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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400006-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 2001
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: April 2, 1976
• Content Type: NSPR

25X1A
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400006=7?
CONFIDENTIAL
NEWS, VIEWS
and ISSUES
INTERNAL USE ONLY
This publication contains clippings from the
domestic and foreign press for YOUR
BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use
of selected items would rarely be advisable.
2 APRIL 1976
NO. 6
PAGE
GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS
1
WEST EUROPE
28
AFRICA
33
Destroy after backgrounder has
served its purpose?or within
60 days.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400006-7
ntal Affairs
I THE WASHINGTON POST
Ini,ellige
By Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writer
The powerful Democratic
whip, Sen. Robert C. Byrd
(W.Va.), declared yesterday
that there is "no way" the?
resolution to establish a new
Senate committee on intel-
ligence activities could pass
"as now written."
Saying the "political cli-
mate indicates a necessity
for some kind of commit-
tee," Byrd offered a com-
promise plan to solve a ju-
risdiction fight that has en-
tangled the present pro-
posal.
Under the Byrd plan, a
new, permanent Senate in-
telligence oversight commit-
tee would be set up with
subpoena power but with-
out budgetary control over
intelligence agencies.
Byrd's suggestion came
during Senate Rules Com-
mittee questioning of Sen.
Frank Church (D-Idaho),
chairman of the Senate in-
telligence committee and an
architect of the proposal ,un-
Friday, iipri2, 7976
Oversight
ompromise Offered
der attack.
Under- the resolution ap-
proved March 2 by the Sen-
ate Government Operations
Committee, the new intelli-
gence committee would
have taken jurisdiction over
intelligence agencies' budg
ets from three powerful
Senate committees?Armed
Services, Judiciary and For-
eign Relations.
All three committees have
raised objections to the pro-
posal.
Byrd told Church: "That
road is so formidable, and
difficult to travel." Instead
he suggested that, "we may
achieve the desired objec-
tive" by giving subpoena
power to the new committee
and "leaving the rest where
it lies."
Otherwise, Byrd said, ap-
proval might be endangered
because "the resolution will
be subjected to unlimited
debate."
In his initial statement,
Church said overlapping or
concurrent jurisdiction be-
tween the new committee
and the old ones was the
"traditional" Senate slain-
tion "where the interest !of
two committees... is
strong."
After Byrd offered bis
compromise, Church argued
"the power of the purse is
the ultimate authority" and
he "couldn't see effective
oversight without" it.
A letter from. Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld,
introduced at the hearing
,yesterday, supported the pa-
sition that it is impost:Ate
to separate cleanly the De-
fense Department's intelli-
gence budget from its over-
all spending since many pro-
grams are intermixed.
Rumsfeld echoed the Byrd
suggestion that the new
, committe undertake only in-
telligence oversight.
Other senators raised with
Church the proposal that
the new committee be an-
thorized to disclose demi-
fied information over a
President's objection.
Church responded, saying
"the greatest breach of seen-
NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, APRIL 2,1976
C.I.A. Said to Have Known he has had- a long-staniring
ilationship with American
-'Embassy officials in Japan. In
In 50 s of Lackheedilribe s !addition, Mr. Kodama was the
;recipient of American funds
;for covert projects on several
'occasions, according to termer
C.I.A. officials. ,*
?The. C.I.A. headquarters in
Washington was inforined of
the Lockheed payoffs through
C.I.A. channels from the em-
bassy in Tokyo in the late
1950's. A Japanese citizen who
worked for Lockheed in 1958,
when certain bribes were
known .to have been made?as
said he told an American Em-
bassy officer of these payoffs.
He has denied having takent
part in the payments himself
and has said that he was un-
aware that the officer was a
C.I.A. agent.
Former senior intelligence
officials have confirmed that
the Embassy official was in-
deed a C.I.A. staff officer
assigned to the Tokyo station.
One former official who was
In a position to see the reverts
said that the stathea in
Tokyo "was checking with
headquarters every stey of the
way when the Lockheed thing
came up."
"Every move made was, ap-
proved by Washington,- he
added, asserting that details 9f
Data on Japanese Reportedly Were Not
Passed on to State Dept. or Grumman,
Whose Fighter Lost Out to F-104
. By ANN CRITTENDEN
Many of the details of the nations of the payments by
bribery of Japanese politicians . Lockheed and other American
by the Lockheed Aircraft Cor-
companies to various parties in
poration in the late .1950's, in Europe, Japan and the Middle
East to win lucrative multimil-
lion-dollar sales contracts for
various products ranging from
aircraft to pharmaceuticals.
The Lockheed payoffs in
-ington, according to a former Japan, involving $12.6 million
CIA. official and Japanese over a period of 20 years,
; sources. I were made to top officials of
Although the C.I.A. was
the Government, primarily
aware of the bribery, public through Yoshio Kodama, an
disclosure of the payoffs did influential power . broker in
not come until last Feb. 4 in Japan Who has already been
bearings of the Senate suboom- identified as the most MI-
mittee on multinational corpo- portant behind-the-scenes rep-
rations. ? ? resentative of Lockeed at that
The scandal has created in- tinw.
?term tional tensions
anal ; Mr. Xodarna has not been
touched off worldwide investi% ! identified as a C.I.A. agent, but
connection with the sale of the
F-104 fighter plane to Japan,
evere reported at that time to
the headquarters of the Central
Intelligence Agency in Wash-
1
?
rity" he had ever seen was
the recent disclosure by the
CIA that the Israeli govern-
ment possesses 10 or more
nuclear weapons. "I have
never even heard anyone
was reprimanded," Church
said.
To emphasize his point
that the resolution as now
written was vulnerable to
attack, Byrd spent 20 min-
utes listing more than a
dozen Senate rules that
would have to be revised in
major or minor ways to con-
form to the resolution's lan-
guage,
Sett Abraham A. Ribicoff
(D-Conn.), chairman of the
Government Operations
,Pommittee that drafted the
resolution, told Byrd "not a
single point there can't be
reconciled" by redrafting
the resolution.
Ribicoff proposed a staff
, meeting to iron out differ-
ences but !Rules Committee
Chairman Howard W. Can-
non (D-Nev.) said that was
"premature" since "we don't
know ourselves" ? what is
needed.
'the Lochheed affair were known
-in high levels within the agency.
.' The Central Intelligence
;Agency failed to pass this in-
formation on to the State Der
partment or to the Grumman
Aircraft Corporation, whose
Fl1F-1F Super Tiger jet fighter
was first selected for Purchase
by the Japanese Government
irt-1958 and then lit 1959 re-
jected in fe.vor of the Lockheed
plane .
Lockheed is estimated to have
spent some $1.5 million to win
the Japanese jet fighter contract
? away ffonn Grumman in the
late 1950's: In all, Lockheed
paid fees, commissions and
bribes totaling $12.6 million to
sell $700 million worth of air-
craft to Japan between 1956
and 1975. -
Kodama Earned $750,000
Of that total, some $7 million
went to Mr. Kodama. who
earned an estimated $750,000
If the information concern-
ing the Lockheed bribes was
passed on to the Justice De-
partment, the Securities- and
Exchange Commission or the
Internal Revenue Service, no
action was taken to investigate
the irregularities.
Foreign bribes are not in
themselves illegal under Feder-.
al law. However, the bribes are:
not 'tax-deductible and the i
large foreign- payoffs raise the
possibility -that Lockheed and
other cot-aphides might have ii.
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legally reduced their taxable
corporate income by deducting
the bribe payments as business
experrea: I
It is also possible that false
statements, punishable by Fed- '
eral law, were made to such
Government agencies as the
? Department of Defense, which
? monitors foreign arms sales.
One Justice Department offi-
cial( told of the allegations of
? C.I.A. awareness of early Lock-
heed payoffs: said that al-
though it might not have been
legally incumbent upon the
agency to report what it knew
to the Justice Department, the
agency's apparent failure to do
so was "certainly a matter of
concern from a policy point of
view."
Part In Payoffs Denied
When informed of the alle-
gation, Mitchell Rogovin, the
special counsel to the Director.
of Central Intelligence George
Bush, said that "the only thing
we can say is we have no rec-
ords of any agency involve-
ment with Lockheed or the
bribes." He denied that the
agency as an institution had
participated in the payoffs.
Mr. Rogovin said that he
could say nothing either con-
firming or denying any agency
knowledge of the payments to
Japanese officials, or any in-
volvement in them by C.I.A.
agents. ?
A spokesman for Lockheed
denied that the company had
had any dealings with individu-
als in Japan that it knew to be
C.I.A. agents.
According to knowledgeable
sources, Mr. Kodama, a power-
ful ultrarightist who for years
exerted a significant behind-
the-scenes influence on politi-
cians of Japan's ruling Liberal-
Democratic Party, also had a
long-standing relationship with
American Embassy officials in
Japan.
In the early 1950's, he is said
to have received some $150,000
from the American Embassy to
smuggle a hoard of tungsten
out of mainland China on Na-
tionalist warships and deliver
it to United States authorities
in Tokyo. .
According to a former C.I.A.
official and to Robert H. Booth,
an American said to have acted
as Mr. Kodama's agent in the
arrangement, the Americans
never received the tungsten. 1
Mr. Kodama let it be known
that the ship had sunk, and ap-
parently kept the commission.
One former agent noted that
there were some sentiment at
C.I.A. headqueraters in Wash-
ington that Mr. Kodama, who
alho had close ties to the Tokyo
underworld, was untrustworthy
and was using the Americans
and their financing for his own
ends.
, In this man's opinion, Amer-
lican authorities were spending
'vast amounts of money sub-
Isidizing extreme rightists to
fight a Communism never real.
ly a serious threat in Japan.
Other experts disagree, arg-
uing that, particularly in the
late 1940's. there was a real
possibility of a left-wing regime
m Japan.
According to Ivan Morris,
1r A 1 T YORK T r76ES
HOUSE PANEL SAYS1
SCHORR CASE LAGS
Leader of Inquiry Says Trial
:Showing How Press Got
C.I.A. Report Is 'Cold'
:
By RICHARD D. LYONS
Special to The New York TimeS
? WASHINGTON, March .31?
The Federal and Congressional
investigations into the unau-
thorized . disclosures to the
press of. the report of the report
of the House Select Committee
on -Intelligence, are bogging
down, and persons active in
the investigation are expressing
doubts that they will be com-
pleted, much less support legal
actions against anyone. ,
Representative John J. Flynt,
the Georgia Democrat who is
in charge of the House investi-
gation, said after a meeting
today of his Committee on
? Standards of Official Conduct
that "the trail is getting cold."
Mr. Flynt said that his com-
mittee:s staff was having prob-
lems drawing up a list of ques-
tions to be posed to People
who Might know howsubstan-
tial portions of the report about
Central Intelligence Agency
operations reached the Village
Voice and other publications.
Representative Otis G. Pike.
Democrat of Suffolk, headed
the House select committee
that made the report.
