COMMUNISM COMMUNIST PARTY CAPABILITES UNDER WARTIME CONDITIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-00915R000200190002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 1, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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0
IA-12
COPY No.
COMMUNISM
COMMUNIST PARTY CAPABILITIES
UNDER WAR']~IME CONDITIONS
INTERIM REPORT
ON
ARGENTINA, BRAZIL., COLOMBIA, COSTA RICA,
CUBA, ECUADOF,, PANAMA, VENEZUELA
APRIL 1952
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INT~.ODUGTORY NOTE
ARGENTINA
BRAZIL
CHILE
COLOMBIA
COSTA RICA
GUBA
ECUADOR
PANAMA
VENEZUELA
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TN'~'RODUCTORY I?TOTE
25X1A2g
1. The following survey of capabilities of certain Communist
Parties in Latin Am?rica under assumed wartime conditions was pre-
pared by the issuing office from replies to questionnaires sent to its
Like its predecessor, on Com-
munist wartime capabilities ia~ several African and Middle Eastern
countries, the present survey is an interim effort,. subject to further
revision.
2a The suanmary was prepared in the spring of 19520
3, As in the previous sanmmary, the emphasis here is on the or-
ganized assets and facilities cif the Communist Parties which would
eanable the Parties to maintain themselves under conditions of probable
wartime suppression, sand to ;~.ssist the USSR by organized sabotage, .
espionage, military action, o:r disruptive propaganda.
4a The estimates and views contained herein are primarily those
25X1A62pf the issuing office?s A certain amoaant of
editing and interpolation lass been performed, but it has been kept to
a minimum, except in the cases of Cuba and Brazil, and leas not substara-~
tially altered the conclusioans coantained in the responses to the question-
naire, with the exceptions noted,
5, In view of the tentative nature of this report, recipients are
requfesf-ed to forward:c~atici~nrr~, a.dditiona.l a:nfora~ia.t~.oa~, estimates
and/or any-data which could serve to improve this report, The final
versioan of the .report is to present firm assumptions on Communist
security-knot political) threats and problems to arise under assumed
wartime conditions
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The Partido Comunista de Argentina (PCAj~ is a well organized
CP which has maintained itself' under conditions of partial suppression
for several years. ~
The Party's main value t:o the USSR in the event of an East-
West War would be the popular support it could rally in favor of
Argentine neutrality. If the .Aa~gentine Government followed a policy
of full or partial support to the West, the Party would be able to carry
out only a small amount of propaganda and agitation to embarrass the
Government, and small-scale sabotage of food and raw materials ship-
ments to the Western Allies.
Unless economic, social, and political conditions deteriorated
badly, the Communists could n:ot expect to rally substantial popular
support for a defi Hite anti.-Go~-ernment policy, nor to foment an
uprising.
Underground ?rganization
The PCA has had experience in operating clandestinely and could
probably maintain itself underground in the event of more repression
than it is now experiencing. There is no evidence that it has stepped
up its preparations for going underground.
Communications
The PCA could maintain secure courier communications.
Propaganda Equipment
The Party would have great difficulty in obtaining equipment and
materials to publish any quantity of clandestine literature: Argentine
authorities closely control printing plants and the supply of newsprint.
Safe Space for Underground Operations
Living conditions in Bue~noa Aires would make it fairly easy for
the Party to obtain secure spa~ue for small meetings and hide -outs
~ Note: The following observations to not reflect on the relations of
the "Dissidents" to tlhe PCA, nor on their capabilities,
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o.
sufficient for minimum operations.
Wartime Solvency
The PCA is short of money naw and would probably have trouble
financing itself in wartime.
Strength and Capabilities of the Hard Care
Party membership is about 30, 000. It is not known what percentage
would remain loyal and active in the face of vigorous repression.
Strength is concentrated in Buenos Aires, and Rosario and
Cordoba provinces. Wartime propaganda and sabotage activities would
be concentrated in the same areas. Argentine authorities have fairly
complete lists of Argentine and foreign Communists, and could probably
round up large numbers in an ~emergency~ -
Resistance Operations
The PCA is not prepared to engage in military actiono It might
carry out political assassinations and small-scale acts of violence.
However, the topography of the country and the fact that the interior is
sparsely settled would make it: extremely difficult to carry on guerrilla
warfare.
Potential leaders far military action number at the most Z, 000 men
--veterans of the Spanish Civil War, Italian resistance, and a few French
and Slavs.
Maximum manpower available to the Party for military operations
is estimated at 4, OOOo
The Party is believed to have no substantial quantity of weapons and
could probably not obtain any by raiding police stations or army dumps.
Sabotage
The Party has no secret sabotage organization. Some leaders have
given lectures on sabotage to small groups of Communists, but it is not
known that a systematic program has been undertaken.,
Probable sabotage targets would bee the railroads; the .frigorificos;
port areas of Rosario, San Lorenzo, Buenas Aires, Comodoro R.ivadavia,
Bahia Blanca, and Necochea. San Lorenzo, La Plata, and. Comodoro_
Rivadavia would be most profitable to the Communists because they are
the petroleum ports. Several Slav Communist cells exist in. these areas
and might be able to interfere with petroleum shipping by sabotage and
labor agitation>
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Subversion of Armed and Security Services
Communist influence in the Armed Services is negligible. It was
believed at one time to be gre;.ter in the police, but the present degree of
penetration is not known.
Wartime Propaganda
Communist propaganda in the event of an East-West war would be
aimed at maintaining the neutrality of Argentina.
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The Partido Comunista Brasileiro (PCB) has been semi-illegal
since PJlay 1847. Not until recently, however, has the Government
made serious efforts to suppress it.
The Party has retained most of its members during the period
from 1g46, but -has lately been losing sympathizers.
In the event of an East-~M1~est War? the Party could maintain itself
underground? could carry out propaganda against Brazilian support to
the U. S. , could carry out a certain amount of sabotage and generate
labor trouble sufficient to hinaler Brazilian economic support of the U. S.
The ability of the Party to raiise a successful revolution is not known
and would depend largely upon future events,
Underground Organization
It is not clear to what exaent PCB structure i s being reorganized
to meet increasing government pressure. The organization was not
changed greatly when the Party was outlawed in 1g47. A striking
feature of the period of semi-]legality was a remarkable proliferation
of all kinds of fronts behind which the Gomrnunists were able to carry
out political work in relative freedom.
