THE CHINESE MINORITY IN INDONESIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-02646R000200070001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 23, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 30, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

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THE CHINESE MINpR27,Y r x ,N,)CNESX4
September 1958
This doeutnent is part of an integrated
file. It separated from t4a file it must be
subjected to individual systematic revists
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CHINESE MINORITY IN INDONESIA
TH ,~-
25X1A8a
This report was prepared primarily
for DDP internal use only.
25X1A9a
Prepared by
Date of Completion: September 1958
r/tiTTT "'--
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THE,CHINESE MINORITY IN INDONESIA
Scope and Limitations
This study examines the problem of the Chinese minority
living in the islands of the Republic of Indonesia. It presents
a brief treatment of the.origins, numbers and distribution of
the Chinese population, and discusses the economic, cultural
political impact of the Chinese on Indonesia. Basic issues con
fronting the Indonesians and-Chinese are reviewed. A-statement
is also included of the principal complaints most frequently
voiced by Indonesians and Chinese against each other., The report,
which is based largely on unclassified information, is limited
to the position. and activities of the Overseas Chinese resident
in Indonesia; it does not include treatment of any other foreign
minority in the area.
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THE CHINESE MINORITY IN INDONESIA
Contents
Background page
1
A.
Origins
Number
Distribution
II.
Impact on. Indonesia
3
A.
Economic
3
B.
Cultural
9
C.
Political
13
1. Dual Nationality
2. Land Ownership
14
III.
Principal Complaints of Indonesians and Chinese
A.
Indonesians vs. Chinese
Chinese vs.. Indonesians
23
Sources
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THE CIINESK MINORITY IN INDONESIA
The two and one-half million.Overseas Chinese, comprising
approximately three per cent of the .population of Indonesia, con-
stitute a racial problem for the Republic of Indonesia. Socially
and culturally aloof, intensely proud of being Chinese; dispro-
portionately wealthy with a strangle hold.on the economic life
the archipelago, they are considered by the Indonesian's as their
greatest internal political problem. This political problem is
complicated by the hold the Nationalist and Communist Chinese
governments have on all their nationals overseas.
In attempting to find a solution to the'problem posed by
the complexities of theSino-Indonesian. relationship, ethnocentric
attitudes have blinded most responsible leaders of both groups to
some of the more promising possibilities. These possibilities for
solution are basically in the political area and depend upon
whether the, :ndigenous Indonesians can divest themselves of their
prejudices regarding the Chinese and receive them as!full citizens
of the Republic; and whether the Chinese can throw off the dual
citizenship control of their motherland .and give their unquali-
fiedsupport to the Republic. Although the Indonesan.Csbinet
is currently considering,implementation of the dual nationality
law, no formal agreement :between the government and the Chinese
Nationalists has been reached to date.
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THE CHINESE MINORITY IN INDONESIA
I. Background
A. Origins
Chinese trading contacts with Java and Sumatra date from
AD 400, but permanent settlements in the islands were not men-
tioned until during the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644). The.estab-
lishment of the Dutch East Indies Company in 1602 resulted in
a sharply increased immigration of Chinese commencing in 1619.
These settlers originated from three distinct areas of main-
land China with each area speaking an individualized dialect.
From.'the South China mountainous area came the Hakkas; sturdy,
freedom-loving, hard working toilers of the soil who initially
engaged in agricultural projects in their new homes. From the
Canton and West River Delta area of Kwangtung came the Cantonese;
men with a background of never being satisfied with their present
living conditions and thus determined to seek fame and fortune
in commerce and trade. From Fukien Province, especially from.
around the vicinity of Amoy and Foochow, came the Hokkiens;
stubborn, hard-headed sailors and business men with one idea
in mind (held by many overseas Chinese to this day) of amassing
a fortune by any means necessary and retiring to their native
villages to live in plenty in their old age. From these
southern areas of China, the Hokkiens furnished approximately
47 per cent of the immigrants, the Hakkas 21 per cent, and the
Cantonese 12 per cent, with smaller groups of Teochiu, Hainanese
and others supplying the remainder of the Chinese settlers.
B. Number
The last official census, taken in Indonesia in 1930,
,placed the Chinese population at 1,200,000. Since that date
the Chinese have increased steadily, according to competent
observers, reaching a total of 1,900,000 in 1947, two million
in 1950, and 2,500,000 in 1957.
With the population of Indonesia estimated in 1957 at
approximately 84 million, the Chinese settlers form about..
three per cent of the inhabitants, the largest and most im-
portant minority group.
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C. Distribution.
Geographically, the Chinese are distributed within.' the
confines of the Republic as follows:
a. The Hokkiens form over one-half of the Chinese
population in Java and Madura, and comprise approximato I ly
60 per cent of the Chinese residents of the Celebes and the
Moluccas. They predominate in the cities where Chinese are
found.
b. The Hakkas are in the majority of the Chinese
inhabitants in west Borneo, Bangka and Billiton. They; are
alsd'present in Java, east Sumatra and in the Riouw archi-
pelago. In the Celebes and Moluccas they form 10 per dent
of the Chinese population.
c. The Cantonese are more widely distributed than
any of the other Chinese groups. They'are found in Java,
east and south Sumatra, Bangka and Billiton, and form about
30 per cent of the Chinese living in Celebes and the Moluccas.
d. The Teochius are distributed similarly to.the
Hakkas; the Hainanese are mostly urbanized and live in al-
most all cities of the Republic, while the remainder of the
smaller groups of the Chinese are generally found along the
east coast of Sumatra.
