Evaluation of Report on Soviet Troop Movements in Manchuria

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A000700190012-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 22, 2000
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: September 30, 1949
• Content Type: IM

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CEU1RAL INTrLLIGr'iEE AGENCY 21
It Further study of subject report does not alter the
conclusions reached in Intelligence 1?2emorandum No. 228 (Preliminary)..
27 September, a copy of which is attached as Enclosure A.
2, An evaluation prepared by the Intelligence Division, OSUSA,
emphasizes that the report is not considered to be true, The
Intelligence Division evaluation is substantially in agreement with
Intelligence 24emorandum No. 228 (Prel.iznixaary), and is attached as
Enclosure B.
INTELLIGENCE M 4ORANDUM 110. 228
SUBS CT:
Evaluation of Report on Soviet Troop lbveanet?nts in
Manchuria
RETITME11CE:
Memorandum to DCI from Department of State, dated
23 September 1949, requesting evaluation of Peiping
telegram (secret) Noe 1578 (20 September .1949)
ENCLOSURES:
A.
D.
CIA Intelligence Ma orandum tb. 228 (Preliminary)
Intelligence Diviciora, GSUSA., Evaluation of SDPT
go. 1578, dated "0 Sept. 1949
0.
D.
Office of Chief of Mval Operations Evaluation of
tnd Comments on SDPT No. 1578, dated 20 Sept. 1949
Directorate of lnie ligence, tJSSAF, Evaluation of
SDP No. 1578, dated 20 Sept. 1949
Reference telegram
3. Evaluations by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
and by the Directorate of Intelligence, USAF, also in substantial
agreement, are attached as Ene1oszares C and D.
State Dept. declassification instructions on file
CR and a u1si.ts'Malitin retained MY
30 September 1949
ARCHIVAL RECORD
PLEASE RETURN TO
AGENCY ARCHIVES, BLDG. A-18
;to67 .2 Box___
Note: Although the TAG Agencies ha-.inaterially contributed to the
eat ?sparati1x~ this report, it has not been forma1iy coordinated.
This decttmeat been retitewe
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DECLA IED
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LIELOE U1 E A
27 September 1949
YNTELLYGEI)E rwnw 3UJ N0. 228 (Prsl,ilnir y)
SUB Th CT s Evaluation of Report on SoAot Troop Lbvements In Manchuria
REPEBEICEs Peiping Telegram (secret) No. 1578 (20 Sept. 1.949)
1. C of 1 uai on.
ORE is of the opinion that t.' information conta:- d In
paragraphs two to four of Peiping Tslegram Noy 3.578 (20 &pt.) 3a
based wholly or largely on rumors, This report is the latest of
several, received intermittently during the past tcro years, dealing
with alleged Soviet military activity in V,. htwia, none of thhich
has been confirmed.
la. These rumors may have sane basis in fact, hocue i!, ie::esrnuch
as there are indications of an increase in the tempo of Soviet
activity and in the numbers of Soviet personal in rchhi-ria and
in North China. It is quite probable that the USSR is treUng,
advantage of the present cosarnt.ty of Sino-.Soviet intoreat to
solidify its position in Manchuria.
&AIMU2U of Paws. 2 _aa 3 s
This report is so vague that it cannot be evaluated with confi-
denee. The qualifications of the observer arc; ebscus e and his intc ra-
tion appears to be based on hearsay. The report, in this respect,
is similar to a number of earlier reports which, as the Consul-General
remarks, "have boon unsubstantiated."
25X1X
Past experiene e reports hats indicated
that Chinese obse 01.. is in thef%r use of
numbers, and are given toe gerat:on. Alec, regular troops may be
confused with Soviet railway guards,, which are Lm= to be present in
Manchuria.
The phrase "rail traffic Harbint-t.Ianchuria& should probably be read
either "EarbinmManahouli," or (becalm Antix ; is mentioned) "Harbin-
Eorea,* but neither of these readings illuminates; the content sufficiently
to permit an estimate of its significance. The "contemp .atec estab-
lishment of three military lines" would be a matter of top-secret
military planning, which would certainly not be availab1 to Chinese
sources.
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01 has no infonaation with which to corifirm the report of move-
ments of tanks and troops between Harbin and Changchun; such movements
are believed possible.
