COMMUNIST SUBVERSION OF GUATEMALA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R000300020008-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 1998
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: April 1, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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COMMUNIST SUBVERSION
OF
GUATEMALA
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A. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
B. The Beginning......................... 2
C. Tactical Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
D. The Open Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
E. Adjuncts to Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1. The Agrarian Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2. Propaganda Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3. Front Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
F. Analysis of Communist Influence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
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Since the Communists had had virtually no status in Guatemala
prior to the revolution, it became necessary for them to move into both
the political and labor spheres as quickly as possible. Their techniques
followed classic Communist tactics and afford interesting examples of
the application of such tactics in a manner and with a timing calculated
to solidify Communist influence, both openly as well as clandestinely,
within the most important elements of Guatemalan national life.
Major developments in the pattern of this Communist subversion
were usually heralded by visits either into Guatemala by.foreign Communists
or by Guatemalan Communists traveling into the Soviet orbit. While efforts
will be made in this report to present developments in chronological order,
Communist activities in various spheres naturally overlapped. Indeed, it
is as a result of parallel developments that Communist influence in Guate-
mala has reached its present peak.
B. The Beginning
Because Communist moves to dominate the Guatemalan labor movement
were comparatively immediate and direct, initial Communist successes in
this field represent the most',obvious first step in the pattern of Communist
subversion. After the revolution, the emerging labor situation in Guate-
mala easily lent itself to Communist manipulation. Whereas before 1944
no labor unions had existed except for the controlled workingmen's mutual-
aid societies, under the new freedoms brought by the revolution the
country's first labor unions appeared and, by 1945, these fledgling unions
were incorporated into the first national labor federation, the Confedera-
cion de Trabajadores de Guatemala (CTG).
The most potent seeds of the future Communist Party were initially
planted within the CTG. This new labor federation had a recognized need
for experienced labor advisers to help in its establishment and progress;
such advisers were not to be found in Guatemala. Into this breach quickly
stepped a group of Central Americans with Communist backgrounds and with
experience in organizing labor in other countries. They became the
advisers to the young CTG and, through their efforts, the CTG began early
to nourish a growing group of Communist-oriented young labor leaders.
The most successful method of indoctrination utilized by these Communists
was a CTG school whose ostensible purpose was to train labor leaders.
Instead, this school was successfully used as a Communist indoctrination
center until forced to close in 1946 because of opposition to its strong
Communist orientation.
At the same. time that Communist influence was spreading in the
labor movement, amore subtle Communist infiltration had begun within
Guatemalan political movements. The "students' party," Frente Popular
Libertador (FPL), and the "teachers' party," Renovation National (RN),
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COMMUNIST SUBVERSION OF GUATEMALA
The steps by which Communism seeks to capture free nations may
vary in accordance with local conditions, but the organizational and
operational techniques used by Communist Parties everywhere bear a striking
resemblance to each other. To those people who would belittle Communism's
chances for success in areas of the world remote from the Soviet orbit,
the story of Guatemala should emphasize the dangers inherent in any country
where a carefully conceived and cleverly~,executed program is not, effectively
opposed by that majority of the people who are non-Communist.
It should not be forgotten that in all free countries of the
world, the Communists seek to gain popular support not through pushing
their own platform, but by espousing non-Communist ideas; by striving to
make people believe that Communism stands for the abolition of things that
are bad; by promising to abolish whatever may be worrying a nation. Nor
should it be overlooked that Communist operational techniques are designed
to effect the greatest degree of control over the most important of the
elements necessary to achieve political control within a country. It is
not necessary for the Communists to achieve strength in numbers; it is
only necessary for them to be able to control and',manipulate in such a
way that their influence is assured and opposition is effectively neutral-
ized. The story of Guatemala presents an excellent example of this pattern
of Communist subversion.
Although small and ineffective Communist groups existed in Guate-
mala prior to 1944, it was actually the popular overthrow in 1944 of the
Ubico-Ponce dictatorship that facilitated the spread of Communist influence
within the country. The political, economic, and social upheavals and
re-groupings which took place during and following this revolution afforded
the Communists those opportunities for infiltration and organizing tactics
which had heretofore been closed to them. They were quick to seize their
opportunities. Their agility attests to the Communist ability and readiness
to exploit situations of flux--such as those posed by a liberal reform
movement-.-and to utilize the usually, dispersed strength'of non-Communist
groups as a springboard for their own concentrated drive for power.