There have been scattered reports lately that Party organizations
have been destroying their files in some places. Also a pamphlet has
been circulated instructing Communists how to behave in case of arrest.
The PGB has had enoitgl~ experience in operating underground to
enable it to go underground again with reasonable efficiency and speed
in case of war.
The PCB already has secure courier service Operating personnel
on the airlines and railroads t-ave been identified as Party couriers.
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Propaganda Equipment
The Party already has a.n underground press networko Mimeo-
graphed publications are distributed in factories,. and small newspapers
have appeared even iai sparsely settled areas.
Estimates of the Party':a supply of newsprint are conflictinge One
report stated that it had a "good reservem" Another report, however,
said that the Party was running short of paper and had had to cut the
size of its editions of V'oz Operaria frarn 60, 000 to 8, OOOo A number of
publishing houses and importi~~g firms are supposed to be contributing
to the ~'arty's supply of gaper,
In `the event of war, the PCB could probably continue to issue
clandestine propaganda, but tree Government could also interfere with
the Party's ability to get more: than minimum supplies of paper and
other materialso
Safe Space for Underground Operations
The Party has been able to find adequate secure places for meeting
and for housing "wanted'" functionaries. There is no reason to believe
that it would not have adequate housing in wartime.
Replacement of Cadre
The PCB has enough experienced cadres to replace at least the
"front line" leaders, should they be arrestedo In 1947, when many of
the best-known functionaries went underground, their places were taken
by cadres who were not well known to the authorities.
Wartime Solvency
There are a number of urealthy sympathizers and secret Party
members who would enable the: party to remain solvent and to manage
its financial transactions securely in event of war?
Brazilian authorities believe that the Party has received fu.~.ri ; from
abroad through Soviet and Satellite diplomatic. and trade establish.iro.entso
Strength and Capabilities of the Hard Core
Party membership seems to have remained fairly constant at
about 150, 000 since 1946. An increasing number of sympathizers has
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been falling away from the Pay~ty since 1947. No firm estimate of
the number of Party members who would remain loyal in case of war
has been received.
There have recently been a numbex of defections and expulsions
of Party members for nationalistic tendencies. How seriously
nationalism would cut into the Party in the crisis of an East-West War
is not known. The most prominent of the expellees, Jose Maria Crispim,
has been trying to organize a lvational CP not tied to the USSR, but
appears thus far to have met vrith little success.
Popular Appeal
The political influence of the Party has been several times its
membership (1945 elections, E~00, 000 votes for the Communist Presi-
dential candidate: 10?fo of the total electorate )o
Pacifism and isolationism are powerful political forces in Brazil
and might be capitalized upon by the Communists. However, the
Communist "Peace" campaign has become more and more bogged down.
The ability of the Party to capture the support of the "masses" in
wartime depends too much upon events and economic-social-political
conditions in the future to make a realistic estimate possible.
Resistance Qperations
The PCB would probably undertake guerrilla operations in the event
of war. It has putout numerous pamphlets on tactics, organizations,
and weapons-procurement, The Party has been responsible for many acts
of violence, Communists have been arrested and found to be in possession
of weapons stolen from Arrny warehouses.
In addition, there have been many reports to the effect that the
Party has been holding courses in guerrilla warfare and street-fighting;
that "paramilitary" formation~a have been organized, and that weapons
have been smuggled into Brazil from abroad.
It is not possible to estimate how far the Party has actually-gone
in planning for military action, or how successful it would be in a
serious military effort against: the Government, The principle which
would probably be followed was given in a document captured in June 1950
which outlined an armed uprising based upon the countryside (the Chinese
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model). Coupled with this would be an attempt to raise a mutiny in
the Army and general strike action in the cities. The present increasing
action by the Government against Communists in the armed services
could wreck the Party's scheme in that direction.
Sabotage
Communists have been committing acts of sabotage for some time.
During July 1950, Brazilian aU.thorities attributed to the Party 134 acts
of sabotage on the Central Railroad in the State of Minas Gerais alonee
Methods employed were: removal of spikes and ,)amrning of switch
controls.
The railroads are very vulnerable to sabotage and at the end of
1950 it was reported that the Party was making special efforts to recruit
railroad workers,
It was also suggested in 1950 that the Air Force bases at Fortaleza,
Natal, Recife, and Porto .Alegre were likely targets for Communist
sabotage because of the atreng;th of the Party in those areas.
Only a few industrial plants have undertaken steps to guard against
sabotage .
One source reports that Party pamphlets on the techniques of
sabotage have been seized by t:he police. Another source says that the
Party has sabotage training schools.
It is not known whether ~~,ny kind of an organized sabotage plan or
system actually exists, Neither has there been any reasoned estimate
of the Party's ability to disrupt Brazilian economy in the event of war.
Subversion of Armed and Security Services
The PCB has a long history of successful penetration of the Armed
Serviceso The main element of the abortive 1935 uprising was the Alianca
National Libertadora (ANL), which was a Communist front organization
set up to penetrate the Arrny,
The Party is believed to have a secret military committee and a
structure of secret and "insulated" cells within the Arrnyo
Most spectacular, howe,aer, has been the exposure of strong
Gomxriunist influence within the army afficerso organization called the
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Clube Militare The organizati.on's publication followed the Communist
line on the Korean war, and a number of its members (up to rank of
major) have been classified as Communists and arrestedo
Party influence has been; strongest arn.ong the enlisted ranks of
the armed serviceso The Ser~;eants? Club, the Airforce Petty Officers?
and Sergeants? Club, and the firazilian Ex-Cornbattants Association
are believed to have been heavily infiltrated by Party members and
sympathizers. A number of Communists connected with the Sergeants'
Club have recently been arrested, The Serg~ants? Club in Sao Paulo
was closed by the police in the: summer of 19510
Vigorous action taken by the Government in the services in the
past few months may spoil the chances .for the Party to cause serious
trouble in the event of war o
It has been estimated that the Party has not penetrated the criminal
investigation police or the military police, which is the force employed
against the Cornmunistso The extent of penetration of the traffic police
is not known, although the Party?s chances are better here, because of
the very low pay-scale.
