CIA TAINT ON THE PRESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 11, 1976
• Content Type: NSPR

25X1A
Wpproved For Release 200te4tibERIADP77-00432R000100400002-i?
NEWS, VIEWS
and ISSUES
INTERNAL USE ONLY
This publication contains clippings from the
domestic and foreign press for YOUR
BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use
of selected items would rarely be advisable.
11 JUNE 1976
NO. 10 PAGE
GOVERIVF-NT AFFAIRS 1
GENERAL 25
EASTERN EUROPE
WEST EUROPE 30
NEAR EAST 35
AFRICA 38
EAST ASIA 41
LATIN AMERICA
DESTROY AFTER BACKGROUNDER HAS
SERVED ITS PURPOSE OR WITHIN 60 DAYS
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
Apriroved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
Goverflmentai.. AffairS
WASHINGTON POST
11 JUN 1976 -
Charles B. Seib
CIA. Taint on the ress
A
There's no point in beating ?a- dead
bOrse. But want to take just one more.
swing at the one that daily becomes
more aromatic. out behind .CIA head-
quarters. T-.? ? ? ? ? ?
? talking about the CIA's involve-
Meat _with_ the :,Pre_s_a=thil......CSMAtrY'_
and. the worlds. The superspies persist
In their refusal to provide details of
this relationship, past or present. And
the press, for all its investigative zeal,
just. can't, Seem to get interested in
doing anything about it.
Two 'developments prompt me to re-
turn to this unpopular subject. The first'
is the recent Soviet charge that three,
leading' American. correspondents in.
Moscow work for the CIA. The second
is correspondence between CIA direc-
tor George Bush and several journalis-
tic organkations... ?
To set the stage, the CIA's stated posi-
tion on its use of the media is that, as of
last Feb. 11, it has sworn off "paid. or
contractual relationships with any full-
time *or part-time correspondent ac-
credited by . any US. news service,
newspaper, periodical, raciiO or televi
sion network or station." .-- ?
'The agency insists that its past rela-
tionships with journalists involved no
Impropriety or any intention to influ-
ence or harm the American press. It
also says it has no intention of reveal-
ing, now or later, the names of journal-
ists who have worked for it.
What does. all this mean in concrete
terms? Just what does CIA mean by
"accredited," for example? The Senate
Intelligence Committee recently re-
ported that until early this year the CIA
had undercover "relationships" with
about 50 American journalists, and that
more than half these ties were continu-
ing despite the Feb. 11 statement. The
Senate report also said that staff inves-
tigators found that two employees of -
"general circulation U.S. news organi-
zations" were still functioning as paid
.undercover CIA contacts. . .
And that brings us to the Russian
charges. Literaturnaya Gaieta, the pub-
lication of the Union of Soviet Writers,
asserted late last month that , Christo-
pher t' Wren of The New YOric Fthies
George.::Krimsky of the 'Associated' ?
Press and Alfred Friendly. Jr. of News-
week were associated with the CIA. ?
There Is no reason to believe the
charges. No hard` evidence was pro-
duced, and there have been strong de
nials from the men, highly regarded
journalists,inii.their publications.
-. But .1e:it not reasonable to believe
that the CIA's unwillingness, to cue its
ties to American journalism feeds the
suspicions that lead to such ?Charges?
Does not that same unwillingness make
it more difficult to refute the charges?
A number of journalists and journal-
istic organizations have called for the
publication of the names of news peo-
ple who have been in the pay of the
CIA, and. of news organitationa that
have knowingly provided CIA cover. .
That, it isarguedOs the only way the
American press can be cleansed of the,
taint of spy work. ALso,,to be pragmatic,:
Such 'publication would be quite,effec-
tive in discouraging future CIA-press:
relationehies. But, as it noted in Ira
11 policy 'statement, the
In-
tention of doing that. Which brings us
to the Bush letters.
On May 3, the National News Council,
a press-monitoring body, wrote to Bush
expressing deep concern about reports
of CIA-press?,ties _end asking_ for more
information on the ties and the portent
they hold for a free press in a free so-
ciety. The council noted that it was not
asking for publication of names of indi-?
vidnals employed by CIA. -
In reply, Bush said that he had hoped
the Feb. 11 statement 'would relieve.
the minds of those in the field of .jour-
nalism." He said that "it has reassured
Many with whem I have spoken pri-
vately." , . ,
On May 14, directors of the Fund for.
Investigative Journalism, which under--,
writes journalistic projects, wrote- a
much stronger,, letter than the News'
Council's. It sai4 the clandestine use of
American news people by the CIA is
"destructive of the fundamental weirs-
ises of a free press and corrosive of the
First Amendment."
Thefiind's board urged that the CIA
gobeyond its earlier statement and an-
nounce tentination of the use of all-
BALTIMORE SUN
11 June 1976
Journalists, ' including freelancers:
stringers and part-time reporters- and
editors, whether or not accredited:
That brought a reply in which. Bush
said he had "talked privately to a nuin-
ber of -members of 'the Fourth Estate.
Although' not all "of 'them are totally'
haPpy.with the situation as it is, I have
met -,with considerable quiet. -under-
standing. One top figure in the national
media told me privately that he
thought that after issuance of my state-
ment, no more could properly be de-,
manded of us." ?
Bush went on to say that "in a per-
fect world,'we might be able to run the
intelligence business in response to the
criticisms of each and every point of.
view, but I'm afraid that perfect world,
Is not yet here."
.Bush is right aboid the imperfection
of the world. But questions Inuit be
raised about his claims. ,of support for
his position within the news business,.
;Who are those members of the Fourth
Estate who have privately given Bush,
the "quiet understanding," whatever
that is? Who is the top figure in the na-
tional'media who said he was satisfied_
with the CIA position?
What we are faced with now is not
only the knowledge that the CIA has
been and continues to be the employer
of an undisclosed number of unnamed
American journalists, but that its stone-
walling has the support, or at least the
acquiescence, of a number of media
people?at the top level, we must as-
sume. But they, too, are unnamed.
Could there be a Catch-22 here by
which some of those who, have shown
"quiet understanding" also have or
have had an involvement, direct- or in-
direct, with the agency? ?
- We don't know. What we do know is
that the taint of CIA involvement con-
tinues to pollute the American press as
a whole. We also know that because of
the taint, charges such as those leveled
by the Soviet magazine are bound to
find a more accepting audience.
Senate panel wants delay
in CIA's destro yin
Washington (AP)?The new
Senate intelligence committee
has unanimously recommended
a six-month moratorium on
Central Intelligence Agency
plans to destroy files of impro-
per and illegal activitieS.
The decision was reached by
the panel in a closed-door ses-
sion Wednesday and publicly
disclosed yesterday by its
chairman, Senator Daniel K. In-
ouye (D., Hawaii) in a letter to
Senate leaders.
"It is the further recommen-
dation of the committee that
-
the CIA and other intelligence
agencies should submit an in-
ventory of the records to be de-
stroyed" to the panel, Mr. In-
ouye said in a letter to the Sen-
ate majority leader, 'Mike
Mansfield (D., Mont.), 'and mi-
nority leader, Hugh Scott (FL,
Pa.).
Senator Mansfield and Sena-
tor Scott earlier in the week
had left it to the new panel to
decide whether the CIA should
be allowed to -destroy its files
on its past misdeeds.
g of files
The controversy was
prompted when the CIA direc-
tor, George Bush, wrote to Mr.
Mansfield and Mr. Scott to tell
them he planned to destroy the
files now that congressional in-
vestigations into allegations of
improper conduct had been
completed.
These same Senate leaders
had been the ones who had
asked the CIA to save the files
Iwhile Congress was investigat-
ing the alleged misdeeds.
WASHINGTON STAR
27 MAY 1975
'CIA Won't Sever All Free-Lancer Ties
CIA Director George Bush has turned down an ap-
peal that the agency sever all ties with its estimated 25
free-lance journalists overseas. he Fund for Investi-
gative Journalism had asked for a total ban on CIA use
of journalists, including free-lancers.
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
NEW YORK TIMES
7 JUN 1976
tilwelet to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, June 6?Following IS
the text of the conclusions of the final:
report of the Senate Intelligence Com- ,
mittze on the activities of the Central"
Intelligence Agency. In, the text, D.C.I.
Is the Director of Central Intelligence,
D.D.I. is the Directorate for Intelligence,
D.D.O. is the Directorate/or Operations,
.and N.S.C. is the, National- Security.,
Council. '
- The C.LA,-, was conceived and estab-
lished to provide high-quality- intelli-
genceto senior policymakers. Since 1947,
,the agency?its structure, its Wade with-
in the Government and its function?has
undergone- dramatic -"change and expan- ?
sion: Sharing .characteristics common to
most large, complex' organizations, the
C.I.A. has-responded to rather than arie-
ticipated the forces of change; it has
accumulated functions rather than rede-
fining them; its internal patterns were ,
established early and have solidified;
success has come to those who have
made visible contributions in high-pri-
ority areas. These general character-
istics have affected the specifics of the
agencys development. -
The notion that the C.I.A. could serve
as a coordinating body for departmental-
intelligence activities and that the D.C.I.
could orchestrate the process did not
take into account tlth inherent institu-
tional obstacles posed by the depart-
ments. From the outset no department .
was willing to condede a centralized
intelligence function to the C.I.A. Each
insisted on the maintenance of its inde-
pendent capabilities to support its policy
role: With budgetary and manaaement
authority vested in the departments,?the
agency was left powerless in the execu- .
tion of interdepartmental coordination.
Even in the area of coordinated national
intelligence estimates the departments
did not readily provide the agency with
the data required.
It was not until John McCone's term-
as D.C.I. that the agency aggressively,
sought to assert its position as a coor-
dinating body. That effort demonstrated
the complex-factors that determined the-
relative success of corrununity ,manage-
ment. One of the principal influences.
was the support accorded the D.C.I. by
the President and the cooperation of the
Secretary of Defense. In a situation
where the D.C.I. commanded no re-
source or outright authority, the posi-
tion of these two individuals was crucial.
While Kennedy and McNamara provided
McCone with consistent backing in a
variety of areas, Nixon and Laird failed
to provide Helms with enough support.
to give him the necessary bureaucratic:.
leverage.
It is clear that the D.C.I.'s own prior-
ities, 'derived from their backgrounds
and interests, influenced the relative
success of the agency's role in interde-
partmental coordination. Given the limi-
tations on the D.C.I's authority, only by
making community activities a first or-
der concern and by pursuing the prob-
lems assertively could a D.C.I. begin to
make a difference in effecting better
management. During Allen Dulles' term
interagency coordination went neglected,
and the results were expansion of corn.
peting capabilities among the depart-
ments. For McCone, community intelli-
gence activities were clearly a priority,
and his 'definition of the D.C.I.'s role
contributed to whatever advances were
made:Helms' fundamental: i?tetesinclinations lay: within the' agency; -.and
he didnot;plish his marida,,tetelt." po
sible;Umits. ?
basic'TrOblerts2havehee&
competing claims On his time andatten-
tion and the lack or ;real authority for;
the .iotecution of thecantral intelligence
funetion. As presently defined,. the
D.C.t.'S job is burdensome in: the. ex;
treme. He is to serve the rotes of Chief'
intelligence adviser to the President',
Manager of community. Intelligence ac-
tivities; and senior executive in the C.I.A.!,
History has demonstrated. that the Job-
of theD.C.I: as community manager and-
as head of the C.I.A. are competing, not;
complementary roles. In- tenni Of bothi
the demands imposed by each function:1!
anclthe expertise requited to fulfill the;
responsibilities, the two roles differ:con.7?::
siderably, In the future separating the
functions with precise definitions ? of au-,
thority and responsibilities niay Prove
plausible alternative.
Although the agency was established
primarily for the purpose of providing'
intelligence analysis to- senior policy-
makers, within three years clandestine
operations became and continued to be
the, agency's pre-eminent activity:, The
single most important factor in the
transformation was policymakers' per-
ception Of the Soviet Union as a world-
wide threat to United' States security.'
The agency's large-scale clandestine ac-
tivities have mirrored American foreign,
policy priorities. With political. "opera-
? tions in Europe in the 1950's,'-paramill.-
tary -operations: in Korea,Third. World
activities,Cuba, Southeast' Asia, and
currently narcotics control,-: the C.I.A.'s
major programs paralleled:: the' inter-.
national concerns of the United States.
For nearly two decades 'American pol-
icymakers considered- covert action vital
in the struggle against international
Communism. The generality of the defi-
nition or "threat perception" motivated
the continual development and justifica-
tion of covert activities from the senior"
policymaking level to the field stations.
Apart from the overall anti-Communist
motivation, successsive Presidential ad-
ministrations regarded covert actions as
a quick and convbnient means of ad-
vancing their particular objectives.
_ _
- Internal incentives contributed- to the
expansion in covert action. Within the
agency D.D.O. careerists have tradition-
ally been rewarded more quickly for the
visible accomplishments of covert-tion than fpr the long term development
of- agents required for clandestine col-
lection.. Clandestine activities will: re--
main an element of United States -for-.
eign policy, and policymakers will di-
rectly affect the level of operations. The
prominence of the Clanciestine Service
within .the agency may moderate as
money for and high-level executive in
terest in covert actions diminish.' How-
ever, D.D.Q. incentives which emPhasize .
operations over collection and which-'
create an internal_ demand for projects
will continue to foster covert action
unless an internal conversion process
forces a Change. s
In the past the orientation of D.C.I.s
such as Dulles and Helms also contrib-
uted to the agency's emphasis on clart-
destine activities. It is no coincidence
that of those D.C.I.s who have been
Agency careerists, all have come from
the Clandestine Service_ Except. for
James Schlesinger's brief appointment,.
_
2
;Pie beifirdireitedbYlti-
,trained-analysr..;. The qualities demandedi
,of individualsin the D.D.0.-,-esSentially1
management of people?serve as-the
basis for bureaneractic skills in the or-
ganization: As a result, the agency's',
leadership has been_dominated by D.D.a.1
careerists. ? :
Clandesting*Ilection and covert ae..,
flow have, - had, their successes,,
dividual activities halite attained their
stitted objectives. What the relative
contribution etelandestine activities has,
been?the- extent to which they "have
contributed to or detracted from the
implementation of United States foreign
policy and:. whether the results have
been worth the risk?cannot be eval-
uated ;without wide access to records
on covert operations, access the corn,
mittee did not have.
Organizational- arrangements within
the agency and the .decision-making
structure outside the agency have per--
mitted the extremes in C.I.A. activity.
The ethos of secrecy which pervaded
the D.D.O. had the effect of setting the
directorate apart within the agency and
allowed the Clandestine Service a
measure of autonomy not accor&o.i
other directories. More importantly, the
compartmentation principle allowed
units of the D.D.O. freedom in deft:e
operations. In many cases tie.4 burden of
responsibility fell on individua.
ments?a situation in which :lapses and
, deviations are inevitable. Previous ex-
cesses Of drag testing, assassination
planning ? and domestic activities were.
, supported by an internal structure that
permitted individuals to conduct opera-
tions .without,the consistent necessity'
or expectation of justifying or revealing
their activities.. -.
, . ?
'Blurred-Accountability' -
7.1/tim'ately, much of the responsibility
for the scale of covert action and for
whatever abuses occurred must fall to-
senior policymakers. The decision-mak-
ing arrangements at the .N.S.C. level
created an environment of blurred ac-
countability which allowed considera-
tion of actions without the constraints-
of individual responsibility. Historically
the ambiguity and imprecision derived
from the initial expectation that covert
operations would be limited and there-
fore could be managed by a small, in-
formal group. Such was the intention
in 1948. By 1951 with the impetus of
the Korean war, covert action had be-
come a fixed element in the U.S. foreign
policy ,repertoire. The frequency of
covert action forced the development of
more formalized decision-matting ar-
rangements. Yet structural changes did
not alter ambiguous procedures. In the
late 1950's" the relationship -between
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles'
and Allen Dulles allowed informal
agreements and personal understandings
to prevail over explicit and precise de-
cisions. In addition, as the scale of
covert action expanded, policymakers-
found it useful to maintain the am-
biguity of the ,decision-making process
to insure secrecy and to allow "IpIaus-
ible deniability' of covert operations.
