THE COMMUNIST PARTY UNDERGROUND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R000600130001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 1, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

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The Communist Party Underground
February 1957
ap"Opohm
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ..........................
1. Geographical Factors ....... ........................ 7
2. Population Density ................................ 8
3. Political Factors .................................... 8
4. Mass Support for Police ........................... 8
III. ADAPTABILITY OF PARTY ORGANIZATION TO ILLEGAL
CONDITIONS ........... . ............................ 10
1. Organizational Continuity ......... . .. ............... 10
2. Cadre Continuity ................................... 11
3. Discipline- and Security ............................ 12
4. Doctrine as Morale-Builder ......... .............. 13
5. Attraction of Doctrine ......................... ,..... 14
6. Cell System ....................................... 15
7. Backlog of Conspiratorial Experience ................ 15
IV. ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS: ADJUSTMENT TO
ILLEGAL CONDITIONS .............. .................. 17
1. Reduction of Party Apparatus.. . ..................... 17
a. Consolidation of Territorial organizations ........ 17
b. Reduction of staffs ............................ 18
2. The Command Function: The Triad System ........... 20
3. Compartmentalization .............................. 20
a. Party and military branches .................... 21
b. Party and auxiliary (front) organizations .......... 21.
c. Party and auxiliary illegal organizations ......... 21
d. Internal Party Compartmentalization 21
1) Elimination of horizontal liaison ............. 21
2) Restriction of contacts ... ............... 21
3) Functional restrictions ....... ............. 22
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4. Election of P rty Committees ....................... 22
a. Election of Central Committees .................. 22
b. Territorial Party committees and electoral
commi sions- ............................... 23
C. Co -optio................................... 23
5. Party Organizations Abroad 24
a. Central Committee and. Central Departments .... 24
. Foreign Bureau .................................. 25
c. Regional support centers . . . . .. . . . 2.5
d. Party or anizations for emigrants ............... 25
e. Specialservice organizations ...... ............. 26
V. OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS OF THE PARTY UNDERGROUND 7
1. The Cadre Problem ............. ................. 27
a. Replacement of the cadre ....................... 27
b. An adequate cadre reserve ........... ....... . 29
c. Ideologic 1 and practical training of the new cadre. 29
d. The prat ction of the illegal cadre .............. 30
2. The "Housing" Problem and Communications ......... 31
a. Internal cor omuni cations ........ 31
b. External comma-ni ations ...................... 32
c. Reportin points for liaison personnel from abroad. 33
3. Technical Apparatus .................... ......... 33
4. The Security Problem .............................. 36
a. Personal security .............................. 36
b. Administrative security ......................... 36
5. The Financia' Problem .............................. 38
6. Mass Support: the Crucial PoEtical Problem.......... 39
a. Penetration and control of legal nor -Communist
partie representing workers and related class
eleme ts .................................... 40
b. Penetrat on and control of legal trade unions ...... 40
c. Creation of dummy front organizations or parties .. 40
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I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
The international Communist movement has not merely survived
but has actually flourished, in the face of difficulties which have ruined
political forces with less constancy of purpose and with less practical
a technique. It has maintained itself as the "vanguard of the proletariat"
through Tsarist and totalitarian suppression, armed intervention, two
world wars, and a decade of general "bourgeois" prosperity. In large
measure, Communist successes can be explained by the organizational
adaptability of the Communist Party and its mastery over a mass of
practical techniques. The Party knows what it must do and how to go
about doing it, in any given circumstance, This competence was
responsible in the first place for the success of the Bolshevik Revolu-
tion, and since then, for the endurance of the Party as a continuing
threat to all "bourgeois" states, Whatever the political climate, the
Party goes on, working openly and legally where it can, secretly and
illegally where it must. It is this latter capability for "conspiratorial"
work which largely accounts for the survival and success of the inter-
national Communist movement in the face of adverse conditions.
The scope of the "conspiratorial" activities of the Communist
Party encompasses defensive and offensive purposes. As an organiza-
tion of professional and practical revolutionaries bent upon the eventual
achievement of revolution, the Communist Party is enveloped by an
atmosphere of hostility. Realizing this, the international movement
has naturally developed a system of defensive measures designed to
protect the Party against the police, intelligence agencies, hostile
groups and the hostile public, and has been normally organized so as
to keep knowledge of the most significant aspects of Party activity
restricted.to a minimum of individuals. For similar reasons, the
Party has made it a general practise to conceal as thoroughly as
possible the mechanics of the political controls through which it
extends its influence beyond Party confines. The Communist Party
is generally designed and able to operate under any conditions of
opposition, hostility and outright suppression. It is capable of going
totally underground when outlawed, and it is sufficiently security-
conscious, even under normal conditions, to conceal many of its "normal"
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activities. The "conspiratorial" practises of Communist Parties operating
in hostile societies re largely defensive in nature and are designed to
preserve political a d organizational gains made by the Party.
The defensive side of the Party's conspiratorial behavior can be
extensively illustrated by its organizational and operational methods
when proscribed. This study deals extensively with this subject -- the
general patterns of underground organization are presented, based on
information availabl as of early 1949.
Defensive measures are normally adopted also by Parties which
function more or less openly and legally. "Legal" Parties give their
program a maxim publication and expose a great number of func-
tionaries as well as arts of their organization to the public eye. How-
ever, even when ad fitted to the political scene, the Party usually
acknowledges the hostility of the society it lives in, and attempts to
submerge, automatically and by virtue of its organizational principles,
the more significant areas of Party work.
Every Communi t Party is a centralized and centrally -directed. ., -
mechanism controlled by a comparatively small group of professional,
paid and full-time functionaries -- the cadre. Within.this cadre-
hierarchy the functionaries at national headquarters occupy the central
position and have a monopoly on policy -making and organizational direc-
tion. Accustomed to strict semi-military discipline, the lower Party
cadre and the rank and file are mere instruments of the Party center.
By virtue of its leadership function the Party center normally guards
the professional secrets of the Party, not unlike the management of a
business enterprise. The Party center, then, puts the stamp of secrecy
on such matters as arty finances, particularly on the origin of funds
not, derived from nor al sources; intra-Party communications of more
than normal adminis rative significance; relations with other fraternal
Parties exceeding th normal interchange of Party literature, and other
routine communications and relations with the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union or repr sentatives of the Soviet Government and the Comin-
form, which are like y to compromise the Party. Experience has further
shown that Soviet int lligence agencies frequently channel their recruit-
ment of Party memo rs through individual functionaries in national Party
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headquarters -- operations which require secure and secret handling.
Thus, even under normal conditions, highly significant aspects of
Party work are managed by a small nucleus of trusted functionaries
and are tightly sealed off from the rest of the Party and the outside
world.
Further, Communist Parties generally maintain intra-Party
police organs, frequently identical with the Cadre Department and
the Control Commission. These agencies are organizational corol-
laries of the cadre principle. As the Party is built upon its cadre,
it is essential for the center,not only to train, protect and properly
assign the professional personnel, but also to preserve constant
ideological and security control. Thus, most Parties maintain a
confidential corps of Party "detectives" who must often perform
counter-espionage duties such as the identification of police agents
infiltrated into the ranks. of the Party, and "illegal" support functions
such as the procurement of false papers and passports for the cadre.
Clearly, the existence of such a Party police force must be concealed,
not only for security reasons, but also for ideological reasons.
On the level of "normal" Party operations, secrecy is also
unavoidable. Considering the smallest operative Party unit, the
individual Party member, it is a well-known fact that many Commu-
nists operate without ostensible connection with the Party. This
apparent lack of connection may be aimed at personal protection or
at safeguarding a particular, often secret, mission. In any case,
the secret Party member shows up in almost every Party -~
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The Party, however, needs not only secret Party members -- it
is bent upon the manipulation of non-Communist groups and organiza-
tions in order to establish "mass support" as a prerequisite for
revolutionary action. The approaches to this organizational problem
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obviously vary from I
which they are handle
in the particular coun
to surround itself wit)
to attract accessible ~
non-Communist mass
political movements i
control. In all these
control over fronts ar
difficult to solve as tr
in public.