Espionage
The PCB could probably perform industrials military and political
espionage for the Soviets in the event of war.
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T /"QT TT !/""/~TTTT /\T
General
The GP has been operating underground since 1948. It could
probably maintain a skeleton organization in the event of an East-West
War, despite probable increasing repression by a Government
friendly to the U. S. It would ].o se most of its mass following, however.
The Party could not overthrovc~ the government. It could carry on
industrial espionage for the Soviets, It could achieve a limited amount
of physical and economic sabotage. The government would be able
to round up most of the leaders of the Party and could quickly taunter
its sabotage efforts.
Underground ?rganization
The CP Chile was made illegal in 1948. However, Government
suppressive measures have been far from severe, -The Party has had
a taste of semi-underground existence. The experience gained should
enable it to carry on clandestinely in the event of war without radical
readjustment of its organizational and security practices.
The GP has developed a secure communications system, with a
net of mail-drop, safe-houses and couriers,
Propaganda Equiprnexit
There is no evidence th:~.t the Party has provided for the production
of clandestine propaganda by caching equipment. It has had difficulty
in its semi-underground period in finding secure presses and supplies.
Replacement of Gadres
Party leaders lived for atime clandestinely. It is believed that a
"second-string" leadership is also being trained to take over in case
the present cadre is knocked Gaut. It has recently been reported that
whenever a group meets, at least one of its leaders stays away9 so
that at least a skeleton of leaders would escape if the Government- should
raid the meeting.
The Party is even now chronically short of money. Declining
membership contributions would hamper the Party's operations in wartime,
but not enough to put. it out of business entirely.
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There was evidence some: time ago that funds had been sent in
from abroad and that the Party has a cushion in dummy firms set up
by foreign capital, but nothing further in this regard has been received
recently.
Stren th and Capabilities of the "Hard Gore"
V1~artime restrictions are expected to prune the PartyBS member-
ship and its mass-following considerably. An estimated 2-5, 000
people of an estimated current membership of 40, 000 would remain
loyal and active. They would be concentrated in economically important
areas; the industrial and coal :mining areas near Concepcion, the
Santiago industrial area, and t1Le northern nitrate and copper regions
and ports.
Popular Appeal
It is expected that left-wingers who now sympathize with the
Communists would retreat in the event of a war and vigorous repressive
measures. Only the small leftist parties that are most strongly infil-
trated by Communists ~"Dernoc:rato del Pueble," the Anthentic Socialist
Party, and the Dactrinary Radical Party) could be counted on for much
support by the CP. Depending on events prior to a war, the two
important Socialist Parties might support the Gommunists.
Resistance Operations
It is unlikely that- the GP would attempt military operations, but
would rather develop sabotage and political propaganda against.Chile's
support of the U, S, as a more profitable activity.. The Party probably
has no substantial quantity of arms. Unconfirmed reports have been
received to the effect that the 1?arty is attempting to form "Comando"
groups in each commune, but even as a plan, current evidence is that
it has not been implemented.
Sabotage .,,
The Party has done no s~rsternatic sabotage planning other than to
indicate to its militants that it expects local and. individual-initiative
in calling and supporting small. strikes and striking at industrial targets
of opportunity. Thus, no general strike is expected, but rather, a
series of local actions wherevE:r the Communists are in a position to
call them.
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Sabotage Targets
Interference in nitrate a:nd copper production and with the shipping
parts for these commodities vv~ould be the most serious threat the
Communists could offer the U, S. in case of war, The Government plans
to round up Communist leaders in an emergency and believes that it
will be able to assure normal production of strategic minerals. Most
vulnerable, owing to Communist strength are: the Huachipato steel-
producing plant near Concepcion; coal production at Lota and Coronel,
near Concepcion; the power plant at Tacopilla, which supplies power to
Chile ~ s largest copper mine at: Chuquicamata, is reportedly extremely
vulnerable to sabotage from within, or to possible attack by enemy
submarine because of its exposed position on the coast.
The Party has instructed its militants to encourage labor trouble s
at the nitrate and copper shipping portso
Subversion of Armed and Security Service
The CP probably has no substantial organization in Chile?s defense
farces. The Juventud Comunista, however, has reportedly been charged
with astepped-up infiltration ~~rograrn~ Twa retired Arrny Generals
(Guillerma PORTALES and Oavaldo VALECIA Zapata) are believed to
be Communist sympathizers. It is believed, however, that Communist
penetration of the Armed Forces or the Investigaciones could not become
dangerous within the forseeab:Le futureo
Espionage
Unless Chile should engage directly in military hostilities, which
seems unlikely, the Communists are not expected to be particularly
interested in military intelligence. Probably, an informal type of
information-collecting service, would be organized to cover industrial
production and shipping.
Wartime Propaganda
The Party would intensify its propaganda efforts to weaken the
Government's position. A major element of the campaign would be aimed
at arousing hostilityr to a Government that cooperated closely with the
U. S. Neither racial disturbaa~nces nor peace riots are expected. The
most the Communists could hope for would be harassment.
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Security Problems
The Government is trying to make plans for mass arrests and
internment of Communists, for plant protection in,strategic industries,
and for preventing CP propaganda. It has a list of about 21, 000 known
and suspected Communists and the list is kept current. By taking
action against these people, th.e Government could seriously interfere
with the Party's wartime ability to assist the USSR,
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COLOMBIA
It is estimated that the Communists could do very little to assist
the USSR in the event of an East-West warn The Party would be
reduced to a small "hard core19 without political influenced It could,
and probably would, attempt to carry out sabotage of the petroleum
industry. It would probably try to raise labor strikes. Unless the
Liberals also produced labor difficulties, however, the Communists
would not be able to raise a general strike, Party leaders are
identified and could be picked up, but only if the Police raised their
efficiency,
Undergraund Organization
The CP Colombia has already gone underground to a certain
extent, Basic organizations have been reduced in size to no more than
five members. All but a small. part of the Party's archives were
destroyed in December 1950 to prevent seizure by the police, Security
preparations have been increased, particularly since the naming of
Luis Ignacio ANDRADE as Mi.ni.ster of Governments The Party has
been considering the creation of a secret committee to be headed by
Father Enrique PEREZ Arbelaez to take over in case of emergency.