As a result of military operations between the Dutch and
forces of the Indonesian Republic, the Chinese migrated
in large numbers to the various cities with the result that
there are presently large numbers of them found in Djakarta,
Surabaya and Palembang.
wpr
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II. Impact on Indonesia
A. Economic
The economic grip which the Chinese hold over the economy
of Indonesia is probably the basic cause of the indigenous
peoples' resentment and fear of the Chinese minority. Every-
where they dominate the commercial life of the islands,espe
cially in the internal wholesale and retail trades. They
control 95 per cent of industry. All efforts to extend; the
participation of Indonesians in these fields has so far; had
little success. With the advent of the Republican govern-
ment, partially effective government controls, coupled With
changing political and economic conditions, have forced; the
Chinese into new patterns of living and even into some :illegal
activities. This development seems likely to alter adversely
their relationships with the native peoples but unlikely to
endanger the Chinese economic hold over the area. The in-
creasing urbanization of the Chinese has accentuated their
aggressiveness, social aloofness, and disproportionate wealth
as compared with the country's nationals, whose own standard
of living has declined in the post-war period. Foreign ex-
change and other controls have transformed many of the Chinese
into smugglers and black marketeers, and such operations have
increased their wealth and their unpopularity. / A metaphor,
which has become a cliche, aptly portrays the impact of the
Chinese minority on the economy of Indonesian the Chinese
do not mind who holds the cow so long as they can milk it'.
In the early days of the Dutch East Indies Company, the Chinese
were permitted to settle in the various islands. However,
even before the European incursion, the Chinese, who h.d
been trading in the archipelago since probably before the
time of Christ, were perhaps the most important foreign
group in the bazaar states, often living within the castle
walls, advising the local king, and maintaining close com-
mercial ties with merchants in China. Asiatic, but bond
neither by the ritualistic constraints of Hinduism or the
legalistic ones of Islam; economically skilled and marvelously
adept at political fence-sitting; tightly organized and
industrious to a fault; and, perhaps most important, pbs-
sessed of a calm sense of their own cultural superiority to
both the Dutch and the Javanese, they were Java's most
successful "marginal men." As such the Dutch soon found
them indispensable as intermediaries between themselves
and the native population, fulfilling economic and political
functions Europeans could or would not fulfill themselves.
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This explains how the Chinese secured their foothold In
Indonesia and why they have succeeded in their dominant
economic position throughout the islands.
1900 was an important year in the economic life of the
islands. As a result of a decline in all businesses,: and
thus in profits, the jealousies of the Europeans in Indonesia
were directed toward the Chinese, The Europeans maintained
that the strong economic position of the Chinese minority
was due to Chinese exploitation of the improvidence wind vices
of the natives. 70 Until this time, a great deal of the
wealth of the Chinese was derived from opium shops, pawn
shops and usury. Having a monopoly of opium, the Chinese
vendors were in a position to push the sale of this harm-
ful drug--an opportunity of which they took full advantage.
As pawn brokers they fixed their terms for loans "with
reference to the need of the borrower rather than to:the
value of the pledge he offered." The pawnshops were often
illicit opium dens. In other forms of money-lendingtheir
operations were equally "unconscionable" in that they aimed
to get the native officials in their power and used this
power to oppress the agricultural cultivators. Even when
ostensibly engaged in commerce, they were equally engaged
in money-lending, and they had such a strangler?hold 9n the
batik (native cloth) industry in particular that the native
craftsman was little better than a slave. Regulations made
by the government to protect the native from these forms
of extortion and oppression were rendered largely inoperative
by the combination of the Chinese among themselves trough
their secret trade organizations to defeat those reg ilations. 11
Thus in 1900 the government passed regulations abolishing
the opium shops and established State pawnshops and facil-
ities for agricultural credit which had a revolutionary
effect on the Chinese economy. Chinese were in. the unen-
viable position of middlemen, exposed to the animosity of
two opposed forces, the natives and the Europeans, though
useful as a buffer between them, High officials of the
period gave support to the theory of the detrimental' role
of the Chinese in Indonesian society, and many of them
regarded them as the "main cause of the diminishing welfare
of the Indonesians." These regulations were all detrimental
to the interests of the Chinese, for in one case they took
away a business that had been theirs for centuries, and
in the other they created competitors to them backed by
all the capital and resources of the government. 12/
Consequently, the Chinese had to seek. new:outle;ts
for their idle capital. They found two new enterprises.
One was in speculation in land which entailed purchasing
large private estates, 13 Chinese and all foreigners in
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Indonesia were greatly circumscribed in this activity due
to laws which prohibited them from owning farm lands. The
other enterprise was in the banking field and subsequently
in the development of industry. In these new fields to
which they put their riches, the Chinese became intimately
associated with capitalist production and therefore into
close alliance with the European community. Thus the
Chinese have been able to turn discriminatory legislation
against them into personal means of further inroads into
the economic life of the Republic.
