(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R000500010027-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 13, 1998
• Sequence Number: 27
• Content Type: REPORT

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PREFACE
The leading role and internal power position of the Communist Party of China
c.cpj
fONWLj was defined by Mao Tee -tung in his opening address to the First National
People's Congress in Sept. 1954 when he stated that "the core of our strength which
CaP
leads us in our cause is the Communist Party of China. "But what are ! objectives
44 east .Asia? At the Peking Trade Union Conference of Asian and Australasian
COP
countries in November 19491. Liu SbaWwc'hi, vice chairman of the 4109. advocated
that "the path taken by the Chinese people to defeat imperialism and its lackeys"
should be followed "by the peoples of the r 'us colonial and semi-colonial countries
in their fight for national independence and people democracy." While the Manifesto
of this same conference advised the "workers of the oppressed countries of Asia"
to adopt the China way orestsblishing a territorial base and an army "when you
can no longerearry on youi action in the cities under the white terror" there wade
no clear mention made of whether or rot Peiping would assume direction of the
national liberation movement. That the Chinese revolution is to be a is
however, indicated by two Communist announcements. The Cominform Journal in
January 1954 accords Mao Tse-t
CPYRGHT
prestige as an original strategist who
ttcreatively and a new way, characterized
as a revolution of a special type, now typical for revolution in colonial
and sernicolonial countries."
The article quoted Malenkov's statement that the
CPYRGHT
"victory of the \ese revolution opened up a new page, not only e
history of the people of China but of all the peoples of Asia."
The role of Chinese practice as the standard for Asian, African and South
American Communist parties is given in a Daily Worker Article of 5 August 1955,
ntitle+ The Indonesian National Liberation Movement and
fi
.published 'for consumption in Indonesia
In this article, William Z. Foster, Secretary General of the Communist Party of
the U.S., describes
CPYRGHT
of
ttPeoples China, co-partner with the Soviet Union, as the great leader
of the world national liberation movement. With its world Marxist-
Leninist fighter Mao Tse-tung at its head, it is the Race setter for the
A SA p& W 4nnrt f 'f ?~'A ` 'i =ni iA~M8 e's democracy
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CPYRGHT
and Socialism, the road that all other peoples of Asia and eventually
also of Africa and Latin America will finally travel."
Communist sources thus make it clear that whether the direction of Asian,
African and South American CPs lies in Peking or Moscow or is divided between
them, the role of the Chinese Party in Asia will be a large one, and its practices
are to serve as the model which Asian "national" parties are expected to copy.
What sort of men do leaders of this influential Party want as their followers?
What are some of the practices which the national parties of Asia and Africa are
expected to follow?
A clue to both these questions comes from a study of the training and
indoctrination given new party members and from examination of the standards,
ideals, principles and practces expounded by present Party leaders for those
on whom they rely to carry out their policies. The Chinese Communists are
remarkably frank about the rigid uncompromising standards of performance
and discipline which a party member is expected to attain, and this collection
of articles describes also how they have perfected a technique which applied to
ordinary human beings turns them into disciplined, militant activists, un-
questioning in their execution of the Party Line.
Already Chinese Communist doctrinal exhortations are required study for
members of such Asian parties as those of Japan and Indonesia; given the
opportunity, the techniques used by the Chinese Communist Party, "pace setter
of the entire colonial world" can be expected to become a part of the arsenal
of organizational weapons of each Communist Party in Asia and Africa.
A note on the nature of this publication
This pamphlet is composed chiefly of a collection of three selections on
Communist methods of recruitment, indoctrination and discipline which were
prepared separately as parts of other works. They are brought together here
for the light they throw on what is expected of a Chinese Communist Party member.
The first selection gives a general description of methods of recruitment,
training and discipline. In the next section are given the Party's ideals for the
performance of individual members, as described in exhortations by two of the
Party's leading theoretician-propagandists.
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The final section is a description of how the Chinese Communist Party
leaders brought ordinary men to fit the ideal during a critical period of Party
history; just after coming to power. As such, it is in a sense a case study of
techniques used to meet particular circumstances, but it has a broad application
to the present and future.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I Personnel Policies:
1. Recruitment
2. Promotions, transfers and assignments
3. Training and indoctrination
4. Party discipline and morale
Party reform and Party purge
TI The Ideal Party Member:
1. ?How to be a Communist Party Member", Chen Yun
. "On the Training of a Communist Party Member", Liu Shoo-chi
III Indoctrination of Cadres:
1. Techniques of Coercion: criticism: and self criticism, physical
control of trainees, fatigue, tension. uncertainty, use of vicious language.
2. Training Process: discussion groups, public confessions, isolation.
. Indoctrination Themes: Power of the organization (party), old versus
new, class consciousness, 'steeling.
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MIS P.
p. 30,
The first selection of this pamphlet describes the party's post-war
approach to the problems of recruitment, training and reform. In reading
this selection special attention should be given to the continuous process
of ideological remoulding which is characteristic of CCP discipline and the
various forms which this process takes at different stages of the party
member's care.~re
of Chinese Communism by Brandt, Schwartz and Fairbank, de-
scribes the ideal of Communist behavior in speeches which were
given by two of the party's leading theoriticians in 1939. Chen Yun,
the author of How to be a Communist Party Member, is a member
cP
of Politburo and Secretariat of the 006 and is also a vice -Premier
specializing in economic affairs. Liu Shao-chi, who wrote On the
Training of a Communist Parma -Member, is vice -Chairman of the
Cce
Central Committee of the , in addition to being a member of the
Politburo and Secretariat and the party's leading theoritcian. The
chief significance of these articles is that they reaffirmed the
Leninist foundations of the party at a time when the propaganda line
occadmned by the anti-Japanese United Front created the impression
that the CPC, in attending to the more immediate national peril had
coxnpromieed its ultimate oar Communist aims. The articles were
emphasized during thet1period and after the switch in the party line,
during the civil war in China and the intense "cold war" with the
West. They continue to be used as major indoctrinatiMa tools, even
though once again in 1955 the United Front tactic hat been resurrects
by many of the Asian national parties, peaceful coexistence is in
vogue; and violence has been temporarily shelved. The continuing
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use of these articles through these diffe rent periods illustrates the
uncompromising nature of party disciplinary requirements. The
central theme of both articles is the need for members "to subordinate
their individual interests to those of the party; to carry out party
resolutions not only in the time of victory but also in the hour of
defeat. +'
The final selection is taken from Richard Walker's. China Under
page 50
Communism: The First Five Year.
