CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR PROSPECTS FOR RED CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01416R000100050118-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 25, 1999
• Sequence Number: 118
• Publication Date: November 1, 1954
• Content Type: NSPR

Second Section
HE C9PY~~"~~f~f~~"
~'Y~~'rOR
Prospects for Red China
Communist China's Disciplined Millions Challenge the Free World
CPYRGHT
This article was prepared from the final chapter of "The Prospects for Communist China," by Prof.
Rostow and others, to be published Nov. 5 by the. Technology Press of the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology and John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York.
CPYRGHT
By W. W. Rostow
Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Just one month ago, the latest dynasty to rule over China celebrated the fifth anni-
versary of its establishment in Peking.
What are the prospects for this regime? What do its leaders envisage as their objec-
tives? By what means do they hope to? achieve them? What problems do they face? Is
Peking likely to launch a major war?
Obviously, no colriplete answer to these questions can be furnished from this side of
the Bamboo Curtain. But from available sources, Communist and non-Communist, a
reasonably coherent picture emerges.
The Soviet Mode
Peking's domestic course over the next 10 years
is clear enough. The top leadership seeks to re-
peat on the Chinese scene the pattern of domestic:
transformations carried out by Stalin in the early
1930's, with a specially urgent emphasis on the
establishment of a Chinese industrial base for
the maintenance of its modernized armed forces.
It seeks simultaneously a related goal: to in-
crease the independent authority of Peking in
Asia within the limits permitted by the need
to maintain the Sino-Soviet alliance and by the
resource requirements of the industrialization
program. For the moment, where internal and
external ambitions conflict (or are made to con-
flict by an effective free-world policy), the .
present leadership in Peking is likely to accord
priority to expansion of its domestic power base.
urno!
Communist period, was not adequate to insure
a large exportable surplus. Moreover, China
lacks the timber and gold which the Soviet
Union- could throw in as its grain export
capabilities declined under the impact of col-
lectivization and population increase.
I
The Chinese Communist regime's problem is
thus essentially more difficult than Stalin's, and
success is not assured. Much hinges on the
course of agricultural output and, especially, on
the peasant's productivity response to the re-
gime's grain-control and collectivization meas-
ures. A repetition in China of the 20 per cent
fall in agricultural output which marked the
first Soviet five-year plan would constitute a
disaster-not to the Chinese people alone, but
to the regime's ideological pretensions, and prob-
ably
In terms of political, social, and cultural pol-
icy, as well as in economic objectives and tech-
nique, the actions of the Chinese Communist
regime as of 1954 strongly recall those of Stalin
in 1930. Generally, the regime's order to the
cadres-to take their guidance from Chapters
9-12 of Stalin's "Short Course"-reflects the fact
that the regime intends, essentially by Stalin's
methods, to duplicate in China the results
achieved by Stalin in the 1930's.
i t
.'
It is, therefore, worth examining how relevant
is the Soviet pattern-a pattern which operates
so powerfully on Peking's rulers-to Commu-
nist China.
In China, 1952 marked the virtual completion
of the postwar rehabilitation process, and,
roughly, the attainment of pre-Communist peak
levels of output. In the Soviet Union, 1928
marked the reattainment of, roughly, 1913 out-
put levels. In 1929 and 1953, respectively, the
Soviet and Chinese Communist first five-year
plans were launched.
The following key differences between Com-
munist China in 1952 and the Soviet Union in
1928 must be noted, however.
1. By the end of the 1920's the Soviet Union
had already passed through the great popu-
lation increase that results from the applica-
tion of basic modern public health measures.
Communist China is still in an early stage of
jr>
Internal Crisis?
Although it is plain that there will be con-
tinning and probably increasing strain between
the regime's doctrines and ambitions on the one
hand and its human and material resources on
the other, it would be foolhardy to forecast a
major crisis. All that we can see now is that,
given a convergence of certain conditions, such
a crisis is- possible. It may be useful, therefore,
to outline very briefly an extreme case.
The regime is committed to a policy of agri-
cultural mobilization sufficient to cover a set of
key requirements: minimum peasant consump-
tion, urban needs, projects demanding mass use
of labor, military and all official needs, and
exports.
