UNPUBLISHED DOCUMENTS DISTRIBUTED AMONG THE DELEGATES TO THE XXTH CPSU CONGRESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 118
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Releas
8-00915R000500080001-7
WEV
UNPUBLISHED DOCUMENTS
DISTRIBUTED AMONG THE DELEGATES
TO THE XXTH CPSU CONGRESS
CRET
NO N
Approved For Release : CIA- P78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
CRET
NOMRN
For the Exclusive Use
of Party Organizations
S ,T
Approved For Rele. e9~CQ - P -00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Ruse : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
\ET
NOFO
I transmitted the notes which V. I. Ilyich cZictated to me
during his illness from 23 December to 23 January - 13 separate
notes. This total number does not yet include the note concern-
ing the national question (Mariya Ilyishna has it). Some of
these notes have already been published (on the Workers-Peasants
Inspection, and on Sukhanov). Among the unpublished notes are
those of 24-25 December '22 and those of 4 January '23 which con-
tain personal characterizations of some CC members. Vladimir
Ilyich expressed the definite wish that this note of his be sub-
mitted after his death to the next Party Congress for its infor-
mation.
N. Krupskaya.
The documents mentioned in the declaration of Com. N. K.
Krupskaya, which are to be transmitted to the CC Plenum com-
mission, were received by me on 18 May '24.*
End of protocol*
N. Krupskaya
N. Krupskaya
Vladimir Ilyich's notes mentioned above and transmitted
to Com. Kamenev - are all known to me and were earmarked by
Vladimir Ilyich for transmittal to the Party.
18. V. 24.
Editor's note:
Lenin died 23 January 1924. The XIIIth
Congress of the Russian Communist Party
(Bolsheviks) took place from 23-31 May
l6k4.
CRET
Approved For Relea e9FC - 8-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Releas 78-00915R000500080001-7
NO N
Having familiarized itself with the documents
which were transmitted to Com. Kamenev by N. K.
Krupskaya on 18. V. 24, the CC Plenum Commission
decided:
To submit them to the nearest Party Congress for
its information.
19. V. 24
G. Zinoviev
A. Smirnov
M. Kalinin
N. Bukharin
J. Stalin
L. Kamenev
SEWBET
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
. NOFO
 Approved For Relea P78-00915R000500080001-7
NO N
I.
LETTER To THE CONGRESS
I should very much like to advise that a series of changes
in our political organization be undertaken at this Congress.
I should like to share-with you those thoughts which I con-
sider to be most essential.
I submit, as of primary importance, that the size of the
CC membership be enlarged to several dozen, possibly even to
one hundred members. It seems to me that our Central Committee
would be exposed to great danger in case future developments
would not be favorable to us (and we cannot rely on it)--if we
had not undertaken such a.reform.
Next.. I would like to call the Congress' attention to the
proposal that under some conditions Gosplan resolutions should
be given a legislative character, taking into consideration here
Com. Trotsky's proposition--up to a certain point and under cer-
tain conditions.
Referring to the first point, i.e., enlargement of CC
membership, I am of the opinion that it is necessary for the
raising of CC authority and for the serious work aimed at rais-
ing the efficiency of our apparatus, as also for the prevention
of conflicts between small CC groupings which would gravely af-
fect the fate of the Party as a whole.
I think that our Party has the right to demand 50-100 CC
members from the working class whom it can give up without tax-
ing its strength too highly.
This reform would lay the foundation for a greater sta-
bility of our Party and would help it in its struggle in the
encirclement of hostile nations, a struggle which in my opinion
can and must greatly sharpen in the next few years. I think
that thanks to such a move the stability of our Party would
increase a thousandfold.
23 XII '22 Lenin.
Written by M. V.
5
I~ET
NOF
F
Approved For Release : CIA-RD -00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
RET
Continuation of the notes
24 December '22
NOF
By the stability of the Central Committee, of which I
spoke above, I mean measures to prevent a split--if such
measures can at all be found. Because the White Guardist from
Russkaya Mysl (I think it was S. F. Oldenburg) was of course
right when, in the first place, in their action against Soviet
Russia, he banked on the hope of a split in our Party and also
when, in the second place, in speaking of this split, he banked
on very serious differences of opinion in the Party.
Our Party rests upon two classes and this may possibly re-
sult in the violation of its stability; and its fall could not
be prevented if these two classes did not reach an agreement.
Under such conditions to apply this or that solution, and even
to discuss the stability of our CC, is useless. No preventive
measures would in such an event avert a split. I hope, how-
ever, that this /The possibility of a split in the Party7* would
threaten only in the remote future, that it is so improbable
that we need not even talk about it.
I have in mind stability which would make a split impossi-
ble in the near future and I intend to examine here a series of
a purely personal nature.
In my opinion, and from this viewpoint, such CC members as
Stalin and Trotsky present the most important factor pertaining
to stability. The character of relationship between them con-
tains, to my mind, the greater part of the danger of that split,
which could be avoided; this preventive aim can, I think, best
be served along with other purposes by raising the number of
CC members to 50, to 100 persons.
Com. Stalin has, having become Secretary General, con-
centrated enormous power in his hands and I am not at all cer-
tain that he is capable of utilizing this power with sufficient
*Editor's note
ET
Approved For Relea3,~6
P78
TI~GI~ -009158000500080001-7
 Approved For R se : CIA-pP78-00915R000500080001-7
caution. Com. Trotsky, on'the other hand, as was already
demonstrated in his fight against the CC in connection with
the question of the People's Commissariat of Communications,
distinguishes himself not only as possessing great abilities.
He is probably the most able man in the present CC but at the
same time he possesses an exaggerated self-confidence and an
exaggerated attraction to the purely administrative side of
affairs.
These two traits of the two able leaders of the present
CC might quite innocently lead to a split; if our Party does
not take steps to prevent this, the split can occur unexpectedly.
I will not further attempt to characterize other CC mem-
bers as to their personal qualities. I will recall only that
the October episode of Zinoviev and Kamenev was, of course, not
an accident, but we should use it against them even less than
non-Bolshevism against Trotsky.
Speaking about the younger CC members, I want to say a few
words about Bukharin and Pyatakov. In my opinion they are the
most able forces (of the younger man); but in regard to them
we should be aware of the following: Bukharin is not only a
very valuable and very prominent Party theoretician, but is
properly regarded as the favorite of the whole Party; his the-
oretical views, however, can be accepted as fully Marxist views,
but only with a very large grain of salt, because there is some-
thing of the scholastic in him (he never studied and, I think,
has never completely understood, the dialectic).
25. XII. Now for Pyatakov; he is a man of unquestionably
strong will and of great ability; he is, however, too much
tempted by administrativeness, by the purely administrative
side of things, to be relied on in an important political ques-
tion.
NOF
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
RET
NOF
It is clear that the first as well as the second observa-
tion refers only to the present, but both are made just in case
these two able and loyal workers are not able to find an occa-
sion to round out their knowledge and get rid of their onesided-
ness,
25. XII. 22 Lenin.
Written by M. V.
Approved For Release' AP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Rele e : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
NO N
N
NUJ
SUPPLEMENT OF THE LETTER OF 24 DECEMBER 1922
Stalin is too rude and this defect, which can be freely
tolerated in our midst and in contacts among us Communists, can
become an intolerable defect in one holding the position of the
Secretary General. Because of this, I propose that the comrades
consider ways and means by which Stalin can be removed from this
position and another man selected, a man who, above all, would
differ from Com. Stalin in only one quality, namely, greater
tolerance, greater loyalty, greater kindness and more consid-
erate attitude toward his comrades, less capricious temper,
etc. This circumstance could appear to be a meaningless trifle.
I think, however, that, from the viewpoint of preventing a split
and from the viewpoint of what I have written above concerning
the relationship between Stalin and Trotsky, this is not a
trifle, or if it is one, then it is a trifle which can acquire
a decisive significance.
Written by L. F.
4 January 1923
sE~
NOFORN
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Releip78-00915R000500080001-7
Continuation of notes; NO RN
26 December 1922
The enlargement of the CC membership to 50 or even 100
persons should serve, as I see it, a two- or three-fold pur-
pose; the more CC members there are, the more persons will
get to know the CC work and the smaller will be the danger of
a split as a result of taking some careless step. Enlistment
of many workers into the CC will help our workers improve the
efficiency of our apparatus,* which is very bad. Actually we
have inherited it from the old regime, because it was entirely
impossible for us to reorganize it completely in such a short
time, especially during the period of war, of famine, etc.
For that reason the "critics," who, in a derogatory or sarcas-
tic manner, point out the defects of our apparatus, can be
boldly answered that they have no concept whatever of the con-
ditions of our present revolution. Effective reorganization
of the apparatus within five years was entirely impossible--
especially during the period of the revolution. It is enough
that during five years we managed to create a government of a
new type in which the workers at the head of the peasants stand
against the bourgeoisie, and this at the time when we are en-
circled by a hostile world; this was a tremendous accomplish-
ment. This knowledge should not, however, blind us to the fact
that it is actually the old apparatus which we have taken over,
the apparatus of the Czar and of the bourgeoisie, and that now,
when we have attained peace and have satisfied our minimal
needs, we should devote all our effort toward improving the ef-
ficiency of the apparatus. I picture this to myself in this
manner; several dozen workers taken into the CC machinery will be
more able than anyone else to occupy themselves with the control,
efficiency and transformation of our apparatus. It became evident
Lenin here, apparently is referring to the governmental or
administrative apparatus.
10
SENT
NOFOR
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For ReM1Le : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
ET
NOFO
that the Workers-Peasants Inspection which initially possessed
this function, is incapable of performing it and can be used
only as an "auxiliary," or, under some conditions, as an assist-
ant of these CC members. Workers drawn into the CC should, in
my opinion, not be recruited from among those who have behind
them a long period of service in the Soviet apparatus (in this
part of my letter I count the peasants as workers in every case,
because these workers have acquired. certain habits and certain
prejudices, which we specifically consider it necessary to com-
bat.
The CC staff should be enlisted largely from among the
workers who are below the level of the group which were pro-
moted during the last five years to positions in the Soviet ap-
paratus, and from among those who are close to the common work-
ers and peasants, who are not directly or indirectly in the
category of the exploiters. I think that such workers, now
attending all CC meetings, and all Politbureau meetings, and
having the opportunity to read all CC documents - are capable
of creating the cadre of loyal supporters of the Soviet sys-
tem; they will be able also, firstly, to add to the stability
of the CC itself, and secondly to work actually on rebuilding
the apparatus and making it efficient.
Written by L.F.
S.
NOFPIR
Approved For Release : A- DP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Rele~~A-~ 78-00915R000500080001-7
Continuation of notes NO
27 December 1922
CONCERNING THE ASSIGNMENT OF LEGISLATIVE
FUNCTIONS TO GOSPUUT-
This idea was, it seems to me, first put forth by Com.
Trotsky. I opposed it, because I considered that in such a
case this would introduce a basic inconsistency into the sys-
tem of our legislative institutions. After a thorough exami-
nation of this question, I have nevertheless come to the con-
clusion that it contains an essentially healthy idea, namely,
that Gosplan is somewhat divorced from our legislative insti-
tutions despite the fact that, being an assembly of competent
individuals, experts and representatives of science and tech-
nology, it actually has the most data necessary to assess the
situation.
Until now, however, our viewpoint was that Gosplan should
deliver to the State carefully compiled materials sufficient for
State institutions to decide the affairs of the State. I con-
sider that in the present situation, when governmental affairs
have become unusually complicated, when it is continuously
necessary to decide on questions which require the expert knowl-
edge of Gosplan members and occasionally on questions which do
not require such expert knowledge, and, what is more, when it
is necessary to decide on questions, parts of which do and parts
of which do not require such expert knowledge of Gosplan--I con-
sider that at the present time we have to take the step to
broaden Gosplan's powers.
I picture to myself this step as follows: Gosplan's de-
cisions cannot be put aside by the regular governmental processes,
but require special procedures such as presentation of the mat-
ter before a VTIK session, its preparation in accordance with
special instructions, accompanied by special regulations and
notes necessary for consideration of whether a given Gosplan
NOF
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Relea4tT,CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
ET
decision should be abrogated and finally--the review of Gosplan's
decisions should be made at regular and specific intervals, etc.
Com. Trotsky's concurrence in this matter, in my opinion,
could and should be obtained, but not as to the assignment to
the post of Gosplan chairman of one of our political leaders or
the chairman of the Supreme Council of National Economy, etc. It
seems to me that in this question the basic consideration is much
too closely tied up with personal considerations. It seems to
me that the currently expressed objections to the chairman of
Gosplan, Krizhanovsky, and his deputy, Pyatakov, are twofold.
On the one hand they are criticized on the grounds that they are
too easy-going, that they do not assert themselves, that they
lack character, and on the other hand, that they are supposedly
too uncouth, that they behave like first sergeants, that they do
not have sufficiently solid scientific background, etc. It
seems to me that these criticisms encompass two sides of the
question pushed to their extremes and that we do need in Gosplan
the skillful combination of both of these types, one represented
by Pyatakov and the other by Krizhanovsky.
In my opinion Gosplan should be headed by a man with scien-
tific background, specifically in technology or agriculture, a
man with great practical experience, an experience of several
dozen years in the field of technology or agriculture. In my
opinion such a man needs not so much administrative ability as
he needs wide experience and the ability to lead.
27 XII. '22
Written by M.V.
NOF
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Releas CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
SET
Continuation of the letter on N
the legislative character of
Gosplan
28 XII.22
I have noted that some of our comrades, who are in positions
to affect the affairs of the State, in a decisive manner, over-
emphasize the administrative side of the question, which at the
proper time and place is, of course, indispensible, but which,
however, should not be erroneously equated with scientific knowl-
edge, with the capacity for comprehension of broad realities,
with leadership talent, etc.
Every governmental institution, and specifically Gosplan,
requires the happy combination of these two qualities; thus,
when Com. Krizhanovsky told me that he managed to get Pyatakov
for the work in Gosplan and that there was a meeting of minds
as to the division of labor--I, giving my consent, felt, deep
in me, on the one side, certain doubts, but visualized, on the
other hand, that we might realize the desired combination of
the two types of governmental leaders. Whether my hope was
realized--to assess this, we must wait awhile; we must, over a
period of time, check this in practice; in principle, however,
- I think - we cannot doubt that the proper functioning of
governmental institutions absolutely requires such a combina-
tion of characters and types (men, qualities). In my opinion,
in this case, the exaggeration of "administrativeness" is just
as harmful as exaggeration generally. A director of a govern-
mental institution should possess in the highest degree the
capacity for leadership and a solid scientific and technical
knowledge to the extent needed for checking a person's work.
This is essential. Without it, no` real work can be done. On
the other hand, he has to know how to administer and has to
have for this purpose a suitable assistant or even assistants.
It is doubtful whether we will find the combination of these
Approved For Release: PA P78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
ET
NOFOR
two qualities in one person; it is equally doubtful whether
such a combination is necessary.
Written by L.F.
28 XII. 22
S.
NOFO
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Rele Ncm P78-00915R000500080001-7
Continuation of the notes NOF
29 December 1922
Gosplan, it appears, is being completely transformed into
a commission of experts. At the head of this institution there
should be a man of great and broad scientific attainments in
the field of technology. Administrative ability should be here
only a useful adjunct. Gosplan doubtlessly needs to be to a
certain degree independent and self-governing provided only that
the employees of this institution are honest and honestly seek
to carry out our plan of economic and social construction.
The last quality if found today, of course, only in
unique cases, because the overwhelming majority of scientists,
of which Gosplan is naturally made up, is heavily burdened
with bourgeois views and preconceptions. To control these peo-
ple in this respect should be the task of several individuals
who can constitute a Gosplan presidium; these individuals
should be Communists and should be checking daily, during the
progress of work, to what degree the bourgeois scientists are
devoted to the cause, whether they are unburdening themselves
of their bourgeois prejudices, and also whether they are grad-
ually accepting the Socialist point of view. This twofold ac-
tivity--scientific control coupled with purely administrative
work--is the ideal to which Gosplan leaders in the new republic
should aspire.
It is logical to chop up the work done by Gosplan into in-
dividual directives, or - on the other hand - should we aim at
the creation of a permanent band of specialists who would be
subject to systematic control by the Gosplan presidium, who
could reach decisions as to the entirety of the problems within
the scope of Gosplan's activity? In my judgment, the second of
the two is more logical and we should make an effort to limit
the number of burning and important specific problems.
Written by M.V. Lenin
29.XII.22
NOF
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Rele ,QP78-00915R000500080001-7
Continuation of the notes NOF
29 December 1922
(FOR THE CHAPTER ON'RAISING THE NUMBER OF CC MEMBERS)
When raising the number of CC members, it is necessary, in
my opinion, to solve - probably first of all - the problem of
control and efficiency of our apparatus, which is good for
nothing. For this purpose we should utilize the services of
highly qualified specialists; the task of making these special-
ists available belongs to the Workers-Peasants Inspection.
How the work of these control specialists, who also have
sufficient knowledge, is to be co-ordinated with the work of
these new CC.members - practice should decide. It appears to
me that the Workers-Peasants Inspection (as the result of its
development and also as the result of doubts in regard to this
development) has reached a stage, which we now observe, namely,
a stage of transition from a separate People's Commissariat
to the assignment of special functions to CC members. This
transition is away from an institution which inspects abso-
lutely everything--away from a group consisting only of a few
members who are, however, first-class inspectors who have to
be well-paid (this is particularly indispensible in our era
when everything has to be paid for and in the situation when
the inspectors are employed only in those institutions which of-
fer better pay).
If the number of CC members is adequately raised and if they
attend each year a course on administration of governmental af-
fairs, benefitting from the help of the highly qualified spe-
cialists and of the members of the Workers-Peasants Inspection
who are highly authoritative in every sphere of activity--then,
I think, we will successfully solve this problem which has so
long evaded solution.
ET
NOFOR
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
CRET
NO
Therefore, totally: about 100 CC members and no more than
400-500 assistants, who, in their capacity as members of the
Workers-Peasants Inspection, control in accordance with their
directives.
29 December 1922
Written by M.V.
NOF
Approved For Release CTA=R8-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Rele s ? 1AHP78-00915R000500080001-7
NO
Proletarians of all countries, Unit .
THE COMMUNIST PARTY (BOLSHEVIKS) OF RUSSIA
THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
DEPARTMENT OF THE BUREAU OF THE SECRETARIAT
No. 12644/$ 16 April 1923
TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE CC/RCP
On order of Com. Stalin there are sent for the informa-
tion of CC members:
a. A letter of Com. Trotsky to the CC members;
b. Articles of Com. Lenin on the national question,
written at the end of December, 1922;
c. A letter of Com. Fotiyeva to Com. Kamenev together
with his answer;
d. A letter of Com. Fotiyeva to Com. Stalin;
e. Com. Stalin's declaration.
Assistant to the CC Secretary, A. Nazaretyan.
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For RelaGlfMP78-00915RO00500080001-7
NO
TO COM. STALIN
TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE CC/RCP
I have today received the enclosed copy of a letter from
the personal secretary of Com. Lenin, Com. Fotiyeva, to Com.
Kamenev concerning an article of Com. Lenin about the national
question.
I had received Com. Lenin's article on 5 March together
with three notes of Com. Lenin, copies of which are also en-
closed.
I had made at that time a copy of this article, as of a
document of particularly basic significance and have used it as
the basis for my corrections (accepted by Com. Stalin) of Com.
Stalin's theses, as well as for my own article on the national
question published in Pravda.
This article, as already stated, is of singularly basic
significance. It contains also a sharp condemnation of three
CC members. As long as even a shadow of hope existed that
Vladimir Ilyich had left some instruction concerning this ar-
ticle for the Party Congress, for which it was obviously meant,
judging by all signs and especially by Com. Fotiyena's note -
so long have I avoided bringing this article up.
