agent,
of course. He is always a Soviet national.
The ambassador's cook, whether man or woman, is often
in charge of the embassy mess, where a large percen-
tage of the staff take their meals, and does not cook
for the ambassador alone. The staff cook is always
a Soviet national, though local cooks may be employed
from time to time, usually in preparation for the
7 November and 1 May celebrations.
2. The Substantive Sections of a Soviet Diplomatic Mission
The substantive sections of a Soviet diplomatic mission
abroad, that is, those sections with which foreigners deal and
which are directly concerned with the implementation of Soviet
foreign policy in the host country, are: the Political Section,
the Cultural Section, the Press and Information Section, the
Office of the Economic Counselor, the Consular Section, the
Scientific and Technical Section, and the Office of the Military
Attache. Of these several elements, only the Political Section
and the Consular Section in their overt work are concerned with
diplomatic work in the traditional Western sense, and only the
Political, Consular and certain elements of the Press and Infor-
mation Section can be regarded as being organizational elements
of the MFA, the other sections falling under the ultimate author-
ity of one or another ministry or State committee in Moscow.
The Soviet ambassador has direct, immediate authority over only
the Political, Consular and certain parts of the Press and
Information Section. His authority over the other sections,
while significant, is more or less on the order of coordinator
of their activities, whose principal concern is that they serve
the best interests of the Soviet State.
Collectively all sections of the Soviet diplomatic mission
are responsible for the greater part of the overt work of all
Soviet missions abroad, which is the promotion of the overt CPSU
propaganda line, and covertly they provide the principal cover
vehicle for the clandestine operations of the legal RIS reziden-
turas in any given non-Bloc country. (A full description of
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overt work of a Soviet embassy will be given below, as will a
description of the participation of the RIS rezidenturas
therein.)
Set out below is each section, with a description of its
overt functions. The staffing pattern of a Soviet embassy is,
however, flexible - not to say confused and often chaotic -
to the extent that it is often impossible to state with any
degree of certainty that a diplomatic officer known six months
ago to be assigned to the Political Section and doing political
work, is not now doing cultural or press work, and will appear
shortly to be engaged in economic analysis. The picture is
further confused by the fact that the rezidentura staffs are
known to change their cover jobs, sometimes on order of the
ambassador to suit the requirements of new MFA directives, and
sometimes in answer to changing requirements from KGB and GRU
headquarters. With certain specific exceptions such as those
involving officers with specialized training who are detailed
to the MFA and posted abroad for a specific task (e.g., men
from the State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign
Countries), experienced MFA personnel are regarded as being
capable of carrying out any overt task in any one of the embassy's
fields of work. The Soviet ambassador is far more interested in
seeing that directives from Moscow are carried out than in
concerning himself with which section of the embassy staff does
the job.
a. The Political Section
Universally the largest element of the Soviet diplo-
matic mission, the Political Section is responsible for: main-
taining contact with the host-country foreign. ministry; ex-
changing diplomatic notes and aides memoires with it and with
other elements of the host government; maintaining contact and
conducting similar "traditional" diplomatic business with the
political life of the host country, which includes establishing
and maintaining contact with members of the host-country legis-
lative bodies and leading members of the significant political
parties, whether they be of the left, center or right; and for
maintaining contact with the personnel of other foreign diplo-
matic missions in the host country.
The Political Section is also responsible for observing and
reporting on changes and events in the political life of the host
country, both internally and with regard to the effect which such
changes and events may have on the external relations 'between
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the host country, the USSR and other major power blocs.
The Political Section of a Soviet embassy is headed by a
counselor or first secretary who is often the KGB rezident,
and the staff itself is composed almost entirely of RIS
officers, with a thin scattering of MFA diplomats. By Soviet
standards the RIS officers assigned to the Political Section
of an embassy are considered to be able to carry on their
overt duties in the same manner as their MFA colleagues, and
in fact many of them in recent years have been superficially
indistinguishable in manner, dress and appearance from their
Western (non-intelligence) colleagues. Aside from their
training in RIS schools, the great majority of the staff of
the Political Section appear to be graduates of institutes of
higher learning such as the Institute of International Relations,
Moscow State University, etc.
b. The Cultural Section
As its title indicates, this section is responsible
for establishing and increasing cultural relations between the
USSR and the host country. This work obviously has many
aspects, but among its more common manifestations are contin-
uing attempts to persuade officials of the host government and
of influential, respected private and semi-private organizations
to visit the USSR and to sponsor visits to the host country of
Soviet musical artists, ballet and folk-dance groups, cosmo-
nauts and similar persons and groups which can be expected to
produce a high propaganda impact.
The Cultural Section is also active in the field of youth
and student activity, propagandizing the alleged superiority of
the Soviet education system; and among the youth of the under-
developed countries of Africa, the Middle East and Asia, persu-
ading them to pursue their studies in the USSR, principally at
the Patrice Lumumba Friendship University. Within the host
country, the Cultural Section frequently sponsors or subsidizes
study groups and formal classes in Russian language and liter-
ature, delivers lectures on Soviet scientific and artistic
accomplishments, shows films extolling the virtues of Soviet
civilization, etc. It also makes arrangements with host-country
authorities whereby Soviet professors and teachers instruct at
local schools and universities.
In those countries where the host country/Soviet Friendship
Society is well-established or shows promise of attracting a
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significant segment of the local population, one of the principal
duties of the Cultural Section is to maintain intimate contact
with the leaders of the society, providing them with funds,
political guidance, literature and films. The Cultural Section
also sponsors travel to the USSR of groups and individuals who
are members or supporters of the local Friendship Society.
The Cultural Section is usually headed by an official of
diplomatic rank (counselor and first secretary are most common)
who is attached to the diplomatic mission from the headquarters
of the State Committee of Cultural Relations with Foreign
Countries (GKSZ). In some cases these men claim to have worked
at the Moscow headquarters of the Soviet end of the host country/
USSR Friendship Society, and in fact some of them do have a
good knowledge of the cultural and political life of the host
country - somewhat of a phenomenon among Soviets serving abroad.
Most of them are RIS officers who employ this type of cover
because of the wide access which it gives to the important intel-
ligentsia stratum of host-country society.
c. The Press and Information Section
Although not organized in a formal sense, there exists
in many Soviet missions throughout the world a Press and Infor-
mation Section which, in fact, coordinates the work of the
several Soviet press and propaganda elements which are to be
found in most countries, i.e., the Press Section of the embassy
proper, and the representatives of Novosti (also known by the
initials of its formal title, APN), TASS, Pravda, Izvestia,
Radio Moscow, etc. It is often difficult to define the precise
duties of each of these elements, since they obviously overlap
on many occasions.
The Press Section: Depending on the political
climate of the country, this section may be a large
one, with coordination responsibility for a huge
propaganda effort, and headed by an official of
counselor rank, down to a few persons headed by a
third secretary or attache. The overt responsi-
bilities of this section are to make and maintain
contact with the local press corps, both host country
and foreign, to influence them to print stories
favorable to the USSR, to elicit from them overt and
semi-overt information and to pass out official
embassy press releases. They also maintain contact
with the host-country foreign ministry, and make
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S E
continuing surveys of the host-country press for
the purpose of gathering information of interest
to the USSR. This section publishes the embassy
press bulletin, which is distributed to the host
government, press media, foreign embassies and
local citizens.
Novosti (APN - Agenstvo Pechati Novosti): Under
the authority of the Council of Ministers of the
Supreme Soviet, Novosti is a major propaganda organ
of the CC/CPSU, especially in underdeveloped areas,
although it maintains offices in almost every
country which maintains diplomatic relations with
the USSR. Nominally an "unofficial" agency, Novosti
took over the work of SOVINFORMBYURO in 1961.
In general terms, Novosti concentrates on supplying
background information and feature articles on
various aspects of Soviet life, and gathers news
stories on general trends abroad which are used as
background material for one or another propaganda
theme in the Soviet press. However much the acti-
vities of the Novosti correspondents may vary from
country to country, in every country of the world
which permits publication, Novosti publishes a maga-
zine, or bulletin, which is variously entitled in
the local tongue, or tongues, "Soviet Life," "USSR
Today" or some variation of these two. Where
possible, this magazine is published in a great
number of copies and in all the major tongues and
dialects of the country. All articles to be included
in a specific issue are sent from Moscow, usually in
Russian and are translated into the local language,
usually by local employees, a clear majority of
whom are members of the pro-Soviet wing of the local
Communist Party, or are Communist sympathizers.
The magazine is also printed in the host country.
Despite the "non-official" status of Novosti, many
of those Soviets engaged in Novosti work hold diplo-
matic rank, and in some areas the Novosti offices
are in the embassy itself or in the embassy compound.
In other areas, the Novosti correspondents carry
service passports and enjoy no diplomatic immunity.
While those Soviets engaged in the purely technical
aspects of Novosti work, e.g., supervising the trans-
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lators or preparing press mats, are usually not
RIS personnel, those who deal regularly with other
foreigners of ten are.
Novosti in its overt work does not normally use
the embassy channels of communication to maintain
contact with Moscow, but rather the local telegraph
and telephone services. It is funded directly from
its headquarters in Moscow through. deposits in host-
country banks.
TASS (Telegraphic Agency of the Soviet Union): The
oldest of the Soviet news agencies, TASS is the
official wire service of the Soviet government and
has representatives in every country which recog-
nizes the USSR. Its overt responsibility abroad is
daily news coverage, which its correspondents trans-
mit to Moscow headquarters directly by open wire,
TWX or telephone. In the USSR, TASS distributes
foreign news to the Moscow and provincial press, and
sells news stories to the foreign press abroad, much
in the manner of Western wire services. In most
major capitals of the world there are several TASS
correspondents and often several locally-hired office
personnel and stringers, all of whom are either
members of the host-country Communist Party or known
left-wingers. The TASS office is almost always
situated away from the Soviet diplomatic installation.
TASS, like Novosti, is funded directly from Moscow
through deposits in local banks, and does not use
embassy communications channels in its overt work.
TASS cover is widely utilized by the RIS because it
affords normal overt contact with a wide variety of
foreign citizens, much greater freedom of movement
than that usually accorded to diplomats, housing out-
side the embassy compound or installation, and a
great compatability of normal cover duties with RIS
targets. It is currently estimated that between 60
and 70 percent of all TASS correspondents are RIS
officers; most, if not all, of the others are co--
opted agents of the RIS.
TASS correspondents, like the correspondents of the
other Soviet press services, enjoy a considerable
degree of independence from the Soviet embassy,
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although they sometimes contribute information to
the various reports prepared by the embassy and are
all members of the Party organization of the embassy
rather than of the Commercial Mission. They are
subject to the same discipline as all other Party
members serving abroad.
- Pravda, Izvestia, Radio Moscow, etc: Correspondents
of these entities are to be found in far fewer
foreign countries than are the representatives of
TASS and Novosti - usually only in the major world
capitals. Their overt work appears to be the same
as that of TASS correspondents, i.e., gathering
daily news stories which are transmitted through
public channels to Moscow. In fact, it is difficult
to determine precisely how the overt work of these
correspondents differs from that of TASS personnel.
As in the case of the other correspondents, these
men are funded from Moscow through local banks and
are quite independent of control by the local Soviet
embassy, except for their participation in the Party
activities of the embassy. Many of these men are
known to be RIS officers.
Often when a major propaganda drive has been ordered
by the CC/CPSU, all Soviet correspondents and newsmen
gather at the Soviet embassy in the host country and
coordinate the campaign which is to be carried out
locally. While each representative present may
pursue a separate plan of attack, the overt line
given by all is invariably the same and the overall
effort is closely coordinated.
d. The Office of the Counselor for Economic Affairs
This section of a Soviet mission is to be found only
in those countries of Africa, Asia and the Middle East in which
there are active Soviet economic, technical and military aid
programs. In brief, the Office of the Counselor for Economic
Affairs administers and supervises the various military and
civilian aid agreements which were previously signed at the
governmental level in Moscow.
In the field, the overall aid program is headed by an offi-
cial of the State Committee of Foreign Economic Relations (GKES),
who holds the diplomatic rank of counselor, and is staffed by
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civilian officials from GKES and from those Soviet ministries
concerned with dam and road construction, heavy industrial
plant building (refineries, steel mills, and so forth); and
by military officers who train the armed forces of the host
country in the use of the various types of military equipment
supplied to that country under the terms of the agreement.
Negotiations concerning the sale and delivery of armaments
and spare parts are the responsibility of the so-called "General
Engineering Department" of the Office of the Counselor for
Economic Affairs. The "General Engineering Department" is
usually headed by a man who holds the diplomatic rank of first
secretary but who is, in fact, a military officer of the rank
of colonel or higher, who is directly responsible to the Soviet
Ministry of Defense, although he is officially subordinate to
the Economic Affairs Office.
The Office of Military Personnel, which supplies military
experts for the Soviet military aid program in the host country,
is staffed by Soviets who openly hold military rank. In the
execution of its tasks it appears to have a close working
relationship with the "General Engineering Department" of the
Office of the Counselor for Economic Affairs, although it also
appears to have a direct line of communications with the Ministry
of Defense in Moscow.
The precise role of the Soviet ambassador in the field of
economic, technical and military aid is unknown, although since
he is responsible to the CC/CPSU for all Soviet activity in the
host country (except intelligence operations per se), it is
assumed that he has some degree of coordinating authority over
these activities. We also lack precise information regarding
the extent to which the Counselor for Economic Affairs has
access to the communications system of the Soviet embassy, or
whether he and the various elements of his office use them at
all.
In those countries which do not have Soviet aid programs,
reporting on the economic life of the host country is the
responsibility of an element of the Political Section of the
embassy, specifically of one or two officers assigned to gather,
analyze and report developments in the internal and external
economic life of the country. It is extremely difficult to
determine at any given time which officers hold this responsi-
bility, since in many areas it appears to be borne by a variety
of men assigned officially to the Political Section who claim
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to have other functions as well, while in other areas men with
apparently good academic backgrounds in economics have the
responsibility. In any case, those charged with economic
reporting prepare the Economic Section of the Annual Report, in
collaboration with the Commercial Mission.
e. The Consular Section and Soviet Consulates
The Consular Section is responsible for processing
the visa applications of all foreigners desiring to visit the
USSR; for protecting the legal rights of Soviet citizens in the
host country, which includes assuring that the interests of
Soviet citizens involved in actions covered by local civil and
criminal codes receive maximum protection; for notifying the
host foreign office of the arrival and departure of all Soviet
diplomatic couriers; and for processing the requests of persons
desiring repatriation to the USSR or seeking information thereon.
With the exception of a few consular installations, all
consular positions are held by RIS staff officers, overwhelmingly
KGB with one or two overt MFA Consular Department officers and
GRU officers sometimes included in larger posts. The fact that
the Consular Section is the focal point for the processing of
visas makes it of paramount interest to the KGB since the bio-
graphical information required for submission in a visa appli-
cation provides the KGB excellent opportunities, both in the
host country and in the USSR, for spotting persons with family,
business or personal reasons for contact with or travel to the
USSR. Among other things, for example, the Consular Section is
responsible for assuring that bequests made by deceased foreigners
to their relatives in the USSR are properly handled. In the
process, the consular officials have occasional access to perti-
nent local records which can be of value in illegals work. In
those areas where there exist groups with significant ties to
one or another ethnic group in the USSR, i.e., emigres, the
goals of consular work are four-fold: to spot, assess and
recruit agents; to spot and neutralize the work of anti-Soviet
emigre individuals and groups; to encourage repatriation to the
USSR; and to promote pro-USSR attitudes among the whole group.
The Consular Section affords the KGB special opportunities
in the field of SK (Sovetskaya Koloniya - Soviet Colony) work.
The passports of all Soviets stationed in the area are held by
the Consular Section, and all Soviets visiting the host country
for over 30 days are obliged to report to the Consular Section
for registration on arrival and for deregistration on departure.
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The KGB rezidentura is notified by its headquarters of the
impending arrival of all Soviet citizens from Moscow, and
probably from other parts of the world as well..
In addition to its other duties, overt and covert, the
Consular Section is responsible for notifying the appropriate
section of the host foreign office of the arrival and departure
of all diplomatic couriers; for organizing parties to escort
the couriers to and from their points of arrival and departure
(the escorts are drawn from the entire diplomatic staff, by
roster, and courier escort duty by itself is no certain. indi-
cation of RIS affiliation); and for providing board and. lodging
for the couriers - usually in a room in the embassy set aside
for that specific purpose - while they are in the host country.
In fact, it appears that the Consular Section, except for
providing logistical support, has little to do with the couriers
who, on arrival, report directly to the chief of the referentura,
turn their pouches over to him and receive from him all diplo-
matic mail prior to departure. All regular diplomatic couriers,
that is those men who are not RIS officers traveling abroad on
special missions under diplomatic courier cover, are employees
of the Tenth Department of the MFA, thus their nominal superior
in an embassy is the chief of the referentura, which is under
the control of the Tenth Department.
There-is often a feeling of resentment on the part of the
rest of the diplomatic staff against the members of the consu-
late based on the allegation that the consulate staff does not
participate in the work of the embassy proper, and that since
the consulate is open for only a few hours a day (a few hours a
week in those countries where there is little travel to and from
the USSR), there is little work to do anyway. On the contrary,
in those countries where travel of local citizens to the USSR
is heavy, the consulate is very busy, the requirements of Soviet
bureaucracy being most exacting as to the filling in of forms,
making large numbers of copies, and so forth. In fact, it is
likely that in large consulates, which handle a heavy volume of
normal consular business, one of the staff is a bona fide MFA
officer who is chosen because of his knowledge of bureaucratic
practice in Soviet and host-country consular law; and that it is
he who does the bulk of the desk work in the Soviet consulate.