and is concerned with the methods
by which the Chinese Communists insure execution of their domestic
policies through the use of "Psychological Control".
Cc P
After assuming power in 1949, the found itself with a vast
area to govern and few trained and disciplined people to administer
it according to the rigid and tough-minded policies they had adopted.
For this reason they established a series of camps and schools in
which they segregated and indoctrinated almost one million potential
cadres per year for over three years. The article which is based
primarily on party documents and personal interviews in Hong Kong
with refugees who had actually attended these schools, describes
the indoctrination principles followed and the adaal training process.
The techniques of coercion beginning with physical control of the
trainees and proceeding through progressive stages of physical
and mental fatigue, tension, uncertainty, study of Marxist-Leninist
documents etc. , until an emotional crisis is reached, are described
here in accurate detail. According to the testimony of these refugees,
"the soul becomes public property" and ultimately the subject
discards his "reactionary" past for an entirely new or Communist
set of values. Thorough inculcation of absolute loyalty to the party
and absolute acceptance of party discipline were placed ahead of
any training in the practical arts of government administration.
Specifically designed to speedily indoctrinate large numbers of
cadres during a period of tremendous party expansion and increase
of responsibility. some features of the program may have been
discarded, but it is assumed that the various techniques are still
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a part of party indoctrination methods. It is known that the searching self and
group criticisms and the unyielding emphasis on orthodoxy and party discipline
continue to animate party practice.
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 I
GENERAL The Chinese Cowornm*,t Party
Commu-
nist with other, Communist- parties. Like other Com-
Munist, parties, It Is a centralized and monolithic
organization in which Powers of policy decision
and appointment are concentrated in a small
group of top party leaders. Authority is trans-
mitted downward through a pyramid of command
to the smallest units of urban and rural control.
The danger of individual aberrations Is effectively
minimized by the vesting of authority at each level
In party committees rather than in individual
leaders, and by the maintenance of an elaborate
sphere of operations. Following the
make all sacrifices necessary for the Wirt
of th-e-p-a-rty"srev-olutionary program.
sesses a strong sense of Mission and dest1q.
TOM
wwhh ch is Inevitable. This conviction has Insp,
offset the lack of material rewards.
Another trait which the CCP has in
0 6 to: of 1. 91
Individual party members still Is often cofi6
from the local populace.
? commow-h6-
munist parties In general, the CCP has ce
11 1
rise to power are: 1) 1 Its long and bitter Mh ;I
struggle against great oddis_,during which It
j~ee
of resistance in rural areas during the 1936191
earlier attempts to gain power In the cit 6C
ciples to an Indigenous Chinese scene and-6
support and divorced from urban are s c6til i * i!
Cc!nraunlst Pp.i~y of the Soviet Union. The
 P Si? and Social 8om osition of the Part
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The COP, with an official membersp of six and one-half
millions in 1954, and an extimated 6,800,000 members in 1955, is almost
on a par in size with the Comm;.ani-t Party of the Soviet Union, Wj*k `"/iEIc* k na,5
6,900,000 members. Its membership comprises just over 1% of China's
population.
has
The party/expeeieneed a tremendous expansion between 1945
and 1955, particularly during the first 6 post war years when membership
rose from 1,200,000 to 5,800,000, or three-quarters of a million per
year. Because of this expansion, the rank and file membership is
composed largely of relative newcomers. Less than 20% have over
10 years service in the party. Assimilation of these millions of
new members into the party has posed many problems for the party
ley.dership . Many new members were poorly educat*d and many more
yb+ ~ai~P
poll ically unreliable. The task of out the poltticalt?
undesirable and of training and indoctrinating the remainder of the
recruits has been given constant and recurring attention by the
from
party xi mm 1951, when a three-year. profram of party consolidation
and reform was begun,, thru 1955, when party organs were
included among the groups into which counterrevolutionaries had found their
way. (See below, under Pa'ty Personnel).
Another striking t'eature of the CCP is the high percentage of
women and youth. As of June 1951, about one tenth of the membership
was female and about 1 of every six was under -:25.
In true orthodox fashinn, the COP claims to be the " organized
vanguard of the working class" , but most of its membership is derived
from vnral?origins. As of 1948, over 90% of the rank and file membership
considted of persons recruited in rural areas. Even as late as July 1951,
two years after taking over urban areas, almost 80%~ of the total wera
persons with pensant backgrounds, and the percentage has not dropped below
at that time,
75%. Of the 1,300,000 non-rural members, about 1,1009000 were classed
as intellectuals rmd a mere 200,000 officially cias:>if led as urban
Because of the con-.flict~ between the facts of the China situation
urban
with the clasical Leninist standards for a party of the/proletariat,
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Chinese flommuni-t theoreticians have re orted to many devious x kDIds
rationalizations to reconcile theory with reality . One expedient has
been to describe the peasants xxdxm as members of the ,-rural proletariat".
