I. STATUS AND STRENGTH OF THE MALAYA COMMUNIST PARTY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R000900030094-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 23, 1998
• Sequence Number: 94
• Publication Date: January 1, 1948
• Content Type: REPORT

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URAWWME
_. I
dene c rg-
pTi.ry efforts as well as Its beast
ve been devoted to awned tnaturrectton carried on
Races L beration .Army. The ALA, receives supp
money, medicine. Jute ,ligence!) from the Mm u Yuen (collective
tx,^~..,,
h
ose s
Ations) w
MC' front or "peoples" orgIMIT
stia ted at an where from 10.000 to 100, 000.
membere'hip to 95 per cent Chinese. Outside of the jungle,
, .. bi r&Au ti is still relatively weak.; its main strongholds
are osswng labor unions and students. particularly these in the
W U004 middle sc ols. a o"w= .e> in Malaya derives its
*9* basic problems coxm to many newly independent,
t-
l
pa
loped countries: the bra=g of traa4ditional Suck a
for new rep ks a lath a I unfulfilled economic
communal problem, by thre growing
s of local Chinese, and
to their cultural herttsqge from
politics and government.
a MCP proper is 5.000; that of
to 1, 6.00 to Z. 0 .
gip' decided at to fourth Plenary Conference
sort to armed action to gain control of the country.
l dup to armed insurrection was to consist of intensified
and a cams aign of sabotage and terrorism to harass
eak+en the government. MCP Was never area to advance beyond
tst phase of aggression. vdAch. however, extend 'd over a
!eraal years and was stU1 going on at we and of 195 y.
Two militant action groups were formed by the MCP. drawing
i
ve
rnbears from front groups in villages organ sed to g
ship in dap*. In Malaya those, factors
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_WR
1
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6"'u J"T n~nrn(?N
t ten
MCP's armed force, MRLA. One of these groups,
ps, was a fiat.-time action unit; the other, the
Corps, wars a part-time action unit. The main
Corps were: ambush, area an estates,
'aph lines, sabotaging rail tes being
and a amuaaition. AdditionaUy? they
posted hams and carried nut Other agitation and propaganda
acts. The Principal tasks of the Self-Protection Corps were
sabotage of power, telegraph and railway lines, destroying rubber
trees and pia on buildings. Also, the Solf-Protection Corps
had to post handbills, and to obtain and raise food and other
Minna for the MRLA. MC? members of the leadership fraction
in the People's Action Party and those in the illegal Chlinose
h Laser were apparently responsible for
student riots of 1954 and 1955 in Saxgapore.
ire are no details available cancer
MCP men for sabotage and
i .Me Targets
U.S. or Allies Per**
years 1948 through 1957 there were thousands
many of which British plantation managers,
4 troops were ambushed and k .ed train
my deaths and even more, injuries
1952 Communist units attacked a U. S.
Valley. On several occasions Conc.
capture arms from police or Name Guard
re many clashes occurred Uetween
e in the spring of 1954-1955. In May 1955
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port and.brick workers in Singapol
kted with student disorders. The day most
455, the students set up roadb aoc ks
.neous attacks on the police in severaal.
Students hurled stones., wounding police-
.g the latter to use tear gas. ude s st*ned,
.y ory~p overturned or b Yned police cars.
Lt or jerrorism Targets
is%s' i eyes when ice. au s
, were attacked and murdered an the highway's.
L 6 Communists were hold responsible for throw
ten person
a$tst acts
tti sh League before, during and a s l
es of May and 3unee 1954 In Sing ore were
tudent disorders of May 1955 in Singaapore,
r inflicted upon witnesses was the slaying
onds, United Press co
. astral ar
communist leader Lance
shooting of Lee Chi Hua.
the disfigure nt Mme.
Singapore Nanyang Girls' High
(c) the shooting of lrspoctor San
unch Officer of the Singapore
enteral threatening letters were written.
td beaten.