In the situation, which has now arisen - as is also evident
from Com. Fotiyeva's letter - I have no alternative but to make
this article known to the Central Committee members, because,
in my opinion, this article has no lesser significance from
the viewpoint of Party policy on the national question than
the former article on the question of the relationship between
the proletariat and the peasantry.
If - on the basis of motives of an inner-Party nature,
whose significance is self-evident--no CC member will make this
article in one or another form known to the Party or to the Party
ET
NOFO
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Rele4P78-00915R000500080001-7
NOF
Congress, I, on my part, will consider this as a decision of
silence, a decision which - in connection with the Party Congress
- removes from me personal responsibility for this article.
16. IV. 23
No. 199/t
Enclosures: Com. Fotiyeva's
letter, three notes and an
article of Com. Lenin.
L. Trotsky
Received at 8:10 p.m.
16. IV. 23
For accuracy: E. Lepeshinskaya
NOF
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Re ase : CIIAA~P78-00915R000500080001-7
C
NO
Continuation of the notes C 0 P Y
30 December 22.
CONCERNING THE NATIONAL QUESTION
OR "AUTONOMIZATION"
I have committed, I think, a great offense against the
workers of Russia because I have not pressed with sufficient
energy and sharpness the well known autonomization question,
known officially, it seems to me, as the question of the union
of the Socialist Soviet republics.
In the summer, when this question arose, I was ill, and
then in the autumn I was too confident of my recovery and be-
lieved that I could press this matter at the October and the
December Plenums, However, I could not attend either the Octo-
ber Plenum (devoted to this problem) or the December Plenum;
and in this way this question passed me by almost entirely.
I managed only to talk with Com. Dzherzhinsky, who had
returned from the Caucasus, and who related to me how this
question looks in Georgia. I also managed to exchange a few
words with Com. Zinoviev and passed on to him my anxiety con-
cerning this question. ;:,hat I heard from Com. Dzherzhinsky, who
was at the head of a commission sent by the Central Committee
for the purpose of "investigating" an incident in Georgia,
made me expect nothing but the worst. If things have gone so
far that Ordzonikidze could stoop to using physical violence,
which was told me by Com. Dzherzhinsky, then it can be imagined
in what a quagmire we have landed. Evidently the whole concept
of "autonomization" was basically wrong and inopportune.
It is said that the unity of the apparatus should be pre-
served. Whence came these assurances? Was it not from the same
Russian apparatus, which, as I have already noted in one of the
earlier numbers of my journal, we have taken over from the
Czarate and have only thinly annointed with the Soviet holy
oil?
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For ReI PP78-00915R000500080001-7
NOF
It cannot be doubted but that a should have waited until
the time when we could have said that we answer for our appara-
tus as, our very own. And now we should say something quite the
opposite, namely that we call as our own an apparatus which is
really foreign to us and which is a bourgeois and Czarist hodge-
podge, which we had no chance of subduing during the past five
years without the help of our states under conditions when the
"business" of war and the fight against the famine was more im-
portant.
Under such conditions it is an entirely natural thing that
the point about the "freedom to withdraw from the union," which
we justify to ourselves, will prove to be but a scrap of paper in-
sufficient for the defense of foreign races in Russia against the
inroads of that very generically Russian man, the Great Russian,
the chauvinist, and actually a villian and a ravisher, who is
the typical Russian bureaucrat. It cannot be doubted but that
the insignificant percentage of Soviet and Sovietized workers
will drown in this chauvinistic sea of Great Russian rascality
like a fly in the milk.
It is offered in the defense of this undertaking that the
people's commissariats whose activity includes the matters per-
taining to the national spirit, national education, are autono-
mous. But a question arises here whether it is possible to
keep the people's commissariats entirely unrelated to the cen-
ter and also a second question, whether we have devised means
with proper care for the purpose of defending foreign races
against the generically, the typically, Russian overlord. In
my judgment we have not devised such means although we could
and should have devised them.
I think that a fatal role was played here by hurry and
the administrative impetuousness of Stalin and also his in-
fatuation with the renowned "social-nationalism." Infatua-
tion in politics generally and usually plays the worst role.
NO
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Rele%U%_gpP78-00915R000500080001-7
NO
I am also afraid that Com.
N
herzhinsky, who went to
the Causasus in order to investigate the "crimes" of these
"social-nationalists" distinguished himself also by his typi-
cally Russian disposition (it is a common knowledge that
Russified members of other nationalities always like to ex-
aggerate when it comes to typically Russian attitudes); the
objectivity of his whole commission is characterized by
Ordzonikidze's "good deeds." In my opinion, no provocation
and also no insults can justify these Russian good deeds and
that Com. Dzherzinsky has committed an irreparable offense by
treating these deeds frivolously.
To all other citizens of the Caucasus, Ordzhonikidze was
the government. Ordzhonikidze has no right to allow himself
such rashness as that with which he and Dzherzhinsky have tried
to excuse themselves. Quite to the contrary, Ordzhonikidze
was duty-bound to show self-control to a degree that is not obli-
gatory for other plain citizens, let alone a citizen charged with
a "political" crime. Actually the social-nationalists were in
fact citizens charged with a political crime and all circum-
stances of this accusation could only thus characterize it.
Here we are already approaching a very basic question: what
should we understand by internationalism.
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For ReleCDP78-00915RO00500080001-7
Continuation of notes
NON
31 December 1922 C 0 P Y
CONCERNING THE NATIONAL QUESTION
"
(continuation)
I have already written in my works treating the national
question that an abstract concept of nationalism is absolutely
useless. Distinction should be made between the nationalism of
an oppressing nation and the nationalism of an oppressed nation,
the nationalism of a large nation and the nationalism of a small
nation.
Speaking about the second type of nationalism, we, large
nations, show ourselves almost always in historical practice
guilty of untold numbers of outrages and, what is more - we do
not even observe that we are perpetrating untold numbers of acts
of violence and abuse; it should suffice for me to cite my own
recollections when I lived in the Volga region to show with
what contempt we treated non-Russians; a Pole is always re-
ferred to as "Polak," a Tartar is sarcastically called a "count,"
a Ukrainian - a "khokhol,,"* a Georgian and other members of the
Caucasian nations - a "Caucasian man."
For this reason the internationalism of the oppressing
nation, or of the so-called "great" nation (even if it is great
only through its violence, great only as an overlord can be
"great")should depend not only on the formal observation of
equality among nations, but also of such inequality by which
the oppressing nation, the large nation, would compensate for
A reference to the softness of Ukrainian speech as com-
pared with the Great Russian.
*
A reference to illiterate pronunciation.
NOF
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For R 9APP78-00915R000500080001-7
NOF
that inequality which actually exist in life. He who does
not understand this does not understand the true proletarian
approach to the national question, actually still retains the
petit bourgeois outlook and, for that reason, cannot but fall
into the bourgeois outlook.
What is important to a proletarian? For a proletarian it
is not only important but essential and compelling that other
nationalities offer him the maximum of trust in the proletarian
class struggle. What is the prerequisite for this? More than
a formal equality is required. It is required that he compen-
sate, in one way or another, through his behavior toward, or
through his concessions to, the other nationalities for that
distrust, that suspicion, those grievances which they have ex-
perienced in the historical past at the hands of the govern-
ments of the "big-power" nations.
I should think that Bolsheviks and Communists need no further
explanation. I think that in the case before us, the case of the
Georgian nation, we have a typical example in which a really pro-
letarian approach requires of us a special caution, understand-
ing and the making of concessions. A Georgian who treats this
side of the matter with frivolity, who frivolously chatters about
the charges of "Socialnationalism" (while he himself is not
only a real and an authentic "socialnationalist," but also a
brutal Great Russian overlord-that Georgian actually harms the
interests of proletarian class solidarity, because nothing so
much impedes the development and the strengthening of prole-
tarian class solidarity as national injustice; the oppressed
nations are not as sensitive in regard to any other matter as
in regard to their equality and, in regard to non-observance
of this equality by the proletarian comrades even when this
is due only to negligence or is demonstrated in the form of a
joke. It is for this reason that in this case it would be
preferable to sin by too much rather than too little con-
cession and indulgence toward national minorities. It is for
"SWOZET
NOFOR
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
 P78-00915R000500080001-7
NOF
this reason that the basic interesf%f proletarian solidarity
and, therefore, of the proletarian class struggle, demands in
this case that we not treat the national question in a formal
manner, but that we always take into account the indispensible
difference which should exist in the relationship of the pro-
letarian oppressed (or small) nation with the oppressing (or
large) nation.
31 XII.22
for accuracy: Lepeshinskaya
NOFXN
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Rele IA-R P78-00915R000500080001-7
T
Continuation of the notes 1~
31 December 1922 NOF c o P Y
CONCERNING THE NATIONAL QUESTION
TI
(continuation)
What practical measures should be taken in the situation
which has developed?
Firstly, we should retain and strengthen the union of
socialist republics; there can be no doubt about this. We
need this as the Communist proletariat of the whole world needs
it in the fight with the international bourgeoisie and in the
defense against its machinations.
Secondly, we should retain the union of socialist republics
in regard to the diplomatic apparatus. It should be mentioned
here that this apparatus is quite exceptional in the governmental
apparatus. We accepted no one who had even a little influentce-
as a former member of the old Czarist apparatus. For this rea-
son this apparatus has made for itself (we can boldly say) the
name of a Communist apparatus which has been tested and cleansed
of the old Czarist bourgeois and petty bourgeois influence to
a degree incomparable with the situation in the apparatuses
with which we have to be satisfied in the other people's com-
missariats.
Thirdly, Com. Ordzonikidze has to be punished as an example
(I say this with greatest regret, because I myself belong to
the circle of his friends and have worked with him abroad, in
the emigration); it is also necessary to examine again or anew
all the materials of the Dzherzhins ,ycommission in order to
correct that great mass of injustices and of biased judgments;
definitely contained in them. Political responsibility for this
whole truly Great Russian - nationalistic campaign should be
placed squarely on the backs of Stalin and DzherzbinsIy.
28
EE T
NOFO
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP 8-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Rele~I E, -RDP78-00915ROO0500080001-7
NO
Fourthly, we should introduce a most rigorous regulation
concerning the use of national language in the republics of
other nations which are members of our union; and we should en-
sure most meticulously that these regulations are observed.
There is no doubt that under the pretext of the unity of rail-
way workers, under the pretext of fiscal unity, etc., a great
number of abuses of. the essentially Russian type will be ex-
perienced by us. To fight these abuses we must practice a
particular scrutiny; this is in addition to the special integrity
required of those who will devote themselves to this fight. We
will need here a detailed code which can be compiled, if only
imperfectly, only by the nationals residing in a given republic.
It should not be predetermined that, while we do this, we will
nevertheless not consider at the next Congress of Soviets the re-
turn to the former situation, i.e., that we will retain the union
of the socialist soviet republics only in the sphere of military
affairs and diplomacy, while in other matters each of the peo-
ple's commissariats will be fully independent.
We should keep in mind that the split of the people's com-
missariats and the lack of co-ordination of their work in rela-
tion to Moscow and to other centers can be neutralized to a suf-
ficient degree with the authority of the Party provided this
authority is used with more-or-less satisfactory circumspection
and impartiality. The harm to our state which could result from
lack of unity of the national apparatuses with the Russian appara-
tus will be imcomparably smaller than that other harm to us and /r
also to the whole international, to the hundreds of millions of
the nations of Asia, which it is expected will in the near fu-
ture, treading in our footsteps, appear on the stage of history.
It would be an unforgivable opportunism if we, on the eve of
this emergence of the East and in the dawn of its awakening,
would undermine in its eyes our authority even through the
smallest tactlessness toward and injustice against our own mem-
bers of other races. The necessity of unification against the
RET
NOF
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For ReleWi, P78-00915R000500080001-7
qq%efff
NOFO
imperialism of the West which is defending the capitalist
world is a different matter. Here, there is no doubt and I
need not say that I praise these measures without any qualifi-
cation. It is another thing, however, when we see that we our-
selves generate an imperialistic outlook on relations with the
oppressed nationalities; this undermines completely our whole
principled sincerity and our whole principled defense of the
fight against imperialism. And the day of tomorrow in the his-
tory of the world will be in fact a day when the people oppressed
by imperialism will awaken and when the decisive, long and hard
fight for their liberation will begin.
31. XII. 22
For accuracy: Lepshinskaya
ET
NOFO
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Relea Cll. P78-00915R000500080001-7
NN
Copy from a copy
or Eyes only
TOP SECRET
Dear Com. Trotsky.
I ask you urgently to undertake the defense of the Georgia
case in the CC of the Party. This case is at present "being shot
at " by Stalin and Dzhershinsky and I cannot count on their ob-
jectivity. Even to the contrary. If you would agree to under-
take the defense of that case, I would be at ease. If you could
not for some reason agree to do this, please return to me all
the materials. This will be for me the sign of your refusal.
Hearty Party greetings,
Written by M. V.
5 March '23
For accuracy: M. Volodichevan
To Comrade Trotsky.
Vladimir Ilyich asked me that, in addition to the letter
whose content you were given by telephone, I informed you that
Com. Kamenev is going to Georgia on Wednesday; VI. Il. wants
to know if you would not want to send there something from your-
self.
M. Volodicheva.
31
ET
NOFO
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP 8-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For RewaQP78-00915R000500080001-7
NOF
THE LETTER OF COM. FOTIYEVA
TO
TO COM. KAMENEV, COPY TO COM. TROTSKY
Lev Borisovich
I am transmitting to you, as the active Chairman of the
Political Bureau, the following which is pertinent to our tele-
phone conversation:
As I have already informed you on 31.XII.22, Vladimir
Ilyich had dictated an article concerning the nationality ques-
tion.
He was very interested in this question and was himself
preparing to present this question at the Party Congress.
Shortly before his last illness he informed me that he
would publish this article, but later, after that, he took ill
and made no final arrangements.
V. I. considered his article as a document of guidance and
attached great importance to it. On the order of Vladimir Ilyich
this article was transmitted to Com. Trotsky to whom V. I. en-
trusted the defense of his position on this question at the
Party Congress because they have both held identical views in
this matter.
The only copy of this article which I have is preserved at
V. I.'s order in his secret archive..
I am transmitting this for your information.
I was unable to do it earlier because I have only today
returned to work after a period of illness.
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
L. Fotiyeva
16. IV. 23
For accuracy: E. Lepeshinskaya
Personal secretary to Com. Lenin
RET
NOFO
 I Approved For R DP78-00915R000500080001-7
ANSWER OF COM. KAMENEV TO THE CC SECRETARIAT
Only a moment ago, at 35 minutes after 5, I received the
enclosed note from Com. Fotiyeva. I am sending this note to
the CC because it contains nothing which pertains to me per-
sonally. In my opinion the CC should immediately decide af-
firmatively the question of publishing the article of Vladimir
Ilyich.
16.IV.23 For correctness:
E. Lepeshinskaya
5:45
THE LETTER OF COM. FOTIYEVA
Com, Stalin
I have today sought the advice of Mariya Ilyinishna in
the question whether Vladimir Ilyich's article which I sent to
you should be published because of the fact that Vladimir Ilyich
had expressed the intent to publish it in connection with a speech
which he intended to make at the Congress.
Mariya Ilyinishna has expressed the opinion that this arti-
cle should not be printed because V. I. had not issued a clear
order concerning its publication; she only grants the possibility
of making this article known to the delegates to this Congress.
From my point of view I need only to add that V. I. did not
consider this article to be in its final form and ready for the
printer.
L. Fotiyeva
16. IV. 23
9 o'clock in the evening
NO
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved for Rele P78-00915R000500080001-7
NOF
THE DECLARATION OF COM. STALIN TRANSMITTED TO CC MEMBERS
I am greatly surprised that the articles of Com. Lenin which,
without a doubt, are of a distinct basic significance, and which
Com. Trotsky had received already on 5 March of this year - he
considers admissible to keep as his own secret for over a month
without making their content known to the Political Bureau or to
the CC Plenum, until one day before the opening of the XIIth Con-
gress of the Party. The theme of these articles - as I was in-
formed today by the Congress delegates--are subject to discussion
and rumors and stories among the delegates; these articles, as I
have learned today, are known to people who have nothing in com-
mon with the CC; the CC members themselves must seek information
from these rumors and stories, while it is self-evident that the
content of these articles should have been reported first of all
to the CC.
I think that Com. Lenin's articles should be published in
the press. It is only regrettable that--as is clearly evident
from Com. Fotiyeva's letter--these articles apparently cannot be
published because they have not been reviewed by Com. Lenin.
10 o'clock p.m.
16.IV.23
34
SENRiET
NOFO
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Relea1w '. X78-00915R000500080001-7
NOF
'FRET
NOF
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
S* ET
NOFO
Copy No.
CONCERNING THE CULT OF THE INDIVIDUAL
AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
Report of the First Secretary CC/CPSU,
,Comrade N.S. Ehrushchev, at the XXth
Congress of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union.
(25 February 1956)
Approved, For Release :
0915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
RET
NOF
Comrades! In the report of the Central Committee of the
Party at the XXth Congress, in a number of speeches by delegates
to the Congress, as also formerly during the plenary CC/CPSU ses-
sions, quite a lot has been said about the cult of the individual
and about its harmful consequences.
After Stalin's death the Central Committee of the Party began
to.implement a policy of explaining concisely and consistently that
it is impermissible and foreign to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism
to elevate one person, to transform him into a superman possessing
supernatural characteristics akin to those of a god. Such a man sup-
posedly knows everything, sees everything, thinks for everyone, can
do anything, is infallible in his behavior.
Such a belief about a man, and specifically about Stalin, was
cultivated among us for many years.
The objective of the present report is not a thorough evalu-
ation of Stalin's life and activity. Concerning Stalin's merits,an
entirely sufficient number of books, pamphlets and studies had al-
ready been written in his lifetime. The role of Stalin in the prep-
aration and execution of the Socialist Revolution, in the Civil
War, and in the fight for the construction of Socialism in our
country is universally known. Everyone knows this well.. At the
present we are concerned with a question which has immense impor-
tance for the Party now and for the future--(we are concerned)
with how the cult of the person of Stalin has been gradually grow-
ing, the cult which became at a certain specific stage the source
of a whole series of exceedingly serious and grave perversions of
Party principles, of Party democracy, of revolutionary legality.
Because of the fact that not all as yet realize fully the
practical consequences resulting from the cult of the individual,
Page 1
ET
Approved For ReleasqV78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
RET
NOF
the great harm caused by the violation of the principle of col-
lective direction of the Party and because of the accumulation
of immense and limitless power in the hands of one person -- the
Central Committee of the Party considers it absolutely necessary
to make the material pertaining to this matter available to the
XXth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
Allow me first of all to remind you how severely the clas-
sics of Marxism-Leninism denounced every manifestation of the cult
of the individual. In a letter to the German political worker,
Wilhelm Bloss, Marx stated: "From my antipathy to any cult of the
individual, I never made public during the existence of the
International the numerous addresses from various countries which
recognized my merits and which annoyed me. I did not even reply
to them, except sometimes to rebuke*their authors. Engels and
I first joined the secret society of Communists on the condition
that everything making for superstitious worship of authority
would be deleted from its statute. Lassalle subsequently did
quite the opposite."
Sometime later Engels wrote: "Both Marx and I have always
been against any public manifestation with regard to individuals,
with the exception of cases when it had an important purpose;
and we most strongly opposed such manifestations which during our
lifetime concerned us personally."
The great modesty of the genius of the revolution, Vladimir
Ilyich Lenin, is known. Lenin had always stressed the role of
the people as the creator of history, the directing and organiza-
tional role of the Party as a living and creative organism, and
also the role of the Central Committee.
Page 2
Approved For Releas 8-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release-:, CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
RET
NOF
Marxism does not negate the role of the leaders of the
workers' class in directing the revolutionary liberation move-
ment.
While ascribing great importance to the role of the
leaders and organizers of the masses, Lenin at the same time
mercilessly stigmatized very manifestation of the cult of the
individual, inexorably combated the, foreign-to-Marxism views
about a "hero" and a "crowd" and countered all efforts to op-
pose a "hero" to the masses and to the people.