With the advent of the second world war, a financial
depression occurred in Indonesia due to the collapse of
Dutch business interests and their capitalistic financing
of trade and industry. The back of the Indonesian mercantile
enterprise was broken in the crash. The Chinese now took
over---not only the more capitalized trades such as hardware
and passenger trade, but even such traditional Indonesian
commercial strongholds as cigarettes and textiles fell in
large part into Chinese hands. These Chinese hands were
not, for the most part, those of the traditional peranakans
Chinese born in Indonesia), but of the aggressive singkehss
Chinese who came directly from the mainland), who had
steadily increased in number and strength throughout the
whole prosperity period and who now took the commanding
position within the commercial community they still main-
tain, squeezing out the traditional element both among
the Chinese and the Javanese. As the singkehs took over
the buying of dry season crops in the rural sector, so
they took over the greater part of the retail, wholesale
and small factory sector of urban life, Where there
had previously been several groups, of whom the Chinese
were admittedly clearly the strongest, competing for in-
come shares within the market sector, now the singke'hs
began to loom over all the others. 15
The resilience and resourcefulness of the Chinese was
further shown in 1946 when Chinese trade was temporarily
paralyzed at the time that the Republican currency was
put into circulation, Many Indonesians thought that the
Chinese advantage in trade had at last been destroyed
and that the Indonesians could now meet them on equal terms,
but they soon found they had miscalculated the abilities
of the Chinese to extricate themselves from this temporary
setback. A few years before this, during the occupation
of the islands by the Japanese forces, the invaders had
transferred to the Republic many economic assets including
a number of rice mills which belonged to the Chinese. In
addition, the Indonesian politicians introduced new laws
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of citizenship with disabilities for aliens,, whose object
was to absorb a great quantity of Chinese manpower and to
obtain control of Chinese property and their wealth. Trade
restrictions were introduced into the Republic. The Chinese
were forced to purchase considerable amounts of Republican
national loan bonds. But still the Chinese traders managed
to make money due to their superior knowledge of the islands
their nationalistic cohesion and their aggressiveness. A
large number of them became wealthy by running successfully
and often the Dutch blockade to Singapore. Durin$ the
hostilities between the Djakarta government and the rebel=lious forces on Sumatra,, much of the blockade running was
in the hands of Chinese who were able to gain financially
in this dangerous trade o
An enumeration of the economic areas in which the
Chinese dominate, together with a brief description of the
activity, follows-
1. Rubber
In the outer provinces Chinese traders dominate
the market; l7 they also lead in.copra transactions. 18
On the main islands there are numerous Chinese as
small holders in rubber sales. IV
2. Rice
In the wholesale field of rice importation, the
singkehs Chinese have a commanding position backed
as they are by Chinese affiliates in the rice ex-
porting countries of' Thailand and Vietnam 20 21
3. Investment Capital
They have more capital for investments at their
command than any other group in Indonesia and
since 1949 indigenous Indonesians have not been
able to catch up. This capital is presently being
used in investments in land, timber, sugar and
other estate cultures. 22/
Foreign Commodities
At the beginning of the 19th century,- the Chinese
had a commanding lead, in the importation.of foreign
commodities,, which they have maintained until the
present. This is particularly true in all articles
imported from other Asiatic countries. 2,3/ L4/
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Industry
.dustry is in Chinese hands, with the Cantonese
group predominating. In Indonesia the carpenters,
metal workers, and petroleum skilled workers, are
Chinese; skilled artisans predominate in the pro-
duction of textiles and rubber goods. 2-
Dry Season Crops
Trade in these crops is controlled by the Chinese
whose mills process the rice from those fields. 2
7. Transportation
Practically all of the jitneys which carry a large
proportion of inter-local produce and travel and
almost all of the bicycle rickshaws which provide
the bulk of passenger transport within the towns
are owned by Chinese. 27/
Factories
The larger small-scale factories in towns and out-
side producing cloth, rice, lumber, soda-pop;, bread
and charcoal are in the hands of Chinese. 28
9o Movies, Theaters and Carnivals
Owned by Chinese and operated for the Indonesians. 7
10. Mining
While mines cannot be owned by foreigners, the
.Ch, .nese predominate in the management of Indonesian
mines; they pioneered in the development of gold
mines in west Borneo. 30 31
lla AZricultural projects
Since the Chinese cannot own farm lands, they have
taken over the management and ownership of many
agricultural projects, In their control; of in-
digenous cultivators, they manage credits in such
a way that these farmers remain. permanently in debt
to their Chinese creditors.
12, Warehouses
Most of these are in Chinese hands. They are used
for two purposes- to purchase and store merchandise
7
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and farm products when the price is low and then
released for sale when these commodities are:
scarce in the asars (market places); and second,
as credit unions for advancing money to the
bakuls (traders), Without these warehouses most
large-scale wholesaling would collapse since the
bakuls lack sufficient capital to stockpile goods.
Thus he Chinese are able to control the whole-
sale market in the Republica 34
13. Tmeking
Practically all of this trade is in Chinese hands. f5
14.. Ka oit
While kapok factories were originally started
by the natives, within a few years they were ousted
by the Chinese who now dominate 6/
15. Credit
Credit for petty traders is almost completely in
Chinese. hands, By means of this credit the Chinese
are able to control practically all market and
small shop business in the archipelago. Gods flow
into the markets from various sources but very few
of them have not at one point or another passed
through Chinese hands. This credit is not in terms
of cash, as the Chinese are unwilling to risk cash
now that the Dutch are no longer present to enforce
contracts. On the other hand., the Indonesian
trader keeps a running debt balance with the Chinese,
a balance carefully managed on both sides not to
grow so large as to encourage flight on the part of
the Indonesian and not to shrink so small .s to
leave the Indonesian without any control over the
Chinese. lu/
16. Groceries
Retail grocery shops in the rural areas are almost
exclusively in the hands of the Chinese 38
17. Press, Journalism.
The Chinese play an important part as journalists,
and maintain an extensive control of the native
press, both editorially and financially.
