GERMAN WARTIME PROPAGANDA IN THE U.S.S.R.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-02646R000400200001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 4, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 7, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

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RET
0*44
Copy No . __-5`
GTF, RR-MAN
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WAiF'\Z.T1ME 'AD-j'1'-7%10
APRIL 7, 1949
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CONTENT
INTRODUCTION
MAIN SOURCES
I ORGANIZATION AND SCOPE
II GENERAL TRENDS
III ECONOMY AND FORCED LABOR
IV NEWSPAPERS, MOVIES AND RADIO
V SOVIET ARMY, POWS AND PARTISANS
VI YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS AND REVIVAL
OF COMMUNISM
CARTOONS ON GERMAN LEAFLETS
Page
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INTRODUCTION
In the early months of their propaganda campaign
against the Soviet Union, the Germans had two advantages.
When they first advanced into Soviet territory they
were considered liberators by the population, freeing
them from Soviet tyranny; and, second, their victories
over the Red Army during the first year of the war gave
them great prestige.
Despite these advantages, all German observers
agreed that their propaganda in the Soviet Union failed.
There were many reasons for this failure.
For years the. Soviet population had been taught
that the Red Army was invincible, and it was difficult
to convince them that this time the Soviet Government
had met with an even stronger power. Therefore, the
local population felt it must reckon with the possibility
of a return of the Red Army and reprisals against those
who had been.anti-Communist.
As a result of their twenty-year experience with
Bolshevik propaganda, the Soviet population had learned
not to believe slogans, and was inclined to Judge the
Germans by their acts rather than words. German
occupation policy, the treatment of war prisoners, and
the forced deportation of workers nullified the effect
of their propaganda.
Political terrorism, strict press censorship,
prohibition of any political activity, and distrust
of local self-administration recalled to the population
the tactics of the Soviet regime.
? The population finally came to regard German
propaganda as false, according to a Security Police
report of April, 1943. In the propaganda warfare the
Germans were always on the defensive.
Nazi Germany, equally opposed to Communism and
Democracy, could offer the Soviet population nothing
but the substitution of one totalitarian system for
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another. It. was therefore natural that, according to
a High Command review of 1944, the people confronted
with the choice between an alien or a native tyranny
preferred the latter.
Lacking original ideas and political sense, German
propaganda substituted for them crude attacks on the
Bolsheviks, the Allies, and the Jews, which boomeranged
against them. German propaganda made very little use
of German technical abilities or of the German achieve-
ments which might have impressed the Soviet peoples.
German propaganda also was less concrete than that of
the Soviets.
As a result, Soviet counter-propaganda steadily
gained ground. Use of the basic nationalism and
patriotism of the Russian people, often recognized
by the Germans as a very clever move, enabled the
Soviet Government to appear as the defender of national
interests, and this gained them widespread support.
Rumors spread by the Communist Party, though never
officially confirmed, raised hopes for a relaxation of
the regime after the war. This belief helped Soviet
and undermined German propaganda efforts.
It appears that the superiority of Soviet political
warfare over the Germans was the result of clever
exploitation of the weaknesses of the opponent, rather
than of Soviet strength.
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MAIN SOURCES
This contribution to the study of German Wartime
Propaganda in the U.S.S.R. has been written from
German Documents as listed below. This study is not
meant to be exhaustive, but is authoritative in so
far as its sources permit.
This study is one of a series made from official
German Documents. Already published in this series
are: "Russian Anti-Communist Forces in the German
War," DW-01, and "Soviet Partisan Warfare Since 1941,"
DW-02. Forthcoming studies will deal with a further
development of Partisan Warfare, the German Analysis
of the Psychology of the Soviet People, and the
Ukrainian Problem.
Main Sources and Analyses:
Qberkommando Wehrmacht (0KW) and Oberkommando Heer
(OKH) reports
(German High Command)
Political analysis of the situation in the
occupied areas, especially those under military
administration. Valuable criticism of the policy
of the Reich Commissars in their respective areas.
Sicherheitsdienst weekly and monthly reports
(Security Police)
Regular and very valuable material, containing
a great amount of factual data. The reports are
conspicuous for independent criticism of German
occupation policy and propaganda.
Vertreter des Auswa.rtigen Amtes (VAA) reports
(Representative of the Foreign Office at the High
Command)
In most instances an over-all picture of the
situation in the occupied areas.
Auswartiges Amt documents
(German Foreign Office), including Hitler's orders,
documents of the "Russia Gremium," Ambassadors'
reports, and so forth.
Important documents on the deliberations and
conflicts in the highest policy making bodies.
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Reichs Ministerium fur Besetzte Gebiete documents and
Reich Commissars reports
(Ministry for the Eastern Territories)
Current problems of propaganda.