Clearly, however
not confine itself to de
whether legal or pros(
as will weaken. the coe
as well as hostile groi
rather than in general
the Party can never ne
character and it must
indirectly related to fi
by no means clear-cut
involves what amounts
intelligence organizati
ramifications. The g(
provides for the organ
the police, the navy, t
tion groups in order tc
of information which v
hostile power mechani
the enemy, 1' particula
times include the organ
plants and enterprises
systematically the
society are clearly re:
security in its widest
particularly when the
traitorous or insecure
revolutionary situation
military organization
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arty to Party, and the extent of secrecy with
I is determined by the political climate prevailing
ry. In general, however, the Party will attempt
a solar system of front organizations in order
roups, and will further direct its fractions into
organizations -- for example, labor unions and
colonial countries -- in order to expand Party
ases, it will be a problem of concealing Party
3 fractions, a problem which becomes increasingly
manipulative techniques of the Party are exposed
, as a revolutionary organization, the Party can-
fensive tactics alone. No matter what its status,
ribed, the Party must at least plan such activities
rcive power mechanism of the "capitalist" state,
zps and political parties, in concrete operational,
political terms. No matter what its tactical shifts,
yglect its fundamentally military-revolutionary
attempt to organize support functions directly or
iture revolutionary action. This concept, which is
and free from straight political considerations,
to the setting up of intelligence and counter-
.ons and/or operations, with all their operational
neral operational program of the Communist Party
,ization of secret Party nuclei in the armed forces,
he government, and occasionally also within opposi-
specialize and concentrate upon a) the procurement
Tould clarify the organization and capabilities of the
sm; b) clandestine subversion within the citadel of
rly in the armed forces. The program may also at
.ization of clandestine nuclei operating in strategic
to provide industrial and economic information
productive capabilities and. facilities of the hostile
Lated to the problems of revolutionary action. Party
sense may also require a more aggressive approach,
physical liquidation of hostile individuals and
Party members is concerned. Finally, when a
approaches, the Party must provide for a para-
to form the executive core of revolutionary
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action -- action, however, which sets into coordinated motion the
entire Party mechanism and the social forces allied with it.
Such and similar clandestine action auxiliaries of the Party
have been occasionally observed in operation. These offensive
clandestine Party operations probably represent the most signifi-
cant area of Party work. They perform functions which transgress
the area of "normal" political action and they may constitute' an acute
threat to the existing social order. However, it is not possible to
generalize too far on the subject, While the normal aspects of Party
organization follow a pattern anywhere, it is by no means certain that
every Party organizes clandestine action auxiliaries in the same
'fashion.
On the basis of evidence available at present, it appears that
Leninist action theory applies practically to the organization of
clandestine action auxiliaries as it applies to any other aspect of
Party work. Thus, the actual organization of clandestine military
auxiliaries prior to the all-out revolutionary effort depends not only
upon such factors as availability of trained manpower, leaders and
arms, but also upon the making of a clear-cut policy decision that a
revolutionary situation,. which may be successfully exploited by the
Party, is near or at hand. While it may be expected. that all Parties
include individuals or even groups who are specialists in military
matters, it would be futile for example, to search for a facsimile of
the Military Revolutionary Organization of the Bolshevik Party (1917)
in the Communist Party of Great Britain at present,. Incipient or
underdeveloped Parties are more likely to concentrate upon political
action in order to achieve mass influence. Parties which have reached
a stage of relative mass proportions may find it practicable to organize
secret military cadres and formations. Again, however, policy con-
siderations and the degree of expectable opposition will affect planning,
timing and organization.
Similar considerations apply to the organization of counter-
intelligence, intelligence, sabotage, liquidation and. other clandestine
action agencies. Materials studied indicate that a stepping -up of such
activity and its formalization in special auxiliaries occurs during
critical periods considered by the Party favorable to aggressive,
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revolutionary action ir
early Thirties when..th
estimated as coming tc
definite relation exists
philosophy governing t
of well-defined clandei
general, such as the middle Twenties and the
"relative stabilization" of capitalism was
an end. It is considered, therefore, that a
between the particular phase of the action-
ie Party at any given time and the incidence
tine action auxiliaries. Informally, however,
and in a less pronounced. fashion, the Party will naturally never pass.
up any chance for clandestine work in the power apparatus of the State
or in hostile groups and organizations.
In focussing upon the organization of underground Parties as well
as on the organization
attempts to clarify the
Party experiences. p
against the totality of
estimation, as well -as
tions may dangerously
Party must be apprec''
of clandestine action auxiliaries, this paper '
problem in terms of both past and current
gain however, this paper must. be examined
he Party's work in a given society -- over-
underestimation, of clandestine Party opera-
distort the terms on which each. national
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II. POLICE AND PARTY
On general principles, the Party prefers to assume the form of
a "legal" political party, in order to achieve more easily a mass
basis. Under "legal" conditions, the entire propaganda and agitation
apparatus can be employed overtly; front organizations can be set up
at will; the Party's drawing power can be demonstrated at the polls;
Communists can operate with greater ease in labor unions, and enter
the government by way of democratic processes.
The Party will therefore fight desperately and until the last
minute to maintain its legal status. It will marshall public opinion
with the aid of liberal sympathizers and fellow-travellers. It will
employ for its defense sympathetic or crypto-Communist lawyers,
who are frequently pooled in international or national front organiza-
tions. It will receive the moral assistance of foreign CP's and-the
Soviet party-government, making an international propaganda issue
of the Party's case.
In any case, the Party will seek.to delay its transfer to illegality
as long as possible, realizing that its organization and operations will
be severely hampered bjr the loss of legal status. Once driven.under-
ground, it will make every effort to become "legal" again.
The Party knows that it can be paralyzed by an efficient police.
The primary concern of the Party underground, therefore, is with
the law enforcement agencies, for these can control the fate of the
Party and its leaders. It is often extremely difficult for the Party
to protect itself against police penetration, arrests, and searches.
Even in areas where the police are not particularly efficient, the
Party must spend considerable effort and time on defensive measures.
The over-all success of the police, however, is conditioned by
several factors, some of which may work to the Party's advantage.
.1. Geographical Factors. In large countries and in countries
with inaccessible territories (mountains, marshland, jungles, vast
forests), the surveillance and border-control problems are difficult
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for the police. The e
shows how great disti
traffic. More recent
Malaya, et al., illu;
xperience of the Bolshevik Party before 1917
.nces favor individual escapes and illegal'bc der
events in Brazil, Greece, the Philippines,
;trate the same point.
2. Population Density. Overcrowded metropolitan areas with
vast slums9 as well as port cities, also enhance chances for sur-
vival. It is comparatively easy for the underground Communist to
shake off pursuit in highly populated street-mazes and among the
wharves.
3. Political Fac ors, Police action against the Party may be
hindered or encourag d by public opinion. Under a totalitarian anti-
Communist government, police persecution of the Party will
obviously be far more effective than under the relatively mild,
legalistic approach o democratic governments. Mussolini, for
example, took a great personal. interest in police and intelligence
operations against the Italian Communist Party, and frequently
directed them himself -- a factor which clearly increased the
efficiency of the Itali n security agencies.
On the other hani
lax and seek only to n
without seriously affe
balanced political siti
near the Soviet border
shaky "liberal" gover
from rightist parties
might become an ally
too, fearful for the fu
too strict and choose
1, a loosely controlled police force may grow
lake occasional arrests for publicity purposes,
cting the Party's operations. A precariously
Lation, such as obtains particularly in countries
rs, may also affect police operations. A
nment may be forced by increasing pressure
to soften its attitude toward the Party, which
in case of need. The individual police official,
Lure of his position, may feel it unwise to be
rather to straddle the fence.
4. Mass Support for Police. If there is mass support for the
regime and its punitive policy, as in Nazi Germany, police opera-
tions against the Part may prove extremely effective. Under such
conditions, the police are able to procure a great number of infor-
mers and penetration agents, as well as disaffected Party members
who remain in the Pa ty as police agents. Large-scale cultivation
of disaffected elements and the development of penetration opportunities
have been favorite police tactics since the early days of the Bolshevik
Party.
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in importance only to Lenin in the Bolshevik wing of the underground
Whenever it has been feasible to put these methods into practice,
they have produced astonishing results. The Tsarist police, for
example, were able to recruit Malinovsky, who for a time was second
Russian Social Democratic Labor Party.
The greatest danger which the Party underground must face is
often not the police itself but the psychological impact of the anti-
Communist movement upon the population and upon the morale of the
Party members themselves. Nevertheless, various Parties which
have undergone this persecution, such as the Bolshevik Party and the
European Parties in.the Fascist period, have managed, in one form
or other, to survive. While the drawing-power of Communist ideology
may partially account for the Party's durability, the adaptability of
Party organization to illegal conditions is an important additional
factor in the struggle between Party and police.
25X6A
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III:.. ADAPTABILITY OF PARTY ORGANIZATION TO ILLEGAL.