"If we had had subpoena
power a month ago we could
have wrapped up the case by
now," Mr. Flynt said, adding
that the memories of some per-
sons familiar with the case
Were being "dimmed" by, time.
? Senior Justice Department
officials are increasingly pessi-
mistic that grounds for criminal
Ijprofessor of Japanese at Co-
lumbia University and an auth-
ority on the extreme right-f
wing in postwar Japan, the
"enormous" American financail
jsupport for conservative ele-
!meats in the country was cru-
cial in 1947 and 1948.
In those years, Japanese pol-
itics could have turned in a dif-
ferent direction, Professor Mor-
ris maintained. "A lot was done
to prevent that," he said, "and
successfully."
Among other things. Ameri-
can occupation authorities in
the late 1940's and the 1950's
used extreme right-wing for-
mer military officers to pro-
vide information on and to dis-
rupt left-wing groups.
In November 1951, for ex-
ample, one of these officers,
-Col. Takushiro Hatted, a for-
mer secretary of General Tojo,
allegedly. provided American
authorities with information on
leftist novelist Kaji Wataru,
who was subsequently kid-
napped by Occupation forces
-and held incommunicado by
1 C.I.A. agents for a year, ac.
1 cording to sources inside and
outside of the Government.
7.
Pleosecution will be' found in
the case because most, if not
all, of the so-called classified
material involved seems to
have been made public in one
form or 'another before it ap-
peared in The Village Voice
last month. - ? ? ? -
. For the last six weeks law-
yers in the criminal division!
a the Justice Department have
sought to determine if material
originally classified as secret
that was contained in the Pike
.report had in fact been in the
public domain. ?
One Federal attorney
in-
volved in the departmental in-I
quiry said it was apparent from
the start that "99 percent" of
the material in the report of
the Pike committee already ha
been in the public domain.
. The case boils down to the
remaining 1 percent, he said,
adding that it is thought that
even this material was pre-
viously divulged. - ?
If the justice department in-
vestigation collapses, as it
seems to be on the verge of
dbing, it would be almost im-
possible to bring charges that
the Espionage Act had been
violated by either Daniel Schorr
or any other newsman who
had reported details of the con-
tents of the Pike report. Mr.
Schorr is the CBS News corre-
spondent here who has admit-
ted providing a copy of the
report to The Voice. -- ? -
' On Jan. .20, The New York
Tunes published articles giving
the substance of the documents,
which severely criticized the
C.I.A. and other Federal intel-
ligence gathering organizations.
In the days that followed, The
Times and other news organiza-
tions published additional arti-
BALTIMORE SUN
15 March 1976
23
ass
cies concerning the report.
On Jan. 29, the House voted ;
not to make the report public. I
Tviea weeks later, The Village!
Yoice started publishing sub-i
stantial excerpts from it.. I.
?-, The disclosures angered many'
eongressmen, and, on Feb. Me
the House voted to have Mr.I
Flynt's committee undertake an;
inquiry. But for the past six!
Weeks there has been disagree-p
ment within the House, firsti
over increased subpoena. pow-I
ers for the committee, then
for investigative funds. ?Both!
Were eventually approved.
?? "Information we could have!
gotten under oath five weeksi
ago will be more difficult to;
:Obtain noW,'.' Mn Flynt said!
today, His committee met in
closed session for half an hour.
today, then adjourned without
setting a future meeting date
and without having settled de-.
tails of how the inquiry should
proceed.
The committee still has not
fbrmally .hired a staff to con-
duct the investigation. Investi-
gators, mainly, former agents
of the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigapon, and attorneys have
;been selected but their con-
tracts 'with the committee have
not been ? approved by the
House. Administration Commit-
tee and may not be for several:
days: About a dozen contracts !
have been submitted. - ?
Additionally, friction has de-I
.veloped within the special staff!
over who among them is inI
-charge of the inquiry. Davidl
Bowers, a former F.B.I. inspec-
tor, appears to have won a!
jurisdictional disputewith C. B.'
Rogers, an Atlanta lawyer who
had been picked to be the spe-i
pial chief counsel.
ussians liste
ies in the .S.
Lantana, Fla. (AP)?The The National Enquirer re-
names of 23 Soviet espionage ported that the information for
agents said to be operating its story came from American
openly in the United States intelligence sources, including
have been learned by the Na- James Angleton, former chief
tional Enquirer, the weekly of counter-intelligence for the?
newspaper said yesterday. Central Intelligence Agency.
One of the espionage agents and David Phillips, a former.
Is Jacob A. Malik. the Soviet CIA official who is now the '
ambassador to the United Na- president Of the Association of
tions, the publication said. Retired Intelligence Officers.
In New York, a spokesman
at the Soviet Union's United
Nations mission said there
would be no comment on the re-
port.
Those named by the weekly
newspaper were described as
diplomats. Several of them are
based in Washington and pay
frequent visits to officials in the
White House, the Pentagon,
Congress and various federal "I refused. The rationale for
agencies, the National En. this is that our association he-
quirer said. lieves the identification of intel-
It described Mr. Malik as the ligence officers leads not to re- I
highest-ranking Soviet intelli- taliation from other intelli- I
gence agent in the United genee services but from the
States. The paper said four So- crazieS of the world, and rouse-
.
viet abzons serving on the quently the statement that I
United Nations administrative identified these gentlemen is in-'
staff are intelligence agents. correct."
In Washington, Mr. Phillips
denied that he had given the
newspaper any information.
"I was contacted, by some-
one from the Enquirer about
the story, asking assistance
from my Association of Retired
Intelligence Officers in identi-
fying Soviet intelligence offi-
cers in this country," he said.
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-Wednesday, March 24, 1976
The Washington Star
e
gang Intel
By Henry S. Bradsher
Washington Star Stall Writer
One source calls it "keyhole ques-
tioning."
The way a number of present and
former government officials describe
it, questions are framed by the
administration so narrowly as to
elicit responses from the U.S. intelli-
gence community that will support
predetermined policies.
There are other techniques for the
selective use of intelligence, too.
Sometimes a branch of the adminis-
tration rejects intelligence findings,
insisting that some factors have been.
ignored, until finally a useful finding
is made.
What several officials call "play-
ing the intelligence game" is an old
bureaucratic art.
They say it was brought to a new
peak of refinement and a new fre-
quency of use when Dr. Henry A.
}Kissinger was the presidential advis-
er on national security, and it contin-
ues with Kissinger as secretary of
state in charge of arms control ne-
gotiations with Moscow. Other parts
of the bureaucracy also play the
game.
A senior administration official in-
volved in the reorganization of the
U.S. intelligence community under
President Ford's Feb. 18 executive
order says the changes now being
made will not prevent such abuses of
intelligence.
MATERIAL STILL can be ordered
from the CIA, the Pentagon's De-
fense Intelligence Agency, the State
Department's Bureau of Intelligence
and Research, and other parts of the
community in ways that will fit it
into top policymakers' preconcep-
tions.
One senior official involved in
major policy decisions, who de-
scribes himself as "an avid consum-
er of intelligence," says he is. una-
ware of leading questions being
submitted to the intelligence com-
munity. "These charges fit into the
category of insinuations that make
the rounds," he comments.
Several other officials and con-
gressional sources point in the direc-
tion of that senior official's opera-
tions, if not at him personally, as one
of the major areas of the selective
intelligence use that he denies.
General policies are framed on the
basis of overall intelligence evalua-
tions. Decisions are made on what is
generally desirable for the United
States, like a cease-fire in Vietnam,
a strategic armaments limitations
treaty (SALT) with the Soviet Union,
an interim Sinai settlement in the
Middle East, or a new weapons sys-
tem.
But then new developments, newly
received information on old situa-
tions, or fresh analyses of problems
can sometimes poke holes in policies.
OW US Art gf
once Fit the'ohclif
Awkward facts that argue against
decisions can appear. If the decision
was a controversial one in the first
place, as many major policies are,
then new facts can reopen and
threaten to change it.
The tendency, therefore, some-
times is to try to adapt the intelli-
gence to the policy, rather than the
other way around, some officials say.
The "keyhole questioning" method
is putting very tightly defined re-
quests for specific answers to .the
intelligence community ? primarily
to the CIA ? without giving the con--
text in which the answer is going to
be used or allowing any surrounding
circumstances to be considered.
These amount to loaded questions.
IF THE FIRST question draws an
answer that does not seem to justify
the policy course already decided
upon, then another one is framed,
"just three degrees to one side,
enough to force another study, in
hopes of getting a different answer,"
one official explained.
This can go on for some
time, until finally the in-
quirer hits upon a formula
that yields an answer that
then can be used in bureau-
cratic debates to . support
the policy. Earlier ques-
tions and answers are
quietly forgotten.
A current case in point
involves a Soviet supersonic
bomber with the Western
code name of Backfire.
When Kissinger arranged
the preliminary agreement
for a second SALT treaty
with the Soviet Union in
November 1974, Backfire
was not included within the
limitations. The Pentagon
objected that the plane has
the capability at striking
the United States from
Soviet territory, and there-
fore had to be counted.
Moscow denied that it was
an intercontinental bomber,
arguing that it was proper-
ly excluded from the agree-
ment.
This objection has been a
major stumbling block in
turning the agreement into
the treaty that Kissinger
and his top advisers seek
for overall policy reasons.
They have argued in the
National Security Council
that Backfire did not de-
serve to be counted.
Backfire alse has been a
problem within the Penta-
gon, since it affects arms
programs of the United
States.
Eight intelligence studies
of the Backfire's range
potential have been made.
Each one showed that it
could reach the United
States.
According to one source
who reflects suspicion of
Kissinger's approach on
SALT II, CIA technical ex-
?;peek confirmed in one
steet.0,1ast autumn that
Baaire had an interconti-
nental capability. But then
other CIA officials tried to?
overrule the technicians by
'saying they had determined
that the Soviets had no
intention of using Backfire
in a long-range tole.
THE OTHER officials
"buckled under pressure"
from Kissinger,' this source
asserted. But the then-
director of CIA, William E.
Colby, overruled the finding
? based on intentiont, insist-
ing that his agency had to
I stick to proveabie data
rather than supplying poli-
cymakers with the inter-
? pretations they sought.
A senior State Depart-
ment official insists,
however, that such prob-
lems arose more from
.Pentagon rivalry over
countering Backfire than
from pressure by Kissing-
iees SALT negotiating
team.
Finally, another source
reported, after the eight
studies, the CIA was in-
structed to commission a
new ?study by engineers of
the McDonnell-Douglas
Corp., a major military air-
craft manufacturer. The
engineers were given intel-
ligence data on the Back-
lire's wing shape and other
factors that were certain to
show greater aeronautic
drag than earlier studies
had found, hence less
range.
But their study only re-
duced the range by about
20 miles. It still was
enough to reach the United
States.
