LETTER TO HONORABLE JAMES O. EASTLAND, FROM GEORGE BUSH
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP77M00144R000800130005-8
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
6
Document Creation Date:
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date:
December 13, 2001
Sequence Number:
5
Case Number:
Publication Date:
March 19, 1976
Content Type:
LETTER
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
![]() | 366.77 KB |
Body:
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R0008001, 0Qq 8
STATI N
DATE OF REQUEST
TO : Mr. Cary
SUSPENSE DATE
FROM : Don
SUBJECT:
Letter to Senate Judiciary on S. 1841, the polygraph bill
NOTES
When this bi was first introduced, we wrote to Senator Bayh about
~
. However, such a meeting never came about and
a meeting on
at this point it would seem more advantageous to send our views to the
Committee. We have not received a request for comments and no action on
the bill is pending. Representative Koch has introduced similar bills in
the House and we can use this model for letters to the House Judiciary
Committee. I have attached PLC's letter to Bella on the polygraph'. subj t,
which is quite similar to the one I have prepared.
COORDINATED WITA (list names as Wg11 as officesi
NAME
OFFICE
orz
OS
NAME
OFFICE
DATE
N
OFFICE
06C~
DATE
NAME
OFFICE
DATE
ACTION REQUIRED BY GLC
Approve for typing in final
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 CIA-RDP77M00144R000800130005-8
DRA % yd F- e&9 27662/01/02: CIA-RDP77M00144R000800130005-8
Honorable James 0. Eastland, Chairman
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
S. 1841, which would bar Federal agencies from administering polygraph
or similar examinations to employees or employment applicants, has been.
referred to the Committee on the Judiciary for consideration. I must strongly
fke' 6i/>
oppose any mealure preventing such -use-of-the polygraph by -t1 Ce itr a1'.
Intelli,.genc-e--A-gency?, as this would seriously impair the ability of the Director
of Central Intelligence to fulfill his statutory charge to "protect intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure" (50 U S. C . 403). An
effective personnel security program is vital to assure this protection.
The Central Intelligence Agency uses polygraph testing as
-it Recurity screening process,f,&r applicants, as--w-ell
program. After a judgment made that-in Rppl i lies-a mars
power need-of-the-Agency, -ourOffice- of Secur"it3-"' coed cts-air. iivegtil on.
-to-determine whether h nplicant meets security criteria. One of the later-
in w xc Me loo yg ~aplm
bases of his sec rity investigation- s kn interview
-.F- f r _ _ . -- _
-,-is -employed. Vie-- investigation, whi is conduced at approximately
five-year intervals in an employee's ~crareer?-is- tuna ,corDjW--y --- to -the APOV
rigid-initial screening. -Us purpose a is to detect any ostile exploitation or
subversion of "in-place" CIA employees. The polygraph examination during
the reinvestigation is limited only to counterintelligence questions.
-RDP77 M 00144R000800130005-8
Approved For Release
Approved For Rel1 2/01/0
'the polygraph-.program is an essential element of our security program..
During the period 1963 through mid-1974, nearly 1800 applicants for staff
w -staff-type positions were rejected-on s curity grounds; of this total,
over 60 percent we rejected on-the bads of information developed principally
I crdsc.
or solely during polygraph interviews. In a sampling of recent records,. 62.
Ire-
licants , een disapprove on t-1 ha ~T x LG6 s-r 3:. 017
fa
t
pp
~
percen
o
depedNtnrpz)i~ah-interviews had aiy completed. all other
security screening and been provisionally approved, cl srs-. 4 ; 4otxf:
the-polygraph-pro-am ,-. disqZl tying information on, these cases would-
ave-remained -unknown. In addition, I elieve i. i..s a^nab-le-to-presu
A
the program is a significant deterrent to application for employment by
unsuitable candidates, and, more importantly, penetra :ion atten?p :s. lay f reign,
ut it r o` CL4?a polygraph program is f t ely a. fi ,ot n of--its-
part ]31 contributing information leAdin ; td=1Iireject a:on of ui u_ifable can d. dates
T-lie--pxeponderance f-pel -graph inter vtm-reports- e-fa-v able-.----TitoVii`
these favorable reports constitute iisefuTand-com f.i,iTg-,confari),atian-ofaiher
sc - ., p,rocedt res; the remainder represent favorable resolutions of
0-21
all ations or suspicions which otherwise could result in injustices or in
unnecessary defensive measures. -
We at CIA are aware of the possibilities of abuse of the polygraph
program, and we have procedures in effect to forestall abuses and to protect
the rights of those taking the examinations. These include.
