SOVIET PARTISAN WARFARE SINCE 1941

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01634R000400140001-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 23, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

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INTRODUCTION
In the U.S.S.R. the German Army met fOr the first
time a highly-developed new technique of partisan warfare.
The Soviet Partisan Movement was not a spontaneous
guerrilla operationo but was conceived and developed
as a regular military adjunct of the Red Army. Plans
And preparations were made before the ware and actual
operations were directed by an integrated partisan war-
fare headquarters set up in Moscow.
The Soviet partisans succeeded in disrupting the
economic life of a large part of the occupied Soviet
territory, and seriously interfered with the German
supply system. They also acted as a powerful psycho-
logical propaganda weapon in preventing the local
population from collaborating with the Germans or serving
in the German civil administration in the occupied areas.
The most important prerequisite for the partisan
Movement was the organization of the air communications
between partisan groups and the Red Army. At one point
when the Red Army was making its greatest use of the
partisans on the Central Front, a,'quarter of Red Air
Force activity in he area was devoted to servicing the
partisans.
The Germans were never able to meet the challenge
of the partisans1 not only because they lacked sufficient
troops and planes, but also because they were unwilling
to make the political concessions necessary to win the
cooperation of the population of the occupied areas.
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MODERN FORM OF PARTISAN WARFARE
A memorandum of the General Staff of the German
Army dated May, 1943, emphasizes that 'Partisan warfare
must be viewed as an important, well-disciplined method
of combat of the Red Army which is increasing in
significance." This w s a general statement of a
situation which had developed since the first weeks of
the war, and was reported with increasing anxiety in
many individual dispatches from occupied Soviet
territory.
The reports about destruction caused by the
partisans were repeated in each dispatch, as were the
complaints concerning the inadequacy of counter
measures employed by the Germans. Although anti
partisan warfare was recognized by the Germans early
in the Russian campaign as a very important problem,
the Germans were never throughout the whole war able
to find a solution to it. The German General Staff
also acknowledged in the 1943 memorandum that,
"activities of the enemy as well as the lack of appro-
priate German counter measures have of necessity led
to the situation Which now exists,?
The designation, "an important, well-disciplined
method of combat of the Red Army" deserves special
attention. Herein lies the basic distinction between
Russian partisan warfare in the last war and the
earlier classic examples, as in the case of the
Spanish guerrilla war nearly a century and a half
before against Napoleon.
The guerrilla war of the Spaniards was at that
time not a combat method of the Spanish Army. Actually,
the guerrillas had replaced the regular army in the
conduct of the war. The regular Spanish Army officers
failed completely when they attempted to make use of,
and lead guerrillas.
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The few disastrous defeats which the guerrillas
suffered fighting with the army led to the complete
and final separation of the army and the guerrillas.
The guerrillas became purely a combat means of the
Spanish peoples since they were not organized by the
army but rather developed out of the spontaneous
resistance of the peoples led for the most part by
Catholic priests.
The development of Soviet partisan warfare during
the recent war was quite different and demonstrates
both the functions and the significance of this form
of warfare in a modern conflict.
The traditional concept of partisan movements
arising through the spontaneous reaction of the popu-
lation against an invader or against the occupying
power has only limited application in the case of
partisan warfare in recent times. It has almost no
relationship whatsoever to the warfare of Soviet
partisans. There were indeed cases of spontaneous
partisan activity in the U.S.S.R., but only much later
than the initial activities noted by the Himmler SS
Security Police in the first days of the war.
II ORIGIN OF SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT
The Security Police units followed immediately
upon the heels of the advancing army in order to
insure the security of rear areas of_the Eastern Front.
Several days after the outbreak of the wars a report
of June 27th noted that scattered forces of the Red
Army between Libau and Memel were continuing the
battle %in part as civilians, contrary to international
law."
In a report of July lsts it was disclosed that the
advance of the Security Police toward Minsk was
impossible 'because the woods were full of Russian bands
and Russian soldiers in civilian clothing." A report
of the next day notes that "the enemy attempted des-
perately to escape out of the three encirclements
(Bialystoks Volkovysk, Novogrodek), partly supported by
civilian bands."
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According to a report of July 7th, it was
ascertained in Lemberg in Eastern Poland that about
twelve agents were left behind by the Russians with
the mission of performing acts of sabotage on bridges
and so forth."
The first conclusive report of partisan activities
on July 9th noted that "according to recent experiences
and according to dispatches from military headquarters
it appears of decisive significance that a resistance
movement is forming in the rear area of the army, com-
posed of dispersed elements of the Red Army under the
direction of energetic Soviet officers."
Thus, only two and a half weeks after the beginning
of hostilities, the Germans were already speaking of a
Soviet resistance movement, and this movement was
characterized as having "decisive importance." At
that time, however, German troops were being received
by the great majority of the population, either with
obvious pleasure (namely, in the areas newly won from
the Soviets), or with an attitude of hopeful reserve
that was in no way hostile.
The Soviet Partisan Movement began as an activity
ordered from above, or more exactly, as a number of
distinct activities. Some elements of the movement
have already been mentioned in the dispatches citedg
scattered parts of the Red Army, agents left behinda
and in addition, some civilians about whom the Germans
at first knew very little.
It was gradually established beyond a doubt that
when the Soviets evacuated an area or a city not all
members of the Communist Party or Comsomols (Communist
Youth Organization) went along. Part of these groups
were instructed to remain behind as "Destruction
Battalions" and carry out scorched earth policies or
disappear into the forests and form bands of partisans.
It was the primary mission of the organizations
of the Communist Party, working in close coordination
with the MD (GPU) to organize guerrilla warfare, in
order to prepare for a gradual, more complete sub-
ordination to the military command and finally to
become the "well-disciplined method of combat of the
Red Army."
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III FIRST ORDERS FOR FORMING PARTISAN GROUPS
The general order for the formation of partisan
units was given by Stalin himself in his speech of July
3rd, 1941. He said: "In areas occupied by the enemy,
partisan units: mounted and unmounted, must be formed
and diversion groups created for the purpose of combat-
ting formations of the enemy army, for carrying on
partisan warfare everywhere, blowing up bridges and
roads, damaging telephone and telegraph communications,
and setting on fire woods, dumps, and transports.
"Unbearable conditions must be created for the
enemy and for all who help him in the occupied areas.
They must be hunted down and exterminated at every
step, and all their efforts must be frustrated."
Countless later orders and proclamations refer back
to this original order by Stalin. However, the in
for the organization of the partisan
movement, (or rather, "movements") were given even
before Stalings speech. The German Security Police
reported in the interrogation on July 12th of a captain
of the Soviet General Staftcaptured after serving with
the 17th Division, that the prisoner discussed the quest-
ions of prewar instructions to the partisans at length.
The captain declared that before the Outbreak of
hostilities no instructions were given to the Red Army
concerning partisan warfare, but during the fighting
such instruction was given. This particular case
occurred during the first days of the war, when the
Soviet captainls division was retreating from Grodno.