The CIA reportedly was
also used to help justify the
1972 SALT I agreement.
Its ? "best estimate" of
what Soviet strength in
intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs) and other
strategic weapons would
become without that treaty
V72S only marginally above
the treaty limitations. That
did not provide a good
argument for U.S. Senate
approval of the treaty,
which was viewed with
doubt by some senators.
The CIA suddenly came
do with a "farce four" esti-
mate, which put the poten-
t:a Soviet strength without
Vee treaty limitations much
higher, thus making the
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treaty look more desirable
and more worthy of Senate
approval.
ThE, NEW ESTIMATE
apparently was a result of a
"keyhole question" asking
what Moscow might
achieve if it launched an
all-out strategic weapons
building program. Intelli-
gence analysts did not ex-
pect an all-out program,
but their terms of reference
were too limited to permit
them to give the _perspec-
tive that they felt the situa-
tion should have had.
Such uses ? or, in the
views of concerned offi-
cials, misuses ? of intelli-
gence have extended into
several other fields, ac-
cording to various sources.
One civilian source said
that last summer the NSC,
then still directed by Kis-
singer, flatly told the CIA
the result that it wanted
from an intelligence study
on a non-SALT subject. The
well qualified source de-
clined to have the subject
identified.
When last year's interim
Middle East truce agree-
ment was being arranged,
the CIA was asked for a
specific judgment on
whether there would be a
war without such an agree-
ment. Hemmed in, the CIA
said yes, thus appearing to
support Kissinger's efforts
to bring full U.S. govern-
mental pressure to bear on
the settlement.
"But, of course, the
agency could just as well
have answered that there
might be a war even with
an agreement, if it had
been allowed enough lati-
tude to exercise its profes-
sional judgment," a former
official said.
OTHER OFFICIALS re-
TheVlashingt, Dn Star Monday, March 22, 1976
George Beveridge
called that CIA estimates of
Soviet and Chinese aid to,
North Vietnam were jug-
gled to suit Kissinger's ef-
forts to negotiate a Vietnam
ceasefire duing 1972.
"Those estimates never
were any good, but they got
quoted as if they were
important," a former CIA
official said.
There has also been
intensive pressure on the
CIA to do things that it is
simply incapable of doMg.
The preliminary apee-
ment for SALT II &Ain-
guishes between IC3Ms
with single and with multi-
ple warheads. KissMger
leaned hard on the CIA to
find ways of telling trhich
Soviet missiles ready in
launching silos had multi-
ple warheads.
The agency could not tell.
Reconnaissance satellites
could not see inside the
missiles. Finally, an exter-
nal trait of dubious validity
was seized upon as indica-
tive, in order to try to satis-
fy the demand and relieve
the pressure. Later evi-
dence showed it to be
invalid, however.
All of this frustrates the
CIA, according to former
and current officials of the
agency as well as outsiders
with contact there. Official-
ly, the CIA will not discuss
the subject.
"We can't do a proper job
if we don't know the context
in which a question has to
be considered," one official
said. Another commented
that there was always the
danger of leakage if too
many persons knew what
policy decisions were being
studied, and therefore some
justification for keeping
questions narrow, but that
the NSC and State Depart-
ment have carried it too
far.
The CIA tarnishes the innocent
The only thing wrong
with the CIA's pledge to
stop using news correspond-
ents as paid sources of
.intelligence overseas is that
.the practice should have
been halted long ago. This
is an alliance in which a
free press has no rightful
place. And the agency's
refusal to identify news peo-
ple who have served as the
CIA's eyes and ears in the
past ? or are still doing so
? leaves some unsettling
questions.
One result, as The Star
has seen in recent weeks, is
that the professional integ-
rity of a host of innocent
foreign correspondents now
seems destined to remain
indefinitely under a.cloud of
suspicion,
On Feb. 9, in the wake of
the latest disclosures on
CIA-news ties abroad, CIA
Chief George Bush an-
nounced two decisions:
0 Effective immediately,
he said, the CIA "will not
enter any paid or contractu-
al relationships with any
full-time or part-time news
correspondents" accredited
by news outlets in the
United States.
0 In a tacit admission of
what's been going on, Bush
said, the CIA also will move
to "bring existing relation- -
ships with individuals in
these groups into conform-
ity with the new policy."
The "existing relation-
ships," it appears, involve
largely, if not entirely, part-
time correspondents, or
"stringers." tNewspaper.
stringers, as dist iintmished
from full-time, salaried em-
ployes, are reporters who
are paid for individual arti-
cles; often, they service
several publications at the
same time.)
But the efforts of The
Star and other newspapers
to check out their "stringer
lists" with the CIA hit a
stone wall. So The Star,
thwarted on that front, last
month shot off to more than
20 of its regular stringers a
letter which read, in part,
as follows:
"As you may know, it has
been acknowledged here by
the CIA that some stringers
for unidentified U.S. news
agencies have been involv-
ed with the CIA in ways
that go beyond the normal
give-and-take of ordinary
journalistic activity. This
obviously is contrary to our
policy.
"Therefore, if you have
or in the past have had such
a connection ? or have
been part of any program
involving U.S. government
agencies, reimbursed or not
? we would like to know
about it."
George Beveridge is
The Star's ombudsman.
Well, that letter did not
call for a response in the
absence of such involve-
ments. But voluntary disa-
vowals (10 to date) have
been rolling in anyway. And
most of the comments reach
substantially beyond (Ilse- ?
vowels.
Stringer Tony Avirgan,
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writing from Tanzania, for
example, strongly urged
The Star to continue to
"push the CIA to reveal the
names of all the journalists
who have worked for U.S.
intelligence agencies."
"Only when this is done,"
he said, "will those of us
who are engaged in honest
journalism be able to par-
tially remove the cloak of
suspicion and get on with
our work."
From Tehran, stringer
Ralph Joseph wnte that
such involvements "foul up
the entire profession and
cast suspicion on all mem-
bers of the press," to their
detriment in dealing with
foreign officials.
From Munich, "categori-
cally" denying relation-
ships with the CIA or any
other government agency,
stringer John Dernberg
wrote that the CIA asper-
sions "were of such a blan-
ket nature" that ?I am
sufficiently inceresed to
examine the possit;iities of
a slander or defamation of
character suit."
There is more of the same
? and the anger, it seems
to me, is justified.
If those views are shared
by the press as a whole,
however, it is not readily
apparent. For the rust part
the pressures on the CIA for
disclosure have sinvly gone
away. Indeed, on two occa-
sions, the newspar.e-,- trade
journal, Editor & .1-Vatisher,
has opposed it.
"We believe the release
of such informatiea," LCIP
said in its Feb. 2: issue,
"would accomplish little ex-
cept harm the reputations
of the persons named and
the.news organizations for
which they worked. It may
be charitable, but we be-
lieve it is accurate, to say
that most of those who help-
ed the CIA and other gov-
ernment agencies in the
past,: whether journalists or
not, did so for patriotic rea-
sons. Times have changed,
and patriotism of this kind
is misunderstood today." ?
Well, times have
changed, and the E&P-at-
tributed motives of patrio-
tism, I suspect, are in the
vast majority of cases
tight.
But there is little consola-
tion in that for the vast
majority of news corre-
spondents around the world
who, in those earlier times,
refrained from such in-
volvements and got on with
their jobs of covering the
news.
For whatever motives,
newsmen who have doubled
as CIA agents bear a bur-
den of Culpability as heavy
as, if not heavier than, that
of the intelligence agency
which recruited them. And
it occurs to me that the
over-all response of the
press in that regard is just
a mite out of kilter with its
zeal in exposing the partici-
pation of all manner of
other people in intelligence
activities.
Charity is surely a cardi-
nal virtue. For newspapers,
especially, even-handcii-
ness is, too.
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BALTIMORE SUN
1 April 1976_
A Case for Prior Restraint of Publication
Two thousand years ago, the life of a
gladiator in the Colosseum depended on
whether the Roman Mob induced the emper-
or to turn one thumb up or down. Until re-
cently our version of such a verdict has been
a public titillated by trial by newspaper.
Three methods of securing conviction
were available to the prosecutor bent upon
achieving a record of constant success. A
confession might be published after being
procured by the police with a rubber hose.
Leakage to the press of a criminal record
has been far from uncommon?a person liv-
ing close to the scene of a crime would be
charged solely because of that record, and
jurors who read about it might be persuaded
of guilt on that record alone. Or a prosecutor
could feed newspapers bits of inflammatory
evidence until jurors were convinced that
the community expected a conviction.
Events in 1963 slowed such practices.
President Kennedy was assassinated by Lee
Harvey Oswald, who was stood by the police
on a table and grilled by reporters about the
crime. Later, the police notified the press of
the time when Oswald would move to anoth-
er prison, enabling Jack Ruby to lynch him.
There followed a realization that a fair
trial for the accused demanded a measure of
restraint: by police, prosecutor, lawyers and
the press. The press fought to establish that
under the Constitution it has an absolute
right to publish what it chooses and never to
be subjected to prior restraint.
No one questions the mandate of the First
Amendment, but never in recorded history
have newspapers had the right to publish
with impunity anything they might choose.
Publication of a libel used to mean imprison-
ment, and today, payment of damages.
Some, but not all, indecencies are subject to
print. The government has been permitted to
interfere with 'advertising by the media. Se-
dition and subversion are subject to restraint
when they may cause a clear and present
danger of government overthrow.
The press defenders carry unyieldingly
the banner of no prior restraint. In the con-
frontation with the Sixth Amendment fair
trial guarantee, they insist that every other
device be resorted to: change of trial site,
questioning of jurors for bias, admonitions to
disregard media coverage, sequestration of
jury and postponement of trial. They insist
that irresponsible reporting can be punished
by imposing a payment of damages.
Christian Science Monitor
1 April 1976
Senate committee mum
on secret CIA probes?
Washington
The Senate Intelligence Com-
mittee has decided to keep secret
its investigations of controversial
Central Intelligence Agency oper-
ations, according to committee
sources.
The committee intends to re-
lease its report in mid-April in the
form of general recommendations
to curb some questionable CIA
activities, but the operations them-
selves will not be mentioned, the
sources said.
By THEODORE VOORHEES
Five justices of the Supreme Court in the
Pentagon Papers case pointed out that the
press may be subject to criminal sanctions
in an appropriate case. Yet the press be-
comes apoplectic when faced with a court
restriction on publication of evidence that
might prevent a fair trial. If the Court sus-
tains Justice Blackmun's "gag order" in the
current Nebraska Press Association case, we
are told, we will see "the erosion of one of
the most basic rights of a free people."
Why should this be so? Liberty of the indi-
vidual is surely as basic as the right of free
press. Yet the Constitution has not crumbled
nor has liberty been dangerously eroded by
judicial exercise of prior restraint in every
aspect of the life of the individual.
A person can be enjoined from commit-
ting a nuisance which would injure his neigh-
bors, from engaging in strikes, from causing
damage to the environment, and from irre-
parable injury to another by breach of a con-
tract. Such restraints have survived charges
of deprivation of property under the Four-
teenth Amendment and involuntary servi-
tude under the Thirteenth.