The present extent of Communist influence in Guatemala, however,
did not burst forth full-blown after the revolution. It was achieved in
the course of several years and as a result of a multiplicity of Communist
tactics designed to subvert and-to neutralize segments of Guatemalan
national life so that the Communist Party could be rendered the major
force within the country.
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M
were revolutionary parties formed to support the presidential candidacy
of Arevalo. These two parties fused in 1945 to form the Partido Accion
Revolucionaria (PAR) and then later withdrew, leaving all three parties
in existence. Communist and Communist-oriented figures managed to exert
an influence in the indoctrination of these political parties at their
inception.
Again, Communists from neighboring countries came into Guatemala
to,work with these political groups. Practically all of those affiliated
today with the Guatemalan Communist Party were active in these three
"revolutionary parties," for the growing number of young Guatemalan
Communists were content for several years to work within the leftist
Administration parties and did not emerge as a separate political entity
until a more propitious time. As a result of both the doctrines taught
by the CTG school and the efforts of Communist figures within the revolu-
tionary parties, within 3 years after the 1944 revolution a group of young
Guatemalans had crystallized into a permanent Communist organization op-
erating clandestinely within the revolutionary political movement.
C. Tactical Developments
Meanwhile, Communist efforts to dominate the Guatemalan labor
movement received a slight setback, but not one which seriously threatened
the eventual Communist control. It is possible that this lesson of the
labor movement was well learned by the Communists and contributed to their
selection of more subtle techniques to be applied to political organiza-
tions.
The Communist orientation of the CTG school so alarmed the rail-
way union and certain other unions that a factional fight split the CTG.
In 1946, these anti-Communist unions withdrew and formed another national
labor federation, the Federacion Sindical de Guatemala (FSG) and, at the
same time, the CTG school was shut down by the government as a violation
of the article in the constitution forbidding "political organizations of
a foreign or international character." The FSG, however, came under
leadership and pressure that gradually returned it to the Communist view-
point. By 1950, the FSG had affiliated with the World Federation of Trade
Unions (WFTU) and the Confederation de Trabajaderos de la America Latina
(CTAL); in 1951, it was finally re-absorbed by the CTG. As an anti-
Communist organization, the FSG as unable to produce the unity of purpose,
the militant membership, or the political support achieved by the Communists
in the CTG.
To some extent, however, the withdrawal of the anti-Communist
unions from the CTG.may have accelerated the complete domination by the
Communists of the remaining CTG organization. Of the early member unions;
that of the school teachers, the STEG, had shown itself particularly
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susceptible to Communist influence. For instance,. this union had strongly
supported the Communist-orientated CTG indoctrination school. With the
withdrawal of those unions which formed the FSG, the STEG remained as the
most militant union within the CTG and came to dominate it. It was largely
from the ranks of the STEG that a group of young Communists emerged to
dominate the entire CTG movement. The most outstanding of these, Victor
Manuel Gutierrez, rose rapidly to become STEG Secretary General and later
Secretary General of the CTG.
After the re-absorption of the FSG by the CTG, this sole labor
federation of Guatemala became known.as the Confederacion General de
Trabajadores de Guatemala (CGTG). Gutierrez became Secretary General and
the organization was under complete Communist domination. All key positions
in the CGTG are held today by members of the Guatemalan Communist Party.
Throughout the period when the CTG and later the CGTG were being brought
under Communist control; Gutierrez and his group received extensive aid
from Communists from outside the country; these represented a rather large
influx of trained Communists who helped to advance the ideological and
organizational capacities of'the local group.
But Communist participation in Guatemalan politics continued for
some time to be conducted behind the facade of other parties. Until 1950,
the end of the Arevalo administration, the existence of any Communist
political organization in Guatemala was denied. The "revolutionary
parties" -- the FPL and the RN -- had formed the principal support which
installed Arevalo as President in 1944. Gutierrez had been an early member
of the FPL and, after the formation of the PAR, later became a member of
that party. Jose Manuel Fortuny, who was to become the Secretary General
of the Guatemalan Communist Party, was also a member of the PAR.
