MAO'S CHINA: A Model For Africa?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-02646R000500180001-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 4, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000500180001-3
MAO'S CHINA
A Model For Africa?
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000500180001-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000500180001-3
MAO'S China, although it has departed from tradition in many ways,
has maintained and even increased a long-standing Chinese interest
in Africa.
Centuries before Communist Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung estab-
lished his regime in 1949, Chinese officials, merchants and explorers
were intrigued by the mysteries and potentialities of the vast continent.
Some Sino-African contacts go back almost 2,000 years. Second
century writings of the famed geographers of Alexandria attest that
Africans already knew both land and sea routes to China. There was
a brisk trade exchange in ivory and porcelain during the Chinese Sung
dynasty, from 960 to 1279. Ibn Batuta, the legendary Arab traveler,
reached China in 14th century journeys from Morocco and Cheng-ho,
a representative of the Chinese royal court, led naval expeditions to
East Africa in the 15th century.
Under Mr. Mao, the People's Republic of China (also known as
Mainland China or Communist China) has sought to develop its ties
with Africa in new and accelerated ways.
It has sent trade, cultural and political emissaries to virtually every
African country and has encouraged return visits by African govern-
mental, business and youth leaders. African students have been urged
to attend Chinese universities. Above all, there has been a concerted
effort to advance the idea that China can serve as a model for the
development of Africa's many newly independent nations.
Peking's representatives say their experiences in attempting to
feed, clothe and industrialize their over-populated country could be
of great value if applied to the needs and desires of Africa. Commu-
nist China, they say in effect, can be a political and economic pattern
for any other nation with similar problems.
The validity of this "model" concept has become one of the dec-
ade's most frequently-discussed topics.
Pertinent African and Chinese views, together with some of the
more important background issues, are summarized in the following
pages. ?
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDR78-02646R000500180001-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000500180001-3
Peking and Non-Alignment
African statesmen and the officials of Communist China have ex-
pressed strikingly different viewpoints concerning the proper role of
their respective nations in world political affairs.
Many African leaders eloquently affirm that non-alignment is the
keystone of their national policies.
Peking insists that'neutrality of any kind is an unreasonable concept.
Premier Ben Bella of Algeria, in October, 1962, said:
"We intend to remain independent despite what any other state
may think. We are, I repeat, completely faithful to our policy of non-
alignment and neutrality."
"Non-alignment," President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana declared on
June 21, 1963, "is now a world factor and moral force in international
relations. The contribution of Africa as a continent united in its observ-
ance of a truly non-aligned policy will give tremendous weight to that
force."
Or, as President Modibo Keita of the Republic of Mali put it at the
Addis Ababa African summit conference on May 24, 1963:
"The African states, uniting their efforts, must develop an inde-
pendent African policy, in all domains, which will be clear to any non-
African country, any great power or group of powers. Together we
must simultaneously undertake the solemn engagement of building
African unity, of never making our organizations into an instrument of
one state.or group of states."
Peking's official spokesmen, especially when traveling in Africa,
tend to avoid direct confrontations on the sensitive non-alignment
issue and to, suggest instead that Communist China and the new Afri-
can nations are bound together by more important ties of mutual
self-interest.
But the Chinese are at a great disadvantage in face-to-face discus-
sions of existing international relationships. Their historic and continu-
ing stand against' neutrality and world cooperation in the United Na-
tions is too well known to be explained away with diplomatic amenities.
Astute African officials, for example, are well aware that Liu Shao-
chi's classic.,, work on nternationalism and Nationalism" contains the
blunt assertion that neutrality is impossible.
r. Liu, who is vice-chairman of the Chinese Communist party as
,yy9ll as .Chairman of the Chinese People's Republic, also declared in
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RrP78-02646R000500180001-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000500180001-3
his 1948 opus that "all the nations, countries, classes, strata, parties
and groups in the whole world" must choose one side or the other in
the so-called East-West conflict.
Chinese Communist Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung, who in 1940 had
predicted that "all the countries of the world will be swept into one or
the other of . . . two camps," expressed Peking's position on non-
alignment even more succinctly in 1949 when he said: "Neutrality is
mere camouflage and a third road does not exist."
It is pure illusion, the Chinese leader has declared, that any country
can follow a policy of inclining "to neither side" on any international
political question.
Jen-min Jih-pao, the official Chinese Communist party newspaper,
carried the "choose-sides-or-else" ultimatum to its ultimate extreme
in a November 30, 1961, editorial urging that non-Communist govern-
ments be "wiped off the face of the earth" in the interests of interna-
tional solidarity.
African awareness of this Chinese attitude was indicated by Presi-
dent Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, on January 18, 1963, when he said:
"The Communist states, in their efforts to weaken the foundation of
non-Communist states, try to create an atmosphere of discontent. In
addition, Tunisia can neither accept their insistence on the necessity
of class warfare nor their belief that Tunisia should follow in the
wake of the USSR or Red China."
In a December, 1963, editorial, the Tanganyika Standard made this
observation regarding the tour of Africa then being made by Chinese
Communist Premier Chou En-Iai:
"Africa today is alert to the danger of those who seek to replace
one form of domination with another. Indeed it is for this reason that
African states have chosen to follow the path of positive neutrality
and warned that they intend to pick their own friends."
