SENATE INTELLIGENCE PANEL CALLS FOR A LAW TO CURB COVERT ACTION AS IMPLEMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400004-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 51
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 2001
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: April 27, 1976
• Content Type: NSPR

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CONFIDENTIAL
NEWS, VIEWS
and ISSUES
INTERNAL USE ONLY
This publication contains clippings from the
domestic and foreign press for YOUR
BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use
of selected items would rarely be advisable.
30 APRIL 1976
NO. 8
PAGE
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7,fif YORN TIMES, TUESDAY, APRIL 27? 1976
d tnt-tr-7t
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icz,y A -A(1,
Bar rallICHOS If. icctt
sactial to The New Yortt
WASHINGTON, April 26?
The Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence Activities, conclud-
ing its 15-month-long investiga-
tion, today urged Congress to
adopt a new, omnibus law cov-
ering foreign and military intel-
iligence? gathering that would
;create charters for the major
lagencies and sharply limit the
juse of covert action as a tool
ot foreign policy.
In a report that had few dis-
closures, the committee re-
vealed that the United States
had conducted about 900 major"
or sensitive covert operations
in the last 15 years. As one
check on such actions in the
future, it recommended that
Congress be informed in ad-
vance of proposed covert op-
erations.
For Central Control
In one proposal for structural
reform it urged that the Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence be
given authority over the entire
intelligence community to set
the overall budget, allocate re-
sources, and determine national
intelligence requirements for all
agencies including the military.
The legislative future of its
recommendations is far from
clear. The committee made
"recommendations" for legisla-
tion by Congress but will no
introduce the bills itself. In-
stead when a permanent over-
sight committee is created it
would take these recommenda-
tion as the basis for a legisla-
tive package.
The new law is needed, the
committee said, because "Con-
gress has failed to provide the
necessary statutory guidelines
o ensure that intelligence
agencies carry out their mis-
sions in accord with coastitu-
tional processes." It would, in
effect, recast the National Se-
curity Act of 1947, which
created the modern iinelligence
system in this country.
The new law, the committee
. said, -should set "clearly de-
fined prohabitions or limita-
tions" on intelligence-pothering
-techniques and operations, dc-
fine th eroles of each intelli-
gkence agency and "set forth
? the basic purposes of national
intelligence actiyitiee.." .
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"This revision should be
the intelligence oversight com-.
given the highest priority .by'
mittee of Congress ,acting in,
consultation with the Execu-
tive branch," the. .committee!
. ;
. . . .
. . .
; , ? Further Report Due
The.-proposal is the center-
piece of n 474-page 'report ,on,
foreign. and militaryintelligence
-that culminates an irivestiga-
:don begun- in. January 1975.
The committee is expected to
make public. a report on its
domestic intelligence . findings.
dater this week.
'Today's report carried 87, ,
separate recommendations. for ,
tstatutory. .or . administrativel ;
. fact" in ...areas ranging. froml
drug tests op humans.to covert;
At the request of the intel-
ligence agencies, the' cOmmittee.
withheld three. chapters of its
report, on "cover" "espionage"
and "budgetary oversight" from
the public. and deleted 'sectionS
on covert action and intellig-
ence operation's of the depart-
merit of State.
A staff spokesman said this
-arnounted to some 200 'pages.
Though the 'material is being
-withheld from, public viewt, he
said, it would be available to
be read by the 100 members of,
the -Senate.
The committee also voted.
six to
The,
in a closed meeting
today to ask the full Senate
whether it could release the ,
'total budget figure for United
'States intelligence. It took this
?atcion after President Ford and
George Bush, Director of Celi-
a:rat Intelligence, urged that the
figure be omitted from the final
report on national security t
grounds, . . z
A blank 'space appeared hr t
the printed report where the, a
figure should have been, but a
other. material in the document: s
permitted the reader to com-
pute that a gross figure for in, t
telligence including the armed c
forces components was some ;
$10 billion annually and that
the aggegate budgets of C.I.A.,
Defense Intelligence Agency,
the National Security Agency
and the national reconnais-
sance program ran about $4.5
billion. W
Senatce Rho G. Tower, the d
Texas Republican' who was vice A
chairman of the committee:and tr
Senator Barry Goldwater, Re- 111'1
oubicen of Arieotta, did not
sign the report. Tower said lm
in a statement that h3 felt the lc
recommendations "if enacted iv
into law, could endanger Amer- 10
ice's seen ri t y."
Sereitar Flowarci Baker Jr.. ico
Repuhliceo Ten'o eaid to
that teotigh lian eleme2 the ice
reocrt ahem. 'i-:era al.-, eras ,rec- I
I ( 4
ommendations be disagreed
wtih. .
Attorney Genera", Edward H.
Levi also appeared roefore to-
day's meeting in La effort, ac-
ording to a COM177".:2Z source;
o get the commieme to relax
stringent elecronie: etroailance
recommendations _tee : has t
made in the upcoffe, domestic
report.
it.Fo, `,"? d'2 .Oe
. lo er I '1 el 'a
611 o1.'1-4,1.
President Ford's recent :Execu-
tive order where it upgraded
the powers of the Director a
Central Intelligence and rnacie
him, more nearly in command
of the entire intelligence cora- !
munity. The Senate committee,
however, would gc fuother ann
give the director the power to
actually formulate e- reeional
ntelligence budget and allocate
the resources of the agencies
covered by the budget.
It 'At the same time, howeveo,
n the committee would, renico ;
the director from direct cone al
over covert operations en the
'clandestine collection of intele
d ligence mainly to reduce ;116;
f "conflict of interest" problem
0- as, the principal adviser to the
- l'resident on foreign itnel-
igence matters.
o gThe Senate committee wan
axe- less harsh than its House
I' Representatives counterpart
n the quality of the intel-
igence estimates .made by the
ornmunity. It said it had f mole':
he estimates were "adequate"
hou,gh "major. improvement is
both desirable and possible." It.
rged that the, function of gath-
ring and analyzing the Intel;
gence be the highest priority
f the intelligence agencies.
IgIrf several areas the corn.
itteets - ? mom/menden-ens
rged ? that traditional cheeks
and' balances of the Executive
branch be restored to decision
making on intelligence matters.. .
It recommended that the secre-.
tarj of State be informed of
all clandestine collection tenerz-?
tions and covert actions in ad-
vance so that he would be in
4 a position to explain them and
so that he could ? raise objec-
dons if he felt they :harmed
foreign policy. The committee
called for faster implementa-
tion of a law that required the
United States Ambassador
abroad be in command of ali
'foreign policy ectivitiem in the
country in whicn he is statiood.
kliThe committee urged that
the counterintelligence ?pert,-
dens', aimed at con-tbatting hos-
e foreign intelligence, servi-
ces, be better coordinated. It
found widespread evidence
over the years of poor coopera-
tion between the C.I.A. and the
Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, the two agencies who
have the main responsibility in
this field. The Senate panel re-
commended that a special corn-,
mittee of the National Security
Council be formed, headed by
the Attorney General, to direct
counterintelligence activities.
Despite its length and retail,
the report was largely devoid
, of new information. Though the
;committee. according to its
;own account, bad (tend ..:ted
thundreds of interviews ant; aol-
lected 110,000 haagres of 4o-
? Areas Stnonor,
The portion of edeO repo
made ? public eor...n.fInted 6
the following are.ane
'qThe. committee 4.eund .tha
"Presidents .and tatimirlistra
tions- have made emeasive ? an.
at tunes, self-defeemag use o
covert action" and titat its us
is now. so routine (''-t00 se,oa
rate operations beeneeen. 1961- 1,
1975) it had -"buremetmatic moe
tnentuc of its. own.' .
f
Though the cor-.thee- gave 0
"serious consideradhat" to re- 0
commending a "time: ban" onl
covert activity it concluded; id
that the United letates must1 rt
have such a capatdtnnet for "ed:-. t
traordinary ? circueneances in-
volving grave threnent to United ed
States national security."
However, it recommended that
"ail political assannamistions, of-
forts 0
forts to subvert democratic ?
overnrnents and :rapport .for m
police or other intenati seem-nee' u
forces which engene in syste-
matic violation of human
rights" be bannedlea law.
gThe committee found thatl
many covert actines clandes-
tine intelligence-gring tech-
niques and countereentelligence
operations had ben iaunche
without any memo" approve.
mechanism at were and little
or no record of who; approved
hem. It has called for formali-
odor: of decision making in
hese areaS. that :mold leave
"paper trail" on :at: decisions
nd end the practite of "plau-
ible deniability."
gThe committee ''atirid that
he Central Intelliemeee Agency
ircuroventecl the le'87 Pres-
dential ban agaiom covertly
supporting and nategaring edu-? til
icational and e'elanthropir
Igroups, bv moving etetain oper-;
ations abroad or ?feealing with
individuals,?
cit found In eceither area
idespreau unethical or illegal
rug tests being one-formed on
mericana and sceatential infil-
'ation of the menet media and
e hook ou'oliel-eezr indgstry.
se latter two nett- 7 the com-
ittee said, reste,e. in Ameri-
ans" being Ofteon e?eugh Math
ertently, fed; the oeopaganda
utput toe allot_ ie the shar-
it langeane of e ieenort. the
nominee reconee eeded laws
halt or control 'so preen-
eiThe commuter on.zelaudecl
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aliments, It made public little
time had not already been re-
ported in the press or dealt
With in earlier reports.
There seemed to many on Ca-
pitol Hill, a willingness by the
committee to delete material at
the request of the intelligence
agencies eel a decided unwil-
lingness to try to force material
from secret vaults of the Exe,
cutive branch.
Scholarly Tone
In tone and presentation, to
-
days report was scholarly and
descriptive, designed more as a
resource document for those
who will frame the new intelie
gepce law than an indictment
of abuse or misbehavior by the
intelligence community.
The' recommendation are
Mainly based upon the prem-
ise that Congress . will ap-
prove permanent joint or sepa-
rate oversight committees with
the power to authorize expend-
itures by the intelligence com-
munity and investigate agency
Operations.
Earlier this year, the commit-
tee recommended that such an
oversight panel be approved by
the Senate. But in the ensuing
weeks the oversight plan has
encountered hard political
going. Many committee mem-
bers hope the final reports will
improve the atmosphere for its
adoption.
The report covered the com-
mittee's views on the entire
foreign intelligence apparatus
including the National. Security
Council, the C.I.A., the Defense
Department and its military in-
telligence components, as well
as, the Defense Intelligence
Agency and the National Secur-
ity Agency.
Analysis of the Law
It said its analysis of the Na-
tional Security Act of 1974 had
fohnd no explicit authority for
espionage, convert action- or
paramilitary warfare. ?
"Nonetheless, . these have
come to be major activities
conducted by the Central Intel-
ligence Agency . . . in contrast
the 1947 act's specific charge,
to the Director of Central Intel-
ligence to coordinate national!
intelligence has not been effec-
tively realized," the report said.;
The report describes how, be-
cause of the immediate and
continued belief that the Soviet
Union and international Com-
munism plotted this country's
destruction, the agencies
'mounted increasingly numerous
covert actions and espionage
'rnisions to meet the perceived!
Communist challenge.
I The ?report details in the drug
;programs, for instance, how the
iC.I.A. began testing LSD "de-
fensively" because it learned
the Soviet Union was exper-
imenting with it.
But, according to evidence in
Ithe report, by mid-1953, Rich-
ard Helms, then assistant chief
lof the clandestine service, al-
ready contemplated its use ag-
gressively in interrogations of
foreign agents.
The report traces the gen-
esis of covert action, from ear-
ly efforts to helo democratic
parties in the Italian elections
in 1948 to the major paramilita-
ry operations such as the abort-
ed invasion at the Bay of Pigs
in Cuba and those in Laos.
Of covert actions in genera?)
the committee found that they
were often inefficient and some
were "inconsistent with our
[United States] basic traditions'
and values."
The committee had even
harsher words for paramilitary
covert operations, noting that
they do not remain covert very
long and "have often failed 'to
achieve their intended objec-
tive." Moreover, the committee
said, "covert U.S. paramilitary
combat operations frequently
amount to making war, but do
not come under the War Pow-
ers Act, since they do not in-
valve uniformed U.S. military
IP
? ? ? .
The committee recommended
that the proposed law require
the intelligence budget proposal
to list each covert operation
and require Congress to author-
ize any paramilitary 'operation
lasting longer than 60 days.
Part of the problem with all
clandestine activities, the com-
mittee report said, was that the
executive, branch of Govern-
ment under Presidents from
Harry, S. Truman through Rich-
ard M. Nixon failed to exert
sufficient control or demand
sufficient accountability. The
report -said that the 40 Commit-
tee, a part of the N.S.C. assigned
to 'authorize clandestine activi-
ties, "also served generally to
insulate the President from of-
ficial involvement and account-
ability in the approval process
until 1974." -
Approval of Operations
Moreover,- the committee
notes, N.S.C. -level approval
was sought. only on airly major
clandestine . operations and it
found numerous instances
*here small, risky intelligence
gathering and covert actions
were taken withut approval.'
Even the new "upgraded"
40 Committee, renamed by
President Ford the Operations
Advisory Group, may not be
adequate if not given sufficient
staff and support, the report
said.
In these areas, including
counterintelligence matters, the
committee recommended that
each level "sign off" on his ap-
proval or disapproval for a giv-
en project and that individuals
are made "accountable" in the
chain of the, command to en-
courage their knowing About
what goes on.
One of the most important
elements in the shroud of secre-
cy surrounding the intelligence
agencies, the report said, was
the 1949 law that permitted the
expenditure of funds by C.I.A.
without a public accounting.
From this germ sprung' a
massive, intricate, but closed-
door, financial empire that is
the intelligence community.
The C.I.A., for instance, deve-
loped the spy-in-the-sky satel-
lites, the U-2 intelligence air-
craft, owned several major air-
lines; capitalized an insurance
company at $30 million.; and fi-
nanced two major and several
minor wars (including uprisings
in the Congo and Guatemala,
Laos and the Bay of Pigs) with
an undisclosed budget, the re-
port pointed out.
"The committee finds that a
full understanding of the budg-
et of the intelligence communi-
ty is required for effective
?pversight,". the report said.
"The secrecy surotinding the
budget, however, makes it im-
possible for Congress as a
whole to make use of this val-
uable oversight tool."
The committee said that in
effect "neither Congress as 4
whole nor the public can deter-
mine whether the amount spent
on intelligence, or by the intele,
ligence agencies individually is' -
appropriate given the priori.,
ties.' ?
The committee, "believes!
there is a serious question as.
to whether the present systerri
of complete secrecy violates
the Constitution."
It rejected the arguments
made by Mr. Bush today.
"The committee believes," the
report said, "that the overall
figure for national intelligence
activities can be made public
annually without endangering
national security or revealing
sensitive programs."
The committee expressed
some of- its deepest concern on
the impact of techniques of in-
tellignce upon American cul-
ture and democracy. It found
that the C.I.A. was using "sev-'
eral hundred" American aced*
ethics, located in over 100
American coleges, 'universities'
and related institutions for such
things as making contacts with:
potential agents or writing
books and articles for propa-
ganda purposes. In a number
of instances, the report said,
.the educational institutions
.were not aware of the relation-
ship.
The committee found the'
C.I.A. had a network of "sever--
al hundred" foreign persons in.
the world news media to pro-
vide intelligence or put out
propaganda. ?
Of these, some 50 are '
dual American journalists or?
employees of U.S. media orga-
nizations," the report said: It:
also found significant infiltra-:
tion of religious groups. -
The committee recommended:
laws to barring the C.I.A. from
ublishing books or circulating.
other propaganda in this corm--
try and.to firm up by law the',
recruiting of journalists along
the lines of the new C.I.A. guid-
elines.
The cOmmIttee would bar re. ?
cruiting persons receiving Unita
Jed States educational grants
and programs.
' It also urged that C.I.A. regu-
lations be changed to require.
'that if an academic person de-
Ivelops a relationship with
IC.I.A. the president of chief ex-
ecutive officer of the education-
al institution be notified.
lThe committee wanted laws'
'to buttress President Ford's or-
ders that the C.I.A.'s inspector
'general system by strengthened
and wanted a law to clarify the
'responsibility of C.I.A. em-
ployees to report crimes to
their superiors so that these
?crimes would, in turn, be re-
ported to the Department of
Justice for prosecution. The
committee rejected the notion
that the C.I.A. or its employees
were above the law.
The clear pattern of many of
the recommendations was to
'bring Congress deeper and
'deeper into the oversight ? of
'agency expenditures and opera-
-The /committee found that
rCongress failed in 1947 to tell
the intelligence agencies what
it wanted them to do; failed
to carry out proper budgetary
oversight and on many of the
unpleasant or highly sensitive
,secret operations took an "I
don't want to now" stance in
its contact with the intelligence
agencies. '
-The report was by no means
harsh on Congress. certainly"
not so harsh as external Con-
gressional critics have become
on these isues, but for a corn- ?
mittee of Congress it was can- ?-?
klid in its view of its own insti-
.
,tution.
The recommendations are
, shaped not only to require the
intelligence agencies to report ?
to Congress periodically- -
numerous aspects of their oper-
ations, but also require Con-
gress to make response of deci-
sion which will reduce the
'chance for lethargic oversight..
NEW YORK TIMES
27 April 1976
Security Check by 'LR
Apeefal to The 17.1e York Times
WASHINGTON, April 26?In the mid4950's, the Cen-
tral Intelligence ?Agency decided to test the security ar-
rangements of Air America, a charter airline service that
was secretly a wholly owned operation of the agency.
The agency asked that an unwitting agent of the
Internal Revenue Service be sent to conduct a norma;
audit of the operation. The agent would, the C.I.A. said,
be told at the proper time that he was dealing with a
Government agency. Lawrence R. Houston, now retired,
was their general counsel to the C.I.A. and he recounted
the. experiment to the Senate Select Committee on Intel-
ligence Activities this way:
"They put a very bright young fellow on. and he
went into it. They came up with discrepancies and things
that would be settled in the normal tax argument, corpo-
rate-I.R.S. argument, and all of these were worked out
eventually, and then we went to this fellow and said.
'Now, this was owned and backed by the C.I.A. The U.S.
Government. What was your guess as to what was hap-
pening?' .
"And he said, "Well, I knew there was. something
.there, and I thought, what a wonclerfte asset it would be
for the Russians to have, but I came to the conclusion
,that it was Rockefeller money."
i2
'
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THE NEW meg TIMES, TUESDAt. APRIL 27, 1976
XCERPTS FROM REPORT
INTELLIGENCEDF UNIT
Spedat to The New York Times
?
WASHINGTON, April 26?Following
!are- excerpts from the Report on the
Foreign and Military Intelligence Ac-
tvities of the United States, the final
eeport of the Senate Select Committee
.inn Intelligence Activities. Passages
"- that were -changed by the committee
t- the request of executive agencies
'appear in italics.
INTRODUCTION
? The Senate Select Committee on In-
lalligence Activities has conducted a
*5-month-long inquiry, the first major
inquiry into intelligence since World
-War H. The inquiry arose out of alle-
gations of substantial, even massive
eyrongdoing within the "national intelli-
gence" system. This final report pro-
vides a history of the evolution of in-
telligence, an evaluation of the intelli-
gence- system of the United States, a
t critique : of its problems, recommends-
;lions for legislative action and recom-
mendations to the executive branch.
-1The committee believes that its recom-
mendations will provide a sound frame-
vork for conducting the vital intelli-
gence activities of the United States in
? manner which meets the nation's
rifttelligence requirements and protects
tfie liberties of American citizens and
.1.he freedom's Which our Constitution
-r-- ,
,guarantees.
The shortcomings of the Intelligente
r:- -
?system, the adverse effects of secrecy-
ad the failure of Congressional over-
sight to assure adequate accountability
,for executive branch decisions concern-
set-ig intelligence activities were major
;Sabjects of the committee's inquiry.
;Equally important to the obligation to
tinvestigate. allegations of abuse was
tho duty .to review systematically the
; intelligence community's overall active
? tiles since 1915,- and to evaluate its
ipresent- structure -and performance.
ff_F An extensive national intelligence
esy.,stem has been a vital part of the
.'United States Government since 1944.
Intelligence information has had an
:f#mortant influence on the direction
Ind development of American foreign
riablicy and has been essential to the
'Maintenance of our national security.
e- committee is convinced that the
pined States requires an intelligence
Vstem which will provide policy-makers
,F,!ith. accurate intelligence and analysis.
:igye must have an early warning system
to monitor potential military threats by
.oeuntries hostile to United States in-
. teeests. We need a strong intelligence
system to verify that treaties concern-
ing arms limitation are being honored.
4r:formation derived from the intelli-
,gence agencies is a necessary ingre-
:client in making national defense and
foreign policy decisions. Such informa-
tion is also necessary :n countering the
:efforts of hostile intelligence services
and in halting terrorists, international
drug traffickers and other international
criminal activities. Within this country
certain carefully controlled intelligence
activities are essential for effective law
enforcement. _
The United States has ,Jevoted enore
mous resources to the creation of a
national intelligence system, and today
ahem Is text-awareness on the part of
many citizens that a nation I in li-
gence system is a permanent and nec-
essary component of our Government.
The system's value to the country has
been proven, and it will he needed for
the foreseeable future. But a major
conclusion of this inquiry is that Con-
gressional oversight is necessary to as-
sure that in the future our intelligence
community functions effectively, within
the framework of the Constitution.
The committee is of the view that
many of the unlawful actions taken by
officials of the intelligence agencies
were rationalized as their public duty.
It was necessary for the committee to
' understand how the pursuit of the public
good could have the opposite effect.
As Justice Brandeis observed:
"Experience should teach us to be
most on our guard to protect lib-
erty when the Government's purposes
are beneficent. Men born to freedom-
are naturally alert to repel invasion of
their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The
greatest dangers to liberty lurk in in-
sidious encroachment by men of zeal,
; well-meaning but without -understand-
ing. Olmstead v.? United States, 277
; U.S. 438,-4i9 41928), -
The Mandate. Of-the.
--- -
Conun- ittee's Tnq?iry
On Jan. 17, 1975, Senate Resolu-
tion established a select committee "to
conduct an tihatestigation:and study; of
governmental operations with. respect
; to inteligence activities and- of the ex-
tent, if any, to which illegal, improper
or unethical activitiea were 'engaged in
by any agency of the Federal Govern-
merit." Senate Resolution 21 lists spe-
cific areas of inquiry and study::
(1) Whether the Central. Intelligence
;Agency has conducted an illegal domes-
tic intelligence operation in the United
;States. -
s (2) The conduct of domestic- intelli-
gence or counterintelligence operations
; against United States citizens by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation or any
other Federal agency. ?? : ? -
(3) The origin and disposition of the
so-called Huston Plan to apply United
States intelligence agency capabilities
! against individuals or organizations
within the United States.
(4) The extent to which the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the Central In-
: telligence Agency and other Federal
law enforcement or intelligence agen-
cies coordinate their respective activi-
ties, any agreements which govern that
coordination and the extent to which
a lack of coordination has contributed
to activities or actions which are illegal,
improper, inefficient, unethical or con-
trary to the intent of Congress. ?
(5) The extent to which the opera-
tion of domestic intelligence or counter-
intelligence activities and the operation
of any other activities within the United
States by the Central Intelligence
:Agency conforms to the legislative
i charter of that agency and the intent
of the Congress.
(6) The past and present Interpretee
lion by the Director of Central Intelli-
gence of the responsibility to protect
intelligence sources and methods as it
relates to that provision of the National
' Security Act of 1947 which provides
; that ". . . that the agency shall have
' no police, subpoena, law enforcement
powers or internal security lune-
. tons. . . ."
(7) The nature and extent of exec-
utive branch oversight of all United
States intelligence activities.
(8) The need for specific legislative
authority to govern the operations of
artet intelligence agencies of the Federal
Government now existing without that
!explicit statutory authority, including
but.not limited to agencies such as the
;Defense Intelligence Agency and .the
iNational Security Agency. -
(9) The nature and extent to which
Federal agencies cooperate and ex-
change intelligence information and the
adequacy of any regulations or statutes
which govern such cooperation and ex-
change of intelligence information.
(10) The extent to which United
States intelligence agencies are gay-
erned by executive orders, rules or
regulations, either published or secret,
and the extent to which those executive
orders, rules or regulations interpret,
,expand or are in conflict with specific
i legislative authority.
(11) The violation or suspected vio-
lation ? of any state or Federal statute
by any intelligence agency or by any
person .by or on behalf of any intelli-
gence agency of the Federal Govern-
silent, including but not limited to
surreptitious entries, surveillance, wire-
taps or eavesdropping, illegal opening
of the United States mail or the moni-
toring of the United States mail.
. (12) The need for improved, strength-
ened, or consolidated oversight of Unit-
ed States intelligence activities by the
4-Congress. .
?
(13) Whether any of the existing laws
. of- the United States are inadequate,
either in their provisions or manner
of enforcement, to safeguard the rights
of American citizens, to improve ex-
ecutive and legislative control of intelli-
gence and related activities and to
'resolve uncertainties as to the authority
; of United States intelligence and re-
lated .agendes.
- (14) Whether there is unnecessary
duplication of expenditure and effort in
the collection and processing of intelli-
gence information by United States
agencies.
(15) The extent and necessity of
overt and covert intelligence activities
in the United States and abroad. -
In addressing these mandated areas
of inquiry, the committee has focused
on three broad ?questions:
(1) Whether intelligence activities
have functioned in accordance with the
Constitution and the laws of the United
States.
' (2) Whether the structure, programs,
past history and present policies of the
American intelligence system have
servedthe national Interests in a man-
.ner consistent with declared national
policies and purposes.
(3) Whether the process through
which the intelligence agenices have
been directed and controlled have been
adequate to assure conformity with
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policy and the law,
?? Over the past year, the committee
and its staff have carefully examined
the tntelligence structure of the United
States. Considerable time and effort
have been devoted in order to under-
stand what has been done by the United
States Government in secrecy during
the 30-year period since the end of
World War II. It is clear to the com-
mittee that there are many necessary
and proper governmental activities that
must be conducted in secrecy. Some of
these activities affect the security and
the very existence of the nation.
It is also clear from the committee's
inquiry that intelligence activities con-
ducted outside the framework of the
Constitution and statutes can under-
mine the treasured values guaranteed
in the Bill of Rights. Further, if the
intelligence agencies act in ways ini-
mical to declared national purposes,
they damage the reputation, power and
influence of the United States abroad.
The committee's investigation has
documented that a number of actions
committed in the name of "national
security" were inconsistent with de-
clared policy and the law. Hearings
have been held and the committee has
issued reports on alleged assassination
plots, covert action in Chile and the
interception of domestic communica-
tions by the National Security Agency.
Regrettably, some of these abuses can-
- not be regarded as aberrations.
The Purpose of the
Committee's
Findings and
Recommendations
? It is. clear that , a primary task for
-any successor- oversight committee and
the Congress as a whole will be to
frame bs sic statutes necessary under
the Constitution within which the Intel-
ligence agerities of the: United States
can function efficiently under, clear
guidelines,: -Charters- delineating the
. missions, authorities and limitations for
some of the United States most im-
portant intelligence agencies do not
-
'exist. For exempla, there is no stet-
ntory authority for the .N.S.A.'s in-
telligence activities. Where statutes do
exist, as with the C.I.A.,, they are vague
and have failed to provide the necessary
guidelines defining? Missions and limit-
'ations. ?
The committee's investigation has
? demonstrated, moreover, that the lack
? of legislation has had the effect of
limiting public debate upon some im-
portant national issues.
The C.1.A.'s broad statutory charter,,
the 1947 Naticnal Security Act, makes
no specific mention of covert action:
The C.I.A.'s former general counsel,
Lawrence Houston, who was deeply in-
volved in drafting the 1947 act, wrote
In September 1947, "we do not be-
lieve there was any thought in the'
'minds of Congress that the act con-
templated covert action." Yet, a few
n- oaths after enactment of the 1947
legislation, the National Security Cowl;
cil authorized the C.I.A. to engage in
covert action programs. The provision
of the Act often cited as .authorizing
C.I.A. covert activities for the agency
,!'. ... to perform such other functions
and duties related to intelligence affect-
ing the national security as the Na-
tional Security Council may front time
to time direct."
Secret Executive Orden issued by the
R.S.C. to carry out covert action pro-
lirrarris were nor subject to Congrei;
sionat review. Indeed, until recent
;years, except for a few members, Con-
gress was not fully aware of the ex-
istence of the so-called "secret charter
for intelligence activities." Those mem-
bers who did know 'had no institutional
means for discussing their knowledge
of secret intelligence activities With
their colleagues. The problem of how,
' the Congress can effectively use secret
knowledge in its legislative process
remains to be resolved. It is the com-
mittee's view that a strong and effective
oversight committee is an essential first
step that must be taken to resolve this
% fundamental issue.
The Dilemma of
Secrecy and Open
Constitutional
Government
? Since World War- II, with steadily.
escalating consequences, many decisions
of national importance have been made
in secrecy, often by'. the executive
branch alone. These decisions are fre-
quently based on information obtained
by clandestine means and available only
to the executive branch.
Recent Presidents have justified this
secrecy on the basis of "national
security," "the requirements of national
defense" or "the confidentiality required
by sensitive, ongoing negotiations or
' operations." These justifications were
generally accepted at face value. The
Bay of Pigs fiasco, the secret war in
Laos, the secret bombing of Cambodia,
the anti-Allende activities in Chile, the
Watergate affair, were all instances' of
? the use of power cloaked in secrecy
which when revealed provoked wide-
spread popular disapproval. This series
of events has ended, for the time being
at least, passive and uncritical accept-
ance by the Congress of executive de-
cisions in the areas of foreign policy,
national security and intelligence activi-
ties. If Congress had met its oversight
responsibilities some of these activities
might have been averted.
An examination of the scope of secret
intelligence activities undertaken in the
last three decades reveals that they
ranged from war to conventional es-
pionage. It appears that some United
States intelligence activities may have
-violated treaty and covenant oblige-
' tions, but more importantly the rights
of United States citizens have been
infringed upon. Despite citizen and Con-
gressional concern about these pro-
grams, no processes or procedures have
been developed by either the Congress
? or the executive branch which would
assure Congress of access to secret in-
formation which it must have to carry
out its constitutional responsibilities in
authorizing and giving its advice and
consent. The hindsight of history sug-
gests that many secret operations were
ill-advised or might have been more
beneficial to United States interests bad
they been conducted openly, rather
than secretly.
The committees stresses that these
questions remain to be decided by the
Congress and the executive jointly: .
What should be regarded as a na-
tional secret?
Who determines what is to be kept
secret?
How can decisions made in secret or
programs secretly 'approved be re-
viewed?
Two great problems have confronted
the committee in carrying out Its charge
4
:to address these issues. ?
The first is how our open democratic
society, which has endured and flour-
ished for 200 years, can be adapted to
,overcome the threats to liberty posed by
Abe continuation of secret Government
activities. The leaders of the United
States must devise ways to meet their
-respective intelligence responsibilities,
including informed and effective Con-
gressional oversight, in a manner which
brings secrecy and the power that
secrecy affords within constitutional
bounds.
For the executive branch, the specific
problem concerns instituting effective
control and accountability systems and
,improving efficiency. Many aspects of
.these two problem areas which have
,been examined during the committee's
inquiry of intelligence agencies are ad-
dressed in the recommendations. It is
our hope that intelligence oversight
, committees working with the executive
,branch will develop legislation to rem-
: edy the problems exposed by our inquiry
and described in this report. The corn-
; ?
mittee has already recommended the
. creation of an oversight committee with
the necessary powers to exercise legisla-
tive authority over the intelligence
activities of the United States.
It is clear that the Congress must
exert its will and devise procedures that
will enable it to play its full constitu-
tional role in. making policy decisions
concerning intelligence activities. Failure
to do so would permit further erosion
or constitutional government.
In a meeting with President 'Ford at
the outset of our inquiry in February
1975, the committee agreed not to dis-
close any classified information provided
by. the executive branch without first
consulting the appropriate agencies, of-
fices and departments. In the case of
objections, the committee agreed to
carefully consider the executive's rea-
sons for maintaining secrecy, but the
committee determined that final deci-
sions on any disclosure would be up to
the committee.
' The select committee has scrupulously
adhered to this agreement. The Interim
Report on Alleged Assassination Plots
_Involving Foreign Leaders, the report on
'C.I.A. activities in Chile, the report on
'illegal N.S.A. surveillance, and the dis-
closures of illegal activities on the part
of F.B.I. Cointelpro, the F.B.I. harass-
ment of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and
other matters revealed in the commit-
tee's public hearings, were all carefully
considered by the committee and the
,executive branch working together to
_determine what information could be
-declassified and revealed without dam-
. aging national security. In those 'reports
? and hearings, virtually all differences
between the committee and the execu-
tive were resolved. The only significant.
exception concerned the release to the
public of the Assassination Report,
which the executive branch believed
Would harm national security. The com-
mittee decided otherwise.
, Some criteria for defining a valid
national secret have been agreed to over
the last year. Both the committee and
the executive branch now agree that the
names of intelligence sources and the
details of sensitive methods used by
the intelligence services should remain
secret. Wherever possible, the right of
privacy of individuals and groups should
also be preserved. It was agreed, how-
ever, that the details of illegal acts
should be disclosed and that the broad
scope of United States intelligence ac-
tivities should be sufficiently described
to give public reassurance that the in-
telligence agencies are operating con-
sistent with the law and declared
national policy.
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SUMMARY-
FINDINGS AND
RECOM-
MENDATIONS
General Findings
The committee finds that rnited
States fereign and militnry intelligence
anencies have made important con-
tributions to the nation's security, end
generally have perfermed their missions
with dedication and distinction. The
committee further finds that the in-
dividual men and women serving
America in difficult and dangerous in-
telligence assignments deserve the re-
spect and gratitude of the nation.
The committee finds that there is a
continuing need for an effective system
-of foreign and military intelligence.
United States interests and responsibil-
ities in the world will be challenged, for
the foreseeable future, by streng and
potentially hostile powers. This requires
the maintenance of an effective Ameri-
can intelligence system. The committee
has found that the Soviet KGB and
other hostile intelligence services main-
tain extensive foreign intelligence op-
erations, for both intelligence collection
.and covert operational purposes. These
activities pose a threat to the intelli-
gence activities and interests of the
United States and. its allies.
The committee finds that Congress
has failed to provide the necessary stet-
? uary guidelines to insure that intelli-
gence agencies carry out their missions
in accord with constitutional processes.
Mechanisms for and the practice of
. Congressional oversight have not been
adequate. Further, Congress has not
devised appropriate means to effective-
ly use the valuable information devel-
oped by the intelligence agencies.
Intelligence information and analysis
that exist within the executive branch
clearly would contribute to sound judg-
ments and more effective legislation in
the areas of foreign policy and national
security.
The committee finds that covert ac-
tion operations have not been an excel),
tional instrument used only in rare
instances when the vital interests of
the United States have been at stake.
On the contrary, Presidents and Ad-
ministrations have made excessive, and
at times self-defeating, use of covert
action. In addition, covert action has
become a routine program with a bu-
reaucratic momentum of its own. The
long-term impact, at home and abroad,
of repeated disclosure of U. S. covert
action never appears to have been
assessed. The cumulative effect of co-
vert actions has been increasingly
costly to America's interests and repu-
tation. The committee believes that
covert action must be employed only
in the most extraordinary circum-
stances;
Although there is a question concern-
ing the extent to which the Constitu-
tion requires publication of intelligence
expenditures information, the commit-
tee finds that the Constitution at least
tequires public disclosure and public
authorization of an annual aggregate
figure for United States national intelli-
gence activities. Congress' failure as a
' whole to monitor the intelligence
agencies' expenditures has been a major
element in the ineffective legislative
oversight of the intelligence community.
The permanent intelligence oversight
committee(s) of Congress should give
further consideration to the question of
:the extent to which further public die-
closure of Intelligence budget informs-
ton is prudent and constitutionally
necessary.
At the same time, the committee
finds that the operation of an extensive
,and necessarily secret intelligence sys-
tem places severe strains on the na-
tion's constitutional government. The
committee is convinced, however, that
the competing demands of secrecy and
the requirements of the democratic
process?our Constitution and our laws
?can be reconciled. The need to protect
secrets must be balanced with the
assuran'ce that secrecy is not used as a
means to hide the abuse of power or
the failures and, mistakes of policy.
Means must and can be provided fOr
lawful disclosure of unneeded or un-
lawful secrets.
The committee finds that intelligence
activities should net be regarded as
ends in themselves. Rather, the nation's
intelligence functions should be organ-
.zed and directed to assure tire thee
serve the needs of those in the execu-
tive end legislative branches who have
responsibility for formulating oe carry-
ing out foreion and national security
. The ocenznittee finds that Congress
has failed M nrevide the necessary
stetutoter guidelines ti insure that in-
tellieence ngenciee earns nnt their
neer' m'esiore in accord with Con-
ceit:if:Irma! nroeess..
in order te nrovi-T.e fhen dirent;en fer
the hltelligenee eeene;es. t!?e cm-nein-se
finds thet nen, stetutorv chertere fo-
.'"ere neeneies must he written. e-hich
telee eccount o.7 the exnerience e 11-
i'asti three and a hele decades. Further.
'!le committee finds that the relation-
Cele among the various intellieerice
neencies and between them and the Di-
rector of Central !atellieence should be
. restructured in order to achieve better
aceountability,. coordination and more
efficient use of., resources. .
These aaeles are urgent_ They should
,h iindertaken by the Corgrees in? con-
sult:lean: with the executive branch in
the cereing year. The recent propeeals
and executive actions by the Presider.:
are most welcome. However, further
actin by Congress is necessary.
Reconnnendatiohs
I. The National Security Act should
be recast by omnibus legislation which
would set forth the basic purposes of.
national intelligence activities, and de-
fine the relationship between the 017-
gress and the intelligence agencies of
the executive branch. This revision
should be given the highest priority by
the intelligence oversight committee of
Congress, acting in consultation With
the executive branch.
2. The new leeislation should define
the charter of the organizations and
entities in the United States intelligence
communitv. It should establish charters
for the Ne:ional Security Council, the
Director of Central Intelligence, the
Central Intelligence Agency, the nation-
al intelligence components of the De-
pertment of Defense, including the Na-
tional Security Agency and the Defense
intell:gcnce Agency, and all other ele-
men:s of the intelligence community,
iecluiline joint oriainizations of two or
inere :nencice
"e This leeleietion should set forth the
gererel reniettiee and preccduree of the
intellience community and the relee
and re ee, isileFtice of the nee:vies-
,:eeeetse
4 Tie, iseeti n hoela contain hpc-
cifi.-. ci:i.arl? dcfin&q,1 oroas or
Iimitritiens on vntons carrIM
;.s.f ;kis '''' :1;?? .,f
the in:elligepit? eorcrAtini'..y,
The National Security
Council and the
Office of the
President
The Nationel Security Council is 11
.instrument of the President and no*
corpornee entity with authority or its
own. The committee found that in ren-
eral the President has had, through the
National Security Council, effective
means for exerting broad policy control
over at least two major clandestine ac-
tivities ? covert action and sensitive
technical collection. The covert Ameri-
can involvement in Angola and the op-
erations of the Glomar Explorer are
examples of that control in quite tiff-
? ferent circumstances, whatever conclu-
sions one draws about the merits of
the activities. The Central Intelligence
Agency, in broad terms, is not "out of
control."
The committee found, however, that
'there were significant limits to this
,control.
? Clandestine Activities
? 4111The degree of control and account-
ability regarding covert action and sen-
sitive collection has been a function of
each particular President's willingness
to use these techniques.
?illThe principal N.S.C. vehicle for
dealing with clandestine activities, the
40 Committee and its predecessors, was
the mechanism for reviewing and mak-
ing recommendations regarding the ap-
proval of major covert action projects
However, this body also served gen-
erally to insulate the President from
official involvement and accountability
in the approval process until 1974.
clAs high-level Government officials.,
40 Committee members have had nei-
? ther time nor inclination to adequately
review and pass judgment on all of
the literally hundreds of covert action
, projects. Indeed, only a small fraction
of such projects (those which the C.I.A.
regards as major or sensitive) are so
approved and/or reviewed. This prob-
lem is aggravated by the fact that the
40 Committee has had virtually no staff,
with only a single officer from the clan-
destine services acting as executive
secretary.
, ilThe process of review and approval
has been, at times, only general in
, nature. It sometimes has become pro
forma conducted over the telephone
, by subordinates.
gThe President, without consulting
any N. S.C. mechanism, can exercise
personal direction of clandestine ac-
tivities as he did in the case of Chile
in 1970.
4jThere is no systematic White House.
level review of either sensitive foreign
espionage or counterintelligence activ-
ities. Yet these operations may also
have a potential for embarrassing the
United States and sometimes may be
difficult to distinguish from covert ac-
tion operations. For example, a propos.;
al to recruit a high foreign government
official as an intelligence "asset" would
not necessarily he previewed outside the
Central Intelligence Agency, at thd
N.S.C. level, despite the implications
that recruitment might pose in conduct,
lug American foreign relations. Similar-
? ly,. foreign counterintelligence opera
,-
dens might be conducted without awe
prior review at the highest Gal/eminent:
levels. The committee found instances
hi the case of Chliie when counteriniel,
ligencn operations were related t,s end,
even hrrd to distinguish from, the pro-
of covert action.
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ilThe Presideene ertereeseN te
?rade the Al) :riff) the
. dons Advisory Groun rd tn !nee
recoenitien tn It- rrne in advising
the President on eoeen etitaties are
desirable. 'Inlet terred'ere however,
will etrein further the Cretin's rbility
tn condten. a intsternatic rwiew of sen-
sitive elendeettn oteeretions Under.
the new s'rueture, the h'e oite mem. Ives
are cabiret &Teem who h?.ve even lest:
nine than the*r erirslpel .denuties, who
ereviotzsle conducted the 40 Commit-
tee's worir. The ti:roup's procedures
must be carefuny structured, so that
the persnestive e" Cehinet officers can
in fact be brought to beer.
Counterintelligence
There is no N.S.C.-level mechanism
for coordinating, reviewing or approving
covnterintelligence activities in the
United States, even those directed at
United States citizens, despite the dem-
onstrated eeetential for abuse.
Coordination and Resource?,
Allocation
The Dirr..ct:T of Central Intelllgence
has be.n assigned the function of co-
o7tinatinz ti-ie activities of the intel-
Iigt,r_ce co7:1-aunqy, ensuring its re-
seer:se:teens te the requirements -fOr
national intelligence and for assembling
a consolidetea, nctionot intoilii7ence
budget Until the recent establishment
of the Committee on Foreien fetal-
-ligence, there was no effective N.S.C.-,
level mechanism for any of these pur-
poses.
Executive Oversight
The committee finds that Presidents
have not established specific instru-
ments of oversight to prevent abuses
by the intelligence community. In
.essence, Presidents have not exercised
effective oversight.
Recommendations
? 5. By statute, the National Security
-Council should be explicitly empowered
to direct and provide policy guidance
for the intelligence activities of the
United States, including intelligence col-
lection, counterintelligence, and the
t-conduct of covert action.
. 6. By statute, the Attorney General
should be made an adviser to the Na-
tional Security Council in order to fa-
cilitate discharging his responsibility to
insure that actions taken to protect
American national security in the field
of intelligence are also consistent with
the Constitution and the laws -of the
United States.
' 7. By statute, the existing power of
the Director of Central Intelligence to
coordinate the activities of the intel-
ligence community should be reaffirmed.
At the same time, the N.S.C. should
establish an appropriate committee,
such as the new Committee on Foreign
Intelligence, with responsibility for al-
locating intelligence resources to insure
efficient and effective operation of the
national intelligence community. This
committee should be chaired by the
D.C.I. and should include representa-
tives of the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of Defense, and the Assistant
to the President for National Security
Affairs.
8. By statute, an N.S.C. committee
(like the Operations Advisory Group)
should be established to advise the Pres-
ident on covert action. It would also be
empowered, at the President's discre-
tion, to approve all types of sensitive
intelligence collection activities. If an
O.A.G. member dissented from an 41-
prove!, the particular collection activity
would be referred to the President for
deCision. The group should consist of'
the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Defense, the Assistant to the President
for National - Security Affairs, the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence, the At-
torney General, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director
of 0.M.B., as an observer. The Presi-
dent would designate a chairman from
among the group's-members.
9. The chairman of the group would
be confirmed by the Senate for that
position, if he were an official ? not
.already subject to confirmation.
? In the execution of covert action and
sensitive intelligence collection activ'i-
'ties specifically approved by the Presi-
dent, -the chairman would enter the
chain of command below the President.
, 10. The group should be -provided
with adequate staff to assist in con-
ducting thorough reviews of covert ac-
tion and sensitive collection projects.
That staff should not be drawn ex-
clusively from the Clandestine Service
of the C.I.A.,
, 11. Each covert action project should
be reviewed and passed on by the
group. In addition; the group would
review all ongoing projects at least
once a year.
12. By statute, the-Secretary of State
, should be designated as the principal
, Administration spokesman to the Con-
gress on the policy and purpose under-
lying covert action projects.
13. By statute, the Director of Central
Intelligence should be required to fully
inform the intelligence oversight .com-
mittee(s) of Congress of each covert
action prior to its initiation. No funds
should be expended on any covert ac-
tion. unless -and until the President
certifies and provides to the Congres-
sional intelligence oversight commit-
tee(s) the reasons that a covert action
is required by extraordinary circum-
stances to deal with grave threats to
: the national security of the United
States, The Congressional intelligence
oversight committee(s) should be kept
fully and currently informed on all
- covert action projects, and the D.C.I.
should submit a semiannual report on
all such projects to the committee(s).
14. The committee recommends that
when the Senate establishes an intel-
ligence oversight committee with
authority to authorize the national in-
telligence budget, the Hughes-Ryan
Amendment (22 U.S.C., 2422) should be
amended so that the foregoing notifica-
tions. and Presidential certifications to
the Senate are provided only to that
committee.
15. By statute, a new N.S.C. counter-
intelligence committee should be es-
tablished, consisting of the Attorney
General as chairman, the Deputy Sec-
retary of Defense, the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence, the Director of the
F.B.I. and the Assistant to the Presi-
dent for National Security Affairs. Its
purpose would be to coordinate and
review foreign counterintelligence ac-
tivities conducted within the United
States and the clandestine collection of
foreign intelligence within the United
States, by both the F.B.I. and the*C.I.A.