No one in the executive?least of all:
the President-7-was required to formally
sign off on a decision to implement a.
covert action program. The D.C.I. was
'responsible for the execution of a proj-
ect but not for taking the decision to
implement It., Within the N.S.C. a group
of individuals---held joint responsibility-
for defining policy objectives, but they-
did not attempt to establish 'criteria
placing moral and constitutional limits -
on activities undertaken to achieve the
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001004000024
7.0.61groliP; ,
coniOfl*Wthint
.110-?tgt!t, 411
r I V
A-`'",?????":'
?
-hx.agforalfpti"
ma?.the
.
-
poia Andir4Olaicacs". ?
,
me
os1,4117:, cfp,Aa., 11S0t.
ks r r
-;<
*WO
,tiost '.1ecuri ojhe
tress--a7na1lgroupi-ef_indi
numb iniduas,inyo
?apprtiv4:roc?s
OsAtibri
as_ weiltas; thit,:assuniritiok411W
beSObje446,diatsid
:1414.41,1f,eC9n#:ThiltecL'AP??4,01444:av
;.soyettactio*aitd...ici *40, Ap',j.
- -eSt1-04.111ge:
--
,
? 4 . , ..,. .. ?
,.., ? ;41 i
. ?"4:,..00401414if i d?t:ts t,:r*"-
, Ocala.' Es?efitriill..' thg.',ffilifilifrOCIPtaii*?
.
functoried 1 EtS_ ,,,.,' 'etr4(0..', Otitinizat:3044
/her:, niaintaing. ,?, POile
reef tracks nitic??ted..intb-.',otte,7,
Individuals firtillirf, 7 - tee itkif 'Llbe4
other-
In Illeciii the'D.V.O*Ctriiiitesthiefiot
lection functiOri ilipulclhay,e;Orittib,tiMck!:
to the D.D.U,s. analytic r.caPacity.:rlid*.!;;
ever, D.D.0, concerns about maintain,-;.
ing the. securityi.pf ',ilta,'., operations'. and
protecting the identitylOribragehts,-anck
D.D.1" conces about measuringLthe re,,
liability of ift-',s61.1r.ces. :testriCted* inter-
change between ? the tWci:;directrorate.s..-;?-,
Fundamentally, this. lias!..ifepriVert the
D.D.I. of a- major, . Sou* or InfOrmarlOM.1
Although D.D..1.-D.D.OkfontaCt heCin-'!.:4
creased during; t14-lasti:Are!f-ITaxsititi
remains'. limited:-..,.:,,Vt.,',!!,1%.4.1:,',
informed, of sensitiyel:,4W.erti,c)Peratlouvi
undertaken by: the 'D:D.6.-' Thi.T., has -* #14
teeter!' the respectly....MiiSiiiii:Eire' bOth-',4
directorates. - The ClandeStliin,'-.Servicet
has net had the bent.ififidt}:fritellifiencir.!
support' durine.considetatiOn' and iniple--',!
Mentation of?itti operations-Ae?Bayot,
?Pige-itwasiorrwan rin: instanc*IkwhiChril
AD-L, allair"! eve4-lhe-:PPPIAY;Pirec.4I
tori for ? Inteiltgetfce;':,-werekupinfq.PriettA
and represents a :`-4,1tUaticill, 4ai',..".',$.-1piSittf
timely' analysis-Of ipriliticirt-tsren _ ,aiirt-
- basic-, geograr44, nlightha**.ada 16 del
ferenceelpet,-histint?cletidiorCbrenik/
bark on:11i4:7opetatioeelck the th,lt*iolaiiti
14
for e:;"05Mttfiee W. thil*
tl..":- laCk P.
-k4Owlec107400'uf :' aPrift0tig'*441';e.O. '
plicated)aridi.,Aindesinined44'n?Zariattiti
effort. Information on a p-.WitOsored
--,
political action progrant'WOuld.g,affecti
Adgments:-abOittAt resuitiotkfigpi
Ar1A1,41
NEW YORK TIMES
30 May 1976
?-?Y ''.7-LiaAjAP,W.I:' Mr ICISSIngerW:
?-,PTP
?Orodooei
recthipqbiem
*Atm-
?
ther?-dotrw44.'`
illathertthan-
_.."agenqf
-
.A..41g1.1044
atopn
.".F.soentraU
? II /it ". #:Iat:r
4ce
ltittithrift124,, tr
11. .40i7",
J 4
?
A,A,A
1,44 .411:th
fri")!Ip t't
Onttc I; ` rk
cr .
paratISCatE
areil
;g0Ye7.00-en
:telligence e?
of national,: ewe. estirnates .otheti
intelligencer: nitatiOrfs'!.: engage::
-overlapping flrganalysisPAT-
..,*....14ther.-41),aa.f4iMkthfiliroited
ordinatmn f4; M00 :t.:.wfq,C.P.eateckltn
agency became: arprochrder of finished
intelligenet'.itildist-ently9 &fronded
its: areai,,.0t.risponsibilityuOolitiCaf
'ItiirtstrztfegiOrriallfgencithrtunidecitrauf
OtattalYglai.*74.0;,StaTWAPiAtnea! itOcf,
agenty-,:tof
AS -the filter "!. itesOilearcir.f in;
Odier-40044.- Pd1;;.4: tP):0-Z,t-
f
C:tiliii4A'Orikr1)44dcireii.64-4ttelf,:tot*
?*40
-414111.,th?4.
? 4611
Work , Inman WO
?"bati eenz. Inmit21-
ttrbcess mrole4.?in?the
Itcrinteiligerie ?
14,11*.es numerous tae
associati
.:itttr'4,71.At,ettee::-Ethc**34.4:eilliWYntalce.tiza.11ig;i7c.,;4.iotiic:e4wie'lli?*iPi4rodod4s:uct,sa:es:.4.11Y7sti;41.1.,..;.t
brf. qttaPer$
de.o6.1etlqn. ?naiysis
fiOntreq*I4Ctil
*fi1tige#01,r0#h. dis
Taikdireanifigt,:144)
reatiorci
:e174191.15,
I1.S.7 is. Chaffengiitg
. . ,
:'Rufe-Making Pulic
'?Kissinger Briefing
?
? `, - .. 4
WASHINGTON, May.29"(AP)
?The- State Department hslde
-
(tided to 'apes!- a Federal. Court
ruling :Imam effort to keep four
comments/at a news ? briefing
on the Vladivostok arms accord
-from being attributed 'directly
to Scretary of State Henry A.
Kissinger, a spokesman says. '
A State Department ?-laF4of
said the p.ractice of ittributtng
marks to-rserrior Uniterf.Statesi
Officialis.. important. ? even
though "it May sound.. silly to
people-who dtaffkrtpw how the..
game. is played, ' ,? ? '?????????.:);.
7Hesaidoffl4a1pub1katite7
rtiens:by Mr. Kissinger could
ffirce other- goVernments - to
react, .but they could choose to
itnicire remarks -attributed only
to United States official;
? The ruling, if ? it-stands, would
identify Mr: 'Kissinger, as the
official who briefed the press
on Dec, 3;.- 1974,,when "a 'senior
United States official' ..repor-
tedly'...gave details' of the nu-
clear 'arms abcord;Teached by
President Forct...'und Leonid
g'? ?, A! ? .1..54.1
15, *.10;
kr?
, A s5i A recfpra1 ones ?
4;2' 4rN, ;I 0,0 ? ;I = A s A
,
L ?
bilitles their'ctiOPO PreOlder)
tilOokert to thefagett chfel.-IfO4
113:kg.e#
the ;agency could
.borforte overt.:?-OperatiOni,:decisMrt-?
.P14.14.,_ #0104 cletktmidenti
.reliance ;son the:;'CLA2[S',Iritelligence ca
edicillaifiderrtrisatieZitt tIr'sPtIelast
at
foolvssire4mscribe,*Yript4oes eh
rieLof iiiroiination, of Which-Intelligence
gei)attAkWa.1-John,,,F,
determined'; John
I .et,exelatiyo,intluence:.hytodefining
rtilefit0:4ZOtnia-nO*4701Finding Dik-
t4::*(401;*qc.eiSkiV***L
dons-0*-": O.P.,4:fiCWOlitc1CcNiXon'''whi)
littlitettffie40eiK;;Of-R1460[0:rehni;an
objectivitSr,,may,:be.'me..ranse.desirabie
objective
frequentlyA ,Wha
senidir,Off:letgs ,want to hear about their
PO:aiit4l4kii3st-'!a4si).?P'Selireiits are
00,1t,t(i 42e', iixtgli=tnizi- of in
. u..4*.1.4e3ekriOvezei414,* Whether
Oti*Pik inchi4act. aniOng, them
CtitOrti: tqlsig;:airyears the phit
* ? - Laiftotioll:Ati
litavlougs....*fict4O4titut
,thU4 1ntellxgenceprofession: Th
-queStion;heir. the , insittui
--itilv?best?
? ."''
United. States District Judge
Tune Green ordered -a transcript
Of. the briefing turned-over' to
Morton Halperin, who iled' suit
to: obtain., it under; the. Freedom
of Information Act Mt.Halper-.
in. disclosed the ,inling on -Fri:-
day.-
,The State Department has
distributed a transcript of most
of the '1974 briefing and gave.
a copy, to4Mr. Halperin, but it
classified four passages as con-
fidential,., contending "attribu-
tion these remarks to the
Secretary of State could da-
mage the national security:.
Jiidge Green ruled that there
was noauthority in any statute
3
-`?????
for dos.-
saying information. The, judge
also noted that the remarks had
been made to 32 reporters-, two
of them foreign,, who' had no
sectirity, clearances:
Halperin, director of a.
Center 'for'National Security
project is seeking puoric
-sure of a varitY of Federal ac-'
tions for "open public debate."hi
Remarks at the briefing, ac-
cording to Judge Green's ruling,:
were originally to be attributed!
to 'a senior-official and remarks
identified as being on '"deep
background" were not tote at-'
tribined to anyone. -
sThe State Department .lawyer
said he could not recall' who-,
ther the four censored pitssagei-
_Were background or deep back-
'grounclin Both Mr, Halperin and
the lawyer said- they did -not
;know what the four comments
Were. ?,??
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 :CI -ROP77-00432R000100400002-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
NEW YORK TIMES
7 JUN nTlir
FAILED TO RIF
R'KEY'TASK
Report to Senate-Unit Saw
, ?
Analytic Work, Sufferef:-?,
as Covert Acts Grew:'t
PRIaRITIES., QUESTIONED
Lag:Is'ee,n in Operatiol*
on Economics,. Drugs,
and, Communism
By-DAVID BINT.,1.1",
Special to The New Yzy:% Tin:23 ?
WASHINGTON,
authoritative hitor:,
Central Intelligence Agency re-4
leased today holds that the
agency has failed over the last
three decades to fulfill several
of its essential missions. -
The study;sprePared with the'
cooperation the agency for
'the Senate SeledeCommittee tOJ
1Study Governmental Operations'
With.. Respect to Intelligence
Activitiee; fiirther concludes '
that the aeency, over the years;
became a bureaucracy that ran
amok because of conflicting:
interests. '
?? It says that, the agency, :de-
spite its successes, especially in.
scientific and technical" fields:.
was "distorted" -very early by
rboth its' directors and their .
[superiors, and ?Moved ? away.
[from its prime task of prowl&
s ing high quality, intelligence
analysis forrn the American
litical leadership.
'
Others Share 'Blame ;
For example, the history'
notes 'that the agency' had: novi
estimate of Communist intertt'..
tions- in Korea before the North,.!
Korean attack om South Kaik.
in 1950.` It also notes that eco-
nomic -'intelligence- -and inter-
national naiveties traffic Intel-
ligence were given Priority only.
in the last decade-and that at-
tention _ to underdeveloped
countries did not begin until
the 1960's. - ? .
Th d history, Which has heed
thoroughly read and declassi-
fied line for line by agency
officials, also says the agency
failed to become a truly "Cen-
tral", intelligence 'service :Co-'
ordinating all espionage re-
sources of the United States.
The study blames a succes-
sion Of. Presidents, Congress,
the armed services and the
agency itself for the shortcom-
ings. But its principal conclu-
sliitTlikhielfirtr.A.:beiiiiiii7
WI, itairPectiliaric nature, .: was
destined.: to, develOp- contrO,
'VeraiaLqUalitiee;-.2
- .-..i,.-- . - ?
_, . .
'Mei 9S.pagerT-ltory *was
written,' by , Anne, karaleltie a
young:Harvard-trained: itittor. i
It.Contains no tliobking dis-
closures about individual aber-
:rations- or covert action disas-
ters. But it does tell about
rivaltY in: the ArneriCan intelli-,
'mince coMintmity; a lack of a.c-
cotmtabilitY .. tO;:,:the 'executive
sand some OeCTIliOr priorities.
Miss- Karalekas ,, spent two
inonthi studying -the agency's
!c4vitc, hiStories,... numbering 7,5
'Volumes; and eight months in-
terviewing 60 present and
'former agency officials.
,. Her fiv,e-page conclusion says
the agency "responded to rath-
er than anticipated the force of
'change" over the last 30: years
and ' "accumulated functions
r tilua redefining them.''
internal patterns were
established early' and have so-
-
Rivalries Persist.
She further concludes that
the agency never succeeded in,
overcoming rivalry' from other
intelligence services, ,operated:
by the four armed service!
'branches:- The one mat-to
blame.; feti:thit, she; w?
;Allen:AV.-Dulles; who- directed
1the ...agency from4953-,to 1961..
f. Thehistory:sjsuggeststhatthe
Chief.,CLA. ob, %Director of
!Centrar':` Intelligence. involves
too many tasks.;.-',"'.
It,
; It says, giving evidence,, that
the agency ':.'was': Very, early
pointed in the, direction of
-covert'operations abroad at the
expense*Of'dassical analytic in-
telligence work and that the
'agency "complicated" rather
than minimized,. problems of
dirplietitkini of intelligence. It
says. that, even after 30 years
of operationithe agency- re-
Mains an:, organization. with
Sharp,,, rivalries '.between "its
clandestineand'analytical sec,
Finally, It., says the agency's
Main -product, its so-called na-
tionals, intelligence estimates,
shavalargelf gone unread by its
!intended consumers,i, including
successimi.of Presidents.,"
Karalekas writes that'
the evolution- of :the agency,'
'which w she describes as "undi-
rected," was deterinined by
four factors internatibnal
environment as ` Perceived by
the Administration of President
Truman, the, inillen ofintelli-
gence institutions, the agency's
structures and values and the
personalities of the agency- Directors; -
-
' In other terms, She said; this
meant the, growing cold 'war
with the Soviet Union, the -jeal-
Ow of themilitary intelligence
services and- the temptation for
C LA. officials to seek spectac.
tiler "successes." ?
Miss Karalekas notes that at
the end of World War II there
was a predisposition among
American policymakers to cen-
tralize the Government's many
intelligence functions. ,
..F-ThenreitstfiC',Stte'
the experience of
Harbor.- attack.irCI90:-.1*,'
.ban when bits' of' intelligence
'icttilted 'by one asency
',ielched'otherlittellieneeenal-
vsts:Whe could have
to ritedict-the assault; "
t'i.'-'1?a*s.Itaralekas; names- Cie&
Donovan,-.,the- wartime
head-of the Office' of -Sttategio,
Services; -James' V. ....FOrreittl,
Secretary -of the Navy.,::'Prqsi-
dent Truniartt, and Ferdinand`
Eberitadt; arileveitment':banle
er,:. as the', f9trad#K.: ii?jr4ziid
the CIA; ?4??-
'
But she 'rietee"-triat the-(
-predecessor organization of
tC,',1A.-LkStaMheel.4.in 'Jan
1940,,:aCkettpiciner4and. per-
sonnel - and 'was onteseed-
the emilitary services and he
State Department.. At that,1
three of the four initial Direc-
tors of the Central Intelligence
Group were military men.. ,
In the beginning J.. Edgar
Hoover's Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation refused to allow the
central intelligence ? organiza-
tion to touch Latin America.