Party communications have been through the regular mails and
occasional use of courierso It is believed that no well-organized,
secure communications system has been created; however, it is
believed that the Communists would have no difficulty in organizing one
if necessaryo
Propaganda Equipment
The Party disposed of mast of its printing equipment because
could not afford to operate a regular presso Its literature is now
mimeographed, Two or three ~vlandestine leaflets are being published
in Bogota, Medellin, and Calio In the event of war, the Party would
find it harder to put out written propaganda, but could pra'oably continue
to distribute mimeographed material clandestinely,
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Space for Underground Operations
The Communists would probably always be able to find places
where small groups could meea in safetya No information is available
as to whether safe -houses have been obtained for hiding Party leaders
or for housing headquarters oi:ficeso
Replacement of Cadre
It is believed that the Party could replace current leaders without
much difficultyo A Communist source estimates that there is a group
of about fifty persons from which new leaders could be recruited. It
was not estimated whether these persons were experienced or would
be efficient leaderse
Wartime Solvency
The Party has difficulty raising adequate funds now, and would
undoubtedly be hard pressed i~a wartime o
Strength and Capabilities of the Hard Core
Severe repression wouldl seriously reduce Party membership, which
has been falling off since 194.5,. Present membership is about 2, 500, but
a large number of these would desert in wartimeo Hundreds of persons
quit the Party in the ernergenc:y following the April 1948 riotse The
remaining'vhard core'P would be incapable of carrying out major propa-
ganda activities; would probably devote itself to physical sabotage,
attempts to raise strikes, and to commit espionage,
Popular Appeal
The declining popular attraction of the Party is reflected in
declining elections voting for :Party candidates Q1~, 000 in 1945; less than
5, 000 in 1951). All sources a?;ree that the Party?s appeal would decline
still further in the. event of an East-West War.
Resistance Operations
It is extremely doubtful that the Party would attempt to organize
a resistance organization. 1t has no militarily experienced. leaders.
There is a going arms traffic, and weapons would be available easily
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to Communists. However, prices a.re high, and most people would not
be able to buy a weapon without financial assistance.
It is probable that the Communists would support the anti-
Gavernment guerrilla groups that are currently operating in Colombia
in the event of war, It is not known whether large numbers of
Communists would join the existing bands or whether they would be
in a position to get control of any significant section of the guerrilla
movement..
Sabotage.
The Communists have not organized a sabotage network, nor is
there- evidence that they have made any plans to do so. It is believed
that the Party does not have any trained saboteurs who could give
training to others .
The main sabotage target would be the refinery at Barrancabermeja.
A secondary target would be the power plant at E1 Centro. Sabotage of
these two would effectively stop oil production and processing. The oil
companies have emergency plant-protection plans, and the producing
company, which is run by the Government, could call in troops for
protection.
Communists in the ports at Barranquilla and Cartagena, and in the
smaller ports of Buenaventura and ;5anta Marta could undertake to
sabotage port installations by burning. Fire is a serious problem in
Colombian fire preventive measures are inadequate and fire-fighting
is usually ineffective.
Colombian railroads are not adequately protected and are therefore
vulnerable to sabotage. Bridges are guarded and in the event of war,
the guard would be improved. The National Police are responsible for
protection of the Bogota water supply.
Among other industrial plants, those that are run by Americans
are better protected than the rest.
The Communist objective in sabotage would be to embarrass the
Government and to disrupt the economy. Colombia is not a direct source
of war materials.
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Subversion of Armed and Security Services
There is no evidence of Communist penetration of the armed
services. A Communist source agrees that there is none of any
importance .
The Police, likewise, seem to be free from Communist infiltra-
tion. There have been cases of the Party?s having been forewarned
of raids, but this is believed to be the result of poor security in the
Police, rather than the presence of Communist informants.
Espionage
It is doubted that the Party could produce significant military,
scientific, or industrial information for the Soviets in the event of war.
Yf the targets in Colombia warranted, the Soviets would probably try to
set up -their own networks independent of the Party. They would have
difficulty in recruiting by ideological persuasion agents and informants
in position to obtain informa.t:ion; would probably have to depend upon
buying information. There are a number of leftist professional men
(mostly lawyers; some, former Communists) who might provide general
information for the USSR; however, many of these could be arrested
and convicted.
Economic Warfare
The basis of Colombia?s economy is coffee, and since the crop could
not be effectively sabotaged, aa~d since coffee would continue to be in
demand abroad, it is unlikel~a~ that the Communists could seriously disrupt
the domestic economy.
Wartime Propaganda
Communist propaganda woa~ld probably be aimed at exploiting the
difference between Colombia's two traditional political parties (Liberals
and Conservatives) and at increasing the friction within the Government
The present Conservative Government has control of the Army but it is
unpopular ,
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The Communist Vanguax~dia Popular is believed to be incapable
of rendering assistance to the USSR in the event of an East-West War.
It is small, poorly led, and c~;~rrently undergroundo It has no political
power. Government agencies have identified most Communists and
would be able to arrest them in an emerge~acy. The country is too
small to permit significant underground organization or operations.
Underground Organization
The Vanguardia Popular was o~.tlawed in 194$ and was almost.
totally destroyed, Under continuous, suppression it has slowly created
a weak, cladestine organization. Secret activities are very difficult
because the country is so small and the people inclined to gossip.
The- Party has no regular communications system, It uses Party
travellers as couriers and ha?: a number of cover addresses.
Propaganda Equipment
Attempts to a stablish a clande atine press have failed, partly owing
to lack of money and partly, to the impossibility of maintaining a print-
ing establishment secretly. 'T'here are three mimeograph establishments
currently in operationo Their locations are known to the Government,
which has not raided them for political reasons,
The Party has. made no plans for the acquisition and storage of
printing equipment and supplies.
Space for Underground Operations
It is believed that the Communists would have the greatest diffi-
culty in obtaining aid maintaining hideouts in the event of war,
Replacement of Cadre
The Party has always s~nffered acutely from personnel shortages.
In case of war, it would not be able to replace any of its cadre with any
type of personnel, known or u:raknown to the authorities.
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Wartime Solvency
The Party is now "in the red," and would probably be unable to
set up any kind of a secret rnoa~:ey administrating organization (secret
accounts, dummy firms, etc. ).