After crossing the Niemen, the corps commander
assembled his staff, commanders and selected platoons
of the Staff in the forest, and distributed machine
guns and small arms.
"The Army corps has been cut off," the captain
said his commander told them. "No one of this group
must be captured alive. Therefore, we must strive to
attain the following objectives: 1, a breakthrough of
the German lines, 2. if the breakthrough is unsuccessful,
ruthless partisan warfare must be undertaken."
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In the same report the Security Police mentioned
the interrogations of several farmers from Collective
Farms who complained that partisans were perpetrating
ruthless acts of terror against the inhabitants of
remote Collective Farms, slaughtering every farm
animal, carrying away food, and in some cases robbing
the inhabitants of their clothing. Red Army soldiers
were obviously already using civilian clothing as was
shown by the reports of June 27th and July 1st.
Even if instructions for partisan warfare had
existed before the war, a captain on the General Staff
need not, and perhaps could not: have known anything
about them. It is obvious that any widespread distri-
bution of plans for partisan warfare, indicating the
possibility of great defeats, would have had a bad
effect on the morale of the Red Army. Such instructions:
however, must have been prepared for the event of
serious defeats, large-scale withdrawals, or the
occupation of extensive Russian areas by a hostile
army,
The official line was that each enemy attack
would be followed immediately with a mighty Red Army
counter-offensive, and the war would be conducted on
foreign rather than Russian soil. General Voroshilov
spoke especially bombastically on this subject on
several occasions before the war while he was still
Soviet Commissar of Defense.
The Soviet captain said that no one in the Red
Army had reckoned with the possibility of encirclement
of such large masses of regular troops and that this
explained why the army issued no instructions regarding
partisan warfare before the outbreak of hostilities.
It might have been different in the case of the
Corps Commander. It is not necessary to assume, how-
ever, that he acted on the basis of earlier instructions,
rather than on his own initiative, since he followed
an attitude traditional in the Red Army,
This attitude has nothing to do with memories of
the partisans of the NPatrioticw War of 1812, which
were only revived later for political purposes, but
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rather with the tradition of the civil war after the
Russian Revolution of 1917 in which partisan warfare
played an extremely great, and in some regions, a
decisive role. According to this tradition the forma-
tion of partisan groups was a perfectly natural reaction
to a military disaster.
IV PRE-WAR PREPARATION
Nevertheless, according to information gradually
assembled by the Germans, it appears certain that
partisan warfare was planned even before the beginning
of hostilities, although not by the military, but by
the Communist Party and the NKVD. This is substantiated
in a report, by the Chief of German Army Military
Police of December 31st, 1941.
This report noted the following statement of a
twenty-five-year old Soviet partisan; "I know that,
two to three weeks before the outbreak of war, Vassili
Kossolapov, a member of the Bolshevik Central Committee
(the highest Party group): who was in Kholm during
meetings and discussions of the Party, repeatedly
urged the organization of partisan groups."
The partisan said that Kossolapov pointed out the
absolute necessity for the organization of partisan
groups, and the possibility for every comrade not
drafted by the army to fight the enemy in this way.
Kossolapov conducted daily theoretical courses in the
afternoon from two to six o'clock in the Red Party
House in Kholm. Participants were, for the most part,
registered members of Young Communist Organizations
(Pioneers and Comsomols) as well as other acceptable
persons who were not Party members.
"The large participation of female workers was
remarkable," the partisan told the Germans. "Partici-
pants ranged in age from fifteen to thirty-five years.
About ninety to one hundred persons attended the
course I took... The lessons included instructions
for the use of rifles, hand grenades, for attaching of
explosives to bridges and so forth... The course
lasted two weeks. During this time we were on the
shooting range ten times."
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He said that the course ended June 23rd s 1941, and
that the exercises were always supervised by NKVD (GPU)
agents. "On June 24th, 1941, we were set in march into
the districts Loknyas Ostrovs Staraya Russas and
Toropenskys in groups of twenty to twenty-five men,"
he declared, We wore civilian clothing. Each one of
us had a rifles a bayonets a Finnish knifes and two
hundred and forty rounds of ammunition.
"In addition, each group was accompanied by a
wagon with several cases of ammunitions twenty hand
grenades s several bottles of liquid fuels hatchets:
axes and provisions. Every man was sworn to fight to
the finish (until self-Sacrifice?)."
It seems to have been a coincidence that the
training in Kholm occurred just before the outbreak of
the war. War had not been expected so early in the
year. Most likely such training classes were scheduled
in various places at various times.
V MEASURES AFTER WAR STARTED
According to most statements of other prisoners:
training in other cases began only after the outbreak
of the war. Then, however s it assumed very large
proportions which leads to the conclusion that at
least sufficient instructors had been trained in
advance.
In a Russian courier aircrafts which had made a
forced landings the Germans found a document reporting
the organization of partisan groups in the same region:
which was dealt with in the above statements.
The document reported the measures taken by the
Political Administration (of the Red Army) on the
Northwestern Front. It was addressed to Mekhliss Chief
of the Political Administration of the Red Arrays and
was dated the 13th or 14th of Julys 1941.
This document shows that already at that time
military authorities were participating in the formation
of partisan groups.
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"A special department has been established at the
Political Administration of the Army Front for the
direction of partisan movements in the rear of the
enemy,* the document stated. "It handles all work on
organization, armament, and leadership of partisan
groups. The department maintains constant contact
with local party organs and partisan groups... The
Political Administration of the Army Front has sent
fifty-two political workers who are to organize and
lead the partisan movement and the work in the rear of
the enemy.
On July 13th, 1941," the document continued,
"twenty-two partisan groups were formed in the area
of the Northwestern Front. These groups are led by
Communists, chiefly political workers from the active
ranks of the Red Army.
*Political workers from local organizations or
leaders of collective farms also served as active group
leaders. All group leaders were thoroughly instructed.
Principally, a group had '.a strength of fifty to eighty
men and is subdivided into five or six divisions."
One special group was three hundred men strong.
?It was led by a comrade Krassavin, an official of the
Ostrov party district, while its chief of staff was a
comrade Yakoshev, a captain of the border troops.
"Furthermore, eleven officers of field rank have
been assigned to this group as company and platoon
leaders,* the document continued.
"On July 12th the group assembled in the Dno area
and is advancing toward the rear of the enemy,.. Other
groups are active in the districts: Pskov-Luga, Ostrov-
Staraya Ruses., Opochka-Kholm."
Furthermore, the authorities of the NKVD and the
NSGB (Peoples Commissariat for the Safety of the State)
formed so-called "clean-up battalions" to combat enemy
paraehutists. Measures had been taken, according to
the extent of the German advance, to convert these
clean-up battalions to partisan groups to fight in the
enemy's rear areas.
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Thus, in the same area (Kholm, Ostrov, Staraya
Russa) there were two sources of recruits for the
partisan movement. In both cases this was not a
spontaneous movements but one ordered and initiated
from above. The first source was members of local
party organizations, the other, from the Political
Administration of the Red Army, both in collaboration
with the organs of the NKVD (and NKGB).
