TAB B

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A000500100013-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 8, 2000
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: February 4, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

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INIELLIGENCE DIVISION, DMA
TAB "B"
SOVIET CAPABILITIES TO COMMIT SABOTAGE IN COUNTRIES OUTSIDE
THE UNITFAD STATES WHICH CONTAIN VITAL RESOURCES AND
FACILITIES REQUIRED FOR THE INDUSTRIAL SUPPORT OF AN UNITED
STATES MOBILIZATION. (Interim Report, Munitions Board,
4 Feb. 1949)
1. NORTH AND CENTRAL AMERICA
a. CANADA
(1) Sabotage, physical, economic and/Or psychologioal, is
indicated.
(2) Sabotage would most probably be attempted in the indus-
trial areas of Ontario, Quebec and British Columbia, (the provinces
which contain most of the vital resources and facilities listed in
the Munitions Board Report) and specifically in the fieldssof mining
and steel production. This estimate is based on two factors:
(a)
The largest concentration of Communist strength in industry is in the
above-listed areas, and (b) the Communists are in oontrol of the
International Union pf Mine, Mill and Smelter WO4ers in Canada and
could seriously hamper vital production through strikes, slowdowns
and general delaying tactics. Aside from mining and steel, the
Communists are also well entrenched in such other essential industries
as inland waterway transportation, electrical and radio, lumbering,
shipyards, and automotive, and are in control of the Canadian Seamen's
Union.
b. COSTA RICA
(1) Sabotage possibly indicated.
(2) Communists have been outlawed but are attempting to
restore their control in labor. Extent of success at this time is
unknown. Costa Rica would have a law priority for Soviet sabotage
efforts.
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0. CUBA
(1) Sabotage is definitely indicated.
(2) Although Cuban Communists have lost their key positions
in labor unions they still exert strong influence in labor (particu-
larly in sugar, maritime and transport unions) and undoubtedly have
adherents in the mining unions. The presence in Cuba of a substantial
group of,militant Communists provides, ample opportunity for planning
and directing sabotage efforts as well as furnishing agents to carry
it out. Secret instructions to party members are to be prepared to
sabotage the war effort in every way possible.
d. GUATEMALA
(1) Sabotage probably indicated.
(2) Communists or pro.Communists exert strong influence in
national labor union leadership. Government policies have encouraged
leftist, anti-United States labor activity and nothing is being done
to prevent Communist labor activity. There are some Communists or
pro-Communists in high government positions.
e. HAITI
(1) No sabotage indicated.
(2) There are practically no militant Communista. Nhile
security measures in Haiti are poor and the introduction of agents
in certain areas would be relatively easy, it is believed that Haiti
is not important enough as a target to warrant much attention from
the Soviet Union. Sporadic attempts to cause trouble in the sisal
industry are possible.
f. HONDURAS
(1) No sabotage indicated.
(2)
There are no known Communists in Honduras. Although
security measures are poor and the introduction of one or more agents
would be easy, it is not believed that Honduras is important enough
to warrant the trouble.
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g. MEXICO
(1) Sabotage definitely indicated.
(2) Soviet inspired or directed sabotage of Mexican indus-
tries vital to the United States will originate from forces both
within and without the country. Sabotage elements within the country
consist of militant local Communists and Stalinist labor leaders, who
are inadvertently abetted by the traditional disinclination of the
Government to take any steps which appear to be anti-labor. While
the majority of Mexican labor is not Communist, it is largely illi-
terate and its living standards are miserable compared with those of
the United States. This forms a fertile field for the operation of
agitators. Stalinists are influential in the leadership of many of
the key unions, such as the Railway Workers and the Petroleum Workers.
By ostensibly making the objectives of the Soviet proletarian revolu-
tion coincide with the objectives of the Mexican Revolutionist Move,-
meat, the Stalinist leaders have entrenched themselves to a serious
degree in government, labor, education, agrarian and cultural fields.