The goal would be to insure strict con-
formity with statutory and constitu-
tional reqirements and to enhance co-
ordination between the C.I.A. and F.B.I.
This committee should review the stand-
ards and guidelines for all recruitments
of agents within the United States for
either counterintelligence or positive
foreign intelligence purposes, as well
as for the recruitment , of -U.S. citizens
abroad. This committee would consider
differences between the agencies con-
cerning the recruitment of agents, the
handling of foreign assets that come to
the United States, and the establishment
6
of the bona fides of defectors. It should
also treat any other foreign intelligence
or Counterintelligence activity of the
F.B.I. and C.I.A. which either agency
brings to that forum for Presidential
level consideration.
The Director of
Central Intelligence
The 1947 National Security Act gave
the D.C.I. responsibility for "coordinat-
ing the intelligence activities of the
several Government departments and
agencies in the interest of national se-
, curity." ?In addition, the D.C.I. as the
President's principal foreign intelligence
adviser was given responsibility for
coordinating and producing national in-
telligence for senior policymakers. How-
ever, the committee found that these
D.C.h responsibilities have often con-
flicted with the particular interests and
prerogatives of the other intelligence
community departments and agencies.
They have not given up control over
their own intelligence operations, and
in particular the Department of Defense
and the military services, which allocate
SO percent of the direct costs for na-
tional intelligence, have insisted that
they must exercise direct control over
peacetime intelligence activities to pre-
pare for war. Thus, while the D.C.I.
was given responsibility under the 1947
act for intelligence community activi-
ties, he was not authorized to centrally
coordinate or manage the overall opera-
tions of the community.
Because the D.C.L only provides
guidance for intelligence collection and
production and does not establish re-
quirements, he is not in a position to
command the intelligence community to
respond to the intelligence needs of
national policymakers. Where the D.C.I.
has been able to define priorities, he
has lacked authority to allocate intelli-
gence resources?either among different
systems of intelligence collection or
among intelligence collection, analysis
and finished intelligence production.
In the area of providing finished in-
telligence, the committee discovered
that the D.C.L., in his role as intelli-
gence judgments are objective artd in-
dependent of department and agency
biases. The committee has been par-
ticularly concerned with pressures from
both the White House and the Defense
Department on the D.C.I. to alter his
intelligence judgments. One example of
such pressure investigated by the com-
mittee occurred in the fall of 1969,
when the D.C.I. modified his judgment
on the capability of the Soviet SS-9
system when it conflicted with the
public position of Secretary of Defense
Laird. After a meeting with Staff of
the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Director Helms deleted a paragraph
from the draft of the National Intelli-
gence Estimate orr Soviet strategic
forces which stated that within the next
five years it was "highly unlikely" that
the Soviets would attempt to achieve
"a first strike capability, i.e., a
capability to launch a surprise attack
against the United States with assur-
ance that the U.S.S.R. would not itself
receive damage it would regard as
unacceptable."
The committee believes that over the
past five years the D.C.I.'s ability to
produce objective national intelligence
and resist outside pressure has been
reduced with the dissolution of the in-
dependent Board of National Estimates
and the subsequent delegation of its
staff to the departments with resporrsi-
bility for drafting national in-
telligence judgments.
The committee believes that the Can-
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green, in carrying out its responsibilities
In the area of national security policy,
should have access to the full range of
intelligence produced by the United
States intelligence community. The com-
mittee further believes that it should be
possible to work out a means .of in-
siring that the D.C.I.'s national intel-
ligence judgments are available to the
appropriate Congressional committees
on a regular basis without -compro-
mising the D.C.I.'s role as personal ad-
viser to the President.
Finally, the committee has found con-
cern that the function of the D.C.I. in
his role as intelligence community lead-
er and principal intelligence adviser to
the President is inconsistent with his
responsibilitiy to manage one of the
intelligence community agencies?the
C.I.A. Potential problems exist in a num-
ber of areas. Because the D.C.I. as head
of the C.I.A. is responsible for human
clandestine collection overseas, inter-
ception of signals communication over-
seas, the development and interception
of technical collection systems, there is
concern that the D.C.I. as community
leader is in " a conflict of interest"
situation when ruling on the activities
of the over-all intelligence community.
The committee is also concerned that.
the D.C.I.'s new span of control?both
the entire intelligence community and
the entire C.I.A.?may be too great for
him to exercise effective detailed super-
vision of calendestine activities.
Recommendations
- 16. By statute, the D.C.I. should be
established as the President's principal
foreign intelligence adviser, with exclu-
sive responsibility for producing nation-
al intelligence for the President and the
Congress. For this purpose, the D.C.I.
? should be empowered to establish a
staff directly responsible to him to help
prepare his national intelligence judg-
.ments and to coordinate the views of
the other members of the intelligence
community. The committee recommends
that the director establish a board ta
include senior outside advisers to re-
view intelligence products as necessary,
thus helping to insulate the D.C.I. from
pressures to alter or modify his national
intelligence judgments. To advise and
assist the D.C.I. in producing national
intelligence, the D.C.I. would also be
empowered to draw on other elements
of the intelligence community.
17. By statute, the D.C.L should be
given responsibility and authority for
establishing national intelligence re-
quirements, preparing the national in-
telligence budget and providing gui-
dance for United States national
intelligence program operations. In this
capacity he should be designated as
chairman of the appropriate N.S.C.
committee, such as the 'C.F.I. and
should have the following powers and
responsibilities:
a. The D.C.I. should establish national
intelligence requirements for the entire
Intelligence community. He should be
empowered to draw on intelligence com-
munity representatives and others whom
he rsay designate to assist him in es-
tablishing national intelligence require-
ments and determining the success of
the various agencies in fulfilling them.
The D.C.I. should provide general gui-
dance to the various intelligence agency
directors for the management of intelt
ligence operations.
b. The D.C.I. should have responsibil-
ity for preparing the national intelli-
gence program budget for presentation
to the President and the Congress. The
definition of what is to be included.
'within that national intelligence pro-1
gram should be established by Congress(
in consultation with the executive. In
this capacity, the Director of Central
Intelligence should be involved early in,
the budget cycle in preparing the buclk-
ets of the respective intelligence com-
munity agencies. The director should
have specific responsibility for choosing
among the programs of the different
collection and production agencies and
departments and to insure against waste
-and unnecessary duplication. The D.C.I.
should also have responsibility for is-
suing fiscal guidance for the allocation
of all national intelligence resources..
The authority of the D.C.I. to reprogram
funds within the intelligence budget
should be defined by statute.
? c. In order to carry out his national
intelligence' responsibilities the D.C.I.
should have the authority to review all
foreign and military intelligence activi-
ties and intelligence resource alloca-
tions, including tactical military intel-
ligence which is the responsibility of
the armed forces.
d. The D.C.I. should be authorized to
establish an intelligence community-
staff to support him in carrying out his
managerial responsibilties. This staff
should be drawn from the best available
talent within and outside the intelli-
gence community.
e. In addition to these provisions
concerning D.C.I. control over national
intelligence operations in peacetime,
the statute should require establishment
of a procedure to insure that in time
of war the relevant national intelli-
gence operations come under the con-
trol of the Secreary of Defense.
18. By statute, the position of Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence for the
intelligence community should be es-
tablished as recommended in Executive
Order No. 11905. This Deputy Director
should be subject to Senate conforma-
tion and would assume the DCI's intel-
ligence community functions in the
? D.C.I.'s absence. Current provisions 're-
garding the status of the D.C.I. and his
single deputy should be extended' to
cover the D.C.!. and both deputies,
Civilian control of the nation's intelli-
gence is important; only one of the
three could be a career military officer,
active or retired.
? 19. The committee recommends that
, the intelligence oversight committee (s)
of Congress consider whether the Con-
gress should appropriate the funds for
' the national intelligence budget to the
D.C.!., rather than to the directors of
? the various intelligence agencies and
departments.
, 20. By statute; the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence should serve at the
pleasure of the President but for. no.
more than 10 years. ,
21. The committee also recommends
consideration of separating the D.C.I.
from . direct responsibility over the
C.I.A.
The Central
Intelligence Agency
The Charter for Intelligence
Activities: Espionage,
Counterintelligence and
Covert Action
The committee finds that the C.I.A.'
present charter, embodied in the N a-
tional Security Act of 1947, the C.I.A.
Act of 1949, and the 1974 Hughes-Ryan
amendments to the Foreign Assistance
Act, is inadequate in a number of re-
spects.
7
While -the legislative history of the
1947 act makes clear that the C.1.A.'s
mandate would be limited to "foreign
intelligence," the act itself does not so
specify. Covert action, in the past a
major C.I.A. activity, is not mentioned
in the 1947 act, although the act con-
tains a vague and open-ended authoriza-
tion for the National Security Council
to direct the C.I.A. to undertake "such
other functions and duties related to the
intelligence affecting the national se-
curity as tthe N.S.C. may from time to
time direct." No explicit authority even
to collect intelligence is provided the
agency.
The restrictions on domestic activi-
ties in the 1947 act were not clearly
defined, nor was the potential conflict
between these limits and the director's
authority to protect "sources and meth-
ods" of intelligence gathering resolved.
Neither did the 1947 act set forth the
agency's role in conducting counterin-
telligence and. in collecting of foreign
intelligence. .
. The Congress's confusing and ill-de-
fined charge to the agency in these
areas rsulted in conflicts of jurisdiction
with other governmental agencies. The
? lack of - legislative specificity also
opened the way to domestic activities
such as Operation Chaos, which clearly
went beyond Congress's intent in en-
acting and amending the Naional Se-
curity Act. In sum, the committee finds
that a clear statutory basis is needed
for the agency's conduct abroad of
covert action, espionage, counterintel-
ligence and foreign intelligence collec-
tion and for such counterespionage
operations within the Uniited States as
the agency may have to undertake as a
result of tthe activities abroad.
Foreign Espionage
Espionage on behalf of the United
States Government is primarily' the re-
, sponsibility of the Central Intelligence
Agency's Clandestine Service which
operates on a worldwide basis. The
.Clandestine Service ? officially, the
Directorate of Operations ? is respon-
sible for C.I.A. clandestine human col-
lection, espionage; covert action, para-
military operations and counterintel-
ligence. The C.I.A. also has speciial re-
sponsibilities for coordinating the
military services' limited espionage ac-
tivities abroad.
The committee believes that the Unit-
ed States cannot forgo clandestine hu-
man collection and expect to maintain
the same quality of intelligence on mat-
ters of the highest importance to our
. national security. Technical collection
systems do not eliminate the usefulness
of espionage in denied areas (essentially
the Communist countries). Agent intel-
ligence can help provide valuable
insight concerning the motivations for
activities or policies of potential adver-
saries, as well as their future intentions.
Nevertheless, the committee found
that there are certain inherent limita-
tions to the value of clandestine sources.
Espionage information tends tp be frag-
mentary, and there is always some
question as to the trustworthiness and
reliability of the source.
The committee found that over the
last decade, the size of the Clandestine
Service has been reduced significantly,
particularly in the field. However, there
; remains the question of whether the
complements abroad and at headquar-
ters have been reduced sufficiently.
The committee found that the C.I.A.'s
clandesteine collection effort has been
;reoriented towards denied areas and
'away from internal political and secur-
ity developments in the third world.
The committee believes that this changed
emphasis is desirable and welcomes it.
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7areign Intelligence Collec-
tion in the United States
The C.I.A. engages in both overt and
clandestine activity within the United
States for the purpose of foreign intel-
ligence collection. The agency's Domes-
tic Collection Division is responsible
primarily for overt collection, while the
Foreign Resources Division manages
clandestine collection of foreign intel-
ligence. Both divisions are currently
within the Directorate of Operations.
Formerly run and staffed by the Direc-
torate of Intelligence, the D.C.O. was
moved to Operations in 1973 and now,
has many clandestine services officers
assigned to it.
The Domestic Collection Division
openly collects foreign intelligence in-
formation from American ciitizens on a
wide variety of subjects, primarily of an
economic and technological nature. The
Domestic Collection Division currently
maintains contact with tens of thou-
sands of American citizens who, on a
confidentiial basis, volunteer informa-
tion of intelligence value to the United
States. The committee notes that the
Central Intelligence Agency is overtly
in contact with many members of the
American academic community to con-
sult with them on 'the subjects of their
expertise. On occasion, at the request
of the academic concerned, these con-
tacts are confidential.
The committee believes there are
significant benefits to both the Govern-
ment and the universities in such con-
tacts and that they should not be dis-
couraged. The committee sees no danger
to the integrity of American academic
institutions in continuing such overt
contacts.
The Domestic Collection - Division
operates from 38 offices around the
United States and lists itself in local
telephone directories, although it con-
ducts its business as discreetly as
possible.
The committee notes that due to the
recent revelations about C.I.A. activi-
ties, some foreign intelligence sources
are shying away from cooperation with
the Domestic Collection Division, thus
impeding this division's most important
function, namely, the overt collection of
foreign intelligence.
The committee also questions the re-
cruiting, for foreign espionage purposes,
of immigrants desiring American citizen-
ship because it might be construed as
? coercive.
?
Foreign Counterintelligence .
Counterintelligence is defined quite
broadly by the C.I.A. It includes ?the
knowledge needed for the protection
and preservation of the military, eco,
nornic and productive strength of the
United States, as well as the Govern-'
ment's security in domestic and foreign
affairs, ? against or from espionage,
sabotage and subversion ,designed to
weaken or destroy the United States.
Counterintelligence is a special form
of intelligence activity, aimed at dis-
covering hostile foreign intelligence
operations and destroying their effec-
tiveness. It involves protecting the
United States Government against in-
filtration by foreign agents, as well as
controlling and manipulating adversary
intelligence operations. An effort is
made to discern the plans and intentions
of enemy intelligence services and to
deceive them about our own.
The committee finds that the threat
from hostile intelligence services is real:
In the United States alone, well over a
thousand Soviet officials are on per-,
rnanent assignment. Among these, over
40 percent have been identified as mem-
bers of the KGB or GRU, the Soviet
civilian and military intelligence units,
? respectively. Estimates for the number
of unidentified Soviet Intelligence of-
ficers raise this figure to over 60 per-
cent and some defector sources have;
estimated that 70 percent to 80 perceni,
of Soviet officials in the United States
have some intelligence connection.
Furthermore, the number of Soviets?
with access to the United States has'
tripled ?since 1960, and is still increas-
ing. In 1974. for example, over 200
Soviet ships with a total crew comple-
ment of 13,000 officers and men visited
this country. Some 4,000 Soviets entered
the United States as commercial or ex-
change visitors in 1974. In 1972-1973,
for example, approximately one-third of
the Soviet exchange students here for
the academic year under the East-West
'Student Exchange Program were co-
operating with the KGB, according to.
the Central Intelligence Agency.
Other areas of counterintelligence
concern include the sharp increase in
the number of Soviet immigrants to the
United States (4,000 in 1974 compared
to fewer than 500 in 1972): the rise in
East-West commercial exchange visitors.
(from 641 in 1972 to 1,500 in 1974); and
the growing number of officials in this
country from other Communist block
nations (from 416 in 1960 to 798 in
1975).
Coordination between C.I.A. and F.B.I.
counterintelligence units is especially
critical. The history of C.I.A.-F.B.I.
liaison has been turbulent, though a
strong undercurrent of cooperation 'las
usually existed at the staff level since
1952 when the bureau began sending a
liaison person to the C.I.A. on 'a regular
basis. The sources of friction between
the C.I.A. and F.B.I. in the early days.
revolved around such matters as the
frequent unwillingness of the bureau to
collect positive intelligence for the C.I.A.
within the United States or to help
recruit foreign officials in this country.
The committee believes that counter-
intelligence requires the direct attention
of Congress and the executive for three
reasons: (1) two distinct and partly
incompatible approaches to counterin-
telligence have emerged and demand
reconciliation; (2) recent evidence sug-
gests that F.B.I. counterespionage results
have been less than satisfactory; and
(3) counterintelligence has infringed on
. the rights and liberties of Americans.
Recommendations
22. By statute, a charter should be
established for the Central Intelligence
Agency which makes clear that its
activities must be related to foreign
intelligence. The agency should be given
the following missions: ? - ?
qThe collection of denied or pro-
tected foreign intelligence information.
qThe conduct of foreign counter-
intelligence. ?
qThe conduct of foreign covert action
operations.
qThe production of finished national
intelligence.
23. The C.I.A., in carrying out foreign
intelligence mission I, would be permit-
ted to engage in relevant activities
within the United States so long as
these activities do not violate the Con-
stItution nor any Federal, state or local
laws within the United States. The-
committee has set forth in its domestic
recommendations proposed restrictions
on such activities to supplement restric-
tions already contained in the 1947
National Security Act. In addition, the
committee recommends that by statute
the intelligence oversight committee(s)
of Congress and the proposed counter-
intelligence committee of the National
Security Council be required to review,
= at least annually, C.I.A. foreign intel-
8
ligence activities conducted within the
United States.
24. By statute, the Attorney General
should be required to report to the
-President and to the intelligence over-
sight committee(s) of Congress any in-
telligence activities which, in his opin-
ion, violate the constitutional rights of
American citizens or any other provi-
sion of law and the actions he has
taken in response. Pursuant to the coin-
Mittee's domestic recommendations, the
Attorney General should be made re-
sponsible for ensuring that intelligence
activities do not violate the Constitu-
tion or any other provision of law.
25. The committee recommends the
establishment of a special committee of
the Committee on Foreign Intelligence
to review all foreign human intelligence
collection activities. It would make rec-
ommendations to the C.F.I. with regard
to the scope, policies, and priorities of
U.S. clandestine human collection oper-
ations' and choices between overt and
clandestine human collection. This com-
mittee would be composed of a repre-
sentative of the Secretary of State as
chairman, the other statutory members
of the C.F.I., and others whom the
? President may designate.
26. The intelligence oversight com-
mittee(s) of Congress should carefully
*examine intelligence collection activities
of the Clandestine Service to assure
that clandestine means are used only
When the information is sufficiently
important and when such means are
necessary to obtain such information.
27. The intelligence oversight corn-
mitte(s) should consider whether:
? qthe Domestic Collection Division
(overt collection operations) should be
removed from the Directorate of Opera-
'tions (the Clandestine Service), and re-
turned to the Directorate of Intelligence;
qthe C.I.A.'s regulations should re-
quire that the D.C.D.'s overt contacts be
informed when they are to be used
for operational support of clandestine
activities;
qthe C.I.A.'s regulations should pro-
hibit recruiting as agents immigrants
who have applied for American citizen-
ship.
28. The President of the United States,
in consultation with the intelligence
oversight 'committee(s) of Congress.
should undertake a classified review of
current issues regarding counterintel-
ligence; This review should form the
basis for a classified Presidential state-
ment on national counterintelligence`
policy and objectives, and should closely
examine the following issues: compart.
mentation, operations, security, r.
search, accountability, training, internai
review, deception, liaison and coordina-
tion, and manpower.
C.I...4. Production of Finished.
Intelligence
Intelligence production refers to the
process (coordination, collation, evalua-
tion, analysis, research and writing) by
which "raw" intelligence is transformed
into "finished" intelligence for senior
policymakers. The finished intelligence
product includes a daily report .and
summaries, as well as longer analytical
studies and monographs on particular
topics of policy interest. In the C.I.A.,
finished intelligence is produced by the
Directornte of Intelligence and Dire's-
tcrate of Science and Technology.
Certain problems and issues in the
area of the production of intelligence
in the C.I.A. have come to the commit-
tee's attention. The committee believes,
these problems deserve immediate at-
tention by both the executive branch.
and future Congressional intelligence
oversight bodies. These problems hear
directly on the res?aurces. allocated. Id
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the prOchiction of finished intelligenge
the personnel systein and the organizaci
'Venal structure Of intelligence prodase
tion. ?
The committee recognizes that it 14.
not the primary purpose of intelligende
to predict every world event. Rather,
the principal function of intelligence is
to anticipate major foreign develope
ments and changes in policies which
bear on United States interests. Intel-,
ligence should also provide a deepen
understanding of the behavior, proce
esses, and long-term trends which may:
underlie sudden military and political
developments.
The committee wishes to emphasizes
that there is an important difference,:
between an intelligence failure and-a
policy failure. The United States had:
intelligence on the possibility of a Turk-
ish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. Thet
problem of taking effective action 'toi
prevent such aninvasion was a policy,
question and not an intelligence failure.,
The committee has received evidence'
that on some subjects, such as the cur-
rent capability of the strategic atu:V
conventional forces of potential adveen
saries, U.S. intelligence is considered,
excellent. But in other areas, U.S.
ished intelligence is viewed by policy-
makers as far from satisfactory in light
of. the total resources devoted to intel-
ligence. On balance, the committee'
found that the quality, timeliness, and..
utility of our finished intelligence is
generally considered adequate, but that
major improvement is both desirable-,
and possible.
One issue examined by the commits:
tee is whether intelligence corrununitaif
elements responsible for producing fulef.
ished intelligence receive adequate at
tention and support. Production is; hi.
the words of one observer, "the step-
child of the intelligence community!"
Since finished intelligence is a principaP
'purpose of all United States intelligence
activities, the committee finds that Mil
neglect of finished intelligence is uni;
acceptable for the future.
Intelligence resources are overwhelmingly devoted to intelligence collection:
The system is inundated with raw Ines
telligence. The individual analyst re-?
sponsible for producing finished intele,
ligence have difficulty dealing with the,
sheer volume of information. Policy-
-
maker's want the latest reports, and'
producers of finished intelligence oftenz
have to compete with the producers ot
raw intelligence for policymakers' ?ate.
tention. In a crisis situation, analyst&
tend to focus on the latest piece.. ?is
evidence at the expense of a longer and?
broader view. Intelligence community;
staff saw this tendency as one reason;
why the Cyprus coup in July 1974 -wee,:
not foreseen.
The intelligence community staff -Irii
its post-mortem on the 1974 Cyprus
crisis noted another general analytiettli,
problem which was involved in the faiee
ure to anticipate the Cyprus coup and.
the Arab attack on Israeli forces
October of 1973: "the perhaps subcon?
scious conviction (and hope) that, inn.,
mately, reason and rationality will pre-
vail, that apparently irrational moves
(the Arab attack, the Greek sponsored.
coup) will not be made by essentially..
rational men."
An additional area of the commite
tee's concern is that analysts are often
not informed in a timely way of nae:
tional policies and programs which af-
fect their analyses and estimates. In..
its examination of cases involving Camei
bodia and Chile in the I970's, the,
committee encountered evidence than,
the analysts were so deprived.
A final issue raled by the committee's,
Investigation of intelligence production:
is whether the new organizational strucee
ture proposed by the Pesident will as,.
sure the appropriate stature for the Di.."
rectorate of Intelligence to help over-
come existing problems in the producie;
tion of finished intelligence. Instead of
reporting directly to the D.C.!. (who'
is still to be the President's chief intel-
ligence adviser), C.I.A. analysts may,,
well report through the Deputy for the
C.I.A. Experience indicates that the newe
deputy will need to devote the bulk of,
his time to managing the Clandestine,
Services and the Directorate for Science,
and Technology. At the same time, the-,
D.C.I. may be preoccupied with greater
communitywide management responshe
bilities. Without some further restrucei
turing, the committee believes that the
production of finished intelligence may,
be lost in the shuffle.
Recommendations
29. By statute, the Director of thef.
Directorate of Intelligence should bey
authorized to continue to report die:
rectly to the Director of Central Intel.'i
ligence. ?--
30. The committee recommends nail'
a system be devised to insure that intel'ai.
ligence analysts are better and mote
-
promptly informed about United States;
policies and programs affecting their'
respective areas of responsibility.
31. The Central Intelligence Agencyd
ainhe intelligence oversight commit-
, - - -
tee(s) of Congress should re-examine'
the personnel system of the Directorate
of Intelligence with a view to providing
eincire flexible, less hierarchical per-
snrinel system. Super-grade positions
should be available on the basis of anal-
ytical capabilities..
? 32. The Directorate for Intelligence
should seek to bring more analysts into
the- CIA. atimiddle and upper grade
levels for both career positions and tem-
pprary assignments.
,-33, Greater emphasis should be placed
on stimulating development of new tools
and ,metheds- of analysis.
"24. :Agency policy should continue to
encourage intelligence analysts to as-
, .
surge substantive tours of duty -on an
open' basis in other agencies (State, De-
fense, NSC staff) or in academic insti-
t.aiions to broaden both their analytical
outleok and their appreciation for the
reidiance of their analysis to policy.
makers and operators within the Gov-
erfunent. ? - ? - - ?
Covert Action and
Paramilitary -
Operations
!Covert action is the attempt to influ-
encei?the internal affairs of other na-
tions in support of United States for-
plot- policy in a manner that cpnceals
the.: participation of the United States
Government. Covert action includes po-
litical and economic action, propaganda
and paramilitary activities.
The basic unit of covert action is the.
project. Covert action "projects" can
range from single assets, such as a
journalist placing propaganda, through
a network of assets working in the me-
diae to snajor covert and military inter-
vention such as in Laos. The agency
also maintains what it terms an "oper-
ational infrastructure" of "standy" aa-
sets ( agents of influence or media
assets) who cart be used in major oper-
ationsa-eauch as in Chile. These "stand-
9
b'ed'I'assets are part of ongoing, most
often. routine, projects. There are no
inactive assets. ?
Cert Action
The committee has found that the
C.I.A. has conducted some 900 major
or sensitive covert action projects plus
several thousand smaller projects since
1961: The need to maintain secrecy
shields covert action projects from the
rigorous public scrutiny and debate
necessary to determine their compati-
bility with etablished American foreign
policy goals. Recently, a large-scale
covert paramilitary operation in Angola
was initiated without any effort on the'
part of the executive branch to articu-
late and win public support for, its over-
all. Policy in Africa. Only public dis-
closure has allowed the nation to apply
its standards of success or failure to
covert action projects and then only in
retrospect, often without the benefit of
tho ...details prompting the original
choice of covert rather than overt
? action. ,
The, secrecy covert action requires
means that the public cannot determine
whether- such actions are consistent
with- established foreign policy goals.
This secrecy also has allowed covert ac-
tions to take place which are incon-
sistent with -our basic traditions and
values,
Some covert operations have passed
retrospect public judgments, such as.
the support. given Western European ?
?
democratic parties facing strong Corn- '
munist opposition in the late 1940's
and 1950's. Others have not. In the
view-of the committee, the covert hare
assment of the democratically elected
government of Salvador Allende in Chile
did not command U. S. public approval.
Pa:rarnilitary Operations
Covert paramilitary operations are a
special, extreme form of covert action.
These operations most 'often consist of
covert military assistance and training,
but' occasionally have involved actual
conibat activities by American advisers._
Because military assistance involves
foreign policy commitments, it is, with
one exception, authorized by the Con-
gress. That exception is covert military
assistance which is channeled through
the:C:1.A. without being authorized or
approved by the Congress as a whole.
Cievert U.S. paramilitary combat op--
era:1.1ms frequently amount to making
es:di:Abut do not .come under the War
Pofveirs Act since they usually do not
inideve uniformed U. S. military officers.
American military officers engaged ih
C.hkesponsored paramilitary operations
are' ,"sheep-dipped" for paramilitary
duty?.that is, they appear to resign
from. the military yet preserve their
place for reactivation once their tour
as -civilians in paramilitary operations
has-- ended.
the committee finds that major para-
military operations have often failed to
achieve their intended objective. Most
have eventually -been exposed. Opera-
tions, as in Angola. recently, and Indo-
nesia in the late 1950's are examples of
such paramilitary failures. Others, such
as 'Laos, are judged successes by the
CFA. and officials within the executive
branch. The "success" in Laos, how-
ever, must be seen against the larger
American involvement in Indochina
which failed.
Paramilitary operations often have
evolved into large-scale programs with
a high risk of exposure (and thus em-
barrassment and/or failure). In some
cases, the C.I.A. has been used to under-
take parsmilitary operations simply be-
cause the agency is less accountable to
the public for highly visible ''secret"
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military operations. In all cases con-
sidered by the committee, command
and.control within the executive branch
was.eigorous. However, all such opera-
tions- have been conducted without di-
rect.Congressional authority or public
debate. In recent years, some have been
continued in the face of strong Con-
gressional disapproval.
. Recently, however?apart from An-
gola?United States paramilitary activi-
ties have been at a very low level. The
capability for these actions, residing
jointly in the C.I.A. and the Department
of Defense, consists of a cadre of
trained officers, stockpiles of military
equipment, logistic networks and small
Collections of air and maritime assets.
Recommendations
35. The legislation establishing the
charter for the, Central Intelligence
Agency should specify that the C.I.A.
is the only U.S. Government agency
authorized to conduct covert actions.
The purpose of covert actions should
be to deal with grave threats to Ameri-
can security. Covert actions should be
consistent with publicly defined United
States foreign policy goals, and should
be reserved for extraordinary circum-
stances when no other means will suf-
fic.e. The legislation 'governing covert
action should require executive branch
procedures which will insure careful
and thorough consideration of both the
general policies governing covert action
and particular covert action projects;
such procedures should require the
pasticipation and accountability ? of
highest level policymakers.
' 36. The committee has already rec.
=mended, following its investigation
of alleged assassination attempts di-
rected at foreign leaders, a statute to
forbid such activities. The committee'
reaffirms its support for such a statute
and further recommends prohibiting
the. following covert activities by
statute:
tlAll political 'assassinations.
flEfforts to subvert democratic 'goy.--
ernments.
AlSupport for police or other internal.
security forces which engage in the
systematic violation of human rights.
37. By statute, the appropriate N.S.C.
committee (e.g., the Operations Ad-
visory Group) should review every cov-
ert action proposal.
The Committee recommends tha't'
the Operations Advisory Group review
Include: .
gA careful and systematic analysis
of the political premises underlying the
recommended actions, as well as the
nature, extent, purpose, risks, likeli-
hood of success and costs of the opera-
tion. Reasons explaining why the ob-
jective can not be achieved by overt
means should also be considered.
gEach covert action project should
be formally considered at a meeting of
the OAG, and if approved, forwarded
to the President for final decision. The
views and positions of the participants
would be fully recorded. For the pur-
pose of OAG, Presidential, and Con-
gressional considerations, all so-called
non-sensitive projects should be ag-
gregated according to the extraordinary
circustances or contingency against
which the project is directed.
38. By statute, the intelligence over.
sight committee(s) of Congress should
require that the annual budget submis-
sion for covert, action programs be
specified and detailed as to the activity
recommended. Unforeseen covert ac-
tion projects should be funded from
the Contingency Reserve Fund which
could be replenished only after the CO*
currence of the oversight and any other
appropriate congressional committees.
The congressional intelligence over-
sight committee should be notified
prior to any withdrawal from the Con-
tingen'cy Reserve Fund.
30. By statute, any covert use by the
U.S. Government of American citizens
as combatants should be preceded by
the notification required for all covert
? actions. The statute should provide
that within 60 days of such notifica-
tion such use shall be terminated
unless the Congress has specifically au-
thorized such use. The Congress should
be empowered to terminate such use at
any time.
40. By statute, the Executive branch
should be prevented from conducting
any covert military assistance program
(including the indirect or direct provi-
sion of military material, military or
logistics advice and training, and funds
for mercenaries) without the explicit
prior consent of the intelligence over-
sight committee(s) of Congress.
Reorganization of C.I.A.
The Position of the D.C.I.
The committee recommendations re-
garding the Director of Central Intelli-
gence would, if implemented, increase
his authority over the entire intelli-
gence community. Given such increased
authority, the committee .believes that
both the executive branch and the in-
telligence oversight committee(s) of-
Congress should give careful consider-
ation to removing the D.C.I. from di-
rect management responsibility for the
Central Intelligence Agency. This
would free the D.C.I. to concentrate on
his responsibilities with regard to the
entire intelligence community and
, would remove him from any -conflict
of interest in performing that task. It
might also increase the accountability
of the Central Intelligence Agency by
establishing a new and separate senior
position?a Director of the Central In-
telligence Agency?responsible for only
the C.I.A.
The Structure of .the
The committee believes that several
important problems uncovered in the
course of this inquiry suggest that
serious consideration also be given to
major structural change in the C.I.A.?
in particular, separating national intel-
ligence production and analysis from
the clandestine service and other col-
lection functions. Intelligence produc-
tion could be placed directly under the
D.C.T., while clandestine collection of
foreign intelligence from human and
techrrical sources and covert operations
would remain in the C.I.A.
Recommendations
41. The intelligence oversight com-
mittee(s) of Congress in the course of
developing a new charter for the in-
telligence community should give con-
sideration to separating the functions
of the D.C.I. and the Director of the
C.I.A. and to dividing the intelligence
analysis and production functions from
the clandestine collection and covert
action functions of the present C.I.A.
Relations With United
States Institutions
and Private
Citizens
In the immediate .postwar period, as
the Communits pressed to influence
and to. control international organiza-
tions and movements, mass communi-
cations, and cultural institutions. the
United States responded by involving
American private institutions and in-
dividuals in the secret struggle over
minds, institutions, and ideals. In the
process, the C.I.A. subsidized, and even
helped develop "private" or nongovern-
meat organizations that were designed
to compete with Communists around
the world. The C.I.A. supported not
only foreign organizations, but also the
international activities of United States
student, labor, cultural, and philan-
thropic organizations. - .
These covert relationships have at-
tracted public concern and this com-
mittee's attention because of the im-
portance that Americans attach to the
independence of these institutions.
The committe found that in the past
the scale and diversity of these covert
actions has been extensive. For opera-
tional purposes, the C.I.A. has:
ciFunded a special program of a
major American business association.
'Collaborated with - an American
trade union federation. ? ?
Helped to establish a research cen-
ter at a major United States university.
Supported an international ex-
change program sponsored by a group
of ? United States universities.
cadade widespread use of philan-
thropic organizations to fund such co-
vert action programs.
I. Covert Use of the U.S.
Academic Community
The Central Intelligence Agency is
now using several hundred American
academies, who in addition to provid-
ing leads and, sometimes making in-
troductions for intelligence purposes,
occasionally write books and other ma-
terial to be used for propaganda pur-
poses abroad. Beyond these, an addi-
tional few score are used in an unwit-
ting manner for minor activities.
These academies are located in over
100 American colleges, universities and
related institutes. At the majority of
institutions, no one other than the in-
dividual academic concerned is aware
of the C.I.A. link. At the others, at least
one university official is aware of the
operational use made of academies. on
his campus. In addition, there are sev-
eral American academies abroad who
serve operational purposes, primarily'
the collection of intelligence. - ?
The C.I.A. gives a high priority to
obtaining leads on potential foreign in-
telligence sources especially those from
Communist countries. This agency's
emphasis reflects the fact that many
foreign nationals in the United States
are in this category. The committee
notes that American academies provide
valuable assistance in this activity.
The committee is concerned, how-
ever, that American academies involved
in such activities may undermine pub-
lic confidence that those that train
our youth are upholding the ideals, in-
dependence and integrity of American
universities.
Government Grantees
C.I.A. regulations adopted in 1967
prohibit the "operational" use of cer-
tain narrow categories of individuals.
The C.I.A. is prohibited from using
ceiving grants from the Board of For-
eign Fellowships under the Fulhright-
, Hayes Act. There ir no prohibition on
the use of individuals participating in
any other federally funded exchange
programs. For example, the C.I.A. rimy
use those greettes--ertists, specialists.
athletes, leade,..s, doitot ri-
my ceive their gnints from the Bourd of
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Foreign Scholarships.' .The Committee
Is concerned that there is no prohibi-
tion against exploiting such open Fed-.
eral programs. for clandestine purposes.
2. The Covert Use of Books
and Publishing Houses
The committee has found that the -
Central Intelligence Agency attaches a'
particular importance to book publish-
ing activities as a form of covert prop..
agenda. A former officer in the Clan-
destine Service stated that books are?
"the most important weapon of stra-
tegic (longrange) propaganda." Prior to.
1967, the Central Intelligence Agency
sponsored, subsidized or produced over
1,000 books: approvimately 25 percent
of them in English. In 1967 alone, the
C.I.A. published or subsidized over 200
books, ranging from books on African
safaris and wildlief to. translations of
Machiavelli's "The Prince" into Swa-
hili and works. of T. S. Eliot into Rus-
sian, to a competitor to Mao's little red
book, which was entitled "Quotations
from Chairman Liu."
The committee found that an impor-
tant number of the books actually pro-
duced,by the Central Intelligence Agency
were reviewed and marketed in the'
United States.
3. Domestic "Fallout" ?
The committee finds that covert
media operations can result in manipu-
lating or incidentally misleading the
American public. Despite efforts to
minimize it, C.I.A. employees, past and
present; have conceded that there is no
way to shield the American public
completely from "fallout" in the United
States from agency propaganda or
placements overseas. Indeed, following
the Katzenbach inquiry, the Deputy
Director for Operations issued a direc-
tive stating: "Fallout in the United
States from a foreign publication which,
we support is inevitable and conse-
quently permissible."
The domestic fallout of covert propa-
ganda comes from many sources: books
intended primarily for an English-speak-
ing foreign audience, C.I.A. press place-
ments that are picked up by an interna-
tional wire service, and publications
resulting from direct C.I.A. .funding of
foreign institutes.- For example, a book
written for an English-speaking foreign
audience by one C.I.A. operative was
reviewed . favorably by another C.I.A.
agent in The New York Times.
4. Covert Use of American
Religious Personnel -
The committee has found that over
the years the C.I.A. has used very few.
religious personnel for operational pur-
poses. The C.I.A. informed the com-
mittee that only 21 such individuals
have ever participated in either covert
action projects or the clandestine col-
lection of intelligence. On Feb, 10, 1976,
the C.I.A. announced: "C.I.A.. has no
secret paid or contractual relationships
with any American clergyman or mis-
siona-y. This practice will be continued
as a matter of policy." -
The committee welcomes this policy
with the understanding that the prohi-
bition against all "paid or contractual
relationships" is in fact -a prohibition'
against any operational use of all
Americans following a religious vocation.
Recommendations
In its consideration of the recom."
mendations that follow, the committee'
noted the Central Intelligence Agency'a
concern that further restrictionon the
use of Americans for operational pur-
poses will constrain current operating
programs. The committee recognizes
that there may be at least some short-
term operational losses if the commit-
tee recommendations are effected, At
the same time, the committee believes
that there are certain American institu-
tions whose integrity is critical to the
maintenance of a free society and which
should therefore be free of any un-
witting role in the -clandestine service
of the United States Government.
42. The committee is concerned about
the integrity of American academic
institutions and the use of individuals ?
affiliated with such institutions for
clandestine purposes. Accordingly, the
committee recommends that the C.I.A.
amend its internal directives to require
that individual academics used for op-
erational purposes by the C.I.A., to-
gether with the 'President or equivalent
official of the relevant academic in-
stitutions, be informed of the clan-
destine C.I.A. relationship.
43. The committee furtherrecom-
mends that, as soon as possible, the
permanent intelligence oversight corn-;
mittee(s) of Congress examine whether'
further steps are needed to insure the
integrity of American academic insti-
tutions.
44. By statute, the C.I.A. should be
*prohibited front the operational use of
grantees who are receiving funds
through educational and/or cultural
programs which are sponsored by the
United States Government.
45. By statute. the C.I.A. should be
prohibited from subsidizing the writing,
or production for distribution within the
United States or its territories, of any
.book, magazine, article, publication,
film, or video or audio tape unless
publicly attributed to the C.I.A. Nor
should the C.I.A. be permitted to under-
take any activity to accomplish indi-
rectly such distribution within the
United States or its territories: ?
46. The committee supports the re-'
cently adopted C.I.A. prohibitions
against any paid or contractual rela-
tionship between the agency and US.
'and foreign journalists accredited tcr
U.S. media organizations. The C.I.A.'
prohibitions should, however, be estab-
lished in law. ? ? ? ?
47. The committee recommends that.
the C.I.A. prohibitions be extended by
;Jaw, to include the operational use of
any person who regularly contributes
material to, or is regularly involved
directly or indirectly in the editing of:
material, or regularly acts to set policy.
or provide direction to the activities
of -U.S. media organizations.
48. The committee recommends that
the agency's recent prohibition on ?
covert paid or contractual relationship
between the agency and any American
clergyman or missionary should be es-
tablished by law.
Proprietaries and
Cover
Proprietary Organizations
C.I.A. proprietaries are business en-
tities wholly owned by the agency
which do business, or only appear to.
do business, under commercial guise.
They are part of the "arsenal of tools"
of the C.I.A.'s Clandestine Services:
They have been used for espionage as
well as covert action. Most of the"
larger proprietaries have been used for
paramilitary purposes. The committee
finds that too often large proprietaries
11
have created unwarranted risks of un-
fair competition with private business
and of compromising their cover as
clandestine operations. For example,
Air America, which at one time had
as many as 8,000 employees, ran into
both difficulties.
While internal C.I.A. financial con-
trols have been regular and systematic,
the committee found a need for even
greater accountability both internally
and externally. Generally, those auditing
of the -C.I.A. have been denied access
to operational information, making
management-oriented audits impossible.
Instead, audits have been concerned
only with financial security and in-
tegrity.
The committee found that the C.I.A.'s
Inspector General has, on occasion,
been denied access to certain informa-
tion regarding proprietaries. This has
sometimes inhibited the ability of the
inspector office to serve the function
for which it was established. Moreover,
the General Accounting Office has not
audited these operations. The lack of
,review, by either the G.A.O. or the
C.I.A. Inspector General's office, means
that, in essence, there has been no out-
side review of proprietaries.
One of the largest current proPrie-
taries is an insurance-investment com-
plex established in 1962 to provide pen-
sion annuities, insurance and escrow
management for those who, for security
reasons, could not receive them directly
from U.S. Government The committee
determined that the Congress was not
' informed of the existence of this propri-
' etary until "sometime" after it had been
made operational and had invested
heavily in the domestic steck markets?,
a practice the , C.I.A.. has discontinued.
Moreover, once this proprietary was re-
-moved frem . the Domestic Operations
Division and placed under the General
Counsel's office it received- no annual
C.I.A. project review.
The record establishes that on occa-
sion the insurance-investment complex
?had been used 'to provide operational
support to various covert 'action pro-
jects. The Inspector General, in 1970,
criticized this use of the complex. be-
cause it threatened to compromise the
security of the complex's primary in-
surance objectives. ?
Cover
The committee examined cover . be-
cause it is an important aspect of all
C.I.A. clandestine activities. Its im-
portance is underscored, by the tragic
,murder of . a C.I.A. station chief in
Greece, coupled with continuing dis-
closures of C.I.A. agents' names. The
;committee sought to determine what, if
'anything, has been done in the past
to strengthen cover, and what should
be done in the future. ?
-The committee found conflicting
views about what constitutes cover;
, what it can do, and what should be
done to improve it. A 1970 C.I.A. in-
spector general report termed the.
agency's concept and use of cover
to be lax, arbitrary, uneven, confused,
and loose. The present cover staff in
the C.I.A. considered the 1970 asses-
meat to be simplistic and overly harsh.
There is no question, however, that
. some improvements and changes, are
needed.
The committee finds that there is a'
basic tension between maintaining'
adequate cover and effectively engaging
in overseas intelligence' activities. Al-
Most every operational act by a C.I.A.
officer under cover in the field?from
working with local inteiligence and-
poliCe to attempting to recruit agents:
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?reveals his true purpose and chips
away at his cover. Some forms of cover
do not provide concealment hut offer a
certain degree of deniability. Others are
se siaborate that they limit the amount
of work an officer can do for the C.I.A:
In carrying out their responsibilities.
C.I.A. officers generally regard the
maintenance of cover as a "nuisance."
The situation of the Athens station
chief, Richard Welch, illustrates the.
problem* of striking the right balance
between cover and operations, and also
the transparency of cover. Ase the chief
of the C.I.A.'s cover staff stated, by the
time a person becomes chief of station;
"there is not a great deal Of cover
left. The chief of the cover staff iden-
tified terrorism as a further security
problem for officers overseas, one that
is aggravated by the erosion of cover.
Recommendations
49;By statute, the C.I.A. should be
permitted to use proprietaries subject
to . external and internal controls. ,
50. The committee recommends that
the intelligence oversight committee(s)
of Congress require at least an annual
report on all proprietaries. The report
should include a statement of each
proprietary's nature and function, the
results of internal annual C.I.A. audits,
a list of all C.I.A. intercessions on be-
half of its proprietaries with any other
United States Government departments,
agencies or bureaus, and such other
information as the oversight committee
deems appropriate.
5L The intelligence oversight Corn-
mittee(s) of Congress shOuld require'
that' the fiscal impact of proprietaries'
on the C.I.A.'s budget be made clear
in the D.C.I.'s annual report to the
oversight committee. The committee
should also establish guidelines for
creating large proprietaries, should
these become necessary.. .
52. By statute, all returns' of funds
from proprietaries not needed for its
operational purposes or because of
liquidation or termination of a pro7.
prietary, should be remitted to the
United. States Treasury as Miscellaneous
Receipts. . .
The Department of Justice should be
consulted during the .process of the
sale or disposition of any C.I.A. pro-
prietary.
53. By statute, former senior gov-
ernment officials should. be prohibited
from negotiating with the CIA: or any
other agency regarding the disposal of
proprietaries. The intelligence oversight'
committees of Congress should con-
sider whether other activities among
agencies of the intelligence community,
the C.I.A. and former officials and em-
ployees, such as selling to or negotiat-
ing contracts with the C.I.A., should
also be prohibited as is the case re-
garding military officials under 18 U.S.C.
207,
Intelligence Liaison
Throughout the entire period of the
C.I.A.'s history, the agency has en-
tered into liaison agreements with the
intelligence services of foreign powers.
Such arangemeros are an extremely im-
portant and delicate source of intel-
ligence and operational support.. Intel-
ligence channels can also be used to
negotiate agreement outside the field
of intelligence. The committee notes
that all treaties require the advice and
consent of the Senate, and executive
agreements must be reported to the
Foreign Relations Committee of the
Senate. Because of the importance of
intelligence liaison agreements to na-
tional security, the committee is con-
cerned that Such' 'agreements have 'not
been systematically reviewed by' the
Congress in any fashion.