Nurnberg Documents (Rosenberg files)
German leaflets - State Department microfilms
Soviet leaflets - State Department microfilms
Propaganda Abteilung "?stiand" reports
(Propaganda Division for the Baltic States and
Byelorussia, at the High Command)
Contain factual material on propaganda in the
Baltic States and Byelorussia.
Geheime Feld Polizei monthly reports
(Army Secret Field Police)
Valuable addition to the Security Police reports.
Reports of Field Mail Censorship
Analysis of soldiers' mail.
.Statements of Soviet prisoners of war
Statements on various aspects of life in un-
occupied territories, on the morale of the Soviet
army, effect of German propaganda, and so forth.
Propaganda Abteilung W and U reports
(Propaganda Division for Byelorussia and Ukraine)
Contain vast factual data on propaganda in the
Ukraine.
Individual reports on the political situation in the
occupied areas and on propaganda, prepared on orders
of the High Command
Provide over-all pictures and analyses of the
German policy, some of them uncritical, exagge-
rating German successes and the friendship of
the population toward the Germans,
ST
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I ORGANIZATION AND SCOPE
A political report of the German Armed Forces
High Command of February 7th, 1942, declared that
ttpropaganda is the most important weapon in this
campaign (the German campaign in the East). By its
employment on a large scale, final victory in the East
can be achieved far more quickly, and our losses of
men can be greatly reduced." This was borne out by
the views of prisoners of war, who said that leaflets
rather than bombs should be dropped on the U.S.S.R.
The German estimate was based on the fact that in
all wars waged by the Soviet Union the ideological
element had played a major role, and, therefore,
political propaganda had assumed great importance. For
this reason, German propaganda in the East was concen-
trated more on such topics than German propaganda
against the Western Allies. It was directed primarily
against such targets as Communism, the "scorched earth"
policy, and the partisans.
Several German agencies were responsible for
propaganda. Hitler?s order of September 8th, 1939,
made the Foreign Office responsible for propaganda
abroad. Yet the High Command claimed the right to
conduct propaganda on all matters pertaining to military
affairs, and especially in the combat zones. The
Ministry for the Eastern Territories, also, had propa-
ganda divisions, and the Reich Commissars of the various
occupied areas, under that Ministry, set up their own
propaganda and censorship agencies. The influence of
the Ministry of Propaganda was almost eliminated. Since
the functions of these various groups were not clearly
defined, there were frequent disputes among them.
At first, German propaganda on the Eastern Front
was handicapped by dislocation and destruction caused
by the fighting. An Army High Command report of
September 16th, 1941, stated that "there is no mail
service, no railways, no movies, no press, in short no
communication facilities, except by word of mouth."
Lack of paper and printing plants created further
difficulties. In this period, the Germans used loud-
speakers mounted on trucks as their main method of
propaganda.
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In the course of a few months, however, many of
these difficulties were overcome. Printed matter,
films, and similar material was sent from Berlin. A
special train equipped as a complete printing plant
traveled throughout the occupied areas doing reproduction
work on propaganda material. By December 21st, 1941,
according to a German Foreign Office report, 425 million
leaflets had been dropped in the unoccupied areas of
the U.S.S.R.
In the period between February and August of 1942
the following material was distributed throughout the
Ukraine: 29 posters with a total of 1,400,000 copies,
16 pamphlets, 1,500,000 copies, 7 leaflets, 3,000,000
copies, 11 leaflet and wall newspapers, 1,800,000
copies, 15 pictures of Hitler, 300,000 copies and other
material, 48,000 copies.
Extensive propaganda efforts were made by the
Germans during their retreat. An army report of June
6th, 1944, states that during the preceding two months
of comparative calmness at the front propaganda was
increased; in April 64,561,000 leaflets were dissem-
inated, and in May, 120,775,000.
It appeared, however, that the German effort fell
far short of the Soviet. With their vast experience.
in mass propaganda the Soviets proved superior to the
Germans both in quality and quantity of their material.
In February, 1943, a report of the SS Security Police
in the occupied areas stated that Soviet propaganda was
"still not countered by effective German propaganda,"
and in April, 1943, that its activity was "intense,
clever and far superior to,German propaganda."
II GENERAL TRENDS
German propaganda was mainly based on the theme
of liberation from Soviet regime, and was supported by
the anti-capitalist trend within the Nazi Party. This
propaganda also sought to undermine Soviet charges
that the Germans intended to reinstate big landowners
and capitalist exploitation. It also tried to arouse
the Russian people against their "plutocratic" western
allies.
