THE IMPACT OF THE 22ND CPSU CONGRESS ON THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF THE FREE WORLD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-02646R000400330001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 70
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 4, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1962
• Content Type: REPORT

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THE IMPACT OF THE 22ND CPSU CONGRESS ON THE
May 1962
COMMUNIST PARTIES OF THE FREE WORLD
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
I. Introduction 1
1. Problems at the congress 1
2. Problems since the congress 1
3. The impact of the congress 2
4. Summary of positions taken by free world parties 2
5. The structure of the study 4
Problems Confronting the CPSU on the Eve of the
Congress 5
1. Divergences 5
2. Sino -Soviet dispute 5
3. Chinese view on the 1960 declaration 5
4. CPSU draft program 6
5. Soviet-Albanian relations 6
6. Effect on other parties and fronts 7
7. The intolerable situation 7
Impact Sf the Congress on the Free World Delegates 9
1. Unexpected issues 9
2. First reactions of the free world delegations 9
3. France and Italy 10
4. India and Indonesia 10
5. Alignment on Albania 11
6. Alignment on Stalin and the anti-party group 11
7. Reasons for the alignment 12
8. Soviet influence on free world delegates 13
9. Free world parties at the end of the congress 14
IV. Reactions of the Free World Parties After the
Congress
1. Opposition to the CPSU
2. Endorsement of the CPSU
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3.
Agitation in the free world parties
15
4.
Factors in the decisions
16
5.
Three groups
17
6.
Orthodox group
17
7.
The reformers
18
8.
The opposition
20
V.
New Moves by the Main Contenders
22
1.
Soviet actions
22
2.
Albanian actions
23
3.
Chinese actions
24
4.
An inconclusive situation
24
VI.
The Impact of the New Moves on the Free World
Parties
26
1.
Soviet attack on narrow nationalism
26
2.
International unity
26
3.
Italian Communist Party
27
4.
CP of India
29
5.
CP of Indonesia
30
6.
CP of Australia
32
7.
CP of New Zealand
32
8.
French Communist Party
33
9.
CP of Belgium
33
10.
CP of Chile
36
11.
Brazil and Paraguay
38
12.
Soviet and Chinese maneuvers in the fronts
39
13.
The World Peace Movement
40
14.
IUS and WFDY
44
15.
WFTU
45
VII.
Conclusions and Forecast
47
1.
Assessment of Soviet success
47
2.
Impact on the free world parties and fronts
48
3.
Forecast
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The Positions Taken by the Free World
Communist Parties
APPENDIX A:
APPENDIX B:
Questions Raised for the Free World Parties
as a Result of the 22nd CPSU Congress
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3. The impact of the congress. As of mid-March most free
world parties have shown that they know that the CPSU is determined
to have its way. Most of them?including those which were reticent
at the congress and immediately afterwards--had, by mid-February,
made their acceptance of Soviet demands very clear. The Italian
party, after attempting to gain support for a loosening of organi-
zational discipline in the movement under the concept of "polycentrism",
was compelled to retreat, formally at least. Only the Chinese party,
the relatively isolated and immature parties in Southeast Asia that
are dependent upon the Chinese, and the Japanese, Indonesian, and
New Zealand parties were still stubbornly refusing to condemn the
Albanians for their open and continued attack on Khrushchev. On
the other hand, the dissension within many free world CPs,
provoked or revealed after the 22nd congress, was still spreading
and increasing in seriousness as of mid-March. Both left and right
wing factions were under vigorous attack, and it is unlikely that
these internal disputes can be quickly and easily resolved. Friction
between the Italian and French parties was openly expressed, and a
wide divergence, not yet amounting to conflict, developed between the
Australian and New Zealand parties. While an open split in the Com-
munist movement appears hard to avoid, the failure of either the CPSU
or the Chinese party to make any new major move against its main
opponent has kept the international and internal party conflicts from
merging openly into a single struggle. Should an open split take place,
the abandonment of the ambiguities in which many parties and dissidents
have so far couched their statements of position would give a completely
new and bitter tone to existing differences at both the national and
international level. At present one faction in the movement believes
that a Sino-Soviet split would lead to greater unity and efficiency in
the parties that support the CPSU. The other faction still insists that
a Sino-Soviet split cannot be considered as anything other than a major
catastrophe for the world Communist movement. And both factions are
powerful.
4. Summary of positions taken by free world parties. In
Appendix A the positions taken by free world parties at and after the
congress on the question of Soviet policy and on the three critical
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I. Introduction
1. Problems at the congress. The purpose of this paper is
to show how the 22nd congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union in October 1961 affected the Communist parties outside the
bloc. The international Communist movement had serious problems
in policy, coordination, and discipline before the congress opened.
These problems, aggravated by frictions and disagreement between
the Soviets and the Chinese, had resisted solution at the international
conferences held on Soviet initiative in Buaiarest in June 1960 and
in Moscow in November 1960, and were brought to a crisis at the
22nd congress when Khrushchev tried to force the whole movement
to accept his policies and rule. By reviving the campaign against
Stalin, elaborating and extending the charges against the anti-party
group of Molotov, Malenkov, Kanganovich, and others, and attacking
Albania, Khrushchev hoped to destroy resistance to his policies
throughout the movement, including the USSR, and to force the
Communist parties to obey Soviet mandates. Failing this,
Khrushchev intended to isolate and discredit those who opposed
him.
2. Problems since the congress. The Soviet offensive
continued after the congress, and the outcome is not yet determined.
The main foreign opponent, the Communist Party of China, has
refused to surrender or to be provoked into breaking away; a
number of Asian parties have sided with China and Albania in
refusing to accept Soviet dictation; several parties and important
elements within parties have shown resistance to rule by the
CPSU; and a number of developments in the USSR that are hard
to understand suggest that some resistance to Khrushchev continues
to exist within the CPSU bureaucracy, even though it has not been
effective. The main result of the congress was to expose the
weakening of discipline within the movement and the inability of
the CPSU to command unanimous and complete obedience to its
will.
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issues of Albania, Stalin, and China are scored on a scale of plus-
three (full support for the CPSU position) to minus-three (hostility
to the CPSU position). Full support of the CPSU on all four matters
would give a score of +12. The following facts emerge from these
tabulations:
a. The average degree of explicit support the free world
parties gave the CPSU at the congress on the full range of critical
issues was relatively low, amounting to little more than would be
justified if the parties had endorsed only the CPSU Program.
b. In the tallies of positions taken at the congress, the
groups of parties in Europe, Middle East-Africa, and Western
Hemisphere were quite close ( +4.2, +5.5, and +4.9 respectively).
c. The average response of the Far Eastern countries
was distinctly colder (-0.4), as was widely observed in general
terms at the time of the congress; it became even colder afterwards.
d. The most pro-Soviet free world delegations at the
congress itself were the following:
Europe. Cyprus, Finland, France, Greece, Italy,
Sweden, Turkey.
Middle East-Africa. Ceylon, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon,
Morocco, Reunion, Sudan, Tunisia.
Western Hemisphere. Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Cuba, Nicaragua, Panama, Uruguay, U. S., Venezuela.
e. The parties outside the Far East shifted markedly in
favor of the CPSU after the congress; scoring averages are:
Europe +8.9, Middle East-Africa +9.5, Western Hemisphere +8.8.
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5. The structure of the study. The following sections show
what the problems were on the eve of the congress that impelled the
CPSU to decide on a show-down, how the show--down developed, and
what the impact was on the free world delegates and their parties.
There follows an analysis of the reactions of the free world parties
after the congress, the new actions of the CPSLI, the Chinese, and
the Albanians, and the impact of these new actiOns on the free world
parties. The final section summarizes the impact of the congress
and assesses the evolving and unresolved problems. In the first
appendix the positions of the free world parties at and after the
congress are rated and the impact of the congress upon them is
noted. A second appendix outlines the most troublesome and
ernbarassing questions that have arisen within the Communist parties
as a result of the open denunciation of Stalin, the attack upon Albania,
and the open opposition of the Chinese to these actions.
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Chinese were nevertheless pleased with some of the results of the
conference. They had made the CPSU accept, for the sake of an
appearance of unity, modifications in the declaration, which, as
the Chinese exploited them, endangered the credibility and effective-
ness of the Soviet propositions. They had also defeated a major
Soviet effort to include in the declaration passages that condemned
factionalism and nationalism within the international Communist
movement and that would have established the principle of majority
rule at international party conferences. The weakness of the
endorsement in the declaration of CPSU congresses was also a
result of resistance by the Chinese, who had held that the congresses
of the CPSU were not binding on other parties. The general attitude
of the Chinese toward the Moscow declaration of 1960 was that it
gave them enough leeway to take positions consistent with their
own concept of strategy and that it set a bench-mark for future
struggle with the CPSU.
4. CPSU draft program. Although the open Sino-Soviet
polemics of 1960 had not been repeated during 1961, there was ample
evidence that disagreement continued behind the scenes. One
evidence is the treatment of the main Soviet document of the year--
the draft program for the 22nd congress. It was published in
China--but virtually without authoritative comment?and on China's
national day, just before the 22nd congress opened, a speech by the
Soviet agitprop chief Konstantinov was edited by the Chinese news
service to delete all references to the program and to Soviet aid.
5. Soviet-Albanian relations. Soviet relations with Albania,
on the other hand, publicly deteriorated after the November 1960
conference. At the conference, Hoxha had violently assailed
Khrushchev personally, as well as particular Soviet policies and
practices, and had declared solidarity with China in the international
dispute. The deterioration after the conference was manifest in
the Soviet treatment of the Albanian party congress in February 1961,
in Albania's absence from various CEMA meetings, in Hoxha's
absence from the meeting of the Warsaw Pact first secretaries
in August, in the return from the USSR of Albanian students in May,
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II. Problems Confronting the CPSU on the Eve of the Congress
1. Divergences. When the 22nd congress opened on
17 October 1961, the Soviet leaders were faced with continuing
divergence within the international Communist movement over
the question of strategy and policies and with a breakdown of their
ability to control the movement. The disagreement with China
was not resolved. Relations with Albania had deteriorated badly.
Some parties shared the views of the Chinese and the Albanians.
And important elements within parties and the international fronts
had begun to lack confidence not only in the: doctrinal line of the
CPSU but also in its leadership.
Z. Sino-Soviet dispute. The Sino-Soviet dispute stemmed
from basic disagreement over economic policy within the Com-
munist bloc and over foreign policy, as well as from Chinese
resistance to CPSU claims of dominance and to the methods used
to enforce these claims. It had not been resolved by the declara-
tion issued at the November 1960 conference of 81 parties. After
November 1960 the Chinese still labelled, as an abandonment of
Leninism and of principle, the Soviet-props ed principle of
peaceful coexistence, with its emphasis on economic competition
with the free world powers, the need to make Communism
attractive as a political system, and the need to eschew war as
an instrument of Communist international policy. They continued
to treat peaceful coexistence as a temporary thing, and they held
that all policies adopted by the CPSU should be consistent with
this attitude: anything else would strengthen the enemy, weaken
the positions of the bloc, and demoralize the Communist move-
ment. The Chinese also resisted Soviet efforts to dictate policy,
and they resisted the economic and other pressures that the
Soviets exerted upon them to this end.
3. Chinese view on the 1960 declaration. Although official
Chinese documents after the 1960 conference acknowledged the
failure of the conference to resolve policy differences, the
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in the withdrawal of Soviet submarines from Albania in June, and in
Albania's cold reaction to the CPSU draft program in August. The
two parties exchanged recriminatory letters during the year, showing
that relations had worsened immediately after the November 1960
conference, and that on the eve of the 22nd congress they were near
the breaking point.
6. Effect on other parties and fronts. It was clear by mid-1961
that a number of parties--including the important ones of North
Korea, North Vietnam, Indonesia, Italy, and Poland--shared, for
reasons of their own, one or more of the attitudes of criticism
that the Chinese and Albanians had expressed. Lack of confidence
in the CPSU was widespread. During 1961 other parties, long
accustomed to accepting Soviet decisions, were concerned over the
unity of the movement, were questioning the ability of the Soviets
to exert effective and firm control, and were losing confidence in
the determination of the Soviets to enforce their decisions. Even
staunch supporters of the post-Stalin strategy were disturbed by
what they considered to be dangerous Soviet concessions in the
language of the November 1960 declaration to the views of the
Chinese-led opposition. Right-wing divergences were apparent
within several parties (particularly in the Indian and Italian parties)
and the World Peace Council and the World Federation of Trade
Unions; left-wing elements were causing considerable trouble in
Brazil; and the Japanese party was plagued by dissension on both
the left and the right.
7. The intolerable situation. After the 81-party conference
of November 1960, statements and domestic policies of the Chinese
party emphasized the existence of complete party unity. Whatever
the reasons for such moves, they probably included the belief of the
Chinese that they had nothing to fear from factionalism within their
party and that it would be useful to exhibit this confidence. The
Albanian leaders also, through their defiance of the CPSU, won
a personal popularity at home they had never enjoyed before.
In propaganda addressed to other parties both parties fully ex-
ploited the concessions they had won from the CPSU in the
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language of the November declaration, in particular linking the
declaration with their unreserved endorsement of Soviet policy on
nuclear testing and on the German issue. In the Soviet view, to
continue to tolerate such behavior and these explanations of bloc
policies would inevitably be interpreted, both inside and outside of
the movement, as tacit Soviet agreement with them. And such an
interpretation of their views, the Soviets must have felt, threatened
to compromise--perhaps fatally--the very prertiises upon which
their moves were based and to reduce the CPSIT to the position of
a mere first among equals in the movement.