Singapore to convey to MCP le
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February and early March 1.948 in
that ehortly after Sharkey's stop at
cided to resort to insurrection. Moral
by the C nform; material support from
I organized. Reports of December 1952
MCP loader Chin wig was trraWng
,y to obtain advice and guidance. Sapport
spore originating in the
channeled through the w unist
rout organization, the International Union of Students.
1.
s
else upon soc
rder to try to
as a protector its
future by this p'
discreet and
:n the new
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I.
;9
h larger than is ra;
and than the estimated number of
rs or sympathizers would indicate. It is
ide organization and is in a position to provide any
piarty by voting for the only atiter party which
D are not Communists but who wished to }rotes
,ad that many of the des received by the NUF were
a the Comm t tnaurractianists have
UOW In n rs and in fighting power. they are still able to raid
villages and to attack and sabotage transportation and comm,
wons fr q,
asst I
essfuUy enough to Bader econom c
City c - n oon- -da ng. s i
lega and illegal C a of Surma are i
umonberabip, of appr~ately 4, OOO - 4,. 0
ears. The
me a total
e has been carried out by military and
vfkML cad"s.
eT
in Comm st bloc countries.
Ion is avaiiab a about traWag of Burmese Co
lose to the caporal
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S.
ss as Targets
e Tar
iL
of the P has aimed at weak n In
;nce saaary 1,94$) Government of
7 bridges had
a up in the preceding gear) a
and hor ing of sraa mss,
elections by intimidation of vote
convoy and mau trains,
t police Outpa
of ices. .k
d that the BCP'a militant action w Mc
ted in late March 1948 was direct response to, t:
w Burmese Communists. Proof of spoemc
,aed by the meetings in India in early 1948 which
47 and by sahsega+ient resolutions calling for aggres-
such action a gparessed in the Zhdanov speech e;
e ninunists outside Surma for the SCP
pitriad, however, is lacking.
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for weapons, ? ds and equipment, the
oat of 1953. When violent action was
xese were app racy convinced that
aterial aid the local. ozn=tunist
954 the Rangoon press was urging
nd,
t some P leea dera in l9 W1951 spent
Cbina. Whether this involved training
attempts were made by these leaden
terrorist action in the near
[nut to be of approximately the sate
57. U mass surrenders of terrorists
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11 a c
0 - Z, 000 been offer
Republic Vietnam. (South Vietnam) derives
tie continuing threat posed by the Iarge and
,ed forces of the Communist " aocratic
a UU) a residual apparatus of
litic agitators left behind in South
have a
e"caon" thr direct North
scctious, and formation of a ; chi-
Leon at
U.
Ultimate direction C
wised after the wit
the war had'
errorism. The reorganizatto
order to prepare them for anew c
date.
There
takes place in.,
the indo_
.ons of 1955.
sub'rersion,
Nmits was
n in South
on indicating any such
has been provided Uy
Two Militant, auction units erhicl
d -violence in South
(The CP of North
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itc
AU *V ewe ai a to date shows that tra g in sabotage
md terrorism is guts in sptotal training centers in the North to
Conumgnistm who operate in the ttb. Selected cadres rec*eives
intmot-ve training in c unicatiaan', espionage metes, btack
Sk"reed most capable are recreated for this training. Special
grvaps aro selected from among the trainees to act among the
orders; olhors are to act among the army.
;ntay Communists have engage
mix= against 111. S. or 117. S. des targets.
aim of Comm #st subversion
E
of confidence in the teem gave
qtrs. crate with dissident sects
ernment. The sects are io
aid beecause of their short supplies cdE arms
ed in late 1955 t
to
cede
tali to rebel units or to snip It nay
u hits tried to sabotage the March 1956 elections.
l ag this terroristic action grenadesS were - hr near voting
eats, mot boxes were burned or stolen, etc. There was a
large increases in the number of assassinations in the last
q r-ter of 19 57 ? Most of these occurred in the Provinces where
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C t turiats baea ed yg men conic-a at
udUftry a etas with harm if they ccmptied with the con
ri on.
tit pr
a of terrorism *xA as
lknth Vist sm. From the puttorn of
1954 and 1957 it seems probable that
it terrorist action while working as m
at4an grates.