By 1949, there began a series of Communist moves which culminated
in the eventual emergence of an open Communist Party, the most virile and
flourishing of the four allied parties controlling the government of Guate-
mala. It is an interesting story of Communist tactics designed to ensure
a favorable political climate, legitimate participation in government, and
the effective neutralization of any remaining non-Communist groups not
already broken up by Communist maneuvers.
In 1949, Gutierrez resigned from the PAR. In 1950, Fortuny and
10 others also resigned from the PAR and established a frankly Communist
newspaper entitled Octubre, whose initial subheading was "For a Great
Communist Party, Vanguard of the Workers, the Peasants, and the People."
,A month after the appearance of this paper, Gutierrez founded the Partido
Revolucionario Obrero de Guatemala (FROG), a workers' party for Marxist-
Leninist indoctrination of political and labor leaders. To work in the
1950 presidential and congressional elections, leaders of the Octubre
Communists and of the PROG,.together with the labor unions under their.
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influence, formed a joint committee. This committee had several, successful
candidates for Congress,. including Gutierrez who supported Arbenz' candi-
dacy for the Presidency.
It was not until April 1951,, however, that Fortuny signed a press
statement as "Secretary General of the Partido,Comunista de Guatemala"
(PCG). Here, at last, was the first known avowal that an organized Com-
munist Party existed in Guatemala. A few weeks later Fortuny admitted
publicly that the Communist Party of Guatemala had existed as a secret
organization since September 1947. In June 1951, on the first anniversary
of Octubre, the party held a public rally, announcing that it would seek
to be'registered as a recognized party under the electoral laws. The
principal political leaders of Guatemala attended,this rally to hear
Fortuny formally launch the PCG. This attested to the degree of influence
already obtained by the Communists in Guatemala and emphasized that their
political support in the 1950.elections of such candidates as Arbenz, the
new President, was paying dividends.
Communist political twists were not quite over. In July 1951,
Gutierrez, head of the PROG, admitted in a press interview that he was
a Communist. He was also the head of the CGTG and had kept that organiza-
tion, and the CTG before that, firmly in the WFTU camp. After returning
from a WFTU Congress in Berlin, Gutierrez, in January 1952,~announced the
dissolution of the PROG and advised its members to follow him into Fortuny's
PCG.
During 1952, the PCG became increasingly important within the
Guatemalan political movement. Fortuny and other representatives of the
PCG began to be reported in the press as sitting in on President Arbenz'
political conferences with the representatives of the other Administration
parties.
In December 1952, prompted in part by protests against the ex-
istence of a "Communist Party," the PCG used the occasion of its Second
Party Congress to change its name. It became the Partido Guatemateco,del
Trabajo (PGT). At the same time, it decided to make'Octubre a daily paper,
adopted a set of statutes modeled on the standard organization of the
Stalinist Communist Parties, and confirmed its intent to register the
party in the Civil Registry. It also announced that it would Join the
PAR, the PRG (which replaced the old FPL through a series of interparty
shifts), and the RN as a member of the Administration's "Democratic
Electoral Front" in the January 1953.congressional elections. In December
1952, prior to the,elections,',the PGT was registered as a political party,
despite some anti-Communist protests'that it should be barred under the
constitutional prohibition on "political organizations of a foreign or
international character." The opposition was not strong enough and was
too late. The day of legitimate political power for the Communists had
arrived.
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D. The Open Party
As one of the four parties controlling the government of Guatemala,
the PGT began to enjoy a uniquely favorable position. The three pro-
fessedly non-Communist government parties -- PAR, PRG, and RN -- continued
to be aggressive supporters of the nationalist and leftist goals of the
revolutionary movement which began in 1944. The PGT, of course, claimed
similar objectives and became the most insistent exponent of stronger
unity within the National Democratic Front, urging not only political
alliance among the government parties and labor groups but also an in-
creased alliance to include mass organizations and all other manifestations
of a "united front program." This is a classic Communist tactic. There
was,. and is, no obvious difference in principle between the three revolu-
tionary parties and the PGT which would hamper the forging of a stronger
government under PGT leadership.