CONDITIONS
The model pattern of Party organization, developed by the Bolshevik
Party during more. than a decade of illegality, was grafted,. through the
Comintern, upon all foreign. Parties. Thus, the basic forms of Party
organization,. as encountered today, have been pretested under illegal
conditions. Consequently, when a Party is declared illegal, there is no
need to alter its basic structure. All that is necessary is an adaptation
of .organization.to illegal conditions, The. specific advantages inherent
in "normal" Communist Party organization, may be summed up as
follows o
a. The Party preserves its continuity in terms of organi-
zation and personnel.
b. The Party emphasizes discipline and security even in legal
periods.
c. Communist doctrine acts as a morale-builder in illegal
periods, and may become attractive to the non-Communist
leftist. in times, of general suppression of all "progressive"
movements.
d. The basic cell organization. of the Party, practiced at all
times, facilitates underground operations.
e. More than any other "normal" political party, the Com-
munist Party has'acquired a backlog of "illegal.:" experience,
even. under legal conditions. 0
1. Organizational Continuity. By its nature as a revolutionary
organization, the Communist Party will operate under any conditions,
legal or illegal. On the basis of its theory, it considers the transition
to illegality an extremely undesirable but otherwise "normal" conse
quence of the class struggle.
This advantage is not enjoyed by the evolutionary Marxist parties
(Social Democrats) which operate strictly by legal, parliamentary
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democratic methods When ostracized and suppressed, such parties
often undergo sever morale and organization' ;: i.: ? : _;, Because of
their fundamental inability (so often attacked by the Communists) to
conceive of a revolutionary approach, they interpret their ostracism
as "failure of the le dership", "failure of doctrine", and begin to
disassociate themselves, psychologically and organizationally, from
their past. "In all Fascist countries, " states a leading Social Demo-
crat, referring toevents in the thirties, "there grows this idea
within the illegal (Socialist) cadre: We are something new! We are
not a mere continuat"on of the old party!. . The old is dead --
something entirely n w must develop now. "
Behind the secu ity of its prefabricated doctrine, the Communist
Party does not, as a rule, need to scrutinize its basic philosophy or
raison d'etre under illegal conditions. Party continuity is taken for
granted by the Communists. When the Party is outlawed it does not
waste precious time and energies wrangling over basic theory and
metaphysical issues. It does not have one form of organization for
legal and another for illegal conditions. The underground Party is
the Party underground.
2? Cadre Conti uity. A further guarantee of continuity is the
fact that the Party is at all times a "cadre Party", As many execu-
tive and administrative positions as possible are occupied by trained,
experienced, full-time and salaried functionaries or "professional
revolutionaries". While the size, reliability and capabilities of the
cadre obviously vary from country to country, the Party habitually,
and as a matter of principle, creates a caste of functionaries who
are entirely dependent upon the Party center in financial, personal
and ideological terms, and who can therefore be depended upon to
follow the center underground,
The extent to which the individual cadre-man is tied to the Party
by personal interest is ably described by A. Rossi (Physiology of the
French Communist arty, Paris, 1948).
"The role layed by personal interest in this faithful
adherence to the Party is greater than one might think. - . The
Party functionar cannot become a functionary without quitting
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tl
his factory, his office, his profession -- he takes on new habits
and lives differently. He sheds his roots, he becomes a sort of
outcast.... He has entered a new social. class, a class sui
generis it is true,: but still elevated as only the salaried class of
industry and commerce...... To quit (this class.) means to be
thrown back into the limbo from where he came. it
. As an added incentive for its cadre, the Party also dispenses power,
which. Rossi describes as frequently greater than that. of high-level
government officials. Having tasted this power, the functionary is
reluctant to give it up.
. A party run both at the center and at the periphery by a well-
trained and disciplined cadre -bureaucracy has the advantage of a con-
crete and specific approach to the problem of going underground. It
can prepare and provide for the event in terms of cadre protection and
replacement. Whatever action potential a Party may salvage in illegality
depends less on the extent to which it can protect its rank and.fle from
arrest, than, on the success it achieves in salvaging or replacing its
entire cadre. The disadvantage of the system, however, is..that if the
cadre fails, the Party fails. The Party underground is the cadre under-
grounda
3. Discipline and Security. The stress on strict discipline which is
required under illegal conditions. constitutes no problem for the Party.
The cadres. will have been trained already and conditioned. to depend on
the instructions of the center in any circumstance. The center wall.
therefore encounter little resistance in. strengthening. its. control over
the cadre, and will -be able to dispense with th- se features of "democratic
centralism" which permitted the rank and file to participate, however
minimally, in: the selection. of the cadre during legal periods. Instructions
issued by the illegal CP France of 1940, for example, stated specifically
that the election of functionaries was out of the question, ;,ad that only
Centralism was to be conserved. While this relationship has the definite
operational advantage of permitting, co coordinated action even under haz -
ardous. conditions, the dependence of the cadre on the. center can choke
the initiative of the individual cadre -man and. impede the efficiency of the
Party.
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Discipline under
to the political and o
rigorous conformity
spiratorial behavior
"betrayed" Party sec
the competent organs
no regard for the cir
(Control Commissio
tions) is a traditional
veniently adapted to
which endangers the
in the Party undergr
police action, moral
defections and penetr
4. Doctrine as
tion and conspiratori
the Party's struggle
underground life on t
quently extremely t
necessity. No matte
for power go into the
a willingness to sacr
a stronger motive th
Party, ready-made,
ideology. Asa mora
line of defense of the
(which is, of course,
as well as illegal per
habits in Communistsl:
a. Superiority complex.. The doctrine is dispensed as
"absolute t uth", providing the believer with a set of answers
for every political, social and philosophical problem. The
illegal conditions means not only strict adherence
ganizational direction of the center, but also
ith underground security rules governing the con-
f cadre and militants. A functionary who has
rets under severe police pressure is punished by
of the Party for a "breach of discipline", with
umstances in which the betrayal occurred.
of discipline and security by special Party organs
Cadre Commission, and other specialized sec-
feature of Party organization which can be con-
derground conditions. The main factor, however,
uccessful preservation of discipline and security
and is that, in the course of extremely severe
may disintegrate and result in factionalism, mass
tions.
orale-Builder. Efficient underground organiza-
skill are, of course, the decisive elements in
o maintain itself when illegal. The demands of
e underground Party worker, however, are fre -
ing, and good morale becomes an operational
how much opportunism, adventurism, or lust
make -up of the individual functionary or activist,
ice everything for the sake of the Party demands
these. This motivation is furnished by the
n the form of its doctrine, the Marxist-Leninist
e -building element, doctrine stands in the first
Party underground. Thorough indoctrination
a continuous and well-organized process in legal
ods) appears to induce the following psychological
e longer he stays in the Party, the less he is able
siders himself a crusader, a fighter for a "new
vidual Communist, in possession of "absolute
&MIA
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 Sanitized - Approved For R P78-00915R000600130001-0
to think in un-Communist terms. He feels eternally mis-
understood by non-Communists and, when, ostracized, feels
victimized. In brief, his indoctrination produces the con-
viction that he is fighting for a just cause -- a definite morale
asset.
b. Hostility, Based upon. the idea of class struggle, the
doctrine systematizes and cultivates hostility generated by
social conflict, frustration and maladjustment. The doctrine
is one of hatred directed at the "class enemy", the latter
being anyone who does not share the Party's point of view.
Such indoctrination, required by the revolutionary-military
nature of the Party, pays off during periods of illegality.
Hostility grows with the increasing pressure exerted by the
"class enemy" and, added-to the instinct for self-preservation,
leads to vigorous resistance.
c. Optimism. Communist doctrine has a strong morale-
building element in its "scientific" certainty of the inevitable
doom of capitalist society. Defeat can be rationalized as a
temporary setback, a deficiency in organization, or the result
of the work of traitors. But it can never be accepted as
definite and final, Optimism is prescribed as the Communist's
basic attitude, and pessimism becomes a heresy. In this. out-
look there is a modicum of religious strength, an asset not to
be underestimated during a period of underground activity.
5. Attraction of Doctrine. In situations where repressive measures
are applied to the non-Communist evolutionary Marxist, liberal and
progressive parties, as well as to the Communist Party, Communist
doctrine may actually extend beyond its defensive function and further
the growth of the illegal Party. When repression becomes total, as under
the Fascist regimes, the peaceful-evolutionists and liberal democrats
may lose their faith in moderate tactics and join the Communists, who
always maintain that socialism cannot be established by legal methods
alone. Under Nazi control, the Austrian working class felt that the
Socialists' democratic methods had brought about their defeat and began
to place their hope in Communist objectives. CP Austria became a
significant organization for the first time in its history during the term
of.Nazi suppression; it declined when suppression was lifted.