It is unlikely that any officer of a Soviet diplomatic instal-
lation abroad in recent years has had, or now has, the authority
to issue a Soviet entry visa on the spot without reference to
Moscow. We are aware of certain cases where the ambassador, for
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political reasons, has urged the rapid issuance of a visa to
a prominent local citizen, and other cases where the KGB
rezident has urged his headquarters not to permit the issu-
ance of a visa to an applicant known to the rezident to be
anti-Soviet; but we know of no instance where the ultimate
right of approval or disapproval has rested with any embassy
officer.
f. Office of the Military Attache
With rare exceptions, all persons assigned to the
Office of the Military Attache in a Soviet diplomatic instal-
lation are officers or employees of Soviet Military Intelli-
gence (GRU). In 1961 General Ivan Aleksandrovich Serov, the
commanding officer of the GRU at the time, ordered that the GRU
rezident abroad take a civilian-type cover position with diplo-
matic rank; and that henceforth the military attache was no
longer to be the rezident, but subordinate to him. However,
Serov has long since departed the scene and in certain instances
during the last several years the military attache has been an
active agent handler, and probably rezident as well.
In their overt capacity, the military attache and his staff
seek to establish and maintain contact with the defense estab-
lishment of the host country, and with the military attaches
of Western nations located in the host country. During these
contacts, which are made for the ostensible purpose of main-
taining military/diplomatic relations, the Soviet attache and
his staff gather biographic and vulnerability data on their
contacts, with the ultimate aim of recruitment. Again in their
ostensibly overt capacity, the Soviet attache and his staff
conduct strategic intelligence surveys of the host country,
gather overt military and scientific-technical journals and
periodicals, observe and photograph military installations, and
so forth.
In addition to its other cover work, the GRU rezidentura,
functioning in this instance as the Office of the Military Attache,
contributes to the embassy's Annual Report.
The Military Attache's apparatus is usually funded in sepa-
rate bank transfers from the Ministry of Defense to local banks,
and prepares separate pouches or separate portions of the over-
all embassy diplomatic pouch.
g. Scientific and Technical Section
Openly identified scientific and technical sections
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are to be found in very few Soviet diplomatic missions. Osten-
sibly established for the purpose of gathering and exchanging
with host-country groups overt technical and scientific data,
these sections are under the direct supervision of the State
Committee for Science and Technology (GKNT) and are in fact
staffed entirely by KGB and GRU S&T officers and co-optees.
3. The Commercial Mission (TORGPREDSTVO)
The Commercial or Trade Mission of a Soviet diplomatic
mission abroad is not an integral part of the Soviet embassy in
the functional sense, being an element of the overseas repre-
sentation of the Ministry of Foreign Trade (MFT). Wherever a
clearly identifiable Commercial Mission is present in the host
country, it is headed by a man called the "Torgpred" (i.e.,
"Trade Representative"), who often holds the diplomatic rank
of counselor, who is usually a genuine expert in the field of
foreign trade and often has a long history of professional
activity in this field, both in the USSR and abroad. (Some
Field Stations and Bases confuse the chief of the Commercial
Mission, the Torgpred, with the Mission itself, the TORGPREDSTVO.
For the sake of clarity, the English translations are used here.)
Both the Commercial chief and his staff, in the pursuit of their
overt duties, are largely free from the authority of the ambas-
sador, whose role in the field of Soviet commercial activity in
the host country is limited to ascertaining that it is in full
consonance with current political directives of the CC/CPSU.
According to official Soviet sources, no substantive disagree-
ments between the Commercial chief and the ambassador may be
settled in the field, but must be referred to Moscow for arbi-
tration.
Although the Commercial chief himself is seldom an RIS
officer, his deputy very often is; some deputies have been known
to be the GRU rezidents.
The Commercial Mission is staffed by representatives of
some 30 All-Union foreign trade associations, each of which was
formed for the purpose of dealing in specific items, for instance:
Inturist; Stankoimport (import and export of machine tools and
similar equipment); Tekhmashinimport (import and export of equip-
ment and machinery for the chemical, rubber, synthetic fiber
and similar industries); Sudoimport (import and export of ships
and maritime equipment); Eksportkhleb (import and export of
grains and grain side-products); Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga (exports
books, periodicals, sheet music, etc.) Obviously not all of
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these 30-odd associations are represented at any one post, the
natural resources and industries of the host country being the
determining factor. Often a single official represents two or
more of the foreign trade associations.
The daily work of the Commercial Mission is concerned, in
general terms, with negotiating for the sale of Soviet goods in
the local market, and for the purchase of a great variety of
locally-made items for use in the USSR. As this activity gives
wide entree to the industrial and business worlds of the host
country, and particularly to economic areas of strategic and
scientific interest, Commercial Mission cover is widely utilized
by both the KGB and the GRU.
The Commercial Mission is funded directly from the MFT in
Moscow and does not use embassy channels for this overt purpose.
It uses overt communications facilities for all overt traffic,
but must use the communications facilities of the embassy, both
cipher and courier systems, for classified traffic. The MFT
has its own cipher system and code clerks, who are to be found
at almost every large post abroad. The MFT code clerks work in
the embassy referentura and are subject to the same rigid disci-
pline as their MFA, KGB and GRU colleagues. No instance has yet
been reported of a Commercial Mission, even those located miles
from the embassy, having its own referentura, although it seems
likely that facilities for the safekeeping of classified docu-
ments may exist.
The Commercial chief is expected to keep the ambassador
briefed on the activity of the Commercial Mission and, of course,
the staff of the Commercial Mission is subject to the discipline
of the Party Bureau, which is located in the embassy. The
relationship between the Commercial chief and the ambassador
varies from post to post, of course. Certain Soviet ambassadors
have been known to complain that the Commercial Mission was not
supplying to the embassy information on the economic life of the
country which it alone had, and was not contributing signifi-
cantly to the economic section of the embassy's Annual Report.
4. Administrative Elements
a. The Administrative Section
Although no part of a Soviet diplomatic mission is
clearly labeled "The Administrative Section," for purposes of
organization all non-diplomatic logistics and other administrative
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personnel are placed in this category in this study. All
personnel in this category, insofar as their overt duties are
concerned, are under the direct supervision of the ambassador,
who has a particularly close working relationship with the
zavkhoz and the bookkeeper. In those instances where the
embassy is a very large one and the ambassador is not as immed-
iately concerned with the daily housekeeping routine as in
smaller installations, the second-ranking MFA diplomat is
often held immediately responsible for the work of the admini-
strative staff.
In general, Soviets responsible for administrative tasks
have limited educational backgrounds, usually speak only Russian
and with the exceptions noted below, are seldom seen outside
the embassy compound except in groups. They receive even less
pay than the diplomatic staff and their living conditions are
poor, since they are assigned the least desirable quarters.
The class distinctions so evident in the USSR today apply
equally in the Soviet colony abroad, as the non-diplomatic staff
is looked down on by the diplomats, whose attitudes towards them
range from the correct and stiff to the openly hostile. The
non-diplomatic personnel often feel discriminated against and
are resentful of their second-class treatment. Drunkenness
among them, although it is by no means limited. to the non-diplo-
matic staff, is frequent. (Soviet ambassadors, while briefing
their staffs prior to receptions for foreigners, have urged
them to guard the buffet lest the non-diplomatic staff drink up
the liquid refreshments before the guests arrived.)
The personnel of the non-diplomatic staff appear to be even
more jealous of petty perquisites and prerogatives than the
diplomatic staff. The description given by Aleksandr Kaznacheyev
in his book, Inside a Soviet Embassy, of the hostile atmosphere
in the Soviet embassy in Rangoon in 1959 is still valid for most
other Soviet embassies today. One Soviet diplomat commented
that the only difference between the "uncomradely" attitudes of
the diplomatic and non-diplomatic staffs was that the former
abused one another in "cultured" language while the latter used
gutter obscenities.
Non-diplomatic personnel are referred to in Soviet termino-
logy as "technical personnel." The adjective is not meant to
denote that these people are technicians, but rather that they
do not hold diplomatic rank and are employed in general admini-
strative, logistical work. The administrative section of an
embassy can be said to be composed of the categories of employ-
ees listed below.
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b. The Embassy Physician
The embassy physician is often a woman and fre-
quently the wife of a staff official. While it appears that
many of the Soviet physicians assigned to diplomatic missions
are well-trained, competent medical doctors, reliable reporting
shows that a significant number of those who are carried on
the official lists as physicians are little more than medical
technicians with an average of two years training. In moments
of candor, some Soviet diplomats have remarked to their non-
Soviet colleagues that they trust the embassy "doctor" to diag-
nose a common cold and dispense aspirin, but nothing more
complicated. In at least one area, the deaths of several
members of the Soviet colony have been attributed to the gross
incompetence of the embassy doctor, reportedly a graduate physi-
cian.
Although treatment of members of the Soviet colony by
foreign physicians and dentists is, of course, not encouraged,
there is no known regulation which forbids such treatment, which
is now quite common. However, the ambassador himself must
approve treatment locally prior to a visit to a foreign physician,
otherwise the patient will not be reimbursed. Where possible,
local physicians who are Communist Party members or sympathizers
are chosen for referral. All attempts are made by the embassy
to evacuate colony members or TDYers who are gravely ill to the
USSR. There are indications that the embassy physician is often
an SK agent. In one case the physician was a staff officer of
the KGB rezidentura. While it would appear that embassy physi-
cians have little professional contact with their non-Soviet
colleagues in the host country, certain among them have accom-
panied members of the mission staff on visits for treatment to
local physicians.
Hospitals have been established and staffed by the USSR in
Africa, Asia and the Middle East, some for the purpose of
treating the Soviet staffs of the various military, technical
and economic aid personnel assigned to certain countries of
those areas, and a few for the care of the local population.
While under the ultimate administrative control of the Soviet
Ministry of Health, these hospitals and their staffs appear to
be under the supervision of the office of the Counselor for
Economic Affairs, the field representative of the State Committee
of Foreign Economic Relations (GKES), which administers all
Soviet military, economic and technical aid projects. The staffs
of these hospitals do not appear to fall within the administrative
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authority of the Soviet ambassador.
C. The Zavkhoz
This man is the general factotum of every Soviet
embassy. He is simultaneously building superintendent, fire-
man, supply clerk and general maintenance man. He is in charge
of all supply procurement, both of materials imported from the
Soviet Union and those which are purchased on the local market.
He usually has some specific skill such as plumbing or a know-
ledge of household or industrial electrical installation, and
a general knowledge of allied mechanical skills.
Although the zavkhoz of a large Soviet mission is an
extremely busy man whose normal duties would seem to leave him
little time for intelligence support work, we have received
hard evidence that in some installations either the zavkhoz or
members of his staff are resident security technicians who
perform counter-audio inspections. As in the case of so many
other positions in a Soviet mission, it is impossible to draw
a composite picture of the zavkhoz or of those members of his
staff who perform security support duties. However, some of
the known and suspect RIS counter-audio technicians have been
known to perform the following tasks:
- To repair and maintain electrical fixtures,
including the electrical equipment in the embassy,
the office of the Commercial Counselor and the
Press and Information Sections of the embassy.
- To obtain estimates on repairs and alterations of
the embassy's motion picture equipment.
- To purchase electrical generator equipment for
the embassy.
- To maintain the internal telephone system of the
embassy.
- To procure supplies for the embassy on the local
market.
The cover titles used by known and suspect counter-audio
technicians throughout the world has ranged from "employee" and
"attache" (the majority), to "engineer," "chauffeur" and "third
secretary." Obviously not all of these men have been carried
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on the official lists as either zavkhoz or members of his staff.
In general, the zavkhoz seldom speaks anything but Russian,
and when dealing with local suppliers works through an inter-
preter from the embassy staff.
d. The Bookkeeper or Accountant
The bookkeeper of a Soviet embassy, who often
serves also as general finance officer, is usually a woman who
has been posted from Moscow, i.e., she is not usually the depen-
dent wife of an embassy staffer hired ad hoc. The bookkeeper
is fully cognizant of all the myriad rules and regulations set
out by the Finance Division of the MFA, including those governing
travel and per diem payments. The bookkeeper is in regular
contact with the ambassador, both for the purpose of examining
running accounts and for preparing the annual budget. In many
cases the bookkeeper is a highly unpopular figure, largely
because she carefully checks every staff expenditure to the last
kopek, and often challenges and refuses to reimburse sums already
obligated or spent. Unless the bookkeeper is also a member of
the KGB or GRU rezidenturas (Mrs. Petrov's cover job in Canberra
was that of embassy bookkeeper and personal secretary to the
ambassador), she has no knowledge of RIS operational accountings.
The bookkeeper usually speaks only Russian and is seldom seen
outside the embassy, unless in the company of other Soviets.
e. The Dezhurniy Komendant
Variously translated as "doorman," "guard,"
"receptionist," and "porter" (in the sense of concierge), this
term is used to describe those non-diplomatic personnel who
serve principally as receptionists in virtually all Soviet diplo-
matic installations abroad. Whereas formerly most of them
appear to have been quite low-level types with very limited
educational backgrounds, many of the dezhurniye komendanty to
be seen today are graduates of one or another Soviet higher insti-
tution of learning and have at least a working knowledge of the
local language, or of one of the principal languages of the
area. We are of the opinion that the latter type is now to be
observed much more often than the former. Those who constitute
the new group of dezhurniye komendanty are young - usually in
their late 20s or very early 30s - and are almost always
married.
Usually seated just inside the main entrance of the embassy
or other diplomatic establishment, the dezhurniy komendant
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interviews all foreign callers, noting their names and the pur-
pose of their visit. On the basis of what he learns from the
visitor, the dezhurniy komendant then summons the appropriate
embassy officer on the internal telephone system, or takes
whatever action he deems necessary. Since those dezhurniye
komendanty of the younger group usually have at least a fair
knowledge of the local language, they are often used to inter-
pret for embassy officers and members of the non-diplomatic
Staff in dealings with local officials and businessmen, and
especially in small installations may also serve as telephone
operators.
In addition to those duties which bring him into contact
with foreigners, the dezhurniy komendant has the following tasks
which are concerned only with Soviet personnel:
Maintains a log book in which the movements of all
personnel are recorded. By regulation, all embassy
staff personnel who live outside the embassy compound
are required to sign in on entering the premises in
the morning, and to sign out, giving their desti-
nations and the. estimated length of time they will be
absent, whenever they leave the premises during working
hours. In theory, the dezhurniy komendant must be able
to tell the ambassador or other senior diplomatic
personnel where all members of the staff are at any
given time. During the absence of a given staff member,
the dezhurniy komendant makes note of all messages and
telephone calls received for a given individual during
the latter's absence, and gives them to him on. his
-
return.
Maintains a schedule of assignments for the
mission's
chauffeurs and serves as vehicle dispatcher.
-
Prepares a detailed report on all events at the end of
his shift. (Wherever there are sufficient personnel,
three shifts of dezhurniye komendanty are maintained.)
Although not every dezhurniy komendant is a staff intel-
ligence officer, there is a sufficient body of evidence to indi-
cate that the position is used by the RIS to place certain
junior officers abroad, and many who first come abroad as
dezhurniye komendanty have proved later in their careers to be
active intelligence officers. Some well-placed sources have
stated that all dezhurniye komendanty are KGB officers.
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Although in theory the MFA is responsible for the physical
security of a diplomatic establishment, which includes guarding
against penetration by hostile foreign elements, in fact the
KGB rezident bears full responsibility; therefore, ultimate
control of the work of the dezhurniy komendant rests with the
KGB rezident, or more directly with his SK man. The dezhurniy
komendant carries a service passport and therefore does not
enjoy diplomatic immunity.
f. Chauffeurs
Aside from the ambassador's chauffeur (see The
Ambassador's Personal Staff), who is not a member of either
rezidentura, the chauffeurs assigned to a Soviet diplomatic
mission are often RIS employees or SK agents. Identification
of these men as RIS support personnel is often made difficult,
however, by the fact that they frequently chauffeur MFA diplo-
mats pursuing their regular jobs, and RIS officers in the course
of their overt functions. When serving in his RIS role, the
chauffeur of either rezidentura drives case officers to agent
meetings, provides countersurveillance during agent meetings,
and so forth. In recent years there have been few if any docu-
mented cases where chauffeurs have served as agent handlers.
For more data related to chauffeurs, see section on Vehicles
(C-6).
g. Char Force
See The Position of Women in the Mission.
h. Code Clerks
See The Referentura.
i. Spetskuriery
The term spetskurier, an abbreviation of the term
kurier spets-okhrany ("courier of the special guard") is used
to designate the referentura guards. The best available infor-
mation shows that these men are employed exclusively as guards
within the referentura. Employees of the Tenth Department of
the MFA, they are seldom seen outside the embassy compound or
buildings, and are believed to have no duties other than main-
taining the physical security of the referentura and the other
personnel assigned to work therein, although it is possible that
some of them may have code and cipher training.
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Information on this category of personnel. is very sparse,
and we have been able to identify few if any of them in recent
years.
C. ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES
1. Working Hours and Daily Routine
Soviet embassies normally conform to the working hours
of the host-country foreign office, but all Soviet empl.oyees
are expected to work from approximately 0900 to 1800 hours, with
an hour for lunch. All employees are obliged to work five-and-
one-half days a week. The ambassador and/or staff members may
return to after-hours work as their duties demand, but only non-
diplomatic employees are paid for overtime work or for work on
holidays. Payments for overtime are usually made in the field
but are credited to the employee's account in Moscow. All
personnel on the diplomatic list serve, in rotation, as duty
diplomat after working hours and on holidays. Normally, embassy
employees do not work on Saturday afternoons, although this time
is often occupied with Party meetings or other events, as noted
elsewhere. The Soviet holidays of 7 November and 1 May are set
aside for receiving foreign guests and for holding internal
celebrations.
Cipher clerks and other referentura personnel are on 24-hour
call, while other employees are assigned night guard duty in
other parts of the mission premises on a rotating schedul.e.
Work in the evening hours is very evident during the final prep-
aration of the Annual Report during January and February, and
the embassy staff usually works in the evenings when couriers
have arrived and just prior to their departure.
2. Length of Duty Tours
The tours of diplomatic personnel vary considerably in
length, although the normal tour of duty in Europe, the Western
Hemisphere and other temperate climates appears to be three
years, and in other areas, two years. Two consecutive tours at
one post, with a home leave period at approximately the end of
each 12-month period, is the general rule for MFA diplomats,
while the number of tours permitted RIS personnel apparently
varies according to the needs of their parent organizations and
their own individual case loads.
The normal tour of duty of non-diplomatic personnel is two
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years, during which they are not granted home leave. At the
end of their tour non-diplomatic personnel return to Moscow
and seldom return to the same post.