Furthermore, as the PGT emerged as an open and major political
organization, a succession of events brought the organized anti-Communist
opposition in Guatemala to virtual extinction. As the PGT grew in strength
and prestige, the non-Communist elements in the other revolutionary parties
found themselves unable to consolidate their forces to block the PGT's
path to preeminence. While the PRG, RN, and PAR have in turn been wracked
by internal dissension and scandal, the PGT has suffered no such weakening,
and the ideologies and programs of the other parties have tended to be-
come replicas of its own. None of the important non-Communist political
figures remained free or in the country following "revelations." of alleged
plots against the Government in March 1953 and January 1954. The PGT took
the lead in protesting alleged "intervention" and in demanding suppression
not only of opposition political activities but of the independent press
in Guatemala.
Communist allegations that "anti-Communism" is equivalent to
Fascism has found acceptance among the other parties. The PGT has been
successful in gaining adherents to the international Soviet line among
influential leaders of the revolutionary organizations. In particular,
the PGT has led the other parties in an increasingly strident propaganda
campaign against foreign, especially U.S., "intervention" in Guatemalan
affairs. The PGT has skillfully exploited national discontents and has
offered itself, in typical Communist fashion, as the instrument to abolish
the worries of the nation and to safeguard its "revolutionary reforms."
The extent of Communist influence in the leadership of the other
political parties in power in Guatemala rests on a more tangible basis
.than merely a common program of nationalist and leftist objectives. It
should not be forgotten that most Communists were initially members of
the other parties. Communists are still there. When Gutierrez dissolved
the PROG and took with him a number'of PROG members into the Communist
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Party, 39 others who had received the same Communist indoctrination in the
PROG returned to the PAR in response to a public invitation to do so.
There is considerable evidence that Communists within the other
parties are carrying out a tactical maneuver to further the "national
front" and "popular acceptance" of the mounting power of the PGT. In-
deed, this evidence suggests that the separate political entities of the
other parties are fast disappearing. When Fortuny was nominated as a
congressional candidate by the Communist Party in October 1952, he was
introduced with warm praise by the Secretary General of the RN. In Novem-
ber 1952, he was formally endorsed by the PAR as a joint candidate and,
soon afterwards, the PRG also endorsed him.
Again and again, representatives of the other parties have
supported, joined with, or defended not only the PGT as a party but also
its candidates for elections. Perhaps. the most striking example of this
was the statement by the Secretary General of the PAR in October 1953
that "... The PAR is a transitory party like the other revolutionary
parties, which are destined to disappear and become part of the great
world Communist Party." And "... I support the PRG ... but I support
above all the Communist Party." The extent of this political affection
is further illustrated by the fact that the PRG elected Fortuny, head of
the PGT, and Alvarado Monzon, the PGT Secretary of Organization, to the
Presidium of the First Congress of the PRG, held in January 1954; they
were the only members of the Presidium who were not PRG members.
During the period when the Communists were thus moving so success-
fully toward political domination, their control of Guatemalan labor was in-
creasingly solidified. The CGTG came under the complete control of the
Political Committee of the PGT, with all key positions in the CGTG held
by PGT members. With the exception of a very few independent local unions,
the CGTG came to represent all organized industrial, transportation, and
commercial labor in Guatemala, and has obtained very considerable strength
in agricultural workers' unions. This strength is~estimated to be at least
100,000 members, a figure which compares significantly with the total of
225,000 votes cast in the last congressional elections and,with the total
of 415,000 votes cast in the 1950 presidential elections.
There has been no serious challenge to the Communist leadership
of organized labor since Gutierrez and his group, aided by Communist.
advisers from outside, assumed control. In 1953, a short-lived revolt
against Communist control of the railway workers' union was easily put
down and its leader apparently forced out of the PRG. Also in 1953,
a new, tiny labor federation was formed and challenged Gutierrez to justify
his international Communist affiliations. Gutierrez did not bother to
answer; in January 1954, the leaders of the little group were arrested by
the police and reportedly expelled from Guatemala.
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Allied with the CGTG is an organization of small farmers and
tenants called the Confederacion Nacional de Guatemala (CNCG), led by a
former associate of Gutierrez in the STEG. The CNCG, also affiliated
with the WFTU, has constantly proclaimed its solidarity with the CGTG--
even to the extent of the Communist theory that rural workers should be
guided by the urban proletariat.
