THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST APPARATUS IN ACTION
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP78-00915R000900220002-6
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
5
Document Creation Date:
November 11, 2016
Document Release Date:
September 23, 1998
Sequence Number:
2
Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 14, 1958
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP78-00915R000900220002-6.pdf | 261.91 KB |
Body:
c' bite n
57
THE INTERNATIONAL Cp?I4UNIST APPARATUS IN ACTI-q
1. The complex international Communist app~_ratus is buried in
every Communist party and Front organization, It performs basics;ly
three functions
a, international co-ordination and control;
b* espionage, and covert (non-attributable) political action
and propaganda;
c. support of Co.munist organization thrnugh Provision of
secret funds, training facilities in the Bloc, supplies ranging
from printing equipment to military material when needed.
2. During the Stalin period, particularly in his last years, emphasis
was on the requirements of Soviet espionage ae vices, and the international
apparatus was largely controlled by the Soviet intelligence services.
Co-ordination and control of the international Cork.unist movement was
conducted andcznntrolled by Stalin and his confidants.
3. Khruushchev is now atte,pting to organize the international
apparatus to better serve the political requirements of the USSR and the
Bloc, in addition to the requirements of Soviet espionage services. From
available evidence it appears that Khrushchev is revitalizing that function
of the international apparat which is concerned with the control, co-
ordination and support of the Communist movement in the Free World. This
does not mean a decrease of Soviet espionage activities aboad. It means,
however, that the Co-wuw=Mist Party of the Soviet Union is incr=-asing its
direct contacts with the Connurrist parties abroad, in order to strencthen
than an viable instruments of subversion. Khrushchav has an internationalist
outlook and believes, more than Stalin did, that Comrtuni; and Communist
parties as well as fronts abroad can eventually take over.
k. At the EEoscow meetings of Corsnunist leaders from all parts of
the world, in November 1957, the groundwork is laid for the revitalization
of the international control and co-ordination apparatus. Emerging principal
features are-
a. The Soviet Contuaist Party and its'"oscow apparatus remain
the organizational center. evidence shows that the CPSU
hay been expanding the Foreign Section of its Central Committee
which performs the routine work of international co-ordination.
Subsequent to the November meetings--in January 1958-the
major front organizations announced a we'll co-cremated,
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aabitious program for 1958. A large delegation of top
Soviet CPSU experts on propaganda was scheduled to leave
for Rora, probably to assist CP Italy with its election
campaign. A top Soviet trade union organizer was des-
patched to Cairo probably to spark-plug C mmist pene-
tration of labor unions in the Middle East mnd Africa. The
trend shows definitely that CPSU is attacking the problem
of co-ordinating the movement with new vigor,
will conv'.okeloeal meetings of the international
Communist leadership once a year. Similarly, regional
meet: rigs will be called in the Bloc when need arises.
c. Corniist parties in the Free World will increase regional
consultation and co-ordination with each other,
d. Communist parties in Europe and Internati.:nal Front organi-
have been ins.tructdd_to_ cations in generals support more effectively liberation nove-
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more support for the Algerian rebels. It also means support
for non-Cosannnist rebels (such as Castro in Cuba), if they
can be persuaded to accept it,
CP China will probably increase its co-ordinating and
support function vis-a-vis CP's in Louth Asia, on behalf of,
and in concert with, the CPSU. Reliable evidence shows
that the Chinese CP has training facilities for foreign
Corzanists,
f. Other Last European GP's will share some aspects of Inter-
national control, particularly the CP's of East Germany and
Czechoslovakia.
At Xoscow in November it was agreed that an international
publication would be issued to clarify problems of doctrine
and ideology. This publication, which will serve to spread
the propaganda campaigns and theories of Noscow and Peking
throughout the world, began distribution in late August.
It is published at Prague in l4 different languages. The
Snglish-language edition is entitled World Marxist
i (i i thiiti
with the subttlewhchse man t o Xoa o
other editions), *Problems of Peace and Socialism,*
h. TraUlne. of foreign Caunists in the Bloc will increase
net the next two to three years. One Communist party
leader expects to have all leading functionaries trained
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in Moscow by 1960. International front organizations will
probably also expand training facilities. The i"P' # e.g.
in atisidiaing a program cf regionalized training schools
abroad,
I. Funds for CPts abroad will probably be furnished by CPSU and
91oc parties on an increasing scale. indications are that
a greater percentage of the funds will go to Covmnanist parties
and organizations in underdeveloped countries.