And until 1950 Gen. Douglas
A. MacArthur( barred clande-
stine operations In the Far East.,
Clandestine intelligence col-
lection began about 1950 under
Gen, Walter Bedell Smith, who
became Director- three years
after the C.I.A. was. formally
constituted.
_ Under General Smith, andi
under - the pressures of. thei
Korean war, the agency swiftly
assumed. the basic" shape, it now
has, the histoty
That ,is,? 'it was-:foimedtai
handle Ovett. itiut;,;-clindestine
operations, "analysis coor
dination, of:: overall:: Amen
intelligence-activities:
The Soviet, Union..vias Made
the princip4. target! of:Arne'
'can intelligence in' March- 1946,
three years,: before ,.the---Rus.
sians. exploded theis first at
IC. weapon. The agency then
had 1,816 employees. Five years I
later, under General Smith, the
number was 3,338.
But Mist Karalekas also,
;Ihei.
'expanding '.. American; "Intelli-
gence effort; such imno correct!
estimate:in 1960. ori Communist
intentionssin K?re?virtual de-
pendence:en' fitendir foreign
intelligence. agencies for dans
i_destine reporting-and tr heavy
concentration on,turning out a
"daily Intelligence summary"
instead_ 'of-long-range estimates:
"Its. 'intelligence became di-
rected-to a wOrking-IeveI au-
dience rather than to seniori
policymakers," ,she says. "In]
attempting to do everything it
34;at 'contributing almost noth-
Miss:3KaraIekas also- reports
that fotiryears after the agency
was -established 24 Government'
dePartniefits and agencies were.
Stial..-L4.1*.flucing economic in
,tailigenec" In 1962 there were
. research groups
in:th.C.L.A.;., alone,. a situation
that: Was ,,not rectified until
The- history; attributes this
continuing' duplication of effort
to the ambition of the agency
leaders to outstrip the rniiita7-y
intelligence services and to'gain
greater access to ? the White
House.
r. As a result; it' 'concltfdes,
there "tension" within the
agency and a proliferation of
intelligence, products unused.by
the officials they were intended
for. One retired analyst, is
quoted as having said: "Our big-
gest problem was whether or
not anybody would read our
product." It . was a complaint
also frequently made by William
E. Colby When he was director
from', 1973 to 1976. ,
11 ?
;.. o0encyNrk.covert actions
!began in 1948, a year after
Ithe establishment of the C-.LA.
iMiss ICaraleicas attributes-their
conception f to George F. Ken-
man; then- director of polity
planning at the State Depart-
ment. *
She quotes Mr: Rennin' as
having said he was alarmed
later over the massive covert
.operations undertaken on What
he had regarded as a mOdett
suggestion.
WASHINGTON STAR I
MAY 1976
Defense Intelligence Agency Gets Chief
Lt. Gen. Samuel V. Wilson, who has served in Viet-
nam, the Soviet Union an-d with the CIA, was named
yesterday as head of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
-DIA collects 'information through the military at-
tache 'officers in 'embassies throughout the world.
Wilson will succeed Lt. Gen. Daniel 0. Graham, who,
resigned last fall after James R. Schlesinger, was re-
placed as secretary of defense.
Wilson, 54, served in Vietnam with the Agency for
International Development from 1964 to 1967, and was
U.S. defense attache in Moscow from 1971 to 1973. He
has been deputy CIA director and most recently was
deputy assistant secretary of defense for intelligence.
The DIA has been under intensive congressional
investigation, along with other U.S. intelligence agen-
cies, during the past 15 months.
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
'Approved -FOr Release 2001/08/08 CIA-ROP77-00432R000.1004000021
NEW YORK TIMES
7 JUN 1976
Ilis :?:-..-,?:,-- -7. T--- -s. -.--- "*"
-
s i orr Fa
, :.__. w fArt;?,-r,,.;:...7':.::
araf''' - C ' " '"4?.. ,. .,`,..;
ekas.:_ 4.-. ',,,,,..,:..,:.-,:..?
... .
_., - , .? .,.. ?. ,.%- ,',:i'. ,,,?,..;.. - :?'?,11 ?d-:-.. :. ' '.i
.aneha.istheiteerork'ninst-- - :1.7 at _,... Latin , ,
the Girls'" b:'sehedb '.."-- Sbi worked' knnnier 'vaell1.-.1V0eir-.W.illiatitilili. Bader of
- . wASRINGTOil .. June - 6z..:. ?.. in. Bostgow recalled'iher as tions front.. school &tot -eled-' ? the Senate Select' Committec,
Untitk, last: summer, : ? Anite-;_ '? of the brightest, well- - cal assistant:. at the Boston:. -. on Intelligence' Activities be
Karalekaes' only; acquaint- ,. qualified ed students?I'!evirl,,,liSympho, law znt,*aandrecepati_oni....?_?st at.;i:,Igan...1.ti........A..fooljsing,eandidfotititecsademlealwr4
nom- with.:91e nether world !-; ' she . 'aiw4Y6;=1.v.-"r.: ti- assistant at annivemiTY.77,;17..Fils1. hiitoMlie:tuloledi
of .?tererga- intelligence serv- -know 'why."' ??, ?- .,.-.,4, ,, ? ,, ..,,.t.,.____ sor.,...}refratiich ... e.iii,._.?4i1.,jprofessmmaw:...., "She vac
Ices wax ;ter- ? study; ',` for ...i,:- :: miss'. Kaildefai41. iee10-lbeii.-10-=.77L , heilo. gol.tia., '..:;:ii..tte-'first.,anie, who .? On ?,tiii
'-... f'r ''',he* doctoral the- --- 'Roy ? fl? 1946 a- Mei '"'t"ew' ? ' d - ? - ? -.:?, inr,nribidr-..liftt:,MOY ?
.' . ' ' ' ' 7 ' ' '?Ina:, nate school an -
, t!fatitaa- -Mai of :'ret.;Oir4s - " :inenth&befOre,Pe (tri ? --."-, her troirneet it, May; a mar..5. - to.,,,!it -AI ,;coirversatton4-
'cect
''' 5:43Ittil**''' :, ffeirtV*ent.innor----, -dii-o-ti,rG"-Yt.*theet.:'th4diistailde;141ii;' vardhad heihistXteaP%lit _;'-.71-h...''''5:ver3tiHtli42. tr" '''''-cini-Miss't'': -kaialekasa':wiltes'idlitS-T*6"1;
. .-..', :?? 44167116 ''
cl?
..' 2 - - - - ? - -.--- '- ' -----'-'' ' -: ? Vtl'hile-t,workingi,loward . ttc,; hatilt .clearentind."-",lietp,s1K
- "i*,-,-4. --'''Greel*r.' *Ill- ',.; seneeklten-er4,6?Ir:in... '=.ki;.ninsteeidegree, iidisRaralei!,ithatAlliSSaraltlits:smies Par-6
ci? ?It4,ridge tkal4iiirr.aht ':- turpuziczka},waaitti, ' .70.*.forohia. . oft.:10,:loork.,:fiet444y;i_t ,-m-w.-.7.becauser;
'irlit'digllet*ies*IG; "'?bus41*944stSJI6 '....`44'.L...--4.1e" - -at , Massachusetts : General she had ' i4itirenneral
&nit- weeks," and.'.ellpeeltd.,E,1.4.1nentarin:cschoOky,in, ,B,r-Aqzn: '..kr ? ital., in . reldministrativak...:.tio poii ' a Harvard. c!,..tkr-1
'entree into," #1?-_____. deq11-,-.1m..i:;Atild gerida.' .- ..-?"..':... ' .. and supervisory capacities.. -. --11.:''.? Studied' Secret Voltnnekk 1
and--.' living."' Ilrgriline-5 YI K'-'-??No:: Oriels' fors itteken" in . . , ger, ,, ,:tinctonti, , . . thesiv_n-' ..,1 - r -- , , : ,_.,_,0 "....,
AniVina= spies 41*?____agen_lt.,*-?:''the KarideitaiIiiinee;!*iltioh :4adinted trota.heitbeintlit..,,? Pe-Orme in Feeetegm;',
he,he*becme.aa aurz...1.4-s?';'-.'!.''.4? ithatiler ltsWifrikff*--Nsgrested ImGreeeelanctavent ,ontAY..ear itgov:in'alt assign-
State;-,o..ilho*,tr,.,,lits*rYt,.k,?t'heeihthee','':6'_ _ebetittf*-_,?,.,Seltti,V1 *in'. - mg' -tacincoborate,sotnething4f,,ment that carried-An- en4ua1i
s*:----' "::'''' .?:. 4A a Greek --'!..L'Sjig,,alt-a-41W ttini-' the iter..." During one Salarret..$19;09.0. she
,Akisees,,.,_ 4W7; i':-:',..'` assign- 4 r "'kV tif*leit?, a, *eekt ;Mr.. .nummet; gie,,_Tesearthed.1- re.:-...,-.ehehttd;...kieen -,nomPlelett,',
Ir*M51. ?Kag*leka3:.....U...i'f'j'.-4.1:_alt_ - fi478 YeTittg'. Bile:she;.flaw...L66" eeritly. released_ .: British diplo-.., free7,-to decide nOW MI _AP-
t., Vr#S ??-'.1v+Itiw.,'"?-'11Y- ?aireiSO ill.. Greek--.0*,-,!'COOK4 4natie.files-at therPublic7Re-, Ptnanst-the-Lsnhiect,-and ,Aen-
yearciti., ;?ual- hit_t?Ornt ..' Greek &hie- eini?oceasionalz?-?
postwar American mtelli- ly wears Greek costume jew7 cord . Office in London. - The ' spent the first two., months ,
. . _ thesis, "Britain, the, United - - browsing,
_ States and Greece--I942 to, through 'a secret --
genCe operations for the ... pi,..,.
Senate's Select Committee to ..? ?' 75-volume- compendium.. ;of
Study Governmental ()Pere- Thankful for 'Standards' - 1945," was completed in Au- C.I.A. history.. ? ,,, - ,.F,?-i ?
tons with Respect to, intern.. :,- At Girls' Latin, she was in: 'gust' 1974, and her ' degree . ' Then she began &series:Of '
gence Activities. .,.._ , , , . ?honor student.rall four yearsi was granted three months la. ..' 60 interviewswith Working
The tall, slender Beston and she remains- grateful- to ter.- , ".; . .. . ? , .. - and ? retired agency 'emi-'
native was, ,chosen. .from a - teachers such as Mrs, Lapi- In: the meantime Graham!, Ployeett. Miss-Karalekas cern-
field of 15 candidates partly; du., Elizabeth Condon.-and T. Allison,: profear of ?oft- pleted., the, history in- early:
on the -Tecommendation- of -.....Eclith. Carapbell,!-.alr retired, s - tics,-; at. Harvard's ' John .-.M.:, = spring, Ibizt. it had to pass '
her associates at .Harvard' .:,14.r ' V711' --ge.MaTimit:'s.terg.- . -, Kennedy School of Govern- . through agonizing bargaining
and partly on the bags of her p.',. dards?"' -,.- -.1 - -,,,r? .i,7,..',-',- ?-??. meat, -asketke..htgas .Karalekas:'' sessions, with top C.I.A. peru
doctorial dissertation:- on . On a Merit scholarship, . she ? to work' ..94.4:a.: series of. -.sonnet. over what could and
America= and British,acii*-;,-ettee-de4 -.g'illeater.C011ege;.,...,yrojects.:f.:9=-:::defense ? and:-...72.couktnetbepublishetz. ,-,A1,,:
-ties hr wartime ....Greacei4.. ..V%yhen-,.tt:i..wao,stillOglied,-1-4..-,-:::arn*corttitsfitiolicy.,,L,...i-- -.--:-?.z,Afiss Karalekas. isnot sine-
"n was alWaywinterest- ,44.4giri. - school' rather- tharr, acl.,*: -- - Ile.said#akshehicirpcov-= :,?,?whe.ther,?"shei-Wantst to, etnt-
--'
:eitiknimary,',,,:saidterlite.th414.`!ionlonf.g:,011etbr tt-TtOday,7:-,-..ett tkbfkletititt..and_hidwitt:litittOi'' ...44X7166i, the Intel'-;
Helen ICaraleigagi 4; W40*,?1 ';',4*.tet:' IFift15e4 CLISIS141004g:a-,. szave,:,itc nonagioir,a..projeetw,-,ligendet -qt'eitk-!noie ? thiCitert
'viiirint- for the Stater. Street' -career in irt-7-Instetrr; .' ortudlitattoperationshv. .k*altglittent. is over "i .
4
concentrated- 7t.itiocioinlitz,tioid*t ;', anct.li*T,;=.0m7te,ti few. articlee'Eo= ' rs
- 1talknnit Itust,C0P2PalV,10.V.t ,r?orate . --
-' .`SItieAlw.alrs iiien4,:.1;titriaght-i... llisto. a.::: ''',:...wiltingia.; -tePort-on foreign- Wienee:7- whe; eaktz 'I glites..l
' , ? -shey witatectto-entnnAltrik ., ,,
- -, 4iniiitstktia7-'4t. tilet?:AblitAT, ,. t_. ,-- ''. '-a*:;-:".indePendent,t.::2,,thors:itinad-ihsa*. reviiatil
- ..,..?,,,. ,,,, '..headeti, by:for-?,...,;:fenOrl'et,',.,?*:eztaict.::51141.
. ..`"A?iiese?r:-AVit? MIL: .., . ? - -. Robert!. ::,- riaisitsw. .......,H,"...... 1
2" ' - - - .r.-.1,;..,-e.......,e, ../31.; v4,1-7A?ge.,q.,,,.:,..tv.
?litift_ ,Islovi--#... _ ,. . i'? . .
_
NS DAY LONDON TIMES
27 May 1976 -18 May- 3.97
CIA: No Newsmen Need Apply
Your editorial "A Case of Subversion From With-
in" ? May 5) has come to my attention. In it you said
my statement of last February II "seemed to promise
that journalists would no longer be hired."
My statement said: "Effective immediately,: CIA
will not enter -into any paid or contractual relation-
ship with any full-time or part-time news correspon-
dent accredited by any U.S. new service, newspaper,
periodical, radio or television network or station. As
soon as feasible, the agency will bring existing rela-
tionships with individuals in these groups into con-
formity with this new policy." - This policy is being carried out. _
You may base the views in your editorial on state-
ments in. the Senate Select Committee report. .The
committee was working frcrn brie f- and necessarily
highly sanitized case summaries. We do not necessari-
? ly agree with their conclusions.
Although the body of your editorial says nothing
? about subversion, the caption over it does. I can as-
sure you it has never been the intent, nor is it the in-
tent now, nor will it be the intent in the future, for the
CIA to attempt to "subvert" the American press.
George Bush, Director
Central Intelligence Agency -
?Vashington, D.C. E.
_
Penkovsky Papers--
;From Dr Robert Conquest
-
Sir, Owing to travel, I have only to-
day seen The Times Diary in your
issue of April 29, which alleges that
the Penkovsky Papers have now
been proved a fabrication, and
attacks me for. maintaining, .the.
opposite. ?