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 Sanitized -Approved F. - A-RDP78-00915R000600130001-0
6. Cell System. Under illegal conditions, when security con-
siderations demand the atomization of Party organization, the Party
need only adjust its c ll system, through which basic operations are
effected? The grouping of the rank and file into small nuclei at the
place of work, at th place of residence, and in non-Communist
parties and organizat'ons ensures the systematic exploitation of the
cell member's norm outside contacts for propaganda and recruit-
ment purposes. This is an all-important task in the underground
when other Party act vities may be curtailed. The importance of
illegal cell activity i intensified by the fact that intermediate echelons
are usually reduced t skeletons; hence, for practical purposes the
Party underground of en consists only of the center and the numerous
"front line" cell orga iizations. There is inherent in this system,
however advantageous, ? a considerable risk of isolation. When com-
munications break down, as they frequently do, the basic Party organ-
izations become ineff ctive or detached from the Party line. If the
breakdown is prolong d, as it was in Germany under Hitler, the Party
is reduced to a multitude of isolated nuclei, which can do little more
than maintain their clandestine existence for the day when the Party
may be revived. It i at this point that the extent to which the Party
has accumulated and ransmitted lessons learned from conspiratorial
experience' becomes ffective.
7. Backlog.of Conspiratorial Experience. Through the Comintern,
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has shaped the organizational
policy of all foreign Parties, and has passed on its own considerable
experience in underground work. Throughout the years of its existence,
the Comintern exhort d and obliged its sections to prepare adequately
for periods of illegality. By means of its Organization Bureau, headed
until about 1936 by Ossip Piatnitzky, a leading organizer of the Russian
underground, the Comintern furnished specific advice on underground
operations and proble s. Terms used in the Russian underground, such
as "technical apparatus" for illegal printing and distribution facilities,
have consistently found their way into the nomenclature of foreign
Parties. The Greek arty, for example, currently uses a Russian
word, "Yavka", mea ing a clandestine reporting center. The "groups
of three" upon which illegal Party organization appears to be based so
frequently, have their equivalent in the Russian underground term,
"troika" (team of three).
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The fundamental problems of illegal activity are now widely under -
stood by the various Parties. The practical experiences of many
Parties, accumulated during underground periods and pooled by the
Comintern prior to 1943, have increased the conspiratorial competence
of the movement, There is hardly a significant Party which has not
gone through illegal or semi-legal phases. While first-hand experi-
ence probably remains the best task-master, it is evident that a pattern
at least exists in general outlines, and that a Party faced with illegality
acts on it. To what degree this pattern has been created by a central-
ized effort, or by the appearance of identical problems treated in a
similar fashion by different Parties, is a minor point. It is more
important to recognize and understand the basic Communist approach
to the organizational and operational problems of the Party underground.
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IV. ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS: ADJUSTMENT TO ILLEGAL
CONDITIONS
The fundamental organizational problem faced by the Party going
underground. is: How to combine maximal security with. maximal
activity -- how to expose its agencies and functionaries to the police
as little as possible. Therefore, the primary concern is with a
,realistic and practicable streamlining of the bureaucratic apparatus.
1. Reduction of Party Apparatus. The extent of the streamlining
process is. determined by the size of the legal Party, the severity of
repressive action against it, and general policy considerations. A
small or underdeveloped Party apparatus cannot be drastically reduced;
a mass Party may find it necessary to run the risk of preserving an
extensive organization. Within.the limits of such considerations, action
may be taken along the following lines:
a. Consolidation of territorial organizations. The terri-
torial organization of the Party, particularly in a large
country, can be conveniently consolidated and reduced.
This makes it possible to utilize staff personnel with
greater economy, and to concentrate communications
with the Party center. All levels of territorial organiza-
tion (region, district, subdistrict and section) may be
reduced simply,by unifying the various staff corrahands,
and combining their original areas of jurisdiction. The
twenty-eight regional organizations (Bezirke) of the Ger-
man Communist Party before 1933, for example, were
consolidated after the advent of Nazi suppression into
eight inter-regional organizations (Oberb:ezirke) other
territorial organizations were apparently also reduced in
number while their jurisdiction was extended.
The Party center itself may be less affected by the pro-
cess of consolidation: a large Party may need a. large
central organization.. On the cell level, however, con-
solidation is not practical. For security reasornns, cells
must be broken up into small units if they are to escape
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police attention. Hence, at the same time that territorial
organization may decrease in number or disappear altogether,
the cell organizations in the Party underground may be
atomized an grow in number,
b. Reduction of staffs, In addition to the consolidation of
territorial organizations, the number of staff positions
throughout the Party is normally reduced in the underground.
The territorial Party committees are apparently strongly
affected in this respect. According to a Comintern instruc-
tion, the committees of illegal Parties should, as a rule, con-
sist of no more than five people, and a secretary should take
the place of he executive bureau. In practice, the composi-
tion of illega Party committees appears to be more elastic,
depending on prevailing conditions. The extent to which the
membership of the Central Committee may be reduced is also
determined b the actual situation, Members of the Central
Committee a e elected at the national Party Congress or Party
Conference, and their tenure of office is valid for both legal
and illegal periods, Over and above the losses sustained by a
Central Committee through arrests and other operational mis-
haps, there is, however, no gene-ral indication of how numeri-
cal composit on is affected by illegal conditions. It may be as
large or as s all as conditions warrant.
There seems to be a general tendency to eliminate Party Com-
mittees during illegal periods, and to assign actual organiza-
tional and political work to the executive-administrative
apparatus of he Party. CP Chile, for example, simply
eliminated al Committees and transferred the direction of
the Party to 'ts executive agencies, as follows:
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CONTROL
COMMISSION
POLITICAL
COMMISSION
SECRETARY
GENERAL
REGIONAL
SECRETARY 1
REGIONAL
SECRETARY
LOCAL
SECRETARY
CELLS\
Insofar as the executive -administrative apparatus of a Central
Committee is concerned, practical security reasons obviously recom-
mend the paring down of staff personnel. If the actual work-load is
too heavy to permit reduction, the Secretariat and the various Depart-
ments or Commissions of the Central Committee (such as Cadre,
Organization, Youth, Agit-Prop, etc.) may continue, while new com-
missions may be created for technical services, relief for interned
comrades, and the like, In some Parties, the personnel of these
Departments may be reduced. In others, the staff may continue or be
replaced. One Central Committee may dissolve its Politburo and
transfer its functions to the National Secretariat. Another may enlarge
its membership in order to make up for expected losses in executive
positions. There is no general rule except adaptability to the situation
at hand.
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2. The Command Function: The Triad System, Consolidation
of territorial organ nations and reduction of staff personnel can, in
some cases, be combined with a special organization of the command
function observable only in underground Parties, According to this
system, at all echelons, from the national down to the cell level,
groups of three functionaries may be established with two -fold re -
sponsibilities: the ver-all direction and supervision of Party work
at their level, and maintenance of vertical liaison with each other.
In the latter capacit these triads represent the live chain of command
in the illegal Party. Whenever observed, these triads have consisted
of a) a specialist for political work, b) a specialist for organizational
problems, and c) a specialist for agitation and propaganda, mass work,
or for labor union work.
The triads, ho ever, do not necessarily replace whatever other
Party organizations may remain effective. They are sometimes merely
superimposed on the illegal Party machinery in order to monopolize
direction. Triads a national and territorial levels have been known to
direct the work of te various administrative and, executive departments
and commissions of the Party. However, it cannot be clearly determined
at present to what extent the national triad may combine executive command
with policy-making unctions. Theoretically it remains responsible to the
Politburo, but in fact it may well become the actual leadership of the Party.
The triad principle may even be applied to cell organization. Cells can be
constituted as three man groups, each member recruiting and .directing
another group of thr e who are not cell members and who comprise sub-
cell basic units.
The triad repre ents an effective concentration of the command func-
tion in the hands of comparatively few individuals. It permits greater
centralization and c mpartmentalization.
3. Compartmentalization. Tight compartmentalization is an organi-
zation and security problem of the first order, since it is necessary to
prevent the police from learning too much when Party members or func-
tionaries are arrested. Compartmentalization is applied to Party opera-
tions as follows:
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a. Party and military branch. Whenever an underground
Party is in.the position. to create a military organization,
the latter's- staff composition is kept distinct from the Party's
political mechanism. The two structures merely coordinate
on policy and recruitment problems. at their highest echelons.
b. Party and auxiliary (front) organizations. Aa in legal
periods, various Party auxiliaries (youth organizations,
women's organizations, sport clubs, etc. ,) remain connected
with the Party through interlocking staff personnel only. They
function on their own., as independently as possible.
c. Party and auxiliary illegal organizations. Party organi-
zations, or teams for the performance of such specialized
tasks as espionage, sabotage, clandestine penetration of
police and other government agencies, liquidation and terror
groups, etc. , are established as largely independent and self-
contained groups even in legal periods. They are maintained
on this basis in times of illegality.
d. Internal Party compartmentalization. Within the political
mechanism of the Party proper, the desired effect can be
ideally achieved by the following measures:
1) Elimination of horizontal liaison. No cell and no
territorial organization is permitted to maintain contact
with any other party organ operating on the same level.