Columnist Ayo Adefolaju, writing in the Lagos, Nigeria Sunday
Times of December 29, 1963, said:
"No amount of propaganda pumped into the head of the modern
African can easily convince him that Communist China is likely to be
a better friend of Africa than any other nation of the world.
"China's record is hardly anything to envy what with its current
aggression against the Republic of India, what with its humiliation of
the Dalai Lama and his poor country. Which African ca r gree
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000500iouu 1-
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000500180001-3
with Chou's dogma that war is inevitable? Who does not know that
the majority of China's teeming population are living in abject poverty
worse than the case in most parts of Africa?
"Communists like capitalists have a right to wish that their system
should be adopted throughout the world. But it is wishful thinking to
expect that the new Africa which is emerging will continue to adopt
foreign systems when it can evolve its own system.
There are very few Africans who can easily be attracted to
Communism. The average African is essentially a democrat who
wishes to be ruled with his own consent."
Several weeks earlier, on October 21, the Kenya Daily Nation had
warned that "the Chinese aim is to get a toehold in Africa and make
individuals as well as governments friendly to them. They are out to
convert those responsive to their thinking and to subvert those who
are not. . . It is clear that the Chinese have no interest at all in fos-
tering African unity."
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDPt8-02646R000500180001-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000500180001-3'
Peking and Peace
Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia stated at the Addis Ababa Sum-
mit Conference on May 22, 1963: ". . . We demand an end to nuclear
testing, to the arms race, because these activities, which pose such
dreadful threats to man's existence, waste and squander humanity's
material heritage. . ."
In official resolutions, the Conference later affirmed its unanimous
opposition to "all nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests" and appealed "to
the great powers to . . . sign a general and complete disarmament
agreement under strict and effective international control."
On August 5, 1963, the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet
Union ended long negotiations by signing a treaty banning all nuclear
weapons tests except those underground. More than 100 other states
- including 30 nations of Africa - promptly signed or acceded to the
treaty. Communist China, however, rejected the agreement as a "dirty
fraud."
The African nations approving the pact were: Algeria, Burundi,
Cameroon, Chad, Congo (Leopoldville), Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon,
Ghana, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Libya, Malagasy Republic, Mali, Mauri-
tania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, So-
mali Republic, South Africa, Sudan, Tanganyika, Togo, Tunisia,
Uganda, United Arab Republic and Upper Volta.
African diplomats hailed the treaty as a step toward general dis-
armament,.the relaxation of international tensions and lasting peace.
Nigerian Foreign Minister Jaja Wachuku called the treaty "a right
step in the right direction at the right time." Ambassador Richard E.
Kelfa-Caulker of Sierra Leone said it was "a shaft of light in the great
darkness." Ambassador Omar Mohallim of the Somali Republic said
it "brings great hope to humanity." Ambassador Aristide Issembe of
Gabon called it "an open door on the road that leads to reconciliation
of peoples and human brotherhood."
Expressing hope that the treaty would lead to further reduction of
tensions, Senegalese Ambassador Ousmane Soce Diop said the
African nations do not want to see the world divided into two antago-
nistic blocs. Ambassador Konan Bedie of the Ivory Coast saw in the
treaty the promise of an international climate favorable to African eco-
nomic, cultural and social development. The same factor was stressed
by Ambassador S. Edward Peal of Liberia, the first African nation to
sign the treaty in Washington. Ambassador Abdou Sidikou of Niger,
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-WP78-02646R000500180001-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000500180001-3
the 100th signatory, viewed the pact as a "decisive step toward the
common objective toward which humanity is reaching - that is peace."
While other African statesmen expressed similar opinions, Commu-
nist China assailed the treaty. "It is unthinkable for the Chinese Gov-
ernmen to be a party to this dirty fraud," an official Peking statement
said July 31, six days after the three original signatories had initialed
the agreement in Moscow.
In this and later statements, the Chinese contended that the treaty
"has every harm and no benefit" and "is rotten to the core." They
maintained that it "jeopardizes the interests of the people of the world
and the cause of world peace" and that it is "not a first step toward
peace but a step to increase the danger of war."
How did Peking arrive at these singular, conclusions? The answer
appears to lie in the dogma to which the Chinese have held rigidly
during their ideological dispute with the Soviet Union since 1956.
Chinese party theorists view the world in terms of a series of "irrec-
oncilable contradictions." The chief of these is depicted as the "inev-
itable" hostility which exists between Communist and non-Communist
countries. This is usually stated as the contradiction between "social-
ism"- and "capitalism," or between "socialism" and "imperialism and
its lackeys." Antagonistic blocs, thus, are said to be an inescapable
reality in the world as it is now constituted.
Such blocs will exist until Communism conquers all opposition and
establishes its own rule everywhere, Chinese spokesmen maintain.
They emphasize that non-Communist nations "will never withdraw from
the arena of history of their own accord." Eventually, all must be over-
thrown. Only when they "are wiped off the face of the earth can the
great ideal of everlasting peace of mankind be really translated into
reality," the Peking Jen-min Jih-pao, top official newspaper of the
Chinese Communist Party, said December 1, 1961.
Possessing this militant outlook and, recognizing that other nations
will defend themselves against Communist conquest, Peking argues
that warfare is also inevitable. Communist parties, therefore, are urged
to develop the power needed "to make a revolution that will smash
the bourgeois state machine." On April 16, 1960, the Chinese party
magazine Red Flag called to mind this, passage from the works of
Lenin: "Not a single great revolution in history has ever been carried
out without a civil war and no serious Marxists will believe it possible
to make the transition from capitalism to socialism without a civil war."