This situation makes it difficult and sometimes impossible for the
Government, no matter how friendly toward the United States, to
impose effective controls on labor.
Physical sabotage by imported teams is facilitated by the ease
with which they could be landed on Mexicots virtually uninhabited and
unguarded coast, and by laxness of immigration and registration laws,
augmented by the fact that under the prevalent "Mordida", or bribery
system, almost anyone willing to pay the necessary fees can obtain
any sort of passport or identity credentials. These factors, coupled
with the greet freedom of movement in Mexico, and the reluctance of
the Government to tread on the toes of organized groups, makes the
infiltration of imported and domestic spies and saboteurs into key
positions in industry a. relatively easy matter.
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The strength of the Communist Party in Mexico is about 10,000,
of whom not more than 10% are militant Communists, but this group,
in combination with the thousands of unwitting fellow travelers who
are tricked into supporting disguised Soviet objectives, is an
effective tool.
Therefore it must be expected that sabotage of Mexico's key
industries, including oil, lead, antimony, copper, manganese,'
hermequin, mercury and zinc, will be attempted by the Soviets, and
that they will have considerable success, at least initially, in
reducing the flow of products to the United States.
h. PANAMA
(1) Sabotage is definitely indicated.
(2) Although the Communist Party of the Republic of Panama
is relatively small and exerts little political influence, it presents
a definite threat to the security of U.S. interests in the Republic
and in the Canal Zone through its powerful influence on organized
labor. The Federation Sindical de Trabajadores de Panama (FSTP) is a
national federation of Panamanian labor composed of 18 affiliated
unions with a membership of about 10,000. This organization is largely
under the control and direction of Dr. Celso SOLANO, the Number 1
Communist and U.S. baiter in Panama. Dr. SOLANO was a leader in the
fight against U.S. military bases in Panama and a prime instigator and
director of the University student riots. He is a bitter foe of
"Yankee Imperialism". Since May 1946, the unskilled and semi-skilled
workers in the Canal Zona have been organized under the auspices of
the United Public Workers of America, CIO. The organizers sent from
the United States to create this union have been militant U.S.
Communist labor leaders. By virtue of their position as organizers,
they have exerted tremendous influence if not complete'control over
the Union, although its membership is not predominantly Communist.
The membership of the Canal Zone union has varied between 10,000 and
15,000, the top figure representing almost half the 32,000 Canal Zone
workers.
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The combined strength of FSTP and UPW, subject to Communist
control, agitation and propaganda, presents a potential for economic
sabotage that will not be overlooked by the Soviets. A general
strike by the FSTP coordinated with similar action by UPW, and timed
to coincide with riots, mob raids on utility installations and other
public services, disruption of transportation and communications
facilities and the attendant civic confusion, would seriously inter,.
fere with the operation of the Canal until such time as order could
be restored by local authorities in Panama and by military forces
in the Canal Zone. The length of time necessary to restore order
will depend largely upon prior security measures by the U.S. and the
Panamanian Government and the promptness and severity of repressive
measures.
It is believed that security measures by U.S. military forces
Could eliminate the threat of physical sabotage by means of
explosives against the locks, spillways, power plants and dams,
because of the difficulty of transporting and concealing the large
quantities of demolition material which a successful effort would
require. However, the threat of blocking the channel of the Canal
by sinking a ship at a critical point presents a more serious problem.
Granted that the difficulties of such a sabotage plan are tremendous,
it is felt that the Soviets might well make the attempt for the
following reasons: Adequate security measures to prevent the execu-
tion of such a plan necessarily involve great difficulty and much
loss of valuable time -i.e., in order to detect a time bomb or
similar weapon concealed in the hold of a ship it would be necessary
to unload the cargo and search the holds. Even though a ship sunk in
the channel might be speedily repaired and raised, the Soviets would
still have imposed the necessity upon the U.S. for unloading and
searching each ship that sought to transit the Canal thereafter, an
enormously damaging delay.