VI GENERAL LINE OF DEVELOPMENT
The introduction to the first of a series of
secret reports on partisan warfare dated May 3rd1 1943,
put out by the General Staff, says:
"The use of partisans is a well-known and proven
means of warfare used by the Russian people in both
national and international struggles. It is, therefores
not surprising that the Soviet Government, through the
NKVD0 prepared for partisan warfare before the outbreak
of the war by setting up a plan of organization,
enlisting former partisan members, holding complete
training courses, instructions for the responsible
leaders of all political organizations.
"During the further course of the war the leader-
ship of the partisan movement was taken over more and
more by the Red Army, a development which found its
outward expression in the appointment of Marshal
Voroshilov as Chief of the Central Staff of the Partisan
Movement."
It may be noted here that about May, 1943, the
German General Staff evidently conducted a particularly
thorough study of the entire and very voluminous material
about the partisan movement. The results of this study
were presented in summarized form in the above-mentioned
series of reports and in several other documents.
Naturally, a short outline like the one git.en here is
a little over-simplified. But it lists correctly the
most important development, and these are confirmed
not only by the entire material in German files, but
also by some comparatively honestly written Soviet
publications on the subject (the best being "People with
Pure Conscience" by P. Vershigora, Moscow 1946).
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Although it is true that preparations for partisan
warfare had been made before the outbreak of war, it
would be an exaggeration to say that the partisan
movement was already organized before hostilities began.
Furthermore, it may be taken for granted that at first
the movement did not develop according to plan.
The German armies advanced so quickly, there were
so many encirclements9 and the Soviet front became so
disorganized that for a long time there was no chance
to coordinate the individual groups and to establish
regular connection with the Red Army.
The connection, as outlined in the report addressed
to Mekhlis, could be established only much later. It
was all the more amazing that during this ohaos, without
regular supply of arms and ammunition, frequently
without expert leadership and - at least in the begin-
ning - in the face of a preponderantly hostile attitude
on the part of the local population (as shown clearly
by many reports), the partisans were able to inflict
very heavy damage upon the Germans.
Complaints about partisan attacks never ceased.
Nor did the hope of German authorities in 1941 that
winter would curtail partisan activity materialize.
There was only a short interruption while the partisans
established their winter camps.
VII RECRUITING
The Germans neither could nor did deny the boldness
and skill of the partisans. German reports always
emphasized the difficulties encountered in combatting
them. There is no doubt that the partisans were self-
sacrificing, enthusiastic and even fanatical.
It seems likely that what may be described as the
first wave of the partisan movement was almost entirely
lost. Vershigora, himself one of the later partisan
leaders, has indicated this indirectly and cautiously
in his book.
? In June, 19429 he arrived at one of the most
important areas of partisan warfare. He wrote that
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"the true heroes of this area were unknown fighterso
lower and medium rank officers of the Red Army who did
not live to see the triumph of the partisan movement."
Among such unknoWn fighters were probably those
"eleven officers of field rank" assigned to a partisan
groupo who had been mentioned in the report of the
Political Administration of the Northwestern Front.
They included many who were not officers of the
Red Army but civilians9 usually faithful Communists.
As Kossolapov said9 the formation of partisan groups
will provide every comrade who is not drafted into
the Army with the opportunity to fight the enemy in
this way."
Thus3 partisan warfare was expected to concentrate
on the use of those who for some reason or other could
not be drafted into the Army.
The partisans were partly recruited from men of
draft age who had not been called to the colors because
of the lack of time in view of the quick German advance9
and partly from those Who were either too young or too
old.
Among the older group were old and faithful party
members and - of particular importance for the activities
of the partisans - partisans of the Civil War 1918-203
these latter especially on the Southern sector of the
front.
For in8tance3 a report of the Sedurity Police of
February 27th3 19423 stated that Makrusov9 the leader
of the entire Crimean Partisan Movemento was an "Old
Partisan" Who had "already distinguished himself in
1918 and had been appointed honorary member of the
Supreme Council of the Soviet Union and decorated for
his services."
Partisan pamphlets toward the end of January9
19429 were signed by him as "Commander of the Crimean
Partisan Movement." Another old partisan was Kovpaks
leader of the most famous partisan group (later enlarged
first into a partisan brigade and then a partisan
division). He was decorated twice with the order of
"Hero of the Soviet Union" and appointed a Major General
during the war.
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He was a soldier in World War I then fought as a
partisan in the Civil War, ending in the most famous
of the early partisan units, the Chapayev Division.
On the staff of Kovpak, another old partisan played an
important part. He was Korenevy called "Died Morozy"
'Grandfather Frosty a Russian fairy tale character,
because of his long white beard.
VIII YOUTH AMONG PARTISANS
And in the ranks beside these older men were many
who were very young, some still children. The Commissar
and actual military leader on KovpalOs staff was
Lieutenant Colonel (later Major General) Rudnev. He
was accompanied by his sons who was not yet sixteen
years old.
Books about the Kovpak brigade mention fourteen-
year old fighters who were mainly employed in recon-
naissance. Statements in the Soviet literature about
very young partisans are not only confirmed but strengthened
by German reports. It is particularly amazing how many
seventeen-and eighteen-year old girls were employed, not
only for liaison duty but also as spies. As the war
progressed, an increasing number of thee girls
parachuted into the rear area of the enemy. The young
boys were mostly recruited from local Communist Youth
Groups.
Thel statements of the partisan from the Kholm
area quoted earlier show that participants in a train-
ing course, Which was held before the outbreak of the
war, ranged from fifteen years up in age.
During the war, however, young people were taken
without any previous training. These were evidently
trained in the partisan groups. The Germans mercilessly
executed the captured fourteen-year old boys and
seventeen-year old girls whose short biographies are
given in their reports.
In June, 1941, Kovpak was fifty-four years old.
Other veterans of the Civil War were often even older.
In case of another war they will not be able to play
the same part again. But there will be other "Old
Partisans,' - those of World War II,
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There are indications that in the Soviet Union the
youth is being trained, not only through military
exercises in the schools. In 1948 "Detgis" (State
Publishing House for Children's Literature) publidhed
a book for children "The Sharpshooters" (Metkiye Strelki2
by T. Grits, Moscow 1948) 360 pages.
The first part of the book, written in easily
understandable and lively form, is a history of shooting
arms, from bow and arrows to the modern rifle.
The second part is nothing short of an instruction
book for the training of snipers, with many pictures,
sketches, and diagrams, and with practical examples
from various wars, particularly the last one. The book
does not only cover sharpshooting but also the subject
of camouflage with many instructive pictures. There
can be little doubt as to the purpose of such "children's
literature."
The conduct of the partisan warfare in the Soviet
Union was based on the principle that warfare is not
only a matter for the Armed Forces, but also for the?
entire population. Stalin in his speech of July 3rd,
1941, saids The Red Army, the Red Fleet and All
0.111.gmg of the Soviet Union must defend every foot of
Soviet Territory, must fight for our towns and villages
until the last drop .of blood."