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I.
of Indonesia
;aggressive action to take over control
nationalist movement at the time of the, ) adi n
since early 1952 the Pia has followed a
selectively supporting several go'rern
t directly represented in the present
olitical influence through mass daemon-
PZRPM were to constitute the nucleus of these groups. The
leader of each group was the person who normally served as head
t PUBES zoaunittee for the given area. In sow %* parts of
isneaala -centred Village Security Organizationis (O) or
""age Defense Organizations had been formed by approximately
+d--1957 for future paramilitary action.
,n the regional, elections of 1957. Mu a of the
parently lies in its control of a series Of
ts, mean important of which is the largest of the
with a claimed membership of 1, 0001, 000. The
ength lies in Java and North Sumatra.
U.
l ssbotage/guerria units were being planned and organized
the Central Sumatra area about mid-1957. Members of
groups was a fa tionary of PIMs fraction in the Communist-
controlled veterans organization, ?ERISE .
hnmodiately responsible for the execution of these ac
under the ultimate direction of the PKI Central Ccnmittee,
0 votes in the general elections of 1955 and over
organizations, and appeals to national su ity. It
Its Ra a p +narible for Sabotage, ltssassinaticm,
Acts of terrorist nature being carried out in Jan -ary 1957 were
M. Sabotage ,_ ra!BLng Gives Within Indonesia
Communist-controlled Village Defense Organizations (OPD) in
Sumatra have received arms and training.
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L
.gave.
Targets
a. '. g. and/or
d anti:-French demonstrations staged in
6 with official government son ction were
e by PKI elements, causing damage to
h and 8rilish diplomatic installations.
Ls were Communist-controlled veteran
;rim. Of the seventy-seven organizations which
pearUc paced. 95 per cent were Communist or Communist-
dominated. In late 1957 caused the and-Dutch campaign
reach extreme portions.
r Sabotage Targets
Ldation were tarried out In January 1957
tders of the religious parties who had criticized
:t PKI guerrilla/sabotage groups which
;seed in the summer of 1957 in Central
siize arms from given locations and would
Council (the Administrative Council for
nation in Central Sumatra) by acts of
t, communication routes, military
arms dumps; by withholding food sup
serves and by carrying out guerrilla. action
ngforces.
In Amt 1957 PK1 was planning Para iiitary action to
o erthro w the administration of Military Territory n, South
ra. lu t tcber 1957 Communist-led Village Defense
Organization (OPI) units attacked the headquarters of the
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- the USSR# China or
nest g rnm*10 to s ep ','IF
violent acition
yree w s": G.... _ -- - -- specially -r front organizations, e.
oA
. - -
raps` orgy nxaa
rec+eiVed military to ng. PEI:1-1 P81
trol *d
AMitions y. ; ,mist-con
i
ti
n r ~ f 4
aL to the U. S. aau
eaeevt
~r `f`lee iarge* omntU *t-cunt ' filed
.on. f , which is a specia lq influential
state
? l D rta-, among they e
::....- w- -
ee of the aggressive ac on it co -
on
t
~
ute'h iAgWLw"jw=w '
r e BSI violence would be
t Pg
sa tn+e government in the future. Another
s4a n g r
t that some
f
ac
,et is presented by the
ad of
e c
are under the;
_ $ or suspected Members.
fay some ev denC that:
met SY of 1)ja
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--- P,NZ5
I. +stm:ass and Streiaassgb
I. Cc
has been illegal
bership is 1, 000 -
operation: in the mounts ns of central
d aced the COOMM wa t-led Huk rebellion
rty, government militigr
'50 of important leaders of the
the Communists have turned to a "legal
d isfiltra on by constitutional means.