The political nature of the Guatemalan labor organization is
well established. Political-action committees have directed labor
participation in elections,, and the CGTG and CNCG joined the four Adminis-
tration parties as formal components of the "National Democratic Front."
E. Adjuncts to Power
1. The Agrarian Reform
Within the framework of their power in the political and
labor spheres, the Guatemalan Communists have pushed their
influence through many other related activities. One of the
most important of these is the agrarian reform movement,
which the Communists have recognized to be one of the most
powerful instruments available to a minority seeking state
power. In Guatemala, the Communists have gone far in gathering
the force of this reform into their own hands and, indeed,
shrewdly participated in it at its inception. Fortuny spent
the greater part of 2 years studying the agrarian-reform pro-
grams of the Satellites and was a major author of the Guate-
malan Agrarian Law.
Communists, both in and out of the Government, showed their
interest in adoption of the Agrarian Reform Bill when the
Administration sent it to the Congress in 1952. The Agrarian
Law created, as instruments of the reform, the National
Agrarian Department, the National Agrarian Council, Depart-
mental Agrarian Commissions, and local Agrarian Committees.
The law assigned three of the nine seats on the Council to
the CGTG and the CNCG. These two labor groups were each
given one of the five seats on the Departmental Commissions,
and they share three of the five seats on the local agrarian
committees. In 1953, the law was amended to provide that
60 percent of the local Agrarian Committees should be composed
of representatives of the CGTG or CNCG, that one of the three
members of the Departmental Agrarian Committee should represent
the CGTG and another the CNCG, and that one of the nine mem-
bers of the National Agrarian Council should represent. the
CGTG and two others the CNCG. Communist predominance in the
local and departmental committees was thus guaranteed by the
terms of the law.
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Furthermore, the Communists have heavily.infiltrated the
National Agrarian Department (DAN) where they hold key
positions. The Chief of the Lands Section is an avowed
Communist and assumes charge of the department in the
absence of the Director. The Secretary General (Chief Clerk)
is the wife of Fortuny. Four of the 20 Agrarian Inspectors
are avowed Communists and another 8 are probably members of
the PGT. In addition, another dozen DAN employees are known
members of the PGT. The CGTG has been especially active
among rural elements since the agrarian reform was enacted,
and has created for itself a further key role by giving
effective assistance to applicants for agrarian benefits.
Nor have the Communists missed any opportunities to impress
upon the public their importance in agrarian reform. There
have been prominent Communists who have participated in all
public ceremonies concerned with the reform program. There
has also been reported at least one case in which Communist
leaders of the CGTG took advantage of the strength of that
organization in a particular district to incite the peasants
to numerous disorderly seizures of land which had not been
duly applied for and apportioned under the terms of the
Agrarian Reform Law. Communist-inspired agrarian unrest
could undoubtedly lead to a significant peasant movement
disposed to violent action--which would give the Communists
even greater control over agrarian reform and, accordingly,
over state power.
Communist support of the agrarian-reform program is a
typical example of their drive for power by espousing non-
Communist ideas. But, as Fortuny himself has written in
discussing the program, "... The Communist Party is not now
fighting for the step toward the power of the proletariat,
but, aware of historic conditions and because of these con-
ditions, it must support whatever steps will lead to the
definite liquidation of feudalism and the giving of part of
the land to the peasants, and it must champion the present
aspirations of the great peasant masses and the workers of
the country, which point to a rapid and less costly road
toward bourgeois development in Guatemala. ... our goal is a
society without exploitation, the Communist Socialist Society."
2. Propaganda Media
The Guatemalan Communists also recognized at an early date
the important attribute to power which lies in the control
of public information media. Even while the major efforts
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of the Communists were directed toward the firm entrenchment
of trained Communists at the top of the national labor move-
ment and the construction of a well-knit Communist Party
firmly interlaced with the allied parties of the left, their
propaganda campaigns were underway and were effectively
furthered by fellow members of the then-secret Communist
Party who had acquired important places in the field of mass
communication. For example, the present Secretary of Propa-
ganda of the PGT formerly held the posts of editor of an
FPL newspaper, announcer on the government radio station,
and editor in chief of the government's Diario de Centro
America; later he became director of Octubre and helped to
form the Communist Party. Another present leader of the PGT
was employed in the President's Office of Press and Propa-
ganda from 19+9-1952. The present Secretary of Organization
for the PGT had, before the public emergence of that party,
served on the FPL newspaper, on the daily Diario de la
Manana, and as special reporter for the government's paper.
