COMMUNIST PARTY CLANDESTINE ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITY 1954-1956

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R000600160013-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 64
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 24, 1998
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: December 1, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

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25X1A2g
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Aid
COMMUNISM
COMMUNIST PARTY
CLANDESTINE ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITY
1954-1956
Distributed
December 1957 Copy ~~ 236
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Co mnunist Party Clandestine Organization and Activity
1954 - 1956
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I. Communist Party Illegal Organization e.ee.eeae...a?,. 1
A. Two General Developments in CP Organization...... 1
B. Elements of a Clandestine Apparatus 2
C. Units Charged with Liaison Work Often Have
Semi-Covert Status ...oeo.ee.ooooeo......ao,ooooo0 11
II. Clandestine Activities ooa...e...q....e....a....a.... 12
A. Penetration of Other Political Parties and
Mass Organizations by Legal Communist Parties ... 14
Western Hemisphere 14
B. Political Action by Illegal Communist Parties oa, 15
Europe .eaoeooeoore.oea,oe.ooe.oaoo...ooo.sooo a 15
Far East ?, q,..,., .. e q. 0 0 0 0? 0 6 0 e? O., 0 0 0 .. a. O g 0 0? 0 17
Middle East .,,.a....ae.....,....a,.aeae.aeae.e,+ 18
Western Hemisphere er...,+.e.p.re..Y.aa......,.. 18
C. Penetration of Civilian and Military Branches of
Non-Communist Governments oe.e...eo,,.o..e...*.. 20
Europe o,s..ee...ooe.eeo.eeooeoeaeoooo.ooeao?oaoo 21
Far East .r.oe.9 e0....oo?esO.o,.oYeoO..segr.00000 22
Near EastOOa..Oa..00e.?aao6o.ao.aeeoao?,o.oO.9ooa 23
D. Communist Party Information Procurement go..o..oo 26..
Europe ..,....,q.a..a,..aeee..eae..e.e........... 27
Far East oo....aa.a.oo.aa?.eo,.raoo.o?e?u,..rgao. 29
Western Hemisphere ?eooaoo.?oeoaeae.eo.ea. 3.1
E. Information Procurement by International Fronts a 33
Trade Union International of Public and Allied
Employees oooo,.ea?ao..oaeo.eeoS0 4o? aoaoega.aoa. 33
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F. Involvement in Military Action and Preparations;
Near East Oe.s......ooaeo.r.e?e..e..aweO.00...e..
North Africa ........eo..a...o.ea+OOrO...e.OOg1e.
Western Hemisphere ..o.a.q?..?Oer.e..e......aaa9e
35
36
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39
G. Sabotage ..............a............ee?.O.e0.a4e. 42
Europe ?..ooa?e.?o4o?eeerea o'soroa.o+oreooeoe..o.?
Far East eO....0-. b...-e 4.Omea? OOOe .a.e..eo.os.0 UI
Western Hemisphere o?rer.e..aearwn.oosa..r.-..eq e
H. Technical Work ... O..OOe644..Ogo.0000.e00e.gO0a0?
Europe aro.sou.oeo.a.wa..oaeaeoe.eo4a.oeow.e.?.ea
Near East sa.e.a'a.a.eoea..e a .e.a ?..o.eo.oaoaa.o
I. Security Measures and Preparations for
Underground
Europe ?a.aoo? aooorogaesao e.eoe.oeo.aeeoe.
Far East ?.. eo.?a ? .e.oeaaa...a?+o..o..aeee9o
Western Hemisphere eoe.eq.aquseaa..aee-e..o.ueaa..
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I. COMMUNIST PARTY ILLEGAL ORGANIZATION
The term "illegal organization" is used to refer to:
(a) Communist party organizations in countries where the
Communist party is legal, but where, in accordance with tradition-
al Communist party regulations and practice, the party also main-
tains a clandestine or illegal apparatus to perform specific
functions which must be kept from the public eye and to serve
as the nucleus of an underground party organization :in the event
that the political situation changes to the point where the
Communist party is banned and must operate entirely underground;
(b) Communist party structure in countries where the Com-
munist party is outlawed and therefore its entire organization
and all its activities must be clandestine and illegal.
A. Two General Developments in CP Organization. Within the
past few years there have been two general developments in
Communist party organization.
1. There has been a concerted effort to extend the party's
open organization and to reach directly and overtly as
wide a segment of the population av possibe4 Par-
ticularly in the period following the Geneva Conference"
of July 1955 when there was a wiaespread belief among
Communist leaders that a relaxed political atmosphere
existed, they attempted to legalize party activities
as much as possible in order to extend contacts with
the masses.
Considerable publicity was given to the party's professed
policy of operating openly and legally. For example,
in speeches and in articles in its official organ, the
Chilean Communist Party emphasized the necessity of
eliminating the tendency in party ranks to maintain the
Party in a state of clandestinity, "which only plays into
the hands of the 'enemy'". The position is maintained
that the psychology of an illegal, clandestine Party
hides the work and importance of the Party from the masses,
and prevents it from receiving the electoral support its
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program merits. (This referred to the Party's program
at the time of the municipal elections in Chile in April
1956.) While "vigilance" against the police is necessary,
excessive caution is a sectarian and opportunist tendency
which impedes the propagation of the historic mission
of the Party.
2. Simultaneously there has been an effort in some areas
to revitalize the Communist parties' clandestine apparatus.
This has been manifested in some places by a reorganiza-
tion of the directing organs responsible for the party's
clandestine work? In other places the strengthening
of the covert apparatus has become evident through reports
that the party is providing for secret enrollment of
party members having outstanding capacities or employed
in sensitive areas of government or of private organi-
zations. In other areas, attention given to persons
not generally known as Communists, who work in groups
or fractions in the ranks of other political parties
and mass organizations, or in the parties' own front
groups to exert Communist influence, to acquire infor-
mation of use to the party, etc., indicates that covert
methods and cadre are being used.
Certain remarks made by Khrushchev at the time of the Soviet
Communist Party's 20th Congress seem to have provided impetus
to the reorganization of the clandestine apparatus of some
Communist parties. In countries where capitalism is still
strong, Khrushchev cautioned, resort to force will be neces-
sary to bring about a socialist state and in such places
the parties should maintain underground organizations which
ultimately will be capable of leading a revolutionary struggle
and taking over political power by force. The Japan Communist
Party, for one example, appeared to take this as a cue to
step up reconstruction of clandestine units.
B. Elements of a Clandestine Aaratus. A well-developed clandestine
apparatus of a Communist party in the West will have some
or all of the following elements
1. The Leadership This is usually supplied by one or two
high-ranking officers of the open party, plus an adminis-
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trative bureau if the clandestine apparatus is of suf-
ficient size to warrant it. Several national Communist
parties are now in the advantageous position of having
cadres whop in some instances, have had as much as thirty
years of party experience, and often much of this time
was spent while the party was in an underground status.
Luigi Longo, formerly a leader of the clandestine apparatus
of the Italian Communist Party (PCI), for example, directed
the illegal organ of the Communist Youth Federation:;
L'Avanauardia, as early as 1922. From the year 192'7
Longo apparently had close connection with covert Comin-
tern units. In 1927 reportedly he helped institute the
Italian Communist Party's "Foreign Center" in Paris where
he was made responsible for youth work. In this year
he also organized an "underground railroad" into and
out of Italy. In 1928 he directed a "special service"
for the manufacture of false documents and the arrangement
for illegal travel, At this time he was also connected
with the Organization Section of the PCI's Foreign Center
in Paris. He possibly acquired Soviet citizenship in
1929 or 1930 and received training at the Frunze Military
Academy in the Soviet Union in the early 1930's.
Longo was active in the International Brigades in Spain
and during World War II he was engaged in partisan war-
fare in northern Italy. In the post World War II period
he has held leadership positions in the open and illegal
sections of the Italian Communist Party.
2. "Professional" or Reserve Cadres. In this category are
found secret members of the Communist party who are
of professional backgrounds or who have outstanding poten-
tial because of ability or advantageous positions they
may occupy. Such key positions may be in other political
parties, labor unions or other large organizations.
These cadres are usually kept as a reserve to perform
highly confidential tasks as needed by the party or
possibly by a Soviet intelligence service. They are
directly under the administration of a headquarters unit
of the party. Persons of this category who are in very
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sensitive posts or who perform highly confidential
work for the party never take part in normal open Com-
munist party activity. Even in countries where the
parties enjoy a mass status, as in France and Italy,
people of this category are of importance in effecting
thorough infiltration of non-Communist organizations,
including government agencies.
As of 1954 the French Communist Party's clandestine re-
serve or "Section Hors Cadre" comprised some 3600 members
and included high-ranking military, government, clerical
and political leaders according to a report not
corroborated. In the apparat were two members of the
directing committee of the French Socialist Party, high-
ranking Confederation Generale du Travail. (CGT) officers
not previously identified as Communists, and functionaries
of a French security service. According to an unconfirmed
report of July 1955, the Dutch Communist Party (CPN)
maintained a secret cadre of "professional" stature which
included doctors, government officials, functionaries
of the Netherlands General Press Bureau (ANP), etc. In
late 1956 the Secretary General of the CPN was reported
concentrating on building up a small, aggressive, tightly-
knit group which could function in an illegal, clandestine
or wartime situation. In Italy also according to an
unconfirmed report, a system of "secret membership" was
set up in connection with the 1955 membership campaign.
Secret members were not issued Party membership cards
and their names were inscribed in a special register for
which the director of the Italian Communist Party's
Central Cadre office was responsible. A special kind
of Party activity was to be planned for these members
since they could not participate in normal business firm,
factory or street cells, Possibly included in this
secret category were PCI members prominent in the "fusionist
current" of the Italian Socialist Party and some PCI
members active in other leftist Parties.
In Panama the Communist Party (Partido del Pueblo, or
PdP) in 1956 was small, suppressed and illegal; thus its
status was completely different from that of the Italian,
French or Dutch Communist Parties. Provision was made,
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however, for a build-up of illegal reserve cadres.
According to an agreement made at the Sixth Plenary
Meeting of the Central Committee held 25 August through
2 September 1956, the PdP was to be reorganized "along
the lines of the double clandestine principle." New
members who held important positions or who possessed
"'significant potential" were not to appear to be affiliated
with the Party. Thus in a Pai y already in an illegal
status there was provision for a reserve; adre of secret
members of special qualifications who could perform
highly confidential tasks as needed by the Party.
3. The_Fractions. These are the groups of secret party
members who work in organizations the party is penetrating
--government agencies., other political parties., mass
organizations of all types including those controlled
by the Communist party. Information about the methods
of operation the fractions are to use in penetrating
target organizations has been reported from a Near Eastern
country. Here, all members of a Communist fraction In
a given organization are controlled by a fraction leader.
Rules for the proper functioning of a fraction are described
by a Party member as follows:
"According to the secret tactics of the Communist
Party, a fraction can be kept strong only if
its members camouflage themselves and do not
reveal themselves as united members of another
organization. Members of the fraction, who are
all from the party cadre, must make plans in
advance to disagree publicly and to argue with
one another openly, but in the end they must
agree publicly.
"The member of the communist fraotion must always
report information on the host organization to
the Party, whether or not he is specifically
ordered to do so.
