STRINGS WITHOUT AID

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01634R000100060020-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 6, 1998
• Sequence Number: 20
• Content Type: REPORT

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On May 2
STHI31G4 WITHOUT AID
8, the soviet Foreign Minister, Andre Gromyko,
handed a note to the Yugoslav Ambaa.ssador, Veljho Micuhovic. In
brief formal words customary to diploi;acy it announced unilateral
action by the Soviet Union to suspend for five -rears a grant of
economic credits equivalent to approximately one hundred million
pounds. The note suggested negotiations about the postponement.
As the Yugoslav Ambassador i mediately recognized, a five-year
suspension amounted in fact to a cancellation, and negotiations
would be a vain exercise.
The Government of the so-called People's Republic in East
Germany, associated with the Soviet Union in. the credits forthwith
announced its concurrence in the Soviet action.
The deal was off; the promise revoked. on the face of it
this looked like bad news to Yugoslavia. It meant frustration of
plans for construction of an aluminum-production plant which was
supposed to have been financed out of the Soviet grant now withdrawn
--and not only the frustration of plans but also actual losses on
investments In money,, time, and effort undertaken by the Yugoslavian
government on initiatory stages of the project.
In another sense, however, it was not bad news. For one things
the Soviet announcement must have come as no deep surprise to the
Yugoslavs, Already on May 9 the Moscow newspaper, Pravda had
given hints of the action. Experience is said to be the best teacher
and the Yugoslavs a experience had surely been enough to have taught
them about the value of Soviet promises, [inwardly their indignant
reaction was not so much amazement at unexpected bad news as chagrin
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over having let themselves be led along thus far when they really
should have known better -1r Moreover, the new situation was not bad
in all aspects. To be sure, the projected aluminum plant,
.ual_ized, would help fill an economic need, but on the other
hand there is something of value in being liberated from false
ations and spurious promises, The Yugoslavs had been left
urch before this b
astern 1'urope in the period
had escaped having to bow down to the Kremlin, and had in a measure
prospered. All this they would be able to do again,
The Yugoslav government did strike back irsrediately with a
demand for the Soviet Union to live up to its promise. The Yugoslav
answer threatened a
without being clear
formally refused to
one-sided charao
There the
coming developz ei:
suit for damages in recompense for the losses--
as to how such a suit might be brought---and
go through with negotiations to cover up the
of the recission.
stands. It is futile to predict the forth-
It is worth while,, how7ever, to review the
background to this episode of breach of promise
and threat to sue, for
purpose of viet
ry of betrayal,
the story tails much of the nature and the
an :conduct in relation to other governments.
Let us go back to the situation in
ely following
:n was then
his grip at home. I
he end of active hostilities in World
the Soviet Union--and had survived,,
much alive. War had tightened
consequences had enabled him to expand his
dominion hugely. As the Nazi imperium retracted and then crumbled
in defeat,. Russian power flowed in to replace it, zppet governments
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which danced to the pulling of strings by scsow were In positions
of authority--in capitals of Eastern Europe and in Eastern Germany.
satellite system began to emerge.
Yugoslavia appeared to he cooperating closely as a member. To
an undi.soerning eye Yugoslavia might then have looked to be as
completely a part of this system--pliable and compromising--as
the others then well set In the status of satellites--Roumania,
Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary,, Albania--or as conforming as the Goamunist
regime of 3zeohoslavakia made captive in the spring of 1948, or
East German satellite administration, then not as yet vested with
the trappings of fictitious autonomy. There were differences,
however., Yugoslavia waa a self-liberated country. It had got rid
of foreign tyranny rather than substituting one such for another.
The political leader, Marshal Tito, had arrived at his position
through his own capacity and effort rather than being put there
through the will and agency of Moscow. [he communist party
apparatus was a Yugoslav affair,, not a mechanism contrived and
operated by foreign masters. These .atent differences became of
enormous importance as time passed and pressure increased)
The difference was simply that those in charge in Yugoslavia
did not have to say something was so merely because Stalin and his
henchmen said so and did not have to follow a particular course
merely because ordered to do so by the Kremlin.
e which brought matters to a head was a simple one.