.Recommendations
54. By statute, the C.I.A. should be
prohibited from causing, funding, or
encouraging actions by liaison services
which are forbidden to the C.I.A.
Furthermore, the fact that a particular
project, action, or activity of the C.I.A.
is carried out through or by a foreign
liaison service should not relieve the
agency of its responsibilities for clear-
ance within-the agency, within the ex-.
ecutive branch, or with the Congress.
55. The intelligence oversight corn-
mittees of Congress should be kept
fully informed of agreements negotiated
with other governments through intel-
ligence channels.
The General Counsel
and Inspector
General
The general counsel,- as ,chief legal
officer of' the Central Intelligence Agen-
cy, has a special role in insuring that
C.I.A. activities are consistent ''with
the Constitution and laws of the.United
States. The committee found that, in the
past, the -participatien of the general
counsel in determining. the 'legality or
propriety of C.I.A. activities was limited;
in many instances the.general counsel
was not consulted- aboutsensitive
projects. In some cases the 'director's
investigative arm, the' inspectorgeneral;
discovered questionable activities often
were not referred to the general counsel
for a legal .opinion. Moreover, the 'gen-
eral counsel never had general investi-
gatory authority.. , ., .
The committee believes that the in:
telligence oversight committee(s). - of
Congress should examine the internal
review mechanisms of foreign.- and
military intelligence agencies' and con-;
skier' the feasibility' ofapplying recom-i
mendations such as those suggested fot
? the C.I.A.
,
,Recommendations -
56. Any ',C.I.A. employee having 144.
formation about activities which appear:
illegal, improper, outside the agency's,
legislative charter, or in violation oil.
agency regulations, should be required_
to inform, the director, the general-,
counsel, or the inspector general of the
agency. If .the general counsel is not:
informed,. he should be notified by the
other officials of such' reports. The
general counsel-and the -inspector gen-
eral shall, except where they deem'it:
inappropriate; be required* to provideo.--
such information to the head of the
agency. .
57: The D.C.I.'sheuld be required ?tri
report any information regarding ent!-'
ployee violations of law related to their'
duties and the results of any internal
agency investigation to the Attorney'
General. . '
58. By statute, the director of the:
C.I.A. should be required to notify the'.
appropriate committee of the. Congress.
of any referrals made to the Attorney
General pursuant to the previous recd
ommendation.
59. The director of the: C.I.A. shOuld'I
periodically require employees having
any information on past, current, or".
proposed agency activities which op-,
pear illegal, improper, outside ilia,
agency's legislative charter, or in vie-4
lation of the agency's regulations, to!
report such information.,
12
6b. By statute, the general counsel_
and the inspector general should have'
unrestricted access to all agency ine'
formation and should have the aulhori--'
ty to review all of the agency activitieS:;
61. All significant proposed C.I.A. ae-
tivities should be: reviewed by the'
general counsel for legality and consti-
tutionality.
62.. The program of-component in-..
spections conducted by the inspector,
general should be increased, as should.
the program of surveys of sensitive;
programs and issues which. cut .across'
component lines, in the Agency. .
63. The director shall, at least an-;.
nually, report to the appropriate come.
mittees of the Congress on the activities'
of the office of the general counsel: and'
the office of the inspector general. .
64. By statute, the general counsel
'should be nominated by .the President-
and confirmed by the Senate. ?
65. The agency's efforts to expand:
and. strengthen the staffs' of the gen-
eral. counsel and inspector _ general-
should be continued.
' 66. The general counsel should he
promoted to, and the inspector general.
should continue to hold executive rank.
equal to that of the deputy. directors:
of the C.I.A. ? .
The Department
of Defense
General Findings nd
Conclusions ,
The.committee finds that despite the;
'Magnitude of the tasks. and the .com-.
-plexity of the relationships, most of.
the important .collection con.
ducted by the Defense Department (the:.
reconnaissance and SIGINT- systems)
are managed 'relatively- efficiently and
'are generally responsive to the needs
of the military services- as well as to,
the policy makers on the national leveLg
Defense intelligence .must respond to
a range of consumers?policymakers
Washington, defense and technical ana?
lysts, and operational commanders
the field?yet, the primary mission of,
defense intelligence is .-to supply the
r armed services with the intelligence.
. necessary for their operations. This
overriding departmental requirement
creates a major problem in the over-all,
allocation of intelligence resources'
throughout the intelligence community.
In promulgating Executive order 11905,
the Administration has decided on a
greater centralization. of authority in,
the Director of Central Intelligence. The
committee notes that this will require
some changes in the Secretary of De?
,fense's authority over allocating defense
? intelligence resources. With regard to'
:intelligence resources management
within the Department of Defense, the
icommittee found that the establishment
'.:of a Deputy Secretary of Defense for
.Intelligence should enable more effec-
tive management of defense intelligence
..resources and help the Defense Depart-
:ment play an appropriate role in the
knew 'centralized interagency structure
:,under the Director of Central Inteili-
v..en,igIncreasingly, technological intelli-
gence systems have grown capable of
-serving both the interest of national
Zpolicymakers and planners and of field
; commanders. Thus, it is often difficult
to distinguish between "national" and
7"tactical" intelligence assets, collection
;Or prodUction. It is the committee's
'view that while the effect of the Presi-
:dent's Executive order giving the D.C.1.
More authority will be to bring national
intelligence assets and budgets under
the D.C.1.'s 'control and guidance, the
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4efense intelligence prograins which are
%tectical in nature and integral to the
'military's operational cOmmands should
remain under the control of the Secre-
tary of Defense. The precise line drawn
between the tactical and military intelli-
gence at any given time will have a
'significant impact on the definition of
'xiational intelligence and on the pur-
'view of any oversight committee of
angress.
:The Defense .Intelligence
? Agency
Historically, DOD has managed the
bulk of all technical intelligence collec-
tion systems, but the C.I.A. has man-
ged many important national technical
collection systems and has been in
charge of much of the analytic function
? and is the primary producer of national
Intelligence. The largest proportion of
intelligence needed by the military es-
tablishment, however, is tactical. There-
fore, national intelligence is a second-
ary mission of D.I.A. Much of D.I.A.'s
.:effort is directed toward producing
Tintelligence needed by the J.C.S., the
'United and Specified Commands, and
?force planners and technical analysts in
the-services. The Secretary of Defense,
on the other hand, is equally or more
'Concerned with national intelligence. In
th? is context, it is not surprising that
'DOD's civilian leadership has comple-
thiented D.I.A.'s product with analyses
from sources in other agencies.
'he National Security
? -Agency
".z The National Security Agency is one
?of the largest and most technically ori-
-ented components of the United States
?intelligence community. Its basic' func-
ation is collecting and processing foreign
'communications and signals for intelli-
?gence purposes. N.S.A. is also respon-
sible for creating and supervising the
'cryptography of all United States Gov-
;Trtiment agencies, and has a special
'responsibility for supervising thn mili-
lary services' cryptologic anncies.
..Another major responsibility is pro-
"tecting the security of American coin-
Immications.
,The. committee regards these func-
,tions as vital to American security.
capability to perform these
4unctions must be preserved. The com-
mittee notes that despite the fact that
N.S.A. has been 'in existence for several
,decades, N.S.A. still lacks a legislative
:pharter. Moreover, in its extensive in-
vestigation, the committee has identi-
,fted intelligence community abuses in
-levying requirements on N.S.A. and
-abuses by N.S.A. itself in carrying out
,its functions. The committee finds that
.there is a compelling need for an N.S.A.
Acharter to spell out limitations which
will protect individual constitutional
-tights without impairing N.S.A.'s neces-
sary foreign intelligence mission.
.1:
.`.Recommendations
'67. In order to implement the corn-
enittee's and the President's recom-
,
mendations for expanding the D.C.I.'s
-resource allocation responsibility, ap-
propriate adjustments should be made
? the Secretary of Defense's general
authority regarding defense intelligence
-activities and in the department's inter-
-nal budgeting procedures. At the same
:lime, there should be provision for the
'transfer to the Secretary of Defense of
responsibilities, particularly tasking in-
etelligence agencies, in the event of war.
ivs 6R. By statute, the intelligence over-
sight committee (s) of Congress. in con-
tultation with the executive, should es-
tablish a charter for the Defense Intel-
ligence Agency which would clearly de-
-fine its mission and relationship to other
'intelligence agencies. The committee
recommends that the charter include
ithe following provisions:
A. In order to encourage close coor-
dination between consumers and pro-
ducers of national intelligence, D.I.A.
should be a part of the office of the
5Secretary of Defense and should report
directly to the Deputy Secretary of De-
fense for Intelligence. A small J-2 staff
should be constituted to provide intel-
4igence support, primarily of an opera-
tional nature, to the Joint Chiefs of
-Staff. The Secretary of Defense should
insure full coordination and free access
to information between the two groups.
? B. The Director of the D.I.A. should
be appointed by the President and sub-
ject to Senate confirmation. Either the
director or deputy director of the agency
:should be a civilian.
C. The Congress must relieve D.I.A.
from certain civil service regulations in
'order to enable the quality of D.I.A.
personnel to be upgraded. In addition,
lnore supergrade positions must be pro-
vided for civilians in D.I.A.
: 69. By statute, a charter for the
National Security Agency should be es-
lablished which, in addition to setting
limitations on the agency's operations,
would provide that the Director of
?N.S.A. would be nominated by the
-'President and subject to confirmation
elly the Senate. The director should
'serve at the pleasure of the President,
abut for uot more than 10 years. Either
ethe director or the deputy director
should be a civilian.
" 70. The Department of Defense
-Should centralize the service counterin-
telligence and investigative activities
within the United States in the Defense
Investigative Service in order to reduce
wasteful duplication.
The Department of
State and
Ambassadors
.. The Department of State and the
Foreign Service have an important role
in the intelligence operations of the
United States Government. Because of ?
its responsibilities in formulating and
conducting U.S. foreign policy, the
State Department is a principal cus-
tomer for intelligence. Abroad, the For-
eign Service, operating overtly, is the
principal collector of political intelli-
gence and is a major collector of eco-
nomic intelligence.
? Because of its foreign policy responsi-
bilities and its worldwide complex of
diplomatic and consular installations,
the Department of State is the only
Washington agency potentially able to
oversee other U.S. Government activi-
ties abroad ? including those of the
C.I.A. In the field, this responsibility
clearly falls on the ambassador by law.
Indeed, ambassadors are the sole
Mechanism available outside of the
C.I.A. itself to assure that N.S.C. deci-
sionr are appropriately carried out by
the Clandestine Service. The committee
found that the role of the Department
of State and the ambassadors consti-
tute a central element in the control
and improvement in America's intelli-
gence operations overseas. However,
the committee also found that ambassa-
dors are often reluctant to exercise
their authority in intelligence matters.
The department has not encouraged
them to do so, and the Administration
has not issued directives to implement
13
.existing law covering the authority of
ambassadors.
In contrast to covert action, the com-
mittee found that neither the State De-
? partment nor U.S. ambassadors are
substantially informed about espionage
or counterintelligence activities di-
rected at foreign governments. Such co-
ordination as exists in this respect is at
the initiative of the Central Intelligence
Agency and is infrequent. The commit-
tee found that there is no systematic
assessment ?outside the C.I.A. of the
risks of foreign espionage and counter-
espionage operations and the extent to
which those operations conform with
overall foreign policy.
In general, ambassadors in the field
are uninformed about specific espionage
activities within their countries of as-
signment. Unlike the case of covert ac-
tion, ambassadors are not asked to ap-
praise the risks of espionage activities,
nor to assess their benefits. Often am-
bassadors do not want to know the
specifics of such operations, and what
coordination as exists in their cases
is based on a general injunction from
them to the station chiefs that they not
be confronted with any "surprises.?
That is not always enough if an am-
bassador wishes to participate in policy
decisions. For example, a shift of re-
sources toward recruitment of internal
targets in a Western country was under
consideration between Washington and
the field, and the U.S. ambassador had
not been informed. In this connection,
the committee believes it would be un-
realistic to use clandestine recruitment
to try to establish the kind of intimate
relationship with political elites in
friendly countries which we have en-
joyed as a result of the shared experi-
ente of WWII and its aftermath.
The committee finds that more than a
year after enactment of a statute
making ambassadors responsible for di-
recting, coordinating and supervising all
U. S. Government employees within
their country of assignment, instruc-
tions implementing this law have still
not been issued by any quarter of the
executive branch. A former Under Sec-
retary of State told the Committee that
the law, in effect, had been "suspended"
in- view of Presidential inaction, More-
over, the C.I.A. has not modified its
practices pursuant to this law. The com-
mittee finds this thwarting of the Unit-
ed States law unacceptable.
The committee finds that ambas-
sadors cannot effectively exercise their
legal responsibilities for a wide variety
of intelligence activities within their
jurisdiction without State Department
assistance on the Washington aspects
of the activities. Such support is partic- ?
ularly important in the case of intel-
ligence operations aimed at a third
country. An ambassador may be able
to judge the local risks of an espio-
nage effort, but if it is directed toward
a third country the ambassador may
not be able to assess the importance or
value of the effort without Washing-
-ton support.
At present, the C.I.A. handles both
State Department and its own commu-
nications with overseas posts. Under
this arrangement, the ambassador's ac-
cess to C.I.A. communications is at the
discretion of the C.I.A. The committee
finds that this is not compatible with
the role assigned to the ambassador
by law: the ambassador cannot be sure
that he knows the full extent and na-
ture of C.I.A. operations for which he
may be held accountable.
The committee finds that amhassa-
dors'- policies governing intelligence ac-
tivities have sometimes been interpreted
in a manner which vitiated their intent.
For exampe, one ambassador prohibited
any electronic surveillance by his em-
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bassy's C.I.A. component. * The head of
the C.I.A. component interpreted this
to proscribe ony C.I.A. electronic sur-
veillance and beieved that such surveil-
lance?could be conducted in cooperation.
with local security services.
The committee found evidence that
C.I.A. station chiefs abroad do not al-
ways reerdinate their intelligence re-
porting on local developments with
their ambassadors. The committee does
not believe that ambassadors should be
able to block C.I.A. field reports. How-
ever, it found that there was no stand-
ard practice for ambassadors to review
and comment on intelligence reporting
from the field.
The committee finds that the Foreign
Setwice is the foremost producer in the
United States Government of intelli-
gence on foreign political and economic
matters. The committee believes, how-
ever, that the State Department does ,
not adequately train Foreign Service
personnel, particularly in political re-
porting. Nor does the department fund
their collection operations, nor manage
their activities so as to take full advan-
tage of this extremely important intel-
ligence capability. In effect, the depart-
ment, despite being a major source of
intelligence, considers this function sec-
ondary to its principal task of diplo-
matic representation and negotiations.
? From discussions in nearly a dozen
Foreign Service posts, the committee
established that there is inadequate
funding for Foreign Service reporting
officers to carry out their responsibili-
ties. The funds available are considered
"representation funds" and must be
shared with the administration and con-
sular sections of most embassies. Such
representation funds have been a favor-
ite target for Congressional cuts in the?
State Department budget.
Recommendations
71. The National Security Council, the
Department of State and the Central
Intelligence Agency should promptly
issue instructions implementing Public
Law 93-475 (22 U.S.C. 2680a). These
instructions should make clear that
ambassadors are authorized recipients
of sources and methods information
concerning all intelligence activities,
including espionage and counterintelli-
gence. operations. Parallel instructions
from other components of the intelli-
gence community should .be issued to
their respective field organizations and
'operatives. Copies of all these instruc-
tions should be made available to the
intelligence oversight committee(s) of
Congress.
72. In the exercise of their statutory
responsibilities, ambassadors should
have the personal right, which may not
be delegated, of access to the operation-
al communications of the C.I.A.'s Clan-
destine Service in the country to which
they are assigned. Any exceptions
should have Presidential approval and
should be brought to the attention of
the intelligence oversight committees
of Congress. .
73. By statute, the Department of
State should be authorized to take the
necessary steps to assure its ability to
provide effective guidance and support
to ambassadors in the execution of their
responsibilities under Public Law 93-475
(22 U.S.C. Sect. 2680a).
74. Consideration should be given to
increasing and earmarking funds for
Foreign Service overt collection of for,
eign political and economic information.
These funds might be administered
jointly by the State Department's Bu-
reau of Intelligence and Research and
the Bureau of Economic Affairs.
75. The N.S.C. should review the
question of which U.S. Government
agency should control and operate coin
munications with overseas diplomatic
and consular posts, including the C.I.A.
and other civilian agencies operating
abroad.
76. The Department of State should
establish specific training programs for
political reporting within the Foreign
Service Institute, and place greater
emphasis on economic reporting.
Oversight and the
Intelligence Budget
The cqmmitte finds that a full under-
standing of the budget of the intelli-
gence community is required for effec-
tive oversight. The secrecy surrounding
the budget, however, makes it impos-
sible for Congress as a whole to make
use -4 this valuable oversight tool.
Congress as a body has never ex-
plicitly voted on a "budget" for national
intelligence activities. Congress has
never voted funds specifically for C.I.A.,
N.S.A., and other national intelligence
instrumentalities of the Department of
Defense.
The funding levels for these intelli-
gence agencielare fixed by subcommit-
tees of the ArMed Services and Appro-
priations Committees of both houses.
Funds for these agencies are then con-
cealed in the budget of the Department
of Defense. Since this departmental is
the budget is the one Congress ap-
proves, Congress as a whole, and the
public, have never known how much
the intelligence agencies are spending
or how much is spent on itifelligelice
activities generally. Neither Congress as
a whole nor the public can determine
whether the amount spent on intelli-
gence, or by the intelligence agencies
individually, is appropriate given the
priorities.
'Because the funds for intelligence are
concealed in defense appropriations
those appropriations are thereby in-
flated..Most members of Congress and
the public can neither determine which
categories are inflated nor the extent
to which funds in the inflated catego-
ries are being used for purposes for
which they are approved.
Finally, the committee believes there
is serious question as to whether the
present system of complete secrecy vio-
lates the constitutional provision that:.
"No Money shall be drawn from the
Treasury but in Consequence of Appro-
priations made by Law; and a regular
Statement and Account of the Receipts
and Expenditures of all public Money
shall be published from time to time."
The committee believes that the over-
all figure for national intelligence ac-
tivities can ? be. made public annually
without endangering national security
or revealing sensitive programs. The
committee carefully examined the pos-
sible impact of such disclosure on the
sources and methods of intelligence
gathering and believes it to be minimal.
The committee found that the primary
concern about this level of disclosure
was that it would lead to pressure for
even more detailed revelation which
would compromise vital intelligence
programs.
The committee believes that disclo-
sure of an aggregate figure for national
intelligence is as far as it is prudent
to go at this stage in reconciling the
nation's constitutional and national se..
curity requirements. Public speculation
about overall intelligence costs would
be eliminated, the public would be as-
sured that funds appropriated to par-
ticular goveinment agencies were In
fact intended for those agencies, and
both Congress and the public would be
14
able to assess overall priorities in gov-
ernmental spending.
Recommendations
77. The intelligence oversight com-
mittee(s) of Congress should authorize
on an annual basis a "National Intelli-
gence Budget," the total amount of
which would be made public. The com-
mittee recommends that the oversight
committee consider whether it is nec-
essary, given the constitutional require-
ment and the national security de-
mands, to publish more detailed budgets.
? 78. The intelligence oversight com-
mittee(s) of Congress should monitoi
the tactical and indirect support ac-
counts as well as the national activities
of intelligence agencies in order to
assure that they are kept in proper per-
spective and balance,
79. At the request of the intelligence
oversight committee(s) of Congress and
as its agent., staff members of the Gen-
eral Accounting Office should conduct
full audits, both for compliance and
for management of all components of
the? intelligence community. The G.A.O.
shoud establish such procedures, coin-
partmentation and clearances as are
necessary in order to conduct these au-
dits on a secure basis. In conducting
such audits, the G.A.O. should be au-
thorized to have all access to all nec-
essary files and records of the intelli-
gence community.
Chemical and
Biological Agents
and the Intelligence
Community
The committee investigated the test-
ing .and use of chemical and biological
agents by agencies within the intelli-
gence community. The testing programs
originated in response to fears that
countries hostile to the United States
would use chemical and biological
agents against Americans or our allies.
Initially, this fear led to defensive pro-
grams. Soon this defensive orientation
became secondary as the possibility of
using these chemical and biological
agents to obtain information from, or
to gain control of, enemy agents be-
came apparent.
The committee found that United
States intelligence agencies engaged in
research and development programs to
discover materials which could be used
to alter human behavior. As part of this.
effort, testing programs were instituted,
first involving witting human subjects.
Later, drugs were surreptitiously admin-
istered to unwitting human subjects.
The agency considered the testing
programs highly sensitive. The commit-
tee found that few people within the
agencies knew about them: There is no
evidence that Congress was informed
about them. These programs were kept
from the American public because, as
the inspector general of the C.I.A.
wrote, "the knowledge that the agency
is engagink in unethical and illicit activ-
ities would have serious repercussions
in political and diplomatic circles and
would be detrimental to the accomplish-
ment of its [C. J. A.'s] mission."
? The research and development pro-
gram and particularly the testing pro-
gram involving unwitting human sub-
jects involved massive abridgements of
the rights of individuals, sometimes with
tragic consequences. The deaths of two
Americans resulted from these pro-
grams; other participants in the leting
programs still suffer residual effects.
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While some' controlled testing for de-
fensive purposes might be defended, the
nature of the tests, their scale, and the
fact that they were continued for years
after it was known that the surrepti-
tious administration of LSD to unwitting
subjects was dangerous, indicate a dis-
regard for human life and liberty. -
The committee also found that with-
in the intelligence community there
were destructive jurisdictional conflicts
over drug testing. Military testers with.
held information from the C.I.A., ignor-
ing their superiors' suggestions for co-
ordination. The C.I.A. similarly failed
to provide information on its programs
to the military. In one case the military
attempted to conceal their overseas op-
erational testing of LSD from the C.I.A.
and the C.I.A. attempted surreptitiously
to discover the details of the military's
program.
Recommendations
80. The C.I.A. and other foreign and
foreign military intelligence agencies
should not engage in experimentation
on human subjects utilizing any drug,
device or procedure which is designed,
intended, or is reasonably likely to
harm the physical or mental health of
the human subject, except with the
informed consent in writing, witnessed
by a disinterested third party, of each
human subject, and in accordance With
the guidelines issued by the National
Commission for the Protection of Hu-
man Subjects for Biomedical and Be-
havioral Research. Further, the juris-
diction of the commission should be
amended to include the Central Intel-
ligence Agency and the other intelli-
gence agencies of. the United States
Government.
81. The Director of the Central In-
telligence Agency and the Secretary of
Defense should continue to make de-
termined efforts to locate those in-
dividuals involved in human testing of
chemical and biological agents and to
provide follow-up examinations and
treatment, if necessary.
General
Recommendations
82. Internal Regulations ? Internal
C.I.A. directives or regulations regard-
ing significant agency policies and pro-
cedures should be waived only with
the explicit written approval of the
Director of Central Intelligence. Waiver
of .any such regulation or directive
should in no way violate .any law or
infringe on the constitutional right and
freedom of any citizen. If the D.C.I. ap-
proves the waiver or amendment of any
significant regulation or directive, the
N.S.C. and the appropriate Congres-
sional oversight committee(s) should
be notified immediately. Such notifica-
tion should be accompanied by a state-
ment explaining the reasons for the
waiver or amendment.
83. Security Clearances?In the
course of its investigation, the come
mittee found that because of the many
intelligence agencies participating in
security clearance investigations, cur-
rent security clearance procedures in-
volve, duplication of effort, waste of
money and inconsistent patterns of in-
vestigation and standards. The intelli-
gence oversight committee(s) of Con-
gress, in consultation with the intelli-
gence community, should consider
framing standard security clearance
procedures for all civilian intelligence
agencies and background checks for
Congressional committees when secur-
ity clearances are required.
84. Personnel Practices?The corn.
mittei found that intelligence agency,
training programs fail to instruct per-
sonnel adequately on the legal limita-
tions and. prohibitions applicable to in-
telligence activities The committee
recommends that theee training pro-
grams should he expanded to include..
review of constitutional, statutory, and
regulatory provisions in an effort, to
heighten awareness among all intelli-
gence personnel concerning the poten-
tial effects intelligence activities may
have on citizens' legal rights. ? ;
. .
85. Security Functions of the Intelli-
gence Agencies?The committee found
that the security components of intelli-
gence agencies sometimes :engaged ;,,in
law enforcement activities. Some of
these activities may have been unlawe
fut. Intelligence agencies' Accurity
functions should be limited toTrotect-
'big the agencies personnel and facili-
ties, and lawful activities and to as-
suring that intelligence personnel fol-
low, proper security practices.
86. Secrecy and Authorized Disclos-
ure?The committee has received vari-
ous Administration proposals that
would require persons having access
to classified and sensitive informatitin
to maintain the secrecy of that infor-
mation. The committee recommends
that the issues raised by these pro-
posals be considered by the new legis-
lative intelligence oversight committees
of Congress and that, in recasting the
1947 National Security Act and in con-
sultation with the executive branch, the
overhight committees - consider the
wisdom of new secrecy and disclosure
legislation. In the view of the commit-
tee any such consideration should in-
clude carefully defining the following
terms: national secrets; sources and
methods; lawful and unlawful classifi-
cation; lawful and unlawful disclosure.
The new legislation should provide
civil and/or criminal Penalties for un-
lawful classification and unlawful'dis-
closure. The statute should also pro-
vide for internal departmental?ap4
NEW YORK TIMES
27 April 1976
3 SENATORS SCORE
C.I.A. OVER REPORT
Some Security Objections
Are Called Outlandish
WASHINGTON, April 26 (AP)
?The Central Intelligence
Agency used national security
arguments to strip the final re-
port of the Senate Intelligence
Committee of any data that
might embarrass or inconve-
nience it, three members of the
committee said today.
"Some of the so-called secur-
ity objections of the C.I.A. were
so outlandish they were dis-
missed out of hand," the'three
Senators said.
They said that the agency
vented to eiiminate any refer-
ence :to the Bay of Pigs as a
paramilitary operation, and to
delete any reference to C.I.A.
'activities in Laos "and they
, wanted the committee to excise
itestimony given in public be-
fore the television cameras."
They said that in some cases
15
agency procedures for employees who
believe that classification and/or dis-
closure procedures are being improp-
erly or illegally used to report such he-
-lief. There should also be a statutery
procedure whereby an employee who
has used the agency channel to no
avail can report such belief without im-
punity to an "authorized" institutional
group outside the agency. The new.in-
telligence Oversight Board is one such
group. The intelligence oversight com-
mittee(s) of Congress would be an;
other. The statute should specify ,that
revealing classified information inethe
course .of reporting information to an
authorized group would not constitute
unlawful disclosure of classified jam-
mation. i.e.,
87. Federal Register for Classified
Executive Orders?In the course of its
investigation, the committee often' he'd
difficulty locating classified orders, di-
rectives, instructions, and regulations
issued by various elements of the ex-
ecutive branch. Access to these order's
by the intelligence oversight commit-
tee(s) of Congress is essential to in-
formed oversight of the intelligence
community.
The committee recommends' that a
Federal Register for classified execu-
tive orders be established, by' statute.
The statute should require the registry,
under appropriate security procedures,
of all executive orders?however they
are labeled--concerning the intelligence
activities of the United States. Among
the documents for which registry in
'the Classified Federal Register should
be required are all National Security
Council Intelligence Directives and all
Director of Central Intelligence Dime-.
tives. Provision should he made for ac-
cess to classified executive orders by
the intelligence oversight committee(s)
of Congress. Classified executive orders
would not be lawful until filed with the
registry, although there should- be pro-
vision for immediate implementation. in
emergency situations with prompt sale-
sequent registry required.
other -requested deletions mere
clearly justified on securijy
grounds.
They said that in some cases
other requested deletions were
clearly justified on security
grounds.
"But in other cases, the C.I.A.
in our view used 'the classifica-
tion stamp not for security, but
to censor material that would
be embarrassing, inconvenient
or likely to provoke an adverse:
public reaction to C.I.A. activi-
ties." the Senators said.
The three Senators are Philip
A. Hart of Michigan, Walter F.
Mondale of Minnesota andl
Gary Hart of Colorado, all De-
mocrats.
They said that in preparing'
the report the committee "benti
over backwards" to insure thati
no intelligence sources, -met-
hods or other classifid matte
ials were disclosed.
But they said that in a num-
bet of complicated areas the
committee's concern "enabled
the C.I.A. to use the clearance
process to alter the report to
the point where some of its
most important implications
are either lost or obscured in
i vague language." ,e
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THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY APRIL 29 1976
CERPTS FROM SENATE'S
INTELLIGENCE ?REPORT
Seeetal be 'Me New York Tletes
? WASHINGTON, April 28?Following are excerpts from "Intelligence
.Activities and the Rights of Americans," the final report of the Senate Select
committee on Intelligence Activities.
I., ?
The constitutional system of checks
and balances has not adequately Con-
trolled intelligence activities. Until re-
cently the executive branch has neither
delineated the scope of permissible ac-
tivities nor established procedures for
supervising intelligence agencies, Con-
gress has failed to exercise sufficient
Oversight, seldom questioning the use
rto which its appropriations were being
pt. Most domestic Intelligence issues
;hive not reached the courts, and in
?,those cases when they have reached
Yhe courts, the judiciary has been re-
Atuctant to grapple with them.
Each of these points is briefly. illus-
trated below.
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
1. The Number of
.., People Affected by.
Domestic
Intelligence.
:...; Activity -
ti-? .
'.United States intelligence agencies
have investigated a vast number of
American citizens and domestic organi-
zations: F.B.I. headquarters alone has
developed over 500,000 domestic intel-
ligence files, and 'these have been aug-
mented by additional files at F.B.I. field
Offices. The F.B.I. opened 65,000 of
These domestic intelligence files in 1972
alone. In fact, substantially more indi-
iidnals and groups are subject to
Intelligence scrutiny than the number
f files would appear to indicate since,
typically, each domestic intelligence file
c,ontains information on more than one
individual or group, and this informa-
tion is readily retrievable through. the
F.B.I. General Name Index.
The number . of Americans and
'dainestic groups caught in the domes-
tic intelligence net is further illustrated
by the following statistics:
e Nearly a. quarter of a million first
class letters were opened and photo-
graphed in the United States by the
q.I.A. between 1953-1973. producing a
q.LA. computerized index of nearly
one and one-half million names.
1 At least 300,000 individuals were in-
ikexed in a C.I.A. computer system and
Oparate files were created on approxi-
rptely 7,200 Americans and over 100
domestic groups during the course of
c.I.A.'s Operation CHAOS (1967-1973).
from,
of private telegrams sent
to or through the United States
were obtained by the National Security
4gency front 1947 to 1975 under a
siecret arrangement with three United
ates telegraph companies,
, An estimated 100,000 Americans
were the subjects of United States
t e ym.idntie,1116ircenfdilelsuctreated between..
1'
Intelligence files on more than 11,000
tIdividuals and groups were created by
e Internal Revenue Service between
1969 and 1973. and tax investigations.
were started on the basis of political
rather than tax criteria.
. At least 26,000 individuals were at
,one point catalogued on an F.B.I. list' of
persons to be rounded up in the event
of a "national emergency."
2. Too Much
F Information
, Is Collected for
i Too Long
?Intelligence agencies 'have ' collected
vaSt, amounts of information. about the
intimate details of citizens' lives and
about their participation in legal and
peeceful political activities. The targets
of, intelligence activity have included
pcilitical adherents of the right and the
left, ranging froth: activist to casual
s4pporters. Investigations have been
directed against proponents of racial
Ulises. and women's rights, otitsPoken
atiostles of nonviolence and rracial
liar-
mpny; establishment politicians; relig-
ious groups, and advocates of new. life
sqrles. The 'widespread targeting of
citizens and domestic groups and the
excessive scope of the collection of
information is illustrated by the follow-
ing examples:
(a) The women's liberation move-
ment was infiltrated by informants
who collected material about the move-
ment's policies, leaders and individual
,members. One report included the name.
of every woman who attended, meet-
ings, and another stated that each
woman at . a meeting had described
"how she felt oppressed, sexually or
otherwise." Another report concluded
that the movement's purpose was to
"free women from the humdrum
existence of being only a wife and
? mother," but still recommended that
the intelligence investigation should be
continued.
(b) A prominent civil rights leader
land adviser to Dr. Martin Luther
King Jr. was investigated on the sus-
picion that he might be a Communist
"sympathizer." The F.B.I. field office
concluded he was not. Bureau head-
quarters directed that the investigation
continue using a theory of "guilty until
proven innocent": ,
"The bureau does not agree with
the expressed belief of the field office
that? is not sympathetic to the
party cause. While there may not be
any evidence that is a. Com-
munist, neither is there any subetantial
evidence that is anti-Communist."
(c) F.B.I. sources reported on the
formation of the Conservative American
Christian Action Council in 1971. in
the 1950's, the bureau collected infor-
mation about the John Birch Society.
and passed it to the White House be-
cause of the society's "scurillnus at-
tack" on President Eisenhower and
ether high Government ofticiais.
(d) Some investigations of the lawful
activities. of peaceful groups have con-
tinued for decades. For example. the
N.A.A.C.P.- was investigated to deter-
mine whether it "had connections with"
the Communist Party. The investigation
lasted for over 25 years, although noth-
ing was found to rebut a report during
the first year of the investigation that
the N.A.A.C.P. had a "strong tendency"
to "steer clear of Communist activities."
Similarly, the F.B.I. has admitted that
the Socialist Workers Party has com-
mitted no criminal acts. Yet the bureau
has investigated the Socialist Workers
:Party for more than three decades on
' the basis of its revolutionary rhetoric
' ?which the F.B.I. concedes falls short
of incitement to violence?and . its
claimed international links. The bureau
is currently using its informants to
,
collect information about S.W.P. mem-
bers' political views, including those on
, "U.S. involvement in Angola," "food
prices," "racial matters," the "Vietnam
War" and about any of their efforts to
support non-S.W.P. candidates for polit-
ical office.
(e) National political leaders fell
within the broad reach of intelligence
investigations. For example, Army In-
telligence maintained files on Senator
Adlai Stevenson and Congressman Ab-
ner Mikva because of their participation
in peaceful political meetings under sur-
veillance by Army agents. A letter to
Richard Nixon, while he was a candi-
date for President in 1968, was inter-
cepted under C.I.A.'s mail opening
program. In the 1960's President John-
son asked the F.B.I. to compare various
senators' statements on Vietnam with
the Communist Party line and to con-
duct name checks on leading antiwar
senators.
(f) As part of their effort to collect
information which "related even re-
motely" to people or groups "active" in
communities which had "the potential"
for civil disorder, Army intelligence
agencies took such steps as: sending
agents to a Halloween party for ele-
mentary school children in Washington,
.D.C., because they suspected a local
"dissident" might be present; monitor-
ing protests of welfare mothers' organ-
izations in Milwaukee; infiltrating a
coalition of church youth groups in
Colorado, and sending agents to a
priests' conference in Washington, D.C.,
held to discuss birth control measures.
(g) In the late 1960's and early 1970's,
student groups were subjected to in-
tense scrutiny. In 1970 the F.B.I. or-
dered investigations of every member
of the' Students for a Democratic So-
ciety and of "every black student union
and similar group regardless of their
past or present involvement in disor-
ders." Files were opened on thousands
of young men and women so that, as
the former head of F.B.I. intelligence
explained, the information could be
used if they ever applied for a Govern-
ment job.
In the 1960's bureau agents were
instructed to increase their, efforts to
discredit "New Left" student demon-
strators by tactics including publishing
photographs ("naturally the most ob-
noxious picture should be used"), using
"misinformation" to falsely notify mem-
hers events had been canceled, and
writing "tell-tale" letters to students'
parents.
(h) The F.B.I. Intelligence Division
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comileonly investigated any indication
nat. "subversive" groups already under
investigation were seeking to influence
or control other groups. One example
of the extreme breadth of this "infiltra-
tion" theory was an F.B.I. instruction
in the mid-1960's to all field offices to
investigate every "free university" be-
cause eome of them had come under
"subversive influence."
(i) Each administration from Franklin
D. Roosevelt's to Richard Nixon's per-
mitted and sometimes encouraged Gov-
ernment agencies to handle essentially
political intelligence. For example:
cPresident Roosevelt asked the F.B.I.
,to put in its files the names of citizens
sending. telegrams to the White House
opposing his "national defense" policy
and supporting Col. Charles Lindbergh.
qPresident Truman received inside
Information on a former Roosevelt aide's
efforts to influence his appointments,
labor union negotiating plans and the
publishing plans of journalists.
qPresident Eisenhower received re-
ports on purely political and social con-
tacts with foreign officials by Bernard
Baruch, Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt and Su-
preme Court Justice William 0. Douglas.
qThe Kennedy Administration had the
F.B.I. wiretap a Congressional staff
member, three executive officials, a
lobbyist and a Washington law firm.
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy
received the fruits of a F.B.I. "tap" on
Martin Luther King Jr. and a "bug" on
a Congressman, both of which yielded
information of a political nature.
President Johnson asked the F.B.I. to
conduct "name checks" of his critics
and of members of the staff of his 1964
opponent, Senator Barry Goldwater. He
also requested purely political intelli-
gence on his critics in the Senate, and
received extensive intelligence reports
on political activity at the 1964 Demo-
cratic Convention from F.B.I. electronic
surveillance.
President Nixon authorized a program
of wiretaps which produced for the
White House purely political or personal
information unrelated to natioual secu-
rity, including information about a Su-
preme Court justice.
Se Covert Action and
the Use of Illegal
or Improper Means
() c veil Action
Apart from uncovering excesses in
the collection of intelligence, our inves-
tigation has disclosed covert actions di-
rected against Americans, and the use
of illegal and improper surveillance
techniques to gather information. For
example:
(i) The F.B.I.'s Cointelpro?counter-
intelligence program?was designed to
"disrupt" groups and "neutralize" indi-
viduals deemed to be threats to domes-
tic security. The F.B.I. resorted to coun-
terinteligence tactics in part because
Its chief officials believed that the exist-
ing law could not control the activities
of certain dissident groups and that
court decisions had tied the hands of
the intelligence community. ?Whatever
opinion one bolds about the policies of
the targeted groups, many of the tactics
employed by the F.B.I. were indisput-
ably degrading to a free society. Coin-
telpro tactics included:
gAnonymously attacking the political
beliefs of targets in order to induce
their employers to fire them;
cAnonymouely mailing letters tn the
spouses of intelligence targets for the
purpose of destroying their marriages;
qObtaining from I.R.S. the tax re-
turns of a target and then attempting to
provoke an I.R.S. investigation for the
express purpose of deterring a protest
leader from attending the Democratic
National Convention;
qFalsely and anonymously labeling
as Government? informants members of
groups known to be violent, thereby ex-
posing the falsely labelled member to
expulsion or physical attack; ?
qPursuant to instructions to use "mis-
information" to disrupt demonstrations,
employing such means as broadcasting
fake orders on the same citizens band
radio frequency used by demOnstration
marshals to attempt to control demon-
strations and duplicating and falsely
filling out forms soliciting housing for
persons coming to a demonstration,
thereby causing "long and useless jour-
neys to locate these adresses."
Sending an anonymous letter to the
leader of a Chicago street gang (de-
scribed as "violence-prone") stating
that the Black Panthers were supposed
to have "a hit for you." The letter was
suggested because it "may intensify...
animosity" and cause the street gang
leader to "take retaliatory action."
From "late 1963" until his death in
1968, Martin Luther King Jr. was the
target of an intensive campaign by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation to "neu-
tralize" him as an effective civil rights
leader. In the words of the man in
charge of the F.B.I.'s "war" against
Dr. King, "No holds were barred."
The F.B.I. gathered information
about Dr. King's plans and activities
through an extensive surveillance pro-
gram, employing nearly every intelli-
gence-gathering technique at the bu-
reau's disposal in order to obtain
information about the "private activi-
ties of Dr. King and his advisers" to
use to "completely discredit" them. -.
The program to destroy Dr. King as
the leader of the civil rights movement
included efforts to discredit him with
executive branch officials, Congres-
sional leaders, foreign heads of state,
American ambassadors, churches, uni-
versities and the press.
The F.B.I. mailed Dr. King a tape
recording made from microphones hid-
den in his hotel rooms which one agent
testified was an attempt to destroy Dr.
King's marriage. The tape recording
was accompanied by a note which Dr.
King and his advisors interpreted as
threatening to release the tape record-
ing unless Dr. King committed suicide.
The extraordinary nature of the cam-
paign to discredit Dr. Xing is evident
from two documents.
At the August 1963 march on Wash-
ington, Dr. King told the country of his
"dream" that:
"All of God's children, black men and
white men, Jews and Gentiles, Protest-
ant and Catholics, will be able to join
hands and sing in the words of the old
Negro spiritual, 'Free at last, free at
last, thank God Almighty, I'm free at
last.'"
The bureau's Domestic Intelligence
Division coacluded that this "demagogic
speech" established Dr. King as the
"most dangerous and effective Negro
leader in the country." Shortly after-
wards, and within days after Dr. King
was named "Man of the Year" by Time
magazine, the F.B.I. decided to "take
him off his pedestal, reduce him com-
pletely in influence," and select and
promote its own candidate to "assume
the role of the leadership of the Negro
people."
In early 1968, bureau headquarters
explained to the field that Dr. King
must be destroyed because he was seen
as a potential "messiah" who could
"unify and electrify" the "black nation-
alist movement." Indeed to the F.B.I.
he was a potential threat because he
might "abandon his supposed 'obedi-
ence' to white liberal doctrines (non-
violence)." In short, a nonviolent man
was to be secretly attacked and de-
stroyed as insurance against his aband-
oning nonviolenee.
. .?
(b) Illegal or Improper
Means
The surveillance which we investi-
gated was not only vastly excessive in
breadth and a basis for degrading
eounterintelligence actions, but was
also often conducted by illegal or im-
proper means.. For example:
(1)For approximately 20 years the
C.I.A. carried out a program of in-
discriminately opening citizens first
class mail. The bureau also had a mail
opening program, but canceled it in
1966. The bureau continued, however,
to receive the, illegal fruits of C.I.A.'s
program. In 1970, the heads of both
agencies signed a document for Presi-
dent Nixon, which correctly stated that
mail opening was illegal, falsely stated
that it had been discontinued and pro-
posed that the illegal opening of mail
should be resumed because it would
provide useful results. The- President
approved the program, but withdrew
his approval five days later. The illegal
opening continued nonetheless. Through-
out this period C.I.A. officials knew
that mail opening was illegal but ex-
pressed concern about the "flap poten-
tial" of exposure, not about the illegality
of their activity.
(2)From 1947 until May 1975, N.S.A.
received from international cable com-
panies millions of ?cables which had
been sent by American citizens in the
reasonable expectation that they would
be kept private,
(3) Since the early 1930's, intelligence
agencies have frequently wiretapped
and bugged American citizens without
the benefit. of judicial warrant. Recent
court decisions have curtailed the use
of these techniques against domestic
targets. But past subjects of these sur-
veillances have included a United States
Congressman. a Congressional staff
member, journalists and ?newsmen, and
numerous individuals and groups who
engaged in no criminal activity and
who posed no genuine threat to the na-
tional security, such as two White
House domestic affairs advisers and an
anti-Vietnam War protest group. While
the prior written approval of the Attor-
ney General has been required for all
warrantless wiretaps since 1940, the
record is replete with instances where
this requirement was ignored and the
Attorney General gave only after-the-
fact authorization.
Until 1965, microphone surveillance
by intelligence agencies was wholly un-
regulated in certain classes of cases.
Within weeks after a 1954 Supreme
Court decision denouncing the F.B.I.'s
installation of a microphone in a de-
fendant's bedroom, the Attorney Gen-
eral informed the bureau that he did not
believe the decision applied to national
security cases and permitted the F.B.I.
to continue to install microphones sub-
ject only to its own "intelligent re-
straint."
(4) In several cases, purely political
information (such as the reaction of
Congress to an Administration's legis-
lative proposal) and purely personal
information (such as coverage of the
extramarital social activities of a high-
level executive official under survetl-
lance) was obtained from electronic sur-
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veillance and disseminated to the highest
levels of the Federal Government.
(5) Warrantless break-ins have been
conducted by intelligence agencies since
World War II. During the 1960's alone,
the F.B.I. and C.I.A. conducted hundreds
of break-ins, many against American
citizens .and domestic organizations. In
some cases, these break-ins were to
install microphones; in other cases, they
were to steal such items as membership
lists from organizations considered "sub-
versive" by the bureau.
(6) The most pervasive surveillance
technique has been the informant. In a
random sample of domestic intelligence
cases, 83 percent involved informants
and 5 percent involved electronic sur-
veillance. Informants have been used
against peaceful, law-abiding groups':
they have collected information about
personal and political views and activi-
ties. To maintain their credentials in
violence-prone groups, informants have
involved themselves in violent activity.
This phenomenon is well illustrated, by
an informant in the Klan. He was present
at the murder of a civil rights worker
in Mississippi and subsequently helped
to solve the crime and convict the per-
petrators. Earlier, however, while per-
forming duties paid for by the Govern-
ment, he had previously "beaten people
severely, had boarded buses and kicked
people, had [gone] into restaurants and
beaten them [blacks] with blackjacks,
chains, pistols." Although the F.B.I. re-
quires agents to instruct informants
that they cannot be involved in violence.
it was understood that in the Klan, "he
couldn't be an angel and be a good in-
formant,"
4. Ignoring the Law.
Officials of the intelligence agencies
,occasionally-recognized that certain ac-
tivities were illegal, but expressed con-
cern only for "flap potential." Even
more disturbing was the frequent testi-
mony that the law and the Constitution
were simply ignored. For example, the
author of the so-called Huston plan tes-
tified: .
Question: Was there any person
who stated that the activity recom-
mended, which you have previously
? identified as being illegal opening'
of the mail and breaking and entry
or burglary?was there any single
person who stated that such ac-
tivity should- not be done because
it was unconstitutional?
Answer: No.
Question: Was there any single
person who said such activity
should not be done because it was
illegal?
Answer: No.