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2. SOUTH AMERICA
a. ARGENTINA
(1) Sabotage probably indicated.
(2) Communists exert no national labor union leadership but
have SOMB influence in railroad and port unions, and probably could at
least temporarily slow down if not tie up transportation. Presence of
large pro-Communist Slav groups which have received training in
sabotage technique makes Soviet sabotage attempts Very probable.
b. BRAZIL
(1) Sabotage probably indicated.
(2) Communist Party is underground but is believed to have
some control in port and transport workers union and possibly in mining
unions. Information on the latter point not conclusive. Brazilian
Communists have announced support of the U.S.S.R. in a capitalist war.
o. BOLIVIA
(1) Sabotage probably indicated.
(2) Labor situation is confused, with rightish Movimiento
Nacional Revolucionario exerting strong control in mining unions. It
should be pointed out that this group is anti-U.S. and might itself
attempt sabotage of a war effort without Soviet instigation. Bolivian
pro-Communists have indicated that they would be on the side of the
U.S.S.R. in the event of war.
d. BRITISH GUIANA ,
(1) Sporadic sabotage indicated.
(2) Information on the extent of Communist penetration into
British Guiana labor is not available. There have been reports on
Communist agitators in the area; but at best their capabilities are
limited.
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e. CHILE
(1) Sabotage definitely indicated.
(2) Although the Communists have been outlawed, Communist
influence remains strong in labor, particularly in mining and trans-
port. There are militant Communists in Chile who would undoubtedly
be ready to sabotage the war effort in any way possible.
f. COLOMBIA.,
(1) Sabotage definitely indicated.
(2) Communist influence is very strong in Colombian labor
and is dominant in petroleum and transportation unions. Colombian
Communists have indicated they would support the U.S.S.R. in a war
against the capitalist nations.
g. CURACAO,
(1) Sabotage probably indicated.
(2) While the Communist Party does not flourish in the
islands of Netherlands West Indies, and the Dutch Colonial Government
pursues a policy of excluding known Communists and labor agitators,
security forces and measures on the islands are estimated to be
inadequate to prevent sabotage with 60MB success in the event of war.
There are no adequate and positive guarantees against the inadvertent
employment of Soviet-trained saboteurs in the oil installations,
which are extremely sensitive to sabotage by fire, or by the destruc-
tion of pumps and generators. Furthermore, the Soviet capability of
landing groups of saboteurs from submarines, or infiltrating them as
migrant laborers poses a threat that could not be met by the security
forces of the Colonial Government or the oil companies. Physical
protection of the storage, shipping and refining facilities by the
U.S. in the event of war would be complicated by political factors
involving a probable demand by the Venezuelan Government that it have
a large share in the protective measure, as well as by the demands
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of certain groups favoring autonomy for the islands. The latter are
not of serious consequence now, but in the event the Netherlands were
over-run by the Soviets and the Government forced into exile, the
supporters of autonomy possibly might make themselves a troublesome
factor by instigating strikes and labor strife. It is estimated that
through any one or more of these factors, the Soviets may attempt
sabotage at the refining, shipping andstorage facilities of the
Netherlands West Indies.
h. ECUADOR
(1) Sabotage probably indicated.
(2) Communists in Ecuador have been split and have been
unable to secure complete control of labor confederations. They do
represent a strong influence and could probably cause some strikes
and sabotage although their success would be limited. Ecuadoran
facilities would have a low priority in the Soviet plans.
i. PARAGUAY
(1) No sabotage indicated.
(2) Communism is rigbrously suppressed, and the only labor
organization is controlled by Conservatives. Introduction of agents
for sabotage of the quebracho industry would seem pointless since it
would be easier to obstruct the product enroute to other countries.
j. PERU
(1) Sabotage possibly indicated.