8
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18. Miscellaneous Economic Activities
While not dominating in these areas, many Chinese
are employees of business firms, clerks, farmers
(important only in west Borneo, east coast'of
Sumatra, Bangka and Billiton), market gardening,
fishing, collectors of taxes, salesmen, contractors
and professionals (accountants, dentists, doctors,
lawyers and teachers). L0 4142
Indicative of the economic hold the Chinese have in
Indonesia is the following survey of a typical town of some
450 retail and service stores and shops of all sizep. Only
16 per cent of these stores and shops are owned andop--
erated by natives; the remainder are divided, 33 per cent
belonging to the singkehs and 48 per cent to the eranakan
Chinese, L3 The Chin accordingly, form the heart o
the town's economic circulatory system, pressing goads,
many of them imported, down through its arteries, pulling
back goods, the greater part of them agriculturxal, 'through
its veins and passing them on to the large suburban: centers
for further distribution0 The business districts are lined
with small, open-front, wooden stores, over 80 per cent
belonging to Chinese. Inside the stores are found hardware,
home furnishings, various types of food, jewelry, false
teeth, automobile and bicycle parts, building mater?ials,
textiles, and drugs, from.sulfa compounds to such promising
medicines as crocodile tongues and cat's beard. Much of
the cloth is bought in Surabaya by the natives directly
from Chinese stores there. Chinese from the cities and
larger towns often come to the typical town to trade with
the indigenous market people. 44
Up to the present time, the indigenous population
has been unable to break the strangle hold of Chinese con-
trol over the economic life of the Indonesian Republic..
B. Cultural
That there is a race problem in Indonesia few Will
deny, since informed Indonesians generally speak of the
Chinese as constituting one of the most difficult And
frustrating of contemporary questions Indonesians
regard the Chinese as perhaps their major "problem;"6
Most Chinese meet Indonesians through work or business;
seldom do they mingle socially. Remaining alopf,
refusing to be assimmilated, proud of being Chinese, and
determined to preserve their culture by means of their
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.own schools, press and business guilds, the Chinese in In-
donesia are a complete society to themselves, interested
chiefly in advancing themselves in the economic life of the
Republic. Consequently, their impact socially on Indonesian
social patterns and culture has been insignificant.
In prewar (WW2) days, almost all interethnic c.ozitacts
found the Chinese in a higher socioeconomic status than the
Indonesians. The attainment of political power by an
indigenous elite has changed this situation and in all' im-
portant range of contacts the Chinese now aie subordinate..
Indonesians presently can, through discriminatory practices,
give satisfying expression to their long smouldering re-
sentment, Consequently, Indonesia is faced with an acute
and explosive problem of "race relations" and ethnocentric
attitudes blind most responsible leaders on both sides to
some of the more promising possibilities for solution. L8/
In addition to the natural tendencies of Chinese overseas
to remain apart socially and culturally from the indigenous
population, there are further explanations of why this is
especially true in Indonesia. Some of the more important
reasons are examined below.
One of the main stumbling blocks to complete assim-
ilation of the Chinese into Indonesian society is the land
policy laid down by the former Dutch rulers and taken over
by the Republican authorities. This policy forbids non
Indonesians from owning farm lands. This rule has given
protection to the natives but it has emphasized the plural
aspect of society, and to the sensitive Chinese this is
interpreted personally as placing them in an inferior
position socially. This policy has cut both ways. The
Chinese were, on the one hand, prevented from obtaining
a monopoly of the land and dispossessing the natives, as
they inevitably could have done when one considers their
business acumen and aggressiveness. On the other' han.d., any
tendency toward the assimilation of the Chinese into the
Indonesian community and making it a single homogeneous
society was arrested. 49/ 'p to the present no solution of
this question has been evolved.
Another stumbling block is the disproportionate wealth
of the Chinese community, which produces envy and suspicion
on the part of the Indonesians. In 1937 the Chinesey less
than two per cent of the country's population, included
29 per cent of all those who lived in the islands with in-
comes of 900 guilders and over. 50 While no statistics are
available at the present writing, it appears that this dis-
proportion has increased rather than lessened, thus Vin-
creasing the apprehension of Indonesian officials.
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Intermarriage between Chinese and Indonesians has con
tributed little toward assimilation, while adjustments to
environment continue to modify Chinese cultural practices
only slightly. 51 In many of these intermarriages the
Chinese have continued to preserve their surnames and thus
a tie with their ancestors. Some of these families have
forgotten their native language but now speak a polyglot
of their own making and still retain much of the culture
and customs of their motherland.
The discrimination practiced by the Indonesians against
the Chinese and the social tensions prevalent are not cal-
culated to pave the way for assimilation. There are probably
large numbers of Chinese living in the cities who are in
a state of poverty, but these attract little attention..
If the Chinese tend to hold together as a group, under con-
ditions making for economic competition on a group basis,
they are in great danger of becoming, eventually, a pariah
group, The Chinese are well aware of this. But even if
they should be more successful than the Inde-Europeans in
assimilating themselves with the Indonesians, in the:long
run they will be unable to maintain their privileged:
position, 52 and at the present time they are unwilling
to place this position in jeopardy.