Freedom of the press is of such import-
ance as to warrant a Supreme Court pro-
nouncement that prior restraint carries a
presumption of illegality. Yet the presump-
tion should be deemed overcome when publi-
cation of prejudicial evidence will jeopar-
dize the fairness of the trial of an accused.
U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
22 March 1976
Congressional investigators trying to
track down the person who leaked to
the press the House Intelligence Com-
mittee's final report on CIA operations
are finding the task bigger than expect-
ed. They believe at-least 3,000 copies
of the report, many made on duplicat-
ing machines outside Congress, are
floating about among federal officials.
?
Justification for a newspaper to publish a
confession in advance of trial can seldom ar-
ise. Even if he confesses before a hundred
? witnesses, the accused has the right at trial
to have the court rule, in the absence of the
jury, whether he confessed voluntarily.
If the media broadcasts the confession,
the appearance of a fair trial and perhaps
the fact are irreparably lost. The excuse of-
fered for the disclosure of the confession or
other damaging evidence is the "the people's
right to know." This claim of the press has a
hollow ring, however, in the light of its own
refusal to disclose the name of its inform-
ants when that would prove to its disadvan-
tage. Furthermore, the informing of the pub-
lic is not permanently restrained but only
temporarily postponed.
The confession, the past record and in-
flammatory evidence can be aired to high
heaven once the verdict is in. True, by that
time, the press has lost the opportunity to af-
fect the outcome, but under our system of
constitutionally mandated justice, the con-
trol of a trial is for the court alone. The
Founding Fathers made no provision for the
press to play a part in the conduct of a trial.
Where publication threatens irreparable
injury to an individual, the public or the na-
tion, prior restraint of publication should be
just as valid as an injunction in any case of
similarly serious injury. A person denied a
fair trial by the press may languish in prison
for the rest of his life. That would be, by any-
one's measure, an irreparable injury.
When publication of a new version of the
Pentagon Papers might endanger the securi-
ty of the nation, prior restraint might readi-
ly be called for until the danger could be
weighed by the court. We have much to learn
from the CIA debacle. With advance knowl-
edge of an intention by Counter Spy to re-
lease the story that blew the cover of Mr.
Welch, a court might have restrained that
action, and he might be alive today.
It is difficult to believe that responsible
elements of the press or electronic media
really want to play God in the lives of other
people. They, more than most, should reject
the contention that the Constitution places
anyone beyond the reach of the law. Our so-
ciety cannot exist with anyone having that
much power, not even the press.
?
Mr. Voorhees is assistant deo o of the
Catholic University law school.
DETROIT FREE PRESS
22 March 1976
Support CIA, FBI
FEEL MORE strongly today than ever tha,. thc?
FBI and the CIA offer me more security than the ?
US. Supreme Court and the Congress. ? .
? I wonder If the proloers could witlistktrol ih
54111C scrutiny that has been ariplitNi to thec
ds. Most of the probing is doing the courary
great harm.
It most dangerous sithation exists in OW, the
judges. especially in the federal court!., are eivra
ter too much power.
IRWIN MILLER SR.
Westland
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BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC
SCIENTISTS, Febrilary 1976
;e7-7,Pv":, rfricT
swampland
of merican
foreign
!icy
The Chairman of the
Senate Intelligence
Committee finds
in the excesses
of the CIA the
? symptoms of an
! illusion of American
omnipotence which
has entrapped
..and enthralled the
nation's presidents
Frank Church
Two hundred years ago, at the
founding of this nation, Thomas
Paine observed that "Not a place
? upon earth might be so happy as
America. Her situation is remote
from all the wrangling world." I still
believe America remains the best
place on Earth, but it has long since
ceased to be "remote from all the
wrangling work!."
On the contrary, even our internal
economy now depends on events far
beyond our shores. The energy cri-
sis, which exposed our yulnerable
dependence upon foreign oil, made
the point vividly.
It is also tragic but true that our
own people can no longer be made
safe from savage destruction hurled
down upon them from the most
hidden and remote regions on Earth.
Soviet submarines silently traverse
the ocean floors carrying transcon-
tinental missiles with the capacity to
strike at our heartland. The nuclear
arms race threatens to continue its
deadly spiral toward Armageddon.
In this dangerous setting, it is im-
perative for the United States to
maintain a strong and elle( tive intel-
ligence service. On this proposition
we can ill-afford to he of two minds:
We have no choice .other than to
gather, analyze, and assess?to the
best of our abilities?vital infortna-
Approved
tion on the intent and prowess of
foreign adversaries, present or po-
tential. .
Without an adequate intelligence-
gathering apparatus, we would be
? unable to gauge with confidence our
defense requirements; unable to
:conduct an informed foreign policy;
unable to control, through satellite
: surveillance, a runaway nuclear
arms race. "The winds and waves
are always on the side of the ablest
navigators," wrote Gibbon.. Those
nations without a skillful intelli-
gence service must navigate beneath
a clouded sky.
With this truth in mind, the United
States established, by the National
Security Act of 1947, a Central Intel-
ligence Agency to collect and evalu-
ate intelligence, and provide for its
proper dissemination within the
government. The CIA was to be a
, clearing house for other U.S.
intelli-
gence agencies, including those of
the State Department and the vari-
ous military services. It was to be an
independent, civilian intelligence
agency whose duty it was, in the
words of Allen Dulles, CIA Director
from 1953-1961: ?
To weigh facts, and to ciraw conclusions
from those facts, without having either
the facts or the conclusions warped by
the inevitable and even proper prejudic-
es of the men whose duty it is to deter-
!mine poliCy and who, having once de-
termined a policy, are too likely to be
blind to any facts which might tend to
prove the policy to be faulty.
"The Central Intelligence Agency,"
'concluded Dulles, "should have.
nothing to do with policy." in this
way, neither the President nor the
Congress would be left with any of
the frequently self-interested intelli-
gence assessments afforded by the
Pentagon and the State Department,
to rely upon..
In its efforts to get at the. hard facts,
the CIA has performed unevenly. It
has had its successes and its failures.
The CIA has detected the important
new Soviet weapons systems early
on; but it has often over-estimated
the growth of the Russian ICBM
For Release 2001/08/08
forces. The CIA has successfully
monitored Soviet adherence to arms
control agreements, and given us the
, confidence to take steps toward fur-
ther limitations; but it has been. un-
able to predict the imminence of
several international conflicts,. such
as the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. In a .
word, though it deserves passing
marks for its intelligence work, the
? CIA has certainly not been infallible.
While one may debate the quality
. of the agency's performance, there
has never been any question about
? the propriety and necessity of its
evolvement in the process of !-_,,at her-
ing and evaluating foreign
inteUi-
gence. Nor have serious questions
' been raised about the means used to
acquire such information, whether -
from overt sources, technical devic-
es, or by clandestine methods.
What has become controversial is
quite unrelated to intelligence, but
has to do instead with the so-called
covert operations of the CIA, those
secret &I-6ns to manipulate events
within foreign countries in ways pre-
sumed to serve the interests of the
United States. Nowhere are such
activities vouchsafed in the statutory
language which created the Agency
in 1947. "No indication was given
in the statute that the CIA would
become a vehicle for foreign politi-
cal action or clandestine political
warfare," notes Harry Howe Ran-
som, a scholar who has written
widely and thought deeply about the
problems of intelligence in modern
society. Rarlsont concludes that
"probably nO other organization of
the federal government has taken
such liberties in interpreting its le-
gally assigned functions as has the
CIA."
The legal basis for this political
action arm of the CIA is very much
Open to question. Certainly the leg-
islative history of the 1947 Act fails
to indicate that Congress anticipated
the CIA would ever engage in covert
political warfare abroad.
The CIA points to a catch-all
phrase contained in the 1947 Act as
a rationalization 'for its operational
prerogatives. A clause in the statute
permits the Agency "to perform
such other functions and duties re-
lated to intelligence .affeeting the
national security as the National Se-
curity Council may, from time to
time, direct." These vague ano
seemingly innocuous words have
been seized upon as the green light
for CIA intervention around the
world. ,
Moreover; these interventions into
the political, affairs or foreign court-
tries soon came to overshado,.v the
Agency's original purpose of gall ler-
ing and evaluating information. Just
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consider how far afield we strayed.
1For example:
? We deposed the government of
Guatemala when its leftist 'leanings
displeased us; .
? We attempted to ignite a civil
war against Sukarno in Indonesia;
? We intervened to restore the
. Shah to his throne in Iran, after
Mossaclegh broke the monopoly grip
of British Petroleum over Iranian oil;
i ? We attempted to launch a
counter-revolution in ?Cuba through
the .abortive landing of an army of
, exiles at the Bay of Pigs;
0 We even conducted a secret
war in Laos, paying. Meo 'tribesmen
and Thai mercenaries to do our
.lighting there.
All these engagements were initi-
ated without the knowledge or con-
sent or Congress. No country was
too small, no foreign 'leader too tri-
fling, to escape our attention.
? We sent a deadly toxin to the
Congo with the purpose of injecting
Lumumba with a fatal disease;
? We armed local dissidents in
, the Dominican Republic, knowing
their purpose to be the assassination
of Trujillo;
? We participated in a military
Icoup overturning the very govern-
ment we were pledged to defend in
South Vietnam; and when .Premier
t Diem, resisted, he and his brother
were murdered by the very generals
to whom we gave money and ?sup-
port;
? We attempted for years to as-
sassinate Fidel Castro and other
Cuban leaders. The various plots
spanned three. Administrations, and
! involved an extended collaboration
between the CIA and the Mafia.
Whatever led the United States to
such extremes? Assassination is
nothing less than. an act of war, and
our targets were leaders of small,
weak countries that could not possi-
bly threaten the United States. Only
once did Castro become an accesso-
ry to a threat, by permitting the
Soviets to install missiles on Cuban
soil within range of the United
States. And this was the one time
when the CIA called off all attempts
against his life.
The roots of these malignant plots
grew out of the obsessions of the
Cold War. When the CIA succeeded
the Office of Strategic Services of
World War II, Stalin replaced Hitler
as the Devil Incarnate. Wartime
methods were routinely adopted for
peacetime use.
In those myopic years, the world.
was seen as up for grabs between
the United States and the Soviet
Union. Castro's Cuba raised the.
specter of a Soviet outpost at Ameri-
ca's doorstep. Events in the Domini-
can Republic appeared to offer an
additional opportun4 for the Sovi-
ets and thtir allies. The Congo, treed
from Belgian rule, occupied the stra-
tegic center of the African continent,
and the prospect of Soviet penetra-
tion there was viewed as a threat to
U.S. interests in emerging Africa.
There was a great concern that a
communist takeover in Indochina
would have a "domino effect"
throughout . Asia. Even the lawful
election in 1970 of a Marxist presi-
dent in Chile was still seen by some
as the equivalent of Castro's con-
quest of Cuba.
