ESTAB\LISHMENT OR STRENGTHENING OF ILLEGAL APPARATS BY FREE WORLD COMMUNIST PARTIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R001200040003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 1, 1998
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 1, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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25X1A2g
ESTABLISHMENT OR STRENGTHENING
OF
ILLEGAL APPARATS
BY
FREE WORLD COMMUNIST PARTIES
JOVE FROM FILE
Distributed
January 1960
Copy N?
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ESTABLISHMENT OR STRENGTHENING OF
ILLEGAL APPARATS BY FREE WORLD
COMMUNIST PARTIES
January 1960
L
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1. ANALYSIS
Preparations for the establishment of a clandestine
Communist party organization or illegal apparat parallel
to the party's legal overt organization have recently been
reported in several Free World Communist parties. * There
are also indications that legally operating Communist parties
in countries where previous conditions of suppression
prompted the establishment of illegal apparats are taking
steps to strengthen their apparats. There is some evidence
to show that the emphasis on illegal organization may go hand
in hand with an increased effort by each. Communist party to
penetrate its country's police and military forces. Finally,
* Clandestine activity in some form is always a part of the
Communist party operations in a Free World country
regardless of whether the party is legal or illegal. For
example, a Communist party may set up a special clan-
destine mechanism or apparat to facilitate the channeling
of funds. Such an apparat may or may not be illegal in
the sense of being against the laws of the country, but is
frequently referred to by the Communists themselves as
an "illegal apparat". As used in this paper, the term
"illegal apparat" refers to a clandestine party organization
compartmented from the party's conventional organization,
whose members are not generally known as Communists,
whose primary purpose is the continuance of party opera-
tions under conditions of severe repression, and which may
include organizational provision for violent action up to the
level of paramilitary forces.
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there are indications that Communist parties in several
countries have either established a capability for armed
action, such as a paramilitary force, or demonstrated an
interest in such a capability. Whether this capability is
part and parcel of the existing (or planned, as the case may
be) illegal organization or a special compartmented mechanism
of the Party, is as yet undetermined.
It should be noted further that at least one illegal party,
the KPD in West Germany, recently has been reported --
although not confirmed -- as establishing a separate clan-
destine apparatus for sabotage and armed action divorced
from the political mechanism of the Party. Also, a usually
reliable source has recently reported that in the illegal CP
of Panama all new memberships are on a clandestine basis.
This suggests either that the CP Panama is establishing a
separate illegal organization comprising unknown Communists
distinct from the known CP which is technically illegal; or
that the existing illegal organization is being improved and
more stringent security practices are being instituted. CP
Australia, it may be noted, is known for using secret Party
members for its illegal operations.
Communist parties reported to be in varying stages of
establishing a clandestine party organization or improving
an existing organization include those of Argentina, Brazil,
Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Venezuela, and the USA
in the Western Hemisphere; France, Italy and West Germany
in Europe; India, Israel, Lebanon, and Pakistan in the Near
and Middle East; and Indonesia and Japan in the Far East.
For most of these parties the pressure of local events made
the question of establishing an illegal apparat an immediate
problem. The reported attention to illegal apparats by the
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above parties may be indicative of similar attention by other
parties of the International Communist Movement (hereafter
referred to as ICM).
Although a CP normally works with both overt and clan-
destine methods, it tends to stress one or the other based on
local political conditions and the prevailing tactical line of
the ICM. Since the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU in
February 1956, the tactical line for the ICM has emphasized
for the CP's in the Free World the employment of legal
methods, coupled with the penetration, exploitation, and
manipulation of nationalist and amenable leftist and trade
union forces in a massive offensive.
There are indications that some CP's, particularly in
Free World countries where political conditions are favorable
to legal parliamentary tactics, emphasized legal means
almost to the exclusion of clandestine operations. Other
CP's, with limited resources, concentrated on the parlia-
mentary struggle rather than disperse their limited resources.