nment was successful in eradicating open
Pte' influence
d youth org,
d to reaactvat
te;
mt. years the
former
NO Popularity of the late President Magsaysay and his
program of economic exp*nsiou and social reform contributed
to the effectiveness of th. government's campaign against the
Con ats. Although previously declared illegal under the
Constitution by court ruling, the C4mmuuist Patty and H-uk
have been formally outlawed the Anti-Subversion
o law in June 1957, which establishes specific
penAlities for Communist activities.
it. I
units Responsible for Sabo !M, Assasstnaitd
ice and armed action was
direction of the Military Conu itteee of the Secr*UrLat. Decisions
utions when practicable were made known to lower
d by regular troops of the RUB, the Party'aa
e throughout the period 1949-19S4 appear to have
gional C ittse/Co and Conferences. most
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rnitted by the regular
provisions were made,whereby
d out by strategically placed c ,vile
Party members of the Sabotage Division of the Civilian Agencies
of the National Intelligence Department, the P3 Intelligence
in. The Sabotage Division existed mostly on p;aaaper
h by October 1.950 some units of it had been +aactivated:
cxtdatton Squad and Labor Agitation Groups.
n mainly im. the final state of the revolutionary
e of the general offensive against the existing
would supposedly be done by key men in
usted men in government offices and technician
ex. One of the goals of the Party In 1961 was the
could carry out sabotage rM *alone
Key leader a of the Co
the congress of Labor Orrganta
Outing the leadership traction within
tnvolved. in the campaign of violence and saa i
CLO officers were Indicted in June 1951 for ha%
on wiA robbery a
'l rant:
omitted murder,
involvement in a P plot to overthrow the
iv
n the P'biltppine
arty planning and training for iradu
d in a PEP document captured in October 1950
;n part an follows: "Based on this formulation of the
obleem the following measures should be aadoptecd:.. .
recruiting work among technological people to conduct
as on the manufacture of home-made weapons, And
researches, actually manufacture them. Send out
e teehnolog;ic*l Wires to advise the militar
problems of the armed struggle. Start training
key workers in the art of industrial sabotage,. i'
,e* Thirteen rankin
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#`.S. and;
pszty by arson,
baaineaar
U. S. Armed F'er?es
P units.
In tb* eve of am outbreak of
Soviet Union PJLP wed (according to captured Party
documents) to initiate a program of *&botago in local
industries m~txxa scturir g war goods.
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tion initiated by other Communist
Other Sabotage Targets
SlUing of Communist renegades and of non-cooperative
r$I*1 people,
Xxtortioen of fps from individual citizens, especially
bum reset
Confiscation of station crops,
X*Wag bus passengers and burning buses.
s little evidence of foreign support and guidance of
PKP's campaign was timed to begin almost
d terrorism campaign. It is significant,
arch 1948. During 1949 PKP was enthused
past Asia after the Coramunist meetings in India
ear Communist successes in China ad was encouraged by the
indications in Chinese Communist propaganda that aid to
eimmu*ists in the Philippines would be forthcoming.
of T,
C unist
eakness of strength and influence,
t may initiate a program of fu aca sabotage
In case of an outbreak of
involving the Soviet Union, PKP wo dd, in
parties, undertake any sabotage
ch would hinder Soviet enemies.