In the words of a former Secretary'
of State, "A desperate struggle_lwasJ
going on in the bad: alleys of world
politics." Every upheaval, wherever
it occurred, was likened to a pawn -
on a global chessboard, to be moved
this way or that, by the two principal
players. This led the CIA to plunge
into a ?full range of covert activities
designed to counteract the competi-
tive efforts of the Soviet KGB.
? Thus, the United States came to
adopt the methods. and accept the
? value system of the "enemy." In the
secret world of covert action, we
threw ofi all restraints. Not content
merely to discreetly subsidize for-
eign political parties, labor unions,
and newspapers, the Central Intelli-
-gence Agency soon began to direct-
ly manipulate the internal politics of
other countries. Spending Many mil-
lions of dollars annually, the CIA
filled its bag with dirty tricks, rang-
ing from bribery and false propagan-
da to schemes to "alter the health"
.of unfriendly foreign leaders and
undermine their regimes. ?
No where is this imitation of KGB
tactiCs better demonstrated than in
the directives sent to CIA agents in
the Congo in 1960. Instructions to
kill the African leader Lumumba
, were sent via diplomatic pouch,
;along with rubber gloves, a mask,
; syringe, and a lethal biological ma-
terial. The poison was to be injected
into some substance that Lumumba
; would ingest, whether food or tooth-
paste. Before this plan was imple-
imented, Lumumba was killed by
Congolese rivals. Nevertheless, our
actions had fulfilled the prophesy of
George Williams, an eminent theo-
logian at the Harvard Divinity
School, who once warned, "Be cau-
tious when you choose your enemy, ?
for yoti will grow more like him."
The imperial view from the White
House reached its arrogant summits
during the Administration of Richard
Nixon. On September 15, 1970, fol-
lowing the election of Allende to be
President of Chile, Richard Nixon
summoned Henry Kissinger, Richard
Helms, and John Mitchell to the
White House. The topic was Chile.
Allende, Nixon stated, was 1111i1C-
ceptable to the President of the Unit-
ed States.
In his handwritten notes for this
meeting, Nixon indicated that he
was "not concerned" with the risks
involved. As CIA Director Helms
recalled in testimony' before the Sen-
ate Committee, "The President
came. down very hard that he want-
ed something done, and he didn't .
care how." To Helms, the order had
' been all-inclusive. "If -I ever carried.
a marshal's baton in my knapsack
out of the Oval Office," he recalled,
? "it was that day." ,Thus, the Presi-
dent of the United States had given
orders to the CIA to prevent the
popu lady-elected President. of Chile
from entering office.
? . To bar Allende from the Presiclen-
?cy, a military coup was organized,
with the CIA playing a direct role in
the planning. One of the major ob-
stacles to the Success of the mission
was the strong opposition to a coup
by the Commander-in-Chief of the
Chilean kmy, General Rene
Schneider, who insisted that Chile's
constitution be upheld. As a result of
his stand, the removal of General
Schneider became a necessary in-
gredient in die coup plans. Unable
to get Geberal Schneider to resign,
conspirators in Chile decided to kid-
nap him. MaChine guns and ammu-
.nition were passed by the CIA to a
. group of kidnappers on October 22,
1970. That same clay General
.Schneiderwas mortally wounded on
his way to work in an attempted
kidnap, apparently by a group affili-
ated with the one provided weapons
by the CIA.
The plot to kidnap General
. Schneider was but one of many ef-
forts to subvert the Allende regime.
? The United G States sought also to
bring the Chilean economy under
Allende to its knees. In a 'situation
-report to Dr. Kissinger, our Ambas-
sador wrote that:
Not a nut or bol; v.-ill be atIov,.ed to
reach Chile under Allende. Once A:-
lende comes to power we shall do all
- within our power to condemn Chile and
the Chileans to utmost deprivation and
poverty, a policy designed for a long
time to come to accelerate the hard
features of a Communist society in Chile.
The ultimate outcome, as you
know, of .these and other efforts to
destroy the Allende government was
bloodbath ? which included the
death of Allende and the installa-
tion, in his place, of a :repressive
military dictatorship.
Why Chile? What can possibly
explain or justify such an intrusion
, upon the right of the Chilean people
.to sea-determination? The country
itself was no threat to us. It has been
aptly characterized as a "dagger
,
pointed straight at the heart of Ant-
arctica."
Was it to protect American-
owned big business? We now know
that I.T.T. offered the CIA a million
7
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dollars to prevent the ratification of
Allende's election by the Chilean
Congress. Quite properly,- this offer
was rejected. But the CIA then spent
much more on its own, in an effort
, to accomplish the same general ob-
jective.
Yet, if our purpose was to save the
properties of large U.S. corpora-
tions, that cause had already been
lost. The nationalization of the
mines was decided well before Al-
lende's election; and the question of
compensation was tempered by in-
surance against confiscatory losses
issued to the companies by the U.S.
government
No, the only plausible explana-
tion for our intervention in Chile is
the persistence of the myth that
communism is a single, hydra-
headed serpent, and that it remains
? our duty to cut off each ugly head,
wherever- and however it may ap-
pear.
Ever since the end of World War
11. we have justified our mindless
meddling in the affairs of others on
the ground that since the Soviets do
it, we must do it, too. The time is at
hand to re-examine that thesis.
Before Chile, we insisted that
communism had never been freely
chosen by any people, but forced
upon them against their will. The
communists countered that they re-
sorted to revolution because the
United States would never permit
the establishment of a communist
? regime by peaceful means.
In Chile, President Nixon con-
firmed the communist thesis. Like
Caesar peering into the colonies
from distant Rome, Nixon said the
choice of government by the Chile-
ans was unacceptable to the Presi-
dent of the United States:
The attitude in the White House
seemed to be: If?in the wake of
Vietnam?I can no longer send the
Marines, then I will send in the CIA.
WASIIIIIGTON STAR
3.4 MARCH 1976
PAIDADVERTISEME.HT
PLEASE IP/RI 'IF: YOUR CON-
GREssmAN f?r:uest..m 0*-..6 ar-
it,CIS On the (?ot. nf
Siosiar and Ilrrvi,IReprt, wnicn 3S '
hires, major seCtions. (This AVO;ieS
Only to Ine unctasSified materiel
which hoe Cs:0k ne.eds to Snow 11.
Saviet finaociny or otner election
aid Is house or swtate
earnoaiims. as lobbyin9 to' Soviet
WiCY ? 2- Soviet G.R U. iateihri,e
penetration et COncress in 5 sc,c'
WaYS and tne Oa, to I 311 1)1111w
G R.U. officers on Capitol Hill. 3.
reistionship the ITT/
Watergate affiir. Inn CuSon
the Soviet EmOass, in Cuo.s. The
Presidium Coinamnd and Ire riots
SCheCuted in Wash.. D.C. thk sum-
mer. Most terrorism, IAn hilt of La.
GuarTea Airport in In:. United
States. the ionticy maitioq control of
the Cuban OGI hy Soviet C1.04 P.11ti?
hey Command. and tne need ci
tolaCic and white parents 1.3
intensiw-e effort to determine what
and whO is coin's to exploit their
Cniti,en to harm th..hn The ;i?rsnn
invOlv..?e, in rntik:nn 11,1 1,11.1{.T
the III InanS tee St.. ?11 he,.
insr the courade to attn.* this ad. .
Sinwes
Ch.srles Bersnek Jr,
? But what have we gained by our
. policy of consummate intervention,
compared to what we have lost?
? .A "friendly" Iran and
lhdone-
sia, members of the OPEC cartel,
!which imposes extortionate prices
on the Western World for indispen-
sable oil?
* A hostile Laos that preferred the
indigenous forces of communism to
control imposed by Westerners,
which smacked of the hated colo-
nialisrn, against which they had
fought so long to overthrow?
? A fascist Chile, with thousands
:of political prisoners languishing in
; their jails, mocking the professed
;ideals of the United States through-
out the hemisphere?
If we have gained little, what then
have we lost? I suggest we have
lost?or grievously impaired?the
" good name and- reputation of the
United States from which we once
;drew a unique capacity to exercise
i matchless moral leadership. Where
I once we were admired, now we are
resented. Where once we were wel-
come, now we are tolerated, at best.
In the eyes of millions of once
; friendly foreign people, the United
JStates is today regarded with grave
l suspicion and distrust.
What else can account for the
startling decline in American pres-
tige? Certainly not. the collapse of
our military strength, for our fire-
power has grown immensely since
the end of World War II.
I must lay the blame, in large
measure, to the fantasy that it lay
within our power to control other
countries through the covert manip-
ulation of their affairs. It formed part
of a greater illusion that entrapped
and enthralled our Presidents: the
illusion of American omnipotence.
Nevertheless, I do not draw the
conclusion of those who now argue
that all U.S. covert operations must
be banned in the future. I can con-
ceive of a dire emergency when
WASENGTOU POST
30 MAR 1976
timely clandestine action on our part
might avert a nuclear holocaust and
save an entire civilization.-
can also conceive of circum-
stances, such as those existing in
I Portugal today, where our discreet
help to democratic political parties
might avert a forcible take-over by a
communist minority, heavily subsi-
dized by the Soviets. In Portugal,
" such a bitterly-unwanted, Marxist
regime is being resisted courageous-
ly by a people who earlier voted 84
? percent against it.
But these are covert operations.
consistent either with the imperative
of national survival or with our tradi-
tional belief in free government. If
our hand were exposed helping a
? foreign people in their struggle to be
'free, we ,could scorn the cynical
doctrine of "plausible denial," and
say openly, "Yes, we were there?
and Proud of it."
We were there in Western Europe,
helping to rdstore democratic gov-
ernments in the aftermath of World .
War 11. was only after our faith
gave way to fear that we began to
act as a self-appointed sentinel of
the status quo.
Then it was that all the dark arts of
secret intervention?bribery, ? black-
mail, abduction, assassination?
were put to the service of reaction-
ary and repressive regimes that can
never, for long, escape or withstand
the volcanic forces of change.
And the United States, as a result,
became ever more identified with
the claims of the old order, instead
of the aspirations of the new.
The remedy is clear. American
foreign policy; whether openly or
secretly pursued, must be made to
conform once more to our historic
ideals, the same fundamental belief
in freedom and popular government
that once made us a beacon of hope
for the downtrodden and oppressed
throughout the world. 0
Vice Admiral to Get CIA ru'o.LA_
Associated Press
Central Intelligence Agen-
cy Director George Bush
yesterday named a former
commander of the Sixth
Fleet to be his deputy for
relations with other intelli-
gence agencies and called
? the appointment an impor-
tant step in reorganizing
.the intelligence community.
Vice Adm. Daniel J...Mur-
phy will direct the day-to-
day business of the
gencej community staff and
has particular responsibility
for the management of re-
sources devoted to U.S. in-
telligence activities," Bush
said in a statement. ?