I It is true that students of- Soviet
;affairs have on -occasion endorsed.
or partially endorsed, fakes (as with
Deutscher and Cam in the cases of
"Budu Mdivani " and the "Litvinov
Diaries." respectively): and had your
Diarist's' assertion been true, I would
naturally have admitted my error.
But it is not.
? All that even the-egregious Senate
Committee's report on Intelligence
Activities and the Rights of Ameri-
cans, which your. Diarist quotes, in
fact says. is that the book was. pre-
pared and written by CIA "agency
assets", but on. the basis of the-
"actual case materials". But this
is no more than a hostile way- of
saying that the materials came
through the CIA (who were, rather
naturally, Colon el P en ko vs ky's
American contacts), and that there-
after they were translated and
edited by someone in the CIA's con-
fidence... There is nothing new here,
let alone any proof of "palpable
forgery". And that such editing
took place has never-been disputed:
it is indeed stated in the book itself.
This is obviously not an entirely
satisfactory situation, but it leaves
the question- of authenticity as one
of . Judgment of the actual. text.
Criticism of it, as against mere anti.
CIA abuse, has been based solely, on
criticis' misunderstandings of. trivia.
and on amateur telepsychology
(" Colonel. Penkovsky would not
have . . ."). Until the CIA releases
the- original- "case Material", as I
hope it will, one can only .say that
the arguments for general authen-
ticity (and the negative arguments
against "forgery ") remain incom-
parably stronger than- their con-
traries. At the very least, the in-
expert intuitions of Mr Brogan can- -
not be taken very seriously, any
more than your Diarist's' attempt to
squeeze implications- out: of the re-
-port of the Church Committee. That
Committee has itself been attacked
in the United States even by liberal
columnists as largely a politically
motivated farce. To find Times con-
tributors who go a good deal further
is a little disturbing.
Yours faithfully,
ROBERT CONQUEST,
Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars.
Smithsonian Institution,
Washington,
May 12.
- - - Approved For Release :2001108/08 CIA4RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
?
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
THE I4EW?it01411i1W4,?-1976
abrst Cites U. S. Risk in De ay
an
*ASKING ; acy
TON 3-1A tralatta# en the FordAtInlinis-
ma kin,
jinklYst1;t1;4011all' onPelicy hneiV.bet?ivis working On
P' yhee
10.7:11/ Nov Yto thaw ititioraz repreeem*, m30...
'sentora-liMiliet; 0e. the Cell tratiOn's gollovf7 IA
intelligintta-,tienCTop ?Liana.", ft ttential eleegerei' leiler article teMpt/Og to distance twice he-
.sueE',0.1.*het-erity..--7'' IiiritnillreiWelitgATA. tween'iditartr t nio4Bover 'whe- Mr; Brown's article, ace' orchng
canrelationshinwi
iobooi Of thought
, . - ?
United States,movt urgently to
matters related to China.- They settle the Taiwan isSue and per-
suggested' that. the agency must haptestablish some kind of mi-
be. ander heavy .criticiant for if- Unity ',relationship' with China?
law flin PublicatiOn or the It China 'after Mao is to move
article and-that it was no at, away from Washington, 'how
far might it move toward Mos-
and th
? ?t ei?rtleiliile 1 The ? u-e Is ted. states should Administration officials, Plat
that ett(delaYttvniiin c*:4141C4tiri Matilda-12* the?' the' tions itivarely in the IrCiSt
l*Cdgrtigidt 'blab* (UMW' Art loci' e 41,40 9ver novr,be ingagediulnzavegn negotiations re.; aciesannHot grow of expect., about
if (1646*jilii 'Se' new '4 tb.(11-14 nwin inetudinfinureof Chinese4m
irgu.ess. that' the _Me agency- aPairee!sel' Theeelssrteltev.eleaa Then , missed, badly on- an
farefrmil.fleunw presenting his tuallY theeesermtancsree" get purtexPeuTprerbction, ?
un-
tung and that without Mr. Mao
death, of. Chairmen M-.---es" Tall- own, ?oPationst- end that the mending that
ng- enotigh to s Mr.
,-- thiPlaguicorPoreigh ;fifes' ? line is, tPL*fl On , , the Ambition of the with Tat, looked. viirid recentlY
Peking: ostutieP17.;.9-qted lationt with China, .eact relations
inagazinetteleiseGlenn Brown ln?4a3"1" rimerstra wltbi Peking's thlre; when mutual defense treaty
tie: dominant group 9
to hold the -Western-oriented
groupS together., aline I
move either toward
httionism or . toward ace
da.withi,iUnT
agency jacoOraged the pubhca-
tion- .of scholarly articles, but
* comment en
'po&pA
the a'
undersmy., Their latest effort to
bring this about failed last ium- Thatarm!' Predicted that
men after the-capture of Sai
the,Presi'dential
tlon looming.
? , ?
Premier -Chou. En-tat - was al,
st ',certain to 'be succeeded
'acting Prime' htinister Tang
;- ping, ? ? successor,
lisAlarndstGroun however; was - Hua Kuo-feng
eludtaty: s, wouldof
state Henry A. Sone-wain. he was 35T1I ?AA that Rather, the debate 'occurs whose: cominitment to. recent
goes ligteadoeiot,with mo iiasbe4 moljZt,,,-;"gena over more specific issues about foreign policy is reportedly less
which, the analysts have little than Mr. Teng's.
.....,cow and Peking aintilinderedt for "414 -"Yeare; '' four hard evidence evidence is foreign policy ' Mr ? Brown arguei4n his ar-?
arr' : source ofteverage which %Wirt spent' on Chna, t major- factor in the recurn4 ticle.that. foreign . policy issues.
'Moscow . ... -.:.- hat,,thi article was written last, struggles for power in Peking? are. e,, major factor in interne/
-. , :-Iilavrt-In'theMinoritY . - 4.1 ,:? h4;, ..
' ' ear and that ha"was...,,elt Cur"'".,_, If it is, does the opening to the Chinese 'pelitics. He also sug-
. ? uY wurruug on' anything 'wet depend on Mr. Mao sand gestt Ahtt Mr. Teng's recent
his well-known distrust of Mos, fall front cswer may be tied MI
article' are-specifically iitt,ii#, to ,Seyeritl ',Administration off-
none ceetilliterintiii.elgenccly sunus, naLlThreiy isiist? *ell-fCarhinon,thimeayi- the end of cbu year. should theinilitarytechnelogy -
.' 'The views, expressed in the do with Chine. ?
be the author's own. t ails said that Mr. Brown wits caw? If es seems likely most Pere' t.?- ? efforts t? seek
analysts, Mr. Mao. dies before western- technology, including'
WASHINGTON POST
4 JUN 1976-
;' ?
? mt-.1?4:: ? ,54;V
*len Chink and Russ Is
-dfingsnedinlViahIngt01$211efidg3r
. once was. An *Wein the new Issue
Foreign Poli*,braogeitaro'fai?-4
Ice analyst at the CIA; warns the admini
istration that'll& policrcOuld lead Pe-
king to. seek an accommodation with;
Moscow:To avert, this, he recommends.
full US: recognition of :Milk, which
would entail the breaking co!' diplomatic;
ties with Taiwan,, and thae provision of!
U.S. military equipment So the Pekingregime.t
is untuaa.. not to
unprecedent-
ed, for, the CIA to join in A Public de-
bate about the direction Of U.S. policy. -
An, editorial note explains that Browe,
'itt? presenting his Own views, not those'
of the CIA.. But the article will, inevita--
bly, be seen in someloreign capitals as:;..
a deliberate signal Of the administra-
tion's intentions. - ? ???:
Nothing could be further from the
truth. Indeed, administration officials
fear that the appearance of the article
may Complicate US.: relations, with!"
both Mom* and Peking. They are an-
'y with the CIA for clearing the arti-
cle for publication. They are also con-
cerned that some of the Issues raided by
Brown - 'may become . involved in ,the,,
election campaign. Ronald, Reagan has
already denounced the. administra-
tion's -plant to. "sacrifice" Taiwan, and
Kiting* has gpOptttdenied that
',hart to keep:, prttiate.T,
There is sindlart debate within the
CIA Itself?not; indeed,, about the pctil
Icy' the U.S shouldfollow,tlinaithe CIAf
ta supposed:to. keep:Outot policfmak
higi but-abutnaIyaiathatshOuk
besupplied tilthepollermakeriL.
crverivhainiing weight Of *Woe,
within; the intelligence community-of,
Which the CIA is only-one segment?
has long been on the side of those. Who/
believed that there was no serious-pos-I,
ability of a Sino,Soiiiit
It therefore followed that there-was no:
pressing need td mollifyPekhig either,
by ditching Taiwan. or by' offering arrow
to. Chink? Bit. a small minority ;Of am!
lysts, made up of seven, men who were
? listed as "diasentersr Ins State' Depart
ment memorandum last year, believed
otherwise. ?
: Brown says that it has been a prendsei
of U.S.:, policy since 1989 that relations;
between Peking and' Moscow are likely
to remain hostile, and- then proceeds to
question; its ,validity. He. argues that
prolonged stagnation inSino-U.Vrela-
lions could help to undermine the
power of those Chinese leaders who are
favorablydiSposed toward-Washington,'
and strengthen the pro-Soviet elements
in the leadership. Then, in the power.
litrtiggleihatfolloWs the death of MOO;':
China tight "seek a general accommo-
dation with Moscow,-'.
6
,ernent
these eventnalitlet are cl
:dot In the, hest interest of the linitedi_
Stabil,' he says, "I believe that ;Wash-,
ington-Sbould:consider recognizing
king" before -'Mao's death. -MK- he!
Alrildea.lnightinfluence the configurai
-don of politiCal power in China, and thel
courdeathe Post-Mao succession stragl
He :sees China's recent purchase a
Rolle Royce fighter aircraft engines;
from Britain as a strong indication of:
Its interest in Western military technoP
ogy. He argues, by implication, in favor
of similar U.S. sales, since these would
lead to increased SinoSoViet tension;
"thus . inhibiting any moves toward
Sino-Soviet reconciliation." -
The first serious proposal along these
Ithesovat made last fall in a Foreign;
Policy article by Michael Pillsbury, a:
Rand Analyst who was strongly , at-,
tacked by Washington officials fort
what they described as a wrongheaded
and irresponsible approach. But., the,
very vehemence of their attack showed'',
the -importance of the issue they were.
trying to play down. Now comes. the;
Brown article, hard on the heels of a
full-scale CIA study entitled "Prospects
for a Sino-Soviet Rapprochement after
Maar!" 'which- clings to the established
line.
The CIA's basic conclusions "are,?tTW
even if a desire to reduce differences
should emerge among Chinese and-So-
viet -leaders. after Mao's death, Peking:
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : GIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
. ;?'?
APproved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RIDP77-00432R000100400002-1
i&IMOseowOuld
bie obstacles, created by- conflicto,
ing% national interests would circut*i
Scribe the ciiicessions each could offeti
M tha!other. But the* Ouestions fir*
raised by Pillsbury; have hada corisklerf;
able hipact on Washington's policy-
maker% if not on *analysts. ,
A mesnorandtim Nandi sent tO
cainlitimtelgutPetitstiAtbsiAstePteil
1
Paitmentli oiveintelligence-orgfaiisHb--?,
lion listed a:series-Of -questions potied
by Kissinger.- "What- should we b&
doIiig"lt 'asked, In deter a Chinese-So-
viet rapprochement??.., *
,."We doubt".. said a response (jatedi
May 6, "that any faction an Peking)
'Amid dare to. undettake a major for-
-eign po1lfisflOfl, Rather,
than ask: wliatwe shield do to deter IS
Pn040Tbitt,:titiffirggkenl.Pkt:P111011!
Saw/day, hese
to: Irritate
irritate
China_Articlit
By Henry. S'..litradshet,
,WpbteNeStarStaft 'Writer
- CIA 1' Director:. George,
Bush has ordered a? revieVe
of the agency's, policy On
allowing US employes totj
publish articles following
what a- CIA. ? spokesman
called, misinterpretation ok
an article- on America*
China policy.
The article, appeannfri
the current- issue. of thei
cinarterly magazine :fort ?
eign Policy, says', theUnited
States shout& consider
establishing- full diplomatic.
relations with .Peking be-
fore they aged and feeble
Mao Tse-tung diesAir hopes
that- -this.[-might infMen
Chinete'politiet:k'[[H. .
tionistnr patch .up relatiOns
witht-the Soviet:Vide:lit-after
Mao dies.. accarding la. the-
athdrttoger4SlenprBrown.
Tiktfte C.I1r4 He. suggesta that
.11%;?-?rectignition.- ? ot:1.- Peking-
Could give :?.1.11,taithingtOn:
-
THE --ARTICLE; 'T.caused,
itritationi yesterday at the
? State ? '::Department,,q which
'bad beconieeware of itonly
-a dayer twaearlier. Senior
Officials fel the. CIA. _mime
:was -being. Med. 1. to -jostle
:policy ? wnrking
"iquiely-towardfultrelatiOns
That hav-,,,been
??stymied; -however;-.by -[.? the-
:la& defense treaty coiittl the
:Chinese..-Nationalist regime
-cut 'Taiwan,: - with, ., which
.[Washingtoa?.1tas,-Inlidiplo-
;matic?relations.1-..
1' :While-the formalities of
diptornatic recognition
. were switched from Taiwan
,to Peking fairly., easily by
countries:. -luck, as -Japan,.
-these countries.' lacked the
complication of- being: com-
mitted to, Taiwan's .defense
against Peking.-
, Brown simply suggested
-that "the United States
.could follow the: `Japanese
model' 'without
explain-
ing what to do about the de
fense tie; Secretary State
Henry A. Kissinger said at
the close of. President
.to Peking-, in
fbecembe7that the
Taiwan treaty was an
resolved problem- Switch-
ing relations., This still is
STATE Depart-
inents spokesman, ' Robert
FUnseth, said 'yesterday
that commentaries by gov-
ernment officials' on foreign
policy "should be cleared in
advance by the State De-
partment." '
K CIA spokesman said
Bush's order for a review of
the agency's publication
policy was not the result:of
any complaints from out-
side the agency. It was, de-
cided upon in order to avoid
problems of inisinterpreta-
tion such as.. occurred' Over
Brown's article, he said. ,
The articla.was
-*tit* statemeut.
Via "Shear
tions.7.But even this, the memorandum,
suggested;.should wait until liter in the
year, When the`, analysis might be found
-Useful by a new administ.ration, But.*
what if Mao -dies first? If Kissinger:
really wants to know what to do, he will
have-to read-Brown's article. '
- -eami.vietorsona.
licatiom Poll
in that it represented
[ attitudes, 'although Brown
was identified, as. a seal
analyst at the agency's. of-
fice of political research,
.? , Bush does not intend to
prevent all publfcation of
CIA material, the spokes-
man said.. In recent years
CIA. analysts have'; been
publishing increasingly
widely in academic jour-
nals, congressional studies
and other forms. Most-arti-
' Cies have dealt with factual
material- on ? foreign coun-
tri es assembled and
analyzed by. them, rather
than, U.S..- governinentak
policies.
AT THE TIME of esca-i
lating U.S. involvement, in.
Yietnarii, the" quarterly
Maga;i. Eo&viga.Afrairs4
EDITOR & PUBLISatii
'I MAY 1976
-JCIA doubletalk
a different putdicatio*
frinn -Foreign Policy.
published an article sup:-
porting .the -commitment,:
w.Titten. by. George A Ca47=:
er. He was identified only,
as' a Specialist in Viet;
namese affairs. -
This caused an outcry itt
Washington. Carver, was
then a senior CIA-
helping shape Vietnam-
; policy; and the . failure to
, tell readers of Ibis Connec-
tion brought congressional:
and Press complaints.