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A typical German leaflet stated that "two sides
are now struggling for the right to live. One side
is the old, out-moded, dying world of predatory
capitalism and slave-owning Communism. The alliance
of the capitalists Roosevelt and Churchill with the
Communist Stalin is not accidental, they are two links
of the chain fettering the toilers of the old world.
The other side is the new world being built under
Hitler?s leadership. It is the world of justice and
freedom."
The new order which the Germans would introduce
in Russia was described in another leaflet as a regime
"without capitalists, big landowners or Communists."
Exploitation of the struggle against Communism
seemed the best weapon for German propaganda because
a large part of the population of the U.S.S.R. was
opposed to the Soviet regime. But since the peoples
of the U.S.S.R, knew so much about their own govern-
ment, they expected from their German liberators more
than mere denunciations. They sought a political and
economic way of life to replace the Soviet regime, and
of ways and means to achieve this end,
According to a High Command review of the period
1941?1944, "the masses of the people instinctively
expected that a new idea would be produced from the
German side, an idea which would bring about spiritual
liberation from Bolshevism. Instead, only promises
came, and in a few months it became obvious that these
promises were being broken."
In conversations with people in the occupied
areas, and in questions asked after propaganda lectures,
the problems were invariably raised: what form of
government and what kind of economy will prevail in a
future Russia, and what place will she occupy in Europe?
Because of their colonization policy in the Soviet
Union, the Germans were unable to give satisfactory
answers to these questions, and confined their propa-
ganda to criticism of the Soviets and to vague promises.
Their "program," announced repeatedly in leaflets,
consisted of the following points: 1m A tract of private
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land for each farmer; 2. adequate wages; 3. private
trade and facilities for skilled artisans; 40 local
administration, meeting the needs of the population;
and, 5. restoration of industrial enterprises and
homes destroyed by the Bolsheviks. In this rather
meaningless program, there was no reference to any
future form of government.
The various German propaganda agencies compiled
regular monthly or weekly surveys of public opinion
in the occupied areas. Almost every survey noted
that during the period under review public feeling
toward the Germans had become more unfriendly, These
reports often urged the adoption of a more positive
and concrete propaganda line, and more extensive
treatment of political problems of the future in
propaganda media.
While criticizing the defects of German propaganda,
some of these reports suggested that even more lavish
promises be given to the Soviet population, regardless
of the possibility of their being fulfilled in the
future,
If Wilson managed to tempt the intelligent German
people by promises, it should be easy to influence the
credulous and primitive Russian people," stated a
report of the Security Police about the end of October,
19410
A Foreign Office report of October, 1941, saw the
weakness in the fact that "leaflets dropped so far
contain few positive statements concerning future
measures planned by the Germans." Such slogans in
leaflets as "Long live the liberty which the armies of
Great Germany bring you'" or "For liberty, free labor,
and a prosperous life for all" or "We bring you
freedom of religion and liberation from Stalin?s
exploitation, terrorism and misery" had no lasting
effect in the light of existing conditions.
The slogan is: struggle against Judeo-Bolshevism,
but the reality is requisition, looting and hardship
inflicted on the population, according to an army report
of February 7th, 1942,
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German propaganda was more effective when it
dealt with single concrete developments. Thus, a
campaign was launched against the reinstatement in
July, 1941, of political Commissars in the Red Army.
Their reappearance, according to one of the leaflets,
proved that "the Kremlin pack of hangmen does not
trust you," that from now on the commanders would
lose their authority, and the troops would be commanded
by "civilian servants of the Kremlin gang of usurpers,"
rather than by military experts.
This approach *a$ in accord with the bitterness
of the Red Army againet the political commissars.
Another instance was propaganda on the occasion of the
Soviet anniversary in November of 1941, when broad-
casts were beamed from Belgrade, Rome, Bucharest, and
Helsinki attacking Communism,
Many German leaflets and posters were repetitious
and written in coarse language which reminded the
population of Soviet propaganda. A year after the
outbreak of war, a German observer.noted that
intellectuals in the occupied areas complained that
the Germans "while changing the names of some insti-
tutions, maintain the Soviet spirit of crudeness."
The poor style of some leaflets raised a suspicion
among the Soviet population that the Russian translators
were sabotaging and deliberately duping the Germans.
Part of the anti-Communist propaganda was devoted
to an extensive and vigorous campaign against Jews.
It held them responsible for the. Soviet regime, for
the hardships of war and the continued slaughter.
"We are not fighting against the peoples of the
U.S.S.R., but against the criminal rule of the Jews
and Stalin," said one of the many leaflets on this
subject, while another carried verses: "Hit the
Commissar-Jew, hig ugly mug calls for a brick,"
Anti-Semitism was also used to drive a wedge
between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies. An
appeal against Communism ended with the words: "Down
with Stalin, the Jewish pack and the Communists! Down
with Britain, the real warmonger!"