In the education of their children, the Chinese: have
always been discriminated against. Previous to 1900 the
authorities laid down rules encouraging the establishment
of schools, for the native population, with the primary
purpose of training native officials. This system con-
tinued until the end of the century when, under the influ-
ence of the ethical movement in Holland, a policy was laid
down for nation-wide education not merely in the interests
of the government, Nothing, however, had been done for
the education of Chinese children since the educational
article in the Regulations of 1854 was interpreted not to
apply to children of peoples assimilated with the natives.
No subsidies were given to Chinese schools and Chinese
children were permitted to enter the lower native schools
only if there was room for them and if they knew sufficient
Dutch to follow the instruction, and upon payment of higher
school fees Education in these schools led normally to
employment in the government service, but from even the
lowest ranks the Chinese were excluded.
About 1900 the Chinese of Indonesia began to assert
themselves to improve their position. Education and the
press were the chief means employed. School societies
were organized and schools opened.. English was chosen
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because English-speaking Chinese instructors could becheaply
obtained from Singapore and, in addition, English had; the
advantage of being the commercial language of the East. The
Chinese press in Indonesia, meanwhile, strengthened the unity
of the national consciousness of the community and passed
the Chinese grievances with the government..
The Dutch government now began to make education; easier
for the Chinese to procure. Chinese were admitted to native
schools on the same basis as natives, and the erection of
government schools for Chinese, the so-called Dutch-Chinese
schools, was begun in 1908, and in 1909 private Chinese
schools were granted government subsidies. It was soon
evident that these private schools had the support of the
Chinese community and every year more schools were established.
Many Chinese urged that the Dutch-Chinese schools be!trans
formed into national schools open to every Chinese child.
This demand could not be granted since the number of teachers
required was not available. If these schools had been trans-
formed into national schools, or if there had been some
planning toward that end, a real beginning in assimilation
would have been made with the younger generation of the
Chinese population.
The establishment of the Dutch-Chinese schools was
in the nature of preferential treatment for the chin6se,
and the Indonesians were not slow to recognize it. While
these schools were subject to Dutch official inspection
and control., the curriculum had a purely Chinese nationalist
character. / Thus was born the swing-away from ultimate
assimilation with the indigenous' population. The establish-
ment of these modern Chinese schools by the Chinese them
selves contributed immensely to the rise of Chinese na---
tionalismo This nationalistic rise was so intense that it
alarmed the Dutch and in 1908 they did a complete about-
face in their policy, whereby the doors of Dutch culture
were opened to the entire middle class of Chinese. In
turn, this caused the Indonesians to think of the Chinese
community as being pro-Dutch and set off a series of
retaliations and subjective prejudices that exist to the
present time.
In the post-world war II period, the system of Chinese
schools? was greatly expanded and. the resinofication of
peranakan society was by 1955 a major phenomenon in Java.
As for singkeh society, its leaders were largely rebpon-
sible for the development and rapid expansion of Chinese
schools in Indonesia and for their politicization in the
interests of. China. In recent months Indonesian authorities
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have made it clear that Indonesian citizens of whatever ex-
traction will eventually be barred from attending. other than
Indonesian schools.
The Chinese,. who have long memories, have never for-
gotten what happened to a gr-bup of their nationals who were
completely assimilated with the native inhabitants at
Tangerang. In this rural community Chinese agriculturalists
became indistinguishable from the indigenous population even
to their physical appearances. They spoke only Javanese-
Malay and led a life almost identical with that of the
Javanese farmers near them, retaining only their Chinese
surnames,,. It was here that a massacre of these Sinop.
Indonesian farmers took place during the birthpangs of the
Republic. The New York Times of 6 June 1946 reported that
600 Chinese, suspected by Indonesians of cooperation
with the Dutch, had been slain and their villages set on
fire. The massacre did not end until 8 June. Further out-
breaks against the Chinese in September occurred at pagan
Api Api when 200 were said to have been killed, with 20
more at Bangko, 34 at Telok Poelau and 75 at Djembra.. In
January 1947, 250 more were killed in Palembang in Sumatra.
When the Chinese decided to place themselves under Dutch
protection as a result of these outbreaks, the Indonesians
felt they were confirmed in their suspicion that theChinese
had cooperated with the Dutch imperialists in the affected
areas, 5/ On the other hand, these series of killings
tended to corroborate the Chinese suspicion that they were
not wanted as equals by the indigenous population.
The Chinese community continues to remain apart and
unassimilated, Among Indonesian politicians there are two
schools of thought concerning the Chinese problems One
school regards the Chinese as a minority problem; the
other school prefers to think of the Chinese born in -
Indonesia as part of the Indonesian people, Notwithstanding
the desirability of the latter policy as an objectiv6, the
psychological tendency among the Indonesians generally and
the Chinese community as a whole favors the first view.
C. Political
There are two political issues concerning the Chinese
minority which fundamentally affect their relationship
with the Indonesian people. These issues are their dual
nationality and their inability to own land,
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1. Dual Nationality
Chinese governments have traditionally regarded the
decendents of emigrants as Chinese citizens. This
position, taken toward the end of the Chaing
Dynasty, has been maintained by all subsequent
Chinese governments, although in very recent years
both Taipei and Peiping have shown a willingness
to retreat from this rigid position. How to
implement this willingness has not yet been worked
out in detailed legislation by the Indonesian'Govern-
ment in spite df the signing of an Indonesian-Chinese
Dual Nationality Treaty with Communist China in 1955.