In the 8ov,i et Union individual farming had been ruthlessly wiped
out to make way for a system of agriculture controlled and owned
by the state. Cozmiunist orthodoxy of the Kremlin persuasion demands
a sanctity of all its acts and patterns of action. If this was the
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pattern in the Soviet Union, then it must be the pattern wherever
Soviet power hold sway.
al Tito and his government saw
things differently on the issue of agricultural policy. Individual
egarded as "the most stable foundation of the Yugoslav
to." Marshal Tito said this publicly. This was in contradiction
the Leninist thesis, maintained by Stalin, "that small individual
farming gives birth to capitalism and the bourgeoisie continually,
hourly, spontaneously and on a mass scale,"-
The question about agriculture was acts ally eyribolic of a
deeper issue related directly to anxieties at the root of the
rer lin-dorinated system. These anxieties and their attendant fears
t for the rigidity and tyranny characteristic of Soviet
conduct. Suppose deviation should he suffered to exist on gizeetions
cultural production. Might it `not spread then to other
aspects of policy? suppose Ygosl avia should prevail and dance
away on an independent course even on a question so obviously of
own concern by any sensible standard.. Then would not the
puppets be tempted by example to try to rend the leading strings
held by Stalin--and thereby gain none measure of self-respect and
autonomy? Sup pose such things were to happen. What would then
become of the satellite system?
A deep issue ring the idea of consent again eoeraIon was
involved. Sta
Ttoiszm.,
Notice to bond
closed doors in a mI
oorlpellpd by his on premises to strike down
ee--or else t--was served on Tito behind
of the Oominform, an organi nation of
party apparatuses used by the Soviet Union to transmit its orders.
in the cryptic fashion favored by the Stalinists, Poland was
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singled out as the target for tirade, but the actions cited as
crimes of independence against Comriunist orthodoxy were unristakably
actions of the Tito regirie. A short- time later, June 2# , 1948,
the issue care into the open in the Czech Comm nist newspaper
d o. Simultaneously Yugoslavia was expelled from the Coninform.
For the Yugoslav reegirze explosion from the Corni}norm was
sores thing like being throws out of jail.
xplusion was dressed up in quite an ar
rhetoric.
'ito ' s Yugoslavia was roundly condemned not only for irregularity
about agricultural policy but
o for nonconformity in party
organizational methods, antipathy to the Soviet union, and a
range of departures from doctrinal orthodoxy--even for falling to
treat Soviet citi..zens as privileged characters in Yugoslavia, for
permitting criticism of the behavior of soviet army officers,, and
for objecti ; to the attempts of Soviet intelligence officials
to recruit Yugoslav ei"tizens as agents. The underlying point,
however,, was
nought, The Yugoslavs in authority had tried
to think out something for themselves and had not vouchsafed Stalin
the subordination and worship required by the Stalinist system.
By the logic of tyranny Stalin's logic was unexceptionally
r*eet. Yugoslavia--Communist, yet deviating from the line laid
down by the omlin-R-has been a challenge and reproach to the
measure of autonomy has set up a standard
of comparison, invidious and compelling;, for the captive regimes.
has been a factor in eruptions against tyranny in East Germany,
Czechoslcwakia, Poland, and Hungary, The fact of Yugoslav autonomy
was an important factor in obstructing the -ermlints effo
place the yoke on Greece. Yes
the logic of his evil system.
g to
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New Poe at the Kremlin
Stalin died early in 1953---less than five years after the
xplusion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform.
Measured in
accomplishment, his life had been a huge success. Yet at the end
he must have felt great frustration in the thought of so retch left
undone.
on his list of failures was Yugoslavia--still there
and still not knuckling under
Catill governed by the Tito regi=^
Q
he Stalinist system. Stalin had pledged prestige and given
huge endeavor to the attempt to bring Tito to heel--and had failed.
Stalin broke off diplomatic relations with Tito c s regi
Russians manufactured a series of intimidatory incidents along the
Yugoslav boundaries. They applied a rigorous economic blocka4e.
They kept up a torrent of abusive propaganda against at Stalin
called
traitorous Tito cliqu
Yet somehow the Yugoslav
government held on. It must have been disturbing to the fading
n1
:ure for tyrannous Stalin and the success for th
defiant Tito were by narrow margins] At the time of the break
Yugoslavia was heavily dependent on trade with Stalints Russia and
the satellite bloc to keep the populace fed and at work.
Soviet Union was the sole source of armaments, machines, important
0 investment capital* and technical knowledge necessary
development. It took courage to out loose--the sort of
courage always necessary to nourish independence.
As months stretched into years, Yugoslaviat a position became
sounder, and the pressure of crisis diminished. Yugoslavia found
other channels of trade--and also many friends such as ENehru e s
India, SSoekarno t s Indonesia,. Nasser t s Egypt, the United States,,
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the United Kingdom, and so on through a considerable list. It was
not necessary to stand alone in the world or even to hunger in
independence,. '.grade with the Soviet bloc, once encompassing almost
the whole of Yugoslavia r s foreign trade, declined to less than a
quarter.