The identification. of-,
Brown in the present article
apparently was intended to
head off such complaints',
But- despite the' distlaimer,,
article appeared-
stiletto&viewpaint
Withinthe gepernmeati
In February, CIA Director George Bush issued a state-
ment saying: "Effective immediately, the CIA will not enter
into any paid or contractual relationship with. any full-time
or part-time news correspondent accredited by any U.S.
news service, newspaper, periodical, radio or television net-
work or station." E&P (Feb. 21, page 6) applauded the
statement as did many publications.
Mr. Bush repeated that statement last week in response
to a question before the annual meeting of the American
Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington.
Now the report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelli-
gence Activities discloses that "of the approximately 50 U.S.
journalists or personnel of U.S. media organizations who
were employed by the CIA or maintained some other covert
relationship with it at the time of the announcement, fewer
than one-half will be terminated under the new CIA guide-
lines."
The committee says the key word is "accredited" and the
agency interprets it as applying to those who are "formally
authorized by contract or issuance of press credentials to
represent themselves as correspondents" leaving all others
(executives and free lancers) as not included.
This is CIA doubletalk.
The damage to the integrity of all responsible news people
continues with this sham.
Mr. Bush should immediately clarify the CIA position by
saying "all news people" are included in the prohibition, not
just some.
7
Approved For Release 2001/08148- p40900-271
-
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
BALTIMORE SUN
5 JUNE 1976
unset re u es
By RENRYI. ?14 Area[ ?
WaslaugtonBureau of Itie Sun
Washington?The State Do.
pertinent frostily rebuked the
Central Intelligence Agency
Yesterday_for an article adv.?,
eating early formal recognition
of China.
Robert L, Funseth, the State
Department spokesman, did
quiteput his comments in those
terms. But he left no other ob-
vious inference.'T.
Yes; he said',,thetState De
partment felt articles: by gov-
ernment officills.,,on foreign
policy should be-' cleared
through the department,, even
when they were framed as per-
sona, opinions. No, that had not
been donein this case. -
He refined:10 cominent: on
the suisian-en7a the article by
Roger Glenn Brown. in the mag-
azine Foreign Policy.' Mr
Brown, 35, :was described as-a'
, former :specialist on China for
thegX now assigned to anoth-
__.
WASHINGTON POST
9 JUN 1.97s
His article is labeled as a re-
flection of his Own personal, un-
official judgment. It advocates
complete normalization
United . States-Chine relations
before the death of Mao Tse-
tung, the Chinese leader,. who is
82 years old and visibly feeble.-
: , As Mr:FunsethImplied, it
impossible for a CIA analyst to
publish Anything. without.
?
:carring policy, overtones,
, President ford already is irider
fire politically.forsileged-plana
to sever former ties with the
Nationalist governmentnnTai-
wan -quickir if he is elietid
in November,.
?? , That, accusation - w
made by several members. of
Congress. Ronald Reagan, Mr.
Ford's Republican challenger,
has translated it into a sugges-
tion that the 'administration
plans to "sacrifice" its defense
commitment of a generation to
Taiwan.
? The: administration's :
cThii"iet.n one
:
-
'
:16-yreivis H. Diupid_
and Don Obeitorfer
viiteeineo_itlosi sten mum
',Th cetrui7bite1111161a1
,kigner black-marliett
transactions to:-Iinarice it
;
activities.. in Vietna*..,
Chile even while. other
vageneles,, worke
out. curruP tion jtrj:sboi.e up,,
,:t;110Wee?fitoollie4.,_?._,Ugetcl
fernier' Offetin...,- ha*.
swith CIA-
The Itietnaint.
, ?
invoiveiVintillionsZof, ci.o_
traded for PL._
blacksiarket ilivitongsl(Ong
according to these sources.
,
'One -fernier .offic
'sal it that at ? $iime petit's', dtir4
ink the war nenFly, all .the
foreign currency .sRent :
the Seigon, station .of 7 t,h
'WC ivao,- kiw44*o
ul
?oich transactions:
4:- ales. A. -Corlier;:. ,wli
iiroott.4O : an economic a
visor t6,413.e:U.S.enshassy 1
Saigon: in 1968-8-snit.?mhtic,ri
ter -counselor for!',:e&iioinicli
there in 1570-3,-; gOit'itk-;re4
*Mtn* 4,01.- Sueollfglallajilid
CIA officials ,told: him' theii
Preferred , to -:obtifiv. .funds
through': ?.litii..:?,4,blick- hagw.
ftonta. 'Hong.. Zong.. due:: to:3.
!"operational' reasons" 2and:
.because : .,inch. transactions
i
'nada their budget 'gO: fin-,:4-
ther, j'-,--.' ,:?:',- ,, ,_ -..,,:f-?
. I.CeoPer, kiiti'=, he, did not
knew what -proportion et',
Saigon.,, CIA expenditures4
were _financed : through:
black-market transactions. '
,`.-Ttie?seSIe of.,CIA:spendingl
economic19 $aigon during 'his time
tauiILfor
4 effeet' view
. in.
m?eh'41iiikec, outlays;
Tt;
th4titgX, 4Iege b,
militarythe ?anc 1.44
.'Ditring" "the' intensive
phat,erof'jit";iriilitarY opera
itsizirete4:1fiiii:,111643iirthe- offi
aiati eicehangeliatii?h0Plyingt
t?'U.S government traniaeg
tions was. 118 plasters t the*
del/ar;.'t Blickunarket._, rated
were' often .-1.*o of thret0
plaster for
most, purposes
275 to the', dollar in October,'
,
1876, under, heavy'
sure( and, successive: adinst,
? ,
Molts In later
lege/ rata
ereper
: pushing inn
realistic ratesLi;tr.s.i. policy
*ma?' Week-market,-market,#41#7'04
actions.. 4.
'."Testimony .:-- hi: it
j)itssY bifida befera'Senfj
-ate, subcommittee in 'N?isieM4
her,;:1982; .saidlhose dealing'
in the .black: market' `!igive.
aidr:' and eomfort.'
eneriir._ -7,, and -Make _the
911etneinese economy' more
unstable and subvert .efforts'
to. establish econAnde:StithlW
ity in Vietnam.'
A former CIA official who,
eslCO not :to be quoted by:.
'name' said - he believed the ?
? _
-agency's resort to the black
market' in the early 1970s'
was due at least in part to a
heasak,.: budgetary drain:
on China recognition call
- sponse has been theraierepeat,
edby Mr, Funseth. Hexecalled
that the Shanghai cottununique,
bistiectduring former-Presi
Richard 1IL Nixon's trip Fto
China4n- 1972* committed the
two.-governments tit eventual
norinalizatiOnef
have. been
step.* step he said, but there
;
t.t0
r;..;10?.__!,:ter_t_nrd_tmeol:_the*,
' oluelOent normalization would
take& the timing. The tiinin
Lwas said: to-remain- sped
many specialists in the US.
argue for sooner rather: than
later.;
The Critical question on
terms nornialization -con-
eerns the :U.S.? aefense treaty
with Taiwan.' at I
publicly; has- satd Must
abandoned as a precondition for
normalization. The U.S.: has
hedged, and Mr. Funseth' Said
yesterday he did not know U.S.
plans in that regard
Otherwise it generally is ae-
i cepted that- the nOrmalization
will follow the pattern set by
1 Japan; -political recognition of
?Peking: while' maintaining eco-
nomic ties with Taipei. But giv-
en the uncertainties of domestic
!'pOlities, the issue is a- hard one
for the administration to deal
th
Wi now: -? _. . ,
,Mr.":Funseth sidestepped the
question whether swift recogni-
tion-was-advocated by-many in
the administration but prevent-
. _
ecl. ROPOutiallY hY H019 A.. Kis-
Singer, Secretary of State. Nor-
mally, he said, there was a wide
range of: views on. foreign poli-
eYin8leavnthia4he bureaucra-
cY;The
Brown...'-- . ' ' '
article Was sym-
bolic, at least, of howsuch con-
flicting interests sometimes are
translated into pressure for a
specific- goal. But several- offi-
cials with otherwise conflicting
viewurejected the idea that the
publication represented in any
tway a disguised effort to test
public opinion.
?:;.. ?
'goosed by the: effort to se-
cretly_
. raise- a sunken:;:Rus-
sian' submarine, in the; Pat
cifie. ?
? The CIA.6.,..etfort to raisei
. the- Soviet,' sub' spe.v
eisiO research.
Atig: the: Hughes Reicher!" Glomar'
earl* iri
Incriorltii,' cost -has been'
estimated- is, asi--$20ft,
'CIA' purchases Of Chilean'eurr?1 on. the: :
black ma
ket were at a time when the:
U.S.-embassv:theree, was. pur-
*uoiruCZ ,''',OPout.,.. $30,0
linonthly, in-Chilean escudos
?fjuitaide: the countrY. hi' Ars
leatini-Z. ,;e?:!': -al -.1 c ? ' , .
:.i.?:DinrinVifS!'t:lieriod thek,
A-a4-? 141614
to 'shore u).7-4 the :Chilean
econontr-insuppartet,Presi.,
' NEWSWEEK.
7 June 1976
_
SHAKE-UP AT THE CIA
When the dust settles, six of the CIA's top
eight men will be new to the job. The replace-
ment of CIA chief William Colby by George
Bush and the ascension of veteran agency ad-
ministrator Henry Knoche into the No.2 spot
are only the most prominent changings of the
guard. William Wells will become the new
head of clandestine operations, replacing
t
William Nelson, who recently resigned.
..\
Others reportedly planning to leave office
' include Edward Proctor, deputy director
for intelligence; George Carver, in charge
of final "estimates- on intelligence, and Carl
Duckett, chief of science and technology,
who led the attempt to raise a sunken Russian
8 sub with the Glomar Explorer.
cient-gduarrIn-Fret _
After theelection' of Sal.,!
.-Y410 Allende as president
of Chile in November -1870
blitek'nler4451 rate$;4Wilielk-,
previously, maintained.. 25.
,per cent Profiiitui,[4.bove. the
legal- market,, soared as 'high
Polle5k41_4411e4;efierPlv
against the' new: regime. The:
CAA
'is.,. said., tq have in-
creased' its Meek-market
Vtinsietiene diniiiit:Ole Al-
lende period to 'Include
,eratioital
' forbid
any Amezican.-r.- official,
'abroad' from -dealing' in
?blascksitiric, ett be currency.
CIA,- -spokesmen, said
yeterd al thatagency
had no comment on the re-
ports of black-market. trans.,:
..c..4014-1??? t 44,11, Act.,
- Approved For Release 2001/08/D8 :CIA-RDP71-00432R00010040000.2-1
Abproved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
THErltSW= YORK' 6r176 - - -
- -
naiizing Aidel'
? !tight' -to Know,"' ?which wnsr
_
Special to The tteirT
:PRINCETON; N.J., :Time
William E. Colby; the.
director of Central
proposed today that any, rw
straints en,,penaltieS'on: the
release, of .sevret:doeumenti to,
press should be p4aced on
Federal officials instead,ot". on
reporters.-7 ,
,Thinkow' .ifltige
lieedi the sanie icatei(pro
Aim-end no `ntere---4hae?
,affertl-to your inetime; te*
turns," Mr. Colby Said. -41f.
Internal Revenue " Man Av
return,: , TCOOMite.
MOM"
iriexpliinlnghb
4.?
PtiiPosa4
!An ;T0100 inidedterCibra**
:t."41*-1 -:f400_1(4'. *PO
014 tiwigedionce_:.
not-to - Daniet,
ever .got the 40%5,40: telklie,
'cMSoT dAt440
reporters.- protected'. undeil
the First Amendment:!!
,Me. Colby made hinckgniarkai
at a round-table discussion *
"The Ethics of teaks:
Right to Withhold Versus thlit
attended by seven', journalists,..
including' Mr: Schorr; the CDSt_i
TV ` investigate -= reporter- WHO
gave The Village-Voice a copy
of the House Intelligence Corn-
Mittee's 111300,: ciiL. the
npoalurt. The.:,.'Da}J Princeel
tonian, ? the student newspaper'
it ?Piincetoix,VhiversOtY: as one
of!-?the:: alumni reunion;
itf4,that have been going
on-here', W./weekend:-
In :discussing -ways to eilmif
discLosutes
*died the; idea of-an'offl
seciiire'lict'. with criminal
Ptintdtlei:-Sgainit'the transfer'
of confidential information to
nongovernmental " personnel,,
-
with
the ndien itg.?
"There are inatead ways. to
im-
prove the discipline of, ;hose
who know the secrets.":_.
? Mr., Schorr Said: he concurred
,with Some of : *Mr. Colby's, su
illestions 'Um- preventing un-
authorized disclosures. _1,4
L -it's the job of Government
NEW YORK-TIDIES
5 June 1970, _
U.S.DisavOwstgOlitySt
On Articklbaut Chin-Ties
?
WASHINGTON, Juan ;t
-The United Statelk disnesoci--!.
a* itself totray-littottiv:com4;
mend:Pim by a senor analyst
CeePist-= ktelligeP-51
Agency that 'POY 024ed,
consider:: fulIz,:rimOglitione.;:- of4
China before the deatk4,:g4ed4
--:WState.OePartnient tpekb.S4
'-nier*-Ilohert pcinSetit: said. thel
Untied Stites:, reinsisted..-com-
mitted in normalizing 'relations
With pelting butAtat not:Sec.':
deadline for accomplishing It. it. :
:Writing in the,citiarterlyinak.
ezinei, -Foreign" Policy, R
Glean.Brown:the'C,.T.X analyst,4
saidAhat" failure to act ,beforel
Mr. Mao dies, eiould,undenninei
thes;',pro.Americart: faction,. in;
Peratig and- strengthen pron,i1
Act Orem' DIF? Mao is 823
and is re?d to'hethfrat
NEW YORK TIMES
16 May 1976
John ants
onv
TO the Editor: , ?
At e. time when we- are taking: ati
Close look' at the actiVities of the CI
and the F.R;L:,,I would like- to, noini
nate for the"..quotation of die day th
following,
Let Us preserve our terimer; our
iiisdonx: our humanity and civility: /
though bur, enemies are everidaY,
renounain,g theirs., John Adams
Data
job of the press to try to f
out :what's going'on,. Mr
Schorr said. "But once a (earn
alist has..a secret, there is no
constitutional power. for ,the
Government to try to grab -it
back."
Salpfk warned tha
ntils getback on arreVen
'Course in this county anAL
away 'from Watergat, we 'will
need .a certain amount of wins-
-He
added: .
,"If ohs intelligence agencie
in a great, and painful inquest
can cover op anything as they
have dope in the past, one way
-tethe suni- they ;wilt not th
futnre'ls to haVe a Young mai
Who. will leak and leave: the
SalutarY benefits -.of _leaking 'to
society." - `-.;
? Edward Barrett: &eche,ofj
.the Communications institute
and former dean of, the Colum-
bia Journalism School, sup;
gested that Mr. Colby's pro-
4.1 ?
I? "--71
:posal b 'modified to include a
'bipartisan blue-ritbon appeals
panel composed of ,ctizens with
WASHINGTON POST
2 7 MAY '37
1 security .clearances.. i i
'This should be an indgpend-
? ern. body that people -like Dan-
il Ellsberg can appeal to if they
"feel information is being, int-
vProPerly withheld," Mr. Barrett
explained. Daniel- Ellsberg has,
{said that he' gave the "Pinta:.
Igen Papersk to the press. c ,
' ;r7 Jose Ferrer 3d, editor of the
'isivt-SigtiOnet.rune inagazine; ,
:disAgregdwitiv Mr.,Colbry's pro-
al., - -,f7,,,-,--,.. ,,..-E_=. '., -.:::?-?,, ,. -,.., ?