The regime is prepared, up to a point, to
regard the food supply left to the peasant as
residual; that is, it is prepared to balance its
books, as in 1953-1954, with starvation on a
considerable scale-but well short of major
crisis.
Nevertheless, a rising population in the face
of an agricultural output either static or de-
creased by unfavorable peasant response or nat-
ural disaster1 would immediately raise serious
questions.
To what extent should rural starvation be
accepted in lieu of reduced allocations to other
categories? How much starvation over what
period would crack the morale of the cadres
and the peasant-born Army? At what stage
would a cutback in foreign trade and invest-
ment be accepted in place of starvation?
And, in the extreme, what would happen if
a population increase and accelerated urbaniza-
tion should so silt up the Chinese economy that
the regime would be confronted with the choice
of unacceptable levels of starvation or a virtual
abandonment of its further development plans?
These are questions of quantity and degree;
and it should be strongly emphasised that an
extreme crisis which would pose them all can-
not be forecast on present evidence. Such a
definitive crisis could come about only as the
result of a process lasting for several years, not
as the consequence of a single poor harvest
season.
ventional military units, rather than guerrilla
operations. They will be more expert in staff
work, logistics, and the handling of modern
equipment than Chu Teh and his colleagues
wno now run the Chinese Communist armed
forces.
The politicians will be experts at the bureau-
cratic manipulation of organized instruments of
power, administrators rather than experts in the
politics of insurrection.
If present modes of education and criteria
for promotion persist, the new generation will
be heavily laced with engineers, industrial man-
agers, and planners. In short, we can expect,
slowly or suddenly, a transition in Communist
China similar to that engineered by Stalin in
the Soviet Union in the 1930's. It is still a
decade, however, before this new generation
emerges and bids for (or inherits peacefully)
the posts of command.
China and Free Asia
Peking is not merely cligaged in a struggle
with its own basic problems, its people, and
its culture; it is in a competitive race with
a. me evolution
in China will be profoundly affected by the
course of events in free Asia; and the full suc-
cess of the Chinese Communist regime depends
in part on what happens over the next decisive
years in free Asia.
The Chinese Communists came to power es-
sentially because the only alternative regime
available was weak in the field, ineffective in
administration, and, to many, unattractive. In a
larger sense the meaning of what Communist
China accomplishes or fails to accomplish will be
measured against the strength and attractive-
ness of free Asia's performance.
In the short run, however, military success can
be an effective political substitute for domestic
performance. Regimes which are achieving inter-
national success seldom break up in their period
of expansion. Free-world military weakness in
Asia could thus strengthen the prestige and
power of the Peking regime within China and
cushion the consequences of a mediocre domesUC_
performance.
'
Direct military aggression by the Chinese
Communist regime is not to be ruled out.
Nevertheless, it appears evident that the regime
wishes to avoid a major war, and that it in-
tends to pursue its ambitions for expansion in
Asia by a mixture of political aggression with
limited military actions which minimize the
risks of major war and which cost little in
resources.
We can count on a determined effort to com-
plete the conquest of Indochina. Incipient opera-
tions in this style may be in the making, directed
against Thailand, certain northern provinces of
India, Burma, and, perhaps, Indonesia.
The Chinese Communists hope to link such
direct pressures on the Asian states to more con-
ventional political efforts to pose as the leading
power of Asia and as the repository of the
correct line of approach to Asia's great problems
of overpopulation and agrarian poverty.
The effectiveness of such a program of quasi-
military erosion and political posturing obviously
hinges on the military and political performance
of free Asia.
If Japan is left to wallow along from year to
year in the trough of a chronic balance-of-pay-
ments crisis; if the Philippines fail to make good
in concrete results the social and economic
promise of Magsa.ysay's political suceesc iL.3ede-
nesia remains indolent and distracted in the
face of its growing population problem; if India
fails to.produce major results from its effort at a
democratically engineered rural revolution; if
Formosa fails to develop both as a creative ele-
ment in free Asia and a political rallying point
for a new China-if, in short, free Asia does
not substantially improve its performance, an in-
different outcome on mainland China would still
represent an important relative achievement both
to the Chinese and to Asians generally.
superiority in agricufura popu ation per acre ,
of cultivated land (0.2 to 1.7).