Another has been to discount social factors and emphasize ideological
and orgauizatl-onal factors. Thus party leader Lit "hao-ch'i argued that:
"`..Phe social origins of party membership are not all-important.
The true determining factors are our party's political struggles
and its political and ideo&gical leadership. Our party's
program will guaran`ee the predominance of the proletarian
outlook. " (On the Party, 1945).
For thepast five years, party leaders have given increasing
attention to building the urban-worker component of the part,: base.
Plans annoi.inceed in July 1950 envisioned the gradual recruitm
r1la three year period of one-third of China'/s
urban workers
0
nt over
,7 1
C t l r~~ ^ < r:
During.
1952 and 1953 there was some recruiting of skilled workers Ln urban
areas, and official statistics of April 1953 tkxx stated that
450,000 trade uni,n members were enrolled as members of the CP.
By 1955, however, recruitment in the countryside--necessary to ensure
success of vital agricultural programs--was being stressed.
 military siecurity. Party organizations in
schools aM colleges determine educational p()
and appointment controi the ?
moreover, thiough branches ?
:pArty's junior auxiiiaries--the New Democratic
Youth League and ? Ploreers-the pExty is
:? to raobtVze the student body ?
tions and for indoctrination pv,rposes. Party mem-
? scattered throughout various "mass organiza-
tions," peasant ? cooperatives,
and mutual aIV teams, serve as "backbone
organizations, ensuring their obe-
dience mem-
bers to even h.1gher levels of performance.
the S. factories and labor
unions, pF,rty leadership a pervasive
control over IndLstr1al rroduction and over the in-
? labor for ie, are taking ?
Si moi es into a new and ? ad-
vanc~d phase ? ? ? economic construction.
within f ac-
Party ? branches set ?
tortes and other industrial enterprisos play leading
toles in, all phases ? ?
cluding the formulatlai of production plans, the
coordination of planniv.5gr and production, and the
supervision of personnel administ,.-ation. in addi-
? ?? ? for enforcing all labor
legislation Issued by the government and for pre-
sabotage. Party organizations within the
labor unions control the selection and promotion
? tabor leaders ? ?
and plans Issaed by the labor unions, Including edu-
? programs and smendments to union
regu-
lations.
' r 1
7 cadres aro not necessarily
ver, party members; both tbo account in
Sections III of this study and the
Chinese Cormnunist press refer to r~oris
assigned jobs as gov,~rrnnent employees who
are described as cadres. Many of
o~sevcY
these cadres
arejnot party members.
 + ? - ?
767TV7 ? inernoers,
rights and privileges of membership (including the
right to vote in party elections and to be elected to
office), and the probationil or "candidate" mem-
? ? In party councils, but no
? ' e. Another Important distinction is the fact
that regular members have access to confidential
documents, whereas the probational members do
?
appears In addition to these two broad categories, there
to classification be a further cadres ac-
cording to party ? ? work assign-
nient, although little ? ? on this subject is
available. broadcasts have re-
feekd to such groups "leadership :.
I lld~'er-level cadres," and "backbone cadres" (ku-
I. ?? cadres" are party
organizations, such as peasant associations and
labor unions.
Party cadres are described as the "nucleus of
leadership among the masses." They provide
party entirely successfully.
Because the regards itself as an elite gr
ards. The party constitution of 1945 stiputA.M.0
Any person may become a member of the p r w
accepts the program and constitution of the party,
belongs to and works In one of the party's organiza-
tions, observes party discipline, and pays party dues.".
The party constitution also specifies certain dut
? ? ? ??
MR-=
?. . ?
exemplary fashion.
recruitment policy since 1948 has S 0,
?
solved to transfer the base of party operationg- " _~.
Influence of the party In urban areas.
One
of the ? landmarks In party
policy was the address of Mao Tse-tung to thU
1950. This speech heralded a tighten g ?
This restriction was lifted shy r?ly
innnediately following the ann-nounce-
ment of the general line for tr-is-
ition to soeialism(4ept. 1953)) the
purpose being to establish pc:-ty
control over producer cooperatives.
A-RDP7$'-(Y69i5
 assessing the performance of paity members. The
criteria reformulated, membership stamdards pre-
? adopted, to Improve members' performance.
and
Outlook.
Outlook.
Party recruiting activity since the end of ig5i
Party recruiting activity since the end of ig5i
Important developments ormance. and
has meclosely integrated with and shaped by two
has been closely integrated with and shaped by two
Important developments o
?
?
? -r
members
rs from the ranks of "activists" (pro-Com-
munist sympathizers in the various mass oigdniha-
?
 25X6A
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 Patty The leadekship has attempted to make
? ? :. .
?
? ? ?
?
?? ? ? ? . ?- ? .
?:
of the man's personnel file, along with an elaborate
.
MUTT=
? ? P ?:
have been based on three major criteria. The first
?
?
?
:? :a
?
?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
?
of Wit [subcounty] cadre, nomination would come
? ? special district and confirmatio '
quite It Is rating and ? ? ? ?.
political policies have tended to place primary emphasis on
rellabilit ? alt
?
PAGE 53-34 Tr
 who are well-educated but politically unreliable.
Party ? . promotion during 1951 and 1952
played down the importance of seniority as a
criterion and emphasized the need to promote
young cadres who had proved their worth, tegard7
less of their length of service in the party. This
new attitude toward seniority 'was part of a more
general attack on the ? . cadres which began in
1950 and continued into 1951. During this
the older cadres were scolded for their "artUr
and warned that they would be judged by their
performance, and not by the fact that they had
many years / party known Very little is about the rotation and
cadres transfer of party cadres, but it would appear that
the lower levels are rotated fairly often.