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800130005-8
2
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800130005-8
of ppUea an of the intent to use the polygr 1
ap Iicant p Q es ing e o ygraph.pr_ocedure-and i
rage is fulf r explain ed,--aml-t - -e -examihattion is, -conducted
--only'-after the applicant consentstathe--inter iew.
--advance consultation with the Office of Personnel and
the Office of Medical Services determine whether a polygraph
is advisable;
. -the applicant is notified of the privilege against self-
incrimination if a question may pertain to a violation of the
criminal law;
--the-general content of all applicant polygraph test
questions is reviewed before testing to assure that all questions
relate directly to security considerations as outlined in Executive
Order 104506
no questions on religious thought or practices or political
affiliation of a non-subversive nature are permitted
- apprliomTt-is- tuld tthe e eznixrttton f e-rrrc . ed
nd ss'laly re orc ed to let him w;.-her Are. 1 idc ?aced - me
--there is random monitoring by a specialized sup . visor,to
insure that no improper questions are askgdp '
--polygraph records are maintain$'d in separate: files with
very strict need-to-know rules governing access;
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA3RDP77M00144R000800130605-8
-RDP77MQ0144R
?-th
l
e po
ygraph e aminer maksd th
-e no recommenaso te
%
security suitability of the person tested;
wrl ?polyg report iii"ev-a uate-4? -Only one element s:
t Vie.-#otal 'env $tigative-_rep.Drt
Spot interviews and occasional surveys have been conducted with
applicants who have completed their polygraph tests to insure th~:a.t: the program
adheres to established standards. In one such program, several thousand.
female applicants were interviewed after their polygraph examinations.
Feedback from these interviews was utilized to guide polygraph procedures,
but the program was finally dropped because the incidence of adverse
commentary was too low to justify its continuance.
Finally, the selec h polygraphoffice as extremely d.iscrmmbia.t:1.17g
.rc a
n
m ne
a
..
The National Security Agency also collects and disseminates extremely
sensitive foreign intelligence information, and that agency has also found it
as to their qu lifications me ence i e ritV, and higli chaza.cter. They
are given a rigorous training program wli h is a continuing process io keep
them abreast of developments in tla xr prz f siorial field To support this
.s
program, CIA has main ine : a yjgorouu research ~- To support this
program, CIA has maintained .a vigosVt s ?esarchf effort inquiring into flew
techniques and equipment to insure th at highest standards a
i
t
id
necessary to use the polygraph as part of its security program. I believe
the use of the polygraph by NSA is also fully justifiable, but I refer the
Committee to NSA for the details of its program.
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800130005-8
4
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800130005-8
In his 2 June 1975 statement accompanying the introduction of S. 1841,
Senator Bayh expressed his willingness to consider the need for a. limited
use of the polygraph in the intelligence field. Former Senator Sam Ervin,,
a strong advocate of individual rights, recognized this need. Tn. his proposed
legislation to protect the personal privacy of Government employees, introduced
during several Congresses prior to his retirement from public office,, Senator
Ervin expressly excepted the CIA and National Security Agency from the
provisions barring the use of the polygraph in Covernmm.'.'
1 `1Y.zas--5.:1688, which-passed the.Senate on 7'--Uarch 19' If S 1841
is reported to the Senate by the Judiciary Committee, I strongly urge the
Committee to add the following amendment to proposed section. 1'46 of Title 18:
(d) This section shall not apply to Central Intelligence
Agency, or- the National Security Agency. ?B
The Office of Management and Budget has advised there is no objection
to the submission of this report from the standpoint of the Administrations
program.
Sincerely,
George Bush
Director
Approved For Release 2002/01/02 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000800130005-8
5