"Each member of the communist fraction must attempt
to locate himself in the sensitive parts of the
host organization, such as in the leadership, in
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the secretariat, in the treasury, in the
organization committee, or in the cadre.
"The member of the communist fraction must
not admit to any member of the host organ-
ization that he is a Communist, and must not
show any connection or friendship with. other
members of the fraction.
"If a member of the fraction reaches a high enough
place in the host organization and is strong
enough, the Communist Party will order him
to make s. split in the host organization...
"If the communist fraction has tried to con-
trol the policy of the host'organization and
has failed, the Party may order it to splinter
the host organization."
Information is available concerning security measures
which were taken by one Communist fraction working within
a trade union following restrictive measures taken by
the local government after strike action. After the
general strike of early January 1956 in Chile, the Com-
munist fraction of the Central Un%ca de Trabajadores
de Chile (CUTCh) tightened its security procedures
during fraction meetings.. Only a part of the fraction
met together and then for no longer than 20 minutes.
The fraction was told of the place and hour of meetings
by rotating liaison men. Meetings generally took place
at night in houses of Party members. Any necessary
meetings during the daytime were limited to a maximum
attendance of three leaders.
A copy of a reappraisal or statement of self-criticism
prepared in April 1956 by a sub-committee for organi-
zation of a Communist Party Departmental Committee was
received from a Central American country. The Party
here was suppressed and illegal. The statement was
particularly critical of the fractions working within
the Party's own front groups. Passages of this re-
appraisal read as follows:
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"The Party binds itself to the masses through
the legal organizations which, since they
are not clandestine, can unite or at least
maintain contact with thousands of students,
workers, and women and can provide a vehicle
whereby our viewpoints may be transmitted
to these groups. Even the Youth Alliance,
our own creation, failed. to get anywhere.
Our way of thinking and our objectives must
be made to reach these sectors through the
Party fractions...What have our errors been
in this aspect of the struggle? Since the
fractions have not been working there has
been no unity of action. Various groups,
lacking a common denominator, have taken
divergent lines. It is urgent that fractions
be organized among all sectors of the.popu-
lation.
"We must first and foremost, as Lenin said
have an organization composed
in What to D.
of people whose profession is revolutionary
actions..
"In other words, comrades, the Party must
consist of closed, clandestine units which
must include only those comrades who have
been thoroughly tested in the struggle,
in order to avoid the blows of the enemy
and prevent enemy infiltration.
"But the Party must reach the masses and the
people, and it can only do so through broad,
legal organizations such as the Students'
Federation..., the Federation of Womens'
Associations..., and labor unions in general.
"It is in the interplay between these two
aspects that we have made serious mistakes.
We have not even really understood that
the ranks of the Party are composed of mili-
tants, sympathizers and members of study
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circles. In summary, practical tasks must
be decentralized, while the management of
the Party must be centralized.
"Comrades must understand once and for all
that when they are acting within legal
organizations they must prevent 'the fear
of coming out into the light' from causing
them to appear suspicious or mysterious;
they must not try to clandestinize the
legal organization they work in. They must
also avoid the use of stereotyped phraseology-
that special language which characterizes
Marxists-for obvious reasons."
4 Administration of Party Fractions Traditionally, the
work of CP fractions has been supervised by Cadre or
Organization departments at either central or regional
levels of the party. Some CP's have developed more
specialized units to administer CP fractions working in
non-Communist organizations and. those guiding the local
Communist fronts.
According to one report concerning the Japan Communist
Party's (JCP's) infiltration program, both the overt
and covert parts of it in the 1954-1956 period were
supervised by one headquarters unit of the JCP, the
United Front Department (UFD), which worked to influence
left-wing mass organizations and racial minority groups
to form a united national front. Known JC:P members
approached non-Communist political groups, trade unions,
industrial and commercial concerns openly on behalf of
the UFD. Covert JCP members already infiltrated in the
target organizations worked behind the scenes toward
the establishment of the national front. The UFD placed
in influential positions in the non-Communist groups
secret JCP members who, without exposing their Communist
affiliation, constantly advocated the national front.
A report of late 1955 from Indonesia stated that there
was a Greater Djakarta Committee member in charge of
a cell in Djakarta consisting of Indonesian Communist
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Party (PKI) members engaged in four of the most im-
portant. penetration operations in that area. The cell,
called the Resort Gabungan (United Cell), included mem-
bers of four fractions: that working in student groups;
that active in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; that
in the Prime Minister's Office and that in the Depart-
ment of Public Works. All fraction members were secret
PKI cadres and were under the direct supervision of
the Greater Djakarta Committee rather than of a section
committee.
According to a subsequent report from Indonesia, PKI
fractions were being organized in all other political
parties. Fraction and sub-fraction leaders were to
report to a PKI Central Committee member who was to
act as a coordinator for the various fractions. A re-
port of more recent date indicates that most PKI fractions
will be under the immediate direction of Instruction
Bureaus which have been set up within PKI Section Com-
mittees.
a. Military Unit. This is responsible for penetration
and subtle propaganda work among armed forces personnel;
for planning for adequate supplies of arms and ammunition
in time of political crisis; for exploiting any political
disturbances to Communist advantage and for taking over
the leadership of any national rebellion against foreign
"imperialists" or local reactionary authorities; for
planning and directing acts of sabotage.
6. Intelligence Unit. This is usually directed by one
of the party's highest ranking leaders who is in direct
or indirect contact with the Soviet Committee for State
Security (KGB). All significant information procured
overtly or covertly by the party will be channeled to
him and the most outstanding reports will be passed
to KGB.
7. Technics Unit. There may be several of these with each
having its own special tasks, which may be the mainte-
nance of safehouses, cover firms, escape routes, supplies
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of paper and printing equipment, etc. A repdrt from
Holland in June 1954 stated that addresses of persons
employed by the technical service of the Communist
Party of the Netherlands had to be kept secret. Materials
used by this unit were not stored at Party headquarters
but in the homes of individuals.
Technical units of the underground West German Communist
Party (KPD) appeared to be active in the fall of 1956;
with the equipment accumulated--electric mimeograph
machines, inks, etc, they were printing handbills and
other propaganda documents.
8. F'nl apes Unit. This unit is usually responsible for
receiving covert funds from-domestic and foreign sources,
for exchanging these funds and distributing them as
needed. In some Communist parties this unit may be
identical with the finance section of the overt Communist
party, or is one segment of that section, but performs
work which is kept secret from the public and from most
of the party's own membership. In other Communist
parties the covert finance unit may be a component of
the party's covert technical apparatus. (See paragraph
2 of Section H.)
For, example, a PCI officer responsible for auditing and
other work in connection with the PCI's overt finances
is also responsible for handling funds for the PCI
supplied by the Soviet Union. These are delivered
in suitcases from the Soviet Embassy in Rorne either
as sterling or dollar currency. The same PCI officer,
with the assistance of another PCI functionary, has
the funds transferred into local currency.
There are indications that the clandestine finance unit
may be responsible for collating economic intelligence
reports gathered through party sources and for transmit-
ting these to KGB. A KGB defector testified that the
same Japan Communist Party (JCP) liaison contact who
received funds from KGB was used to transmit intelligence
reports from JCP to KGB. In some Parties the Finance
Unit may be closely associated with units known as
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Economic Commissions, the principal function of which
is the collection of economic data. In some parties
these Commissions have a covert status.
C. Units Charged with Liaison Work Often Have Semi--Covert Status.
In addition to the units which have been outlined here as
components of a CP's clandestine apparatus, in -many cases
there are CP units (or possibly a few designated party mem-
bers) which are apparently placed within a CP's overt head-
quarters structure even though the units and the activity
they perform are rarely mentioned in any of the CP's overt
publications or at open party meetings. Examples of such
units are those known variously as International Depart-
ments, Foreign Affairs Branches, Foreign Sections, etc.,
which are responsible for a CP's relations, liaison and
contacts with other Communist parties, including the Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). These are counter-
parts of the Foreign Section of the Central Committee of the
CPSU. The existence of these Foreign Sections does not
preclude contacts and meetings between party chairmen,
secretaries and other high officials, and in the Stalin era
at least, such contacts reduced the activities of the Sections
to a more or less routine natures.
By the end of 1956, however, with the growing emphasis within
the world Communist movement on bilateral and multiparty
contacts between Communist parties, these foreign or inter-
national departments were becoming increasingly active.
Party officials engaged in this work were playing a more
responsible role and displaying greater initiative than
they had previously. The extent to which covert CPSU directives
were channeled through such units in the past is not known;
evidence available in 1956 indicated that in some countries
the CPSU was then utilizing high-ranking officials of the
Communist parties' international or foreign departments to
dispel doubts or questions concerning CPSU action.
It is known that international front organization conferences
and congresses and travel in connection with these events
are exploited as opportunities for confidential inter-party
communication. The constantly increasing number of Communist-
sponsored delegations to and from Soviet-bloc countries
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provide additional means for transmitting sensitive communi-
cations, particularly between the CPSU and non-Orbit Com-
munist parties. Routine inter-party communications, however,
seem to be handled by the foreign or international depart-
ments of the central committees of the respective Communist
parties.
II. CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES
Information about a Communist party's clandestine organization
is usually more difficult to procure than Information about
the party's covert activities. Party members are always cau-
tioned not to reveal anything about the party's organization-
either the open or clandestine sections of the partyhich
must be protected at all costs. Structure of the underground
organization is usually compartmented with each part sealed
off as completely as possible from all other parts. The little
that is known about current clandestine organizational structure,
however, is sufficient to show that the structure or form is
tailored to fit functional requirements. Since much more in-
formation is available about covert activity, the rest of this
study illustrates selected instances of covert action under-
taken by several Communist parties during the 1954-1956 period.
A comprehensive report is not attempted.
Clandestine or semi-clandestine work in which the Communist
parties or the front organizations were engaged fell into one
of the following major categories:
(a) penetration of other political parties and mass
organizations by legal Communist parties
(b) political action by illegal Communist parties
(c) penetration of civilian and military branches
of non-Communist governments
(d) Communist party information procurement
(e) information procurement by international fronts
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(f) involvement in military action and preparations; terrorism
(g) sabotage, including moderate tactics to slow down
production or more violent forms of sabotage such as damage to
factory machinery, rail lines, oil pipe lines, etc,
(h) "technical" work: activity which involves the preparation
of underground leaflets a procurement of safehouses, planning
of escape routes; finance work: management of all funds procured
clandestinely; procuring of funds through front organization
sources, etc., for a party which is operating completely under-
ground.
(i) security measures and preparations for underground
existence.
During the period covered by this study, 1954 through 1956,
greatest emphasis in Communist covert work was placed on infil-
tration of other political parties, non-Communist mass organi-
zations and non-Communist governments. Specific directives
for this work appeared in the Cominform journal prior to the
termination of that publication, An article of 27 November
1953 written by Pietro Secchia, Deputy General Secretary of the
Italian Communist Party, stated:
"Experience shows that we need to intensify the work
of Communists outside the Party: at the enterprises,
working-class meetings, in groups, in places where work-
ing people go for rest and leisure, in trade unions,
in co-operatives, municipal and provincial councils,
in the mass organizations, as well as their activity in
the organizations of our adversaries and amidst working
people under their influence."