Liaison may only be conducted vertically with the designated
functionary of the superior Party organization, whose task
it is to direct the lower organizations under his jurisdiction.
2) Restriction of contacts. The fewer comrades a func-
tionary or activist knows and meets in.the course of his work,
the better. This principle is sound if applied realistically.
It can, however, be formalized to an extreme degree. CP
France in 1941, for example, applied the triad system not
only to the organization of the command function, but ap-
parently als.o, as a security measure, to all Party activities.
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No co rade was to know more than two other Party
workers. It is questionable whether the French
principle can be put into practice rigidly. Even CP
Franc frequently had to threaten disciplinary action
in order to push its compartmentalization program to
the ext a me.
3)
group
to) the
Franc
each f
sible,
to his
ground
occur
Election of
4.
plied to the illegal
and the direction of
national and territo
When this is the cas
sents an organizatio
Parties that in an u
possible, though the
the elections thems
members would not
this advice has bee
Functional restrictions. "The comrades of a
f three must not know anything but (what refers
r work proper," states an instruction of CP
(1941). More than ever, it is incumbent upon
ctors of illegal Party work to define the job of
nctionary and activist clearly, so that he does
y beyond security limits. It is not always pos-
owever, for the individual functionary to "stick
uns". Nothing is less permanent than an under
organization, and shifts from one job to another
ften. As a result, a functionary may learn more
good for the Party.
,arty Committees. The streamlining process ap-
arty organization may not always be extensive,
he Party may actually lie in the hands of the
ial committees and their administrative organs.
, the illegal election of Party committees repre-
al problem. The Comintern advised its member
derground situation illegal Party elections were
must take place in restricted conferences and
Ives handled in such a way that even the conference
now who was elected. It is not certain whether
generally heeded, as the problems of illegal
entical.
a. Election of Central Committees. Electing. a Central
Committee at a conference abroad is one way of circumvent-
ing security restrictions at home when the Party is under -
ground. In this way, the Bolshevik underground elected its
Central Committee at conferences abroad, attended by dele-
gates who travelled illegally from the interior of Russia.
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In 1949, the Party conferences of CP Greece were held
abroad for practical purposes (in the rebel area). This
is also true of CP Spain at present. On. the other hand,
conditions prevailing in a particular country may permit
the holding of large illegal meetings at home. For
example, the illegal Central Committee (38 members) of
CP Yugoslavia was elected in that country at a national
conference of more than 100 delegates in October 1940.
The Party may not be able to hold a national Party Con-
gress for the election of the Central Committee, but may
be able to convoke the smaller national conference. Again
in the case of CP Yugoslavia, special dispensation was
granted by the Comintern in 1940 to allow the election of a
Central Committee at a national conference instead of a
congress.
b. Territorial Party committees and electoral commissions.
Special electoral commissions have sometimes been created
for the purpose of electing members of territorial Party
Committees. A Comintern document refers to two types of
such commissions.
1) An electoral commission chosen by the Party con-
ference for the counting of secret votes. cast. The commis
sion checks the votes but does not announce election results
to the conference.
2) A small electoral commission, elected by a Party
conference, together with a representative of the next
higher Party committee, actually "elects" (i. e. , appoints)
the new Party committee. In this case, the Party conference
does not cast votes for candidates. It merely elects the
commission.
c. Co-option. Elections of Party committees at all levels can be
replaced by or combined with "co-option" -- i. e. , appointment
to its membership by a specific Party committee. This practice,
however, appears to, be regarded as an interim solution. Under
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normal co ditions, all members of Party committees are
supposed to be elected. One of the most severe of the
criticisms directed by the CP Soviet Union against CP
Yugoslavs in 1948 was that the latter had.carried over a
disproportionate number of co=opted Central Committee
members into the legal post-war period. Administrative-
executive positions may also be filled by co-opting respon-
sible functionaries.
5. Party Organizations Abroad. When repressive measures
become severe, the central Party organs, as well as special support
centers, often have t be established abroad, working from the outside
into "illegal" territo y. This method of salvaging and maintaining cen-
tralized leadership a road has been traditional with the movement since
the days when Marx and Engels wrote in exile, and when Lenin and his
staff abroad laid the foundation for the CP of the Soviet Union. The
types of central organizations commonly transferred.to, or created upon,
foreign;. soil are the following:
a. Central Committee and Central Departments. The Central
Committee and its administrative -executive apparatus
(Politburo Secretariat, Departments, Control Commission)
may be transferred, either in their entirety or in their salvage -
able comp nents. Such was the case with CP Germany under
the Hitler regime, At present (1949), the central organs of CP
Spain and P Greece are functioning in the same manner.; , The
freedom o action enjoyed by centers outside the home country
obviously varies with the attitudes of the government and police
of the host country. Party centers abroad are often forced to
operate illegally or semi-illegally and are therefore not always
effective. The current solution to this problem lies, when
practical, in transferring the center to the Soviet Union or to
satellite a eas.
The centr organs abroad, as well as performing a command
assignment, must also provide the Party at home with propa-
ganda and indoctrination material, printing equipment, funds,
specialists in underground work, a central repository for files
and archiv s, training facilities for the illegal cadre, communi-
cation services, arms and ammunition, safe haven, and financial,
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support for exiled Party workers. In short, the central
Party organization abroad becomes the chief operational
support center for the home Party. It must therefore
frequently create new types of auxiliary and administrative
organizations.
b. Foreign Bureau. The Bolshevik Party abroad and the
Italian Party during the Mussolini era (the Ufficio Estero
in Paris) are known to have established Foreign Bureaus.
This organization represents a central administrative-
executive agency charged with the direction of support func-
tions, such as communications, production and di.5tribution
of press and propaganda, etc. Theoretically, the supervision
of the Foreign Bureau rests with the Central Committee, but
in the cases. at hand, the Bureaus-have been the real directing
centers.
c. Regional support centers. The apparatus of the Central
Committee abroad may prove unable to handle all its work-
load, particularly when it must operate into a country with
long frontiers. Consequently, the command and support func-
tion.may have to be decentralized, and several support centers,
operating from various countries into sectors of the homeland,
may be created. The central organization of CP Germany, -
established abroad in the thirties, created such regional support
centers in the form of regional command posts (Abbschnittsleitungen),
which operated out of several countries bordering on Germany.
Coordination with the Central Committee was effected through the
assignment of Central Committee members to the regional centers.
d. Party organizations for emigrants. Special Party organiza-
tions for exiled Communists, such as the "Emigrantenleitungen"
of the German Party organization abroad, may be created. They
do relief work and carry out the indoctrination and training func -
tions of basic Party organizations. They also furnish personnel
for special underground assignments (couriers, border guides,
etc. ).
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 Sanitized - Apprrove IA-RDP78-00915R000600130001-0
Party organi
with front or
latter, somet
tions for emi
from which t
pretext furni
far -flung org
the war was
Central Co
Free German
particularly i
States, folio
e. Special s
usually has t
tions. with the
through a bor
control of the
station. The
tribution via
entrusted to
a Technical S
sable for the
ations for emigrants should not be confused
anizations created by the Party abroad. The
Imes set up instead of special Party organiza-
rants, serve political propaganda purposes
e home Party may benefit. They are con-
-raising instruments for the Party under the
hed by the front's ostensible purpose. The
nization of the Free German Movement during
uch a front constituted abroad. The German
ittee in Moscow practically merged with the
center in the USSR; other Party nuclei abroad,
Latin America, Great Britain and the United
ed suit.
rvice organizations, The Party Center abroad
create special organs, to facilitate communica-
homeland. Communications may be .expedited
er -crossing mechanism, either under direct
center or manipulated by a regional support
production of printed materials and their dis -
pecial communications routes may have, to be
separate organization, usually referred. to as
rvice or Apparatus. These groups, indispen-
ffective functioning of the illegal Party, will
be discussed .n greater detail below (see. V, 3), as they are
not only of Party. organizations abroad, but
Party organi
sensitive sup
raised by the
country in th
courier pers
ever, merge
solve these p
home country as well.
ations abroad fulfill extremely necessary and
ort functions. Their efficiency is frequently
assistance obtained from the CP of the host
shape of funds, living space, safe houses,
nnel, etc. Their operational problems, how-
ith those of the Party at home. Failure to
oblems may spell the death of the Party.