Although the entire population did not answer this
call, there were enough men and women available to
conduct an extraordinarily effective guerrilla war.
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IX CONNECTION WITH THE RED ARMY
Any complete study of the history of the Soviet
Partisan Movement would require an entire volume,
although actually there is no lack of material for
such a work. However, it is possible to give a picture
of its development through an outline of the most
important trends,
The general line of the development was correctly
characterized in the German General Staff document,
quoted earlier, which stated that the movement passed
more and more under the direct control of the Red Army.
This meant also, that the movement gradually became
more thoroughly organized, and that its activity was
more completely coordinated with the operations of the
Red Army.
Later German reports mention several times that
the ?"bandits," as they usually called the partisans,
did not consider themselves partisans, but "soldiers of
the Red Army in the rear of the enemy."
The partisan movement developed in several stages,
which were, however, not always simultaneous in all of
the occupied areas. The partisan groups were originally
connected with local Communist Party and NKVD units.
The Party and NKVD units, however, had to be evacuated
because of the German advance.
Some dependable party members as well as many NKVD
agents were left behind in order to build up secret
party organizations in territories occupied by the
Germans and also, if possible, to remain in contact with
the partisans.
This contact proved very difficult. The work of
the secret party groups was considerably handicapped
by their lack of freedom of movement. Many of them
were discovered by German Security Police or betrayed
by the population. Often discovery of links between
groups led the Germans to partisan units Which they
destroyed,
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The hundreds of small partisan groups were isolateds
and had to act exclusively on their own initiative, It
was especially hard for them because of the lack of
communication with the Red Army which thus out them off
from this source of weapons and ammunition. They tried
of courses to establish contact with unoccupied Soviet
territory, the *Big Country" as they frequently called
it.
Such contact was also attempted from the Red Army
side of the fronts but this was again impossible as
long as the partisan movement was not first consolidated
through contact among the groups themselves. The final
consolidation of the partisan movement was described in
a German General Staff study of Mays 1943.
"During the past summer (1942) many small bandit
areas were reported which were connected together only
loosely or not at ails" the General Staff stated.
"During the winters however, concentrations were
noticeable in the areas of Bryansks in the triangle
between the Pripyet and the Dniepr, southwest of
Bobruysk and on the Ordha and Nevel Rivers. These
were accomplished primarily by small bandit groups
which had previously acted independently s uniting into
larger bandit organizations. In some cases s reinforce-
ment of such concentrations by additional manpower from
more remote areas was noted,?
According to Soviet books on the subjects at least
a few *Unions* of partisan groups already existed in
the summer of 1942s although the functions of such
unions were still limited.
Vershigoras who was mentioned earlier parachuted
into the Bryansk areas the so-called "Little Country,"
on June 13th s 1942. This area of 3500 square miles
(130 kilometers long and 70 wide) was completely under
partisan rule. Vershigora described it as an area
"four times as large as the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg,51
In this "Little Country s" Verdhigora found a Union
of Partisan Groups formed from more than BO individual
groups. The unions however, was still a very loose one.
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It had a headquarters s but its actual activity was
limited to gathering reports of individual groups and
relaying them by the single small radio station to the
"Big Country."
Thus, the union was able to establish regular
contact with the other side of the fronts a contact
which it was impo sible for individual groups to main?
tain. This was the first essential step toward coopera?
tion with the Red Army and subordination of the partisan
movement to central military leadership.
The partisans were advised beforehand of
Vershigora's arrival and he. was met on landing by
parachute by a young man and girl. He joined the
Kovpak group in August and in the same month (Augusts
1942) Kovpak himself was sent by an airplane (a Douglas)
to a conference of partisan leaders in Moscow,
On August 31st Kovpak and the other partisan
leaders were received by Stalin who personally gave
Kovpak orders to carry out a large operation. Stalin
used the following words to the partisan leaders
Which became famous g For the presents you are our
second front."
X ROLE OF THE AIR FORCE
The contact by air played a decisive role in the
partisan movement. Military leaders 9 technicianss
weapons s ammunitions and medicine were brought to the
partisans by Soviet Air Force planes. German reports
recorded such operations as early as Augusts 1941.
Later on the partisans were also able to use landing
fields behind the German lines.
In Februarys 1943, the Germans reported a total
of 600 supply flights and in the first part of Maya
more than 29000 in a single section of the fronts the
area of Army Group Center. The front of this army
group extended from Novosokolniki in the North to Sumy
in the South and the "Main Bandit Region" was located
in this part of the occupied area.
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This means,* a report of the German General Staff
stated 9 *an average of 20 supply flights daily in
February, and in the first part of May an average of
150 flights daily. This explains also the continued
improvement in the equipment of the bandits, such as
additional submachine guns 9 machine guns, light and
heavy mortared and artillery. Up to now due to
inadequate armament, poor leadership and insufficient
manpower 9 the military value and fighting power of the
bandits were slight. Their activities were generally
limited to sabotage and small-scale attacked but now9
the possibility of a growing scale of attacks coordinated
with operations at the front must be foreseen. The
employment of parachute and airborne units might be
of particular importance in this case.
The air lift to the partisans apparently reached
its peak during the first half of Maya 1943. The
Germans noted a decline in air supply operations during
the second half of Mayo According to Army Group Center
reports 9 the following number of missions were flown
by the Russians during the periods indicated
Period
Total
Ail Types
Fighter
Bomber
For Partisans
1943
May 1-13
89357
19577
880
29055
May 14-31
59599
93?
619
l.254
July 16-31
129039
29883
29189
659
During the second half of Maya 19439 air activity
as a whole decreased but the relation of partisan
supply flights to total flights remained about the
eamed 24.4 percent during the first ha1f9 22.4 percent
during the second half of the month.
In contrast supply flights during the second
half of July amounted to only 5.5 percent of total
flights, even though the total number of missions flown
increased sharply. The explanation lies in the increased
tempo of combat flying at the front up to July 13th due
to the German offensive, and after July 1e.th9 due to
the Soviet offensive.
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The importance to the partisan movement of air
communication with the .Big Country N cannot be over-
estimated. Particularly, its psychological and morale
effect must not be overlooked. Once this communication
was established the partisans no longer felt themselves
isolated from the rest of the Soviet world. They could
again send and receive letters from their families, and
many such letters were found by the Germans on dead or
captured partisans, They felt that they had a great
power behind them taking care of them and supporting
them.
Although much of What appears in Soviet publications
about partisans relations with Moscow and with Stalin
himself may be good propaganda s it also had a basis
in fact. Since a great many partisans were also faith7
ful Communists Stalin represented to them the supreme
authority the Nfather of the people. N And when in
addition to military supplies, they also received musical
instruments or gramophones and records, their morale
was helped,
Without air communication the military organization
of the partisan movement could not have reached the
point which it did, Parachutists alone would never have
been able to apcomplish any such degree of organization.
At firsts rough landing fields s and later even
regular air fields s were built, so that inspection
tripe by higher Red Army contenders ae well as flights
to 1012=1/ by Kovpak and other partisan leaders were
made possible.