It is believed that this situation appeared deplorable to the
CPSU, which foresaw its offensive tactics leading either to
counterpressures forcing the CP's to go underground or to a
situation favorable to a takeover by the CP. From its view-
point, under these conditions, an illegal apparat or clandestine
organization paralleling and compartmented from the overt
party would be considered essential; in the former case to
protect the party and in the latter case to play a key role if
required. The situation is also believed to have appeared
unsatisfactory to the CPSU with respect to certain illegal
parties which, long suppressed, had placed too great an
emphasis upon purely clandestine agent operations -- result-
ing in a consequent weakening of the illegal membership base
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of the Party. An example of this is the 1957 criticism of
Zachariades by the KKE Central Committee in the Soviet
bloc, in which he was described as following a "line of
detachment from the masses". Accordingly, the CPSU
appears 'to have decided to take necessary corrective
measures.
The renewed emphasis on the establishment of illegal
or parallel apparats by Communist parties in the Free
World appears to have stemmed from the gathering of delega-
tions from some sixty-five Communist parties at Moscow in
November 1957 for the 40th anniversary celebration of the
October Revolution. Stressing the importance of this
gathering for the ICM, the Soviet press at that time commented
that "there has been no event like it in the Communist move-
ment for more than twenty years," an obvious comparison to
the important Seventh (and last) World Congress of the
Comintern held in 1935. The conclusions of the Moscow
gathering were embodied in the Twelve-Party Declaration
which set the policy for the ICM. Significantly, this
declaration restricted the "parliamentary road to Socialism"
to "a number of capitalist countries" and stated that in case
of resistance by reactionary forces, "the possibility of non-
peaceful transition to Socialism should be borne in mind. "
Pursuant to this latter proviso, the CPSU leaders secretly
pointed out to representatives of the Free World Communist
parties the advisability of establishing illegal or parallel
apparats and increasing efforts to penetrate the security
services. Some party leaders, notably the secretary-
general of the Indian Communist Party, raised objections to
establishing an illegal apparat, and no firm agreement or
policy binding on all parties appears to have been reached at
that time. However, even the Indian Communist Party con-
curred in the advisability of increasing efforts to penetrate
the security services.
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Following the November 1957 Moscow Conference, Soviet
representatives are believed to have reiterated to a number
of Communist parties the CPSU desire for the establishment
of illegal apparats. Particular attention appears to have been
given by these functionaries to the parties reluctant to under-
take this action. That the CPSU achieved some success in
its over-all efforts. is indicated by the fact that during 1958
the Communist parties of Argentina, Brazil, Peru and
Venezuela in. Latin America; France and Italy in Europe;
India, Israel, Lebanon and Pakistan in the Near and Middle
East; and Indonesia, and Japan in the Far East were reported
in varying stages of establishing or strengthening illegal
apparats and/or preparing for paramilitary activities. Of
these parties, the case of the Indian Communist Party (CPI)
is perhaps most interesting because the CPSU had to over-
come a strong reluctance on the part of the leadership of the
CPI to the establishment of an illegal apparat.
Subsequently, the CPSU used the occasion of its 21st
Party Congress (held at Moscow from 27 January to 5
February 1959 and attended by some seventy-two CP delega.
tions) to emphasize again to selected Free World Communist
parties the necessity of establishing illegal apparats and
developing a capability for armed action in case of need.
Guidance on these points was given to representatives of
certain Free World CP's attending the Congress by CPSU
officials, including Khrushchev himself. Similar guidance
was given by officials of the Communist Party of China (CPC),
including MAO Tse-tung, to CP representatives from Latin
America who visited Peiping after the 21st Congress of the
CPSU.
In guidance to the Italian Communist Party (PCI),
Khrushchev is reported to have stated that a crucial period
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T
for the peace of the world was at hand and that the party's.
clandestine organization should be reviewed and strengthened
in view of this grave prospect. He emphasized that even if
the Berlin situation did not reach the point of armed conflict,
the need for a strong illegal apparat was vital because of the
possibility of suppressive action against the C.P's in Western
Europe.
With respect to the Indian Communist Party, the Japan
Communist Party, and probably other Communist parties in
the Middle East and Far East, leading CPSU and CPC
officials pointed out that recent military coups as in Burma,
Pakistan, and Sudan and the development of repressive anti-
Communist policies by governments in these areas seriously
threaten the survival of the CP's. The Indian Communist
Party and possibly others were admonished to meet this
threat by developing apparats capable of armed resistance,
or at least by building the cadre of an underground party.
They were also instructed to intensify their efforts to
penetrate their countries' military and police circles.