A subsequent Cominf onn journal article of 13 January 1956 written
by Nozaka Sanzo and entitled, "Vital Points in Resolution of
Sixth National Conference of Japanese Communist Party" reads
in part:
"Lenin taught us that to heighten the political conscious-
ness of the masses and win them over ideologically, Com-
munists ought to work in mass organisations of all kinds,
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including reactionary organisations, if the proletarian
and semi-proletarian masses belong to them."
A. Penetrations of Other Political Parties and Mass Organizations
by Legal Communist Parties
Western Hemisphere.
1. Paraguay. After the failure of political alliance with
the Liberal Party in May 1955, the Communist Party of
Paraguay tried to increase its infiltration of other
mass organizations, including labor unions and other
political parties. Certain secret Communist Party ,
members who were used as penetration agents in other
parties were identified by local security services.
The penetration program had been successful to a certain
degree, as of about mid-1956. in the Colorado Party,
the dominant conservative political organization of
Paraguay, Communists had achieved penetrations at middle
levels. For instance, the former president of one of
the Colorado Party units in Asuncion was believed by
Paraguayan authorities to be a Communist.
2. The United States. At a convention of the Underground
National Committee of the Communist Party of the United
States (CPUSA) in the latter part of 1953, it was decided
that an extensive infiltration by Communists and sympa-
thizers should be made into existing major political
parties and organizations with special emphasis on the
Democratic Party, with the aim of gaining leadership
posts from which to influence policy. In certain areas
of the United States Communists would infiltrate the
Republican Party.
In the latter part of 1955 the CPUSA leadership was
about to initiate a project whereby "colonizers" were
to be established in the South so that CPUSA would
have a nucleus of Coimnunists, unidentified as such,
throughout the labor movement in the southern states.
These people would be available for future underground
assignments if CPUSA needed their services. Direction
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and the latter's student organizations, for example,
the Sindicato Espanol Universitaria., In July 1956 a
Partido Comunista de Espana (PCE) leader designated
as PCE's immediate objective the lending of moral and
material encouragement to all political or parapolitical
organizations of a clandestine and opposition nature,
including the most extreme monarchists. The PCE was
to concentrate chiefly on the c'hristian Democrat group
supported by high ecclesiastics and a large section of
the Spanish ,piddle class. The Party was to give special
attention to government officials in the middle salary
scale, intellectuals, and university students,.all of
whom PCE regarded as "having more time to think than
to spend money".
The PCE's official view as of July 1956 was that it
was easier and more practical to disrupt the existing
order than to organize a large Communist faction, because
Spain was then ready to awake from her lethargy but
was not prepared to adopt a Communist alternative to
the Franco regime. The Communists might ,aim strength
if the regime were overthrown by violence, in this case
the Communists could establish themselves in a more favor-
able position, although under the auspices of some
other political group.
The POE wanted a campaign to damage and divide the present
regime but not under the Communist banner, since the
Party wanted to avoid any outward traces of Communist
intervention in a possible political change in Spain.
The PCE regarded a political evolution of a rightist
tendency, which would not be alarming to the average
Spaniard, as an essential prerequisite for the definite
establishment of Communism in Spain. The PCE was willing
to submit to a leadership which was neither Communist,
socialist nor even republican in order to gain positions
from which it could later launch its bid for power.
In 1956 the PCE was especially eager to arrive at an
agreement with the Basque Nationalists. The PCE believed
that the Basque Nationalists were very active in support
of the labor unrest in northern Spain earlier in 1956
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and that their influence was supreme in the Northern
provinces which were the most fertile grounds for a
revolt against the regime. A second tactical objective
of the PCE was a campaign among the working classes to
shake off their lethargy and to develop an industrial
transformation even though this had to be done in the
name of the official trade unions.
A third tactical objective of the PCE was the organization
of Juntas for Economic Protection. By the summer of
1956 these had been established in 276 Spanish firms,
and although the majority were not Communist inspired,
24 of them were run by Party members who, although not
having backgrounds as prominent Communists, were obtain-
ing outstanding results,
Far Ea
1. Singapore. One of the reasons for progress of Communist
influence in Singapore was the fact that the. Communists
achieved infiltration and strong influence in the best-
organized, most dynamic political party, the Peoples'
Action Party (PAP). Leading officials of the Government
of Singapore denounced the PAP as the instigator and
director of Chinese student disorders. The PAP's program
had come to be identical in most respects with that
advocated by the international Communist party line,
PAP leaders were also key figures in the extremist labor
unions which were responsible for major strikes in
Singapore.*
2, Malaya. In early 1956 the Malayan Communist Party (MCP)
was reported to have directed some of its followers to
enter political, labor and educational organizations
as individuals, maintaining only secret ties with the
Communist Party. The Communist plan apparently required
that members enter these organizations and follow os-
tensibly individual tactics. Each Communist was to
build up a strong following and advance himself within
* For these reasons several of PAP' s left-wing leaders were
arrested and imprisoned in August 1957.
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the penetrated organization by hard work, winning of
friends and procuring votes by merit. Once he attained
a position of prominence, he could then begin to exert
Communist influence.
Middle East
Pakistan. Three Communist functionaries in late Sep-
tember 1955 were drafting a new thesis covering proposed
operational techniques for the Communist Party of Pakistan
(CPP) to utilize during its illegal status. The thesis
was to reciommend,that all Party members seek outlets
for Party-directed political activity by gaining foot-
holds wherever possible in established, legal, political
organizations, including the Muslim League. The thesis
adopted recommendations sent to the CPP in April 1955
by the General Secretary of the Communist Party of India.
Even prior to this, however, the student fraction of
the CCP was reported to have infiltrated successfully
the Muslim Student's Federation and the Lahore Committee
of that Federation had elected a Communist as its secretary.
As of late November 1956 Communists in East Pakistan
had succeeded in building an extensive and efficient
organization within the East Pakistan Awami League (EPAL).
Responsible for Communist influence over the EPAL was
the Communist fraction within EPAL's central leadership.
In addition to their prominent position in EPAL, Communists
were then still in control of EPAL's closest ally of the
moment, the Ganatantri Dal.
Western HemiZhere
1. Pe . As of October 1956 the Partido Comiunista Peruano
PCP) was planning to continue to concentrate its main
energies on the penetration and control of the Partido
Accion Popular (PAP) because this party had received
much support from the laboring class and because the
PCP considered that the PAP leader, Fernando BELAUNDE
Terry, was the political figure least likely to attach
himself to the reactionaries. A PCP campaign was under
way to support the PAP and PCP was also forming groups of workers
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(presumably secret PCP members and sympathizers) to
try to assume certain directing posts of the PAP.
A somewhat earlier report from Peru stated that although
PCP members were affiliating with other political parties,
they would continue to receive Communist indoctrination
through intimate meetings of small groups of Communists.
Such groups would consist mostly of people of the same
profession so that similarity of interests could serve
as cover,
2. Guatemala. By late 1955 Guatemalan Communists had de-
cided that in the future they would not oppose activities
of the various anti-Castillo groups which were both
inside and outside Guatemala, but that they would use
them by guiding them discreetly, through penetration
agents, along lines most beneficial to the Communist
movement. In early January a Guatemalan Workers' Party
(PGT, Co munist) cell in Guatemala City discussed in-
filtrating the Sisniega Otero political movement. Plans
were made whereby a group of persons not known to be
connected with the Communist Party would present Sisniega
with a set of proposals towards the achievement of
which Sisniega's group would work. The first proposals
would be limited to a series of demands on the Govern-
ment for a more tolerant political atmosphere, for ?
the raising of salaries and lowering of prices. Later,
when the Sisniega movement had gained momentum, the
Communists in it would demand freedom for political
prisoners, return of exiles and freedom for the establish-
ment of opposition political parties, including the PGT.
About the first of February 1956 leaders of the PGT
exiled in Mexico sent directives to PGT underground
leaders in Guatemala. Among these were instructions
pertaining specifically to PGT penetrations of non-
Communist organizations:
"Abstain from defending the points of view and
slogans of the Party in order to avoid being
suspected.
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"The members of the Party who are not well
known, preferably sympathizers, should affiliate
with or join anti-Communist' organizations
or committees in order to be above any suspicion.
"Infiltrate into the anti-Communist parties,
especially those closest to the government,
as many unknown Party members as possible.
"Those Party members who have already in-
filtrated the anti-Communist parties should
provoke discussions within the anti-Communist
parties.
"When discords or conflicts develop within or be-
tween anti-Communist parties, do not favor in
any manner whatsoever any faction but maintain
an absolute impartiality and try as much as
possible to accentuate the conflict and bring
about the dissolution of the party.
"Try in every manner possible to increase the
number of Party members working for government
agencies, especially the Ministries and executive
offices.
"Maintain conflicts and divisions among those
groups striving to re-establish unions, always
giving preference to those groups of Catholic
orientation."
C. Penetration of Civilian and Military Branches of Non-Communist
Governments.
Numerous reports of 1955 and early 1956 show that the Com-
munist parties wanted to extend and improve their work among
armed forces personnel in non-Orbit countries, and some
indicate that the parties wanted their members to take
advantage of training offered by the military services.
Penetration of civilian agencies also received emphasis.
As previously mentioned, in several areas provisions were
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made whereby especially well-qualified (or well-placed)
government employees were recruited and retained as secret
party members. Communist penetration at high levels of
government ministries controlling information and propa-
ganda was of great value in gaining strong influence in
both Egypt and Syria.
Europe
1. Finland. The Finnish Communist Party was reported in
November 1955 to be keeping close watch on the activities
of the Reserve Officers' League, the Reserve Non-Com-
missioned Off icers? League and the Comrade Support Or-
ganization, which is composed of former SS men (Finns
who volunteered for service on the eastern front in
the German elite corps).
Party instructions issued prior to 15 December 1955
reportedly contained the following provisions concerning
the subject of military training for Finnish Communists
in the armed forces:
"...when party members, or the children of
member families, are called into the army
they will be instructed to obtain all possible
training that the army offers. They must not
try to avoid assignment to a noncommissioned
officer school but should, through exemplary
deportment, attempt to win such appointments.
The same applies to officer school. In fact,
such youths who appear to have the educational
prerequisites for officer training must actually
apply for it. The youth must be instructed
to make voluntary application also to all possible
courses, such as communications, radio-telephone
training, etc."
2. West Germa v. SED/KPD leaders assumed that many young
people of West Germany would prefer service in the army
to difficult working conditions in certain industries,
for example in the mining industry. The Party was there-
fore making provisions for direct contact with Army-
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personnel by reinfiltrating as volunteers members who
were formerly non-commissioned or officer personnel
in the Army.
Far East
1. Indonesia. The Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) imple-
mented plans for systematic infiltration of the Army,and
as part of this plan, PKI worked to place its members
in positions vacated by over-age soldiers who were being
discharged. It was also trying to recruit new members
among rank and file. The intensive penetration campaign
called for fraternization by individual PKI members
with Army and police personnel. Low level penetration
was being accompanied by efforts to exert influence at
Army General Staff level.