Under the Dutch administration of the East Indies,
it was ruled that a.Chinese born on Dutch territory
was a Dutch subject as long as he resided there.
The instrument transferring sovereignty over Indonesia
from the Netherlands to the Republic of Indonesia in
1949 contained a clause providing that Chinese who
were Dutch subjects automatically became Indonesian
citizens unless they specifically rejected Indonesian
citizenship before December 31, 1951. This system,
known as the "passive system" in Indonesia, covered
all persons 21 years or above, married, and who had
lived in Indonesia for five years. D.ring World..War II and
the years immediately following there was little
Chinese immigration into Indonesia and this provision
conferred Indonesian citizenship upon virtually all
Chinese in Indonesia unless they wished to reject
it. It did not, however, jeopardize their claim to
Chinese citizenship..
In 1951 the Indonesian Government issued a Registra-
tion Regulation requiring all persons of non-in-
digenous descent to register if they wished to re-
tain Indonesian citizenship. This was objected to
by the Arab and Chinese minorities on the grounds
that they already considered themselves Indonesian
citizens and that the requirement to register was
discriminatory. This requirement, which became
known as the "active system" was, however, maintained
by the government. In accordance with the regulation,
it is estimated that about one-third of the Chinese
population in Indonesia registered. The "active
system" cancelled the formerly applicable "passive
system" and as a result two-thirds of the Chinese
in Indonesia, through failure to register, lost
their claims to Indonesian citizenship.
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Sunario, who later became Foreign Minister, made an
important statement on 31 December 1951. Stating
that he did not agree with the concept of dual
citizenship; he added that "a difference between
.original and non-original citizens had to be made.
This difference is related to the different economic
conditions, the original citizens, owing to their
economic weaknesses, are considered to need help,
and as regards the others who are not original
citizens, it is necessary to check their influence
on the economy." This statement shows that there
was no intention to accord Indonesians of Chinese
ancestry, even those who confirmed their desire to
keep Indonesian citizenship under the "active
system," equal business opportunities. In 1953
when.Sunario was Foreign Minister, the Ali Sastroamid-
jojo Cabinet issued a regulation which reserved most
of the import licenses to Indonesian citizens and
in the administration of this regulation Indonesian
citizens of Chinese ancestry were treated as non-
citizen Chinese,
Late in 1953 Communist China alloted four seats to
Overseas Chinese from Indonesia in, the All China
People's Congress, thus dramatizing the dual cit-
izenship question. In September 1954 the Indonesia
press carried reports that during CHOU En-lai ' s
visit to New Delhi in July, CHOU told Nehru that
his government would henceforth regard Overseas
Chinese as foreigners and that Peiping was willing
to conclude agreements with other governments based
.on the single nationality concept. During November
of 1.954 negotiations on the matter were held in
Peiping but became stranded.on the question of the
legal position of Overseas Chinese who passively
declined to reject either Chinese Communist or
Indonesian citizenship. The Indonesian Government
wanted such persons to be considered Chinese
citizens and the Chinese Communists insisted that
they be accorded the rights of Indonesian citizens.
In.the meantime, the Indonesian Government decided
to present a draft citizenship bill toParliament
which provided that all Indonesian citizens residing
in Indonesia should renounce any other citizenship
they possessed within one year of the bill's coming
into force
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By early spring 1955, both the Indonesian and Chinese
Communist governments apparently were eager to reach
agreement quickly on a dual citizenship treaty to
enable the signing ceremony to take place during
CHOU's presence in Indonesia for the Asian-African
Conference. While the content of the negotiations
was a closely guarded secret, two problems were
assumed to have been discussed. One was again the
1951 Registration Regulation concerning what :should
be done to persons who failed to reject either
Chinese or Indonesian citizenship after the treaty
became law, either through ignorance of the law or
through willful decision not to make a rejection on
the grounds that they were already good Indonesian
citizens under the "passive system." The other
problem was the insistence by the Chinese Communists
of a clause guaranteeing non-discrimination against
Indonesian citizens of Chinese ancestry, which was
rejected.:by the Indonesians. In March, before the
negotiations were moved to Djakarta, the Indonesian
Government announced that in February a "second
phase" registration of foreigners had begun. These
regulations stipulated that aliens had to register with
the local Immigration Office, bringing with them at
least 10 separate documents including such items as
a letter from the tax office certifying full payment
of taxes, police questionnaire, and a biography for
every alien 16 years and above.
On 3 June 1955, a note exchange took place between
Prime Minister All Sastroamidjojo and CHOU En.lai
which clarified some of the more ambiguous points
in the Dual Nationality Agreement, which was signed
in Bandung on 22 April 1955 by CHOU on behalf of
Communist China and Sunario, on behalf of the Republic
of Indonesia. The five items in the exchange-of notes
are as follows:
a. The dual nationality problem was inherited
from the. Past.
b. There was a category of persons of Chinese
ancestry in Indonesia whose social and political
status testifies that they already had implicitly
renounced Chinese nationality: such persons did not
have to make a choice of nationality and it was to
be left up to the Indonesian Government to determine
who were to be included in this category.