J
With specific reference to Latin America# it is reliably reported
that a conference of all Latin American delegates was held in
t`escow# November 19$7~t under the chairtansh p of the Soviet spec-
ialist for Latin American affairs of the CPSU# and attended by
Chinese delegates. The conference permitted the representatives
of significant Cornnlst parties to discuss their area problems.
The Soviet chairman laid out specific action program for the
Latin Arerican Ceanu nist parties which was s cc :pted. The program
included recuests for:
a) increased efforts to fan and exploit anti-U.S. sentiment;
b) revival of the Communist controlled peace movement throu&
a Latin American peace conference. (This was held in
Argentina in hey 19$$x;
to
c) /support the Communist noveiant in Cuba by, organizing a week
of solidarity with the people of Cuba;
t) renewed efforts to attack the Organization of American
States through a Communist controlled cultural conference
to coincide with the next OAS conference;
e) to promote the Soviet economic offensive,:; by organising
a Coeenmaist controlled eeonoSc conference. (A conference
now scheduled to be held in Buenos Aires in December 1958
may combine both the cultural and economic objectives.)
The chairman also requested that the Latin American Ccmmimiat
partite improve and intensify the co-ordination of their activities.
At the conference the Confederation of Workers of Latin America
(CTAL) came in for some criticism, and ways and means of streng-
thening or reorganizing the CTAL were discussed.
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8. The care of the Latin Asaerican conference illustrates the
thorrughncss with which Communist area problems were discussed in
Psscow. It also illustrates the fact that the preparatory work was under
the control of the CPSU and the Bloc parties, which in this fashion
assur.td policy king powers. According to the account of Friedrick
Ebert, politburo rember of the East German Communist Party (&:D), the
"sister parties from the capitalist countries" i.e., from the Free World,
were only "consulted" at this stake, eaen though these discussions
centered around the drafting of the Twelve-Party Declaration, which
contains a general directive for Communist parties in the From world. s
9. In 195P the international Co ?r4rcist apparatus has concentrated
a. deteloping and increasing the activities of the international
Communist front organizations in Latin America, Asia, the
Piddle.:ast, and in Africa, through exploitation of the idea
of Afro-Asian and anti-colonial erlidarity..
b. increasing the subversive potential of Co;nii,atist pasties
largely through legal, parliamentary means and united
front tactics.
10. Concerning the subversive potential of the international Com-
munist freest organizations, it is noted that evidence on the activities
of Soviet agents within them is increasing. For example, a -Japanese
front figure, identified as a Soviet agent, was reported to be active in
organizing a wasz reception for Sukarno upon the latter's arrival in
Japan. A fora-or Soviet agent who was involved in the assassination
attempt on the life of Trotsky in Y4y 19110, has been involved in organizing
an anti-US front which extends throughout Latin America. At the Atro-
Asian Solidarity conference in Cairo in Decester 1957 several delegates
with records of Soviet agent activity were noted. International Corruni.st
front organizations also r-aintain their capability for subsidizing Cossiunist-
controlled publishing firrse in the Free World although the headquarters
of most of thece fronts have been pushed back behind the Iron Curtain.
11, Concerning the erphasis on legal, parliamentary cethods, this
tactic will probably prevail most strongly in the underdeveloped countries
which are the wain targets of the Soviet diplomatic and ecenonic offensive.
Corsunist pa=ties in these areses will increasingly attempt to legalize
themselves in cases where they are underground, and atte^pt generally to
merge with the political streams of nationalism in order to exacerbate
nationalist tensions and frictions with the West. CP Brazil, for example,
has initiated a legall--ation drive. Local election tauccessee of the
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Corm mint political front in Singapore further illustrates the tr .d.
But this legal method is only effective when it is successfully com-
bined with the infiltration of other parties or government organizations
by the concealed Goi :vnjst. This too Is being worked on by the parties
in Afbv-A, is and Latin America, in some countries? where the CP's are
illegal, subversive action, to overthrow or help to overthrow an existing
anti-Conrnnis't rover nt may be a prerequisite to legalization and the
adoption of parliamentary tactics.