(2) Communists are relatively weak in Peru and have no
control of the national labor confederation. It is possible that
they may increase their control with the weakening of the socialist,
anti-,Communist Group APRA (Alianza Popular Revoluoionaria Americana),
although both groups have been declared illegal. Communists control
small segments of the petroleum and port workers.
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k. SURINAM
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(1) Sabotage possibly indicated.
(2) There is no information on the existence or extent of
Communist influence in Surinam labor. Some undoubtedly exists and
considering the importance of Surinam bauxite to the United States,
sabotage would probably receive a high Soviet priority. Local
security measures are poor.
1. TRINIDAD
(1) Sabotage possibly indicated.
(2) Although rioting and sabotage occurred in the oil pro-
ducing and refining industry of Trinidad in 1937 and 1947, its origin
and causes had nothing to do with Communism or the influence of the
Soviets. British colonial policy is now well accepted an the Island*
and the principal labor union, the Oil Field Workers Trade Union, is
now under responsible leadership. The danger of sabotage by the
Soviets hinges on two factors of importances (a) The widespread
ignorance and poverty of the native laborers, which makes them
vulnerable to the efforta of agitators; and (b) the possibility of
infiltration of trained Soviet saboteurs into the sensitive oil
industry. The vital importance to British wartime economy of the oil
and refined products of this colony make it a sufficiently remunera-
tive sabotage target, it is believed, that the Soviets will possibly
attempt both economic and physical sabotage.
m. VENEZUELA
(1) Sabotage definitely indicated.
(2) Physical and economic sabotage must be expected through-
out the Venezuela oil industry because of: (a) Physical vulnerability
of installations, such as isolated locations, inadequate local guards,
etc.; (b) control of some petroleum industry unions and maritime and
port workers unions by Communists; (c) reports of relatively high
evaluation of Soviet or local Communist plans for sabotage; and (d)
dependency of local counter-measures upon the type of Government
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3. AFRICA
In Algeria, French Morocco, Tunis, and the Union of South Africa,
Communist elements and Soviet and Satellite representatives have made
progress in the infiltration of labor and political groups. In other
areas of Africa they have as yet not made such progress. However,
nationalistic elements are becoming increasingly active and it is
considered that such elements may be exploited by Soviet and Communist
forces. It is for these reasons sabotage is indicated in some of the
African countries, although not of Soviet or Communist origin.
a. ALGERIA
(1) Sabotage possibly indicated.
(2) Physical sabotage is possible because of the following
data:
(a) The principal labor union in Algeria, the Confederation
General du Travail (CGT), is heavily infiltrated
by Communists;
(b) The Soviet Consulate in Algiers is one of the major
dispatch points for Soviet agents in North Africa;
(c) Throughout Algeria, Communists attempt to capitalize
on nationalistic feeling by being ultra-nationalists;
(d) Communist agents reportedly are active among dock
and transportation workers.
b. BELGIAN CONGO
(1) No sabotage indicated.
(2) Physical and economic sabotage in the Belgian Congo is
not considered likely because:
(a) The country is in an isolated position in the heart
of Africa;
(b) There is an absence of important leftist groups in
the country;
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(c) There is no Soviet consulate in the area; however,
a Czechoslovakian Consulate has been established
at Leopoldville;
(d) Extreme care is exercised by Belgian authorities,
because the Congo is the world's most important
source of uraninite (Pitchblende) and of various
complex uranium hydroxide minerals used in the
manufacture of atomic bombs;
(e) There is a negligible amount of agent activity in
the Congo.
c. BRITISH EAST AFRICA
(1) No Sabotage indicated.
(2) Physical and economic sabotage to installations in
British East Africa is not likely because of:
(a) Rigid control by the British authorities;
(b) The negligible number of Communists or leftists
in the area.
d. FRENCH MOROCCO
(1) Sabotage definitely indicated.