Party ? in the army are apparently rotated
every three years, and attempt is made to have
them serve both at the central and local levels. A
similar policy may be followed party. In the directives during 1952, however, emphasized that
cadres should be 1 romoted fr6m within local
organizations rather than transferred from other
organizations. turnover f l o c a l person-
nel + also discouraged.
the transfer and assignment of party cadres in
the government appears to be handled jointly by
party organization departments and by govern-
?. f ? ? ? ?
cadres technical and to circumvent attempts to
transfer them-probably a reflection of the acute
Him
under the various ministries of the central g(~
ment. 0.
The problem of political training Is crucig
means of creating a basic homogeneity of 6440
R22 14 i,$1612
of the party In fact, depends to a great extefif!
depart from that orthodox norm.
Second, the Importance of party train
12?~MITMM KIM HIM ? ? ?
the rank and file -Party member Is far.nilfari A"'
the party leadership.
? party ? :role
111L
'proving relations between - the party afid.11
? ?
relations ? and are ?expecte
MON
carry out his public relations work, and ~'
actually Injure the party by alienating voteOll
s,Lpporters.
process. PartV education is re aided M_
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
feng). These programs are aimed at eradle-a
any deviationist tendencies which may have 69
Into the thinking of party members.
 Although the party vas fnrc^d to
rely on iinformal instruction ra Mier than
IM highly f nrmal i zo-3d trn. i_n ing pr. og;rams
during the post war period of expansion,
there is evidence that a highly system-
atic indoctrination prograrn(described in
$e ;tion Jckxex III of this p>.:iphlet) was
developed imirdediatoly following the
Comn.ruiist seintire of power. The intensity
of the indoctrination program vms peesLUn-
ably an outgrowth of the party's desire
to coupensate for the anticipated ad hoc
nature of later on thfe job training
during the party expansion period.
party for the direction of party training seems to have
been del.pgated to regional and local party otgant-
zations. Party committees at each level have gen-
eral responsibility for, setting up training programs
and for running party schools. Party secretaries
often assume personal direction of Important pro-
grams and brief their subordinates on aims and
methods. In some cases the regional and provincial
committees ? special subcommittees
on party education which draw up study plans
and review progress made. According to directives
Issued in 1950, these committees were to be headed
by full-time educational directors, but It is not
clear whether this was actually done. Depart-
mehis of propaganda at each level 'appear to have
responsibility for determining the degree of prog-
ress made In study programs and for preparing
and issuing study guides and manuals. Local
S. committees at the Wen and Wit levels are
assigned supposed to have one or two cadres permanently
to party work. Much of the re-
sponsibility
party branch, which is the vehicle for training new
To date, the local party organizations appear to
party, members.
have considerable freedom to plan study programs
and select study materials., However, there appears
to be some review of study plans by higher levels
of the and the'central and regional party
organizations assign special personnel to Inspect
the progress of training programs at the local level.,
? ? party instry . . ? part
theory policy. committees at the pro-
vincial municipal up "study rooms" and evening schools for political
study work.
In an effort to facilitate the supervision of party
indoctrination work by party committees, CCP
leaders have attempted to establish system ? inspection and
verification. Party In-
structors local party,branch are required
to file with their ?
report ? each indoctrination session, Including
account of the contents of lectures given, the
? Is NOW. A. I. ?
Men ? ?. ? ? SILCR report
adding comments on the reactions of the party
members. The summary Is then forwarded to the
Men (county) committee, which In turn prepares
a summary for higher-level committees at the
provincial Little Information on party schools
and training facilities. From available data It
would appear that party schools are principally
with administrative or technical training.
party Formal schools appear to exist :only at
party-the the higher levels of the
? 11 111
 University, which has evening classes for party
cadres. Both schools are reported to have Soviet
? At the ? level party training media are more
informal. ? emphasis is on general educa-
tion ? theoretical studies. Ward
classes In ? and writing and general ?
committees organize short-term training
classes for new recruits and refresher training
classes ? cadres ? from the lower levels of
the ch'il and hsiang party units.
(C) TYPES AND CONTENT ?
type of training a party member receives depends
?upon such factors as his previous education,
length ? service In the party, and his place In the
patty party members are expected
? ? ?
ig,
?: ?
to develop technical skills.
Political Training-New members
? I I I
? Cadres" LKan-pu Pi-tuj), as well as
confined to the "leading cadres" (party seA
and hfgher-ra-n-king officials) at each levpf-
Policy documents assigned for-study incl~
0 Ms
current events.
If the party wants a given set o 11
lowed. The study program is widel ti I
? ,1;)Vi@J off
? ? ? ? ?
organizations.
During 1952 a special campaign was
i{.
1 ?:? -- ? Ti 5 ? 7-3
? ;roc ?mt
 WI-M-1 - . ?? ?
navigation. Apparently many of the schools are
still in the Planning stage.
3) Party Training ? Nonparty
im-
? considerable
portance to the training of "active elements" In
.? rural and urban areas. By such training the
party apparently hopes to create a reservoir of po-
litically reliable people who can be drawn upon as
future members of the CCP.
In December 1951 the East China Bureau of the
CCP ? to Indoctrinate urban
workers In the East China area by the end of 1953.
The workers were to . rotated for training in party
schools, Democratic schools,
government cadre schools, and revolutionary unt-
to be dtssemi-
. -? amone the workers ? .15 ; ?. depart-
ments. During 1952 patty committees In several
students ? ? of the. graduates of
these classes were to ? ? ? ? ? party S. ? ? ?
reported enrollments, of over
1,200.
political Party training for activists has also been
a
three to Graduates five, weeks. Interviewed by local party members, and those wh6
showed promise were to be considered for meniberi-
?