The greatest concentration of Communist penetration in
the Indonesian Army was centered among non-commissioned
officer personnel in the Djakarta area. Although there
apparently had not been extensive infiltration at the
General Staff level of Army headquarters by the end
of 1956, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Suryadarma,
had leftist leanings, and his wife was a known Communist.
Military command posts of Indonesia's several military
districts were filled by non-Communists, but secondary
levels of the district commands were infiltrated in some
cases. The deputy to the military commander in North
Sumatra, Major Macmour, supplied arms in January 1957
to several hundred plantation workers who were members
of a Communist-controlled labor union.
Town command posts in some places were rather solidly
under Communist control. For example, the Djakarta
Town Commander, Major Dachjar, was a puppet of his
Chief of Staff, Major Marsudi, who was pro-Communist.
In early 1957 Communists were concentrating on pene-
trating one Army division, the Siliwangi Division, which
they believed to be the last block to military control
of all Java. At least two regimental officers of the
division, one of whom was a regimental commander, were
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Communists who were trying to exert influence on the
division commander, Suprajogi.
2. a a.. Tabulation of known Japan Communist Party (JCP)
operations against the Japanese Self-Defense Forces
(SDF) shows that the following JCP subversive activities
were directed at the SDF in the period January to August
1955
a. four cases of JCP intelligence operations
b. 68 cases of JCP propaganda and agitation
c. 16 cases of JCP-inspired obstructive demon-
strations
d. 60 cases of infiltration into the SDF
e, 13 cases of operations to win over SDF personnel
Ten persons who were confirmed JCP members and 29 suspected
members were found in the SDF.
As a means of penetrating some Ground Self-Defense
garrisons, the JCP organized and administered economic
study circles. The JCP anticipated considerable success
for its penetration efforts through the use of these
circles and claimed to have enlisted as sympathizers
in one garrison more than two percent of the personnel
within a one-year period.
Near East
Egypt. The infiltration of Communist sympathizers or
secret Communist party members into goverment positions
was one of the major factors causing the Egyptian Govern-
ment to draw progressively closer to the Soviet bloc.
These persons continually exerted every influence to
move Egypt into the Soviet orbit and to stimulate con-
ditions within Egypt which would permit the growth of
Communism. Control over a few key government positions
was greatly significant since governmental control over
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economic and cultural activity in Egypt is highly
concentrated.
The Minister of National Guidance, Fathi Radwan, responsible
for supervision over all media of communication--press,
radio, etc.-probably was an example of Communist pene-
tration. Whatever his actual status was, Communist
Party member, sympathizer, or fanatic nationalist, his
actions played into the hands of those who wanted Egypt
firmly within the Soviet bloc. In November 1950 Radwan
was elected to the governing body of the World Peace
Council, the Communist-dominated international "peace"
movement. After 1952 he :Wade an apparent effort to
disassociate himself from "peace" activities, especially
on the international level. It has been reliably reported
that direction for all Commmunist activity in Egypt was
provided by a few leaders of the local "peace partisan"
movement. In the past Radwan was closely connected with
these persons. Inflammatory propaganda heard over the
Egyptian State Broadcasting Company (over which Radwan
ultimately had charge) was frequently of such nature
that Communist undertones were unmistakable.
2. Iraq. The Communist Party of Iraq (CPI) had very few
members in the Iraqi Armed Forces. These were, however,
among "educated" NCO's and privates--i.e., those NCO's
and privates who were graduates of elementary schools.
Such men were to be found ii Communications, Electrical
Engineers, Mechanical Engineers, and Artillery Branches
of the Army, and in its School of Military Industry;
in the Air Force and at the Ministry of Defense.
The CPI was reportedly less interested in officers of
the Armed Forces (possibly because the CPI considered
these men not susceptible to recruitment), and never
had more than a few members at the officer level.
The CPI may have succeeded in recruiting one or two
officers at the Ministry of Defense but it failed in
attempts to recruit unit commanders.
The CPI formerly directed its activities in the Iraqi
Armed Forces through a Military Committee. This Corn-
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mittee was isolated from all other national committees
of the Party and was attached directly to the Central
Committee, Harold 'Uthman, who became Secretary General
of the CPI in June 195, considered this direct tie,
a security hazard and reportedly dissolved the Military
Committee.
The CPI's organization within the Iraqi Armed Forces
in the early part of 1956 reportedly was directed by
one member of the Central Committee, He conducted his
business with Party organizations within the Iraqi
Armed Forces through messengers. One member of each
of the Party's four regional Branch Committees was
responsible for the CPI organization in military units
in his territory and reported directly to the responsible
Central Committee member,
The Party organization in each branch of the army (i.e.,
artillery, signal corps, engineers) had a leader who
was responsible to a chief organizer for the Party
organization in the Iraqi Army, The Party organization
in the Air Force was compartmented from that in the
Army and its leader reported directly to the appropriate
member of the Central Committee,
3, Syria, Since early 1955 about a dozer. Syrian Army
officers have been reported as Communists. Most con-
spicuous of these was Captain Burhan Qassab Hasan,
Chief of the Syrian Army's Information and Education
Office. From this position it was possible for him to
exercise general censorship of the press during periods
of tennsion.
In early 1956 there was evidence of a Communist organi-
zation within the Syrian Army, the leader of which was
in personal contact with Khalid Bakdash, Secretary General
of the Syrian Communist Party, Details of this organi-
zation are not known. Two reports stated that the
Syrian Communist Party had instructed its members to
join the Army. According to an estimate of January
1956, 6,000 Communist volunteers had enlisted. Some
of these were of NCO and officer categories. By the
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early part of 1956 the Syrian Deuxieme Bureau from
the chief downwards-reportedly had strong leftist
leanings.
Reports of April and September 1955 indicated that the
Syrian Communist Party was focusing its infiltration
effort toward the NCO training center near Latakia;
reportedly the Party was trying to reach those NCO?s
who had contact with large numbers of enlisted men.
Traditionally, the Communist parties have been instruments
of information procurement. To support their political,
labor and economic programs efforts have been made to collect
all available data pertinent to these three fields of activity
and each party member automatically was expected to report
all information of interest to the party. Accordingly, to
a large degree, information procurement carried out by the
non-Orbit Communist parties in the 1954-1956 period was
directed toward background political information, including
biographic and public opinion surveys, and economic and
industrial information. Much of the data collected appears
to have been of unclassified nature.
During the Stalinist period, both major Soviet intelligence
services benefited from the foreign Communist party informa-
tion procurement programs. In periods of extreme need
(during World War II in the United States and Canada, for
exampl4 whole groups of Communist party members or trusted
sympathizers worked to acquire data about Soviet intelligence
targets. Such action took place despite Soviet intelligence
restrictions inhibiting use of members of foreign Communist
parties in espionage.
Evidence available in the 1954?1956 period indicated that
Soviet intelligence continued to benefit from foreign Com-
munist party and front group acquisition of political,
economic and industrial data. Soviet intelligence still
appeared to be working with certain trusted CP leaders in
the exploitation of Communist party information, facilities
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and personnel. There were indications that questionnaires
or "guides" circulated by higher bodies of certain Com-
munist parties and by certain international front organi-
zations were of Soviet origin. The questionnaires requested
detailed and copious information pertaining to government,
industry, political coloring of the population, labor laws,
etc.
There are several indications that the Soviets may be relying
on certain Communist parties and front organizations for
talent-spotting services. At least one international front
and one national Communist party are showing special interest
in the development of correspondents for their respective
publications. In the case of the international front, the
Soviet representative to the executive body of a trade union
international of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU)
is particularly desirous of developing worker correspondents
in western countries. The Japan Communist Party (JCI') has
been showing interest in the development and training of
news correspondents. It is apparently true that the JCI?
news organ, Akahata, had poor news coverage in certain
fields, but with the Soviets establishing an official mission
.in Japan with the restoration of diplomatic relations between
the USSR and Japan, it is possible that revitalizing of
the JCP's overt news reporting system may have stemmed from
a Soviet requirement. The Soviet Committee for State Security
(KGB) is =Without doubt expanding its legal networks in
Japan and needs help in spotting persons with the proper
ideological motivation and the ability to report on intellir
gence targets.
Europe
1. Italy. According to a report of July 1955, the Italian
Communist Party (PCI) Economic-Political Institute pre-
sented the PCI Directorate with a detailed study on
the activity of United States firms in petroleum develop-
meat in Central Italy (Abruzzi) and Sicily. An uncon-
firmed report stated that the study was made at the
request of the Soviet Embassy in Rome.
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The Economic Studies Office of the PCI` was asked in
January 1956 to prepare itineraries and programs for
a group of Polish technicians visiting Italy who wanted
to visit all the Montecatini industrial plants. Among
the Polish technicians there were to be some representa-
tives of the Polish Intelligence Service who would col-
lect as much data as possible on the plants. The Economic
Studies Office of the PCI was urged to assist in this
information procurement project.
Of more immediate interest to the PCI itself were rumor
collecting offices ("raccolta voci") which, according
to unconfirmed reports, were set up in 1956 some time
prior to August and attached to the Press and Propa-
ganda Commissions at each Federation headquarters.
These were to remain in operation for a temporary period
only and were to collect all rumors concerning the various
currents within the Party, dismissals, resignations,
deviations, etc. Rumors circulating both inside and
outside the Party were to be noted,
In Brig, Switzerland in late 1955 a physical search
on the person of Francesco
Scotti, Italian C oimrunist Party functionary, revealed
two written requests from the Chinese Legation in Bern
for information on journalists affiliated with Corriere
de la Sera, an independent, pro-government Milan daily
newspaper. Scotti admitted having visited the Chinese
Legation and subsequently was
25X1X7
25X1X7
and permitted to enter Italy. Scotti was then a
member of the Foreign Section of the Italian CP and
was responsible for liaison with the Chinese Communists.
2. West Germany. The Department for Federal, State and
Communal Policy was, until the banning of the Communist
Party in West Germany, that department ixaediately
responsible for Party policy with respect to action
taken by the federal, state and local government agencies.
It also guided the activities of Party members employed
Possibly this was the Economic Studies Office of the CGIL,
the Communist controlled trade union.
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in local, state or federal government offices. Some
of the specific functions of this Department involved
procurement and/or exploitation of information, including
(a) collection of information pertaining to communal
problems caused by the United States and/or other outside
armed forces; (b) collection of data concerning unemploy-
ment, sanitation', welfare, schools and refugee affairs;
(c) furnishing the Mass Agitation Department with inf or-
mation for political exploitation; (d) organizing communal
delegations to visit the German Democratic Republic;
(e) initiating a program aimed at establishing contact
between communal representatives of East and West Germany.
Far East
1. Indonesia. A somewhat comparable but much more com-
prehensive questionnaire was sent to all section and
provincial committees of the Partai Komunis Indonesia
(PKI) after the fourth plenary session of the Central
Committee of that Party in August 1956. It was entitled,
"Working Guide for all Secoms and Provcoms" and contained
questions pertaining to government offices and personnel
in the provinces, local government regulations and
decisions, and the members and actions of people?s councils.