Lenin taught that the Party's strength depends on its indis-
soluble-unity with the masses, on the fact that behind the
Party follow the people - workers, peasants and intelligentsia.
"Only he will win and retain the power," said Lenin, !"who believes
in the people, who submerges himself in the fountain of the liv-
ing creativeness of the people."
Lenin spoke with pride about the Bolshevik Communist Party
as the leader and teacher of the people; he called for the pres-
entation of all the most important questions before the opinion
of knowledgeable workers, before the opinion of their Party;
he said: "We believe in it, we see in it the wisdom, the honor,
and the conscience of our epoch."
Lenin resolutely stood against every attempt aimed at be-
littling or weakening the directing role of the Party in the
structure-of the Soviet State. He worked out Bolshevik prin-
ciples of Party direction and norms of Party life, stressing
that the guilding principle of Party 'leadership is its collegial-
ity. Already during the pre-revolutionary years Lenin called
the Central Committee of the Party a collective of leaders and
the guardian and interpreter of Party principles. "During the
Page 3
NNOF
Approved For Releas78-0091
5R000500080001-7
 Approved For ReleNft P78-00915R000500080001-7
period between congresses," pointed out Lenin, "the Central Com-
mittee guards and interprets the principles of the Party."
Underlining the role of the Central Committee of the Party
and its authority, Vladimir Ilyich pointed. out: "Our Central Com-
mittee constituted itself as a closely centralized and highly
authoritative group..."
During Lenin's life the Central Committee of the Party was
a real expression of collective leadership of the Party and of
the nation. Being a militant Marxist-revolutionist, always un-
yielding in matters of principle, Lenin never imposed by force
his views upon his co-workers. He tried to convince; he patiently
explained his opinions to others. Lenin always diligently ob-
served that the norms of Party life were realized, that the Party
statute was enforced, that the Party congresses and the plenary
sessions of the Central Committee took place at the proper intervals.
In addition to the great accomplishments of V. I. Lenin for
the victory of the working class and of the working peasants, for
the victory of our Party and for the application of the ideas of
scientific Communism to life, his acute mind expressed itself
also in this that he detected in Stalin in time those negative
characteristics which resulted later in grave consequences. Fear-
ing the future fate of the Party and of the Soviet nation, V. I.
Lenin made a completely correct characterization of Stalin,pointing out
that it was necessary to consider the question of transferring
Stalin from the position of the Secretary General because of the
fact that Stalin is excessively rude, that he does not have a
proper attitude toward his comrades, that he is capricious and
abuses his power.
In December 1922 in a letter to the Party Congress Vladimir
Ilyich wrote: "After taking over the position of Secretary General
Page 4
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
RET
NOF
Comrade Stalin accumulated in his hands immeasurable power and
I am not certain whether he will be always able to use this power
with the required care.
This letter - a political document of tremendous impor-
tance, known in the Party history as Lenin's "testament" was
distributed among the delegates to the XXth Party Congress. You
have read it, and will undoubtedly read it again more than once.
You might reflect on Lenin's plain words, in which expression is
given to Vladimir Ilyich's anxiety concerning the Party, the peo-
ple, the State, and the future direction of Party policy.
Vladimir Ilyich said: "Stalin is excessively rude, and
this defect, which can be freely tolerated in our midst and in con-
tacts among us Communists, becomes a defect which cannot be tol-
erated in one holding the position of the Secretary General. Be-
cause of this, I propose that the comrades consider the method by
which Stalin would be removed from this position and by which another
man would be selected for it, a man, who above all, would differ
from Stalin in only one quality, namely, greater tolerance, greater
loyalty, greater kindness and more considerate attitude toward the
comrades, a less capricious temper, etc."
This document of Lenin's was made known to the delegates at
the XIIIth Party Congress, who discussed the question of trans-
ferring Stalin from the position of Secretary General. The
delegates declared themselves in favor of retaining.Stalin in
this post, hoping that he would heed the critical remarks of
Vladimir Ilyich and would be able to overcome the defects which
caused Lenin serious anxiety.
Comrades! The Party Congress should become acquainted with
two new documents, which confirm Stalin's character as already
outlined by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin in his "testament." These
Page 5
NOF
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Releas
78-00915R000500080001-7
Ell
documents are a letter from Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaya
.to Kamenev,who was at that time head of the Political Bureau,
and a personal letter from Vladimir Ilyich Lenin to Stalin.
1. I will now read these documents:
"Lev Borisovich:
Because of a short letter which I had written in
words dictated to me by Vladimir Ilyich by permission
of the doctors, Stalin allowed himself yesterday an
unusually rude outburst directed at me. This is not
my first day in the Party. During all these thirty
years I have never heard from any comrade one word
of rudeness. The business of the Party and of Ilyich
are not less dear to me than to Stalin. I need at
present the maximum of self-control. What one can
and what one cannot discuss with Ilyich--I know bet-
ter than any doctor, because I know what makes him
nervous and what does not, in any case I know better
than Stalin. I am turning to you and to Grigory as
to much closer comrades of V. I. and I beg you to pro-
tect me from rude interference with my private life
and from vile invectives and threats. I have no
doubt as to what will be the unanimous decision of
the Control Commission, with which Stalin sees fit to
threaten me; however, I have neither the strength
nor the time to waste on this foolish quarrel. And
I am a living person and my nerves are strained to
the utmost.
Page 6
NOF
RET
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Releas
F78-00915R000500080001-7
ET
Nadezhda Konstantinovna wrote this letter on 23 December
1922. After two and a half months, in March 1923, Vladimir Ilyich
Lenin sent Stalin the following letter:
2. The Letter of V. I. Lenin
"To Comrade Stalin:
Copies for : Kamenev and Zinoviev.
Dear Comrade Stalin!
You permitted yourself a rude summons of my wife to
the telephone and a rude reprimand of her. Despite
the fact that she told you that she agreed to forget
what, was said, nevertheless Zinoviev and Kamenev
heard about it from her. I have no intention to for-
get so easily that which is being done against me,
and I need not stress here that I consider as directed
against me that which is being done against my wife.
I ask you, therefore, that you weigh carefully whether
you are agreeable to retracting your words and apolo-
gizing or whether you prefer the severance of rela-
tions between us.
(Commotion in the hall)
Sincerely: Lenin
5 March 1923"
Comrades. I will not comment on these documents. They
speak eloquently for themselves. Since Stalin could behave in
this manner during Lenin's life, could thus behave toward
Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaya,whom the Party knows well and
values highly as a loyal friend of Lenin and as an active fighter
for the cause of the Party since its creation - we can easily
imagine how Stalin treated other people. These negative charac-
teristics of his developed steadily and during the last years
acquired an absolutely insufferable character.
Page 7
ET
NOFOR
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
I
 Approved For Release CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
CRET
NO
As later events have proven, Lenin's anxiety was justi-
fied: in the first period after Lenin's death Stalin still paid
attention to his (i.e., Lenin's) advice, but later he began to
disregard the serious admonitions of Vladimir Ilyich.
When we analyze the practice of Stalin in regard to the
direction of the Party and of the country, when we pause to
consider everything which Stalin perpetrated,. we must be con-
vinced that Lenin's fears were justified. The negative charac-
teristics of Stalin, which, in Lenin's time, were only incipient,
transformed themselves during the last years into a grave abuse
of power by Stalin, which caused untold harm to our Party.
We have to consider seriously and analyze correctly this
matter in order that we may preclude any possibility of a repeti-
tion in any form whatever of what took place during the life of
Stalin, who absolutely did not tolerate. collegiality in leader-
ship and in work, and who practiced brutal violence, not only
toward everything which opposed him, but also toward that which
seemed to his capricious and despotic character, contrary to his
concepts.
Stalin acted not through persuasion, explanation, and pa-
tient co-operation with people, but by imposing his concepts and
demanding absolute submission to his opinion. Whoever opposed
this concept or tried to prove his viewpoint,-and the correct-
ness of his position -- was doomed to removal from the leading
collective and to subsequent moral and physical annihilation.
This was especially true during the period following the XVIith
Party Congress, when many prominent Party leaders and rank-and-
file Party workers, honest and dedicated to the cause of Com-
munism, fell victim to Stalin's despotism.
We must affirm that the Party had fought a serious fight
against the Trotskyites, rightists and bourgeois nationalists,
Page 8
NOFOR
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-094,&R000500080001-7
 Approved For Rely!igpP78-00915R000500080001-7
NO
and that it disarmed idologically all the enemies of Leninism.
This ideological fight was carried on successfully as a result
of which the Party became strengthened and tempered. Here Stalin
played a positive role.
The Party led a great political ideological struggle against
those in its own ranks who proposed anti-Leninist theses, who
represented a political line hostile to the Party and to the cause of
Socialism. This was a stubborn and a difficult fight but a neces-
sary one, because the political line of both the Trotskyite-
Zinovievite bloc and of the Bukharinites led actually toward the
restoration of capitalism and capitulation to the world bourgeoisie.
Let us consider for a moment what would have happened if in 1928-
1929 the political line of right deviation had prevailed among us,
or orientation toward "cotton-dress industrialization," or toward
the kulak, etc. We would not now have a powerful heavy industry,
we would not have the Kolkhozes, we would find ourselves disarmed
and weak in a capitalist encirclement.
It was for this reason that the Party led an inexorable
ideological fight and explained to all Party members and to the
non-Party masses the harm and the danger of the anti-Leninist
proposals of the Trotskyite opposition and the rightist opportun-
ists. And this great work of explaining the Party line bore fruit;
both the Trotskyites and the rightist opportunists were politically
isolated; the overwhelming Party majority supported the Leninist
line and the Party was able to awaken and organize the working
masses to apply the Leninist Party line and to build Socialism.
Worth noting is the fact that even during the progress of
the furious ideological fight against the Trotskyites, the Zinovie-
vites, the Bukharinites and others - extreme repressive measures
were not used against them. The fight was on ideological grounds.
But some years later when Socialism in our country was fundamentally
Page 9
RED'
NOFOR
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
WET
J%
NOF
constructed, when the exploiting classes were generally liqui-
dated, when the Soviet social structure had radically changed,
when the social basis for political movements and groups hos-
tile to the Party had violently contracted, when the ideologi-
cal opponents of the Party were long since defeated politically --
then the repression directed against them began.
It was precisely during this period (1935-1937-1938) that
the practice of mass repression through the government apparatus
was born, first against the enemies of Leninism -- Trotskyites,
Zinovievites, ?Bukharinites, long since politically defeated by
the Party, and subsequently also against many honest Communists,
against those Party cadres who had borne the heavy load of the
Civil War and the first and most difficult years of industriali-
zation and collectivization, who actively fought against the
Trotskyites and the rightists for the Leninist Party line.
Stalin originated the concept "enemy of the people." This
term automatically rendered it unnecessary that the ideological
errors of a man or men engaged in a controversy be proven; this
term made possible the usage of the most cruel repression, vio-
lating all norms of revolutionary legality, against anyone who
in any way disagreed with Stalin, against those who were only
suspected of hostile intent, against those who had bad reputa-
tions. This concept, "enemy of the people," actually eliminated
the possibility of any kind of ideological fight or the making
of one's views known on this or that issue, even those of a
practical character. In the main, and in actuality, the only
proof of guilt used, against all norms of current legal science,
was the "confession" of the accused himself; and, as subsequent
probing proved, "confessions" were acquired through physical pres-
sures against the accused.
Page 10
N
c &
Approved For Release :
78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Relea 178-00915R000500080001-7
NO
This led to glaring violations of revolutionary legality,
and to the fact that many entirely innocent persons, who in the
past had defended the Party line, became victims.
We.must assert that in regard to those persons who in
their time had opposed the Party line, there were often no suf-
ficiently serious reasons for their physical annihilation. The
formula, "enemy of the people" was specifically introduced for
the purpose of physically annihilating such individuals.
It is a fact that many persons, who were later annihilated
as enemies of the Party and people, had worked with Lenin during
his life. Some of these persons had made errors during Lenin's
life, but, despite this, Lenin benefited by their work, he cor-
rected them and he did everything possible to retain them in the
ranks of the Party; he induced them to follow him.
In this connection the delegates to the Party Congress
should familiarize themselves with an unpublished note by
V. I. Lenin directed to the Central Committee's Political Bureau
in October 1920. Outlining the duties of the Control Commission,
Lenin wrote that the Commission should be transformed into a real
"organ of Party and proletarian conscience."
"As a special duty of the Control Commission there is rec-
ommended a deep, individualized relationship with, and sometimes
even a type of therapy for, the representatives of the so-called
opposition - those who have experienced a psychological crisis
because of failure in their Soviet or Party career. An effort
should be made to quiet them, to explain the matter to them in
a way used among comrades, to find for them (avoiding the method
of issuing orders) a task for which they are psychologically
fitted. Advice and rules relating to this matter are to be for-
mulated by the Central Committee's Organizational Bureau, etc."
Page 11
RET
NOF
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
NOF
RET
Everyone knows how irreconcilable Lenin was with the
ideological enemies of Marxism, with those who deviated from
the correct Party line. At the same time, however, Lenin, as
is evident from the given document, in his practice of direct-
ing the Party demanded the most intimate Party contact with
people who had shown indecision or temporary nonconformity with
the Party line, but whom it was possible to return to the party
path. Lenin advised that such people should be patiently edu-
cated without the application of extreme methods.
Lenin's wisdom in dealing with people was evident in his
work with cadres.
An entirely different relationship with people charac-
terized Stalin. Lenin's traits--patient work with people;
stubborn and painstaking education of them; the ability to induce
people to follow him without using compulsion, but rather through
the ideological influence on them of the whole collective--were
entirely foreign to Stalin. He (Stalin) discarded the Leninist
method of convincing and educating; he abandoned the method of
ideological struggle for that of administrative violence, mass
repressions, and terror. He acted on an increasingly larger scale
and more stubbornly through punitive organs, at the same time
often violating all existing norms of morality and of Soviet laws.
Arbitrary behavior by one person encouraged and permitted
arbitrariness in others. Mass arrests and deportations of many
thousands of people, execution without trial and without normal
investigation created conditions of insecurity, fear and even
desperation.
This, of course, did not contribute toward unity of the
Party ranks and of all strata of working people, but on
the contrary brought about annihilation and the expulsion from
the Party of workers who were loyal but inconvenient to Stalin.
Page 12
Approved For Release
f 78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release, CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
RET
NOF
Our Party fought for the implementation of Lenin's plans
for the construction of Socialism. This was an ideological fight.
Had Leninist principles been observed during the course of this
fight, had the Party's devotion to principles been skillfully com-
bined with a keen and solicitous concern for people, had they
not been repelled and wasted but rather drawn to our side - we
certainly would not have had such a brutal violation of revolu-
tionary legality and many thousands of people would not have
fallen victim of the method of terror. Extraordinary methods
would then have been resorted to only against those people who
had in fact committed criminal acts against the Soviet system.
Let us recall some historical facts.
In the days before the October Revolution two members of
the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party - Kamenev and
Zinoviev - declared themselves against Lenin's plan for an armed
uprising.: In addition, on 18 October they published in the
Menshevik newspaper, Novaya Zhizn, a statement declaring that the`
Bolsheviks were making preparations for an uprising and that they
considered it adventuristic. Kamenev and Zinoviev thus disclosed
to the, enemy the decision of the Central Committee to stage the
uprising, and that the uprising had been organized to take place
within the very near future.
This was treason against the Party and against the revolu-
tion. In this connection, V. I. Lenin wrote: "Kamenev and
Zinoviev revealed the decision of the Central Committee of their
Party on the armed uprising to Rodzyanko and Kerensky..;"
He put before the Central Committee the question of Zinoviev's
and Kamenev's expulsion from the Party.
Page 13
S T
Approved For Release 'C1~C= 7 - 0915R000500080001-7
 Approved For RV""; P78-00915R000500080001-7
NOFOR
However, after the Great Socialist October Revolution, as
is known, Zinoviev and Kamenev were given leading positions.
Lenin put them in positions in which they carried out most re-
sponsible Party tasks and participated actively in the work of
the leading Party and Soviet organs. It is known that Zinoviev
and Kamenev committed a number of other serious errors during
Lenin's life. In his "testament" Lenin warned that "Zinoviev's
and Kamenev's October episode was of course not an accident."
But Lenin did not pose the question of their arrest and certainly
not their shooting.
Or let us take the example of the Trotskyites. At present,
after a sufficiently long historical period, we can speak about
the fight with the Trotskyites with complete calm and can analyze
this matter with sufficient objectivity. After all, around
Trotsky were people whose origin cannot by any means by traced to
bourgeous society. Part of them belonged to the Party intelli-
gentsia and a certain part were recruited from among the workers.
We can name many individuals who in their time joined the Trot-
skyites; however, these same individuals took an active part in
the workers' movement before the revolution, during the Socialist
October Revolution itself, and also in the consolidation of the
victory of this greatest of revolutions. Many of them broke
with Trotskyism and returned to Leninist positions. Was it
necessary to annihilate such people? We are deeply convinced
that had Lenin lived such an extreme method would not have been
used against many of them.
Such are only a few historical facts. But can it be said
that Lenin did not decide to use even the most severe means
against enemies of the revolution when this was actually necessary?
No, no one can say this, Vladimir Ilyich demanded uncompromising
Page 14
FRET
NO N
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
RET
NOFO RN
dealings with the enemies of the revolution and of the working
class and when necessary resorted ruthlessly to such methods.
You will recall only V. I. Lenin's fight with the Socialist
Revolutionary organizers of the anti-Soviet uprising, with the
counter-revolutionary kulaks in 1918 and with others, when Lenin
without hesitation used the most extreme methods against the
enemies. Lenin used such methods, however, only against actual
class enemies and not against those who blunder, who err, and whom
it was possible to lead through ideological influence, and even
retain in the leadership.
Lenin used severe methods only in the most necessary cases,
when the exploiting classes were still in existence and were
vigorously opposing the revolution, when the struggle for sur-
vival was decidely assuming the sharpest forms, even including
a civil war.
Stalin, on the other hand, used extreme methods and mass
repressions at a time when the revolution was already victori-
ous, when the Soviet state was strengthened, when the exploit-
ing classes were already liquidated and Socialist relations were
rooted solidly in all phases of national economy, when our Party
was politically consolidated and had strengthened itself both
numerically and ideologically. It is clear that here Stalin
showed in a whole series of cases his intolerance, his brutality
and his abuse of power. Instead of proving his political cor-
rectness and mobilizing the masses, he often chose the path of
repression and physical annihilation, not only against actual
enemies, but also against individuals who had not committed
any crimes. against the Party and the Soviet government. Here we
see no wisdom but only a demonstration of the brutal force which
had once so alarmed V. I. Lenin.
Page 15
'SET
Approved For Release 78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Releav 3 1 78-00915R000500080001-7
Lately, especially after the unmasking of the Beriya gang,
the Central Committee looked into a series of matters fabricated
by this gang. This revealed a very ugly picture of brutal willful-
ness connected with the incorrect behavior of Stalin. As facts
prove, Stalin, using his unlimited power, allowed himself many
abuses, acting in the name of the Central Committee, not asking
for the opinion of the Committee members nor even of the members
of the Central Committee's Political Bureau; often he did not in-
form them about his personal decisions concerning very important
Party and government matters.
Considering the question of the cult of an individual we
must first of all show everyone what harm this caused to the
interests of our Party.
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin had always stressed the Party's role
and significance in the direction of the Socialist government
of workers and peasants; he saw in this the chief precondition
for a successful building of Socialism in our country. Pointing
to the great responsibility of the Bolshevik Party, as a ruling
party in the Soviet State, Lenin called for the most meticulous
observance of all norms of Party life; he called for the realiza-
tion of the principles of collegiality in the direction of the
Party and the State.