The PGTFs Secretary of Education is yet another who worked
in the President's Office of Publicity and Propaganda until
1950, when he publicly avowed his Communist affiliation. And
as these and other Communist leaders turned from journalism
to management of the Communist Party, they left others well
qualified and well placed to carry on their work.
Today an avowed Communist is Director of the National Radio
Station as well as Director General of National Broadcasting,
with jurisdiction over all the radio stations of the country.
A well-known Honduran Communist remains on the editorial
staff of the government daily newspaper, which gives copious
and favorable publicity to Communist-front activities and fre-
quently reflects Communist-line viewpoints in its editorials.
There are faithful propagandists for Communism remaining in
the President's Office of Publicity and Propaganda. Other
similar-minded men advance the Communist line in the daily
newspapers Nuestro Diario and Diario del Pueblo, the latter
actually being the PRG party organ. And there is also the
mouthpiece of the PGT itself, Tribuna Popular.
The Communists in Guatemala have continued to be uniformly
successful in gaining wide circulation of their propaganda
in the pro-Communist press of the country, particularly under
the "peace" tag. Their propaganda development has followed
the familiar international Communist pattern, adapted to the
geographic, economic, cultural, and political conditions of
the country. While eulogy of the Soviet regime and policies
has its part, the dominant tone is set by attacks on propaganda
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targets carefully selected to build up antagonism and
hatred toward free world influence, to discredit the leaders
of nations opposing Communism, and to undermine domestic
anti-Communist leadership. All this is approached, of course,
by the Communist technique of identifying Communism with
nationalism.
3. Front Organizations
Coupled with this Communist influence in the public informa-
tion media are the Communist-front organizations which serve
as sounding boards to echo and re-echo the Communist line.
More importantly, these mass organizations afford means of
cadre recruitment, general indoctrination, and agitation,
while providing organizational and other links with parent
international Communist organizations.
The creation of mass organizations is an integral step in
the familiar Communist pattern for penetration and seizure
of power within a free country, and in Guatemala the Com-
munists have followed the usual practice of creating politi-
cally orientated associations among the social and cultural
groups into which society can most readily be divided. It
has not mattered that Guatemala is a great distance from the
rest of the Soviet world. The Guatemalan Communist Party has
tried to identify itself with many of the aspirations and
hopes of the Guatemalan people and has formed those institu-
tions whereby it hopes to influence an increasing number of
citizens toward a form of political awareness that leads them
to identify themselves with the objectives of the Communist
Party.
Apart from the labor organizations, the most powerful and
important of these mass groups are: the National Peace
Committee, the Alliance of Democratic Youth of Guatemala
(AJDG), the Democratic University Front (FUD), the Guatemalan
Women's Alliance (AFG), the Confederation of Post-Primary
Students (CEP), and the Saker7Ti Group of Young Intellectuals
and Writers. Guatemalan mass organizations virtually always
contain a PGT member, under the discipline of the Party
Political Committee, in a key position, usually as Secretary
General or Secretary for Organization. Most of these organi-
zations are affiliated with a recognized international Com-
munist organization, paralleling the affiliation of the CGTG
with the CTAL and WFTU.
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F. Analysis of Communist Influence
Although the growth of Communist influence in Guatemala dates
from the revolution of 1944, its acceleration stems from the advent of
the Arbenz administration, which came to power in 1951. It has been
said that the key to the Communist success is the attitude of the ad-
ministrations of Arevalo and, particularly, of Arbenz toward Communism.
This is true insofar as the tolerance of and collaboration with the
Communists has permitted their activities to flourish virtually unchecked.
It is also true when one considers the fact that, politically speaking,
the Guatemalan executive has had the power to wipe out the Communist
movement and has refrained from doing so. But this is only part of the
answer to the Communist success--their organizing abilities, their opera-
tional techniques, their clandestine training, and their concentration of
purpose equipped them to make the most of their opportunities.