(2) Physical and economic sabotage in Morocco is considered
likely because:
(a)
There are increasing signs of an espionage ring
located at Port Lyautey. Several networks have
been uncovered among civilian employees at the
U.S. Naval Air Activity, Port Lyautey. Officials
are convinced that other networks exist that are,
as yet, undetected. It is believed that Communists
obtained clearances from French police for the
disloyal employees detected at the port, either
by penetrating an office of the police, or by
counterfeiting-the necessary documents.
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(b) Security among civilian employees is considered to
be entirely unsatisfactory. It is believed that
this situation will continue urtil several compe-
tent intelligence investigators are sent to the
port area and adequate counter-measures are taken;
(c) There is also a group of Spanish republican refugees
who live at Port Lyautey. Some of these are con-
sidered to be dangerous Communist Party agents;
(d) The principal labor organization in Morocco, the
Confederation General du Travail (CGT) is heavily
infiltrated by Communists;
(e) Exploitation by Communists of nationalistic feeling
in Morocco.
e. GOLD COAST
(1) Sabotage possibly indicated (not Soviet or Communist).
(2) Physical and economic sabotage is possible because of
the following facts:
(a)
The rising wave of African nationalist sentiment
may flare up at any time. However, the British
authorities, greatly disturbed by the riots which
occurred in February 1948 have taken what they
believe to be adequate security precautions.
(b) The narrow-gauge one-track route from the mines
at Nsuta to the port of Takoradi affords an
excellent sabotage target.
f. MADAGASCAR
(1) Sabotage definitely indicated (not Soviet or Communist).
(2) Physical sabotage of graphite mines in Madagascar is
considered likely because of the following facts:
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(a) The presence in the country of native tribes, such
as the Boras. which have in the past incited
rebellion among other tribal elements. The Boras
made elaborate plots for the widespread outbreak
which occurred in Madagascar at the end of March
1947. During the course of this outbreak, most of
the mines were badly damaged. Although the rebel-
lion has subsided guerrilla raids are expected to
continue for SWAB time.
(b) The mines and the routes used in transporting
graphite to the seaport are easy targets for
sabotage because of their isolated location.
It is doubtful Whether enough French troops could
be assigned to protect the mines during another
revolt.
g. MOZAMBIQUE
(1) No sabotage indicated.
(2) Physical and economic sabotage in Mozambique is not
considered likely because of the following facts:
(a) There are a negligible number of leftists in the
area;
(b) Firm control is exercised by local authorities.
h. NIGERIA
(1) Sporadic sabotage indicated (not Soviet or Communist).
(2) Sporadic physical sabotage is indicated owing to the
following fact:
(0)
(a)
Nigeria, because of rising African nationalistic
sentiment, may at any time be the scene of native
outbreaks. British authorities, however, have
long been aware of this and have taken what they
believe to be adequate precautions. Police and
troops in the area are quite efficient.
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VIEW
i. NORTHERN RHODESIA
(1) No sabotage indicated.
(2) Physical and economic sabotage to mines in Northern
Rhodesia is not considered likely for the following reasons:
j?
(a)
There are a negligible number of Communists or
leftists in the area. There is no Communist
organization functioning in the country at present;
(b) Rigid control is exercised by the British authorities.
SIERRA LEONE
(1) No sabotage indicated.
(2) Physical and economic sabotage of the chromite mines
in Sierra Leone is not considered likely for the following reasons:
(a) There are a negligible number of leftists in the
area;
(b) Firm control is exercised by the local authorities.
k. SOUTHERN RHODESIA
(1) No Sabotage indicated.
(2) Physical and economic sabotage of the mines in Southern
Rhodesia is not considered likely for the following reasons:
(a) There are a negligible number of Communists or
leftists in the area;
(b) Rigid control is exercised by the British authorities.
1. TUNIS
(1) Sabotage definitely indicated.