Collegiality of leadership flows from the very nature of
our Party, a party built on the principles of democratic central-
ism. "This means," said Lenin, "that all Party matters are ac-
complished by all Party members--directly or through representa-
tives-who without any exceptions are subject to the same rules;
in addition, all administrative members, all directing collegia,
all holders of Party positions are elective, they must account
for their activities and are recallable."
Page 16
RET
NOF
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7,
RET
NOF
It is known that Lenin himself offered an example of the
most careful observance of these principles. There was no matter
so important that Lenin himself decided it without asking for advice
and approval of the majority of the Central Committee members or
of the members of the Central Committee's political Bureau.
In the most difficult period for our Party and our country,
Lenin considered it necessary regularly to convoke congresses,
Party conferences, and plenary sessions of the Central Committee
at which all the most important questions were discussed and where
resolutions, carefully worked out by the collective of leaders,
were approved.
We can recall, for an example, the year 1918 when the coun-
try was threatened by the attack of the imperialistic interven-
tionists. In this situation the VIIth Party Congress was con-
vened in order to discuss a vitally important matter which could
not be postponed - the matter of peace. In 1919, while the Civil
War was raging, the VIIIth Party Congress convened which adopted
a new Party program, decided such important matters as the rela-
tionship with the peasant masses, the organization of the Red
Army, the leading role of the Party in the work of the Soviets,
the correction of the social composition of the Party, and other
matters. In 1920 the IXth Party Congress was convened which laid
down guiding principles pertaining to the Party's work in the
sphere of economic construction. In 1921, the Xth Party Congress
accepted Lenin's New Economic Policy and the historical resolu-
tion called, "About Party Unity."
During Lenin's life Party Congresses were convened regu-
larly; always, when a radical turn in the development of the
,Party and the country took place, Lenin considered it absolutely
necessary that the Party discuss at length all the basic matters
pertaining to internal and foreign policy and to questions bear-
ing on the development of Party and government.
Page 17
NOFORS
Approved For Release : CIA- DP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
CRFT
NOPQRN
It is very characterictic that Lenin addressed to the
Party Congress as the highest Party organ his last articles,
letters and remarks. During the period between congresses the
Central Committee of the Party, acting as the most authorita-
tive leading collective, meticulously observed the principles of
the Party and carried out its policy.
So it was during Lenin's life.
Were our Party's holy Leninist principles observed after
the death of Vladimir Ilyich?
Whereas during the first few years after Lenin's death
Party Congresses and Central Committee plenums took place more
or less regularly, later, when Stalin began increasingly to abuse
his power, these principles were brutally violated. This was es-
pecially evident during the last 15 years of his life. Was it a
normal situation when our 13 years elapsed between the XVIIIth
and XIXth Party Congresses, years during which our Party and our
country had experienced so many important events? These events
demanded categorically that the Party should have passed resolu-
tions pertaining to the country's defense during the Patriotic
War and to peacetime construction after the war. Even after the
end of the war a Congress was not convened for over 7 years.
Central Committee plenums were hardly ever called. It
should be sufficient to mention that during all the years of
the Patriotic War not a single Central Committee plenum took place.
It is true that there was an attempt to call a Central Committee
plenum in October 1941, when Central Committee members from the
whole country were called to Moscow. They waited two days for
the opening of the plenum, but in vain. Stalin did not even want
to meet and to talk to the Central Committee members. This fact
shows how demoralized Stalin was in the first months of the war and
how haughtily and disdainfully he. treated the Central Committee
members.
Page 18
RET
Approved For Release p ff 8-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Rele
78-00915R000500080001-7
In practice Stalin ignored the norms of Party life and
trampled on the Leninist principle of collective Party leader-
ship.
Stalin's wilfulness vis-a-vis the Party and its Central
Committee became fully evident after the XVIIth Party Congress
which took place in 1934.
Having at its disposal numerous data showing brutal will-
fulness toward Party cadres, the Central Committee had created a
Party Commission under the control of the Central Committee Pre-
sidium; it was charged with investigating what made possible the
mass repressions against the majority of the Central Committee
members and candidates elected at the XVIIth Congress of the All-
Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks).
The Commission has become acquainted with a large quantity
of materials in the NKVD archives and with other documents and
has established many facts pertaining to the fabrication of
cases against Communists, to false accusations, to glaring abuses
of Socialist legality -- which resulted in the death of innocent
people. It became apparent that many Party, Soviet and economic
activists, who were branded in 1937-1938 as "enemies," were
actually never enemies, spies, wreckers, etc., but were always
honest Communists; they were only so stigmatized and often, no
longer able to bear barbaric tortures, they charged themselves
(at the order of the investigative judges -- falsifiers) with
all kinds of grave and unlikely crimes. The Commission has pre-
sented to the Central Committee Presidium lengthy and documented
materials pertaining to mass repressions against the delegates to
the XVIIth Party Congress and against members of the Central
Committee elected at that Congress. These materials have been
studied by the Presidium of the Central Committees
Page 19
S.
NOFORN
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
It was determined that of the 139 members and candidates
of the Party's Central Committee who were elected at the XVIIth
Congress, 98 persons, i.e., 70 percent, were arrested and shot
(mostly in 1937-1938). (Indignation in the hall.)
What was the composition of the delegates to the XVIIth
Congress? It is known that eighty percent of the voting par-
ticipants of the XVIIth Congress joined the Party during the years
of conspiracy before the Revolution and during the Civil War; this
means before 1921. By social origin the basic mass of the dele-
gates to the Congress were workers (60 percent of the voting
members).
For this reason, it was inconceivable that a Congress so
composed would have elected a Central Committee a majority of whom
would prove to be enemies of the Party. The only reason why 70
percent of Central Committee members and candidates elected at
the.XVIIth Congress were branded as enemies of the Party and of
the people was because honest Communists were slandered, accusa-
tions against them were fabricated, and revolutionary legality
was gravely undermined.
The same fate met not only the Central Committee members
but also the majority of the delegates to the XVIIth Party
Congress. Of 1966 delegates with either voting or advisory
.rights, 1108 persons were arrested on charges of anti-revolu-
tionary crimes, i.e., decidedly more than a majority. This very
fact shows how absurd, wild and contrary to common sense were the
charges of counter-revolutionary crimes made out, as we now see,
against a majority of participants at the XVIIth Party Congress.
(Indignation in the hall.)
We should recall that the XVIIth Party Congress is his-
torically known as the Congress of Victors. Delegates to the
Congress were active participants in the building of our
Page 20
Approved For Release Nqk_9 915R000500080001-7
 rr ^
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
Socialist State; many of them suffered and fought for Party
interests during the pre-revolutionary years in the conspiracy
and at the Civil War fronts; they fought their enemies val-
iantly and often nervelessly looked into the face of death.
How then can we believe that such people could prove to be
"two-faced" and had joined the camps of the enemies of Social-
ism during the era after the political liquidation of Zinovievites,
Trotskyites and rightists and after the great accomplishments of
Socialist construction?
This was the result of the abuse of power by Stalin,who
began to use mass terror against the Party cadres.
What is the reason that mass repressions against activists
increased more and more after the XVIIth Party Congress? It was
because at that time Stalin had so elevated himself above the
Party and above the nation that he ceased to consider either
the Central Committee or the Party. While he still reckoned with
the opinion of the collective before the XVIIth Congress, after
the complete political liquidation of the Trotskyites, Zinoviev-
ites and Bukharinites, when as a result of that fight and Social-
ist victories the Party achieved unity, Stalin ceased to an ever-
greater degree to consider the members of the Party's Central
Committee and even the members of the Political Bureau. Stalin
thought that now he could decide all things alone and all he
needed were statisticians; he treated all others in such a way
that they could only listen to and praise him.
After the criminal murder of S. M. Kirov, mass repressions
and brutal acts of violation of socialist legality began. On the
evening of 1 December 1934 on Stalin's initiative (without the
approval of the Political Bureau -- which was passed two days
later, casually) the secretary of the Presidium of the Central
Executive Committee, Yenukidze, signed the following directive.
Page 21
'CRET
Approved For Release : ?}-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Rel P78-00915R000500080001-7
NO N
Investigative agencies are directed to speed up the
cases of those accused of the preparation or execution
of acts of terror.
II. Judicial organs are directed not to hold up the execu-
tion of death sentences pertaining to crimes of this
category in order to consider the possibility of pardon,
because the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee
USSR does not consider as possible the receiving of peti-
tions of this sort.
III. The organs of the Commissariat of Internal Affairs are
directed to execute the death sentences against criminals
of the above-mentioned category immediately after the passage
of sentences."
This directive became the basis for mass acts of abuse against
Socialist legality. During many of the fabricated court cases
the accused were charged with "the preparation" of terroristic
acts; this deprived them of any possibility that their cases
might be re-..examined, even when they stated before the court that
their "confessions" were secured by force, and when, in a con-
vincing manner, they disproved the accusations against them.
It must be asserted that to this day the circumstances sur-
rounding Kirov's murder hide many things which are inexplicable
and mysterious and demand a most careful examination. There
are reasons for the suspicion that the killer of Kirov, Nikolayev,
was assisted by someone from among the people whose duty it was
to protect the person of Kirov. A month and a half before the
killing, Nikolayev was arrested on the grounds of suspicious be-
havior, but he was released and not even searched. It is an un-
usually suspicious circumstance that when the Chekist assigned
to protect Kirov was being brought for an interrogation, on
2 December 1934, he was killed in a car "accident" in which no
other occupants of the car were harmed. After the murder of
Page 22
RET
NOFO
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Relea e : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
ET
NOFO
Kirov, top functionaries of the Leningrad NKVD were given very
light sentences, but in 1937 they were shot. We can assume
that they were shot in order to cover the traces of the organ-
izers of Kirov's killing. (Movement in the hail.)
Mass repressions grew tremendously from the end of 1936
after a telegram from Stalin and Zhdanov, dated from Sochi on
25 September 1936, was addressed to Kaganovich, Molotov and other
members of the Political Bureau. The content of that telegram
was as follows:
"We deem it absolutely necessary and urgent that Comrade
Yezhov be nominated to the post of People's Commissar for Internal
Affairs. Yagoda has definitely proved himself to be incapable of
unmasking the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc. The OGPU is 4 years
behind in this matter. This is noted by all Party workers and
by the majority of the representatives of the NKVD." Strictly
speaking we should stress that Stalin did not meet with and
therefore could not know the opinion of party workers.
This Stalinist formulation that the "NKVD (term used inter-
changeably with 'OGPU')* is 4 years behind" in applying mass
repression and that there is a necessity for "catching up" with
the neglected work directly pushed the NKVD workers on the path
of mass arrests and executions.
We should state that this formulation was also forced on
the February-March plenary session of the Central Committee of
the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in 1937. The plenary
resolution approved it on the basis of Yezhov's report, "Lessons
flowing from the harmful activity, diversion and espionage of
the Japanese-German-Trotskyite agents," stating:
The content of this parenthesis is an editorial note
of the translator.
Page 23
Approved For Release :
8-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For R IDP78-00915R000500080001-7
NOFO
"The Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union
Communist Party (Bolsheviks) considers that all facts revealed
during the investigation into the matter of an anti-Soviet Trot-
skyite center and of its followers in the provinces show that
the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs has fallen behind
at least 4 years in the attempt to unmask these most inexorable
enemies of the people."
The mass repressions at this time were made under the slo-
gan of a fight against the Trotskyites. Did the Trotskyites at
this time actually constitute such a danger to our Party and to
the Soviet State? We should recall that in 1927 on the eve of the
XVth Party Congress only some 4,000 votes were cast for the
Trotskyite-Zinovievite opposition, while there were 724,000 for
the Party line. During the 10 years which passed between the
XVth Party Congress and the February-March Central Committee
Plenum Trotskyism was completely disarmed; many former Trotsky-
ites had changed their former views and worked in the various
sectors building Socialism, It is clear that in the situation
of Socialist victory there was no basis for mass terror in the
country.
Stalin's report at the February-March Central Committee
Plenum in 1937, "Deficiencies of Party work and methods for the
liquidation of the Trotskyites and of other two-facers," con-
tained an attempt at theoretical justification of the mass ter-
ror policy under the pretext that as we march forward toward
Socialism class war must allegedly sharpen. Stalin asserted
that both history and Lenin taught him this.
Actually Lenin taught that the application of revolu-
tionary violence is necessitated by the resistance of the ex-
ploiting classes, and this referred to the era when the
exploiting classes existed and were powerful. As soon as the
Page 24
ET
NOFO
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
ET
nation's political situation had improved, when in January 1920
the Red Army took Rostov and thus won a most important victory
over Denikin, Lenin instructed Dzherzhinsky to stop mass terror
and to abolish the death penalty. Lenin justified this important
political move of the Soviet State in the following manner in his
report at the session of the All-Union Central Executive Commit-
tee on 2 February 1920:
,,We were forced to use terror because of the terror prac-
ticed by the Entente, when strong world powers threw their
hordes against us, not avoiding any type of conduct. We would
not have lasted two days had we not answered these attempts of
officers and White Guardists in a merciless fashion; this meant
the use of terror, but this was forced upon us by the terrorist
methods of the Entente.
"But. as soon as we attained a decisive victory, even before
the end of the war, immediately after taking Rostov, we gave up
the use of the death penalty and thus proved that we intend to
execute our own program in the manner that we promised. We
say that the application of violence flows out of the decision
to smother the exploiters, the big landowners and the capital-
ists; as soon as this was accomplished we gave up the use of all
extraordinary methods. We have proved this in practice."
Stalin deviated from these clear and plain precepts of
Lenin. Stalin put the Party and the NKVD up to the use of mass
terror when the exploiting classes had been liquidated in our
country and when there were no serious reasons for the use of
extraordinary mass terror.
This terror was actually directed not at the remnants of
the defeated exploiting classes but against the honest workers
Page 25
RET
Approved For Release :-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For ReI1Cb4&1QP78-00915R000500080001-7
of the Party and of the Soviet State; against them were made
lying, slanderous and absurd accusations concerning "two-
facedness," "espionage," "sabotage," preparation of fictitious
"plots," etc.
At the February-March Central Committee Plenum in 1937
many members actually questioned the rightness of the established
course regarding mass repressions under the pretext of combating
"two-forcedness."
Comrade Postyshev most ably expressed these doubts. He
"I have philosophized that the severe years of fighting have
passed, Party members who have lost their backbones have broken
down or have joined the camp of the enemy; healthy elements have
fought for the Party. These were the years of industrialization
and collectivization. I never thought it possible that after
this severe era had passed Karpov and people like him would find
themselves in the camp of the enemy. (Karpov was a worker in the
Ukrainian Central Committee whom Postyshev knew well.) And now,
according to the testimony, it appears that Karpov was recruited
in 1934 by the Trotskyites. I personally do not believe that in
1934 an honest Party member who had trod the long road of unre-
lenting fight against enemies for the Party and for Socialism,
would now be in the camp of the enemies. I do not believe it...
I cannot imagine how it would be possible to.travel with the
Party during the difficult years and then, in 1934, join the
Trotskyites. It is an odd thing ..." (Movement in the hall.)
Using Stalin's formulation, namely that the closer we are
to Socialism the more enemies we will have, and.using the reso-
lution of the February-March Central Committee Plenum passed
on the basis of Yezhov's report - the provocateurs who had in-
filtrated the state security organs together with conscienceless
Page 26
\RET
NOF
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-0091 5R000500080001-7
ShWET
NOFO
careerists began to protect with the Party name the mass terror
against Party cadres, cadres of-the Soviet State and the ordinary
Soviet citizens. It should suffice to say that the number of
arrests based on charges of counter-revolutionary crimes had
grown ten times between 1936 and 1937.
It is known that brutal willfulness was practiced against
leading Party workers. The Party Statute, approved at the
XVIIth Party Congress, was based on Leninist principles ex-
pressed at the Xth Party Congress. It stated that in order
to apply an extreme method such as exclusion from the Party
against a Central Committee member, against a Central Committee
candidate, and against a member of the Party Control Commission,
"it is necessary to call a Central Committee Plenum and to in-
vite to the Plenum all Central Committee candidate members and
all members of the Party Control Commission"; only if two-thirds
of the members of such a general assembly of responsible Party
leaders find it necessary, only then can a Central Committee
member or candidate be expelled.
The majority of the Central Committee members and candi-
dates elected at the XVIIth Congress and arrested in 1937-1938
were expelled from the Party illegally through the brutal abuse
of the Party Statute, because the question of their expulsion
was never studied at the Central Committee Plenum.
Now when the cases of some of these so-called "spies" and
"saboteurs" were examined it was found that all their cases
were fabricated. Confessions of guilt of many arrested and
charged with enemy activity were gained with the help of cruel
and inhuman tortures.
At the same time Stalin, as we have been informed by mem-
bers of the Political Bureau of that time, did not show them
the statements of many accused political activists when they
Page 27
Approved For ReleaseN(g)8-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
'FRET
NO
retracted their confessions before the military tribunal and
asked for an objective examination of their cases. There were
many such declarations, and Stalin doubtlessly knew of them.
The Central Committee considers it absolutely necessary to
inform the Congress of many such fabricated "cases" against the
members of the Party's Central Committee elected at the XVIIth
Party Congress.
An example of vile provocation, of odious falsification
and of criminal violation of revolutionary legality is the case
of the former candidate for the Central Committee Political
Bureau, one of the most eminent workers of the Party and of the
Soviet government, Comrade Eikhe, who was a Party member since
1905. (Commotion in the hall.)
Comrade Eikhe was arrested on 29 April 1938 on the basis
of slanderous materials, without the sanction of the Prosecutor
of the USSR, which was finally received 15 months after the
arrest.
Investigation of Eikhe's case was made in a manner which
most brutally violated Soviet legality and was accompanied by
willfulness and falsification.
Eikhe was forced under torture to sign ahead of time a
protocol of his confession prepared by the investigative
judges, in which he and several other eminent Party workers
were accused of anti-Soviet activity.
On 1 October 1939 Eikhe sent his declaration to Stalin
in which he categorically denied his guilt and asked for an
examination of his case. In the declaration he wrote:
"There is no more bitter misery than to sit in the jail
of a government for which I have always fought."
A second declaration of Eikhe has been preserved which
he sent to Stalin on 27 October 1939; in it he cited facts very
Page 28
Approved For Release?
0915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Re a ?&MP78-00915R000500080001-7
NOF
convincingly and countered the slanderous accusations made
against him, arguing that this provocatory accusation was on
the one hand the work of real Trotskyites whose arrests he had
sanctioned as First Secretary of the West Siberian Krai Party
Committee and who conspired in order to take revenge on him,
and, on the other hand, the result of the base falsification of
materials by the investigative judges.
Eikhe wrote in his declaration: ". . . On 25 October of
this year I was informed that the investigation in my case has
been concluded and I was given access to the.materials of this
investigation. Had I been guilty of only one-hundredth of the
crimes with which I am charged, I would not have dared to send
you this pre-execution declaration; however, I have not been
guilty of even one of the things with which I am charged and my
heart is clean of even the shadow of baseness. I have never
in my life told you a word of falsehood and now, finding my two
feet in the grave, I am also not lying. My. whole case is a
typical example of provocation, slander and violation of the
elementary basis of revolutionary legality .. .
. . .The confessions which were made part of my file are
not only absurd but contain some slander toward the Central
Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and
toward the Council of People's Commissars because correct reso-
lutions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist
Party (Bolsheviks) and of the Council of People's Commissars
which were not made on my initiative and without my partici-
pation are presented as hostile acts of counter-revolutionary
organizations made at my suggestion....
"I am now alluding to the most disgraceful part of my life
and to my really grave guilt against the Party and against you.
This is my confession of counter-revolutionary activity. . .
Page 29
-NWRET
N
'Nk
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
NOF
RET
The case is as follows: not being able to suffer the tortures
to which I was submitted by Ushakov and Nikolayev - and es-
pecially by the first one -. who utilized the knowledge that
my broken ribs have not properly mended and have caused me
great pain - I have been forced to accuse myself and others.