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c. The 20-year period of the treaty (subject to
renewal) did not mean that persons who had chosen
their nationality would have to do so again at the
end of 20 years.
d. There will be established in Djakarta a joint
committee of Indonesians and Chinese Communist rep?-
resentatives who will discuss methods of implementing
the Agreement.
e. The present status of dual nationals should
remain unchanged during the two-year period for the
choosing of nationality.
However, there still was no agreed definition be-
tween the Indonesians and Chinese Governments on
what a dual citizen was. The implementation of the
agreement, therefore, would depend on the cooperation
of the Indonesian and Chinese Communist Governments.
Another danger to Indonesia was the provision for
establishing offices to register the citizenship
choices of Overseas Chinese. This provision would
give the Chinese Communists greater convenience
for their subversive activities in Indonesia. How-
ever, the greatest danger arising from this agree-
ment was the fact that, signed at the Asian-African
Conference, it presented to the public evidence of
a rapprochement between Indonesia and Communist China.
The impact of this agreement upon the people living
in Indonesia was varied. On 1 May the PNI Executive
Council announced its full concurrence with the'
agreement. On 2 May it was announced that the Cab-
inet had approved its submission to Parliament.
The anti-Communist newspaper'Indonesia Raga declared
its opposition, stating the .greement was more of
a Communist propaganda victory than an instrument
to solve a difficult minority problem. The PSI
issued a statement condemning the agreement as un-
constitutional, but after the note exchange agreed
that the notes opened the possibility of correcting
mistakes in the Igreement. Wibisone, a leader of
the Masjumis declared his party would vote against
ratification.
In the Chinese community, reaction was generally
unfavorable. The pro-Nationalist Chinese and anti-
Communist Chinese objected to the implication that
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the choice-of nationality was confined to either
that of Indonesia or Communist China and thus making
them stateless, SIAUW Giok Tjhan, a. pro-Communist
and chairman of BAPERKI (a left-wing political' party
composed mainly of Overseas Chinese) objected to
the requirement of having to make a rejection bf
nationality., After the exchange of notes SIAW.T
changed his position, but apparently without en-
thusiasm and further stated that BAPERKI would light
for the right of Indonesian citizens of Chinese origin
not to have to make the rejection,
Representatives of the group of Chinese who were
neither pro-Nationalist nor pro-Communist generally
disapproved of the greement. After the exchange
of notes, their opposition also subsided and their
interest tended to rest only on the question of how
the Indonesian Government would determine the cate-
gory of persons who would be exempt from the require-
ment of rejecting one citizenship or the other, On
27 June the pro-Communist newspaper Sin Po published
a report that the following groups of persons would
be exempt from making rejections: cabinet ministers,
members of Parliament, military officers, police,
election candidates and those who vote. 58
On 17. December 1957, the Indonesian Parliament ratified
the Dual Nationality Treaty, with the Masjumi Party
abstaining. Ten days later the treaty was approved by
the Chinese Communist State Council. On 30 December
it was ratified by the Standing Committee of the Chinese
Communist National Peoples Congress. Up to the present,
neither government has reached agreement for implemen-
tation of the terms of the treaty,
In the November-December-January 1957-1958 issue of
Report on Indonesia, Vol. 10, No. 7, page 9, the
following is noted:
Djakarta. Following the rejection of the.
motion submitted by MP Anwar Harjono (Masjumi
Party) by 100 votes against 39, the Indonesian
Parliament unanimously adopted the Dual Cit-
izenship Bill, In his motion Anwar Harjono
asked for postponement of the decision re-
garding the bill until Parliament discusses
another draft bill on basic Indonesian cit-
izenship. He stated that the discussion of
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the dual citizenship, bill prior to the cit-
izenship law would inevitably influence the
future discussion of the later.
MP Siauw Giok Tjhan (National Progressive]
who opposed the motion said that in order,
to end racial prejudices which occasionally
gave rise to undesirable sentiments, settle-
ment-of the dual citizenship bill was not
urgent.
There are two Overseas Chinese organizations in
Indonesia that are of importance politically,'
They are the BAPERKI Party (committee Concerned
With Ending Racial Discrimination.)-and the Chung
Hua Chtiao Ttuan Teung Hui (Djakarta General
Association of Overseas Chinese Organizations)
commonly referred to as the CHCTTH.
The BAPERKI Party is made up almost.exclusively
of Chinese It functions as a party in elections
and Its representatives serve in Parliament,ithe
Constituent Assembly and in municipal councils
In Indonesian politics it is aligned with the
National Progressive Faction, gives all-out sup-
port to President Sukarno, and generally finds.
itself on the side of the Indonesian Communist
Party in political debates, In 1955 it
polled approximately 160,000 votes in the Par-
liamentary elections. During the fall of 1957
the Party endeavored to obtain at least one seat
in as many Java municipal and regional councils
as possible to lobby against the head tax on
aliens as well as against the.glosing and re-
strictions of Chinese schools in Indonesia. LO/
At the core of Communist-oriented Chinese ccm
munal organization in Indonesia is the CHCTTH.