Similarly, the man who for 10 years
headed F.B.I.'s Intelligence Division
testified that:
. . never once did I hear anybody,
including myself, raise the question:
is this course of action which we have
agreed upon lawful, is it legal,- is it
ethical or moral. We never gave' any
thought to this line of reasoning, be-
cause we were ' just naturally prag-
,triatic."
Although the statutory law and the
Constitution were often not "[given] a
thought." there was a general- attitude
that intelligence needs were responsive
to a higher law. Thus, as one witness
testified in justifying the F.B.I.'s mail,
opening program:
"It was my assumption that what we
were doing was justified by what we
,had to do . . . the greater good, the
national security.'
5. Deficiencies in
Accountability
and Control
The overwhelming nuMber of excesses
continuing over a prolonged period of
time were due in large measure to the
fact that the system of checks and bal-
ances?created in our Constitution :to
limit abuse of governmentalnower?was
seldom applied to the intelligence com-
munity. Guidance and regulation from
outside the intelligence agencies?where
it has been imposed at all?has been
.vague. Presidents and other senior. ex-
ecutive officials, particularly the At-
torneys General, have virtually abdicated '
their consitutional responsibility to over-
see and set standards fors intelligence
activity. Senior Government officials
generally 'gave the agencies broad, gen-
eral mandates or pressed for immediate
result's on pressing problems. In neither
case did they provide guidance to pre-
vent excesses and their broad mandates
and pressures themselves often resulted
'in 'excessive or improper intelligence
activity.
.. Congress has often declined to exer-
cise meaningful oversight, and on oc-
casion has passed laws or made state-
ments which were taken by intelligence
agencies as supporting overly broad
investigations.
On the other hand, the record reveals
instances when intelligence agencies
have concealed improper activities from
.their superiors in the executive branch
and from the Congress, or have elected
to disclose only the less questionable
aspects of their activities.
There has been, in short, a clear and
sustained failure by those responsible
to control the intelligence community
and to 'insure its accountability. There
has been an equally clear and sustained
failure by intelligence agencies to fully
inform the proper authorities 'of their
activities and to comply with directives
from those authorities.
6. The Adverse
Impact of Improper
Intelligence
Activity
Many of the illegal or improper dis- -
? ruptive efforts directed against Ameri-
can citizens and domestic organizations
succeeded in injuring their targets. Al-
though it is sometimes difficult to prove'
that a target's, misfortunes were caused
by a counterintelligence program di-
rected against him, the possibility that
an arm of the United States Govern-
...
ment intended to cause the harm and
might have been responsible is itself,
abhorrent.
The committee has observed numerous,
examples of the impact of intelligence:
operations. Sometimes the harm was
readily apparent?destruction of mars;
sieges, loss of friends or jobs. Some-.
times the attitudes of the public and of.
Government officials responsible for
formulating policy and resolving vital:
;issues were influenced by distorted ins"
telligence. But the most basic harm was-
to the values of privacy and freedom.'
which our Constitution seeks to protect
and which intelligence activity infringed,
on a broad scale.
(a) General Efforts to
Discredit
Several efforts against indlviduali
18
:and groups appear to have achievest
their stated aims. For example:
9A bureau field office reported that;
the anonymous letter it had sent to an-
activist's husband accusing his wife of
infidelity "contributed very strongly"
to the subsequent breakup of the mars.
siege.
gAnother field office reported that a'
draft. counsellor, deliberately and falsely'
accused of being an F.B.I. informant,.
was "ostracized" by his friends and as-
sociates.
9Two instructors were reportedly put
on probation after the bureau sent an
anonymous letter to a university ad.:
ministrator about their funding of an
anti-Administration student newspaper.
41The bureau evaluated its attempts to
"put a stop" to a contribution to the
Southern Christian Leadership Confer-
ence as "quite successful."
41An F.B.I. document boasted that a.
"pretext" 'phone call to Stokely Car-
michael's mother telling her that mem-
bers of the Black Panther Party in-
-tended to kill her son left her "shocked."
The memorandum intimated that the
bureau believed it had been responsible
for Carmichael's flight to Africa the
following day.
(b) Media Manipulation
The F.B.I. has attempted covertly to
influence the public's perception of per-
sons and .organizations by disseminat-
ing derogatory information to the press,
either anonymously or through "friend-
ly" news contacts. The impact of those
articles is generally difficult to meas-
'use, although in some cases there are
fairly direct connections to injury to
the target. The bureau also attempted
to influence media reporting which
would have an impact on the public
image of the F.B.I. Examples include:
41Planning a series of derogatory
'articles about Martin Luther King Jr.,
and the poor people's campaign.
For example, in anticipation of the
-1968 "poor people's march on Wash-
ington, D. C.," bureau headquarters
granted authority to furnish "coopera-
tive news media sources" an article
"designed to curtail success of Martin
Luther King's fund raising." Another
memorandum illustrated how "photo-
graphs of demonstrators" could be used
in discrediting the civil . rights move-
ment. Six photographs of participants
in the poorneople's campaign in Cleve-
land accompanied the memorandum
with the following note attached: "These
[photographs] show the . militant ag-
gressive appearance of the participants
and might be of interest to? a coopera-
tive news source." Information on the
"poor people's campaign was provided
by the F.B.I. to friendly reporters on
the condition that "the Bureau must
not be revealed as the source."
qSoliciting information from field of-
fices "on a continuing basis" for
"prompt . . . dissemination to the new;
,media . . . to discredit the New Left
movement and its adherents." The head-
quarters directive requested, among
other things, that:
"Specific data should be furnished
depicting the scurrilous and depraved
nature of many of the characters, activ-
ities, habits and living conditions sepses
sentative of New Left adherents."
Field Offices were to be exhorted that
."every avenue of possible embarrass-
ment must be vigorously and enthusis
astically explored."
gOrdering field offices to gather in-
formation which would disprove allega-
tions by the "liberal press, the bleedmg
hearts and the forces on the left" that
the Chicago police used undue force in
dealing with demonstrators at the 1968
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Democratic convention.
liTaking advantage of a close relation.
ship with the chairman of the board?
described in an F.B.I. memorandum as
"our good friend"? of a Magazine with
? national circulation to influence articles
? which related to the F.B.I. For example.
through this relationship the bureau
"squelched" an "unfavorable article
against the bureau" written .by a 'free-
lance writer about an F.B.I. investiga-
tion; "postponed publication" of -an
article on another F.B.I. case; "fore-
stalled publication" of an article by Dr.
Martin Luther King Jr., and received
information about proposed editing of
King's articles.
(c) Distorting Data to
Influence Government
Policy and Public
Perceptions
Accusate intelligence is a prerequisite
to sound Government policy. However::
as the past head of the F.B.I.'s Dom'estiqei
Intelligence Division reminded the corn-,
mittee:
"The facts. by themselves are not too
meaningful. They are something like
stones cast into a heap."
On certain crucial subjects the doi
mestic intelligence agencies reported
the "facts" in ways that gave rise to
misleading impressions.
For example, the F.B.I.'s Domestic
Intelligence Division initially discounted
as. an "obvious failure" the alleged
attempts of Communsts to influence the
civil rights movement. Without any sig-
nificant change in the factual situation,
the bureau moved from the division's
conclusion to Director Hoover's public
Congressional testimony characterizing
'Communist influence on the civil rights
movement as "vitally important."
F.B.I. reporting on protests against
the Vietnam War provides ancther
?example of the manner in which the in-
formation provided to decision-makers
can be skewed. In acquiescense with a
? judgment already expressed by Presi-
dent Johnson, the bureau's reports on
'demonstrations against the war in Viet-,
_nem emphasized Communist efforts to
influence the antiwar movement and
underplayed the fact that the vast ma-
jority of demonstrators were not Com-
munist controlled.
-(d) "Chilling" First
Amendment Rights
The First Amendment protects the
rights of American citizens to engage
in free and open discussions and to
associate with persons of their choos-
ing. Intelligence agencies have, on occa-
sion, expressly attempted tO interfere
with those rights. For example, one
internal F.B.I. memorandum called for
,"more interviews" with New Left sub-
:jects "to enhance the paranoia endemic
in these circles" and "get the point
,across there is an F.B.I. agent behind
every mailbox."
More importantly. the Government's
surveillance activities in the aggregate
.?whether or not expressly intended to
do so?tend, as the committee con-
cludes. to deter the exercise of First
Amendment rights by American citizens
' who become aware of the Government's
domestic intelligence program.
(e) Preventing the Free
Exchange of Ideas
Speakers, teachers, writers and pub-
lications themselves were targets of the
;.F.13.1.'s counterintelligence program. The
F.B.I.'s efforts to interfere with the free
exchange of ideas included:
19Anonymously attempting to prevent
an alleged "Communist-front" group
from holding a forum on a Midwest
campus and then investigating the
'judge who ordered that the meeting be
allowed to proceed.
41Using another "confidential source"
in a foundation which contributed to a
local college to apply pressure on the
school to fire an activist professor.
tiAnonymously contacting a univer-
sity official to urge him to "persuade"
two professors to stop funding a stu-
dent newspaper in order to "eliminate
what voice the New Left has" in the area
CITargeting the New Mexico Free Uni-
'versity for teaching "confrontation poli-
tics" and "draft counseling training."
7. Cost and Value ,
Domestic intelligence is expensive. We
have already indicated the cost of illegal
and improper intelligence activities in
.terms of the harm to victims, the injury
,to constitutional values and the damage
?to the democratic process itself. The cost
in dollars is also significant. For ex-
ample, the F.B.I. has budgeted for fiscal
year 1976 over $7 million for its domes-
tic security informant program, more
tthan twice the amount it spends on
.informants against organized crime.
The aggregate budget for F.B.I. dornes-
.tic security intelligence and foreign
-counterintelligence is at least $80 mil-
lion. In the late 1960's and early 1970's,
when the bureau was joined by the
C.I.A., the military and N.S.A. in collect-
ing information about the antiwar move-
ment and black activists, the cost was
. substantially greater. ?
Apart from the excesses described
above, the usefulness of many domestic
'..intelligence -activities in serving the
legitimate goal of protecting society
'has been questionable. Properly-directed
-intelligence investigations concentrating
'upon hostile foreign agents and violent
terrorists can produce valuable results.
The committee has examined cases
where the F.B.I. uncovered "illegal"
? agents of a foreign power engaged in
clandestine intelligence activities in
violation of Federal law. Information
'leading to the prevention of serious vio-
lence has been acquired by the F.B.I.
'through its informant penetration of ter-
-rorist groups and through the inclusion
in bureau files of the names of persons
'actively involved with such . groups.
? Nevertheless, the most sweeping domes--
tic intelligence surveillance programs
have produced surprisingly few useful
returns in view of their extent. For
? example:
ilBetween 1960 and 1974, the F.B.I.
? conducted over 500,000 separate invee-
tigations of persons and groups under
,the "subversive" category, predicated
on the possibility that they might be
likely to overthrow the Government of
the United States. Yet not a single indi-
vidual or group has been prosecuted
'since 1957 under the laws which pro-
hibit planning or advocating action to
overthrow the Government and lerhich.
are the main alleged statutory basis for
such F.B.I. investigations.
41A recent study by the General Ac-
counting Office has estimated that of
some 17,528 F.B.I. domestic intelligence
investigations of individuals in 1974,
only 1.3 percent resulted in prosecution
and conviction, and in only "about 2
percent" of the cases was advanee
knowledge of any activity?legal or il-
legal?obtained.
19
' 410ne of the main reasons advanced
for expanded collection of intelligem e
about urban unrest and antiwar pro-
? test was to help responsible offic:s1,
cope with possible violence. Howe?er,
a former White House official with ma-
jor duties in this area under the John-
son Administration has concluded, in
retrospect, that "in none of these situa-
tions . . . would advance intelligence
about dissident groups [have] been of
much help," that what was needed was
"physical intelligence" about the geog-
raphy of major cities, and that the at-
tempt to "predict violence" was not a
? "successful undertaking."
cDomestic intelligence reports have
Sometimes even been counterproductive.
A. local police thief, for example, de-
scribed F.B.I. reports which led to the
positioning of Federal troops near his
'city as:
". . . Almost completely composed of
, unsorted and unevaluated stories,
threats and rumors that had crossed my
desk in New Haven. Many of these had
long before been discounted by our in-
telligence division. But they had made
their way from New Haven to Washing-
ton, had gained completely unwarranted
credibility and had been submitted by
? the Director of the F.B.I. to the Presi-
dent of the United States. They seemed
to present a convincing picture of im-
pending holocaust."
In considering ,its recommendations,
the committee undertook an evaluation
of the F.B.I.'s claims that domestic in-
? telligence was necessary to combat ter-
rorism, civil disorders. "subversion" and
hostile foreign intelligence activity. The
'committee reviewed voluminous mate-
rials bearing on this issue and ques-
? tioned bureau officials and former Fed-
eral executive officials.
? We have found that we are in funda-
? mental agreement with the wisdom of
Attorney General Stone's initial warn-
ing that intelligence agencies must not
be "concerned with political or other
opinions of individuals" and must be
limited to investigating essentially only
"such conduct as is forbidden by the
laws of the United States." The com-
mittee's record demonstrates that do-
mestic intelligence which departs from
this standard raises grave risks of un-
dermining the democratic process and
harming the interests of individual citi-
zens. This danger weighs heavily
against the speculative or negligible
benefits of the ill-defined and overbroad
investigations authorized in the past.
Thus, the basic purpose of the recont-
mendations in this report is to limit the
F.B.I. to investigating conduct rather
than ideas or associations.
The excesses of the past do not, how-
ever, justify depriving the United Staiee
of a clearly defined and effectively con-
trolled domestic intelligence capability.
The intelligence services of this nation's
international adversaries continue to at-
tempt to conduct clandestine espionage
operations within the United States.
Our recommendations provide for in-
telligence investigations of hostile for.
eign intelligence activity.
Moreover, terrorists have engaged in
serious acts of violence which have
brought death and injury to Americans
and threaten further such acts. These
acts, not the politics or beliefs of those
who would commit them, are the proper
focus for investigations to anticipate
terrorist violence. Accordingly, the com-
mittee would permit properly .:ontrolled
intelligence investigations in those nar-
row circumstances.
Concentration on imminent violence
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can ovoid the wasteful dispersion of re-
sources which has characterized the
sweeping (and fruitless) domestic intel-
ligence investigations of the past. But
the most important reason for the fun-
damental change in the domestic intel-
ligence operations which our recom-
mendations propose is the need to pro-
tect the constitutional rights of Amer-
icans.
In light of the record of abuse re-
vd'aled by our inquiry, the committee is
not satisfied with the position that mere
exposure of what has occurred in the
past will prevent its recurrenr.e. Clear
legal standards and effective oversight
and controls are necessary to insure
that domestic intelligence activity dces
not itself undermine the democratic sys-
tem it is intended to protect.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendation 1?There is no in-
herent constitutional authority for the
President or any intelligence agency to
violate the law. ?
Recommendation 2?It is the intent
of the committee that statutes. imple-
menting these recommendations provide
the exclusive legal authority for Federal
domestic security activities.
(a) No intelligence agency may en-
gage in such activities unless authorized
by statute, nor may it permit its em-
ployees, informants or other covert hu-
man sources to engage in such activities
on its behalf.
(b) No executive directive or order
May be issued which would conflict
with such statutes.
1 Recommendation 3?In authorizing
-intelligence agencies to engage in cer-
tain activities, it is not intended that
such authority empower agencies, their
-informants or covert h,uman sources to
violate any prohibition enacted oursuant
to these recommendations or conta:ned
in the Constitution or in any other law.
Recommendation 4?To supplement
-the prohibitions in the 1947 National
Security Act against the C.I.A. exercis-
ing "police, subpoena, law enforcement
'powers or internal security functions,"
.the C.I.A. should be prohibited from
.Conducting domestic security activities
within the United States, except as spe-
Cifically permitted by these recom-
.mendations.
Recommendation 5?The Director of
' Central Intelligence should be made re-
sponsible for "coordinating" the protec-
tion of sources and methods of the in-
telligence community. As head of the
C.I.A., the Director should also be re-
sponsible in the first instance for .the
security of C.I.A. facilities, personnel,
operations and information. Neither
function, however, authorizes the Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence to violate any
Federal or state law or to take any ac-
tion which is otherwise inconsistent
with statutes implementing these recom-
mendations.
7tecommendation 6?The C.I.A. should
not conduct electronic surveillance, un-
authorized entry or mail openings with-
in the United States for any purpose.
Recommendation 7?The C.I.A. should
not employ physical surveillance, infil-
tration of groups or any other covert
techniques against Americans within
the United States except:
(a) Physical surveillance of persons
on the grounds of C.I.A. installations:
(h) Physical surveillance during a pre-
liminary investigation of allegations an
employee is a security risk for a limited
period outside of C.I.A. installations.
Such surveillance should be conducted
only upon written authorization of the
Director of Central Intelligence and
should he limited to the subject of the
investigation and, only to the extent
necessary to identify them, to persons
with whom the subject has contact;
(c) Confidential inquiries, during a
preliminary investigation of allegations
an employee is a security risk, of out;
side sources conderning medical or fi-
nancial information about the subject
which is relevant to those allegations;
(d) The use of identification which
does not reveal C.I.A. or Government
affiliation, in background and other
security investigations permitted the
C.I.A. by these recommendations and
the conduct of checks which, do not re-
veal C.I.A. or Government affiliation tor
the purpose of judging the effectiveness
of cover operations upon the written au-
thorization of the Director- of Central
Intelligence;
(e) In exceptional? cases, the place-
ment or recruitment of agents within an
'unwitting domestic group solely for the
purpose of preparing them for assign-
ments abroad and only for as long as
is necessary to accomplish that pur-
pose. This should take place only if the
Director of Central Intelligence makes a.
written finding that it is essential for
foreign intelligence collection of vital
importance to the United States, and
the Attorney General makes a written
finding that the operation will be con-
ducted under procedures designed to
prevent misuse of the undisclosed par-
ticipation or of any information ob-
tained therefrom. In the case of any
such action, no information received by
C.I.A. from the agent as a result of his
? position in the group should be dissemi-
nated outside the C.I.A. unless it indi-
?cates felonious criminal conduct or
threat of death or serious bodily harm,
in which case dissemination should be
permitted to an appropriate official
agency if approved by the Attorney
General.
Recommendation 8 ? The C.I.A.
should not collect information within
the United States concerning Ameri-
cans except:
(a) Information concerning C.I.A. em-
ployees, C.I.A. contractors - and their
employees or applicants for such em-
ployment or contracting;
(b) Information concerning individ-
uals or organizations providing or offer-
ing to provide assistance to the C.I.A.;
(c) Information concerning individ-
uals or organizations being considered
by the C.I.A. as potential sources of
information or assistance;
(d) Visitors to C.I.A. facilities;
(e) Persons otherwise in the immedi-
ate vicinity of sensitive C.I.A. sites; or
(f) Persons who give their informed
written consent to such collection.
In (a), (b) and (c) above, information
should be collected only if necessary
for the purpose of determining the per-
scn's fitness for employment or assist-
ance. If, in the course of such collec-
tion. information is obtained which in-
dicates criminal activity, it should be
transmtted to the F.B.I. or other ap-
propriate agency. When an American's
.relationship with the C.I.A. is prospec-
tive, information should only be col-
lected if there is a bona fide expecte,-
tiort the person might be used by the
C.I.A.
' 20
RecommendatiOn 9?The C.I.A. should
not collect information abroad concern-
ing Americans except:
(a) Information concerning Ameri-
cans which it is permitted to collect
within the United States;
(b) At the request of the Justice De-
partment as part of criminal investiga-
tions or an investigation of an American
for suspected terrorist or hostile foreign
intelligence activities or security leak or
security risk investigations which the
F.B.I. has opened.
Recommendation ? 10?The C.I.A.
should be able to transmit to the F.B.I.
or- other appropriate agencies informa-
tion concerning Americans acquired as
the incidental byproduct of otherwise-
permissible foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence operaticns when-
ever such information indicates any
activity in violation of American-law.
Recommendation 11?The C.I.A. may
employ covert techniques abroad
against Americans:
(a) Under circumstances in which the
C.I.A. could use such covert techniques
against Americans within the United
States, or .
(b) When collecting information as
part of Justice Department investiga-
tion, in which case the C.I.A. may use
a particular covert technique under
the standards and procedures and ap-
provals applicable to its use against
Americans within the United States by
the F.B.I.'
(c) To the extent necessary to iden-
tify persons known or suspected to be
Americans who come in contact with
foreigners the C.I.A. is investigating.
CIA. Human Experiments ?
and Drug Use
Recommendation 12?The C.I.A.
should not use in experimentation on
human subjects any drug, device or
procedure which is designed or intended
to harm, or is reasonably likely to harm,
the physical or mental health of the
human subject, except with the in-
formed written consent, witnessed by
a disinterested third party, of each
human subject, and in accordance with
the guidelines issued by the. National
Commission for the Protection of
Human Subjects for Biomedical and Be-
havioral Research. The jurisdiction of
the commission should be amended to
include the Central Intelligence Agency
and other intelligence agencies of the
United States Government.
Recommendation 13?Any C.I.A.
activity engaged in pursuant to Recom-
mendations 7, 8, 9, 10 or 11 should he
subject to periodic review and certifi-
cation of compliance with the Constitu-
tion, applicable statutes, agency regula-
tions and executive orders by:
(a) The Inspector General of the
C.I.A.:
(b) The General Counsel of the C.I.A.
in coordination with the Director of
Central Intelligence:
(c) The Attorney General, and
(d) The oversight committee recom-
mended [below].
All such certificationc should he;
available for review by Congressional
oversight committees.
Recommendation 14?N.S.A. should
not engage in domestic security activi-
ties. Its functions should he limited in
a precisely drawn legislative charter to
the collection of foreign intelligence
from foreign communications.
Recommendation 15?N.S.A. should
take all practicable measures consistent
with its foreign intelligence mission to
eliminate or minimize the interception,
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eselection and monitoring of communi-
cations of Americans from the foreign
'communications.
Recommendation 16?N.S.A. should
not be permitted to select for monitoring
:any communication to, from or about.* .
an American without his consent, ex-
cept for the purpose of obtaining in- '
formation about hostile foreign intelli-
gence or terrorist activities, and then
only if a warrant approving, such moni-
toring is obtained in accordance with
procedures similar to those contained t
in Title HI of the Omnibus Crime Con-
trot and Safe Streets Act of 1968.
Recommendation 17? Any personally
identifiable information about an Amen- A
can which N.S.A. incidentally acquires, A
other than pursuant to a warrant, should a
not be disseminated without the consent
of the American, but should be destroyed
as promptly as possible unless it indi- a
cates:
(a) Hostile foreign intelligence or
terrorist activities, or.
Control of Civil Disturbance
Intelligence
Recommendation 23?The Department
of Defense should not be permitted to
conduct investigations of Americans on
the theory that the information derived
therefrom might he useful in potential
civil disorders. The Army should be per-
mitted to gather information about geo-
graphy, logistical matters or the ident-
ty of local officials which is necessary'
o the 'positioning, support and use of
roans in an area where troops are likely
o be deployed by the President in con-
ection with a civil disturbance. The
rmy should be 'permitted to investigate
mericans involved in such disturbance's
fter troops have been deployed to
he site of a civil disorder* to the extent
ecessary to fulfill the military mission
nd to the extent the information can-
oe be obtained from the F.B.I.
Recommendation 24 ? Appropriate
agencies of the Department of Defense
(b) Felonious criminal conduct for
which a warrant might be obtained pun-
or
suant to Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, or
s
. (c) A threat of death or serious bod- m
e
should be permitted to collect back-
--mind information on their present or
ospective employees or contractors.
ith respect to security risks or the
curity of its installations, the Depart-
e.nt of Defense should be permitted
If dissemination is permitted, by (a), te
.?fly harm.
to
(b) and (c) above, it must only be made
C.
to an appropriate official and after ap- sts
proval by the Attorney General. tio
Recommendation 18 ? N.S.A. should
not request from any commercial car- vi
tier any communication which it could De
not otherwise obtain pursuant to these te
recommendation's. inf
conduct physical surveillance consis-
nt with such surveillances as the
LA. is permitted to conduct, in similar
ctunstances, by these recommends-
Recommendation 25?Except as pro-
ded in 27 below, the Department of
fense should not direct any covert
chnique (e:g., electronic surveilance,
ormants, etc.) at American civilians.'
Recommendation 26?The Department
of Defense should be permitted to con-
duct abroad preventive intelligence in-
vestigations of unaffiliated Americans,
provided such *investigations are first
approved by the F.B.I. Such investiga-
tions by the Department of Defense' in-
.
dote , the ? use of covert techniques,
uld ordinarily be conducted in a man-
consistent with the recommends-
s pertaining to the F.B.I.; however
o verseas locatigns where U.S. milita-
orces constitute the governing power
where U.S. military forces are en-
ed in hostilities circumstances may
uire greater latitude to conduct. such
estigations.
ecommendation 27 ? The I.R.S.
uld not, on behalf of any intelligence
ncy or for its own use, collect any
mation about' the activities of
ricans except *for the, purposes of
roing the tax laws. ?
ecommendation 28?I.R.S. ? should
select any person or group for tax
Ligation on the basis of political
vity or for any other reason not rela-
t to enforcement fo the tax laws.
ecommendation 29?Any program of
!licence investigation relating to
estic 'security in which targets are
cted by both 'tax and nontax criteria
Id only be initiated:
) Upon the written request of .the
rney General or the Secretary of
Treasury, specifying the nature of
requested program and the need
efore, and
) After the written certification by
Ccmunisssoner of the I.R.S., that
edures have been developed which
sufficient to prevent the infringe-
of the constitutional rights of
ricans. and
Recommendation 19?The Office of
Security at N.S.A. should be permitted
to. collect background information on
present or prospective employees Or
contractors for N.S.A. solely for the
purpose of determining their fitness for
employment. With respect to security
risks or the security of its installations, CIU
N.S.A: -should be permitted to conduct sho
physical surveillances consistent with ner
'such surveillances as 'the C.I.A. is per- tion
raitted to conduct, in similar circum- in -
stances, by these recommendations. ? ry f
'''Recommendation 20?Except as spe- or
cifically provided herein, the Depart- gag
ment of Defense should not engage in req
domestic security activities. Its func- inv
tions, as they relate to the activities
of the foreign intelligence community, sho
should be limited in a precisely drawn age
legislative charter to the conduct of infor
foreign intelligence and foreign counter- Ame
intelligence activities and tactical mili- enfo
tary intelligence activities abroad ? and
production, analysis and dissemination
of departmental intelligence. not
inves
- Recommendation 2I?In addition to
its foreign intelligence responsibility, acti
the Department of Defense has .a re- van
sponsibility to investigate its personnel '' R
in order to protect the security of its inte
installations and property, to ensure or- .dom
der and discipline within its ranks and
to conduct other limited investigations sele
once dispatched by the President to sup- shou
press a civil disorder. A legislative char- ? (a
-Ger should define precisely?in a manner Atto
which is not inconsistent with these rec- the
csnmendations? the authorized scope 'the
and purpose of any investigations un- ther
dertaken by the Department of Defense* (b
to satisfy these responsibilities. ' the
Recommendation 22?No agency of proc
the Department of Defense should -con- are
duct investigations of violations of crim- meritinal law or otherwise. perform any la' Ame
enforcement or domestic security func- (c)
tions within the' United States, except mitte
en military bases or concerning military of th
personnel, to erCorce the Uniform Code gram
of Military Justice.
With Congressional oversight, com-
es being kept continually advised
e nature and extent a such pro-
s. ?
21
Disclosures Procedures
Recommendation 30?No intelligence
?agency should request from the Internal
Revenue Service tax returns or tax-re-
lated information except under the sta-
tutes and regulations controlling such
disclosures. In addition, the existing
procedures under which tax returns and
tax-related information are released by
the I.R.S. should be strengthened, as
suggested in the following five recom-
mendations.
Recommendation 31 ? All requests
from an intelligence agency to the I.R.S.
for tax returns and tax-related informa-
tion should be in writing and signed
by the head of the intelligence agency
makiIng the requst or. his. designee.
Copies of such requests should be filed
'With the Attorney General. Each request
should include a clear statement of:
(a) The purpose for which disclosure
is sought;
(b) Facts sufficient to establish that
the requested information is needed by
the requesting agency for the perform-
ance of an authorized and lawful func-
tion; ? ? .? ? ?? ?
(c) The uses .which the requesting
'agency intends to make of the informa-
tion; ? ?
(d) The extent of the disclosures
Sought; ,
(e) Agreement by the requesting agen-
cy not to use the documents or infor-
mation fo any purpose other than that
stated in the request, and
-(f) Agreement by the reouestine agen-
?cy that the information will not be dis-
closed to any other agency or person
. except in accordance with the law.
? Reemmendation 32?I.R.S. should
nOt release tax 'returns or tax-related
information to any intelligence agency
unless it has received a request satisfy-
? ing the requirements -of Recommenda-
tion' 31 and the Commissioner of Inter-
nal Revenue has approved 'the request
inwriting.
Recommendation 33?I.R.S. should
'maintain' a record of .all such requests
and responses 'thereto for a period of
20 years. . ?
Recommendation 34?No, intelligence
agency should use the information sup:
.piied to it by the I.R.S. pursuant to a
request of the agency except as stated
'in a proper request for disclosure.
Recommendation 35?All requests for
:information sought by the F.B.I. should
be filed by the Department of Justice'
Such requests should be signed by the
Attorney General or his designee, fol-
lowing a determination by the depart-
merit that the request 'is proper under
the applicable statutes and regulations.
Post Office
Recommendation 36?The Post Office
'should not permit the F.B.I. or any intel-
ligence agency to inspect markings or
addresses on first class mail, nor should
the Post Office itself inspect markings
Or addresses on behalf of the F.B.I. or
any, intelligence agency on 'first class
mail, except' upon the written approval
of the Attorney Genral or his designee.
Where one of the correspondents is an
American, the Attorney General or his
designee should only approve such in-
spection for domestic security purposes
'upon a written finding that it is necessa-
ry to a criminal investigation or a pre-
ventive intelligence investigation of ter-
rorist activity or hostile foreign intel-
ligence activity.:
Upon such a request, the Post Office
may temporarily remove from circula-
tion such correspondnee for the put-
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nese of such inspection of its exterior
as is related to the investigation.
. Recommendation 37?The Post Office
should not transfer the custody cif any
first class mail to any agency exceed
the Department of Justice. Such til
should not be transferred or opened ex-'.
cent upon a judicial search warrant.
(a) In the case of mail where one
of the correspondents is an American,
the judge mut find tha there is prob-
able.cause to believe that the mail con-
tains evidence of a crime.
? (b) In the case of mail where both
parties are foreigners: ?
(1) The judge must find that there
is probable cause to believe that both
parties to such correspondence are
foreigners and or one of the correspon-
dents is an official employer or con-
scious agent of a foreign power, and
(2) The Attorney General must certify
that the mail opening is likely to reveal
information necessary either to the
protection of the nation against actual
or potential attack or other hostile acts
of force of a foreign power; to obtain
foreign intelligence information deemed
essential to the security of the United
States, or to protect national security
information against hostile foreign intel-
ligence activity.
:Recommendation domestic
security investigative activity, including
the use of covert techniques, hhould be
centralized within the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, except those investiga-
ticns by the Secret Service designed to
protect the life of the President or other
Secret Service protectees. Such investi-
gations and the use of covert techniques
in those investigations should be central-
ized within the Secret_ Service.
Recommendation 39?All domestic
Security activities of ? the Federal
Government and all other intelligence
agency activities covered by the domes-
tic intelligence reeommendations should
be subject to Justice Department over-
sight, to assure compliance with the
Constitution and laws ,of the linked
States.
Recommendation 40 ? The F.B.I.
-should be Prohibited from engaging on
'own or through informants or others
in any of the following activities direct-
ed at Americans:
(a) Disseminating any information to
the White House, any other Federal offi-
cial, the news media or any other person
for a political or other improper pur-
'prise, such as discrediting an opponent
of the Administration or a critic of an
Intelligence or investigative agency.
? (b) Interfering with lawful speech,
publication, assembly, organizational
activity or association of Americans.
(c) Harassing individuals through un-
necessary overt investigative techniques
such as interviews of obvious physical
surveillance for the purpose of intimida-
tion.
Recommendation 41 ? The bureau
should he prohibited from maintaining
information on the political beliefs, polit-
ical associations or private lives of
Ariericans except that which is clearly
necessary for domestic security investt-
gations is described [below].
Investigations of Committed
or Imminent Offenses
Recommendation 42?The F.B.I.
should be permitted to investigate a
commited act which may violate a Fed-
eral criminal statute pertaining to the
domestic security to determine the iden-
tity of the perpetrator or to determine
.whether the act violates such a statute.
Recommendation 43 ? The F.B.I.
should be permitted to investigate an
American or foreigner to obtain
evidence of criminal , activity where
there is "reasonable suspicion" that the
American or foreigner has committed,
is committing or is about to commit
a specific act which violates a Federal
statute pertaining to the domestic secu-
rity.
Recommendation 44 ? The F.B.I.
? should be permitted to conduct a pre-
' liminary preventive intelligence investi-
gation of an American or foreigner
where it has a specific allegation or spe-
cific or substantiated information that
the American or foreigner will soon en-
gage in terrorist activity or hostile
foreign intelligence activity. Such a pre-
liminary investigation should not con-
tinue longer than 30 days from receipt
of the information unless the Attorney
General or his designee finds that the.
information and any corroboration
which .has been obtained warrants in-
vestigation for an additional period
which may not exceed 60 days. If, at
the outset, or at any time during the
course. of. a preliminary investigation,
the bureau establishes "reasonable sus-
picion" that .an American or foreigner
will soon engage in terrorist activity,
or hostile foreign intelligence activity,
it may conduct a full preventive intel-
ligence investigation. Such full investi-
gation should not continue longer than
one year except upon a finding of com-
pelling circumstances by the Attorney
General or his designee.
In no event should the F.B.I. open
a preliminary or 'full preventive intel-
ligence investigation based upon infor-
mation that an American is advocating
poitical ideas or engaging in lawful po-
litical activities or is associating with
others for the purpose of petitioning the
Government ' for redress of grievances
or other such constitutionally protected
purpose.'
Recommendation 45 ? The F.B.I.
should be permitted to collect informa-
tion to assist Federal, state and local
officials in connection with a civil disor-
der either?
(i) After the Attorney General finds
in writing that there is a- clear and im-
mediate threat of domestic violence or
rioting which is likely to require imple-
mentation of 10 U.S.C. 332 or 333 (the
use of Federal troops for the enforce-
ment of Federal, law or Federal court
orders), or likely to result in a request
by the governor or legislature of a state
pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 331 for the use
of Federal militia or other Federal armed
forces as a countermeasure, or .
(ii) After such troops have been intro-
duced.
Recommendation 46--F.B.I. assistance
to Federal, state and local officials in
connection with a civil disorder should
bee limited to collecting information
necessary for
(1) The President in making decisions
concerning the introduction of Federal
troops;
(2) Military officials in positioning and
supporting such troops, and
(3) State and local officials in coor-
dinating their activities with such mili-
tary. officials.
Background Invetigations
Recommendation 47?The F.B.I.
should. be permitted to participate in
the Federal Government's program of
background investigations of Federal
employees or employees of Federal con-
tractors. The authority to conduct such
Investigations should not, however, he
used as the basis for conducting investi-
"gations of other persons. In addition,
Congress should examine the standards
of Executive Order 10450, which
serves as the current authority for
F.B.I. background investigations, to de-
termine 'Whether additional legislation
is necessary to:
(a) Modify criteria based on political
beliefs and associations unrelated to
Suitability for employment; such modi-
fication should make those criteria con-
sistent with judicial decisions regarding
privacy of political association, and
(b) Restrict . the dissemination of in-
formation from name checks of infor-
mation related to suitability for employ-
ment.
. Recommendation 48?Under regula-
tiOns to be formulated by the Attorney
General, the F.B.I. should be permitted
to investigate a specific allegation that
an individual within the executive
branch with access to classified informa-
tion is a security risk as described in
Executive Order 10450. Such investiga-
tion should not continue longer than 30
days except upon written approval of
the Attorney General or his designee.
Recommendation 49?Under regula-
r ' tions to be formulated by the Attorney
:General, the F.B.I. should, be permitted
'investigate a specific allegation of
-the improper disclosure of, classified in-.
.'formatioh. by employees or contractors
of the executive branch. ,,Such investi-
gation should not continue longer than
30 -days except upon written approval
? of the Attorney General or his designee:.
Recommendation 50?Overt tech-
niques and name, checks should be per-
littitted in all of the authorized domes-
tic security ,investigations, described'
.? above, including preliminary and full_
',preventive intelligence investigations.
? Recommendation , 51?All nonconsen-
sual electronic surveillance, mail-open-
ing and unauthorized entries should be
'conducted 'only upon authority of A
'judicial 'warrant.
Recommendation 52?All nonconsen-
sual electronic surveillance should be
'conducted pursuant to judicial warrants
Issued under authority of Title III of
'the Omnibus Crime Control ,and Safe
Streets Act of 1968. ? ,
-
The 'act, should be amended to ,pro-
..e
vide, with respect.to electronic surveil-
lance of foreigners in the United States,
,,that a warrant may issue if:
(a) There is probable cause that the
target is an officer, employee or con-.
:.;.scious agent of a foreign power.
9j. (b) The Attorney General has certified
::Ithat the surveillance is likely to reveal
information 'necessary to the protection
? the?riation against actual or poten-
-tial attack or other hostile acts of
?'-force of a foreign power, to obtain
iforeign intelligence information-deemed
essential to the security of the United
..States, or to protect national security
'.information against hostile foreign in-.
?-telligence activity. -?
(c) With respect to any such elec.
*ironic surveillance, the judge. should,
"'Adopt procedure's to minimize the ac-
qutsi.ton and retention of nonforeign
intelligence information about Ameri-
CanL
(d) Such electronic surveillance should
"
he exempt ft-mil the disclosure require-
Ments of Title III of the 1968 Act as to
'foreigners generally and a3 to Ameri-
cans if they are 'involved in hostile
::foreign intelligence activity.
? As noted earlier, the committee be-
lieves that the espionage laws 51-wald
,be amended to include marArial (sp:o-
,Aage and other modern farms of espio-
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nage not presently covered and Title III
,should incorporate any such amend-
ment.
? Recommendation 53?Mail ? opening
should be conducted only pursuant to
a judicial warrant issued upon probable
?cause of criminal activity as described
.in Recommendation 37.
? 72- Recommendation 54 ? Unauthorized .
!entry should be conducted only upon*
',judicial warrant issued on probable
'cause to believe that the place to be
searched contains evidence of a crime,
except unauthorized entry, including
surreptitious entry, against foreigners
Who are officers, employees or conscious
agents of a foreign 'power should be
,permitted upon judicial warrant under
the standards which apply to electronic
'Surveillance described in Recommenda-
tion 52,
Adininistrative Procedures
? .
;Recommendation 55?Covert human
scurces? may not. be &meted at an
American except:
(1) in the course of a criminal investi-
gation if necessary to the -investigation,
:Provided - that covert human sources
.ahould net be directed at an American
as a part of an investigation, of a
committed act ;unless there is reasonable
inspicicin, to believe that the American
Is responsibte, for the act, and then
7enly ,for the' purpose of identifying
:ith'e perpetrators of the act. .
If. the American is the target
of a full preventive intelligence investi-
evation . and the Attorney General or
is designee. makes a written -.finding
,that he has ? considered and rejected
...less Intrusive techniques and he believes
'that covert human 'sources are necessa-
to obtain information for the investi-
', gation.
.Recommendation 56--Covert, human
-
sources which have been directed-at -an
'investigation
in a full preventive intelligence
oneestigation should not be used tie-col-
lect information on the activities of the
,.American for more than 90 days after
,ilie source is in place and capable of re-
Porting unless the Attorney General or
,his designee finds in writing either that
there are "compelling -circumstances,".
which case they may be -used for an -
'additional. 60 days,, or that there is
probable cause that the American will
soon engage in terrorist activities or
hostile foreign intelligence activities.
Recommendation 57?All .covert. hu-
:than sources used by the F.B.I. should
be reviewed by the. Attorney General
ier his designee as soon as practicable
*rid 'should be terminated unless. the
Covert human source could be !directed ?
\against an American in a criminal inves-
ligation or a full preventive intelligence
liniestileation under these recontmenda-
tions. ? ?
' 'Recommendation .58?Mail . surveil-
:lance and the review of tax returns
d tax-related information should- be
Conducted consistently with the. rectitm-
inendations '[above], In addition to re-
strictions [above], the review of, tax
teturns and tax-related 'information, as
well ' as' review' of medical or social
iiittory records, 'confidential records of
private institutions and confidential rec-
eords?of Federal, state and local govern-
ment agencies other than intelligence
or law enforteinent agencies may not
be used against an American except:
(1) In the course of a criminal 'investi-
gation, if necessary to the investigation;
e. (2) If the American is' the' target
ot a full preventive intelligence investi-
gation and the Attorney General or
'lis designee makes a written finding
that he has considered and rejected
?
less intrusive techniques and he believes
that the covert technique requested
by the bureau is necessary to obtain
information necessary to the investiga-
tion.
Recommendation 59--The use of phys-
ical surveillance and review, of credit
and telephone records and any records
of governmental or private institutions
other than those covered in Recommen-
-dation 58 should be permitted to be
used against an American, if necessary,
in the. course of either a criminal inves-
tigation or a preliminary or full preven-
tive intelligence investigation.
? Recommendation 60?Covert tech-
niques should be permitted at the scene
of a' potential ,civil disorder ? in the
coulee of preventive "criminal intel-
ligence and criminal investigations as
'described' above. Nortwarrant ',covert
techniques may also be ? directed at
an -American during a civil disorder
in which extensive acts of violence
are occurring and Federal troops have
been introduced. This additional author-
ity to direct such covert techniques
at 'Americans during a civil disorder
sheuld be limited to circumstances
where Federal troops are actually in
use and the technique is used ? only
for the purpose or preventing further
violence.
? Recommendation 61--Covert tech-
niques should not be directed at an
American in the course of a background
investigation without the informed writ-
ten consent of the American.
. _
"Recommendation 62?If Congress en-
acts a statute 'attaching criminal Same
tions to security leaks, covert tech-
niques- should be directed at Americans
iff the course of security leak investigao
tont onlyif such techniques are consist-
ent tvith Recommendation 55(1) 58(1)
or 59. With respect to security risks,
Congress might consider authorizing.
'covert techniques, other than 'those re-
quiring a judicial warrant, to be directed
at Americans in the course of security?
risk investigations, but Only upon a
Written finding of the Attorney General
that there is reasonable suspicion to,
believe that the'indiVidual is' a security
risk, he has .considered .atel rejected
less intrusive techniques and he believes
the technique requested is necessary ,
to the investigation.,, ? .t ?
,110,1dellta1 Overhears, y, ?
lecommendatton 63?Except as Iiinit-
ed elsewhere in these recommendations
or in Title III oP the' Omnibus Crime
?Contred and Safe Streets Act of 1968,
information obtained incidentally
through an authorized covert technique
about an American or a foreigner who
,isnot the target of the covert technique
Con' be used as the basis for any author-
:ized_domestic security investigation.
Recommendation 64, ? Information
should not he maintained except where
relevant to the purpose of -an investiga-
tion.
Recommendation 65 ? Personally
identifiable information on . Americans
obtained in the following kinds of inves-
tigations should be, sealed or purged
as follows (unless it appears- on its
face to be necessary for another author-
"ized investigation):
.(a) Preventive intelligence investiga-
tions of terrorist or hostile foreign
intelligence activities?as soon as the
investigation ie terminated by the Attor-
ney General ? or Ids designee -pursuant
to Recommendation 45 or 69.
'(13).Civil disorder assistance...etre soon.
as the ,assistance is termineted by the
Attorney. -General or his designee 'put-
23
suant to. Recommendatien 69, provided
that Where troops have-been intmduced
such information need .be sealed or
purged Only within, a reasonable period
after their withdrawal.',,
Recommendation es Information
previously gained by the F.B.I. or any
other intelligence agency through illegal
.techniques should be sealed -or purged
? as soon as practicable. ? -
Recommendation 67 Personally
identifiable information on Americans
from domestic security investigations
may be disseminated Outside the De-
partment of Justice as follow;
(a) preventive ?intelligence investiga-
tions of terrorist activities?Tersoually??
identifiable information On Americans
from preventive criminal intelligence
, investigations of terrorist activities may
be disseminated only to:. .
(I) A foreign Or domestic law enforce-
ment agency which has jurisdiction over
the criminal activity to which the infor-
mation relates, or ? ?
.(2) To a foreign intelligence or Milita-
ey. agency of the United States, if
necessary for: an attivity :permitted' by
, these irecommendations, or
' (3) To an appropriate Federal. official
?with authority tcrmake?personnel deci-
sions about the -subject of the infoltna-
.. lop, or t ? ? ?
-(4) To 'a foreign intelligence or niilita-
ey agency of' ceopeeating foreign
:power if? necessary for an. artivity per-
mitted by these recommendations to
? similar 'the . of %e -.United States,
;or. ?
'(5). Where necessary to warn state
or local officials' of -terrorist activity
:likely to occur within their jurisdiction,
(6) Where necessary to warn any
'person ofe a threat toiif or property
?
from terrorist activity.
(b). Preventive intelligence investiga-
tions of hostile foreign 'Intelligence ac-
-tivities?personally identifiable informa-
tion on Americans from preventive
-criminal 'intelligence investigations of
hostile 'intelligence activities may be
disseminated only: , ? '
(1) To an appropriate Federal official
with authority to make personnel deci-
- sions about the subject of the informa-
tion, or
. (2) To the National.-- Security Council
? or the Department of state upon request
or where appropriate to their adminis-
tration of U.S, foreign policy; or
- (3) To a foreign 'intelligence or mill-
itary 'agency of the -United States, if
relevant ? to an activity permitted by
these recommendations. or
(4) To a foreign intelligence or milita-
ry agency of a - cooperating foreign
power if relevant to an -activity permit-
ted by these recommendations to similar
.(c) Civil disorders assistance?person-
ally:identifiable information on. Amer-
icans Involved in an actual or potential
disorder, collected in the . course of
.civil disorders assistance, should not
,be disseminated outside the Department
of Justice , except . to military officials
and appropriate state and local officials
at the scene of a civil diserder where
Federal. treops are present.