"The majority of my confession has been suggested or
dictated by Ushakov, and the remainder is my reconstruction of
NKVD materials from western Siberia for which I assumed all
responsibility. If some part of the story which Ushakov fabri-
cated and which I signed did not properly hang together, I was
forced to sign another variation. The same thing was done to
Rukhimovich,who was at first designated as a member of the re-
serve net and whose name later was removed without telling me
anything about it; the same was also done with the leader of
the reserve net, supposedly created by Bukharin in 1935. At
first I wrote my name in, and then I was instructed to insert
Mezhlauk.' There were other similar incidents.
"...I am asking and begging you that you again examine
my case and this not for the purpose of sparing me but in order
to unmask the vile provocation which like a snake wound itself
around many persons in a great degree due to my meanness and
criminal slander. I have never betrayed you or the Party. I
know that I perish because of vile and mean work of the enemies
of the Party and of the people, who fabricated the provocation
against me."
It would appear that such an important declaration was
worth an examination by the Central Committee. This, however,
was not done and the declaration was transmitted to Beriya while
the terrible maltreatment of the Political Bureau candidate,
Comrade Eikhe, continued.
Page 30
RET
Approved For Release : (, jR -00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
ET
NOFO
On 2 February 1940 Eikhe was brought before the court.
Here he did not confess any guilt and said as follows:
"In all the so-called confessions of mine there is not
one letter written by me with the exception of my signatures
under the protocols which were forced from me. I have made my
confession under pressure from the investigative judge who from
the time of my arrest tormented me. After that I began to write
all this nonsense. . . The most important thing for me is to tell
the court, the Party and Stalin that I am not guilty. I have
never been guilty of any conspiracy. I will die believing in
the truth of Party policy as I have believed in it during my
whole life."
On 4 February Eikhe was shot. (Indignation in the hall.)
It has been definitely established now that Eikhe's case was
fabricated; he has been posthumously rehabilitated.
Comrade Rudzutak, candidate member of the Political Bureau,
member of the Party since 1905, who spent 10 years in a Czarist
hard labor camp, completely retracted in court the confession
which was forced from him. The protocol of the session of the
Collegium of the Supreme Military Court contains the following
statement by Rudzutak:
"...The only plea which he places before the court. is that
the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)
be informed that there is in the NKVD an as yet not liquidated
center which is craftily manufacturing cases, which forces in-
nocent persons to confess; there is no opportunity to prove
one's nonparticipation in crimes to which the confessions of
various persons testify. The investigative methods are such that
they force people to lie and to slander entirely innocent per-
sons in addition to those who already stand accused. He asks
the Court that he be allowed to inform the Central Committee of
the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). about all this in writ-
ing. He assures the Court that he personally had never any evil
Page 31
Approved For Release
78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Relea ? FA.91 ` 78-00915R000500080001-7
NO
designs in regard to the policy of our Party because he had
always agreed with the Party policy pertaining to all spheres
of economic and cultural activity."
This declaration of Rudzutak was ignored, despite the fact
that Rudzutak was in his time the chief of the Central Control
Commission which was called into being in accordance with Lenin's
concept for the purpose of fighting for Party unity ...In this
manner fell the chief of this highly authoritative Party organ,
a victim of brutal willfulnesss'he was not even called before the
Central Committee's Political Bureau because Stalin did not want
to talk to him. Sentence was pronounced on him in 20 minutes
and he was shot. (Indignation in the hall.)
After careful examination of the case in 1955 it was es-
tablished that the accusation against Rudzutak was false and
that it was based on slanderous materials. Rudzurak has been
rehabilitated posthumously.
The way in which the former NKVD workers manufactured vari-
ous fictitious "anti-Soviet centers" and "blocs" with the help
of provocatory methods is seen from the confession of Comrade
.Rozenblum, Party member since 1906, who was arrested in 1937
by the Leningrad NKVD,
During the examination in 1955 of the Komarov case Rozen-
blum revealed the following fact: when Rozenbium was arrested.
in 1937 he was subjected to terrible torture during which he
was ordered to confess false information concerning himself and
other persons. He was then brought to the office of Zakovsky, who
offered him freedom on condition that he make before the court
a false confession fabricated in 1937 by the NKVD concerning
"sabotage, espionage and diversion in a terroristic Center in
Leningrad." (Movement in the hall.) With unbelievable cynicism
Page 32
RET
NOF
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
NO~RN
CRET
Zakovsky told about the vile "mechanism" for the crafty
creation of fabricated "anti-Soviet plots.,',
"In order to illustrate it to me," stated Rozenbium,
"Zakovsky gave me several possible variants of the organiza-
tion of this center and of its branches. After he detailed
the organization to me, Zakovsky told me that the NKVD would
prepare the case of this center, remarking that the trial would
be public.
"Before the court were to be brought 4 or 5 members of
this. center: Chudov, Ugarov, Smorodin, Pozern, Shaposhnikova
(Chudov's wife) and others together with 2 or 3 members from
the branches of this center . . .
Y'. . . The case of the Leningrad center has to be built
solidly and for this reason witnesses are needed. Social
origin (of course, in the past) and the Party standing of the
witness will play more than a small role.
"You, yourself," said Zakovsky, "will not need to invent
anything. The NKVD will prepare for you a ready outline for
every branch of the center; you will have to study it carefully
and to remember well all questions and answers which the Court
might ask. This case will be ready in 4-5 months, or perhaps a
half year. During all this time you will be preparing yourself
so that you will not compromise the investigation and yourself.
Your future will depend on how the trial goes and on its results.
If you begin to lie and to testify falsely, blame yourself.
If you manage to endure it, you will save your head and we will
feed and clothe you at the government's cost until your death."
This is the kind of vile things which were then practiced.
(Movement in the hall.)
Page 33
Approved For Releasepq J 78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Releas : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
7ET
NOF
Even more widely was the falsification of cases practiced
in the provinces. The NKVD headquarters of the Sverdlov oblast
"discovered" the so-called "Ural uprising staff"--an organ of the
bloc of rightists, Trotskyites, Socialist Revolutionaries, church
leaders--whose chief supposedly was the Secretary of the Sverdlov
Oblast Party Committee and member of the Central Committee, All-
Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), Kabakov, who had been a Party
member since 1914. The investigative materials of that time show
that in almost all krais, oblasts and republics there supposedly
existed "rightist Trotskyite, espionage-terror and diversionary-
sabotage organizations and centers" and that the heads of such
organizations as a rule - for no known reason - were first secre-
taries of oblast or republic Communist Party committees or
Central Committees. (Movement in the hall.)
Many thousands of honest and innocent Communists have died
as a result of this monstrous falsification of such "cases," as
a result of the fact that all kinds of slanderous "confessions"
were. accepted, and as a result of the practice of forcing accu-
sations against oneself and others. In the same manner were fabri-
cated the "cases" against eminent Party and State workers --
Kossior, Chubar, Postyshev, Kosaryev, and others.
In those years repressions on a mass scale were applied
which were based on nothing tangible and which resulted in
heavy cadre losses to the Party.
The vicious practice was condoned of having the NKVD pre-
pare lists of persons whose cases were under the jurisdiction
of the Military Collegium -and whose, sentences were prepared in
advance. Yezhov would send these lists to Stalin personally
for his approval of the proposed punishment. In 1937-1938, 383
such lists containing the names of many thousands of Party,
Soviet, Komsomol, Army and economic workers were sent to Stalin.
He approved these lists.
Page 34
Approved For Release `.'CI ,QP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Rele P78-00915R000500080001-7
NOFO
A large part of these cases are being reviewed now and
a great part of them are being voided because they were base-
less and falsified. Suffice it to say that from 1954 to the
present time the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court has
rehabilitated 7,679 persons, many of whom were rehabilitated
posthumously.
Mass arrests of Party, Soviet, economic and military
workers caused tremendous harm to our country and to the cause
of Socialist advancement.
Mass repressions had a negative influence on the moral-
political condition of the Party, created a situation of un-
certainty, contributed to the spreading of unhealthy suspicion,
and sowed distrust among Communists. All sorts of slanderers
and careerists were active.
Resolutions of the January Plenum of the Central Committee,
All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), in 1938 had brought some
measure of improvement to the Party organizations. However,
widespread repression also existed in 1938.
Only because our Party has at its disposal such great
moral-political strength was it possible for it to survive
the difficult events in 1937-1938 and to educate new cadres.
There is, however, no doubt that our march forward toward
Socialism and toward the preparation of the country's defense
would have been much more successful were it not for the tre-
mendous loss in the cadres suffered as a result of the base-
less and false mass repressions in 1937-1938.
We are justly accusing Yezhov for the degenerate practices
of 1937. But we have to answer these questions: Could Yezhov
have arrested Kossior, for instance, without the knowledge of
Stalin? Was there an exchange of opinions or a Political
Bureau decision concerning this? No, there was not, as there
Page 35
S R.ET
NO N
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
BEET
NOF
was none regarding other cases of this type. Could Yezhov
have decided such important matters as the fate of such eminent
Party figures? No, it would be a display of naivete to consider
this the work of Yezhov alone. It is clear that these matters
were decided by Stalin, and that without his orders and his
sanction Yezhov could not have done this.
We have examined the cases and have rehabilitated Kossior,
Rudzutak, Postyshev, Kosaryev and others. For what causes were
they arrested and sentenced? The review of evidence shows that
there was no reason for this. They, like many others, were
arrested without the Prosecutor's knowledge. In such a situa-
tion there is no need for any sanction, for what sort of a
sanction could there be when Stalin decided everything. He was
the chief prosecutor in these cases. Stalin not only agreed to,
but on his own initiative issued arrest orders. We must say
this so that the delegates to the Congress can clearly under-
take and themselves assess this and draw the proper conclusions.
Facts prove that many abuses were made on Stalin's or-
ders without reckoning with any norms of Party and Soviet le-
gality. Stalin was a very distrustful man, sickly suspicious;
we knew this from our work with him. He could look at a man
and say: "Why are your eyes so shifty today," or "Why are you
turning so much today and avoiding to look me directly in the
eyes?" The sickly suspicion created in him a general distrust
even toward eminent Party workers whom he had known for years.
Everywhere and in everything he saw "enemies," "two-facers"
and "spies."
Possessing unlimited power he indulged in great willful-
ness and choked a person morally and physically. A situation
was created where one could not express one's own will.
Page 36
ET
Approved For Release @8-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
\RET
NOF
When Stalin said that one or another should be arrested,
it was necessary to accept on faith that he was an "enemy of
the people." Meanwhile, Beriya's gang, which ran the organs
of state security, outdid itself in proving the guilt of the
arrested and the truth of materials which it falsified. And what
proofs were offered? The confessions of the arrested, and the
investigative judges accepted these "confessions." And how is
it possible that a person confesses to crimes which he has not
committed? Only in one way - because of application of physical
methods of pressuring him, tortures, bringing him to a state of
unconsciousness, deprivation of his judgment, taking away of
his human dignity. In this manner were "confessions" acquired.
When the wave of mass arrests began to recede in 1939,
and the leaders of territorial Party organizations began to
accuse the NKVD workers of using methods of physical pressure
on the arrested, Stalin dispatched a coded telegram on 20
January 1939 to the committee secretaries of oblasts and krais,
to the Central Committees of republic Communist Parties, to
the Peoples.Commissars of Internal Affairs and to the heads of
NKVD organizations. This telegram stated:
"The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party
(Bolsheviks) explains that the application of methods of physi-
cal pressure in NKVD practice is periissible from 1937 on in
accordance with permission of the Central Committee of the All-
Union Communist Patty (Bolsheviks) . . .It is known that all
bourgeois intelligence services use methods of physical influ-
ence against the representatives of the Socialist proletariat
and that they use them in their most scandalous forms. The ques-
tion arises as to why the Socialist intelligence service should
be more humanitarian against the mad agents of the bourgeoisie,
against the deadly enemies of the working class and of the
Page 37
Approved For Releas2'
78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For ReI
rP78-00915R000500080001-7
LAME
"'4' "
NO N
Kolkhoz workers. The Central Committee of the All-Union Com-
munist Party (Bolsheviks) considers that physical pressure
should still be used obligatorily, as an exception applicable
to known and obstinate enemies of the people, as a method both
justifiable and appropriate."
Thus, Stalin had sanctioned'in the name of the Central
Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) the
most brutal violation of Socialist legality, torture and op-
pression, which led as we have seen to the slandering and self-
accusation of innocent people.
Not long ago--only several days before the present
Congress--we called to the Central Committee Presidium session
and interrogated the investigative judge Rodos, who in his time
investigated and interrogated Kossior, Chubar and Kosaryev. He
is a vile person, with the brain of a bird, and morally com-
pletely degenerate. And it was this man who was deciding the
fate of prominent Party workers; he was making judgments also
concerning the politics in these matters, because having estab-
lished their "crime," he provided therewith materials from which
important political implications could be drawn.
The question arises whether a man with such an intellect
could alone make the investigation in a manner to prove the guilt
of people such as Kossior and others. No, he could not have done
it without proper directives. At the Central Committee Presidium
session he told use "I was told that Kossior and Chubar were
people's enemies and for this reason, I. as an investigative
judge, had to make them confess that they are enemies." (Indig-
nation in the hall.)
He could do this only through long tortures, which. he did,
receiving detailed instructions from Beriya. We must say that
at the Central Committee Presidium session he cynically declared:
Page 38
RET
NOF
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
\RET
NOF
"I thought that I was executing the orders of the Party."
In this manner Stalin's orders concerning the use of methods
of physical pressure against the arrested were in practice ex-
ecuted.
These and many other facts show that all norms of correct
Party solution of problems were invalidated and everything was
dependent upon the willfulness of one map.
The power accumulated in the hands of one person, Stalin,
led to serious consequences during the Great Patriotic War.
When we look at many of our novels, films and histori-
cal "scientific studies," the role of Stalin in the Patriotic
War appears to be entirely improbable. Stalin had foreseen every-
thing. The Soviet Army,on the basis of a strategic plan prepared
by Stalin long before, used the tactics of so-called "active de-
fense," i.e., tactics which, as we know, allowed the Germans to
come up to Moscow and Stalingrad. Using such tactics the Soviet
Army, supposedly, thanks only to Stalin's genius, turned to the
offensive and subdued the enemy. The epic victory gained through
the armed might of the Land of the Soviets, through our heroic
people, is ascribed in this type of novel, film and "scientific
study" as being completely due to the strategic genius of Stalin.
We have to analyze this matter carefully because it has a
tremendous significance not only from the historical, but es-
pecially from the political, educational and practical point of
view.
What are the facts of this matter?
Before the war our press and all our political-educational
work was characterized by its bragging tone: when an enemy vio-
lates the holy Soviet soil, then for every blow of the enemy we
will answer with three blows and we will battle the enemy on his
Page 39
Approved For Release fM8-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
NOFO
ET
soil and we will win without much harm to ourselves. But
these positive statements were not based in all areas on con-
crete facts, which would actually guarantee the immunity of our
borders.
During the war and after the war Stalin put forward the
thesis that the tragedy which our nation experienced in the first
part of the war was the result of the "unexpected" attack of the
Germans against the Soviet Union. But, Comrades, this is com-
pletely untrue. As soon as Hitler came to power in Germany he
assigned to himself the task of liquidating Communism. The
Fascists were saying this openly; they did not hide their plans.
In order to attain this aggressive end all sorts of pacts and blocs
were created, such as the famous Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis. Many
facts from the pre-war period clearly showed that Hitler was go-
ing all out to begin a war against the Soviet State and that he
had concentrated large armed units, together with armored units,
near the Soviet borders.
Documents which have now been published show that by 3 April
1941 Churchill, through his ambassador to the USSR Cripps, per-
sonally warned Stalin that the Germans had begun regrouping their
armed units with the intent of attacking the Soviet Union. It is
self-evident that Churchill did not do this at all because of his
friendly feeling toward the Soviet nation. He had in this his
own imperialistic goals - to bring Germany and the USSR into a
bloody war and thereby to strengthen the position of the British
Empire. Just the same, Churchill affirmed in his writings that
he sought to "warn Stalin and call his attention to the danger
which threatened him." Churchill stressed this repeatedly in
his dispatches of 18 April and in the following days. However,
Stalin took no heed of these.warnings. What is more, Stalin
ordered that no credence be given to information of this sort,
in order not to provoke the initiation of military operations.
Page 40
Approved For Release :
P78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Relea
78-00915R000500080001-7
We must assert that information of this sort concerning
the threat of German armed invasion of Soviet territory was
coming in also from our own military and diplomatic sources;
however, because the leadership was conditioned against such in-
formation, such data was dispatched with fear and assessed with
reservation.
Thus, for instance, information sent from Berlin on 6 May
1941 by the Soviet military attach6, Capt. Vorontsov, stated:
"Soviet citizen Bozer ... communicated to the deputy naval attache
that according to a statement of a certain German officer from
Hitler's Headquarters, Germany is preparing to invade the USSR
on 14 May through Finland, the Baltic countries and Latvia. At
the same time Moscow and Leningrad will be heavily raided and
paratroopers landed in border cities..."
In his report of 22 May 1941, the deputy military attache in
Berlin, Khlopov, communicated that "...the attack of the German
army is reportedly scheduled for 15 June, but it is possible that
it may begin in the first days of June..."
A cable from our London Embassy dated 18 June 1951 stated:
"As of now Cripps is deeply convinced of the inevitability of
armed conflict between Germany and the USSR which will begin not
later than the middle of June. According to Cripps,the Germans
have presently concentrated 147 divisions (including air force
and service units) along the Soviet borders..."
Despite these particularly grave warnings, the necessary
steps were not taken to prepare the country properly for de-
fense and to prevent it from being caught unawares.
Did we have time and the capabilities for such preparations?
Yes, we had the time and capabilities. Our industry was al-
ready so developed that it was capable of supplying fully the
Soviet army with everything that it needed. This is proven by
Page 41
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Releas
78-00915R000500080001-7
the fact that although during the war we lost almost half of our
industry and important industrial and food production areas as the
result of enemy occupation of the Ukraine, Northern Caucasus and
other western parts of the country, the Soviet nation was still
able to organize the production of military equipment in the
eastern parts of the country, install there equipment taken from
the Western industrial areas, and to supply our armed forces with
everything which was necessary to destroy the enemy.
Had our industry been mobilized properly and in time to
supply the army with the necessary materiel, our wartime losses
would have been decidedly smaller. Such mobilization had not
been, however, started in time. And already in the first days
of the war it became evident that our army was badly armed, that
we did not have enough artillery, tanks and planes to throw the
enemy back.
Soviet science and technology produced excellent models of
tanks and artillery pieces before the war. But mass production
of all this was not organized and as a matter of fact we started
to modernize our military equipment only on the eve of the war.
As a result, at the time of the enemy's invasion of the Soviet land
we did not have sufficient quantities either of old machinery
which was no longer used for armament production or of new ma-
chinery which we had planned to introduce into armament produc-
tion. The situation with antiaircraft artillery was especially
bad; we did not organize the production of anti-tank ammunition.
Many fortified regions had proven to be indefensible as soon as
they were attacked, because the old arms had been withdrawn and
new ones were not yet available there.
This pertained, alas, not only to tanks, artillery and
planes. At the outbreak of the war we did not even have suffi-
cient numbers of rifles to arm the mobilized manpower. I recall
Page 42
S.ET
NOF
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
ET
NOFO
that in those days I telephoned to Comrade Malenkov from Kiev and
told him, "People have volunteered for the new army and demand arms.
You must send us arms."
Malenkov answered me, "We cannot send you arms. We are send-
ing all our rifles to Leningrad and you have to arm yourselves."
(Movement in the hall.)
Such was the armament situation.