- 26 -
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 Sanitized - Approved For P78-00915R000600130001-0
V. OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS OF THE PARTY UNDERGROUND.
While the Party is legal, it normally exposes most of its cadre to
the public eye. Once it is outlawed, therefore, a certain number of
functionaries and activists have to be withdrawn from active duty. Those
ranking functionaries who are indispensable must be safely housed or
otherwise protected from the police. The compromised cadre must be
replaced, and new personnel has to be trained for the various new func-
tions which are characteristic of underground work. In view of the
hazardous conditions which prevail in the underground, a special type
of cadre must be developed: self -controlled, self -sacrificing and
intrepid. More than ever, able cadre selection and supervision become
the problems of the Party's personnel agencies (cadre departments and
commissions). Numerically, a balance must be struck between a cadre
which is too large -- and therefore in danger of exposure -- and a cadre
which is too small -- and therefore incapable of mass work, shrinking
into insignificant study and discussion circles.
a. Replacement of the cadre must be undertaken as a pre -
paratory measure before the Party is actually outlawed.
Sensitive functions may be secretly transferred to an
"invisible cadre" of comparatively unknown individuals.
The Comintern strongly advised the creation of an in-
visible cadre, an "illegally directing core", which must
be kept distinct and separate from the Party Committee's
legal apparatus, and thus ready to take over numerous
supervisory functions when the Party goes underground.
This cadre, according to the Comintern, was to be formed
from those Communist leaders who were comparatively un-
known to the police and the rank and file of the Party, but
who were well trained in practical Party work.
According to the Comintern, the process of developing and
bringing into play an invisible cadre should be applied to the
entire Party structure and its auxiliaries, within trade unions
and other legal "revolutionary" organizations. If, by the time
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 Sanitized - Apprp -01'116- RoMmaw CIA-RDP78-00915R000600130001-0
the Party is ou lawed, these invisible cadres have been
strategically placed and properly trained, the most sensi-
tive functions o the Party apparatus, as well as Party
documents, ca be handed over to them. Hence, when the
police seize Party premises, very little of the Party's
activities and f w of its personnel will be revealed.,
It also become necessary to deceive the police further
by divesting ostensibly important functions of their signi-
ficance. The Secretary of a Party committee, normally
the most impor ant functionary, may, in the underground,
be degraded fr m political. leader to administrative officer.
The Comintern instructs on this point as follows:
"Not only is
Committee c
leader of the
be its politic
It is imports
mittee in ill(
upon whom,
that person i
his arrest w
The political
it not necessary for the secretary of the
f a Communist Party to be the political
Committee, but as a rule he should not
al leader.... Why is such a rule essential?
nt because the secretary of the Party Com-
!gal or semi-legal conditions is the person
above all, the blow of action will fall. If
s the political leader of the Party Committee,
11 affect the work of the entire Committee.
leader of the Party Committee should not be
connected with the technical functions of the Party apparatus.
Whether or not this principle has become general practise is not
known; it would certainly need revision in the case of small
Parties with in ufficient cadre material. There are, however,
past and recent indications that Parties expecting to go under-
ground do prep re invisible cadres for underground work. In
1927, for example, when central records of the illegal CP Italy
were seized in Genoa, none of the regional leaders whose names
were revealed had previous records as Communists or Party
members. In January 1949, Togliatti, Secretary General of CP
Italy, reportedly instructed a leading functionary to make a tour
of the regional organizations in Northern Italy and to nominate
new regional secretaries, who would operate under illegal condi-
tions if the Par y should be outlawed.
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The extent to which an. invisible cadre may be created ap-
pears in practice to depend largely upon. the availability of
a reserve of trained but unknown Party workers and crypto-
Communists.
b. An adequate cadre reserve must be maintained by the
Party underground in order to have the means for re-
constituting . the Party. It is not always possible, however,
to defer good workers from active duty, especially as the
Party becomes progressively decentralized. Larger numbers
of active functionaries are required in an illegal than in a
legal situation. "The cadre requirements of our Party are
unlimited, " the CP France organ Vie du Parti stated in late
1941. The discovery of new cadre material, so necessary for
replacement purposes, is no bureaucratic affair in the under-
ground. This responsibility does not rest exclusively with the
personnel (cadre) officers. A. Rossi (op. cit.) points out that
the CP France in.1941. recognized the fact that the recruitment
of cadre personnel must preoccupy:the. entire Party and could
not be left, as in legal times, to individual (cadre',) functionaries.
The French Communist functionaries were instructed, at that
period, to give up bureaucratic methods applicable to legal
activity; only through an over-all Party effort could a new and
capable cadre be developed.
c. Ideological and practical training. of the new cadre must also
be de-bureaucratized in. the underground. This is necessary for
the simple reason that it becomes extremely hazardous to run
Party schools, and not very practical. to send large numbers of
militants out of the country to attend courses arranged by Party
organizations abroad. Only specialized technical training, such
as radio operation, is occasionally conducted abroad. Ideologi-
cal training may be acquired in.the course of cell work, simply
by reading and discussing the illegal press, and the standard
works of Communist. literature. Functionaries, who. are well-
versed in theoretical matters, may merely pass on their know-
ledge to small groups of other comrades (sometimes no more
than two), and create "within the Party a multitude of small
schools whose students may, in their time, become teachers of
other. Communists." (Rossi, op. cit.)
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 v--.CIA-RDP78-0091 58000600130001-0
On the whole,
pushed into the
problems. Th
ideological re
based, at least
matters during
The Party and
for practical,
centralization
of basic three-
and medium le
as a result, to
without regard
admittedly low
long run recei
than it could o
Party's specia
housing, produ
owever, ideological training is likely to be
background by more pressing operational
recent emphasis of the Cominform on the
raining of the Eastern European Parties was
partially, upon the neglect of ideological
the.illegal war years.
rground does afford considerable opportunity
n-the -job training. In the course of its de -
for example, CP France with its multitude
an units), the Party may require more low
el functionaries than usual. It may be forced,
assign Party workers to responsible positions
to bureaucratic considerations. Although
in. the hierarchy, this new cadre may. in the
e better and more valuable practical training
tain.in formal Party schools. Similarly, the
underground services (communications,
tion and distribution of printed matter, etc.)
must be established ad hoc and require new personnel who
must receive their training on the run. Thus, an illegal
period, if it ca be successfully weathered, may prove
beneficial forte Party. Upon emergence from the under-
ground, the Party may have a cadre larger than in the normal
legal period an possessed of practical experience not pre-
viously availab e .
d. The protection of the illegal cadre. must be given top
priority. Defe
Party) must be
and unreliable
this is not a sp
be effectively h
departments a
charged with th
Party. In Co
word. Deviati
discipline, fool
of initiative co
lively, the cadre (and with it the entire
protected against infiltration by police agents
lements into Party positions. Obviously,
cial. problem of the underground, and it may
ndled by the national and territorial cadre
/or control commissions which are normally
investigation and loyalty program of the
unist terms, however, loyalty is an elastic
ns from the Party line, factionalism, lack of
ardiness, breach of security rules., and lack
stitute acts of disloyalty as reprehensible to
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 Sanitized - Approved .For-Rapnaf ?6io-RDP78-00915R000600130001-0
the Party as the actual work of a police agent. Consequently,
the cadre department or control commission may also be
charged with the political supervision of the Party functionaries.
During the war years, when CP France was illegal, the "Cadre
Responsible" of the Paris Inter -region attended certain meetings
of the responsible regional triad, and reported to the political.
"responsible" at national headquarters on the political conduct
of the regional functionaries. Disciplinary action, including
expulsion, based on the investigation of the Cadre Commission
or the control commission, rests with the National Control
Commission in legal as in illegal. periods. In operational terms,
however, cadre protection in.the underground requires the
provision of false papers, as well as the maintenance of an
adequate number of safe houses and apartments where the
functionary may live or hide out from the police and make his
professional contacts securely. This is an elementary under-
ground requirement, especially since functionaries and militants
must frequently change their domicile.