Murphy, 54, will be
Bush's second deputy under
President. Ford's executive
order to reorganize U.S. in-
telligence agencies. The
other is Army Lt. Gen. Ver-
non A. Walters, ? who has
been deputy CIA director
for several years.
In his statement, Bush
said Murphy "has been ap-
pointed to the post .of dep-
uty to the director of cen-
tral intelligence for the in-
telligence community. The
appointment represents an
important step in advancing
the President's program icr
reorganization of the intelli
gence community."
In addition to command-
ing the Sixth Fleet, Mucliy
has been military assIslant
to the Secretary of Dcrei17-1,
and director of antisubilla-
rine warfare and ocean ?;11-?
veillance programs in tile of-
fice of the chief of naval od?
crations.
..Murphy has spent
years in the Navy zinci hoid.,
the Secretary of
distinguished service To,t1;,1
and the Lei4inn of Alc.:it
with a guld star.
8
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Sunday, March 21, 1976
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The Washington Star
By I. F. Stone
One of the first steps in solving a
crime is to determine who benefited
by it. The chief beneficiaries in the
leak of the Pike Committee report on
intelligence were the intelligence
agencies themselves. The report
turned up on the CBS evening news
Sunday, Jan. 25, and in the first edi-
tions that same evening of the New
York Times for Monday, Jan. 26.
When the House of Representatives
met in Washington at noon next day,
the minority on the Pike Committee
launched the attack which led three
days later to the vote against release
of the report.
LF. Stone, who long published the
influential newsletter I.F. Stone's
Weekly, is a contributing editor of
the New York Review of Books.
This is an abridgment of an arti-
cle in the New York Review of
Books. Copyright0 1976 by NYREV
Inc. Reprinted by permission. All
Rights Reserved.
Logic, probabilities, and the cir-
cumstantial are not proof. Folly can
never be excluded. But an examina-
tion of the strange circumstances in
which the report was suppressed
may put newspapermen on their
guard and show the public what we
are all up against in dealing with se-
cret agencies.
The Pike Committee voted 9-4 on
the afternoon of Friday, Jan. 23, to
release its report. Everything was
ready for publication after months of
hard work and agonizing hassles with
the intelligence agencies and the.
executive branch. The majority of
the committee and the staff were
triumphant. The last hurdles to publi-
cation seemed to have been safely
cleared
Yet that very weekend someone
leaked a copy of the report to the
New York Times and to Daniel
Schorr of CBS, giving the intelligence
agencies their chance to discredit the
committee and block release of the
report.
This leak was not, repeat not, a
leak to thwart censorship. Under the
rules of the House and the resolution
establishing its Select Committee on
Intelligence (the Pike Committee),
that 9-4 vote on Friday afternoon,
Jan. 23, was all that was needed to
release the report. The committee
did not have to go to the Rules Com-
mittee for permission, nor did it need
a vote of the House to make the re-
port public. The report would have
been released automatically as soon
as copies came back from the print-
er. It was the leak that did the com-
mittee in.
At the time of the leak, the Times
and CBS were not giving the public
information that would otherwise
have been suppressed. They were
merely getting the report in advance
of their competitors. At that point,
their news stories were a beat, not a
public service. Indeed, as soon be-
dame clear, it was a public disservice
to jump the gun by a few days on offi-
cial release of the report at the cost
of giving its enemies ? and the
enemies of the press ? just the
opportunity they were looking for.
' The leak fit beautifully with a well-
synchronized attack by the enemies
of the report. On Monday morning,
Jan. 26, Daniel Schorr showed his
copy of the Pike report on the CBS
morning news and the Times arrived
in Washington with extensive stories
on what the report contained. This
coincided ? whether by accident or
design ? with plans which seem to
;have been already made for an on-
slaught that very day on the floor of
the House.
The leaks to the Times and CBS,
were brought up over and over again
by Congressman McClory of Illinois,
the ranking Republican on the Pike
? Committee, and by his supporters.
:The final speaker, the Republican
, minority leader, Rhodes of Arizona,
summed it all up by saying that the
executive branch "charged with our
national security" could not be ex-
pected "to confide in a Congress that
is a direct conduit to the public press
and rushes to the media to divulge
every particle of information it re-
ceives." In a phrase worthy of the
best on Madison Avenue, Rhodes said
the public's right to know did not give
Congress "the right to blab." Even
soap has never been sold more skill-
fully.
This is the theme song of the
counterattack orchestrated by the
intelligence agencies ? the new-
speak of the CIA and FBI. Congres-
sional control is to be stigmatized as
a "blabbermouth" operation. Atten-
tion is to be focused not on the abuses
of secret government but on those
who criticize and expose them. And if
there isn't enough "blabbing" from
Congress we may expect the intelli-
gence agencies to do the blabbing
themselves and blame it on Congress
and the press.
The government itself has always
' been the foremost leaker. The chief
value of the classification system is
the wide leeway it gives the govern-
ment for manipulating the public
mind by selective declassification.
But this is only one of its many uses.
One way to undercut a congres-
sional investigation is to beat it to the
punch by leaking part of the story in
advance. It makes the later official
revelation sound like old-hat news. It
leaves the congressional report,
when and if it comes, to be greeted
by "ho hum, so what's new?"
A lot of the "leaks," as many news-
papermen know, have come from the
executive branch and the intelligence
agencies themselves. One of the big-
gest -leaks," which hurt the Pike
Committee last November. was the
9
on ar
leak to Schorr at CBS and to the
Times and the Christian Science
Monitor of the tragic story of how the
CIA sold the poor Kurds down the
river, first giving them secret sup-
port against Iraq and then cutting it
off when that suited the Shah of
Iran's power politics. Pike Commit-
tee sources claim that there were
hitherto unknown details in the New
York Times and the Christian
Science Monitor reports of the Kurd
story which were new even to its own
investigators, details which led them
to suspect that the leaks must have
come from an intelligence agency.
Schorr broke the Kurdish story on
CBS news on the Saturday night be-
fore it appeared in the Times and the
Monitor. Mitchell Rogovin, special
counsel to the CIA, phoned a Pike
Committee staff official that Satur-
day morning and asked him to stop
Schorr from telling the story on TV
that night. The Pike Committee offi-
cial, who had not been aware that the
Kurdish story had leaked, asked him-
self whether that telephone call was
a cute way to divert suspicion from
the CIA as the source. That l's the
kind of question naturally bred by the
CIA's capacity for murky and laby-
rinthine manipulations. The CIA was
aware that nothing had so angered
the Pike Committee as the Kurdish
tragedy ? this was a subject on
which there was no minority ? and
some Pike Committee members be-
lieve that the intelligence agencies
leaked it in advance to defuse the
coming committee report.
The Kurdish story leaked the very
weekend in November that CIA
Director William Colby was fired by
Ford. The New York Times in pub-
lishing it gave "a senior intelligence
official" as its source. While the leak
was later used to smear the Pike
Committee, the target of the intelli-
gence official in leaking it was Kis-
singer, who was Nixon's willing
accomplice in this tragic bit of "real-
politik."
? The executive branch and the intel-
ligence agencies had a motive, and
the intelligence agencies had ample
? means, to leak the Pike report in ad-
vance. There were several versions
of the Pike Committee report as it
went through repeated and prolonged
revision in hassles with the various
executive and intelligence agencies
involved. There were close to 2,000
copies of various versions circulating
in the White House and the federal
agencies for the purpose of pinpoint-
ing security matters and arguing far
various kinds of deletions. Copies
were even sent to many embassies
abroad. A leak could easily have
been arranged in those quarters and
been far harder to trace than a leak
inside the Pike Committee, where
there were only enough copies for
each of the 13 members and perhaps
tmlf-dozen copies for staff use. 'Vet
a stiff leak cannot be excluded.
This brings us to a new problem, of,
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which the public has not been aware,
and that is the problem of "detail-
ees." The word "detailee" is a new
word I.don't believe anybody ever
heard used publicly until the Pike
Committee report. The word seems to
have been added to the lexicon by the
CIA. It is a bureaucratic euphemism
for a certain kind of infiltrator, an
intelligence agent who is slipped into
other branches of the government,
sometimes openly, sometimes covert-
ly. Sometimes he is semicoyert ? his
identity being disclosed only to the
head of the department or office to
which he has been "detailed."
Were there "detailees" operating
covertly on the Pike Committee staff,
or in the federal agencies that had
access to the report, and did they
have any part in leaking it? Schorr
and the New York Times reporters
may well have been unaware of the
real affiliation, or hidden loyalties, of
their secret "source." I'm sure they
would not have lent themselves
knowingly to a leak which had been
set up by the CIA to undermine the
committee and thwart the public in-
terest.
(It should be noted here that,
whatever the origins or motives of
those who leaked the report, once the
House voted for suppression, Schorr
and the Village Voice performed a
public service by getting the contents
published. They acted to print the
text only after the House vote to sup-
press, when there was clearly a duty
to make the text available.)
There are two dangerous prece-
dents for newsmen in the Schorr
case. The first lies in Schorr's sus-
pension by CBS on the ground that he
has put himself in an adversary posi-
tion with the government. A news-
man was intended ? shades of
Jefferson! ? to be in an adversary
position to government. To let
Schorr's suspension go unchallenged
is to give corporate media employers
an excuse to get rid of reporters who
THE ECONOMIST MARCH 20, 1976
Not nuclear?yet
For 10 years Israel has doggedly denied
possessing nuclear weapons. On Sunday
Mr Rabin, the prime minister, was still
reiterating the sacred formula: Israel is
not a nuclear power and will not be the
first to introduce nuclear weapons to the
Middle East. But this was after Mr Moshe
Dayan. the former defence minister, had
said in Tel Aviv that Israel had reached
the limit of its ability to absorb con-
ventional weapons and must now try for
a nuclear option. Mr Dayan argued that
the Arabs must be made to realise.that if
Israel's survival were at stake it could
threaten the Arabs with at least equal
destruction.
On March 11th a CIA official said at
a disputedly private briefing that Israel
is already estimated to have 10-20
nuclear weapons ready to use. The New
York Times published these figures,
saying it had been given permission.
When tackled about this. Mr George
Bush, the CIA's new director, took full
responsibility for the disclosure but said
that there had been an understanding
that it would not be published. A routine
Israeli disclaimer followed.
The background to Mr Dayan's
bombshell is a dispute among Israel's
military men over a new defence
doctrine. With new Soviet arms coming
to Syria, and the prospect or western
get in wrong with the powers that be.?
I do not understand why the Wash-
ington Post and the New York Times
(which have attacked Schorr) do not
see this: If they had acted like CBS,
the former would have suspended.
Woodward and Bernstein and the lat-
ter Seymour Hersh.
Why shouldn't Schorr be able to
fight back as a reporter for, and on,
CBS and expose the evils of secrecy
in government instead of being
placed on the defensive and put in
isolation as '`controversial"?