In this connection we cannot forget, for instance, the
following fact. Shortly before the invasion of the Soviet Union
by the Hitlerite army, Korponos, who was Chief of the Kiev Special
Military District (he was later killed at the front) wrote to
Stalin that the German armies were at the Bug River, were preparing
for an attack and in the very near future would probably start
their offensive. In this connection Kirponos proposed that a
strong defense be organized, that 300,000 people be evacuated
from the border areas and that several strong points be organized
there: anti-tank ditches, trenches for the soldiers, etc.
Moscow answered this proposition with the assertion that
this would be a provocation, that no preparatory defensive work
should be undertaken at the borders, that the Germans were not to
be given any pretext for the initiation of military action against
us. Thus, our borders were insufficiently prepared to repel the
enemy.
When the Fascist armies had actually invaded Soviet terri-
tory and military operations began, Moscow issued the order that
the German fire was not to be returned. Why? It was because
Stalin, despite evident facts, thought that the war had not yet
started, that this was only a provocative action on the part of
several undisciplined sections of the German army, and that our
reaction might serve as a reason for the Germans to begin the war.
The following fact is also known. On the eve of the invasion
Page 43
NNQF
Approved For Release 78- 00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
RET
NOF
of the territory of the Soviet Union by the Hitlerite army a certain
German citizen crossed our border and stated that the German armies
had received orders to start the offensive against the Soviet Union
on the night of 22 June at 3 o'clock. Stalin was informed about
this immediately, but even this warning was ignored.
As you see, everything was ignored; warnings of certain
army commanders, declarations of deserters from the enemy army,
and even the open hostility of the enemy. Is this an example of
the alertness of the Chief of the Party and of the State at this
particularly significant historical moment?
And what were the results of this carefree attitude, this
disregard of clear facts? The result was that already in the
first hours and days the enemy had destroyed in our border re-
gions a large part of our air force, artillery and other mili-
tary equipment; he annihilated large numbers of our military
cadres and disorganized our military leadership; consequently we
could not prevent the enemy from marching deep into the country.
Very grievous consequences, especially in reference to the
beginning of the war, followed Stalin's annihilation of many
military commanders and political workers during 1937-1941 be-
cause of his suspiciousness and through slanderous accusations.
During these years repressions were instituted against certain
parts of military cadres beginning literally at the company and
battalion commander level and extending to the higher military
centers; during this time the cadre of leaders who had gained
military experience in Spain and in the Far East was almost
completely liquidated.
The policy of large-scale repression against the military
cadres led also to undermined military discipline, because for
several years officers of all ranks and even soldiers in the
Page 44
ET
Approved For Release M(a' 00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For ReI ff 78-00915R000500080001-7
NOFO
Party and Komsomol cells were taught to "unmask" their superiors
as hidden enemies. (Movement in the hall.) It is natural that
this caused a negative influence on the state of military disci-
pline in the first war period.
And, as you know, we had before the war excellent military
cadres which were unquestionably loyal to the Party and to the
Fatherland. Suffice it to say that those of them who managed
to survive despite severe tortures to which they were subjected in
the prisons, have from the first war days shown themselves real
patriots and heroically fought for the glory of the Fatherland;
I have here in mind such comrades as Rokossovsky (who, as you
know, had been jailed), Gorbatov, Maretskov (who is a delegate
at the present Congress), Podlas (he was an excellent commander
who perished at the front), and many, many others. However,
many such commanders perished in camps and jails and the army saw
them no more.
All this brought about the situation which existed at the
beginning of the war and which was the great threat to our Father-
land.
It would be incorrect to forget that after the first severe
disaster and defeats at the front Stalin thought that this was the
end. In one of his speeches in those days he said: "All that
which Lenin created we have lost forever."
After this Stalin for a long time actually did not direct
the military operations and ceased to do anything whatever. He
returned to active leadership only when some members of the Politi-
cal Bureau visited him and told him that it was necessary to take
certain steps immediately in order to improve the situation at
the front.
Therefore, the threatening danger which hung over our Father-
Page 45
RET
NOF
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP 8- 00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
RET
NOF
land in the first period of the war was largely due to the faulty
methods of directing the nation and the Party by Stalin himself.
However, we speak not only about the moment when the war
began, which led to serious disorganization of our army and
brought us severe losses. Even after the war began, the nervous-
ness and hysteria which Stalin demonstrated, interfering with
actual military operations, caused our army serious damage.
Stalin was very far from an understanding of the real situ-
ation which was developing at the front. This was natural be-
cause during the whole Patriotic War he never visited any section
of the front or any liberated city except for one short ride on
the Mozhaisk Highway during a stabilized situation at the front.
To this incident were dedicated many literary works full of fan-
tasies of all sorts and so many paintings. Simultaneously, Stalin
was interfering with operations and issuing orders which did not
take into consideration the real situation at a given section of
the front and which could not help but result'in huge personnel
losses.
I will allow myself in this connection'to bring out one
characteristic fact which illustrates how Stalin directed opera-
tions at the fronts. There is present at this Congress Marshal
Bagramyan who was once the Chief of Operations in the Headquarters
of the South-Western front and who can corroborate what I will
tell you.
When there developed an exceptionally serious situation for
our army in 1942 in the Kharkov. region, we had correctly decided
to drop an operation whose objective was to encircle Kharkov,
because the real situation at that time would have threatened
our army with fatal consequences if this operation were continued.
We communicated this to Stalin, stating that the situation
demanded changes in operational plans so that the enemy would be
prevented from liquidating a sizable concentration of our army.
Page 46
Approved For ReleaseN
915R000500080001-7
 Approved For R ase : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
NOFO
Contrary to common sense, Stalin rejected our suggestion
and issued the order to continue the operation aimed at the en-
circlement of Kharkov, despite the fact that at this time many
army concentrations were.themselves actually threatened with en-
circlement and liquidation..
I telephoned to Vasilevsky and begged him,
"Alexander Mikhailovich, take a map (Vasilevsky is present
here) and show Comrade Stalin the situation which has developed."
We should note that Stalin planned operations on a globe. (Anima-
tion in the hail.) Yes, comrades, he used to take the globe and
trace the frontline on it. I said to Comrade Vasilevsky: "Show
him the situation on a map; in the present situation we cannot con-
tinue the operation which was planned. The old decision must be
changed for the good of the cause."
Vasilevsky replied saying that Stalin had already studied
this problem and that he, Vasilevsky, would not see Stalin further
concerning this matter, because the latter didn't want to hear
any arguments on the subject of this operation.
After my talk with Vasilevsky I telephoned to Stalin at his
villa. But Stalin did not answer the telephone and Malenkov was
at the receiver. I told Comrade Malenkov that I was calling from
the front and that I wanted to speak personally to Stalin. Stalin
informed me through Malenkov that I should speak with Malenkov.
I stated for the second time that I wished to inform Stalin per-
sonally about the grave situation which had arisen for us at the
front. But Stalin did not consider it convenient to raise the
phone and again stated that I should speak to him through Malenkov,
although he was only a few steps from the telephone.
Page 47
NoFn,Yn
Approved For Release : IP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
RET
NOF
After "listening" in this manner to our plea Stalin said,
"Let everything remain as it is!"
And that was the result of this? The worst that we had ex-
pected. The Germans surrounded our army concentrations and con-
sequently we lost hundreds of thousands of our soldiers. This
is Stalin's military "genius;" this is what it cost us. (Movement
in the hall.)
On one occasion after the war, during a meeting of Stalin with
members of the Political Bureau, Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan mentioned
that Khrushchev must have been right when he telephoned concerning
the Kharkov operation and that it was unfortunate that his sugges-
tion had not been accepted.
You should have seen Stalin's fury! How could it be ad-
mitted that he, Stalin, had not been right! He is after all a
"genius," and a genius cannot help but be right! Everyone can err,
but Stalin considered that he never erred, that he was always
right. He never acknowledged to anyone that he made any mistake,
large or small, despite the fact that he made not a few mistakes
in the matter of theory and in his practical activity. After the
Party Congress we shall probably have to re-evaluate many wartime
military operations and to present them in their true light.
The tactics on which Stalin insisted without knowing the
essence of the, conduct of battle operations cost us much blood
until we succeeded in stopping the opponent and going over to the
offensive.
The military know that already by the end of 1941 instead of
great operational maneuvers flanking the opponent and penetrating
behind his back, Stalin demanded incessant frontal attacks and the
capture of one village after another. Because of this we paid with
great losses until our generals, on whose shoulders rested the
whole weight of conducting the war, succeeded in changing the
situation and shifting to flexible maneuver operations, which
Page 48
Approved For Release ]JICMR78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Relea Ar P78-00915R000500080001-7
NON*N
immediately brought serious changes at the front favorable to us.
All the more shameful was the fact that after our great
victory over the enemy which cost us so much, Stalin began to down-
grade many of the commanders who contributed so much to the victory
over the enemy, because Stalin excluded every possibility that
services rendered at the front should be credited to anyone but
himself.
Stalin was very much interested in the assessment of Comrade
Zhukov as a military leader. He asked me often for my opinion of
Zhukov. I told him then, "I have known Zhukov for a long time;
he is a good general and a good military leader."
After the war Stalin began to tell all kinds of nonsense
about Zhukov, among others the following, "You praised Zhukov,
but he does not deserve it. It is said that before each operation
at the front Zhukov used to behave as follows: he used to take a
handful of earth, smell it and say, 'We can begin the attack,' or
the opposite, 'the planned operation cannot be carried out."' I
stated at that time, "Comrade Stalin, I do not know who invented
this, but it is not true."
It is possible that Stalin himself invented these things for
the purpose of minimizing the role and military talents of Marshal
Zhukov.
In this connection Stalin very energetically popularized
himself as a great leader; in various ways he tried to inculcate
in the people the version that all victories gained by the Soviet
nation during the Great Patriotic War were due to the courage, dar-
ing and genius of Stalin and of no one else. Exactly like Kuzma
Kryuchkov (a famous Cossack who performed heroic feats against
Page 49
ET
NOFO
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
CRET
NO N
the Germans)*, he put one dress on 7 people at the same time.
(Animation in the hall.)
In the same vein, let us take, for instance, our historical
and military films and some literary creations; they make us feel
sick. Their true objective is the propagation of the theme of
praising Stalin as a military genius. Let us recall the film,
"The Pall of Berlin." Here only Stalin acts; he issues orders in
the hall in which there are many empty chairs and only one man
approaches him and reports something to him - that is Poskrebyshev,
his loyal shield-bearer. (Laughter in the hall.)
And where is the military command? Where is the Political
Bureau? Where is the Government? What are they doing and with
what are they engaged? There is nothing about them in the film.
Stalin acts for everybody; he does not reckon with anyone; he
asks no one for advice. Everything is shown to the nation in
this false light. Why? In order to surround Stalin with glory,
contrary to the facts and contrary to historical truth.
The question arises: And where are the military on whose
shoulders rested the burden of the war? They are not in the film;
with Stalin in, no room was left for them.
Not Stalin, but the Party as a whole, the Soviet Government,
our heroic army, its talented leaders and brave soldiers, the
whole Soviet nation - these are the ones who assured the victory
in the Great Patriotic War. (Tempestuous and prolonged applause.)
The Central Committee members, ministers, our economic
leaders, leaders of Soviet culture, directors of territorial
Party and Soviet organizations, engineers, and technicians --
everyone of them in his own place of work generously gave of
*The content of this parenthesis is an editorial comment
of the translator.
Page 50
NOF
Approved For Release : Cl
P78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
CREW
NOFlS{SN
his strength and knowledge toward ensuring victory over the enemy.
Exceptional herosim was shown by our hard core - surrounded
by glory is our whole working class, our kolkhoz peasantry, the
Soviet intelligentsia, who under the leadership of Party organiza-
tions overcame.untoid hardships and, bearing the hardships of war,
devoted all their strength to the cause of the defense of the
Fatherland.
Great and brave deeds during the war were accomplished by
our Soviet women who bore on their backs the heavy load of produc-
tion work in the factories, on the kolkhozes, and in various
economic and cultural sectors; many women participated directly
in the Great Patriotic War at the fronts; our brave youth contrib-
uted immeasurably at the front and at home to the defense of the
Soviet Fatherland and to the annihilation of the enemy.
Immortal are the services of the Soviet soldiers, of our
commanders and political workers of all ranks; after the loss
of a considerable part of the army in the first war months they
V
did not lose their heads'and were able to reorganize during the
progress of combat; they created and toughened during the progress
of the war a strong and herioc army and not only stood off
pressure of the strong and cunning enemy but also smashed him.
Page 51
Approved For Release :Xl$-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Re-aYP78-00915R000500080001-7
NOFO
The magnificent and heroic deeds of hundreds of millions of
people of the East and of the West during the fight against
the threat of Fascist subjugation which loomed before us will live
centuries and millenia in the memory of thankful humanity.
(Thunderous applause)
The main role and the main credit for the victorious ending
of the war belongs to our Communist Party, to the armed forces of
the Soviet Union, and to the tens of millions of Soviet people
raised by the Party. (Thunderous and prolonged applause.)
Comrades, let us reach for some other facts. The Soviet
Union is justly considered as a model of a multi-national State
because we have in practice assured the equality and friendship
of all nations which live in our great Fatherland.
All the more monstrous are the acts whose initiator was
Stalin and which are rude violations of the basic Leninist prin-
ciples of the nationality policy of the Soviet State. We refer
to the mass deportations from their native places of whole nations,
together with all Communists and Komsomols without any exception;
this deportation action was not dictated by any military considera-
tions.
Thus, already at the end of 1943, when there occurred a per-
manent breakthrough at the fronts of the Great Patriotic War bene-
fiting the Soviet Union, a decision was taken and executed con
cerning the deportation of all the Karachai from the lands on
which they lived. In the same period, at the end of December
1943, the same lot befell the whole population of the Autonomous
Kalmyk Republic. In March 1944 all the Chechen and Ingush peoples
were deported and the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic was
liquidated. In April 1944, all Balkars were deported to faraway.
places from the territory of the Kabardyno-Baikar Autonomous
Republic and the Republic itself was renamed the Autonomous
Page 52
NOFOR
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
gRET
NOF
Kabardynian Republic. The Ukrainians avoided meeting this fate
only because there were too many of them and there was no place
to which to deport them, Otherwise, he would have deported them
also. (Laughter and animation in the hall.)
Not only a Marxist-Leninist but also no man of common sense
can grasp how it is possible to make whole nations responsible
for inimical activity, including women, children, old people,
Communists and Komsomols, to use mass repression against them,
and to expose them to misery and suffering for the hostile acts
of individual persons or groups of persons.
After the conclusion of the Patriotic War the Soviet nation
stressed with pride the magnificent victories gained through great
sacrifices and tremendous efforts. The country experienced a
period of political enthusiasm. The Party came out of the war
even more united; in the fire of the war Party cadres were tem-
pered and hardened. Under such conditions nobody could have even
thought of the possibility of some plot in the Party.
And it was precisely at this time that the so-called "Lenin-
grad Affair" was born. As we have now proven, this case was
fabricated. Those who innocently lost their lives included Com-
rades Voznesensky, Kuznetsov, Rodionov, Popkov, and others.
As is known, Voznesensky and Kuznetsov were talented and
eminent leaders. Once they stood very close to Stalin. It is
sufficient to mention that Stalin made Voznesensky first deputy
to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Kuznetsov was
elected Secretary of the Central Committee. The very fact that
Stalin entrusted Kuznetsov with the supervision of the State
security organs shows the trust which he enjoyed.
How did it happen that these persons were branded as
enemies of the people and liquidated?
Page 53
44ET
Approved For Release ~A 915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
ET
NOFOR
Facts prove that the "Leningrad Affair" is also the result
of willfulness which Stalin exercised against Party cadres.
Had a normal situation existed in the Party's Central
Committee and in the Central Committee Political Bureau, affairs
of this nature would have been examined there in accordance with
Party practice, and all pertinent facts assessed; as a result
such an affair as well as others would not have happened.
We must state that after the war the situation became even
more complicated. Stalin became even more capricious, irritable
and brutal; in particular his suspicion grew. His persecution
mania reached unbelievable dimensions. Many workers were be-
coming enemies before his very eyes. After the war Stalin sepa-
rated himself from the + llective even more. Everything was
decided by him alone without any consideration for anyone or
anything.
This unbelievable suspicion was cleverly taken advantage
of.by the abject provocateur and vile enemy, Beriya, who had
murdered thousands of Communists and loyal Soviet people. The
elevation of Voznesensky and Kuznetsov alarmed Beriya. As we
have now proven, it had been precisely Beriya who had "suggested"
to Stalin the fabrication by him and by his confidants of ma-
terials in the form of declarations and anonymous letters, and
in the form of various rumors and talks.
The Party's Central Committee has examined this so-called
"Leningrad Affair'"; persons who innocently suffered are now re-
habilitated and honor has been restored to the glorious Lenin-
grad Party organization. Abakumov and others who had fabricated
this affair were brought before a court; their trial took place
in Leningrad and they received what they deserved.
The question arises: Why is it that we see the truth of
this affair only now, and why did we not do something earlier,
during Stalin's life, in order to prevent the loss of innocent
Page 54
Approved For Release
78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For ReIe 78-00915R000500080001-7
NOFOR
lives? It was because Stalin personally supervised the
"Leningrad Affair," and the majority of the Political Bureau
members did not, at that time, know all of the circumstances
in these matters, and could not therefore intervene.
When Stalin received certain materials from Beriya and
Abakumov, without examining these slanderous materials, he ordered
an investigation of the "Affair" of Voznesensky and Kuznetsov.
With this their fate was sealed. Instructive in the same way
is the case of the Mingrelian nationalist organization which
supposedly existed in Georgia. As is known, resolutions by
the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union,
were made concerning this case in November 1951 and in March
1952. These resolutions were made without prior discussion with
the Political Bureau. Stalin had personally dictated them. They
made serious accusations against many loyal Communists. On the
basis of falsified documents it was proven that there existed in
Georgia a supposedly nationalistic organization whose objective
was the liquidation of the Soviet power in that Republic with
the help of imperialist powers.
In this connection., a number of responsible Party and
Soviet workers were arrested in Georgia. As was later proven,
this was a slander directed against. the Georgian Party organiza-
tion.
We know that there have been at times manifestations of
local bourgeois nationalism in Georgia as in several other re-
publics. The question arises: Could it be possible that in the
period during which the resolutions referred to above were made,
nationalist tendencies grew so much that there was a danger of
Georgia's leaving the Soviet Union and joining Turkey? (Anima-
tion in the hall, laughter.)
Page 55
ET
NOFO
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP 8- 00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
CRET
NORN
This is, of course, nonsense. It is impossible to imagine
how such assumptions could enter anyone's mind. Everyone knows
how Georgia has developed economically and culturally under Soviet
rule.
Industrial production of the Georgian Republic is 27 times
greater than it was before the revolution. Many new industries
have arisen in Georgia which did not exist there before the revo-
lution: iron smelting, an oil industry, a machine construction
industry, etc. Illiteracy has long since been liquidated, which,
in pre-revolutionary Georgia, included 78 percent of the popula-
tion.
Could the Georgians, comparing the situation in their Repub-
lic with the hard situation of the working masses in Turkey, be
aspiring to join Turkey? In 1955 Georgia produced 18 times as
much steel per person as Turkey. Georgia produces 9 times as
much electrical energy per person as Turkey. According to the
available 1950 census, 65 percent of Turkey's total population
are illiterate, and of the women, 80 percent are illiterate.
Georgia has 19 institutions of higher learning which have about
39,000 students; this is 8 times more than in Turkey (for each
1,000 inhabitants). The prosperity of the-working people has
grown tremendously in Georgia under Soviet rule.
It is clear that as the economy and culture develop, and as
the Socialist consciousness of the working masses in Georgia grows,
the source from which bourgeois nationalism draws it strength
evaporates.
As it developed, there was no nationalistic organization
in Georgia. Thousands of innocent people fell victim of willful-
ness and lawlessness. All of this happened under the "genial"
leadership of Stalin, "the great son of the Georgian nation,"
as Georgians liked to refer to Stalin. (Animation in the hail.)