3.val,ti o^ P~~ra. La
~. "Explanation" I., i. e. , that the USSR believes the US to be
preparing for war in the Pacific:
ORE has no information to isxiicate that the USSa genuinely
believes that the t is preparing to attack the USSR militarily in the
near future.
~. wExplanation" III, i.e., that the WSR itself plans to launch
a war in the near futures
O has no information to irAicate that even wi-hti its "new"
atomic capability the Soviet Union intends to resort to rdUtary aggression
in the near future.
St. Mxplanati " U, i.e., that the USSR is employiszg the threat
of an imminent East-West (Cosmnmi et vs, non-Communist) 'gar as a means
of gaining Chinese Communist acgr-4escence in the extension and con-
solidation of Soviet control in China, especially in W-aahuriaa
It is believed that the M SR oocasi anallya perhaps systemiatice-11y,,
falsifies its estimate of the situation, in order to gain Chimes
Communist acquiencence in the extension and connol.idati-n of Soviet
control in China anal over the CCP. However, it is doubtful that the
CCP leadership in convinced of the i inence of an armed conflict
b e t w e e n t h e Co t i t and non-Co smuaist nations, or that the I R has
found it necessary to employ the threat; of Imminent war in order to
gain Chinese Cyst acquiescence in the Soviet program in and toward
China. It appears more likely that the WSR and the CCP leadership
are agreed upon the necessity Por increasing the defensive and offen-
sive capabilities of the Far Eastern Communist bloc,, in preparation
for an eventual, but not Immediate,, military conflict with the West.
4. .c; r ,ii .sa~f. of` ~@lSefpt'+Fs~r~~iaeft
tivtyi r a
In addition to the above report, of 10041.; 0,000 Soviet troops
present or scheduled to arrive in Manchuria, and of Soviet troop and
tank movements in chi ris, there have been recent reporrts of the
arrival in Harbin of Soviet Marshal .odion r-1altr ovsky, together with
a staff of 130 officers; and of the cons ti on of barn-?acksi at ' kden,
adequate to house 30,000 men, which are possibly for the use of Soviet
military or railway personnel. The reports have not been confirmed.
MINOWNbs
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There is a general trend toward tightened Sim-Soviet control, or
Soviet control with Chinese acquioscence, over r3anahiwin., particularly
in the strategic Port Arthur Naval. Base area. At the sad-ne time, the
MR is probably seeking to streng hers the lateral integration of
13anchur1a and North Korea,
It is of major importance to the USSR, politicai3 and eaonorrdca]1 r,
to improve the rail system between Utarnchuria and North China, Inas-
much as railway control is used to spearhead Soviet penetrations, the
recent influx of Soviet railway personnel into Manchu min and North
China indicates an increasingly successful extension of Soviet control.
Soviet railway personnel have quas . .ta status, an at times hwre
included regular army a secret police off .cia7,s.
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EIMwsuRE B
nt Peiping
intelligence D Telegram No, 1578 Dated 20 SepState tember 194-9
I. A. The Soviet garrison in port Arthur-Dairen consists of
60,000 troops., with four divisions. Normal military traffic by land
and sea between this detached garm'aon and the Soviet Union is not
inconsiderable. This includes i ove menu of leave personnel and re-
placements, occasional relief of ooi-p1ete =all units, and movements
of military supplies.
Despite frequent rumor s to the contrary, it is believed
that the only Soviet, Army units of ar4r siMcance in F"huria are
those in the Port Arthur-Dairen are rim, of the re- its of Soviet
troops in IMan+churia are be3.ieved to r.'ofer to the '+n-ifo =cried. Soviet rail-
way guards the patrol the railvrsye, which are jointly czwnad by the
Soviet and Chinese governments. In addition, Soviet military and
technical advisers to Chinese the F~~~~~i a~ s~o a Z lesser ~
~?
are believed to be present aar~oE be estimated.
where in Chian. The scale of such `ais25X1'X7
. such
The report at hand is from a
reports, without solid confirmation., have often proms Ago be seriously
exaggerated or distorted.
no other reports confirm the "three milit& linen"
reportedly being established., eit er in the sense of defense limes or
military vo cations limes. Neither is there confirmation of a
Harbim'Changeblm troop and tank movement. The telegra :, does not stato
whether Soviet or Chinese troops a and tanks are i xwoive6.