The "guide" also contained questions about political
parties and labor organizations in all areas. Time
limits were specified for the completion of each portion
of the questionnaire and instructions about methods
of procuring the information of each category were
provided. Although these questionnaires were directed
toward overt information, the results would have been
of obvious value to any intelligence service. One part
of the PKI questionnaire which pertained to other politi-
cal parties in Indonesia:., specifically requested that
the Party member be objective and not color his reply
25X1X6
by adding opinion.
25X1X6
testified
that KGB officers, in evaluating reports received from
Japan Communist Party elements, took into consideration
the fact that they were slanted.) The prominence given
in the questionnaire to information about government
regulations also suggested that it may have originated
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with an intelligence service of an Orbit country.
Soviet intelligence services frequently have relied upon
foreign Communist parties to supply operational infor-
mation of this nature. Also, the plan or outline of the
questionnaire follows in general the outline of a KGB
headquarters letter to a field representative known to
have been used in some instances. the information targets,
the degree of urgency, and instructions as to how the
information could be procured.
2. Japan. In February 1956 certain JCP functionaries were
forwarding to a member of Ambassador Malik's delegation
in London reports on domestic public opinion regarding
the Japan-Soviet talks about the re-establishment of
diplomatic relations. The contents of the report included.
(a) information obtained at meetings held in Japan on
internal attitudes and conditions regarding the restoration
of Japan-Soviet diplomatic relations; (b) Prime Minister
Hatoyar?_a's policies, obtained from newspapers and politi-
cians; (c) views expressed by Kazami Akira's group re-
garding Socialist Party activities in connection with
the Japan-Soviet negotiations. The information was
compiled, edited into a monthly review entitled "News
on the Restoration of Japan-Soviet Diplomatic Relations",
and forwarded to London with one copy in English and
one. in Japanese.*
In July 1956 one JCP Regional Committee requested the
units under its command to make a study of the House
of Councillors election campaign. A questionnaire
or "guide" was provided for the use of Party units as-
signed to collect the data. According to the guide,
subjects to be covered were, for example, number of
JCP votes by district, names of JCP supporters, criti-
cism of JCP candidates, questions pertinent to the
financing of the election campaign and interference from
"outside elements".
Probably the reports were prepared in a journalistic style
in order to appear innocuous and overt. Similar reporting
procedures have been employed in the past by the French
Communist Party.
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Western Hemisphere
1. Brazil. Over a two-year period the Communist Party
of Brazil compiled detailed information on the extent
of the United States' participation in the Brazilian
economy. The results of this effort were tabulated in
a report prepared in four copies in approximately Jan-
uary 1956. One copy was sent to Moscow for the use of
persons planning Soviet economic policy with respect
to Brazil; the remaining three were retained by the
Party for its own use. The report contained detailed
information on the finances and organization of United
States firms in Brazils as well as the identities of
Brazilian political figures who invested in these
companies. The bulk of the material used in the report
was gathered from United States economic publications
and from the Diario i is , publication of the
Brazilian Government.
2. MexjCO. A report of October 1956 stated that a general
survey of all factories and industries was to be conducted
by the Partido Comunista Mexicano (PCM) over a period
of several months. Jorge Saldivar, organization sec-
retary of the PCM Federal District Committee, issued
a blanket order to all Party cells under his jurisdiction
to furnish detailed information on all factories and
industries operating in their immediate vicinity. Such
information was to be furnished on all factories regard-
less of size. The reason given was that the survey would
facilitate future PCM penetration of these factories
or industries.
The following specific instructions were issued to all
PCM cells in the Federal District area in connection
with this survey:
a. List the address of each shop, factory, or
industry located in the general vicinity of the
cell's operating area.
b. Give in detail the type of work each employee
is doing in factory or industry. Title of
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worker? Number of hours he works each week?
Salary?
c. State whether workers in each factory or industry
are unionized. If so, to which union do they
belong? Political affiliation of each union?
d. Give the type of management of each factory
or industry. Is management native, foreign,
or mixed? Political ideology of each member
of management personnel?
e. State the capital structure of each factory
or industry. Is capital native, foreign, or
mixed? Proportions?
f. Give detailed information on any social or
political group that has attempted. to make
overtures to the employees of each factory
or industry.
g. Outline worker's most urgent problems. For
example, does he have an adequate water supply,
is there sufficient electricity in his living
area, are the streets near his home paved,
are there adequate shopping facilities, is there
adequate schooling?
h. Give particulars on any other information that
appears to be pertinent.
3. The United States. In late 1955 the Communist Party
of the United States set up an Economic Commission headed
by Victor Perlo which worked covertly. The Commission
was to make a complete survey of the economic situation
in the United States which ostensibly would serve as
a basis for the Party's policies in the 1956 elections.*
Elizabeth Bentley and other Communist defectors in the United
States have testified concerning Victor Perlo's effective role
in secret CPUSA apparats which procured information for the
Soviets.
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In late 1956 certain CPUSA leaders showed considerable
interest in the announcement by certain United States
Senators that when Congress convened in January 1957
they would take steps to curb filibusters by trying to
change Senate procedure rules. All CPUSA districts were
instructed to advise national headquarters immediately
of the reaction of Negro, trade union, agricultural,
religious and other non-Communist organizations to the
proposal.
E, Information Procurement by International Fronts
Trade Union International of Public and Allied Earoloyee_.
Excerpts from a questionnaire originating with an inter-
national front organization illustrate that these Communist
bodies also serve as information procurement agencies.
The front organization involved was the Trade Union Inter-
national of Public and Allied Employees. (TUI/PAE), an
organ of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), The
questionnaire was dated 6 June 1956 and one recipient was
the Professional Trade Union of Telecommunications Employees
and Allied Branches of Chile. The stated purpose of the
questionnaire was to obtain facts which would permit this
TUT to make a study of the legal position of Government
employees. The letter of transmittal accompanying the
questionnaire pointed out that the TUI/PAE expected that
certain questions could be answered easily and rapidly;
therefore it requested that some answers be submitted by
letter without delay; answers to other questions which pre-
sented difficulties or required more time were to be sent
in later. One of those which it anticipated could be an-
swered immediately was question 3 under section B.
"Questionnaire: Statute on Personnel
A. Existence of Reg u1a_ti ons
1. Is there a law or statute for personnel of
public services in your country compiling basic
legal provisions establishing their legal
position?
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2. Instead of legislative provisions are there
one or several collective agreements?
3. Is the statute or collective contract applicable
to all workers of the public services? Indicate
the categories to which it applies.
4. Which are the non-benefiting categories of each
and which are desirous of being included?
5. Are there specifications defining the relations
of the workers and officials of the public
services with the State?
B. Their Contents
1. If there exists a special preamble, indicate
the most important principles and ideas.
LNumbering is as in original paragraph
2 is missing/
3. Does the statute or collective agreement contain
paragraphs on: the authorization or denial
of trade union rights? On the right to strike.
On the right of trade unions to represent their
memberships before administrative tribunals?
Are there provisions or restrictions on the
exercise of civil rights and on the democratic
liberties of public service personnel?
Is the Statute applied without distinction as
to race, age, sex, or nationality'?
4. Does the statute or collective agreement establish
the creation of commissions or similar organs
charged with examination of matters which affect
personnel and for insuring the application of
the terms of the statute?
5. How are these organs composed and in what manner
are their members designated?
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Do they have a consultative character or do
they have power of enforcement?
D. The Validity of the Statute as a Legal Base
Do there exist infractions of the statute on
the part of State organs?
What actions have the personnel taken in the
trade unions or other bodies to defend the
statute or any of its parts?
In this respect what is the mission discharged
by legal institutions such as administrative
tribunals? What have been the judgments handed
down by these tribunals?"
Although answers to these questions primarily would aid the
agitation-propaganda program of the WFTU, some of the answers
would also be of value to a foreign intelligence service
which wanted to place.'deep cover agents in government positions
and needed to know how such agents would be protected by
local laws.
At the founding conference of the TUI of Public and Allied
Employees a Committee was set up called the United Action
Committee to Win and Defend Trade Union Rights. The TUI/PAE
attempted to present the United Action Committee as an
independent group composed of both ICFTU and 4TFTU components.
Actually the United Action Committee was purely an instrument
of the WFTU-controlled TUI/PAE, Some communications obviously
initiated by the TUI/F'AE itself were sent out under the
name of United Action Committee. For instance, a question-
naire almost identical with the one just quoted appeared
in at least one non-Orbit country under the name of the
United Action Committee.
F. Involvement Jn Military Action Preparations Terrorism
The Communist parties, in line with established practice,
have tried in almost every area where there was an organized
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national liberation or resistance movement to assume the
leadership or these forces. According to revolutionary
theory, Communists are obliged to provide coordination,
leadership and correct orientation for all liberation forces,
especially in places where these have achieved ''mass" status.
If such movements tend to disintegrate, Communists must
conduct appropriate agitation-propaganda to rally popular
support and revitalize them.
Training for most of these paramilitary forces appears to
be given locally, frequently by non-Communist elements of
the resistance organization. In Syria, following Israeli
and Anglo-French military action against Egypt, the Central
C onmittee of the SyrianCosnmunist Party encouraged Communist
Party members to enroll in popular resistance organizations
being armed and trained by the Syrian Government for emergency
defense of the country.
In one unconfirmed case, however, young Communists received
training behind the Iron Curtain for future paramilitary
action in their own country. In 1956 at a school in Poland
known as the Lazne Jesenik School, 450 young Greeks between
the ages of 18 and 21 were undergoing training in guerrilla
warfare and tactics for future partisan activities in Greece.
Instruction was given by Greek and Czech Communists; the
majority of the students were children kidnapped in 1949
who received intensive schooling in Communist ideology and
tactics.
Near East
Syria. The Central Committee for the Support of Egypt
was a national resistance organization set up in August
1956 at the instigation of the Egyptian government and
financed by it. Leadership of this Committee was strongly
left-wing; some reports even stated that the leader of
the Syrian Communist Party, Khalid Bakdash, was a member
of it.
Possible Communist utilization of this Committee was
indicated in the account of its establishment of popular
defense organizations. These were issued Czech submachine
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guns and participants received military training.
Although ostensibly organized for resistance to external
aggression, their training, as noted by a Western observer
in Damascus, was more along lines of "mob training and
fighting techniques of the Communists" than actual military
training for defense of the country. A Syrian Army officer
long reported as a Communist and arrested in connection
with Communist participation in riots in Aleppo in February
1956, allegedly was involved in the supervision of this
training.
North Africa
Algeria. For several months after the outbreak of the
national rebellion in Algeria in November 1954, the
Algerian Communist Party (ACP) held back and gave little
significant support to the movement. By.June 1955, how-
ever, it was more directly participating, At this time
the ACP's membership was largely Arab, but French elements
were most significant in its leadership. Propaganda
in support of the rebels was disseminated, forged docu-
ments for rebel use were being prepared by clandestine
cells of Communist activists, and modest amounts of other
material aid were being provided. According to a Com-
munist Party statement, refugees were being sheltered
and certain acts of sabotage were committed in collabo-
ration with other nationalist elements. By the beginning
of 1956 the ACP was strongly agitating on behalf of the
liberation movement and was strengthening its efforts
to promote a united front between nationalists and "pro-
gressive Europeans".