5 .4tansm man
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Another leaflet stated: "StalinBs alliance with
the Jews of London and Washington is not an alliance
of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. with the peoples of
Britain and America, but a union of Soviet, British
and American Jews for the defense of their common
Jewish interests."
Anti-Semitic propaganda was reported to be
successful in many regions of the Soviet Union,
especially in the West, Other reports stated that
harsh measures applied against Jews were disapproved
by the population.
The lack of subtlety in German propaganda can be
illustrated by the following example.. In December,
1941, the High Command suggested that leaflets be
printed containing faked orders of the Soviet Govern=
ment, It was hoped that such orders would create
confusion among Soviet troops,
The Committee of Russian Experts at the Foreign
Office agreed to this plan. But when the High Command
printed an order allegedly signed by Stalin giving
each Soviet soldier the free choice of whether to
fight on or to desert, the Committee objected that in
this case, as often before, "the intelligence of the
opponent is underestimated and far too clumsy traps
are set for him."
Despite the large number of leaflets dropped from
German planes, the Soviet command obviously found means
of intercepting them. According to a German report of
May, 1942, prisoners of war often stated that they
had never seen German propaganda, while the area behind
their lines had often been flooded by Soviet leaflets.
Freedom of religion was a recurrent slogan in the
German propaganda literature. Though many reports
pointed out that the younger generation was often
indifferent to religion, the importance of this
problem in the U.S.S.R. was often stressed.
It was found, for instance, that in Catholic
Lithuania anti-German feeling was bolstered by sympathy
for Poland. As to the Russian Church, an army report
of 1944 declared that it could not be used for any
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anti-Soviet campaign because of its pan-Slavic tendency
and lack of fighting spirit.
German propaganda tried to enlist the support of
national minorities in the Soviet Union, and on several
occasions tried to stimulate their aspiration to inde-
pendence. Thus, an appeal to the Ukrainians declared:
'The hour of liberation for which you and your fathers
have fought and made so many sacrifices in blood has
struck' ... The Tsars almost wiped out your language,
and the Bolshevist Muscovites wanted to turn you,
peasants and Cossacks, into permanent serfs... For
twenty years Adolf Hitler and his National Socialists
have watched your suffering... In the name of justice
we came forward in support of the Ukrainian language,
Ukrainian culture and a free Ukrainian state,"
An appeal to the peoples of the Caucasus said:
"With her invincible army Germany marches also for
the freedom of all peoples of the East; Never again
shall the yoke of the Muscovites be borne by these
peoples,.. Long live free C?ucasus in alliance with
Adolf Hitler?s Greater German Reich'"
The few scattered statements of this kind were
not in accord with Hitler?s real plans for these
territories. They represented a swing away from
HitlerBs political line formulated by Reich Minister
Hans Lammers, head of the Reich Chancery in a letter
to Rosenberg on September 23rd, 1944; "The Fuehrer
does not wish that any assurances be given to persons
belonging to the Eastern peoples concerning their
political future."
Similarly, a directive on propaganda and press
for the Ukraine stated-. "The press and the enlighten-
ment work in the occupied Eastern regions will have to
emphasize repeatedly that in the next years the only
slogan for the population liberated from Bolshevism
will be: work and still more work."
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III ECONOMY AND FORCED LABOR
During an interrogation about the effect of German
propaganda on the Red Army, a Russian prisoner of war
said that in the Soviet Union effective propaganda
must be based on a consideration of the Soviet standard
of living. Soviet soldiers should be asked,, "Why does
the Soviet factory worker and kolkhoz farmer live in
such bad conditions?" In the leaflets, he said, the
answer could be confined to a few sentences describing
Bolshevik mismanagement.
In the occupied regions, too, the economic problem
played an important propaganda role. German reports
stress that the economic disorganization of these
regions was a major element in arousing the population
against the Germans and undermining their propaganda
efforts.
A report of June 4th, 1942, declared that because
of food difficulties the population was. more friendly
to the Bolsheviks than several months before, and held
the German administration responsible for the misery
because of the large-scale requisitions.
The extent of this misery was illustrated by the
following fact. In an area investigated by the
Security Police in the fall of 1942, the number of
cattle was 4843 percent of the prewar figure, the
number of sheep and pigs 22.9 percent, and the number
of horses 62kry percent. The population, which had
expected a swift normalization of life by the Germans,
came to the conclusion that the Germans "achieve not
much more than our former Bolshevik rulers."