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III. Impact of the Congress on the Free World Delegates
1. Unexpected issues. The delegates from the free world has
been led to expect that the congress would focus on the new party
program and statutes, but Khrushchev injected the three unexpected
issues of Stalin, the anti-party group, and Albania. Except for a
brief reference to Kaganovich as an opponent of the modernization
of Soviet railroads, there was no hint, through the first three-
fourths of Khrushchev's report for the Central Committee on
17 October, that these issues would be raised in any exceptional
way. Whatever other reasons Khrushchev may have had for re-
opening the attack on Stalin's political mistakes and crimes, it is
clear from the Central Committee report that he used the attack to
justify and reaffirm the strategy and policies of the 20th CPSU
congress in 1956, to discredit the positions taken by the anti-party
group and Albania, and to degrade their motives. Without naming
the Chinese, Khrushchev's report extended the political criticism
of the Albanian leaders to "anyone else" who opposed the line of
the 20th congress. Later Soviet speakers, and Khrushchev himself
in his speech of 27 October, developed this further by elaborating
the criminal charges against the anti-party group and the Stalinist
viciousness of the Albanian regime, and by coupling the elaboration
with further attacks on the policy positions held by the group and
the Albanian leaders.
2. First reactions of the free world delegations. The free world
delegates were not prepared for these actions by Khrushchev. They
knew that the problems between the Soviets and the Chinese had not
been resolved, and there had been public evidence of continuing
strain in Soviet relations with Albania. They expected an international
conference to be held after the Soviet party congress and probably
anticipated that these matters would be brought up then. Their first
responses showed that they had not been prepared for the airing of
these matters at the congress itself. They could also see that the
congress was not going smoothly. Voroshilov, whom Khrushchev's
political report included for the first time in a listing of the members
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of the anti-party group, was sitting in the congress presidium
visibly shaken. The proceedings, which had been open to the non-
Communist press for the first two days, were thereafter closed.
The delegates from outside the bloc could see that the Chinese
were cold to the Central Committee report when Chou En-lai was
the only one not to rise in applause; and, on 19 October, when Chou
criticized the open attack upon Albania, they knew that the Chinese
had determined not to be cowed by the CPSU or '6tampeded into
support of the CPSU's actions. Further evidence of Chinese
opposition was offered on 21 October when Chou -laid on the mausoleum
a wreath dedicated to Stalin "the great Marxist-Leninist."
3. France and Italy. The first two speeches by free world
delegates--Thorez of France and Togliatti of Italy?showed divergent
emphasis even in their support of the CPSU. Thorez endorsed fully
the Soviet line on Stalin, the anti-party group, and Albania, and the
current Soviet policies on Germany and nuclear testing; he also
reaffirmed the vanguard role of the CPSU. He based his criticism
of Albania on the opposition of the Albanian leaders to Soviet strategy.
Togliatti, on the other hand, criticized the Albanian leaders mainly
for rejecting the rules of democratic centralism' and for their "in-
admissible internal regime. " Unlike Thorez, he said nothing' about
the anti-party group, and concentrated more on purely Italian political
matters and more on approval of the strategy for the movement than
on individual Soviet foreign policies. Togliatti, in recalling that the
Italian party had openly criticized the Albanians long before the 22nd
congress had laid out a line on them, and by his treatment of the
fundamental significance of the 20th congress, implied that he gave
his support to the CPSU voluntarily and on the basis of equality with
the CPSU. The support Thorez gave was more Orthodox and more
in tune with Soviet desires.
4. India and Indonesia. On the next day, 21 October, further
divergence from the CPSU positions was expressed. Ajoh Ghosh of
India, while in full support of the line of the 20th congress, failed
to take an explicit position on the critical issues raised at the present
congress. Aidit of Indonesia actually attacked the Soviet actions,
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although the Soviets edited this out of his published speech.
Divergence occurred also in the speeches of the leaders of some
of the bloc countries, for Kim 11-song of North Korea and Ho Chi
Minh of North Vietnam failed to line up with the other bloc speakers
in support of the controversial Soviet actions. In addition to these
indications that the congress was not going the way the CPSU wanted,
Chou En-lai left Moscow for home on 23 October, ostensibly "in
connection with the coming session of the All-China Assembly of
People's Representatives"--an event which, according to an
announcement in late December, would not take place until
March 1962. P'eng Chen was designated acting head of the Chinese
delegation, and Chou never returned to relieve him.
5. Alignment on Albania. Of the eighty fraternal parties that
Khrushchev said were represented at the congress, two were not
publicly identified. Of the remaining seventy-eight parties, no
publicity was given to the positions taken by three if, indeed, they
took positions at all: Guatemala, Paraguay, and Luxembourg. On
the basis of the published texts of speeches made or messages
delivered, the line-up of the other seventy-five parties was as
follows: open opposition to the Soviet censure, one (China);
explicit support of censure, forty-seven (bloc, seven; free world,
forty); no direct reference to Albania, twenty-seven (bloc, two;
free world, twenty-five). The twenty-seven parties that failed to
censure Albania explicitly were North Korea and North Vietnam;
Algeria, Australia, Belgium, Burma, Canada, Denmark, Dominican
Republic, Guadeloupe, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia,
Northern Ireland, Irish Republic, Japan, Malaya, Martinique,
New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand,
South Africa, and the United Kingdom.
6. Alignment on Stalin and the anti-party group. On the issues
of Stalin and the anti-party group, the bloc parties divided as they
did on the Albanian issue. China, North Korea, and North Vietnam
failed to mention either the cult of personality or the anti-party
group. The other bloc parties endorsed the Soviet positions. Only
three free world parties, Denmark, France, and Iraq, explicitly
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endorsed the Soviet attacks on both Stalin and tlile anti-party group.
Another sixteen parties referred to the cult of Stalin directly and
many more, by eulogizing the 20th congress, implicitly supported
the Soviets. No free world delegate endorsed the attack on the anti-
party group by itself. Three parties that had refrained from com-
mitment on the Albanian question took pro-Soviet positions on
Stalin: Denmark, Sweden, and South Africa. I-lagberg of Sweden
was especially effusive in praise of Khrushchev for attacking
Stalinism.
7. Reasons for the alignments. The wide range of the
responses of the free world delegates at the congress on the three
critical issues resulted from diversity in motives. The attitudes
of some of the Asian parties--Indonesia, Burma, Malaya, Thailand,
and, to a lesser extent, Japan--can be attributed to ties with the
Chinese as well as to sympathy for the Chinese-Albanian position
on how Communist parties can win state power.- The reservations
of the New Zealand delegation may also have been a result of agree-
ment with Chinese attitudes--a closeness that has grown in the
past few years. The Indian party delegation, div. ided between
leftists and rightists, probably could not agree tipon a firm stand
on the critical issues, though Ghosh managed to convey fundamental
support for the Soviets. The reserved position 0.ken by the British
delegation is hard to explain, but, as later developments suggest,
may have been inspired by distaste for the methods used by the
Soviets to force a show-down or by anxiety for te unity of the move-
ment. The Canadian delegate, Tim Buck, who did not commit
himself on the critical issues at the congress, \leas strong in his
praise of Khrushchev personally and enthusiastic about the CPSU.
Some of the basically pro-Soviet delegations that failed to take a
stand on the critical issues may have felt that the mandates from
their parties did not extend far enough; others rriay have feared
resistance in their parties. Some may have failed even to realize
that a commitment was demanded by the CPSU. One Western
delegation, in what may or may not have been a post facto
rationalization of its silence on Albania, took th4 position that having
been burned before (on the Yugoslav case), it would not commit
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itself until it had had a documented case furnished by Soviet
officials. Of the free world parties, the French showed up as
the most completely loyal to the CPSU.
8. Soviet influence on free world delegates. The CPSU tried
to influence the free world delegates in several ways--by the way
the Soviet speakers developed the issues, by parliamentary devices,
and by direct persuasion. The Soviets managed to link opposition
to Khrushchev's strategy and policies to the complicity of the
anti-party group in the crimes of the Stalin era, and the use of
this argument culminated, on 27 October, in Khrushchev's call
for the overthrow of the Albanian leaders and his rebuke of the
Chinese for siding with them. The moral and political pressure
of this argument on the free world delegates must have been very
strong. In addition, the Soviets manipulated the order of speakers
from the free world parties in an effort to overcome the set-back
given them by the Korean, Vietnamese, and Indonesian delegates
on the 21st. A group of reliable delegates (U.S., West German,
and Spanish) was moved up on the schedule as the Soviets apparently
tried to create a band-wagon in their favor. Soviet functionaries
talked to free world delegates and there is circumstantial evidence,
in the messages of the Haitian and Nicaraguan parties, that some
of these delegates were persuaded to give explicit support to the
CPSU on the Albanian question. These messages to the congress,
although they were ostensibly signed before the congress opened,
included condemnation of the Albanian leaders. Because there is
no reason to believe that these parties knew in advance of the
attack on Albania, the messages therefore look anachronistic.
A similar case, though not quite so glaring, is the message of
greetings signed by the General Secretary of the San Marino
party, who was present at the congress: it condemns Albania.
Soviet pressure on the free world delegates continued after the
congress. Tim Buck, for example, who had refused to commit
himself at the congress but who stayed on in the USSR for nearly
two weeks after the congress ended, finally published an article
in Pravda on 18 November strongly condemning the Albanian
leaders for "senseless adventurism" which could end in putting
Albania "outside the camp."
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9. Free world parties at the end of the congress. By the end
of the congress on 31 October it was clear to the free world delegates
that the CPSU had failed to coerce the Chinese or to force them into
an open break with the CPSU, for which they would have to bear
the onus. It was also clear that the Soviets were prepared to go far
to achieve their ends and to force a show-down With the Chinese.
Confusion over the meaning of the actions againtt Stalin and the
anti-party group was cleared up, and the Soviet,decisions on these
questions were made practically irreversible. The free world
delegates were put into the position of knowing they could no longer
avoid taking sides. The Chinese and their allieis could hope that
unitary forces within the bloc might deter Moscow, but they could
have little confidence in this. They could do little but uphold their
positions and try, within the movement, to encoiirage resistance to
the Soviet methods of didation. The Albanians liad begun an open
counter-attack on the CPSU even before the congress closed, and
this could only create new problems for the free world parties. The
delegates were faced on their return home with the problems of
justifying their commitments (or failure to commit) before their
own parties, getting endorsements, controlling ferment and defeating
factionalism, riding out the attacks of enemies and rivals launched
on the basis of the revelations at the congress, and, in some
countries, adjusting party policies and leadership to the new demands
of Soviet strategy and policies.
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IV. Reactions of the Free World Parties after the Congress
1. Opposition to the CPSU. After the congress many of the
free world parties took formal action to ratify the positions taken
by their delegations, to clarify their positions on the critical
issues, and to set the stage for further discussion within the party.
The parties that had most distinctly taken exception to the Soviet
line at the congress (Burma, Malaya, Thailand, Indonesia)
demonstrated their continued sympathy for Albania by sending
laudatory messages in November and their opposition to de-
Stalinization by making favorable references to Stalin.
2. Endorsement of the CPSU. Most of the hold-out parties
endorsed the Soviet actions on Albania, particularly after Hoxha
launched his counter-attack. These included the following parties:
Algeria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Guatemala,
Martinique, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, South Africa, and the
United Kingdom. There were, however, significant shadings in
these responses, ranging from obvious reservations on the part
of the British party to vigorous support of the CPSU by the head
of the Guatemalan party.
3. Agitation in the free world parties. Many parties published
statements acknowledging the disquieting effects of the congress on
cadres and party ranks. In parties that formally endorsed the
actions of the congress, members bitterly criticized Khrushchev
in private, going so far as to call him an enemy agent. Some
members attacked their leaders for past complicity with the Soviets
in promoting Stalinism and for establishing their own cults. Some
Communists declared that their faith still lay with Stalin, while
others acknowledged the difficulty of reconciling the anti-Stalin
line with their own statements praising him in the past. The
decision to remove Stalin's corpse from the mausoleum was
criticized, but it was rationalized either as a necessary consequence
of the public revelation of crimes committed in the past or as a
logically necessary symbol of the complete break with the past.
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Some Western Communists expressed repugnance for mummifi-
cation as such, likening Lenin to an Egyptian pharaoh. The de-
nunciation of Voroshilov was criticized as dangerous and unnecessary.
The decision to change the name of Stalingrad was even more widely
and openly criticized. In Italy a vigorous and remarkably unrestrained
debate took place, with strong and public demands by younger leaders
(Amend?la and others) for more democracy within the party (including
the right to register dissent from decisions), for the autonomy of
parties within the movement and the right of parties to dissent from
Soviet positions, a n d for the completion of de-Stalinization in the
USSR. In other parties the debate was generally more tightly
controlled and kept out of the press, but similar sentiments were
expressed privately and it was obvious that the congress had raised
more questions than answers and that these questions could not
easily be turned aside by Soviet fiat as in 1956. A compilation of
questions being asked most frequently inside the parties is attached
as Appendix B.
4. Factors in the decisions. On the critical issues the range
of reaction by party leaders was extremely broad, with all kinds
of overlappings, shadings, and convergences and divergences, and
for different reasons. The reactions were conditioned by the local
political concerns of the parties, by their dependence upon or ties
with Moscow or Peking, by the personality of individual leaders,
and by the political maturity of the rank-and-file followers. In
virtually every instance there is evidence that the reactions of
the leaders were also influenced by the following more general
factors.
a. The Soviet general line and current policies (e.g.,
Berlin, nuclear testing).
b. The reassertion of Soviet hegemony and the implications
of this for the future rights of individual parties.
c. The revelation of crimes, intrigues and pressure
techniques.
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d. The need for unity in the international Communist
movement and the consequences of a split in the bloc.
5. Three groups. In taking positions on the issues, the leaders
of the free world parties have fallen generally into three main groups.
One group supports the CPSU completely and in orthodox terms;
another supports the CPSU, but less mechanically, and only at the
price of asserting a claim to independence and equality; the third
group basically objects to the Soviet actions at the congress on the
issues but endorses one or more of the particular features of the
resolutions and actions of the congress.
