THE CRISIS OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM: IMPACT OF HUNGARIAN EVENTS ON THE MOVEMENT OUTSIDE THE BLOC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R000600090009-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 1998
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: February 11, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

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THE CRISIS OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM:
IMPACT OF HUNGARIAN EVENTS ON THE MOVEMENT OUTSIDE THE BLOC
11 February ]L957
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THE CRISIS OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM: IMPACT OF
HUNGA.RIA.N EVENTS ON THE MOVEMENT OUTSIDE THE BLOC
1. The Hungarian crisis had a number of important consequences for
the international movement--
a. A. drive to enforce Soviet leadership in the movement, to suppress
deviationism, to renew the attack on Tito in order to sterilize his
influence in the movement, to get clear-cut Chinese Communist
backing for Moscow's leadership and to establish some kind of
machinery for more effective international coordination.
b. Some difficulties for the "peaceful coexistence" strategy,
particularly in the promotion of Asian "neutralism".
c. Setbacks for the movement in Western Europe, expressed in terms
of loss of popular support, membership losses and defections of
prominent intellectual fellow-travellers and some Party cadres, in
terms of disagreement within the Party leaderships and apathy among
the ranks. The united front drive has been reduced to empty and
ineffectual propaganda, at least for the moment. The Social Democrats
were strengthened vis-a-vis the Communists and the Soviet effort to
promote united fronts and/or to gain influence by way of exchange
delegations was set back.
d. Less important effects in Latin America, where there were minor
anti-Soviet manifestations and some evidences of confusion in the
CP's in the early stages.
e. Dissension in some of the international Communist fronts.
f. Steps to re-consolidate the Western alliance, and the decision of
the Icelandic Government to continue the U. S. defense arrangement.
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 2. In the following p
summarize the impa
Western Europe
5. In Western Europ
was more intense tha
on CP offices, attack
setback in terms of p
unity. The small We
smaller than before.
It is not yet possible
15R000600090009-7
ragraphs an attempt is made to analyze and
t of the Hungarian crisis on popular opinion and the
region by region.
details on a country basis. The information in t ze
ous sources, including the press.
iated if recipients of this survey would provide
nificant additional information available to them.
where popular revulsion against the Soviet action
elsewhere, and in some instances violent (raids
on CP leaders), the movement suffered a definite
pular support, Party membership, and internal
t European CP's are even more isolated and
The big French and Italian CP's have also suffered.
o assess the full significance of this set-back, for
embership losses to date are not firm. The CP's
y have not yet been able to calculate them.
b. Many Party members who are directly opposed to the leadership
are staying in, hoping to bring pressure on the leadership for a
change in policy and/or to achieve a change in the leadership. The
ultimate fate of these oppositionists cannot be known for many months.
c. Many disaffected members are simply dropping into inaction and
more may do so in the future. The leadership may continue to carry
them on the membership rolls for a long period, partly in the hope
that they can be reactivated, partly to avoid further demoralization
by revealing the to ses.
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e. The successive shocks of the year undoubtedly renewed the
thinking process in some staunch Communists, and they may not
be willing in the long run to submit to the reimposition of hard
discipline: i.e. , the defection process may be gradual, as in the
case of Belgian Communist Van Hoorick, who waited for two months
before making up his mind.
f. The self-delusive tendencies of pro-Communist intellectuals
should never be underestimated: some of them are already having
qualms and may return to the movement.
g. Evidences to date of losses in popular support (local elections,
trade union elections, other actions calling upon non-Party people
for support) are only suggestive, not conclusive.
6. In Denmark, the Party has had substantial defections, mainly on the
local level and among the intellectuals, both in the Party itself and on
its fringes. It has also experienced serious internal dissension, the
outcome of which is still in doubt. The Norwegian CP has had some
defections and has expressed criticism of the USSR, but has lost no top
leaders, and appears to remain under control. The Swedish Communist
front organizations have lost members, but the CP itself has not been
noticeably hurt. The Finnish Social Democratic press claims that there
is substantial dissension in the FCP. In Iceland, where the intensity of
the popular reaction against the USSR was unusual for that country, the
CP has lost part of its hold over labor, and suffered a setback in its drive
to expel U. S. forces. The Dutch CP has been financially hurt by loss of
subscriptions and advertizing contracts to its press, but there have been
no large -scale defections from the Party. The Communist labor
federation in Holland (EVC), however, has suffered heavy losses. In
Switzerland, on the other hand, there were substantial defections with
Party sections resigning e'n bloc and a number of prominent Communists
quitting. The British CP has also suffered heavily, with numerous
intellectuals, trade unionists and local Party leaders resigning. Although
British Party leader Gollan predicted a membership loss of only about
3%, the caliber of the defectors makes this loss rather significant.
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The Belgian CP experi
escaped any large -seal
Van I-ioorick went over
Magazine No. 3 (19-25
a tone of regret and so
Party. The latter's ne
feel obliged to take a m
Austrian CP was partic
national leadership was
that "at no other time h
event shaken our consc
crisis extended down in
despite this dissension
labor leaders, the A.ust
anti-deviationist positio
7. In brief, among the
exhibited the most serf
British, Danish, Swiss,
serious strategic set-b
The big CP's
nced some leadership disagreements, and has
defections, but former Politburo member Bert
o the Socialists in January 1957. Drapeau Rouge
January 1957), in commenting on the case, adopted
ght to blur the issue by attacking the Socialist
spaper predicted that Van Hoorick would soon
re openly vigorous stand against the Party. The
larly hard-hit by the Hungarian crisis. The
torn by dissension, with Ernst Fischer declaring
s any other event hurt us so deeply, nor has any
ence so painfully as the Hungarian tragedy. " This
o the provincial organizations. Nevertheless,
nd the defection of several intellectuals and local
ian Party has officially taken a firmly pro-Soviet,
smaller West European CP's those that have
us overt signs of internal crisis to date are the
and Austrian. The Icelandic CP has suffered a
ck.
8. The Hungarian events
ways. CP France suffe
defections of fellow-tra
returned to the fold) an
CGT. The Party appar
and tightly controlled b
been relatively unaffect
firmly pro-Soviet ortho
spearheaded the Soviet
deviations in Poland. T
demonstrated the re-co
leadership.
hit the French and Italian CP's in rather different
ed mostly on the periphery, with the spectacular
eling intellectuals (some of whom have since
with at least a temporary revolt by units of the
tus as a whole, however, always highly disciplined
Maurice Thorez, seems on the surface to have
d by the Hungarian crisis. Thorez steered a
ox course throughout the crisis year of 1956. He
ttack on Tito in November and against the
he French-Czech Party discussions in January
solidation of the Bolshevik CP's under Moscow
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9. The Italian CP, on the other hand, which was never so tightly
disciplined as the French Party, experienced significant internal
dissension and has had a number of important defections, particularly
from its press apparatus. The most important break was made by
former Senator Eugenio Reale, who was expelled for publicizing his
opposition to the leadership and its record on Hungary. Togliatti, who
was partly to blame for the internal ferment in the Party, (as well as
in the international moveme nt), has sought to re -establish discipline
and to re-affirm international solidarity. By adroit "rigging" of the
Party Congress and of the leadership apparatus, he appears to have
maintained his control over the apparatus, eventhough the elections to
the Central Committee showed that his personal popularity within the
Party had suffered.
10. Both the French and Italian CP's have lost members. No firm
figures on the PCF losses are available,* but about3D percent of the
members of the PCI, according to a public admission by Amendola at
the January Central Committee meeting, have failed to renew their
membership (current strength: 1, 449, 000). Both Parties experienced
a period of aimlessness, apathy and inactivity within their ranks, and
insofar as it is measurable, both have lost some political strength.
* Sartre has claimed that the Party has only about 180, 000 members.
It is believed, however, that this figure is much too small, and that
membership has not fallen below 300, 000. At the 14th Party Congress
last July, Organization secretary Servin claimed that 429, 653 member-
ship cards had been "delivered" to the Federations. On the face of it,
this would indicate a loss of about 30%, but the ambiguities involved in
the comparative estimates prevent us from arriving at any reasonably
accurate figure. France-Soir of 28 November said that at the
20-21 November CC meeting, Servin had announced a total of 562
resignations in a report that was not intended for publication. (The
accounts of Servin's report published in the Party press reflected
nothing but great gains, expressed in carefully relative terms. )
Perhaps the France-Soir estimate is somewhat nearer the truth than
some of the others.