(d) Background investigations?to the
maximum extent feasible, the results
of background investigations 'should be
segregated within the F.B.I. and only
disseminated to officials. outside the
Department of Justice authorized to
make personnel decisions with respect _
to the subject.
(e) Al) other authorized domestic
security investigations--to governmen-
tal officials who are authorized to take
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action consistent with the purpose of
an investigation or who have statutory
duties which require the ,information.
? Recommendation 68?Officers of
executive branch who are made respon-
sible by these recommendations for
overseeing intelligence activities and?
appropriate Congressional committees
should have access to all information
necessary for their functions. The com-
mittees should adopt procedures to
protect the privacy of, subjects of files
maintained by the F.B.I. and other?agen-
des affected by the domestic intel-
ligence recommendations. . -
Attorney General Oversight of.
the F.B.I.
?
Recommendation 69?The Attorney
,Geteral should:
(a) Establish a program of routine
and periodic review of F.B.I. domestic
security investigations to ensure that,
the F.B.I. is complying with all of
the foregoing recommendations, and
(b) Assure, with respect to the follow-
ing investigations of Americans, that:
? (1) Preventive intelligence investiga-
tions of terrorist activity or hostile
foreign intelligence activity are termi-
nated within one year, except, that the
Attorney General or his designee may
granf extensions upon a written finding
of "compelling circumstances";
(2) Covert techniques are used, in
? preventive intelligence investigations of
terrorist activity or hostile foreign intel-
ligence activity only so long as necessa-
ry and not beyond - tinie lintits estab-
lished- by the Attorney General, except
'
that the Attorney General or his desig-
nee may -grant extensions upon a writ-
.:ten finding- of "compelling Cirdita-
stances." - ' ' ?
??:.'(3) Civil disbrd:ers assistance as ter-
minated mien) withdrawal of Federal
troops or, if troops were not introduced,
within e reasonable time after the find-
ing by the. Attorney General that troops
are likely to be requested, except that
thel'Attorney. General of his designee
may', grant extensioris upon a Written
finding of "compelling circumstances."
?
Reconiinendatioo 70?The Attorney
'General shOeld review the internal regu-7
lations of the F.B.I.-and other, intel-
ligence agen,cies engaging in domestic
'security activities to ensure that such
internal regulations are proper, and ade-
quate to protect the, constitutional
rights efAmeritaes. . .
Recommenation 71?The Attorney
General or his designee (such as the
Office of Legal Counsel of the Depart-
ment of Justice) should advise the gen-
eral counsels of intelligence agencies
on interpretations of statutes and regu-
lations adopted pursuant to these rec-
Ommendations and on such other legal
questions is are described below. ,
: Recommendation 72?The Attorney
:General should have ultimate responsi-
bility for, the investigation of alleged
Violations ef law relating to the domes-
tie intelligence recommendations. ?
Recommendations 73?The Attorney
'General should be notified of possible
alleged violations of law ,through the
Office of Professional Responsibility by
agency heads, general counsel or inspec-
tors general of intelligence agencies. -
Recommendation 74?The heads of all
intelligence agencies affected by these
recommendations are ? responsible for
the prevention and detection of alleged
violations of the law by' or on behalf
of their respective agencies and for the
reporting to the ?Attorney General of
all such alleged violations. Each such
agency head should arsO assure his
agency's cooperation with the AttOrney
General in investigation of alleged
4? ? ,,
' Recommendation -75?The F.B..t. and
each other intelligence agency' should
have a general counsel, nominated by
the President and confirmed by the Sen-
ate, and an inSpentor 'general appointed
by. the agency head. ?
Recommendation 76-7-Any individual
having informatipn on past, current, or
, proposed activities which appear Are be
illegal, improper or in Violation of age,n-
?cy. policy should be ?required to report
?.,the matterimmediately to the agency
head; general counsel or inspector gen-
eral. If the matter is not initially re-.
ported .to the. general counsel he. should
' be notified. by the agency head or in-
spector general. Each Agency should reg-
*.ularly remind employees: of their -obli-
gation to report such information.. .
Recemmendation 77?As provided in
Recommendation 74, the heads . of the
F.B.I.' and of other intelligence agencies
are responsible for reporting to the At-
torney General alleged violations of law.
When such reports are made the ap-
,propriate Congressional committees
should be notified. . . ?
e. Recommendation 78 ?? The general
counsel and inspector general of the
F.B.I. , and of each other , intelligence
agency, should have unrestricted access
to all information in the possession. of
' the agency and should have the authori-
ty, to review all,, of the agency's, activi-
ties. The Attorney, General of the Office
of Professional Responsibility; on, his be-
half, 'Should have access to ill leforma-
tie in 'the possession Of 'an agency
Which, in the 'opinion of the Attorney
General, is 'necessary' for an investiga-
tion of Illegal activity.,'
Recommendation. 79, ? The general
counsel of the, F.B.I... and of each other
'intelligence agency should review all
Significant proposed:agency activities to
determine their .,legalitY and- constitu-
, fionality. . ,
-Recommendation 80?The director of
?
the F.B.I. and the heads of each other
(intelligence agency should . be required
to report at least annually. to the appro-
priate committee of the Congress on. the
',activities of the. general counsel and the
Off ice of theInspectoe General.
-Recommendation 81?The director of
the F.B.I. and the heads of each other
intelligence agency should 'be required
report, at least annually, to. the Attor-
ney General on 011, reports of activities.
which appear illegal, improper, outside,
the legislative charter or in Violation
of 'agency regulations. Such reports
should include , the general counsel's
findings concerning these activities, a
summary of the inspector general's in
vestigations of these activities and the
practice and procedures developed to
discover activities that raise questions'
of legality or propriety.
Office of Professional
Responsibility
? Recommendation 82?The Office of.
Professional Responsibility created by
Attorney General Levi should be recog-
nized in statute. The director of the of-
fice, appointed by the Attorney General,
should report directly to the Attorney
General or the Deputy Attorney General!,
The functions of the office should, in-
dude: ? ?
Attorney General, should report directly
to the Attorney General or the Deputy
Attorney General, The functions of the
office should include: ,
(a) Serving as a 'central repository
of reports and notifications provided the
Attorney General, and
24
(b) Investigation, if requested by the
Attorney General, of alleged violations
by intelligence agencies of statutes en-
acted or regulations promulgated pur-
suant to these recommendations.
Recommendation 83?The Attorney
General is responsible for all of the ac-
tivities of the F.B.I., and the director of
the F.B.I. is responsible to, and should
be under the supervision and control
of, the Attorney General.
, Recommendation 84?The director of
the F.B.I. should be nominated by the
? President and confirmed by the Senate
. to serve at the pleasure of the President
for a single term of not more than eight
?
Recommendation 85?The Attorney
General should consider exercising his
power to appoint assistant directors of
? the F.B.I. should be nominated by the
should be imeoseeI,on the tenure of the
assistant director for the Intelligence Di-
vision.
. Recommendation 86?The Attorney
General should approve all administra-
tive regulations required to ?implement
statutes created pursuant to these rec-
ommendations. ?
?
Recommendation 87?Such regula-
- tons, except for regulations concerning
investigations of hostile foreign intel-
ligence activity or other matters which
are properly classified should be issued'
pursuant 'to the Administrative Proce-
dures Act and should be subject to
the approval of the Attorney General.
Recommendation 88?The effective
date of regulations pertaining to the
following matters should be delayed
90 days, dering which time' Congress
would have the opportunity to review
such regulations:
. (a) Any C.I.A. activities against Amer-
icans, as permitted above;
(b) Military activities at the time
?of a civil disorder; ?
(c) The authorized scope of domestic
security investigations, authorized in-
vestigative techniques, maintenance and
dissemination of information ? by the
FBL and ? ?
? (d) The termination of investigations
and covert techniques -as described
.,[above].. . .
,?? ? Recommendation 89?Each, year the
F.B.I. and other intelligence agencies
-affected by these recommendations
should be required to seek annual statu-
tory authorization for their programs.
Recommendation 90?The Freedom
of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552 (b) )
and the Federal Privacy Act (5 U.S.C.
552 (a) ) provide important mechan-
isms by which individuals can gain
access to information on intelligence
activity directed against them. The
domestic intelligence recommendations
assume that these statutes will continue
to be vigorously enforced. In addition,
the Department of Justice should notify
all readily identifiable targets of past
illegal surveillance techniques and all
Cointelpro victims and third parties
who had received anonymous Cointelpro
communications of the nature of the
activities directed against them or the
source of the anonymous communica-
tion to?thein.
Recommendation 91?Congress should
enact a comprehensive civil remedies
statute which would' accomplish the
following:
(a) Any American with a substantial
' and specific claim to an actual or
threatened injury by a violation of
the Constitution by Federal intelligence
officers or agents 'acting under coiar
of law should have a Federal cause
of action against the Government and
the individual Federal intelligence offi-
cer or agent responsible for the viola-
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_A.PPrP_Ked Fctr Re Ipa?,e.,001/08/9.8_; PIA-IRDP77,790432Rq001.9940909479
tion, without regard to the monetary
amount in controversy. If actual injury
is proven in court, the committee be-
lieves that the Injured person should
be entitled to equitable relief, actual,
general and punitive damages and re-
covery of the costs of litigation. If
threatened injury is proven in court,
the committee believes that equitable
relief and recovery of the costs of
litigation should be available.
? (b) Any American with a substantial
and specific claim to actual or threatened
Injury by violation of the statutory char-
ter for intelligence activity (as proposed
by these domestic intelligence recom-
mendations) should have a cause of ac-
tion for relief as in (a) above.
(c) Because of the secrecy that sur-
counds intelligence programs, the tom-
-rnittee believes that a plaintiff should
have two years from the date upon
which he discovers or reasonably should
have discovered the facts which give
rise to a cause of action for relief
from a constitutional or statutory viola-
tion.
(d) Whatever statutory provision may
be made to permit an individual defend-
ant to raise an affirmative defense
that the acted within the scope of his
official duties, in good faith and with
? a? reasonable belief that the action be
took was lawful, the committee believes
that to insure relief to persons injured
by governmental intelligence activity
this defense should be available solely
to individual defendants and should
not extend to the- Government.
Moreover, the defense should not be
available to bar injunctions against indi-
vidtral defendants.
Criminal Penalties Should Be
;Enacted
?
. Recommendation 92?The committee
believes that criminal penalties should
apply, where appropriate,, to. willful
. and knowing violations of statutes en-
acted pursuant to the domestic intel-
ligence recominendations. ?
Recommendation 93?Congress should
, either repeal the Smith Act (18 U.S.C.
2385) and the Voorhis Act (18 U.S.C.
.2386), which on their face appear to
authorize investigation of "mere advo-
cacy" of a political ideology, or amend
those statutes so that domestic security
investigations are only directed at
conduct which might serve as the basis
fora constitutional criminal prosecution
tinder supreme Court decisions inter-
preting these and related statutes.
Recommendation 94?The appropriate
committees of the Congress should re-
view the Espionage Act of 1917 to
determine whether it should be amended
to cover modem forms of foreign
espionage, including industrial, techno-
logical or economic espionage.
.. Recommendation 95?The appropriate
.Congressional oversight committees of
the Congress should, from time to time,
request the Comptroller General of the
United States to conduct audits and
reviews of the intelligence activities
of any department or agency of the
United States affected by the Domestic
Intelligence Recommendations. For such
pu:pose, the Comptroller General or
any of his duly authorized representa-
tives should have access to, and the
right to examine, all necessary materials
of any such department or agency.
Recommendation 98?The committee
re-endorses the concept of vigorous
Senate oversight to review the conduct
of domestic security activities through
a new permanent intelligence oversight
committee.
Definitions
For the purposes of these recommen-
dations:
A. "Americans" means U.S. citizens,
resident aliens and unincorporated
associations, composed primarily of
U.S. citizens or resident aliens; and
corporations, incorporated or having
their principal place of business in
the United States or having majority
ownership by U.S. citizens, or resi-
dent aliens, including foreign sub-
sidiaries of such corporations, pro-
vided, however, "Americans" does
not include corporations directed- by,
foreign governments or organi-
? zations.
,B4 "Collect" means to gather or initiate
the acquisition of information or to
request it from another agency.
C. A "covert human source" means
undercover agents or informants
who are paid or otherwise con-
trolled by art agency.
D. "Covert techniques" means the col-
lection of information, including col-
lection from record sources not
readily available to a private person
(except state or local law enforce-
ment files), in such a manner as?n'ot
to be detected by the subject.
, E. "Domestic security activities" means
governmental activities against Amer-
icans or conducted within the United
States or its territories, including
enforcement of the criminal laws,
intended to:
1. Protect the United States from
hostile foreign intelligence activity
including espionage;
2. Protect the Federal, state and
local governments from domestic
'violence or rioting, anti
3. Protect Americans and their
Government from terrorists. 4
F. "Foreign communications" refers to
a communication between or among
two or more parties in which at
least one party is outside the United
States or a communication trans-
mitted between 'points within the
United States if transmitted over a
facility which. is under the control
of or exclusively used by a foreign
government. ? .
G. "Foreigners" means persons and or-
? gartizations who are not Americans
as defined above.
IL "Hostile foreign Intelligence'
tivities" means acts or conspiracies
by Americans or foreigners who are
NEW YORK TIMES
27 April 1976
Articles in 1974
Spurred Inquiry
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON. April 26?The report
of the Senate Select Committee on In-
telligence Activities, part of which was
released today, is the result of the most
intensive investigation ever conducted -
into America's foreign and domestic in-
telligence system.
The study grew out of articles that
appeared in The New York Times late
in 1974. On Dec. 22, 1974, Seymour M.
Hersh reported in the Times on a wide-
spread program of spying on American
citizens conducted without legal au-
thority by the Central Intelligence
Agency.
As a result of that article and earlier
accounts of covert United States in-
25
officers, employees or conscious
agents of a foreign power or who,
pursuant to the direction of a for-
eign power, engage irr clandestine
intelligence activity or engage in
espionage, sabotage or similar con-
? duct in violation of Federal criminal
statutes. ,
I. "Name checks" means the retrieval
?by an agency of information already
in the possession of the Federal Gov-
ernment or in the possession of state
or local law enforcement agencies.
J. "Overt investigative techniques"
. means the collection-of information
readily available from public sources
or available to a private person, in.
eluding interviews of the subject or
his friends or associates.
K. "Purged" means to destroy or trans-
fer to the National Archives all
? personally identifiable information
(including references in any general
name index).
L. "Sealed" means to retain personally
identifiable information and to retain
. entries in a general name index but
? to restrict access to the information
arid entries to circumstances .of
"compelling necessity."
M. "Reasonable suspicion" is based
upon the Supreme Court's decision
in the case of Terry V. Ohio, 392
? U.S. 1 (1968), and means specific
and articulable facts which, taken'
together'. with rational inferences
from those facts, give rise to a retta
sonable suspicion that 'specified ac-
tivity has occurred, is occurring or
is about to occur. ?
N. "Terrorist activities"' means acts, or
conspiracies which: (a) are violent
'or dangerous to human life; and (b)
violate Federal. or state criminal
statutes concerning assassination,
murder, arson, bombing, hijacking
or kidnapping; and (c) appear in-
tended to or are likely -to have the
effect of: ?
? (1) Substantially disrupting Fed-
eral, state or local government, or
(2) Substantially disrupting inter-
state or foreign commerce between
the United States and another coun-
try, or
(3) Directly interfering with the
exercise by Americans of constitu-
? tional rights protected by the Civil
Rights Act of 1968, or by foreigners
of their rights under the laws or
? treaties of the United States. -
O. "Unauthorized entry" means entry
? unauthorized by the target.
volvenient in 'the overthrow of the Gov-
ernment of President Salvador Allende
Gossens in Chile, the Senate voted on
Jan. 26, 1975, to organize the select
committee. On Feb. 18, the House estab-
lished a counterpart committee.
The House committee's report has yet
to be made public, largely ljecause of a,,
controversy that arose wben The Times
and Daniel Schorr, a CBS News cor-
respondent, obtained and reported on
the final results of the House study be-
fore its official release.
The congressional investigations ,
follow one conducted within the C.I.A.
by the former Director of Central Intel-
ligence, William .E. Colby, and another
by a Presidential commission headed by
Vice President Rockefeller.
All of the reports supported the
original disclosures in The Times about
covert activities by the C.I.A. in Chile ?
and illegal intelligence work , in the
United States.
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WASKENGTON POST
27 APR 19(5
Uses Academ-ics, Reporters
Covert Roles Trolthle Panel
By Stephen Isaac's
Washingt1 Poit. writer
The Central Intelligence 771 Some detail how the-CIA_
Aeency continues to use 'e.'heti iir;zed in .1%7 by a
American academics and s-1..eoial pregden(ial ' study
journalists, according to the 44minission it) end its covert
Senate intelligence commit- tist . of Ainerica,n institu-Y
tee's report. The report ticeis. simply switched its,
withheld the names of in- 4cus instead to the indiviW
dividuals and institutions rats in the instialtion?- -?4';
that cooperate with the
1967 st tidy cOnun'1.1 ee
CIA, ,
las:headed My then Xiider:
?1..C..eretary. of State. NiCholOS:
de13.?kafzenbach.
Inc Katzenbach commit-
tee, the new report, says
was really .intended not to
study the. 1, nation's
gence- comMunity,:. bit ? to
Shield it. ? ?
.' ;The administratio ? . of
Pfesident Johnson
Italy; and consciousl..
.mandate 3f:r.thb
Kotzenbach committc.2's,
veStigation." the repol t says.
Katzenliach. now ? ail attor:
ney ,prate prar in
New York, testified ' .hat his
committee was de.sig7ied...'by:
President- -Johnson . . to
In a section dealing with
the 'domestic impact of for-
eign clandestine opera-
tions," the report states that
the CIA has covert relation-
ships with more than 25
American journalists or em-
ployees of U.S. media and
uses "several hundred" aca-
demics.
The report asserts that
the CIA is in contact with
"many thousands" of Ameri-
can academics, but that
most of these contacts are
not dangerous because they
consist principally of
"asking an academic about
his travels abroad."
The committee is more
worried about the opera-
tional use of academics.
"The committee sees no
danger to the integrity of.
American private institu-
tions" in informal consulta-
tions between 'academics
and the CIA, the report
says. "Indeed," it states,
"there are benefits to both
the government and the
universities in such con-
tacts, funding mechanistr i." . time serve an operational
"... The operational use ...One device the ;IA' used'
purpose -? directed .by the
of academics is another mat- to get .arotind the 967 com-. Central intelligence Agen;
ter. It raises troubling ques- Mitte:e.'s ban On?- frther in-
tions as to preservation of stitutional. fund ag was The -committee also
the integrity integrity of American '.surge funding.' ?
academic institutions." gests that all contacts with
In. this. the CIL advanced acacleiniei be open.- '
According to the commit- large.sums. of moit-w. to cert "... If the CIA is to
tee, several hundred Ameri- tam. organizations "before serve the Intelligence- needs
can academics. "in addition the December- tleadlinc," of the nation." the report
to providing leads and, on thus giving the:A enough says; "it must -have unfet-
occasion, making introdue- money. to operat; for sev- tered access to the best ad-
tions for intelligence pur- teal \'CarS I vice and judgment .our .uni?
poses, occasionally write Radio Free !'uriitie and versities can produce. Blif
books and other material to Radio. 'Liberty were se-
t is . advice and expertise
be used for propaganda pur- turided;" the rem t says.. ? ?
and should be openly'
poses abroad. Beyond these, -.-,The Senate r, oort states can
sought ?and, openly given."
an additional few score are that appearance rather
In its section on the me:
used in an unwitting man- than specific re.: dations ?
ner for minor activities. determined WI- h itistitu- dia, the .report notes that'
the CIA has "a network of
several hundred foreign. in:
. divicluals around the Worlct.
who provide intelligence for
the CIA and at times at-
tempt to influence .foreign
opinion through the use. of
covert propaganda. These
individuals provide' theCIA
With direct access to a large
number of newspapers and
periodicals. Scores 'ofpress
services and news agencies,
radio and television stations
commercial book publishers,
and other foreign media out-
lets.-"-'?
The CIA had covert rein...
tionshlps with "about ;30
American journalists or em-,
or. -.enaeted as a statute.
Thus, it has no firm legal
st ? ? : - ? - -
As a result. the Senate
study notes. the CIA. pontin-
tiCrl to f . ?
".A Publications a n d
institute that.. main-
tained a -worldwide. network
of stringers and correspond-
ents." _
'?"-Several international
tratI6 union organizations."
? ?'!A foreign based news
feature service."
? "A foreign -based re--
-search and publishing insti-
tute." ? .%
One orthe things the CIA
did, the- .Senate committee'
says, was to "surge-fund" a
"large project in the ? Far
I East" so that it could con-
.
tine into-fiscal year i969
The' committee recon
mends that the CIA be for-
bidden by law. to convert
those' who go abroad under
government-sponsored pro-
grams into witting or unwit-
ting operatiyes.. ? ?
. The' CIA now has a paliCY
of avoiding use of Fulbright
luaad!--'ott.:a full-Seqe scholars and those who re-:
celye grants from the. Carrie.:
senate report 535.;"'4.11,
gie; Ford ' or Rockefeller
eovert relationships were. tt,i, foundations. The committee
fexeluded , from t. c ia feels that, ban should be ex-
? ? ?,4;' tended. ,
Z.4-urt11,er,, -aeeordin 14 th
..e -It is -unacceptable."' the.
'Zenate- ;.r.e.pdrt -1 ? e CIA report says, "that Ameri-
trbved?:-.- rapidly ?-tr Shelter cans Would go overseas un-
diertaln-- high-prioritV opera-1,. der ,a cultural or academic
Mobs from the K:,,-,zenbach exchange' program funded.
(committee's) prcitibitions openly by the United States.
and .to devise mo; ?.! secure Congress and 'at the same'
"These academies are lo- tions the ? CIA ?out(' con-
cated in over 100 American tinue to fund- r '1 which it
colleges, universities and re- WOuld cutoff.
lated institutes. At the ma- ,0"Many Of- the restrictions-
Jority of institutions, no one developed- hi' tin CIA in re-?
7:trher than the ludividnal sponse to the ex1nts of 1967
,mieerned is aware or? the appear to he sr ,trity .meas-
?-I\ link. At the others, at eves aimed rt loreventing
'least one university official hod her disclosures
?s.ii.ch could je )3111iZe Sl`11-
1 aware of the operational
:itse made of academies on sitivr (41A op ations" the
Ifis campus, hi addition.' report says. " tor' did not
:there are several 'American rep res en t s;mificant re,
academics abroad who serve thinking of v ere bound-
tperational purposes. 1)11. :ivies ought to drawn in a,
marily the collection of in free society. ?""ver'
ee?ce." ? , though Presit l'rit Johnson
, , a.dopted the l?-,:tzenbarli re-
The Aninnmittee putiines Port as a it was not
issued as an es litiVC order
26
ployees.0L.U.S. media organ-
izat ions" until rehru.zry,
.1976, and continues to have
relationships with more
than halt of those, :he re-
port says.
? The report dwells at some
length ? 'on Cl ,-sponsored
books, and notes that 4,ne?
CIA &Tidal had written
that books can lw -the most
important weapon of strate-
gic '(long.-range) propa-
ganda." -
In Ode year-1967?the re-
port says, the CIA
"published or subsidized
well over 200 books."
Those books ? ranged. ?ac-
('ording to the report, from
"books on Wildlife and sa-
faris to' translations of Ma-
chiavelli's "The Prince" into
Swahili and works of LS.
Eliot into Russian. -to a par.
odY. of. the' famouS little red
book of quotations- from
Mae -entitled 'Quotations
from Chairman Liu."
Among the pre-1967 books
-the CIA had a
hand Were-the famed Pen-
kovskY. PaPers, which were'
serialized in $0111e 'American
newspapers. including The
Washington Post, in 1965.
Atthe,:.tilne,?when the So-
viet",-Unitut said -the hook.
was, ? 6.,? fraud, investigat:orit
by ,rnoft ',American media
callect..the book legitimate. ,
. The!. Senate - '.'-eoranittee's
repo.qtlestribes. the Papers
as a:"CIA,book.".
"The' be*, was prepared
and . ? Written; by witting
agency aSsefs'Icho drew on-
actual-ease materials," the
S e n.a te.. committee --says,
"Publication rights JO the
manuscript were sold- to -a
publisher through a trust
fundc?which:' was,esrablisited
for. the.: PurPose.. The-pub.
lisher- was' unaware of ank
U.S. .government. iii Wrest,"
The;.report adds that the
book:iVoSfereated "for opera-
tional . reasons" by the -clA
and 'almost 'accidentally had
a commercial success.
Another book the CIA de-
veloped was one "abow" a
student'..from a developing
count*" who had studied in
a COtmmenist-country."-
Tivo"major -American 'rag.:
azin'es ? -published digested
versions of-the book, the re-
port says, and "Eric Sevar-
eid,. the. -CBS political com-
mentator, ill' t?eviewin.: this
book, spoke a larger truti.
than he knew when he sug-
gestyd. that 'our propazanda
seryjces tould do worse than,
to flood:,(foreign) universty
towns with this volume.' "
Yet another 'CIA book. on
the Vietnam. wer, was p:?o-
duced by the CIA :v. 1.`154
and was "distributed to tor- ?
crobassic:s :he
:_linted States. ard I,, ?,t?
levied new?spapen, 1:,te-
azitte editors both in Ine
United States and abroad.'
s i e I h.; -:1
committee *report
the! Senate committee saj's
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t 6.k it ?
been devoted -almost totally
to "books and other mated-.
als published abroad."'
Since 1969, the report
says. the CIA has produced
about 250 hooks abroad,
most of them in foreign Ian-
guages.
The report notes that
"more than a dozen United
? States news organizations
? and commercial publishing
houses ? -formally provided
cover for CIA agents
abroad. A few of these or-
? lanizations. Were . unaware
that 'they ? provided this
cover."?
. Most new organizations
that were found to be using
?CIA operatives abroad were
unaware that they were buy;
ing stories from people with
CIA connections, the report
says.- in noting that most
CIA -relationships with
American ? Media people
abroad involve free-lance
journalists.
The Senate committee's
report discusses the "isn't it
a Small world" situation that
in communications
have created.
In previous centuries, for-
eign propaganda w 0 u 1 cl
likely never 'rebound heine.
But' with the kind of .elec:?
tronic togetherness that
binds today's- World,- the re-
port says; I.:propaganda des
tined for one Part- 'Of the
world often has fallout back
home. - ? -.s":.?
:Further:,-; the. cOmmittee
saYs, ?HoWard Hunt (Of-
White- *.:Ifouse. "pluMbers"
finite) Was: in'. charge' of the
CIA's "contact. with book
publishers in the late 1960s,
and testified befOre the Seri-
ate COmthittee 'that :such.
propaganda "fallout the
United States) may not have
been -nnintentional."
view of thatAhe coin;
inittee-:?says that. the CIA
may have "helped shape
. American attitudes toward,
Atie.eteerging China" in the
1960s, and "engaged in prop,
agandizing t. h e American-
public, inclusinns its Con-.
-gress, on the- con;.:oyersial.
Assile of U.S. involvemeet in.
yietnam."
the latter case, the re--
Poresays the CIA funded a,
Vietnamese institution,'t
whose magazine was distribs-
uted in the 'United States
. by the. South , Vietnamese.'
einbassyhere. ? ..
. The funding was secret.
and the organization, the Vi"
etnamese Council on For-
eign Relations. was not
named in the ropers>
The CIA provided 5170.000 .
per ? year in 1974 and 1975'
-for support of the institu-
tion's publications, the re,
port says. ,
,
, Intelligence sources said
the CIA had founded the-
council as a covert opera-,
tion. designed to promote.
,support for the Vietnam war'
-among foreign influence
-
'molding, groups.
The report said that -in at'
_least' 'one .InStatiee ?CIA,?:=
supported Vietnam publica-
tion was used to propagan-
dize the -American public
and the members and staff
of both houses of Congress.
So effective was this propa
ganda that some members
quoted from the publication
in debating the controver-
sial question of United
States involvement in Viet-
nam."
The report also says that
"tile institution on at least
.one occasion invited a group
'of, American congressmen to
Vietnam and Sponsored
their' acitivities on at least
part of their trip"-
- In another instance of
American fallout from an
overseas propaganda, sys-
tem, the report mentions
that the CIA maintains "two
proprietary news services"-
inEurope.
"The larger of the two?
was'subscribed to by over 30
U:S; newspapers," thereport
says. "In au' effort JO reduce:
the problem of fallout. the'
CIA made a senior official.
at ...the major U.S. dailies
aware- that the CIA con
trolled these two 'press serv-
ices." 2.
The committee notes that
sometimes "fallout in the
United States May 'be a nec-
essary part -nf.- the. propa'
ganda procesii" to .create an-'
aura of "credibility, as with
serious:he-6k reviews.
:00 -at least- one occasion,'
the report Says, ,CI A-s p o
sored book was reviewed in
The New York Tittles "by a
CIA writer *under contract."
Yet another kind of U.S.-
foreign rebound is described
in the report of a relation-
shin _between an American
newspaper executive and,
the CIA. ,
.In view of, this' malt's
"accest.to information of in-
'telligence and operational
interests," "the CIA con-
tacted the man, who "served
.as witting. unpaid collabh-
rotor for intelligence collec-
tion and received 'briefings
from :CIA which 'were of
professional benefit' to him.
The CIA Materials state
? that:. .? ? ? .
was ' visualized
that. propaganda ? ? (if
agreeable to -him) might be
initially inserted :1h his pa-
per ,and then* be available
for ? reprinting by Latin
American news outlets . . .
'There is no indication in the
file that Subject agreed . .
or that he did place *propa-
ganda in his newspaper'."
Finally, the committee re-
port On qornestic fallout dis-
cusses the danger of using
;religious 'organizations as
CIA fronts. ?
"Making operational use
of U.S. religious groups for
national purposes both vio-
lates their nature and un-
dermines their bonds with
kindred groups around the
world," the committee says.
Since 1967, the report
says, the CIA has had strict
rules against using religious
NEW YORK TIMES
27 April 1976
.- ? war
PanelsUrgedtoMonitor
Covert Actions Abroad
Rpeesial to The New Y?sek
WASHINGTON, April 26-1
i'The United States has underta-'
!ken thousands of covert actions
'abroad since 1947, including
900 major or sensitive projects
in the last 15 years alone, with'
only partial success and in
Isome instances, severe damage
to the nation's foreign policy.
laccording to a report today by
the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence activities.
, The 11-member committee
iconsidered at one point recom-
mending a ban against all
!covert actions, the report said,
but later concluded that the
United States must have some
covert capability. Only Senator
Frank Church, the Idaho Demo-
crat who headedsthe panel, end-
ed up calling for a ban.
. Limits on Covert Actions
"The committee has conclud-
ed, however, that the United
States should maintain the ca-
pability to react through covert
action when no other means
will suffice to meet extraordi-
nary circumstances involving
grave threats to U.S. national
security," the report said.
"Nevertheless, covert action
should' be considered as an ex-
ception to the normal process
of Government action abroad,
rather than a parallel but invis-
ible system in which covert
operations are routine."
The report mentioned by
name no covert operations that
had not been previously public
ly known. It urged that "the
intelligence oversight commit-
tees of Congress should require
that the annual budget submis-
sion for covert action programs
,be specified and detailed as to
organizations without ap-
erovat. from: high-level CIA
,:ificials and "the CIA has
assured the committee that
the 'prohibition against 'all
paid -or contractural rela-
tionships' is -in fact a prohi-
bition. against any opera-
tional use Of Americans fol-
lowing 'a religious vocation."
? The Senate committee
says the CIA- has used few
American clergy or mission-
aries, Adding that only four
such 'relationships- existed
by, last August.
Of the recent cases, "the
most damaging would ap-
pear to, he that of a U.S.
priest serving the CIA as an
informant on student and
religious dissidence," the re-
port says.,
Of the earlier cases, the
report notes' that the CIA
"used the pastor of a church
in a Third World country as
a 'principal agent' to. carry
out covert action projects,
and as a.' spotter; assesspr,
asset , developer, a recruit-
er."
This man, who the report
says reflected political infor-
mation and passed CIA
propaganda I o the local
press, was paid by the Cl.?
for more than ten years.
27
the activity recommended."
The recommendation left the
door open, however, for "un-
foreseen" covert action projects
to be financed from the intel-
ligence agency's "contingency
reserve fund' and accounted for
later.
The report defined covert ac-
tions as those sub-rosa efforts;
?from buying-candidates in anl
election to waging a secret wail
in Laos?that the United States i
tried to carry out without beingj
identified with as a nation.
The committee said that there i
was no legal authorization fori
covert action in the 1947 Na.!
tional Security Act or subse-
quent laws pertaining to intel-
ligence, but that internal execu-
tive orders had increased th
powers to conduct covert oper-1
ations 'abroad.
.The .committee investigated I
covert actions frein the crea-
tion of the modern intelligencel
system in 1947 through the,
present. Part of its findings andi
descriptions, the report said.!
would be circulated only to
senators and not made public,,
at the request of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
Covert Actions Traced ,
The report traced covert ac-
itions from a State Department-
C I A hybrid in the late 1940's
,called the Office of Policy Coor-
dination through the formation
of a clandestine services sec-I
tion at the C.I.A. in 1952. then
called the Deputy .Directorate
for Plans.
The early covert *actions .run
by the Office of Policy Coordin-
ation mainly involved giving fi-
nancial support and encourace-,
ment to labor unions, poltical
parties and other groups in-
Western Europe in the late.
1940's as they tried to resist;
a Communist takeover, ,the
re-
port said. -
. It was during the Korean'
War, the' report said, that para-1
military covert operations camel
to the fore. After the Korean
War, according to the report,
a directive of The National Se-'
curity Council broadened oper-
ations to the entire globe.
Prviously such . actions were
confined to areas contiguous to-
the Soviet Union or China. ? '
This resulted in widespread
1secret operations in Latin
America, Africa and the Far
East, the report said. Though
?the committee. studied several
actions, it publicly discussed
only a 10-year effort to stop
Salvador Allende Gossens. a
Marxist, from becoming Pres-
ident in Chile, efforts to under-
mine General Sukarno in In-
donesia and various political
assassination plots, includig
operation Mongoose, which
sought to kill Fidel Castro,
Prime Minister of Cuba.
The? committee leveled- its
strongest criticism at the para-
military covert -actions. "The
committee's findings on para-
military activities suggest that
these operations are an anoma-
ly, if not an aberration, of
covert action," the report said.
The committee said that tins
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WASHINGTON POST
27 APR 1916
Dealing Intelligently with Intelligence
11-1HE SENATE INTELLIGENCE .committee'S. fina
? teport is a serious comprehensive summary?
surely' the best in the public domain?of American
'foreign) intelligence activities. It 'extends beyond 'an
accounting' ofselected past abuses into an an,alysisef
the: eduntry's intelligence requirements and a-set of
detailed proposals on how these requirements canbe
met ma way that at once served national security and
respects the rule of law.' ?
:The report is a mainstream document Its premise
Is that intelligence remains a national necessity, that
all..intelligence activities must- be managed more
carefully, that some must be conducted secretly. Yet
past abuses are not whitewashed and the genuine dif-
ficulties of future control are not glossed over. The
House may 'have been unable,- to deal intelligently
with intelligence. The Senate? by this report, has
earneci.the publiCs,confidence in: its capacity to join
*the shaping of national intelligence policy., ???::
?The special virtue of this report lies in the method
of 'congressional.?executive interaction by which.it
was' produced. Avoiding do-or-die confrontations of
the. sort-that destroyed the House inquiry, :::?the
Church 'committee bargained out differences with
the-executive over access to, and. disclosure of,H.Ccin
tested information. This meant that some material
?was..withheld. But the, public ended up getting. muCh
pore than it otherwise would.
It is-t,essible, of course, to be too sympathetic toex-'
etutive .pleadings for secrecy. The case for limiting
covert operations to the "most extraordinary eft.-
cuinstanceS," for 'inStance, as the committee' reCoin-
Mends; would have been stronger .if it had been able
to publish more detail on *hat three members called
the "high political costs and generally meager bene-
fits" of past covert actions. Yet We doubt that the
Church panel yielded too much. Realistically speak-
ing, this is the only spirit in which Congress can 'hope
to win the requisite executive, congressional and
public support for a continuing intelligence role.'
Congress is unlikely to 'win a shootout on the barri-
cades; the likelier outcome is stiffened intransigence
I :? ?. bithe executive which OnlireinforceS the Old Status
quo.. At some .point, of course, Congress could "win"
'by resorting to budgetary reprisals,. but this resolu-
tion of a shootout hardly serves the purpose of read-
ing a reasonable and effective accommodation on the
conduct of intelligence activities..
The problems. associated-with the Conduct and con-
:. trol..of covert operations have received most of the
publicity' attending the- CIA in -the 'last two years.
:. Over, the long term, however, the problems of collect-
' ing tend producing intelligence?both "national' in-
? ? telligence. for: policy makers and "tactical" intelli-
gence for military men?ares though duller, of much
greater* consequence.- The 'committee's ? substantive
-treatment. Of the Political, bureaucratic and psycho-
logical aspects of intelligence is probably its most val-
uable work. The -question of . whether the country is
getting the intelligence it needs, not to. speak of the
intelligence it pays for, must be relentlessly pursued.
'The
Church committee took the position that the
intelligence reforms already put in place by the Ford
:4administratiOn 'should be -accepted and built On, not
,.junked. Again, no useful purpose Would be served by
gratuitous confrontation. Whether all of the commit-
tee's own structural and policy recommendations are
equally sound, however, remains to be debated. We.
Intend to return to the More important of .these in
time: At the least; the cominittee's proposals give the
. public-abetter basis for judging the worth.of admin,
? ?? istration reforms. r- ? 1 ? '? ? ? ? ? ?, ?
?
was b'ecatise they were almOR7
impossible to conceit and thus
.very quickly became overt
operations. ? '
"Of the five paramilitary ac-
tivities studied by the commit-
tee, only one appears to have
athieved its objectives," the re-;'
port said. The report did not
list those studied, but the coni?-:
mittee is known to have exam.:
ined the Bay of Pigs invasion'
in .Cuba, operations in Laos,-
South Vietnam and Korea, and,
earlier operations in Greece.
, The, committee said that Con'
gress had failed, until the pas;-:.
'sage of the Hughes. Ryan,
'amendment, which required.
the President to report covert
activities to Congress. to COtt-,
!duct adequate oversight or
covert actions and it also fault;.!
ed the mechanism for approv-
ing such projects by the exeCli-F'.
tive branch.
_
It urged 'that covert actions'
be approved only in the most.
dire circumstances, after full:
consideration by the National.:
Security Council and after each.
person in the chain of corn-,
mind had put his views in writ;
ing and signed them: This sy,s'
tem, in general terms, was
called for by President Ford'si
executive order earlier ? this
year but the committee wanted-
the Order buttressed by law.
? '
The. next step' ought to he the establishment of a
-. standing Senate intelligence oversight committee.
Only by this step can the process of reform, as well as
continuing oversight, be carried forward. This will
? require the President to share power in intelligence,
' as he routinely does in every other area of public p01-
icy. But it will require Congress to share responsibili-
? ty. Ultimately, the effectiveness of this working rela-
tionship?and not the contents of reports?will be
the standard by which the Vow-concluded Senate in-
, telligence inquiry must be judged. ?
WASHDIGTON POST
28 April 1976
William Nelson Resigns
As CIA Operations Aide
?
William Nelson, the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency's
deputy director for opera-
tions, resigned yesterday.
An ? agency spokesman
said CIA Director George
Bush had tried to convince
the 30-year veteran to stay
on.
Asked if Nelson's depar-
ture had any relation to the
Senate intelligence commit-
tee report, which criticized
CIA's covert and counterin-
telligence operations, the
spokesman said: "No, it was
a 30-year retirement."
Nelson assumed control
over CIA counterintelli-
gence operations in Decem-
28
her, 1974, when James An-
gleton resigned.
The Senate committee re-
port referred to Angleton's
retirement and traced it to
"differences of opinion with
Director William Colby on
the proper approach to the
practice of counterintelli-
gence."
Angleton believed in tight
compartmentalization of
counterintelligence opera-
tions and often not even the,
CIA director knew what op-
erations he had under way.
Under Nelson, counterin-
telligence responsibilities
were diffused throughout
the CIA operations director-
ate.
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NEW YORK TIMES
2 8 APR 1976
Reporters
As US.
Agents
' By James Reston
, WASHINGTON, April 27?In its
censored report on the overseas opera-
tions .of the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence Activities confirms that
the C.I.A. has been using United States
reporters, academics, ? and even reli-
gious leaders as paid spies, but re-
fuses to disclose the names of those
involved.
Moreover, according to the com-
mittee,' this practice is still going on,
and all efforts by officials of the
universities, churches and the media
to get the facts so that the practice
an be stopped have been evaded by
Ote C.I.A. for years.
'This "raises troubling questions,"
the 'Senate committee observes, "as
to preservation of the integrity of
Anierican academic institutions." It
ckies more than that: It casts doubt
oh,the operations of all media, religious
and 'academic representatives abroad,
without giving their institutions the
opportunity of defending themselves
against the corruption of their work.
,Several observations about this:
...ger years, leading American news-
papers have requested and received
ftom? the C.I.A. assurances that none
of their staff members were being used
by-the C.I.A. as paid informers.
?Z' The answer- usually given by, the
C:LA. was that this practice was corn-
zn6n some time ago but had been dis-
sentinued, at least so far as "staff
Manners" of the newspapers were.
NEW
NEW YORK TIMES
28 APR 1976
Intelligence Report
?
The Senate Select Committee on Activities correctly
perceived that the. basic issue it faced was to strike an,
appropriate balance between the precepts of American'
democracy and the secrecy requirements of twentieth-
century power 'politics. The committee's recommenda-
tions tilt away from secrecy and toward controls over.
intelligence activities which, if enacted, would bring this
country's secret foreign policy machinations somewhat
more into line with what Americans want to believe
about their country and themselves.
The committee duly reported the fundamental fact
that both the executive and the legislative branches of
Government have mishandled the job of controlling the
intelligence community. Whether in gross numbers
(there have been 900 major covert actions since 1961),
or in ugly specifics (C.I.A. researchers dropped LSD
into the food and drink of unsuspecting citizens) the
record supports that assertion.
The Church committee's recommendations are on
the whole constructive and intelligent. The committee's.
suggestion that formal written authorization be required
for clandestine activities would in itself insure a decline,
in the number and modification in the nature of such
programs. The notion of limiting severely the circum-
stances in which covert activities can be undertaken
centerned. Maybe some "stringers" or
part-time space-rate reporters for
American papers were used, but even
this' Was not common C.I.A. practice.
? gWhen detailed investigations by
the House and Senate Intelligence
Committees disclosed that this was
not true and that the practice still
cbntinued, again the C.I.A. refused to
cooperate with the papers when the
.':WASHINGTON
4
li,tier asked for a private list so they
could clean house.
Still, the Senate committee report
says. that the C.I.A. had covert rela-
tionships with "about 50 American
journalists or employes of U.S. media
organizations" until February of 1976,
and continues to have relationships
with more than half of these.
It adds that "more than a dozen
United States news organizations and
commercial publishing houses formally
prqvided cover for C.I.A. agents
abroad: A few of these organizations
were; unaware that they provided
this cover."
:.This, invites the inference that most
these "news organizations" and
"commercial publishing houses'''know-
iftly.provided cover for spies and still
del,so, thus leaving the reader without
a:; clue as to which "news organize-
tipOs" are innocent and which are
'guilty, of misleading the public.
-eA. distinction should probably be
.nincle here between normal contacts
by. reporters with C.LA. agents, and
using reporters as paid C.I.A. agents.
American reporters assigned abroad
often, seek information from C.I.A..
officials and have usually found their
information to be accurate if not ?
always complete.
...This practice, particularly during the
Vietnam War, often led to exchanging
of :information between the reporter
and. the agent, to the benefit of both,
but 'reporters serving as paid agents'
of the Government is a - different
29
matter. Most reporters in Washington.
for example, will not accept pay
for going on "talk shows" for the
official Voice of America, lest they
seem to be putting out the official
U.S. propaganda.
What is troubling about this is that
President Ford does not simply issue
an order to the C.I.A. to stop the prac-
tice. Some of us have talked to him
privately about it and he does not
condone it, nor does he deny the
intelligence committee's report that
the practice continues. The dilemma is
that he does not stop it himself or
make available, in private if necessary,
tie information the media, the uni-
versities and the churches need to
abolish the practice themselves.
-It is common practice, of course, for
Communist governments to use what
they call "reporters" as spies, and vice
versa. Even some of the Western
European governments have used
journalists as "cover" for their agents,
but not until the last World War with
tlie'creation of the O.S.S. did the U.S.
Government consciously subvert its
Oivri reporters and academics.
"The: Senate Intelligence Committee
report will now go to the Congress
; for remedial action, and no doubt there
will be close, r control by the Congress
over the finances and covert opera-
Wins of the C.I.A. But this will take
?
:the C.I.A. itself has been complain-
ing, Often with good cause, that the
press was interfering with its legiti-
mate intelligence-gathering functions
particularly in the publishing of the
names of its spies. Here the reporters
and others have some responsibility'
net to subvert their own professions
,or the essential work of the C.I.A.,
hit this does not justify the C.I.A. in
, trying to subvert the press.
-Nor. does it absolve the President.
The ,C.I.A. is his intelligence agency,
and. all he has to do is call George
Bush. on the phone to clear up the ,
?
and requiring that' Congress be notified in advance
would also be effective steps toward a more responsible
and controlled intelligence program.
Unfortunately, however, the committee's analysis was
superior, to its ',Office savvy. Legislative momentum
began to dwindle weeks ago and this' report did 'little
to revive it. It contains few disclosures that were not
already in the'. public, domain. Thus, the committee did
little to enrich the foundation of fact and public under-
standing required to achieve the legislative remedies
which it found necessary and desirable.