The other dangerous precedent lies
in the sanctions which the House
witch-hunters hope to apply. The
House does not have a legal leg to
stand on if it tries to prosecute
Schorr. The power to classify rests
on shaky grounds in the executive
branch; there are no grounds at all.
for classification in Congress. The
only way the House can punish
Schorr is to take away his credentials
as a correspondent and thus his job.
This is exactly the punishment
sought in the investigation by that
,House Ethics Committee which was
originally set up to police congress-
men, not newspapermen, and which
in almost a decade of existence has
never before even bothered to obtain
subpoena power or hire a full staff.
If covering Congress is a privilege,
not a right ? if the price of a news-
man's job is acquiescing in arbitrary
congressional censorship ? then the
Congress and the intelligence agen-
cies operating through Congress
have another way to draw the press
itself into the conspiracy of silence
and to intimidate newsmen.
There was a time when parliamen-
tary proceedings were privileged.
Before 1771 reporters and printers
could be punished for reporting the
proceedings of the House of Com-
mons without its permission. In this
Bicentennial year it is worth recall-
ing that John Wilkes, the best friend
ones to Egypt, Israel feels itself hard
pressed to keep up even the one-to-three
ratio against the Arabs that the United
States believes is enough for safety. Last
week Mr Shimon Peres, the defence
minister, made the first official reference
ever to the size of the armed forces,
putting them at around the size of the
Jewish population on the eve of the
country's independence in 1948. This
means about 650,000 men and women.
or almost one in four Israelis, on active
service or in the reserves.
Even with American assistance, Israel
has neither the money to buy the con-
ventional weapons it thinks it needs to
? counterbalance total Arab strength (and
the space to store them) nor the man-
power to maintain and operate them.
Israel's military shopping list is so
enormous that the.Amerieans have been
asking, only half in jest, what on earth
it proposes to do with all the weapons it
is getting. Reservists these days do extra
time greasing and polishing in the arms
depots, and the army keeps on appealing
for more volunteers for maintenance.
Both the prime minister and the finance
minister have been trying to cut defence
spending, which consumes more than a
third of the country's gross national
product.
10
the rebellious American colonists had
in the House of Commons, establish-
ed the right to cover parliamentary
proceedings. As sheriff of London, he
successfully prevented the arrest of a
printer the House charged with pub-
lishing its debates. That
"lawlessness" in defense of a free
press was one of the great moments
of English history.
Congressman Stratton of New
York says reporters must obey the
law. Of course, they must. But there
may be times when the public inter-
est imposes on them a duty to risk
breaking secrecy rules.
Stratton kept talking of Rule X of
the House. He said that under it "the
privileges of the House concern the
integrity of our proceedings." The
Constitution says Congress shall
make no law abridging freedom of
the press. Which is to prevail, a rule
of the House or the First Amend-
ment? If the secrecy miasma is to
spread from the executive branch
into the legislative, where does the
duty of a free press lie? In submit-
ting, and letting free government go
down the drain? ?
The heart of the evil lies in the
"dirty tricks" in Which the CIA has
specialized and which other intelli-
gence agencies, especially the FBI,
have also practiced. A government
cannot carry on lawless activity in
public. If it is going to use assassina-
tion, burglary, bribery, corruption of
elections, agents provocateurs, cov-
ert slander, it can only do so in se-
cret. There is no way for Congress to
"oversee" such activities without re-
vealing them and opposing them. To
allow "dirty tricks" is not only to
make real oversight impossible but to
make Congress an accomplice in law-
lessness.
That is the rock-bottom issue
which has to be faced in the debate
over the intelligence agencies, and
very few are facing it.
So Mr Dayan's argument that Israel
should buy fewer -conventional weapons
and concentrate on nuclear ones haS
considerable appeal. Those who argue
that Israel's nuclear alternative should
be brought out into the open suggest
that. this would provide an exit from the
cul-de-sac in which Mr Kissinger's step-
by-step approach seems to have vanished.
Israel, according to this theory. could
offer substantial territorial concessions,
In return for some no-war formula, with-
out having to rely on international
guarantees which it does not trust; the ?
crippling tax burden could be eased and
a halt called to the arms race.
A strong argument against the new
nuclear thinking is that it is not new.
The superpowers followed this line and
it cost them more, not less, and did not
crirninish their need for conventional
weapons. Their experience in substituting
cold wars for hot is not necessarily
attributable to nuclear weapons; nor is
there any reason to believe that their
experience could be transferred to the
Middle- East. The Americans might shut
off the flow of conventional arim aid if
Israel tried out active nuclear diplomacy.
The argument is only beginning; a lot
more will be heard before Israel decides
whether to become a nuclear power
openly.
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zog tit lc=
Defected Russ
Agent Still a
Mystery Man
Ex-KGB Official Kept
in Solitary by Wary
CIA for Three Years
BY JACK NELSON
Times Washington Bureau Chief
? -
WASHINGTON--.Somewhere in the
-United States, living under an as-
sumed .name, is a former. Soviet se-
cret police official whom the CIA
kept in solitary confinement for
? three years for fear he was a double
agent?not a bona fide defector.
Yet during that time, the Russian,
Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko: ?
?Became an important source of
information the Warren Commis-
sion's investigation of President John
F. Kennedy's assassination.
?Fingered Samuel Adason Jaffe,
aan American journalist, as a KGB
agent, creating a cloud of suspicion
in the American intelligence commu-
nity that the former CBS and ABC
correspondent has spent seven years
trying to dispel.
Although the Warren Commission
relied heavily on Nosenko's state--
'inents that Lee Harvey Oswald was
not a Soviet agent, the FBI never in-
formed the commission of Nosenko's
confinement or of the suspicions that
he might be a double agent.
The Rockefeller commission on
CIA abuses reported last year that a
Soviet defector, whom it did not
identify, had been held "in solitary
confinement under spartan living
conditions" for. three years. CIA and
commission sources told The Times
that Nosenko was the defector.
Jaffe, now a free-lance- journalist
living in Bethesda, Md., first learned
of Nosenko's allegations about him
when he was interrogated by FBI
aeents in Washington in 19(39. The
questioning centered on Jaffe's acti-
vities whir serving as ABC-TV cor-
respondent in aloscow.
Jaffe, %rho had been considered a
reliable seurce by both CIA and FBI
agents with whom he had worked as
.a journalist; acknowledged using
KGB agents as sources during his
work as a correspondent but denied
giving them vital or secret informa-
tion.
Nosenko is a former KGB lieuten-
ant colonel who defected in Feb-
ruary, 1964, about ? 10 weeks after
Kennedy's aesassination.
Now, declassified CIA and FBI doe-
merits give a rare glimpse into the
-world of intelligence as lived by
Nosenko; the defector, and Jaffe, the
journalist.
In the first week of February,
1964, Nosenko was a member of the
Soviet delegation to a 17-nation dis-
armament conference in Geneva,
Switzerland. Then 36, he was husky,-
handsome and dark-haired, with hea-
vy eyebrows. He spoke badly broken
Engiish.
At that time Jaffe, having left an
earlier post with CBS, was ABC's cor-
respondent in Moscow. Then 37, he
was a nice-looking, gregarious jour-
nalist, with thick red hair.
Although Nosenko had supervised
KGB operations against foreign visi-
? tors, he and Jaffe had apparently
never met. But Nosenko had access
to documents that showed Jaffe had
met with other KGB officials.
On Feb. 4, 1964, about 1-p.m.; Ge-
neva time, Nosenko suddenly disap-.
peared from the Soviet delegation's
headquarters at the Rex Hotel.
Six days later, the State Defied-
ment announced in Washington that
Nosenko had defected and was being
granted asylum in the United States.
Intelligence sources described the de-
fection as one of the most important
intelligence triumphs since World
War IL
Nosenko reportedly left behind in
Russia a wife and two children. He
was described at the time as an ex-
pert on disarmament and as an admi-
rer of the Western European way of
life, but little else was publicly dis-
closed.
Recently, however,- it has been
learned that Nosenko claimed to
have directed the KGB in the sexual
entrapment of several foreigners in
Moscow in the late 1950s. A heavily.
censored CIA document released re-
cently under the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act said:
"In September, 1958, he claimed to.
have personally recruited (blank). Itl
was also in 1958, he said, that he su-
pervised the sexual entrapment of
(blank) . . .
?"Beginning in the spring of 1959
he said he directed his agents Yefre-
mov and Volkov in a series of suc-
cessful entrapments (blanks) . . .
"Nosenko stated that he also used
these homosexual agents in 1959 in
compromising two American guides
at the Sokolniki Exhibit. . .
"Finally, Nosenko said, he recruit-
ed the Moscow representative
(blanks) . . .
"Nosenko claimed that his opera-
tional success during 1959 earned
him a commendation from the KGB
chairman."
Regardless of what other intel-
ligence Nosenko might have pos-
sessed, his knowledge of the KGB's
surveillance of Oswald in Russia was
considered vital. It had been only 10
weeks since the Kennedy assassina-
tion and the Warren Commission was:
in the early stages of its lengthy in-
vestigation to try to determine
whether there had been a conspiracy.
When the Rockefeller commission
released its report on CIA abuses in
.June, 1975, it gave no clues to
Nosenko's identity. But without nam-
ing him, it said:
"The CIA maintained the long con-
finement because of doubts about the
-bona fides of the defector. This con-
fmament was approved by the Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence; and the
FBI, attorney general, U.S. Intel-
ligence Board and selected members
of Congress were aware to some ex-
tent of the confinement."
The CIA refused to say whether
Nosenko was in confinement or un?
der any duress when he gave his
statements about Oswald and Jaffe.
And the Rockefeller commission
made no mention of the treatment
accorded Nosenko while in confine-
ment, although it reported that in an-
other case a defector was "physically
abused."
The CIA's official position is that
what it calls Nosenko's "bona fides"
(credentials as a defector) had been
verified by the time of his release
from confinement..
However, some U.S. intelligence
officials still express doubts. A for-
mer high ranking CIA official recent-
ly told The Times that even after
three years of "adversary interroga-
tion" by the CIA, Nosenko remained
under suspicion by sore CIA officials.
CIA documents recently released.
'under the Freedom of Information
Act raised questions about some of
Nosenko's statements to the FBI and
concluded that Nosenko's ignorance
of Cswald's communications with the
Soviet Embassy in Washington "dis-
-credits his claim to complete knowl-
edge of all aspects of the KGB rela-
tionship with Oswald."
Nosenko never testified before the
Warren Commission and was not list-
? ed in the commission's published re-
port. The commission relied on leng-
thy statements given to the FBI by
Nosenko, who told of the KGB's sur-
veillance of Oswald When he was liv-
ing M Russia before the Kennedy as-
sassination.
Nor did Nosenko testify before the
Rockefeller commission. The commis-
sion depended upon information from
Nosenko supplied by the CIA.