Thus s the tactical situation could be discussed
with higher headquarters and replacement problems solved
on the spot on the basis of past experiences. Replace-
ment requirements were very great, since the rate of loss
of commanding officers was high and sometimes crippling.
For instance, the Kovpak partisans lost their mOst
Important military leaders Major General Rudnevs in
Augusts 1943,
Since two accounts of the Kovpak groups one by
Kovpak himself, the other by Vershigoras have been
published in the U.S.S.R., more details are known about
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this group than about the others. The first aircraft
to bring Kovpak medical supplies landed near his head-
quarters behind the German lines close to Bryansk
about the end of July or the beginning of Augusts 1942.
A few weeks later Kovpak himself flew to Moscow.
After thata air communication with partisan groups
became quite regular. At the end of October two 76
millimeter guns were flown in; and the same aircraft
evacuated the wounded and mothers and children to
Moscow.
In Januarya 19430 Kovpak's staff was located in
the Byelorussian village of Lyakhovichi. A landing
field was laid out on the ice of a nearby lake. Air-
craft brought in weapons and ammunition for further
military operations a and also brought correspondents
and photographers of Moscow papers; as well as moving
picture photographers to take action pictures. A
member of the Ukrainian SOR Supreme Soviet brought in
decorations and medals.
In the meantimea five partisan leaders; including
Kovpak and Rudneva were raised to the rank of Major
General, Their generals uniforms were also brought
in by air. Finallya when Kovpak was having trouble
with his teethe a special plane arrived from Moscow
with an outstanding dentist and his technician to make
the partisan leader a set of false teeth.
On April 20th the Secretary of the Ukrainian
Communist Party Korotchenkoa accompanied by several
aidesa arrived with instructionsa anda latera the -
Chief-of-Staff of the Soviet Ukrainain Partisan Move-
ment; Major General Strokach, landed with more
decorations and medals.
Although Kovpak's troops marched at least 29000
miles behind the German lines through occupied terki-
torya they maintained almost uninterrupted air commun-
ications with the Red Army.
Atter communications between most individual
partisan groups had been well established, between the
summer of 1942 and the spring of 1943, the partisan
organization was systematically developed.
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XI STRENGTH OF PARTISAN MOVEMENT
According to the German General Staff reports the
following measures were carried out;
1. Consolidation of small bands into larger units,
such as partisan brigades and divisions.
2. Use of complete units of paratroops and air-
borne forces in support of bands or for the purpose 'or
organizing new bands.
3. Reinforcements through recruitment of local
civilians.
4. Replacement of leaders lacking military
training by officers of the Red Army.
5. Raising of training standards through partisan
schools and courses of instruction.
6. Equipment of bands with more radio supplies
to assure closer control of all units.
7. Use of more planes for liaison and also the
introduction of a regular system of supplying of
partisan units by air.
According to the same reports there were 129
large bands with a total strength of 125000 in May
1943s compared with 43 bands with 579000 men in Febru-
ary of the same year. These figures however, do not
give a complete or altogether accurate picture. The
comparison is not correct because the February figures
do not include bands operating in the Baltic States
and the Ukraine. Therefore the two sets of figures are
not directly comparable.
When comparable areas are considered the February
let figure of 579000 compares with a May 15th figure of
939000 men. Even these figures are not entirely accurate
since in addition to larger bands smaller groups were
also operating. /n facts it is impossible to present
an exacts statistical report of the partisan movement
without knowledge of secret Russian data. On the other
hands sufficient data is available to gain an approximate
numerical estimate of the partisan movement.
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German statistics of losses Which the partisans
suffered during 1943 and 1944 show the following
figures:
Dead
147,056
Captured
90,904
Deserters
7.402
TOTAL
245,364
It is apparent, therefore, that in the period from
the beginning to the end of the war several hundred
thousand persons served in partisan units. From Soviet
sources only one figure is available, that of 340,000
partisans for the Byelorussian area (Ogoniok No. 52,
December 1948). Since this figure appears in an
article in the issue celebrating the 30th anniversary
of the Byelorussian SSR, the figure may not be reliable
but may be an overstatement for propaganda purposes.
Nevertheless, it is not an unreasonable one. The
partisan movement originated in Byelorussia and reached
its greatest strength there. German statistics show
that as of May 1st, 1943, 61 percent of all partisans
in large bands were in Byelorussia and neighboring areas.
The Soviet publication gives the figure of 340,000
for this region, so this would mean nearly. 600,000 for
the whole occupied area, assuming that the same percent-
age ratio existed throughout the war, and that the
German estimate of 61 percent for Byelorussia was
correct.
XII PARTISANS IN BYELORUSSIA AND UKRAINE
German statistics on the distribution of partisans
according to areas are very revealing. A comparison
between the area of Army Group Center and the Ukraine
is especially interesting. In May, 1943, the composi-
tion of the population in the Army Group Center area,
according to German estimates, was as follows:
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White Russians
20520,000
Ukrainians
1s300$000
Russians
500.000
4s320,000
According to German observations, at least a portion
of the Ukrainlan population of this area was under
Great Russian influences while there were no separatist
tendencies among the White Russians. Conditions for
furthering the Soviet cause by partisan warfare were,
therefore s most favorable in this area.
It is for this reason that a comparison of this
area with the Ukraine is particularly interesting,
since in the Ukraine a strong antagonism existed
between the Great Russians and Ukrainlans. According
to German figures the number of partisans in the
larger groups ehowed the following fluctuations:
Date - 1943
Army Grotip Center
Ukraine
March 1
55s300
10s000
March 15
57 200
12s500
April 1
58,800
17,500
April 15
71s500
8,500
May 1
75,500
17s500
May 15
69,800
18s000
The fact that the area of Army Group Center
contained particularly favorable topographical features
such as forests and swamps partly explains the fluctua-
tions in these figures. Partisan groups from neighboring
areas would assemble here for a time and then leave the
area again. It seems evident from many reports,
Including Soviet publications that the Soviet partisan
movement in the Ukraine was mainly fostered for quite
some time from the Army Group Center area.
The Bryansk forests were a favorite partisan
assembly area. The Ukrainian partisan leader Kovpak
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also came to this area before he appeared with his
brigade in the Ukraine in 1943 for the purpose, in his
own words, "of spreading the fire of the peoplees
struggle." Although there was widespread willingness
to collaborate with the Germans in all the occupied
Soviet areas, it was especially strong in the Ukraine.,
and almost universal among the Ukrainian peasants, Who
felt a deep hatred against the Soviet regime.
However, after bitter experience with German
occupation policies, anti-German feeling and even
hatred developed among UkrainiAns.