As soon as they occupied extensive areas, the
Germans launched a propaganda campaign to stimulate
agricultural productions In the areas of Mogilev and
Orel this propaganda started very early in the warp
Army horses were placed at the disposal of farmers,
However, this propaganda admittedly was not an
effective counter-balance for the continuing requiai$
tionsp Moreover, German observers commented that the
Soviet population became contemptuous of the Germans
who, it appeared, lived themselves in such misery that
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they needed the last piece of bread of the Soviet
people. In the streets of Smolensk the children
chanted: "Adolf Hitler, the German Fuehrer, has
liberated us from bacon, meat and bread."
Abolition of the Soviet system of collective
farms (kolkhozes) and Soviet state farms (sovkhozes)
was promised by the\Germans from the start, and was
eagerly, awaited by the population. When a moderate
land reform program was enacted early in 1942, the
Germans launched a big propaganda campaign. According
to an army report of March 13th; 1942, in Byelorussia
and the Baltic States one million copies of the German-
published newspaper "Pravda", carrying the story, were
distributed, and 16,000 posters bearing the text of
the law and Rosenberg's statement, as well as 18,000
posters with the text alone, were plastered on walls.
In many towns such as Pskov and Luga mass meetings
and religious thanksgiving services were held, and
exhibitions to show the happy life of the German
farmers were organized.
According to a Security Police report of June,
1942, the Soviets tried to counter this German propa-
ganda by disseminating rumors that Stalin had granted
land to the farmers, permitted religious services and
removed Jews from responsible government posts.
Similarly, in Byelorussia pro-Soviet sources
circulated rumors that Stalin had started breaking
up the collective farms and that partisans were now
fighting "not for Stalin, but for a. new Russian order."
When it appeared that the German reform existed only
on paper, disillusionment was great'both in towns and
villages.
As early as April 15th, 1942, the High Oommand
reported that "the favorable feeling of the population,
greatly enhanced by the land reform, had'turned into a
rather expectant attitude."
Additional difficulty in the economic field was
caused by the Soviet "scorched earth" policy and
sabotage. The Germans used a large number of leaflets
and lectures in an effort to persuade the population
to refrain from following Soviet orders.
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ennn .m
"Citizens! Do not let Stalin's hangmen of the
NKVD and extermination outfits burn your houses, your
bread, your people's factories and plants," a typical
leaflet stated.
Ukrainian peasants were told: "Your soil is
your most important possession, think of this and work
your fields. The product of the land will be paid for
in good money."
In October, 1941, 700,000 leaflets were distributed
among the miners of the Donets Basin.
One of them said: "Do not fulfill the irresponsible
and stupid orders of the Soviet Government. If you
destroy your plants, factories, mines and means of
production, you and your families will remain without
work and without bread... In Hitler's Germany the
worker lives better than in the Soviet Union because
he is recognized as an equal member of the National
Socialist state."
Workers of oil refineries were urged: "Do not
allow the prerequisites of your tomorrow's happy life
to be destroyed." However, there is no indication
from German sources as to the effectiveness of this
propaganda.
German exploitation of the conquered areas was
not confined to the purely economic field. In the
U.S.S.R., as in the western nations, it included the
mobilization of manpower for service in the Reich.
This mobilization presented a new task to German
propaganda. To popularize this supposedly voluntary
mobilization the Germans used newspapers and letters
allegedly written by Soviet workers shipped earlier
to Germany.
The Germans were anxious to shift the onus for
this mobilization to native members of the local
administration, Meetings were held in towns with local
mayors or known collaborators as the main speakers.
German reports from some districts say the prescribed
quota of workers was filled in many districts by
voluntary enlistment. However, probably more reliable
reports from other districts, for instance an army
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report of. June 4th, 1942, stated that only a small
percentage of the required number of workers had
enlisted as a result of propaganda, and that "con-
siderable pressure" had to be exercised to increase
their number.
This pressure, coupled with information which
leaked out about the appalling conditions in the labor
camps, caused much resentment among the population.
According to a report of the High Command of April
12th, 1942, the quota for Kiev was 30,000, but the
very first group of workers, even before it left Kiev,
was subjected to brutal treatment, and this became
generally known in the Kiev area. As a result, by
the fourth day of enlistment 5,000 eligible men had
fled from Kiev. These circumstances, states the report,
out the ground from under German propaganda, which,
even at best, was very inadequate. Here again, the
population drew comparisons between the Soviet and the
German occupation regimes.
"The opinion often prevails among the population
that the recruitment for work in the Reich is nothing
other than deportation to forced labor, well known
under the Soviets," a Security Police report stated.
Soviet propaganda took advantage of the situation
to incite the population against the Germans by leaflets
and what the Germans called "whispering propaganda."
In 1942, a Soviet leaflet charged the Germans were
sending Ukrainian workers "like slaves to so-called
concentration camps, in which hundreds of thousands of
Poles, Czechs, Serbs and Frenchmen have died from hard
labor, hunger, whips and bullets of the fascist guards."