(2) Physical sabotage may be expected in Tunis for the
following reasons:
(a) Most of the three to four thousand Communists in
Tunisia reside in critical areas such as Bizerte,
Ferryville, etc.;
(b) French officials are over confident of their ability
to prevent sabotage due to the fact that they
receive reliable information regarding actions to
be taken by the Party;
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(o) One of the most important labor organizations in
Tunisia, the Union Syndioale des Travailleurs de
Tunisie (U.S.T.T.), is dominated by Communists.
m. UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA
(1) Sporadic sabotage indicated.
(2) Sporadic physical sabotage of mines in South Africa,
particularly Corundum mines, is to be expected because:
(a)
There are unfriendly relationships between miners
and mining company officials. There have always
been strikes and disorders in the mine compounds;
some tribal fights and a number of minor Tiote
due to dissatisfaction regarding food have occurred;
There are racial antagonisms throughout the country;
There is increasing Communist infiltration in some
native unions.
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4. BuROPE
a. SPAIN
(1) Sabotage probably indicated.
(2) Sporadic sabotage throughout Spain is probable for the
following reasons:
(a) Despite strong police repression curtailing the
activities of the illegal Spanish Communist Party
there are indications that the party has in the
Spanish Interior a loosely organized cadre exper-
ienced in various forms of sabotage;
(b) Although economic and industrial sabotage would
represent a departure from current Communist activity,
action in those fields by the above groups should be
anticipated. Current acts of sabotage appear to be
linked to guerrilla fighting;
The Spanish Communist Party has emphasized the
colleotion of economic and industrial intelligence
by its members, such information being funneled
into Spanish Communist Party headquarters in Paris,
France; it is presumed that such intelligence is
forwarded to the U.S.S.R.
(0)
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. ASIA MINOR
a. IRAN
(1) Sabotage is probably indicated.
(2) Physical and economic sabotage in Iran is probable if
deemed expedient because:
(a)
The Tudeh Party, a Soviet oriented political group
operating underground, has a large number of
sympathizers and former members in Iran;
(b) The ease with which Soviet agents may come jute
Iran from the U.S.S.R.
b. KUWAIT
(1) No sabotage indicated.
(2) Physical and economic sabotage to oil installations in
Kuwait is not considered likely because of:
(a) The negligible number of leftist individuals in
the area;
(b) The extreme caution exercised by oil company
officials and local government in Kuwait.
c. SAUDI ARABIA
(1) No sabotage indicated.
(2) Physical and economic sabotage is not likely owing to
the following facts:
(&) Communists are virtually non-existent in Saudi
Arabia;
(b) The Saudi Arabian government is very sensitive to
foreign agents of any kind within their country
and most of the Arab population has been alerted;
(e) When a laborer with Communist tendencies is found,
he and all of his close associates in the place
of employment and in his living quarters are
expelled from the country.
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d. TURKEY
(1) Sporadic sabotage indicated.
(2) Physical and economic sabotage of installations in Turkey
is considered possible because:
(a)
Scattered groups of workers with grievances against
the government exist in such places as the coal
mines in the Zonguldak area, in the street-car
administration in Istanbul and in the tobacco
factories in Izmir;
(b) Prices are extremely high and working conditions are
unsatisfactory.
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6. ASIA
a. BURMA
(1) Sabotage probably indicated.
(2) The following factors oreate conditions favorable for
sabotage in Burma:
(a)
The present government is unable to maintain stable
security conditions in the country;
(b) The Communist element are already in active armed
revolt and the government forces have been unable
to quell than;
(c) It is possible that the present government may
compromise with the Communists in its efforts to
reach stability. While this will probably not
result in real stability it will place the
Communists in a more advantageous position to
carry on sabotage.
b. CEYLON
(1) No sabotage indioated.