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 11. The impact of the
two CP's differed. De
CP has failed to develo
never have entertained
"popular front." In It
years has really been
consisting of PCI, PSI
Democrats, and at a "
Togliatti encouraged t
and PSDI.
the Stalin question, ha
There is a substantial
by the Hungarian crisi
political struggle is in
Prize and turned over
Hungarian relief) and
Commin is back in Ital
20 January 1957, Togli
leaders who would opp
capitulation" and the p
Italian news service A.
the PCI's being isolate
and that he is calling f
a definite change in PC
12. In addition to this
scene, there have bee
position favoring close
movement. He says t
organization, but in th
avoided.
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ungarian events on the "united front" line of the
pite its official line on the subject, the French
p an effective approach to the Socialists and may
any serious hopes for the achievement of a
ly, on the other hand, Togliatti's policy for many
imed at the formation of a broad left-wing front,
PSDI and the left-wing of the Christian
arliamentary transition to Socialism. " Thus,
steps taken last summer to re -unify the PSI
tro Nenni, who broke sharply with the USSR over
continued to move further away from the PCI.
ro-Communist faction in the PSI leadership, but
munist faction has undoubtedly been strengthened
. At the moment, the outcome of this complicated
suspense. Nenni renounced his 1952 Stalin Peace
large sum to the Italian Red Cross (i. e. , for
to push PSI-PSDI reunification efforts. On
tti made a speech promising to support PSI
se reunification. His references to "shameful
iority of "the class struggle", as carried by the
SA., suggest that he fears that the possibility of
by a PSI-PSDI unification is a definite prospect
r a split in the PSI itself. If so, this would mark
I strategy.
pparent tightening up of PCI policies on the local
indications that Togliatti has gone over to a
international coordination of the Communist
at he opposes any "centralized" international
nature of things some centralization could not be
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13. In conclusion, it is emphasized that the setbacks experienced by
the French and Italian CP's, while serious, should not be regarded as
fatal. They have lost ground in popular support, in membership, and
have experienced significant dissension, either in the periphery or in
the Party itself. But they remain strong organizations with significant
mass followings, and it is always possible that they can recoup their
losses in an economic decline.
14. Asian preoccupation with the Egyptian crisis tended at first to
distract attention from the Soviet action in Hungary. Indignation over
the Anglo-French attack on Egypt tempered Asian reactions to the
Hungarian events with a feeling that Russian behavior was no worse
than that of the West. Condemnation of Soviet action in Hungary was
delayed and blunted by these feelings. Since the Middle Eastern crisis
has been somewhat ameliorated, Asian countries have been able to give
more attention to Hungary. Consistently, however, Asians have tended
to associate the two events and to mention the Middle East whenever
speaking of Hungary.
15. Although widespread unofficial and press criticism of the Soviet
move quickly developed throughout Asia, governments and official
spokesmen were slow to commit themselves to an anti-Soviet stand.
On the first United Nations proposals for censure of the Russians the
Afro-Asian bloc generally abstained or voted with the Soviet bloc,
although Cambodia, Thailand and the Philippines supported the West.
This was perhaps due to a reluctance to appear to take sides between
East and West. The Indonesian Foreign Minister and the Burmese
United Nations delegate justified their stands by the claim that they
did not have complete information on events in Hungary, a position
which the Indian Prime Minister Nehru also used on a number of
public occasions where he was called upon to comment on Hungary.
None of the non-Communist Asian nations, however, undertook to
defend the Soviet action.
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16. The support of t
first United Nations
India and abroad. T
statement in which h
the Soviet action. T
recent trip through t
China had not unequi
Hungarian revolt.
17. On the final Unit
aggression in Hungar
the Western position,
position, and India a
e Indian delegates for the Soviet Union in the
ebates on Hungary provoked strong criticism in
is may have been in part responsible for Nehru's
declared that freedom had been "outraged" by
e Indian reaction also suggests that Chou En-lai's
at area would have been more successful if
cally supported the Soviet suppression of the
d Nations resolution condemning Soviet
, the Asian neutralist bloc had moved closer to
with Burma and Ceylon supporting the Western
d Indonesia abstaining.
18. International con
during the period of t
of four of the Colomb
meeting in mid-Nove
the Soviet interventio
which was in Bombay
includes the leaders o
passed a strong resol
Hungary. Although th
resolution, no membe
It is significant that S
concurred strongly wi
Ceylon and Israel in t
19. Government spok
censuring the Soviet, a
November 19 was perh
sensitivity in Asia to
Ba Swe of Burma spok
Socialist Conference o
of attempting to "scutt
political parties excep
public opinion, the Ind
statement "regretting
ultation among Asian countries also took place
e crises in Egypt and Hungary. Prime Ministers
powers, India, Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia,
ber, issued a mildly critical statement concerning
in Hungary. The Asian Socialist Conference
,
during the first week of November, and which
Governments in Burma, Israel and Ceylon,
tion condemning the Russian use of troops in
re was dispute over the language of the
of the conference opposed the basic principle
.
cialist opposition parties in India and Indonesia
h the Socialist Government leaders of Burma,
e Asian Socialist Conference resolution.
smen in several Asian countries made statements
tion. Prime Minister Nehru's statement on
ps the most significant in indicating a greater
ommunist imperialism, although Prime Minister
out sooner and in stronger terms at the Asian
4 Nogember when he accused the Soviet Union
e the United Nations.,, Under pressure from all
the Communists, from the press and from
nesian Government on 8 November made a
he involvement of troops of the Soviet Union in
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Hungary. Foreign Minister Abdulgani qualified this resolution further
in his statement to Parliament on 13 November warning that this
"resolution could easily be made into a tool to transfer world attention
from a more serious issue, namely the British-French-Israeli
aggression against Egypt." On 20 December,A.bdulgani again criticized
the Soviet military intervention in Hungary, but coupled this with a
warning against "meddling by any country, through agitation among the
Hungarian people or otherwise." This warning was presumably aimed
against the United States. The Government, in these statements and in
other actions, clearly seeks to avoid having to take an unequivocal stand
which would compromise its "neutrality."
20. Foreign Minister Shigemitsu of Japan, Prince Sihanouk of
Cambodia and President Diem of South Vietnam also issued public
statements strongly criticizing the Soviet aggression in Hungary. South
Korea even offered volunteers for Hungary.
21. Asian public opinion, like the views of Asian leaders, has been
preoccupied with the Egyptian question and there has been relatively
little popular expression of indignation over Hungary. Demonstrators
in Pakistan did include Russia with France and Britain as objects of their
anger. Attempts to organize anti-Russian demonstrations in Indonesia
were forbidden by the Government, although violent outbursts against
France and Britain had been encouraged. The Islamic and Socialist Youth
organizations in Jakarta organized a "Committee Against Soviet
Colonialist Intervention" in late November, and the Indonesian Red Cross
appealed for aid for the Hungarian people as well as for the Egyptians.
Public rallies to organize sentiment against the Russian action and for
aid to Hungary took place in Saigon, Manila and Tokyo. Press criticism
of the Russian intervention in Hungary has been strong in Japan,
Indonesia and Burma.
22. Communist Party leadership throughout the area has said nothing to
conflict with the Soviet line on Hungary. The statements which have
been made in India, particularly, have paralleled to some extent the
views expressed by Marshal Tito during the early stages of the crisis,
deploring the bloodshed and blaming the mistakes of the Hungarian
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Communist leadership. Indonesian Party statements have followed
more closely the Soviet line that the Hungarian revolt was engineered
by U.S. "imperialists." The Hungarian crisis has had little impact
on PKI leaders, who do not question the Soviet "explanations". The
Austrialian CP showed no signs of significant internal dissension, and
Party leader L. L. Sharkey showed, in an attack on the Gates faction
of the CPUSA (Tribune, 28 November) that he had no ideological
differences with Moscow,
23. It is too early to
effects, but there ha
of rank-and-file Part
Japanese Party has o
ranks , and two Corn
the Asian Solidarity
have issued staten-ien
the defection of Party
exists in the CP, eve
appreciable extent. I
publicly deplored the
to avoid the question
Namboodripad made t
Hungarian events have
movement which, exc
has been able to capit
24. Soviet action in H
manifestations in Ar g
Catholic organization
were active in these d
throughout the area ad
some countries, parti
Soviet action was dive
action in Egypt. The
crisis to act against th
countries government
Soviet action.
make any predictions as to the long-range
e been several authoritative reports of discontent
members with the Soviet action in Hungary. The
enly admitted to some "confusion" within its
unist front organizations, the Japanese chapter of
ommittee and the Japanese Committee for Peace,
s deploring the Soviet action. In New Zealand,
theoretician Sid Scott suggests that dissension
though it has not come into the open to any
than Communist leader A.joy Ghosh has also
loodshed in Hungary. Although Ghosh managed
f alleged A.me rican "intervention", E. M. S.
is charge explicit. In the Middle East the
had no discernible effects on the Communist
pt in Israel, has continued to make gains and
lize on the Egyptian crisis.
gary led to minor anti-Soviet, anti-Communist
ntina, Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, and Uruguay.
and local Hungarian and Polish immigrant groups
monstrations. The non-Communist press
pted strongly anti-Soviet positions although in
ularly in the early stages, reaction against the
ted by critical reaction against A.nglo-French
rgentine Government seized upon the Hungarian
Argentine CP, and in other Latin American
pokesmen and political leaders attacked the
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25. Despite some evidence of disorientation in the leadership and of
confusion among the ranks of a few of the Latin American CF's, they
seem to have been relatively untouched by the Hungarian events. A. few
deviant articles appeared in the Brazilian Communist paper, but they
were soon followed by strictly pro-Soviet articles, and on 20 November
the paper carried a stiff letter by Party leader Prestes, cracking down
on the loose discussion over Stalin and calling for "iron discipline" and
"proletarian internationalism" in support of the CPSU. The Communist
press in Chile, Costa Rica and Ecuador also adopted firmly pro-Soviet
positions, as did Lombardo Toledano in Mexico.