The ACP-in accordance with Communist teachings--conceived
its role in the movement as that of unifier, coordinator,
and eventually controller. An article in a March 1956
issue of the ACP's Liberty which is published clandestinely
stated:
"the Communists support... armed patriots whoever they
may be who promote liberation, whether armed groups
of the National Front (FLN),. groups directed by
the Communists, Fighters of Liberty, the National
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Algerian Movement (MNA), or isolated combatants....
We will do everything to unify and coordinate their
actions."
The ACPts intention ultimately to lead the revolutionary
movement became clear in June 1955. Paul Caballero,
secretary of the ACP, was arrested on 20 June 1955 in
Algiers, in application of a judgment of the Court of
Appeals condemning him to a year in prison and a large
fine for action threatening the security of the state.
At the time of his arrest, he had on his person docu-
ments concerning the deliberations of the Political
Bureau and the Central Committee of the ACP. These
documents brought out the intention of the ACP to assume
the leadership of the rebel movement with the support
of the Moslem nationalist masses. In June 1955 it was
announced at the ACPts Oran Committee meeting that the
ACP had put armed groups into action in the Aures.
Extensive reporting appeared in the Algerian press during
October 1956 concerning the uncovering of Communist
"technical" cells working within the Algerian National
Liberation Front (FLN). According to the ;press, some of
these cells were responsible for the manufacture and
storing of explosives; some stored Communist propaganda
tracts, and still others prepared false identity docu-
ments for the rebels or produced photographs of rebel
fighters to be used on such documents.
In the latter part of 1955 the Confederation Generale
du Travail (CGT, Communist controlled labor federation)
was serving as "cover" for certain French Communist
Party activities in France. Film sessions were being
organized by the CGT for showing to North African workers
in France. The films had been produced during the Indo-
china war to teach sabotage techniques to Viet Mmnh fighters.
Also, Communist militants in France, aided by CGT unions,
were assembling North African militants in order to trans-
fer them to the Aures where they could join the rebels.
believed that all .elements 25X1 X7
of the French Communist Party's technical apparatus which
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formerly worked to support the Viet Minh had been
performing services on behalf of the Algerian rebels.
Following the roundup of workers in an underground printing
plant, it was found that all French Communists involved
had worked for the Viet Minh until approximately the
spring of 1955, then had been transferred to work for
the Algerian rebel cause.
Western Hemisphere
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wim INUED CONT
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Brazil* Discovery of a Communist Party arms cache,
seizure of a Party document setting forth the basic
principles to be followed by Communists in carrying
out revolutionary action in Brazil and specific mention
in a Party speech of the formation of armed guerrilla
bands indicate that military action received some con-
sideration by the Brazil Communist Party. Two documents
in Portuguese were confiscated, one of them entitled,
"Conventional Warfare and Guerrilla Warfare", found in
the possession of a member of the Central Committee of
the Brazil Communist Party who left it when he fled from
the police, and another entitled "Combatting Tanks in
Street Fighting". The f ollouing pertinent passages
appeared in the first documents,"Conventional Warfare
and Guerrilla Warfare",:
"Whatever may be the developments in the
international situation (peace or war), the
outlook of the establishment in our nation
of a popular revolutionary government is
closely linked with the establishment of a
popular revolutionary army. Fundamentally,
the basis of a popular army is the arming
of the masses. It may be said that the new
People's army is being formed among us at
present within the struggles of the masses
of Brazilian workers against hunger, exploita-
tion, and police violence in urban and rural
regions, by the resistance of the majority
of the nation against the colonization of
Brazil, and by the imminent threat of another
imperialist war. On the other hand, in a
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country like ours, in which the Armed Forces
have such strong traditions of fraternization
and even active participation in popular inde-
pendence movements, for the republic and against
imperialism, the inestimable contribution which
the nation expects and should receive from its
Armed Forces must be taken into account, whether
the contribution be by the cadre or by the
support of the great masses of soldiers and
sailors in the struggles of the working masses,
or be it by the adhesion of entire units, men
and material, to the patriotic struggle,
"An intense, constant and tireless effort toward
organization is fundamental and necessary in
order to fight under these conditions. Every
fighter must have a knowledge of the economic
and social situation of his country and his
region. He must be linked with the struggles
of the people and must have a clear concept of
the objectives to be reached and the prospects
which face the nation. Besides this, he must
study and work toward the goal of a full command
of military science---not only that of the ruling
power but, above all, of proletarian military
science ...He must also have assimilated the ex-
periences and the initiatives characteristic of
popular struggles."
A Communist Party arms cache which was uncovered in Nilopolis,
State of Rio de Janeiro, on 22 January 1956 contained four
machine guns and other arms. It was believed that the
location was used for training Party militants in the use of
arms and guerrilla warfare.
.Specific mention of the formation of guerrilla bands was
made in a speech given before the Central Committee in
February 1955. Since the 'lrazil Communist Party was not
known to have any guerrilla groups at that date, it is
probable that the speech was intended to prepare rank and
file members psychologically for this type of action in
case the Party decided on its use.
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2. Colombia. The guerrilla movement here was re-
ferred to sympathetically by the Cominform journal
of 8 July 1955; Colombian workers were described as
marching in the forefront of the country's fighters.
The article described the Colombian peasants as fighting
heroically and the national bourgeoisie as increasingly
anxious about the "endless concessions made by the govern-
ment to United States monopolies to the detriment of
the national economy". The article stated that a broad
democratic front of national liberation was being formed.
At the 19th Plenum of the Colombian Communist Party on
25 August 1956, Party leaders reportedly determined that
the guerrilla movement needed "unif'ied direction and
correct orientation" which should be provided by a
(Communist-controlled) Co-ordinating Board. One of the
leaders present. commented that the armed movement had
been sustained because of guidance provided by Communists
who have always aided the peasants." He also stated
that the cause of the guerrilla movement had been harmed
by some units which had engaged in banditry. The Com-
munist leadership had been wrong in condoning and even
defending this type of action since it had alienated
some popular support of the guerrilla movement. "Every
guerrilla who steals from peasants loses his orientation
and becomes of service to the Colombian government."
Another Communist leader attending the Plenum commented
that in some localities the guerrilla movement had dis-
integrated and that it had to be reorganized. He proposed
that a national meeting be called in which the guerrilla
leaders take part; that the preparation for this meeting
be based on material to be prepared by the National
Executive Committee of the Communist Party and passed
to the guerrillas for their study. It should be dis-
cussed so that at the meeting all participants could
arrive at clear concepts of the proper direction required
for the armed movement. The leader proposed! that sub-
sequently a national commission or command be named
which would have the mission of orienting and co-ordinating
all activities, of the guerrilla movement in Colombia?
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3. French West Indies. Here Communist agitation in con-
nection with demands for sugar cane workers was developed
to the extreme and in some places assumed. the aspects
of terrorism. In late February 1956 the sugar mills
of Guadeloupe had almost stopped operating because of
terrorist activities and impossible labor demands made
by Communists. When the harvest began the Communists
went into the fields, worked actively to create an in-
terest in the concessions they requested, and urged the
workers to strike. Acts of intimidation by the Communists
and failure of the police to protect the workers resulted
in almost complete work stoppage.
In Martinique at the height of the sugar cane strike
in April 1956 Communist Party and Confederation Generale
du Travail (CGT) leaders organized shock troops of
approximately 200 men. These were divided into groups
of twenty and were paid by the Communist Party of Martinique.
The men were armed with truncheons and machetes and were
urged to burn the sugar crop and to intimidate non-
striking workers.
G. Sabotage
In countries where law and order prevailed there were few
reports of Communist party-directed sabotage until 1956.
Since then there have been reports indicating that a few
CP's have been giving attention to sabotage, particularly
that which will halt production in large industrial firms,
in mines, in oil refinery installations and on oil tankers.
In areas where there was a chaotic political situation,
Communists either independently or in collaboration with
other nationalist or dissident elements planned or committed
acts of sabotage.
Europe
1. Norway and Denmark. At a meeting of Scandinavian Com-
munist leaders in Stockholm in November :L956 when many
aspects of Communist activity in Scandinavian countries
were discussed, it was resolved that the Danish and
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Norwegian Communist Parties would initiate sabotage
activity in their respective countries. These areas
were determined to be the most appropriate because of
the connection of these two countries with NATO. Under
the guidance of unidentified functionaries of the Finnish
Communist Party, the Norwegian and Danish Parties were
to enter upon a program to include the slowing down
or halting of production of war goods, and preventing
shipments and deliveries of war goods.*
West Germ= v. A report of July 1956 related several
instances of sabotage either in metallurgical plants
or in mines of West Germany. In one factory oil
pressure pipes of a moulding machine, a key element
in the die casting process, were forcibly removed.
In the same plant locks and instruments in a new
generator installation were repeatedly broken at short
intervals. There was evidence in this case that mem-
bers of the illegal Communist youth organization were
implicated.
At a mine shaft installation foreign objects were thrown
into the transmission gears of two conveyer belts,
resulting in the loss of 700 tons of coal. In this
case there was evidence that the secretary of the :Local
Communist Party district was ultimately responsible.
Similar acts of sabotage occurred repeatedly at another
mine; local authorities believed they were perpetrated
by an illegal Communist group calling itself the "Com-
munist Party Youth Factory Group".
Far East
1. Burma. On the occasion of the visit of Khrushehev and
Bulganin to Burma in early December 19 5., the burma
Communist Party (BCP) distributed literature stating
the BCP's desire for peace and unity and demanding that
* Although this meeting of Scandinavian Communist leaders (as
well as a subsequent inter-Scandinavian Communist meeting)
has been confirmed, no further information about proposed
sabotage action has been received.
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the Government open negotiations to end the insurrection
and to grant the BCP legal status as a political Party.
Despite these public protestations, however, the BCP
was simultaneously resorting to violence and sabotage.
On 5 December 1955 Burma Communists blew up the pipe-
line which supplies 20 million gallons of water daily
to Rangoon. Upon the expiration of the government?s
amnesty offer on 31 March 1956, the Burmese press reported
that Communists blew up several bridges on railroad lines
leading out of Rangoon. Six more bridges were allegedly
blown up by Burmese Communists on 3-4 April 1956.
2, South Vietnam, Numerous incidents of sabotage took
place immediately preceding and during the National
Constituent Assembly elections on 4 March 1956, but
the effect of violence on the outcome of the elections
was slight. Reports indicated that the Viet Minh and
dissident elements were active in practically all provinces
of Free Vietnam, with voting localities the most common
targets. Grenades were thrown in or near voting booths
in many villages; there were several reports of small-
arms fire in the vicinity of voting places and two or
three reports of mortar shells falling in town areas.
Additionally, ballot boxes were stolen or burned and
several acts of arson were committed against government
and private buildings. Statistics of 14 March 1956
indicated that Viet Minh and dissident violence accounted
for nine killed, about a score wounded and ten persons
kidnapped or missing.
Western Hemisphere
1. Brazil. Several incidents appearing to be acts of sabotage
attributable to Communists occurred in January 1957
in Brazilian ports. According to press reports an explosion
on 13 January in Maranhao State on the ship Iuanema
resulted in the loss of 600 barrels of kerosene and
aviation gasoline and the sinking of the ship. On the
afternoon of 17 January the tanker Amapa of the Petrobas
(Brazilian petroleum monopoly) fleet was partially
destroyed in Guanabara Bay. An explosion occurred on
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the ship after oil, brought from a refinery in Rubatao,
Sao Paulo, had been unloaded to deposits of the Atlantic
Refining Company at Rio de Janeiro. The ship was partially
destroyed.