Beautiful German posters, noted the High Command, made
no headway against this Soviet campaign. The
accusations were believed by the population.
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IV NEWSPAPERS, MOVIES AND RADIO
German observers noted on many occasions that the
Soviet population was anxious to obtain information on
current events. The people "show a strong urge for a
steady and current supply of information on the politi-
cal and military situation and a strong desire for
reading material," a German High Command report noted.
After a year and a half of occupation, a Security Police
report stated that "it is amazing how difficult the
reading hunger of the Russian population is to satisfy,"
since their criticism was sharp, and they were inter-
ested even in the advertisements which were hardly ever
printed in the Soviet press. The Secret Field Police
observed that farmers would sometimes offer an egg or
some milk for the loan of a newspaper.
The Germans published periodicals in Russian and
in other Soviet languages, though such publications
were small and few in number, The Propaganda Division
of the Ministry for the Eastern Territories reported
in October, 1941, that the Pskov newspaper "Pravda"
had a circulation of 225,000, and that in the Ukraine
newspapers with a circulation from 4,000 to 40,000
each, appeared in ten towns. Some of them were week-
lies. In August, 1942, there were 17 Russian and
Ukrainian papers in that region with a total weekly
circulation of 460,000. The Security Police reported
in 1942 that the Germans were publishing in Vitebsk
a farm journal, an illustrated paper, a comic paper
and a "Monthly for Politics and Culture"; in Viazma,
"The New World" with a circulation of 25,000, in Orel,
"The Speech" with a 6,000 circulation, and similar
publications in other areas. A popular calendar
"New Europe" and various pamphlets met with appreciable
success.
All these publications were strictly supervised
by German propaganda agencies, which determined the
place of publication, the printing plant to be used,
the size and the price of the paper and the rate for
advertisements. Since local newspapermen were few,
most of the writing had to be done by propaganda
officials. Newspaper material was sent from Berlin,
12
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""Awava
and such material was sometimes criticized in German
reports as showing a lack of understanding of the
mentality of Soviet people.
The main columns of the newspapers were devoted
to the German military communiques. Articles were
devoted mainly to current propaganda subjects, local
affairs, and agricultural problems. Political comment
was scarce. In the Ukraine, discussion of the postwar
form of the Ukrainian state was explicitly forbidden.
The constantly recurring German statement that the
population asked for more news, and that the spreading
of information by word of mouth never decreased,
indicate that the comment and information sections of
the newspapers were unsatisfactory.
Security Police reports noted that the rural
population, which was difficult to reach by German
propaganda, "obtained concrete material about Soviet
successes" from Soviet sources, and that in Byelorussia
"the native population was better informed through
(Soviet) leaflets and oral propaganda about the cir-
cumstances of the fall of Stalingrad than the Germans
through official information." Ten days after Pearl
Harbor, in a place some 20 miles from Minsk even
Germans knew nothing about the United States-Japanese
conflict, the High Command reported.
Not much use was apparently made of radio
propaganda, This may have been due to the fact that
a considerable part of the Soviet population could
not be reached by radio. Available texts of German
broadcasts consist mainly of generalities. and propa-
ganda.
By contrast, Soviet broadcasts to Germany were
more vigorous and better directed toward particular
targets. Thus, they were used to disprove the
accusation of maltreatment of German prisoners of war.
Soon after the beginning of the war, the Moscow,
Lenningrad, and Kuibyshev radio stations broadcast
personal greetings from prisoners of war to their
families in Germany, and anti-Nazi appeals to indi-
vidual German military units and factories. These
broadcasts, called "POW Mail," attracted the attention
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ftW4ftftftb
of numerous relatives of German soldiers, among them
many old Nazis.
An attempt to reach soldiers? families was also
made with postcards signed by German prisoners of war
and dropped from planes behind the German lines,
Handwriting experts of the German police found that
these signatures were partly genuine and partly
forged. Former Communist members of the Reichstag
addressed their countrymen by radio. The National
Committee of Free Germany, from its inception in July
of 1943, also used the radio for communication with
Germany.
Movies and theaters were also an important medium
of propaganda. The German view on this -subject was
expressed by one German propaganda group working in
the Ukraine.
"Worry about everyday life always focuses attention
on political and economic problems," this group stated.
"By opening or expanding movie theaters the attention
of the population could be diverted and, simultaneously,
propaganda influence could be exercised,"
In all the occupied areas the population was
mainly interested in two kinds of films: newsreels
and films giving a true picture of life In Germany.