There is apparently no set limit on the time an ambassador
may spend at the same post.
3. Leave Practices
a. Home Leave
Ordinarily, Soviet diplomatic personnel are granted
one month's home leave every year with travel at government
expense.
Home leave time is further extended to more than 30 days
per year if diplomatic posts are in southern zones or in areas
deemed unhealthy for Soviets. For instance, employees in Nepal
are reportedly granted 40 days home leave each year. In 1965,
a Soviet diplomat assigned to Laos said he received two months
home leave each year because Laos was an "unhealthy post." He
said the same leave practice held in Hanoi.
All leave must be taken in the USSR; there are no exceptions
to this rule. The leave period is exclusive of travel time;
therefore, if excessive travel is occasioned from a distant post,
the diplomat may be on leave for two months or longer.
Although the most sought-after vacation period is summer,
a schedule of leave is established in each embassy and Commercial
Mission usually toward the end of the calendar year. Thus while
a certain first secretary may be permitted to take leave during
the summer months in one year, he will probably be obliged to
go on vacation during winter in the following year. It appears
that the vacation period is a source of considerable competition
and discord. Usually the diplomatic wives precede their husbands
to Moscow and often return later than their husbands to the
foreign post. This gives the wives a longer period to be with
their children who attend school in the Soviet Union.
Although the majority of MFA diplomats abroad take leave each
year, a heavy work load or some unusual circumstance may prevent
an officer from taking any leave during a particular tour. In
such cases, the wife usually takes leave whether her husband
does or not. Leave may be accumulated, either to be used upon
reassignment to MFA headquarters or the diplomat may be paid
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for his accumulated leave time when he returns to Moscow for
rotation.
b. Extended Leave
In addition to recreational leave, diplomats on
occasion may be detailed in Moscow for consultative purposes
or training courses (RIS or MFA) at the beginning or end of a
vacation, and records reveal that some diplomats may be away
from their posts for as long as several months.
c. Emergency Leave
Leave to return to the USSR is granted those
personnel suffering from illness which requires prolonged or
intensive treatment, as well as to those who have suffered the
loss of a member of their immediate family in. the USSR. How-
ever, it is extremely difficult if not impossible to determine
if the illness or death is indeed true, as these reasons have
often been used to cover TDY trips of RIS officers to the USSR,
and to cover the recall of personnel from abroad for discipli-
nary reasons.
d. Unusual Leave Patterns
Sudden departure of Soviet diplomats reported as
"on leave" from a foreign post is a strong indication that the
person is an RIS officer under diplomatic cover who has been
recalled to Moscow for specific instructions or briefings.
Ambassadors, however, are often noted as being "on leave" in
Moscow prior to special meetings of Soviet government and/or
Party bodies.
4. Finance
a. Budget
The budget of a Soviet embassy is drawn up for the
calendar year, January through December. It is submitted to
the Finance Division of the MFA by mid-January and is usually
approved one month later. Accordingly, an embassy must plan
to have sufficient reserves from the previous year's budget to
cover running expenses until headquarters approval of the current
yearly budget is received in mid-February. Unless previously
obligated, no funds may be spent after the 15th of December
until the budget for the succeeding year is approved.
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The preparation of the annual budget is of special concern
to the ambassador, who examines every item in minute detail and
spends many hours discussing each allocation with the embassy
finance officer. The budget must conform to rigidly established
categories for food, fuel, lighting, representational enter-
tainment and overall maintenance. Every planned expenditure
for even a small, miscellaneous housekeeping item is weighed and
its need evaluated as if the ambassador were to be called upon
to defend it in the highest Moscow court. Moscow insists
repeatedly that costs be cut and kept at a minimum and that a
signed receipt for every disbursement be sent to the Finance
Division of the MFA. The only flexibility in regard to the
budget is a transferral at the end of the year (with the ambas-
sador's permission) of surplus funds from one category to
another in which funds are short. No emergency fund alloca-
tions appear to exist. Visiting Soviet tourists or delegates
attending international meetings in the local area have been
known to get short shrift if they run out of money and appeal
to the Soviet embassy for emergency funding.
b. Secret Funds
Not included in the embassy budget are secret funds
received by the ambassador in the pouch to be transmitted to
the KGB or GRU rezident upon request. Through their own channels
the RIS alerts the rezidents that such funds are being dispatched,
and the rezidents sign receipts for this money when they receive
it from the ambassador
c. Salaries and Allowances
Through the offices of the State Bank, MFA in Moscow
deposits funds to cover embassy budgets and salaries with local
banks in the form of bank drafts. Salaries are normally paid
in cash in the local currency on the 15th and 30th of each
month. On occasion, however, in a newly-established embassy
where the communications service has not yet become routine,
sufficient funds to meet regular salary payments may be delayed
and the entire staff, from the ambassador on down, may not be
paid for two or three consecutive weeks. Although Soviet offi-
cials grumble about this they do not complain officially to
their headquarters. Such laxness on the part of officialdom
is more or less accepted as the usual way of Soviet life.
Current pay scales and allowances are not known. We do
know, however, that all pay and allowance scales abroad are
determined prior to the opening of an embassy and salaries are
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not raised to compensate for a rising cost of living until such
cost of living increase has reached a point above 10 percent
of the base established by Moscow. From what is currently
known, however, salaries paid abroad to Soviet; embassy employ-
ees are extremely low. A diplomat in a West European embassy
noted that a typist in the American embassy was paid more than
the Soviet ambassador, and a Soviet ambassador in another part
of the world commented that in his previous post, he received
one quarter of what the Bulgarian ambassador was paid. The
salary of a certain Soviet first secretary abroad is not more
than $150.00 per month. Base salaries are augmented by 10 per-
cent for the first year of service in the MFA and by five per-
cent for each succeeding two-year period. Supplements of 10
percent to 20 percent are granted for the maintenance of profi-
ciency in foreign languages. From the salary accredited in
Moscow, however, taxes and government bonds are reportedly
deducted.
It should be noted that MFA employees do not receive their
entire salary while stationed abroad. An employee, accompanied
by his wife, receives approximately one-half to two-thirds of
his salary locally; the remainder is deposited. to the employee's
account in Moscow. It may be drawn upon by relatives upon the
written authorization of the employee. When an employee is
abroad without his wife, he may receive at his post as little
as 25 percent of his total salary.
The higher salaries received abroad by Satellite diplomats
are cause for complaint by the Soviets, as well as the fact
that Satellite diplomats have rent-free apartments and their
household effects are sent abroad at no expense to themselves.
The Soviets, who depend on smaller salaries, must meet these
expenses. To reduce expenses, Soviet diplomats rarely take
household furnishings abroad, preferring to pay a small furni-
ture rental fee, plus regular rent for furnished units provided
by the embassy, located either within the compound or in apart-
ments.
5. Housing
The allotment of living quarters, whether they be the
cramped one- or two-room accommodations common to Soviet embassy
compounds or separate apartments located outside the compound,
is the prerogative of the Soviet ambassador or of a senior MFA
diplomat appointed by the ambassador. Wherever possible, the
maximum number of personnel is crowded into a single small
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small apartment house or villa-type building, one family to a
room or possibly two rooms, but rarely more than that number.
The chief of the referentura and the code clerks are obliged
to live in the embassy building, and normally occupy quarters
near the referentura itself.
Separate apartments, located outside the embassy or
Commercial Mission compound and much more luxurious and spac-
ious than the quarters situated in the compound or Soviet-
controlled villa, are usually allotted only to senior MFA diplo-
mats and RIS officers, whose overt and covert duties require
them to meet and occasionally entertain foreigners. Although
such living accommodations are a cut above the quarters which
are occupied by most of the mission staff, in few instances are
they above the standard enjoyed by the average young female
American embassy clerk-typist.
An apartment occupied by an RIS officer may or may not be
taken by his replacement. Analysis of Soviet housing practices
in certain areas of the world indicates that, although over a
period of several years a certain apartment will be occupied by
a succession of ranking Soviet officials - counselors of
embassy, military attaches, first secretaries - there is often
no covert or overt common denominator among them. Thus, an
apartment formerly occupied by Military Attache "X," a GRU
officer, may be taken over by Counselor "Y," an MFA diplomat,
and in turn later occupied by First Secretary "Z," a KGB officer.
On the other hand, certain apartments on the local market, i.e.,
outside the embassy compound, are known to have been occupied
by two KGB or two GRU officers in succession, but rarely more
than two. Local real estate conditions permitting, it appears
to be Soviet practice not to continue to rent the same apart-
ment for more than a few years, probably for security reasons.
The assignment of quarters, both within the embassy compound
and outside it, is the cause of a great amount of dissatisfaction
and jealousy among the mission staff, each family vying for the
best possible accommodations.
6. Vehicles
Privately-owned automobiles remain a great luxury in
the USSR. This, coupled with the fact that a Soviet citizen
desiring to take his car abroad during a PCS assignment must
pay for the transportation of it, plus insurance costs and other
attendant expenses out of his own pocket, assures almost with-
out exception that every vehicle driven by Soviets abroad is
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State property, whether or not it is registered in the name of
an individual Soviet.
The question of who in a Soviet mission, aside from the
clearly identified chauffeurs, is permitted to drive a vehicle
cannot be determined with anything approaching absolute accuracy.
For instance, an MFA regulation states that any Soviet citizen
assigned to an embassy or Commercial Mission may, with the
express permission of the ambassador, use an official Soviet
vehicle for personal reasons. The same regulation states that
the Soviet citizen will be held personally responsible for any
damage occuring to the vehicle. It is, however, doubtful that
more than a few Soviets abroad are able to exercise their theo-
retical rights under this regulation.
Up to a very few years ago it was unusual to observe Soviet
diplomats with no known or suspect RIS affiliation driving alone,
yet this has now become a common sight in many parts of the
world. It has been known for many years that both the KGB and
GRU rezidenturas have their own vehicles but it remains as
difficult as ever under normal circumstances to determine
whether a known or suspect RIS officer seen driving is on an
operational mission, personal business or pleasure, or occupied
with his overt job.
In general terms, it now appears safe to say that any Soviet
who has a legitimate need to drive a vehicle in his overt mission
capacity is permitted to do so, but that the number of cars
available, the frequency of his business needs for a car (and
hence his driving experience) and other factors limit the
personal use of cars largely to RIS officers and senior repre-
sentational diplomats.
In many parts of the world officially-assigned Soviets
purchase vehicles on the local market, ostensibly for their
private use and registered as their personal property. That
such a vehicle is in fact State property becomes evident when
the original "owner" returns to the USSR and the vehicle is taken
over by his replacement; the title, however, remaining in the
name of the original "owner." Although it is impossible to
make generalizations which are everywhere applicable, in the
majority of cases locally-purchased vehicles, almost always of
Western manufacture, are used by the RIS rezidenturas while
Soviet-made vehicles are utilized chiefly by the MFA staff of
the mission for representational or administrative support
purposes.
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Soviet-made vehicles are usually serviced and maintained by
the embassy motor pool, while non-Soviet-made vehicles are
serviced in local garages, usually at those which charge the
least money.
7. Registry, Pouch and Cable Procedures
All official but unclassified correspondence between the
Soviet mission and the foreign office and other ministries,
private industries and individuals of the host country is regi-
stered by the ambassador's female secretary, who also maintains
copies and a log of such correspondence. The same secretary
usually receives overt mail arriving at the mission through the
local postal system, and distributes it to the appropriate
sections of the mission.
All classified material destined for Moscow which is
prepared in a Soviet diplomatic installation outside the Bloc
and which is not transmitted by electronic means, and all such
material prepared in Moscow for dispatch to official installa-
tions abroad, is carried in the diplomatic pouch. Correspondence
destined for Moscow (MFA reports, reports of the two legal
rezidenturas, MFT reports) is assembled and prepared for trans-
mission in the referentura by an officer or employee of the
appropriate mission element; that is, the chief of the referen-
tura assembles and packages all material destined for MFA head-
quarters, the KGB code clerk assembles and packages material
for?KGB headquarters, and GRU clerk all material for his head-
quarters, and the MFT clerk the material for his center.
Although RIS pouch procedures are far too complicated to be
described in this study, in general terms all correspondence from
and to KGB and GRU headquarters is first typed, then photographed,
the correspondence itself going forward in the form of undevel-
oped film strips or rolls in containers specially devised to
prevent and detect any opening. A foreign passport of opera-
tional value, or an original foreign document of greatest value
in its original form will, on the other hand, be forwarded as is.
Classified correspondence between the Ministries of Foreign
Affairs and Foreign Trade and their field installations, on the
other hand, is sent in the clear, only cable traffic being
enciphered.
Correspondence prepared by the various elements of a diplo-
matic mission is handed over, sealed, to the chief of the
referentura who then places it in a diplomatic pouch and seals
the pouch. In similar fashion, the diplomatic couriers on
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State property, whether or not it is registered in the name of
an individual Soviet.
The question of who in a Soviet mission, aside from the
clearly identified chauffeurs, is permitted to drive a vehicle
cannot be determined with anything approaching absolute accuracy.
For instance, an MFA regulation states that any Soviet citizen
assigned to an embassy or Commercial Mission may, with the
express permission of the ambassador, use an official Soviet
vehicle for personal reasons. The same regulation states that
the Soviet citizen will be held personally responsible for any
damage occuring to the vehicle. It is, however, doubtful that
more than a few Soviets abroad are able to exercise their theo-
retical rights under this regulation.
Up to a very few years ago it was unusual to observe Soviet
diplomats with no known or suspect RIS affiliation driving alone,
yet this has now become a common sight in many parts of the
world. It has been known for many years that both the KGB and
GRU rezidenturas have their own vehicles but it remains as
difficult as ever under normal circumstances to determine
whether a known or suspect RIS officer seen driving is on an
operational mission, personal business or pleasure, or occupied
with his overt job.
In general terms, it now appears safe to say that any Soviet
who has a legitimate need to drive a vehicle in his overt mission
capacity is permitted to do so, but that the number of cars
available, the frequency of his business needs for a car (and
hence his driving experience) and other factors limit the
personal use of cars largely to RIS officers and senior repre-
sentational diplomats.
In many, parts of the world officially-assigned Soviets
purchase vehicles on the local market, ostensibly for their
private use and registered as their personal property. That
such a vehicle is in fact State property becomes evident when
the original "owner" returns to the USSR and the vehicle is taken
over by his replacement; the title, however, remaining in the
name of the original "owner." Although it is impossible to
make generalizations which are everywhere applicable, in the
majority of cases locally-purchased vehicles, almost always of
Western manufacture, are used by the RIS rezidenturas while
Soviet-made vehicles are utilized chiefly by the MFA staff of
the mission for representational or administrative support
purposes.
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Soviet-made vehicles are usually serviced and maintained by
the embassy motor pool, while non-Soviet-made vehicles are
serviced in local garages, usually at those which charge the
least money.
7. Registry, Pouch and Cable Procedures
All official but unclassified correspondence between the
Soviet mission and the foreign office and other ministries,
private industries and individuals of the host country is regi-
stered by the ambassador's female secretary, who also maintains
copies and a log of such correspondence. The same secretary
usually receives overt mail arriving at the mission through the
local postal system, and distributes it to the appropriate
sections of the mission.
All classified material destined for Moscow which is
prepared in a Soviet diplomatic installation outside the Bloc
and which is not transmitted by electronic means, and all such
material prepared in Moscow for dispatch to official installa-
tions abroad, is carried in the diplomatic pouch. Correspondence
destined for Moscow (MFA reports, reports of the two legal
rezidenturas, MFT reports) is assembled and prepared for trans-
mission in the referentura by an officer or employee of the
appropriate mission element; that is, the chief of the referen-
tura assembles and packages all material destined for MFA head-
quarters, the KGB code clerk assembles and packages material
for KGB headquarters, and GRU clerk all material for his head-
quarters, and the MFT clerk the material for his center.
Although RIS pouch procedures are far too complicated to be
described in this study, in general terms all correspondence from
and to KGB and GRU headquarters is first typed, then photographed,
the correspondence itself going forward in the form of undevel-
oped film strips or rolls in containers specially devised to
prevent and detect any opening. A foreign passport of opera-
tional value, or an original foreign document of greatest value
in its original form will, on the other hand, be forwarded as is.
Classified correspondence between the Ministries of Foreign
Affairs and Foreign Trade and their field installations, on the
other hand, is sent in the clear, only cable traffic being
enciphered.
Correspondence prepared by the various elements of a diplo-
matic mission is handed over, sealed, to the chief of the
referentura who then places it in a diplomatic pouch and seals
the pouch. In similar fashion, the diplomatic couriers on
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arrival at an installation abroad turn over the pouch to the
chief of the referentura, who then unseals it and distributes
the contents to the appropriate elements; MFA mail to the
ambassador or MFA counselor, KGB mail to the KGB code clerk or
rezident, GRU mail to the GRU clerk or rezident, etc. Only
the chief of the referentura has the right to open and seal
diplomatic pouches.
The travel schedules of Soviet diplomatic couriers are
announced to the embassies concerned well in advance, and
changes in schedule from one point to the next are signalled
by cable, as are the time of departure, means of travel and
expected time of arrival of the couriers. The couriers are
met on arrival by an.escort party, composed of a chauffeur and
members of the diplomatic staff of the embassy, which makes
certain that the couriers pass through the local customs and
immigration authorities as quickly as possible, and then drives
the couriers and their pouches to the embassy. A similar escort
party drives the couriers and their pouches to the point of
departure, and waits until they have left.
Soviet diplomatic couriers always travel in pairs, almost;
invariably stay in quarters controlled by the Soviet embassy
in the host capital, and rarely have any dealings with mission
personnel other than the chief of the referentura. Outside the
USSR, aside from the chief of the referentura, only the ambas-
sador has any authority over the diplomatic couriers, which is
limited to ordering them to remain for a given period of time
beyond their scheduled stay, usually because all material for
the pouch is not yet ready.
The number of persons authorized to originate cables in a
Soviet mission is believed to be very limited, probably only
the ambassador, the senior MFA diplomat and the RIS rezidents
enjoying this authority. Cables are drafted in longhand on
numbered sheets of paper which are kept only in the referentura.