On 22 January a large fire broke out on the Saboa docks,
Santos while the world's largest tanker, the Universe
Leader, was unloading oil. According to the press report,
the fire began at a nearby anchorage for fishing boats
and spread quickly over the oily marsh to oil pipelines.
Through the alert action of the Universe Leader crew,
the oil line was withdrawn and the ship was moved away
from the dock.
The partially charred body of a young militant Communist
was found afterwards in a small fishing boat in an
estuary near the fire, where he had apparently been
trapped when the fire spread suddenly as a result of
the pipe line explosion. In his pockets were found a
quantity of matches and rags which analysis showed
to have been gas-soaked. The damage to the pipe line
was estimated at several million cruzeiros. The young
Communist involved, Raymundo Nonato de Oliveira,. had
attended Communist-sponsored youth and student congresses
at Bucharest and Warsaw in August and September 19,50,
At Oliveira.' s. funeral, two Communists who spoke declared
that Oliveira was not the first nor the last "Brazilian
patriot to die as a hero, in keeping with the line
taken by the Brazilian Communist press which presented
the incidents as "imperialist sabotage" of the Petrobras
fleet. For example, in the 19 January 1957 issue of Voz
er ria, Brazilian Communist weekly', is found the head-
line, "Washington Conspires Against Petrobras".
2, Chile. A report originating with a member of the Communist
Party of Chile set forth the overt Communist Party line
with regard to sabotage and other forms of violence:
"The Communist Party of Chile (PCCh) condemns the
use of explosives and other arms for any attempt
at sabotage or coups d?etat. The PCCh believes
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that the only way to put an end to the
situation of hunger and misery, injustice,
and the domination of imperialist monopolies
and the oligarchy, is through the formation
of a powerful movement of popular unity,
to bring about a new form of government.
Terrorist tactics were discredited by the
PCCh more than 25 years ago, and the anarcho-
syndicalist proponents of direct action
are no longer active. No member of the PCCh is
now being instructed in sabotage tasks. The
PCCh hopes some day to govern and does not
want to destroy that which would be of use to it."
This professed attitude toward sabotage would have been
expressed by many Communist parties in Western countries
which were trying to work overtly, as well as covertly,
to gain influence through greater membership and through
collaboration with other leftist parties for certain
goals.
According to other reports from Chile, no mention was
made in the Communist cells of sabotage or of preparations
for sabotage, because this would have caused many new
members to desert, and because of the risk of spreading
the belief that Communism was a school of terrorism.
Rather, the Party believed that members with the proper
degree of fanaticism react automatically in their think-
ing at the proper time (in case of war, for example)
in terms of the necessity of struggling against the
enemies of the Soviet Union. Otherwise Communists limit
themselves to "legal sabotage" manifested as agitation
against foreign exploitation and incitement erf the workers
to strike.
Observers in the area who have a close knowledge of
Communist Party affairs have stated that while it is
possible that certain PCCh functionaries who have been
trained behind the Iron Curtain. may have received in-
struction in sabotage, it was kept as a closely-guarded
secret in view of PCCh1s policy and tactics during the
period under discussion.
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H. Technical Work
Administrative and technical work of a Communist party's
underground apparatus is performed by a clandestine unit
usually referred to as the Technical Apparatus. Sometimes
this is subdivided into specialized subsections which have
exclusive responsibilities, such as the finance section
responsible for procurement and distribution of funds.
Work performed by a technical apparatus may include such
activities aso procuring safehouses and hideouts; arranging
escape routes; acquiring official documents and forms, as
blank birth certificates and residence certificates; publishing
covertly Communist propaganda sheets and underground news-
papers; operating laboratories which can produce false docu-
ments, photographs, etc.; or it may produce explosives,
grenades or other materials which Communists either intend
to use themselves or to supply to other elements of a national
liberation movement.
Europe
1. Greece--Crete. A Greek Communist Party (KKg) functionary
who served as liaison between Is illegal mechanism
in the Athens-Piraeus area and that in Crete, was arrested
in late December 1955 during a regular baggage check
of passengers arriving in Piraeus. He was found carrying
current copies of illegal publications of the KKE and
of the Greek Communist Youth (EPON). Also in his pos-
session was a brochure entitled, "Notes on Our Work in
the Provinces", which had no date but probably applied
to the situation prevailing in November-December 1955.
The first part of the section on organizational work
concerned Communist cells ("enlightenment detachments")
which would provide direction for work in mass organi-
zations; this was followed by a discussion of the for-
mation and work of the mass organizations themselves.
Then a portion of the text applied specifically to the
covert technical cells:
"Completely separate from the above organi-
zational work, a well-fortified illegal
technical and publishing mechanism must be
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formed. For this purpose we need two to three
good safehouses without political taint where
we can install a typewriter, mimeograph
machine and whatever else we need to print
proclamations, hand bills..,etc. Thus we
will supply our organization with propaganda
material beyond that which the members of
our organization will create (manuscripts,
handbills with carbon paper, rubber or linoleum
stamps, etc.). This mechanism must not be
allowed to interfere with our other projects.
To secure financial means for our publication
work, we must develop our financial work
(membership dues, financial sponsorships,
etc.)."
2. Italy. The only elements of the Italian Communist
Party's (PCI) clandestine section which were identified
as active in the 1954-1956 period were those engaged
in "technical work." This included the following tasks:
a, providing safehouses and clandestine escape routes
out of Italy for Communists seeking refuge behind
the Iron Curtain;
be establishing and maintaining a number of hideouts
for the use of high-ranking Party officers which
could be used in case of emergency;
c. receiving funds of Soviet origin, making exchanges
of currency as needed and distributing these funds
from secure places;
d. maintaining a supply of printing and duplicating
machines in various locations for clandestine
publications in case the Party found need for these.
Near East
1. Egypt. In the period, 5-7 February 1956, thirty-nine
members of the Egyptian Communist Party were arrested
by Egyptian police. Two printing presses, three mimeo-
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graph machines and a large amount of type and paper
were seized. All the equipment was new and of excellent
quality. Later in February other Egyptian Communists
engaged in clandestine propaganda activity were arrested.
In contrast to propaganda tracts published earlier in
a language of fairly high standard, those confiscated
by Egyptian security authorities in February 1956 were
written in a low-type, colloquial Arabic, presumably
in order to reach a broader section of the population.
2. Iran. In connection with operations carried out by
Iranian security authorities against the Tudeh Party
(Communist), a number,of arms caches were uncovered
between September 1953 and October 1955. Twenty members
of a covert technical apparatus engaged in the manufacture
grenades were arrested and interrogated in the fall
of 1955. An executive committee consisting of three
engineers, all Tudeh Party members, directed the work
of the apparatus, with one, the leader, responsible for
the distribution of grenades and payment of expenses,
the second in charge of "technical matters", and the
third responsible for the preparation of chemicals.
Most of the work of this apparatus was carried out in
two legal and open workshops owned by individuals who
were Tudeh Party members. The.cylinders and bodies of
the grenades were made in the shops, but assembling,
loading and caching were carried out elsewhere. In one
shop (actually a lathe workshop, to be called here
Shop No. 1) all preliminary steps were taken, including
the preparation of casts and molding equipment. In
this shop presses and equipment for making cartridges
were constructed. Every few days one of the lathe
operators in this shop received from the apparatus'
leader ten grenade shells can which he did the boring and
molding. Eventually the shop changed hands, with one
Tudeh member buying it from another (although possibly
Tudeh funds were used to purchase it), and the shop
was subsequently used by leaders of the apparatus for
the manufacture of grenade shells.
The original owner of Shop No, 1 (Musavi) was at first
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not a Tudeh Party member, but was recruited into the
Party after a trial period of five or six months.
Then a member of the technical apparatus (whose alias
was Rubik) asked for and obtained employment in Musavi"s
shop. About a month after this occurred, Musavi was
told by the Tudeh Party that a certain engineer would
contact him. The latter was one of the committee of
three which directed the technical apparatus. Then
on his behalf another individual contacted. Musavi and
instructed him to make preparations "with the help of
the workers and under the supervision of Rubik" for
constructing presses and equipment for making cartridges.
Of incidental interest is the fact that one member of
this apparatus, a partner of the last owner of Shop
No. 1, was also involved in the procurement of infor-
mation needed by Party leaders. This person previously
had transferred his citizenship from Iranian to Soviet
with the concurrence and knowledge of the Tudeh Party.
The second shop participating in the work of this ap-
paratus was manned by five or six Tudeh members, one of
whom, Jandaqi, was designated as chief of the shop.
The shop contained a press, a drill press and other
machinery for constructing grenades. Jandagi was re-
cruited for this work as follows: prior to the uprising
of 19 August 1953, an unemployed Tudeh Party member
(Hoseyn) suggested that he and Jandagi set up a work-
shop together. Jandaqi agreed, and along with one
of Hoseyn?s acquaintances, they rented a workshop.
The acquaintance of Hoseyn turned out to be Abumal?
Fathi, the leader of the technical apparatus. Iranian
authorities apparently believe that Jandaqi entered
into the venture innocently.
The chiefs of the two shops alternated in delivering
grenade bodies to a representative of the Tudeh military
organization whom they met at a predesignated time
and place on a road leading out of Tehran. These two
technical workers admitted having delivered a total of
10,500 grenades to the Tudeh military organization.
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1, Security Measures and Preparations for Under raun~_ Dpi sterice
Traditionally the Communist parties established security
procedures which permitted careful watch over the entire
party membership. New members were carefully checked to
prevent infiltration of hostile or bourgeois elements,,
During intensified recruiting drives the barriers have
been lowered somewhat with the checking of new members de-
f erred until party organs responsible for this work could
find time to carry it out. At no time, however, according
to regulations, was a party member allowed to hold a party
office no matter how minor until he was thoroughly checked.
The higher a party functionary progressed, the more care-
fully he was scrutinized for possible connection with anti-
Communist persons or organizations. In theory at least a
permanent investigation procedure was maintained with each
party member carefully watched, either for ideological
deviation or for evidence of connections the party did not
approve.
The preponderance of emphasis in Cominform journal articles
during the period 1952 to April 1956, calling upon the
Communist parties to exercise "revolutionary vigilance:",
was directed against the danger of the "infiltration of
imperialist agents." Proper regard for revolutionary vigi-
lance, according to the Cominf orm journal, entailed the
following measures., (a) assure that the party conducts
an adequate education program to improve the ideological
understanding of the average party member; (b) provide for
the expression of criticism and self-criticism; (c) carry
out verification of membership (investigate the loyalty of
each party member thoroughly); (d) observe principles of
democratic centralism and control from below; (e) improve
existing party control systems or organize new ones. As
in the case of most instructions emanating from a national
Communist party pertaining to security regulations, most
of the articles in the Cominform journal concerning proper
security practices appeared after a violation had occurred.