Strength and Capabilities of the Hard Core
Severe undergrouxnd hardship is expected to totally paralyze
attendance at meetings, participation in literature dissemination, and
general activities, The "hard Bore" consists of about four personso
Popular Appeal
Resistance Operationns
No capability.
Sabotage
Sabotage capabilities of the Party are practically Wile
Targets of remotely possible sabotage attempts would be dock
facilities at Limon and Puntarenas; railroad bridges, San Jose -Limon and
San Jose-Puntarenas; airport sit San Jose; banana company installations,
Ue S, petroleum interests.
On the other hand, it wogald be quite possible for foreign sabotage
agents to operate in Costa Ric~~, either against targets .there, or using
it as a base for operations against the Panama Canal, Border controls
are inadequate and local law eY~forcement agencies are not equipped to
handle professional saboteurs or other types of agento Persons have
often moved about the cou~.try :for several years without any documentation
at cello
Subversion of Armed and Security Forces
Nilo Infiltration might result if the Calderon Guardia party returned
to powero The Armed services are fully capable of preventing penetrations
Espionage
No capabilityo
No capabilitya Labor is anti-Communisto
" -20-
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How the Comm~x~ists in (~uba, in their party called the Partido
Socialists Popular ~PSP~, will make out as the Batista regime develops
is not yet clear. Upon this, of course, depends their ability to assist
the Soviets in some futu:~.re East-West Wara
In the past, the PSP has had reasonably good leadership, by
Latin American~Communist sts~,ndardse l.t succeeded in greatly
expanding its political power after 1933, and Communists entered the
Governments of Batista in 1940 and of Grav San Martin in 1944 as the
result of political deals,
Recently, however, the l?arty has been declining, politically,
financially, and psych.ologicall~y, It is believed capable of maintaining
itself in the event of war and probable suppression by the pro-U. S.
Government. It could not, barring substantial changes in the political
and economic climate, hope to overthrow the Government, either by
peaceful political means or by force< Serious military action would also
be unlikely. Oan the other hand, the sugar industry offers many targets
for sabotage, and the result of a strong sabotage program could be
very serious to the U. S. and also to the internal economy of .Cuba. In
general, a program of sabotage of the sugar industry, coupled with
anti-LJ. S. propaganda is~ the direction PSP wartime effort would most
logically take o
Undergrous~.d Organization
A number of sources reported that the Party was reorganizing,
or had made plans to reorganize, against the possibility of suppression
in 19510 Details of the reorga~s.ization scheme as reported varied
somewhat, but ha.d iag common the pri~aciples of de centralization (smaller
cells, more responsibility put on local ciirectiong organs restrictions on
lateral contacts betweea~ orgsxnsy and the imposition of standard organiza-
tional ar~d personal seca~trity measures.
According to oxne fairly reliable source, no reorganization would
actually take place w~ntil suppreassion had begun, in order that the Party
might coa~ntinue to exercise m~~s:im~.m political influence.
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As early as the summer of 1950, it was reported that the Party
was destroying some of its records, and in November, statements were
made in Party publications calling for an increase in "revolutionary
vigilance" to prevent the infill;ration of unstable and hostile persons
into Party organs.
Despite the fact that Bar;ista cooperated with the Party during
his previous administration to the extent of permitting it to carry
out open political activities, it is probable that he will take a firmer
stand against Communism during his present rule. One Communist
leader has already written to a contact abroad that Batista had begun
to put pressure on the Party ~~nd that some leaders might soon .have
to take refuge abroad, in Guatemala, preferrably.
If, as seems likely, th~~ pressure continues, the Party will be
forced to go completely underground. Having had previous experience
in clandestine existence, and plenty of opportunity to prepare for it
again? the Communists should be able to maintain at least a skeleton
organization, and could continue-to operate in the event of an East-
West War.
It is b elieved that a secure courier system is already in operation,
utilizing women and boys in the cities, and bus drivers and conductors
going into the interior of the country.
Prior to the Batista Co~xp, it was also reported that a number of
Party members in public coxr.~munications facilities were expediting
secure transmittal of Party messages. They could be expected to
continue this until weeded out by the Government.
It has also been reported in the past that a number of Cuban "ham"
radio operators were Communists. It is possible that a radio net could
be maintained for some time.
There have been Party members on the staffs of standard broad-
cast stations. It is not incon~~eivable that such personnel could be used
to transmit disguised messages in wartime until they were identified
and arrested.
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Propaganda Equipment
The Party should be able to maintain a clandestine press in wartime,
When the Party newspaper, Hay, was banned in 1950, enough equipment
and supplies were removed to a private print shop to put out an illegal
paper. During this period, a small paper, Mediodia9 was published
fairly regularly,
In wartime, the Party would not be able to issue a substitute paper
with impunity as it did in 1950, when America. 7eportiva simply took
the place of Hoy and was distributed openly. America Deportiva is
believed to have been printed in a secret shop.
It has been reported that the Party has cached away newsprint
and distributed mimeograph rriachines to trusted individuals in small
towns. One source (rated "E") stated that "technical departments" would
be organized at national and provincial le vela to prepare for and carry
out the work of clandestine printing and distribution of underground
propaganda.
Safe Space for Underground Operations
Party meetings have been held for some time in houses of secret
Party members and sympathi:~ers, and the Communists are expected to
be able to obtain and maintain a sufficient number of safe-houses for
meetings and the housing of important, hunted leaders in wartime.
One report that has not been confirmed and that is "unusual" to
say the least, held that in 19413 a Communist "spelunker" made a tour
of mountainous areas to locate caves which might be used as hide -outs
and headquarters in case the :Party ever undertook guerrilla warfare,
The question of safe space depends largely on the main role the
Party would undertake in wartime. If emphasis were put upon sabotage
of the sugar industry, or guerrilla operations, then safe quarters would
be sought in the couii.try-sides If emphasis were put on political agitation
in Habana, then safe houses v~~ould have to be found in or near the cityo
Replacement of Cadre
On the one hand, it is probable that the Party has enough trained
cadres to replace the "first-string" in case it were rounded up, and
there have been reports to the: effect that little-known individuals have
already been designated to tape over in an emergencyo On the other
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hand, Cuban authorities are beaieved capable of identifying any replace-
ments soon after they begin to works The Party does not have so many
efficient cadres that it could support a series of replacements if the
government kept up a campaigns of large-scale arrests and intensive
inve sti.gation.