Some way must soon be found to improve the legis
lative climate because the key to reform is currently
locked away in the recesses of the" Senate Rules' Com-
mittee. The intelligence committee's recommendations
are founded on the assumption that a neW Senate com-
1 mitue with legislative authorization and oversight
power would be formed. That concept was embodied
in Senate Resolution 400, but the old barons of. the
Senate'?particularly Senators Eastland and Stennis of
Mississippi whose Judiciary and Armed Services Com-
mittees would lose. power under this measure?are
undermining it.
Unless the months of work and hundreds of thousands
of dollars spent in this investigation are to he essentially
wasted, members of the lnIclligence Committee and
'.other members of the Senate who ere concerned about;
exercising some democratic control over intelligence
operations must find a way to rescue S. Res. .100 and
'to pass it quickly.,
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NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, APRIL 27,1976
Wider Congress Role
Committee Goes Further Than Ford
In Moving Toward Tighter Oversight
By LESLIE IL GELB
awe' to The New Vnrk Tint,1
WASHINGTON, April 26?The covert operations; under highe
recommendations of the Sene policy review and under
ate Select Committee on Intel.:
I
the law. Mr. Ford did not deal
ligence Activities, like the: with the overlapping character
actions taken by President Ford
several months ago, seek to.
strengthen the role
of the President
and the Director
of Central Intelli-
gence in control-
ling covert opera-
tions and the hands of enforce-
ment authorities in dealing with
violations of the law.
In the committee report re-
eased . today, however, the
senators go much further than
the President in pinpointing re- ?
sponsibility for covert, actions
and broadening Congressional
oversight powers.
The philosophy behind the
President's executive orders,
was to make the existing sysi
tern of policy-making and re-s
view more efficient, not to
change it. The attitudes under-
News
. Analysis
of these operations.
cRequiring prior Congres- '
sional approval of covert opera-
tions. Mr. Ford would continue
to inform Congress, as now re-
quired by law, "in a timely
fashion," which has always
proved to mean after the fact.
4Prohibiting by law political;
assassinations, in peacetime the
overthrow of .democratic
governments, and ehe use of,
newsmen and. clergy es agents.'
Continued use of business cov-
ers would be permitted but un-
der close review. Mr. Ford,
'again, desires policy flexibility.
crMaking public the aggregate
budget-of the intelligence com-
munity for Congressional ap-
proval as required by the Con-
stitution., Mr, . Tord has -stated!
that even' publication of the ag-
gregate figure would help
foreign powers counter Ameri-
can intelligence programs. The
Senate Budget Committee re-
jected today making the budget
cGive the State Department,
lying the committee's recom- and the ambassadors in partic-
mendations are that funda- ular, control over field opera-
mental changes are necessary tions. Mr. Ford did not address l
in the laws, within the execu- the problem of field control. I
tive branch, and in Congress; Several principal findings un-i
derpinned these proposals, andi
to insure that the secret acti- in some instances, these!
vities of the intelligence coin-, findings paralleled those of thei
munity are brought into greater President.
harmony with the requirements
of democracy.
"The fundamental issue faced
by the committee in its investi-
gation was how the require-
ments of American democracy of the some 900 covert actions
can be properly balanced in in-
conducted since 1961 did not
go through a formal policy re-
telligence matters against the view, and that the Director of
Central Intelligence had real
'authority only over his own
central intelligence agency and
her of recommendations that not the rest of the intelligence
. community. .
Mr. Ford has flatly said he The report called "desirable"
would oppose. These proposals the President's upgrading of the
would have the effect of mak- 40 Committee, the sub-Cabinet-
level group that advised the
!President on covert actions in
the past, to a Cabinet-level
!operations advisory group.
!While such advice should be
;made more formal, the report
'warned that Cabinet officials
might not have the time to do
this job properly. The report
'urged the President to make,
charters and regulations govern- ,in explicit fashion, the National
ing all the intelligence agencies Security Council his principal
such as the National Security
Agency and the Defense Intel-
ligence Agency, and all the
. Like the President, the corn-i
mittee came to the conclusions
*that there had been inadequate
oversight of intelligence opera-
tions within the executive
branch; that the vast majority
need for secrecy," the report
stated.
The committee made a num-
ing Congress a virtual coequal
with the President in deciding
upon covert operations and in
drastically reducing the in-
cidence of such secret paramili-
tary and money-passing opera-
tions. Among them were:
()Putting into statutes the
adviser.
The repott also commended
the President for enhancing the
powers of the various inspec-
practices of the Central Intel- tors general to police internally
ligence Agency that have. been the intelligence community,
going on without benefit . or particularly in giving them in-
Congressional authorization. vestigative powers and imme-
Mr. Ford wants to retain exist- diate access to legal redress.
ing informality and Presidential The committee went further,
flexibility. ! however, in detailing how the
r.Bringing counterintelligence 'inspectors general could en-
and e..pionage activities, which force the laws without waiting
often have the same effects as for abuses.
IAlso supported was the Pres-
ident's intent to increase the
authority of the Director of
Central Intelligence, a post now
held by George Bush. After
documenting a history of con-
siderable duplication and even
triplication of effort, the report
urged making the "D.C.I." the
head of the intelligence commu-
nity in fact as well as in name,
by giving him the power of con- '
trolling the over-all .intelligence
'budget.
' The report stated that the
President's new committee on
foreign intelligence with the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence at
its head is "a step in the right
direction." It cautioned, howev-
er, that the words of the Pres-
ident's order to the director to
. "manage" and "coordinate" are
I too general. The committee said
i that the director was to have
? clear authority to determine
priorities and to control all in-
telligence resources.
The report found the Pres-
ident's new intelligence over-
sight board "to be long
overdue," but maintained that
it should not be considered as
a substitute for greater Con-
gressional oversight.
Contrary to Mr. Ford, the
committee found that Congress
does have the constitutional au-
thority to regulate intelligence
programs.
The President's only recom-
mendation to Congress in this
regard was to form a joint
House-Senate intelligence over-
sight committee with no real
additional powers. The Senate
report called for separate Sen-
ate and House oversight com-
mittees with considerably en-
larged powers to approve, to
, know and to investigate. .
The report did not specify
how the proposed Senate over-
sight committee would work.
because the senators chose to
leave the matter for subsequent
negotiations among the inter-
ested committees.
Nevertheless, the members of
the proposed committee would
be drawn from the existing
oversight committees?Armed
Services, Appropriations and
Foreign Relations?and would
serve as a focal point to receive
all information and to dissem-
inate to other interested com-
mittees. The oversight commit-
tee would be empowered to au-
thorize the budget for the
whole intelligence community.
On the right to know and
make information public, the
report drew a distinction be-
tween protection of valid se-
crets and valid disclosure. The
Administration's approach .has
centered almoct entirely on le-
gal penalties for unlawful dis-
closure.
30
. The committee's studies also
left a number of issues for fu-
ture consideration: Whether the
analytical and information gath-
ering arm of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency should be sepa-
rated from its operational arms,
and whether the director
should remain .as head of the
C.I.A. as well as head of the
whole intelligence community.
A strand of thought running
throughout the committee's
recommendations and find:7gs
was the need for a trail of ac.-
countability, as several com-
mittee staff members explai-ted,,
in more detailed laws, execu-
tive procedures and record.
keeping. ?
The House Select Committee
? on Intelligence, which com-
pleted its work in February,
went further than the Senate
panel in proposing some basic
b
restructurina of the intellie5nce
community. Among its stigges-
dons were: Abolishing the De-
fense Intelligence Agency and
dividing its functions between
the C.I.A. and civilian defense
agencies, and separating the Na-
tional Security Agency from the
Pentagon and reorienting ? its
communications-monitoring ac-
tivities toward econcmic and
political concerns.
While the House voted
against the publication of the
full report of its committee, the
panel's recommendations were
officially published.
The House panel's recommen-
dations paralleled those of the
Senate committee's in a num-
ber of respects. Both proposed
beefing-up the policy-review
process for covert operations
and the powers of the Director
of Central Intelligence, al-
though the Senate's proposals
were more detailed.
Both sought to increase Con-
gressional oversight by estab-
lishing separate watchdog com-
mittees. But, whereas the
proposed Senate oversight corn-'
mittee would have the power
of prior approval of covert ac-
tions, the proposed House
counterpart would only be em-
powered to receive notification
within 48 hours of Presidential
approval. .
The committee did not find
that the C.I.A. had been "ont
of control," as some critics
have said, although it some-
times was, but that Presidents
had made "execessive, and at
times self-defeating, use - of
covert action."
The committee's recommen-
dation ? was: "Covert actions
should be consistent with pub-
licly defined United States for-
eign policy goals, and should
be reserved for extraordiwzrv
circumstances when no otnee
means will suffice."
WALL STREET JOURNAL
16 APRIL 1976
0
CIA Director George Iiir4h said he has re-
cently made.a secret trip to three countries
In Europe .and is encouraged by whal he
learned. Bush. speaking to an editors' con-
vention In Washington, said the agency will
never identify reporters who once collabo-
rated with the CIA. lie also said agents' mo-
rale is high despite recent investigations and
criticism of intelligence agencies.
ydr-7".--sft
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NEW YORK TIMES
30 APR 1976
-The Meaning (if Any) of the Intelligence Investigation
NICHOLAS M. HORROCK
spftic to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, April 29?
'The curtain has fallen on an
,,Other Congressional investiga-1
-tion. The television lights in.
ahe old Senate Caucus Room
'are gone, the witness chairs are
empty, the micro-
phones are silent.
News This week, the
? - Analysis Senate Select Com-
mittee on Intelli-
gence, which con-
ducted half of a coordinated
House and Senate investigation
:pi the United States intelli-
gence agencies, isued its final
.'report, two fat green volumes
containing 183 recommenda-
tions for reform or reorganiza-
tion.
. What is perplexing many to-
day in Washington, as it must
be perplexing many around the
-country, is what, if anything,
3t. all meant.
e On the very day that the
committee was publishing part
of its findings, another Senate
-committee, the Committee on
Rules, was dismantling the key
aegislative proposal to cpme
.from the whole investigation, a
till that called for a single
powerful Senate oversight com-
mittee for intelligence.
Since most of the select
committee's recommendations
rely for their implementation
km the creation of an over-
sight committee, the future of
the entire legislative package
?seems in doubt.
,.. In addition to possible legis-
lative failure, the intelligence
investigation was never good
. box office. If Congressional. in-
quires were ranked as New
'York theater, the intelligence
investigation would fall well
,behind Watergate and the
Army-McCarthy hearings and
Somewhere between Senator
Estes Kefauver's organized
crime inquiry in the 1950's and
enator Edward V. Long's 1966
inquiry into Government inva-
sion of privacy.
' Nor did the -intelligence in-
vestigation create heroes. Sena-
tor Frank Church, the Idaho
Democrat ? who was chairman
of the committee, has found
the investigation a poor plat-
alorm for his Presidential race
-and a nonissue on the campaign
trail.
- The public image of the 10
other members of his commit-
tee is no better now than it
was before, and a couple have
wondered if their image is
worse. This also holds true
for the members of the investi-
gating House committee.
The two main staff figures
on the Senate committee, F.
A. 0. Schwarz 3d, the counsel,
and William Miller, the chief
of staff, had no national reputa-
tions when they started this
investigation, and they have
none now.
Many people in Washington.
came over the last decade to
believe that a repressive, se-
cret-police atmosphere was a
part of the atomic age. They
held outlittle hope that anyone
or anything could change that.
Those with this view argued
that Watergate provided a for-
tuitous wedge into the secret
workings of government, like
an opening in an overcast sky,
and that the reformers would
:have a limited time in which
to hammer into place protec-
tions against repression and
a police state before, as one
Congressional aide put it, "the
sky closed again."
These people believe that the
sky began to close when the
public no longer appeared con-'
cerned about the Central Intel-
ligence Agency's assassination
plots, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's Cointelpro'andl
the National Security Agency's1
electronic snooping. Since no
new laws in 'these areas are
in effect today, these .critics
mark the investigation as a
failure.
There is another kind of critic
in this city who suggests that
the investigation did more
harm than good by exposing
national security secrets for
no better reason than curiosity
or publicity, and that the na-
tional defense may have been
irreparably harmed as a result
This contention gets little ge-
neral support, and even profes-
sional intelligence officers ge-
nerally reject it.
Yet a third view of this year's
investigation may be closer
? than the others to what has
really happened. As one mem-
ber of the Senate committee
put it privately, "The Senate
lcommittee may have failed in
its objectives, but the investiga-
tion as a whole was a partial
success."
Soon After Watergate
'It is his opinion that the
? investigation was broader than
the Senate committee and
broader than its House counter-
part. It was touched off in
December 1974 by an article
in The New York Times report-
ing sources who said that the
C.I.A. had conducted illegal
domestic surveillance.
The article came a ?few
months after Watergate and
was the catalyst for several
forces ?that saw evidence that
widespread illegal intelligence
activities were being carried
out by several Government
agencies.
Three investigations followed.
the two on Capitol Hill and
another by a Presidential com-
mission headed by Vice Pres-'
ident Rockefeller.
The pressure of these investi-
gations has brought some inter-
nal changes by the executiv
branch of the Government
President Ford earlier this year
issued an executive order that
appears to bar some improper
practices and to make changes
in the mechanics of how the
intelligence community
operates.
The President's efforts have
been soundly criticized by
some, but pragmatists on Capi-
tol Hill like to point out that
his reforms are all that there
Is right now. Attorney General
Edward H. Levi has issued the
first internal guidelines for the
conduct of domestic intel-
ligence investigations by the
F.B.I. and has got some Con-
gressional support for a new
electronic surveillance law. '
It is widely agreed that the
Administration would not have
made these moves if it had
not been for the pressure of
, the investigations. .
Power of Exposure
There is also antoher remedy
at work here, less easy to de-
tect: the power of exposure.
The atmosphere of secrecy
I that surrounded the intelligence
agencies for three decades
lulled the men and women who
worked in those agencies into
the belief that their actions
took place in a vacuum and
would never be. made public;
that what they did and who
decided to do it would never
be held up to scrutiny against
the general standards of socie-
ty.
It is highly likely that the
men who conspired to prepare
and send to Mrs. Martin Luther
King Jr. a tape recording of
sex activities picked up by an
electronic room bug to force
bar husband from public life
never thought at that moment
that their actions would be
described at a public Congres-
sional hearing.
Their successors at the F.B.I.
and their colleagues at the
C.I.A. the N.S.A., the Defense
Intelligence Agency and the
other segments of the intel-
ligence community can no lon-
ger rely on that secrecy. They
must now consider that any
act they take in their official
duties may well end up in
public view before a Congres-
sional committee or in the news
media.
The problem is that these
'de facto reforms are temporary.
They rely upon men's memories
and upon the willingness of
successors to President Ford
and Mr. Levi to carry them
out.
It was for this reason, in
the view of many, that legisla-
tion, particularly a law calling
for strong Congressional over-
sight, was so clearly necessary
for long-term change. Many
? Congressional political strate-
gists believed that there was
support for a strong oversight
committee in Congress last
spring.
If that support was there,
why has it been so seriously
eroded? ,
31
' Mr. Miller and 'Mr. Schwarz
suggest that the publicity stem-
ming from the murder of Moll-
ard Welch. the C.I.A. intel-
ligence officer, in Athens and
the publicity from the unau-
thorized publications of the
House Intelligence Committee's
report were major factors in
dissipating public and political
? support for intelligence reform.
Never Caught The
Several committee members
have said in interviews that
from the beginning of the in-
vestigation the issues of C.I.A.
political assassinations or F.B.I.
Cointelpro harassment of vari-
ous groups have never caught
fire among their constituents.
Without pressure from con-
stituents, they suggest, Con-
gress has little impetus to act.
, If the 'ingredient for success
of reform legislation is pressure
from the public, the Senate
Select Committee may well
share in the blame for squan-
dering it.
? The committee was unwilling
from the beginning to operate
in public or to confront and
do battle with intelligence
.agencies that were reluctant
to supply full and complete
information. From January un-
til August last year, the com-
mittee conducted the investiga-
tion of assassinations behind
closed doors.
Meanwhile, in the hallways
of Congress millions of dollars
worth of free exposure in the
news media was available.
Instead of news about testi-
mony, witnesses and graphics
of an open hearing, the public
received occasional newsgrams
from Senator Church or Sena-
tor John G. Tower, Republican
of Texas, who was the com-
mittee's vice chairman.
The committee said that the
assassination matters were too
sensitive for public hearings.
And it later bowed to Adminis-
tration wishes not to disclose
matters on ? covert operations.
The committee, particulary
toward the end of its inquiry,
.seemed intent on proving that
Congress was as responsible
in keeping secrets as was the
.executive branch.
Thus, the committee went
from November last year until
this week with no.attempts to
keep public attention on the
problems of intelligence abuse.
Strong reform legislation may
well be a casualty of these
tactical decisions.
vriNT YOR.K TINES
25 April 1976
Cuba Accuses
C.I.A. in Bombing I
HAVANA, April 24 (Reuters)
?The official Cuban daily
Granma today blamed the'
bomb attack this week on the
Cuban Embassy in Lisbon on
Portuguese "Fascist" groups
and on the Central Intelligence
Agency.
The bodies of two Cuban
members of the staff killed in
the blast were to be flown
here later today.
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THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Tuesday. April 27, 1976
OA Doesn't Require-Strong New Reins,
Senate Panel Says; Mild Ones Face Fight
By ARLNN J. LARGE;
Stall Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
WASHINGTON?The Central Intelligence
Agency's . cloak-and-dagger operatives ,
aren't as active abroad as they used to be
and don't need any severe statutory reins, a
Senate panel has decided.
The conclusion of the 11-member Senate
committee that has been investigating the
CIA for the past 15 months is essentially
bland, reflecting the continued reluctance of
Congress to contemplate a major overhaul
of the spy agency. Bland or not, there will
be an enormous fight over the committee's
list of proposals for closer congressional
monitoring of what the CIA does. ....
Thore proposals mightn't get far. The
special panel chaired by Sen. Frank Church
(D., Idaho) wants the Senate to establish a
new committee with centralized authority
over the budgets of U.S. intelligence agen-
cies. The CIA also would have to give the
new committee prior notice of any major
plans for "covert" operations abroad, such
as fomenting coups against foreign govern-
ments.
The proposed new committee already is
In trouble. Senior members of the existing
Armed Services and Judiciary Committees
don't want to give up jurisdiction over such.
agenciesas the CIA and FBI and plan to
wage a sharp Senate floor fight against the
proposed rival. Moreover, the proposal
lhelped cause the defection of the Church
committee's two most conservative mem-
bers, Sens. John Tower (R., Texas) and
Barry Goldwater (R., Ariz.), who refused to
al
sign the fin report.
?
Intelligence Budget ,
. And there will be another Senate floor
fight over a proposed disclosure of the na-
tion's total intelligence budget. The Church
committee decided it is unconstitutional to
keep this account a secret and originally
voted to disclose it as part of the final report
released last evening. President Ford, how-
ever, urged the committee not to do it, and
a last-minute appeal for secrecy was made
In person yesterday by-CIA Director George
Bush.
So the committee voted six to five ,to
leave the question up to the full Senate. This
vote split the committee's liberals. Chair-
man Church wanted to go ahead and put the
figure in the report. But the next ranking
Ilunocrat, Philip Hart of Michigan, argued
that the committee's unilateral release. of
? the figure would anger other Senators and
i hurt chances for establishment of the per-
manent new committee to ride herd on in-
telligence agencies.
What the full Senate will decide is uncer-
tain. The House last year defeated a pro-
posal to disclose the budget figure.
The section of the Church committee's
651apage report that discusses CIA finances
is riddled with blanks and deletions. There
is a graph, however, that traces the trend of
the annual budgets of several intelligence
agencies. The budget total is shown snaking
upward since 1962 to an unspecified height
in the current fiscal veer, but these are in
inflated dollars. A budget line corrected for
inflation snakes downward over the years,
so that intelligence financing for the current
year is "about equal in buying power to the
budgets of the late 1950s." the report said.
Covert Actions Taper Off
This is consistent with other findings in
the report that the CIA's covert operations
have tapered off lately. In the mid-1960s, ac-
cording to the report, the CIA was financing
and co.tching "paramilitary" wars in Indo-
china, plotting to overthrow the Castro re-
gime in Cuba and engaging in other political
activities outside the sphere of just gather-
ing intelligence. "The period 196a to the
present has registered declines in every
functional and geographic category of cov-
ert action," the report said.
As reasons, the report cited the end of
the Indochina war, a cutback in CIA Opera-
tions involving labor, students and media af-
ter these operations were disclosed in 1967
and a reduction in agency personnel over-
seas made in 1973. ,
The report said that despite this decline
in activity the committee "gave serious con-
sideration" to a flat ban on covert activities
by the CIA. "Presidents and administrations
have made excessive, and at times self-de-
feating, use of covert action," the report
said, addition, covert action has become
a routine program with a bureaucratic mo-
mentum of its own." Nevertheless, the com-
mittee decided the U.S. "should maintain
the option of reacting in the future to a
grave, uriforseen threat" by using covert
operations.
. Chairman Church, a candidate for Presi-
dent, wanted to go further and assign the
CIA's covert-action responsibilities to the
State Department, to be used "only in the
most extreme unavoidable situations.- This
would have produced a sharper Senate fight
than the committee had stomach for, and
the proposal was dropped.
Journalist Network
The committee found that until last Feb-
ruary, the CIA "maintained covert relation-
ships" with about 50 American journalists or
employes of U.S. media organizations.
These people, .said the report in a section
worded with CIA guidance, were part of a
network of "several hundred" foreign
mdi-
vluals around the. world who spy for the
agency "and at times attempt to influence
foreign opinion through the use of covert
propaganda."
._
In February the CIA said it wouldn't .
have a money or contractual relationship :
with any correspondents accredited by U.S..
newspapers or broadcasters. The Church ,
committee report said fewer than half the 50
journalists will be -terminated" by the new
guidelines and recommended that the rules
32
THE NEW YORK DAILY MIS
28 April 1976
be broadened.
The committee said it could find nothing
wrong with the CIA's use of secret buziiness
operations to aid its activities. One of these
is -a complex of insurance companies" op-
erated mainly abroad by the CIA to provide
Insurance benefits for its spies. The commit-
tee said it didn't find any evidence that the
insurance companies buy ..md sell securities
for the purpose of influencing foreign stock
, markets or foreign currencies. The insur-
ance complex at one time had invested
I "heavily" in domestic stock markets. but
I the committee said this has been stopped.
The report included a discussion, based
on Information from the FBI, of Soviet
spying in the U.S. In February of last year
there were 1,079 Soviet officials on perma-
nent ? assignment in this country. -Among
these, over 40% have been positively identi-
fied as members of the KGB or GPU. the
Soviet civilian and military intelligence
units,- the report said. It added that the
number of Soviet officials here having
"some intelligence connection- may be as
high as 70% to 80%.
The Church committee last year issued
exposes of CIA attempts to assassinate for-
eign political figures and the use of mail-
'openings and other domestic spying tech-
niques to seek a connection between foreign
governments and U.S. opponents of the Viet-
nam war. In its final report the committee
said it found "duplication and waste, inertia
and ineffectiveness in the intelligence com-
munity."
However, the report's tone wasn't all hos-
tile. The committee said' it "wishes to em-
phasize that it has found much that was
good and proper in America's intelligence
efforts." The less-than-drastic list of recom-
mendations also reflects a considerable
change in last year's congressional alarm.
over the CIA's activities, due in part to a
skilled defense of the agency by President
Ford. A major turning point came last De-
cember with the assassination in Athens of
Richard 'Welch, the CIA station chief in
Greece.
Sen. Church and other congressional in-
vestigators of the CIA insisted they didn't.
expose Mr. Welch as a CIA rnan, but his
death and elaborate funeral in Washington
put them on the defensive. A parallel CIA
Investigation in the House ended more or
less in disarray. with its final report still of-
ficially unpublished in a dispute over leaks.
Ck W tcdg Unit
Suffers Bria.Setback
?
? By JOSEPH VOLZ - ? -
:Washington, April 27 (News Bureau?A move -to set
tup a powerful permanent Senate Intelligence Committee
suffered a possibly fatal setback today when the Senate
Rules Committee voted 5 to 4 to parcel out the responsi-
bility. ?
Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho, W. Cannon (D-Nev.), committee
chairmman of the Senate Select chairman, to conduct another
Intelligence Committee, which qudy of what kind of intelli-
goes out of business May 30, had -
proposed the permanent panel gence panel is needed:
with jurisdiction over all intelli- The committee postrioned ac
gence activities. But Senate tion on the study, which would
elders who head committees have been made by yet another
which now have jurisdiction committee established solely that
launched a successful fight to purpose. The chairmen of the
strip the new committee. Armed Services, Juilicairy and
The vote today means that Foreign Relations Committees,
four committees would share the who who would lose some no-
job. Sen. Dick Clark (D-Iowa); a thority to the new Intelligence
Rules Committee member, so the Committee, would have, made the
vote "greatly weakesn" intern- study.
gence reform. The next stop is the Senate
But Clark was able to beat floor, where Church hopes to re-
back a proposal by Sen. Howard verse the Rules Committee vote.
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. .
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'GENERAL
THE NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY; APRIL 21, 1976
Bold Steps Urged to Overcome LI . Disarray in
. ?
? al Assembly received Iasir Ara-1
! fat, leader of the Palestine'
Liberation Organization, with
honors usually reserved for
head of state, an act that was1
widely attacked in this country;
and further diminished Ameri-i
can confidence in the United!
States.
USN.
Commission?Morris B. Abram,
Rita Hauser and Philip E. Hoff-
man?and John Carey, the al-
ternate American representa-
tive on the commission's sub-
commission against discrimina-
tion.
Also in the group were Prof.
Thomas M. Frank of New York
University, Prof. Hans Morgen-
thau of the City University,
I and Prof. Thomas Buergenthal
of the University of Texas.
Others were Charles William
Maynas, secretary of the Carne-
gie Endowment for Internation-
al Peace; Nathan Pelcovits, a
former policy planner of the
State Department; Norman
Cousins, publieher and writer;
Leo Nevas of the United States
Association for the United Na-
tions; Jerome Shestack, pres-
ident of the International
League for the Rights of Man,
and Sidney Liskofsky and Ber-
tram M. Gold, both of the
American Jewish Committee.
Mr. Gardner said that the
participants, had begun their
project in 1974 after-the Gener-
By KATHLEEN TELTSCH
spftiai to The Nev., York Times
UNITED - NATIONS, N.Y.,'
April 20?A group of scholars
and Americans associated with
the United Nations has con-
cluded that American policy
in the world organization is
? in a ''state of unprecedented
disarray" and called?for a bold
corrective strategy.
In a report presented today
to William W. Scranton, chief
United States delegate, the
group advocated measures to
restore American influence in
the world organization. Increa-
singly in recent years the Unit-
ed States has been on the losing
-end of votes in the General
Assembly piled up by a majori-
ty of Communist and third-
world countries.
Among ,its .specific recom-
mendations, the group said that
the United States should boy-
cottor with hold funds from
rnoxiou's" United Nations pro-
grams. It advised the United
States to take a "tough" diplo-
matic line, demonstrating that
it will listen to honest economic
grievances but that "it would
not be pushed."
The United States was urged
also to take the lead in fashion-
ing a new "world order coali-
tion" of like-minded states be.
ginning with Western European
allies, Japan and some of the
developing countries to consult
together and frame joint strate-
gy.
The group reporting to Mr.
Scranton was made .up of 16
participants with Richard N.
Gardner, professor of interna-
tional law at Columbia Univer-
sity and a former Deputy Assis-
tant Secretary of State for In-
ternational Organizations act- ,
ing as spokesman. It included
Seymour M. Finger, a former
United States delegate to the
United Nations, three former
members of the Human Rights
THE ECONOMIST APRIL 17,1976
0, my America
Three-quarters of the abuse that is now flying about
Mr Henry Kissinger's ears is unjustified and undeserved.
The belatedly published official summary of those famous
"remarks" Mr Kissinger addressed to a group of Ameri-
can ambassadors in London last December?which he
must now wish he had made public long ago?shows
that clearly enough. The starting point of Mr Kissinger's
policy towards the Soviet Union is entirely sensible.
The Russians have now moved into the superpower
stage of Soviet history, and there is very little the
United States could have done to prevent that happening;
so the aim of American policy is to find the best way
of containing this growing Soviet power. The three-
quarters of the criticism aimed at Mr. Kissinger which
really consists of baffled American fury about the expan-
sion of Soviet strength is pointed at the wrong target.
It is the other quarter of the criticism which is starting
to tell. This is the part which says that Mr Kissinger
has not managed the containment of Soviet power as
well as he claims to have done, and that he is now sunk
? in a global gloom which makes it unlikely that he can
lead the necessary containment operation of the future.
The penalties that never penalised
This serious quarter of the attack on Mr Kissinger con-
sists of three specific charges. The first is against his
belief that it was going to be possible to bind the Soviet
Union into a network of agreements with the west which
would discourage it from throwing its weight about:
? Mr Kissinger's "Gulliverisation" theory, as The Econo-
mist has called it. The obvious weakness of this theory
was that it always seemed unlikely that any such net-
work of agreements between Russia and the west could
ever be tight enough to have much effect on the Russians.
After all, the immensely coMplicated spider's web of
trade, investment and culture that linked Germany to
its western neighbours in 1914 and 1939 was not enough
The report, entitled "A New'
United States Policy Towardj
the United Nations," was of-1
fered to Mr. Scranton as guid:
ance- fel. the State Department:
at a time when its policies
are-. under review, Mr. Gardnef,
sad
e One of its major criticiirri;
-was' that the Government tendsto conduct United Nations poli-
cy
a separa,e
I'box unrelated to direct reia-,
tions between Washington and!
!other capitals. This has led:
Ito', harmful inconsistencies, the!
treport said.
I Implied here was a criticism:
of Secretary of State Henry'
A. Kissinger for having nego-.,
dated. a new agreement with
Brazil m February. ? :
and?it is hard to imagine the communist superpower
ever letting itself become as entangled with the capitalist
world as the various capitalist countries were with each
other in 1914 and 1939.
On top of this, it now emerges that Mr Kissinger and
, his colleagues had never quite worked out what to do
if this network of "incentives and penalties" failed to
make the Russians behave. Would the Americans then
I cancel their agreements with Russia? When the Russians
intervened in Angola, President Ford declined to cancel
his grain deal with them; the "penalty" for Angola turns
out to be nothing more frightening than the postpone-
ment of the next Russian-American chat about three
very minor items of business. Or was the hope that in
the long run the Russians would start to enjoy their
co-operation with America so much that they would
stop doing things like Angola? The trouble is that in
the long run there can be a lot of Angolas; and if none
of them causes the Russians to lose any of their deals
with America, they may reasonably conclude that they
can have their "detente" and their Angolas too.
This is the central flaw in the Gulliverisation theory.
It is why, in the end, it does not matter much whether
Russia or America is getting more out of any particular
exchange of information about agriculture, or space
research, or whatever. Mr Arthur Hartman, Mr Kissin-
ger's assistant for European affairs, recently made a
speech gallantly arguing that the 150 different projects
of this kind between America and Russia are of con-
siderable benefit to the United States. No doubt some
of them are. It is difficult to believe the majority are,
because on the whole The American economy and
American technology are more efficient than Russia's,
and expertise is going to flow, like water, from the higher
level to the lower. In any event, even if the balance of
advantage were exact (which is improbable), this net-
work of kigrcemen ts would not be doing its main intended
to stop the Germans throwing their weight about then; - job unless it was having a calming effect on .the general
i3
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course of Soviet policy. The first complaint against Mr
Kissinger is that it isn't, and was never likely to.
The second complaint is that Mr Kissinger's detente
policy never seems to have included an attempt to make
the Russians agree about the rules of the balance of
power in Europe. Mr Kissinger is alarmed at the prospect
of the Communist party entering the government of
Italy; anyone inclined to suspect him of being "soft on
communism" should read his remarks on the subject
to those ambassadors last December. He is worried
that a Communist success in Italy may encourage a
Communist success in France; that American public
opinion will not understand why it should help to defend
a partly Communist Italy and France; and that the
Italian and French Communists' claim to be good demo-
crats now is by no means as foolproof as the optimists
think (in which he may well be right, see page 14). But
the new respectability of the Communists in western
Europe is partly a by-product of detente, which made
the Soviet Union itself seem more respectable: The
detente policy should therefore have included a clear
understanding with Russia about the east-west political
competition in the two halves of Europe.
?
Change in neither?or both
Such an understanding would have had to take one of
two forms. There might, in very hypothetical theory,
have been an agreement by the west to regard eastern
Europe as permanently communist in return for a Russian
agreement to regard western Europe as permanently
non-communist. But the Russians would certainly have
said that they cannot control western Europe's Com-
munist parties nowadays, which may or may not be true
but is hard to disprove. Anyway, the west's own belief
in pluralism requires it to accept that Communists can
legitimately be elected to power if they claim to have
accepted the rules of democracy. That was probably a non-
starter. The alternative was therefore to tell the Russians
that if they were looking forward to radical political
changes in western Europe they would have to accept
the possibility of change in eastern Europe too. The
competition Would have to be a two-way process.
This is where Mr Helmut Sonnenfeldt, the counsellor
at Mr Kissinger's state department, comes into the
argument. Now that the summary of Mr Sonnenfeldt's
own talk to those American ambassadors last December
has been published, it is clear that he was not washing
America's hands of all interest in the future of eastern
Europe. On the contrary, he said that the Americans
should respond to the east Europeans' hopes of a "more 1
autonomous existence"; which is the polite way of say-
ing more independence from Russia. The trouble is that
the American policy-makers still seem to be telling the
east Europeans that their best hope of more independence
is the relaxing effect detente ought to be having on
Russia (but detente does not in fact seem to be making
Russia relax at all); and that they should be careful not
to stare Russia too boldly in the eye (but why advise
them to keep their eyes down?).
The west could and should be urging a different course
on the Russian-dominated countries of eastern Europe.
This would not amount to an invitation to them to revolt.
If the west was not prepared to help Hungary in 1956,
nor to help Czechoslovakia in 1968, it is unlikely to
intervene on behalf of a democratic rebellion now, when
Russia is militarily stronger than it was then. But the
west could be saying to thefl Communist governments
of eastern Europe that, if they want more independence
from Russia, they should look at what Hungary has
done to make its economy rather different from Russia's,
and Rumania its foreign policy, and Poland its treatment
of intellectuals. And then add them up. .
If an east European country tried to marry for its
own purposes the combined independence of, say, Hun%
gary and Rumania, would Russia really send its army
in to stop the nonsense?and risk a plummeting of Com-
munist votes in Italy and France? It seems unlikely:
the Communist governments in eastern Europe can risk
being a bit more assertive. The west should also be
saying to the. people who live under those governments
that it does not regard monolithic single-party Commu-
nist rule as their permanent and inevitable lot. Most
east Europeans would like a wider range of choice, as
the Czechoslovaks showed in 1968; and the west should
be encouraging them to press their rulers to give them
rather more choice?at first, for instance, by allowing
different factions' to compete within the Communist
parties. It is Mr Kissinger's failure to urge the need for
change in eastern Europe vigorously enough that is the
second count against him.
: The third is that he no longer seems to have the old
Kissinger bounce. To be sure, he has every reason to
be tired and dispirited. For seven long years he has
been running the most centralised foreign policy opera
tion since John Foster Dulles's. For the past two years
the American congress's attempt to get in on the act
has produced one confusion after another?Soviet
emigration, the arms ban on Turkey, the Angola mess
?which ? congress has then left Mr Kissinger to try to
clear up. The old idea that the government's men might
occasionally have things they would like to chat about
in private has virtually collapsed under the enthusiasm
of American journalists for publishing any document
a piqued official gives to them. Mr Kissinger's Middle
East policy has run into a sand dune; his Soviet policy
has gone skidding on the icy surface of the Russian
will to power. It is enough to make any secretary of
state feel depressed.
But Mr Kissinger's dispiritedness seems? to go deeper
than this. He sometimes sounds as if he no longer
believed that congress and administration can co-operate
enough to run a coherent foreign policy, or that American
public opinion is prepared to carry the weight of Ameri-
ca's position in the world. He has been accused of being
resigned to accepting second place for America, behind
Russia; it is probably truer to say that he fears America
is resigned to it. .
The resilience is there
If he does, he is almost certainly wrong. The main lesson
so far from this year's presidential campaign is the
groundswell of support for a more vigorous assertion
of the American role in the world. There is no reason
why the American people, with all their economic and
technological power and vitality, cannot insist on
military equality with Russia, and recover some of the
ground lost in the past few years. There is no reason,
on this year's evidence, why. American opinion cannot
be rallied to support an intelligent defence of western
interests. But the effort will have to be led by a man
resilient enough to understand America's own capacity
for resilience. Perhaps this German-born secretary of
state could ' escape from his apparent Weltschmerz if
he remembered that he is, after all, an American now.
34
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NEW YORK TIMES
2 3 APR 1976
ROCKEFELLER GIVES
'A REPORT ON TRIP
Notes.Wide Concern About
U.S. Foreign Policy
By PHILIP SHABECOFF
Special to The New Yoric Times
IWASHINGTON, April 22?
:Vice President Rockefeller, re-
cently returned front a seven-
nation, four-continent official
journey, says that America's
friends are gravely concerned
about the thereliability and con-
cerned about the reliability and
consistency of United States
foreign policy.
:In an interview yesterday,
Mr. Rockefeller said that after
2.2 period of "drawing back"
him the United States because
ot Vietnam and other factors,
the countries he visited were
again "reaching out" to the
ited States for support.
Most of the leaders with
whom he talke dtold him they
counted on a stronger American
military presence in their area,
it. Rockefeller said, adding:
s`A. subject of major concern
around the world is: 'Is the
United States withdrawing into
isolationism? Is America foreign
policy going to be coordinated
between its legislative and ex-
ec.:dive branches. Can we count
on you?"
.also said he found that
leaders of the countries he vi-
sited "appalled" that the -Unit-
ed States did not take decisive
action in Angola. '
Mr. Rockefeller, at the re-
quest of President Ford, visited
Tunisia, France, Iran, Malaysia,
Singapore, Australia and New
Zealand in March and April.
Yesterday he -sat in an easy
chair in his cavernous office
In the old Executive Office
Building next to the White
house and discussed his trip.
In Tunisia, Mr. Rockefeller
said, he had found considerable
uneasiness about the future,
particularly about future ac-
tions of its neighbors, Libya
and Algeria. ?? _
There was particular concern
about Algeria, which had been
receiving large amounts of
arms from the Soviet Union
and which had been visited
by the Vietnamese military
strategist, Gen. Vo Nguyen
Giap, and also by Prime Minis-
ter Fidel Castro of Cuba.
The Shah of Iran, whom Mr.
Rockefeller met on the islan-
reat f Kish, expressed the
hope that the United States
wouid retntain a strong pre.
sence in the Indian Ocean. He
also said that he was working
to improve relations between
India and Pakistan.
In New Zealand and Australia
Mr. Rockefeller found that the
Governments desired a United
States naval presence In the
South Pacific. In fact, Mr.
Rockefeller said, requests that
the United States naval capaci-
ty be maintained and streng-
thened were encountered con.
stantly on his journey.
Mr. Rockefeller said that he
WASHINGTON STAR
22 APRIL 1976
William F. Buckley Jr.
The Finlandization of
:the American will
The lesson for today is
the 'lead essay in the April
issue of Commenrarymaga-
zine, written by its editor,
Mr. Norman Podhoretz. It
is entitled, "Making the
World Safe for Commu-
nism," and is an agonized
documentary of what has
happened to the American
will during the past few
years. Picking up the term
from a European intellectu-
al, Mr. Podhoretz terms it:
? "Finlandization from with-
. It was a long time ago
that the fate of Finland
crystallized in the public
. mind as something of an ar-
chetype. What does Finlan-
, dization of the spirit mean?
- That more and more
Americans, more and more
? often act on the assumption
that the Soviet Union is,
? when you come right down
to it, the supreme power in
this planet, and that the
only sensible thing you do
about it is: accommodate.
When 'the Soviet Union de-
cides that it will massively
support a conclusion of the
? war in Indochina with a
? victory by North Vietnam,
you permit it to happen,
though it is appropriate to
come up with a little fustian
rhetoric, as when, fleeing
the bully to the safety of
yotir front porch, you shout
out your defiance of him.
When the Soviet Union de-
cides to intervene decisive-
? ly in Angola, you find it that
? ' .
found throughout his travels
"the appreciation, of the need
for a strong, determined" Unit-
ed States foreign policy and
"a much more open desire to
cooperate" with the United
States than in the recent past.
One reason for this, he said,
was that many of the countries
have been moving politically
"toward the center," just as,
he asserted, the United States
is.
But he said that this country
must persuade its friends that
it can conduct a steady, consis-
tent foreign policy, not a policy
that is fragmented between the
President and Congress.
"We have to discern as a
people what our goals and ob-
jectives are at home and how
those goals relate to the -T-r-t
or the world," Mr. Rockefeller
said.
much easier to yield, the
Vietnam experience having
permanently ruled as out of
consideration any direct
military. intervention.
It is Mr. Podhoretz's
melancholy conclusion that
the pervasiveness of our
new isolation has reached
such a point as to all but in-
capacitate us from effective
resistance. The ? liberals
(and many conservatives)
are blunt on the matter of
military intervention, one of
their objectives in their as-
sault against the "imperial
presidency. They are also,
as witness their assaults on
the .CIA, opposed to extra-
military intervention. The
CIA's. role in helping the
anti-Communist fraternity
everywhere in the world
during the postwar years is
all but neutralized. When it
was suggested that CIA
money might go to help the
democratic parties of Italy,
the protests were very
,nearly universal. Any sug-
gestion of aid to the anti-
Communists in Portugal
was, quite simply, ex-
cluded. .? .
Why all of this? In part, .?
Mr. Podhoretz correctly
concludes, because of the ?
creeping military superior-
ity of the Soviet Union.
("When the "Chamberlain'
side of Kissinger asks
American critics of the
SALT agreements, 'What in
the name of God is strategic
superiority? What do you do
r77-
, with it?' he might better ad-
dress the question to the
Russians, who seem to
know very well both what it
is and what you do with it,
and who could easily
enough give him the an-
swer. What you do with it is
intimidate other nuclear
powers who might wish to
stand in your way when you
start to move ahead.") But
also because, among the,
elite in particular, there is a
marked diminution in any
concern for freedom, or in-
deed appreciation even for
freedom at home ? the best
evidence of which is the
dizzy enthusiasm American
intellectuals have shown for
life in Mao's China.
Thus the strides of the
Communists abroad coin-
cide ? indeed, are made
possible by ? the general
demoralization at home: .
"If it should turn out that
the new isolationism has in-
deed triumphed among the
people as completely as it
has among the elites, then
the United States will cele-
brate its 200th birthday by
betraying the heritage of
liberty which has earned it
the wonder and envy of the
world from the moment of
its founding to this, and by
helping to make that world
safe for the most deter-
mined and ferocious and.
barbarous enemies of liber-
ty ever to have appeared on
the earth." , .
Tuesday, April 20, 1976 The Washington Star
Crosby. S. Noyes
Maybe they DO
listen to Henry's
35
No one has mentioned one
possible explanation for
some of the things Henry
Kissinger has been saying
about Africa and Europe.
He could believe the people
involved may take his
warnings seriously. -
It may not be quite as
loony as it seunds to some
of his listeners in Washing-
ton. Many of them seem to
believe the secretary of
stzite is men* huffing and
puffing aboutsuch things as
the Soviet-Cuban presence'
in southern Africa and the
Italian elections.
When he says that the
United States "will not
tolerate" any more Ango-
las, orthat the participation
of the Communists in a fu-
ture Italian goverrunent is
-unacceptable" to the
United States, the reaction
in this country is that he is
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bluffing, which is futile or
counter-productive. The as-
sumption is that the secre-
tary is essentially power-
less to control ? or even
influence ? events in other
parts of the world.
may be mistaken. It is
unlikely that the Russians
expect the Marines to land
in Angola. It is also quite
possible that the Italian
Communists may win some
votes by complaining about
American interference in
their internal affairs. But
there is at least some evi-
dence that neither the Rus-
sians nor the Italians are
entirely insensitive to the
political trends here, or to,
Mr. Kissinger's expression
of them.
Indeed, recent reports
from Moscow suggest that
the Soviet government is
showing signs of anxiety
about the fading of the
mood of detente in this
country and its effect on the
whole spectrum of Russian-
American relations. Ac-
cording to the New York
Times, "some Soviet insid-
ers, concerned by President
Ford's responsiveness to
criticism from the right, are
predicting a new restraint
in Moscow's foreign mili-
tary involvement during the
coming months, particular-
ly in southern Africa."
The same may be true of
Mr. Kissinger's warnings
about a possible role for the
Communists in a future Ital-
ian government. A good
many Americans, apparent-
ly, reject as fanciful the
secretary's fears of a new
kind of "domino theory"ef-
feet in which the advent of
communism in a country
like Italy could involve
other Western European
countries as well. Some
critics, including former
Undersecretary of State
George Ball, seem almost to
favor participation of the
Italian Communists as an
antidote to the "corrupt"
and "flabby" political
parties that have governed
Italy since the war.
Yet the Europeans in
general and the Italians in
particular are a good deal
less enthusiastic about the
prospects of sharing power
with the Communists. There
is considerable skepticism
about the new independence
from Moscow proclaimed
by the Western European
Communist parties and
their devotion to liberal
Western democratic pro-
cesses. Mr. Kissinger's
forebodings of the political
consequences of govern-
ments in which Communists
hold power are widely
shared.
In Italy, for example, two
out of three votes cast in the
national elections are still
anti-Communist votes. Ac-
cording to a recent poll,
nearly half the population
of the country believes that
once the Comnmunists
come to power, they will
stay. Even the Italian
Commmunists themselves
have obvious reservations
about pressing their present
ascendancy too far or too
fast.
Can it be that Mr. Kiss-
inger's cautionary words
are taken more seriously
abroad than here? "As
secretary of state," he
says, "I have the obligation
to make clear what I feel
the consequences of certain
events are, even if we can-
not control them." Such
warnings may have been
more effective than many of
us realize.
DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
14 April 1976
In Easter Week: thoughts on the border between religion and politics
SOME observers,' have supposed
that the willingness of
Christianity to 'associate itself
with international socialist causes
is the result of careful calculation
?that Church leaders have read
the signs of the times, concluded-- tire
that socialism is ahout.to suceeecl ?
everywhere, and have judged it
prudent, for the Church's survival,
to be on the winning side. B EDWARD NORMAN
OW
LF
How much one wishes that was
the case. It would at least show
a degree of political realism within
Christian leadership and a proper
sense of employing the guile of the
world in the promotion of. the
Divine scheme. But unhappily the
rush to embrace international Left-
wing thinking is not -the result' of
calculation, but of belief.
? The mechanics of its appeal are
only too clear. Radical Christiana
throughout the world are not, in
general, horny sons of the soil,
striving against corrupt social
-systems in order to bring the
simplest necessities to 'their
wretched dependents. They are
members of the bourgeois radical
elite, emotionally attached to the
fashionable idealism ,. of social
-change.
e Their espousal of socialism is a
class characteristic, an -indication
of their moralism. . Their moral'
seriousness has become secula-
-rised, and politics is now the tex-
-tore in which it is wrapped.' It is,
from this atmosphere of the '
possibility of secular redemption
that sd many Christians are. now
prepared to acquire their own ,
sense of social righteousness ?
rather ? than from faith in eternal ;
.priorities.
They rationalise the emotional ,
investments that have already
been made by others, in the selec-
tion of particular issues for con-
centrated propaganda. They make
a simple, and generally innocent,
conflation of Christian, love of
neighbour and the most' hard-line
international Marxist devices to
attract liberal and humanitarian
consciences to the side of world
revolution. They reason away the
rhetoric arid Style of the propa-
ganda as merely'. a succinct man-
ner of expressing agreed Moral,
truths about :human society. "-This''
last feature ? can be very baffling
for?the less zealous, who correetlY:.
detect the true ideological affinie:?
ties of all- the moralistic rhetoric;-i-
but who do not have' adequate ?
countermodels against Which to set,:
their reservations: ? ' ?.
Furthermore, ? Church leaders
usually deny that their- moralism -;
has any affinities with the propa--
ganda assumptions, of -tem inter-'
national Left at all: And within the
'hothouse ? atmosphere -; of central
Church 'administrative thinkinge
that can' seem a reasonable claim,-
There the sums have all been done.,
The breathless steps have all ,been
lakere Yes:I, Christian concern,.
with human needs does require a ,
political dimension. Yes: it can he ?
i,dentified : withe; 'movements to
overthrow " oppressive " regimes.
Church leaders whose progres-
sion -has been. along these..
familiar lines have lone ago lost
touch with the ordinary aseuropa
tions of ordinary Christians. Ileum,.
the hurt surprise of the men in -
the ,pews?of, the huge. majority -
The- arithnt It Dean of Peferlionee,
Cambridge.
36
irens
at 'Christians' in England saday?
when they are -offered rationalised
political, . rhetoric, dressed up as
Clatistian "concern,"answer to
;their :puzzled .queries about the
propriety. of ? identifying the de-
emands of God, with the ephemeral.
'enthusiasm' s of :contemporary poli-,,tical moralism,.
,For all, their, belief in 'their own
reasonableness,, however, Church
: leaders in, fact, hold their political
,opinions, with, good deal of
passion.' I .had. occasion to notice
this myself in' February. During
the 'week, in which the General
Synod: of the .'Church of England -
-discussed, ,.a,, highly contentious
: paPer abotit..Chile, produced by its
? own Board for Social Respon-
sibility,efewasi asked by this news-
paper and' ? by,,the B B C to offer
some views on the matter.
I suggested that, appalling
though' aspect's of the Chilean re.
gime are, there was a danger that
the Church., in seeking a .1.wmarli-
tarian vieW of world eve,hts',;?would
'innocently absorb .the, Propaganda
promoted by agencies of inter-
national Marxism. To my surprise
my, opinions evere extravagantly
caricatured, .arid then denounced
r for their patent', absurdity, during
the Synod. debate and apparently
'amid a good* deal of derisive
hilarity; L
? ... ei I
An tyranny I
Christians today are victims of
theireewn, mor-alism. ;They a- ti,
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easily 'prepared., to t
WOrst of . supposedial reactionary
opinion, and far tdo gullible about
the general picture Of "exploita-
tion" and " oppressioin "? which in-
: ,ternattorial Left-wing thinking
'seeks to . establish a4. self-evident
truth.' "
The &Sire io have ;Christian at-
titudes to. :" worldi problems"
comes at a time when Christian
ieaderS are -notable for their lack
s? Of professionalism in political
'judgment.. They are easily bagged
by anybne whd epre$ents his poll-
,
:tical objettives in the compulsive
moral. rhetoric whichi is so attrac-
tive ?to bourgeols-radinalism. !.Those
who remain as unbelievers are
,owritten off as "extreme Right
--ithough they are more
likely to be genuine liberals?or as
s;yictinat .of conspiraey theories,"
voyeurs. ? of' redS under: the
I bed.!'.. A:new`' tyranniy of opinion ,
isi descending'' upon !the Church.
,Aricl,beeause Church leaders today ,
are such amateurs in the very - pro-
fessional business of political pro-
7paganda, -and. because they really
are so dedicated to primer humanie`:-
trian ideals, they are permanently. .
open. .to- uncritical acceptance of
- seeminey:Any account of World
co-nditions which exploits their
generosity.
Because their much-proclaimed ?
" Christian " concern for humanity
usually turns out to be just ordin-
,ary humanism, they are easily
swept up by secular enthusiasm for
humanity, lacking, as they so often
seem to do, distinctly spiritual in-
sights into men and their social
behaviour. So the Marxists' liturgy
of propaganda is reproduced in the
world views of Christianity: a
? Government or social- system
? marked down for "liberation " is
first described in isolation, without
reference to the conditions general
among mankind (and especially the
. conditions in socialist countries) in
order to show how miserable is the
condition of people under "capital-
ism ". '
Then come the atrocity stories.
The Government is denounced for
brutality and torture. Then the
forces of oppression are depicted
as "the bourgeoisie ", whereas it
is the bourgeoisie in most countries
(and as in Chile) who are most
noticeable for their socialism. Next,
distinguished Western liberals ex-
plain in what ways the conditions
complained of are offensive to their
consciences. Finally, the World
Council of Churches weighs in, and
international' Christianity conse-
crates the polemicism of the inter-
national Left.
?This is not to say, of course, that
Christians Who' -become- Marxists
are wrong. Christianity is a univer-
sal religion, and it would be
lamentable if it was not rendered
in all the experiences which men
THE WASHINGTOi POST sunder.
April le..1976
hen, Two
By Peter L Berger
Berger is professor of sociology at Rutgers Univer.
sity. His "Pyramids of .Sacrifice," published last year,
was nominated for a National Book Award. This article
is excerpted from the March issue of Commentary .
magazine.
?
1VITL THE LATE 1960s, the great inalarfty of Amer-
ican intellectuals accepted the essential legitimacy
of. American power, even if they had objections to this
or that manifestation of it. Equally important, the eco-
nomic elite operated on the notion that the maintenance
of American power in the world was in their interest (in
.that respect, at any rate, being in full accord with the
Marxists). Vietnam changed all this.
Most American intellectuals have since Vietnam come
to believe that the exercise of American power is immo-
ral. But what has been less noticed is that Vietnam has
also changed the mind of a substantial segment of the
economic elite as to the economic advantages of world
power: it has given rise to the idea that the maintenance
of American world power is unprofitable.
The antagonism between the two elites is confined al-
most entfrely to domestic issues. On international issues
there is a remarkable convergence of perceptions and
have of righteousness. But the
troolale. with the present willing1?=
to 'accept Marxist ;definitions
of World affairs IS precisely that
the Churchmen who lead opin-
ion do not become Marxists. They
are merely deceived into becoming
the helpful allies of Matxist move-
mentss far change: They are just
not well enough acquainted with
? the harsh realities of political
manipulation ? supposing, indeed,
that such vile devices are the
brutal monopoly. of " oppressive "
ri..eimes of the Right, or possibly
of the Soviet system in its unhappy
lapses?but not as something that
could conceivably stain the pristine
political purity of the liberation
politics of the "Third World ".
What we are seeing today is the
demoralisation of Western society;
the dismantling of the values of
the Western way of life. It is a
terrible irony that Christianity
which ought to have been a
guardian ?of those values, is now
so often drawn into assisting their
destruction. If freedom survives
in the world, men , will look upon
this period as one of incredible un-
reality. Christianity was once the
vehicle of the moral-seriousness of
the intelligentsia. Today. through-
out the world, that role is increas-
' fulfilled 'by Marxism. It is
strange to find Christianity so sym-
pathetic to its own replacement.
interests, and as this convergence becomes established, a
,new phenomenon will increasingly become evident ?
?tthe influence of what might well be calletha new intel-
? lectual-industrial complex on American foreign policy.
s The term "intellectual-industrial complex" was once
'Used to describe the situation in the early 1960s, when in-
tellectuals in- America related much more positively
s both to government and to the economic elite. My con-
? tention is that a quite different convergence is emerging
now around an altogether different ? and indeed op-
_? posite ? objective: the dismantling of American power
'ithroughout the world. ?
- Let me hasten to say that I am in no way suggesting a
?-.conspiracy. The idea of a convergence between the two
,:'elites is not at all dependent on the assumption (though
it may be a correct one, for all I know) that top execu-
stives of multinational corporations regularly engage in
earnest dialogue with editorial writers of The New York
? ',Times. Current fashion to,the contrary notwithstanding,
?--history rarely moves through conspiracies: Nor is it my
.assumption that the convergence is based on some sort
of agreement on matters of theory. Rather, perceptions
and interests-converge in an Unintended way, possibly
even in a way that contradicts the theories held by the
two parties.
Few members of the American intellectual elite rec-
ommend the -abolition of the military establishment:
rather, it is to be cut down as much as possible ? and,
very importantly, not to be relied upon as a means of in-
fluence and persuasion. ?Needless to say, there is even
? stronger antagonism to covert operations of any kind. In
? all .of this, there is hardly any sympathy for the major
foreign adversary of the United States.
The group under discussion here is certainly not pro-
Soviet (though it has a pronounced tendency to underes-
timate Soviet power and overestimate the reasonable
? character of Soviet intentions). When it comes to adrnir-
?-ing foreign regimes, the propensity is to 'choose regimes
that 'call themselves "socialist" and that are (or are
thought to bet different from the Soviet type of "social-
Ism"? China, North Vietnam, Cuba have at one time or
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another been the major beneficiaries of this quest for
new forms of socialism to admire.
But the main point of the program of this group in for-
eign affairs is that the United States is no longer to use
its power to contain the spread of communism, or to in-
tervene militarily to defend other democratic countrieS,
or to foster the spread of free institutions anywhere else
in the world. These American intellectuals do, of cour
believe in such classical democratic values as freedom
Speech, freedom of worship, iedividual protectio
against arbitrary arrest, due process and the like. B
they are against any effort to "impose" such values
other countries ? or,at any rate, on other countries c
Ing themselves "socialist."
Bud for Business
UNTIL VERY recently such ideas were in sharp op-
?,..) position to those prevailing among the economic
elite in this country. If the latter was seen by the former
as caught in a "Cold War mentality" or an ideology of
"imperialism," the reverse perception was one of "uto
anism," "idealism" and "softness on communism." P
simply: intellectuals were losing faith in the benev
ence of American world power while businessmen we
still holding on to it. I believe .that this has been chan
ing since the debacle of the American intervention in I
dochina. While businessmen have not exactly becom
latter-day converts to McGovernism, the perceived se
interest of the economic elite is leading it to a posture
the area of foreign policy which is highly congruent
with the posture of the intellectuals.
Again, this is not to suggest that businessmen are ex-
clusively motivated by material interests, any more than
(conversely) intellectuals are exclusively motivated by
ideological or moral considerations. Intellectuals have
material interests as well as idological commitments,
\and businessmen have beliefs, values and moral and cog-
nitive prejudices as well as material interests. Indeed,
when businessmen are compared with intellectuals, it is .
hard to say who has the edge in the matter of ideology. - ? '
However, the economic elite operates in a context
where the penalties for false perceptions are more
swiftly and more tangibly experienced than in the .con-
text of the intellectual elite. This means that ideological ?
tendencies among businessmen are more rigorously con-
trolled by a. "reality principle" ? to wit, the principle of
perceived economic interest. t ?
It is on the basis of this principle that the American
economic elite has been changing its position on the
American role in world affairs. The maintenance of
American power in the world, previously perceived as
an economic asset, is now coming to be seen as an eco-
nomic liability. It is inflationary (Vietnam was not "good
for Wall Street"); it is an insufficient guarantee for the
.safety of foreign investments; it unnecessarily antago
nizes an important sector of the foreign market fo
American goods. This shift may not pertain to all part
of the world equally; an exception may be at least some
areas of Latin America. But it pertains, I think, to mos
of the rest of the Third World. Most importantly, it ha
.affected the perception of American economic interests
vis-a-vis the Communist countries.
From the standpoint ?laity economic elite, political
stability is a prime desideratum: It must be, since only in
a politically stable situation can long-range economic
strategies pay off. The modern corporation is compelled,
most of the time, to think in long-range terms; that is, it
can only rarely afford quick in-and-out economic adven-
tures. This concern with political stability has led over
and over again to a readiness to do business with all
sorts of morally distasteful regimes, as lung as those re-
gimes had a control over their respective countries that
seemed reasonably long-range. In fact, as intellectual
critics have pointed out repeatedly, American business
abroad had tended to prefer stable dictatorships to unst-
able democracies. ?
The one big exception to this general tendency has
been Communist regimes. These did, of course, provide
political stability; indeed, it could be argued that in the
contemporary world they provide the politically stable
situations par excellence. But they were also viewed
(and viewed correctlY) as being inimical to American
economic enterprise.
SC, It is precisely this perception that is now changing.
of Communist regimes, and particularly those within the
ns Soviet orbit, have shown themselves increasingly to be
ut
on
all-
reliable trade and investment partners; in the exact
measure in which this is taken to be the case, the politi-
cal stability of these regimes comes to appear an asset.
In the past few years, the Soviets and their European
satellites have demonstrated that they are very much in-
terested in economic relations with American business.
Empirically, they have turned out to be hard bargainers,
but once, they make an agreement, they keep it. Ameri-
can investments in these countries- have , been limited.
But they are invariably safe, or so it seems thus far.
pi-
ut There is no reason to think that this would change if
ol- the investments grew. In the Communist countries, as
contrasted with those of the Third World, there are no
re
problems with anti-American intellectuals and political
n- movements; with coups or terrorism, with aggressive la-
bor unions. Inflation is controlled and tax regulations
If-
are simple. Once it can , be assumed that Communist
in
countries. are interested in long-range economic rela-.
;ions with American business, all these qualities become
very attractive indeed. And, even better, no .exercises in
American "imperialism" are necessary to maintain such
favorable conditions. In sum: it has become possible to
do very good business with the Communists.
Admittedly, all these. perceptions are based on the
slim evidence of the last few years. The new view in the
ascendant among the business elite makes some assump-
tions that cannot be en-wide:ally validated ? particu-
larly the assumption that the economic needs of the So-
viets will continue to be what they are now, and the fur-
ther assumption that a new generation of Soviet leaders
will continue the present precarious balancing act be-
tween economic and ideological interests.
Nobody (least of all the Sovietologists) can say how
likely it is that the assumptions will hold. Can the So-
viet economy, and especially its agrarian sector, finally
overcome its chronic inefficiencies? Can Soviet technol-
'ogy catch up with the West? Is an ideologically or mili-
tarily more aggressive leadership waiting in the wings?
Who knows? The assumptions on which the new view is
based, however, are about as reliable as any others held
in connection with foreign economic undertakings ?1
and they are almost certainly better than any assump-
tions about the future of that explosive area of erstwhile
American -imperialism" known as the Third World.
Righteous Realism
BUT IT IS NOT in the Third World, it is in Europe
that this shift in perception may have the rnost far-
reaching consequences. It is Europe that has been the
major focus of American economic and political-military
interests. It has been axiomatic since World War II that
Europe was essential to these interests; indeed, the very
existence of what we now know as Western Europe is a
product of this axiom. Now, it is not at all necessary to
conclude- that this axiom is about to be rejected in tow
by the American economic elite. There will continue to
be very important American economic interests in West-
ern Europe. But increasingly there wilt also be impor-
tant American economic interests in Eastern Europe.
Sooner or later, the difference between the two Europes
will become a little fuzzy in this perspective. One may
pinpoint the change by saying that until now, a Sovieti-
zation of Western Europe, whether by direct Soviet ac-
tions or by means of internal Communist movements,
was deemed to be fundamentally contrary to Nmerican
38
z'ol
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economic interests. What I believe is happening no is?
that such a Sovietization of Western Europe is becoming..
less unthinkable to the American business elite. That is
to say, it is becoming less self-evident to the economic
elite that American economic interests necessitate the
preservation of democracy in Western Europe and the
.expensive deployment of American military power to
that end.
? If one wanted Lobe ironic, one could say that Ameri-
can businessmen are beginning to get rid or their Marx-
ist presuppositions. It is Marxism, of course, that has ins-
isted on the inevitable linkage of American capitalism
and American world power. But what if Marxism has
been wrong all along? What if American world power
comes to be seen as an economic disadvantage by the
."ruling circles" of the American economy?
The rudest shock would be experienced by those Eu-
? ropean intellectuals (probably the majority) whose anti-
Americanism has been. coupled all along with the serene
assurance that American power will continue to protect
Ahem from the RUssians.lt will be interesting to observe
the reaction on the day when Western Europe wakes up
to the fact that American "imperialism" has, indeed,
gone home ? leaving the Europeans, armed only_with'
France's force de frappe and a lot of Swedish rhetoric,
alone with the Russians at last:
How powerful is the new intellectual-industrial com-
plex? It is difficult to tell. Certainly there are forces on
:the other side. There continue to be people in the eco-
nomic elite who view things differently. be It for ideo;
? logical reasons (one can still say "free world" in business
circles in this country without immediatly losing the en-
? tire audience) or because of a different notion of eco-
? nomic interests. There still are intellectuals, in a rather
beleaguered state, who perceive a connection between
American power and freedom. There is, of course, the
?'military. There is the present leadership of American la-
'bor.
.- All these groupings function in a context of demo-
cratic politics and public opinion which, at the present ?
moment, are in a state of considerable flux. Thus,it is
? very hard to assess which viewpoint "has the troops" in
terms of American politics. There continues to be a large.
? segment of the American people that is highly suscepti-
? ble to the old Wilsonian appeals to liberty and democra-
cy. The popular response to Daniel P. Moynihan's
speeches at the United Nations may be cited as-evidence.
'Undoubtedly, though, there is also a widespread weari-
ness with foreign commitments, a fear of Vietnam-like
episodes in the future and considerable disillusionment
with patriotic rhetoric about America's mission in the
world.
The new intellectual-industrial complex is in a posi-
tion to respond to this mood in a peculiar way. If the '-
proposition is to diminish American world power, the in-
tellectuals make it seem morally right and the business-
SUNDAY TIMES, London
28 March 1976
any
39
n cle
trigg r?
LAST week the world shivered
briefly at the spectre of ? Col.
Gadaffi, by leave of France
sending his people scurrying
about the world not with the
usual pistols and machine guns
in their diplomatic bags, but
with small and inefficient
.atomic bombs. The deal now
under discussion between
Fi'il nee and Libva--denouneed
by the United States?does no
men make it appear realistic. A combination of self-
? righteousness and hard-nosed realism is hard to beat in
? American politics.
Tianetary Barfft,ain'
TT1 0 SUM UP THE argument: this new intellectual-in-
dustrial complex is a curious symbiosis of percep-
tions which is beginning to have an influence on Ameri-
can fbreign policy. It is often called isolationist, but this
is a misleading epithet, since neither of its two compo-
nent groups envisages the withdrawal of the United
States from the world. Rather, to use Harlan Cleveland's
provocative phrase, America is to be. a partner in an
emerging "planetary bargain."
The coinage to be used in this bargain is largely moral
for one group, largely economic for the other; both-
would deemphasize the coinage of military and political
power. If one were to adopt the terrninology of Vilfredo
?Pareto, one could say that the methods of "foxes" are to
be substituted for those of "lions." Or, if one were to
adopt a terminology of more recent vintage, one could
speak of a "greening" of American foreign policy.
The symbiosis, is fragile. In this alliance between puta:
tive morality and alleged realism, either side could fall
apart. One can imagine various eventualities raising
questions among the intellectuals about their nio?ai as-
sumptions: new threats to the survival of Israel must.,
alas, rank high on the list. The businessmen might come
to doubt the realism of some of their own perceptions:
what, for instance, if an economically irrational Bona-
partism were to arise in the post-Brezhnev Soviet leader-
ship?
Needless to say, neither American intellectuals ,Tior
American businessmen have much control over .the
processes that might lead to. such eventualities. The sym-
biosis, then, may not be permanent.,All the same, I be-
. neve that its emergence at this very important moment
in world affairs is a fact to be taken account of, a fact
with potentially far-reaching consequences even if it
should turn out to be transitory. -
American power since World War H has been an often
uneasy mixture of two purposes ?the pursuit of Ameri-
can self-interest, as variously perceived, and the defense
of the shrinking number of democratic societies. And
whatever else American power may have been (all too
often it was very depressing indeed, from any moral
point Of view), it was also the only significant.shield of
free societies in different parts of the world. What is
being suggested here is that the two purposes may now
eome to be 'dissociated altogether ? with ominous re-
sults for the future of freedom everywhere. Despite all
the talk about multilateral centers of power, the only im-
mediately visible beneficiary of a contraction of Ameri-
can power would be the Soviet Union. In that case, the
main hope f6r the survival of free societies is that the So-
viet empire would turn out to 6e as efficient as Soviet
agriculture. It is a tenuous hope.
By WAYLAND KENNET
and ELIZABETH YOUNG
in fact include anything which
would enable him to do that.
but the very spectre forces u?;
to think again about the;
plutonium revolution. What is I
really happening!
Let us start with generali-
ties. Nuclear energy is seen
as a good way of generating
electric power; it saves oil
imports and it is, so far, safe.
At the end of the line lies the
hope of fusion power, which
will be safer, cleaner, and in
time cheaper.
But until that becomes
economic, governments must
either risk the exhaustion of
oil, trust to new untried
sources of energy?tides,
waves, winds?or build more
and more fission ? plants.
There ? are already a few
hundred fission plants round
the world. To run the Com-
munist types, you proceed in
five stages. (1) You feed it
with enriched uranium. ? (2)
You let it run. -(3) You extract
the worn out elements, vhicli
now contain a lot of plutonium.
(4) You " re-process " or
" separate " the plutonium:
(5)You either put the pinto.
Mum back into the reactor
system and run it some more,
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or you make it into an explo-
sive device to use as a bomb
or for earth-shifting.
So for controlling prolifera-
tion, stage four, re-processing,
is the most sensitive. It re-
quires highly specialised plant
and historically this work has
been done for all countries by
the original "nuclear sup-
pliers "?United States, Soviet
Union, the UK ens' France.
Recently, however, there
have been a spate of cases
where a supplier country has
contracted to sell not just a
reactor or so, but also repro-
cessing plants. The Americans
are hotly opposed to this,
because even if the first such
plant is under good safe-
guards, the country concerned
will be able to build another
? plant under no safeguards at
all. Moreover, they say it
makes no eeonomic sense to
maintain a ,;!--4e-ocessing plant
unless you i4e`e handling the
used elements from whole
nuclear industries. If a small
country seeks its own plant,
that means only one thing: a
desire to make bombs.
A country may, however.
want a reprocessing plant so
that it is in no danger of being
. without fuel if its processor
suddenly wants to subject it
to political pressure. ?
The world is laced in all
directions by agreements and
half-agreements, conventions.
and half-conventions, working
or partly working. In spite
of this network, France has
agreed to sell. Pakistan and
Germany has agreed to sell
-Brazil nuclear generating
systems including re-proces-
sing plants. Neither Pakistan
nor Brazil has signed the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
In both these cases,
despite US complaints, the
International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) in Vierirta,.
which exists to make sure that
plutonium, etc.. is used in
reactors and not in bombs, has
now approved both deals.
France also went a long way
towards selling.a re-processing
spoken in moments of stress
or isa!ation about getting.
nuclear weapons? Turkey,
Indonesia, Tahean, Libya. Yet
others move steadily towards
the technology that permits
nuclear weapons: South
Africa, Australia, Iran, Japan
.and Argentina.
Offers to help with nuclear
programmes, some of them
more irresponsible than
others, coma from most of
the supplier states?France.
West Germany, the Soviet
Union, Canada, India:
But not from Britain: we
stitk to the opposite approach.
The main example is the re-
cent deal by which we will
re-pioeess Japan's spent fuel
elements here. The agree-
ment is a showpiece. If such
a large advanced industrial
country as Japan finds it ?
economic to include a journey
to England and back in the
nuclear power ? generation
cycle, then all these little !
South Koreas and Pakistans
stand convicted of militarism.
HOW CAN WE control all
this? The principal tool ought
to be the Non-Proliferation
Treaty of 1968. This had been
privately agreed in advance
between the Americans and
Russians, and, since anything
agreed between America and
Russia starts 10% up in
British eyes, it was enthu-
siastically (and uncritically)
endorsed by this country: and.
for the same reason, decried
by France and China.
It was unenthusiastically
endorsed by most of the rest
of the world, after they had
forced the nuclear powers to
agree to include an article in
the Treaty binding there to
work for disarmament among
themselves. A great majority
of countries in the world
igned (and a smaller majority
-atified). .The non-nuclear
weapon EEC states ratified
nly last year; Japan has not
et done so. Others have
-ejected it as one would reject
sermon on abstinence by a
lrunken pastor.
While the Treaty was being
tegotiated, it was pointed out
y Egypt and others that it ;
ontained many loopholes, the
videst being that non-nuclear
veapons countries (for
itstance Germany, Czechoslo-
akia, Canada, Iran) are not
revented from helping non-
ignatoriee to get nuclear.
?eapons (for instance, Paki-
tan, Israel, South Africa,
ndia). Nor are private
rms prevented from doing
nvthing whatever.
In May last year an NPT
eview conference was to take
lace in Geneva. The month
efore, the Americans, instead
f trying to get the loopholes
lugged with the agreement of
he Treaty parties, convened
complete secrecy a first
iceting of "The Nuclear Ex-
orters Consultative Group,"
emetimes called " The Secret
even." (France only agreed
plant to South Korea, another t.
country whose government I
explicitly reserves the right to
make nuclear weapons ? b
despite having signed and c
ratified the NPT (from which %
everybody does have a right '
to withdraw). But the
Americans impressed on v
the South Koreans that they e
could continue to enjoy
American nuclear protection w
only if they made no move s
towards nuclear weapons of I
their own. For tha moment fi
the deal with France is off. a
The Indian " explosive
device " was made with the r.
hep of systems imported from p
Canada !Deg ago under b
evidently inadequate safe- a
guards. Aed the same is tree p
of France's nuclear help which t.
set Israal on the road to the ii
(untested) nuciear weapons n
the CIA now says she pos- p
sesses. Neither India nor s
Israel is an NPT signatory. S
Other countries have
40
to join if it was secret.) They
are USA, the Soviet Union,
Britain, France, West Ger-
nianye Canada, Japan.
Last month an American
official, Mr George Vest, gave
to Congress what 'is still
almost the only hard news of
the consensus of this elite
group. First, it wants other
countries to join (Belgium,
Sweden, East Germany, etc).
Second, America has decided
(and we may assume these
"decisions " resemble more
or less the "guidelines"
accepted by the Secret Seven
as a whole) to demand " assur-
ances" that their nuclear
exports will not be used to
produce explosives, and that
if re-exported, the same
" assurances" will be passed
up the line. Third, America
favours " multilateral regional
facilities for re-processing and
enrichment," so as to have
it done -in fewer places and
under international control.
A system of " assurances "
is unlikely to bring control
over these processes even up
to the level now exercised by
IAEA over the fissionable
materials themselves. But as
the reactors and the trade in
fuel spreads, so will the abso-
lute amount of "Material Un-
accounted For" (or MUF)
which means the margin of
error in any conceivable
system of control. In time
this margin can only become
so big that people could be
making bombs within it.
Nuclear power is bombs just
as much as it is electricity,
and the Soviet Union's deci-
sion to use nuclear explosives
in its "Transformation of
Nature" programme has pro-
vided a plausible alibi for
bomb makers.
The real answer, as usual in
human affairs, must hi. poli;.1-
val. The developed world mus:
really now ask itself: wl-rs
should Pakistan, Brazil, ot?
even Libya not have nuclear
weapons? There is no answer
in common polities; what is so
special about Pakistan or
Brazil? Why do they have to
be denied the rights we enjoy?
The only way forward,
therefore, still lies where it
always did?in the cessation
and reversal of the centrai
arms race between Russia and
America. Haltingly, in the lae
five years, .the super-powees
have begun to talk. But out ef
the world's hearing; and the
published agreements are lee-
able only for ambiguity z
insufficiency. And a new
generation of weapon.s--creiae
missiles, an updated V-bomb
? threatens to "reduce lo
nothing all that has been
achieved so far." The words
are from Russia hut Dr
Kissinger is saying the same.
But " what has been
achieved so far" has been
negotiated in airless secrecy
which has fed the apprehen-
sions- of outsiders and made
"nuclear independence "
seem merely prudent. What
the Shah said about the
"Secret Seven." in ail liter-
view in Le Monde las:: Deem-
her is true of the whole
nuclear affair: "One wonders
if the real purposes of the
group do not go beyond the
advertised aims. If it is ready
the case that they are only
concerned with non-proiifera-
tion, why are they doimz it
behind locked doors?" Why
indeed?
NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, APRIL 18, 1976
Bonn's Atom Offer to Iran
Stirs a Debate on Sharing
By CRAIG R. WHITNEY
Special to The New York T.loes ?
BONN; April 16?Early next.
gy, not' iust'one or' two atomic
month, a negotiating team of reactors to generate electricity.'
West German and Iranian ibut the whole range of equio-1
atomic-energy specialists will
meet in Teheran to discuss a
question that is likely to be a
point of conflict between the
United States, its European
ment, scientific techniques andi
nuclear knowledge needed toi
realize Shah Mohammed Pizal
Pahlevi's ',labs to make hfs;
country a major modern indus-i
allies, and the developing coun- trial power.
tries for decades. The full .technology includes!
The question is whether in- "'sensitive" processes for ext..;
dustrialized countries like West :riching uranium' and' reprocess-i
Germany should share with ing the fuel elements of a nu-I
third-world countries like Iran clear reactor, removing pieta-
the nuclear science and tech- nium and other byproducts of
niques that could, be used for atomic reaction. This technolo-
nuclear weapons. gy could be used to make atom.
The United States has in ic bombs,
effect a ban on -sensitive" ex- Although Iran signed the nu-
;ports. But the West Germans clear nonproliferation treaty
twill discuss this arca. with Iran. and is committed not to (levet-
and actually made a compre-nioP nuclear explosives, the S:?..th
hensive nuclear export agree. could not get "sensitive" rr.:-!
mvnt with Brazil last year, clear technology from Inc tat-,
Iran wants nuclear technolo-; ed States. As a matter of
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? Icy, the Administration does
not permit the export of equip
ment and techniques that could
be used to make bombs no
matter what the buyer prom-
ises.
But the West Germans say
they are willing to discuss any
area of technology, placing
their faith in tight controls
and international supervision
of the "sensitive" installations
they export to the developing
world.
no area of technolo?giiai hee
- excluded from the discussions
including reprocessing." Earlie
nf sured Washington in advanc
that Bonn did not plan to se
ri any nuclear reactors to Egyp
Exports are the heart of the
West German economy, and
the Germans feel they simply
cannot afford to be cut out
of the high-technology export
field. "They missed out on aero-
space and computer technolo-
gy," an American businessman
here commented, "and they see
nuclear technology as the big
area of the.future?they're just
not willing to lose this one."
The French are engaged in
an equally vigorous nuclear ex-
port drive, reportedly involving
the sale of plutonium - re-
processing plants to such coun-
tries as South Korean and Paki-
stan. Under American pressure,
South Korea decided not to
go through with the deal, but
the French are as eager as
the West Germans not to lose
a share of the nuclear technolo-
gy market.
A Huge Stake
Billions of dollars and tens
of thousands of jobs?even the
economic future of Western Eu-
rope?are at stake, they feel.
And as an official of Kraft-
werk Union, the seven-year-old
West German manufacturer of
nuclear power plants, ex-
plained, "Wherever we look?
in Italy, Spain, Sweden, Thai-
-land, South Korea?the Ameri-
cans have already been there.
The third world is the only
open market left."
The United States will Meet
with six other nuclear-supplier
countries' in London in June,
and Secretary of State Henry
A. Kissinger said the central
issue would be that of export-
ing reprocessing plants. The
United States believes that they
should be under multinational
control; West German experts
say this would be unrealistic
in the case of countries like
Iran that are in politically un-
stable regions.
What the West German nego-
tiators will agree on in Teheran
next month is unclear. It is
certain, the West Germans say,
that if any comprehensive nu-
clear agreement is reached with
Iran it would be tightly con-
trolled.
"There is nothing concrete
yet," said Dr. Wolf-J. Schmidt-
Kilster of the Ministry of Re-
search and Technology, "but
this year, West Germany an
Iran reached tentative agree
ment on an outline for a
nuclear-cooperation agreement
but did not make it public.
Sensitivity about the risk o
an uncontrollable spread of nu
clear weapons is running so
? high in the United States that
Washington and Bonn nearly
clashed openly last June when
West Germany signed the
world's first complete nuclear-
technology export agreement,
with Brazil.
The weekly news magazine
Der Spiegel attacked the
Government last month with
a long article that said in part:
"The responsible politicians
seem to worry little, if at all,
about the danger that states
with a highly doubtful reputa-
tion are being helped to effort-
less acquisition of nuclear-weap-
:ons technology."
But after the Brazilian expe-
rience, according to Government
and industry officials inter-
viewed for this article, the
West Germans have become
not only sensitive but also
acutely defensive about the
issue.
el really all -we have."
ll
d 'Brazil was signed here 13.3t
t The controversial treaty with
di until the United States di
- According to the expert
however, reactors are not th
, main problem?the "sensitiv
'technology" used in enrichin
f the uranium fuel and recover
. ing plutonium and uranium-23
from spent fuel cells poses th
danger. Plutonium has no pres-
ent practical use, America
experts say, except in bormbs
But American efforts withi
the group of nuclear-supplier
nations have failed so far to
get the Germans and the
French to agree not to expor
enrichment and reprocessing
devices. ,
There is an enormous amount
of suspicion here that behind
the U.S. drive for tighter con-
trols is a desire to corner
the vast world nuclear-technol-
ogy market for American com-
panies like Westinghouse and
General Electric.
Joachim Hospe, an official
of Kraftwerk Union, said in
Frankfurt: "To fully exploit our
nuclear power plant capacity,
we have to land at least three
contracts a year for delivery
abroad. The market here is
about saturated and the United
States has cornered most of
the rest of Europe, so we have
to concentrate on the third
world."
Operating within the frame-
wor of the nuclear-coopera-
tion agreements West Germany
has with Brazil, Canada, Ruma-
nia, Pakistan, India, Iran and
Chile (the last one dormant
since the military coup there)
Kraftwerk Union now has 27
power-plant orders on its
books. It is big business: the
!average 'price for a 1,200-mega-
lwatt nuclear plant is about
6600 million.
Kraftwerk Union also bid to
build two? nuclear plants in
South Africa, where it is in
competition with both 'Ameri-
can and French concerns. But
according to some West Ger-
man officials Chancellor Hel-
mut Schmidt may veto any
deal with South Africa because
the white minority Government
there is politically 'offensiveto
many members of his Social
Democratic Party.
Another proposal, a three-
ear-old plan to build a nu-
lear-power plant at Kalinin-
grad ?.for the Soviet Union, fell
through last month after the
Russians refused to let the elec-
tric - transmission lines . run
through East Germany to sup-
ply West Berlin.
"It's too bad," Mr. Hospe
id, "Russia could have been
market. You see that the
e
veloping countries
e..: ;June 27, and Karl-Heinz Schol-1
e Ityssek, an official of the t
e 'Foreign Ministry, described it;
g in an interview as "a model.";
- The agreement provides for
5 exploration for uranium ore in
e ,Brazil to supply \Vest Germa-
ny's needs, now met largely
n! by supplies from the United
? States and the Soviet Union.
n In return, the West Germans
will give Brazil access to the
t, here, and build a pilot ree
1 separation-nozzle uranium-en-
richment process developed
, processing plant in Brazil. The;
installation is capable of sepa-
rating and extracting weapons-
grade plutonium from used
reactor fuel elements?a "com-
plete nuclear fuel cycle," in
other words.
I "The Brazilians want to buy I
as many as eight large pressurH
iized-water power-plant reac-
tors from us," Mr. Schmidt:
Mister said, "and i: they have!
,that many, by 1990, they will
ineed their own facilities for
'enriching and reprocessing the;
!fuel. Otherwise they'd have to,
ibe transporting this dangerousj
'material thousands of miles:
across the ocean, to Germany4
and there are objections alli
the time to doing that sorti
of thing here." ? I
Mr. Scholtyssek pointed outi
that the Brazilians pledged ini
the treaty not to use either;
the equipment or the technolo-1
gy they get from West Germa-{
ny ? for: any kind of nuclear
explosive device even a "peace- I
'ful' one.. And, he pointed cut,i
an integral part of the agreeH
ment was that Brazil had to,
submit to supervision and con-!
trol by the International Atom-
ic Energy Agency. The agencf.
? and the Governments of Zrazi.
and West Germany sigriled a
treaty insuring these control:
on Feb. 26.
"The technology, in additior
to the equipment, is explicit13
included in the controls.'-" Mr
Scholtyssek said, "and the tri
lateral agreement cermet- be
unilaterally abrogated. It -last
as long as the equipment does.'
Critics like Der Spiegel ' asser
that equipment the Brazilian:
develop later, with Germar
technology 'can not be trt
o
trolled, an assertion Mr. Schol?
tyssek denies. . ,
The American Government':
attitude' is that avoiding the
export of sensitive technolog!
like reprocessing and enrich-
ment is better than controls
as Mr. Kissinger said in a 'Sere
late bearing on March 9.
The issue is one that will
not be dismissed by the con-
trols, safeguards and interna-
tional supervision that the
West Germans tied into the
agreement with Brazil and will
tie into any other nuclear co-
operation treaty, as Dr. Schmidt-
Mister emphasized.
Kissinger Unhappy
Despite the controls, to be
carried out by the Vienna-based
International Atomic Energy
Agency, Secretary Kissinger
was known to be unhappy
about West Germany's agree-
ment with Brazil. On Capitol
Hill there were calls for the
'United States and the Soviet
Union to agree to cut off
France and West -Germany
from supplies of enriched ura-
nium for their own nuclear-
power plants unless they agree
not to export to "untrust-
worthy" countries.
Since Brazil, the West Ger-
mans have been more circum-
spect. For example, after
, Egypt's President, Anwar el-Sa-
dat, ended his visit here April
1 he toured the 1,200-megawatt
nuclear-power plant at Biblis.
Both Iran and Brazil have al-
ready each ordered two like
it.
Mr. Sadat was given a gold-
plated hard hat as a souvenir,
hut he took little else away
from the visit. Even though
the Biblis pressurized - water
reactors contain little militarily
,y
Ic
sa
useful technology, the West a
German Government had as-; d
41.
are now
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THE WASHENGTON POST
? Saturday. April 17.1916
Diplomatic Hostages and Detente
trilE PREDICAMENT OF SOVIET and American diplo-
-11- mats working in each other's country these days
reflects all too accurately the soured state of "detente."
Because of continuing stark Soviet restrictions on Soviet
Jews, a few American Jews have adopted criminal ter-
ror tactics against Soviet diplomats in New York?to
the point of firing into apartments occupied by children.
The New York police and other authorities have applied
extraordinary diligence to the task of safeguarding the
diplomats, but with less than total success. As a result,
the Kremlin has undertaken a campaign of phone threats,
bomb scares and physical intimidation against American-
diplomats in Moscow. Daily life for the two diplomatic
communities could scarcely be more grim.
It goes without saying that diplomats of all nations
must be personally immune from all such threats and
hostile- acts. No measure of political disagreement justi
fee holding diplomats hostage to their governments'
policies. That said, there is a glaring difference in lhe
two situations. The American government is trying to
uphold the law and bring to account the perpetrators-
of anti-Soviet crimes in New York. The Soviet govern
anent is itself breaking the law and dishonoring its inter.
national duty by conducting organized harassment of
Americans in Moscow. A month ago, in regard to com-
plaints of Americans there that they were being exposed
to dangerous radiation from Soviet surveillance equip
-
anent, the question was raised whether the United States
ought to give Soviet diplomats in Washington a similar
?t Eon. The answer, quite properly, was no. Other, legal
forms of reciprocal treatment?such as withdrawal by
Americans from all but the most format essential con-
WASHINGTON POST
26 APR 1976
Screens Found to
?
tacts with Soviet diplomats?would be much more ap-
propriate. But that only points up the truly ugly nature
of the Kremlin's conduct in these affairs. It ought to
be widely condemned.
No less worthy of condemnation, however, are the
assaults by militant Jews-in New York. They are doing
a good deal more than breaking the law, undercutting
the hospitality the United States owes foreign diplomats.
and providing a? pretext for Soviet countermeasures
against American diplomats They are also alarming the
very people, Soviet Jews, whose cause they profess to
espouse. Jews in Moscow have already relayed their
criticism of the likes of the "Jewish Armed Resistance."
protesting on principle against the use of terror and
noting that the Kremlin might use the provocation as
grounds for a further crackdown on Soviet Jews.
The basic source of this tension remains the Soviet
Union's refusal to respect the human rights of its citi-
zenry, in this case, the rights of Jews. If anything is
clear fiom the recent years of close foreign attention to
the matter, however, it is that tactics meant to relieve
Soviet citizens must be carefully designed and executed.
'Recent well-intended efforts to use economic leverage to
promote Jewish emigration, for instance, ended up con-
tributing to a sharp drop in emigration, a stalemate in
trade, and a deterioration of atmosphere which played
back negatively into still other Soviet-American projects.
We are not sure how to.restore the generally more posi-
tive circumstances in which emigration, among other
things, grew in 1973-74. We are confident, though, that
the way not to do it is to fire bullets into the apartments
of Soviet diplomats in New York.
Block
Rays at Moscow Embassy
Associated Press
A classified State Depart-
ment document says that
aluminum screening re-
cently installed at the U.S.
embassy in Moscow is 90 per
cent effective in blocking
out microwave radiation be-
Ing beamed at the embassy
by the Soviets.
The document, prepared
for use in closed briefings of
embassy employees, pro-
vides the first detailed offi-
cial explanation of the mi-
crowave situation, which has
aroused concern over poten-
tial health hazards because
of the radiation.
Yet many basic questions
remain unanswered ? in-
cluding why the Soviets are
continuing the microwave
bombardment.
I Secretary of State Henry
A. Kissinger has called the
I issue "a matter of great deli-
cacy which has many ramifi-
cations," adding that the
United States is involved in
talks with Soviet officials in
an effort to get the radia-
tion stopped.
A copy of the confidential
State Department briefing
paper was made available to
the Associated Press.
The document says that
window screens installed at
the embassy 2% months ago
"reduce the current micro-
wave signals to a point well
below one microwatt per
square centimeter but not to
a 'zero' level."
By contrast, late last year
the microwaves had reached
a maximum intensity of 18
microwatts in certainly
heavily irradiated areas of
the embassy, the briefing
paper said.
U.S. officials in Washing-
ton and Moscow have re-,,
fused to give any detailed
public explanation about the
microwave problem since it
broke into headlines in
early February.
On the purpose of the mi-
crowaves, the briefing paper
said, "This is something the
Soviets are in the best posi-
tion to answer."
The Soviets, the document
noted, "have suggested to
some newsmen recently that
they are attempting to inter-
fere with embassy reception
of communications. Others
have theorized that the
beams were in some way
connected with surveillance
activities."
On the question of possi-
ble health hazards, the pa-
per said that so far "no
cause and effect relation-
ship has been established
between _disorders con-
tracted by those In Moscow
and their exposure to the
electromagnetic field." -
It noted that "a full-scale
study of those, who have
served in Moscow in the
past and those whoe are
there now is in the process
of being developed."
The briefing document
also reported that since Oc-
tober, 1975, the embassy has
been the target of two mi-
crowave beams. "Both are
highly directional, some-
what like searchlight beams,
but wider. They are aimed
at the upper floors of the
central wing of the chancery
from different directions,"
the document said.
The upper floors of the 10-
story building house the of-
fices of the ambassador and
other top diplomats, along
with sensitive communica-
tions and intelligence areas.
The State Department ac-
count said the two micro-
wave beams "are sometimes
on the air simultaner.usly
for three to four limirs a
day."
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WASHINGTON POST
20 APR 1976
Today's Example of Chutzpah
. yOU REMEMBER the definitive illustration of the
word chutzpah: It is the story about the young
man who murdered his parents and then pleaded
with the judge to take pity on a poor orphan. That
word has taken on a meaning that lies well beyond
the comparatively pallid English term, unmitigated
gall:It connotes an effrontery so outrageous as to
command a certain reluctant admiration. Today's ex:
ample of chutzpah is the Soviet accusation that the
United States is meddling in Western European af-
fairs.
:The United States, In this Soviet- view, is not living
--lip. to the ?Helsinki agreement that Was signed amidst
? much mutual congratulation last August. It required
all-the signatories to promise not to meddle in each
,:tiliers' internal affairs. The current Soviet accusation
.1.1.-a response to the American admonitions to Italy
--Ilmut the prospect of Communists in its government.