3. In 1928, real income per capita in the
Soviet Union was about four times as high as
in 1952 Communist China.
4. In 1952 Communist China allocated about
four times as much to the armed forces as the
Soviet Union did in 1928.
5. Pig-iron and steel output in 1952 Corn-
munist China was roughly comparable to that
of Russia in the 1890's. The first five-year plan,
if successful, will expand this industrial base
roughly to the 1913-1928 Soviet level.
6. Largely because of the initial inadequacy
of its industrial base, Peking must count on an
enlarged level of foreign trade in its first five-
year plan, while the Soviet Union could achieve
its goals despite a sharp decline in external
trade.
7. Communist China's agricultural output,
On the other hand, the evolution of solid mili-
tary, political, and economic policies in free
Pki itli tilitd
Asia could denyengs camo mary an
' " .' ers except rthat ~they are 'likely to be different ideological primacy in Asia,gaan~d help force, over
With this in view, is tl~ r tfts"!ii'CddGlI~1~4n.f~ ~I ~CHklh1~(;Imel reevaluation
d
underline the five convergent c an s domestic and
they persisted, might yield a major crisis, for tary men will have had their training in con- foreign policies.
all are to some extent present or possible in the
Chinese scene:
1. A sharp fall in the death rate.
2. A disproportionate rise in the urban pop-
ulation. ----- --
3. An adverse productivity reaction of the
peasantry to the regime's agricultural policy,
yielding static or declining output.
4. A relative neglect of agricultural in favor
of industrial investment.
5. A succession of bad harvest years.
Roughly -speaking, it could be said that the
fulfillment of Peking's current objectives re-
quires something like a 10 per cent increase in
agricultural output over the 1952 level by, say,
1957 to 1959; and that a 10 per cent fall in out-
put from the 1952 level, if it persisted for several
years, could generate a decisive crisis.
Such a crisis would notbe merely a domestic
affair. Its existence would constitute a demon-
stration that the Soviet mo~1el is inappropriate
to the Chinese (and Asian) scene; and that the
network of ties to the Soviet Union failed to
carry China over the hump into sustained in-
dustrial growth. '
In such an extreme setting, the leadership
might well split and Peking's international
orientation as well as its domestic policy come
anus
quent conflict.
Thus, while emphasizing the fact that a de-
cisive crisis on the mainland cannot be firmly
forecast, it can be said with confidence that one
critical test of theregime over the next several
years will lie in its ability to move. toward its
announced goals in the face of China's funda-
mental problems of overpopulation and low
agricultural productivity, by techniques which
violate the peasant's incentive to produce.
Changes at Top
What changes can be expected to take place
in the top leadership of the Communist regime
over the next decade should crisis or major war
be avoided?
At the moment, the top leadership represents
a continuity stretching back to the earliest days
of Chinese communism, This homogeneous group
of individuals, now mainly in their 50's, will
continue to control the Chinese Communist re-
gime over, say, the next decade whether or not
Mao Tse-tung himself survives, and to remain
unified and fairly impervious to change until
the 1960's.
The passing of Mao Tse-tung, who is now in
his early 60's, would undoubtedly remove the
most powerful, most unifying personal force.
But the regime has already begun to lay the
foundations for collective leadership in public.
doctrine and, quite possibly, in administrative
practice.
i I i
As we look ahead, however, the inevitable
process of wholesale replacement, whether grad-
ually prepared for or occurring over a rela-
tively short period, could have significant mean-
ing. The older leaders like Chu Teh, Lin Tsu.
han, and Tung Pi-wu, who now lend great
prestige to the regime and still exert influence
on policy, will presumably have passed from
the scene or will be without real power.
The same holds true for the famous military
veterans, the very core of Mao's strength and
of the unique Chinese Communist administra-
tive system, all but, possibly, Lin Piao, who is
only 46-and Lin is thought by some to be.
already seriously incapacitated.
By 1965 the elders may well be Chou En-lal,
l is SMp-eb'i, p"yig Chi, Ch'en Yun, P'eng
T4h-hu atotTbl~r-cWRn. There is only one
full-scale military man here-,-Feng T'eh-huai.