6. Orthodox group. The leaders in the orthodox group, rep-
resented by Thorez of France and De Groot of Holland, publicly
endorse the CPSU, criticize the Chinese for giving aid to the
Albanian leaders, and want the impact of the congress to be con-
tained within limits that will leave the CPSU's authority intact. In
contrast to their foot-dragging resistance in 1956, they now appear
convinced that it is the CPSU rather than they who set the inter-
national line and define its limits, while they themselves must
discover how to respond to this fact of party life at the least
possible cost to themselves and their party. In these instances
the authority of the CPSU has been enhanced, even as it has been in
most of the European satellite states. But this public position does
not necessarily correspond with private convictions.
a. De Groot, in particular, privately despises Khrushchev
and is infuriated by Khrushchev's methods. The educational campaign
demanded of the French and Dutch parties was carried on, but it
was marked by an effort to limit debate and to get the official Soviet
explanations of the congress accepted.
b. Thorez, in presenting his case to the French Central
Committee, asserted that only one person in the leadership had
opposed the open censure of Albania and the revival of the Stalin
and anti-party group issues, but this assertion of the absence of
a dogmatic left opposition--probably false--appears intended to
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obscure the fact that there is resistance to Thorez's reestablish-
ment of his own authority by conforming to the CPSU's demands.
The orthodox position of Thorez and his distrust of his right-wing
opponents were also expressed in his criticism of autonomist
sentiments in the Italian party and of a call by the Italian Communist
youth organization for a more objective analysis of Soviet history,
even of Trotsky's contribution to the revolution.E The concern of
Thorez lest such unorthodox ideas achieve somd respectability in
the party in Italy and stimulate revisionism in Prance and other
West European parties led him to misrepresent the Italian views
as calls for regionalism inspired by nationalist tendencies and
as Trotskyite demands for the political rehabilitation of Trotsky.
To prevent the French party from being infected, the leaders saw
to it that the debate in Italy was kept out of the V_'rench Communist
press.
c. The position of this orthodox group :does not necessarily
represent confidence in the long-range goals of peaceful coexistence
as a strategy; the French party, for one, has never been noted
for enthusiasm for the tactical flexibility which Could make such
a strategy effective. Thorez and company are convinced that
complete loyalty to the CPSU is necessary for their own futures
and the fortunes of their parties, and that they must make a genuine
effort to support Soviet foreign policy initiatives in return for Soviet
approval of their leadership.
7. The reformers. The second group of leaders, represented
by Togliatti and others in the Italian party and by the leadership of
the Belgian party, wants in one way or another to complete the
de-Stalinization process throughout the movement so that their
parties may convincingly present themselves as respectable,
patriotic, and democratic. As the debate in the Italian party showed,
there are complex shadings of attitude and of approach to this
problem. These range from a militant workers left, with ties with
the Trotskyites and concerned with attracting youth, particularly
working class youth, to join the Communist party and its mass
pressure campaigns, to a nearly revisionist current on the right,
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more concerned with gaining acceptance by the conservative
Socialist and even non-Socialist masses. Togliatti stands some-
where in between.
a. Concerned both with the credibility and the inter-
national unity of the Communist movement, Togliatti wants the
CPSU to push the examination of the rise of Stalinism back
farther in time than the Soviets themselves want to, but he has
tried to restrain those on both extremes of the party so as to
establish a position that is generally acceptable to the CPSU and
tolerable to other Communist parties as well.
b. In the course of the Italian debate some leaders of
the reformers objected to the methods that Khrushchev had used
against the anti-party group. The proposition of 1956--that
Stalinism represented a degeneration of the Soviet system--was
revived. Some speakers suggested that the steps taken by the
CPSU to reestablish democracy are not adequate and that some
method must be found for "alternations in the leadership in a
normal and dialectical way." Some called for the establishment
of minority rights within the party, without, however, the formation
of organized factions.
c. A strong appeal was made for polycentrism in the
international movement. This, Togliatti asserted later in refuting
Thorez, means more autonomy for the parties and international
mass organizations, and not the establishment of regional groupings
of parties. One leader related this question to Albania by suggesting
that the use of "moral and material coercion" was no longer per-
missible. Another, the leader of the "renovationists, "* Amendola,
The "ren.ovationists" are most concerned with reforming the
Party's methods of handling internal problems. They want
more democratic freedom within the party and fresh flexible
policies. They think that this would help to weaken anti-
communism and give them a big political boost. They are,
of course, opposed by the conservative bureaucracy, and
their ideas go beyond those of the center, represented by
Togliatti in the Italian CP.
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criticized the existing methods of international coordination by means
of bilateral meetings, secret polemics, summit meetings, and
conferences and pointed to the "fictitious unanimity" of the 1957 and
1960 Moscow declarations.
d. In the formal communique of the PCI Secretariat on
the 22nd congress--a document attributed primarily to Togliatti--
mild versions of the renovationist arguments were incorporated,
along with full support of the congress actions On the critical
issues. Indirectly expressed Soviet exceptions'to Italian ideas,
such as the editing out of renovationist portions of PCI statements
republished in Moscow and statements in the Soviet press rebuking
unnamed Communists for suggesting that the Soviet system had
degenerated, appear not to have seriously constrained the party
leaders.
8. The opposition. The third group of free world party leaders,
represented by Aidit of Indonesia and the leader's of the parties in
Iceland, Malaya, Burma, Thailand, New Zealand, and, to a lesser
extent, Japan and Australia, disagrees with one aspect or another
of Soviet policy and resists the efforts by the CPSU to impose its
will upon other parties. In the latter respect, they join hands with
those Italians who call for autonomy. In stressing unity at all
costs, they resemble Thorez, but they believe that the CPSU should
make concessions in policy to the Chinese and that the CPSU has
no right to make policy without regard for their town positions.
a. The Australian, New Zealand, Indohesian, Burmese,
Thai, and Malayan parties sent greetings to Albknia in November
(as did the Belgian party, whose message was, however, quite
different in character). The shadings in these messages show
that the Malayan, the Thai, and especially the Burmese, parties are
closer to the Albanians and Chinese than the others are, at least
in public. The Australian party eventually became critical of
the Albanian leaders in late December after Hoxh.a s speech de-
nouncing the "Kh.rushchev group."
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b. Aidit, who had strongly criticized the Soviet actions
at the congress itself, issued a statement on 27 November, after
returning from Peking, amplifying his position. He made these
points: the Indonesian delegation had not known that Albania would
be criticized at the congress; denunciation of a party at the congress
of another party is wrong; differences should be settled by con-
ferences and negotiations; the CPSU has a right to do what it pleases
about Stalin and the anti-party group, but it cannot make other
parties endorse such actions; and the Indonesian party continues
to value Stalin and his speeches and writings on revolution in the
East.
c. Even more strongly pro-Stalin views have been publicly
expressed by individuals and lower party organizations in India,
while in Burma,a Communist youth organization wanted to hang
Khrushchev in effigy. This youth group consists mainly of dissident
Red Flag Communists, but also includes persons associated with
the orthodox BCP and its fronts.
d. The leaders of the Japanese party, while avoiding
direct controversy, have indicated that they, too, object to the
Soviet handling of the Albanian question. The dissident Kasuga
group has assailed the JCP as pro-Chinese in its basic policies,
claiming that their own views were more consistent with those of
the CPSU.
e. All these parties--even when they criticize Albania,
as the Australian party has done--call for settlement of disputes
in accordance with the terms of the 1960 Moscow declaration, and
the New Zealand party has published views close to those of Aidit
in criticism of the CPSU (see below, page 32).
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V. New Moves by the Main Contenders
1. Soviet actions. Between the end of the congress and mid-
March 1962, a series of moves by the CPSU, the Albanian CP,
and the Chinese CP introduced new problems and considerations
into the dispute over the CPSU's authority. These developments
had an impact of their own on the free world patties. The most
important Soviet moves were the following:
a. Recalling the Soviet diplomatic staff from Albania
and inspiring other European bloc states to reduce their links to
a minimum. According to the Albanians, this move was initiated
by the USSR on 25 November. Apparently trying again to put on
the Albanians the onus for the break, the USSR Asserted that it
took action on 3 December; among other reasons, it referred to the
Albanians' hostile act of distributing documents to diplomatic offices
in Moscow on 25 November. The documents were the Albanian
party's Central Committee resolution of 20 October and Hoxha's
7 November speech.
b. Injecting the attack on Albania into the activities of?the
international Communist fronts. This was done directly through
the secretariats of the World Federation of Democratic Youth and
the International Union of Students, and indirectly with the World
Federation of Trade Unions and the World Peace Council, where
free world spokesmen publicly criticized the Albanians for positions
they had taken at important meetings convened in December.
c. Beginning, in February, broadcasts in Mandarin to
China, which comprehensively attacked Albanian (and unspecifically,
Chinese) positions; and by continuing to publish in Soviet journals
articles asserting the justice of the congress actions and the
fallaciousness of contrary attitudes. In such articles, and in
Soviet press releases, an effort was made to show that other Com-
munist parties were vigorously supporting the CPSU. In the
January 1962 issue of the international Communi4 monthly,
Problems of Peace and Socialism, the logical culmination of this
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particular campaign was reached in the assertion that the 22nd
congress "to all intents and purposes was an international assembly
of Communists" and, by implication, equal in status to the 1960
Moscow conference.
d. Calling upon a number of free world parties to send
letters to the Chinese party criticizing Chinese attempts to exert
pressure on party delegates at international front meetings.
Z. Albanian actions. The Albanian party responded to the
severance of diplomatic relations by the following:
a. Explicitly and publicly attacking the "Kh.rushchev
group" for aiding the enemy by trying to split the Communist
movement.
b. Publicizing details concerning covert Soviet acts to
control, subvert, and coerce Albanian nationals and the Albanian
government. These exposures went beyond the revelations and
charges embodied in Hoxha's 7 November speech, and were
presented as direct refutations of specific Soviet statements and
accusations, including speeches delivered at the 22nd CPSU
congress.
c. Circulating in foreign languages a resolution of
3 August 1961 which took an extreme position on the Berlin dead-
line--"even at the risk of war", according to an article in the
Brazilian Communist weekly Novos Rumos of 9-15 February.
d. Publishing, and broadcasting in foreign languages,
a long editorial in the party newspaper, Zen i i Popullit, in early
January which summarized the Albanian case against the CPSU,
and against Khrushchev in particular, and refuted the latest
Soviet charges. It explicitly linked the efforts of the CPSU to
subject the Albanian party to the CPSU's overall effort to assert
its hegemony within the entire Communist movement while
divesting itself of all responsibility for the actions of other parties
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and for the consequences of such actions. This article is as
broad, detailed, and vigorous an attack as anything the Chinese CP
has ever levelled against the CPSU in its interparty letters or in
speeches by Chinese delegates to the Bucharest and Moscow conference
of 1960. But it goes far beyond the Chinese by making the charges
publicly.
3. Chinese actions. The Chinese reacted to the Soviet diplomatic
moves against Albania by further strengthening their economic ties
with Albania, particularly by creating a jointly owned shipping con-
cern. It is also rumored--so far without direct 'confirmation?that
the Chinese issued a new interparty letter late iri 1961 demanding
the convening of a new conference of all Communist parties, in-
cluding the Albanians. In spite of the lack of confirmation, such
a move by the Chinese is considered likely to haVe occurred. A
reliable source states that the Chinese are determined to have an
interparty conference convened eventually and tol insist that the
Albanian party be permitted to participate fully ih the conference.
Chinese spokesmen in the international fronts again took the lead in
an open defiance and criticism of the Soviet general strategy and its
premises, particularly in the peace movement. But by mid-March
the CP China had not made any overt official staAement endorsing
the Albanian charges or validating, as party views, the views ex-
pressed by Chinese spokesmen in the fronts. For the Chinese, the
unity of November 1961 had been replaced by a second round of
struggle, like that which they began with the publication of "Long Live
Leninism" in April 1960 and their attack at the WFTU Conference.
4. An inconclusive situation. Despite such maneuvers, it was
apparent by mid-March that neither side was prepared to make the
move that would force a decisive show-down leading to capitulation,
to mutual, real concessions, or to a break. The Albanians were not
yet completely out of the bloc--even the Soviet-dominated sector of
the bloc--but were being squeezed onto the periphery. They complained
bitterly about being excluded from the Warsaw Pact conference that
ended on 1 February and on the 9th expelled the Warsaw Pact rep-
resentative from Tirana, but the Albanian Ambassador was still on
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duty in Sofia, trade and barter agreements were concluded with China,
North Korea, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria, and the Chinese con-
tinued to refer to the "12" countries of the bloc. Khrushchev made
scathing remarks about "foreign critics" of the CPSU program at the
CPSU Central Committee plenum on 5 March, but the plenum closed
without any decisive open move in the dispute. The Chinese post-
poned the National Peoples' Congress till mid-April and, though
Peking Radio had begun Russian-language broadcasts on 25 February,
these programs had refrained from entering into the dispute. The
situation was still fluid, as of the middle of March.
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VI. The Impact of the New Moves on the Free World Parties
1. Soviet attack on narrow nationalism. In the post-congress
period the main thrust of the CPSU's effort to reestablish its
authority was extended from the attack on Albania to a general
attack on "narrow nationalism" as the source of resistance to
Soviet policy inside the international Communist movement and of
the threat to the successful carrying out of Soviet strategy. Some
developments in the response and attitudes of free world parties
can be attributed to this extension. Other developments (Belgium)
came as a result of the party's effort to deepen the effects of the
congress internally and thereby, to extract from them greater local
political utility.
Z. International unity. As it appeared to the free world parties
increasingly possible that Albania would eventually be expelled from
the socialist bloc or that a schism would occur in the international
Communist movement, many of them by late December and during
January-March became occupied with the question of international
unity.
a. The Italians, in the interest of unity, muted their
own debate, made conciliatory moves toward the French party,
and tried to shift the party's attention to local political tasks; but
they persisted in defending the principle of CP autonomy, thus
making themselves vulnerable to the charge of narrow nationalism.