-, ...',`Tin ,fit, Con'vince -.03:balt-thei
-depth of the problem calls' fon
new- laws,",, Mr.' 'Ferrer -'said
"''Wetergate seems to Paint:7i1
the other ' directicat.' Legiala ?126
Ici=ptishbeck to anera okgreat-
er secrecy,- Is not -now
.? Others, on .the panel were
William Attirooai the publisher
.of- NewsdaY; !William Ewing
Philadelphia',,, a lawyer , and
Donald, Oherdorfer? a national-.
Laffairs reporter for The Wish-1
ingt,on Post: John L Oakes
editorial page editor of The,
New York Times, was the mod-
erator.
:aiOni-
.4.k,..:ift,*-it.-tit*
'deneywould still tli
40:12:tm .._---a....,,,,,, ..,t,,ing!i,?,....- .....litiatitik'sei*i .,:?.pieuifreliiittia*F7wahh461,
7.,..131gt. irbiirtit'rifigar., ..- Idtpacit -fall into . the.; -eate-A
te4.13.404gi-fir*Citit*Tr4:.: 'gory of. tboie. "accredited".-i
,1 -ortit?ieck:o-**.tin- .--ii.i.?.P.1,,` ,,tc''Y*. 7.:32.iela::-. . - ' 4
th?thei_sitpati* 4-, 4:44:f,t' The' Senate intelligence
iiim -1170- 74* C'C' , committee; ;in rt.:resent re4
a letter'..tO;The Rintifltar'24,*4,74:-..tundandk port '911-, the agency's use of
- ,. .
ve -Ioutnallsre `.top'.0 '
rriedie:%tritd.).:z_o_rt..- ninelisti,:': said: that3,
ashingtoli-b*se&:6 - .0,4F-iy) as?pfrAto4iger..47w4e!,1
.4... ,t0 "that he thought thatJAIre?Pa4C-0;n041-bags-ot art: i7:1
d.-reutieste - that.. ;r0tef.,',421020*-..', - ',clot .1,WritteWwere. on, con.ii
hi? ..'"the=z-reeridtiiiiit?; --:ment, no ? more' could- ,.1440t,7,11.!%,-,1,11t:ONe4c11:-..0,Per
uue 4Isrftlit llitielli. .
is
!Ventral., ..,.._.? er1Y-tie, detnandedied ies,71
, , .? t.,-,_ _
t.l'esr._._..s. :. e -,.'i--'!'';:""-t,:.;ir.-rt.,---';'..: ..-
of *t. I0Y1:11,171.7:::A;'-i'i'iiit.eierit issieit '
free-lancers, -. '" - ' - -'-, i. - - , _The' repOrt alsOzsaidl.hatil
.,?..ii ?.,4_4.4,4' ' , ,.,te '..- Feb.. , 11,:?'? shortly: after- he , two full-time, aecreditedeor-.1
-,M.,,,."- l'''''n,'`...,,;,..,._ , 7,':.rt``-`' ?'iltioltliver: as. CIA,--dtreeto4;i: gespondents.-.:-Shioad ,-. ' had:
,i'?,4.461r. f'2-::' ' '11-."'"'''Bush announced.1,...:that, thdf ''.',. Working' relationships .-- with :
, _ ' ' 'aces MaY 21_ ageneY wouldpolOgir eng?-;.fi the CIA BB last
k,n,....._..e zu".}itz,',..-tile:W?e?:':?f: 'ri'Ofiti?12s7witiii an. .,;f*tir4fx t-1, thelournalists he consulted ..'?:".'Werifiaile public by ter into 'paid'Or contractuak , -''While Bush durtick name
p.,--8,.....4 4*-,i'.-,,t4e.:?...- Soviet' ., --Or:- Part-time neW.-. ,.'...-:corret--:: on. his Polley, he conferred,
weekir.,-,.Litrary *Gazette:7:: soondent:-"accredited. by i-,.: _With editors. of The New:.
f;flat:. -near'. cirre'..,',. U.S.: news serviceii:ngwsPa'7' ,Yeref,Times and executives.
Op lideseaw .: are , per, periodical, radio or tele, &I eat
'and the W-,
Nfackint far the, CIA,'. _ .., . visou, network - or: tleit.', , .......,eilla; __o_tli-, .1-3
....musnnetwork shortly if- ,
/AdamsT wrote- this , in IC letter, t'or,
Joseph Ward when the British- were;
Making destructive raids and burning
towns on the plevrEnglanci. coast.
ROBERT J. TAYLOR..
?
EdItOr iii:C,hief,:.-The Adams Papers
Roitcrri; May 4; I976"`.?
There was no elaboration
56ermi ugliviho'cl3eusif tint, ndii91-.s..iilitz-i.i .w1:1,01
'. : . -?'. "'irector,' The three SessionS
:;-, ? - ter his instanation-,as CTA!
accredited means.,
d
kniglitintliertM,journalis; .'.;.r.' '',11eiiin said. that ther:',-.;*ere.:-. conducted.: privately.;
*e community; he recalled, ., agencywould bring existing , .4-tiring. a: visit- by BuslaL,toi
that he had enunciated his - relationships with such lour-. - -New- York' ? - ,-- ----- ?
-,-...L.i".....L.;.",!:._.
9
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDp77-00432R000100400002-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
"IIE NEW YORK 'TIMES, WEDNESDAY, MAY 26-1976,,, .
Moscow,1 I
a er-m:
1.?,.**4= ' '777
Aleiati-jaa#' *LT Ongfi
'
ivtosco*-kty 21k ;..f
The Soviet weekly _Literatur
naya Gazeta; in fits iasue- for
tomorrow, suggested that th
American, news correspondents'
accredited in Moscow were
sedated with the United Stat
Central Irrtelligence? Agency:. -??
. The Correspoedents, -_wer
Christopher S. -?Wren of ?,The
? NewYork Times, George Krim..
sky of The Associated.: press
and Alfred' PrlendlYi,'-',". Jr. .of
Newsweek. ? ?
Liters.turnaya- 7:Gaeta, .ehe
publication of ,the Union or,
viet? Writers, gave no &ideate&
to support its; allegation:
Aplproved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE
30 May 1976
James 0. Jackson
Soviet libel of U. S. newsmen requires a
CIA unmasking
MOSCOW?A false and scurrilous So-
viet attack on three United States news-
men last week underscored the urgent
need to identify and disown all quasi-"
correspondents who have ever been
on the payroll of the Central Intelligence
Agency.
The attack, published by the weekly
Literaturnaya Gazeta ? [Literary Ga-
zette], showed that the CIA's shortsight-
ed policy of employing journalist-agents
has armed America's ideological ene-
mies with a powerful new weapon.
Literaturnaya Gazeta [itself a notori-
ous tool of the Soviet secret intelligence
services]. was able to allege, with abso-
lutely no supporting evidence, that the
three reporters were in the service of
the CIA. The libel was made believable
by the CIA's own admission that it em-
ploys reporters abroad.
There is nothing new, of course, about
Soviet newspapers attacking American
reporters. What is new is the use of the
CIA smear, which is a marvelously neat
MANCHESTER GUARDIAN
24 May 1976
?r;4 r;
murder,
? From pAvip TONGE
Athens,: May 23 .
:. The. continuing mysteryituri-
:,
rounding the ' Minder; -- of :
Richard S. Welch,-Athens CIA.:
' station chief, has been high-
lighted by a? Greek- press report:
today, claiming that Mr Welch:
had been shot by a man Who,;
? the paper, Eleutherotypia ,LsaYs,
had been a CIA contractikiller
for 20 years- and is novKliving
in the Balkans. Senior .Greek:.
'officials todaY?titid that, they
.had indeed questioned a qreet;
living in Yugoslavia who, they
had heard?iiiight.be' connected
with the murder,- but that. he
had had a - flint- alibi- for
December 23, the night of the
However, the:. official add
that the suggestion that the
CIA -ordered Me ? Welch's
murder: to stop: United States
Congresiional pressure.- on the
agency is among several that
cannot be totally- excluded,
although they express the reser-
-Vation that,. as: fir as they
know, the CLi. has no previous
record-. of takiug,..4.4,g11..fird-,
and useful one as far as Soviet propa-
ganda hacks are concerned. It explains
everything in the three little letters,
CIA. The Soviets might say:
Why did the reporters write stories
about Soviet problems? The CIA paid
them to do it. Why do they talk to
dissidents? The CIA pay e them to do it.
Wby would they write eiee? The CIA
pays them to do it.
Before the CIA smear beetheee availa-
Ne, Soviet propagandists eoula jeerge
American newsmen and women elett,
with sexual misbehavior, black marke.
teering, or alcoholism. Those were weak
and vulnerable libels, because they did
not contain within themselves an expla-
nation of why reporters wrote critically
of the Soviet Union.
!In the old days, a typical Literaturna-
ya Gazeta attack might have accused a
correspondent of going to bed with
young women. But that did not neces-
sarily mean that he was anti-commu-
nist, since pro-communists, one would
presume, else; sleep with young women.
-e
*tet(4.70-00Plirltiel'eeNre:eepNeee
Oileee
:deemed the emurder.-44,-; an,
"association. of: oftleera of
!nationalist IA eel le and
." November, IT,'; a:group: which
'purports to, be of:the extreme
Left This second group-posted -
,a .two-page tract; against
Imperialism to jourmilists here
but the police are extremely
-douliftid. about, whether. the
group really exists and suggest
that- the authors% of. the tract
may have sought publicity fOr
this._ to" draw: attention, away
frqm Atter possiblechannels.of
inquiry.
One Week iftei the -crime,
foreign- journalists were:: tele-
phoned by men -who claimed
to- 'have carried. out the-
and who told- them the location
;of the stolen car; 'which they-
Said they bad used. -A--,,Siinc.a
was duly found where they'
said it would- be, but police-are
not convinced that this
was used. ' ?
Since thert; all Cypriots who
Might conceivably have been
involved have been investi-
gated, aS- have many- Arabs in
Athens. Following both these--
inquiries and the outcome of
agents' work in- various Arab-
countries, the Greek security
services now- doubt Whether
groups from the Middle East
were involved. They have also
eliminated the possibility that
Mr -Welch, whose :riame and:
address had been published in
the local press;-was murdered
because of his: previous activi-
ties in Peru:- ' -
JudiciallY; the case- has now
been tranFferred lero-rn thp mra. -
mining to a higher magistrate:
The same is true of black marketeer-
ing or boozing. Half the population of
the Soviet Union engages in those two
activities, so it hardly makes a corre-
spondent anti-Soviet if he does the same.
But the CIA smear has a beautiful
symmetry to iti It not only undermines
the journalist's integrity, it also explains
why he writes as he does. It saves space,
it saves time. And it saves the hacks of
the Soviet press the uncomfortable ne-
cessity of trying to challenge the truth
of what American journalists write.
.7.ut, /ere is more to it than that. The
CIA szetee not only endangers a journal-
ist's credibility, it also endangers his
lice.
There are enough misguidc-..i is
this world who believe what the,y read
in the Soviet press to make a reporter's
life uncertam in such places as Ulster
or Beirut, where guerrillas, terrorists,
zealots, and assorted cranes run around
armed to the sideburns. .
A correspondent falsely labelee'. as a
CIA agent by an irresponsible Soviet
newspaper will face an extra measure
of danger in covering the news, espe-
, daily in trouble spots of the Third
World. He will never know when some
mad Marxist, taking a Communist libel
at face value, will murder him in the
! street.
That is why those who compromised
the press must be named, and why they
must be purged from its ranks. It may
happen that in this process some great
reputations will be ruined. It may bap-
pen that careers will be wrecked, that
I friendships will be ended, that promises
! will he broken, and that illusions will be
shattered.
But better that, -far better, than to
ellew this eerie, shadow of .suspicion to
eat an!,' at the honor, the credibility,
! and the usefulness of a fundamental
American Institution.
(James 0. Jackson is The Tribune's
Moscow correspondent.),
NEW YORK TIMES
5 June 1976
1Federatludge Rates-Mk
May: Keep ?Budget Secret
: WASitu4GTON,..line"4:-IAP1z4
A Federal: judge ruled- today
that the Central Intelligence
Agency may continue to
its budget a secret. -_ - ?
."The court concludes -that th
'secret: classification arrlied to
the C.I.A. budget and expend,.
ture flies is rroper, both proce-
durally and substantively,' Dis-
trict Judge John Lewis Sm th
11
?
The: decision came in- a- suit
filed by. Morton K. Halrerin,
wio. sciught -O.I.A. records on
it budgetauthority for the cur-
rent fiscal Year and. its actual
expenditures,for tke, 1974 fiscal
'Halperin fanner na-
tional security adviser; filed his
'suit under- the Freedom,. of In-
formation- Act- which' requires
many Government recOrds to!
be disclosed to- the public. _,
? A-pprovett,For Release 2001/08/08-: CIA;RDP77-00432R000100400002-.1 ? ? ?
ApproVed-FcirReleate 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
THE NEW YORK TIMES; AIONDAY, MAY 3/, 1976
Press betrayed. Fur
By'Edward P. Morgan
-,--WASHINGTON--What bothers me is
the calm after the storm. The Press has:
been had by the Central Intelligence -
Agency. That shocking fact rolled like/
thunder through the .report of the Sen-
ate Select. Committee on intelligence
-
Activities. Yet where the loud col;:
lective otitrage from_ what Inie td,t.
consider the honorable trade of jourvf
,nalism, the only one l'have
Can We minions of the news medIa
,be so busy righteously defending free-
doin of the press under the First'
.Amendment that we have no time
to discover , (or admit) that we bavto
been subverted? -
In highlighting the committee report
-released by chairman Frank' Church4
Democrat , of ?Idaho. The New York
Times noted that '!as Of last February;;
some 50 American journalists- or ern,
ployees of domestic. news-gathering
organizations' maintained covert links .
to the C.I.A. Even under new restrie-
tive guidelines, half Of these relation-
ships will be continued." ' -
How free is a press 'riddled with
spies and informers?' Hew can you:
argue that such. : a porous head of,
journalistic cheese is entitled to pro-.'
teetion under the-First Amendment?
How da you publith or air what the-
public has a right to-know if you don't
knoW yourself- whether it is tainted:
with distortion andiror -lies? The in-'
sidiousness of -the situation has just(
been intensified by totally unsubstari,
!dated, allegations of. a Soviet_Weekli::
that, the MoscOviZcorteXPondents
The NeW.-iYork.110m*Newsweek an
The, Associateckyresnare-working:
-the- CIA.. ;The ag asencrb uncorked-I
lirracidthateata.
44,03004,-
itraQgithi
-10terti
'That's - Only part of the problemi,ib:,==
Depling* PrisVeritiaVerde4Ille agei4
ct continues -.."covert' ties"' with intW:
drecls of academie scholars. -1967:
the Church report says, " the C:I.A;
"published - or subsidized well over 200
books"; In 1969, the , total. _reached
25O' The agency supports a press in-
stitute with a galaxy of reporters, and
a foreign-based publishing institute. ?
' George Orwell'i Big
Briitheilik* be. Pm' 40404 to- hang
Ilikgiv4OndOraskik-Caueqn,:the" line
aditarsittiv*,reptitedlY1,wp
day 'and nightrevising the Soviet E&
-cyOneltaitigrttinibmt.TWthWetian*I
Fait,LLICt'engiit'''OfeW of hiaterflin4t,het
green ...with envy. r For all. I. know, the;
C.I.A.' may -be-Covertbilientlying; even;
i
nowar Soviet Encyclopedia-ki counter-;:!
felt' of a; counterfeit of -history. .
'It is easy but risky to jest on thisi.
subject. Even if the new Senate Intel-
ligence Committee maintains- a tough,
and skeptical overview and a tight leash
on the C.I.A. budget an iffy prospect),
how can We be sure how or whether
the agency actually removes its honey-
comb of activities from the catacombs
of official secrecy, where the skeletons
of power abuse still twitch? ,
.,--When I was director of CBS News,.
briefly,:: I', beard Our. Cairo stringer:
worked for.:,the-,C.:S.A. He was home on,
'Alava I askekbiti. He denied it firmly.!
and, 1 thOuglic-joiwincinglir 13ut hew4'.
could; r really know?He resumed his
Cairo; post.' What should I have. done?...