Wartime Solvency
It has been estimated th~~.t the Party would be able in wartime to
maintain secret bank accounts in the name of trusted secret Party
members and sympathizers. 'That it has been following this practice
for some time was demonstrated by the exposure in January 1952 of
such a trusted individual who Yiad embezzled over $13, 000 of Party
funds kept to his account in the: Royal Bank of Canadao
There have been indications that the Party is having financial
difficultiesa These would undoubtedly increase in wartime, and problems
of handling them, also. However, it is believed that the Party could
finance the restricted activities of which it would be capable in wartime .
Strength and Capabilities of Hard Core
The Party claimed that i.t had 19, 000 "militants" in February 1950.
It is difficult to estimate how many of these would remain both loyal
and active in conditions of wartime suppression: 10, 000 would be a
generous estimate, Cuban aut:h.orities have an automatic arrest list which
contains about 1, 000 nameso
Popular Appeal
In the partial elections of ,dune 1951, PSP candidates received about
151, 000 votes - 70 4% of the total ballot, This ways about 24, 000 mare
than the officially registered Clommunist voters in 1949? In the registra-
tions of autumn 1951, only 59, 000 registered as Communist voterso
Whether these figures reflect a proportionate decline in the present
popular appeal of Communism., or simply a decline in the number of
persons willing to register as Communist, is impossible to says
It is also impossible to :Foretell the mass political effects of th.e
new Batista regime.
In the event of war, the sugar economy would depend entirely on
the Western market, and military circumstances would dictate economic
conditions in Cuba to a large extents It is unlikely that disruption of
the economy could be used to raise pro-Soviet sympathies directly, but
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the Communists coa~ld capitalize upon it indirectly, through front
.organizations and labor agitation
The left wings of the PA.17 ~Partido Action LTnitaria) and of the
Partido del Pueblo Cubano (Ortodoxo), both of which were infiltrated
by the Communists, might side with the PSP in the event of war, if
the Government permitted them to function, which is not likely.
Resistance Operations
Estimates of the ability of the Ca:mmunists to carry out military
activity in wartime are conflicting, On the one hand, the capability
was reported to be great, and the Party to have a large number of
militarily trained cadreso Oa:~ the other hand, a responsible desk
officer has estimated that a military effort would succeed in recruiting
no more than a few hundred m~eno
Sabotage
There is only one industry in Cuba that is of importance to the
U~ So --the production and shipping of sugar,
The producing industry is greatly decentralized, offering many
targets for sabotage, Each P91~entral" has its own railroad lines from
mills to warehouses and to the main railroad lines; most mills have
their own power plants; molasses and alcohol plants are usually
separate from the mills.
It is of interest to note 1:hat the probable effect on PSP organization,
if the Party chose and were capable of concentrating on sabotage of the
sugar producing industry, wo~xld be a considerable decentralization,
with wide freedom being given to local organizations to act on their own.
initiative ,
It is difficult to estimatf: haw strong a hold the PSP has in the
labor that operates the prod~.cing end o.f th.e industryo In general, the
rural popu~.lations, which grow the cane, are anti-Communisto Some of
the mill unions are to some extent connected with the Partyo The
syndicates in the following esl:a.blishments are the most important of
those which are opposed to the anti-Communist Sugar Workers? Federation
(FNTA). Whether they are actually pro-Communist or are simply
opposed to the current leader ship of the anti-Commuxnist FNTA is not known
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Gomey-Mema Mill, San Nicolas, Habana Province
Central Hormiguero 1vIi11, San Fernando de Camerones, Las Villas
Central Narcisa, Yuguajay, Las Villas
Central Santa I4iiaria, Ra.nchuelo, Las Villas,
So far as shipment of sugar to the LJ, S~ is concerned, there appears to
be little chance that the Communists could seriously interfere with it
by sabotages The Communist maritime union, which like other
Communist unions parallels the anti-Communist unions and has the
same Warne, has been reported to be largely a paper organization with-
out any followingo The bulk oi: Cuban maritime workers belongs to
the anti-Communist union.
Subversion of Armed and Security Services
A very small number of Communist sympathizers are in the
Armyo They have been identified and are being watcheda
Espionage
No substantial information is available on Party plans or organization,
if any exist, to carry out espionage in wartimeo
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By itself, the CP Ecuador (PCE} is believed incapable of rendering
important assistance to the USSR directly i.n the event of an East-West
War. It could carry oalt a certain amount of sabotage, propaganda, and
espionage. It could not mount a serious military operation. Of more '
concern is the possibility that the Party could exert enough pressure
on the Government to nullify Ecuador's political and economic support
of the United States. At present, the Government appears to be not
sufficiently aware of the threat: of Communism to undertake steps to
control it. Nor has it given stay evidence of becoming aware of this
danger in the forseeable future:.
Underground Organization
The Party has been reported to have been making plans for under-
ground operations several times in the past few years, whenever it
feared that the Government might declare it illegal. There is n.o
evidence that anything concrete was ever done, however.
It is not known whether a secure internal comm~lnications system
has been organized or prepared, Ever since 1948, unconfirmed reports
have indicated that the Communists have organized a courier service
for overseas communications within the Flota Mercente Grancolombiana.
The number of couriers, mail drops, etc. , of this service has not been
determined to date .
Also reported, but unconfirmed, have been a courier service
organized by the Guayquil Port Cell aA~d another within the Grande y
Hijos Line which carries bana:~nas between Puerto Bolivar and the U. So
Propaganda Equipment
The Party is not knowca to have made definite plans for obtallAing
and hiding printing equipment .and supplies. However, it should have no
difficulty in doing so at any til:neo it already awns presses and other
duplicating equipment; a Communist-owned printing shop in Quito
recently acquired some new equipment. Nor should supplies be arA
insurmountable problems the brother of the owner of one of the largest
newspapers in Guayaquil is an active Communist,
S
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/'~ T T
Safe Space for Underground Operations
The Party would have no difficulty in establishing bases for
operations. However, owing to the small size and population of
Ecuador, it would probably noi: be able to operate undetect ed for
any time. Reports to the effect that the Party was choosing safe-
houses for headquarters if outllawed have not been confirmed.