Except for the ambassador, who is permitted by regulation to
draft cables in his own office, all cables must be written in
the referentura, after which they are turned over to the
appropriate code clerk for enciphering and transmission.
In those cases where directives and instructions received
by cable from MFA headquarters in Moscow must be read by a
senior MFA or Party official to a wide number of the mission
staff, regulations expressly forbid the cable to be read verba-
tim and order that the contents instead be paraphrased. KGB and
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GRU rezidents have been known to brief their ambassadors on the
contents of cables from KGB and GRU headquarters, but in all
cases they have never read the text verbatim but have rather
given the ambassador precis of information.
8. Supplies; Building Maintenance
Because of a chronic shortage of foreign currency, every
effort is made to import from the USSR as much as possible of
the goods and supplies required to keep the Soviet mission
functioning. Technical equipment, telephones for the internal
communications system, and like materials are invariably brought
in from the Soviet Union. However, furniture, rugs, drapery
material and curtains, stationery for official use, building
maintenance material such as lumber, plumbing supplies, floor
waxes and soaps, and all perishable foods for the embassy mess,
are usually bought on the local market, under the supervision
of the zavkhoz. Although the zavkhoz is under strict orders
from the ambassador to shop about among the local merchants in
order to buy at the lowest possible price, it is almost inevitable
that over a period of years the Soviet mission falls into the
habit of buying most of its supplies from the same merchants.
The maintenance and cleaning of physical facilities in the
mission is the responsibility of the zavkhoz and his staff, and
these men do in fact make every attempt to keep the physical
plant running. However, major, complex repair work is beyond
the abilities of most zavkhozy, thus local firms must be called
in to repair heating and air conditioning systems, mend roofs
and do other jobs which require specialized skills. As in the
case of small supplies, the mission usually falls into the habit
of calling on the same firms for these specialized jobs.
9. Dependents
a. Working Wives
As in the USSR so abroad, all women are expected to
work, whether they be-assigned PCS from Moscow to a specific task
in an embassy or whether they be the wives of staffers. The
wives of those officials with diplomatic rank often work as
secretaries in the embassy or Commercial Mission, and on occasion
as clerk/typists in the offices of TASS, Novosti or other press
correspondents. Those not so employed hold leading positions in
the administration of the mestkom (the "Local Committee," the
organization of the Trade Unions y, where they supervise the
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free-time activities of the colony's children, establish and
run the colony's library, and similar activities. In addition,
the diplomatic wives are usually active in affairs of the
zhensovet (women's council), which organizes free-time acti-
vity among the women of the colony, including the organization
of choral groups, discussions of common housekeeping problems,
sightseeing excursions for the women and children, summer camps
for the children, etc. The zhensovet is often headed by the
wife of the ambassador.
Except in certain countries of South Asia and the Far East,
a regulation forbidding the employment of non--Soviet personnel
within an embassy is in force, thus all cleaning of the embassy
(and Commercial Mission) premises must be done by women of the
colony. In most cases, the char force of an embassy is composed
of the wives of the non-diplomatic staff, i.e., of the chauf-
feurs, code clerks, doormen, clerks. However,, wives of diplo-
matic staff members also work on the char force in some embas-
sies, and have occasionally been surprised on their hands and
knees, with pail and scrub brush in hand.
All staff wives who work are paid for their labors.. The
best evidence available, however, shows that the rate of pay is
extremely low, to the point of being minimal. In some embassies
women of both the diplomatic and non-diplomatic staffs have
been trained to serve as waitresses at receptions, formal dinners
and during protocol visits to the embassy by prominent persons
of the host country. In other embassies, women act as guards
at-the outer gates of the walls surrounding embassy premises.
In no instance known to us, however, have women served as door-
men/receptionists ("dezhurniy komendant"), such posts being
held exclusively by men.
The number of women assigned to an embassy as bona fide
MFA staff employees or under MFA cover is small compared to the
total number of employees, since the number of slots is often
limited by the host government, and these utilized to place as
many men as possible in positions which carry diplomatic immunity.
The fact that staff wives are obliged to work obviates the
necessity to send women abroad to do jobs for which those already
on the spot are at least partially qualified. The jobs which
female staff members regularly hold (whether bona fide or for
cover purposes) are: secretary/typist to the ambassador
(sometimes referred to as zavkants, or chief of the ambassador's
secretariat); bookkeeper or finance clerk; telephone recept-
ionist; schoolteacher; embassy physician; and file clerk/typist.
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Only three or four women employees of the MFA are known to hold
diplomatic rank.
b. Position of Women in the Mission
Most women in a Soviet diplomatic mission have
little leisure time. If they are not regular staff employees,
their services may be called upon for ad hoc duties which, in
addition to personal housekeeping tasks, cleaning, laundry and
child care, admit of little free time during the day, while even-
ings are taken up with organized activities. Wives do snatch
time to gossip, and violent personal jealousies arise between
wives over living quarters, personal possessions and petty
perquisites. Cliques develop, and formal complaints are made
against a certain wife or unmarried female employee who is judged
as becoming too Western in her attitudes and in her manner of
dress. Wives have been criticized for purchasing Western luxu-
ries for their children and have been warned about buying child-
ren's nylon dresses and chewing gum, and otherwise spoiling the
children with decadent Western extravagances.
There are many reports of unfaithfulness among Soviet wives.
In one Soviet mission, the ambassador's male secretary was sent
home in disgrace because he was having an affair with the wife
of the KGB rezident.
The Soviet woman seen abroad in the late 1940s and in the
1950s - overweight, dumpy, without make-up, wearing a flour-
sack dress and speaking no foreign languages - is no longer a
stereotype. Many of the Soviet wives seen outside the USSR today
dress with a certain degree of chic, do not huddle together,
dumb, on social occasions, and have a fair understanding of
foreign languages. Some, in fact, are easily able to pass for
Western Europeans, at least superficially. These women, however,
are more often than not the wives of RIS officers and are them-
selves educated women with a certain degree of exposure to West-
ern customs. Nevertheless, the majority of Soviet wives abroad
remain a colorless lot who adhere to regulations, rarely learn
the local language, seldom acquire any real understanding of life
outside the USSR, and are subservient to their husbands. Many
diplomatic wives spend as much time as possible on leave in the
Soviet Union, particularly if they have children attending school
there.
Wives, like their husbands, complain of boredom resulting
from their restricted living conditions within the compound; they
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.complain of scrimping "to make do" with a limited budget and
they complain of the weather if the embassy is located in a
hot-climate country. Soviet women do, however, receive permis-
sion to make repeated trips outside the compound to visit the
local stores and markets, beauty parlors, and to attend certain
approved movies. Although Soviet women have been observed at
beaches and parks in some areas accompanied only by their child-
ren, they usually travel in pairs while outside the mission and
must report any contact of consequence that they may have with
any member of the local populace or with any other foreigner.
Some Soviet women have been sent home in disgrace for shop-
lifting. Many Soviet women seem starved for personal posses-
sions; bright scarves, hats, nylon hose, Western shoes, cosmetics
and junk jewelry. Soviet diplomatic wives do not frequent local
restaurants or cafes.
C. Schooling of Dependent Children
By law, all children of Soviet parents assigned or
attached to a Soviet mission abroad must attend Soviet?-run
schools. The only documented exceptions to this rule have
occurred in Northern Europe, where the preschool children of two
Soviet diplomats attend locally-run kindergartens; one case in
the Far East where the daughter of the Soviet ambassador to
Japan attends a non-Soviet elementary school; and several cases
in East Africa, where Soviet children of elementary school age
attend a non-Soviet school. The exceptions notwithstanding, in
recent years no school-age child of Soviet parents is known to
have attended a full course of instruction (i.e., all grades of
elementary, junior high or high school) in any but a Soviet-run
school.
Conditions permitting, each Soviet colony abroad runs a
school, or schools, attended by children six through eleven years
of age, which is in session from 1 September through 15 May. In
some areas, there are only four-year classes. All children 12
years and above must return to the USSR for further education.
In those areas of the world where circumstances of climate or
lack of proper facilities prohibit the setting up of schools,
all children seven years and above are returned to the USSR to
be educated.
While the Soviet curriculum varies greatly from that of non-
Soviet systems of education and by itself is sufficient reason
for the children of Soviet citizens stationed abroad to be edu-
cated in the Soviet Union, a consideration of equal importance
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is the overriding importance of "proper" political indoctri-
nation of the young, which the Soviets regard as being done
correctly for their citizens only in the USSR. Although the
hostage system of the Stalin era has largely disappeared, at
least as far as the Soviet citizen posted officially abroad is
concerned, nevertheless the fact that one's child or children
must remain in the homeland during the greater part of one's
service abroad certainly acts as a deterrent to defection in
many cases. The separation of parents and children for long
periods of time obviously causes feelings of deep anxiety in
many of the parents, and a significant number of Soviet diplo-
matic personnel have complained with apparent sincerity of the
hardship which this system brings.
Soviet schools abroad are under the overall supervision of
the ambassador or principal officer, but under the direct super-
vision of the secretary of the mestkom. In many posts, the
teachers - all women - are professionals sent from Moscow
whose only duty is teaching, while in other posts the teachers
are staff wives with professional teaching experience. The
curriculum followed in Soviet colony schools is precisely the
same as that used in the USSR.
Although the practice does not appear to be widely encour-
aged, there are known instances of children of the more zealous
Communists among Bloc diplomatic personnel attending Soviet
colony schools.
The overall supervision of Soviet colony schools abroad is
the responsibility of the All-Union Ministry of Education, which
operates through the Schools Inspectorate of the MFA.
The children of parents stationed abroad are permitted to
visit their parents during vacation time, and it is now no longer
rare or even highly unusual to find all members of one family
together at a foreign post for a period of two or three months
during the summer. The costs of vacation-time travel to and
from the USSR must be borne by the child's parents. Each child
must be accompanied by a Soviet citizen at all times while
traveling.
10. Personnel Practices
a. Soviet Diplomatic Ranks
Until World War II, the Soviet foreign service did
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not assign diplomatic ranks to its officers, but since approxi-
mately 1944 it has employed the titles and ranks in common
usage throughout the rest of the world, with certain varia-
tions as noted below. Soviet diplomatic ranks are as follows,
in descending order:
Ambassador
Minister-Counselor
Counselor, First Class
Counselor, Second Class
First Secretary, First Class
First Secretary, Second Class
Second Secretary, First Class
Second Secretary, Second Class
Third Secretary, First Class
Third Secretary, Second Class
Attache
Referent
Probationer
All ranks from attache through ambassador carry diplomatic
passports; all persons assigned abroad below the rank of attache
carry service passports. Within a consulate-general, the consul-
general usually has a diplomatic rank roughly equivalent to that
of counselor. In a large embassy where there are several senior
officers with the rank of counselor, the senior among them some-
times carries the rank of minister-counselor. Where the title
of minister-counselor is not used, the next-ranking officer
after the ambassador is named first counselor of embassy.
Precisely what differences there are between first- and second-
class secretaries is not known, and in fact the titles them-,
selves appear to be used by the Soviets themselves infrequently.
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b. Promotions
The Soviet MFA officer always carries with him the
highest rank which he has reached, i.e., if he was a first
secretary at Paris during his last tour, he will appear at his
next post, Rome, with the same rank or possibly with the rank
of counselor, but never with a rank lower than that of first
secretary. Under the Soviet system he could not be demoted and
expect ever to serve abroad again. RIS officers who go abroad
under MFA cover, on the other hand, sometimes change rank down-
ward or carry the same rank, often a relatively low one, from
post to post. For example, a KGB officer may first appear in
Washington with the rank of second secretary, then in London as
third secretary, and later in New Delhi as counselor of embassy.
On the other hand, another KGB officer may appear in a variety
of posts throughout the world always with the rank of third
secretary. (There is one well-known KGB officer who has held
the ranks of attache and third secretary from approximately 1948
to the present.) Where it is possible to observe the career of
a given Soviet diplomat over a period of years, the fact that
he has changed rank erratically or downward is a sure sign that
he is an intelligence officer.
Promotion of bona fide MFA officers appears to be slow.
Promotion of RIS officers, however, is often rapid, and the fact
that a certain Soviet diplomat arrives at a given post as a
probationer, and within two tours has risen to the rank of second
secretary, is often another indication that he is an intelligence
officer. Promotions of RIS personnel under MFA (and MFT) cover
are often handled directly by the KGB and GRU, to the point that
the ambassador sometimes learns of the "promotion" of one of his
subordinates, an intelligence officer under embassy cover, from
the rezident and not through MFA channels.
c. Trainees and Probationers
In recent years it has become customary for trainees
to be sent from Moscow to embassies abroad, for the purpose of
improving their language and area knowledge. The average
trainee is in his mid-20s and is usually a fifth-year student
of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (IIR)
who is specializing a certain geographical area. He usually
remains at a foreign post for periods ranging from nine months
to a year, during which time he is often assigned to the ambas-
sador's personal staff as a general factotum, translating
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articles from the local press, preparing background reports on
the local political and economic scene, and so forth. The
trainee during this period is not yet an employee of the MFA,
although he may well already be a junior RIS officer. He
carries a service passport.
The lowest rank in the Soviet diplomatic order is that of
"probationer" (stazher), although the probationer does not carry
a diplomatic passport and does not enjoy diplomatic immunity.
The probationer is usually in his mid- or late 20s and a recent
graduate of the IIR. Oftentimes, he has been a trainee in the
country of his first regular assignment, and usually has a good
basic working knowledge of the local language. The probationer
usually spends about two years at his first post during which
time he, like the trainee, is assigned to the ambassador's
personal staff and does much the same work as the trainee,
although the probationer is frequently rotated among the various
sections of the embassy: Consular Section, Political Section,
etc. During his first tour the probationer's work is observed
carefully by the ambassador and other senior officers, and at
the end of his tour the ambassador forwards to the MFA an eval-
uation of performance, with a recommendation to hire the proba-
tioner as a career officer, or with a recommendation that he
not be given permanent status owing to general. unsuitability.
If accepted by the MFA, the probationer receives the temporary
rank of referent and soon after, the full diplomatic rank of
attache. Prior to receiving the rank of attache, however, the
probationer must by regulation be granted full membership in the
CPSU.
Although we now estimate that at least 50 percent of all
graduates of the IIR are taken into intelligence work and are
assigned abroad, mostly under MFA cover, by no means do all
probationers enter MFA, either for RIS cover purposes or as
genuine diplomats; nor are all probationers RIS officers. Deter-
mination of a probationer's RIS affiliations can be made only
after he has been observed for a considerable period of time
during PCS assignments.
11. Observance of Official Holidays
Seven holidays are officially observed. in all Soviet
missions abroad: 1 January (New Year's Day), 1 May (International
Labor Day), and 7 November (anniversary of the October Revolution)
are universally celebrated as full holidays and little work is
done for periods of several days prior to and after them.
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23 February (Red Army Day) is the occasion of official recep-
tions given by the Office of the Military Attache, and of
unofficial receptions limited to members of the GRU reziden-
tura. 8 March (International Women's Day), 22 April (Lenin's
Birthday), and 5 December (Constitution Day) are celebrated
by special meetings within the colony but are not necessarily
free holidays nor are they usually marked by official closings
of Soviet installations. 20 December, the anniversary of the
founding of the Cheka, is a KGB holiday. For obvious reasons
it is not celebrated publicly abroad, and the extent to which
it is celebrated privately by KGB rezidenturas is unknown.
7 November and 1 May, the principal holidays, are cele-
brated, at least in large missions, in three stages, compressed
to one or two in smaller posts. On the first day a formal
reception is given at the Soviet embassy, to which ranking
officials of the host government, prominent host-country poli-
ticians, intellectuals, businessmen and journalists, and the
leading diplomats of foreign embassies are invited. Soviets
who attend are, in principle, only the diplomats, down through
the rank of attache in smaller posts, but limited to the ambas-
sador, counselors and first secretaries in larger ones; however,
there are more Soviets of middle rank at this reception than at
any other where foreigners attend.
On the second day a reception is usually held to which only
diplomatic personnel of the Bloc countries are invited. Whether
the Yugoslavs are invited depends on the political climate at
the time. The Communist Chinese are not known to have been
invited since 1960 - 1961. The atmosphere on the second day is
much more relaxed than on the first, and the celebration is
marked by entertainment such as choral singing and folk dancing
by both the Soviets and personnel of the various Bloc countries.
The third stage is a general party held exclusively for all
members of the Soviet colony, regardless of rank. All Soviets
not obliged to be on duty attend this party, which is celebrated
by organized entertainment such as the staging of plays and
choral singing and by unorganized consumption of great quanti-
ties of food and drink. Alcohol, which is officially restricted
to a few bottles during the rest of the year, flows freely
during these celebrations, releasing inhibitions and causing old
feuds and resentments to flare up. These parties are usually
the occasion for at least one major fistfight among members of
the staff. The party of 1 January is a full family affair, with
attendance practically obligatory. In the afternoon the children
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and some of the grownups do acts and skits, and the party
continues into the evening, usually very liquid.
D. SECURITY PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES
1. General
To understand the Soviet concept of security abroad, it
must be emphasized that "peaceful coexistence" notwithstanding,
the Soviet citizen abroad, whether he be in a "friendly" Bloc:
nation or in a non- or anti-Communist country, considers himself
to be in hostile territory, surrounded by real or potential
enemies. That this fixation did not die at the end of the Stalin
era but persists in full vigor today, is evidenced not only by
the continued use by the KGB - the security arm. of the CPSU -
of the term "The Main Enemy" (Glavniy Vrag) to denote the United
States and other powerful leading non-Communist nations of the
West, but also by the reports of recent knowledgeable defectors
and by the unguarded remarks of Soviets in many parts of the
world. No matter how relaxed the attitudes of many official
Soviets stationed abroad may appear to be in comparison with
those of the 1940s and early 1950s, such relaxation must be
regarded as only superficial. Every Soviet citizen being posted
abroad is imbued with the concept that, once outside the bound-
aries of the USSR, he is on "enemy territory" (the term is
actually used at times) and will be surrounded by "enemies" who
attempt constantly to entrap him for the purpose of subverting
the Soviet State.
In order to reduce to the lowest possible minimum the danger
of physical penetration of Soviet installations and the subver-
sion of Soviet citizens abroad, a wide variety of prophylactic
measures is taken in all Soviet missions.