There is a sizable group of Communist Party
veterans in their 40's; and there have appeared
in recent years important new leaders, like An
Tzu-wen, Lai Jo-yu, and Hu Yao-pang, who
seem to be without any known history of dis-
tinction in the Chinese Communist movement
and to have moved suddenly from the regional
periphery to the power center. Here is the ma-
terial of future leadersbi$--a mixture of what
we might call second-generation veterans whom
we recognize at least in part and of newcom-
ers just beginning to show.
L I E-
There is little to be said about the newcom-
Monday, November 1, 1954 -
Conc'nsions
Looking ahead, the Peking regime's continued
stability can be'satd on the
following four interconnected factors:
1. The policy and performance of Soviet Rus-
sia. Moscow must continue to deny itself direct
intervention in Peking's internal-control system,
and Moscow must avoid an internal Soviet crisis
that would gravely weaken Soviet strength on
the world scene. A weak Soviet Union would
force a reappraisal by Peking of the lean-to-one-
side policy, as would an attempt to extend Soviet
strength into Peking's domestic power
machinery.
2. Competition with free Asia. Peking must
persuasively maintain its posture- as Asia's wave
of the future, both in terms of military strength
and, especially, as possessor of the "correct"
formgla for the solution of Asia's problems.-
Peking's ability to do this lies largely in the
hands of the free world: in free-world actions
and policies, and in the image the free-wort
impresses on the thinking of Asia's citizens.
3. The economic problem. Peking must
achieve industrialization, without excessive
starvation, in the face of China's underlying
between measures to increase agricultural ou
put and the human response of the peasant
to collectivization-with the harvests an
portant random variable. -
4. Top leadership unity. Unity and continui
must be maintained in the top leadership of
regime, a problem which is likely to hinge
the foreseeable future more on the success
Peking's substantive internal and external pof
ties and the leadership's continued agreeme
on them, than on personal or bureaucratic stru
gles for power within Peking's control structur .
1?-
All this is said on the assumption that maj
war will not come. The question arises: Is Pekin
likely to launch a major war-for example, b
pouring its ground forces south into Burm ,
Thailand, Malaya, and Indonesia, taking the ris
that would be involved, as the Japanese did
1941? . -
For the moment such premeditated milita
aggression seems unlikely. Peking's leaders ha
a strong sense of history. They see - China in
tactically strong position, but without the str
tegic underpinnings for independent majo
power status. For the moment their main p
pose is to concentrate on the establishment
the industrial and military foundations f
major-power status. They are not in the ni
for reckless military adventure which wou
risk their hard-won base of power in China.
But it cannot be too strongly emphasized t
the determination of the cost of military adve
ture to Peking is a matter of the free world
strength, unity, and will. Communism is never
self-containing phenomenon.
What are likely to be Peking's intentions '
the face of limited unstable conflicts?
Peking is likely to press its interests coolly
ruthlessly by political schisms and weaknesse .
It will abandon no positions cheaply, but wi 1
assay the real power position it confronts in
mixed political-military terms that have mark
Chinese Communist thought since Mao's ascen
ancy.
If the regime is. confronted with the choice t
postponing the achievement of its external a -
bitions or of facing either major war or oper
lions costly to industrialization, it is prepar
to postpone its expansion in Asia.
But if confronted with a situation which wo
seriously endanger the regime's hold on its d -
mestic base (and in the context of Sino-Sovi t
relations the United Nations advance to
Yalu and Manchuria was so judged in 195 ,
Peking is likely to fight to the limit.
l
This, then, is the phenomenon that confron
the West. A unified, confident, ambitious gro
of men deeply committed to the use of totallta -
Ian techniques has mastered mainland Ch'
These are men driven on by their internal a d
external ambitions to industrialize rapidly a d
. e.ad .. ...L .1 usrd force
- They face, in the coming years, a decisi e
passage of modern history at a time of inten e
power struggle in which they are caught up t o
ways: in the Sino-Soviet, alliance, and in e
interaction of China and the rest of Asia.
Thus, despite the unique powers the Comm -
fist regime exercises on the mainland, its fa e
rests substantially with the peoples of the fr e
world and their governments.