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 CIA-RDFF78-02646R000500180001-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000500180001-3
~ 0 c
U
-a 0
O C
cd E
0 O E
0 0
Cso
rnU)
'a co
c c
co as cd
ca s s
rn O~
H 0
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000500180001-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000500180001-3
The peaceful co-existence tactics which soviet Premier Khrushchev
advocates for Communist gains will not achieve the final victory,
Peking insists.
In 1963 the Ppking regime on numerous occasions reaffirmed its
commitment to these rules which Mao Tse-tung laid down many years
earlier: 1) "Whoever has an army has power, for war settles every-
thing; 2) "Every Communist must grasp the truth that political power
grows out of the barrel of a gun; 3) "The whole world can be remolded
only with the gun. . War can 'only be abolished through war - in
order to get rid of the gun, we must first grasp it in our hands."
The Chinese argue that the emergence of nuclear weapons has not
changed the validity of these Maoist rules or "the fundamental Marx-
ist-Leninist theory" on the inevitability of war. They accuse the Soviet
Union of "fatalism" and, "pessimism" for dwelling on the terrible de-
struction that nuclear war could bring to all parts of the world. They
say it is "spineless" and "cowardly" to shrink from revolutionary risks
because of fear that local wars might lead to general thermonuclear
war:
If Communist states maintain sufficient military might, Peking be-
lieves, they could win a nuclear war. Then, as Red Flag prophesied in
1960, "on the debris of a dead imperialism, the victorious people
would create swiftly a civilization a thousand times higher than the
capitalist system and a truly beautiful future for themselves." A cruel
? and callous view, indeed, the Soviet Union replied, "a cynical gamble
with human lives."
Upholding these positions as the nuclear test ban treaty was ini-
tialed and signed, Peking charged that the Soviet Union had "sold
out" Communism's world revolutionary interests by entering into an
agreement which could limit the military potential of the Communist
states.
Another factor was also involved here: the strong revolutionary and
chauvinistic desire of the Chinese to develop nuclear weapons of their
own. They recognized that the test ban could deter their, plans or
further isolate China in world opinion if they conducted atmospheric
tests in the future. On August 20, 1963, a Soviet government statement
said the Chinese leaders had "shut themselves off from the entire
world, by some sort of blinkers" and were "blinded by their craving to
have nuclear weapons in their own home."
While opposing the partial test ban treaty, Premier Chou En-lai on
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP77-02646R000500180001-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000500180001-3
c U)
O O r
E cz cz
a) c L
a) 0. CC
cu a) a)
L
0
(n
Cd co
U
- a)
cz O
-0 N w 0
0 g N J
a) t O) -
y cd a)
a) CS ~ri i
Cd cc O
a asp LL
c ?Q? T s
.0
v, ,~;
Approv
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000500180001-3
August 2 addressed a letter to "the government heads of all countries
of the world" proposing that a global summit conference be called to
discuss "the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear
weapons." This was widely regarded as an attempt to deflect support
from the test ban treaty.
Peking continued to promote the idea of a general disarmament
parley, although a Chinese government statement of September 1,
1963 declared: "Universal and complete disarmament can be realized
only after imperialism, capitalism and all systems of exploitation have
been eliminated. To make propaganda about the possibility of realiz-
ing 'a world without weapons, without armed forces and without wars'
through universal and complete disarmament while imperialism still
exists, is to deceive the people of the world and is detrimental to the
struggle for world peace."
An explanation of this apparent inconsistency - calling for disarma-
ment but deeming it impossible of attainment - may be found in ear-
lier Chinese sources. These reiterate that a "world without weapons"
can be achieved only when Communism creates a "world without
states." However, they continue, this should not stop Communist par-
ties from making disarmament proposals as a tactic to arouse feelings
against "imperialism" and keep alive the concept of "irreconcilable
contradictions." Chinese Central Committee member Liu Chang-
sheng explained the tactic to a World Federation of Trade Unions
meeting in Peiping June 8, 1960: "We support the disarmament pro-
posals put forward by the Soviet Union. (But) it is of course incon-
ceivable that imperialism will accept proposals for general and com-
plete disarmament. The purpose of putting forward such proposals
is. . . to unmask the aggressive and bellicose nature of imperialism
before the peoples of the world."
Africa's acceptance of the nuclear test ban treaty took outright ex-
ception to Peking's views. The Kenya Daily Nation saw a job lying
ahead. It commented on July 27, 1963: "Red China does not yet pos-
sess the atomic bomb. But the indications are that (China) is working
hard to catch up with Russia and the West and it has been predicted
from Moscow that China can be expected to explode an atomic bomb
in the next two or three years. Here is a worthwhile task for African
leaders. . . It will be their job to persuade China not to restart the
nuclear arms race, not to plunge millions of people into war-minded-
ness and not to cast new shadows over the survival or extinction of
mankind."
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-R4'78-02646R000500180001-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 CIA-RDP78-02646R000500180001-3
Peking and War
Representatives of 28 other countries were encouraged by the
words of Chou En-lai, Premier of the Chinese People's Republic, at
the Asian-African Conference held at Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955.