2. The "Housing" Problem and Communications. The provision of
safe shelter for illegal Party functionaries and fugitives constitutes merely
one aspect of a much larger problem. The Party underground requires
numbers of safe houses or apartments for a variety of administration and
operational purposes. Archives, files and Party correspondence can no
longer be kept at "legal" premises, and bank deposits cannot be maintained
in the Party's name. In fact, the entire process of "going underground"
and of sustaining an illegal Party machine can be reduced to the prosaic
but intricate search for safe space: homes of unsuspected sympathizers,
shops and offices of crypto-Communists, houses and farms in the country,
and the like. Particularly important is the safe housing of communications.
a. Internal communications. Liaison between the illegal national
and territorial organization -- whether constituted on a "normal"
basis or reorganized as triads -- requires safe meeting and
contact places for representatives of the higher and lower echelons.
Reporting points. The Comintern advised Parties underground to
establish special addresses or flats where at appointed times
representatives. of the cells and fractions of the mass organizations
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 Sanitized - Approv : CIA-RDP78-00915R000600130001-0
could meet rep esentatives of the Party committee for
consultation an 1 instruction. Such reporting points may
be established t all echelons of the Party underground.
Even a legal P rty may find it useful to create clandestine
reporting point whenever the legal Party premises become
insecure. Protective measures include the establishment
of safety signals and special passwords for verification
purposes. At the central reporting point of the Bolshevik
underground Party, for example, different passwords were
used for rank and file workers, for district functionaries,
and for functionaries of the central apparatus.
Letter drops and contact points for couriers. Written
communication between higher and lower echelons pre-
suppose the .existence of safe addresses where "mail" can
be delivered an picked up. The Comintern's instructions
specify that su h safe addresses must not coincide with
.those of report ng points. By the same token, special
addresses may be established for the use of intra-Party
couriers carry ng verbal messages.
b. External communications. Communications with the
Party organizations abroad pose special "housing" problems.
Border -crossimechanisms. There must be established
on the borders pecial conduct points and safe houses (such
as overnight stations) for the use of couriers, instructors,
and the various special services of the Party, as well as for
fugitives. In practical terms, the Party must either use the
homes of "safe" Party members or sympathizers in the border
regions, or buy the services of non-Party individuals who may
be helpful by virtue of their experience. In the Bolshevik under -
ground it was c mmon practise to hire smugglers operating in
border areas. Recruitment or bribery of individuals employed
by, border -control authorities may also be attempted. Fisher -
men, barge-owners, and maritime workers may be utilized.
when the crossing of waterways and maritime frontiers is re-
quired. The 7onnections of Danish fishermen with their Ger -
man friends in he Hamburg area were exploited in the thirties
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 Sanitized - Approved For P J a.-q? _ CIA. RDP78-00915R000600130001-0
by the regional support station of the German Party in
Denmark for the infiltration of liaison personnel.
Security considerations demand that border-crossing
mechanisms remain specialized and compartmentalized.
The Party must create as many of these as possible:
special border-crossing points for couriers, for Party
emissaries from abroad, for the transportation of prop-
aganda material, and for escapees. They may exist side
by side. So long as they are separate, if one mechanism
is discovered, the others will not be endangered.
c. Reporting points for liaison personnel from abroad.
The success of liaison personnel sent by the foreign support
station into the homeland hinges upon a very simple require-
ment: the man must know where and to whom to report
securely. In the CP Germany underground during the Hitler
regime, such.liaison personnel (referred to as "instructors")
were assigned the addresses of trusted Party workers
(Vertrauenspersonen) inside Germany. The provision of
adequate shelter for such liaison agents from abroad adds to
the numerous housing difficulties of the underground.
3. Technical Apparatus. Maintaining and distributing illegal Party
newspapers, information sheets and propaganda material necessitates
the establishment of additional safe space for production, storage and
distribution. Since considerable security risks are involved in the run-
ning of an illegal production and distribution machine (or "technical
apparatus"), the importance which the Party attaches to this work.merits
attention.
The function of the Party press in the underground is, in Lenin's
words, that of a "collective organizer". As such, it not only organizes
the mind of the reader along Party lines, but also groups the readers
around the distribution personnel in, loose, but nevertheless important,
nuclei. In some cases, the Party may be reduced to just this level of
operations: an illegal newspaper and several circles of readers con-
nected with the center through the workers who bring the sheet to the
house or factory. Further, the Party press tangibly demonstrates the
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 Sanitized - Approver j,=~ ?i?L1T1r' ^IA-RDP78-00915R000600130001-0
strength of the suppres ed Party. In highly organized Parties, the press
serves the center as a vehicle for political direction on a mass basis.
The abilities of Parties to maintain illegal publications vary.. On the one
hand, the illegal CP France was able to produce large numbers and many
editions of national and regional newspapers, leaflets, factory papers and
reviews within France., On the other hand, CP Germany under Gestapo
suppression had to rely almost exclusively on the production of its foreign
support centers, In general, however, an attempt will be made by the
Party to follow Comintern instructions:
All Corn' unist ."artics must without fail have an extensive
apparatus for the publication of illegal Party literature,
printing plants, various kinds of rotary machines, copying
machines, mimeographs and simple hectographs in order to
publish illegal literature, newspapers, leaflets, etc. In
particular it is absolutely essential that the local Party Com-
mittee guarantee the publication of the factory paper for the
factory ce 1. , . , "
In addition to the production apparatus a special distribution mechanism
must be set up. Forsecurity reasons, the technical apparatus of the
illegal Party must be divorced from the center and compartmentalized on
all levels; it may assume the character of a semi-independent Party sec-
tion. According to Comintern instructions, special personnel must be
brought in for this purpose; special addresses are needed for the safe-
keeping of literature- fr m the press and for passing it along to all levels
of the underground; and only one member of the Party Committee should
ooe made responsible fo publication and distribution.
The production process itself is dependent on the availability of paper,
equipment and trained p rsonnel, The acquisition of paper is often a
troublesome problem. At times it must be stolen or pilfered by a Com-
munist employee from is place of work. Equipment must frequently be
improvised.., However, when production is on a professional scale, as it
was in France, the process may be broken up into as many component
parts as possible; decentralization of the production of a leaflet provides
better security: Depending on the scale of production and its decentraliza-
tion, the number of per Tons engaged in technical work may vary, Three
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 Sanitized - Approved For P78-00915R0006O0130001-0
types of personnel, however, can be distinguished: 1) the responsible
functionaries who supervise and direct production and distribution,
2.) the skilled technicians (typesetters, printers, etc. ), and 3) liaison
and distribution personnel. The function of the supervisors appears
to be restricted to technical problems; the writing and editing rest
with the political functionaries, Liaison personnel may be needed in
increasing numbers when the production process is decentralized.
Six liaison agents, for example, wero' reportedly involved in the pro-
duction of an illegal French leaflet, taking the text from the editor to
the typesetter, and so on, down to the central storage place and dis-
tribution point,
Final distribution of the product apparently is undertaken by the
political organization (local Party committee, etc.. )? The technical
apparatus merely brings the product to the political section. If the
center of the technical apparatus is abroad (as in the case of the
German '' Reichstechnikum"), it must provide its own courier and
border-crossing service. As a rule, the jurisdiction of the techni-
cal apparatus ends when the product is delivered. Special function-
aries of the local Party organization may be in charge of the ultimate
storage places and distribution to the rank and file. The distribution
process itself, according to the capabilities of the technical apparatus,
may be put on a mass or on a selective basis. If there are only a few
copies of a paper available it is obviously essential to distribute them
among persons with good contacts, capable of passing on the informa-
tion to wider circles. In any case, it can readily be seen that the
housing of the technical apparatus constitutes a major problem, Homes
must be rented for the keeping of equipment (even if only a, ian(lpress
and a typewriter), Paper must be stored. Central and local distribu-.
Lion points must be established. Couriers must be sheltered. The
component operations of the production process must be safely installed.,
There has not so far been any evidence to indicate that there is a
pattern which various Parties follow in treating the housing problem.
Each Party organization, whether, political or special, national or
regional, appears to handle the problem according to its own needs
and capabilities.
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 Sanitized - Apprrove CIA-RDP78-00915R000600130001-0
4. The Security Problem. The severe impact of security consid-
erations on the organiz tion and operations of the outlawed Party has
been amply demonstrated in the preceding sections. Two special
aspects arise to be treated: personal and administrative security.
a. Personal security. Functionaries and members alike
must adhere to certain "conspiratorial rules" if their security
is to be protected. All Parties evolve a set of practical.
regulations affecting the member's entire way of life under
illegal condit ons. These cover such details as alcohol con-
sumption; behavior in case of arrest, threatened or actual;
private correspondence; selection and change of apartments;
storage of letters, notes, newspaper clippings and literature
in general; attitudes towards wife, girl friend, children, un-
reliable com ades, etc. Provision is also usually made for
the use of fic itious. (Party) names. In the CP Portugal, for
example, members in close contact over a long period knew
each other only by such pseudonyms. Some Parties advocate
the creation f a "Party language", prohibit the use of tele-
phone or mail for Party communications, advise the frequent
changing of c oohes and coiffure, and even of posture and gait.