HO* refreshing to note that, it takes:,
suspicion7and insidiousness to . defend
shoakt_the:
4 .ilAirwer,
t- cak mcgi
,fea/100's believethia
tionshi
4kuilfurcr
lx0sgf "mike
tW;TheM1*
hv8..-startecrtheirtoo)
OreinizatknTh- :ghost expos,. pre- and; cl
ignIction:Wthe sgoad!'-eTt.,typ&snter* a'plot dei
vice called aManGuffin.brEitehpbek .14a: eGuffin
whatall the rmnm rig around :.**34441.:ATIlinP.---31*
fihitt_vieiintspyr....arganiza" titairean.';p0i.eibly corkiipCkik
harttforighilit, That view Was a rein ininei;Lneetinly
by many filriS of the tOs (e.g., 'The SPyytrhOCarne
Prom' .tbe_,Cotity..-"Tbi:,1peresi -FileZ. *a): but. also
worheitiatreit'illtelienellfwelf:vtkrheexh4 Ong!
dent; for iiiier,,Kty60.-J:-:`-'? ? ?
The problem with "air the President's Men" is 'more
iLoriOletAW-rnoile-? Beeititrtu.,:be;- for most?ifita-r*
vog tkok;axeli-pladei7,1ast7:peeettnewspapeT:00117-41,1
thousktheTililiO7makerilifi**Cogirety_sOived tlf*
tenblenterhiinta fikkabon:tilligi:guyataticingtn a
of PebPletktalicritios, and the anditinceS:keernbaf4
fled, however, by the confusion of tone of the "last X'
minutes .of the film.. in his efforts as a produ-
cer to inflate the seriousness of the film beyond the
limit the movie can support, has included/a:Anat.-meet-
ing with peep: Throat that seems to imggesf;?Woodn
the wrongdoingv In the. CIA. While-
nd publisher.
_fivfth-tiie intelligence community? Ab-
surd! During the Cuban Missile crisi.v
John -Scab, then, my ABC colleague:
was a vital conduit of information be-,
tween,theWhite House and the Sovief
Embasit; when Official: tions between between Moscow and Washing-
ton sputtered so _unreliably. Allen
Dulles-and other, chjefs gaverne
ri-eluablbriefhtiet-"eantiets
. fore- seine foreign- trig. Other, corte-1
spondenes received: similar treatment.,
Its when. the ,.cloak-and-dagger' are
thrust . upon _air. American journalist
that I draw ; line, We asiiime that
,the than front Pravda,: Tass,orilzvestta
is doing double dufrtvith espionage:-;
It's a different' ball 'game_ if, some,
United - States news agency' bureaul
chief in Bangkok is Working for George
Bush. ,(I have no' knowledge that one"!
The'
- The C.I.A.'s penetration- of the:
Fourth Estate has created a treacher-1
ous and intolerable situation. It could
well undermine what respect and in-
_ _
, tegrity the press has left with a skep-
tical public..
We
We simply cannot pretend to have
a free press if we don't purge our-
selves of' this subversion. To fail "to
do- so would sun us. a red badge of
cowardice: !,believe the names of the
correspondents, publications and agen-
cies still working for the C.I.A. should
be exposed:
In this: sinister, age of bugs and' tap*
and other invasions of privacy;-must
3- be'rml,",_ brother'! ;!eeper? Not if
jegraulisrasi
..070*.ge z..,Zi4:..rAfJATA:)24
WOod .1iirts*ttimat. -Mat begabillfitarekidliiiii
irativeiy folielnvestigatiens the CU; they literaij
WAid-rioCatt4It-aeenis out of keeping with the ilteraf-
'W-:tbe restq Dm t suggest sticjt 47tenriecticsk
tn ofsamee in thAboott-**1,04-,thiltati:i
tnal legeL-thw see* in the fIlth peetwobekrotbainao.:
moratton?Whereasi:litcordilitte ..thOriOls,.. it .pectirrect
four months later' after the'other paperr, Judp:Slrica,
and ;the Congest-tar:gotten into _ the; *gm*. De*
Ilkoat'scalitaient4,in thebook:Segn tOelelerring to
Iiii*radtutOistiatrOstriftehiPti to cover up.;
Watergate'aeUvities byiettettylurthey=.: were related
to CIA activities. :This; sequence la' ,;th furthert
leaves the'impression that.-Woodatein were being 111-4
,TeitigatecAnCthiiatened;j3eeaUse of. their :work.--
Woodstenbithkbook say the precaution's they took
againit,beinthriliitigated Were Toolisli and melodra-
matic" and the 'final sentence in that sectionis, "They
-never, found: any' eridence that their telephones had
been tappett-brthat anyone's life had been in danger.*
One does not set that feeling from, the sequence in the
. L4le _ .
, :are attract
ed to these two fib* because of *seriousness:I'
:inwapc. eat, Or..-7Thige, Thignot tbe_ceindoelvas. that of
a ;mildly" stiek:psentio-Wittheticidan thriller, : and the
appeal tit 'All the. PreSidept'S Mee! was best delimit
by a student of Mine- atittisqingeles- CUT College whoi,
nicknamed the: rdm.:The:,aiindance Kid and the Grad-
uate rGet
Tait -STEitiPEL13
jlak4.11.!Y_FJ1
Approved-for-Release-2091/08/08 ::CIA-RpP77-00432R0001004000024...
Aj3proved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
PUBLISFER' S WEE=
17 MAY 1976
Senate Group Finds CIA Now
Active Only in Books Abroad
The book publishing program of the
Central Intelligence Agency, once con-
sidered an important weapon of long-
range propaganda, reached a high wa-
termark in the year 1967 and has subse-
quently been sharply scaled down and
limited almost entirely to books pub-
lished abroad, according to the recently
released report of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence.
With the exception of one reference
to Praeger and several other pre-1967
book publishing ventures, the report
contains no names of individual au-
thors, titles or publishers. A spokes-
man for the Intelligence Committee
would not go beyond the contents of
the report in commenting on relations
between the CIA and the world of pub-
lishing. Press officer Spencer David
told PW the Committee had an agree-
ment with the CIA not to disclose
sources of information or methods or
the names of individuals and organiza-
tions involved without their consent.
"The civil rights of individuals and or-
ganizations used by the CIA without
their knowledge have already been ab-
rogated," he said, "so we don't want
to turn around and do the same thing."
"The publicity which in 1967 sur-
rounded several CIA-sponsored organi-
zations and threatened to expose oth-
ers," the report noted, "caused the
CIA to act quickly to limit use of U.S.
publishers . . . Thus since 1967 the
CIA's publishing activities have almost
entirely been confined to books and oth-
er materials published abroad. During
the past few years, some 250 books
have been published abroad, most of
them in foreign languages."
The CIA denied to the Committee
the number of titles and names of au-
thors of the propaganda books pub-
lished since 1967. Brief descriptions
provided by the Agency indicated the
breadth of subject matter, however, in-
cluding the following topics enumer-
ated in the Committee report: (1) com-
mercial ventures and commercial law
in South Vietnam; (2) Indochina repre-
sentation at the U.N.; (3) a memoir of
the Korean War; (4) the prospects for
European union; (5) Chile under Al-
lende.
During the pre-1967 period, the CIA
had developed a complex pattern of
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
26 MAY 1976
News focus
IMIMM???????0?41,
By Charles Bartlett
EXCERPT :
Congress still wants to hear about
CIA secret operations but the in-
? telligence agency hasn't learned how
to live with the ? leaks that result.
Only a few hours after CIA Director
George Bush told the House Interna-
tional Relations Committee that the .
relationships in which it could get
books published or distributed abroad
without revealing any U.S. influence
by covertly subsidizing foreign publica-
tions or booksellers; by initiating or
subsidizing indigenous national or inter-
national organizations for book publish-
ing or distributing purposes; and by
stimulating the writing of politically sig-
nificant books by unknown foreign au-
thors?either by directly subsidizing
the author, if covert contact were fea-
sible, or indirectly, through literary
agents or publishers.
Prior to 1967, the CIA had produced.
subsidized or sponsored well over 1000
books, the Senate Committee said. Ap-
proximately 25% of these were in Eng-
lish. "Many of them were published by
cultural organizations which the CIA
backed, and more often than not the au-
thor was unaware of CIA subsidi-
zation," the Committee report states.
"Some books, however, involved di-
rect collaboration between the CIA and
the writer." Some books were pub-
lished without any knowledge on the
part of the publisher that the writer had
been subsidized by the CIA. But there
were cases where publishing houses
contracted with the CIA to publish
books, the Committee said.
In 1967 alone, the CIA published or
subsidized well over 200 books, rang-
ing from books on wildlife and safaris
to translations of Machiavelli's "The
Prince" into Swahili and works of T. S.
Eliot into Russian, to a parody of the fa-
mous little red book of quotations from
Mao entitled "Quotations from Chair-
man Liu."
According to the Committee, the
CIA has recently been particularly sen-
sitive to the charge that CIA covert
relationships with the American media
jeopardize the credibility of the Ameri-
can press and risk the possibility of
propagandizing the U.S. public.
Former director William Colby ex-
pressed this concern in testimony be-
fore the House Select Committee on In-
telligence when he said: "We have tak-
en particular caution to ensure that our
operations are focused abroad and not
at the United States in order to influ-
ence the opinion of the American
people about things from a CIA point of
view." The new director, George
administration plans no covert steps
to affect the Italian elections, the
news was leaked on Capitol Hill.
Some hope the Senate's creation
of an oversight committee will per-
suade Congress to repeal the Hughes-
Ryan amendment, which obliges the
CIA director to report all covert ac-
tivities to at least six committees.
Over the past 16 Months, virtually
none of the information conveyed to
Congress under the amendment has
been kept secret.
Bush. has made similar assurances.
The Senate Committee, headed by
Senator Frank Church (D.. Idaho)
went a step further, however, by noting
that there is domestic fallout even from
covert propaganda abroad, including
books intended primarily for an Eng-
lish-speaking foreign audience. "For
example. CIA records for 1967 state
that certain books about China subsidi-
zed or even produced by the Agency
circulated principally in the U.S. as a
prelude to later distribution abroad."
Several of these books on China were
widely reviewed in the United States,
often in juxtaposition to the sympa-
thetic view of the emerging China as
presented by Edgar Snow. At least
once, a book review for an Agency
book which appeared in the New York
Times, was written by a CIA writer
under contract.
E. Howard Hunt. who had been in
charge of contacts with U.S. publishers
in the late 1960s, acknowledged in testi-
mony before this Committee that CIA
books circulated in the U.S. and sug-
gested that such fallout may not have
been unintentional.
''Question: But, with anything that
was published in English. the United
States citizenry would become a likely
audience for publication?
"Mr. Hunt: A likely audience, defi-
nitely.
"Question: Did you take some sort
of steps to make sure that things that
were published in English were kept
away from American readers?
"Mr. Hunt: It was impossible be-
cause Praeger was a commercial U.S.
publisher. The books had to be seen,
had to be reviewed, had to be bought
here, had to be read."
[Frederick A. Praeger, who in October
1963 left the firm which he had estab-
lished in 1950, told PW in 1967 that "on-
ly 15 or 16 books" were published
which had any CIA connection?fewer
than 1% of the books which the compa-
ny had published since its estab-
lishment?and that most had been pub-
lished in the late I 950s. He declined to
identify the titles but described them as
dealing with Communist parties or
movements abroad. He said that some
had been suggested by the CIA and
some by himself and that in this regard
the publisher's role was "no different
from our relationships with other gov-
ernment agencies." He insisted that
"the CIA at no time had any editorial
control whatsoever."]
SUSAN WAGNER
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
13 MAY 1976
Japanese court officials are alleged
to have traveled on CIA funds.
A Communist member, of parlia-
ment, Atsushi Hashimoto, charged
that the San Francisco-based Asia
Foundation was a CIA front. Jastice
Minister Osamu Inaba acknowledged
that more than 50 judges and prose-
"cutors had received money from the
foundation for travel abroad between
1966 and 1975. The sums ranged from
$500 to $700. He said the subsidies
were "unpleasant" and would be bar-
13 red to judicial officials in the future.
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
WASHINGTON POST
g MAYIEL_.
asiro
By George Crile III
Crile is Washington editor of Harper's magazine and a '
Writing a book on the CIA's Cuban operations for Dou-
breday. His article on the CL4's-man in Havana, the
Cuban agent codeLnamed AM LASH, appeared in Out- ;
look on May 2. In this article, lie-examines the CIA's'
other major attempt to plot the assassination of Fidel
Castro, which failed for what may have been
similar-reasons.
vir ANY ODD TRIBUTES have been offered to the
_VI American character, but few can rival that of Sen...
Walter Mondale upon reviewing the total failure of the
CIA's persistent efforts to kill Fidel Castro.. "Thank
God," he said, "we're just not very good at that sort of
thing."
Most thoughtful observers seemed to draw the same
reassuring conclusion. Even the American Mafia dons
who had been recruited by the Agency to carry out Cas-
tro's-execution were seen as too incompetent to be really
evil. The portrait drawn by the Senate Intelligence Com-
mittee casts them more in the light of characters out of
Gang That Couldn't. Shoot Straight," bumbling'
after; Castro but apparently never getting around to
making attempt on his life. -
Such interpretations of these deadly undertakings are
no doubt comforting, but they are unlikely to be more
than exercises in wishful thinking. To begin with, Sen.
Robert _Morgan (D-N.C.) tells us "the theory that pre-
vailed in the [Senate Intelligence] Conunittee was that
the Mafia never tried to kill Castro, that we-were being
used."
? The committee did not pursue this, but an indepentV
ent examination of the available record of one of the
key Mafia figures involved in the plot makes us consider
the troubling possibility that at least some of the CIA's
Mafia associates were working with Castro.
Such a combination would hardly have seemed likely
in 1960 when the CIA set out to recruit the Mafia. Almost
all the major underworld families had invested heavily
_
in Cuba and Castro was fast moving to seize their hold-
ings. He had even put some of their members in jail. The
' Mafia's willingness to do the CIA's dirty work would not
then have required explanation.
Sam Giancana and John Roselli are the two mobsters
generally identified with the Mafia-CIA plot. But a third,.
Santo Trafficante Jr., was perhaps the most important of
the three, for it was his men, botli in Miami and Havana,
who were supposed to carry out the murder. _
Trafficante is generally identified as the don of south-
ern Florida, but he is also one of the chiefs in the Mafia's
loose national confederation. Once the Agency decided
to turn to the mat), it was inevitable that Trafficante's as-
sistance would be sought. Alone among the principal
dons, he had lived in Cuba. He had built a large organiza-
tion there and still had a number of associates in Cas-
tro's Havana. ? Moreover, his professional experience
made him ideally suited for assassination work.
He had learned the business from his father, Santo
_
Trafficante Sr., who came from Sicily in 1904 to Tampa,
where he built and ran his crime family for the next 50 --- muc
one
14
years. In. 1954i Yeai aftei siii*IVinifillio,41ni attempt
on his life, Santo Jr; succeeded his father:. ? ' -
Iii the first few years Of his Tule, Tampa was plagued
with gangland murders. He was -himself a leading sus-
pect in the 1957 barbershop execution-- of-Albert Anasta-
sia, the old chief of Murder Incorporated, Accompanied
by a Cuban associate, Trafficante had been in Anasta-,
sia's New York hotel suite the night before the killing.
. _
.According to reports of the Senate Permanent Investiga-
tions Committee, Anastasia had been. atienipting to,
move in-on Trafficante's Cuban gambling operations
The following month, Trafficante was arrested-at thgc
Mafia national convention at Apalachin,. N.Y. Ten years.
latet his eminence was again confirmed by his appear-
ance at the La Stella Restaurant in New York with Car-
los Marcello, Carlo Gambino and several other. of the
country's leading dons.