4) Training Publications and Va
I$ HM: Iwo M 0111"1 IW -
In duly 1953 the Central Committee
of the party inrtructe,d all rcatr:us
party cc'dres to study chapters IX through
X11 of t11-ho Lititory of tl-G Communist Party
of the Soviet Union and selected works
of Lenin and Stalin on Socialist economic
?,on.struction in order to learn frmocxx
i~ia~x~x~g~x~s?~c~~xai~?x~~caa~-~cic3aaslx3t~cxa~a
from the experiences of the Soviet Union.
Study groups were expected to devote
4-6 hours per weo1-_to..thjq assi =uwzjt.....,
 ?
? ? I I
?
? I ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
?
? 1. ?/ ?
?
?
? 1
?. 1 ? /
?
III -I ? ? P. ?.. I /
I I III ? P. ?
I I' I I I ? P.
?
I I III ?? ? ? I.
I
1 I
1111111 RITIFY.M.M.,
PEI
in 4 arious fields.
In the
OEM=
WRL=
air=
radio networks to
transmit elementar lessons
Party discipline and moral
(a) THE PROBLEM - The CC k9m, RM
recognized the need for strict party discipin
- -- - -----------
Many Important pronouncements of f6e
?
?
?
use of united front tactics.) Since the part
tt-ative talents over a broad territorial base, Odif.1
 rr
#* CWWX#
Now that we are victorious, It Is possible that some
party members may choose to Indulge in a life of
ease rather than live the old life of hirdship....
It is possible that some of our members who were
invulnerable to the real bullets of the enemy may
now be vulnerable to the sugar-coated bullets of the
bourgeoisie.
As later developments proved, these fears were
not unfounded. During 1950 and :1951 there was
increasing concern with the danger of "bourgeois
corrosion" of the party. Party leader Kao Kang,
speaking in January 1952, declared that:
gly c4 'e warnings, the party has been in
creasin kded by bourgeois Ideologies and In-
fluences.
The campaign against waste, corruption, and red
tape In government launched during the winter of
19pi-52 revealed fairly widespread corruption
among nilddle-ranking party officials In - many of
the larger urban centers such as Tientsin and
The danger of "bourgeois corrosion" was hot en-
tirely an urban phenomenon; It had a counterpart
in the villages. After the completion of land re-
1 the first stage of the agrarian revolution,
there was a natural tendency for the rural party
cadres to relax and to feel that ,the revolution
over." The growing "complacency" and "apathy"
? cadres was bitterly attacked edi-
torials party newspapers during 1951-52. Of-
ficial labor,
rural cadres, Including the exploitation of hired
money-lending at high rates of interest, a
tendency toward soft living, and "arrogant atti-
tudes toward the masses."
in addition to the dangers of "bourgeois corro-
sion," the party also had to face the personnel
problems created by the establishment of a vast
bureaucratic apparatus. Many party members de-
veloped "bureaucratiic tendencies" that sorely per-
? ? the ? ? leadership.
? 1
address to the ? ? of the
CPPCC National Committee in February 1953 noted
that ?? many ? cadres" in the central ?
flees were content to sit in their offices and merely
issue directives, without making any attempt to
check upon their implementation. Other reports
from party leaders noted that local cadres were
using Illegal methods to carry out party programs
and were violating laws. The problem ? Ing such "bureaucratic tendencies" Is viewed as a
? constant atten-
tion.
?? I ?r I I I err I .irrerrr..r.rr,.
rr - ?
?
?
? ? think they can do as they please.11
Another aspect ? discipline and morale causing
borne the party leadership considerable trouble is the
problem of the older cadres. These men, having
brunt of the party's long military
struggles, feel that they ? special considera-
tion and resent the assignment ? ? to
more desirable positions. since late 050, the party
leadership has repeatedly warned these older cadres
that they will ? be given special concessions
because of their long service In the party.
(b) INCENTIVES - In ? ? to pro-
mote discipline and morale, the party
has at its command a number of methadv-4sr -msr-
suading or coercing the party rank and file into
doing
bidding. be summarized
briefly under headings of incentives
and controls.
The Incentives are both and psychologi-
cal. Although tangible material advantages
to ? gained ? ? ? In the ?
not necessarily great, the Individual
?
? _ party, the gains to an elite 1 organiza-
tion commanding monopoly of political
Power and patronage.
of securing a desirable position
and ? 1 / ? promotions and special privileges.
Although party member ?
taft degree of material security, he does not appear
to have many material comforts, and
In fact is ex-
pected to live a fairly austere and ascetic life.
Party ? who manage to extravagantly
live run the ? ? being denounced
"bourgeois decadence" and the frequency
which the S. ? ! cadres who
have In-
PAGE 53-40 T7 Irl
 FF 1.,
?11:L
L
--'
? ? / a : / : ? t~~~at
ver long periods of time. robatt ap' 'e;
posed to be used with the greatest caution, a
?. ? . a ? . . ? .i..
a ? _ a . l,(-.c
system party members know that any iaige Ki-
The formal disciplinary ? ?s4'
? . ? ? a ? ?
branches at the ? provincial,
? a a ? ? a: ? :t-1~,
? . . . ? 1: ?- a ra
? ? ?
himself before /
Fol"N ?' ? .: ? a
branch committee,, which reviews the ke ??
? ? a
so mgm ? IMCII IM a ? 1
?. a ?. a aj
higher party committee ? : / /
a a ?.
dividual party m e m b e r s : 1) private warnihg~~
? a.: ? a ? ? a a:
114 4 ;,..
? .. ??? ? 10 - a
following 1 degrees / punishment: i) ?
? ?.. / ? ?'
? ? ?- ? a 1 a-
'4
!it
 nation. Capital punishment is not one of the regu-
sanctions used by the party itself; however, a
member who c o m m i t t e d has ? offense
against the state can be put to death, after trial
and appropriate action by the 'People's Courts and
other governmental agencies.