26. The few indications of even minor setbacks for Latin American
Communism include these:
a. The action ci the Argentine Government.
b. A disagreement in the leadership of the pro-Communist Chilean
labor central, CUTCH.
c. A protest resolution adopted by the Ecuadoran University
Students' Federation, an affiliate of the international Communist
front, IUS.
d. A. decision of the Socialist-oriented, but apolitical, labor
federation, CSU, in Uruguay against cooperating with a
Communist trade union instrumentality.
e. In Costa Rica, a prominent pro -Communist women's leader
renounced her Soviet sympathies.
27. On the other side of the coin, it is of some interest to note that, after
a month of silence, Chilean poet Pablo Neruda flatly rejected an appeal
from the Congress of Cultural Freedom to join French intellectuals
(Sartre, et al) in denouncing the Soviet action.
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28. The CPUSA has been in crisis ever since the first stories leaked
out concerning the secret Khrushchev speech on Stalin, and the
Hungarian events have aggravated the situation. The National Committee
split over the first Soviet intervention in Hungary, with the'majority,
headed by Daily Work r editor John Gates, adopting a resolution
condemning the Soviet action. The Gates faction, the views of which are
expressed by most of the regular columnists of the Daily Worker, draws
its main strength from the New York State Party organization, which
counts for about 50% f the membership of the Party. National Chairman
William Z. Foster, who has been on the defensive against what he calls
the "liquidationist" program of the Gates faction, voted against the
majority statements of 5 November, and in an article in the Daily Worker
of 21 November sough to rationalize the Soviet action in Hungary. Party
Secretary Eugene Dennis, while in disagreement with Foster in the past,
supports the latter's position on Hungary. A National Committee letter
to the Party members released on 19 November called the first Soviet
intervention a "tragic error" and said that "divergent views" existed
in the leadership over the intervention of 4 November. On 26 November
an editorial in the Daily Worker challenged the right of the CPSU
publication Kommunis to attack the Daily Worker's views as "babbling"
and called upon the C SU to publish the full text of the Daily Worker's
statements. Daily Worker columnists have also defended Tito against
the distortions in Pra da's attack on the Pula speech of 11 Novemeber.
29. Like the CPUSA,
been going through a s
process started. The
which has been manife
Canadian Tribune, . r
(Harry Binder, Nation
Toronto organizer), th
(Quebec Party leader),
meeting that closed on
to retain his control of
will not lose it in the r
leadership, the Hungai
organizations are part
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the Canadian CP (Labor Progressive Party) has
erious crisis ever since the de-Stalinization
Hungarian events have exacerbated this crisis,
sted in protest letters to the Party weekly
esignations from the National Executive Committee
al Treasurer of the LPP; and Norman Penner,
e defection of six local leaders led by Gui Caron
and the long dispute at the National Committee
9 November. At this meeting Tim Buck managed
the Party apparatus, and it seems likely that he
.ear future. In addition to this crisis in the
-ian and Jewish members of the Party's ethnic
icularly disaffected.
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APPENDIX: Impact of Hungarian Crisis in
Various Countries Outside the
Page
Italy
13
France
17
Austria
21
Belgium
23
Denmark
24
Finland
27
(West) Germany
27
Iceland
28
Luxembourg
29
Netherlands
30
Norway
31
Sweden
32
Switzerland
33
United Kingdom
34
Argentina
36
Bolivia
37
Brazil
37
Chile
38
Colombia
38
Costa Rica
38
Cuba
39
Ecuador
39
Guatemala
40
Mexico
40
Peru
40
Uruguay
40
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CT.`.^r r?..
1. Popular Action.
Crowd of about 3500 attended Hungarian sympathy rally sponsored
by 17 veterans' and student organizations 11 November. Over 5, 000
troops and police cordoned off the area of CP Headquarters. Non-
Communist trade unions took the offensive against Communist CGIL
in a statement condemning Communist position in Hungary, refused
to deal with CGIL in Turin shop councils.
Anti-Communist brawls in Catania.
Heavy police concentration in Perugia, 11 November, to prevent
major conflict between Communists and anti-Communists at meeting
addressed by Togliatti. The first peaceful demonstrations against
Soviet action in Hungary became violent as result of neo-fascist and
Communist activists' involvement.
Government leaders denounced Soviet action. Foreign Minister
Martino sent a message to Nehru, calling upon him to take a firm
stand on Soviet action in Hungary on the basis of the five Bandung
principles.
The Government denied Susloy an entry visa to attend the PCI
Congress, as a protest against Soviet action in Hungary.
3. Repercussions in Italian Communist Movement.
a. Resignations, expulsions, dissidence in CP.
1) Over-all membership loss, about 29%. Amendola report to
CC, 15 January, cited issuance about 1, 500, 000 member-
ship cards for 1957, as compared with 2, 035, 358 claimed
membership for 1956.
2) Minor variations in losses from place to place, but percentage
loss generally equally spread. Particularly hard hit in some
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25 Octo
populati
a large
nations in Genoa city and province between
er and 10 November. During the week 4 November,
bers reportedly resigned in Rovigo (total
n: 14, 600), a center of PCI strength'. In Turin,
ortion (estimated at 61%) of the membership
renew their cards.
3) Anti-Soviet reaction particularly strong among intellectuals.
E. g. --
L'Unita Director Pietro Ingrao reported disillusioned;
Il Paese and Paese Sera staff members sent letter to
L'Unita rote sting Party's defense of Soviet action;
two editors of Paese Sera resigned.
Il Paese founder, Senator Tomaso Smith, who first re-
signed from the paper at the end of November, but who
was persuaded to withdraw his resignation when the
paper pledged that he would have ''complete freedom
of criticism, " again resigned on 18 January 1957.
Mario odignola, editor of Genoa L'Unita resigned from
the pap t and from the Party.
A group of six intellectuals announced their resignation
from the Party on 1 January in a letter castigating the
leadership for its failure to find an "autonomous road
to Socialism. " One of the six, Professor Vezio
Crisaf li, professor of Constitutional Law at Trieste
University., said that the group was disgusted by the
PCI's "subservience to the Soviet regime. " The other
members of the group were Domenico Purificato, a
painter; Leoncillo Leonardi, a sculptor; Claudio Longo,
an architect; and writers Gaetano Trombatore and
Natalin Sapegno. Another prominent Communist
writer, Italo Calvino, announced that he subscribed to
the vie s of this group. L'Unita refused to print his
statement and said that he had been called up to explain
his acti n to the Party Secretariat.
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4) Significant expressions of disaffection at 8th Party Congress,
8-14 December, continuing similar expressions in pre-
Congress discussion, E.g.--
Carlo Salinari, managing editor of leading intellectual
weekly, Il Contemporaneo, led Communist intellectual
group in public protests and opposition against Party
line, leadership, and Soviet action. At the Congress,
Antonio Giolitti and Fausto Gullo led criticism and
opposition. At the Congress Togliatti firmly rebuffed
Di Vittorio's stand in favor of "depoliticization" of
the CGL. Giolitti recanted.
5) The most significant dissident movement centers around
former Senates' Central Committee member, and rep-
resentative at Cominform foundation Eugenio Reale. The
PCI leadership felt it was safe to expel him only after it
had gotten through the Congress. (He was prevented from
attending the Congress, even as an observer.) Fabrizio
Onofri, who engaged in hot public dispute prior to the
Congress, is in the Reale group, as is Giolitti and
Crisafulli (see above). Giolitti remained in the Party.
The Communist Action group continues dissident activity,
within and outside the Party.
6) Apathy and indifference in Party ranks. Extent of in-
difference particularly striking in Rome (reports of total
lack of attendance at section meetings, etc.) because
Rome is seat of Party headquarters.