The report to believe& either to be untrw , or to eraia
lwey
greatly magnified reflection of sazbstantialiy norms m
guard traffic.
B. Paragraph 5 is coreuvred in.
0. Since the report is not accept, none of :has the cases
is believed to be relevant. They are discussed, however,, undo r II A
below.
n. A. on the hypothesise that paragraphs two anes1 three trues
1. Case 1 is believed extreime3,y Improbable. The Soviets
could hardly interpret evacuation of 15 citizens and the `a.,r depanaents
as an indication of 4S preparations for war in the Paci.fi.c. They must
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appreciate that this action is motivated by the obvious danger to
the individuals' safety., and that the are no other present imdica-,
tions of the types of US action that would have to accorapan r such
preparations,
2, Case 2 is the most likely explanation. Soviet
policy might logically consider the present as a suitable time to
insure consolidation of control of Parrachuria, and movement of large
bodies of troops into the area would be em aspect of such coneolida-
tion.
3. Case 3 is believed unlikely, although it cannot be
eategoricaUy dismissed. The probability that the Soviets art making
preparations for an early offensive war must be considered in light of
all indications from all areas.
B. Under the hypothesis that the report is trves, other
possible explanations ores
1. A move to stiffen the Chinese Co aauift armies and
insure their cow loyalty by xeinforcament vrith siriable troop units
as well as by technical advisory aid.
2, Reinforcement of the Fort Arthur gar son (although the
force imvolved. for such a purpose is excessive).
3, A move to strox g han the p" t North Korean regime
and to support a move by it against South Korea. Soviet troops from
the Vladivostok area could more e2fectively accomplish this objective,
hover.
!,. A combination of any of the above possibilities.
0. Again on the assumption that the report is true, the
following considerations bear on its effect on W security inttr?estst
1. If the matte does not extend beyond M r Kuria, the
effect of the move itself would be negligible in the near future, Soviet
capabilities for attacking Japan or South Korea, or both, would not be
materially enhanced.
20 If the objective of the move were to reinforce and
stiffen the Chinese Communist armies and strengthen Soviet control over
them, it would later enhance Soviet capabilities to threaten US security
interests to the extent that it succeeded in this objective.
III. It is emphasized that the report is not considered to be true.
It is likely to be founded on a not abnormally large troop or railway
guard movement, with the incident amaggeration often fob in reports
from Par Eastern sub-sources.
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ENCY1' C
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Evaluation of and Ccamaants on
State Department Peiping Telegram No. 1578 Dated 20 September 1949
Z&;% - Evaluations.
A. Although the presence in Manchuria of Soviet tank units and troops
has been repeatedly reported to ONI by fairly reliable sources, numbers and
dispositions of troops have not been a-,certained. Planes bearing Soviet
markings have been observed in the area and Soviet naval voseels have been
reliably reported operating in the Chih-li Gulf.
B0 ,fir t 1. The presence of sons Soviet troops in Manchuria can
hardly be questioned.
C. Cale 1. This statement seems to be based o the assumption that war
always follows evacuation of foreigner: from a trouble zone,. It probably
expresses the hope of certain non-Go=mist Chinese who desire liberation
as soon as possible. This type of thinking abounds in postwar reports
from Eastern Europe and cannot be suppor cd by facto
CaBe . This is the most logicea of the three statements presented
inasmuch as Soviet propaganda beamed to all the world stresses the fact
that the tE is preparing for war.
Cam. This statement is not suppa ed by any evidence.
Comments.
A. Case is the most probable of the three cases. If it is publicized
more than usual., the I.SSR is probably stressing "US aggression as a smoke
screen to divert Chinese attention from Soviet consolidation oE Influence
in Manchuria.
B. No further solution.
C. No change in the present atrattegic picture,.. However, the presenc:o
of 100,000-150.,000 Soviet troops in r'irhuria would strengthen the already
recognized Russian control of that a reap
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EICIQST E D
Directorate of Intelligence, IFAP, Evaluation of State Department
Peiping Telegram No. 1578 Dated 20 September 1949
1. The Director of Intelligence, USAF, evaluates SECRET Peiping
Telegram No. 1578 as follows:
P Uba two Ona three t
(1) Paragra~h two is evaluated as F-6 (neither source
nor content can be judged)
(2) Paragraph three is evaluated as F-3 (source cannot
be judged; content is possibly true).