Neither the Senate Intelligence
Committee nor its House counterpart
called Nosenko as a witness.
? -Jaffe, described in one CIA memo
as "persistent and energetic," has
tried to persuade congressional inves-
tigators to get to the bottom of his
entanglement with intelligence agen-
des. But his case has received scant
attention from either committee.
. The former correspondent, who
?tv.: interrogated at length by the
FBI in 1969, recently prevailed upon
the CIA to write a letter which, in ef-
fect, says it has no evidence he was
ever a foreign intelligence agent.
And after repeated inquiries by
Jaffe and The Times about whether
the FBI had such evidence, FBI Di-
rector Clarence M. Kelley has writ-
ten a similar letter to Jaffe.
? Utilizing the Freedom of Informa?
boa Act, *Jai fe obtained voluminous
CIA. and FBI documents detailing
how: he cooperated extensively with
bot t intelligence agencies during the.
19r4 and 1960s -in providing .infor-
me:eon about his contacts -as a jour-
11 na;e4. with Russian and ChilleSe Coni.
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400006-7
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400006-7 _
munists.
"rve been suspected of being ev-
erything?CIA, FBI. KGB?you.
name it," Jaffe says. "And I've done
nothing except what many other
journalists have done." ?
The records also show how Jaffe,
in his journalistic endeavors, dealt,
with the KGB while stationed in
Moscow and how he immediately in-
formed the American Embasiy after
a KGB official had tried to' recruit
him as a secret agent.
The documents detail a KGB effort
in October, 1962, to blackmail Jaffe
after he and a Russian woman he
was dating were involved in a car ac-
cident. . .
And they show how Jaffe's KGB
contact warned the correspondent
that Nosenko had defected and
would probably finger him as a KGB
agent. And indeed Nosenko did.
Nosenko said that when he defect.'
ed he was deputy chief of the Tourist
Department, second chief directorate
of the Committee for State Security,
which is concerned with internal se-
curity.
Nosenko told the Ffaif that he had
supervised the handling of the KGB
file on Oswald in the Tourist Depart-
ment and could provide information
on Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union
between 1959 and 1962.
The gist of Nosenko's statements
was that the KGB never even consid-
ered using Oswald as an agent. On
the contrary, he said, it considered
him mentally unstable and not very
bright.
? Nosenko told of a suicide attempt
by Oswald after his request to re-
main in Russia was rejected by So-
viet authorities.
"Oswald had locked himself in his
room and when entry was made to
his room Oswald was found bleeding
from self-inflicted wounds to his
wrists" an FBI memo to the Warren
. Commission said. "Nosenko stated Os-
wald was rushed to a hospital, and
? Nosenko exPressed the opinion that
? if Oswald had not received immedi-
ate medical assistance he would have
? . After Oswald's release from the.
hospital, he threatened suicide again
upon being told that. he could not re-
main permanently ?in the Soviet
Union, Nosenko said. At this point,
Nosenko said, the second directorate
a of the KGB "washed its hands of Os-
wald."
Nosenko said that although Oswald
was permitted to remain temporarily;
in the Soviet Union, KGB agents
were instructed "to maintain a dis-
creet check" on his activities in
Minsk, where he lived ,with his Rus-
sian wife, Marina.
"Nosenko commented that the pos-
sibility that Oswald might be a 'sleep-
er agent' for American intelligence
had been considered by the KGB but
at ? this time the interest of KGB
headquarters in Oswald was practi-
cally nil," according to the FBI memo.
Nosenko said he did not know who
had granted Oswald permission to re-
side temporarily in Russia, but said
he was sure it had not been a KGB
decision. .
He went on to say that, after Os-
wald and his wife left the Soviet
Union for the United States in June,
1962, he had not heard of Oswald
again until receiving word in Sep-
tember, 1963, that he had applied for
a reentry visa at the Soviet Embassy
in Mexico City. ?? ? .? ? e, .
"Nosenko's department had no in-
terest in Oswald," the statement con-
dinued, "and recommended that Os-
wald's request . be denied." The
request was denied. s
Although Nosenko said he did not
know whom Oswald contacted at the
embassy in Mexico City, the CIA, in a
recently declassified document, re-
ported it had learned from indepen-
dent sources that the contact, was "a
KGB officer under 'consular cover."
Nosenko said Oswald's name did
not come up again until the KGB was
notified that he had been arrested in
the Nov. 22, 1963, assassination of
President Kennedy.
On orders of Gen. Oleg M. Griban.
ov, chief of the KGB's second Chief
directorate, Nosenko said, ? he tele-
phoned the KGB office in Minsk to
get a, summary of the Oswald file. .
The summary concluded with a
statement that the KGB at Minsk had
endeavored "to influence Oswald in
the right direction." ? . .
' That "greatly disturbed" Gribanov,
according to .Nosenko, because the
KGB had been under orders to take
no action except to "passively. ob-
serve" Oswald's activities.
On Gribanov's orders; Oswald's.
complete file, together with an ex-
planation of the concluding state-
ment, was flown by military aircraft
from. Minsk to Moscow. Nosenko said
he reviewed the entire file before
giving it to Gribanov, who forwarded
it through channels to Premier S. Ni-
kita S. Kluuslichev.
The explanation, Nosenko said,
was that an uncle of Marina Oswald
voluntarily approached Oswald and
suggested that he "not be too critical
of the Soviet Union when he re-
turned to the United States." ?
The FBI memo noted: ?
"Nosenko commented that when
the KGB at Minsk was first requested
to furnish a summary of the Oswald
file it was unaware of the interna-
tional significance of Oswald's activi-
ties and had included the statement
reporting their endeavors to in-
fluence Oswald as a self-serving ef-
fort to impress the KGB Center."
Nosenkb also told the FBI that Ma-
rina Oswald had not been employed
as an agent of the KGB., He said she
had been a member of the Komsomol
12
(Communist Party, Youth Oeganiza-
tion) but had been dropped from the
rolls on .an unknown date for non-
payment of dues over a long period
of time. -
Although Nosenko never appeared
before the Warren Commission, he
expressed a willingness to. testify, the
FBI. said, as long as it would be "in
secret and absolutely no publicity is
given either to his appearance before.
the commission or to the information
itself." ? .- ? , ? ? ? : ? ?
Neither the CIA nor the FBI will
discuss Nosenko's confinement. But a
former CIA official told The Times'
that Nosenko .was not put in confine-
ment until four or five months after
his defection. For at least three years
thereafter, Nosenko was intereegated
periodically. . ;.?
d At least as late as Jan. 5, 1968, the
CIA was still subjecting Nosenko to
interrogation about his knowledge of
Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union
and the KGB's relationship with him.
On that day he was required to an-
swer some questions in his ? own
handwriting.' ?
- Since: hist defection in 1964,
:Nosenko is known to have surfaced
in a public way only once?in May,
11970, when . he :walked into a Read-
er's Digest offide in Washington and
,offered to assist John Barron with his
:book, "KGB the Secret Work of So-
viet Secret Agents."
17 forget the date," Barron said in
an interview' "but one morning a
rather handsome, distinguished-ap-
pearing man who spoke in a Slavic
accent arrived in my office here and
said; 'I am from the center.' In KGB
jargon that means headquarters."
Barron said Nosenko told him he
had read in Reader's Digest that Bar-
ron was writing'a book on the KGB
and he wanted to offer his assistance.
. "I had asked the CIA earlier if we
could -be provided with Nosenko's ad-
dress so we could communicate with
him, but had been told he didn't wish
to cemmunicate with a journalist,"
Barron said. ?
Barron, who interviewed Nosenko
several times in subsequent months,
.considered Nosenko a "goal mine' of
:information and quoted him several.
.times in the book,
"tie was very straightforward in
telling me there were certain areas
'that he was not free to get into, hut
was good in making distinctions be-
tween what he knew as a result of
his own experiences and observations
as oppossed to what he heard," Bei..
ron said. - ?
Noscnko is believed to live in the
Washington area. .
THE NEW YORK TIMES
20 March 1976
Bush Backs Colby on Funds!
WASHINGTON, March 191
(UPO?George Bush, Director
of Central Intelligence, hacked
his predecessor, William E.
Colby, today in refusing to
divulge the- agency's- budget
because "I don't want to help" j
Soviet intelligence. Mr. Bush
told the National Newspaper
Association, Our budget fig-
ures are not made public.",
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400006-7
ARGOSY
April 1976
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0.1-0--L-:-''---';'? ?
---.. ? .., ."1 .
3
.:e . are?the ones. who financed the Dallas job
--t
-on Kennedy ? . .
1 ARGOSY: Were offers to assassinate
! Kennedy actually made to you and your
i group? . ? . ? . . -
. i HEMMING: Rather frequently..
i ARGOSY: How many? ?
HEMMING: .More than two dozen, by
.1 organized elements that had financial
I backing within the United States.
1 ARGOSY: What kind of elements? The
right wing? Minutemen types? ..
HEMMING: There might be a retired
, armed forces type, a guy from the Klan:
i These would only be.casual conversations.
1i When it came time to open up the
lattachet case with the money in it, it was
! usually a mixed group.
; ARGOSY: You actually saw money. on
! the line? ' ?
' HEMMING: Oh yeah, more than once..
Some of the cheapos talked about
S100,000; one said they'd pay a million. .
ARGOSY: So what did you do?
HEMMING: About that point, we
would gracefully back out .of it. Then we
would later find out that. they were trying
?to recruitIour Cuban contacts for the same
purpose. .
ARG.OSY: Do you think it's possible
i that the Kennedy killing involved some of
- the Cuban exile community?
HEMMING: Yes, very possible. It
wasn't that hard a job. I've seen and been
. on the scene ? for harder jobs :than what
happened in Dealey Plaza. You had a hard
core of characters in the Dallas l'olice and
County Sheriff's Department that would
blow somebody's head off at a whisper_
When you've got people running around
.who have friendships with organized
? crime, Federal agencies", and have been in
bed with so Many people?well, when the
assassination goes down, everybody's
covering their tracks.
ARGOSY: Can you be Specific about the ?
offers you. received to kill Kennedy?
HEMMING: Look, there are people
who didn't have a goddamn thing to do
with it, but they think they did because
they were conned by other people. If they
think somebody's gonna point the finger
.at them, they're gonna get 'em: And I'd
? like to stay alive.
ARGOSY: You told the Senate in-
vestigators that you believed in 1963 that
Loran [Lorenzo) Hall was somehow
involved. (Hall, an ex-CIA contract
employee, right-wing politico and trainer ?
of Cuban exiles fora Cuban invasion, was
named by the Warren Commission as one .
of three men who may have .been in
Dallas with Lee Harvey Oswald in Sep-
tember 1963.)
HEMMING.: Yes, the day of the
assassination, I made a call to Texas from
Miami. And 1 pointedly asked, is Lorenzo
Hall in Dallas? I made the call about i :30
or 2:00 in the afternoon. He was there. My
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