7) In outlying areas whole sections have resigned en bloc,
with most of the resignees applying for membership in
the DC. E.g., in Vernole (Lecce), a Party Section
secretary resigned, taking all his Section leaders with
him.
8) Continued disagreement between Vidali and his Trieste
Party on the one hand and PCI on the other, as well as
within Trieste CP, over terms of incorporation. About
1/2 of Trieste CP opposes PCI line and advocates
autonomy. This conflict aggravated by Tito problem.
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b. Loss of Pop
1) Heavy Co
Alto Aldi;
(paralleli
cline of t]
2) Heavy set
t
elections
in Hungar
Rubber w
only 26. 3
3) Decline ix
difficultie
lar Support; Troubles of PCI Press.
e
nmunist losses in regional elections, Trentino-
e, reflect-- (1) loss of genuine mass support
Lg losses in membership), as well as (2) de-
e negative "protest" vote.
backs for Communist candidates in factory
in Northern Italy shortly after the Soviet action
Communist candidates in the Michelin
rks shop stewards' election in Turin polled
o of the vote, as against 59.8% in 1955.
the circulation of Party press, and financial
4) Loss of about 2% of the cooperatives.
c. Relations wi~h PSI.
Hungarian
between elen
PCI tendenci
of the PSI an
repelled by t
although atta
and basically
to be e s s e nti
viction that a
ploited to en}
party. He sE
ever getting
which he wi 1
would not wa
the governm(
elements in 1
sentiment foi
leader factio
of PCI memt
elements in 1
(2, above); (,
events aggravated already existing differences
gents of the PCI and the PSI; encouraged anti-
s to come out into the open. Lower levels
I PSI elements in the CGIL were particularly
ie Soviet action. It is estimated that Nenni,
-king Soviet action, remains "neutralist"
anti-US and anti-NATO. His position appears
illy opportunist and reflects his current con-
nti-Soviet sentiments can be profitably ex-
Lance the PSI potential as the major left
~e s the PCI as having lost the possibility of
-power, but as retaining political significance
L not irrevocably alienate. The PSI leadership
it to write off PCI support if the PSI entered
:nt. Nenni's position vis-a-vis pro-PCI
he PSI Directorate will depend on (1) popular
? socialist unification; (2) strength of the PSI
z that sees a chance to pull substantial numbers
ers into PSI; (3) success of dissident (Iteale)
he PCI who are in contact with PSI elements
E) extent to which a compromise formula can be
T
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worked out to satisfy pro-PCI faction in PSI Directorate and,
at the same time, promote "socialist unification. " A clearer
picture may emerge at the PSI Congress, 7-11 February.
Meanwhile, Togliatti in 20 January 1957 Party anniversary
speech in Milan, came out strongly against "socialist unifi-
cation'' at present on any basis that would compromise the
PSI's position in the "class struggle. " He said that the PCI
would support any PSI leaders who would oppose such a
unification with the PSDI. Togliatti's stand at Milan can be
interpreted as--(1) a concession to the "hard" wing in the
PCI; (2) an exercize of pressure on the PSI to ensure
continued collaboration with the PCI; (3) a blackmail threat
.that he would engineer a split in the PSI.
FRANCE
1. Popular Action.
Anti-Communist action began in Paris; later spread through-
out France. Student demonstration at Soviet Embassy 5 November.
Crowd of about 3, 000, mostly students, demonstrated at CP head-
quarters, where they smashed the steel shutters and tried unsuccess-
fully to smash bars and to enter building. Windows broken at Humanite
offices. Socialist Party and Force Ouvriere called fifteen-minute
work stoppage 7 November in honor of Hungarian martyrs. On 7
November crowd of about 10, 000 demonstrated. Students led march
on CP headquarters, broke in, set first two floors afire, threw
furniture and documents into street. Firemen rescued some students
held by the Communists and extinguished fire, but also threw furniture
and documents into street. Students then broke into and sacked CP
printing plant. Attempts to break into France-USSR building and
to march on Soviet Embassy were thwarted by massive police barriers.
Communist headquarters and newspaper plants sacked in Nice, Nimes,
Nantes, Montpellier, Strasbourg, Caen, and Rennes. Smaller-scale
anti-Communist demonstrations in Marseilles, Roanne, and Alencon.
Popular response to Hungarian relief drive has been tremendous,
and the CP and its fronts have considered it advisable to launch their
own independent drive.
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Assembly vo
Government to aid
Vote was 436 to 14;
Center and R
by Tixier-Vignancc
thwarted by parliar
the CP, many parti
that the CP will hal
Communists
banned a Communi
on 8 November.
3. Impact on Fr en
ction.
:ed sympathy for Hungarians, calling on the
refugees and to seek means to prevent deportations.
~, with only Communists and Progressives opposed.
.ght politicians talked of banning the CP. Attempt
urt to obtain ban in Assembly, 7 November,
-ientary tactics. While interested in harassing
es would not favor a ban on the CP. Some think
.g itself with its intransigent unpopular stand.
:laimed that the Prefect of the Seine Department
t "people's demonstration" against the "fascists"
uicipal government ordered the flag flown at half
r, in sympathy with the Hungarians.
a. The CP appa:
tightly contro
no outward si
Hungarian aff
French Comn
periphery: ai
intellectuals,
unions (CGT),
b. The intellectuals: a spectacular rebellion.
1) Leading Communists and fellow-travelling writers, members
of the Communist front Comite National des Ecrivains (CNE),
signed a p blic protest "against the use of cannon and tanks
to break the revolt of the Hungarian people and its desire
for independence. " The group included Jean-Paul Sartre,
Jacques P revert, Claude Roy, Claude Morgan (Editor in
chief of C Fmmunist weekly Les Lettres Francais),
Jacques- ancis Rolland, Roger Vailland, J. Bruller
("Vercors ") and Simon de Beauvoir.
h Communist Movement.
'atus in France, which has always been more
lied and disciplined than that in Italy, has shown
gns of severe internal strain as a result of the
air. The primary effects of Hungary on the
lunist movement have been observed on the
nong fellow-travelling and recently affiliated
and in the structure of the Communist-controlled
QANEMMMN~
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2) Rolland gave an interview to L'Express on 9 November
charging that the bureaucrats of the PCF were stifling
criticism.
3) Communist Professor Gerard Lyon-Caen of the Paris Uni-
versity Law School sent a letter to PCF headquarters
upholding Roy, Vailland, Rolland, and Morgan, and deploring
the suppression of the Hungarian uprising by force.
4) On 22 November Le Monde reported that the following
Communist intellectuals had signed a letter protesting
L'Humanite's failure to carry accurate news on international
affairs, calling for a special Party Congress, and affirming
their loyalty to the Party: painters Pablo Picasso and
Edouard Pignon; writers Georges Besson, Francis Jourdain,
Helene Parmelin, Paul Tillard; teachers Marcel Cornu,
Henri Wallon and Renne Zazzo; and Dr. J Harel.
1) The Central Committee met three times in a five-week
period during the crisis (18-19 October, 1 November,
20-21 November) Fajon, Garaudy, Billoux and Guyot laid
down a rigidly pro-Soviet, anti-deviationist line. Servin,
in L'Humanite of 12 November attacked the ''termites and
liquidators. 'The leadership would not "allow obscure
little 'Petofi circles' to break up the Party, '' Servin de-
clared. Guyot denounced the "opportunists and liquidators. "
2) At the CC meeting of 20-21 November J F Rolland was
expelled from the Party, Lyon-Caen was suspended for
6 months; Roy, Vailland, and Morgan were publicly repri-
manded.
3) The Party press sought to divert attention from Hungary by
concentrating on Egypt.
.4) The staff of the weekly France Nouvelle has been thoroughly
overhauled. Guyot told the Central Committee on 20-21
November that the publication had failed to fulfill its "decisive
role in the ideological combat. " Francois Billoux replaced
Florimond Bonte as Director, beginning with the 1 December
issue.
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RN 011- F~
Communists a
figures are av
the ranks of w
Party has only
probably much
ship has not fa
not afford a cl
of the East Eu
1) The CGT ca
Fascists" o
According t
CGT membe
member ship
small numb
gether to re
some put in
3) CGT candid
prise. In th
the CGT dro
elections.
lost control
Other losses
Parisienne s
Agricole at
the Barroui
Forges de 1
4) CGT leader
divided on th
At a meeting
Pierre Le B
eports indicate apathy on the part of rank-and-file
d some resignations from the Party, but no firm
ilable. France-Soir of 28 November said that
d cases of open rebellion have occurred among
rker militants. " Sartre has claimed that the
about 180, 000 members, but this figure is most
too low. It would appear that the formal member-
len below 300, 000, and even this figure does
ar estimate of the losses suffered as a result
opean crisis.