Thus the basic facts were different by the time of the emergence
of Stalin's eventual successor from the deadly daze that passes f
political oo
e now rn
different from
able gestures
bygones be bygones,
on in the Soviet Union.
a Krusohohev, proved to he of a stripe
ns subtler, more outliving, more inclined to
d less inclined to murder--the type to let
east on the surface and for a while .1
No .Indeed, a poll
toward Yugoslavia of letting bygones be
bygones had set in at the Kremlin within a few weeks after Stalin's
death=-long before the secession of Kruschchev to the pinnacle of
power. Almost imediately the Kremlin took an initiative in
resuming full diplomatic relations. a year or so later a trade
t had replaced the economic blockade.
?uschchev, not yet arrived at the. Premiership but already
obviously the man of power, and Marshal Bulganin, then his toadying
Premier, nade a journey of contrition to Tito's capital, Belgrade.
Thel blared the past deadly unpleasantness on Stalin and on the
meritedvant Berl.a, late chief of the Soviet terror apparatus
n for his crimes. Tito s s "desire to improve relations between
d West" drew a tribute from the visitors. Yugoslavia i s
o develop socialism in its own style was acknowledged,
work of amends and of restoring amity went on and on--
so far that Puppet Hungary, at the instance of Moscow, in March of
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1956 rehabilitated Laszlo Rajk, a cabinetoffieer? convicted seven
years prdviously for plotting with Tito. '?'his confession
or did nothing to mend the neck broken on the gallows.
Tito was responsive. In a Journey to Moscow in June of 1956
returning the compliment of the Journey of contrition, he 4 ?arnly
hopta
cpredicted ,; "There will never again be a misunderstanding among
the nations of the Soviet camp."
This turned out to be a singularly funprophetic est3 zate of
the prospects.
The SlowRetreat of Illusion
One should accord j?uschchev credit for a sincere attempt.
None was in better position than he to appreciate the tragedy and
debauchery of the Stalinist regi.me, for he was so rich a part of
them. None could understand more deeply than he the wastefulness
and degradation of naked coercion, for he had been a witness and a
par
noxious evi
Kremlin
logic proved
The battle b
;ht befo
He had every reason for wishing to abate the more
of the +talin ,st method.
rehip, however, has a logic of its own. That
noXorable, Kruschchev's goodwill was only contingent,
n the two was long drawn out; goodwill put up quite
*umbing to the logic of tyranny.
well behind the smiles and beneath the surface
becam
apparent during a second visit by schdhev to
Belgrade on September 19,E 1956. Kruschchev made a point about
attempting to bring Yugoslavia back into line with Kremlin discipline,
A few days 1*ter, after a new return visit to Moscow, Tito
brought, the lingering frictions further into the open. He spoke
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up in advocacy for a wider measure of national independence among
the European satellites--a view in express contrast to the Soviet
insistence on strict control.
On October 17 of that year a circular letter from Moscow to
the various European satellites gave the rejoinder in an assertion.
that "the 4omnunist Party of the USSR considers that it remains
the directing Party among all the Gom auni st organizations
world. "
Here was the authentic voice of Stalin again
than in the day of ruthlessness unlimited, but the intention no
clear, Less than two weeks later the world was to be awakened
to the awful potential for renewed brutality When the Hungarians
puv~ _,.' ntarv challenge only to be crushed by interposition
j the Soviet arlny -* 0100 ~ k4gV
is b 'oody events in Hungary set Soviet-Yugoslav differences
giving
drarna.tic relief. Yugoslavia made clear its position by g
Hungarian Prime Minister, mire Nagy,, deposed by
Soviet force and in flight for his life. Moreover, Yugoslavia
supported a. resolution in the United Nations General Assembly
labeling the brutal intervention in Hungary, for ghat it was and
ling for 3 e irate withdrawal of Soviet forces, Speaking
out on ovraber 11, Tito called the Soviet action "a fatal error."
id even more--and What he said can best be summed up in Kruschchev t s
phxasot of the outraged guilt feigning reproachful innocence:
"The rebels in Hungary were defended, and the fraternal assistance
of the Soviet Union to the Hungarian people was called Soviet
interventio
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While the graves of the victims of brotherly love were still
sh, however, Kru ehchev resumed his wooing of the Yugoslavs-
tentatively and somewhat diffidently now, as if hoping against
hope that they might desist from the crime of independence and
submit to reduction in the Kremlin mode,
A late sum er meeting in 1957 in Roumania between Kruschchev
and Tito produced some rhetoric of reconciliation but no solid
achievements, The Yugoslav Communist leaders persisted in walking
their own path, keeping lines of friendship open with the world at
large, and not bending the knee to Kruschchev,
As late as May 25 of thi year Kruschchev continued to speak
guage of amity, deplorin ,, 'in a birthday message to Tito, the
"misunderstanding" between the Yugoslav and Russian Communist
parties nd expressing hope of reconciliation..