2. Screening and Briefing of Personnel
a. The Exit Commission
Prior to being permitted to leave the USSR, each
Soviet citizen is subjected to a lengthy investigation of his
personal life and political background (fully documented under
Soviet Party practice), which involves inter alia writing his
biography and being interviewed by various Party commissions.
The culmination of this investigation for the Soviet being posted
abroad PCS to a diplomatic mission is his mandatory appearance
before the so-called Exit Commission (Kommisiya po Vyyezdam
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Zagranitsu pri TsK - Exit Commission of the CC/CPSU), an organ
of the Secretariat of the CC/CPSU. This commission is known to
be headed by Aleksandr Semenovich Panyushkin, former ambassador
to the United States, who has a long history of intelligence
activity and who is also Chief of the Department of Personnel
Abroad of the CC/CPSU.
The Soviet going abroad appears before a so-called "instructor"
of the Exit Commission, usually a KGB officer who has served in
the area and who is well acquainted with the individual's file,
including Party and KGB reports on his personal life and politi-
cal background. The "instructor" then proceeds to question the
interviewee concerning his personal background, his political
attitudes and training, and then recommends to the Exit Commis-
sion whether he shall be permitted to go abroad. The Exit Com-
mission is the highest authority in the USSR concerning permis-
sion to go abroad. In theory, there can be no appeal from a
negative decision.
Once the Exit Commission has granted permission for a Soviet
citizen to go abroad, the latter is given a lengthy list of
regulations concerning such matters as his duty to protect
Soviet State secrets, to defend the interests of the Soviet State
in all possible ways, to avoid entanglement with foreign women,
etc. Having read this, the prospective traveler signs a docu-
ment stating that he has read and understood all parts of the
list.
b. Briefing on Arrival at a New Post
At his post abroad, the newly-arrived officer is
briefed individually and in private by a member of the KGB rezi-
dentura (who does not, however, identify himself as such) on
local security hazards, which briefing usually includes a general
description of the activities of the local counterintelligence
service against the Soviet mission, the attitude of the local
population towards Soviet citizens in general, and actual or
alleged past means of "provocation" (entrapment) used in the
host country against members of the mission. On the occasion of
a serious security flap, such as the arrest of a Soviet agent
in the host country (always described by the Soviets as a "provo-
cation" against them), the ambassador will often call a general
meeting of the entire staff, refer to the "provocation," warn
all present to be especially vigilant against further "provo-
cations," and remind them all that, before leaving Moscow, they
signed an agreement to protect Soviet interests by all possible
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means. RIS staff personnel and co-optees are briefed concern-
ing the organization, modus operandi and personnel of hostile
intelligence and security services operating in the host
country.
3. Personnel Security and Discipline at the Post
a. General
The conduct of Soviet citizens serving abroad, both
in its professional and private aspects, is viewed by the Soviet
system from two sides - the Party and the KGB. In the first
instance, the Party is responsible for guarding the "moral"
conduct of its members, which does not mean conventional moral-
ity in the Western sense, but rather embraces all aspects of
the individual Soviet's life within the context of the princi-
ples of Marxism-Leninism. In the second instance, the KGB
rezidentura is responsible for preventing all Soviet citizens
in the host country from being subverted by hostile, anti-Soviet
elements.
It is sometimes difficult to determine at which point the
personal conduct of a given Soviet abroad passes from the concern
of the Party to that of the KGB. The following example may
partly clarify this point: Second Secretary ":K," an MFA diplo-
mat, begins to drink heavily, usually after duty hours but also
on two occasions during work-days. However, he has maintained
complete sobriety outside the embassy and when dealing with
foreigners. The case is brought to the attention of the ambas-
sador who, working with the Party secretary, makes certain that
the matter is raised at the next Party meeting and that Second
Secretary "X" is chastized in a formal "criticism session." No
further action will be taken, assuming that the secretary reduces
his excessive drinking to the accepted norm, and the matter is
handled entirely within the framework of Party discipline. How-
ever, should Second Secretary "X" have been drunk repeatedly in
public outside the embassy, in a place or places where the host-
country counterintelligence service had been able to observe him,
the matter would become a security case and would be handled
exclusively by the KGB rezidentura, which would take the posi-
tion that the secretary had laid himself open to compromise.
In order to lessen the possibility that they will fall under
the influence of "bourgeois decadence" (the term is still very
much in use among the Soviets), non-diplomatic staffers are
seldom permitted to remain at one post longer than a single tour.
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MFA diplomats and RIS staffers under MFA cover often remain
for two tours. However, there is considerable evidence showing
that the KGB becomes very concerned over the security of an
MFA diplomat who remains at the same post for over two tours.
Presumably, the KGB has less concern for the possible attrac-
tion of hostile influences to their own staff, many of whom
remain in the same geographical areas, if not the same country,
for much longer periods of time.
b. The Regime of the SK
The "protection" of all Soviets stationed abroad
from subversion and recruitment by hostile intelligence services
is the responsibility of the Soviet Colony (SK - Sovetskaya
Koloniya) Section of the Counterintelligence Department of the
First Chief Directorate (Foreign Intelligence) of the KGB.
(The term "Soviet Colony" includes all Soviet citizens, whether
diplomats, administrative staff, trade personnel, correspondents
and others who are assigned to a mission abroad.) Within a KGB
legal rezidentura, at least one staff officer is assigned to SK
work and he in turn recruits agents among the other Soviet
personnel, for the purpose of observing and reporting on the
conduct of their colleagues. The number of KGB officers
assigned to SK work in a mission is apparently small. - perhaps
one officer for about 50 people, and in small installations one
officer for the whole colony. But the ratio of SK agents to
the number of staff personnel is quite high, on the order of one
to five. Thus, in a typical installation each SK agent would
be assigned the task of observing his or her close colleagues,
with perhaps specific assignments to watch one or more people
in his close periphery whose actions were judged by the SK to
merit special attention. In an embassy, the staff of which
numbers 100, including wives, there are likely to be about two
SK officers and 20 SK agents. Although a KGB regulation exists
which forbids the recruitment of foreigners as SK agents, it is
known that this regulation is sometimes relaxed in certain cases
where certain foreigners of proven pro-Soviet loyalty are in
especially good positions to report on Soviet citizens in their
milieu.
In theory, outside the KGB rezidentura, the identity of the
SK officer(s) is known only to the ambassador, and the SK
agents are kept carefully compartmented from one another and
are known only to the SK officer and the rezident. However,
the identity of the SK officer is frequently known within the
colony, because of the fact that his constant investigations and
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snooping soon reveal his true status. In some instances the
SK officer is also the deputy KGB rezident.
c. Crimes and Misdemeanors
Minor derelictions, serious offenses and crimes
against Party morality are punished by a variety of measures,
in strict accordance with the Statute of the CPSU, which sets
out in great detail the duties and responsibilities of the
Party member. These punishments range in intensity from public
reproach within the Party organization, usually done at a Party
meeting, through several steps to a severe reprimand which is
registered in the offender's Party file, and culminate in
expulsion from the Party. The last step means in effect that
the individual, unless later "rehabilitated," has lost any possi-
bility of holding any position of significance in Soviet public
life. Depending on the nature of the offense or crime, the
sentence of expulsion from the Party may be accompanied by a
sentence of imprisonment under civil law. Those punishments
meted by the Party organization which are not sufficiently grave
to be recorded in the Party member's personal Party dossier are
not cited thereafter in any Party document, except in the case
of KGB officers, where they are recorded in the officer's Party
dossier. On the other hand, Party punishments sufficiently
grave to warrant recording in the member's Party dossier remain
on record until his death.
Derelictions, violations and crimes which are punishable
under either the formal code of the CPSU or under the informal
rules of the SK section of the local KGB rezidentura are many.
Among those which are known to have been committed frequently
by Soviets stationed abroad during the last decade are: drunken-
ness, adultery with the wives of other Soviet citizens, currency
speculation, misuse of position for the purpose of embezzling
State property, misappropriation of State property and funds,
unauthorized contact with foreigners (particularly Americans and
British), and shoplifting. A high official of the Foreign Cadres
Department of the Secretariat of the CC/CPSU noted several years
ago that Soviet diplomats have been recalled to the USSR for
the following offenses: habitually getting drunk with local
citizens in cafes and restaurants; driving while intoxicated
and being arrested by the local police; remaining all night in
local restaurants and bars; habitual drunkenness during working
hours; unauthorized contact with Americans; while driving, becom-
ing involved in traffic accidents and killing or injuring local
citizens.
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The foregoing examples notwithstanding, there appears to be
no universal, fixed attitude on the part of Soviet authorities
abroad toward the various derelictions and offenses punishable
under the provisions of the pertinent Party and KGB rules and
regulations. The influence of the individual ambassador, and
the Soviet view of the politics and counterintelligence acti-
vity of the particular country, affect the severity with which
standard rules are applied. The following incidents demon-
strate this:
- In a Western European country, several officers of a
Soviet embassy - among them at least one KGB officer -
regularly frequented prostitutes in the open red-light
district of one of the large cities of the host capital.
There were no operational implications in these visits.
- During a previous tour in the same country a suspect
KGB officer stationed in Scandinavia fathered an ille-
gitimate child during a liaison with a local woman. He
was not punished, although his offense became known to
his superiors.
- A Soviet ambassador in the Western Hemisphere misappro-
priated State property for his own use. He was subse-
quently reduced to the rank of candidate member of the
Party but was later "rehabilitated" and is now serving
again outside the Bloc as ambassador.
- A KGB co-optee in the Far East had intimate relations
with a large number of local women, a fact which was
well known.
- A Soviet ambassador in Western Europe appeared drunk in
public on several occasions, and on one of these occasions
insulted the local head of state and the entire diplo-
matic corps. He is currently serving abroad in another
European country, still as ambassador.
These examples, however, must be viewed as exceptions rather than
as the rule, for it is clear that where the Soviet citizen abroad
exposes himself to the local public view in such a manner as to
embarrass the Soviet State; or where he or where his actions
come to the attention of host intelligence and security author-
ities, in situations which the KGB regards as compromising from
the security viewpoint, he will normally be recalled to the USSR
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as quickly as possible. Some 190 Soviets were recalled for
cause from foreign posts in the year 1959 alone.
d. Contact with Foreigners
Contact with and cultivation of foreigners is offi-
cially encouraged by the MFA for some specific advantage, such
as promoting friendliness to the USSR or gaining some service
or favor, and normally only in the context of specific direc-
tives which levy requirements to promote a certain propaganda
line, or to gather certain specific information. Such contacts.
are encouraged for diplomats only and not for second category
employees, for whom, in general, they are forbidden. The KGB
and GRU, of course, use such contacts for operational assessment,
development and other purposes. It can normally be assumed
that a Soviet diplomat who regularly entertains foreigners in
restaurants or at his apartment, or who visits local night clubs
or bars alone or with another Soviet, is an intelligence officer
or co-optee. Other RIS or non-RIS cultivation of foreigners
for purely social purposes is discouraged, if not strictly for-
bidden, as is the frequenting of bars, night clubs and other
places of "dubious social nature."
In addition to the ever-present fear of being observed and
reported on by the SK network in the colony, the MFA diplomat
does not cultivate foreigners or visit local places of enter-
tainment - except for motion picture theaters - for the very
simple reason that he cannot afford to do so.
Except for the zavkhoz and his assistants, who occasionally
must deal with local merchants in their places of business, and
the chauffeura, the non-diplomatic staff are seen infrequently
outside the official buildings or compound, and then usually only
in groups. The code clerks are forbidden to leave the mission
premises alone. In some areas it is known that non-diplomatic,
non-RIS employees are expressly forbidden to consort with local
citizens unless accompanied by another Soviet, and this rule may
in fact apply in most or all Soviet installations abroad. In
fact, special warnings have been issued from time to time concern-
ing contact with Americans and the dangers of AIS efforts to
compromise and recruit Soviets. In periods of crisis or polit-
ical sensitivity, such as publication of incidents involving
RIS activity, times of delicate negotiations, or major Soviet
political events such as Party Congresses, all contacts with
foreigners may be cut off and other seemingly drastic security
precautions taken.
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All members of the staff of a Soviet diplomatic mission are
required to sign a log book which is maintained by the duty
officer, or dezhurniy komendant, noting the destination and
purpose of any trip outside the embassy, time of departure and
expected time of return. Should a given staff member not return
within a certain period of time after his expected time of
return, the KGB rezidentura is informed and a search for him
is begun.
All contacts with foreigners, whether made in line of duty
or resulting from chance encounters, must be reported to a
superior official. A high-ranking MFA diplomat or important
Party official abroad may go out socially with foreigners at
will, although he is expected to report his plans in advance
and afterwards to his superiors. A. lower-ranking diplomat or
member of the non-diplomatic staff who associates with for-
eigners without an official purpose may come to the attention
of the SK officer if the relationship continues for more than
a couple of meetings. If the relationship goes on and is not
reported by the subject, the SK man will normally attempt to
determine the nature of the relationship, sometimes via his SK
agents. If the SK officer finds that the relationship may be
indiscreet or compromising, or suspects any hint of disloyalty
or indiscipline in it, he notifies the KGB rezident who in turn
notifies KGB headquarters. The suspect is normally packed off
to Moscow under the most convenient pretext. The suspect is
investigated further and questioned by the KGB only after he
has returned to the USSR, and not on the spot, in order to pre-
vent possible defection in the host country.
Even KGB officers, if they maintain unauthorized contact
with foreigners which they do not report, may be in serious
trouble and may well be returned to Moscow. SK officers are
forbidden to investigate other KGB personnel, however; the
investigation of such a case is the responsibility of the KGB
rezident only. He in turn must receive permission from KGB
headquarters to allow some of his subordinates to surveil the
suspect.
If it is discovered by the SK section that a GRU officer or
employee is in unreported contact with a foreigner, the chief
of the SK section or the KGB rezident notifies the GRU rezident,
who then informs GRU headquarters. However, if the SK section
has absolute proof that the GRU officer or employee is in
unauthorized contact with American, British or other hostile
intelligence services, the SK officer exercises his power to
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arrest the guilty party, and then notifies KGB headquarters
and - if he trusts him - the GRU rezident.
4. Physical Security
a. Defense Against Entry
In addition to making maximum use of human resources,
the Soviet system of physical security abroad also makes use of
a variety of sophisticated technical and electronic means to
guard its installations against penetration by hostile elements.
Wherever possible, Soviet installations abroad are housed within
a compound, or are otherwise surrounded by high walls or fences.
Means of access to the compound or mission area are severely
limited, there usually being only one or two gates or other
means of entry, all others having been walled in or closed off.
During normal business hours, these gates or entry ways are
guarded constantly, and locked at the close of business. In
certain parts of the world, the grounds within the fence or
compound walls are often patrolled at regular intervals by
guards, often accompanied by vicious dogs. In the mission
buildings themselves, all outside doors and windows (save those
in the staff living quarters) are locked at night, and a duty
guard system is employed during the hours of darkness.
With the exception of cleaning women and other menial
laborers in certain parts of Asia and the Far East, practically
no foreigners are employed on a regular basis in a Soviet embassy,
and nowhere do any foreigners have access to classified or sensi-
tive areas. In some areas of the world, however, the same house-
painting, roofing, glazing and similar repair and maintenance
firms have been retained for years by Soviet embassies. Outside
the embassy, foreigners are often employed by TASS, Novosti and
other organs as translators, secretaries and clerks. In almost
all cases such foreigners are members or sympathizers of the
local Communist Party, spotted and vetted by the Party or indi-
vidual trusted Party members, and even they do not work in
areas where they have access to classified information.
b. Internal Communications in a Soviet Embassy
Physical circumstances permitting, all Soviet diplo-
matic installations abroad are equipped with an internal tele-
phone system which connects the principal offices within the
installation. This system is always of Soviet manufacture,
consisting of a number of telephone instruments which are con-
nected in the standard fashion to one another by wires which
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run through a switchboard. The telephones are dial-type cradle
instruments, of standard Soviet type and are not equipped with
any known anti-audio devices. The switchboards in general use
are either manned or automatic, depending on local requirements,
i.e., on the number of instruments necessary. The system is
usually sent from Moscow via the diplomatic pouch and is in-
stalled by a team from Moscow. In every installation so equip-
ped, a member of the non-diplomatic staff is responsible for
maintenance and repair of the system, sometimes a trained tech-
nician of the KGB or GRU rezidenturas.
The internal telephone system is not connected to any tele-
phone line running outside the installation. Users of the
internal system are forbidden to discuss any classified infor-
mation, and while this rule is obviously violated from time to
time, the system is seldom used for the discussion of sensitive
matters. The internal telephone system of one large Soviet
embassy in the West has well over 100 individual numbers,
including the referentura, the office of the ambassador, the
duty diplomat, the duty guard, the building superintendent and
the quarters of the staff members who live in the embassy building.
Although the Soviet diplomatic installation is normally
connected to the local telephone system by a few lines, only the
larger embassies have many. These lines are connected directly
or indirectly, through a manned switchboard, to a few internal
offices, such as that of the ambassador, the Consular Section,
the Political Section and the Protocol Section. In some embas-
sies, incoming calls are taken by the doorman/receptionist on
the one telephone in the building near the main entrance of the
building. He summons the Soviet officer being called to the
outside telephone via the internal system. It is believed that
all Soviet citizens are warned prior to going abroad to non-Bloc
countries that host-country telephone systems are tapped by the
host-counterintelligence organs, and it is known that all Soviets
stationed abroad assume this to be the case. (Indeed, Soviet
intelligence sometimes uses lines to misinform local counter-
intelligence authorities.) However, this assumption does not
stop many Soviets from gossiping on the telephone, and in the
early stages of social relationships of Soviet officials the
phone is sometimes used inevitably.
c. Technical Security
All classified information and material in a Soviet
mission is maintained under guard in a secure area, and some
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Soviet diplomatic installations are equipped with areas which
are alleged to be audio-proof (see D 4 d). In addition to
those measures, other steps are taken routinely to ensure that
a high degree of physical security is maintained by technical
means,
Each official installation and all living quarters are swept
by an audio-tech team at least once a year, either by the rezi-
dent audio technician(s) or by a team from Moscow.