(2) There is no indioation that any effective sabotage will
be performed in Ceylon. However, the following situation exists:
(a)
There are three very small Marxist parties, one of
which claims to.be Stalinist, and is called the
Communist Party of Ceylon;
(b) All three parties constantly fight each other for
control of the various labor unions, which weakens
each party;
(o) Most of their activities appear to be political
and overt;
(d) It is believed that the Government of Ceylon would
imprison labor leaders at the first indication that
their actions were motivated by other than purely
political reasons.
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o. CHINA
(1) No sabotage is indicated. Soviet or Communist sabotage
is not necessary in China because of the special status of Communism
in that country with the Chinese Communist Army in control of most of
the strategic areas of the country and capable of taking over, by
military action, such other areas as may become expedient.
(2) The following factors indicate that China's strategic
materials probably will not be available to the U.S.:
(a) The Communists are the strongest element in the
country;
(b) Chinese in Nationalist held areas are largely
accepting the inevitability of eventual Communist
victory and are showing an inclination to yield
to strong Communist pressure;
(o) Nationalist-controlled areas are steadily being
infiltrated by Communist agents who are adroitly
using propaganda to organize groups which will
cooperate with Communists in taking over the
remainder of China;
(d) While a Communist-controlled China may trade with
the U.S. for economic reasons, it would be poli-
tically aligned with the U.S.S.R., and trade dis-
advantageous to that relationship is unlikely.
d. INDIA
(1) Sabotage possibly indicated.
(2) The following conditions indicate the Soviet sabotage
potential in India:
(a) Soviet and satellite trade representatives and
international Communist personalities have been
quite active in India;
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(b) Contacts have been reported which indicate a well..
organized Soviet-controlled underground group in
India;
The effectiveness of any Soviet sabotage making
use of native Communist elements is being severely
hampered by the Governmental drive to arrest all
known Communists, especially those who participated
in.-the recent terrorist activity in Calcutta;
(d) Communist labor groups are losing strength as is
shown by the ineffectiveness of the recent threat-
ened general strike which was averted by strong
and timely police action.
(0)
e. JAPAN
(1) Sabotage probably indicated.
(2) The following conditions indicate the Soviet sabotage
potential in Japan:
(a) The largest Libor union federation in Japan is
Communist.00ntrolled;
(b) The Japanese Communist Party has a well-organized
underground element which is designed for illegal
activity;
Soviet nationals are active as follows:
1. organizing and directing covert operations
in Japan;
2. advising the leaders of the Japanese Communist
front organizations;
3. employing selective procedures in the repatria-
tion of Japanese nationals from Soviet-
controlled areas which facilitate the infil-
tration of persons who can be used for sabotage.
(0)
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(d) However, However, in amelioration of this situation, the
present Japanese government, aided by U.S.
Occupation Forces, is attempting to reduce
Communist control of labor and is observing
where possible, the ?overt activities of the
Communists.
f. SOUTH KOREA*
(1) Sabotage definitely indicated.
(2) The following information is applicable regarding the
Soviet sabotage potential In Korea:
(a) Communist bands are in armed revolt in South
Korea;
(b) Agents from the Soviet Satellite People's Republic
of North Korea are infiltrated at will across the
38th parallel to guide and assist in the opera-
tions of the armed Communist bands and in the
illegal activities of the South Korean Labor
Party (the underground Communist Party of South
Korea);
(c) Nhile the South Korean Government, Army, and
Security forces have achieved only limited suc-
cess thus far, they are making progress in bring-
ing Communist activity in the country under
control.
g. MALAYA
(1) Sabotage definitely indicated.
(2) The Communist elements have the capability for sabotage
as indicated below:
NOTE: *NORTH KOREA is carried as a Soviet Satellite.
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(a) Communist bands, comprised almost wholly of Chinese
elements, are conducting terrorist raids in the
plantation of tin mining areas, thus sabotaging
production efforts;
(b) Security forces, while exercising increasing sur-
veillance, have been unable to halt the terrorist
activity of the bands;
(c) In most of Malaya, the government security forces
aided by the British are able to maintain stability.
