LETTER TO HONORABLE JAMES O. EASTLAND FROM GEORGE BUSH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77M00144R000800130007-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 13, 2001
• Sequence Number: 7
• Content Type: LETTER

Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800130007-6
These reports did not clear OMB
during the 94th Congress.
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800130007-6
 Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800130007-6
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASH INGTON, D.C. 20505
Honorable James 0. Eastland, Chairman
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
S. 1841, which would bar Federal agencies from administering polygraph
or similar examinations to employees or employment applicants, has been
referred to the Committee on the Judiciary for consideration. I must strongly
oppose this bill, as it would seriously impair the ability of the Director of
Central Intelligence to fulfill his statutory charge to "protect intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure" (50 U . S . C . 403). An
effective personnel security program is vital to assure this protection.
The Central Intelligence Agency uses polygraph testing as one of
the final steps in the applicant security screening process. It is also used
in our reinvestigation program, which is conducted at approximately five-
year intervals in an employee's career. The purpose of the reinvestigation
is to detect any hostile exploitation or subversion of "in-place" CIA employees.
The polygraph examination during the reinvestigation is limited only to
counterintelligence questions.
Statistics prove that the polygraph is an essential element of our
security program. During the period 1963 through mid-1974, over 60 percent
of applicants rejected on security grounds were rejected because of informa-
tion developed principally or solely during polygraph interviews. In a
sampling of recent records, 52 percent of applicants disapproved because
of their polygraph interview had completed all other security screening
and had been provisionally approved. In addition to this proven value,
I believe the program is a significant deterrent to application for employment
by unsuitable candidates, and, more importantly, penetration attempts by
foreign intelligence services. Most polygraph interviews, however, are
favorable; these serve to confirm other screening procedures or put to rest
allegations or suspicions which otherwise could result in injustices or in
unnecessary defensive measures.
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800130007-6
 Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800130007-6
We at CIA are aware of the possibilities of abuse of the polygraph
program, and we have procedures in effect to forestall abuses and to protect
the rights of those taking the examinations. These include:
--each applicant is notified of the intent to use the polygraph
and must consent to the interview. Questions are reviewed with the
applicant before testing;
--advance consultation with the Office of Personnel and
the Office of Medical Services determine whether a polygraph
is advisable;
--the applicant is notified of the privilege against self-
incrimination if a question may pertain to a violation of the
criminal law;
--all questions relate directly to security considerations as
outlined in Executive Order 10450. No questions on religious
thought or practices or political affiliation of a non-subversive
nature are permitted;
--there is random monitoring by a specialized supervisor to
insure that no improper questions are asked and the applicant is
so informed;
--polygraph records are maintained in separate files with
very strict need-to-know rules governing access;
--the polygraph examiner makes no recommendation as to
the security suitability of the person tested;
--the standards for selection of polygraph operators are
extremely high. Operators are given a rigorous training program;
--CIA maintains an active research program into new
equipment and techniques to insure that the highest standards
are maintained.
Spot interviews and occasional surveys have been conducted with
applicants who have completed their polygraph tests to insure that the
program adheres to established standards. In one such program, several
thousand female applicants were interviewed after their polygraph examina-
tions. Feedback from these interviews was utilized to guide polygraph
procedures, but the program was finally dropped because of the incidence
of adverse commentary was too low to justify its continuance.
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800130007-6
 Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800130007-6
In his 2 June 1975 statement accompanying the introduction of
S. 1841, Senator Bayh expressed his willingness to consider the need for
a limited use of the polygraph in the intelligence field. Former Senator
Sam Ervin, a strong advocate of individual rights, recognized this need.
In his, proposed legislation to protect the personal privacy of Government
employees, introduced during several Congresses prior to his retirement
from public office, Senator Ervin expressly excepted the CIA and National
Security Agency from the provisions barring the use of the polygraph in
Government. The National Security Agency also collects and disseminates
extremely sensitive foreign intelligence information, and that Agency has
also found it necessary to use the polygraph as part of its security program.
I believe the use of the polygraph by NSA is also fully justifiable, but I
refer the Committee to NSA for the details of its program. If S. 1841 is
reported to the Senate by the Judiciary Committee, I strongly urge the
Committee to add the following amendment to proposed section 246 of Title 18:
" (d) This section shall not apply to the Central Intelligence
Agency or the National Security Agency. "
The Office of Management and Budget has advised there is no objection
to the submission of this report from the standpoint of the Administration's
program.
Sincerely,
George Bush
Director
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800130007-6
3
 Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800130007-6
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON,D.C. 20505
Honorable Peter W. Rodino, Chairman
Committee on the Judiciary
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
Five bills which would bar Federal agencies from administering
polygraph or similar examinations to employees or employment applicants,
have been referred to the Committee on the Judiciary for consideration.
These bills are H.R. 564, H.R. 2596, H.R. 5437, H.R. 5438, and H.R. 9002.