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d Strength of the Ia
IQ.MlfllM~lWf.
ist Party f ICP), a
has since 1955 rnwd the posture of an overt
:ideal organization which professes to ss
and independence" for Japan through
rather than violence and subversion.
directed mainly towards eking the pro-
'', winning popular support or
position on international issues,
ce thdn non-Communist organizations,
trade unions, and farmers'
of S P strength is in the urban
sortio of its votes from
tion than does any other party. The
resulting from reports of i:ntraparty discord
1nanciai practices of the JCP, combined with
of the Party's subservience to Bloc interests
example, 3C P' a support of the Soviet intervention In
have tended to thwart JCP efforts to expand its mem-
bership. is believed that the total membership of the Party
has. suffered a *ubetaan ;a l decline during the past year. SCP's
estimated Membership ill 60, 000.
planning and directin
e to the Military lairs Committee
ecutes any action decided upon. In the
unit is "a military organization of fighting
me movements and make all preparations
ng up arms to protect themselves and
enemy at factories and farm v ilage$ .
19
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tense Corps must pr6d*cee, 04V 're,
m : and dish
bdormaden auout
so=" and Pr*P&
wee amen tbo
.ts demands of the workers and far aces s
a, st,04 t tar y tactics, obtain
enemy's pis, s eert the en*My's
v*y for the organization of partisan
. During the e f aer si ve phase the
l swan and se'-deefensae organizations Inn:..
ied struggle against American ' p*r is
ri.&' Z) deepen the re ro i asary
rsse$. and (3) Obstruct the efforts of the
bas**, p r -e and transport arrms,
nd deprive tb*m of t r rights. According
a these struggles of the defensive, phase--
ea ae. prover 'fi ae ag legal and ti1egal
eted by the masses. Ldi ay sabotage of 1949
isee the partisan forces be
.P fractions in the trade anions. .01
td " r a .* C t ee
:+ action.
sued inst ti Bans on
tarry Affairs .milt+ees, inc
*Concrete Somb' comp
glass or trap sinter
gsbeet Ee Tr a Clime for USAD eaae
$t Moc Countries
No Information reported.
Zg.
lei was apparen rte
re
stye devise r.
sing Pau
rifle pellets for
emanating
:ailed instructions
rder,
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- '' r Tar
S. and/ear U
.ivee sabotage of the Jesse national railways
tied a in 1949. One accide which resulted from
caused 3 deaths and 30 iuriiees. In another
6 persons were, killed, and about IZ injured.
se railway accident statistics covering
1949 shows the following types o
39 cases
16 caseselr:
S cases of laying dynami
as cliaxed hyr the murder
as begun in F ekkaW , in early
1952. may
ce was precipitated by Communists in 19'52.. Riots
in Tokyo "suited in several hundred casualties
U. S. vehicles. Other minor inst cee:s of attack
dense or U. a. military personnel occurred.
JCP sie
at federation of Students' &a-Government Associations
i7REN)--wel ro involved in demonstrati against the
of U. S. Air rorce runways in order to permit the
-
, In 11.95+6 nearly $00 persons were injured
et a survey team which was protected 14- 2i, 000
Tachikavwa Mr blase, and obstructive action
kawa. In 1957 the students erected flag-
p6 ees which interfered with landings and departures of U. S. planes.
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1950
Wc:nsed
vim, The
le JC' of svvr -
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K"04 e I
Labor ftfty
eg she October 1949. There is eridenc
~. _ _.,,. , ...,`.
9traa a w a Conan t uudergro d Organization continues
pac rly in urban areas. *vex. ire ;ts virtually
the general population, and
.ties are vigorously
we been reduced
pa ice
1947. The
in each a( the.
ces of the SKLP.
Tr
LvreA Wi
eriorated prior to June
ea
ere trained in large nun-Avers
sch ol., to North Norea am saboteurs
V. !bow a "` ets
a. U.S. &w/or U. 3. AI U** Pers,
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~~~~~ Enel~ nDni
?.&b_jjNL* Targets
Phi ./C v Win?
t all firms of m i Ett 4 CO
far sevexal years, The North Kare" Party/
r the close direction of representatives
t ra un&rtaken in South rea
saigned to a p 'essicn4 intelligence, agency
verxunent. It is not likely that such. action
n unless an iaternatioaall, conflict appeared
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