Addressing the Political Committee of the conference on April 23,
Mr. Chou said in part:
"We should ... settle all questions that may arise amongst us on
the basis of common peace and cooperation. . .
"We, on our part, do not want to do anything for the expansion of
Communist activities outside our own country. . .
"As to respect for territorial integrity, it is stated that China will not
and should not have any demand for territory. . .
"As to the determination of common borders which we are going
to undertake with our neighboring countries, we shall use only peace-
ful means, and we shall not permit any other kinds of methods."
The now historic Asian-African Conference had met to consider
common, problems and discuss ways of achieving greater economic,
cultural and political cooperation. It was convened on the invitation of
the Prime Ministers of Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan.
African states which participated were Egypt (now the United Arab
Republic), Ethiopia, the Gold Coast (now Ghana), Liberia, Libya and
the Sudan (now Republic of the Sudan).
Some delegates came to the conference with serious misgivings
concerning the international intentions of Communist China. They ex-
pressed their desire for a clarification of these questions:
Would the Peking regime seek to expand beyond its frontiers to
threaten neighboring states? Would it seek to export Communist rev-
olution to other states? Should not. Communist colonialism be con-
demned along with any other kind?
Previous actions by the Peking regime had provided solid reasons
for raising these questions. The Chinese People's Republic was es-
tablished on October 1, 1949. A year later, Peking's forces began in-
vading Tibet. During October, 1950, Peking also began pouring troops
into Korea. In defiance of United Nations police action there, the
Chinese intervened to support North Korea's invasion of the Republic
of Korea. For this action, they were branded as aggressors by a vote
of the United Nations early in 1951.
Before the Bandung Conference, Burmese Communists had been
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP 78-02646R000500180001-3
12
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000500180001-3
receiving sanctuary and military training on the Chinese side of the
ill-defined border between Burma and China. Indonesian leaders were
uneasy over financial subsidies which Peking was proyiding the Indo-
nesian Communist Party. Chinese military aid continued to reach North
Viet-Nam, although such help from outside had been prohibited by the
1954 Geneva Agreement on Indo-China. Support was also being of-
fered Communist guerrillas in Laos. In a speech to the Bandung Con-
ference, Prince Wan Waithayakon, Thai Foreign Minister, cited evi-
dence of Chinese activities "for purposes of infiltration and subversion
in Thailand."
Territorial claims of the Peking regime had caused trouble in rela-
tions with Burma, Pakistan and India. On April 2, 1953, Foreign Minis-
ter Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan had protested a Chinese violation
of Pakistan's border in Hunza state. An attempted Chinese crossing
into the Indian state 'of 'Uttar Pradesh was protested by New Delhi on
August 27, 1954. Determined to seize Taiwan, Peking's forces on Sep-
tember 3, 1954, began shelling Quemoy Island, garrisoned by the Re-
public of China. Intensive military activity in the Taiwan Strait con-
tinued into the early months of 1955.
Despite Peking's known penchant for forceful solutions, before the
Bandung Conference there were signs which appeared to be possible
harbingers of change. Three times in 1954, Communist China made
non-aggression pledges to India. The first pledge was contained in .a
trade agreement on Tibet, signed in Peking April 29, 1954.
In the preamble to the agreement, India and China promised to
abide by the Panch Shila - the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-exis-
tence which Prime Minister Nehru had propounded out of his desire
for world peace. The five principles were "mutual respect for each
.other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression,
mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and
mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence."
Peking reiterated its promise to uphold these principles when the
agreement was ratified by the Chinese government June 3, 1954. The
pledge was given a third time on June 28, 1954, after Premier Chou
held talks with Mr. Nehru in New Delhi. Listing the Panch Shila, a com-
munique on their meeting said that "the Prime Ministers reaffirmed
these principles and felt that they should be applied in their relations
with other countries in Asia, as well as in other parts of the world."
Premier Chou, a skillful and persuasive diplomat, arrived at the
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RD*8-02646R000500180001-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000500180001-3
Bandung Conference in a seemingly conciliatory mood. "The Chinese
delegation has come here to seek unity and not to quarrel," he said
on April 19 in his initial speech. In other carefully chosen words, he
struck a posture of reasonableness - denying in the process that "we
are carrying out subversive activities against the governments of other
countries."
His speech of April 23 was even more moderate and more definite
in commitment to the Panch Shila. He proposed a seven-point peace
declaration which was embodied, substantially, in the final communi-
que of the Asian-African Conference.
Once again, through Premier Chou, the Peking regime vowed to
respect the territory and the rights of others. However, events which
followed the Bandung meeting revealed striking discrepancies be-
tween Peking's words and actions. Clashes occurred when Chinese
troops intruded into Burma in 1956. Another crisis was touched off in
the Taiwan Strait in 1958. Chinese aid to Communist guerrillas in Viet-
Nam and Laos went on as before. Then came new Chinese actions
against Tibet and India.
When the. Chinese completed their occupation of independent Tibet
in 1951, they took charge of Tibetan military and foreign affairs. But
they promised, in a 17-point agreement, not to alter "the existing po-
litical system in Tibet" nor the "established status, functions and pow-
ers" of the Dalai Lama, spiritual and temporal ruler of Tibet's 1,200,000
Buddhist inhabitants. They also stated that they would protect "reli-
gious beliefs, habits and customs" and refrain from compulsion "in
matters related to various reforms."