Replacement of Gadre
The PCE would have difficulty replacing its current leadership
on all levels. It has only a fe~v capable cadres. Capable personnel
who have escaped identification thus far are probably very few.
Wartime Solvency
The PGE is believed to be capable of raising and administering
funds to a certain extent in the underground. Wealthy Party sympa-
thizers could be expected to contribute ..funds and to manage them through
secret accounts and dummy firms.
Strength and Capabilities of Hard Core
Estimated PGE mernbexship is about 5, 000. The rank and file
is believed opportunist, and if the Party were suppressed, no mare
than 1, 000 members would remain loyal and active.
Popular Appeal
Communist doctrine is riot expected to exert a strong appeal if
war comes. The Party has thus far failed to command the prestige of
the lower classes largely because. Farty leaders have lacked "political
personality" and because of th.e influence of the Catholic Church.
Despite the limited appeal of t:he Party itself, however, there is a
possibility that it could muster considerable support for anti-American
political actions through the Socialist Party, which has cooperated
closely with the PCE in the past. The Socialist Party would probably
not support the USSR directly in case of a war, but it would probably
also fail to give real support t;o the U. S. Furthermore, there is a
left-wing of the Socialist Party that would probably support the Communist
program in the event of war. Two small parties, the PRL and the
VRSE, are. also close to the F'CE in some respects and might support
it in wartime. These factors, added to the fact that the Government
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party, the MCDN, depends partially on Communist votes, make it
unlikely that the Government would act vigorously against the PCE
in the event of a warn The Party might be able to develop indirect. .
support for ita political policies in wartime far beyond what it can
directly command in memberf~hip or at the polls.
Resistance Operations
The PCE is believed incapable of raising a military resistance
force. It lacks militarily experienced personnel, and it is thought not
to have any significant stores of arms ar ammunition, Neither is it
believe@ capable of seizing weapons from Government stores in the
event of conflict.
Sabotage
It is not known if the PQ:E has organized any sabotage network or
made concrete plans for sabotage in wartime, The organization of
"sabotage committee s/? to mal+.e plans was reported in September 1950.
Targets for sabotage would be Guayaquil port facilities, oil production
at Anton, the Guayaquil-Quito railroad; factories in Guayaquil, Ambato,
and Quito; and, possibly, the :rice fields,
It should be noted that a1; present, no plans or organization exist
for plant protection against sabotage in Ecuadoro
Subversion of Armed and Security Service s
The exteiat of Communist infiltration of the Services is not known,
It has been reported that penetrations do existe The Director General
of the Seguridad National, in :Fact, is considered a radical Socialist
who has demonstrated sympatl!xy for the Cornmunistso Local armed and
security services appear to be: quite apathetic to the problem of the
Communist penetration.
In the event of an East-West War, the extent of penetration would
depend upon the relationship of the Socialist Party to the Government at
that time, and the Governmen't's stand towards the PCE, The Army is
believed capable of Countering Communist penetration if permitted to
da so by the Government,
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Espionage
It is snot known if the Party has made plans for espionage in the
event of war, or if a Party intelligence network exists at this time. The
Party s ability to -collect information far the USSR will depend upon the
relationships between Government, the Socialist Party and the PCE.
At this time, the PCE is believed able to obtain almost any type of
military, scientific and industrial information it desires from the
Government. One of the Functional Senators, Pedro Saad, is the most
important labor leader of the PCEp and can legally demand all such
information in the possessiorn. of Government ministries,
Again, the ability of the Communists to interfere with Ecuador-U. S.
trade and financial relations in w~.rtime wilL.~depexad upon the position of the
Government vis-a-vis the Socialist Party and the PCE. Undoubtedly, PCE
political power could seriously influence the countryas economic policies.
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General
The People?s Party ~Conimunist) is believed incapable of serious
action against either the Government of the Republic or the United
States in the event of warn Existing social, economic, and political
conditions are bad; the Government is weak; nevertheless, the
Communists have not been able to muster public support of any
consequences The Party has ~~ membership of only about X00, but
even of these, o~s:ly about 200 sire active It has a srazall youth or~a.ni-
zation> The most- important leibor federation, the FSTRP, cla.ima a
membership of over 20p 000, bust has actually no more than 400 active
members. The FSTRP is an s~ffiliate of the Communist-dominated
Confederation of Latin American Workers OCTAL), The Party has
no money. if war came, the Communists in the Republic would
probably rn.aintain a small clandestine organization for anti-American
propaganda; and could produce a small amount of intelligence for the
Soviets, particularly in the field of Canal defenses and traffic, However,
-the National Police in the Republic. and TJ. S~ Services in the Canal Zone
would reduce Communist effectiveness to a minimum and might well be
able to destroy the Party altogether, The Party has no capacity for
conducting military action against the Government. The Government is
friendly to the U, Sa and is expected to continue so The Police are
believed capable of s~.ppressirdg sabotage atad subversive activities in '
Panama, surveilling airfields and coastal areas, guarding vital routes
of communication in the Reput>lic and enforcing travel control measures.
Underground Organization
The Party was outlawed by Presid.e,~.tial Decree of President
Arias in April 1950u D~.ring t:~ae Aroseme~a Administration the ban was
not executede There is no evidence that the Party has made systematic
plans or concrete preparations for operating clandesta.nelyo
1t has occasionally been rumored that the Party was thinking about
setting up s~.fe-houses and secret c.ommta~.ica.tions systems, but the
stories have never been confirmed by reliable sourceso
Propaganda
The Party raewspapery 1J1 Patri.ota, suffers from chronic shortage
of money and su~.pplies, In wartimeA a serious effart to suppress the
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Party would probably reduce %t to mimeographing and hand-lettering
publication.
The Party is believed ir.icapable of replacing arre steal cadres.
An estimated 75?jo of its membership would drop out as a result of the
risks and hardships of underground existence. Automatic arrest lists
now kept current, if used, would result in the arrest of about 1, 500
Communists and Soviet and Sabtellite people.