They did retreat, however, from their polycentric views.
b. In India and Indonesia, the parties in mid-December
moved to organize systematic discussion of the hasic issues, with
the Indian leader promoting a pro-Soviet line and the Indonesians
R
a pro-Chinese line. In both parties there was resistance to the
leadership's efforts.
c. The French party, closely following the CPSU, built
up its attack on the Chinese-Albanian dissidents. It played an
important part in Soviet maneuvers in the international fronts.
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results of the 22nd congress and issued a statement that emphasized
the importance and conclusiveness of the CPSU's program, statute
revisions, and resolutions. It approved the communique issued in
November by its secretariat, but it failed to repeat the demands for
further democratization and public correction of historic records
addressed to the CPSU in the November statement. Only Rino Serri,
head of the Communist Youth Federation, addressing the federation's
Central Committee on 22 December, persisted in the earlier pattern.
As Togliatti had done earlier, Serri rejected Thorez's criticisms
of alleged Trotskyite influence in the Italian party, and he supported
the condemnation of the Albanian party leaders for their anti-
democratic and repressive methods of domestic control; but he went
on to demand that the CPSU's dispute with Albania be taken up in an
interparty conference that should convene not merely to condemn
the Albanians but to examine the substance of the charges and counter-
charges that had been aired in the dispute. Echoing the earlier
secretariat statement, Serri rejected the existence of a guide party
or state, rejected undocumented condemnation of nationalism, and
asserted that international decisions must be made by unanimous
agreement even if this meant that agreement would be limited to
partial conclusions.
b. On 15 January 1962, the PCI published for party members
a pamphlet of four documents relating to the November 1960 Moscow
Conference: a memorandum of the Italian delegation to the preparatory
commission for the conference, the two speeches of Longo at the
conference, and a letter from the delegation to Khrushchev and the
CPSU delegation. Very critical of the Chinese and Albanians and in
full support of Soviet positions, these documents serve to put the
PCI on record as having voluntarily adopted the positions it has
expressed publ i c ly since the 22nd congress at an international
conference. This justifies the party's attitude toward the 22nd
congress and makes it clear that this attitude had not been formed as
a result of any kind of pressure or the need to support a Soviet
fait accompli. For the record, Longo, in his first speech at the
1960 conference, had challenged the Chinese for maintaining an
attitude of exceptionalism toward the conference declaration draft
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d. In Belgium, an exhaustive discussion was opened in the
party newspaper for the purpose of "renoviition" of internal party
procedures, and for a "regeneration" of it political line to suit new
conditions. This resulted in the public expression of dissent by one
party leader and in his being formally criticized by the politbureau
for holding pro-Chinese views.
e. In some Latin American parties--notably the Chilean
party, whOse attitude in most issues was like that of the French
party--loyalty to the CPSU was made the okrerriding consideration.
f. The pro-Soviet parties and factions advanced the
argument that even the possibility of a split in the movement had to
be considered with equanimity, since it would lead to more effective
unity in the Soviet-led group of parties. The pro-Chinese parties
and factions, appealing to the underdeveloped world, emphasized
that toleration or promotion of a split was unthinkable because it
would weaken the anti-imperialist struggle The actions of the
Albanians after the 22nd congress made it more difficult for free
world parties to support them.
g. The dispute carried over into the international fronts,
being especially acute in the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organi-
zation, the WPC, and at the Afro-Asian Writer's Conference. A
number of parties responded to a Soviet request to officially protest
Chinese views and factional activities in the fronts.
h. There have been several reports and rumors of efforts
to establish some kind of pro-Chinese alignment among parties. The
latest of these stories (none of them confirmed) concern a proposal
to convene a meeting of representatives of a. number of Asian parties
in April, either in Hanoi or Peking.
3. Italian Communist Party.
a. The Italian party's Central Committee, in a two-day
session (20-22 December 1961) discussed the party's debates on the
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and had let it be known that the Chinese were reserving the right to
interpret the declaration as they saw fit. The PCI documents
serve to legitimize the 22nd congress as entirely in line with the
1960 declaration. In this way, the party asserts its essential
independence at the very time it gives full support to the CPSU.
It expresses complete opposition to any reversion to policies
and practices of the pre-20th congress period. The PCI hoped for
political reasons that publication of the documents would convince
the rank and file of the party that its positions were firm and
sincere.
4. CP of India. Ajoy Ghosh, secretary general of the Indian
party, published a personal statement on the 22nd congress on
10 December and gave a press interview on 17 December neither
of which the CPSU could have considered satisfactory.
a. Like the Italians, Ghosh said that the 22nd congress
proved that there was no infallible party or leader in the movement.
He also said that the majority of Indian party members had been
confused and distressed by de-Stalinization and disagreed with the
renaming of Stalingrad. More important, Ghosh said that the
Indian party's views on the 22nd congress could only be formulated
by the party's National Council, and that the council could not be
convened until after the national election, to be held during
February. Ghosh, too, refused to grant that either the Albanian case
or the rules and principles governing relations between Communist
parties were no longer open to discussion. While he praised the
new CPSU program and expressed sympathy for the CPSU's justifi-
cation of its actions at the 22nd congress, he insisted that the rules
of the 81-party declaration were still binding. At the press conference,
in fact, he intimated that the public condemnations of Albania by
the other parties were themselves violations of that declaration.
b. Ghosh's stand obviously reflected his concern over
maintaining party unity during the forthcoming election. It also
showed that he personally faced a dilemma, in which his desire to
retain full CPSU support for the Indian party and to keep the policies
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of the Indian party consistent with the general strategy since 1955
conflicted with his desire to :protect the status and influence of the
Indian party itself in the international movement. His demand that
all members of the CP India refrain from public expressions of
personal views on the issues of the 22nd congrOss was the best
tactic he could think of to postpone the moment when the CP India
would formally take a stand. This tactic was consistent with his
efforts, particularly since 1955, to mediate between factions of the
CP India in the hope of restoring a healthy and real unity. But, at
a time when the CPSU had moved decisively to crush and eliminate
dissidence in the movement, Ghosh's stand was clearly outdated.
After his death in January, the Indian party found itself without a
spokesman of comparable caliber to put forward the basically
pro-Soviet policy position. The CPSU congress, however, appears
to have had no adverse effect upon the CPI's political appeal, for
it did rather well in the elections.
5. CP of Indonesia. In South Asia, the Indonesian party's
challenge to the CPSU became even clearer than it had been. On
1 December the Chinese published the text of a speech that D.N. Aidit
had obviously drafted while in Peking and that he had delivered on
23 November privately to a group of PKI leader on his return from
the bloc. This speech was published in Djakarta. on 15 December
and was followed the next day by a politburo resolution that called
for a study of the issues by the whole party. A Central Committee
plenum in late December endorsed these actions.
a. The politburo resolution published gn 16 December
endorsed the actions of the PKI delegation to the 22nd congress and
expanded upon the views expressed by D.N. Aidit privately on
23 November and publicly on 27 November. The resolution explicitly
repeated the most crucial of Aidit's criticisms Of the CPSU--his
insistence that the Albanian dispute should not have been made
unilaterally and publicly by the CPSU at its congress. This was now
the official party position; it also went beyond Aidit's opinion by
explicitly stating that the CPSU's action contravened the 81-party
declaration. The resolution also called on party members to study
materials from the Soviet, Albanian, and other parties on the issues
already in public debate.
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b. On virtually all other issues in dispute, the PKI,
endorsing the CPSU program and accepting the CPSU's claim that
action against the anti-party group and Stalin was necessary,
clearly tried to make its views as palatable to the CPSU and
Khrushchev as possible. Like Aidit on 23 November, it also tried
to straddle the gap between Khrushchev and Mao by expressing its
gratitude for the benefits the PKI derived from Aidit's discussions
with both men.
c. Other materials in the resolution that are drawn from
Aidit's 23 November speech suggest PKI agreement with Chinese
criticisms of Soviet foreign policy. Commenting on questions of
international policy, the PKI, after endorsing the policy of peace-
ful coexistence and the struggle for general and complete disarma-
ment, went on to insist--as the Chinese have done--that the anti-
imperialist, anti-colonial struggle must be given priority. By
stating that Aidit had received guarantees from all the parties he
consulted at Moscow that they would wholeheartedly suppoit the
liberation of West Irian, the politburo at least intimated that the
CPSU had committed itself without reservation to this particular
liberation struggle. These features of the statement suggest that
the PKI lacked confidence in the CPSU's commitment to all-out
support of a direct anti-imperialist struggle and that it wished to
make the assurances to the PKI a matter of record. Aidit's
23 November statement, finally published in Indonesia on 15 December,
is more explicit than the resolution on this point. Aidit went to great
lengths to identify the recovery of West Irian as a just, anti-imperialist
liberation struggle, in the precise terms employed in the November
1960 declaration.
d. Characteristically, the PKI also criticized Yugoslav
revisionism as an attack upon the unity that is an essential condition
for success in the anti-imperialist struggle.
e. The Central Committee in late December endorsed the
positions taken by the delegation to the 22nd congress--including,
explicitly, the refusal to criticize Albania--and the politbureau
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resolution, as well as Aidit's speech of 23 November. Characte-
ristically, Pravda's account on 6 January of the Central Committee
meeting distorted its outcome: Albania is not mentioned, and it is
made to appear that Aidit fully sympathized with de-Stalinization.
Harian Rakjat's 9 and 10 January accounts of the deliberations make
no mention of the Stalin issue.
6. CP of Australia. In December the Australian party's polit-
buro issued a statement, which, like the Indonesian, approved the
actions of its delegates to Moscow. It rejected the Albanian charges
of revisionism against the CPSU and the Albanian post-congress
attack on Khrushchev, and endorsed Khrushchev and the CPSU program.
But it reaffirmed the Party's adherence to the provisions of the 81-party
declaration governing relations between parties, and implicitly questioned
the propriety of CPSU actions at the 22nd congress. The leadership
was divided over these questions, but the majority (against a sub-
stantial number of opponents and abstainers) brbught the Party
officially into line with the CPSU, and a regional party leader
identified with pro-Chinese views was purged in February.
7. CP of New Zealand. The New Zealand party, in a Political
Committee statement published on 28 February, openly took issue
with the CPSU's handling of the Stalin and Albanian problems. On
Stalin, the party sided with the views of Aidit, and it complained that
"some of the acts of 'de-Stalinization' had created misunderstanding
and diversions"--particularly, the renaming of Stalingrad. The
statement declared that it was "incorrect" to publicly air the Albanian
question and to "introduce this question into the congress in the way
in which it was done." The party had, it was announced, sent identical
letters to the Soviet, Chinese, and Albanian parties calling upon them
to meet and settle their differences, and proposing that "an inter-
national conference might be necessary, in whicb case that would be
the proper time and place for the New Zealand Party to put forward
its opinions on the matters involved." The letter stated that the
CPNZ would not take a partisan position, since 'our actions in any
direction could only serve in widening and hardening the breach."
Endorsing the letter, the Political Committee explicitly refused to
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denounce Hoxha as "non-Marxism, " as "many Parties have done",
because "an objective discussion of the many points of criticism
made of, and by, Comrade Hoxha and the Albanian Party.. .has
not yet taken place."
8. French Communist Party. The French party, at the end
of November, also made new and major moves. As part of its
inner-party discussion of the 22nd congress it published, for party
militants only, the full text of the speeches delivered by Thorez at
the November 1960 Moscow conference. Like the publication of
the Italian documents, this pamphlet incorporates all-out attacks
on China and Albania, and is a significant step to create unity in-
side the party. Contrasted with the FCP's efforts after the 20th
congress to prevent any discussion of de-Stalinization in its ranks
and its later efforts to conceal the extent and seriousness of the Soviet
differences with the Chinese, it must be considered compelling evi-
dence that the Thorez leadership was now convinced that the CPSU's
determination to solve the questions of authority and discipline at
any cost was firm. In this light, Thorez's attack in early December
on the Italian party's right-wing and the 28 December attack by
Raymond Guyot on both the Sino-Albanian left wing of the World Peace
Council and on d'Astier de la Vigerie for his expression of right
revisionist views concerning Soviet nuclear testing must be treated as
purposeful steps by the leaders of a major free world party to carry
out the simultaneous attack on the left and right dissidents that was
called for by the Konstantinov article in Kommunist of early December.
9. CP of Belgium. After the congress, in November 1961, the
Belgian party sent what was intended as a non-controversial letter of
greetings to the Albanian party. While friendly, the message?unlike
those from the Asian parties?pointedly referred to the lessons of
the 20th, 21st, and 22nd CPSU congresses. When the message was
exploited by Radio Tirana to imply CPB sympathy, the Central Com-
mittee hastily adopted a resolution on 16 November condemning the
Albanian leadership on all counts. Subsequently, acting on a Central
Committee decision of 6-7 January, the party newspaper Drapeau
Rouge published a series of discussion articles intended to contribute
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to the "renovation" of the party in accordance with the terms in which
the leadership interpreted the 22nd congress. The articles stimulated
a counter-action by a more conservative element within the leader-
ship, in the form of a major dissident article on 22 February. The
Politbureau issued a sharp rebuke in the same issue of Drapeau Rouge.
The affair has not yet been settled, but the public discussion was
suspended abruptly in March.
a. Representative of the main discussion articles, is a
series by Jean Terfve, appearing in Drapeau Rouge during January.
In attacking the Albanians and Chinese, Terfve went further than the
Soviets would themselves go publicly for fear of promoting revisionism
in the Communist movement. He defined peaceful coexistence as a
strategic objective upon which other Communist objectives depend. To
accept the Chinese treatment of peaceful coexistence as a tactic would,
he said, make alliances impossible and would alienate the neutral
nations. The Chinese underestimate the dangers of thermonuclear
war, a "qualitatively" different kind of a war. They overestimate the
power of the imperialists and underestimate disagreements among
imperialist leaders. They wrongly hold that the Soviet disarmament
proposals undermine the national liberation struggle. On other -counts,
Terfve challenged the Chinese. They failed to understand the need to
raise living standards in the USSR and failed to see that "equalization"
(massive Soviet aid to bloc economies) would weaken the USSR and the
cause of peace. The "special" position reserved by the Chinese was
due, perhaps, to idealism, backwardness, military experience, and
nationalism. But this special position must be challenged because the
Chinese line and the incompatibility of this line with that of Khrushchev
affect not only the Communist movement, but the whole world. There-
fore, Terfve concluded, the Belgian Communists had a "duty" to
participate in the debate in the effort to achieve a "real synthesis."