With respect to Latin America, CPC officials gave a
detailed briefing on the necessity of establishing illegal
apparats to the representatives of fifteen Latin American
Communist parties* who visited Red China in February and
March 1959 after the 21st CPSU Congress. This briefing was
given in a context of encouraging the Latin American CP's to
`Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Colombia,
Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela.
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pursue the "national liberation struggle" which the Cuban
revolution had shown could be successful in the imperialist
rear. Although. the CPC approved of the armed revolution
which occurred in Cuba, it was recommended that elsewhere
peaceful and legal tactics should be tried first. The time for
armed struggle would be determined by the conditions of
imperialist oppression rather than by the Communistst own
decision. The Communist parties must be prepared for this
eventuality, and therefore an illegal apparat functioning
parallel to a legal or semi-legal Communist party in each
country must be established. The important' aspect, accord-
ing to CPC officials who briefed James Jackson of the CPUSA
(secretary for .negro and southern affairs), was not that a
Communist party have a large membership, but that it have
an underground organization in reserve and protected.
The CPC officials emphasized that the knowledge of the
existence of the illegal Communist party must be limited to
members of the Central Committee of the legal CP, and
better still, to only a few of them. The illegal CP should
never surface, even if conditions of legality permit. When
part of the illegal CP or one of its members loses contact,.
by reason of investigation or repression, the "lost" unit or
individual should join the overt, legal CP without even
mentioning the illegal CP. The illegal CP should be organ-
ized in highly compartmented form to avoid destruction when
part of it is discovered.
The CPC officials pointed out that the CPC used this
system to advantage, especially in Shanghai, where without
it the CPC could not have been so successful. They stated,
moreover, that a truly clandestine Communist party operating
alongside a legal CP is essential to avoid disaster brought
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about by total repression. In addition, the parallel illegal
CP, apart from its normal tasks, is in a good position to
obtain financial assistance from various sources for both
the overt and covert CP organizations, and to facilitate the
collection of information.
It appears that both the CPSU and the CPC agreed that
the various CP's should operate legally, if possible, while
holding an illegal apparat in reserve for the defense of the
party or for offensive action at the proper time. However,
within the framework of increased fraternal liaison and
assistance as sanctioned by the CPSU, the CPC, in its
guidance and training of other CP's, has stressed clandestine
work, citing in particular practical illustrations from the
CPC's own successful rise to power. CPSU training of CP
functionaries, on the other hand, has been, so far as is
known, of a more academic nature. There is also some
evidence that the CPC in its guidance and training of other
CP's is seeking to increase its influence and stature within
the ICM by presenting its experiences as more up-to-date
and pertinent for parties currently engaged in "national
liberation struggles" than the experiences of any other
Communist party. It appears that Latin American Com-
munists in particular are becoming more inclined to regard
the CPC as their guide to the revolution on the grounds that
problems faced by the CPC are similar to those confronting
Communists in Latin America, and that therefore the CPC
experience has considerable applicability. Because clan-
destine work played such a large part in the CPC rise to
power, more emphasis on illegal apparats may thus be
expected in those CP's susceptible to CPC influence. In
the reported cases of Communist parties establishing a
clandestine party organization or improving an existing
organization, the extent of progress varies from party to
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party. In some cases only initial preparations have been
made to meet the possibility of the party being outlawed.
Such preparations include arrangement for safekeeping of
documents and valuable movable property, the establishment
of secure communications channels, the designation of sub-
stitutes for well-known key personnel, and the training of
selected personnel for the clandestine party. In other cases
organizational preparations have progressed to the point
where an underground cadre is in being with leaders
selected and secret party members instructed and recruited.
In some instances organizational measures have gone so far
as to include the establishment of clandestine paramilitary
groups or "shock troops", the acquisition and caching of
arms, paramilitary training, and preparations for sabotage
(including training in preparation of explosives and other
sabotage techniques). However, as noted previously, the
exact relationship between the paramilitary structure of a
party and that party's illegal apparat is not clear.
In certain cases selected secret CP members were
designated to form an ostensibly non-Communist party to
operate legally in the event the Communist party is outlawed.
Use of a front party operating legally is, of course, an
accepted Communist technique in countries where the CP is
both illegal and suppressed.