Particular at ention is paid to security at meetings which
should, as a ule, be attended by small numbers and should
not last long. Playing cards may be displayed on the table to
give the meetings a social appearance. Resolutions taken at
meetings should be as succinct as possible.
A breach of security constitutes not only a breach of disci-
pline but als a major political crime: "To be a good Com-
munist under the present circumstances means above all to
apply strictl the rules of illegal work, it means to understand
that each fail ire in this respect represents a danger for the
Party and a veritable crime against the working class. " (Vie
du Parti, 194L)
b. Administ ative security. Over and above the need, for safe
storage space, special security measures may be introduced to
protect Part records. Paper work is necessary even in the
underground, although its reduction to minimal proportions-is a
constant pre cription.
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 Sanitized - Approved For Re"IMP P78-00915R000600130001-0
Membership records. Preparatory to going underground,
functionaries will usually destroy membership lists and
records indicating the affiliation of individuals with the
Party. Some Parties may stop their recruitment program
altogether, or for a certain period of time. During illegal
periods, the issuance of membership cards or books and
dues stamps is often discontinued. In some cases, the
responsible personnel functionary may simply rely on his
memory to keep track of the members. The consequences
of failing to carry out such an elementary security measure
are illustrated in the case of CP Germany. The Gestapo was
able to seize voluminous central records, which had been
allowed to remain stored at Berlin headquarters.
Intra-Party communications. Written reports from lower
to higher echelons and instructions from above, when per -
mitted at all, will be as brief as possible. They should not
contain any specific details of police interest, such as names
of functionaries, cities, villages, and addresses. Confidential
communications may be composed in code or ciphers, and
written in invisible ink. Documents will generally be forwarded
by a trusted courier, and delivered at special reporting points.
In case of arrest, the courier must attempt to destroy the com-
munication by all possible means. In the underground, Party
functionaries will not, as a rule, sign with their names: they
may use their initials or assigned numbers.
Biographical documentation. The Cadre Commissions (or
Departments) may find it necessary to increase their bureau-
cratic activities. Cadre control in the underground is essential,
and detailed biographical statements may be requested of each
functionary and militant, particularly replacements. Such
biographical reports may be transmitted by special couriers of
the Cadre Commission, which may be in charge of safe-guarding
these records.
The actual volume of administrative paper work will depend
chiefly on the size of the Party. A mass Party will not be able
to function effectively without substantial administrative records.
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 Sanitized - Apprpve IA-RDP78-00915R000600130001-0
5. The Financial
expensive than operatin
of income dry up. On t
often heavy financial bu
atomization of Party or
cadres must be increas
and militants must be c
police or to. minimize t
their domicile, someti
capped by a lack of mo
storage places, etc.,
have to rent several ap
Printing and distributio
by the police and must
families of arrested fu
be extremely heavy in
On the other hand,
from sympathizers dwi
collecting campaigns a
literature decreases;
roblem. Operating underground is much more
legally. What is more, the "normal" sources
e one hand, illegal conditions impose a new and
den on the Party. As a consequence of the
anizations and the specialization of personnel,
d -- and payrolls with them. Functionaries
nstantly on the move, either to escape the
e risks of their work. They may have to change
es at the slightest alert, and must not be aandi-
ey. Rentals of safe houses and apartments,
ay be considerable; one individual may frequently
rtments, each under a separate false identity.
costs rise; equipment is constantly being seized
e replaced. Further, the Party must aid the
ctionaries and members, an expense which may
e event of mass arrests.
the collection of dues is hampered. Contributions
dle; front organizations, through which fund-
e channeled, may wither; the sale of Party
d commercial ventures of the Party may fail.
Thus, Party finances frequently become a priority operational
problem. Preoccupati n with financial questions is shown in the
instructions of the (ille al) CP France, calling for a discussion of
finances at the beginni
partially solve the dile
CP France in 1941 cons
a) propaganda material
c) couriers. The same
as follows: 50% for pr
50% for organizational
rents, etc.).
frequently look for sup
countries, or Party a
time Party units, are
help of fraternal Partie
g of every cell meeting. Tight budgeting can
na, but essential costs cannot be eliminated.
dered the following categories as essential;
-- paper, equipment; b) travel expenses; and
Party further advised all echelons to budget
paganda costs (paper, machinery, etc.) and
xpenses (salaries, indemnities, travel expenses,
ity of funds in the underground, the Party must
ort from abroad. Party centers in foreign
iliaries with foreign connections, such as mari-
articularl.y suited to collecting funds with the
s and their front organizations. Prior to the
-RDP78-00915R000600130001-0
sel
 Sanitized - Approved For RPlpzma-- cio-Rr)P78-00915R000600130001-0
dissolution of the Comintern, underground Parties could also present
their case to the Budget Commission of the Communist International.
While it is difficult to estimate the current financial policy of the CP
Soviet Union towards foreign underground Parties, it is probable that
if a significant Party should be forced underground in the near future
(CP Italy or CP France, for example), direct or indirect financial.
support from the Soviet and satellite Parties would be forthcoming.
Whatever the origin of underground funds, their administration
poses a critical security problem. Party funds, in possession of the
national and territorial finance departments or finance functionaries,
can in some cases simply be placed with trusted Party workers. Again,
security considerations recommend decentralization of hiding places.
When practical, dummy accounts and dummy corporations can be created.
The administration of funds may also be taken out of the hands of ter-
ritorial organizations and centered upon the national Party treasury,
when the latter operates in safe territory a procedure recently re-
ported to be followed by CP Greece.
6. Mass Support: the Crucial Political Problem. The Party's
financial difficulties may be overcome, and the Party machine may be
salvaged to a certain extent. Even so, deprived of its legal outlets,
the Party's basic strategy of developing into the directing force of the
entire working class and other susceptible strata, will be severely
hindered under illegal conditions. Fronts and auxiliaries fall by the
wayside in a state of political suppression, and the entire propaganda
and agitation apparatus must restrict its operations. The strength of
the Party as. a political force is based upon free access for its
propagandizers and organizers to wide masses of workers:, farmers,
intellectuals, minority groups, etc. The legal Party can obtain a
maximum of mass support; the illegal Party may fall far short of
this basic objective. "The fundamental deficiency of every illegal
Party, " in words of the Comintern, "(is) that an illegal Party appara-
tus makes contacts with the masses difficult - and yet the fundamental
task.of the Communist Party is to. have close contact with the masses. "
There are several methods by which the Party may attempt to surmount
these obstacles.
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 Sanitized - Apprpve IA-RDP78-00915R000600130001-0
a, Penetration and control of legal non-Communist parties
representing workers and related-class elements. This
approach has only limited possibilities. In the first place,
during sever repression all "progressive" or "liberal"
parties may, e outlawed, and another illegal party is not
worth penetr ting because it is itself restricted. In the
second place, Communist efforts to take over a non-
Communist "Workers' Party" will, meet with considerable
resistance wherever these parties are controlled by
Socialists, he attempt made by CP Austria to take over
the Austrian Social Democratic Party as a whole,. through
a tactical alliance, made by the two parties during the middle
thirties',, met with failure ir{ this way,
Penetrat
b.
tactic recom
not be achie
can exert a c
trade unions
penetration
nent require
Party may b
ion and control of legal trade unions. This is a
ended by the Comintern? Even if control can-
ed, Party fractions working in legal trade unions
ertai.n degree of political influence. Illegal
are clearly less valuable, than legal outlets. The
ent, no matter what the political status of the
c. Creation of dummy front organizations or parties. As a
rule, this m thod has little chance of success because it is
usually tootransparent. Exceptions may occur when suppres-
sion is not severe (such as currently in Brazil) or when the
Party is in a position to exploit a national emergency (such as
foreign occupation or colonial unrest) and to marshal national
or colonial ' iberation" movements.
The fact remains t
underground may concl
illegal membership, it
its potential strength.
is never adequate; ultir
legal. The passing fro
possible in acutely revs
organize military-revo
or it may have to wait :
during which the regim
hat no matter what political alliances the Party
ude, or what additional strength it may gain in
still is not a legal Party and cannot fully develop
The "combination of legal and illegal methods"
nately the illegal Party must attempt to become
m illegality into legality, however, may only be
dutionary situations a The Party may have to
lutionary action (as in Russia, China and Greece),
For such an international crisis as World War II,
e suppressing the Party is destroyed.
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 Sanitized - Approved For Release CIA-RDP78-00915R000600130001-0
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