Meanwhile, disagreements should not be covered up and those who
disagree should not be labelled "anti-Marxist. "
b. The counter attack launched by Jacques Grippa on
22 February virtually called National Secretary Jean Blume a re-
visionist and accused Terfve of at least advocating a split in the
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movement.* In most essentials, the arguments advanced by Grippa
are similar to those of the Chinese. Peaceful coexistence is not a
goal in itself, but a means to an end. Fear of war lulls the people.
Material power alone is not enough and must be accompanied by
political action. Imperialism must not be prettified and it is wrong
to divide capitalists into "reasonable men" and "ultras." Ne-
gotiations and disarmament proposals must be viewed as tactical
maneuvers. Support for the peace struggle should not be sought from
adversaries. National liberation struggles must be supported now,
and so on. Concerning relations among parties, Grippa asserted
that the PCB acceded to the criticism of Albania only on the grounds
of violation of legality within that Party, but he deplored the fact
that the matter was not discussed at an international conference, with
the Albanians present, before the congress confronted the movement
with a "fait accompli." The Soviets were wrong to break diplomatic
relations, particularly in the light of the Yugoslav precedent.
Terfve's criticisms of the Chinese amounted to a priori judgements
with only one outcome: schism. He says that Blume asserts the
right to pick and choose what he likes in the 81-Party Declaration of
1960. The CPSU has responsibilities to the other parties, said
Grippa, and it is wrong for other parties to align mechanically with
the CPSU. Finally, Terfve is wrong in alleging that the Chinese
demand "equalization."
c. The Politbureau's response to Grippa attacked his
vehemence, his treatment of responsible comrades as if they were
"enemies or agents of enemies, " and his "deliberate" manipulation
of quotations from Blume. Basing its case largely on a refutation of
Grippa's definition of peaceful coexistence as a intermediate, rather
than a ultimate, objective, the Politbureau identified Grippa's positions
All three are members of the Political Bureau. Grippa and
Blume accompanied party chairman Burnelle to the 22nd
congress.
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as essentially those of the Chinese and proceeded to criticize them
in the same terms the CPSU had been using since the Bucharest
conference of 1960. Responsibility for the Sino-Soviet conflict was
laid upon the Chinese for seizing upon the "restrictive clauses" of
the 81-Party Declaration as the essence of the whole document, and
the Soviet actions against Albania were justified as the only possible
response to Albanian actions.
d. Interpreting special significance of this exchange, with
its extremely complex argumentation, is further complicated by
the polemic techniques used. It seems likely that Grippa has tried
to refute the Terfve criticisms of the Chinese case and, at the same
time, to establish an ideological bridge between the Soviet and the
Chinese stands. A total impression of his views is definitely close
to the Chinese line and, in fact, he states that the Chinese are
correct. On the other hand, on the question of the relationship of
peace struggle and of peace policies, he stands on a position that
Khrushchev himself has occupied.
e. The dispute apparently caused considerable difficulty
in the party. In late March Grippa was censured formally for his
attacks, but no punitive measures have so far been taken against him.
10. CP of Chile. In Latin America the Chilean party secretary,
Luis Corvalan, made a formal report to his Central Committee on
29 November that gives an excellent insight into the conclusions he
drew from the CPSU's actions and the prelimin4ry discussions of
them by Chilean party members. This report, the most explicit and
coherent statement so far available from the pro-Soviet parties in
the free world on the impact of the 22nd congress, was unanimously
approved by the Central Committee on 1 December.
a. Corvalan first drove home the ideaS that the CPSU was
irrevocably committed to the new program, fully united and competent,
and powerful enough to carry it through. Almost half his speech was
devoted to this point. Acknowledging the existence in Chile of re-
sistance to de-Stalinization, of demands for more details concerning
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the charges made against the anti-party group, of confusion,
demoralization, and mystification, he said that such reactions
had to be expected and respected but that they would soon pass.
He called for a display of confidence in the new course.
b. Leaders, he said, had to show their confidence by
the way they dealt with party members. He said that two kinds of
mistakes were being made in dealing with questions and reactions
from party members. He criticized those whose defensive reaction
was to block discussion and to respond with criticisms of the
failure of party members to do the work the party gave them.
Speculation, on the other hand, he said, should be avoided, and
arguments should be based on the facts already available. He said
all talk of polycentrism should be rejected, since its recognition
or acceptance would lead to nationalism, ideological confusion,
and the weakening of international unity. All criticism of the CPSU's
methods should be rejected, whether it dealt with methods against
the anti-party group or against Albania. He said that the good luck
of the anti-party group, who had not been shot and who still had the
rights of every Soviet citizen, was enough to disprove the criticisms
that had been expressed.
c. The most important part of Corvalan's speech is his
virtually Stalinist defense of the authority of the CPSU in his dis-
cussion of the attack on Albania. He denied that the actions for
which the Albanians were attacked were the internal affair of the
Albanian party. Describing them as "ideological questions that
recognize no frontiers," he said that the CPSU had always been and
still was the directing center of the movement and had the responsi-
bility, following Lenin's path, to carry on a principled struggle
against left and right deviations in the international movement. In
discussing this question he gave as a precedent the 1946 attack by
Jacques Duclos on Browderite revisionism, which he said was
absolutely just and appropriate. Corvalan's justification of the
leading role of the CPSU is of considerable interest, for he said it
was based neither on unilateral action by the CPSU nor on an agree-
ment between parties but on historic circumstances. The obligation
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of every Communist to be well disposed toward the USSR and the CPSU
was not merely a matter of sentiment but of principle that had not in
any way been changed by the denunciation of the crimes of Stalin's
time. It was in this context that he explained the need to reject poly-
centrism absolutely. He suggested also that a renewed attack on right
revisionists would involve Yugoslavia, saying that true Communists
there were obliged to struggle to reunite Yugoslavia with the bloc.
d. Commenting on the question that had been raised in Chile
concerning the Chinese party's position and the possibility of a
schism in the Communist movement, Corvalan said that the future
could not be predicted, but that in any event what was developing
was a more solid unity of principle in the movement. Comparing the
disputes and discussions of today to those that accompanied the creation
of the Comintern, he said that "whatever the conduct of some, although
some one or several may separate themselves fbr a time from the
family of Communist parties, the unity, fraternity, health, and future
of that family are assured." He committed the Chilean party to work
along these lines, and to bring its members to abcept them.
e. His final remarks suggested that factional maneuvering
would no longer be tolerated in the party. He referred critically to
steps taken in the Chilean party before the 22nd congress to conceal
the reasons for the demotion of a regional secretary and to bypass a
regional unit of the party in the preparations for an earlier party
conference.
11. Brazil and Paraguay.
a. Against the background of this part Df Corvalan's speech,
the decision of the Brazilian party in December to expel a group of
left-wing dissidents just after the secretary general, Luis Carlos
Prestes, returned from discussions in Moscow may also be an out-
growth of the CPSU's actions in October and November. An
article in the party's weekly, Novos Rumos for 4-15 February, by
one of the old-timers, Ivan Ramos Ribeiro, is of special interest.
In addition to giving details on the circulation in several languages
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of the Albanian resolution of 3 August 1961 on the Berlin dead-line--
a resolution characterized by Ribeiro as "dangerous" and "out-
landish"--the article makes a distinction between "equality of
rights" of all parties and "the idealist anarchorevisionist idea
that these parties are equal." This argument of a more-equal-
than-others CPSU is similar to one advanced by Ib Noerlund of
the Danish CP in Tiden (January-February 1962), and the coin-
cidence suggests Soviet inspiration.
b. The resolution adopted by the Central Committee of
CP Paraguay at the end of December falls into the pattern of the
Brazilian actions. It gave unconditional support to the CPSU,
attacked the Albanians for having in fact broken with the Com-
munist movement and for putting weapons in the enemy's hands,
and sharply criticized the Chinese for their support of Albania.
The Paraguayan attack was replayed prominently by Pravda on
12 January, and its charges are similar to those set forth in the
lead editorial of the January 1962 issue of Problems of Peace and
Socialism. The March issue of this publication also cites the
Paraguayan resolution, along with several others.
12. Soviet and Chinese maneuvers in the fronts. In the
international fronts, the CPSU and its allies in the free world are
moving cautiously, avoiding clashes in major meetings where the
pro-Chinese representation is strong, but pushing hard to compro-
mise and isolate the Chinese where they felt that they had pre-
dominant influence. There is also evidence that the CPSU and its
supporters have been provoking the Chinese at front meetings,
while at the same time the most pro-Soviet of the Free World
parties have been telling their own members that the Chinese have
carried their factional activity into the international fronts,
particularly in the peace movement. The maneuver in the
secretariat of the IUS and WFDY can be considered as a
characteristic Soviet-inspired effort to outflank and undermine
the Chinese position to organizations where the Chinese are likely
to have most support. The Chinese have held to their basic
positions wherever clashes have occurred, but they have also
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tried to avoid creating open factional splits, if only to deprive the
CPSU of arguments to use against them.
13. The World Peace Movement. The peace campaign sparked
through the World Peace Council is and will probably continue to
be a major area of Sino-Soviet maneuvering in their dispute. A
violent clash took place in the World Peace Council meeting in
Stockholm, and a number of European Communist parties in letters
sent to Peking later criticized asfactionalism Chinese efforts to
influence their delegates to th.e meeting.. The Chinese efforts to
enlist support in fact are concentrated mainly on Asian, African,
and Latin American participants in organizations involved in the
peace campaign. Within the Secretariat of the Afro-Asian Peoples'
Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) the Chinese have in effect accused
the Russians of using "mechanical majorities" at the Stockholm
WPC meeting for factional purposes. Although there appears to
have been no open dissension at the most recent Vienna meeting of
the WPC presidium in mid-March, the conflict continues. For the
time being, the conflict in the peace movement is being felt at the
level of national affiliates of the WPC and in other fronts.
a. At the Stockholm WPC meeting (16-19 December), the
top Chinese delegates Liao Cheng-chih and Liu sing-i promptly put
on record their opposition to the general line of the WPC. As usual,
they insisted that the struggle for peace required all peace forces
to give full support to national liberation struggles as well as to
campaigns for disarmament. They repeated standard Chinese views
that the danger of nuclear war should not be stressed and that
negotiations with imperialists and Soviet diplomatic aims should not
be put ahead of revolutionary movements. On disarmament they
said it could not be pushed to the point where it would affect
countries still struggling for full national independence. The Soviet
delegate Korneichuk tried to refute the Chinese aTguments, but the
Chinese reportedly walked out on his speech. But the differences
went far beyond this.
b. A concerted attempt has been made by pro-Soviet
leaders of the WPC since December 1961 to create the impression that
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the Chinese took the initiative in forcing a showdown at Stockholm over
the title of the World Congress to be convened by the WPC in 1962.
It has repeatedly been pointed out that, when a vote was taken on the
question, the Chinese contingent was defeated by an overwhelming
majority vote of 163 to 24. Raymond Guyot of the French party,
Jean Terfve of the Belgian party, Velio Spano of the Italian party,
and J. D. Bernal, president of the WPC, all have publicized this
interpretation of the Stockholm events.
But this seemingly simple explanation conceals what
really happened. The Soviet-dominated Presidium of the WPC failed
during the first three days of the meeting to overcome Chinese re-
sistance or to isolate them. In fact, on the last day of the conference,
draft resolutions prepared in all the commission meetings had been
unanimously approved for submission to the final plenary session.
It was in this final plenary that the Presidium entertained the
resolution to call the World Congress a "Congress of Disarmament,
Peace, and National Liberation," and called for a vote. It is not
known who offered the resolution, but it seems most unlikely that
the move was Chinese-inspired, for it was this vote, the first in the
history of the WPC, that forced the Chinese to take a stand on a point
of principle. The Chinese in fact privately attributed the decision
to force this vote to the Soviet-dominated Presidium of the WPC. The
Chinese also pointed out later that given the composition of the World
Peace Council, a vote on a resolution so phrased was bound to be
defeated, and the Chinese and their allies to be is olated. It seems
likely therefore, that it was the Soviet group that created this test
to expose the weakness of the Chinese faction. As a matter of fact,
what the majority did endorse was the modified formula "Disarma-
ment and Peace", which the Chinese group would under normal
circumstances have endorsed without protest. The conference closed
a day early, presumably at Soviet instigation.
During most of the conference, the factional maneuvering
actually centered on the discussions over the convening of a three-
continent (Asia, Africa, Latin America) conference of national liberation
and peace. The subject was put on the general agenda for the WPC
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meeting at the last minute, although a delegatioh of the Afro-Asian
Solidarity Organization came to Stockholm by pre-arrangement
with the WPC secretariat to discuss the conference with Latin
American delegates and to get an endorsement of their plan from the
WPC. The first discussions of the three-continent conference took
place in private between the Latin Americans and the Afro-Asian
Solidarity delegation. It immediately became apparent that the pro-
Soviet group among the Latin Americans were determined that the
World Peace Council be accepted as one of the organizers of the
three-continent conference. Earlier at Gaza the Chinese contingent
had secured unanimous AAPSO approval of a plan that would have
obliged the WPC to participate in the preparations only through its
offshoot, the Peace Liaison Committee of the Asian and Pacific
Region, located in Peking. One Brazilian also tried to predetermine
the character of the three-continent conference by stipulating that
it should take the same line on the interrelation .of national independence
and peace that the March 1961 Latin American cOnference in Mexico
city had followed. The AAPSO delegation refused to surrender on
these points. At a hastily organized WPC plenaiy on the three-
continent conference the next day, the Solidarity delegation head--
Hoang Muci, of North Vietnam?read to the gatliering the instructions
given his delegation after the Gaza meeting of the AAPSO and then,
during a speech by a Cuban delegate, led a walkout of all but the
Soviet and Indian members of this delegation. Most of the African
delegates to the meeting also walked out. In preparation for another
meeting, six delegates--all pro-Soviet--from Cline, Mexico, Brazil,
Argentina, Lebanon, and India, were empowered by the WPC
Presidium to act as a committee for the WPC in,preparing the three-
continent conference, thus depriving the AAPSO 'delegation of any
basis for continuing their bilateral discussions directly with Latin
American delegates, many of whom had earlier endorsed the main
AAPSO proposals. This Presidium decision was announced when the
meeting of all the Latin American and the AAPSQ delegations con-
vened. The discussions were then broken off, with the Chinese
protesting the Presidium's methods and the Soviet representative
congratulating the Latin Americans for insisting on WPC partici-
pation in future planning for the three-continent conference.