Personnel involved in the establishment of illegal
apparats or paramilitary forces appear as a general rule to
fall into one or more of the following categories:
a. Individuals known in the past to be represent-
ative of the group within the CP most inclined towards
violent tactics. Examples of this are Putchalapalli
Sundarayya and Harkishan Singh Surjit in the CP India,
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and Rafael ECHEVERRIA Flores and Jorge
RIVADENEIRA A. in the CP Ecuador.
b. Persons with past experience in illegal or
paramilitary activities. Here again are Sundarayya
and Surjit; Charles Tillon of the CP France, an ex-
resistance fighter; and Suhayl Yamut and Ibrahim
Munaymnah of the CP Lebanon, both known to have
previously engaged in terrorist activities.
c. Persons holding party positions which have
historically been involved in the establishment of illegal
apparats, (i. e. Organization Secretary, Control Com-
mission Chairman, Cadre Department head). As
examples, Phil Bart, organization secretary of the
CPUSA, was made responsible for the establishment of a
skeleton illegal apparat; Jorge RIVADENEIRA A. , the
secretary for organization of the Pichincha Provincial
Committee of the CP Ecuador, is allegedly responsible
for the organization of a paramilitary force; Jesus
Encarnacion VALDEZ_ Ochoa, secretary for organization
of the CP Mexico, and Arnaldo MARTINEZ Verdugo, his
deputy, are believed to have received a briefing on illegal
apparats from CPC officials.
It is possible that training in the Bloc may also be a
characteristic which could serve to identify persons concerned
with illegal apparats. Rafael ECHEVERRIA Flores and
Ricardo PAREDES of the CP Ecuador have both recently com-
pleted training in Communist China. The latter was involved
in a previous attempt to establish an illegal apparat and the
former is involved in the present effort to establish a para-
military force. While this training is believed to have been
primarily ideological, there is evidence that "experiences in
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clandestine work" and "experiences in the armed struggle"
were discussed.
Some of the persons involved do not at this time appear
to fit into the above categories. However, it is possible that,
as additional biographic information on these "mavericks" is
accumulated, either they will tend to conform to the pattern
suggested above or a new pattern will emerge. As examples
of these "nonconformists", Felipe BESRODNIK, who appears
to have been concerned previously with finances within the
Buenos Aires Committee and the Central Committee of the
Argentine CP, received a briefing on illegal apparats in
Communist China and was subsequently reported as heading
"shock troops" of the CP in Buenos Aires; Douglas BRAVO,
who is responsible for the guerrilla force of the CP Venezuela,
holds an undetermined position within the Federal District
Committee in Caracas; and Teodoro NUNEZ Rebaza,
alleged head of a paramilitary force planned by the CP Peru,
is a Communist student at the University of San Marcos with
no known official position within the Party.
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In the past two years, the following legal parties
previously reported as possessing illegal apparats are
believed to have taken steps to improve their clandestine
organizations -- either as a direct result of the pressure
of local events or in response to guidance received from
the CPSU and/or the CPC,
France
Despite its long-established illegal apparat, prob-
ably neglected in recent years, the French Communist
Party (PCF) was in no position to operate illegally when
de Gaulle came to power. Subsequent to the de Gaulle
takeover in May 1958, the PCF, fearing that it would be
outlawed, reportedly undertook preparations for such an
eventuality. These preparations involved protection of
documents and valuable movable property, decentraliza-
tion of Party leadership, localization of the printing of
propaganda, penetration of opposition political groups
as well as the police and army, etc. However, these
efforts were not long-lived and present indications are
that the PCF has ceased all such preparations, at least
on a broad and observable scale.
Indications that the Indonesian Communist Party
(PKI) possesses an illegal apparat have been received
from the immediate post-World War II period up to the
present. Not least among these indications has been
the revelation from time to time of the existence of
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secret PKI members in the ranks of other parties or in
high government circles.
D. N. Aidit, secretary-general of the PKI, who
attended the 21st Congress of the CPSU, is known to have
returned via Communist China where he met with CPC
officials (including MAO Tse-tung). Since the CPC is
known to have briefed Latin American CP delegates who
returned from the Congress via Peiping on illegal
apparats, it is quite possible that Aidit received a
similar briefing.
. Information received subsequent to Aidit's return
suggests that the PKI is expanding and strengthening its
illegal apparat. Since about April 1959, new PKI cadres
have been brought directly into the underground Party
and not into the overt Party organization as was pre-
viously done; and in June 1959, a fairly reliable source
revealed that the PKI intended to infiltrate the "Angkatan
'45" (Generation of 1945) organization in order to develop
it as a mechanism through which to carry on Party
activities in the event the PKI should be outlawed or
suppressed.