The anti-German trend did not so much help the
pro-Soviet elements as it created a firmer basis for
various Ukrainian Nationalist Movements, These for the
most part developed in the Western Ukraine which had
belonged to Poland until September, 1940. However, the
'strength of these movements such as the Bandera, Melnik,
and "Tams Bulba" groups were partly dissipated by
righting among themselves. Their attitude towards ths
Soviet 'partisans was largely hostile, although the
Ukrainians did in some cases propose to the Soviet
partisans neutrality so both sides would be free to
fight the Germans,
A, German report of August 9th, 1943, states
"Fortunately, no agreement has thus far been effected
between the Ukrainian nationalist and Soviet bands, On
the contrary, these groups are bitter enemies, and only
recently engaged in a three-day battle at Ostrog about
twenty-five miles southeast of Rovno, with both sides
suffering several hundred casualties."
The more important Ukrainian groups were committed
to a struggle against the Germans as well as against
the Soviets. The same German report states that "the
Ukrainiansdirected their efforts exclusively against
the German civil administration with the avowed purpose
of bringing as much Ukrainian territory as possible
under their control, They freely admitted that they
had no interest whatsoever in attacking the German
military and German supply lines, since before any
independent Ukraine could be established the German
and Soviet armies would have to destroy each other."
In the summer of 1943, the report continued,
conditions changed radically. The number of attacks
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on trains, convoys, strong points and warehouses, and
terrorist acts against individuals, groups, villages,
and entire regions became so numerous that the partisan
situation developed into a "real menace not only to
the Army supply system and transport routes over which
agricultural products are distributed but even to the
prestige of the German administration itself."
At this time, the partisans of Kovpak, Saburov,
and others, who in August, 1942, had been ordered by
Stalin himself to proceed to the "right bank Ukraine,"
that is, the region west of the Dniepr River, had
already been active for two or three months.
The attitude of the local population had also
changed. Red Army victories, beginning with Stalingrad,
raised the possibility that the Soviets might reconquer
the Ukraine. The population began to fear Soviet
reprisals and no longer dared actively to oppose Soviet
partisans.
A report about the Ukraine from the Chief of the
Economic Staff in the Eastern occupied areas, dated
July 24th, 1943, states "The number of attacks by
bands is steadily increasing and during June of this
year increased 10 times over June of the previous
year."
It cannot be ascertained exactly What part of this
increase in partisan attacks was due primarily to the
local development of the movement and what part to the
activity of the Bryansk forest partisans who moved into
the Ukraine from Byelorussia.
A tabular representation accompanying this report
shows a striking increase in partisan attacks after the
last part of April, 1943. This fact supports information
from Soviet sources concerning the activity of partisans
Who were sent to the Ukraine. The greatest increase
occurred during the period from April 25th to June 1st,
and there is a very significant relationship between the
increase in Soviet air attacks on the German rear areas
and the corresponding increase in the number of partisan
attacks.
Unfortunately, German statistics concerning the
larger partisan groups, such as those available for the
time up to May 15th, 1943, were not compiled for the
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later period. In any event, it is safe to assumed that
the sharp difference between the number of partisan
operations in the areas of Army Group Center and in the
Ukraine became less as the Ukrainian Partisan Movement
grew after the summer of 1945.
Finally, partisan activity in the Crimea should
be mentioned, since it was also relatively strong, and
the partisans were adept at exploiting the opportunities
which this mountainous area afforded them.
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XIII EFFECTS OF PARTISAN WARFARE
The partisan movement reached its peak in the
summer of 1943. Thereafter it declined gradually, not
in intensity, but in scope, as a result of the constant
advance of the Red Army.
The area of the U.S.S.R. occupied by the Germans
contracted until the Soviet forces were again in complete
control of their homeland. Districts in which the
partisan groups were concentrated and which had never
been mopped up by the Germans were, one by one, re-
occupied by the Red Army and became rear areas of the
Soviets.
The activities of partisans who were still behind
the withdrawing Germans did not diminish, but lost some
of their importance measured by the total effect of the
Soviet offensive.
The partisan movement also could not obtain the
support it formerly received from the Red Army9 because
the Red Air Force was too occupied in supporting the
Red Arthyls offensive. German reports for the first half
of October record 571 missions for the purpose of
supplying the partisans as against 3952 fighter and
5013 bomber sorties, or 4.8 percent of the total
(129003) Soviet missions flown.
In the second half of October, 315 flights to
supply the partisans were recorded as against 3237
fighter and 3190 bomber sorties9 so flights to supply
partisans amounted to only 3.5 percent of all (8915)
missions flown. Nevertheless, partisan attacks still
represented a disturbing factor for the Germans even
at that time.
Partisan warfare was of the greatest value to the
Russians at the time when it interfered with and slowed
down the German offensive and gave the Red Army time
to strengthen its defenses, as well as in the period
from July to September of 1943, when the Soviet armies
definitely went over to a sustained offensive.
One might obtain a more complete picture of the
functions and significance of partisan warfare in con-
junction with an offensive by supplementing the study of
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Soviet experience with .a study of partisan movements
in other countries (as for example in France after the
A1lies1 landings.)
On the other hand, the experiences with the Soviet
conduct of partisan warfare clearly show how the
offensive capabilities of an army in enemy country can
be limited by this type of warfare.
German losses in manpower as a direct result of
combat with partisans were of small significance com-
pared with losses suffered in battle against the Red
Army. It is true that Soviet reports assert, for-
example0-that Byelorussian partisans alone killed more
than 600,000 Germans, but this is a'fantastic exaggera-
tion. Various Soviet reports concerning particular
engagements often give several very contradictory figures
of German losses.
Thus, for example, Bragin, a small Ukrainian city
occupied by a German garrison, was attacked in April,
1943, by Kovpak and two other partisan units. Kovpak
writes that his Unit alone "wiped out more than 400
German officers and menow
Vershigora, Who also took part in this action,
reports that in all, that is by all three partisan
units, more than 200 Germans were killed. These Soviet
reports are entirely unreliable, because they were
published for an obvious propaganda purpose. However,
these are secret German reports published for their own
use, Which are necessarily more accurate, since there
would be no reason for the German military authorities
to leave such losses out of their own reports if they
existed. Furthermore, there is no reason to doubt the
validity of German reports Which were not destined for
publication but rather for restricted official use.
In the area of Army Group Center, Where the
partisans were strongest, the German Command noted the
following losses by their own or allied troops during
a period of five months, May to September, 1943:
Germans, 902 dead, 1864 wounded, and 202 missing; their
allies, for the most part Hungarians, 344 dead, 501
wounded, and 72 missing, auxiliaries from various
nationalities of the Soviet Union, 758 dead, 788 wounded,
and 3512 missing, kidnapped, and deserters.
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The basic principle of the partisans was to avoid
open combat with German troops. In such engagements the
regular German troops superiority in armament was too .
great.
Whenever the Germans succeeded in encircling and
destroying the partisan groups, partisan losses were
extraordinarily high compared to German. For example,
in October, 1943, the Germans succeeded in liquidating
the so-called Grishin Regiment. The Germans counted
1769 partiaansl bodies, and this report added that this
was probably not all. They captured 463 and rounded up
about 1000 civilians from the woods. The Germans lost
64 dead, 18 missing (obviously killed in this case),
and 120 wounde&
Far more important to the Germans, however, than
actual losses in killed and wounded was the number of
German troops tied up by partisan activities. In
November, 1943, when the area occupied by the Germans
had already decreased substantially, the High Command
of Army Group Center estimated that it would require
210 battalions of 350 men each, that is 73,500 men, in
order to effect "minimum security" on the railroads and
highways alone. It was not in a position to make such
numbers of troops available for this duty.