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The Chinese contingent, after the conference, privately
criticized the Presidium's acts as those of a "fraction of the WPC",
pointed to the absence of African representation on the Presidium,
and said that "anti-imperialist militants" from Asia, Africa, and
Latin America were never adequately represented in sessions and
working bodies of the WPC. They also speculated that the methods
of the WPC would never permit the organization to assume its "proper
responsibilities toward the Afro-Asian peoples." Later in January,
WPC president Bernal announced that the World Congress of Dis-
armament and Peace would meet in Moscow in July. At Stockholm,
it had been proposed that the three-continent conference meet in
July. Here again, in the preempting of the date for a meeting, the
"methods of the WPC Presidium" were being used to keep the
Chinese at a disadvantage.
c. At the WPC Presidium meeting in Vienna (17-19 March
1962), there was an apparent lull in the conflict within the WPC.
A Chinese delegation attended, and all resolutions on preparations
for the Moscow Congress were adopted unanimously. The WPC
president, J. D. Bernal, said at a press conference that there had
been no serious dissension during the meeting, although divergent
views were, he claimed, still apparent. Other participants have
made it clear that the Chinese still held to their basic views, but
they also claimed that unity in the WPC had been restored. The only
thing that can be said with confidence is that there was no effort made
to provoke or isolate the Chinese, and the Chinese have not felt
impelled to publicize their dissident views.
d. Other such disputes as that which began between Terfve
and Grippa in the Belgian party in January suggest that the impact
of the dispute on the Peace movement is now being felt at the level
of the national affiliates of the WPC, since Terfve is an important
European Communist in the peace movement. Events in France,
Japan, and Indonesia also suggest that this is the case.
The WFTU too has become involved in the peace movement dispute.
The question of giving a formal WFTU endorsement to the Disarma-
ment Congress has apparently been discussed in WFTU headquarters
43
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but well-informed WFTU functionaries believed it likely that the WFTU
would refrain from taking a stand and leave the matter of supporting
the Congress up to each national affiliate. Such la formula would
avert another direct confrontation between the USSR and China inside
the WFTU. But factional maneuvering still occurs elsewhere.
e. At the Afro-Asian Writers' Conference in Cairo
(12-16 February 1962), Mao Tun, the Chinese Minister of Culture,
denounced "unconditional peaceful coexistence" as opposed to
"principled peaceful coexistence", saying that "sheep and wolves
can never coexist peacefully." At one point, the Soviet delegate,
Mirza Tursun-Zade, interrupted Mao to ask for respect and was
caustically rebuked by Mao. Two pro-Soviet participants in the
meeting, who had earlier participated in the Sto:ckholm WPC sessions,
provoked and harrassed the Chinese-oriented group. The main policy
clash occurred over a Soviet supported draft rebolution on disarma-
ment offered by Nazim Hikmet, a Polish citizen, who nominally repre-
sents Turkey in various international fronts. This resolution was
denounced by the Chinese as "anti-national, anti-liberation", and
was not carried. Mulk Raj Anand of India callea unsuccessfully for
the throwing out of the general report of the organization's secretary.
On two other less serious issues, --the choice of a site for the next
writer's conference and the location of the Permanent Bureau--the
Soviet contingent also lost out. An organizational change adopted at
this meeting may, by increasing the Asian Communist and African
representation in the policy-making machinery,- strengthen the position
of those who diverge from Soviet policies in this offshoot of the Afro-
Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization. Chinese factional strength
in that organization is already apparent.
14. IUS and WFDY. Free world Communists supporting the
CPSU in these fronts contributed to broadening the attack on the
Albanians in the first post-Congress period. A Senegalese deputy
secretary general of the International Union of Students and a Bolivian
member of the secretariat of the World Federation of Democratic
Youth who represented their organizations at the Albanian Youth
Congress on 23-25 November, provided the basis in critical reports
of the congress and of the treatment they receWed from the Albanians.
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The secretariats of the two organizations issued condemnations of
Albania in early December, and the USSR and Poland publicized
these actions fn mid-December. But neither organization had, as
of mid-March, made any further move related to the dispute. A
new attack on Albania was made at the Soviet Komsomal Congress
in mid-April, in the presence of delegates from other national
affiliates of the WFDY, but no open conflict developed.
15. WFTU. The WFTU Congress held in Moscow 5-16
December was a setback for the right-wing parties of the free world
in spite of the Italian efforts to attack the Sino-Albanian left. The
Italian representatives, who had criticized the secretariat of the
WFTU for "retaining sterile and outmoded organizational ideas" and
for incorporating mechanically too much of the CPSU's program and
line into the WFTU program, made the open charge (in a single radio
broadcast of 12 December) that these organizational ideas had the
support in WFTU of the Albanians and of the French. The French
and Italian delegates at the congress were in fact bitterly opposed
to each other, but Soviet support apparently was given, that time at
least, to the French party contingent. The Italian vice-president,
Novella, a strong advocate of autonomy and polycentrisrn, was
replaced by another Italian CP member, Renato Bitossi, who has
never been involved in the PCI polemics and is considered loyal to
Togliatti. Neither the Albanians nor the Chinese were attacked
openly at the Congress. They participated fully in the Congress
work and endorsed, apparently without reservations, both the draft
program and the report submitted by Saillant. The program and
report were sufficiently broad and militant to be acceptable. But,
as with the 81 party declaration in 1960, both the Soviet and Chinese
spokesmen emphasized in speeches and statements the particular
aspects of the documents which were consistent with their basic
views. By the end of the congress on 16 December, the Italian
delegation, having found itself without support, yielded and approved
the congress documents but only after formally stating its reser-
vations. This clearly was done in the interest of maintaining unity
with the CPSU. The proof is in Luigi Longo's speech to the PCI
Central Committee December plenum. Speaking of his conversations
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with representatives of other parties in Moscow at the end of
November, he said that on international questiofis the Italian party
would be presumptuous to think it could not learii from other parties
and that many aspects of international reality had been inadequately
analyzed by the PCI. He also said that the Italii`..n talk of polycentrism
had aroused fears in other parties that it would lead to a weakening
of international unity, and he proposed that the pci drop the term
as a possible source of error and confusion.
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VII. Conclusions and Forecast
1. Assessment of Soviet success. So long as the Sino-Soviet
dispute remains an unresolved issue, the full impact of the 22nd
congress and its aftermath will not be apparent. Nevertheless,
certain judgments can be made about the extent to which the CPSU
has so far succeeded in reestablishing its hegemony within the
Communist movement. First, the CPSU failed in its attempt to
coerce the Chinese at the congress itself, and failed to isolate
and discredit them completely, as Khrushchev had hoped. Whether
the actions at the congress and the Soviet campaign afterwards
will ultimately have better results remains to be seen. Second,
Khrushchev did not completely succeed in his attempt to coerce
the Albanians or to isolate them, either at the congress or later,
although the Albanians were discredited mt,r.tit almost all free world
parties, either as a result of Khrushchevrs charges against them
or as a consequence of their own actions after the congress. Third,
he failed to bring the entire movement to support him on de-
Stalinization. Against these partial but important failures, must be
balanced a significant success: after the congress the CPSU won
a formal commitment from almost every free world party to its
disciplinary authority, its program, and Khrushchev's peaceful
coexistence strategy. The importance of this accomplishment
emerges in a comparison with the situation at the end of the
conference of 81 parties in November 1960. There, most (but not
all) delegations had criticized the Albanians and the views of the
Chinese, but this did not involve a formal commitment, since the
directly relevant portions of the Soviet position(i.e., those con-
cerning majority rule, factionalism, and the authority of CPSU
congresses) were not included in the Declaration. By endorsing
this compromise document, the commitment of the parties was
essentially ambiguous, since the Declaration was interpreted in
different ways by the Soviets on the one hand and the Chinese on the
other. Now, for almost all free world parties, the program and
decisions of the 22nd CPSU congress have virtually superseded the
1960 Declaration.
47
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Z. Impact on the free world parties and fronts. The immediate
effect on the congress was to shake discipline on both the international
and national levels. In sharp contrast with 1956, very little moral
revulsion has been observed. The overriding coticern now is over
the practical, political consequences. Nevertheless, the 22nd
congress has had little apparent effect on the political power of
the parties, so far as it can be judged from limited tests.
3. Forecast. On one point all the contenders agree--that the
strength of International Communism is now greit enough to justify
a new strategy. But, since its inception, the dispute has involved
conflicting views of what that new strategy should be. For the free
world parties the pressing, practical, and still unresolved question
involved in the dispute is its effect, and that of the strategy finally
adopted, upon their future fortunes and programs. Those who
seem willing to see the CPSU carry the dispute to its logical con-
clusion, forcing China into isolation, face a basic dilemma. A
split would inevitably involve a weakening of the movement, and
would at the same time invalidate their main argument for their
pro-Soviet stand, that the Soviet strategy is acceptable precisely
because the movement is so strong. Some try to evade this question
by virtually equating the strength of the USSR with that of the move-
ment, but this fails to carry much conviction. Those who insist on
unity, on the other hand, must face the fact that the CPSU is
formally committed by the 22nd congress decisions to its stand
on Albania and de-Stalinization, and cannot retreat, except at the
cost of repudiating the acts of at least some of its leaders. For
the moment a stalemate seems to exist.
In the past, internal conflicts of critical importance to
the movement have been resolved eventually by familiar "Stalinist"
methods: the crude general purges of 1936-39, and the more
selective but equally ruthless operations of 1948-1951. After the
20th and 22nd congresses repudiated the old methods, it would be
necessary at least to find a new way to achieve the same end.
The search for a new method so far appears unsuccessful.
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For both extremes, there are compelling reasons to seek
a solution that will not involve a full break. One formula has appeared
that might legitimize the stalemate, avert a showdown, and win broad
if grudging acceptance in the movement. It simultaneously reaffirms
the basic principle of democratic centralism--i.e., of majority rule
on practical decisions, and adds the essentially new idea--for the
Communist world--that a dissident opinion can be held and expressed
without having to be condemned as proof of factional activity. But
nothing in the past, including the treatment of the CPSUrs anti-
Party group, can encourage the belief that tolerance of dissent will
be lasting.
The "loyal dissent" device has already been employed at
the international level by the Italian party, specifically at the WFTU
congress, without provoking any immediate criticism or condem-
nation by either the CPSU or the Chinese. The absence of any
critical exploitation of the unprecedented split vote in the WPC
Stockholm meeting falls in the same pattern. But attempts to invoke
the same device within individual free world parties (for example
in the Italian and Belgian parties--by Amendola and Grippa re-
spectively) have provoked countermeasures which barely miss being
punitive in character. If the CPSU can avoid a major setback in
its general program and is willing to abstain from further intensi-
fying its attack on Albania, a new international crisis might be
averted for some time on the basis of some such formula.
But the erosive effect of such a formula on the unity,
elan, and discipline within at least the free world parties cannot be
averted. It would be difficult to convince dissident minorities,
pro-Soviet or pro-Chinese depending upon the party involved, that
the device could properly be used at the international level but not
at the national level. Pressure for more "inner party democracy"-
a basic threat to the combat party character of every CP--would
certainly appear time and again, in many forms. It might well be
then, that the next general crisis--which eventually must, we
believe, occur?would arise from one or more such factional
struggles within the major parties of the world. But sooner or
later, a ruthless method, as efficient if not as crude as those of the
Stalin era, will almost certainly be required if monolithic unity and
Soviet hegemony are to be fully restored.
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APPENDIX A: The Positions Taken by the Free World
Communist Parties
Explanation of Tally-Sheet
1. Purpose. This tally-sheet attempts to show, by means of
symbols and a rating system, how the individual Free World Com-
munist Parties stood relative to each of the test is
Stalin, China, and international policy--at the 22nd congress and
what positions they took after the congress. It also includes notes
on the impact of the congress on the parties.
2. Scoring system. In general, a party is rated on a scale
ranging from .1.3, indicating full support of the Soviet positions at the
congress, down through -3, indicating maximum agreement with the
Chinese or Albanians on each test issue. A zero stands for a non-
committal attitude, failure to mention one of the_test issues, or a
position midway between the Soviets on the one hand and the Chinese
or Albanians on the other. A dash indicates either that not enough
material was available in a policy statement--in many cases, we
have had to depend on summaries or excerpts--to enable us to make
a judgment, or that the statement itself was not explicit enough to
assess. Scores given in parentheses indicate either an assessment
based on intelligence reports, rather than official Party statements,
or an incomplete net in cases where the party's position on some
issues could not be determined from published summaries and
excerpts.
3. Criteria used in scoring. On the test issues the following
criteria were used as consistently as possible.
Albania
+3 Condemned for policy, internal regime, and for
breaking unity.
+2 Condemned for one or two of these.
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+1 Mildly rebuked and begged to recant.
0 No commitment.
-1 Differences deplored, but Albania not blamed and
hope expressed for settlement on the basis of the
1960 Moscow Declaration.
- 2 Sympathy shown for Albania, but no endorsement
of her leaders.