Technically a federation of Chinese organizations
in the Djakarta area.only, it acts as.a.central
headquarters for similar federations and single
organizations throughout Indonesia. Member,
groups, in mid-1953 reported to number 70, come
from every phase of Chinese community life--
schools, labor groups, social and benevolent
institutions, sports clubs, dramatic clubs, the
press, merchant groups and youth and student
groups, jLl/ The CHCTTH also acts as the com-
munity contact for the Chinese Communist Embassy
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in Indonesia. 62 The Partal Komunis Indonesia (PKI),
recovering in t 7e year following its, almost, complete
annihilation in Madiun (September 19.8), found an
unexpected ally in many of the Chinese Communist members
of the Chung Hua 'Iaung 1-rui, from which the CHCTTH
was ultimately'. formed in protest against Kuomintang
dominance of the parent organization in 1952. The
Chinese Communist Embassy in 1950 used these pro-Com-
munist members of t sung Hui, and after 1952 the
CHCTTH, as a front in extending aid to the PKi.
The general tone of the constitution of theCHCTT
is set up along the traditional lines of a Communist
organization, with an all-powerful presidium holding
strict control over its members. It has a.separate
Youth Corps which as far back as 1952 reported a
membership of 5, 000. ' 64 Si To Chan (SZU-?T' U Than
0674/1778/6363) as of mid-April 1957 is listed as
chairman of the organization. / Probably the most
important of the CHCTTH affiliates is the Min Sheng
She (3046/3932/4357)\, which. has been described as
the Chinese Communist Party in Indonesia in.disguise,
and possibly the most politically active group among
the Communist-oriented Chinese. Its reported ob-
jectives include, elimination of any remnant of
Dutch imperialistic influence in Indonesia; destruc-
tion of the Kuomintang and all pro-Nationalist
elements; organization of Communist cells; dis-
tribution of Communist literature; support of the
principles of MAO Tse-tung; support of the Soviet
Union and Chinese People's Republic and aid; to them
through espionage activities and in the procurement
of essential materials; and undermining all pro-
Western influence in Indonesia. In mid-195:3 the
organization claimed 5,000 individual members. In
1952 OEY Tjiu Kwie (HUANG Chou-kuei 7806/0719/6016)
was reported as Chairman< 66
While Kuomintang branches function in all the larger
Indonesian cities, they are weak and operate at a
disadvantage in a nation which does not recognize
the Chinese Nationalist Government, Political
initiative in the Chinese community has clearly
passed to the Peiping regime especially since the
Korean War. 67.
2. Land Ownership
The inability of aliens to possess land legally
in Indonesia colors the thinking of the Overseas
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Chinese community. This prohibition, which Was in-
stituted by the Dutch authorities and applied to their
own nationals as well as to all foreigners, was
designed to protect the indigenous populatio-a from
exploitation. It has been carried over as alaw by
the Republic. 68 The O:inese argue that if'they
cannot own land as the natives can, then they a.r.e,
second-class citizens and in time this discrimination
would lead to their economic collapse.
On the other hand if they are to be citizensLof
Indonesia in the true sense they must be able to
own land, Like the other minorities in Indo,esia,
they are awaiting assurances from the government
that they would receive equal treatment with. other
Indonesian citizens before making up their minds
concerning the dual citizenship question. Con-
sequ.ently, the chief question in their thinking
is whether or not Indonesian citizenship would
automatically eliminate the Dutch-imposed. ban on
their acquisition of landed property. To this
major political problem the Republican, government
has not yet provided an answer. The matter has
reached an impasse; the Chinese wondering'wh .t
the local nationalists will offer them in return
for shifting their allegiance, and the nationalists
on their part wanting evidence of loyalty before
alloting the Chinese an important stake in their
country. L0
The Overseas Chinese are now ?at the
~o
politically. Should they continue as aliens or
should they endeavor to become citizens? It'has
been suggested that a firm political statement
by both Taipei and Peiping that they regarded their
countrymen who voluntarily would choose Indonesian
citizenship as foreigners, would help to clear
the atmosphere. Such,a declaration would be ex-
tremely difficult to make.as it could be inter-
preted as an abandonment of their own nationals,
and thus a loss, of national prestige. An effort
is needed to settle these perplexing political
questions fairly and amicably without loss to
either the Chinese or the Indonesians and thus
permit aliens, in Indonesia to become bona-fide
citizens without reservations or discriminations,,
Up to the present, there is little evidence that
this is being done,
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III. Principal Complaints of Indonesians and Chinese
Both the Indonesian indigenous population and the Overseas
Chinese domiciled in Indonesia have complained that there are
serious grievances.against the opposite camp. The principal
complaints of both sides are listed below. These complaints,,.
compiled by authorities on Indonesia and often difficult to
document, are nevertheless presented as the compiaintsvoiced
by the average Indonesian and Chinese when iestioned to ex-
plain the lack of harmony between them in their economic,
cultural and political relationships.
A. Indonesians vs. Chinese
1. All Chinese are "bad", both pro-Nationalists and pro-
Communists,
",Once a Chinese always a Chinese" is reportedly the
slogan of nationalistic Overseas Chinese living in the
archipelago.
3. A "superiority complex" is common among the young
Chinese Nationalists.
The Chinese hold the controlling position in the
economy of the Republic, 95 per cent of the industry
and internal trade and a near monopoly of both whole-
sale and retail trade.
5. The Chinese are disproportionately wealthy; much of
this wealth was unlawfully gained by black marketing,
usury, unethical monopolies and "unconscionable"
loan operations.
6. The Chinese are too shrewd and acquisitive.
7. As blockade runners of barter trade, the Chinese have
contributed to the economic instability of the Republic.
8. During 1958 wealthy Chinese are illegally converting
millions of dollars worth of rupiahs into Malayan
currency and transferring their funds to Singapore.
9. The Chinese have always sided with the Dutch against
the