I must strongly oppose these bills, as they would seriously impair the ability
of the Director of Central Intelligence to fulfill his statutory charge to "protect
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure" (50 U.S.C. 403).
An effective personnel security program is vital to assure this protection.
The Central Intelligence Agency uses polygraph testing as one of
the final steps in the applicant security screening process. It is also used
in our reinvestigation program, which is conducted at approximately five-
year intervals in an employee's career. The purpose of the reinvestigation
is to detect any hostile exploitation or subversion of "in-place" CIA employees.
The polygraph examination during the reinvestigation is limited only to
counterintelligence questions.
Statistics prove that the polygraph is an essential element of our
security program. During the period 1963 through mid-1974, over 60 percent
of applicants rejected on security grounds were rejected because of informa-
tion developed principally or solely during polygraph interviews. In a
sampling of recent records, 52 percent of applicants disapproved because
of their polygraph interview had completed all other security screening
and had been provisionally approved. In addition to this proven value,
I believe the program is a significant deterrent to application for employment
by unsuitable candidates, and, more importantly, penetration attempts by
foreign intelligence services. Most polygraph interviews, however, are
favorable; these serve to confirm other screening procedures or put to rest
allegations or suspicions which otherwise could result in injustices or in
unnecessary defensive measures.
~y rTT6 -196^a~
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800130007-6
 Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800130007-6
We at CIA are aware of the possibilities of abuse of the polygraph
program, and we have procedures in effect to forestall abuses and to protect
the rights of those taking the examinations. These include:
--each applicant is notified of the intent to use the polygraph
and must consent to the interview. Questions are reviewed with the
applicant before testing;
--advance consultation with the Office of Personnel and
the Office of Medical Services determine whether a polygraph
is advisable;
--the applicant is notified of the privilege against self-
incrimination if a question may pertain to a violation of the
criminal law;
--all questions relate directly to security considerations as
outlined in Executive Order 10450. No questions on religious
thought or practices or political affiliation of a non-subversive
nature are permitted;
--there is random monitoring by a specialized supervisor to
insure that no improper questions are asked and the applicant is
so informed;
--polygraph records are maintained in separate files with
very strict need-to-know rules governing access;
--the polygraph examiner makes no recommendation as to
the security suitability of the person tested;
--the standards for selection of polygraph operators are
extremely high. Operators are given a rigorous training program;
--CIA maintains an active research program into new
equipment and techniques to insure that the highest standards
are maintained.
Spot interviews and occasional surveys have been conducted with
applicants who have completed their polygraph tests to insure that the
program adheres to established standards. In one such program, several
thousand female applicants were interviewed after their polygraph examina-
tions. Feedback from these interviews was utilized to guide polygraph
procedures, but the program was finally dropped because of the incidence
of adverse commentary was too low to justify its continuance.
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800130007-6
 Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800130007-6
Former Senator Sam Ervin, a strong advocate of individual rights,
recognized the need for use of the polygraph by intelligence agencies.
In his proposed legislation to protect the personal privacy of Government
employees, introduced during several Congresses prior to his retirement
from public office, Senator Ervin expressly excepted the CIA and National
Security Agency from the provisions barring the use of the polygraph in
Government. The National Security Agency also collects and disseminates
extremely sensitive foreign intelligence information, and that Agency has
also found it necessary to use the polygraph as part of its security program.
I believe the use of the polygraph by NSA is also fully justifiable, but I
refer the Committee to NSA for the details of its program. If any of these
bills is reported to the House by the Judiciary Committee, I strongly urge
the Committee to add the following amendment to proposed section 246 of
Title 18:
"(d) This section shall not apply to the Central Intelligence
Agency or the National Security Agency."
The Office of Management and Budget has advised there is no objection
to the submission of this report from the standpoint of the Administration's
program.
Sincerely,
Geor Bush
Director
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800130007-6
3
 ^ UNCLASSIFIED nn INTERNAL nn rrnn~~ '' nnFF~~TTII eett SECRET
A roved For'R~lelUYe QN /01/02: CIA-RDP77MA014~RO~U8~913V007-6 ^
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
FROM:
Legislative Counsel
EXTENSION
NO.
7D35 HQ
6136
DATE
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.
Dire for
Bills introduced in both the
House and Senate would ban the use
2.
LJ~ t .-
-
of the polygraph by all Federal
agencies in an employment or
security context. We have not been
3.
asked for comments on any of these
bills nor is any immediate action
pending. However, because of the
4.
importance of the issue, I recommen
you sign the attached letters on this
subject to the two Judiciary Committ
5.
These
ese letters have been coordinated
with OGC a pd Office of Securit
L
7.
eo e L. ary
egislative Counsel
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
-edl
FORM 61 0 uSEDTCPFE O OUS [:1 SECRET ^ CONFIDENTIAL F-1 USE ONLY
3-62 F1 UNCLASSIFIED
es