Furthermore, other security troops were also
necessary because the partisans attacked not only rail-
roads and highways, but also villages, cities, and German
supply depots. In the summer of 1943, as far as can be
ascertained, the Germans were able to prevent barely
half of the attempted attacks on the railroads with
the forces at their disposal. The successful attempts
were sufficient to cause serious disrrupt ion of railroad
traffic.
The statistics of Army Group Center are not entirely
uniform, since in some cases attacks on railroads in
the area far behind the front governed by the General
Commissar for Byelorussia were also counted. Likewise,
it is not sufficient to count only the number of attacks,
since each attack occurred at several places at the
same time.
Thus, for example, during September in the limited
area of the Army Group Center only, 588 attacks were
reported, including the entire Byelorussian area, 1256
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(attacks) with 14,150 demolitions of rail lines, in
October 1093 attacks with 5456 demolitions, (fewer than
in the previous month because the occupied area was
smaller), and in November 952 attacks with 4574
demolitions.
In May, 1943, the Germans recorded 765 partisan
attacks which had the following results: traffic was
completely interrupted on the damaged rail lines for
3,863 hours; and reduced to single track operation for
2,132 hours; 255 locomotives were damaged, and of these
123 were severely damaged,
In August; the partisans in Army Group Center area
carried out a large-scale operation, Which began during
the night of August 2-.3. In two nights, demolitions
were carried out at 6,619 points on the lines and
2,086 additional charges were removed unexploded,
During August there were a total of 781 attacks
against railroad inetallations0 involving 12,717
individual demolitions and 3,011 additional unexploded
charges. In all, 74 locomotives and 214 railroad cars
were damaged, 80 locomotives and 625 cars derailed and
150 kilometers (more than 90 miles) of rails were
rendered unserviceable. Hitler ordered an increase in
the number of troops to be used to guard rail installa-
tions0 but it was found to be impossible to carry out
these orders, The Army Group Center High Command
reported that it had been forced to use security troops
for other purposes at the front. They had to be with-
drawn from their assigned mission of combatting partisan
bands.
The partisan movement in the Ukraine was nowhere
near as strong during the summer of 1943, but neverthe-
less the situation was viewed as very grave. On July
24th, 19430 the chief of the Military Economic Staff of
the Eastern occupied territories wrote the Army High
Command that many harassing actions had been successfully
carried out against the German rear areas during June
in the Western Ukraine. Be stated that these actions
consisted of "221 attacks with mines, 65 derailments
caused by rail removals, and 78 air attacks. It must
be recognized, that the danger of sudden interruption
of traffic on the main supply line becomes steadily
greater."
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The attacks of the partisans frequently and
effectively slowed up the movement of German military
supplies and delayed or destroyed food transports.
Both of these conditions interfered with the usual
precision of the German war machine and created a state
of nervousness among the troops. In addition, partisan
activity seriously affected the economic life of the
occupied areas and the attitude of the local population.
The attached map (see end of study) shows clearly
how the Germans estimated the effect of partisan activity
on the economic life of the occupied areas in April, 1943.
They had no reason to present a blacker picture in their
official documents than the situation actually warranted.
The German report to which this map was attached
also contained some very striking figures. The
situation was worst in Byelorussia, where partisan
activity had developed earlier and more vigorously than
in other areas.
The Germans expected that there would be a sharp
decline in the agricultural production of the Byelo-
russian area "because of the insufficient pacification
of the area," and therefore set the quotas for deliveries
very low, 10 percent of the grain yield, and 30 percent
of the meat.
The German report states that the bands could claim
as their achievement the fact that even these reduced
quotas were not fulfilled. Grain collections were only
40 percent fulfilled, meat quotas only 36 percent, and
fats (including vegetable oils) by 70 percent. Deliveries
per hectare of farm land declined by 74 percent due to
partisan activity.
Of 967 state farms ("Bovkhoz?09, which the
association appointed by the Germans operated in 19420
only 312 remained under its control in 1943, while
partisans had taken over the others. During the 1942
to 1943 wood-cutting season only 44 percent of the
previous yea's amount could be cut and half the sawmills
were destroyed.
In the operational area of Army Group Center
agricultural yields per hectare of farm land dropped
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66 percent, total grain yields dropped 160,000 tons or
59.6 percent and total meat production dropped 30,000
tons or 75 percent. The sawmill production declined 42
percent. The report stated that 90 percent of the
forests were infested by bands.
The situation in the Ukraine was more favorable.
The Germans estimated in the 'spring of 1943 that in the
Ukraine only 1 percent of grain production would be lost
and 13 percent was greatly endangered, and 5 percent of
meat production would be lost and 11 percent greatly
endangered,
For all occupied areas, an overall 10 percent loss
in grain production and a 20 percent loss in meat
production were considered certain, while an over-all
11 percent of grain and 8 percent of meat Production
were considered greatly imperiled. However, conditions
similar to those prevailing in other areas were develop-
ing in the Ukraine, so that a deterioration of the
situation there might be expected and did materialize.
The report related "how deeply also the economy of
southern Russia (the Ukraine) has been imperiled by band
activity." Finally, partisan activity deprived the
Germans of the labor of 1,5950000 able-bodied personae
The following conclusion was drawn "The economic
losses are heavy. The dangers Which threaten the supply
of the army on the East Front and even of the Reich -
itself because of the present situation and strengthened
and expanded partisan activity are extraordinarily real
and cannot be minimized."
One important aspect, however - namely, that even
reduced deliveries of agricultural products could be
extracted from all areas only by increasing pressure on
the local population was not mentioned in the report
These areas With the exception of the Ukraine usually
produced no? surpluses even in normal times, and any
put in production was an acute hardship for the people.
For the local population to deliver grain and meat to
the Germans under such conditions meant actual starva
tion At first this development stirred up the anger of
the population against the partisans. Later, however,
the sentiment of the population turned more and more
against the Germans. This reversal of feeling in turn
provided fertile ground for the development of the
partisan movement.
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XIV PARTISANS AND LOCAL POPULATIONS
The country population in particular suffered
directly and heavily from partisan activity. They were
subjected to pressure from two direction's. One of the
first aims of the partisans was to destroy anything
Which might otherwise be used by the Germans. This was
primarily food and livestock. The partisans tried to
destroy all food stuffs and to carry away or slaughter
livestock. This, if successful, meant a terrible- famine
for the population. The same partisans would later
appear in the villages to requisition provisions.
The majority of the population, at first hoped for
an improvement of their lot and particularly for
dissolution of collective economy by the Germans. At
the same time, however, they saw they were being robbed
of daily bread by the partisans. Apparently reliable
German reports, which consistently emphasize conditions
Unfavorable as well as those favorable to the Germans,
indicate that originally the attitude of the farmers
toward the partisans was overwhelmingly hostile.