Italy
While there have been indications in the past that the
PCI maintains an illegal apparat, it is not believed to
have been very extensive or particularly active. It has
been reported to have been involved in limited prepara-
tions for underground activity in the event the PCI should
be outlawed, but its main activity seems to have been
the penetration of Italian government institutions and
political parties. However, as a result of discussions
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with CPSU officials at the time of the 21st Congress,
the PCI has reportedly increased its preparations for
clandestine activity in the event the Party should be
declared illegal.
The following legal parties, in the past two years, have
taken steps towards the establishment of a clandestine organ-
ization parallel to the overt :party organization. While some
of these parties certainly acted under the pressure of local
events, others are reliably reported to be acting in response
to guidance from the CPSU and the Communist Party of
China (CPC).
Argentina
In the latter part of January 1959 the Argentine Com-
munist Party (PCA) showed its concern over the possi-
bility of illegality when it issued directives cautioning
PCA members against any actions which would provoke
the Argentine Government into declaring the Party
illegal and instructing cell leaders to begin training
Party members in underground techniques. At that
time, Felipe BESRODNIK, a member of the Central
Committee of the PCA responsible for finances, was
in Moscow attending the 21st Party Congress of the
CPSU. It is known that he returned via Peiping where
he was among Latin American CP representatives who
received a briefing from officials urging the establish-
ment of illegal apparats. Reports received in early 1959
reflected that the PGA was indeed making preparations
for underground activity -- particularly after
FRONDIZI's executive order given in April which forbade
all Party activities, although it did not actually outlaw the
PCA. Subsequent to the restrictive order the PCA
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instituted measures to increase the security of Party
communications; began the dispersal of files, corre-
spondence and compromising papers; ordered the
establishment of safehouses for clandestine meetings;
and made arrangements for the shifting of Party head-
quarters to a covert location in Cordoba. That these
preparations on the part of the PCA are not for naught
is shown by recent reports that the FRONDIZI govern-
ment intends to initiate court action which may result in
the Party being declared illegal.
Ecuador
At some time prior to 1948 a member of the Spanish
Communist Party who was passing through Ecuador
briefed Ricardo PAREDES, then secretary-general of
the Ecuadoran Communist Party (PCE), on the troika
system utilized by the Spanish Communists and urged
PAREDES to start immediately organizing such a system
in Ecuador. PAREDES did indeed take initial steps
towards the establishment of an illegal apparat, but
shortly thereafter, in 1948, PAREDES' power in the
Party was broken and the PCE dropped the idea com-
pletely. PAREDES' replacement as secretary-general
of the PCE was Pedro SAAD, who favored a relatively
legal approach. In January and February 1959 SAAR
attended the 21st Congress of the CPSU, accompanied by
Rafael ECHEVERRIA Flores, secretary-general of the
Pichincha Provincial Committee of the PCE, who had
just completed six months training in Communist China.
It is believed that SAAD and ECHEVERRIA went to
Peiping after the Congress and there received a briefing
on illegal apparats from CPC officials. Subsequent to
their return, SAAD is said to have altered his position
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and in May 1959 the PC.E was reported planning to
establish a covert organization divorced from the overt
Party.
/Caveat: Details of the establishment of an illegal
apparat in India and Ajoy Ghosh's discussions with CPSU
and CPC officials emanate from a source of question-
able reliability, but are included in this analysis because
of the high degree of agreement between this data and
similar information from other sources, pertaining to
other CP's. The allegation that the Indian Communist
Party is, indeed, in the process of establishing an illegal
apparat has been confirmed by separate independent
sources./
In early February 1958, the First Secretary of the
Soviet Embassy in New Delhi briefed two CPI officials,
P. Sundarayya and Harkishan Singh Surjit, on the
necessity of establishing an illegal apparat. Some
difference of opinion developed within the CP India
leadership over this question, and the Party secretary-
general Ajoy Ghosh continued to voice opposition, as he
had at the 40th Anniversary celebration in November
1957, on grounds that the Party reorganization required
by such action would weaken the Party's efforts in the
parliamentary struggle. At its Congress in Amritsar
in April 1958, the CPI continued to emphasize the parlia-
mentary struggle for attaining power and incorporated
this concept in its Amritsar thesis. However, while the
Congress was still in session, an important CPI official,
P. Sundarayya, departed for Moscow to discuss the
establishment of an illegal apparat. In mid-May 1958
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Ajoy Ghosh also went to the Soviet Union to confer with
officials of the CPSU. Upon their return to India in June
and July, respectively, both officials were in agreement
on the necessity of establishing an illegal apparat and of
increasing efforts to penetrate India's armed forces. The
coming to power of General de Gaulle in France, in spite
of a highly organized CP with strong parliamentary
support, was cited as an illustration of what might occur
in India, and was used as a justification for the establish-
ment by the CPI of an illegal apparat. P. Sundarayya
was reportedly given the responsibility of beginning
building this apparat immediately in Andhra Pradesh.