In addition to the sanctions that can be applied
against individual party members, there are also
collective sanctions that can be appited to party
organizations as a whole. The party constitution
of 1945 prescribes ? ? ? collective punish-
ment: reprimand; 2) partial reorganization ?
"leading the body" ~standfng committee or execu-
tive
"leading body"; or 4) dissolution of the entire party
organization complete ? ?
mem-
bership.
committees beneath it and the special district com-
over It may also be forced to engage In
? ? other official ? of re-
pentance.
in many respects, the most effective control
wielded over the party membership consists of psy-
chologicat pressures brought to bear on the Indl-
vidual to conform, to rigid patterns of thought and
? party as a whole, this disciplinary
process takes I the form of an 111htra arty stitiggie.'
? individual party member Ift expressed In
the form of group meetings In which the sins and
? ? ? are discussed by the entire
group.
the "Interparty stru'ggie," as dehnea by part
theoretician Liu Shlao-ch'i, Is a relentless strugg!
between the party Ideologies and other Ideologies,
and between party interests and the interests o
the Individual. Its aim Is to eradicate all tenden
cles within the party that tend to weaken the mon
4ithic unity of the party and to create an attitud
of mind among party members that will subordt
nate personal interests to those of the party. The
oretically the struggle is over principles aandd hhoo
personalities, and Is supposed to be conducted In
? ? "correcting mistakes" and not In a spirl
? vengeance. members are exhorted ?
report to higher authorities all mistakes committed
? colleagues. Theoretically a party member
appears subordinates, but in reality, criticism of superiors
to be carefully channelled and ?
often re-
pressed.
This practice of "criticism and self_criticisml~-a
essential elements of "de ocracy" within the
party.
In addition to the "normal" process of Ideologi-
cal discipline, the party from time to time inaugu-
rates special reform programs aimed at raising
general levels of performance, "consolidating" the
party organization by purging those fnembers who
fail to measure up to the party's standards,
~trengthening the party unity, and making the~
ifiernbership more responsive to central direction.'
(7) Far- ty Reform anal Party Furf.,o
Prriodic p.rc"ra:-;s of :,arty rcf or: , o
ref.-.rre: .. i f t n !,i cr ...
mcvei, fnn t^, are the eq,_0-;rr l.en "or t?lt_ r?a r i .,
org-..nization as a whole of salt eri.tici:-:1
_for the irldivid.ual rcx inambor. A I,?1 cou ro: -'
to the Soviet"blood p.irges 1-,11H ;o row,,r.A!7
have empha31 zt,d the p,ycholof;i.^ 1 ap 'ra. ,', -
}:o'iti'.`'~.er hairy" Have ?,'~a'e ',~'.nt up in cecp,.{lr '
i. n ",'ins i tyz hat they have 1a. ched i.n ximin,
violence. The rellic'.arie e of c:;;." l~rtc?o' ..
to carry out 3Neepi.I7pure i ,119,,7 be tltx'' 1'1
part to tiro urgont n'id constantly ~,v}nndio
need for Ira.inod ?-r- ty ca ]res.
}'arty reform irlts to tn1:e n'
at criti.cal points in the party's history
1:ach move' ?nt S'-a~'.~',s f;r he Llin--d 9-t ,^~ tf 1'
the m)ra1 fibre of t'. J by rnAicr,'
s:.:';0 x:~~'ti RxttxY~xri+x'n }x,: par ti.c .lr,
1-fe, t in #_ir !'ty' op' rattr.i, t~ i c i
'Ii :cir,lino. Sinop 1f40 thrre 11rve be>>i j}?
_ficre major reform -jicvei rats - two prod:~:~ , '
f ,ho party ' rice to :l'? f i Jn(11 ';T".^!? a-id
rf3t'. l: i e f allowed .i `. The " rs i.;
laulchfa:l in 1942 wn Mm(-!-_! ~t ti,:, .,17?~ ,1;
f ' (IO rl fr tic" t ~',d ,1ci.3 ri 7' rZ XR1; T4-r--
'~ Il`
~1 *C?;EC ?Y.l i;'} :i XX Fir7t t i high.?; 9i ri i.t7
cz he l ons of t.ho party; the ...+ - 1'a 1 1
was directed n W
primarily a[7)ainst "r f-1, f i r
Learlf?!_cie- a1'iorli.- rt'ra1 cn,Ir.' in
lcrid reform- The third reform,
officially in June 1950, follow -i clost~l.';
on the party's rapid expansion of me:nbershlr
and
 Approved For Relea 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-0091 x000500010027-6
and the shift of the party's base to the urban areas.
It was aimed in part at eradicatin
certain defects in the work methods and outlook of the local cadres, including M u a *xx
"arrogance".. "heroism"(oel#ish individualism) and "bureaucratic tendencies." This reform
lasted until October 1950 and involved four stagesx 1) the study of assigned documents,
includingreports by party leaders to the
review- of past work and activities, with
of the current situation and of the 'aaka
In the course of the reform,
party comet&ttees to direct reform
committees at the higher levels.
Central Com',~ittee; 2) the summarizing and
an eye to discovering mistakes; 3) an* analysis
tasks ahead$ 4) criticism and self-criticism.
special ad hoc committees were sot up under the regular
activities, and special instructors were trained by party
At the local levels party cadres were reformed through
training classes set up by the hsien,party committees. Higher level cadres attended
"remoulding conferences" held under the auspices of the provincial and regional party
organizations.
which
The fourth party reforn,Iwas completed in the spring of 1954, was launched at a
national conference on party organization held in March 1951. This reform movement
was ostensibly designed to consolidate the party branches, to raise the general quality
of party membership,and to strengthen the party organization as a whole for the forth-
coming tasks of industrializat.iin. Other underlying considerations probably prompting
the reforms were: 1) a desire on the part of the party leadership to prevent the rank
and file from relaxing; 2) a desire to discipline those party veterans who were showing
signs of discontent and insubordination; and 3) a concern with growing corruption among
the party membership and a general falling off of revolutionary zeal.