Instead of carrying out the agreement, Peking's officials began sys-
tematic exploitation of Tibet's economy and repression of the tradi-
tional Buddhist religion. They established a new neo-colonial frame-
work for converting Tibet into an "autonomous region" of China, The
Dalai Lama became a figure-head ruler. Tibetans were drafted into
forced labor gangs and put to work building roads and airfields for
Peking's use. Families were broken up and thousands were sent away
to China for Communist indoctrination. Lamasaries were raided, and
monks were humiliated, tortured and killed.
Tibetans stood the treatment until 1959. Then they rose in large-
scale revolt. Peking ruthlessly put down the rebellion and dissolved
the Tibetan government. The Dalai Lama and thousands of refugees
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-R[b078-02646R000500180001-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000500180001-3
M C) - C
M m
CU o
E c ti= a
a)
C U a) ~
CC L 01 >
.w- E ?6 ~z O
O cC C
`?-- ) cCCC
o t
a) H 0
O cC + .F.
ca 0
00.. C O to Q.
a) U C C
n3
'Cr -o to
-O 0
i
- C ? O
.2
(n cz M .2
Q CC CO
U E a)
cC 0 -~ O
u) m cz to
E cC
o -p
v ` a)
cC m .c )
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-02646R0005001800b'1 - _ 0)
15
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000500180001-3
fled to India, where they gave detailed testimony on the character of
the Chinese occupation.
Assessing all the facts, the International Commission of Jurists in
1960 found Communist China guilty of repeated "acts of genocide" in
Tibet. Peking was formally charged with attempts "to destroy the
Tibetans as a religious group." Twice - in 1959 and 1961 - the United
Nations passed resolutions deploring the many violations of the Ti-
betan people's fundamental rights and freedoms.
After putting down the Tibetan revolt, China increased its pressures
against India. These had not ceased as a result of Premier Chou's New
Delhi and Bandung pledges. Only two months after the Asian-African
Conference, India was forced to protest an unauthorized encampment
which Chinese troops had set up on Indian territory. As nibbling en-
croachment continued, Peking laid claim to 50,000 square miles of
India's frontier lands. A series of Chinese attacks resulted in casual-
ties on both sides in 1959. But it was not until October 20, 1962, that
Chinese forces launched a massive invasion of India. Prime Minister
Nehru led his countrymen in mobilizing to meet this "greatest men-
ace" to India's freedom. And expressions of sympathy and support
came from around the world.
When it became apparent that India would defend itself resolutely,
Peking announced a unilateral cease-fire in the Himalayan war and
called off its invasion. Representatives of six African and Asian coun-
tries then met in Colombo, Ceylon, to make recommendations on
methods by which China and India might undertake peaceful negotia-
tions to settle the long-standing border dispute.
Participants in the Colombo Conference were Burma, Cambodia,
Ceylon, Ghana, Indonesia and the United Arab Republic. India readily
accepted the Colombo proposals. But Peking insisted on two "points
of interpretation" which, in effect, constituted a rejection of the pro-
posals. The first anniversary of the Colombo Conference passed on
December 12, 1963, with Peking still refusing to negotiate on the basis
of the Afro-Asian recommendations.
Public opinion in Africa was concerned over the Chinese aggression
against India. The Ivory Coast newspaper Abidjan Matin summed up
a prevailing African attitude in this December 10, 1962 editorial com-
ment: "What one must conclude is that certain powers scorn all dia-
logue except that of war. And China is the epitome of such powers.
Approved F -IK Zell ei2OObO8l21s:cCl%-qk -02646R000500180001-3
16
 ARproved For Release 2000/08/27: CIA-RDP78-02646R0005001'80001-3
? d '- C
C
C CO a.
C C) L
C U)
i O
f~ C
O to 4)
U O C
as-p"O
C fn L
C o
I 2
C N N
C: :3
C "Q Q
C
C)
C_
^O
>
C
O to
Q E
O C
O N
Q
C 0
Q) ++
> cd In
o ca In ~Cis
3-C -C
s C_
r Y 'O C
O >
Q. .,. 0
CO
O )b cn
0-0
s c
cts a) Q
C Q C
.C O)
O - C
Cl) Y
N O O
C S a-
0) co
E M-0 co
E C6 O M
O C r
U 0 Q C
C >,
O
c >^Z
a 3 0)
OZ v2
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 CIA-Rt '78-02646R000500180001-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000500180001-3
Against the background of Peking's aggression, broken promises
and support of subversion, African concern also has been voiced over
mounting Chinese attention to Africa itself. One aspect of Peking's
interest in the continent was noted at the United Nations on October
3, 1962, by Jean-Faustin Betayene, then Minister of Foreign Affairs for
Cameroon. He told the U.N. General Assembly:
"It is common knowledge that the regime administering mainland
China has consistently pursued a policy of subversion not only in Asia
but in Africa as well. . . Toward my country the People's Republic of
China has for years been carrying out a policy of aggression. We know
and we have proof that the Government of the People's Republic of
China, on its territory, has openly trained and armed Cameroonian
terrorists who are trying to overthrow the democratically established
Cameroonian Government."