- 3 Explicit endorsement of Albanian leaders.
Stalin
+ 3 Condemned for policy, crimes, and cult trappings.
+ 2 Condemned for one or two of these.
+1 Stereotyped mention of the liquidation of the cult.
0 No mention.
-1 Reservations or exceptions taken to some aspects
of de-Stalinization (e.g., renaming Stalingrad
or removal of Stalin's corpse).
- 2 Assertion of right to judge Stalin independently.
_ 3 Praise of Stalin.
China
+ 3 Rejection of Chinese position at the Congress and
afterwards as harmful to unity and of Chinese
policy as wrong.
+ 2 Strongly phrased general reproval of Chinese support
for Albania.
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+1 Milder reproof.
0 No commitment.
(Minus scorings, indicating support of the Chinese
positions at the congress, were found not needed).
Policy
+ 3 Endorsement of peaceful coexistence policies
associated with Khrushchev as correct, necessary,
and of positive value to the parties. Or, full and
explicit endorsement of Khrushchev's Central
Committee report or of the decisions of the 20th,
or 22nd CPSU congresses.
Acceptance of peaceful coexistence, but with more
emphasis on Soviet power and pressure tactics.
+ 1 Stereotyped endorsement,
0 Indication of preference for a balanced policy
between peaceful coexistence and anti-imperialist
action.
- 3 Rejection of peaceful coexistence; strong emphasis
on anti-imperialism.
4. Caveat. A degree of subjectivity in scoring was unavoidable.
This is particularly true of the assessment of a party's attitude toward
Soviet policy as expressed in the traditional effusiveness of speeches
at the congress itself. Also, it must be kept in mind that formal policy
statements issued by parties do not necessarily reflect the real at-
titudes of leaders or the extent of disagreement among them. Some,
who openly attacked Stalin most vigorously and therefore were given
a score of plus 3 on that issue, are privately still very fond of him.
52
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EUROPE
4.111111111111111.11.11 13
3
<
(t?
a
AFTER
AT IMPACT AT CONGRESS AFTER CONGRESS
CONGRESS m
00
0
,...,
.4
g M
LI
.-4
4 d H
E.
C/3 0
AUSTRIA
+4
+10
CONSIDERABLE DISSATISFACTION WITH CONGRESS EXPRESSED AT CC PLENUM
15-16 NOV. AND IN LOCAL PARTY DISCUSSIONS. LEADERS EVENTUALLY ADOPTED
VERY PRO-SOVIET POSITION, BUT EVIDENCE OF INDEPENDENT THINKING,
SIMILAR TO THAT IN ITALY, IS SUBSTANTIAL
+2
0
0
+2
BELGIUM
+3
+II
CONSIDERABLE DISSATISFACTION EXPRESSED, LEADING TO OPEN EXPRESSION
OF PRO-CHINESE VIEWS BY GRIPPA AND HIS CONDEMNATION BY POLITBUREAU.
FREE DEBATE IN PARTY PRESS AT LEAST AS UNINHIBITED AS IN ITALY. BEGAN
LATER AND EXTENDED OVER A LONGER TIME.
0
0
0
+3
CYPRUS
(+3)
+9
CONSIDERABLE DISSATISFACTION IN LEADERSHIP OVER RAISING OF STALIN
ISSUE, PARTICULARLY AS IT COULD BE EXPLOITED BY THE OPPOSITION TO
EMBARRASS THE PARTY.
+3
-
-
DENMARK
+5
+9
LARSEN'S DISSIDENT PARTY GAINED IN LOCAL ELECTIONS.
0
+2
0
+3
FINLAND
+6
(+12)
SOME IMPACT ON INTELLECTUALS. PARTY'S POLITICAL POSITION NOT HURT.
+3
0
0
+3
FRANCE
+7
.1-Il
CONSIDERABLE IMPACT, PARTICULARLY AT LOWER LEVELS. LEADERSHIP
CONTROL APPEARS UNHURT. DISSIDENT SPLINTERS VIGOROUSLY EXPLOITING
ISSUES TO ATTACK PRESENT LEADERS.
+3
+2
0
+2
GERMANY (WEST)
+4
+9
NEGLIGIBLE.
+2
0
0
+2
GREAT BRITAIN
0
+9
LEADERSHIP OBVIOUSLY UNHAPPY ABOUT CONGRESS ACTIONS ON ALBANIA,
BUT APPARENTLY LITTLE IMPACT ON PARTY RANKS. CONCERN FOR FUTURE
EXPRESSED BY SOME LEADERS.
0
0
0
0
GREECE
+8
+9
BAD DEFEAT OF FRONT PARTY (PAME) BEING ATTRIBUTED BY SOME IN PART
TO CONGRESS ACTIONS. THIS LED TO BICKERING IN (PAME) LEADERSHIP.
+3
+2
0
+3
ICELAND
+3
( -3)
CONSIDERABLE DEFENSE OF STALIN IN PARTY RANKS AND LEADERSHIP.
SECRET RESOLUTION REPORTEDLY INCLUDED STRONG PRO-STALIN
STATEMENTS.
0
0
0
+3
IRELAND (NORTH)
+3
0
0
0
+3
0
b
lin
-.,
(tO
CT
+3 +3 +1 +3 A)
w
4:0
+3 .2 +3 +3 CD
(.0
03
+3 +3 0 +3 FJ
4=k
+3 +3 0 +3
+3 +3 +3 +3
+3 +3 +3 +2
Co
+2 +2 +2 +3 a
I%)
+3 +3 0 +3 Ci)
4=k
+3 +3 0 +3 a
a
+ (+3) + -
CD
CD
04
CD
- .4 fililiali1111111*
-
1 aminspi.
-C)
IMPACT
AT AFTER CONGRESS
CONGRESS AFTER AT CONGRESS
CD
a
1-4
2 H a
E. 0
-n
IRELAND (REPUBLIC) +3 0 0 0+3 0 2
IMPACT STRONGER EVEN THAN IN 1956. REMARKABLY OPEN EXPRESSIONS OF X
INDEPENDENCE. YOUTH ORGANIZATION, CALUNG FOR RE-EXAMINATION OF
ITALY +9 1-10 TROTSKY, HAD TO BE DISCIPLINED. TOGLIATTI APPEARS TO HAVE OUT-
MANEUVERED"RENOVATIONIST"WING IN DEBATE SO FAR, BUT MANEUVERING
FOR CONTROL OF POSITIONS STILL IN PROGRESS.
LUXEMBOURG - +7 ANTI-SOVIET STATENENTS MADE PRIVATELY BY ONE CF THE RIVALS FOR
LEADERSHIP.
SONE DISSATISFACTION IN LEADERSHIP WITH DE GROOT'S TACTIC AT THE
CONGRESS OF BASING HIS POSITIONS ON THOREZ. CRITICISM OF PARTY
NETHERLANDS +5 -18 NEWSPAPER FOR TAKING DEFENSIVE ATTITUDE DURING CONGRESS. RE-
SENTMENT IN PARTY ABOUT RE-NAMING STALINGRAD.
NORWAY +3 (-F6)
* MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, AS PUBLISHED IN PRAVDA 29 OCTOBER.
SAN MARINO ( +5 ) (+2) ** IT IS REASONABLE TO ASSUME THAT THE PARTY'S POSITION ON SOVIET
POLICY DID NOT CHANGE AFTER THE CONGRESS.
+3
+3
0
+3
+3
+3
+1 +3
+2
+3
0 +2
+3
0
0
+2
+3
+3
0 +2
0
0
0
+3
+3
-
- +3
+2*
0
0
+3*
-1
-
- (+3)**
4:1
c7
A)
(f)
4:1
C.0
C.0
C.0
CD
03
.....?,
4N.
? ?
PROBABLY NEGLIGIBLE, ALTHOUGH THERE IS SOME SLIGHT AND INDIRECT
SPAIN +5 -112 EVIDENCE OF FRICTION IN THE LEADERSHIP.
PARTY NEWSPAPER, WHICH INDIRECTLY EXPRESSED DISSATISFACTION WITH
CONGRESS, AND PARTY LEADER HAGBERG, WHOpRAGGED HIS FEET ON
SWEDEN +6 +II CONGRESS ISSUES AFTERWARDS, WERE BOTH UNDER ATTACK BY STRONGLY
PRO-CPSU YOUNG GUARD.
ATTEMPTS MADE TO DIVERT PARTY MEMBERS' ATTENTION FROM ISSUES IN
DISPUTE, AND TO MOBILIZE SUPPORT FOR SOVIET POSITIONS. DISSENSION,
SWITZERLAND +3 +7 AND ACKNOWLEDGENE NT OF SERIOUSNESS OF DISPUTE EXPRESSED BY A
REGIONAL PARTY LEADER TO A REGIONAL MEETING.
TURKEY -1-6
PORTUGAL +5 +8
+3
0
0
+2
+3
+3
+3
+3
0
+3
0
+3
+3
+3
+2
+3
0
0
0
+3
+2
+2
+1
+2
+3
0
0
+3
+2
0
0
+3
+3
+2
0
+3
0
)1>
Ai
0
"0
>
1:3
-0
3
<
CD
m
0
X
CD
CD
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CD
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CD
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.-._.--1 ?
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41011/11111111111111gr
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AFTER CONGFE SS
0 . ri
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-0
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CD
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0
7:1
CD
ALGERIA
+3
+70
0 0 +3
+2 +2 0 +3
al
ao
CEYLON
+7
( +3)
REPORTED THAT POLITBUREAU DECIDED DURING THE CONGRESS TO OMIT
PASSAGES FROM KHRUSHCHEV 17 OCT. SPEECH CRITICIZING ALBANIA AND
INSTRUCTED KEUNEMAN TO AVOID COMMITMENT ON ALBANIA AND STALIN.
SONE MEMBERS PRIVATELY CRITICAL OF REMOVAL OF STALIN CORPSE.
NATIONAL ORGANIZER SILVA, FORMERLY PRO-CHINESE, BECAME PRO-
SOVIET SINCE CONGRESS.
+2 +2 0 +3
- - 0 +3
(i)
CD
CD
CD
CD
INDIA
+3
-
LEADERSHIP DECIDED NOT TO TAKE OFFICIAL POSITION TILL AFTER
ELECTIONS, LEST DEBATE PRODUCE A SPLIT AND HURT POLITICAL
CHANCES. SOME REGIONAL PARTY ORGANIZATIONS ISSUED PRO-
STALIN AND PRO-ALBANIAN STATEMENTS. PARTY DID WELL IN THE
ELECTIONS
0 0 0 +3
Co
IRAN
+5
( +6)
+2 0 0 +3
+3 +3
0
IRAQ
+8
+12
+2 +3 0 +3
+3 +3 +3 +3
I
.;
ISRAEL
+8
+12
CONSIDERABLE CRITICISM BY PARTY RANKS OF LEADERS' FAILURE TO
GIVE GUIDANCE ON STALIN, ALBANIAN, AND CHINESE ISSUES AND FOR
TAKING PRO KHRUSHCHEV POSITION AT THE CONGRESS. PARTY NEWS
PAPER NOTED EXISTENCE OF SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE FOR FIRST TIME
ON 24 NOV. DESPITE CC COMMITMENT TO FULL SUPPORT OF CONGRESS
ACTIONS, SECRETARY GENERAL MIKUNIS ADMITTED STALIN: S MERITS
AT CLOSED MEETING 16 DEC.
+3 +2 0 +3
+3 +3 +3 +3
0
13
-...4
03
4:5
K.)
01
JORDAN
+5
-
+2 0 0 +3
LEBANON
+6
(+3)
+3 0 0 +3
- .3
MOROCCO
+7
+9
+2 +2 0 +3
+3 0 +3
J3.
NEPAL
-
(-I)
PRO-SOVIET FACTION WANTED TO KEEP SILENCE ON STALIN, BUT PRO-
CHINESE FACTION PUBLISHED PAMPHLET PRAISING STALIN.
(NOT RJBLIGLY IDENTI-
FIND AS ABSENT)
- -1 - -
CD
(A)
4.1
CD
(7 AT AFTER
A) CONGRESS
0
CD
mai I MI 1 I I I I II P 111 P
IMPACT
C
CD PAKISTAN +3
CD
(.0 REUNION +6
CD
03 SOUTH AFRICA +4 +7 LITTLE IMPACT. *POSMONS ASSESSED FROM EDITORIAL IN AFRICAN
COMMUNIST, AN SACP ORGAN.
4=k
SUDAN +6 IMPACT INSIGNIFICANT, BUT PARTY RANKS CONTINUE TO PRAISE STALIN
AND TO EXCUSE HIS FAULTS.
SYRIA +5 THE ONLY EXPRESSION OF VIEWS AVAILABLE IS THAT OF SECRETARY
GENERAL BAKDASH, WHO LIVES IN THE SOVIET BLOC.
TUNISIA +6 +10 *ON BASIS OF SCORE ON POLICY AT THE CONGRESS, THIS SHOULD PROBABLY
BE +3.
AT CONGRESS
2
5
AFTER CONGRESS
-
CD
a.0
CD
CD
CD
CD
en
6 0 0 +3
CD
+3 0 0 +3
Co
0 +1 0 +3
+2* +2* 13* +3*
4=k
+3 0 0 +3
+2 0 0 +3
+3 0 0 +3
+3 +3 +1 (+)k)
5.3
/11.000??0017000N9179Z0-8/dC1N-V10 : 17Z/80/6661. eseeieN .10d peACMCIdV
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
AT
CONGRESS
AFTER
IMPACT
AT CONGRESS
A
g
ca 2
AFTER CONGRESS
A c
(t?
a
-n
0
(i)
CT)
11.1
ARGENTINA
+9
+9
DEBATE SUPPRESSED BY LEADERSHIP TO AVOID EXPLOITATION BY-OPPOSITION,
PARTICULARLY TROTSKYITES. SUCCESS OF PARTY?PERONISTA ALLIANCE IN
MARCH ELECTIONS INDICATES CONGRESS HAD NO ADVERSE LOCAL POLITICAL
EFFECT.