The specific aims and objectives of this reform program varied somewhat from time
to time and from area to area. One of the basic aims was to familiarize the member-
ship with the new and stricter standards of performance adopted in 1951 and then to
appraise each member in terms of those standards. Members who fell hopelessly short
of meeting the standards were expelled from the party; those, however, who evidenced
a willingness to reform themselves were given a chance to do so. According to 1952
party directives the reforms were also aimed at eradicating corruption and "rightist"
deviations (such as usury-and exploitation), improving party control over rural
organizations, andk giving the rural party cadres a better understanding of Communist
policies and objectives.
According to official Communist statements, this reform movement passed through
four major stages In the first stage-preparation and mobilization--party reform
cadres were trained through conducting "experimental" reforms in key areas, and reports
in the Communist press during December 1951 indicated that experimental reforms in
two or three large cities had resulted in the` 'on of 8% to 10% of party
members. By early 1953 the preparation and mobilization stage had been completed in
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 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500010027-6
most areas. Raidaudx This initial phase was followed by a "study" stage, in which
party members received indoctrination on party objectives and goals and were expected
to study assigned works on Communist theory and policy. The third stage was one of
"rere istration " in which each +0-Ce.~upt
g , party member made a detailed mort of his political
and social background and decided for himself whether he felt qualified to continue
as a party member. The fourth and probably the most important phase was one of
"appraisal," and it was centered in the party branch. The past history and performanne
of each party member was discussed individually by the branch meeting. Then, under the
direction of specially assigned party reform cadres, the branch prepared a written
report on each member, including recommendations for disciplinary action if needed.
This report ix was forwarded to a higher party committee, which decided whether or
not the party member shall remain in good standing. These appraisals were supposed
to be conducted in accordance with the higher standards of performance adopted in
March 1951.
During the period from January 1952 to June 1952, the party reform movement was
closely integrated with the so-called "Three Anti" movement, which was aimed at
eradicating corruption, waste and red-tape from the ranks of the governmental
btac bureaucracy. The "Three Anti" movement, which was directed by a national
committee headed by party leader Po I-po, resulted in the expulsion or demotion of
a fairly large number of party members holding middle-ranking positions in govern-
ment and with about 10 to 15 years of service. Only about half the defendants were
accused of "corruption." Other alleged crimes included insubordination, sabotage of
party policies, hepotism, suppression of criticism from lower levels, empire
building, and "bourgeois decadence" (soft living).
"Because of the paucity of available information, it is difficult accurately to
gauge the effect of the "Three Anti" movement on the party organization. The number
of party members actually expelled from the party appears to have been well under 5%
of the total party membership, and perhaps as low as 1% or 2%. However, the stern-
ness with which the reforms were conducted arrarently caused a considerable loss of
morale among lower- and middle-ranking party bureaucrats. Information from fairly
reliable sources has indicated that there was an epidemic of suicides among party
members in certain areas of South China during the early part of 1952. Many party
members have tried to avoid being assigned to responsible positions in government, Jug
lest they becc#e vulnerable to attack. The reforms may also have created a general
inertia and apathy among the lower levels of the party, especially in urban areas.
As the "Three Anti" movement drew to a close after June 1952, the party reform
campaign was increasingly oriented toward the party's national economic planning
program and the development of precollective types of rural organization. An important
editorial in the party press in July 1952 stated that "the work of consolidating the
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party must go hand in hand with the basic construction work of the state, and in
 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-009' R000500010027-6
particular with construction work centered on industrialization...." In September
1952 party organizations at the regional level issued directives stressing the need
for i "strengthening party leadership in various fields of national construction and
urging party members to master technical skills and industrial management procedures.',
From about October or November of 1952, the tempo of party reform activity
apparently increased, especially in rural areas. Official reports indicated that
"a general adjustment of Party organization and of the ideological levels of Party
members" was launched among rural ground-level organizations of the party in November
1952, and stated k that this had the result of "pushing the rural economy along
the path of collectivization." Subsequent reports indicated that party reforms in
rural areas of Northeast China would be completed by the spring of 1953. In January
1953 it was officially announced that the "streamlining" of party organizations in the
northeast had been virtually completed in rural areas. In February it was announced
that party organizations in North and Northwest China had "completed the first stages
of party reform" and were starting on the second stage.
An important report by An Tzu-wen, Deputy Director of the Party Organization
Department, released in February 1953, stated that party reform had been completed in
40,000 out of a total of 180,000 rural party organizations in China. Results to date,
said An, indicated that about 90% of the total party membership measured up to standards
set by the party leadership. Of the 10% who did not measure up, about 3% to 5% or
less than 1% of the total party membership, had been expelled from the party as "un-
desirable elements." The remainder had withdrawn on the grounds that they had become
"passive" or "backward".
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 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500010027-6
The fourth and current reform movement, the Party Unity Drive, was launched at a.
Central Committee meeting in February 1954. The general line for transition to socialism
had been opposed by KAO Kang, head of the State Planning Commission, and other leading
cadres who apparently split from the party xntz center's pro ram of gradual transition.
Li W'-' A" "w'
The Party Unity drive was aimed at eliminating,biris "despicable bourgeois individualism"
although KAO Kang and his supporters were not announced as the offenders until March 1955.