Ajoy Ghosh attended the 21st Congress of the CPSU
and returned via Peiping. While in Moscow and Peiping
he participated in discussions with CPSU and CPC
officials in which he was allegedly informed that the
military coups in the Middle East and Asia seriously
threaten the survival of the Communist parties in those
areas. To meet the threat, the CP's must develop
apparats capable of armed resistance, or at least build
the cadre of an underground party and must also intensify
their efforts to penetrate military and police circles.
The CPI decision to establish an illegal apparat was
strengthened by the Kerala crisis. As of September 1959,
however, there was disagreement within Party leader-
ship circles as to the form the apparat should take: one
group apparently felt that the apparat should for the time
being be organized with planning and preparatory tasks
at the national and provincial levels alone; the other
group favored a broader structure of a more militant
character, to include the creation of units at the lowest
levels of the Party.
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A noteworthy feature of the Indian case is the
evidence that the CPI has been reluctant to weaken its
overt organization and run the risk of compromising the
parliamentary struggle by diverting assets to an illegal
apparat, a problem which may also apply to other legal
Communist parties heavily committed to overt activity
in a parliamentary democratic context. Also of signif-
icance is the impact of de Gaulle's rise to power in
France upon the CPI. This development had a similar
impact on other parties of the ICM, and may have made
the task of the CPSU easier in convincing the various
CP's of the necessity of establishing an illegal apparat.
Violence which occurred in Nazareth on 1 May 1958
drew rumblings from Government circles that the
Israeli Communist Party (Maki) might be outlawed. At
the National Convention of Maki during the same month,
two Maki politburo members referred to the necessity
for preparing safeguards against the possibility that the
Party might be declared illegal. Immediately after the
convention initial steps were taken involving the covert
recruitment of selected activists to take part in certain
long-range plans for illegal work involving a complete
break with Maki on the part of the selected individuals.
However, it has recently been reported that these
preparations have been discontinued.
Japan
Two reports received in late 1958 reflected concern
by the JCP with the possibility that the Party might
sometime be forced underground. The JCP delegation
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to the 21st Congress of the CPSU is believed to have
discussed the suppression of CP's in various Free
World countries and is known to have returned to Japan
via Communist China, where discussions were held with
CPC officials. After the return of the delegation to
Japan, reports from a source of undetermined reliability
reflected that the JCP was seeking to establish an organ-
ization known as the Kyuyu Kai, to be composed
primarily of individuals not known to be Communists,
which would enable the Party to continue its activities
in the event it was declared illegal.
A usually reliable source revealed that in June 1959
Juan Pablo SAINZ y Aguilar, acting secretary-general
of the PCM during the absence of secretary-general
Dionisio ENCINA Rodriguez (who led the PCM's delega-
tion to the 21st Congress of the CPSU), intended to
recommend that the PCM be reorganized as three
separate entities comprising a legal structure, a semi-
legal apparatus composed of Party sympathizers, and
an illegal apparatus consisting of persons who had never
had any overt connection with the Communists. However,
SAINZ decided to shelve the plan pending the return of
ENCINA and the rest of the PCM delegation: Jesus
Encarnacion VALDEZ Ochoa, secretary of organization,
and Arnaldo MARTINEZ Verdugo, assistant secretary of
organization. ENCINA is known to have returned to
Mexico in late July or early August 1959. Since his
return the proposal for the reorganization of the PCM
has remained shelved, possibly because it was felt that
the PCM should concentrate first on healing the split
which was then plaguing the Party.