Many Soviet embassies are equipped with electronic warning
systems which signal the entry of unauthorized persons, and all
referenturas are equipped with alarm systems which are used to
warn the chief of the referentura or the referentura guards that
a police or other hostile raid is threatened or is taking place.
Radios are kept on not only in sensitive areas such as the
ambassador's office and the referentura, but in many other areas
where routine work is done. No civilian-type radio receivers
not of Soviet manufacture, nor civilian-type radio receivers of
Soviet manufacture which have been repaired on the local market
may be used in sensitive areas of the installation.
In those missions not yet equipped with audio-proof areas,
sensitive discussions are often held out-of-doors, where the
possibility of interception is virtually nil.
d. Secure Areas
(1) The Referentura
The referentura, or secret section of a Soviet
diplomatic installation, houses all classified materials of the
MFA, MFT, KGB and GRU components, including the code and cipher
gear of all four; and provides a secure working area for all
embassy, Commercial Mission and other authorized personnel. It
is headed by a chief, often a middle-aged man, who holds diplo-
matic rank ranging from attache (most often) up to first secre-
tary. He is an employee of the Tenth Department of the MFA,
which is responsible for the Soviet diplomatic courier system
and for the cryptographic section of the MFA, both in the USSR
and abroad. (Whether the Tenth Department of the MFA is an
integral part of the KGB, or whether it is an integral part of the
MFA over which the KGB exercises security control is not known.
However, up to a few years ago the Tenth Department was headed by a
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lieutenant general of the KGB, and even if the chief of the
referentura, the MFA code clerks and the diplomatic couriers
are?MFA employees, all of them hold high KGB clearance. Refer-
entura chiefs, MFA and MFT code clerks, and regular diplomatic
couriers apparently do not engage in operational work involving
agents.)
Where conditions permit, i.e., where the embassy occupies
a multi-story building, the referentura is located in an area
between the lower and upper stories in order to lessen ease of
outside access from ground or roof level.
Depending on the size of the MFA staff and of the intelli-
gence rezidenturas which it services, the referentura is com-
posed of several rooms: one or more reading rooms, equipped with
desks at which one can read files and write reports; the office
of the chief of the referentura; the work areas of the MFA,
KGB, GRU and Commercial Mission (MFT) code clerks; and an area
which houses the transmitter(s). Where there are no transmitters,
it houses radio receivers and recorders which may be used to
receive blind broadcasts from Moscow, or for use in radio inter-
cept operations. The work areas of the MFA, MFT, KGB and GRU
code clerks are separated from one another and at least in theory
none has access to the other's area. The referentura also often
contains an incinerator for the destruction of classified waste.
What follows is a composite description of the physical layout
of the referentura of a Soviet embassy; the referentura in any
given area may be different, but only in minor detail.
There is only one entry to a referentura; all other doors,
interior windows and other openings having been walled in. To
enter the referentura, one must pass through two doors, an outer
one of wood or other light material and an inner one of solid
steel. The outer door, which appears superficially to be an
ordinary one, is equipped with a lock which can be opened only
by electrical impulse from within the referentura. To get inside
the first door, one pushes a concealed button located high up
on or near the door frame, which activates a buzzer within the
referentura. The duty officer or guard inside, in turn, pushes
a button which, by means of electrical impulse, releases the
lock and simultaneously causes a light bulb set above or on one
side of the door to flash intermittently, indicating that the
outer door is unlocked.
After opening the outer door one steps into a short corri-
dor at the end of which is a massive steel door set in a heavy
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metal frame. In the center of this door is a thick, round piece
of glass (probably optical glass) about the size of a quarter,
permitting the referentura duty officer or guard to see clearly
the person who wishes to enter. The referentura staff holds a
list of all personnel cleared for entry, whether they be embassy
or Commercial Mission staffers, press representatives, UN organ-
ization officials or members of visiting delegations. Permis-
sion to enter the referentura must be approved in Moscow. It
has been reliably reported that only the KGB can grant such
approval.
Once inside, the visitor states his business to the chief
of the referentura or to the duty guard. Assuming that the
visitor wishes to read a classified directive or to write a
report, he is given a desk in the reading/writing room, which
is located just inside the steel door. (This last sentence
applies only to MFA and other non-RIS officers; the RIS person-
nel always have their own separate work areas.) If he wishes
to write a report, the visitor so informs the referentura chief
or the referentura duty guard, and is then given a certain amount
of paper on which the visitor prepares his draft, in longhand.
Each sheet of paper is numbered, and all sheets must be accounted
for to the referentura personnel when the visitor leaves.
The chief of the referentura then summons a cleared female
typist to the referentura. After the material has been typed in
final form, the referentura chief submits the report to the
appropriate embassy officer for approval. If the latter orders
certain changes, the author is requested to return to the refer-
entura to make the suggested changes; otherwise the report is
forwarded to Moscow. (The foregoing refers only to reports
prepared by MFA officers and by RIS officers working in their
cover capacities. The preparation of RIS reports is done in a
completely different manner.)
It appears, on the basis of imperfect evidence, that only
the .principal embassy officers, i.e., ambassador or charge
d'affaires and counselors, may draft and send cables to the MFA.
As noted above, classified reports are prepared by the
originating officer in longhand, and typed by a female secretary.
With the exception of the ambassador, diplomatic officers do not
have personal secretaries, thus whatever typing must be done is
assigned to a pool in some embassies, while in other embassies
one secretary is assigned to each major component, e.g., Polit-
ical Section, Cultural Section, Consular Section. In the latter
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case, it is the secretary assigned to a specific section who
goes to the referentura to type the reports prepared by
officers of that section.
Regulations regarding the security of the referentura are
strict. No documents may be taken outside the referentura with-
out permission of the ambassador; no notes may be made from
documents on file therein and taken outside; no reports of a
classified nature may be worked on outside but must be completed
in toto within the referentura; discussion of classified sub-
jects among diplomatic staffers working in the referentura is
forbidden, etc. Several well-placed sources have reported,
however, that these regulations are often violated; that reports
are partially written in non-secure areas of the embassy and
taken to the referentura for completion; that precis are made
and notes taken from documents on file in the referentura and
left in desk drawers in non-secure areas; and that discussions
of classified material often take place among diplomatic staffers
working in the referentura. One KGB co-optee who was working
with top secret KGB agent reports kept them for a period of
several days in an unlocked drawer of his desk, which was
located far from the referentura.
Violations of the type cited above occur principally because
of working conditions prevailing in many referenturas: crowded
working space, no ventilation, foul, overheated air being among
the chief complaints. Embassy officers often accumulate mater-
ial for several reports in their own work areas and only then
go to the referentura and complete them all at one time, in order
to avoid having to make frequent visits there. One source sug-
gested that the Soviet habit of over-classifying reports leads
to security violations, noting that many officers do not regard
these classifications seriously. He cited as a typical example
the frequent instance of classifying "secret" a report in Russian
which is a verbatim translation of a completely overt article in
the host country press.
Alone among the diplomatic staff, the ambassador prepares
his reports in his own office, his working materials being brought
to him by the chief of the referentura, who also returns them
when the ambassador has finished his work or leaves his office
for any significant period of time.
In addition to a certain amount of background material on
the host country, CPSU and MFA directives, the records of the
local Party organization are retained in the referentura. The
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embassy bookkeeper and the finance clerk also keep their records
and funds there during non-duty hours. It appears that very
little, if any, non-RIS classified material is retained longer
than six months, at the end of which period it is destroyed.
RIS components retain almost no files. We know of no. area in
a Soviet diplomatic installation outside the referentura which
is considered to be secure. Few safes or vaults are known to
be located outside the referentura and any material which is
kept legally in them, or in cabinets or desks, is not regarded
as sensitive. However, the KGB rezident keeps some technical
gear in his cover office, which is locked when he is not there.
Within the referentura, no one is allowed past the area
which houses the reading/writing room(s) except the chief of
the referentura, the code clerks and certain officers and audio
technicians of the rezidentura staffs. All windows in the
referentura are equipped with steel bars and heavy steel shut-
ters, which are kept closed and locked. Communications between
the referentura and the rest of the embassy is maintained by
telephone(s), tied in to the internal telephone system. It is
forbidden to have within the referentura any telephone instru-
ments connected to the outside local system. Radios usually
play constantly in the referentura in order to drown out any
conversations taking place, and probably also to relieve the
boredom of routine for the code clerks.
Having completed his work, the officer notifies the chief
of the referentura or the duty guard and turns over to him what-
ever material is necessary. The officer who is familiar with
the system of entry and exit is able to leave the premises with-
out assistance; otherwise he rings a buzzer which summons the
duty guard, who then opens the heavy inner door. This is done
in some embassies by first pressing a button and then operating
a double-handled lever which releases the lock. When the inner
door is opened, a sustained buzzing sound is heard, which conti-
nues until the door is shut again. If an attempt is made -to
open the door improperly an alarm sounds, different in intensity
from the buzzer, and one of the referentura personnel immediately
appears to investigate the cause.
(2) Other Secure Areas
Certain areas within Soviet diplomatic instal-
lations have recently been reconstructed in such a manner as to
make them "audio-proof," to provide a place where highly classi-
fied matters can be discussed without fear of being intercepted
by any known audio device. This involves building a new floor,
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ceiling and walls within a given area, placing them about eight
centimeters from the original surfaces, lining the space
between with some (unknown) substance and fitting an electronic
device (no details). All outside windows in such areas have
been fitted with double panes of opaque glass, also fitted
with the same electronic device which is placed between the
wall, ceiling and floor surfaces.
(3) Other KGB and GRU Work Areas
In addition to the "safe" areas cited above, in
certain embassies the KGB and GRU rezidenturas maintain their
own individual work areas, in which are kept various types of
operational equipment such as audio gear, cameras and photo-
graphic supplies, and dark rooms. These areas are sometimes
located adjacent to the referentura, or in other instances in
areas of the embassy premises which afford maximum physical
security, e.g., cellars with thick walls. Entrance to these
areas is restricted to staff members and co-optees of the rezi-
dentura which controls the area. One KGB co-optee, whose status
was not widely known among the embassy staff, was instructed
never to approach the KGB area if other Soviets who were non-
KGB personnel were in the vicinity and could observe him. In
at least one instance, it has been reliably reported that such
areas have been equipped with counter-audio devices, an assump-
tion which can be safely made for all such areas.
e. Regulations on Classified Talk
The virtually inherent sense of security in almost
all Soviet officials is complemented and reinforced by formal
laws and local ground rules concerning the protection of State
secrets and other sensitive information. In addition to signing
a statement swearing that he will protect the Soviet State by
all possible means, the Soviet citizen abroad is liable to
heavy punishment, including the death penalty, for disclosing
State and military secrets. Thus, although Soviet wives (and
their husbands) often gossip on the telephone and in their
quarters about their colleagues, Soviets abroad are generally
observed to avoid, even in their homes, talk of sensitive matters
or revelation of their intelligence status or activities.
The Soviet abroad assumes that his public telephone is tapped
by the local counterintelligence service, and many of them
probably assume that the local KGB rezidentura has the same capa-
bility.
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Regarding the internal telephone system in the embassy, it
has been reliably reported that the SK section taps the internal
lines periodically, in order to determine whether classified or
sensitive information is being discussed. Sensitive information
is sometimes discussed within Soviet embassies outside of the
"safe" areas therein.
E. REPORTING FROM A SOVIET EMBASSY
1. Types of Reports
There are seven specific types of reports which are
prepared by every Soviet diplomatic mission throughout the world:
- The Annual Country Report (Godovoy otchet posol'stva)
- The Political Letter (Politicheskoe Pismo)
- The Monthly Chronicle (Khronika sobitiy)
- The Essay Report (Spravka)
- The Country Guide Book.(Spravochnik)
- The Report of Conversation with a :Foreigner (Zapis
besedy)
- The Quarterly and Semi-Annual Reports
a. The Annual Country Report (commonly referred to as
"The Annual Report")
The most authoritative report prepared by the MFA
staff abroad, this document is a detailed summary of information
for the previous 12-month period. All overt sections of the
mission contribute to its preparation, which is begun in December;
the report itself is due at MFA headquarters in Moscow in mid-
or late February of the following year. Unlike certain other
reports cited here, the. Annual Report goes forward over the
signature of the ambassador only.
The Annual Report is divided into the following sections
(content described below is optimum; shortcomings in this and
other reports will be noted at the end):
- The Internal Political Situation of the Host Country
Contains a complete account and analysis of all
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changes in the governmental structure. Contains a
complete account and analysis of political acti-
vities, trends and policies of all political parties,
trade unions and other organizations of political
significance. It is prepared by the Political
Section of the embassy.
- The Foreign Policy of the Host Country
Contains accounts and analyses of the host country's
foreign policy towards countries other than the USSR,
and is divided into two distinct sections: relations
with the Socialist Bloc countries, and relations with
the capitalist nations. This section is also pre-
pared by the Political Section.
- USSR/Host Country Relations
Embracing the entire scope of relations between the
USSR and the host country during the past year, this
section includes accounts of the number and type of
delegations from either side, negotiations on both
sides, the number and content of diplomatic notes
passed by both sides; and comments and analyses of
all these events. This section in fact describes
the totality of the Soviet effort in the host country.
Contributions to it are made by the various sections
of the embassy and by the Commercial Mission, the
Soviet press representatives and representatives of
other Soviet organs (excepting the RIS rezidenturas
per se) in the host country.
- The Economic Situation
Contains accounts and analyses of aspects of the
economic life of the host country, including the
economic policies of the government, economic trends
and foreign trade. This section is prepared jointly
by the Commercial Mission and the Political Section
of the embassy.
- The Military Section
Contains a general description and analysis of the
state of preparedness of the host-country's armed
forces, and comments on such political/military
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matters as the relationship of the host country with
NATO, SEATO and other military alliances. Where
applicable, this section also contains analyses of
the attitudes of the host-country government and
political parties towards such subjects as the Multi-
Lateral Force and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. It
does not, however, include strategic intelligence
information nor information describing technical
details of certain armaments possessed by the host
country, this information being restricted to GRU
channels. The section is prepared by the military
attache's group alone in its overt capacity.
Cultural Relations
Depending on the state of cultural relations between
the host country and the USSR, this subject is either
treated as a separate section or is included in the
USSR/Host Country Relations section.. When treated as
a separate section, it contains an account of the
number and composition of Soviet cultural groups,
including sports teams, which have visited the host
country; an account of host-country cultural groups
and delegations which have visited the USSR; and
analyses of the effect which these occasions have
had on relations with the USSR.
The Administrative or Organizational Section
Covering mission and Soviet colony life, this section
includes sub-sections on such matters as Party work,
Komsomol and trade union activities; the language
training program; housing and other logistics problems;
and financial questions. It is believed that this
section is prepared by the Consular Section with the
direct participation of the ambassador and the first
counselor.
Proposals
The final and most important section of the Annual
Report, this consists of a short summary of the con-
clusions drawn in the foregoing sections, which is
followed by a point-by-point listing of proposals and
suggestions for changes and improvements in Soviet
foreign policy with regard to the :host country. This
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section is prepared by the ambassador personally,
in consultation with certain of the leading
officers of the mission staff.
b. The Political Letter
This is an ad hoc report containing details of an
extraordinary event such as a military or political coup,
special elections and announcements of major governmental policy
changes. Forwarded over the signature of the ambassador alone,
it contains a report on the event, analysis thereof, and pro-
posals for Soviet action. Although it may in theory be prepared
by the ambassador alone, the Political Letter is more often the
combined work of the ambassador and the various chiefs of the
mission.
c. The Monthly Chronicle
This is a short summary of occurrences in host-country
domestic and foreign affairs, as reflected in the host-country
press. Prepared usually by a probationer or attache, it is
forwarded over that officer's signature at the end of each month.
d. The Essay Report (Spravka)
This report deals with a specific topic in the
realm of host-country internal or external politics; for example,
the anti-Vietnam protest movement in the United States. These
reports are written by the junior members of the embassy diplo-
matic staff - probationers, attaches and third secretaries -
and may be initiated by the officer himself but more usually are
prepared by order of the ambassador or a section head. Each
probationer is expected to write an Essay Report each two or
three months, and attaches and third secretaries less often,
albeit regularly. In preparing the report, the writer first
discusses the subject matter and general outline with the ambas-
sador or chief of section, to whom the draft must be shown prior
to being approved for forwarding to Moscow. When finished, the
report is forwarded over the signature of the preparing officer.
e. The Country Guide Book
In theory, this document is a cross between a post
report and an almanac, and contains detailed background infor-
mation on all aspects of the host country. However, such a
report is to be found in few Soviet diplomatic establishments,
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general background knowledge of the host country being one of
the outstanding weaknesses of the MFA abroad.
f. The Report of Conversation With a Foreigner
By MFA regulation, every conversation with a for-
eigner conducted under formal conditions, i.e., in the course
of official business, must be made a matter of record and for-
warded to Moscow. These reports are described as containing
the foreigner's name and position, the circumstances under which
the meeting took place, and the subjects discussed. It is quite
obvious that not all conversations are in fact recorded (see
A 2, The Overt Work of a Soviet Diplomatic Mission Abroad), and
that those reports which are made are often found unsatisfactory
by Moscow. One certain explanation of this is the fact that the
RIS officer under diplomatic cover, being obliged to prepare a
memorandum of conversation with a foreigner in his overt capa-
city, will prepare a very sketchy report for the MFA, and a
very detailed, comprehensive report on the same subject for his
rezidentura.
g. The Quarterly and Semi-Annual Reports
These are short reports designed to bring up to date
the information contained in the Annual Report. They are
believed to be prepared by the diplomatic staff of the embassy,
without the participation of other mission elements.
2. Routing of Correspondence to Moscow
Each document forwarded by a Soviet diplomatic establi-
shment to Moscow is accompanied by a covering note or dispatch
("soprovoditel'noe pismo," lit., "accompanying letter"), which
contains a brief statement of the contents of the document and
a list of the various organizations and officials to whom copies
should be routed. This determination is made by the ambassador.
Routine documents are sent to the appropriate geographical area
desk and to the Archives Division of the MFA, while more import-
ant ones are sent to the CC/CPSU and to the deputy foreign mini-
ster responsible for the geographical area in which the embassy
is located. The covering dispatch is written and signed by the
reporting officer and countersigned by the ambassador.