1 for "a great day of union and action against
13 November was a fiasco everywhere.
L'Express of 16 November several thousand
rs answered this call by mailing torn-up
cards to CGT headquarters. Only a relatively
r went out on strike. Many CGT units failed alto-
pond; some refused to transmit the strike order;
ver-time work to raise funds for Hungarian relief.
CGT federations and sections adopted resolutions
oviet action in Hungary.
tes lost ground in several plant Comites d'Entre-
elections at the Berliet factories, on 15 November
ped from 56.19% to 47. 36% as against the 1955
t the Ugine Steel plant at Chambery, the CGT
f the Committee for the first time since 1936.
were recorded in the Nouvelles Messageries
de Presse, the Societe Francaise de Materiel
ierzon, the Dunlop Plant at Montlucon, and
factory of the Compagnie des Ateliers et
Loire.
enoit Frachon admitted that "the CGT has been
subject of Hungary" in a speech on 18 November.
of the CGT Bureau Confederal on 14 November,
un and Jean Schaeffer reportedly attacked the
"mom
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Soviet action in Hungary, and on 23-24 November Frachon
said that the "differences" would be "swept away by the
economic troubles which unfortunately are about to descend
upon the working class. "
f. Impact on other pro-Communist groups.
1) A group of 15 members of the National Council of the "Peace
Movement" signed a petition calling for a special meeting
to "define the position of the Peace Movement in Hungary"
and regretting the "lack of clarity in the declarations of the
Bureau concerning Hungary. "
2) The Union Progressiste, which traditionally lines up with
the PCF in the Assembly, has objected to the Soviet action
in Hungary.
3) Francois Mauriac, Edouard Herriot, and others have
resigned from the society France-URSS, and its vice-
president, Dr. Weill-Halle, published an open letter in
Le Monde of 14 November deploring the "tragedy" of
Hungary, but stating that he had decided to postpone
"temporarily" a decision as to whether to resign.
(Aime Cesaire, Communist leader in Martinique and member of the
National Assembly, rebelled against the leadership of the PCF during
the course of the East European crisis, but for reasons which appear
not to have been directly connected with the crisis.)
1. Popular Action.
Popular reaction very strong. Socialist Youth staged silent
parade 4 November before Soviet Embassy. Large crowd gathered
at Embassy 7 November to demonstrate on the occasion of the
October Revolution celebration. On 8 November crowd of about
5, 000, mostly students, broke up poorly attended Communist rally
and sacked every CP headquarters in Vienna as well as Communist
book stores. Flag at Soviet Trade Mission burned. Over 3000
police unable to maintain order, but prevented demonstrators from
entering Soviet Embassy.
Austrian Trade Union Federation protested Soviet actions in
appeal addressed to WFTU, Central Council of Soviet Trade Unions,
ICFTU, and IFCTU.
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2. Governmental Action.
Communist newspaper Volksstimme for 4 November confiscated
by State Prosecutor on charges of high treason, i. e. , for claiming that
Austria had violated neutrality in favor of Hungarian insurgents.
3. Repercussions in Austrian Communist Movement.
Austrian press reports that Central Committee members refused
to endorse Party Chairman Koplenig's proposal to send greetings to
Kadar, and walked out of a stormy CC meeting.
Majority of CC members rejected Koplenig's proposal to send
October Revolution greetings to Moscow. Numerous officials have
quit the Party. Con iderable anti-Soviet sentiment in Styrian Party
leadership, where L ndtag Deputy and Graz municipal councilor
Kramer heads the opposition. Kramer sent message to Graz Mayor
condemning Soviet intervention in Hungary, demanding that the CP
assert its independe ce, and that Stalinist CP leaders resign.
Kramer later told a Styrian CP conference that he had no intention
of resigning from th Party; that his declaration had aimed at giving
"impetus to a speedy change of the policy of the Central Committee
and to the speedy publication of principles concerning a specific
Austrian road to Socialism, which avoids the grave errors of the
Hungarian People's Democracy as regards hasty and sacrificing
industrialization, the treatment of peasants and small business men,
and particularly the iolation of democracy. '
Many Communist workers and shop stewards have quit the CP.
Press reports at the opposition in the KPOe leadership centers
around Ernst Fischer, Bruno Frei, and Viktor Matejka, and that
violent clashes occur at every Central Committee meeting. Com-
munist press account of regional CP conferences confirmed existence
of substantial friction. Some observers believe that the Party will
soon split into Titois and Muscovite groups. Fischer wrote (Volksstimme,
25 November), that "a no other time has any other event hurt us so
deeply, nor has any event shaken our conscience so painfully as the
Hungarian tragedy. 1 ever before has there heen a similar conflict
between personal conscience and political consciousness, and never
before was it so nece sary for each one of us, and for the entire Party,
to learn genuinely ho to make Communism attractiye again. " He
said that "it would be completely wrong to characterize the events in
Hungary as a 'counterrevolutionary putsch.
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Press reports defections have continued, including Communist
art critic Johann Muschik; Dr. Ferdinand Warnig, city librarian
and officer of Austro-Hungarian Society; Dr. Hertha Singer, a mem-
ber of the staff of Der Abend; physicist Dr. Hans Gruemm; Johann
Erliner, a labor leader in the Vienna electricity company; a large
number of shop stewards in the metal workers' and miners' union.
The Austro-Soviet Society issued a statement adopted 1 December
admitting that its leadership does "not agree in their views on the...
/position/ of the Soviet Union in the recent events... "
Socialist press reports that the Association of Communist
Policemen is split; that 50 members recently walked out on, a CP
spokesman who sought to defend the Soviet actions.
1. Popular Action.
Non-Communist press and public opinion uniformly repelled
by Soviet action in Hungary. About 2000 university students from
Brussels and Louvain demonstrated at Soviet Embassy, 5 November.
Antwerp dockers announced refusal to load Soviet ships.
Foreign Minister Spaak broadcast, 5 November, condemned
Soviet action.
3. Repercussions in Belgian Communist Movement.
Press reports that CP leaders went into hiding after a demon-
stration outside Party headquarters, and that police did not know
where they had set up headquarters. Reports of internal disagree-
ments in Party leadership, but no large defections.
The Brussels press reported on 16 January 1957 that former
Politburo member Albert Van Hoorick had resigned from the CP
to join the Socialist Party, and this was confirmed by Le Drapeau
Rouge Magazine No. 3 (19-25 January 1957). The Party has taken
a "kid-gloves" attitude toward Van Hoorick and will probably con-
tinue to do so until, with Socialist encouragement and from the
logic of events, he comes out publicly to attack the policies and
leadership of the CP.
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 DENMARK
1. Popular Action.
Following fir
drives for funds fo
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'T
t use of Soviet troops, widespread and spontaneous
Hungarian relief.
ort that Government and public reaction was
other event since the war. Conservative Youth,
nd trade unions promoted mass protest meetings.
viet action of 4 November even stronger.
heard Student Joint. Council condemn Soviet action,
4 November, Stude t and Socialist Youth groups tried to deliver
protests to Soviet Embassy. Police obliged to show truncheons
when 800 persons p cketed CP newspaper office.
All flags at h
silence in memory
rung throughout the
boycotted. Two to
Embassy, smashed
demonstrators inju
Danish CP cancelle
broke windows and
National Orga
action and the W FD
protesting the Sovie
Prime Minist
Communist leader
where members he
spent only 5 minute
if-mast and five-minute work-stoppage and
f Hungary, 8 November. Church bells were
five-minute period. Soviet Embassy reception
hree-thousand demonstrators stormed the
windows, attempted to fire the building. Some
ed. Delegation exchanges with USSR halted.
its October Revolution celebration. Crowds
mpeded delivery of CP newspaper.
ization of Liberal Youth condemned Soviet
. Other organizations adopted resolutions
action.
r protested Soviet action 4 November; gave
sel Larsen angry tongue-lashing in Folketing,
kled Larsen. Government Chef de Protocol
at Soviet Embassy reception, 7 November.
On 3 January 1957 the Government announced that the
Bulganin-Khrushche
indefinitely.
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3. Repercussions in Danish Communist Movement.
Serious dis affection among rank-and-file, among Communist and
fellow-travelling intellectuals, and in mass organizations.O.rer-all
membership loss estimated at 20%, but some local statistics suggest
that this estimate may be too high. Disagreement and even opposition
in Party leadership, reflected in Land og Folk articles that criticized
the Soviet action, and in a shifting line taken towards the intellectuals.