P car 2h five. Tha Director of Intelligence, ASAP, agrees
with the Consul General's comment regarding subject report and previous
reports of the presence of Soviet troops in M'Jantchuria.
IL. rarasrahh_f=. The Director of Intelligence, USAF, makes
the following commanta on Cases 1, 2, and 3 of this paragraphs
(1) Case 1 is considered unlikely in the light of informa-
tion available to the United states Air Force and in the light of in-
formation concerning United States intentions presumably available to
the USSR.
(2) Case 2 is considered logical and is generally in line
with other reports of increasing Soviet dominance in Manchuria.
(3) Case 3 is considered illogical on the basis of available
information but should not be ruled out, because of the corrupted Soviet
thinking processes referred to in Par. four of subject telegram,
2. The Director of Intelligence, USAF, considers that if Pars.
two and three of subject telegram were true the following reasoning
would apply:
#. (1) Case 2 would be the most probable of the three cases
listed in subject telegram. It would seem, however, that effective
Soviet control of Manchuria could be achieved without the presence of
large numbers of Soviet troops.
(2) Case 3 could be valid if, in addition to large-soele
Soviet troop movements in Manchuria, there were also other necessary
war preparations, including unusual Soviet Air Force activity. Informs.-
tion available to the Director of Intelligence, i AF, does not indicate
such Soviet Air Force activity.
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t. A logical reason for Soviet troop movements into r1armhuria
would be that of giving moral and/or military support to North Korean
military forces in the event that the long-anticipated hostilities
against the Republic of Korea materialize. Even this eventuality, how '
ever, should not require 100,000 to 1509000 Soviet troops*
The Director of Intelligence, USAF, considers that any
go
large-scale increase of Soviet armed forces in Llanchuria would be a
potential threat to E security interests, inasmuch as such forces could
be used offensively against Korea, thus dealing a bloc to t prestige in
the Far East, Such a Soviet advance into southern Korea., if. accompanied
by a comparable increase in Soviet air.aud eea power, would constitute
an increased treat to the U5 position in Japan and the island chain to
the south.
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ENCLOSURE E
INC014ING T1LEGRM4
DEPARTWNT OF STATE - DIVISION OF CO11JNICATIONS AND RECORDS
Control 7825
Reo'd September 20, 1949
2:10 p.m.
25X1
FROM: Peiping
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 1578' September 20, 3 p.m.
RECONTI1 1551 September 15. 25X1 X7
at Soviet
25X1X
Same source reports 100,000 or 150,000 Soviet troops are present or
coming Manchuria, that rail traffic Harbin-Manchuria has been suspended
one month and half (source unclear but noted Antung somehow come into
picture) and said there is contemplated establishment three military
lines, respectively, along Yalu River, north/south of Pe aihu, north/
south of 1kden. He was unclear likewise regarding significance this
project but designated them as first, second and third lines in above
indicated order and said Soviets might anticipate Amva attack through Korea,
aclvssora being introduced into Harbin organizations in large numbers.
Gave examples Soviet woman doctor recently became head women's de.
partment hospital and it was promptly ruled that hospital orders were
ineffective without her countersignature.
reports from two sources movements of troops and tanks
Harbin-Changchun.
Assuming movements Soviet troops into Manchuria, following, after native
explanations, seems possible: 1) Noting similarity between evacuation
American citizens and ones dependent 1940 and present, USSR believes USA
in fact getting ready for war in Pacific; 2) Soviets are using allegation
that war from side USA threatens in order get Chinese Communis'40a acquiescence
their program to end that their hold shall be fastened unshakably on Manchuria;
or 3) USSR itself plans war relatively near future (see COZY S 1276 August
1 and 1316 August 8). Personally judge second explanation most logical.
Note informant, cited REFTEL, predicted Soviets were going to supply railway
guards Manchuria. (Note possibility of use Sinkiang patterns particularly
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stationing Soviet brigade Iiami in guise local troops.) But if 1) seems
ill. cal it is to be remembered Soviets are excessively suspicious, and
if 3) seems premature it is to be remarked that Soviets have so corrupted
their own thinking that their tinning may be different from that American
side would consider facts warranted. All three alternatives, I feel are
to be considered possible, if of unusual probability.
This said, note that above reports unconfirmed and are sent at face value,
and that previove reports of presence Soviet troops Manchuria have been
unsubstantiated.
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