In this field German propaganda proved especially
weak. Even at the end of 1942, many German films were
still shown without Russian captions, while in Vilno
newsreels were three months old. Propaganda films
designed for domestic German use were often shown,
although they had no appeal for the Russians, Pictures
showing the quality and quantity of German armament,
however, produced a marked impression. On the basis
of this observation, the Germans used to stage military
parades when news from the front was unfavorable.
It was further observed that pictures of battles
showing the bodies of Soviet; soldiers had a depressing
effect, since relatives of many of the audience were
in the Soviet Army, Pictures of social life produced
a mixed reaction, and some of them were criticized as
immoral. A German order of 1942 directed that theaters
"should under no circumstances be used for propaganda
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for reactionary-Tsarist, Bolshevik, Great Russian or
Ukrainian nationalism." In the Ukraine, joint
attendance at movies and theaters by German soldiers
and Ukrainians was prohibited.
A similar line was taken in regard to other
fields of cultural activity. The Germans sponsored
reading rooms, museums and exhibitions, in an effort
to at least give the appearance of satisfying the
cultural desires of the Russian people. Special
attraction was exercised by concerts. Exhibitions
were sometimes used for direct propaganda purposes.
In October, 1942, an exhibition was organized in
Kharkov to show Soviet faults in handling art, economy,
public health and education.
V SOVIET ARMY, POWS AND PARTISANS
The Foreign Office representative at the High
Command supervised the publication of a "Newspaper for
the Red Army Man," to spread German propaganda in the
ranks of the Red Army, but only a limited number of
copies were printed. In April, 1944, 10,000 copies
of the current issue were dropped, But the main medium
of this type of propaganda was leaflets stressing the
superiority of the German Army and the difference
between the misery behind the Soviet lines and the
improvements in the occupied regions.
"Heroism and readiness for sacrifices alone are
not enough to win a war... Your resistance is sense-
less, hopeless and unnecessary... Come over to us as
thousands of your brethren have done. Long live
peace!", one of these leaflets said.
A special appeal to the Cossacks urged them to
turn their arms against the Soviets for the sake of
their families and homeland. Attention was given to
propaganda directed at Red Army officers, and the
question of extending this field to cover political
commissars was discussed but met with opposition.
One of the few appeals addressed to commissars
said: "Drop your arms and surrender! Comrade
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SW
Commanders, lead this reasonable cause'. Comrade
political commissars, cease all agitation for the
continuation of war a "
The dropping of passes for crossing the German
lines proved a successful device, and many Soviet
deserters presented such passes to German posts. The
text of the pass read: "The bearer of this wishes no
senseless bloodshed in the interests of Jews and
commissars, quits the vanquished Red Army and goes
over to the German Armed Forces. German officers and
soldiers will welcome the newcomer, will feed him and
will give him a Job.
A great number of leaflets addressed to the Red
Army contained letters from the soldiers, families and
Soviet prisoners of war urging Soviet troops to lay
down their arms. These letters, whether genuine or
forged, described the growing hardships and the reign
of terror in the unoccupied part of the U.S.S.R. and
the pleasant conditions in the German prisoner of war
camps. In the fall of 1941, 750,000 copies of an
appeal of this kind to Soviet soldiers from mothers
and girls were disseminated.
Soviet counter-propaganda took a similar line.
It published reports of huge German losses, and
stressed the hopelessness of the German struggle, the
terror prevailing in the occupied areas and the
appalling conditions in German prisoner-of-war and
forced-labor camps.
In 1943, it elaborated on the Allied successes
in Africa, and on the economic and political tension
in Germany. It paid special attention to German
prisoners of war, and organized model camps with
courses for their indoctrinations
The most important instrument of Soviet propaganda,
however, were the partisans. The oral reports which
they circulated were by far more effective than printed
material. They became the main source of information,
true or otherwise, in the occupied area, and hence an
important element in influencing public opinion. They
spread the new Soviet patriotic slogans, and stirred
public feeling against the Germans who, they declared,
16 T
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were enslaving the Soviet people and making their last
stand against the powerful Red Army.
The main advantage that Soviet propaganda derived
from partisans was the spreading of rumors that could
not be substantiated officially. In 1943 rumors were
circulated by partisans in Dniepropetrovsk that the
British fleet had entered the Dardanelles and shelled
Sevastopol, that a British-American expeditionary
force had landed in Murmansk, and that the Soviet Army
had become a national Russian Army. The partisans,
too, were the source of rumors about the forthcoming
or even actual democratic trends within the Soviet
regime.
This new line was first noted in a Security
Police report of November 27th, 1942, which stated
that a "new note" had appeared in Soviet propaganda:
partisan groups now declared that a Russian national
government would continue the struggle against Germany;
the beginning of this development was the granting of
religious freedom by the Soviet Government.