Today, as active supporters and collaborators with the Arbenz
government, Communists and pro-Communists are continuing to increase their
strength and prestige. They can be found in all departments of government.
Four of the 56 deputies in the national legislature are Communists, and
many other legislators are fellow travelers and crypto-Communists. At
least one pro-Communist sits on the Supreme Court. The executive depart-
ment, from the office of the President to various ministries and the Na-
tional Agrarian Department, is honeycombed with Communists and their
sympathizers. Although the Communists have yet to gain a Cabinet post,
two pro-Communists have held the post of Foreign Minister and one pro-
Communist is at present Minister of the Interior. Communists and con-
firmed fellow travelers hold key positions in the Social Security Institute,
the National Agrarian Department, and the Ministry of Labor. The two
top Communists, Fortuny and Gutierrez, have ready access to President
Arbenz. Pro-Communists hold important diplomatic posts abroad'and in the
U. N. The Department of Press, Propaganda, and Tourism `is heavily in-
filtrated by Communists and fellow travelers, and, as previously noted,
so are the official press and radio.
Yet despite all this, and despite, too, the important positions
which still-hidden Communists and pro-Communists hold within the non-
Communist administration parties, the PGT is small and the Communist
movement has no real mass support worthy of the name. Communists in
Guatemala exercise a disproportionate influence in national life. The
Communist subversion of Guatemala is a subversion by a minority. The
country has a population of around 2,900,000. The PGT National Conference
in August 1953 claimed a 100-percent rise in membership, but this would
give it only about 2,000 official members. Even adding to this the
probably substantial numbers of Communists who have not openly identified
themselves with the Party, the fact remains that the PGT has obtained its
position of influence without achieving a real rank-and-file following
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MaNsaw
dedicated to Communism. Labor is but a cat's-paw and blindly follows the
Communists, who mouth its own immediate aspirations and inflame its sen-
sibilitigs; the peasants are following the same road. Within the other
parties, the Communists have apparently concentrated on positions of
leadership, without paying obvious attention to the lower echelons. There
seems no reason to believe, however, that they will not continue to in-
crease and solidify their influence.
The story of Guatemala also shows how international Communism is
at work in areas of the world remote from the Soviet orbit. Local Com-
munists in Guatemala have not achieved their power without continuous aid
and support from Communist figures from outside Guatemala. Mention has
already been made of the several foreign Communists who initially advised
the young CTG; the principal foreign group consisted of Salvadoran exiles.
During the years when the CTG and FSG were veering toward final merger,
a further large influx of Communist visitors from abroad helped advance
local capabilities. These visitors were Communists from Chile, Cuba,
Brazil, Mexico, and Costa Rica, many of whom were leaders of their re-
spective parties or important figures in the CTAL. In 1951, Louis
Saillant, Secretary General of the WFTU, and Lombardo Toledano of the
CTAL came to Guatemala and helped to achieve the unity of labor under
Communist control.
During the early years of the revolutionary parties, their in-
doctrination was influenced by other foreign Communists from neighboring
countries. A further upsurge of contacts with the international Communist
movement occurred in 1952., when Fortuny and other PCG members were reported
as participating in the Administration's political conferences. There
were more foreign visitors to Guatemala, as well as trips by some PCG
figures to Moscow and Peking. Even before this, however, there had begun
a continuous flow of Guatemalan Communist leaders to the Soviet capital,
including Fortuny, Gutierrez, Pellecer, etc.
There have continued to be frequent visits by Latin American Com-
munist leaders to Guatemala which, today, has become a focal point of Com-
munism for neighboring areas where there are conditions less favorable to
the development of strong local Communist groups. And the PGT leadership
is in contact with the main current of international Communism through
participation in a variety of international conferences and congresses,
sponsored by the WFTU, the World Peace Council, the World Federation of
Democratic Youth, the International Union of Students, etc. Indeed, the
story of Guatemala shows that it is not necessarily required that the
Communists erect a full-fledged People's Democracy in the Western Hemi-
sphere in order to advance toward their objective of destroying its united
opposition to Soviet world domination.
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