LIU Shao-chi s * a stressed the need for absolute conformity during thps"crucial
historical stage of x.L:kxzxtx socialist transformation," and issued a. stern admonition
to those who "regard the region or department under their leadership as their individual
inheritance or independent kingdom." The Communist press followed up with continual
attacks o8"local nationalism, unprincipled disputes and controversies over personal aims,"
all of which were regarded as serious threats to party unity. abrwxft txwxdxmi
At the National Conference of the CCP in March of this year KAO Kang and JAO Shu-shih,
who had been director of the Organization Department, were identified as tkwx_pxtxgaptxx
wf2axatw.mxx the leaders of an "anti-party faction which undermined party solidarity and
The resolutions of the National Conference provided for the establishment of
unity." Central and local control committees, probably organized along the lines of
to replace
the Soviet model, xapiaxad the discipline inspection committees which were"no longer
suited to the task of strengthening party discipline in new era of class struggle."
Party organisations at all levels were directed to ferret out the "tendencies :tvnR
zsfx
toward personal dictatorship and tzxgx cfragacaxxtx fragmentation which undermine the
principle of collective leadership?"
AKatxpxtsxxtzxtkaxxmxm mmtxwfxtkacx x gxpxrgwxaxxjL taxxaitwrx oskgxxxxxxxxxx
Just prior to the announcement tiaxt of the KAO Kang purge, =xRacttxswf*ffxax icgxxx
the Communists iaagxx launched a nationwide campaign against HU Fang and his "counter-
revolutionary clique." In the autumn of 1954, HU Feng a Marxist; writer, though not a
member of the CCP, had made a vehement attack on communist exploitation of literature
for political purposes, in a speech before a large gathering of leading literary figures.
dany observers feel that the timing of the ltzuxa drive against counter-revolutionaries
was a ,deliberate attempt by the CCP to propagandize the "sharpening of the class struggle"
by some means other than a detailed and embarasing expose of the KAO Kang-.JAO Shu-shih
"anti party alliance."
described as bein
HCT's. crimes were much broader in scope than those of
the "anti party a an
Approves'orWAle.%$ 25M/ WY CFA- P8-09( 05 1?6 h forward
 Approved For Release O00/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500010027-6
the class struggle, far
complicated by the fact
from abating, becomes even more intensell7e problem is further
tke. C*v%k .v h,%':rts reg rgl
thattcounter-revolutionarie such as: KAO Kang and HU Fen
jiv' agents of the imperialist agressors.
l+t is
z'"& obvious that regardless of whether or not
Communist tl'position
analysis of the 9a=XX tpQKit:k3&Xx
they encounter
?k?A their
program, they intend to keep the hi'' ? Vf
p pressure on the masses- the reform, in all its -do'
manifestations has become an essential ingredient of their system,xf,
a universal and thorough educational program in government units, people's organizations,
army units, schools, cooperatives and among the greet ru sses of the urban and rural
people. A Pravda/Peking dispatch of 12 June 1955 is even more revealing as to the
targets for this educational program: "-6xisting evidence indicates that HU Feng's followers
worked their way into certain state institutions, military agencies, cultural-*,nlighten
ment organizations, publishing houses, magazines and newpapers, economic agencies and
the administrative bodies of public organizations such z as the trade unions and the
this drive
New Democracy Youth League. Official statistics reveal the intensity of uc x r n
and its effect x on those who were beyond reformation; from January 1954 to May 1955
the People's: Courts had heard 364,604 cases involving counter-revolutionaries.
Why is it that ever since the CCP siezed power in 1949 China has been in the grip
of a series of nationwide drives to eliminate anti-Communist opposition? Is it because
the Com-unist system itself does not admit of tranquility and that consequently the fine
edge must be maintained even after the opposition has been eliminated or have the
Communists failed to achieve the unity for which they have been given credit? Their own
explanation for the frequency and intensity tax of the reform movements is typically
Communists Since the goal of the present program is extinction of all who oppose socialist
construction, violent reaction is inevitable; during this critical phase of development)
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 Approved For RWpase 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915R000500010027-6
aw
sere e
Section II: The Ideal eea Party Member:
?t were ax7rPc `ed roft s,vrecke's +w+~,'a4,
The articles which are included belowAwere written in 1939 by Politburo
members Chen Yun and Liu Shad-chi. These articles appear here as they
were translated from Cheng-feng wen-hsien (Documents on the correction of
unorthodox tendencies) pp 67-u2 and 83-121; edited by Chieh-fang she (The
Emancipation News Agency). Yenan; published by Hain-hua shu-tien (New
China Book Company), Shansi-Chahar-Hopei branch, Kalgan, March 1946,
297 pp. .(Harvard-Yenching Library); and reprintedikthe Documentary
History of Chinese Communism, by Brandt, Schwartz and'Fairbank, with
commentaries by these three writers.
1. How to be a Communist Party Member, Chen Yun
j
on the Training of a Communist Party Member, Liu Shao -chi
Section III: Indoctrination of Cadre-s;
This article is presented here as it appears in Chapter III of Richard
Walker's China Under Communism: The First Five Years, Yale University
Press, 1955, under the title of Psychological Control. The de scription of
the cadre training process which follows is based 1) interviews with 17
refugees who had actually been through the process (conducted in Hong Kong
during
summer of 1952); 2) a general survey of Western and Chinese
literature on the subject; and 3) a study of CPC documents.
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 roved For Releas60'00/087.:1CIAP78-00915IIM0500010027-6
IN i
2
4'
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pzc 4-;'t-
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 rov or Release 2go 0/08/27: CIA-RDP78-00915R000500010027-6
O ee emo~'anaum ? UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
TO
FROM
SUBJECT:
,Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-00915`RD00500010027-6