Party leader Aksel Larsen seems to have adopted a position that is not
entirely in accord with the Soviet line on Hungary. In Lando Folk of
25 November, he said that the "consequences" of the Soviet aggression
would be 'serious. " "In accordance with Socialist principles," Larsen
wrote, "a people should be allowed to conduct its own affairs without
foreign intervention. We know that the tragic events in Hungary did
not occur without imperialist intervention, but Soviet tanks were and
are more easily visible in Budapest than infiltration from the West. "
His article concluded by saying that the Party must "undertake in-
dependent evaluations of important problems without, with uncritical
faith, approving of everything that happens in the Soviet Union. "
On 27 November, Land og Folk mildly criticized the Kadar Govern-
ment for its handling of the Nagy disappearance.
A special Party Congress was called to open on 18 January,
and may produce a show-down in the leadership. Other indications
of losses include the following:
Communist fractions in two trade unions adopted resolutions
29 October protesting Soviet action. One group in Copenhagen
tramway union threatened to resign from the CP if the latter
failed to deliver a protest to the Soviet Ambassador. The
other, in Elsinore shipyard union, voted funds for Hungarian
aid. Shop stewards in Communist-influenced Elsinore ship-
yards condemned Soviet intervention, 2 November.
The son and a grandson of the late author Martin Anderson
Nexoe, who was a show-piece of the CP, have resigned from
the Party. Olaf Anderson Nexoe, the son, stated that he was
resigning not "only on account of Hungary, " but that he had
"been planning to withdraw for some time. "
Thirty-four intellectuals signed an "opposition statement" which
was published in Information after Land og Folk refused to print it.
Two of these were expelled on 16 November. The statement was finally
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carried on 21 Dece
inner-Party discus
carried pro-Soviet
Inger Merete Norde
Kaj Christian
other staffers have
writer; Anders Tyc
Lund Hansen and C
ber in a 4-page supplenut to Land og Folk on the
ion. In addition to the statement, the supplement
rticles, but also an article by CC member
toft sharply attacking the Soviet action in Hungary.
er has attacked the Soviet action.
gens Fog attacked the Party, and fellow-travelling
en, one of three editors of Land og Folk, and five
quit their jobs (Jorgen Christensen, editorial
e and Egon Rasch of the editorial staff; Kaj
rl D$rge, press photographers).
Teit Kaern resigned from the Copenhagen City Council, but
not from the Party.
from the Party.
Viggo Han
Guldbaek
Svend Lau
Workers' Uni
Gunnar An
zation in Veil
d the Soviet Union, cancelled his membership.
sen, Secretary of the Society for Cooperation
f the strikes in the spring of 1956.
r, shop steward in the Danish Aluminum Industry
en, official of the Bookbinders Union.
an sen , official of the Smiths union in Copenhagen.
sen, chairman of Copenhagen Fuel Workers' Union.
sen, vice-chairman of Section M of the Railway
Madsen, CP chairman and member of machine
in Brgnderslev, Jutland.
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1. Popular Action.
Student attempt to demonstrate at Soviet Embassy thwarted by
police. Conservative Party delegation to Kekkonen 7 November pro-
tested abstention vote in UN, but non-Communist parties did not de-
bate the issue in the Diet.
2. Governmental Action.
Government cautious. Police dispersed Helsinki students who
gathered to march on Soviet Embassy 5 November. Government
leaders decided to abstain UN vote on Hungary.
3. Repercussions in Finnish Communist Movement.
Tyokansan Sanamat took a firmly pro-Soviet line from the
beginning of the Hungarian crisis, justifying the Soviet intervention
and attacking the "Western imperialists." Social Democratic press,
however, stated that considerable disagreement exists in the CP;
that many Party members are critical of the Party's defense of Soviet
action in Hungary; that some have called for the ouster for the A.altonen
leader ship.
(WEST) GERMANY
Anti-Soviet crowd of 50-75, 000 at Berlin Schoeneberg Rathaus
5 November. Student and youth groups, (8-10, 000) marched on Soviet
Sector. Some passed through police road-block to join more than 1, 000 at
Brandenburg Gate and Soviet War Memorial. Soviet Sector signs burned.
Crowd stoned "Peoples Police" armored vehicles. Small youth group
at Soviet War Memorial dissuaded from rushing Soviet Sector.
Some Berlin citizens advocated a global boycott of Soviet goods
and strike against loading ships for Soviet ports.
About 2500, mostly Hamburg University students, paraded
5 November in protest against Soviet action in Hungary and Anglo-French
action in Egypt. Broken up by pglice, smaller groups (600-800)
demonstrated before French, British, U. S. Consulates General.
Hamburg flags half-masted over Hungarian events.
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MWO&WMW
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1. Popular Action.
Icelandic popular reaction against Soviet action in Hungary was
unusually strong. Icelanders had not been so indignant since Russia
invaded Finland in 1939.
Protest demonstrations at Soviet Embassy sponsored by non-
Communist student and writers groups.
Communist-dominated Federation of Labor decision 2 November
to collect funds for Hungarian relief viewed as defensive maneuver.
The IFL failed to respond to an ICFTU request for a five-minute
work stoppage, stating that request was not received in time. Despite
opposition of Communist unions, five-minute protest work stoppage
was widely observe 1 8 November in Reykjavik, Hafnarifjordur, and
Schools observed five-minute silence in sympathy with
Hungarian people. Many foreign missions and all public buildings
flew flags at half-s aff.
Several hundr
and booed the few I
Writer Halldor Lax
flag torn down. Ice
position of having to
Hungarian eve
withdrawal of US fo
made by notes exch
ds gathered before Soviet Embassy, 7 November
,
elanders attending October Revolution, reception.
ess entered and left under police escort. Soviet
andic Foreign Minister placed in the embarrassing
apologize to the Russians.
is induce Government to cancel its request for
.ces. Agreement over continuation of US bases
nged 6 December.
Prime Minister condemned Soviet action in Hungary and Anglo-
Stormy sessio
Conservatives took
recognize leader of
in lower house of Althing, 6 November, where
e offensive. Communist speaker refused to
onservative Party who wanted to introduce
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resolution of sympathy. Social Democratic atic parliamentary group
adopted resolution 6 November paralleling Government resolution.
3. Repercussions in Icelandic Communist Movement.
Internal dissension reported in CP Labor Alliance resolution,
which included condemnation of Soviet aggression, adopted. against
opposition of ''Moscow wing'.
CP Council meeting, 25-28 November, paid relatively small
attention to the defense issue--a marked departure from its recent
policies. The Communist Society of Husivik on 28 November de-
nounced the Soviet action in Hungary, and criticized the CPI leader-
ship and the Party newspaper. The Society said that it would
resign from the CP unless the leadership and the paper reversed
their stand on the Hungarian crisis. 25X1A2g
Petrina Jakobsson, member of Reykjavik City Council,
member of Party Central Committee, and sister of defected
Communist leader Aki Jakobsson, broke with the Party, parti-
cularly over its line on Hungary. Her son resigned from the
Party at the same time.
In January 1957 trade union elections, Communists lost
heavily (about 25%), except in the Party - controlled Dockworkers
Union. Conservative candidates made definite gains in the
Reykjavik Seamen's Union, the Hafnarfyordur Seamen's Union
and the Throttur Truck Driver's Union.
Halldor Laxness in a 7 November interview in the CP
paper Thjodviljinn showed clearly his own shock and disillusionment
over events in Hungary.
Large crowd (estimated at 2, 000), mostly students, wrecked
Soviet Legation 6 November, destroying furn.i.shing.s and two
Soviet cars, and consuming or spoiling food and wine that had
been prepared for October Revolution reception, for which no
invited guests had appeared. Legation staff hid on top floor.
Luxembourg army restored order.
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Former Luxembourg prisoners of USSR planned to stage more serious
demonstrations 7 Nov mber.
Prime Minister Be3h, greatly upset by 6 November events, presented
regrets to Soviet Mini ter and was staggered by the ruin of the Legation.
Victor Ewen and Leon Thurm, Communist members of the city council
of Esch s/Alzette (the major steel center and center of the left-wing
in Luxembourg) resigned from the CP. Ewen also resigned from the
Council.
Professor Pierre Biermann, whose house had been attacked
during the demonstrat ons of 5-6 November, issued a statement on
15 November stating at he had resigned from the CP in August because
he did not believe that Soviet policy was really being 'de-Stalinized. ''
Biermann had resigne from the presidency of the Luxembourg Peace
Movement in 1953, an in his recent statement he said that it was
because of constant C interference.