Page 56
RET
Approved For Releasqj..78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
'\RET
NOF
The willfulness of Stalin showed itself not only in decisions
concerning the internal life of the country but also in the inter-
national relations of the Soviet Union.
The July Plenum of the Central Committee studied in de-
tail the reasons for the development of conflict with Yugoslavia.
It was a shameful role which Stalin played here. The "Yugoslav
Affair" contained no problems which could not have been solved
through Party discussions among comrades. There was no signifi-
cant basis for the development of this "affair"; it was com-
pletely possible to have prevented the rupture of relations
with that country. This does not mean, however, that the Yugo-
slav leaders did not make mistakes or did not have shortcomings.
But these mistakes and shortcomings were magnified in a monstrous
manner by Stalin, which resulted in a break of relations with a
friendly country.
I recall the first days when the conflict between the
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia began artificially to be blown up.
Once, when I came from Kiev to Moscow, I was invited to visit
Stalin who, pointing to the copy of a letter lately sent to Tito,
asked me, "Have you read this?"
Not waiting for my reply he answered, "I will shake my
little finger - and there will be no more Tito. He will fall."
We have dearly paid for this "shaking of the little finger."
This statement reflected Stalin's mania for greatness, but he
acted just that way: "I will shake my little finger - and there
will be no Kossior"; "I will shake my little finger once more -
and Postyshev and Chubar will be no more"; "I will shake my
little finger again - and Voznesensky, Kuznetsov and many others
will disappear."
Page 57
Approved For Release P A 8-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : C1A-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
RET
But this did not happen to Tito. No matter how much or
how little Stalin shook, not only his little finger but every-
thing else that he could shake, Tito did not fall. Why? The
reason was that, in this case of disagreement with the Yugoslav
comrades, Tito had behind him a State and a people who had gone
through a severe school of fighting for liberty and independence,
a people which gave support to its leaders.
You see to what Stalin's mania for greatness led. He had
completely lost consciousness of reality; he demonstrated his
suspicion and haughtiness not only in relation to individuals in
the USSR, but in relation to whole parties and nations.
We have carefully examined the case of Yugoslavia and
have found a proper solution which is approved by the peoples
of the Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia as well as by the working
masses of all the people's democracies and by all progressive
humanity. The liquidation of the abnormal relationship with
Yugoslavia was done in the interest of the whole camp of Social-
ism, in the interest of strengthening peace in the whole world.
Let us also recall the "Affair of the Doctor-Plotters."
(Animation in the hall.) Actually there was no "Affair" out-
side of the declaration of the woman doctor Timashuk, who was
probably influenced or ordered by someone (After all, she was
an unofficial collaborator of the organs of State security.) to
write Stalin a letter in which she declared that doctors were
applying supposedly improper methods of medical treatment.
Such a letter was sufficient for Stalin to reach an imme-
diate conclusion that there are doctor-plotters in the Soviet
Union. He issued orders to arrest a group of eminent Soviet
.medical specialists. He personally issued advice on the con-
duct of the investigation and the method of interrogation of
the arrested persons. He said that the academician Vinogradov
Page 58
Approved For ReleaseNOP
78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
;ET
NOFO
should be put in chains, another one should be beaten. Present
at this Congress as a delegate is the Former Minister of State
Security, Comrade Ignatiev. Stalin told him curtly, "If you
do not obtain confessions from the doctors we will shorten you
by a head." (Tumult in the hall.)
Stalin personally called the investigative judge, gave
him instructions, advised him on which investigative methods
should be used; these methods were simple--beat, beat and, once
again, beat.
Shortly after the doctors were arrested we members of the
Political Bureau received protocols with the doctors' confes-
sions of guilt. After distributing these protocols Stalin told
us, "You are blind like young kittens; what will happen with-
out me? The country will perish because you do not know how to
recognize enemies."
The case was so presented that no one could verify the
facts on which the investigation was based. There was no pos-
sibility of trying to verify facts by contacting those who had
made the confessions of guilt.
We felt, however, that the case of the arrested doctors
was questionable. We knew some of these people personally because
they had once treated us. When we examined this "case" after
Stalin's death, we found it to be fabricated from beginning
to end.
This ignominious "case" was set up by Stalin; he did not,
however, have the time in which to bring it to an end (as he
conceived that end), and for this reason the doctors are still
alive. Now all have been rehabilitated; they are working in
the same places they were working before; they treat top
Page 59
ADDroved For Relea e :
78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Relea ? CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
ET
NOFO
individuals, not excluding members of the Government; they
have our full confidence; and they execute their duties honestly,
as they did before.
In organizing the various dirty and shameful cases, a very
base role was played by the rabid enemy of our Party, an agent
of a foreign intelligence service - Beriya, who had stolen into
Stalin's confidence. In what way could this provocateur gain
such a position in the Party and in the State, so as to become
the First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the
Soviet Union and a member of the Central Committee Political
Bureau? It has now been established that this villain had climbed
up the government ladder over an untold number of corpses..
Were there any signs that Beriya was an enemy of the Party?
Yes, there were. Already in 1937, at a Central Committee Plenum,
former People's Commissar of Health Protection, Kaminsky, said
that Beriya worked for the Mussavat intelligence service. But
the Central Committee Plenum had barely concluded when Kaminsky
was arrested and then shot. Had Stalin examined Kaminsky's state-
ment? No, because Stalin believed in Beriya, and that was enough
for him. And when Stalin believed in anyone or anything, then
no one could say anything which was contrary to his opinion;
anyone who would dare to express opposition would have met the
same fate as Kaminsky.
There were other signs also. The declaration which
Comrade Snegov made at the Party's Central Committee is inter-
esting (Parenthetically speaking, he was also rehabilitated
not long ago, after 17 years in prison camps). In this dec-
laration Snegov writes:
"In connection with the proposed rehabilitation of the
former Central Committee member, Kartvelishvili-Lavryentiev,
I have entrusted to the hands of the representative of the
Page 60
S.
Approved For ReleasN )RM-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Rele F78-00915R000500080001-7
NOF 11
Committee of State Security a detailed deposition concerning
Beriya's role in the disposition of the Kartvelishvili case
and concerning the criminal motives by which Beriya was guided."
In my opinion it is indispensable to recall an important
fact pertaining to this case and to communicate it to the Central
Committee, because I did not consider it as proper to include in
the investigation documents.
On 30 October 1931, at the session of the Organizational
Bureau of the Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party
(Bolsheviks), Kartvelishvili, Secretary of the Trans-Caucasian
Krai Committee, made a report. All members of the Executive of
the Krai Committee were present; of them I alone am alive. Dur-
ing this session J. V. Stalin made a motion at the end of his
speech concerning the organization of the Secretariat of the
Trans-Caucasian Krai Committee composed of the following: First
Secretary, Kartvelishvili; Second Secretary, Beriya (it was then
for the first time in the Party's history that Beriya's name was
mentioned as a candidate for a Party position). Kartvelishvili
answered that he knew Beriya well and for that reason refused
categorically to work together with him. Stalin proposed then
that this matter be left open and that it be solved in the proc-
ess of the work itself. Two days later a decision was arrived
at that Beriya would receive the Party post and that Kartvelishvili
would be deported from the Trans-Caucasus.
This fact can be confirmed by Comrades Mikoyan and
Kaganovich who were present at that session.
The long unfriendly relations between Kartvelishvili and
Beriya were widely known; they date back to the time when Com-
rade Sergo* was active in the Trans-Caucasus; Kartvelishvili was
the closest assistant of Sergo. The unfriendly relationship im-
pelled Beriya to fabricate a "case" against Kartvelishvili.
* Translator's note: "Sergo" was the popular nickname for
Ordzhonikidze.
Page 61
CRET
NOF
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
It is a characteristic thing that in this "case" Kartvelish-
vili was charged with a terroristic act against Beriya.
The indictment in the Beriya case contains a discussion of
his crimes. Some things should, however, be recalled, especially
since it is possible that not all delegates to the Congress have
read this document. I wish to recall Beriya's bestial disposi-
tion of the cases of Kedrov, Golubiev, and Golubiev's adopted
mother, Baturina - persons who wished to inform the Central Com-
mittee concerning Beriya's treacherous activity. They were shot
without any trial and the sentence was passed ex-post facto, af-
ter the execution.
Here is what the old Communist, Comrade Kedrov, wrote to
the Central Committee through Comrade Andreyev (Comrade Andreyev
was then a Central Committee secretary):
"I am calling to you for help from a gloomy cell of the
Lefortorsky prison. Let my cry of horror reach your ears; do
not remain deaf; take me under your protection; please, help re-
move the nightmare of interrogations and show that this is all
a mistake.
"I suffer innocently. Please believe me. Time will testi-
fy to the truth. I am not an agent-provocateur of the Tsarist
Okhrana; I am not a spy; I am not a member of an anti-Soviet
organization of which I am being accused on the basis of denun-
ciations. I am also not guilty of any other crimes against the
Party and the government. I am an old Bolshevik, free of any
stain; I have honestly fought for almost 40 years in the ranks
of the Party for the good and the prosperity of the nation. . .
. . .Today I, a 62-year-old man, am being threatened by
the investigative judges with more severe, cruel and degrading
methods of physical pressure. They (the judges) are no longer
capable of becoming aware of their error and of recognizing
Page 62
ET
Approved For Releas G 78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Relea PTP78-00915R000500080001-7
NO N
that their handling of my case is illegal and impermissible.
They try to justify their actions by picturing me as a hardened
and raving enemy and are demanding increased repressions. But
let the Party know that I am innocent and that there is nothing
which can turn a loyal son of the Party into an enemy, even
right up to his last dying breath.
"But I have no way out. I cannot divert from myself the
hastily approaching new and powerful blows.
"Everything, however, has its limits. My torture has
reached the extreme. My health is broken, my strength and my
energy are waning, the end is drawing near. To die in a Soviet
prison, branded as a vile traitor to the Fatherland - what can
be more monstrous for an honest man. And how monstrous all this
is! Unsurpassed bitterness and pain grips my heart. No! No!
This will not happen; this cannot be - I cry. Neither the Party,
nor the Soviet government, nor the People's Commissar, L. P.
Beriya, will permit this cruel irreparable injustice. I am
firmly certain that given a quiet, objective examination, with-
out any foul rantings, without anger and without the fearful
tortures, it would be easy to prove the baselessness of the
charges. I believe deeply that truth and justice will triumph.
I believe. I believe."
The old Bolshevik, Comrade Kedrov, was found innocent by
the Military Collegium. But despite this, he was shot at Beri-
ya's order. (Indignation in the hall.)
Beriya also handled cruelly the family of Comrade Ordzhon-
ikidze. Why? Because Ordzhonikidze had tried to prevent Beriya
from realizing his shameful plans. Beriya had cleared from his
way all persons who could possibly interfere with him. Ordzhon-
ikidze was always an opponent of Beriya, which he told to Stalin.
Instead of examining this affair and taking appropriate steps,
Stalin allowed the liquidation of Ordzhonikidze's brother and
Page 63
T
%TN
Approved For ReleasP78-00915R000500080001-7
 . Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
RED'
NOF
brought Ordzhonikidze himself to such a state that he was forced
to shoot himself. (Indignation in the hail.) Such was Beriya.
Beriya was unmasked by the Party's Central Committee short-
ly after Stalin's death. As a result of the particularly de-
tailed legal proceedings it was established that Beriya had com-
mitted monstrous crimes and Beriya was shot.
The question arises why Beriya, who had liquidated tens
of thousands of Party and Soviet workers, was not unmasked dur-
?ing Stalin's life? He was not unmasked earlier because he had
utilized very skillfully Stalin's weaknesses; feeding him with
suspicions, he assisted Stalin in everything and acted with his
support.
Comrades:
The cult of the individual acquired such monstrous size
chiefly because Stalin himself, using all conceivable methods,
supported the glorification of his own person. This is supported
by numerous facts. One of the most characteristic examples of
Stalin's self-glorification and of his lack of even elementary
modesty is the edition of his "Short Biography," which was pub-
lished in 1948.
This book is an expression of the most dissolute flattery,
an example,of making a man into a godhead, of transforming him
into an infallible sage, "the greatest leader," "sublime'stra-
tegist of all times and nations." Finally no other words could
be, found with which to lift Stalin up to the heavens.
We need not give here examples of the loathsome adulation
filling this book. All we need to add is that they all were
approved and edited by Stalin personally and some of them were
added in his own handwriting to the draft text of the book.
Page 64
Approved For ReleaspN
P78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
CRET
NO
What did Stalin consider essential to write into this book?
Did he want to cool the ardor of his flatterers who were compos-
ing his "Short Biography." No! He marked the very places where
he thought that the praise of his services was insufficient.
Here are some examples characterizing Stalin's activity,
added in Stalin's own hand:
"In this fight against the skeptics and capitulators,. the
Trotskyites, Zinovievites, Bukharinites and Kamenevites, there
was definitely welded together, after Lenin's death, that leading
core of the Party..* that upheld the great banner of Lenin, ral-
lied the Party behind Lenin's behests, and brought the Soviet
people into the broad road of industrializing the country and
collectivising the rural economy. The leader of this core and
the guiding force of the Party and the state was Comrade Stalin."
Thus writes Stalin himself! Then he adds:
"Although he performed his task of leader of the Party and
the people with consummate skill and enjoyed the unreserved sup-
port of the entire Soviet people, Stalin never allowed his work
to be marred by the slightest hint of vanity, conceit or'self-
adulation."
Where and when could a leader so praise himself? Is this
worthy of a leader of the Marxist-Leninist type? No. Precisely-
against this did Marx and Engels take such a strong position.
This also was always sharply condemned by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin.
*Omitted portion of list as found in "A Short Biography," by
Joseph Stalin, Moscow: Foreign languages Publishing House, 1949,
p. 89 is as follows: "...consisting of Stalin, Molotov, Kalinin,
Voroshilov, Kuibyshev, Frunze, Dzerchinsky, Kaganovich, Orjon-
ikidze, Kirov, Yaroslavsky, Mikoyan, Andreyev, Shvernik, Zhdanov,
Shkiryatov and others."
Page 65
CRET
Approved For Release : P78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Rele P78-00915R000500080001-7
NOF
n the draft text of his book appeared the following sen-
tence: "Stalin is the Lenin of today." This sentence appeared
to Stalin to be too weak, so in his own handwriting he changed
it to read: "Stalin is the worthy continuer of Lenin's work, or,
as it is said in our Party, Stalin is the Lenin of today." You
see how well it is said, not by the Nation but by Stalin himself.
It is possible to give many such self-praising appraisals
written into the draft text of that book-in Stalin's hand. Es-
pecially generously does he endow himself with praises pertain-
ing to his military genius, to his talent for strategy.
I will cite one more insertion made by Stalin concerning
the theme of the Stalinist military genius.
"The advanced Soviet science of war received further devel-
opment," he writes, "at Comrade Stalin's hands. Comrade Stalin
elaborated the theory of the permanently operating factors that
decide the issue of wars, of active defense and the laws of
counter-offensive and offensive, of the co-operation of all serv-
ices and arms in modern warfare, of the role of big tank masses
and air forces in modern war, and of the artillery as the most
formidable of the armed services. At the various stages of the
war Stalin's genius found the correct solutions that took ac-
count of all the circumstances of the situation." (Movement in
the hall.)
And further, writes Stalin:
"Stalin's military mastership was displayed both in de-
fense and offense. Comrade Stalin's genius enabled him to divine
.the enemy's plans and defeat them. The battles in which Com-
rade Stalin directed the Soviet armies are brilliant examples
of operational military skill."
In this manner was Stalin praised as a strategist. Who
did this? Stalin himself, not in his role as a strategist but
in the role of an author-editor, one of the main creators of
his self-adulatory biography.
RET
NOI
Page 66
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
RET
Such, comrades, are the facts. We should rather say
shameful facts.
And one additional fact from the same "Short Biography"
of Stalin. As is known, "The Short Course of the History of the
All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)" was written by a Com-
mission of the Party Central Committee.
This book, parenthetically, was also permeated with the
cult Of the individual and was written by a designated group of
authors. This fact was reflected in the following formulation
on the proof copy of the "Short Biography of Stalin":
"A commission of the Central Committee, All-Union Commu-
nist Party (Bolsheviks), under the direction of Comrade Stalin
and with his most active personal participation, has prepared
a "Short Course of the History of the All-Union Communist Party
(Bolsheviks),"
But even this phrase did not satisfy Stalin: the follow-
ing sentence replaced it in the final version of the "Short
Biography'":
"In 1938 appeared the book, 'History of the All-Union
Communist Party (Bolsheviks), Short Course', written by Comrade
Stalin and approved by a commission of the Central Committee,
All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)." Can one add anything
more? (Animation in the hall.)
As you see, a surprising metamorphosis changed the work
created by a group into a book written by Stalin. It is not
necessary to state how and why this metamorphosis took place.
A pertinent question comes to our mind: If Stalin is the
author of this book, why did he need to praise the person of
Stalin so much and to transform the whole post-October histori-
cal period of our glorious' Communist Party solely into an ac-
tion of "the Stalin genius?"
Page 67
Approved For ReleaseN&
78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
RET
NOFO
Did this book properly reflect the efforts of the Party
in the Socialist transformation of the country, in the construc-
tion of Socialist society, in the industrialization and collec-
tivization of the country, and also other steps taken by the
Party which undeviatingly traveled the path outlined by Lenin?
This book speaks principally about Stalin, about his speeches,
about his reports. Everything without the smallest exception
is tied to his name.
And when Stalin himself asserts that he himself wrote the
"Short Course of the History of the All-Union Communist Party
(Bolsheviks), "this calls at least for amazement. Can a
Marxist-Leninist thus write about himself, praising his own
person to the heavens?
Or let us take the matter of the Stalin prizes. (Movement
in the hall.) Not even the Tsars created prizes which they
named after themselves.
Stalin recognized as the best a text of the national an-
them of the Soviet Union which contains not a word about the
Communist Party; it contains, however, the following unprec-
edented praise of Stalin:
"Stalin brought us up in loyalty to the people,
He inspired us to great toil and acts."
In these lines of the anthem is the whole educational,
directional and inspirational activity of the great Leninist
Party ascribed to Stalin. This is, of course, a clear devia-
tion from Marxism-Leninism, a clear debasing and belittling of
the role of the Party. We should add for your information that
the Presidium of the Central Committee has already passed a
resolution concerning the composition of a new text of the
anthem, which will reflect the role of the prople, and the role
of the Party. (Loud, prolonged applause.)
Page 68
ET
Approved For Release"Q~A- -00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
RED'
NOF
And was it without Stalin's knowledge that many of the
largest enterprises and towns were named after him? Was it
without his knowledge that Stalin monuments were erected in the
whole country -- these "memorials to the living?" It is a fact
that Stalin himself had signed on 2 July 1951 a resolution of the
USSR Council of Ministers concerning the erection on the Volga-
Don Canal of an impressive monument to Stalin; on 4 September
of the same year he issued an order making 33 tons of copper
available for the construction of this impressive monument.
Anyone who has visited the Stalingrad area must have seen the
huge statue which is being built there, and that on a site
which hardly any people frequent. Huge sums were spent to build
it at a time when people of this area had lived since the war in
huts. Consider yourself, was Stalin right when he wrote in his
biography that "...he did not allow in himself,.,.even a shadow
of conceit, pride, or self-adoration?"
At the same time Stalin gave proofs of his lack of respect
for Lenin's memory. It is not a coincidence that, despite the
decision taken over 30 years ago to build a Palace of Soviets as
a monument to Vladimir Ilyich, this Palace was not built, its
construction was always postponed, and the project allowed to
lapse.
We cannot forget to recall the Soviet., Government resolu-
tion of 14 August 1925 concerning "the founding of Lenin prizes
for educational work." This resolution was published in the
press, but until this day there are no Lenin prizes. This, too,
should be corrected. (Tumultous, prolonged applause.)
