LETTER TO JOHN J. MCCLOY FROM ALLEN W. DULLES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000800050068-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2003
• Sequence Number: 68
• Publication Date: April 13, 1961
• Content Type: LETTER

Approved For Release 2003/08/18: CIA-RD PMB01676R000800050f2Cs8- J
13 APR 1961
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STATE, NSC, USAF reviews completed
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Originated by: ~9 Rl
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Deputy Director (lnfelligence)
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 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
INITIALS
DATE
1
Deputy Director/Intelligent
2
Deputy Director of Central I
3
Director of Central Intelli a
ce
4
5
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks :
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
AD/SI 145 Barton Hall0
7 A r 61
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tPR 1961
BRIEF FOR: Director for Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : Letter to Mr. John J. McCloy
Special Advisor to President on Disarmament
1. The attached letter to Mr. McCloy is in response to his
letter of 24+ March. He had requested a complete delineation of how
and to what degree United States Intelligence would support the U.S.
Delegation to a Control Commission. I have convened within the DDI
area a task force to prepare the necessary studies. A representative
from the DDP area is also participating with the group. I believe the
studies will be completed and ready for delivery by 15 May. Prior to
their transmittal it may be desirable to present these to the United
States Intelligence Board.
2. Above and beyond this immediate response to Mr. McCloy, there
is the broader question of how U.S. Intelligence will gear itself to
support
disarmament discussions and any treaties which
may be realized. A recent request for much broader support than asked
for in the 24 March letter from Mr. McCloy makes the breadth of this
matter clear. I believe it will be necessary for you to make recommendations
to the President on the assignment of responsibility for intelligence
support
very soon; and, together with Mr. Bissell, I
shall be drafting the necessary staff papers and recommendations.
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Deputy Director/Intelligence
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.uct,meiLt consists of 3 pages.
u._i',er ] of y conies, Series A.
SECRET
LICTlD DISTR11BUTIOIh
MAR .1.96 1
As you know, the A;nerican Delegation to the lhuclear Test
ban Conference has returned to Geneva i th revised proposals
which make the conclusi:n of a treaty at least possible. This
possibility, of course, depends largely upon a movement by the
Soviet Union toward accepting a re-Liable contrc_ and inspection
system.
I believe that the prospects for a treaty, though far from
assured, do call for a thoughtful and ti;-rei_y e>1 urination of re-
quirements which. could arise should this event transpire. In
particular, present U.S. proposals and the draft treaty require
that a Preparatory Commission shall come into existence one day
after the signature of the treaty. 'J'his Commission will function
until the ratification of the trey ty and will t e responsi;:~le for
developing detailed recommendations for the installation and
operation of a nuclear test ban control organization. It is
therefore clear that various studies should be got under way in
the near future which define and support anticipated U.S. proposals
for installation and operation of the control system in the USS.,
U.S., U.I. and other locations specified for Phase I of the in-
stallation schedule. Such proposals should ta;.a into account all
relevant information and substantive capabilities of the U.U.
Intelligence Community concerning the USS' and other treaty areas.
In this regard, you will recall that apprwdmately 100 seismic
events annually of aagnitude 4.75 or greater will be eligible for
The Honorable
Allen Dulles,
Director,
central Intelligence Agency.
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inspection within the USSR in accordance with the simplified
criteria which only require a determination of equivalent yield
and approximate tine and location of the event. The choice of
events to be inspected within an agreed quota, from among, those
declared to be eligible, must be largely determined on the basis
of national intelligence data, including technical information.
Once the choice has been made, inspection teams _-1ust be rapidly
and comprehensively briefed in order that they will be fully
informed about significant conditions in regions to which they
will be going. inally, the U.S. will be entirely dependent
upon unilateral intelligence for indications of possible clan-
destine tests not detected by the international control system,
e.g., decoupled underground and high altitude events.
Accordingly, I would like you. to be responsible for the
following studies which will be needed by 15 hay:
1. Support measures the U.S. Intelligence Community should
undertake for the U.S. Delegation at the Test Ran Control Com-
mission which krill supplement the effectiveness with which
observance of treaty obligations are enforced, including:
a. Intelligence information which may clarify ambiguous
data collected by the control organization indicating the occur-
rence of nuclear tests,
b. Intelligence information which may indicate the
occurrence of nuclear tests not detected by the control organiza-
tion, e.g., decoupled underground and high altitude tests,
c. Factors to be taken into consideration in deciding
to request on-site inspection of suspicious events,
d. Information which should be available in the Inter-
national Inspection Office or the U.S. Delegation at the Control
Commission for briefing or otherwise facilitating; the effective
operation of on-site inspection activities,
2. Capabilities within the near future c' the U.S. Intelli-
gence Community, including its technical components, to implement
the above measures, particularly,
a. Organization of existing; information in a rapidly
recoverable form, probably by means of electronic data processing
systems,
>!C`ET
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b. Organization of internal resources and procedures
insuring that all newly acquired information relevant to foreign
clandestine nuclear activities will flow rapidly to the basic
fund of intelligence,
c. An intelligence unit, with the necessary logistical
support, within the U.S. Delegation at the Control Commission
responsible for keeping the U.S. .eoresentative appraised of
all significant intelligence development and to other-vise assist
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In planning for implementation of the above studies, it
should be borne in :rind that the draft treaty provides for a
relatively brief preparatory period after treaty signature before
installation of system elements is to co;mnence. Accordingly,
organization of implementational .-activities should proceed as
nearly in step with development of the above ;;tuaies as is
feasible and prudent.
The foregoing studies are, of course, in addition to the
responsibility now borne by your organization for the technical
administration of the on-site inspection research porticn of
I assume that results of activities in this area,
including preparatory studies .in anticipation r;f a treaty si ,na-
ture, will be contributed through administrative channels which
have been provided for this purpose.
I would like to have 1.r. Lloyd 1. Belt of the U.S. Disarma-
ment Administration function as our representative in all matters
relating to the above studies and activities. tr. Belt is
located in Room 40.30 NS, telephone DUdley 3-6476.
Sincerely yours,
John J. McCloy
Adviser to the President
on Di sa rroament
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7 APR 1961
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APR 1961
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