Another aspect was noted in a July, 1963, article published by the
North African weekly journal Jeune Afrique. "To be an ally of the Chi-
nese," the article stated, "it is essential to be aMarxist, Leninist, Mao-
ist revolutionary to the tips of one's fingers and willing to submit to
the discipline of the international Communist movement."
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000500180001-3
18
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000500180001-3
Peking and Economic Development
Economic activity is the decisive factor shaping man's political and
social life, according, to the theory of Communism, and the highest
economic development can be attained through state ownership and
collectivization. Communist China commends its own economic sys-
tem to nations in Africa and elsewhere.
But the fact is that within the past two years the Peking regime has
been forced to turn to Africa to buy foods its own economy has been
unable to produce in quantities' sufficient for the Chinese people.
Southern Rhodesia provided the Chinese with 59,000 tons of corn in
1962. South Africa supplied 167,000 tons from 1962 to mid-1963.
These purchases were only a small fraction of the total amount of
grains Peking acquired from non-Communist countries in an effort to
stave off Chinese famine. Almost exhausting its meager foreign ex-
change reserves, China has bought between 5 million and 5.5 million
tons of grain annually since 1961. Contracts have been concluded for
additional deliveries as late as 1966. Argentina, Australia, Burma, Can-
ada, France and West Germany have been suppliers, in addition to
Southern Rhodesia and South Africa.
Behind the grain purchases lies a story of severe economic failure
in China. Farm production there has registered no substantial gains
since 1958, although the populations has increased by at least 50 mil-
lion since then. When agriculture suffers in China, all else suffers.
Chinese light industry draws 80 percent of its raw materials from the
farms. Heavy industry requires machinery imports - which must be
paid for by agricultural exports. Factories are now operating far below
capacity.
China's economic crisis caused widespread hunger and hardship
from 1959 to 1961. Improved conditions were reported in 1962 and
1963, but recovery is still incomplete. The outlook for any rapid eco-
nomic growth in the future is poor and probably will remain so as long
as the population increases each year by 10 to 17 million persons -
all requiring food, clothing, other consumer goods and employment.
Overpopulation is a distinct problem in mainland China. Inability to
control floods and droughts is another. The Peking regime is believed
to have exaggerated the effects of bad weather conditions as a cause
of its economic failures. The biggest problems, many economists say,
derive from the Chinese economic system itself.
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RD978-02646R000500180001-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000500180001-3
The Chinese government has encountered trouble in inspiring high
production without the incentives of some private ownership. Workers
and farmers have resented the regimentation and low rewards of state-
run farms and industry. Total state control, furthermore, has led to the
creation of cumbersome bureaucracies. These often have enmeshed
the Communist economies in strangling red tape.
While mainland China's basic problems are duplicated elsewhere,
the Peking regime added to its troubles in 1958 by launching two ill-
conceived developmental programs. One was called the Great Leap
Forward - an ambitious agricultural and industrial drive which sought
to utilize labor with unprecedented intensiveness. The other program
called for the establishment of rural communes - one of history's most
upsetting experiments in social engineering.
During the Great Leap Forward, Peking boasted that it would sur-
pass Great Britain in industrial production within 15 years. In agricul-
ture, it planned to concentrate "20 years of progress in one day."
Novel methods were tried, as party propagandists attempted to whip
up a frenzy of enthusiasm for production.
Party committees were given free reign in factories. They displaced
qualified engineers, overworked factory hands in one "emulation cam-
paign" after another and haphazardly altered production techniques.
Peking later admitted some of the results: accounting became cha-
otic, costs soared, upkeep was neglected and the quality of produc-
tion plunged downward.
Throughout the country, millions of persons were put to work smelt-
ing homemade iron in "backyard furnaces." Peking later confessed
that the product was useless. Millions more were drafted to carry stone
and dig canals to irrigate the dry North China plain. But officials re-
ported later that many of the canals leaked 60 percent of the water
they were supposed to convey.
On the farms, the Communist Party claimed it would "negate the
law of diminishing returns" by proving that land could be made to
produce ever-increasing crop yields.
Party "experts" instructed farm workers to set plants "so close to-
gether that even rats could not move among the seedlings." Rice
fields formerly planted with 100,000 to 200,000 seedlings per mou (one-
fifteenth hectare) were jammed with 300,000 to 800,000 seedlings.
The farmers were told to plow deep with new implements or even
with explosives. They du to de ##~hhSS foot
Approved For Release 2000/08/21: CIA-IDP7r~60~~~1~8~g3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000500180001-3
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RD~78-02646R000500180001-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000500180001-3
(33 centimeters) to ten feet (3.3 meters), compared with the traditional
practice of plowing five inches (15 centimeters) deep.
Too late, the results became obvious. Deep plowing brought sterile
subsoil to the surface and required abnormally large amounts of
scarce fertilizer. Close planting cut off sunlight and ventilation. Under-
nourishment produced spindly stalks, yellow leaves and small ears of
grain. In many areas, farmers began to complain that crops were "fall-
ing down and dying."
Still greater disruption was caused by the rural communes. When
the Chinese Communists first came to power in 1948 they redistributed
land and equalized holdings of the farmers. Then they began' taking
the land away and organizing 120 million farm families into 750,000
"agricultural co-operatives." In 1958 they began amalgamating the
co-operatives into 24,000 large communes.