In fact, however, no misunderstanding obtains, aeh side
understands the other very well,
in April Tito, for his part,, made his understanding of the
on perfectly clear- dondemning Soviet attempts at political
dominance and demanding that the Soviet rulers give up their ideasi
which he termed absurd, for reeducating the Yugoslav Communists.
'hinese Communists, sor: ett;?ies seconding Moscow and again
even setting the pace in condemnation of Tito and his works. have
mode equally clear rejoinder through the spring. The Chinese
Pegple's Da, y of Peiping has proclat'.ed: "Present day revisionism
o must be fought to the end," It has called the heads of the Yugoslav
Co.rm?aunist Party "shameful traitors," Peiping has stridently
asserted the basic correctness of the Cominform action of 1948
which attempted to cast the Yugoslav deviationists into outer
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At a meeting of the Bulgarian Communist Party early- in
,June K-rr.uschcthev has likened the Yugoslav Comrnunist Party to a
Trojan horse,
Up to now, except at the beginning, this account has ot.nitt
details about aid from the Soviet Union
The (ii s
chart,
or
bloc to Yugoslavia.
on Soviet aid and politics implicit in this
one. They are facets of the sane thing, as the
brings out,
count of Soviet aid to Yugoslavia i
-or at least the promise of aid--h
ka a fever
the pretensions of Corunist fellowship have been high. It has
dwindled and vanished as Kremlin affections have chilled in response
signs of independence from Belgrade.
Here are the devolopmerts in simple svnopsisW
the end of World .far. II to the expulsion of Ytu:gos
the Cominform in 1948, a sun of 125 million pounds in development
credits from the Soviet bloc was contracted for by '~ugoslavia,
about one third' of it from the USSR; less than 9 million pounds
overall and 300,,00,C) pounds from the USSR: proper were actually used.
Ir nediately after the bre
credits were suspended,
th the Cominform/development
The post-Stalin reproachrnent brought a renewal of ored
the following sequence: A 39 million mound Soviet-Yugoslav
credit agreonent for capital equipment and rndscellaneo a.s projects
in January of 1956; two Soviet credits totaling 30 million rounds;
a Czechoslovakian credit of 26 million pounds, and a Polish credit
of 7 million pounds i
following months a taint Soviet-last
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development log{: of 60 million pounds in August
for construction of an al-mainum plant at Titograd in Montenegro,
ostensibly scheduled for cortaletion in 1961.
In the sequel to the Hungarian' revolt, as retalitation, agai_
Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union announced a 5--year postponement of
the credit for the a.lumimun plant, setting the completion date
'vej to 1966, and indefinitely put off plans to finance a fertilizer
plant and a power station.
the period of warming up again in. 195'7 the Soviet Union
d a new agreea ent for an 87 million pot .rad credit--ea arking
70 per cent for the aluminum plant and moving the completion date
ahead two years to 1964 and restoring plans for the fertilizer
plant and the power station,.
ads us back to the beginni
2is account--to
romyko' a amounoenent of WT 28 of a now five-year suspension of
the aluminum plant project, an at of retaliation for Yugoslavia
persistent independence, `'
FThis is the Way itrne story of Soviat aid goes.
It is not the way Kruschchev said It would go.
of 1956, for example, K,r uschchev spoke thus about
Soviet aid to underdeveloped countries: ?te?hiese countries,
they do not belong to the socialist world system, can draw on its
achievements to build up an independent national econot and to
raise the living standards of their peoples. Today they need not
go begging for up-to-date equiprent to their former oppressors.
They o an got
socialist countries, free of any pol.tieal
bligations,'
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Again, earlier this year$ Krusohchev said: "We. take the
position that the underdeveloped countries should be helped to
build up their own industries, develop their own productive forces
and carry out their political and economic plans independently of
other countries.,
"We support disinterested, real aid to the under-developed
countries, so that they, by over co;ring their bac'.kwardn ss, will
become increasingly strong economically."
,Such statements abound from smiling, affable Kruschcehev---
uschah ;ov wAIIO
zrder in Hungary as
assistance.." He has made r much of the allegedly unencumbered
character of Soviet aid and has built "aid without strings" into
one of the leading phrases of the Soviet propaganda panoply, but
for Yugoslavia his purpose is strings without aid,
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