NETHERLANDS
1. Popular Action.
Force of Anti-S viet reaction unprecedented. Flags half-masted,
press unanimous in attack on Soviets and Dutch CP. Demonstrations
and attacks on Soviet rade Mission and Embassy on CP Headquarters,
bookstores, and offic s of front organizations in Amsterdam, Rotterdam,
The Hague, and Utrec t. Crowd of 5-6000 attacked CP offices in
Amsterdam 4 November. Soviet representatives, Communist leaders
and families molested. Soviet families moved into Embassy or Trade
Mission, which were put under heavy police guard. Rotterdam dockers
refused to work on So iet ships and Dutch firms have boycotted Soviet
business. Public attempted to prevent distribution of CP newspaper
which endorsed Soviet line on Hungary. Kurhaus hotel at Scheveningen
cancelled Soviet reception 7 November. Thousands of Amsterdam
students hung Zhukov in effigy 5 November. Dutch-Soviet soccer
match cancelled. May organizations have pressed for severance of
diplomatic relations with USSR. Dutch team withdraws from Olympic
Games, donates fund to Hungarian relief. Many advertizers cancel
contracts with CP newspaper. The CP publishing firm has lost many
of its private printing contracts and many of its employees have been
laid off.
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Prime Minister Drees forestalls attempt of several ;political
parties to break diplomatic relations with USSR on the ground that it
would hurt the Netherlands, but he said that his Government was
prepared to cancel cultural and athletic exchanges.
3. Repercussions in Dutch Communist Movement.
Substantial defections from Communist trade union central (EVC).,
Resignations of a number of locally prominent Party members, including
members of municipal councils. Many subscriptions to CP newspaper
De Waarheid cancelled. Hard core of CP maintained its rigid position.
Some Communist intellectuals signed a protest statement against
the Soviet action and were rather mildly criticized by Marcus Bakker
in De Waarheid (16 Nov. 1956).
1. Popular Action.
Strong popular reaction against Soviet action in Hungary. Flags
at half-mast; Storting stood in respect for Hungarian dead;; Oslo Uni-
versity President expressed sympathy for the Hungarians. Trade
unions recalled delegations in USSR. Youth and students demanded
cessation of delegations to USSR. Almost complete boycott of Soviet
Embassy 7 November celebration. Numerous trade unions and other
organizations demanded withdrawal of Soviet troops. Largest mass
meeting since 1945 assembled for fund-raising campaign for Hungary,
6 November (estimated 7, 000 persons). About 1-2000 then joined in
demonstration at Soviet Embassy; slight disturbances (bottles, stones,
one stink-bomb thrown). David Oistrakh concert and meeting of
Norwegian-Soviet Friendship Society cancelled. Norwegian Cooperative
Association delegation to USSR cancelled. Norwegian shipowners
refused Soviet shipping, pending clarification of international situation.
Demands for cancellation of Bulganin-Khrushchev visit next spring.
Prime Minister and Foreign Minister denounced Soviet action.
Government recalled two Norwegian labor delegations traveling in
USSR, 5 November. Labor Party cancelled visit of Soviet editors'
delegation 5 November.
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3. Repercussions i Norwegian Communist Movement.
Drammen Di trict CP leader resigned; hoped to join the
Labor Party, taking some Communists with him. Prominent Com-
munist youth leade in Kristiansund defected. Division reported
in CP between leaders and trade unionists and sizeable defections
have been reported from Norwegian-Soviet Friendship Society.
Despite these defections, as well as a few other resignations of
locally prominent leaders (Lauritz Nygard, Egersund municipal
council member) t ere have been no mass resignations from the
Party itself.
On 9 November, CP Chairman Emil L~vlien declared in
Parliament that the Soviet action could not be defended. The
CP published a sta ement on 11 November calling for the withdrawal
of foreign troops from all countries, including Hungary. The
statement also supported the admission of UN observers into
Hungary as a preliminary step to the withdrawal of Soviet forces.
The NKP informed the Hungarian Labor Party, the CPSU and
other Communist Parties of its views. This statement was
endorsed by a nati nal Party conference on 24-25 November, as
was L~vlien's stat ment. Friheten also criticized the abduction
of Nagy.
The State Youth Council, representing fifty-nine Norwegian
youth organization 3, including the Communists, rejected a Soviet
proposal for exten ive cooperation, in protest against Soviet
action in Hungary.
SWEDEN
1. Popular Action
Reaction against Soviet action in Hungary described as un-
paralleled. Condemnation from all sectors: Conservatives,
Liberals, Agraria. s and Social Democrats. Student-labor demon-
strations in all university towns. 4000 Stockholm students rioted
in front of Soviet Embassy and 10, 000 marched through streets.
Soviet Embassy r ception 7 November poorly attended, but no
major demonstration. Heavy contributions for Hungarian relief.
Swedish trade union federation, LO, condemned Soviet action.
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2. Governmental Action.
Speakers of both houses of the Riksdag broadcast condemnation
of Soviet action. Foreign Minister spent only five minutes at Soviet
Embassy reception, 7 November.
Government refused visas for Soviet Bloc delegates to attend
World Peace Council meeting scheduled to take place in Stockholm,
mid-November.
3. Repercussions in Swedish Communist Movement.
Non-Communist press claims that the Communist "friendship"
and "peace" movements have lost heavily in popular support as a
result of Soviet action; that Communist leaders in the cultural and
"friendship" movement in Gothenburg have quit.
According to Ny Dag, of 10 November the Party leadership,
in discussing the Egyptian and Hungarian developments, stated that
" 'changes in a country's internal affairs must be made in accordance
with the people's will and not forced on them by interventions from
outside. ' The Party thus alines itself with the principle of non-
intervention and that 'no country should try to influence or intervene
in the internal developments in any other country with troops or any
other means.' " The CP adopted the line that had been taken by
the Norwegian and Danish CP's in calling for withdrawal of all foreign
forces from Europe. Closing its statement, the Party expressed itself
for "complete democratization, peace, and national sovereignty for
Hungary."
Subsequently, however, according to a Moscow TASS account
(10 January 1957) the CP has adopted the firmly pro-Soviet position
that "in the Hungarian events... the main part was played by U. S.
imperialism and the internal reaction.
Locally prominent Communists, Borje Fransen (Dalsiand) and
Olle Karlsson (Stockholm) have resigned. Dissident "Stalinist" Set
Persson has increased his activities.
1. Popular Action.
Strong popular and press reaction against Soviet action. Groups
in Bern demonstrated before the Soviet Embassy and collected signatures
for anti-Soviet petition, 4 November. Helvetic Society (patriot group)
and Bern youth organization called for mass demonstration, 5 November.
Pro-Hungarian demonstration, Zurich, 10 November.
Socialist Party called on Federal Council to deny recognition to
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Large anti-Soviet demonstration, Geneva, 7 November. CP
newspaper office damaged. Police used fire hoses and tear gas to
disperse demonstrators and prevent disturbances of Soviet October
Revolution reception.
in Vorwaerts 14 and 15 November,
J.
Party leader
rious damage had been done to its CP y t e
acknowledged that s b h
Hungarian crisis.
Numerous resignations from CP. Basel and Zurich report
greatest number of defections. French-speaking Switzerland CP
less affected. Editor of Basel CP newspaper Vorwaerts Ulrich
Kaegi resigned. Three party sections near Basel resigned en bloc
and now operate ind pendently. Basel Communist youth organization
objected to "swallowing everything" that the Soviets say. Leading
defectors include Peter Stein, Fritz Heeb, Adolf Haesler, Dr.
Primo Medice, Dr. Martin Stohler, Jean Moser, Hans Kugler,
Gottfried Baumann, Willy Grieder, Eugen Grise, Gerhard Lehman,
Georges Perrenoud Paul Camenisch and Otto Schudel. Many of
these were members of Basel and Zurich local governments.
Renowned painter and fellow traveler Hans Erni denounced the
Soviet action.
On 15 December, it was announced that publication of Vorwaerts
would be reduced from six times a week to once a week because of
financial difficulties.
UNITED KINGDOM
Popular Action.
British Trad
28 November to redommend against any further exchange delegations
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t 2, 000 Hungarian refugees.
it participated in relief for Hungarians. Govern-
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with Soviet Union in protest against Soviet action in Hungary;
voted 15, 000 Pounds Sterling in addition to initial 10, 000 for
Hungarian relief; but decided against international boycott of
USSR on practical grounds and because it opposes industrial
action for political ends.
Crowd of 200 students chased Party Secretary Gollan.
through the streets of Cowes, Isle of Wight, after he quit a
meeting at which he was to speak on Hungary and Poland.
Repercussions in British Communist Movement.
"Hundreds" of resignations from the CP by trade unionists
and intellectuals, including John Horner (General Secretary, Fire
Brigade Union), A. Wallis (Yorkshire official of Electrical 'Trades
Union), Alex Moffat (Scottish Mineworkers Union); Jack Grahl,
Leo Keeley, and T. Parry (Officials, Fire Brigade Union); Leslie
Cannon (a leader of Electrical Trades Union), Professors Edward
Thompson and John Saville (editors of The Reasoner, anti-leadership
Communist publication), "Gabriel" (James Friell) (Chief cartoonist,
London Daily Worker). Richard Seabrook (East Anglian organiser
of the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers), Fred Moore
(London organiser of the Amalgamated Union of Building Trade
Workers), David Ross (Secretary, Gateshead branch of Amal-
gamated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen); leaders
of CP local organizations, Arthur Fullard (Sheffield), Maurice
Graham (Hainault, Essex), James Crooks (Ashington, Northum-
berland).