Under this program, they deprived the farmer of his private property,
including tools and animals. Everything became the property of the
commune. The farmers were required to eat in public mess halls, place
their children in nurseries, send their elderly relatives away to homes
for the "useless" aged. In some cases, husbands and wives were sep-
arated and required to live in different central dormitories.
The communes constituted a massive attack on the Chinese family.
Traditionally, in China as in Africa, high value had been placed on
family life and family loyalties. After acceding to power, the Peking
regime set out deliberately to weaken the family system. Children
were taught to place love of the Communist Party above love for their
fathers and mothers. They were encouraged to spy on their parents
and report any criticism of the party or any other "reactionary" activi-
ties. Families were broken up as the state claimed the right to assign
workers to employment away from home. The commune system went
beyond all previous measures to weaken family ties.
One fundamental purpose of the communes was to "free" women
for long hours of work alongside men. During the Great Leap Forward,
farm workers of both sexes were reported to be displaying such en-
thusiasm for labor that they even ate and slept in the fields. In fact,
however, they were soon overcome by fatigue, apathy and resentment.
Passive resistance developed and grew in proportion to the hunger
and nutritional diseases which followed crop failures.
Peking tried to maintain the pace for three years. At first, the regime
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 CIA-R?f78-02646R000500180001-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-02646R0005001.80001-3
Under the commune program which Communist China began in
1958, all land and means of production were to belong to the state.
Later, small plots of land for private cultivation were returned to the
farmers in an effort to spur production. Here a farmer in Hopeh prov-
ince fertilizes his own farm, a two-foot (60-centimeter) strip of land
alongside a furrowed field belonging to the local commune.
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RpP78-02646R000500180001-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000500180001-3
said grain and cotton output of 1958 was double that of 1957. It re-
ported that steel production had increased 107 percent and that other
tremendous industrial gains had been made. However,. in 1959 the
party admitted that local officials, under pressure to amass impressive
Great Leap Forward records, had inflated and falsified their statistical
reports. As hunger deepened and industrial operations dropped below
50 percent of capacity, the truth could not be concealed.
At the beginning of 1961, Peking was forced to abandon the Great
Leap Forward and retreat drastically from the commune system. An
emergency program was decreed. It called for reduction of industrial
investment to enable the whole country to concentrate on tasks of
agricultural recovery. Small private plots of land were returned to the
peasants. They were permitted to till these plots when not working for
the communes. Free markets were restored for the exchange of pri-
vate production.
Detailed information on the current state of the Chinese economy
is concealed by Peking. Official statements on the subject are vague.
Over-all statistics have not been issued since 1960. Politically-moti-
vated grants and credits extended to other countries have been em-
ployed to give an impression that China is better off than the known
facts would indicate.
But Chinese leaders, chastened by their recent experiences, do
sometimes admit that Utopia lies farther ahead than they originally
thought. Foreign Minister Chen Yi told an Australian television pro-
ducer in 1963: "China requires 100 years to become a modern state.
We have made and we will make many mistakes, because we lack ex-
perience. As I say, it will take 100 years; in the past we thought we
could do it in 10. But that was wrong."
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RD2 8-02646R000500180001-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000500180001-3
Peking and Education
Great changes have taken place in the outside world's image of
China during the 20th century, first as China was increasingly exposed
to western influence and later as Mao Tse-tung'g Communist party
grew in power and finally gained control of the mainland in 1949.
Interest in China, however, has continued to grow.
Students from Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America have gone to
Peking and other mainland cities in increasing numbers, most of them
accepting 'scholarships and other inducements offered by China's
officials and institutions.
They have been intrigued by the opportunity to expand their hori-
zons - and to see what the Chinese revolutionaries have accom-
plished in little more than a decade. Many, impressed by the claims
of agricultural and industrial advances made by Peking, have been
eager to observe economic and social conditions at first hand.
What have African and other students learned from their experi-
ences on the Chinese mainland?
The consensus, judging from the uniformity of the observations
made by returning students, is that visitors to China must make major
readjustments in their habits of living and thinking.
This is true in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as well, but the
adjustments necessary in Communist China are even broader in scope
and sharper in detail.
One of the first problems all encounter is the Chinese language,
which often requires years of intensive study. African students also
report that a great deal of their precious learning time had to be given
to long and tedious, but required, lessons in ideology and politics -
courses they describe as "pure propaganda."
Living conditions are austere and complaints are frequent about
food, travel restrictions, the ban on free social relationships and the
difficulty of obtaining exit permits. Racial discrimination is often cited,
too, although Chinese Communist propaganda makes a point of em-
phasizing that the Chinese and Africans, both races being non-white,
have a great mutual bond.
_ A young Somali student, Abduloadir Scek Mohammed of Moga-
discio, was so resentful of his Chinese experiences that he wrote a
pamphlet about them after his return to Africa. He objected to the
constant surveillance by party representatives that is characteristic of
Approved For Release 2000/08/27: CIA-R78-02646 R000500180001-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000500180001-3
Communist societies and concluded that "in effect,, it was not possible
to associate with the Chinese students or people." In order to obtain
exit permits in one instance, he said, it was necessary for African stu-
dents to threaten a hunger strike.
Another Somali student, referring to the bitter dispute over policies
and methods between Moscow and Peking, said it was obvious to him
that both the Russians and the Chinese coveted the African continent.
The only difference, in his estimation, was that Soviet leaders favored
gradual infiltration while Chinese party officials sought a "big revolu-
tion."