Europe
1. Spain. Here the Party was illegal and severely suppressed.
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It was divided into cells or groups of three members
each, only one member of which was in contact with one
member of the next higher group of three. Great care
was taken to keep all Party activity as secret as
possible.
Spanish Security authorities in September 1.955 discovered
a Communist Party mail drop which contained. instruction
sheets addressed to chiefs of troikas and a document
entitled, "New Rules of Conduct for Militants", outlining
specific security measures to be followed by Party
members. Pertinent portions of the regulations are
quoted here since they are typical of instructions issued
by Party leaders in several areas where the Party was
completely underground,
"Upon enrollment in the Party, a militant must
adopt a fictitious name to be used in dealings
with his regular contact. The name must not
be his true name nor an exotic, unusual, one,
but a common, religious name such as Manuel
or Juan which will be changed as often as neces-
sary and will be used only within the Party....
"A militant?s domicile and place of work must
not be known to his associates in the Party,
not even to his regular contact....
"A militant must lead a normal life so that
neighbors, friends, relatives and fellow workers
will have no suspicion that he is a member
of the Party. If any associates should. become
suspicious, it is imperative that the militant
go to Mass frequently and seek admission into
Catholic rightist centers or Falangist groups,
even if he is a military man. These steps
are to be taken with the concurrence of the
regular contact, who will have consulted his
superiors.
"A militant should not regularly carry on his
person any compromising papers, nor should
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he have them in his house unless the house is
used for archives or serves some similar purpose.
"If two militants meet by chance in the street
neither should greet the other. Three reasons
for this are that if one of them should be
accompanied he would have to introduce his
companion to the other militant, and this
should be avoided; secondly, it must not be
known that a militant is acquainted with Party
members; and thirdly, if one militant is be-
ing followed, the other might be discovered
if they were to greet each other.
"A militant should continue to cultivate friend-
ships outside the Party, but no friendships
can exist between Party members....
"Every comrade must terminate all indiscretions,
and can discuss any matter pertaining to the
Party only with his regular contact...-.6
"Meetings among comrades in cafes, bars, taverns,
inns, etc.,.. will cease....
"Militants must try to be punctual at all appoint-
ments and should not wait even five minutes
past the appointed time. Meetings should always
be held on the street or outdoors and should
be held in a different place each time.
"Party members will refrain from comment if
a comrade has been released from prison, has
been seen at liberty, is being pursued or is
in hiding. A militant will make no comment
about these matters which would reveal that
he is cognizant of such affairs."
2. West Germany. Since 1951 the West German Communist
Party (KPD ) anticipated illegality and spent con-
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siderable time planning for underground existence.*
Because of the demoralizing effect the prospect of
illegality held for the average party functionary and
rank and file member, the Party openly adopted the attitude
)that a ban was ridiculous_ and impossible; Iiit un~Ter?too~c __/__
relatively few organizational measures implement
plans, prior to the actual banning in August 19566
Underground preparations which were carried out to varying
degrees in various localities concerned the following
specific measures: (a) provision of adequate personnel
and operational safeguards to insure continuation of
the most important internal activities of the Party;
(b) establishment of a system of reliable lodgings,
safe havens and meeting places throughout the Federal
Republic; (c) arrangements for facades for local Party
headquarters and for cover employment for Party function-
aries; (d) expansion of the existing organizations for
the transport of training and agitation material over
the border from East Germany into West Germany and for
the distribution of this material within the Federal
Republic. In 1955 KPD tried to circumvent confiscation
of its property by transferring ownership titles to
dummy companies or to individual Party members. Two
days before the actual banning of the Party on 17 August
1956, Party workers conferences were called on short
notice in the individual counties.of one state directo-
rate. At these meetings, the first secretaries discussed
the anticipated outlawing of the Party, issued security
instructions and gave notice that members should be
ready for illegal activity later.
Shortly after 17 August 1956, in accordance with plans
made previously, KPD began the formation of illegal
Party units. In one City Section underground cells
were to be patterned after the traditional "troika"
or group of three. In each troika only the leader
was in contact with one person of the next higher grouping.
* In this planning KPD drew heavily on the experiences of the
illegal West German Communist youth organization,
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The plan for organization in City Sections appeared to
vary since in another Section, under the top troika,
there were to be five persons in each cell or group,
At least in one case, for the City Section Directorate
there was to be a "second" or reserve directorate to
take over the administration of the work in case any-
thing happened to the first directorate.
In one West German town a local rifle association,
established purposely to facilitate the Party's illegal
activity, was to be used as a meeting place? Collection
of dues was to be made, but receipts, in the usual form
of membership fee stamps, were not to be issued. In
one City Section "toto" slips ("totozettel") marked'
according to amounts received were being issued.
In some localities illegal Party leaflets appeared shortly
after the banning. Party work in large industrial con-
cerns was to be given priority; it was also considered
important for KPD members to join sport clubs and al-
lotment holders organizations and for them to gain in-
fluence in the non-Communist trade union federation,
the Deutscher Gewerkschafts-Bund. Delegations of Party
members to participate in training courses in the Soviet
Zone were to be continued.
For security reasons KPD planned to use a very limited
number of highly trusted people. Recognition signals
used shortly after the Party was banned also were of
a traditional form.* functionaries identified themselves
at meeting places by showing a piece of torn newspaper
which matched the piece held by the other Party functionary.
Far East
1. Indonesia. Prior to the first national elections which
were held in September 1955 a vigorous membership campaign
was initiated by the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI)
beginning about March of that year and was directed
mainly toward front organizations, Having taken
new members in wholesale fashion from trade unions and
other front groups, it was decided that screening and
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weeding out of undesirable elements was necessary,
In June 1955 the PKI established a control commission
under the supervision of the three-member Secretariat.
By August 1955 subordinate bodies had been set up to
conduct investigation of members and candidate members
at the provincial level.
2. Japan. The Japan Communist Party's (JCP) Police Counter-
measures Department, set up in mid-November 1954, had
organized Police Countermeasures Operations Sections
in the Tokyo area by July 1955, with the district police,
the Metropolitan Police Board and the Public Security
Investigation Agency as major targets. As of July 1955
district and target operations leaders had been designated
and code names, communications codes and instructions
disseminated. Lists of personnel of the target organi-
zations were to be compiled which would include home
addresses and would designate areas in which the police
agents worked. The objective'of Police Countermeasures
personnel was to determine police action against the
JCP.
If other JCP members accused Police Countermeasures
personnel of being "enemies" or of suspicious activities,
the latter were to refrain from giving explanations re-
garding their status or from talking about their missions.
Party members, other than those connected with the
Police Countermeasures Department, who maintained contact
with the police were to be investigated and reported.
The JCP Police Countermeasures Department was first
reported to have been set up directly under the JCP?s
Organization Bureau, but later was reported to have
been placed immediately under the JCP Central Committee.
A report concerning JCP activities of May 1956 showed
that the JCP was willing to engage to a limited extent
in counterespionage operations which would expose American
intelligence operations in order to free the Party
from one of its obstacles. One Prefectural Committee
reportedly made the following decision:
"Action is to be taken in regard to the
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espionage activities of the American Intel-
ligence Agency toward the Party. If the
American Intelligence Agency makes another
attempt in the future to develop informants
among the Party members in this area, the
Party will have the Party member concerned
accept their offer, and have him arrange for
the time, date and place to meet the American
Intelligence Agent. The Party member asked
to be an informant of the American Intelligence
Agency will immediately report this infor-
mation regarding the rendezvous to the District
Committee. The District Cc nittee will
dispatch Party members to the scene of rendez-,
vous and pick up the American Intelligence
Agent at the scene, take pictures of the
scene for evidence. With these pictures,
the Party will conduct a protest struggle
together with other Democratic organizations
in this area in an effort to expose the
espionage network of the United States.
While publicizing their scheme to the general
public, strong protests will be filed with
the Japanese Government and the United States
authorities."
Western Hemisphere
1. Argentina. Security violations by Partido Comunista
Argentino (PCA) members prior to the spring of 195.5 had,
resulted in Party information reaching government
authorities in spite of warnings from PCA's Security
Committee that constant vig lance be maintained. In the
spring of 1955 an "underground movement" reportedly was
activated which was to be responsible for detecting police
agents.
An unconfirmed report of December 1956 stated that there
was a subsection of PCA's Military Section which was
responsible for the infiltration of national and local
police. (Possibly this was the PCA unit referred to in
the March 1955 report as the "underground movement".)
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Despite the stepping up of security measures in 1955,
it was reported in October 1956 that new members joining
the PCA were subjected to very little processing. Usually
the new members were recruited by PCA members who supplied
some information on their backgrounds. Persons who
joined the Party without previous contact with members
were rarely questioned about their backgrounds. Before
a member was given any responsibility, however, a careful
study was made of his activities.
2. C,' 1 e. Following the arrests of several trade union
leaders-including some Communists-in early January
1956, the Partidc Comunista de Chile (PCCh) in Santiago
undertook a series of precautionary measures to protect
its leaders and to assure the continuance of Party activity.
Certain Party leaders were withdrawn from "circulation"
with some Party functionaries designated to serve as
"liaisons" (presumably to serve as contact with the leaders
in hiding). Two bookstores were designated as liaison
points. El Siglo, the Communist daily newspaper, was
to be approached only in case of emergency. Party liaisons
were appointed to serve as contact with the parties
allied with the PCCh in the Frente Nacional del Pueblo.
Among precautionary measures to be taken were: (a) sus-
pension of all semi-clandestine organizational tasks
of the regional, communal and central commissions; (b)
temporary suspension and clandestine reorganization
of all Communist cells; (c) the designation of certain
persons as clandestine liaison between the Central Committee
and El Siglo; (d) the use of pseudonyms by all editors
of El Siglo, who had been in the habit of signing articles
with their true names,
3. Paraguay. A confidential document of the Paraguayan
Communist Party (PCC) announced that Party leaders were
aware that certain persons expelled from the Party were
maneuvering within the rural labor organizations in order
to obtain secret Party documents and to learn about the
activities of the Party leaders. For these reasons it
has been resolved to name a Commission for Political
Investigations within the entire Party. The document
called the attention of Party members to the fact that
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within its ranks there were "anarchist-oppartunists,,
traitors, sellers of political secrets to the enemies
of democracy and Paraguay". Twenty-nine members of the
new Commission were named in the document. Party leaders
in each zone and group were requested to facilitate the
work of the investigation commission.
4. Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA) . In 2,955
CPUSA issued instructions that review commissions be
established in every major district of the Party, for
protecting the Party's security. By the end of 1955
review commissions for the most part had replaced the
security apparatus of the CPUSA underground, the primary
function of which was to detect FBI methods of penetration.
These commissions were to develop the practice of
vigilance in order to detect the "enemies" within the
Party's ranks. In order of priority and importance the
Party was to uncover the following enemieso (1) FBI
penetration agents who infiltrated into positions of
leadership; (2) the informant or stool pigeon who informed
for the FBI or any other organization; (3) anti-Communist
groups; (4) renegades, such as Trotskyites. Not only
was the security problem to receive careful attention
from within the Party, but it was to be attacked from
without" openly: how the entire system of informers
functioned was to be exposed to-workers and Party members.
Additionally, trade union members were to be taught how
"stool pigeons" work for employers and against trade
unions.
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