Numerous German reports noted persistent rumors
about the end of the collective farm system and
liberties already introduced by the Soviet Government
or to be enacted immediately after victory. These
rumors, according to German reports, exercised great
influence upon the population and became a difficult
obstacle for German propaganda to overcome.
A Security Police report of March, 1943, stated
that "German propaganda is not in a position to
counter this flood of rumors." In Byelorussia, the
Security Police declared in another report that German
propaganda was on the defensive "as long as we cannot
overcome the partisans."
"The elimination of the influence of Soviet
propaganda in areas cleared of bandits is especially
difficult," because of the information they had spread
an army report of May, 1944, declared.
The Soviet Government also used the partisans to
carry on propaganda against collaboration with German
authorities. A very successful method was used by the
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 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02646R000400200001-1
Germans for the recruitment of, and propaganda among
officials of local administrations in the occupied
areas. Groups of them were sent to Germany to see
conditions in the Reich. They were greatly impressed
by the difference between life in Germany and in the
Soviet Union, For instance, in the summer of 1943
about 200 local officials from the Army Group Center
area were given an opportunity to visit the Reich.
Upon their return, they gave a favorable account of
their trip to the local population.
However, after partisan raids, tracts were found
in the streets and on the walls promising early return
of the Soviet authorities and harsh punishment of
mayors, policemen, and even teachers and doctors in
the occupied areas.
In April, 1943, a tract signed by the Central
Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party declared;
"Your sin against the Fatherland is great, and if you
continue to help the Germans there will be no defense
for you. But the Soviets will forgive you if you are
faithful to the Russian people. Hurt the Germans
wherever you can. Hide cattle and grain. Cheat the
Germans, give them false information, hide refugees
and help partisans. Singly or in groups destroy all
telephone wires. Blast railroads. Destroy locomotives
and cars. Set German dumps on fire."
In the town of Rovno, a Soviet tract addressed to
policemen said: "You have sold out your homeland and
your people... The people never forgive traitors.
They will never forgive your children, wives, brothers
and sisters, fathers and mothers."
A German general declared in 1942 that "land
grants, field kitchens, tobacco and propaganda are
the most effective means for combatting partisans."
Actually, the Germans used only two themes in
their propaganda against partisans. They maintained
that the raids inflicted much suffering on the
population and that such tactics could not harm the
powerful German Army,
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A typical propaganda leaflet asserted: "Partisans
cannot stop German advance, Sabotage and guerrilla
warfare are madness, They will result in injury only
to yourself."
Confidential German reports, however, stressed
time and again that the partisans were an important
factor in destroying the effect of German propaganda;
the population was impressed by the fact that the
German Army was unable to cope with the partisan
forces.
As early as September, 1942, the High Command
declared that the main cause of the, extraordinary
spread of the partisan nuisance lay in the defects of
German political warfare.
VI YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS AND REVIVAL OF COMMUNISM
Efforts to turn the youth against the Communists
were hampered by German restrictions on education in
the occupied parts of the Soviet Union. Even anti-
Soviet teachers and students in the Ukraine were
reported aroused by the German order limiting education
to elementary and professional schools,
The Army Group Center made special efforts to
support Russian and Byelorussian youth organizations.
In July, 1943, a Byelorussian Youth Organization was
founded, in which national and family ties were stressed,
but political questions eliminated; members received
uniforms and flags on the Nazi pattern. In May, 1944,
a Russian Youth Organization was formed in Borisov,
which enlisted 500 members within one month; it also
received uniforms and flags. Attempts were made to
influence children of 10 to 14. However, a Security
Police report of 1943 stated that because German
propaganda opened no political perspectives, young
people between 15 and 30 years of age, concerned with
their own future, were least receptive to it.
Another Security Police report of the same year
noted that from the standpoint of German propaganda
the most important fact was "the attitude of the great
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majority of the population which stands ?between left
and right.'
In the beginning this large middle group was the
most favorably disposed toward the Germans. But by
1943 the Security Police observed that this sector of
the population "vacillates between antipathy (to the
Germans), nationalism, and friendship to the Soviets."
This same change developed progressively during the
occupation and was reported from all occupied areas.
An army report from Smolensk of September, 1942,
said that "at present there are more, Reds in town than
before. Under the Soviet regime many cursed Stalin,
now they feel nostalgia for him. w
According to the Germans, the main cause of this
change was due to economic difficulties. In a Ukrainian
village, the report added, peasants "making the sign
of the cross expressed the wish for the return of the
Reds."
Furthermore, traces of reviving Communist
activities were reported even more frequently, espe-
cially in 1943. Thus, in April of that year, in
Kagarlik, near Kiev, a Communist organization with
135 members was discovered, and in Kiev 97 Communists
and 24 members of the Communist Youth Organization
were arrested.
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