During Stalin's life, thanks to known methods which I
have mentioned,, and quoting facts, for instance, from the
"Short Biography" of Stalin -- all events were explained as
Page 69
Approved For ReleaseNe)
78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Rele 4=,,p P78-00915R000500080001-7
NO N
if Lenin played only a secondary role, even during the October
Socialist Revolution. In many films and in many literary works,
the figure of Lenin was incorrectly presented and inadmissibly
depreciated.
Stalin loved to see the file, "The Unforgettable Year of
1919," in which he was shown on the steps of an armored train
and where he was practically vanquishing the foe with his own
sabre. Let Kliment Yefremovich, our dear friend, find the neces-
sary courage and write the truth about Stalin; after all, he knows
how Stalin had fought. It will be difficult for Comrade Voroshilov
to undertake this, but it would be good if he did it. Everyone
will approve of it, both the people and the Party. Even his grand-
sons will thank him. (Prolonged applause.)
In speaking about the events of the October Revolution and
about the Civil War, the impression was created that Stalin al-
ways played the main role, as if everywhere and always Stalin had
suggested to Lenin what to do and how to do it. However, this is
slander of Lenin. (Prolonged applause.)
I will probably not sin against the truth when I say that
99 percent of the persons present here heard and knew very little
about Stalin before the year 1924, while Lenin was known to all;
he was known to the whole Party, to the whole nation, from the
children up to the graybeards. (Tumultous, prolonged applause.)
All this has to be thoroughly revised, so that history,
literature, and the fine arts properly reflect V. I. Lenin's role
and the great deeds of our Communist Party and of the Soviet peo-
ple--the creative people. (Applause.)
Comrades! The cult of the individual has caused the em-
ployment of faulty principles in Party work and in economic
Page 70
SLAT
NOFOR
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
CRET
NO
activity; it brought about rude violation of internal Party and
Soviet democracy, sterile administration, deviations of all sorts,
covering up of shortcomings and varnishing of reality, Our nation
gave birth to many flatterers and specialists in false opism and
deceit.
We should also not forget that due to the numerous arrests
of Party, Soviet and economic leaders, many workers began to work
uncertainly, showed over-cautiousness, feared all which was new,
feared their own shadows and began to show less initiative in
their work.
Take, for instance, Party and Soviet resolutions. They
were prepared in a routine manner often without considering the
concrete situation. This went so far that Party workers, even
during the smallest sessions, read their speeches. All this
produced the danger of formalizing the Party and Soviet work and
of bureaucratizing the whole apparatus.
Stalin's reluctance to consider life's realities and the
fact that he was not aware of the real state of affairs in the
provinces can be illustrated by his direction of agriculture.
All those who interested themselves even a little in the
national situation saw the difficult situation in agriculture,
but Stalin never even noted it. Did we tell Stalin about this?
Yes, we told him, but he did not support us. Why? Because
Stalin never traveled anywhere, did not meet city and Eolkhoz
workers; he did not know the actual situation in the provinces.
He knew the country and agriculture only from films. And
these films had dressed up and beautified the existing situation
in agriculture.
Many films so pictured Kolkhoz life that the tables were
bending"from the weight of turkeys and geese. Evidently Stalin
thought that it was actually so.
Page 71
CRET
Approved For Release: I P78-009158000500080001-7
 Approved Fo elease : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
CI E7'
NOF
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin looked at life differently; he was
always close to the people; he used to receive peasant dele-
gates, and often spoke at factory gatherings; he used to visit
villages and talk with the peasants.
Stalin separated himself from the people and never went
anywhere. This lasted tens of years. The last time he visited
a village was in January 1928 when he visited Siberia in con-
nection with grain deliveries. How then could he have known the
situation in the provinces?
And when he was once told during a discussion that our
situation on the land was a difficult one and that the situation
of cattle breeding and meat production was especially bad, a
commission was formed which was charged with the preparation of
a resolution called, "Means toward further development of animal
breeding in Kolkhozes and Sovkhozes." We worked out this project.
Of course, our propositions of that time did not contain
all possibilities, but we did charter ways in which animal breed-
ing on the Kolkhozes and Sovkhozes would be raised. We had pro-
posed then to raise the prices of such products in order to
create material incentives for the Kolkhoz, MTS and Sovkhoz
workers in the development of cattle breeding. But our project
was not accepted and in February 1953 was laid aside entirely.
What is more, while reviewing this project Stalin proposed
that the taxes paid by the Kolkhozes and by the Kolkhoz workers
should be raised by 40 billion rubles; according to him the
peasants are well-off and the Kolkhoz worker would need to sell,
only one more chicken to pay his tax in full.
Imagine what this meant. Certainly forty billion rubles
is a sum which the Kolkhoz workers did not realize for all the
products which they sold to the government. In 1952, for in-
stance, the Kolkhozes and the Kolkhoz workers received 26,280
million rubles for all their products delivered and sold to the
government.
Page 72
Approved For ReleasWbPP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
Did Stalin's position then rest on data of any sort what-
ever? Of course not.
In such cases facts and figures did not interest him. If
Stalin said anything, it meant it was so - after all, he was a
"genius" and a genius does not need to count, he only needs to
i
look and can immediately tell how it should be. When he ex-
presses his opinion, everyone has to repeat it and to admire his
wisdom.
But how much wisdom was contained in the proposal. to raise
the agricultural tax by 40 billion rubles? None, absolutely none,
because the proposal was not based on an actual assessment of the
situation but on the fantastic ideas of a person divorced from
reality. We are currently beginning slowly to work our way out
of'a difficult agricultural situation. The speeches of the dele-
gates to the XXth Congress please us all; we are glad that many
delegates deliver speeches, that there are conditions for the
fulfillment of the Sixth Five-Year Plan for animal husbandry, not
during the period of five years, but within two to three years.
We are certain that the commitments of the new five-year plan
will be accomplished successfully. (Prolonged applause.)
Comrades!
If we sharply criticize today the cult of the individual
which was so widespread during Stalin's life and if we speak
about the many negative phenomena generated by this cult which
is so alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, various persons
may ask: How could it be? Stalin headed the Party and the coun-
try for 30 years and many victories were gained during his life-
time. Can we deny this? In my opinion, the question can be asked
in this manner only by those who are blinded and hopelessly
Page 73
ET
Approved For ReleasA 2 78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
CRET
NOF~BN
hypnotized by the cult of the individual, only by those who do
not understand the essence of the revolution and of the Soviet
State, only by those who do not understand, in a Leninist man-
ner, the role of the Party and of the nation in the development
of the Soviet society.
The Socialist revolution was attained by the working class
and by the poor peasanty with the partial support of middle-
class peasants. It was attained by the people under the leader-
ship of the Bolshevik Party. Lenin's great service consisted of
the fact that he created a militant Party of the working class,
but he was armed with Marxist understanding of the laws of so-
cial development and with the science of proletarian victory in
the fight with capitalism, and he steeled this Party in the
crucible of revolutionary struggle of the masses of the people.
During this fight the Party consistently defended the interests
of the people, became its experienced leader, and led the working
masses to power, to the creation of the first Socialist State.
You remember well the wise words of Lenin that the Soviet
State is strong because of the awareness of the masses that his-
tory is created by the millions and tens of millions of people.
Our historical victories were attained thanks to the or-
ganizational work of the Party, to the many provincial organi-
zations, and to the self-sacrificing work of our great nation.
These victories are the result of the great drive and activity
of the nation and of the Party as a whole; they are not at all
the fruit of the leadership of Stalin, as the situation was pic-
tured during the period of the cult of the individual.
If we are to consider this matter as Marxists and as
Leninists, then we have to state unequivocably that the leader-
ship practice which came into being during the last years of
Stalin's life became a serious obstacle in the path of Soviet
social development.
Page 74
SECRET
Approved For Release :8-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Rele se : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
RET
NOF
Stalin often failed for months to take up some unusually
important problems concerning the life of the Party and of the
State whose solution could not be postponed. During Stalin's
leadership our peaceful relations with other nations were often
threatened, because one man decisions could cause and often did
cause great complications.
In the last years, when we managed to free ourselves of the
harmful practice of the cult of the individual and took several
proper steps in the sphere of internal and external policies,
everyone saw how activity grew before their very eyes, how the
creative activity of the broad working masses developed, how favor-
ably all this acted upon the development of economy and of culture.
(Applause.)
Some comrades may ask us: Where were the members of the
Political Bureau of the Central Committee? Why did they not as-
sert themselves against the cult of the individual in time? And
why is this being done only now?
First of all we have to consider the fact that the members
of the Political Bureau viewed these matters in a different way
at different times. Initially, many of them backed Stalin actively
because Stalin was one of the strongest Marxists and his logic, his
strength and his will greatly influenced the cadres and Party
work.
It is known that Stalin, after Lenin's death, especially
during.the first years, actively fought for Leninism against the
enemies of Leninist theory and against those who deviated. Be-
ginning with Leninist theory, the Party, with its Central
Committee at the head, started on a great scale the work of So-
cialist industrialization of the country, agricultural collectiv-
ization. and the cultural revolution. At that time Stalin gained
great popularity, sympathy and support. The Party had to fight
Page 75
RET
Approved For ReleasU:'?e178-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
RET
NOF
those who attempted to lead the country away from the correct
Leninist path; it had to fight Trotskyites, Zinovievites and
rightists, and the bourgeois nationalists. This fight was indis-
pensable. Later, however, Stalin, abusing his power more and
more, began to fight eminent Party and government leaders and to
use terroristic methods against honest Soviet people. As we
have already shown, Stalin thus handled such eminent Party and
government leaders as Kossior, Rudzutak, Eikhe, Postyshev and
many others.
Attempts to oppose groundless suspicions and charges
resulted in the opponent falling victim of the repression. This
characterized the fall of Comrade Postyshev.
In one of his speeches Stalin expressed his dissatisfaction
with Postyshev and asked him, "What are you actually?"
Postyshev answered clearly, "I am a Bolshevik, Comrade Stalin,
a Bolshevik."
This assertion was at first considered to show a lack of
respect for Stalin; later it was considered a harmful act and
consequently resulted in Postyshev's annihilation and branding
without any reason as a "people's enemy."
In the situation which then prevailed`I have talked often
with Nikolai Aleksandrovich Bulganin; once when we two were
traveling in a car, he said, "It has happened sometimes that a
man goes to Stalin on his invitation as a friend. And when he
sits with Stalin, he does not know where he will be sent next,
home or to Jail."
It is clear that such conditions put every member of the
Political Bureau in a very difficult situation. And when we also
consider the: fact that in the last years the Central Committee
Plenary sessions were not convened and that the sessions of the
Page 76
Approved For Release
78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
ET
iOFO'
Political Bureau occurred only occasionally, from time to time,
then we will understand how difficult it was for any member of
the Political Bureau to take a stand against one or another in-
just or improper procedure, against serious errors and short-
comings in the practices of leadership.
As we have already shown, many decisions were taken either
by one person or in a roundabout; way, without collective dis-
cussions. The sad fate of Political Bureau member, Comrade
Voznesensky, who fell victim to Stalin's repressions, is known
to all. It is a characteristic thing that the decision to re-
move him from the Political Bureau was never discussed but was
reached in a devious fashion. In the same way came the decision
concerning the removal of Kuznetsov and Rodionov from their posts.
The importance of the Central Committee's Political Bureau
was reduced and its work was disorganized by the creation within
the Political Bureau of various commissions - the so-called
"quintets," "sextets," "septets" and "novenaries." Here is, for
instance, a resolution of the Political Bureau of 3 October 1946.
"Stalin's Proposals
"l. The Political Bureau Commission for Foreign Affairs
("Sextet") is to concern itself in the future,. in addition to
foreign affairs, also with matters of internal construction and
domestic policy.
02. The Sextet is to add to its roster the Chairman of
the State Commission of'Economic Planning of the USSR, Comrade
Voznesensky, and-is to be known as a Septet."
"Signed: Secretary of the Central Committee, J. Stalin."
What a terminology of a card player; (Laughter in the
:hall.) It is clear that the creation within the Political Bu-
reau of this type of Commissions--"quintets," "sextets," "septets,"
and "novenaries,"--was against the principle of collective.lead-
ership. The result of this was that some members of the Polit-
ical'. Bureau were in this way kept away from participation in
reaching the most important State matters.
CRET
Page 77
Approved For Release IY 1-1 T7
. rA- 8-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
RET
NOF
One of the oldest members of our Party, Kliment Yefremo-
vich Voroshilov, found himself in an almost impossible situation.
For several years he was actually deprived of the right of par-
ticipation in Political Bureau sessions. Stalin forbade him to
attend the Political Bureau sessions and to receive documents..
When the Political Bureau was in session and Comrade Voroshilov
heard about it, he telephoned each time and asked whether he
would be allowed to attend. Sometimes Stalin permitted it, but
always showed his dissatisfaction. Because of his extreme sus-
picion, Stalin toyed also with the absurd and ridiculous suspi-
cion that Voroshilov was an English agent. (Laughter in the
hall.) It's true -.an English agent. A special tapping device
was installed in his home to listen to what was said there.
(Indignation in the hall.)
By unilateral decision Stalin had also separated one other
man from the work of the Political Bureau - Andrey Andreyevich
Andreyev. This was one of the most unbridled acts of willfulness.
Let us consider the first Central Committee Plenum after
the XIXth Party Congress when Stalin, in his talk at the Plenum,
characterized Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov and Anastas Ivano-
vich Mikoyan and suggested that these old workers of our Party
were guilty of some baseless charges. It is not excluded that
had Stalin remained at the helm for another several months,
Comrades Molotov and Mikoyan would probably have not delivered
any speeches at this Congress.
Stalin evidently had plans to finish off the old members
of the Political Bureau. He often stated that Political Bureau
members should be replaced by new ones.
His proposal, after the XIXth Congress concerning the se-
lection of 25 persons to the Central Committee Presidium, was
aimed at the removal of the old Political Bureau members and the
bringing in of less experienced persons so that these would
extol him in all sorts of ways.
Page 78
Approved For Release : 0I0
-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
RET
NOF
We can assume that. this was also a design for the future
annihilation of the old Political Bureau members and in this way
a. cover for all shameful acts of Stalin, acts which we are now
considering.
Comrades; In order not to repeat errors of the past, the
Central Committee has declared itself resolutely against the
cult of the individual. We consider that Stalin was excessively
extolled. However, in the past Stalin doubtlessly performed
great services to the Party, to the working class, and to the
international workers' movement.
This question is complicated by the fact that all this
which we have just discussed was done during Stalin's life un-
der his leadership and with his concurrence; here Stalin was
convinced that this was necessary for the defense of the in-
terests of the working classes against the plotting of the ene-
mies and against the attack of the imperialist camp. He saw
this from the position of the interest of the working class, of
the interest of the laboring people, of the interest of the vic-
tory of Socialism and Communism. We cannot say that these were
the deeds of a giddy despot. He considered that this should be
done in the interest of the Party; of the working masses, in
the name of the defense of the revolution's gains. In this lies
the whole tragedy!
Comrades! Lenin had often stressed 'that modesty is an ab-
solutely integral part of a real Bolshevik. Lenin himself was
the living personification of the greatest modesty. We cannot
say that we have been following this Leninist example in all re-
spects. It is enough to point out that many towns, factories and
industrial enterprises, Kolkhozes and Sovkhazes, Soviet insti-
tutions and cultural institutions have been referred to by us with
a title - if I may express it so - of private property *tVo names
Page 79
T
Approved For ReleasV ia4 P7 - 0915R000500080001-7`
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
RET 11
NOF
of these or those government or Party leaders who were still
active and in good health. Many of us participated in the action
of assigning our names to various towns, rayons, undertakings and
Kolkhozes. We must correct this. (Applause.)
But this should be done calmly and slowly. The Central
Committee will discuss this matter and consider it carefully in
order to prevent errors and excesses. I can remember how the
Ukraine-learned-about Kossior's arrest. The Kiev radio used to
start its programs thus: "This is radio (in the name of) Kos-
sior." When one day the programs began without naming Kossior,
everyone was quite certain that something had happened to Kos-
sior, that he probably had been arrested.
Thus, if today we begin to remove the signs everywhere and
to change names, people will think, that these comrades-in whose
honor the given enterprises, Kolkhozes or cities are named, also
met some bad fate and that they have also been arrested. (Anima-
tion in the hall.)
How is the. authority and the importance of this or that
leader judged? On the basis of how many towns, industrial en-
terprises and factories, Kolkhozes and Sovkhozes carry his name.
Is. It not about time that we eliminate this "private property"
and "nationalize" the factories, the industrial enterprises, the
Kolkhozes and the Sovkhozes? (Laughter, applause, voices: "That
is right.") This will benefit our cause. After all the cult of
the individual is manifested also in this way.
We should in all seriousness consider the question of the
cult of.the individual. We cannot let this matter get out of
the Party, especially not to the press. It is for this reason
that we are considering it here at a closed Congress session.
We should know the limits; we should not give ammunition to the
enemy; we should not wash our dirty linen before their eyes.
Page 80
ET
Approved For Releasjik jP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : C
IA
-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
CI
-
SET
NOFO
I think that the delegates to the Congress will understand and
assess properly all these proposals. (Tumultuous applause.)
Comrades; We must abolish the cult of the individual de-
cisively, once and for all; we must draw the proper conclusions
concerning both ideological-theoretical, and practical work.
it is.necessary for this purpose:
First, in a Bolshevik manner to condemn and to eradicate
the cult of the individual as alien to Marxism-Leninism and not
consonant with the principles of Party leadership and the norms
of Party life, and to fight inexorably all attempts at bringing
back this practice in one form or another..
To return to and actually practice in all our ideological
work the most important theses of Marxist-Leninist science about
the people as the creator of history and as the creator of all
material and spiritual good of humanity, about the decisive
role of the Marxist Party in the revolutionary fight, for the
transformation of society, about the victory of Communism.
In this connection we will be forced to do much work in
order to examine critically from the Marxist-Leninist viewpoint
and to correct the widely spread erroneous views connected with
the cult of the individual in the sphere of history, philosophy,
economy and of other sciences, as well as in the literature and
the fine arts. It is especially necessary that in the immediate
future we compile a serious textbook of the history of our Party
which will be edited in accordance with scientific Marxist ob-
jectivism, a textbook of the history of Soviet society, a book
pertaining to the events of the Civil War and the Great Patriot-
ic- War.
Page 81
ET
NOFOR
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500080001-7
CRET
NO~RN
Secondly, to continue systematically and consistently the
work done by the Party's Central Committee during the last years,
a work characterized by minute observation in all Party organi-
zations, from the bottom to the top, of the Leninist principles
of Party leadership, characterized, above all, by the main prin-
ciple of collective leadership, characterized by the observation
of the norms of Party life described in the Statutes of our
Party, and finally, characterized by the wide practice of criti-
cism and self-criticism.
Thirdly, to restore completely the Leninist principles of
Soviet Socialist democracy, expressed in the Constitution of the
Soviet Union, to fight willfulness of individuals abusing their
power. The evil caused by acts violating revolutionary Social-
ist legality which have accumulated during a long time as a re-
suit of the negative influence of the cult of the individual has
to be completely corrected.
Comrades;
The XXth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union has manifested with a new strength the unshakable unity
of our Party, its cohesiveness around the Central Committee,
its resolute will to accomplish the great task of building Com-
munism. (Tumultuous applause.) And the fact that we present in
all their ramifications the basic problems of overcoming the cult
of the individual which is alien to Marxism-Leninism, as well as
the problem of liquidating its burdensome consequences, is an
evidence of the great moral and political strength of our Party.
(Prolonged applause.)
We are absolutely certain that our Party, armed with the
historical resolutions of the XXth Congress, will lead the Soviet
people along%the Leninist path to new successes, to new victories.
(Tumultuous, prolonged applause.)
Long live the victorious banner of our Party--Leninism:
(Tumultuous, prolonged applause ending in ovation. All rise.)
Page 82
CIVET
Approved For Release 78-00915R000500080001-7