Other African students, in comments about the "hypocrisy" they
observed in China, have noted that Peking,. although claiming to share
in the widespread African opposition to South Africa's system of racial
segregation,'continues to make heavy purchases of that country's agri-
cultural and other products. Peking's imports from South Africa,.in the
first quarter of 1963 alone, amounted to some $6,000,000.
Thirty youths from Cameroon, in West Africa, returned from China
in 1962 with stories remarkably similar to the observations separately
noted by students from the Somali Republic in East Africa. Informal
personal contacts between African and Chinese students were for-
bidden, they said, and Africans were not even allowed _to. patronize
the same shops frequented by non-Africans.
One of these students, Pierre Mouchilu, said "all contact is forbid-
den, not only between African men and Chinese women, but between
Africans and Chinese" generally.
Reactions of this type are by no means confined to students from
Africa. Brazilian journalist Heinrich Harrer Jr., after a 1962 visit to
Peking University, wrote:
"Resented by fellow students, tired of daily lectures on Marxism-
Leninsm, unhappy over unkept promises and eager to get out at the
first opportunity, this was the general feeling which, I found among
South American students."
Rene Goldman, an European youth who studied Chinese language
and history at Peking University from 1953 to 1958, recalls that each
new day began with loud praises of Mao Tse-tung and the Communist
party - boomed from "loudspeakers all over the. campus." At recrea-
tion and meal times, he said, the loudspeakers kept up a constant:din
of mass songs, martial music, speeches and editorials from Commu-
nist newspapers.
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 CIA-RD78-02646R000500180001-3
26
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000500180001-3
"Despite their relatively good living conditions (compared to the
privations endured by Chinese young people), Mr. Goldman wrote in
an article published in the July-September, 1961, issue of The China
Quarterly, "the prevailing mood of the foreign students was not one
of satisfaction. Some reacted by devoting themselves exclusively to
their studies and paying no attention to events in Pei-Ta (as the uni-
versity was called) and in China generally, while many others, includ-
ing the Soviet students, privately expressed bitterness and disappoint-
ment. . . One of the many issues at stake was the complaint by foreign
students of being spied upon."
Several observers, in view of the fact that foreign students return-
ing from China have expressed almost uniform dissatisfaction with the
treatment they received, have raised the question of why African
youths continue to accept Peking's hospitality.
One reason, according to Mahdi Ismail of the Somali Republic, is
that the Communists have an extensive and efficient recruiting organ-
ization. "Throughout the world," he said, "are Communist agents
whose task it is to offer scholarships to suitable youths from develop-
ing countries: Communist embassy attaches, representatives of Com-
munist-front organizations like the International Union of Students, the
World Federation of Democratic Youth, the World Federation of Trade
Unions, and other organizations affiliated with them or sympathetic to
their aims."
The Chinese goal in all this, a number of African students have rea-
soned, is directly related to Peking's continuing overtures to foreign
officials, journalists, teachers, business men and other opinion leaders.
Closer ties with Africa are desired and Peking strategists are confi-
dent that the by-products are certain to include political as well as
economic advantages.
So far, however, the campaign has been somewhat compromised by
the sharp eyes of the students and other visitors who have accepted
Peking's invitations. Even the most carefully managed tours of Com-
munist China's showplaces, plus lavish banquets and parades of smil-
ing citizens, have been unable to conceal evidences of Chinese life
as it really is.
Emmanuel John Hevi, a Ghanaian who now teaches at a college in
Nigeria, was particularly observant during his period as a medical stu-
dent in China during the early 1960's.
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-R '78-02646R000500180001-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-02646R000500180001-3
Among his comments:
"The medical course in the China I know leaves much to be de-
sired. . . The incompetence of Chinese doctors was always a regular
topic of discussion among foreign students. . . Added to my growing
concern over the quality of the instruction at the Peking Medical
School was a certain uneasiness over the fact that Chinese universi-
ties do not grant degrees, only diplomas. . .
"The Chinese have so long posed as defenders of the African and
the persecuted races that it must really come as a shock to many
people to hear that racial discrimination is practiced in China. Chinese
racial discrimination is not of the kind that springs spontaneously from
the people. It is a deliberate attempt by the Communist Party to assert
and make the African accept once and for all the idea of the superior-
ity of Yellow over Black. . .
"A Chinese girl student once said, quite bluntly, that Africa is uni-
versally known as the most backward continent on earth. I come from
this 'primitive backwater' and so far as accommodation for higher as
well as lower institutions of learning is concerned, and in what relates
to personal and general hygiene and the treatment of students as
human beings, it is we Africans who must civilize the Chinese, not
vice versa. . .
"Out of a total of 118 African students who studied in China during
my time, ninety-six had actually left and a further ten had signified
their intention to leave by the time I packed my bags. This means that
approximately 90 percent of the original number have found something
wrong with China - something which made it impossible for them to
stay longer. . .
"In my view, there were two causes of the student exodus: first,
China failed us miserably by not offering a standard and quality of
education acceptable to us. Second, we were disenchanted with so-
cialism when we discovered that the Chinese brand of socialism was
not the material of our dreams - nor the nostrum by which we dreamed
to cure all the ills of Africa. . .
"No matter what the future holds I, for my part, will never regret my
decision that Red China and I must go separate ways."
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RQf878-02646R0005O0180001-3