The Communists are able to continue their activits
ties because of the rough terrain in which they
operate and because of this ability to force
peaceful Chinese to supply food and shelter.
h. NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES (INDONESIA)
(1) Sabotage probably indicated.
(2) The fact that the situation in the Netherlands East
Indies is at present in such a state of confusion makes it difficult
to furnish an accurate statement of Soviet and/or Communist sabotage
capabilities. However, the following factors must be considered:
(a)
Soviet agents are reported to be conducting covert
operations in the NEI, but not on an extensive
soale;
(b) There are two Communist elements in the area which
may be used for sabotage;
1. The Tan Malaka group within the Republican
Forces. This group is sometimes credited
with being the real power in the Republican
movement while at other times, it is said to
be virtually without support;
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2.
The Chinese Communist group, Min Chu Tung Men,
is found largely in the Dutch held area. This
group has very close relations with the Malaya
Communist Party and. is said to be partially
directed by Kan Kah Kee.
i. NEW CALEDONIA
(1) No sabotage indicated.
(2) There is no Communist Party as such in New Caledonia and
persons with reported leftist feelings have retired from politics.
The presence of Soviet representatives or their activity in New
Caledonia has not been reported.
j. PAKISTAN (WESTERN SECTION)
(1) No sabotage indicated.
(2) While no evidence of extensive Soviet or Communist actis.
vity in Western Pakistan has been reported these factors exist:
(a) There is an underground Communist movement primarily
interested in organizing strikes. The Government
of Pakistan is attempting to remove this movement
by arresting active individuals;
(b) The country may be subject to pressure from the
Soviet Union because of its geographical position.
In addition, the location and the generally
unprotected frontiers lend themselves to the
infiltration of personnel.
k. PHILIPPINES, REPUBLIC OF
(1) Sabotage probably indicated.
(2) While there is no evidence that any specific attempts at
sabotage have been made or planned in the Philippines, the following
elements of instability exist which create a situation whereby it may
be accomplished:
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(a)
(0)
It is estimated that there are 10,000 Chinese
Communists in the Philippines, the majority being
concentrated in Manila;
There is a native rebel organization (Hukbalahap)
which presently controls a part of the Islands of
Luzon; this organization is led by an admitted
Communist, Luis Taruc. This group has made an
effort to acquire Philippine Scout uniforms;
while its activities have recently been concen-
trated on stealing food and equipment, they could
also be diverted to sabotage;
(d) There is a fairly large colony of Phite Russians
which reportedly contains a number of Soviet agents.
1. SIAM
(1) Sabotage probably .indicated.
(2) The following conditions indicate the Soviet sabotage
potential in Siam:
(a) The ptrongest Communist group in Siam is believed
to be Chinese, and is in touch with similar groups
in Asiatic countries and with the Chinese
Communist Party;
Soviet and Satellite agents have been reported as
being active in covert operations in Bangkok;
Any sabotage operations will be hampered by the
fact that the government has been active in trying
to halt all Communist labor activity by the
organization and support of a pro-government
labor group.
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7. AUSTRALIA
a. AUSTRALIA
(1) Sabotage probably indicated.
(2) Soviet capabilities to perform sabotage in Australia rest
-n
in the following:
(a) While the actual Communist membership in Austiglia
estimated at around 15,000, this well organiaid group
-)
runs many "cover" activities and controls 14por
unions which have a membership of about 275,000.
They influence or control the unions of all basic?
'.
industries except agriculture; notably the IirrworUrs,
Building Workers, Industrial Union, WatersideWorkers
Federation of Australia, Seamen's Union of Australia,
Meat Industry Employees Union and the Amalgamated
Engineering Union, all of which are centrally
controlled;
(b) Communist sympathizers exist in all levels of
Australian public and industrial life, a fact which
retards the effective use of counter-measures;
(c) An attempt is being made to put into effect better
security measures in all levels of the Australian
government, especially among the security services.
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