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James E. Jackson attended the 21st Congress of the
CPSU as a representative of the CPUSA. Either in
Russia or in Communist China he held a "lengthy discus-
sion with Chinese comrades" who convinced him that the
CPUSA should possess an organization in reserve and
protected. Jackson passed his ideas on to the CPUSA
leadership and, as a result, Phil Bart was designated
organization secretary and charged with the establish-
ment of the apparat. However, as of June 1959, Bart
had reportedly taken no action.
The Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV) regained
legality on 23 March 1958. It is not known whether the
PCV retained in reserve an illegal apparat parallel to
the overt organization. A clandestine apparatus of the
PCV is known to have been operating in the field of labor
activities in September 1958, but it is not known if this
was part of a parallel illegal apparat or a separate
covert mechanism of the Party. It is also known that
the PCV was represented among the Latin American CP
members who were briefed on the advisability of
establishing illegal apparats by CPC officials after the
21st Congress of the CPSU. Information dated September
1959 revealed that the PCV possesses a prepared list of
Party members not known as Communists who could
serve should the PCV be forced underground. The
report alleged that, if declared illegal, the PCV would
go underground and resurface behind the front of a new,
unknown leadership.
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The following illegal CP's have either established or
are believed to be in the process of establishing illegal
apparats distinct from the Party's political mechanism.
The military coup in Pakistan on 7 October 1958
resulted in the abolishment of all political parties and
the arrest of many Communists. Important and well-
known CP leaders were instructed by the Party not to
go into hiding or underground but to face arrest calmly
and not attempt to escape imprisonment. Lesser-
known leaders, however, who were important as
agitators or activists, were told to go into immediate
hiding so that they might be available for instructions
through underground channels.
As mentioned earlier in this paper, all new
memberships in the illegal CP of Panama, according to
a recent report, are on a clandestine basis. This suggests
either that the CP is establishing a separate illegal organ-
ization comprising unknown Communists distinct from
the known CP which. is technically illegal; or that the
existing illegal structure is being improved and more
stringent security practices are being initiated.
Another feature of the recent trend toward clandestine
activities within the ICM is the establishment of a capability
for armed action by certain Free World CP's. Communist
parties in several countries, predominantly in Latin America,
have demonstrated an interest in the establishment of, or
have established, a paramilitary force. Whether such forces
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are part and parcel of the existing (or planned, as the case
may be) illegal apparat or a separate covert mechanism of
the Party is as yet undeterfni.ned.
The following legal Communist parties have reportedly
within the past two years established or considered the
establishment of paramilitary forces.
Argentina
The PGA in Buenos Aires is said to have initiated
in August 1958 a training course in military tactics,
firing positions, hand-to-hand combat and sabotage. A
usually reliable source, in an unconfirmed report,
alleged that three "CPSU members" arrived in
Argentina in September or October 1958 to conduct
classes in "semi-military" tactics for Army veterans
and PCA members. In early 1959 the PCA reportedly
maintained in Buenos Aires a force of "shock troops"
which took part in the violent anti-Government demon-
strations of 3 April 1959. This force was said to be
under the leadership of Felipe BESRODNIK (who visited
Peiping after the 21st Congress of the CPSU). In May
1959 the PCA was allegedly training groups of young
people in street-fighting and sabotage and had alerted
the secretaries of the zone committees and made them
responsible for organizing armed groups. During the
spring and summer of 1959 evidence accumulated
showing the PCA to be collecting arms and ammunition.
Ecuador
According to a usually reliable source, Rafael
ECHEVERRIA Flores upon his return to Ecuador in
March 1959 advocated the creation of a paramilitary
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force by the PCE. The revolutionary group of the PCE,
as personified by ECHEVERRIA and Jorge RIVADENEIRA
A., began developing a plan of action. The group was to
conduct training courses in sabotage and paramilitary
techniques. Each person trained was then to recruit and
train five more who would in turn be responsible for five
others. The system was to continue with each group of
five knowing only the identity of its own leader. Pseu-
donyms were to be used by all members. A subsequent
report from the same source revealed the existence in
May 1959 of a group called the Comandos, headed by
Jorge RIVADENEIRA A., numbering about seventy
individuals. The membership of this group was
apparently drawn from the young Communists' organiza-
tion of the PCE. The Comandos were said to be organized
into units of fifteen persons (these fifteen may have been
further divided into squads of five, but there is no proof
of that as yet). It subsequently became apparent that the
PCE Comando group was only in the planning stages.