+3
+3
0
+3
+3
+3
0
+3
fp
C.0
C.0
W
BOLIVIA
+5
_
+2
0
0
+3
a
co
BRAZIL
+7
+8
LEFTIST MINORITY FACTION CONTINUES TO BE REMOVED FROM POSITIONS
OF AUTHORITY; NOW FORMING NEW GROUP AND LOOKING FOR CHINESE
SUPPORT.
+2
+2
0
43
*3
+2
0
+3
ilZ3
4=k
. .
CANADA
-1-3
+5
0
0
0
+3
+2
..
*
+3
0
CHILE
+6
+12
PARTY MEMBERS DISTURBED BY 22ND CONGRESS AND BY CORVALANS PUBLIC
ENDORSEMENT OF IT WITHOUT CONSULTING LOWER UNITS. CORVALAN
PRIVATELY UNHAPPY ABOUT TREATMENT OF ALBANIA. SERIOUS DISSENSION
REPORTED IN COMMUNIST YOUTH ORGANIZATION.
+2
+2
0
+2
*3
+3
+3
+3
COLOMBIA
+6
+6
+3
0
0
+3
+2
+2
0
+2
03
COSTA RICA
+3
+8
PARTY SENT LETTER TO CPSU ENDORSING CONGRESS ACTIONS.
.3
0
0
+3
+2
0
+3
a
11/41
CUBA
+6
+7
+2
+2
0
+2
*2
+2
0
+3
CD
4=k
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
+3
?
0
0
0
.3
X
ECUADOR
+2
?
LEADERSHIP DECIDED NOT TO ISSUE STATEMENT FOR FEAR CF RAISING
PROBLEMS, BUT IT SUPPORTS CPSU.
+2
0
0
0
(+2)(+2)
?
?
CD
a
a
CD
a
CD
(7)
a)
CD
CD
CD
CD
a
co
0111111MMIIIIImo
GQ41614;04+64.
AT
CONGRESS
AFTER
IMPACT
GUADELOUPE
+2
GUATEMALA
+6
HAITI
+5
MARTINIQUE
+I
+9
MEXICO
-1-3
+9
REMOVAL OF SOME CC NE.MBERS IN DECEMBER IS RELATED TO SINO-SOVIET
DISPUTE. LEADERS ARE PRO-SOVIET, BUT SOME MEMBERS ARE PRO-
CHINESE.
NICARAGUA
+6
PANAMA
+6
NO APPARENT IMPACT.
PARAGUAY
+12
PERU
+5
PARTY LEADER HAS SAID THAT ISSUES WOULD BE DISCUSSED AT A PARTY
CONGRESS AND THAT IT COULD CAUSE A DIVISION IN THE RANKS.
SALVADOR
+2
URUGUAY
+9
+12
PARTY WAS FIRST IN LATIN AMERICA TO IMPLENENT CPSU CONGRESS LINE
IN PRACTICE. ORDERED BOOKSTORE TO DESTROY CHINESE MATERIALS AND
STALIN WRITINGS, PISCONTENT AT LOWER 1-EVELE CAUSED LEADERSHIP
TO OPEN PARTY-WIDE DEBATE. DISCONTENT CONTINUES. ATTENDANCE AT
MEETINGS DROPPED. PARTY CONGRESS POSTPONED FROM FEB. TO MAY.
U. S.
+6
+12
PUBLICATION OF ATTACK ON "DISRUPTERS" 28 JAN. INDICATES EXISTENCE
OF SIGNIFICANT SYMPATHY FOR ALBANIA AND CHINESE. PRO-ALBANIANS
EXPELLED.
VENEZUELA
+6
PARTY PREOCCUPIED WITH VIOLENCE AND SABOTAGE. NO FORMAL PRO-
NOUNCEMENT ISSUED.
AT CONGRESS AFTER CONGRESS
1
0
+3
0
+1
+3
+3
+2
+2
+3
+3
+3
.5
5
g
4
0
0
+2
+3
-
- +3
-
0
*2
0
0
*1
+3
+3
0
+3
0
0
+2
+3
+3
0
+3
0
0
+3
+1
0
+2
+3
+3
+3
+3
0
0
+3
0
0
0
.3
0
+3
+3.3
+2
+3
0
0
+3
+3 +3
+2
+3
0
0
+3
CONFID
L.
?
03
6
K.)
4b?
43k
ID
0
Ca,i) itaa4
CD
CD
fl)
Cl)
CD"
CD
FAR EAST
AT
CONGRESS
AFTER
IMPACT
AT CONGRESS
0 r. m Pi
.4 n
AFTER CONGRESS
m z
=HA?
P '12
CD
CD
Co
AUSTRALIA
0
+8
SENT GREETINGS TO ALBANIA, BUT LATER CONDEMNED HOXHA FOR HIS
SPEECH OF 7 NOVEMBER. LEADERSHIP SHIFTED POSITION ON ALBANIA
AND AWAY FROM CHINA IN FAVOR OF THE CPSU. OPPOSITION TO SHIFT
EXISTS IN LEADERSHIP. REGIONAL PARTY LEADER PURGED.
0 0 0 U
.3+2 0+3
4=k
. .
0
BURMA
0
--6*
EXTREME LEFTIST RED FLAG PARTY AND YOUTH OPPOSE CPSU. OPENLY
DEFY DE-STALINIZATION. THE RECOGNIZED BCP OPPOSES CPSU ON ALBANIA
LEGAL FRONT BWP-NUF SEEMS TO SUPPORT CPSU. *RED FLAG POSITION.
0 0 0 0
.3_3*-
0
INDONESIA
(-4)
?5
SHIFT OF FORMERLY PRO-SOVIET LEADERSHIP TOWARD CHINA ON ALBANIAN
AND STALIN ISSUES HAS STRENGTHENED UNITY. SOME EVIDENCE THAT LINE
ON DOMESTIC POLICY MAY ALSO BE SHIFTING TO LEFT. IMPENDING SPECIAL
CONGRESS ACTIONS COMPLICATED BY SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT.
(-3)(-1) 0 0
-2 0 -3.
03
cb
JAPAN
0
0
CONTINUED FAILURE OF LEADERSHIP TO TAKE A PARTISAN POSITION MAY
BE DUE TO FEAR THAT IT WOULD AGGRAVATE LONG?STANDING FACTIONALISM,
BUT IT ALSO CONTRIBUTES TO INCREASING LOSS OF DISCIPLINE. EXPELLED
KASUGA FACTION EXPLOITING CONGRESS CONCLUSIONS.
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
4o.
MALAYA
0
?3
0 0 0 0
a
a
NEW ZEALAND
41
?4
LEADERSHIP PRIVATELY VERY BITTER ABOUT ATTACK ON ALBANIA. ISSUED
STATEMENT CRITICIZING ACTIONS ON STALIN AND ALBANIA. CONCERN FOR
FUTURE EXPRESSED.
0 0 0 +1
-2-2-0
a
4o.
THAILAND
0 U 0 0
a
a
a
a
a
CD
(7
su
Cl)
CD
?a
CD
CD
CD
a
oo
4)k
-o
Co
4)k
CD
rleVIIPPM78-02646R000400330001-7
. .
CHART SHOWING SHIFTS OF POSITION OF FREE WORLD
PARTIES AFTER THE CONGRESS
EUROPE 2 1 0 5,
1133TRITA
BELGIUM
CYPRUS
DENMARK
FINLAND
nANCE
GERMANY (WES )
GREAT BRITAIN
GREECE
ICELAND
IRELAND (NORTH)
IRELAND (REPUBLIC)
ITALY
LUXEMBOURG
NETHERLANDS
NORWAY
PORTUGAL
SAN MARINO
SPAIN
SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND
TURKEY
NEAR EAST-AFRICA
ALGERIA
CEYLON
INDIA
IRAN
IRAQ
ISRAEL
JORDAN
LEBANON
MOROCCO
PAKISTAN
REUNION
SUDAN
SYRIA
TUNISIA
SOUTH AFRICA
7 5 5 10 Ii .2
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
ARGENTINA
BOLIVIA
BRAZIL
CANADA
COLOMBIACHI LE
COSTA RICA
CUBA
DOMINICAN REPUB LTC
ECUADOR
-GUADELOUPE
GUATEMALA.
HAITI
MARTINIQUE
MEXICO
NICARAGUA
PANAMA
PARAGLI.Y
PERU
SALVADOR
URUGUAY
U. 5.A.
VENEZUELA
FAR EAST
AUSTRALIA
BURMA
INDONESIA
JAPAN
MALAYA
NEW ZEALAND
THAILAND
9 10 11 12
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11111111.1111.114111.111.00
Explanation of the Chart Showing Shifts of Position of Free World
Parties after the Congress
1. The parties are grouped regionally.
2. Parties are accorded the scores as shown in the Tally-Sheet
at and after the congress. The direction of shifts in position is
indicated by arrows. A dashed arrow indicates a presumed shift
from an unknown or incompletely documented position at the congress
to a known position afterwards. A single dot without an arrow in-
dicates the score accorded the party at the congress; its post-congress
position is not sufficiently known to score it. A circled dot indicates
that the net score at and after the congress has not changed.
3. Average net regional scores, taking into account only
adequately documented positions, are as follows:
At the congress After
Europe + 4.2 + 8.9
Middle East-Africa
+ 5.
5
+ 9.
5
Western Hemisphere + 4.
9
+ 8.
8
Far East
- 0.
4
- 1.
4
Note the closeness of the average scores of the pro-Soviet areas
at and after the congress.
53
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1
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Approved For Release
00400330001-7
APPENDIX B: Questions Raised for the rree World Parties
as a Result of the 22nd CPSU Congress
On Stalin and the Anti-Party Croup*
Revisionist questions
1. Does the phenomenon of Stalin have roots in some basic
defects of the Soviet system? Why did the CPSU choose to ignore
Lenin's warning about Stalin's character and what other critical
choices did the CPSU make in subsequent years that contributed
to Stalin's omnipotence? Do the principles of the monolithic party,
the rule of unanimity, and the one-party tradition have something
to do with this? Why was the party unable to resist Stalin and why
did it take so long after his death to even begin the process of
de-Stalinization?
2. Is the Soviet explanation of Stalinism Marxist-Leninist
and is it convincing? How can the argument that Stalin decided
everything be reconciled with the argument that the party remained
sound and that democracy prevailed below the t41? Is the argument
that Stalinism was a cancer in a basically sound body consonant with
historical materialism or is it not an idealistic argument? How can
it be that a leader who has been good suddenly becomes bad? If
Stalin was wrong about his victims during the great purges of the
1930's, might he not also have been wrong earlier? Is it not
advisable to re-examine the historical position of Trotsky and others
purged by Stalin?
3. Does the unilateral denunciation of Stalin by people who
rose to high positions under him really guarantee that Stalinism
Note: On this question, a pattern of divisio-n between re-
visionist and oppositionist questioning is discernible and is
treated accordingly. No such pattern emerges very clearly
on the other issues.
54
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-
aseum111111Mmitip
is finished? Are not these people doing things the way Stalin himself
did? Why was Molotov prevented from defending his views. Are
the present Soviet leaders credible when they claim that they were
ignorant of what Stalin was doing, and does this claim not prove the
dangers of a closed society? To what extent do Khrushchev and his
team share responsibility for Stalin's mistakes and crimes, and
should they be relieved of the necessity of personal self-criticism?
Oppositionist questions
1. What right has Khrushchev to expose the Stalinist period
as one of crimes, deceit, and sycophancy? What right has he to
make other parties historically guilty of Stalinism and to provoke
anti-leadership movements in other parties?
2. Why does Khrushchev minimize Stalin's achievements--which
made the USSR what it is today? How can these achievements be recon-
ciled with the Soviet argument that Stalin seriously damaged the cause
of Communism?
Questions asked by pro-Soviet and oppositionist leaders alike
1. Was it necessary to remove Stalin's corpse from Lenin's
mausoleum?
2. Was it necessary and proper to re-name Stalingrad and to
do away with other relics of Stalin?
3. Was it proper to attack Voroshilov?
Albania and China
1. Was it proper to condemn Albania publicly and without an
adequate hearing? Does the action of the CPSU bind other parties to
take the same position? Is it proper for the Chinese--and other
-A,
parties--to take different positions?
55
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4?11111111Miiilltb
2. Why did the leaders persist in denying rumors of differences
of opinion? (In some countries, why did the party newspaper delete
critical passages from Congress materials?)
3. What is the real reason for Sino-Soviet differences:
strategic economic, or a result of different historical experiences
and psychology?
4. Has the CPSU in fact resorted to improper pressures and
intrigues against Albania (and China)?
National Leadership and Discipline
1. To what extent are Communist leaders Outside the bloc
responsible for Stalinism? Were they really so ignorant as they now
claim? Do they now really understand what is happening and should
party members accept their perhaps still faulty ?planations as
correct?
2. To what extent should free world parties try to influence
the CPSU to complete the de-Stalinization proce4s and to provide a
better explanation for what happened and more convincing guarantees
that it cannot happen again?
3. How independent and critical can a party be toward the
CPSU? Should the parties be autonomous? Is regional decentra-
lization of authority ("polycentrism") advisable or permissible.
To what extent is it proper to openly criticize other CPs (other than
the CPSU)?
4. What is the proper method for settling differences between
parties and for arriving at international decisions? Should state-
ments be compromised so as to obtain unanimity that is.formal but
not real? Should unresolved problems be left out of joint statements?
Should majority rule prevail?
56
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IAL
dilisiiiiiimila
5. How much democracy should be allowed inside a party?
Should a minority be allowed to publish its position?
6. How can Communists retain confidence in the ability and
wisdom of the CPSU in light of all the mistakes that have been
expo sed?
7. How can Communists convince others that the CPSU is
doing the right thing now and that its policies should be supported
as sincere ones?
57
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