Other Daily Worker staff members Patrick Goldring (film
critic), Malcolm MacEwen, (features editor) and Llew Gardner
(staff, reporter) also quit the paper. Except for Goldring, these
staffer s did not quit the CP.
Cannon, Grahl, and Keeley issued statement calling for
dissolution of the CP. Daily Worker correspondent Peter Fryer
resigned from the paper, but not from the CP, because it refused
to publish his stories from Hungary, Oxford University branch
of the CP disbands in reaction to Hungary. Recent meeting of
Young Communist League seek "a revival of Trotskyite policies
and outspoken refusal to subscribe to Soviet brutalities. "
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London Daily Worker claims that only a "tiny few... are
reconsidering their embership" (London, Reuters, 14 November);
but letters critical o Soviet action have appeared in the paper, and
the Party has called a special Congress for next Easter. On a
television program, 10 December, Gollan admitted that 590 persons
had resigned and predicted a 3 per-cent total loss. He failed to
mention that these defections included most of the Party's thoughtful
members and almost all of its outstanding intellectuals.
On 1 January 1957 the Daily Worker said that it was faced with
a possible closing down because of rising costs and loss of circulation.
The circulation loss was said to be due to 'some readers' disagree-
ment with our policy on Hungary. "
Peter Fryer, he Daily Worker correspondent in Budapest who
resigned from that aper, gave an interview to the London Daily
Express setting fort his reasons: his stories had been censored and/or
suppressed by the D3.ily Worker; he knew that Soviet troops had
committed excesses in Hungary; he knew that the uprising was
supported by "99 pe -cent of the people, including a great number
of the ordinary hon st-rank-and-file members of the Communist
Party", and that there was "no 'white terror' ". He called the
Soviet action "brutal, criminal, and totally unnecessary. " He has
just published a book, "The Hungarian Tragedy. "
The factional
by John Saville and
number with an app
completely from the
and to maintain cont
a "new Socialist jou
from the CP for thr
ARGENTINA
Pro-Hungaria
lasting several hour
Soviet Embassy sto
and horse charges.
ommunist publication The Reasoner (edited
. P. Thompson) put out its final November
al for CP members to "dissociate themselves
leadership of the British Communist Party"
cts. The editors promised to try to establish
nal. " Saville and Thompson were suspended
e months.
demonstration near Soviet Embassy, 7 November,
s and becoming violent. Crowd estimated at 500.
ed. Police obliged to use tear gas and vehicle
Catholic students clashed with Communists at
set on fire and several persons wounded.
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Poor attendance at Soviet Embassy reception celebrating October
Revolution.
Soviet flag torn down from UN office.
2. Governmental Action.
Ministry of Interior banned all meetings of the CP and its affiliates.
Argentine Court ruled that the CP cannot present political candidates
for elections. Hungarian events cited in judgement that CP is tied to
international totalitarian movement and therefore not democratic.
Police raided CP District Headquarters in Buenos Aires; arrested
15-20 Communists. Two police killed in gunfire.
Government protested Soviet action.
Chamber of Deputies adopted resolution 7 November condemning
Anglo-French action in Egypt and Soviet action in Poland and Hungary.
The first strong defense of the Soviet action in the unofficial CP
newspaper El Pueblo did not appear until 27 November.
BRAZIL
Minor demonstrations of sympathy with Hungary. Intellectual
leaders failed to develop vigorous indignation over Soviet action.
In early stages of Hungarian crisis some articles appeared in
CP's Imprensa Popular, expressing the view that the uprising had
genuine popular roots and was not the exclusive product of `imperialist,
fascist reaction. " These were soon followed by strictly pro-Soviet
articles. In a letter published on 29 November, Party leader Prestes
cracked down on loose discussion, called for "iron discipline" and
'proletarian internationalism" in support of the CPSU, "the bulwork
of world socialism. " The Central Committee fully endorsed the
Prestes letter in a resolution published on 25 November.
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 Meeting spon
intervention in Eas
liberal organ-z-.--
in Hungary. Liber
with Hungarian peo
Isauro Torres mad
"We, the Radicals,
refuse to accept th
imperialist design
COSTA RICA
Unusually
Hungary. Large
mated 2, 000 seco
demonstrations a
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ored by Hungarians and Poles protesting Soviet
ern Europe, 31 October. Various left-wing and
s issued statements condemning Soviet action
1 Party resolution 30 October expressed solidarity
le in struggle for independence. Radical Senator
speech on behalf of his party 20 November, saying,
do not reject the doctrine of Communism, but we
diabolic use of Communist dogma to satisfy the
of Moscow. "
tement supporting Soviet action in Hungary,
f internal confusion.
Council of the strongly Communist labor central,
when a resolution was adopted 20 November Aro-
n in Hungary.
eruda rejected an appeal from Congress of Cultural
rtre in repudiating Soviet action.
rong public condemnation of Soviet actions in
umber of anti-Soviet newspaper editorials. Esti-
dary school students and others participated in
d mass for Hungarian patriots, 19 November.
National Assembly resolution adopted 1 November expressing
sympathy for Hu garian people.
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3. Repercussions in Costa Rican Communist Movement.
Confusion in CP leadership over Hungarian events outwardly
resolved by the decisive Soviet action on 4 November. Official
Party statement published 11 November in Adelante, fully supporting
Soviet. line that "imperialists" were behind Hungarian revolt. Never-
theless, reports of disorientation in the leadership persisted through
December. Professor Corina Rodriguez, a pro-Communist leader
of women's activities, completely renounced her sympathies for
the USSR on 16 November.
CUBA
Non-Communist press condemned Anglo-French action in
Egypt and Soviet action in Hungary.
PSP circular dated 26 October blamed Hungarian troubles on
U. S. "imperialists. "
PSP publications following second Soviet intervention of 4
November continued firmly pro-Soviet line.
President Ponce said in a press interview that the UN police
force should go to Hungary as well as Egypt "to restore the dignity
and sovereignty of Hungary,"and offered 500 Ecuadorian troops.
He condemned the "Russian massacre of the Hungarian people,
and sent a telegram to European Governments-in-exile expressing
"moral solidarity" against Soviet action. The Government offered
asylum for the Hungarian refugees.
In addition to other signs of growing revulsion of Quito Uni-
versity students against Soviet action, the Ecuadorian University
Students Federation, an affiliate of the international Communist
students' front, IUS, adopted a resolution condemning Soviet
action in Hungary and calling on the IUS to "clarify" its position on
the Hungarian situation. This resolution apparently was the result
of pressure from below in the FEUE. Worker reaction against the
USSR has given the Communists a set-back in organized labor.
On 10 November the CP daily El Siglo justified the Soviet action.
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MEXICO
s reported as confused by anti-Soviet actions in
Poland and Hunga
numerous article
end of November
any personal stat
of the USSR was
the pro-Communi
October, taking a
in the "capitalist'
Hungary.
PERU
y in October, although the Party press carried
and editorials defending the USSR. As of the
CM leader Dionisio Encina had still not made
ment on the crisis. The strongest early defense
ade by Vicente Lombardo Toledano, head of
t Partido Popular, who gave a lecture on 31
rigidly pro-Soviet position and attacking the "lies"
press concerning the first Soviet intervention in
General popular reaction against Soviet action in Hungary,
distracted somewhat by opposition against Anglo-French action in
Egypt. Most Congressmen and the major daily newspapers ex-
pressed sympathy for Hungarian people. Even the Aprista publi-
cation Impacto sh rply criticized Soviet propaganda.
URUGUAY
Immigrant
demonstrated 7 N
Soviet Consulate.
Legation guests a
major clash. Stu
orkers from Satellite countries and 300 students
vember; set fire to and seriously damaged the
Large student demonstration at Soviet Legation.
d police stoned. Students heckled Communist
celebration; mounted police required to prevent
ents attacked CP headquarters with fire bombs.
s attacked the USSR. Several Senators proposed
oted unanimously on 22 November to send to the
n Relations the transcript of its debate in which
taking sanctions against the USSR. Uruguayan UN delegation in-
ainst seating of Kadar delegate.
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Communist trade union activity seriously, if only momentarily,
setback by Soviet action in Hungary. The CSU (Socialist-influenced,
but apolitical labor central) Congress in special session on 17 November
decided against joining the Coordinating Committee of the so-called
Central Union of Workers, a Communist (UGT) sponsored organization.
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