However, in August 1959, with the approval of Pedro
SAAD, secretary-general of the Party, RIVADENEIRA
issued orders to expedite the development of the original
plans. In September 1959, a separate, independent
source, of unknown reliability, confirmed the fact that
the PCE was attempting to organize some sort of parallel
organization, based on groups of five persons, to be used
for "tactical actions" rather than insurrection.
During the period immediately after the de Gaulle
takeover in France, when the PCF was purportedly
making preparations for illegality, it was alleged that
the PCF was planning the creation of paramilitary cadres
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under the leadership of Charles Tillon, ex-resistance
leader. This allegation was never confirmed and no
further reports concerning such activity on the part of
the PCF have been received.
There is unconfirmed evidence that the CP India
may be planning the establishment of a paramilitary
force. Information dated November 1958 from a non-
Indian liaison service alleged that the CPI had opened a
guerrilla training camp at Kakchin on the eastern border
of Manipur adjacent to Burma.
During September 1958, the PCV discussed plans
for the organization of a secret guerrilla force, having
as its primary mission the repelling of attempted coups
against the BETANCOURT Government (the PCV fears
the return of a military regime); and as its secondary
mission the support of the PCV in its struggle for power.
Such a force was established with Douglas BRAVO, a
member of the Federal. District (Caracas) Regional
Committee of the PCV1 , at its head. BRAVO was said to
be responsible to a Cornite Revolucionario de Comandos
(Revolutionary Committee of Commandos), a sub-
committee of the PCV Central Committee. Paramilitary
training of members of the PCV guerrilla force was
initiated in March 1959 at several secret locations and
has continued on a regular basis up to the present time.
There is some indication (but no proof) to suggest that
the Italian Communist Party may be providing some
support to the PCV relative to the organization and train-
ing of the guerrilla force.
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The following illegal or quasi-legal* Communist parties
have reportedly established, or considered the establishment
of, a covert paramilitary organization;
In February 1958, the PCB is reported to have
organized a special Guerrilla Warfare and Sabotage
Commission to study the possible application of those
methods by the PCB. There is no confirmation of this
report nor has there been any indication that the PCB
took any further action relative to the establishment of
a clandestine paramilitary force.
In late December 1958 a usually reliable source
reported the existence of a special two-man sub-
committee attached to the Central Committee of the
quasi-legal CP Lebanon. This subcommittee, known
as the Technical Committee, was said to be responsible
for paramilitary activities. Members of the committee
were allegedly Suhayl Tamut and Ibrahim Munaymnah,
both known to have been active as terrorists during the
Lebanese violence of early 1958. There has been no
confirmation of the existence of the Technical Committee.
*By quasi-legal is meant CP's which operate more or less
overtly, but which are not yet recognized as legal political
entities. This is common to CP's in the transition from
illegal to legal status; they are legal de facto, but not yet
de jure.
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An unconfirmed report from a source of undeter-
mined reliability, obtained in March 1958, informed that
the PCP had selected one Teodoro NUNEZ Rebaza to
organize a group of Communists and Communist
sympathizers to be known as the Comando de Choque
(Shock Command or Shock Commandos) to start riots
and encourage violence during demonstrations. It was
implied that the group was to be armed and that it would
receive training in the use of firearms. No further
reporting concerning such a group within the PCP has
been received. It is known, however, that as of July 1958
Teodoro NUNEZ Rebaza, a Communist student at San
Marcos University, was in contact with Jorge DEL
PRADO Chavez, secretary of press and propaganda and
member of the Central Committee of the PCP, and Raul
ACOSTA, secretary-general of the Party. DEL PRADO
and ACOSTA subsequently attended the 21st Congress of
the CPSU, later visiting Communist China (where they
were briefed on illegal apparats by CPC officials).
West Germany
A recent report from an official liaison source
alleged that the KPD was initiating the establishment of
a separate clandestine apparat for sabotage and armed
action divorced from the political mechanism of the
Party. This paramilitary organization was to be set up
on the three-man or troika system and its functionaries
were to receive special training in East Germany. There
is, as yet, no confirmation of this report.
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