Then the Germans inaugurated the policy of "terror
againSt terror" as it was called in a report of .the
Security Police dated August 22nd, 1941. If the popu-
lation tried to oppose the partisans, and resist their
demands for food,and help the Germans to locate the
bands, they were subject to partisan reprisals.
If they did not oppose the partisans, or were
compelled to assist them, and if they did not want or
were afraid to betray them to the Germans,. they were
subjected to reprisals by the Germans who were perfectly
prepared to burn down whole villages and execute their
entire population.
The Security Police stated on August 22nd, 1941,
that "reports have been received about villagers Who had
fed partisans or had temporarily hidden them. On the
basis of these reports a number of villages were searched.
In most casess interrogation of the persons accused in
the confidential,reports and questioning of other
villagers succeeded in locating: the adoomplices of the
partisans. They were either shot on the spot or, if
32
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useful information might be expected from further
interrogation, they were taken to the headquarters
(Or the Security PpliCe). After interrogatiOrOhey
were executed. Repeatedly, the houses of accomplices
of partisans- were burnt down in order to deter others
from such action. It was announced to the population
that their entire village would be burnt down if aid was
given once more to partisans or if partisans appearing
in the village were not immediately reported. The
technique of opposing terror against terror has
achieved excellent results. Fear of reprisals has led
farmers to come from distances. of 12 miles or more on
foot or by horse in order to bring reports about
partisans which in most cases proved correct."
This method, however, was a two.edged weapon Which,
was turned rather strongly to the advantage of the
partisans. Disillusionment, exploitation by the Germans,
and the German reign of terror gradually taught the
population to hate the Germans and caused a renaissance
of patriotic sentiment.
The terror worked in favor of the Germans only so
long as they appeared to be the stronger side. Their
inability to cope with the partisan movement undermined
their authority-And resulted in a different appreciation
of their power.- In many regions the partisans were
more feared in 1942 than the Germans.
Since May, 1942, German reports contained a steady
stream of complaints that the attitude of the population
was growing steadily worse and that it was mainly
influenced by partisan activity and the desperate food
situation, which also was caused by partisan activity.
Menaced from these two sides and without adequate
German protection, many people saw no other solution
but that of taking to the woods and joining the parti-
sans, Thus the partisans did not have to resort to
forced recruiting in many cases to fill their ranks.
Simultaneously, the partisans disorganized the local
administrations set up by the Germans by mercilessly
destroying collaborating elements and particularly the
village mayors appointed by the Germans and German.
controlled police forces (Ordnungsdienst). Whenever a
village mayor or teacher in a school licensed by the
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Germans was murdered, several other village mayors or
teachers resigned in fear of the partisans.
Finally, when the Red Army began to be victorious,
fear of reprisals for collaboration in case the Red
Army would reconquer the area spread. Prisoners of war,
who had fought on the German side and who were frequently
employed against the partisans, began to desert to the
partisans. The September report of the Army Group Center
listed under losses on "Indigenous" manpower, that is
persons of Russian origin, including national minorities,
187 dead, 166 wounded, 194 missing and 2076 deserters.
XV GERMAN FAILURE IN FIGHTING PARTISANS
On May 9th, 19430 the Commanding General of the
Security Forces of Army Group Center summed up the
situation as follows:
The battle in the occupied area behind the front
calls not only for military operations but is largely
a political struggle. The less military means are
available, the more political measures have to be used,
because in the long run the 'entire population of the
()Coupled area is forced to participate in this struggle,
,just for their existence. An aggravation of the partisan
situation means to the population an admission or our
weakness. Lack of any political goal makes doubtful the
loyalty of even those parts of the population Which
before worked readily and voluntarily for and with us
and Which proved their confidence in us by their previous
sacrifice of their blood. A finaly triumph over the
partisans and pacification of the entire area thus will
depend on 1) adequate German forces being made available
to fight the partisans, 2) the enunciation of a polit-
ical goal Which takes into account the aspirations of
the population of the occupied area. ? However, the
Germans had neither sufficient Manpower nor were they
able to furnish the population with the necessary
political goal. They had already lost the political
var.
'. If the Germans had not lost the political war they
would have had sufficient Russian forces to combat the
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partisans. They should have perlitted the Russian
peasants to fight for their own land. There is no
doubt that if the collective farms had been dissolved
and the land divided among the peasants, they would
have defended their property against everyone.
The partisans, moreover, represented the regime
which had forced the peasants into collective farms
with the utmost brutality. Because of their own policy
of exploitation, the Germans could not risk arming the
peasants so that they might defend themselves against
the partisans. The question was much discussed but
never decided positively. In particular, the Germans
considered the establishment of so-called "Armed
Villages," that is, villages whose inhabitants were
armed.
In the draft of the German Armyls final report
concerning the military government in the occupied
Eastern area, the statement was made that "as early as
1942 the wish was expressed by elements of the country
population that they, might be armed to defend themselves
against partisan attacks. The experimental arming of
inhabitants of villages by Army Group Center in the
areas of Bryansk, Smolensk and Klinzy had the following
result partisan attacks on these areas diminished and
in some cases ceased entirely, as for example in the
area of the Smolensk Kommandatur.
"In spite of the success of this principle in
experimental cases it was not attempted on a large
scale."
The report ascribes this to the dispute between
various German authorities as to which had jurisdiction
in this matter. It is almost certain, however, that
the basis of this rivalry was mainly political. A
second attempt, however, was made At the beginning of
1944. In this case also, the same report said, "the
Armed villages proved their effectiveness. Partisan
activities diminished noticeably in such areas. The
armed peasants fought very well against several partisan
attacks.?" However, it was already too late. The
Germans missed the opportunity to transform partisan
warfare and the defense against it into a Russian civil
war in which each side was backed by a regular army.
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It is difficult on the basis of the German experience
to conceive of any other possibility for a successful
campaign on Russian soil.
Finally, it seems remarkable that the Germans
were practically powerless to prevent supply of the
partisans by air. According to the German estimate of
partisan losses in the years 1943 to 1944, the partisans
lost 295 aircraft, apparently shot down by the Germans.
These losses, however, were not sufficient to interrupt
effectively the supply of the partisans by air. On
May 3rd, 1943, the Chief of the General Staff, 4th Army,
wrote to the High Command of Army Group Center that it
"seems necessary that the continuing supply by air of
the partisans be stopped by means of vigorous attacks
on the supply aircraft by night fighters."
This was one of the "necessary" things which was
never accomplished. One gains the impression from
German reports that the Germans did not make much use of
airpower against the partisans. Attempts to discover
partisan air strips were surprisingly ineffectual. In
the reports there are many instances where air strips
were identified repeatedly in a certain location (for
example in the area of Dyatkovo), but more accurate
determination of the location was never made.
Apparently the Germans also did not have sufficient
air forces to combat the partisans. Thus neither of the
two requirements for the successful combatting of
partisans, formulated in the document cited above; was
ever fulfilled.
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Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-01634R000400140001-2