:Late last year the United States government was
"embarrassed by .the disclosure, that it was preparing
16 pour Several million dollars into Italian politics, in,
?"a 'despairing effort to propThp the non-Communist
,parties. The dislosure was, fortunately, enough to kill
.the whole idea. The 'Soviets, Meanwhile, have been
,iibsidizing the Italian. Coninurniit party so long and
ZOO fined tinut sun, April 111, 19/6
so steadily that they hardly think of it as foreign in-
terfezence any longer. It's merely an old Russian cus-
tom.
Europeans use a double standard in judging these
affairs, and they are quite right. They know that it is
in the nature of the Soviet government to tamper
with the internal affairs of other countries whenever
the opportunity presents itself. They understand that
. high-minded international agreements do not affect
that basic fact of life. They realize that it is foolish to
expect the Russians to do otherwise.
But Europeans also know that a great many Ameri-
cans have grave doubts about this country's occa-
sional attempts to mess around covertly in other peo-
ple's politics, and Americans persist in debating the
issue loudly although their government frequently
wishes that they would not. As a result, the United
States government currently can do very little more
than lecture Italy about the probable results of its
present tendency. The Soviets profess to believe that
these lectures represent a violation of the Helsinki
treaty. Here as always, the Soviet view is that the So-
viet government is to be judged publicly only by
those things that it chooses to do publicly.
THE $ONNENFELDT DOCTRINE'
Dualism Marks U.S. Policy
? - BY ZYGMUNT NAGORSKI JR.
American policy toward Europe?both
East and West?shows a curious dualism.
We are dogmatic and inflexible toward
the emerging electoral strength of West-
, ern European Communist parties. At the
lame time, we have moved from the pre-
Mous. position of tolerance and tacit
-approval of Soviet domination of Eastern
Europe to a more explicit and politically
suggestive concept recently labeled the-
Sonnenfeldt Doctrine. .
In a briefing for our European ambassa-
dors, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, one of the
closest advisors of Secretary of State Hen-
ry A. Kissinger. suggested a "more natural
and organic" relationship between the So-
viet Union and Eastern Europe.
? Is there a link between these varied
American positions? There could be.
From a historical perspective, a connec-
tion can be seen between the present
American position and the Yalta Agree-
ment concluded between the big powers
on Feb. 11, 1945. It was at Yalta that a di-
vision of the spoils was sealed. It was
there that Eastern Europe was awarded to
the Soviet Union as the area of its legiti-
mate security concern, and it was there
that the Russians were told to keep their
43
hinds off elsewhere. It was also at Yalta
that efforts were made by the West to
preserve a semblance of self-rule in such
countries as Poland and Czechoslovakia. -
?
? Greece, Turkey and Iran were threa-
_
tened later by "wars of liberation," and
Poland and Czechoslovakia were sub-
merged by what Sonnenfeldt aptly termed
sheer Soviet power. But 31 years ago it
was impossible to foresee the dichotomy of
the developments witin the two European
halves: prosperity and social convulsions
- in the West; uniformity?after a period of
desperate unrest?in the East.
The Sonnenfeldt Doctrine is our admis-
sion of failure. It suggests that the Yalta
Agreement did not work out either to our
benefit or expectations. It also suggests
. that it would be in the interest of the Unit-
ed States to see within the Soviet bloc
A staff member of the Council on Foreign.'
Relations, Zygmunt Nagorski is the author
of "Psychology of East-West Trade: Illusions
and Opportunities."
more cohesive and more politically signifi-
? cant developments permitting the Rus-
sians to relax their concern and to begin
relying less on power and more on institu-
tional and political links.
- Such goals can be accomplished only if
Eastern Europeans become institutionally
and politically closer to the Soviet Union.
The new American doctrine, cites the ex-
, amples of Poland and Hungary, where ac-
commodations to that effect are being
made by the ruling Communist parties. In
Poland serious attempts have been- made
to amend the constitution to fit it more
into the mold of the Soviet constitution.
t The authorities rammed it through the ?
controlled parliament, but a wave of
protests swept the country. led by writers,
artists and academicians who saw in the
official attempt another step toward even-
tual incorporation of Poland into the net-
work of Soviet socialist republics. The
wording of the more drastic amendments
was changed. The protesters had scored a
few points.
Sonnenfeldt's implied theory is that such
protestors are simply delaying an inevita-
ble process of evolution. It also suggests
that Eastern Europe, unless well en-
trenched within the Soviet power struc-
ture, could be a powder keg and even trig-
ger another major war. It is difficult to see
the logic of his concern. Should his doc-
trine enter the body of American foreign
policy, any. repetition of past uprisings in
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%that part of the world would be left to the
Soviet Union alone to deal with. Where,
therefore, would be the danger of a West-
ern involvement?
The link between our Western and East-
ern European policies thus emerges. While
we are willing to go far beyond the Yalta
Agreement by suggesting stronger syste-
mic cnonections in the East, we are also
telling the Russians that they should keep
their part of the bargain concluded in 1945
by keeping their hands off the West. This
explains Washington's rigidity toward
tern Communists. They have
? ben, and still are natural Soviet al-
lies, and thus cannot be permitted to
assume a share of power in the West.
ince in both France and Italy the
Communist parties emerged out of
the electoral process,' the U.S. Ad-
ministration is using its leverage to
bypne% the process and enforce the
Continuity of non-Communist majori-
" .. ?
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ble of tackling such issues as social
justicei employment, morality in pub!,
lic life and economic recovery.
It has also been widely assumed in
Europe that the Soviet Union would
- view the assumption of power by the
Italian Communist Party with mixed
feelings. A successful experiment of a
trills, democratic Communist partici-
pation in power, an experiment ar-
rived at through the electoral pro-
Cess, would be viewed with uneasi-
ness ' by the existing Communist
governments in Eastern European
countries, for reasons 'easily per-
ceived.-. ?
? -There is not a single country with-
in the Fastern bloc where commu-
nism has sustained .itself: through
pluralistic institutions, freedom of
speech, assembly and choice. In
Yu-
.js, where the' Soviet Union is
'absent, government control oyer the
. individual reigns supreme. In Roma- -
nia, where foreign policy is directed .
by a president of clear nationalistic
-leanings and where Soviet influence
? is limited, a rigid internal police sys-
. tem exists. Elsewhere, governments
-rest on a combination of Soviet and
?domestic pollee powers. ? ? -
:And the majority of the. people?
who go through an electoral process.
always returning 99%--of Communist
candidates to office?assume that
without an element of_ coercion,. no
Cemmunist-controlle& regime could
survive. The party apparatus adds.
credence to that belief, by steadily re.:
fusing to permit the exerrnso of na--
tural human-freedom
-Italy, a country outside the, reach
of direct Soviet power, may suddenly
.challengt that eassumption. Should
the historical compromise succeed in
Rome, without undermining Italian
democratic . institutions, ? a tamed
Communist-Christian Democrat re-
gime could emerge. It would be
based on a democratic process of se-.
lection; it would not require a heavy
police hand. It would reject the no-
:Lion of Soviet predominance In .
foreign and defense policies. .
In short, Eastern Europeans, and
Russians as well, would see the
- 'This attitude appears distinctly un-
icl=ocratic to Europeans. America
ifenerges as another superpower in-
?teneested more in overall balance and
.tiectrity considerations than in the
will of the people concerned. The dif- ?
tference between the two?the Soviet
;Union and the United States?begins
-itci bit=
? '
-Yet there may be another, differ-
' *nt connection between US. policies
Vox East and West. It has been wide-
ay assumed in European political cir-
icles that the Communist movement is
facing a serious crisis. It is no longer
(either an ideological or political men-:
liti It is a set of ideas, vaguely
Inked to its original Moscow source,
,Ibut representing a new set of values,
4..tee-sponding to all kinds of new chal-
hnges. The Soviet Union, faced with
e schism of its original faith, is -
;gaping. for solutions. It continues to.
demand loyalty from its followerseIt-
ts it from some, like the French?
ettlei spite of their declarations 'to the e
outs:ay?but not from all,
Jo' In Italy, . the" Communist Party
*ceased to be an international branch
lof an outside church. Today it rep/e-
a-eels to many Italians a party capa-
NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, APRIL IS, 1976
he View from
uro e Is of a
eceding U.S.
By FLORA LEWIS
PARIS?As they survey what is coming to look like the
shambles of their own efforts to unite. European leaders
have begun to question America's intentions around the
world. The questions are whether United States policy is
really changing after 30 years of active intervention in
global polities; whether the United States and Russia are
heading for a new period cf cold war over the heads of other
development of a socialism with a
.'human face?a development which
caused Moscow to send tanks to
Czechoslovakia in 1968. But such use
-'of force would be iinpossible in Italy.
It is entirely possible, therefore, -
. that.. such a major change in Italy .
would have a destabilizing effect on
the Soviet-controlled part of Europe.
The Soviet Union may have to rely
more, not less, on its military might.
The organic ? links' advocated by Son-
: nenfeldt would be even more remote.
?,7Sucli links could be developed only
through growing mutual trust mixed
? with the feelings of desperation by
? Poles, Romanians and -others, desper- .
ation born out of the reality of stand-
ing alone face to face with the Soviet .
An Italian experiment in dernacra-
_ cy embracing a genuine Communist
-Party would open a possible way out
? of such a state-of desperation." All
over Eastern Europe, other people
e would ask: "Why don't we also try to
e adapt our system to both lanmen and -
....national aspirations?" 7
Y% 'Thus emerges the link between our
? two positions regarding Eastern and
'Western Europe. In order to save de- .
tente? and to assure our continued di-
: alogue with the Soviet Union, we are
attempting to defuse tensions all over
.
Europe:' in :.the East by suggesting
. more 'normal' relations with the So-
viets; in the West by eliminating a
'a-potential security problem for. our-
:elves and.at the same time a politi-
-cal and ideological problem; for the
'.Russians.. The goal is clear; bilateral
t'n American-Soviet relations are more
--important . than -other- elements of
Power -struggle in the areas wider
-the respective Soviet and Arr1Prioan
influences. ' ? ,
But along the way we may find ?
ourselves alone and isolate& The
Sonnenfeldt theory cuts America off
:.from the -continuing aspirations of
the people of, Eastern Bin-one. And
on the western side of the continent,
the process of change is going to con-
tinue with or without our blessing;
with or without cue perticipation.
-:dOuntries that would nonetheless feel the chill; whether the ?
world balance is really tilting towards Moscow.
These are overlapping and contradictory questions, re- ,
fleeting the fact that there is no real consensus in Europe
on what is happening, only a consensus that something is
coming unstuck and old assumptions can no longer be
taken for granted.
The sharpened quill of headlines and commentators has
been warning for some time now of American "withdrawal," .
"eclipse," "paralysis," "neo-isolationism," even "abandon-
ment of responsibilities." The phrases flow after each new
international crisis, such as Lebanon and Angola. and reach
back to Vietnam, Watergate. Responsible officials do not
make it sound quite so drastic, but they share a sense of
uncertainty about what to expect from the United States,
and many of them complain of American retrenchment. At
a recent meeting of Common Market government heads in
? Luxembourg, the mood was one of helpless and even bitter
gloom.
France warned that Africa was about to topple into the
Soviet orbit, taking perhaps more. seriously than other ob-
servers the Ford Administration's warning about what
would happen if Congress refused to intervene in Angola.
There was a general 'awareness of the growth of Soviet
44
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military power (which the leaders have known about for
. years, hut which seems-suddenly to have struck their con-
? sciousness anew) and that the rhetoric of detente might
work to demobilize the West and benefit Moscow.
Some high officials think there is a sea-change coming
in America, as a result of a shift in the power balance
between the President and Congress. Some think that is
a threat, not yet realized. Some, the veterans, tend more
to suppose that election year blues will? lift when the bal-
-lots are counted and the United States will show its familiar,
eager 'face.
The worries are not clearly focused. Nobody influential
has suggested that the United States would not go to the
defense of Western Europe in case of attack, nor that an ?
attack has become any more likely. But there has been '
more talk of the danger of Europe's "Finlandizatiop."
The general public has not paid much attention to these
politicians' and officials' concerns. Countries are focusing-
inwards, on their immediate grievances and troubles, and
when they speak to their electorates, the leaders are follow-
ing this trend. The result is that they do not speak openly
of their fears. Another result of this concentration on the
home-front is that judgments about what is happening in
the United States and. the world tend to reflect Internal
partisan squabbles even more than usual.
? France's influential daily, Le Monde, took the Kissinger-? ?
r ?
Sonnenfeldt statements on American. policy, -madetri?
- group of United States ambassadors last December, as'
further proof that Washington is determined to prevent.
the rise of an effective power partner in Europe. Others
have taken the compressed policy review as an indication
? that the United States is losing the will to contain Soviet
influence.
The confusion has only compounded itself, as' tha?qUesr
thin is put about what the Europeans wish America would
do. One sage, retired participant in the highest councils.
..said: "Don't worry. The West has only lost where it was
wrong?Indochina, Portuguese Africa, and next will come
Rhodesia." He belittled the widespread complaints among
. European officials that revelations about the Central Intel-?
? ligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, cor-
porate bribery, were undermining America's authority.
"There has never been so much American intervention,
and clumsy at that,- in European affairs as now, with your
leaders shaking their fists about which governments they
will and won't. tolerate," he .said. It was a reference to
.the ford Administration carnpagn against Communists in
France and Italy.-
But among .the people who make policy, this calm, even,
bemused view is the exception, More common is the fear
that somehow America may stop being willing and able to
'
shield Europe, not only on its own territory but in areas
of the developing world where it has vital interests.
In an inchoate way, the fear is beginning to spread to
layers of society who feel they can only lose as the un-
certainty spreads. A group of French businessmen said that
many of their friends were sending money abroad now, to
Canada, the United States and Brazil, not to West Germany
or Switzerland. It isn't clear whether they are worried about
the Russians or the French Communists. But they do say
they lack confidence in the future of Western Europe.
The fraying fabric of the Common Market, reflected in
the failure of the nine government heads to agree on any-
thing, even a bland communique, when they met in Luxem-
bourg, is an element in the loss of hope and assurance af-
flicting European policy-makers. It is generally admitted
that there simply is no longer any point in mouthing slogans
about a common European defense, either to displace
American influence as the Gatrllists always wished, or to
buttress and if necessary replace it, as the Atlanticists
have sought. It isn't about to happen and that makes the
Europeans more conscious of their dependence on America
for security.
It isn't so much the election-year debate on foreign policy
which has upset the Europeans, as their perception cf
American unwillingness to undertake major foreign inter-
ventions during an election year.
But the lack of cohesion and sense of common purpose
among Europe's leaders., has gone so far that they can't
?even- reach -a common view-on what -they. wish America ?
would do. ?
? Perhaps, by the time of the alliance's spring meeting in
Oslo next month, a nucleus of the Europeans will manage
to come up with some kind Of suggestion to America. But
,nobody is betting on it in the present m3od.
And it seems important that the same people who ex-
press this glum view of the West's future are the ones who
keep pointing out that fear is . what .the Europeans have
most to fear, lest they resign themselves to a gradual
into paralyzed acceptance of Soviet demands. Morale is
terrible, they say, and that is demoralizing.
There are still some who insist that the cold facts in
both America and Europe give no justification for this self-
defeatism, which would concede to Russia in? the next
generation something, like the prime super-power status
throughout the world which America held during the
postwar generation. Since it is more a matter of mood than
reality, these sober voices argue, the situation could be
turned around by an injection of encouraging leadership.
But the fashion of the moment is to pessimism, the eye
of .the powerful is fixed on the shadows. It makes for
passivity, regardless of the actual balance of light and dark
on the horizon.
. ? ?
? ..
45
Flora Lewis' is chief of the Paris bureau of The New
York Times.
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Nea East
LONDON OBSERVER
4 April 1976
Step-by-step to eath
f the Lebanon ,
LIKE doctors, statesmen have
the macabre distinction of
counting their errors in human
lives; and Dr Henry Kissinger,
the most confident physician
to treat the ailments of the
Middle East for a quarter of
a century, ends up having a
mountain of Lebanese corpses
on his conscience.
. ?The destruction of Lebanon
and of its unique society can
be traced, at least in part, to
,l-wo strategic decisions taken
1 by .Dr- Kissinger in the
1,
immediate wake of the October
I' Wan of 1973. The first Was to
:-seek to take' Egypt- out of the
conflict, thus separating her
from her battle ally Syria, in
? the,. expectation that, once
Egypt was disengaged, peace-
making on the other fronts
Iwould be far easier?the
fatrious Kissinger step-by-step
I procedure.
. The second decision was a
I negative one : a refusal to take
.his surgeon's knife to the
central cancer in Arab politics,
the Palestine question, in the
belief that if the Arab States
could be persuaded to make
disengagement or non-belliger-
? ,ency deals with Israel?even
' short of full-scale peace?the
Palestinians would simply have
to acquiesce in whatever
arrangements were made for
them; and if they didn't, the
Arab States would deal with
them. V, .
Both these decisions, which '
? bear ..the mark of Israeli
influence .on Dr Kissinger's
? thinking, already appear as
gross misjudgments. ,.
Encouraged by Dr Kissinger,
the ' defection ' of Egypt from
the battlefield at once put
intolerable pressure on Syria
and aroused immense resent-
ment in her. leaders... They
were haunted with the pros-
pect of a new war with Israel
in which they would have to
.stand alone: and this fear has
dictated their every move.
Syria's national ? interest,
indeed her survival, demands
that she control, neutralise or
contain any radical, militant
or extremist element in 1
Lebanon which might trigger
off an Israeli intervention and
drag Syria into a suicidal
adventure. ,
. This need to control events
vital to her national security
has made Syria the reluctant
and embarrassed champion of
the old guard Lebanese estab-
lishment and has brought her
into conflict with the Pales-
tinian guerrillas, .with .mili-
tant --Arab nationalists and
with the Left. V Syria simply
cannot afford violent, unpre-
dictable revolutionary
change in Lebanon.- ?
As for the Palestinians, Dr
Kissinger's consistent neglect
! of them, his reluctance in
deference to Israel to grasp
the nettle of their stateless-
ness, has brought' to the sun-
face in 'Palestinian leaders a
neurotic fear of their own:
that of seeing their national
interests 'sacrificed- On. the
altar of __Arab peace - with
Israel. ?
They recognise that' they
have
They
an embarrass-
ment to an Arab world which
has embarked on ?;the search
for an accommodation with
Israel. But they believe Kis-
singer's step-by-step pro-
cedure means ultimate- stran-
gulation for them. So they
trust no Arab regime; they.
wriggle out of dependence on,
any one of them; they fear
Syrian overlordship and, hav-
ing established squatters'
rights in weak, vulnetable
and hospitable Lebanon, they
now fight tooth and nail to
preserve this last haven.
? .This is the political context
in which Kamal. Jumblatt, an
aristocrat turned populist, a
sort of Lebanese Tony Benn,
has made his bid for power.
He has come closer to success
now than at any time in his
long maverick career.
- Exploiting Syria's fear of
? disorderly change, her un-
popular defence of President
Franjieh and her heavy-
-handed tutelary role, Jum-
blatt mobilised under his radi-
cal banner not only the Pales-
tinians but also every other
restless party and sect that
felt tinfavoured, insecure or
unrepresented under the old
regime: Communists, Nasser-
ists, Shia Muslims, many
Greek Orthodox Christians,
his own Druze followers and
young nationalist military
firebrands such as Lieutenant
Khatib, leader of the muti-
nous, self-styled Lebanese
Arab Army, who scents to
have the makings of a
Qadhalia
These men ? Jumblatt,
Khatib and their Palestinian
allies, Arafat, Habash, Jibril
and so forth?are the new
leaders of Muslim Lebanon,
I Patrick Seale
completely displacing the
older moderate Sunni genera-
tion of Rashid Karami, Saab
Salam and Abdullah- Yali.
,They now physically control
three-quarters of the country.
? Jumblatt makes no bones
.- about it; he's out to smash
the old system ,at whatever
cost in human suffering.
Hence his frontal and un-
remitting -military assault on
the Maronite Christians, for-
merly the dominant political
,community, now much re-
duced by razzias and mas-
sacres, but still the only real
;obstacle to his ambitions.
' For-. Jumblatt and his
friends to come to power,
they must either destroy the
'Maronites militarily?an un-
likely outcome in view of the
difficulties of the terrain, the
stubbornness of the defence
''and' the possibility of foreign
intervention?or they must
change the constitution with
its 'built-in, privileges for
Maronites and Sunnis.
This now seems Jumblatt's
objective in agreeing to a
10-day truce. Having weak-
ened the Maronites in war, he
hopes by sustained political
' pressure to oust Franjieh at
long last, install an interim
President and secure elections
on a non-sectarian basis for a
constituent assembly, charged
with the task of dismantling
the politico-religious State
and building a new secular
order in which the Left must
dominate.
Can the Syrians afford to
allow it to happen? Can Jum-
blatt keep his alliance to-
gether long enough to push it
through?
The man who can tilt the
balance one way or the other
is Yasser Arafat, Jumblatt's
main military prop and, as
such, the real arbiter' of
Lebanon's future. Like Dr
Kissinger, he, too, has a lot of
corpses on his conscience. ?
The Lebanese political
system was no doubt corrupt,
but it was also tolerant, liberal
and democratic. Arafat must
hear a heavy responsibility
for its ruin.
To protect what Ire con-
ceived as Palestinian inter-
ests, Arafat allowed Jumblatt
and the Communists to use
h is guerri I las against the
Maronites, thus contributing
to the devastation of the one
Arab country which had given
his people unlimited if fool-
hardy support. His moral
position has undoubtedly
been weakened by the carn-
age.
The Palestinians are now
desperate for a new strategy:
the Arab States, on whose
armies they counted to give
them statehood, are edging
towards peace with Israel.
The Lebanese quagmire
threatens to swallow them up.
At this dark moment in
their history, the rumbling,
erupting disorders in the
occupied West Bank and in
Galilee ? culminating after
eight or nine weeks of strikes
and stone-throwing in last
Tuesday's outburst ? have
given a tremendous boost to
Palestinian morale.
In a trice, the Resistance
appears to have shifted the
focus of its struggle from the
Arab States, where the going
for it has become rough
indeed, to inside Israel itself.
This switch from ' outside '
to inside,' from the painful
Lebanese imbroglio to the
'glorious ' battlefield of Israel
?has already had a noticeable
effect on Arafat. It has rid him
of many complexes. The
anguished conciliator, seeking
to steer ? an independent
course between the hammer
of Syria and the anvil of jum-
Liam has once more donned
the mantle of the revolution-
ary guerrilla leader.
? Last week .saw the public
reconciliation of Arafat and
George Habash, the most fero-
cious opponent of any compro-
mise with Israel. 'We shall
continue the march in blood
and soul,' Arafat declared,
until we establish our demo-
cratic State on all the soil of
Palestine,' a far cry from the
encouraging am bigui ties of
his famous UN speech.
Paradoxically, this new
Palestinian militancy directed
against Israel may give
hard-pressed Maronites some
respite, as Arafat will not
wish to fight on two fronts.
Jumblatt may yet he thwarted
in his hopes. But in the mean-
time Lebanon has paid a
heavy price for Dr Kissinger's
peacenuaing. ,
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Afrita
Newsweek, May 3,1976
rs
tkiLi
fr:71
" r
montiniamnanumaammin so' samarzananant&
Eldridge Cleaver
Fidel Castro's African Gambit
W
!tile living in Cuba in 1969, I sent a
cassette recording back to friends
in the U.S. in which I said: "The white
racist Castro dictatorship is more insid-
ious and dangerous for black people than
is the white racist regime of South Africa,
because no black person has any illu-
sions about the intentions of the Afri-
kaners, but many black people consider
Fidel Castro to be a right-on white
'brother. Nothing could be further from
the truth."
? That remark was actually a distillation
of views expressed to me by Captain
Toro, a zealous young black Cuban Army
officer freshly home on six months' leave
. from Guinea-Bissau, where he had been
fighting for Amilcar Cabral's rebels
against the Portuguese.
Captain Toro, a short, wiry, bmwn-
skinned man who was so full of energy
he could hardly sit still, minced no words
in denouncing Castro's policy of ship-
ping out to foreign wars the militant
*young black officers as a safety valve on
the domestic scene. By sending them off
to fight in Africa, Toro said, Castro kills
two birds with one stone: (1) he gets rid
of an explosive element capable of caus-
ing him trouble at home; (2) he im-
presses black Cubans that he is a fighter
for black people's rights, thus quelling
opposition to his rule amongst blacks,
,who are still at the bottom of the Cuban?
'pecking order.
At first, I was suspicious of Captain
Toro. I thought perhaps he was part of a
, government plot to test me, or set me up.
ifIe was so outspoken in his criticism,
even in front of white Cuban Commu-
nists, who clearly feared him. In fact, I
got the impression that Toro's tone be-
came even more scathing when white
Cubans were, around.
THE LAST WHITE HOPE
In Tom's view, Fidel Castro was the
t white hope of the traditional Cuban
ruling class which, given the choice
between a black-led revolution and a
white one, had chosen Fidel. This effec-
tively sidetracked the historic thrust of
the Cuban revolution, which draws its
spirit from the great black hero of Cuban
independence, Ceti. Antonio Maceo.
Since coining to power, Castro's great-
est single preoccupation has been getting
rid of wave after wave of militant black
leaders who constitute an ever-present
pressure and danger to his continued
rule. "One of the first things Fidel tried
to do after coming to power," said Toro,
"was to disarm the blacks in Oriente,
Cuba's heavily black province, site of
sugar cane and slavery, of fort Moncada
? and the Sierra Maestra, the historic home
of the Cuban revolution. Of course, he
failed to disarm us. His white troops were
afraid to try it and the black troops
refused. Why should we blacks disarm
ourselves? That was the beginning of
troublebetween Che Guevara and Fidel.
Che refused to go along with a policy of
disarming the people but, then, Che was
not a white Cuban. The next thing we
knew, Fidel started shipping us off to
fight in Africa?and to die."
When Castro first embarked upon his
.?African wars, it was a "safe" thing to do.
Nothing could have been more irrele-
vant back in the early 1960s than fighting
the Portuguese in Guinea-Bissau. The
real test of Fidel's sincerity came in the
Congo, and he came up shaky.
A 'SECRET CODE
? After the death of Patrice Lumumba in
1961 at the hands of Moise Tshombe, the
CIA, Joseph Mobutu and Belgium; a
Lumumba follower' named Pierre Mu-
lele organized an effective guerrilla
movement. It had a high potential of
taking power in short order against
Tshombe's mercenary-led ragtail forces
and Mobutu 's army of stooges. Victory
was virtually assured when Che Guevara
accepted a commission to lead a column
charged with opening up a rear supply
line stretching from Congo (Brazzaville)
to Mulele's forces in the jungles of
Katanga Province. On the eve of the
successful link-up between Guevara's
column and Mulele, Fidel Castro sent a
team of Special messengers to pull Cite
out of the Congo. They bore a message in
a special secret code between Fidel and
Che that they had agreed beforehand
would only be used in the most urgent
circumstances and which was, therefore;
to be responded to immediately.
On a visit to Congo (Brazzaville) in
1973, I talked to the man who was in
charge of Che Guevara's operation? t
Ange Diawara, the political commissarof
the army of Congo
(Brazzaville.) Dia-
wara had received
Guevara in top se-
cret upon his initial
arrival in the Congo;.
he had supplied him
and made all ar-
rangements between Guevara and the
government in Brazzaville, which se-
cretly supported Guevara's mission.
"The hopes of the African revolution
were riding on the success of the
Guevara-Mulele link-up," Diawara said
wistfully, somewhat crestfallen.
A POLICY OF BETRAYAL
"We had a farewell reception for Che
in Brazzaville, which I organized," he
continued. "It was a very sad occasion.
Che had tears in his eyes. In fact, all of us
were crying. We knew that the African
revolution had been betrayed, by deci-
sions taken in Moscow, Washington,
Cairo and Havana. Everybody under-
stood that Castro was pulling Che out of
the Congo because of pressure from the
Soviets, who had arranged things with
the Americans. This was the fundamen-
tal betrayal of the African revolution,
When Che arrived in Cuba, he quarreled
with Fidel and was placed in seclusion.
Soon after, he went on a suicide mission
in Bolivia. It was a Sorry affair, very
treacherous. My government recalled its
ambassador from Havana and all but
broke off diplomatic ties over this."
Today, the chickens are coming home
to roost for Fidel's policy ofexporti lig his
fighting men to Africa, a policy that has
contributed heavily to his longevity as
the white head grafted onto Cuba's black
body. As Africa runs out of wars of
liberation, Fidel Castro runs out of
dumping grounds. He will then have to
face the Captain Toros, who have
learned much and fOrgotten nothing.
Cleaver, a former leader of the Black
Panther Party, fled the U.S. in I96S and
spent seven years abroad as a fugitive
lk voluntarily surrendered to Federal
intim:Ines last November and is now in
1 California prison waiting trial on
charges stemming from a shoot-out be-
ween the Panthers and the Oakland
)(dice ha /968
47
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i iAmeria
SATURDAY REVIEW
17 April 1976
I Outlook I
Sol M. Linowitz, former U.S. ambassador
to the OAS, is chairman of the Commission
on United States?Latin American Rela-
tions. He was previously chairman of the
Xerox Corporation.
Reflections on Kissinger's Latin American Foray
by Sol M. Linowitz
Qecretary Henry Kissinger's recent
LY Latin American trip once again fo-
cused fleeting attention on the relation-
ship between this country and Latin
America. For a number of months Latin
Americans had been waiting patiently
for the long-promised visit by the Ameri-
can Secretary of State. When it came,
? its impact was, in a word, underwhelm-
ing. For its major features appear to
have been a reaffirmation of familiar
promises of economic cooperation and
the signing of a new consultative agree-
ment with Brazil that caused predictable
indignation and concern in a number of
other Latin American countries.
When Secretary Kissinger undertook
the trip, he was all too aware of the fact
that his November 19, 1974, call for a
"New Dialogue" with Latin America had
left behind a deep and widespread sense
of disappointment. For once again
words were not translated into action,
and the "New Dialogue" remained a
slogan without substance. On this trip
Kissinger was clearly determined to
avoid overblown expectations, and in
this he unquestionably succeeded.
One can quarrel with what Kissinger
did or did not achieve during the trip,
but certainly no one can take issue with
his premise that we can no longer take
Latin America for granted. The simple
fact is that we are in a new ball game with
Latin America. No longer can we treat
Latin Americans patronizingly. No
longer can we threaten to take our bat
and ball and go home.
For the world has changed, Latin
America has changed, and the United
States has changed. Today the hard fact
is that we need Latin America just as
much as Latin America needs us. And
what we need is not only Latin Ameri-
can oil and raw materials but also?as
the vote on the U.N. anti-Zionist resolu-
tion clearly demonstrated?their coopera-
tion and support in the global arena. This
calls for a whole new approach and a
drastic change in our perceptions about
our relationships in this hemisphere.
The first point to be recognized is
simply that interdependence has dis-
placed security, in its narrow sense, as
the raison d'?e for American foreign
policy. Today there are a number of
other important centers of power in the
world besides the superpowers. Trans-
national forces, including the multina-
tional corporations, have become fea-
tured actors on the international scene.
The line between domestic and foreign
policy has become increasingly blurred,
and our interests abroad have become
inextricably intertwined with our inter-
ests at home.
When we talk of security in this kind
of a world, we have to think not only of
military and political power but also of
oil and copper and bauxite. We have to
consider what the urgent prospect of
world famine resulting from the scarcity
of food and fertilizer will mean to our
own future. We have to ponder the im-
pact that the population problem on this
planet will have on us?and the fact that
4 billion people dwell on this Rarth and
by the turn of the century there will be
8 billion or more.
While these dramatic changes have
been taking place in our international
system?multipolarity, transnationalism,
scarcity of raw materials and foodstuffs,
population growth?tremendous changes
have also been taking place within the
various countries and regions of Latin
America. Rapid urbanization and mass
communications have produced political
awareness among people who do not yet
participate in the economic growth of
their countries. As a result, governments
face increasing demands to provide jobs
and services. To meet these internal de-
mands, Latin Americans have sought
freer access to the markets of the United
States and other developed nations for
their manufactured and semi-manufac-
tured products and their raw-material
exports. They have also sought better ac-
cess to both capital and technology.
In their search for helpful responses
to these needs, Latin Americans have
become increasingly active participants
in the world community beyond the con-
fines of our hemisphere. So we have be-
gun to hear new voices coming out of
Latin America?voices of identity, voices
of nationalism, voices of outrage at lin-
gering dependency. ?
Meanwhile, as we know all too well,
we have also been undergoing drastic
changes at home. No longer do we domi-
nate world economic and military affairs
as we once did. No longer is it appro-
priate or feasible for the United States
to try to be a policeman or tutor every-
where in the world. Moreover, in the face
of the challenges we have becn confront-
ing?unemployment, racial conflict, the
long war in Vietnam, the major crisis of
4
8
governmental leadership?we have found
our coherence as a nation severely
strained and tested by an energy crisis,
commodity shortages, and worldwide in-
flation.
Deeply aware of these changes and
concerned about their impact, the Com-
mission on U.S.?Latin American Rela-
tions?an independent group of 23 pri-
vate citizens, some having held high
government positions *_recently issued a
report based on an analysis of hemi-
spheric affairs. In the report that was
presented to the President and to the
Secretary of State, the commission ar-
rived at the following conclusions:
? The premises of past American poli-
cies, from the Monroe Doctrine to the
Alliance for Progress to Mature Partner-
ship, have been seriously undermined by
the major changes in the world, in Latin
America, and in the United States.
? Our policies in the future must be
based on the recognition of the fact that
Latin America is not our "sphere of in-
fluence" to be insulated from the rest of
the world, and that Latin American
countries are playing an increasingly ac-
tive and important role in a world of
growing interdependence.
? U.S. policies must also recognize
that there is a diversity among Latin
American countries and that our inter-
ests do not require ideological conform-
ity. We must respect their independence
and their capacity to act independently.
? Our mutual concerns today center
not on military security but on economic
development, on the well-being of our
citizens, on the coherence of our socie-
ties, and on the protection of individual
liberties?all goals that cannot be at-
tained in isolation or at the expense of
our neighbors.
? Both self-interest and our funda-
mental values require that we nurture
our common interests and historic ties in
*The members of the commission were:
W. Michael Blumenthal, G. A. Costanza,
Prof. Harrison Brown, Prof. Albert Fish-
low, Prof. Samuel B. Huntington, Nicholas
de B. Katzenbach, Theodore M. Messer,
Charles A. Meyer, Dr. I. George Han-ar,
Rita Hauser, Dr. Alexander Heard, Henry
J. Heinz 11. Andrew Heiskell, Rev. Theo-
dore Hesburgh, Lee Hills, Arturo Morales-
Carrion, Peter G. Peterson, Elliot L. Rich-
ardson, William D. Rogers, Nathaniel
Samuels. Prof. Kalman Silvert, and Dr.
Clifton Wharton, Jr. Sol M. Linowitz
served as chairman.
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the Americas and cooperate in building
a more equitable and mutually beneficial
1 structure of international relations.
Pursuant to these conclusions, the
commission made 33 specific recom-
mendations for action by the United
States. They included: an end to covert
U.S. intervention in the internal affairs
of Latin American countries such as took
place in Chile; strengthening of efforts
to assure protection of human rights in
the hemisphere; developing an initiative
in seeking to normalize relationships
with Cuba; signing and ratification of a
new Panama Canal treaty; encouraging
arms-limitation agreements in the hemi-
sphere; repeal of the Hickenlooper and
Gonzalez amendments and avoiding
other threats, such as unilateral eco-
nomic sanctions; elimination of the U.S.
veto power over fund operations of
the Inter-American Development Bank;
strengthening OAS conciliation and
peacekeeping capacities; elimination of
travel and migration restrictions to and
from Latin America; enactment of a
generalized trade preference that would
be truly helpful to Latin America; estab-
lishment of a regional system for ex-
change of commodities supply-and-de-
mand projections and exploration of
mechanisms to offset wide fluctuations in
commodity supply, demand, and price;
collaboration between the United States
and Latin? America in the development
of codes of conduct defining rights and
responsibilities of foreign investors and
governments as well as the establish-
ment of impartial fact-finding mecha-
nisms; and U.S. assistance in the de-
velopment of scientific and technical
capabilities.
Little has been done since the issuance
of the commission's report and recom-
mendations to improve the general cli-
mate of relationships in the hemi-
sphere. The trend toward divisiveness
and indifference is a matter of real
concern. Erosion of mutual trust and
respect has increased as U.S.?Latin
American relations have been clouded
by revelations of covert intervention in
Chile; by the sharpening differences
within the hemisphere over how to re-
spond to major violations of fundamen-
tal human rights; by the failure to make
real progress in the vital area of eco-
nomic cooperation; and by the continu-
ing uncertainty concerning the strength
of the U.S. commitment to the solution
of hemispheric problems.
? During his trip Secretary Kissinger
did undertake to deal with some of the
economic concerns, but more?much
? more?remains to be done:
? The revelations regarding CIA in-
volvement in Chile make it imperative
that the United States renounce clearly
and forthrightly any unilateral inter-
vention?overt or covert?in the internal
affairs of Latin American countries. An
unequivocal Presidential declaration re-
? inforced by a congressional resolution
is called for. Any equivocation on this
score will be regarded as inconsistent
with our professed support of a mutu-
? ally respective world order in which
governments are responsible for their
own policies and actions.
? The reports of extensive repression
in Chile and elsewhere underscore the
importance of having the United States
take a much firmer stand in implement-
ing its proclaimed commitment to the
protection of fundamental huinan rights.
The United States should press for an in-
ternational investigation?by the United
Nations or the OAS?of alleged repres-
sive practices, and should cease provid-
ing aid and support to regimes that sys-
tematically violate human rights. At the
same time, measures for providing relief
to the victims of repression should be
made effective.
? Although negotiations with refer-
ence to a new treaty with Panama for the
Panama Canal are slowly making prog-
ress, in an election year there will be
great temptation to try to make the canal
a political issue. To do so would be to
prejudice the negotiations in a manner
that might well endanger the possibility
of settlement. It is important for the
President strongly to reaffirm his sup-
port for the new treaty negotiations now
under way, and for the administration to
begin to build requisite public and con-
gressional backing for the treaty.
THE ECONOMIST APRIL 17, 1976
Let it go
? New tensions and developments
have interrupted progress in the normali-
zation of relations with Cuba. Cuba's
position with reference to Puerto Rico
and its intervention in Angola have im-
posed roadblocks to such normalization.
Despite these setbacks, the United States
must stand ready to explore in the right
way and at the right time such measures
as lifting the blockade on food and
medicine to Cuba in return for an ap-
propriate Cuban response.
Steps such as these will be helpful as
indications of our commitment. But basic
problems will remain, and one that is
least recognized is the failure of the
United States to learn that what we
have in common with Latin America is
a good deal more than Latin America
itself. Secretary Kissinger took this
into account in the consultative agree-
ment entered into with Brazil. But Latin
America consists of much more than
Brazil. In international arenas such as the
United Nations, we cannot assume an
easy or permanent mutuality of inter-
est between us and the countries of
Latin America. We must expect that the
Latin American countries will act in
ways which they determine to be best
for themselves?whether or not these will
be helpful or harmful to the United
States. Therefore, it is in our best interest
to try to work with the countries of
Latin America in developing common
approaches to global issues so that the
Latin American countries will in turn
find it in their own interest to cooperate
with us.
We will not begin to deal realistically
with Latin America until we recognize
that in Latin America we are playing
for high stakes, much higher than in so
many other parts of the world that
over the years have absorbed our atten-
tion and have been given so much higher
priority on our list of concerns. For what
we are playing for is a chance to work
with our neighbors in shaping our own
hemisphere and in trying to bring into
being the kind of world we have so long
sought?one free from war and want. 0
Sooner or later the United States is going to get out of Panama. Sooner is'
better
The United States Navy was Theodore Roosevelt's big
stick, and the Panama canal was the way to get it from the
Atlantic to the Pacific. The canal was a symbol, too, of a
newly imperial America. led to expansion at the turn of
the century by a sense of mission it called manifest destiny,
that curious phrase for what Kipling better called the
white man's burden. Since early 1974 the United States
has been negotiating a treaty that would hand the canal,
and the zone of territory around it, to Panama. Teddy
Roosevelt may be revolving in his grave. But with the
Panamanian left threatening sabotage and Mr Ellsworth
49
Bunker, the chief American negotiator, talking of a "new
Vietnam" if there is ro agreement, it looks as if the time
has come for the United States to give up its sovereignty
oyer those 559 square miles in the middle of Panama.
Although neither side wants to say much about the
negotiations until the American election is over in Novem-
ber, it is thought that a new treaty could be ready for sign-
ing early next year. This would give the Panamanians
jurisdiction over the canal zone at once. and let them take
over the running of the canal itself before the end of the
century. It would probably also let the Americans keep an
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armed force there for several years, to make sure the
canal is not denied to American ships. The terms have to
be finely balanced if they are to be acceptable both to the
Panamanians and to the suspicious American senate.
Panama's boss, General Omar Torrijos, recently sacked
two of his cabinet ministers in an effort to stifle opposition
to the scheme from people who say he isn't getting the
Americans out quickly enough. He can probably get
the treaty through. But it may not pass the American
senate; two-thirds of that body's 100 members must
approve any new treaty, and more than a third is already
on record against giving the canal zone to Panama.
There is no question that the United States has legal title
to sovereignty over the canal zone. Nor is there any ques-
tion about the canal's economic importance to the United
States. But its big-stick strategic value is decreasing. In
the days when the Americans had only a one-ocean navy,
control of the canal was vital. Now it has in effect two
navies, one for the Atlantic and one for the Pacific, and
most of the capital ships of today?the aircraft carriers?
WASBI NGTO 11 PO ST
2 1 APR 1976
cannot squeeze through the canal anyway.
Ownership is not enough
The United States did not extort the canal from
Panama back in 1903. It did encourage dissidents in
Colombia to secede, to create Panama, and then to sell
the canal zone to America. But the present-day Pana-
manians are the beneficiaries of that, not the victims.
From direct payments, and the jobs created by the canal.
they enjoy one of the highest average incomes in Latin
America. For all that, the political realities are, first, that
the canal is emotionally as well as geographically smack
in the middle of Panama; and, second, that a country like
the United States has to exercise influence by means other
than the retention of sovereignty over distant places where
that sovereignty proves unpopular. The Americans are
strong enough, and central America is clearly enough
in their sphere of influence, to be able to go on using the
canal for their purposes without keeping a strip of Ameri-
can soil on either side of it.
.S. Envoy to Urugu
rotests VIA Story
By Joanne Omang
Washington Post Foreign Service
MONTEVIDEO?U.S. Am-
.. basSador to Uruguay Ernest
Siracusa has registered
"vigorous objections" to a
_ Voice of America account
.of alleged_ torture in Uru-
t,guay, saying the Uruguayan
? government "will. have
every right to resent" .the
story.
? The story involved a Feb-
:: ruary report by the Geneva-
based International Corn.
mission of Jurists (ICJ),
which investigates charges
, of human rights violations
around the world. The two-
minute broadcast by VOA
Geneva part-time corre-
spondent Richard Kilian
? Feb. 11 contained exaggera-
tions and distortions" of the
? Uruguayan situation which
"can only be injurious to
our friends, to our relations
' and to our efforts to develop
? useful influence on the very
. situation commented upon,"
Siracusa's confidential corn-
plaint said.
VOA is an agency of the
U.S. government that has a
charter to report news with-
out slant. It has frequently
run into criticism from
American missions abroad
that its newscasts hamper
U.S. foreign policy. In one
?case. for example, the U.S. be reached for comment.
ambassador in a West Afri Siracusa's five-point ob-
can country complained that jection focused on Kilian's
VOA reporting of Argentin- statement that the commis-
ian guerrilla operations sion's report described mas-
should be curtailed because sive arrests of political sus-
it could spark similar activi- pects, that few of the sus-
ties in the country he was pects survived imprisonment
accredited to. and that there was no press
In his response to Sire- freedom in Uruguay. The
cusa's critique of the VOA story added that the jurists
report on Uruguay, U.S. In- ' said church documents had
?
formation Agency director been censored, and that the
James Keogh agreed that commission had heard a re-
the treatment had been "ex- port on alleged torture in.
cessive and that [the] report 1 Chile the previous day.
should have been handled
far more carefully." At the
same time, Keogh main-
The word "massive," Sira-
cusa complained, "grossly
exaggerated" t h e situation
tamed that "we believe the up until a recent anti-Com-
story in question accurate- munist drive in Uruguay.
ly reflected the content of "With respect to the Corn-
the IJC report" munist drive, one could even
Copies of Siracusa's con- question whether the ar-
f idential Feb. 13 complaint rests of several hunched per.
toAssistant Secretary of sons over a five-month pe-
State William D. Rogers and nod could itself :be called
to Keogh, and of Keogh's 'massive.'"
Feb. 17 response, were ob. To say few of those ar-
tained by The IVashington rested survived, he contin-
Post. The response was a ued, was untrue and "can
milder version of an original only be considered" by the
draft submitted to Keogh by Uruguayan government "as
VOA officials, according to a calumny and a provoca-
sources within the organiza- lion." The question of press
Ition. freedom, he added, was "a
A spokesman for Keogh relative one," while the al-
said the VOA director de- leged 'church censorship
c was
lined to comment on the "a minor problem .
matter. Siracusa could not worked out between the go"-
SO
ernmerit anif-the fchurchj
hierarchy."
Mentioning Chile, Siracu-
sa concluded, was "a gratui-
tous effort on the part of the
VOA writer to link Uruguay
?with the already censured
case of Chile as to human
rights."
Three times in the com-
plaint Siracusa reiterated
support for the VOA's policy
of disclosing such news, but
said "it should have been
handled far more carefully"
in order n o t to endanger
efforts he was making
"through correct diplomatic
channels to improve the hu-
man rights situation to the
extent that there are viola-
tions. This effort can only
be endangered if the govern-
ment interprets the VOA re-
port, with broad audience
here, as an aggressive ges-
ture of the U.S. government
inconsistent with the man-
ner and integrity of my ap-
proach." Siracusa said.
Keogh agreed that the
VOA story, although an ac-
curate description of t h e
commission's report. "show-
ed insufficient appreciation
10 r sensitivities involved."
He added that future re-
ports would be "subject to
closer review and cross-
checking prior to use."
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