3. Classification of MFA Documents
Three categories of security classification are used in
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the MFA: Top Secret, Secret, and For Official Use Only. The
various types of reports described above are classified as
follows:
Top Secret Secret For Official Use Only
The Political Letter The Annual Report The Monthly Chronicle
Quarterly Reports The Country Guide Book
Semi-Annual Reports
The Essay Report
Report of Conversation
With a Foreigner
Depending on the sensitivity of content, The Essay Report and
the Report of Conversation With a Foreigner may be classified
either "Secret" or "For Official Use Only," the determination
being made by the ambassador.
4. Examples of Materials Carried in Soviet Diplomatic Pouches
Listed hereunder are the subject titles of all materials
contained in a diplomatic pouch sent from a certain Soviet embassy
to the MFA; and in a pouch from the MFA to the same embassy.
The pouches in question were dispatched in the early 1960s and
were carried by regular Soviet diplomatic couriers. Examination
of the contents showed that all the material related entirely to
"straight" MFA work and that no material originating in KGB or
GRU rezidenturas or headquarters was contained in either pouch.
While the contents of these pouches may not necessarily be typi-
cal of all diplomatic pouches, this material is included here to
aid understanding of the sort of material which is sent by MFA
elements to and from the field.
a. List of Items Sent by Pouch to MFA Headquarters From
a Soviet Embassy
Requests for certain literature; two films; question-
naire forms for consular use (current supply depleted);
certain information on a foreign matter (not defined);
status reports on certain visa requests.
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- Acknowledgment of receipts for literature and curri-
cula for the embassy school.
- Finance: Report on medical expenses and funds
allotted for a certain person; acknowledgment of
receipt of money for embassy use; transmittal of
membership dues to the Ministry of Agriculture.
- Information Reports: Report from the embassy school;
journals and bulletins of various countries; embassy
information bulletin; document on an international
organization; translation of an article from the
local press entitled, "Yugoslavia is Looking for
Contacts"; letter giving the composition of a host-
country shipbuilding delegation; references to
policies on disarmament; additional data on a certain
personality, as requested.
- Reports of Conversation: Report of a conversation
between the Czech ambassador and an embassy officer;
report of a conversation between a member of the
host-country Friendship Society and an embassy
officer; report of a conversation with the chief
editor of a student newspaper in the host country.
- Letter for Khrushchev written by the chief editor of
a student newspaper in the host country.
b. List of Items from MFA Headquarters Sent in a Pouch
to a Soviet Embassy
- Job Descriptions: Summaries of job descriptions -
Foreign policy materials: Compendium on foreign
policy; report on negotiations for halting nuclear
weapons tests.
- List of materials available for embassy use: Text
of sound track for Soviet films; catalogues of avail-
able films and slide projections.
- Materials relative to embassy schools for children:
Curriculum and studies for elementary grades; program
for testing and evaluating schools; copy of a reso-
lution from conference of school employees.
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- Announcements of personnel changes: Announcement
of is appointment to chief of an MFA
geographical division; note concerning the transfer
of a certain person.
- Financial matters: Statement on the opening of
credits in a local bank; authorization for expendi-
ture of money for an undefined project; request for
an expedite accounting of an amount of money depos-
ited in the bank by a certain person; rules for
transferring money within socialist countries..
Couriers: Announcement of arrival and departure
dates of diplomatic couriers.
Permissions granted for certain embassy actions;
letter from the Finance Department of the Ministry
of Agriculture indicating Soviet acceptance of an
invitation to participate in tests and experiments
with the host country.
Refusal of embassy request: Negative reply to a
request for Soviet participation in a congress for
irrigation and drainage.
- Confirmation of reports received by headquarters:
Receipt of a program on an international congress
of interest to the Ministry of Health.
- Requests for reports on current elections in the
host country; expedite answer to questions concerning
a parliamentary deputy of the host country.
- Informational material: Summary from the Ministry of
Agricultural Products, Lithuanian SSR; copy of an
MFA note concerning a reception for host-country
diplomats.
- Visas: List of names for whom visas were granted
or refused.
- Consular matter: Copy of a letter relative to a
certain person on a consular matter.
Reports on conversations: Memorandum of a conver-
sation between a certain person and the counselor of
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the Polish embassy; memorandum of a conversation
between a certain local person and the charge.
5. Weaknesses and Shortcomings in MFA Reporting From a
Soviet Diplomatic Mission
Samples of reports from Soviet embassies to MFA head-
quarters show that the reporting done by Soviet diplomats in
the economic and political fields - which subjects comprise
the bulk of "straight," i.e., non-RIS reporting - is pedestrian
at best, at worst misleading, and unobjective throughout. As
noted in other parts of this study, the sources of information
of the overwhelming majority of Soviet diplomatic reports are
the local press and, to a much lesser extent, local citizens.
Thus, the bulk of this information is not only overt but also
in many cases untrue or only partially true, given the fact that
the press in many areas of the world is controlled by one or
another political party or special-interest group, and that
some of the Soviets' "live" sources deliberately give them false
or misleading information either because of a pro- or anti-
Communist slant, or give them information which these people
think the Soviets wish to hear. It is true that most diplomats
without affiliation to the intelligence services of their govern-
ments rely for information on the same types of overt sources
as the MFA diplomats. The non-Soviet career diplomat, however,
usually has an understanding of the country in which he is
stationed - its political system, history, cultural traditions,
customs - far beyond the comprehension of the average MFA
diplomat, and often of his RIS colleagues, and. is thus usually
better equipped than his Soviet counterpart to evaluate accurately
what he reads and hears, and to report it objectively.
There is often little background material on the host country
in a Soviet embassy. In one mission in Western Europe, the only
reference works available. were an old almanac published in the
United States and a French encyclopedia. In yet another embassy,
save for the previous year's Annual Report, there were no back-
ground reports older than six months, all other material having
been destroyed or forwarded to MFA headquarters. Some embassies
do retain Essay Reports and similar material for as long as two
years, but no Soviet embassy is known to be equipped with a
reference library of the sort which is found in every American
embassy installation abroad.
The Annual Report, the most authoritative document written by
the Soviet embassy, is a curious mixture of fact and rubbish.
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Not only does it contain information which is not true, but also
the information which is accurate is analyzed strictly according
to the dictates of Marx and Lenin. One source who participated
in the writing of two Annual Reports commented that the finished
reports were most unobjective, presented all facts in black and
white, twisted some facts to make them acceptable to one or
another tenet of Marxism/Leninism, greatly overestimated certain
events in the political life of the country and failed to under-
stand the importance of others. The same source noted that it
is usually the older members of the staff who set the tone of
the Annual Report, and since these men are rigid Party bureau-
crats, the report itself is rigid, uninspired and unimaginative.
Some examples of Annual Reports: In a Soviet embassy in Europe,
the Economic Section of the Annual Report contained a statement
that the average wage in the host country was lower than that
of two of the most poverty-ridden nations of Europe; in fact,
the average wage in the host country is among the highest in
the world. While preparing the Political Section of an Annual
Report in yet another embassy, the staff debated the signifi-
cance of the fact that an industrial group had supported workers'
demands for higher wages. After considerable heated discussion,
an analysis in consonance with the teachings of Marx and Lenin
was found; the industrialists had supported the workers' demands
in order to control them through the trick of giving them higher
wages.
That the Party leaders and certain of the MFA chiefs realize
that reporting from most Soviet embassies is poor is shown by
some of the comments quoted in A-3. Kaznacheyev, in his book
Inside a Soviet Embassy, commented on the low quality of repor-
ting, and noted that the staff was criticized for it. Nonethe-
less, and in spite of remedial measures taken, the reporting
done by the staff of most Soviet embassies is often as poor
today as it was in Rangoon in 1959.
If, as described above, MFA reporting from the field is
often of such low quality, how is this possible when it must be
prepared by RIS officers who comprise approximately three-quarters
of the diplomatic staffs of most Soviet embassies? The answer
is anything but simple, but we believe that it can be found in
the following reasons. First, most of the reports prepared for
dispatch to the MFA are meant for background information only,
and are read chiefly by the lower echelons of the MFA geograph-
ical area divisions, and thus play no role in the formation of
Soviet foreign policy. Only the Political Letter and similar
reports, which relate to significant changes in the host country,
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are sent directly to the Collegium of the MFA and to the
CC/CPSU. Such reports are believed to be prepared jointly by
the ambassador and the KGB rezident (perhaps also the GRU rezi-
dent), and thus contain information from overt, semi-overt and
clandestine sources, plus analyses done by the most qualified
men in a Soviet embassy. Secondly, few officers of either rezi-
dentura participate significantly in the preparation of much
of the reporting which is forwarded through MFA channels, and
in those instances where they do participate, they attempt to
persuade their MFA colleagues to report accurately, usually to
no avail. Last, but most important, the responsibility for the
collection of detailed, objective political intelligence within
the Soviet system rests in the final analysis with the KGB,
which obtains it by clandestine means and reports it exclusively
through KGB channels.
F. THE PARTY ORGANIZATION IN A SOVIET DIPLOMATIC MISSION
1. General Considerations
All members of a Soviet diplomatic mission (including
the Commercial Mission), both diplomatic and non-diplomatic, and
the majority of their wives, are members of the CPSU or of the
Komsomol. In order to maintain the patent fiction that Soviet
citizens serving abroad are officials and employees of the
government without significant connections with the Party, each
Party and Komsomol member must surrender his Party card prior
to leaving the USSR for assignment abroad. In return, the Party
member receives a card identifying him as a member of the trade
union (profesionalnyi soyuz, usually shortened to profsoyuz) of
his parent ministry; this card being known as a profsoyuznyi
bilet. The Komsomol member receives a card identifying him as
a member of "The Physical Culture Organization."
In like fashion, the Party organization or unit abroad is
never referred to by its true name, but rather as "The Trade
Union" ("Profsoyuz"), and Party meetings are referred to by the
euphemism "Trade Union meetings." The Party secretary is usually
known as proforg, or Trade Union organizer.
In those Soviet diplomatic missions where the Commercial
Mission is large, both the embassy and the Commercial Mission
have their separate Party units, the most active members of
which form yet a third Party organization known as the Party
Bureau or Party Committee, headed by a secretary who is "elected"
by all members of the unit. In fact, candidates for the position
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of Party secretary are proposed by the ambassador, in consul-
tation with local Party activists, to the CC/CPSU, which must
approve the nomination, and only then are put up for election
by the local unit. The election results are a foregone conclu-
sion.
Although the Party secretary normally acts under the control
of the ambassador, under certain circumstances the secretary
enjoys a certain amount of independent authority. For instance,
the secretary appears to have the authority to establish, con-
trary to the desires of the ambassador, a local commission of
investigation to make inquiry concerning charges of dishonesty
against a Party member involving embassy funds or property.
Further, the Party secretary has the authority to act on the
findings of such a commission, even though the ambassador may
not agree with them.
To show, respectively, how the CC/CPSU believes Party work
in a diplomatic mission should be organized, how it actually is
organized and how Party meetings are conducted, four examples
are presented here.
An official of the Central Committee of the CPSU said
that the principal task of the Party Bureau (i.e., the
Party unit composed of leading activists from the
Commercial Mission unit and from the embassy unit) is
to provide overall orientation and guidance to the
subordinate units of the Party organization. Thus the
secretary of the Party Bureau must be a skilled organ-
izer who will not only know how to provide such orien-
tation and guidance, but will also supervise the practi-
cal work of the subordinate units. The work of the
subordinate units, in turn, must be directed to the
immediate tasks which are peculiar to them (commercial
and diplomatic), within the framework of the orientation
and guidance given them by the Party Bureau. The secre-
taries of the subordinate Party units must bring to
fruition the policies of the CC/CPSU, fulfill the assign-
ments given them and maintain strict discipline, both
in the political sphere and in the sphere of personal
conduct. It must be impressed on all Party members that
the fulfillment of these tasks is not the responsibility
of the secretary alone, but of all Party members. The
acts of individuals which disrupt the harmony of the
collective must not be allowed to pass unnoticed by the
Party organizations, but must be discussed openly in
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Party meetings and appropriate action taken.
This CC/CPSU official further said that the principal
tasks of the Party Bureau and its subordinate units
are: to carry on educational work toward the fulfil-
lment of the decisions of the latest Party Congress;
and to fulfill all tasks assigned by the CC/CPSU
through the ambassador. The CC/CPSU must receive all
work plans and the minutes of meetings of the Party
Bureau and subordinate Party units.
The following information is taken from actual reports
of two separate Party meetings; one, a meeting of a
subordinate Party organization and the other a Party
Bureau meeting.
The first meeting opened with an announcement of the
agenda: presentation by the secretary of a report on
the work of the organization for a three-month period;
a critique of the report and of the Party work during
that period; and a discussion of work plans for the
next three-month period. There followed a review of
responsibilities: Comrade "X" (a second secretary),
the secretary responsible for organizational matters;
Comrade "Y" (a consular officer), the deputy secretary
responsible for educational work; Comrade "Z" (an attache)
responsible for production matters; Comrade "A" (a coun-
selor) responsible for mass-cultural work. It was then
announced that the main effort of the organization was
directed toward assuring that the productive (i.e.,
diplomatic) work of the mission was carried out in the
best possible manner. Note was made that, despite the
hostility of "ruling circles" in the host country, and
despite "provocations" on the part of host-country counter-
intelligence against the mission staff (KGB agents had
been apprehended), the mission had fulfilled all the
orders of the Soviet government.
In the jargon so dear to the Party hack, the secretary
announced that "all comrades, regardless of post or rank,
treated their responsibilities honorably, and with
sincerity and seriousness fulfilled their tasks." Among
the tasks cited were: discussing how to increase contact
between the embassy staff and the local populace; the
condition of the colony's library; preparation of
lectures on the international situation; the preparation
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of lectures on the builders of Communism, on morale,
on the strengthening of socialist law; the condition
of the colony's school and the upbringing of children;
together with the mestkom, to organize "evenings of
relaxation" for all personnel and their families.
Criticism of Party work took the form of pointing out
that deadlines for completion of discussions ordered
by the CC/CPSU had not been met, and that insufficient
preparation had been made for studying materials promul-
gated during the latest Party Congress. The meeting
ended with a tirade from one of the more zealous members,
who noted that some of the embassy staff were not sub-
scribing to Pravda, nor any other Soviet newspaper. The
zealot observed that those who did not read the Soviet
press could not possibly be well-informed and could not
in fact even consider themselves to be Soviet citizens.
A meeting of the Party Bureau of a certain diplomatic
establishment was held for the purpose of preparing a
work plan for the next six-month period. (Work plans
for Party Bureaus abroad, following the pattern estab-
lished in the USSR, are drawn up for three- and six-
month periods. In general, the difference between the
two types appears to be that the first involves specific
topics of immediate concern while the second concerns
broad, overall subjects.) Following a general discussion
of pertinent CC/CPSU directives and how they could be
implemented, a plan of work was drawn up consisting of
the following specific tasks:
To prepare plans for mass-cultural work among the
colony in general, and among the embassy women,
in particular;
to prepare and execute plans for political and
cultural work among Soviet seamen calling at host-
country ports;
to study the work of Inturist in the host country,
and to make recommendations for improving it;
to increase the vigilance of the colony in the
host country, with particular attention to possible
provocations (a favorite Soviet euphemism for all
manner of illegal acts committed by Soviet citizens
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abroad, from espionage through shoplifting and
traffic violations) by the host-country authorities
against both the kollektiv and individuals;
to study and report on specific measures to extend
the circle of contacts of the embassy in political,
public and business circles in the host country
("public" is a broad term encompassing press and
journalistic, cultural and intellectual circles);
to study what had been accomplished by the Commercial
Mission in the improvement of host-country/USSR
trade; and
to study means by which the decisions of the 22nd
Party Congress of the CPSU could best be implemented.
After the members of the Party Bureau had agreed on the
six-month work plan, certain members present were each
assigned the job of preparing papers on one of the above
subjects, and were assigned deadlines. Those not assigned
these specific tasks were given overall. responsibility
for blocs of several of those topics.
Although certain of the members present suggested that,
owing to the complexity of the subject matter, two or
three members should be assigned to one subject, arguing
that if one member alone were to prepare a report which
would then be. discussed by the Bureau as a whole (such
was the secretary's order), only the person who prepared
a specific report would be knowledgeable on the subject
while the other members would be discussing from igno-
rance or half-knowledge. The suggestion was dismissed
out of hand by the secretary.
Prior to this meeting, the chief of mission and the first
counselor discussed certain shortcomings in the work of
the diplomatic mission, and decided between themselves
that these shortcomings should be brought to the atten-
tion of the other members; they decided that the best way
to accomplish this would be via the "criticism session."
It was then agreed that the chief of mission would criti-
cize the counselor for dereliction of duty in the matter
to be brought to the attention of the others. The coun-
selor would then admit his guilt. After the counselor
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had admitted his guilt, the chief of mission would then
praise the counselor for the excellence of his work in
the field for which he was primarily responsible. At
that point the counselor was to make a few mild criti-
cisms of the chief of mission but then praise him for
the excellence of his overall performance.
In the diplomatic mission where the meeting cited above
took place, the Presidium of the Party Bureau (secre-
tary, deputy, chairman) met weekly to discuss the most
pressing Party problems, while the Party Bureau as a
whole met once a month.
An extraordinary Party meeting was held in another diplo-
matic mission to discuss a breakdown of discipline among
the staff. As it was a Party Bureau meeting, all the
leading officers of the various sections of both the
embassy and Commercial Mission were present, including
the principal officers of both the KGB and GRU rezi-
denturas. The meeting was held over the strenuous
objections of the Bureau secretary, a KGB officer, who
apparently saw in the meeting a threat to his authority
as a Party official; the secretary agreed to hold it
only after a clear majority of the members threatened to
unseat him. The meeting began in an atmosphere of open
hostility, to which was added the element of confusion,
no one knowing quite how to go about starting the dis-
cussion. What followed for the next several hours was
a series of charges and counter-charges concerning real
or imagined insults to most of the staff; heated criti-
cism and self-criticism; and finally "comradely" agree-
ment that the meeting had been beneficial and provided
the basis for study aimed at a general improvement of
all Party work in the mission. The results were as
follows:
All members of both the embassy and Commercial
Mission staffs are obliged to obey the orders of
the chief of mission, who is the leading repre-
sentative of the USSR abroad; this includes even
those persons not under MFA direction. However,
to be completely effective as chief of mission,
the principal officer must exercise the authority
which he holds, establish and maintain discipline;
oversee and supervise the work of those under him,
both those with diplomatic rank and the adminis-
trative staff; and see to the morale and well-
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being of the entire staff. Although it was
generally agreed that the chief of mission
should be obeyed by all, some members present
noted that his orders to them ran counter to the
orders received "from their own headquarters,"
and that the chief of mission had failed to take
this into account.