Resistance Capabilities
The Party is believed incapable of raising or operating a military
resistance forces It lacks militarily experienced personnel. It lacks
both the means and the money to obtain armsa
Sabotage
Aside from the Canal, Panama has no industries offering profitable
targets for sabotage. U. S, forces in the Canal Zone could prevent
sabotage to the Canal itaelfa It is possible, however, that asmall-acale
program of sabotage against public utilities, coupled with a strike
effort, could interfere with local food supply and the shipment of food
products to the United States to some extent, and thereby result in some
anrn,oyance to this country.
The merchant fleet, although fourth largest in the world, could not
be touched by the Panamanian. Communists, for the ships are foreign-
owned, .are manned by non-Panamanian crews, a.nd seldom dock in
Panama.
E spianage
The only significant esp~io~age targets in Panama are Ganal
T?efenses and shipping. Tt is believed that security measures in the
Canal Zone could be increased sufficiently to scotch any important espionage
program mounted by either t1~:e Soviets or the Peopleas Partyo
Subversion of Armed and Sec~n.rity Services
Panama has no military forces Tt is not known. to what degree, if
any, the Communists have ini'iltrated the :ranks of the IoTational Police.
Leadership of the police is definitely anti-Gornmuni.sta
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Wartime Propaganda
Although lacking equipmea~t for propaganda, the Communists might
be able to play upon existing social and economic inequalities to engender
friction between the Republic ,~.nd the U. So Exploitable issues area
Higher wages paid to American workers in the Canal Zone as
compared to Panamania~:~ workers.
Lack of social security :for Panamanians in the Zone,
Failure of the Government of Panama to solve problems of
high prices, unemployment, and racial discrimination,
Patriotic resentment of the tla S. power in Panama--particularly,
the granting of bases to the LT. S.
The Communists have a~tready infiltrated the important (7, 500
followers) Partido Frente Patrioticoo They do not control it, but in a
crisis, they might be able to ~:ise it as a lever to push through legislation
harmful to the Uo So
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Communist capabilities in Venezuela in the event of an East- West
War would be very limited. 'Che Government would be pro-U. S. It
would bear down hard on the Communists, who are divided between
two opposing parties, the PCT (Partida Comunista de Venezuela) and
the PRP ~(Partido Revolucionario del Proletariado Comunista). The
PCV is itself internally divided into factions. Communist strength
has been declining and is expected to continue to do so. The Parties
are short of efficient cadres. The only real danger to U. S, interests
would be sabotage of Venezue Lan petroleum production, and the
Communists by themselves are believed to be incapable of interfering
seriously in this. More dangerous would be joint Communist-Action
Democratica (AD) operations, There have been rumors of Communist-
AD cooperation, but thus far, no confirmation,
Underground C)rganization
The PCV is already underground, having been outlawed on 13
May 1950. Little is known about its underground organization or what
plans, if any, have been madf; for clandestine operations in the event
of an East-bleat War, The dissident PRPc is still legal, and has been
trying to increase its strength in labor unions.
No information is available on the existing internal communications
system,
Propagarnda Equipment
The PCV has a clandest:ine press and distributing apparatus, Its
current clandestine publications are irregular and of poor quality. There
are enough Communists in the printing trade to ensure a supply of
equipment and paper in wartime, but it would probably not be enough for
a sustained, voluminous coverage
Safe Space for Underground Cpperations
The PCV seems to have: safe space for operations in its current
undergraund existence,
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Replacement of Cadre
0002-7
The Communists would. have considerable difficulty in replacing
current leadership with unknown, but efficient, personnel. The present
leadership is believed to be inefficient and internally divided. Several
important functionaries have been ajiled or exiled. On the other hand,
Government Security Services are not sufficiently effective to spot
possible cadre replacements, In the event of war, this failure would
be somewhat overcome by ini`ormation provided by Communists defect-
ing for patriotic reasonsa
Wartime Solvency
Both the PCV and the F'RPc have been short of money even when
legal, Some of the wealthier Communists, many of whom sit on the
fence between the PCV and th;e PRPc, might furnish the movement
with some funds. It is believed that the Communists would not be
able to establish and maintain secret accounts, deposits, or dummy firms,
Stren th and. Capabilities of t:he Hard Core
The "hard core" expected to remain loyal to the Party in adverse
conditions would consist of labor leaders and intellectuals. The
effectiveness of the latter wo~xld probably be slight, because they are
well-known and would either be arrested or put under close surveillance,
Most of the rank and file would drift away from the Party in the event
of an East-West War,
Popular Appeal
Communism has been l~~,tely losing its attraction for the Venezuelan
people. Its political pulling power would be extremely small in the event
of war. It is believed that no other existing political groups would side
with the Communists in wartirn.e,
Resistance operations
Communist capability o:E creating a military organization is
believed to be very slight, T:he Party has neither trained personnel nor
substantial stores of arms and ammunition. Government services would
be able to destroy any armed groups that appeared.
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Sabotage
The prime target in the event of an East-West War would be the
oil industry. The industry is row, and will always be, vulnerable
to sabotage. However, the petroleum companies have made considerable
progress in developing security against sabotage, and the Government
security services are also raising their effectiveness in this respect.
No information is available on any Communist plans or preparations
for organized sabotage in the event of war.
Subversion of Armed and Security Services
No information is available on the extent to which the Communists
have infiltrated the armed and security services, It is assumed to be
small. The Government has probably not identified Communists in the
services. A factor limiting Communist penetration in the event of
expansion of Venezuelan forces would be that most conscripts would
come from small towns and farming communities, where the Communists
have not developed as much of a following as they have in the cities.
Espionage
It is believed that security measures imposed in the event of war
would make it extremely difficult for the Communists to create and
operate an espionage networks Prime target for Communist espionage
would be the petroleum industry, not only for production figures, but
also for singling out vulnerable targets far sabotage.
Economic Warfare
The Communists ~mostl~r those in the PRPc- are capable of
effecting small strikes and. slow-downs, but nothing important enough
to seriously disrupt the Venez?~elan economyo
Wartime Propaganda
Propaganda woa~.ld be aix~ned at c~.ttin.g off oil exports to the ZJ, S,
and her allies. Suppression o:E the Cornmaznist press would make a strong
anti-17'o S. propaganda campaign diffic~a.lt,
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