Proper respect to the position and authority of
the chief of mission was not being paid by the
leading members of the embassy staff, and this
was reflected throughout the mission. It had
reached the point where no one recognized another
as his administrative superior, no one would obey
orders and no one was working as he should.
Members of the non-diplomatic staff openly defied
the orders of the diplomatic staff and cursed
their superiors even in the presence of foreigners.
Rudeness was prevalent everywhere and mutual
insults were exchanged with great frequency.
Cliques were being formed everywhere, each vying
for position and all ignoring the presence of
constituted authority.
The Party life of the mission was badly organized
and poorly conducted. More than half of the total
Party membership of the mission was engaged in
supervising the work of the rest, who were expected
to do all the work. The study of Marxism/Leninism
was being conducted in a vacuum, without reference
to the daily needs of the collective, and the
general level of Party-educational work had fallen
into an unsatisfactory state. Because of the self-
ish and "uncomradely" attitudes of the diplomatic
staff, the recreational and other vital needs of
the non-diplomatic staff were being neglected and
a hostile attitude towards the diplomatic staff
engendered. A further result of the breakdown in
discipline was that both the living and working
areas of the embassy had become very dirty.
Disciplinary action against certain members of the
staff, resulting in their immediate recall to the
USSR, was insufficiently explained to the rest of
the staff. Confusion and low morale were the results,
since many of the staff did not know the true cause
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of recall and thus feared that it was due to
arbitrary actions on the part of the mission's
leadership.
Charges of abuse of public funds were levied.
Comrade "X" was accused of outfitting his
quarters with furniture from embassy funds, while
the pressing needs of other members of the staff
were neglected.
The meeting finally ended with a short speech by one of
the activists, to the effect that the proceedings had
been most beneficial and that the points made would
provide the basis for fruitful study.
2. The Role of the Party in a Soviet Mission
The role of the Party appears to be a vital one in the
life of a Soviet diplomatic mission. Through the local Party
organizations the CC/CPSU controls the political life of the
embassy and its subordinate units, and guards against any possible
deviations on the part of individuals. Whatever the ideological
convictions of the Soviet diplomat (or KGB or GRU officer) may
be today, he knows that he must at least give full apparent
loyalty to the concepts of Marxism/Leninism, and understands
fully that his every political statement is being carefully moni-
tored at every Party meeting. Moreover, whether Party activi-
ties are specifically designed for this purpose, the fact remains
that the Party member abroad is kept so busy at tasks levied on
him by the secretary and other Party officials - aside from his
professional duties - that he has little time to think of or
contemplate the alien life which goes on about him outside the
embassy walls.
The Party member is also fully aware that the Party meeting
can be used to denigrate him and perhaps ruin his career, should
he deviate from whatever standards have been established as the
norm. Thus, some personal dereliction, although completely
lacking in political meaning to the Party member guilty of it,
can be interpreted by his enemies during a meeting as "uncom-
radely" or "against the best interests of the collective."
Since the minutes of all Party meetings must, by regulation, be
forwarded to the CC/CPSU in Moscow, it is obvious that too many
reports of "uncomradely conduct" would harm the career of the
offender.
However, it appears that verbatim transcripts of meetings
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such as the extraordinary session described above are not for-
warded, but rather a precis is written in such a manner as to
hide the damaging evidence (after all, all present would be
tarred with the same brush). In fact, a ranking Party official
of the embassy in question visited the offices of the CC/CPSU
not long after this meeting and assured a ranking official of
the Central Committee that "a very harmonious collective"
existed in the mission.
Although it is impossible to draw a composite picture of a
Party meeting in every Soviet diplomatic installation through-
out the world, more often than not it is an occasion for releas-
ing pent-up emotions and venting the spleen accumulated by
living elbow-to-elbow, often in substandard conditions, rather
than an opportunity to study and discuss the loftier meaning of
the writings of Marx and Lenin. In this sense the Party meeting
may have a stabilizing effect on the mental health of the Soviet
diplomatic colony, although personal dignity is abused and
personal feelings injured.
While the ambassador ostensibly plays no special role in
the Party life of a Soviet diplomatic mission, in fact he and
the Party secretary often decide on the agenda prior to meetings,
and in general decide what subjects will be emphasized. As
the representative of the CC/CPSU the ambassador is, of course,
charged with overall responsibility for Party affairs in all
the units under him.
The KGB rezidentura is not known to play any special role
in the internal Party affairs of a Soviet mission abroad. Unless
elected to special office by other Party members, officers of
either rezidentura appear to have no more influence in the con-
duct of Party matters than do bona fide MFA and MFT officials
and non-diplomatic staffers. The professional intelligence work
of the rezidenturas is not discussed or even mentioned at Party
meetings.
3. The Mestkom
The word mestkom, in common usage in all Soviet diplo-
matic missions, is an abbreviation of the Russian mestnyi
komitet, or "local committee." This phrase in turn is a
euphemism for Trade Union, either the trade union of the MFA
or that of the MFT. All officials and employees of the many
ministries of the USSR belong to the "trade unions" thereof.
In Soviet diplomatic missions abroad, however, the "trade union"
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or mestkom activities are usually limited to the non-diplomatic
staff, although members of the diplomatic staff participate in
certain of their functions, viz., the organization and running
of summer camps for the children of the colony.
In general, the work of the mestkom is social rather than
political in nature, although the political element is ever-
present. The mestkom is involved in such activities as organ-
izing choral groups; organizing the Saturday night movie schedule
traditional in every Soviet diplomatic establishment; organizing
picnics in the countryside and mass visits to museums and other
"cultural" pursuits; presenting lectures on the latest advance-
ments of Soviet science and art, and so forth. The political
element is present in the figure of the mestkom secretary,
usually a Party activist who is a member of the Party Bureau and
who is responsible for making certain that no possible devia-
tion from the Party line crops up in any mestkom discussions or
activities.
The mestkom and Party organizations frequently sponsor joint
"evenings of relaxation and culture," particularly on the occa-
sion of the national holidays, 7 November and 1 May, and also
on Women's Day, Constitution Day and the like. In most Soviet
diplomatic missions, the mestkom is also usually responsible
for the running of the dreary "club," which Kaznacheyev described
in Inside a Soviet Embassy. The mestkom is a conspicuous mani-
festation of the Soviet concept of the kollektiv; all hands kept
busy at some "socially useful" task, which in fact may consist
largely of watching one another.
4. Study Groups
Directives from the CC/CPSU regarding educational work
among Party and Komsomol members abroad are implemented through
the formation of study groups within the mission. The secretary
of the Party Bureau nominates tutors, most of whom are graduates
of advanced courses in Marxism/Leninism, to lead classes in
political discussion and study, each class being composed of
from five to ten members. The study and instruction done through-
out the mission is at roughly three levels, tailored to the
educational background and political "maturity" of the various
elements of the staff. At the lowest level, instruction is
given in such subjects as the history of the USSR, and the organ-
ization of the Soviet government. These courses are attended
mainly by the wives of non-diplomatic employees, although a few
wives of members of the diplomatic staff may be included.
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At the next level, study centers on the history of the
CPSU, and the standard writings of Marx and Lenin are read and
discussed. This course is normally attended by members of the
non-diplomatic staff, e.g., the zavkhoz and the code clerks,
and sometimes by the wives of the diplomatic staff.
At the highest level, study is concentrated on subjects
which require a solid foundation in Marxism/Leninism, such as
political economy, dialectical materialism, imperialism, and so
forth. Those who participate in such study are usually only
members of the diplomatic staff, whether genuine diplomats or
RIS officers, who have already had many years of study of
Marxism/Leninism at the university level. At this level,
studies may be conducted either in groups or alone in consul-
tation with a tutor.
Group study meetings are regularly scheduled and are held
two or three times each month, each session lasting between two
or three hours in the evening after normal working hours. The
classes are held on the embassy or Commercial Mission premises,
in any convenient room or office.
G. MISCELLANEOUS ASPECTS OF A SOVIET DIPLOMATIC MISSION
1. The Atmosphere in a Soviet Diplomatic Mission
Seen outside his embassy, the Soviet diplomat often wears
a mask of self-confident superiority; inside those wails he is
very much a human being, and often a very second-rate one. To
be posted abroad is obviously a highly-sought prize among the
Soviets, yet in most respects life for them outside the USSR is
not vastly different from what it is in Moscow. In many parts
of the world the personnel of a Soviet diplomatic staff live in
crowded conditions, one family to a room,
and toilet facilities. Where there is no
such, it is often common practice for the
on a long-term contract, large villas or
sharing
kitchen,
bath
embassy
compound
as
embassy
to buy or
rent
apartment
houses,
and
crowd most of the staff into them. Those who live apart; from.
the other members of the colony are usually senior diplomatic
officers or RIS officers whose operational duties require them
to have presentable quarters for representational purposes.
Although there have been and now are exceptions, such as a book-
keeper or other non-diplomatic staffer living with his family
apart from the other members of the colony, this is still the
general rule. The press correspondents, however, almost invari-
ably live apart from the other Soviets in private apartments.
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S E C T
The crowded conditions under which the Soviets often live
inevitably breed quarrels, often starting with arguments among
small children, then spreading quickly to the women and finally
to their husbands. There is a great deal of bickering, which
often leads to violent quarrels, over such matters as whose
room has a better view or is better heated or ventilated. If
it is true, as one leading Soviet expert has said, that in the
USSR the very notion of
privacy
is in danger of becoming
obso-
lete, it is equally true
for the
members of a Soviet colony
abroad.
The low pay received
abroad
by the staff of a Soviet
diplo-
matic mission is another
source
of irritation, especially
after
the newly-arrived Soviet
learns
that his Bloc counterpart
often
earns considerably more than he, and enjoys certain perquisites
unknown to the Soviet service. At least in Western countries,
that the average Soviet is as eager for material goods as the
rest of mankind is shown by the fact that he and his wife spend
a great deal of time window-shopping and talk endlessly among
themselves about which model of household appliance made in the
host country is the best bargain. (In New York, the staff of
the permanent Soviet Delegation to the United Nations, as well
as members of visiting Soviet delegations, spend hours haggling
with the pushcart peddlers on the Lower East Side, trying to
get the best bargains in the second-rate merchandize offered
there.) The average Soviet family abroad scrimps, saves and
pinches every penny during its tour, and towards the end of it
goes on a shopping spree, buying up all manner of consumer goods
to take back to the USSR. As noted above, the MFA diplomat
seldom eats in a local restaurant or stops in a local bar, as
much for the reason that he cannot afford it as out of fear of
being reported to the KGB rezidentura. That his KGB and GRU
colleagues visit restaurants, bars and night clubs freely is
an obvious source of resentment to him.
Drunkenness is a common problem in the Soviet colony, parti-
cularly among the non-diplomatic staff but among the diplomatic
staff as well. Like other diplomatic personnel, Soviet diplo-
matic personnel have access to tax-free diplomatic stores, yet
in many areas the ambassador himself must approve all purchases
of spirits and other alcoholic beverages, which he usually limits
to two bottles per month. There is clear evidence that the frus-
trations built up by the routine of life in a Soviet colony are
aired during parties inside the mission, when drink is available;
arguments break out, often ending in physical violence.
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S E E T
The Soviet abroad is kept constantly busy. When not
attending to his assigned professional duties five-and-one-
half days per week or longer, he is attending a Party or
mestkom meeting, or doing some "socially useful" work. Each
member of the staff is expected to contribute some of his free
time to such tasks as repairing the "club," helping in the
library or joining in the work of the embassy choral group.
Attendance at the traditional Saturday night movie in the mis-
sion is virtually mandatory. Excursions to the countryside,
to a museum or art gallery are always organized and attended by
large parts of the staff in a body. The concept of the
kollektiv is all-pervading.
Although the conditions described above are-little different
from those in the USSR, there is a noteworthy difference. In
the Soviet Union most people live under such conditions; abroad,
in many parts of the world, on the other hand, it is obvious
to the Soviet that the local population around. him - oppressed,
exploited and downtrodden according to the precepts of Marx and
Lenin - live better than he and enjoy a degree of freedom
which is inconceivable to him.
At least on the surface there is complete equality among all
members of the staff of a diplomatic mission; first name and
patronymic are usually used in the daily routine, and in Party
meetings the atmosphere is "comradely." In reality, however,
the class system now prevalent in the USSR is to be found in
equal measure abroad. The ambassador may be personally friendly
with the ranking officers of the mission, but his attitude
toward the rest of the diplomatic staff is "correct" and formal,
and his treatment of the non-diplomatic staff is usually that
of the boss who knows the power of his position and intends that
it be respected. The attitudes of the rest of the diplomatic
staff towards one another, and of them all towards the non-diplo-
matic staff are a reflection of the ambassador's attitude; super-
ior to subordinate. Within the diplomatic staff the "straight"
diplomat resents his RIS colleagues, those of the KGB because he
knows that they are watching him, and those of both rezidenturas
because they enjoy far more privileges than he, and because they
are far less burdened than he with the drudge work of the embassy,
e.g., translating endless articles from the local press into
Russian.
Pressures and frustrations in a Soviet mission result from
official as well as personal reasons. The seat of all power
lying in the highly-centralized Moscow bureaucracy, what Moscow
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wants the mission is expected to obtain, and quickly; what the
mission wishes from Moscow, Moscow either ignores or grants at
a very leisurely pace. Thus, embassy officers complain that
they cannot act on a matter of importance to relations between
the host country and the USSR, because Moscow has issued no
instructions, although the problem has been pressing for many
months. Shipments of equipment needed in the daily life of the
mission do not arrive for long periods of time, and then more
often than not the equipment which arrives is not that which
was ordered. The Soviet-made embassy cars break down and remain
out of service for varying periods of time, because of lack of
spare parts or because the wrong parts were sent. An internal
telephone system equipped to handle 75 lines is requested; one
which handles 25 lines is sent, with some of the vital parts
missing and will not function, etc.
A sense of overall responsibility for the work of the mission
often appears to be lacking among many Soviet diplomats. The
common reply given to a request that Second Secretary "X" do a
job which he does not consider to be completely his responsibility
is "Go to hell, I have my own work." Some ambassadors have been
known to complain that no one in the embassy seemed to know how
to do his job, and that all were sitting about doing nothing
but drawing their pay every two weeks. Despite the great amount
of hostility which exists within a Soviet mission, in spite of
the frustrations of life therein and the frequent disorderliness
of-the daily routine, Soviet missions throughout the world do
not regularly collapse in chaos but continue to serve the ends
of the Soviet State. But no matter what mask the Soviet mission
may wear when seen by the outside world, the life inside that
mission is an unpleasant one.
2. Social Life and Recreation
The social life of a Soviet mission takes place largely
within the framework of the kollektiv, that is, it is highly
organized and all are expected to participate - from the
ambassador to the lowest member of the non-diplomatic staff.
Aside from the organized parties which take place during the
celebrations of major holidays (see C 11), the social life of
the mission revolves around the activities of the "club," which
is run by the mestkom (see F 3). The "club" is usually located
either in the embassy itself or in one of the buildings within
the compound and consists of one or two large rooms sparsely
furnished with plain chairs and tables, a lecturn and a portable
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projection screen. Although there is no law or regulation
which states that the staff are to spend their free hours in
the "club," in fact all personnel, including those who live
outside the compound, are expected to show up there regularly.
The highlight of the "club's" weekly activities is the
Saturday night movie. Either a Soviet-made film or a non-Soviet
film which has been reviewed by one of the local Party acti-
vists for political "correctness," the movie is preceded by a
political lecture on some elevating theme such as "The Roof
the Working Class of the So
i
t U
i
v
e
n
on in the Great Pat 1. io ic1
War," delivered with greater or lesser enthusiasm by a Party_
and is usually followed by a dance. Attendance at the Saturday
night movie is virtually mandatory and even the RIS personnel,
who avoid the "club" assiduously during the rest of the week,
are usually in attendance in full force. Nonattendance is viewe6
by the Party Bureau as "violation of the spirit of the kollektiv."
The library, to which only the mission staff have access,
usually adjoins the "club" and is stocked with the usual works
of Lenin, Marx, etc., and with the works of "approved" Soviet
and foreign authors. The political works in the library are the
chief source of material for the organized political study groups
which are so integral a part of Soviet life, both in the USSR
and abroad. New material for the library is almost always
obtained through the local representative of M:ezhkniga (Inter-
national Book) and rarely from host-country bookstores. The
task of running the library is often assigned to one of the
junior diplomats.
Another prominent feature of social life in a Soviet mission
is organized sports, usually in the form of volleyball, Volley-
ball games are organized both intramurally and with teams from
foreign missions in the host country, usually from the Bloc
embassies. (Such affairs with the American embassy are arranged
only for RIS operational aims; during one of the reported volley-
vall games between Soviet and American mission teams, the Soviet
team was composed entirely of KGB officers; in another, the
Soviets sought a game with a team of the Marine guards, who are
interesting targets of the KGB.) Pingpong tables are common in
Soviet embassy "clubs."
Birthday parties for the children of the colony are frequently
organized and a party is usually held at the end of the school
S R E T 105
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4K
S E C T
year. The latter is a rather formal affair at which the
ambassador gives a speech exhorting the children to be good
Soviet citizens.
As noted elsewhere, social contact with foreigners, parti-
cularly Westerners, is forbidden except for intelligence pur-
poses or for the purpose of winning them over to a pro-Soviet
point of view. Soviet officials will not, therefore, normally
invite Western acquaintances, or even neighbors or landlords,
for finings in their own apartments.
106 S E C' T
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