He was, in short, one of the major crime bosses in the
United States and, significantly, the don most deeply af-
fected- by- Castro's revolution: Not only were his gam:
bling casinos seized but he had been jailed in Cuba. One:
would assume that such a man might have contemplated:
taking on Castro independently. At that time, in 1960,
Castro's grip on Cuba was by no means. secure: Once
Trafficante accepted his CIA commission, Castro's days
should have been numbered.
A Question of Loyalties-
THE INITIAL PLOT called for poisoning Castro in
his favorite Havana restaurant, where one of Traf-
ficante's men worked. The CIA's Technical Services
Divi-
sion supplied deadly botulinum toxin which Robert Ma-
heu, who was coordinating the mob's efforts for the CIA,
passed to a?xile associated with Trafficante at the Fon-
tainebleu Hotel in Miami Beach. From there Traffi-
cante's courier was to deliver the poison pills to the man
in the Havana restaurant. ,
All of this took place in March and April of 1961, just
before. the 13,1y otPigs. Accounts vary as to Why the plan
failed. One version--is that-the authorization to adminis. ?
ter the-poi:son never came through;- another, that Castro
stopped going to the restaurant.
The most intriguing theory was proposed by the CIA's
'deputy inspector general, Scott Breckenridge, to a Sen-
'ate staff member. Breckenridge, who had been responsi-
ble for investigating the CIA-Mafia plot, maintained that
Trafficante-had been providing Castro with details of
the plot all along.
But why would Santo Trafficante, of all people, -do
this? One 'possible. explanation is proposed in a July 21,
1961, report on Trafficante by the Federal Bureau of.
Narcotics: "There are unconfirmed rumors in the Cuban
refugee population in Miami that, when Fidel Castro ran
the American racketeers out of Cuba and seized the casi-
nos, he kept Santo Trafficante Jr. in jail to make it ap
pear that he had a personal dislike for Trafficante; when
in-fact Trafficante is an agent of Castro. Trafficante is al-
legedly Castro's ?outlet for illegal contraband in the
-country." _
,
The report goes: on to summarize contradictory re-
ports on Trafficante's relationship with Castro but, be-
cause of its date, the allegations quoted are of great in-
terest.- Back in 1961,- the Mafia's anti-Castro credentials
were impeccable.: The informants relied on by the nar-
cotics agents may have been wrong in their conclusions,
but it is hard to think of a possible self-serving. motive
for fabricating such a story.
Th
? som
mo
ton
ear
_
ere are other indications that there may have been
e working arrangement between Castro and the
b. Several reliable witnesses ? most notably Grays-
Lynch, who wasn senior case officer with the CIA in
mi for eight years ? assert that during the crucial
y 1960s Castro relied on Cuban Mafia contacts for
h of his intelligence in the exile community. And
e again Santo Trafficante emerges as a central fig-
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
itie;' for Castro is reported haiia 'paid' off his Mafia
agent's through the Florida numbers racket ? Bolita ?
iwhich Trafficante runs.
- Here another Bureau of Narcotics report' one
-prepared by agent Eugene Marshall ? is instructive:
Fidel Castro has operatives in Tampa and Miami
making heavy-Bolita bets with Santo Trafficante Jr.'s or-
gailization. The winning Bolita numbers are taken from:
the last three digits of the lottery drawing in Cuba every.
Saturday- night." According to this report, prior to the.,
drawing, these operatives communicate with Cuba and'.,
-advise Which numbers are receiving the heaviest play..
The Cuba lottery officials then rig the drawing. .." Ac-
*cording to this report and others, Castro's agen& were
robbing Trafficante of ?arge share of his profits. The
Narcotics Bureau Was afraid that, if Trafficante's Bolita
operation were ruined, he would Concentrate even more.
on the drug trade..
But Trafficante was in an even better position thatv
the feds to know about raids on his profits. Had he cho-
.sen to, he could have solved' the problem overnight by
shifting the payoff numbers from the Havana lottery to
the weekly dog races in Miami, as he finally did in the
late 1960s. If, then, these reports are to be belived, Traffi-
cante's Bolita may have served as one of the paymasters
to the Cuban intelligence network in the United States.
Divided Loyalties
rir o THOSE ONLY loosely familiar with. Cuba in the
1950s, and the Mafia's intricate role there, it must
seem absurd to suggest that the underworld could col-
laborate with Castro's intelligence. But the Mafia is not a
monolith and not all of its branches had been Castro's
enemies. The Mafia had placed most of its bets on the
dictator Fulgencio Batista, but it had also served as the
gun runners for the revolutionaries. Castro; as well as
mosVother important Cuban revolutionary leaders, had
previously dealt with and relied on one or another un-
derworld family for arms to carry on the fight.
, As the owners and managers of the luxury hotels and
'gambling casinos in old Havana, the Mafia had played a
pervasive role in Cuban life. Soon after Castro's victory
its leaders were no longer welcome in Cuba as its opera-
tions were progressively closed down; but it still had
friends and former business associates high in Castro's
government. The complexity of the Mafia-Castro rela-
tionship is exemplified by the ambiguities that surround
the Imprisonment and release of Trafficante himself in
1959..
It was a time when thousands of enemies of the revo-
lution (and Trafficante clearly seemed to fall into this
category) were being summarily taken out and shot. The
Bureau of Narcotics report suggests the possibility that
he had agreed to work with Castro and that the jailing
Was designed to provide cover. But officially, he got out
of Cuba thanks to the services of his, resourceful lawyer, -
Rafael Garcia Bango. Bango is himself another good ex-
ample of that _era's ambiguities ? not least because his
brOther Jorge was and is one of Castro's closest friends
and advisers. (He is Castro's regular handball partner
and is the minister of sports, a prestigious post in Cuba.)
? ?
After getting Traficante out of Cuba, Bango stayed on
for the turbulent first seven years of the revolutionary
government. Then, in 1966, he left for Miami, where he
came to the attention of a federal anti-crime strike force ?
which had Trafficante under surveillance. According to
one strike force official, the two men had whit
amounted to a "father-son relationship." Eight months
later Bango was arrested and jailed in Spain for passing
counterfeit American money.
Significantly, Bango is now back in Cuba. That an im-
portant mob attorney, whatever his family connections,
should find life palatable in the new Cuba is at least cu-
rious. But there seem to be nothing but contradictions in
the lifestyles of Trafficante and his friends.
15
Mysterious Grafitti
.1p OR THE NEXT PART of Trafficante's history we
must turn to Jose Aleman,, an exile in Miami who-
became involved with Trafficante in 1962 through his--!
cousin, Garcia Bango. Aleman had 'been a rich young
revolutionary in Havana, one of the leaders of the al-
most successful 1957 attack on Batista's presidential' pal-
ace. His then considerable wealth had -enabled him, to-.
maintain a base in Florida where he owned the Trade-
winds Motel and much other Miami real estate, includ- ,
Ing the Miami Stadivm. The Tradewinds figured promi-,
nently in the revolution, for by 1957 most of the leading,
revolutionaries in Havana had fled' into exile, including
many of Castro's followers, and most ended up by stay-
ing there at Aleman's expense.-?
_ ? ?
After the revolution, Aleman returned to Cuba and'
stayed' a year before he was forced into exile again.?
this time as a pounter-revolutionary. On arriving in the
United States, he was met by George Davis of the FBI
with a subpoena to appear as a witness against a Mafioso
named Norman Rothman at a trial in Chicago.
Aleman had had frequent dealings with the Mafia
when he was buying guns for the revolution. He had met
Rothman in 1958 when the latter was trying to save his
Cuban investments by ingratiating himself with the anti-
Batista forces. Rothman offered to flood Cuba with fake
currency in order to bankrupt the economy and bring
down the government. In return he wanted to be able to
maintain his gambling operations. Aleman had rejected
his offer. He tried to avoid testifying, but the FBI re-
minded him that, if he did not cooperate, he might be
subject to prosecution for illegal gun running.
Aleman's relationship with the FBI had initially been
-hostile. The. Tradewinds "was an armed barracks," ex-
plained George Davis, who was assigned to monitor the
exile activities, and the FBI had tried to close it down.
But by late 1958 the Bureau had cause to change its
mind. Aleman had visited the State Department. to warn
that Fidel Castro was a Communist, and he persuaded
one of the Communist revolutionaries staying at the Tra-
dewinds to brief the FBI on the nature of the party in
Cuba.
All of this stood Aleman in good stead with the Miami
FBI office, particularly after Castro revealed his politi-
cal affiliations. And after his testimon in the Rothman
trial, Aleman's relationship with the Bureau grew very
close. The FBI men came to rely on him, not only as a
useful source of information, but as a guide to under-
standing the customs and thinking of the exiles. "Jose's
a real nice fellow," the now retired Davis remarked.
"He's a reliable individual."'
After his appearance at Rothman's trial, Aleman con-
tinued to meet regularly with his contacts at the FBI to.
report on exiles he suspected of being Castro agents. He
also told them of an extraordinary series of meetings
with Trafficante.
Traffieante's Indiscretion ?
WHEN ALEMAN'S FATHER died, his stepmother
inherited most of the fortune and the inheritance
taxes were so high that Jose Jr. (who had already lost his
land holdings in Cuba to the revolution) was forced to
sell the Miami Stadium and the Tradewinds Motel. By
.1962 he was in debt, with his only asset the three-story
Scott Bryan Motel, on Collins Avenue and 33d St., in Mi-
ami Beach.
Some time in September of 1962 an old revolutionary
colleague who rented an apartment at the motel told
Aleman that Trafficante wanted to see him. The col-
league explained that Trafficante felt indebted to Ale-
man's cousin, Garcia Bango, and wanted to express his
gratitude by helping Aleman out of his financial diffichl-.
ties. He was prepared to arrange a sizeable loan from the
Teamsters Union. Aleman's friend assured him that the
loan was perfectly legal and that it had already been
cleared by Jimmy Hoff a himself.
Aleman was understandably, wary ? particularly
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
since' he had so recently testified againit a Mafia leader.'
But mire enough, the Tampa godfather did visit Aleman,
at the Seen Bryan and offered him the loan $1.5 mil-
lion to replace the ramshackle motel with a 12-story'.
glass-wonder, complete with a penthouse apartment for
Aleman.
Aleman says that Trafficante spent most of the even-
ing philosophizing. "He spoke almost poetically about
democracy and-civil liberties." But then he turned to the
Kennedys: they were -not honest, they took graft and.
they did not keep a bargain. He complained about their
attacks on his friends, saying, "Have you seen how his
brother is hitting-Hoffa, a man who is a workers; who is
not a millionaire, a friend of the blue collars? He doesn't,
know that this kind of encounter is very delicate. Mark
my words, this man Kennedy is in trouble, and he will
set what is coming to him." Aleman says that he argued
that KennedS, would get reelected, and Trafficante
re-
plied, "No, Jose, he is going to be hit.", ' ,
Alenian says that he reported this conversation to his
FBI contacts, who expressed interest only in Traffi-
canted' business proposals. Aleman assumed that they
dismissed the Kennedy warnings as gangland braggado-
cio.
For the next year, Trafficante used the Scott Bryan as
his business headquarters, renting an apartment when;
ever he came to town. Aleman met with him frequently,
to discuss the Teamsters loan and Trafficante soon be-
gan to lead Aleman into other kinds of conversations
.and to introduce-him to other Mafia figures like Angelo
Bruno of Philadelphia. Aleman, like his FBI -contacts,
could not -quite figure out what Trafficante was doing.
But he played along, hoping the loan would come
through. Also the FBI considered his information valua-
ble and he Was pleased to be of service.
Starting in late 1962 and continuing through the sum-
mer of 1963, Aleman says that three Cubans he had
known in Havana and at the Tradewinds, who had gone
to work for Castro after the revolution, appeared in Mi-
.ami and then left for Texas. He suspected them of being
Cuban agents and he told this to the FBI. "I advised the
FBI in long conversations that I thought something was
going to happen: .. I was telling them to be careful." By.
this time Alemari?ays he -was meeting quite frequently
with his FBI contacts.-They listened to-what he said but
rarely seemed interested in his speculations. .
About the endof October, 1963, the same exile who
had introduced Aleman to Trafficante asked Aleman to
sign a petition bitterly critical of President Kennedy.
Aleman was no great admirer of the Kennedys. He
signed the petition but immediately had second
thoughts, especially when it was reproduced in several
Cuban newspapers in Miami.
On the day of the Kennedy assassination, Aleman ar-
rived home to find' that the FBI had telephoned. "I was
worried that, because of the petition, they might suspect
me." But what they were interested in was Trafficante's
previous statement that Kennedy was going to be "hit."
"Two agents [Aleman is quite certain one of them was
Paul Scranton] came out to see me: They wanted to
know more and more. I finally had to tell them he didn't
say he was going to do it. He just said Kennedy was .
going to get hit." The agents stayed until they had ex-
plored every possible angle and then _told. Almeman to.
keep the conversation confidential.
The only source for all of this is Aleman, who 'claims
that he personally repeated everything to various offi-
cials of the FBI; especially George Davis and Paul Scran-
ton in 1962 and 1963. Both agents acknowledge their fre-
quent contacts with Aleman but both declined to com-
ment on Aleman's conversations- with Traffieante.
Scranton explained he would have to have clearance: "I
wouldn't want to do anything to embarrass the Bureau."
The Enemy of My Enemy
IN' SEEKING to destroy both the Castro regime and
the Mafia empire, the Kennedys had aroused two des-
peratl'enemies, each, With a tradition of violence ant;
covert action. No proof that either was connected witir
the assassination of President Kennedy has ever been
produced._ But their traditions and their predicament at,
the Moment whin Kennedy was cut, down make eitheel
eligible suspects: And when the two-front war that the;
Kennedys were waging is viewed through the experi-
ence of Santo Trafficante, it becomes at least interesting;
to speculate on the possibility:of these two powers oper-.,
,
ating in concert. '
The possibility becomes even more intriguing if one,'
chooses to take seriously a memorandum to the director:
Of the CIA recently declassified from the Warren Com-
mission files. It reports the conversation of a gritish,
journalist, John Wilson (also known as Wilson-Hudson) at
the American Embassy' in London just four days after
Kennedy was killed. Wilson said that in jail in Cuba After
the revolution in 1959 he had met an American ,"gangs--
ter-gambler named .Santos who could not return to the
U.S.A. because there were several indictments outstand-
ing against him. Santos opted therefore to remain. in pri-
son for a period of time paying Castroin dollars for his
rather luxurious and definitely non-prisonlike accom-
modations... While Santos was in prison," Wilson says,
"Santos was visited by an American gangster type
named Ruby."
It is tempting to make much of such a document but
? more needs to be known about the English . journalist,
about the memo and about Jack Ruby's travels before
any conclusions can be made. Probably the only witness
who could help answer the questions raised here are the
CIA's old Mafia associates. The Church committee Only
managed to interview- one of them, John Roselli. Sam
Giancana, due to give his testimony, was executed the
day before. Santo Trafficante was never called as a wit-
ness. The committee 'staff claimed he could not be
found.
None of the extraordinary possibilities that have sur-
-faced here offer a documentable refutation of the sole -
assassin theory. As in all such explorations touching on
the Kennedy assassiAation, the trail goes cold as it ap-
proaches Dallas. But that does not mean that there was
not a conspiracy. There is simply no assurance that con-
spiracies, when they exist, must inevitably come to light..
Many secrets prove not all that hard to keep.
Just consider the numbers of people who knew about
the CIA's secret war against Cuba in the early 1960s ?
about the Agency's mammoth station in Miami with its
400 case officers, its 2,000 Cuban agents, its navy and
small air force, its arsenals, safe houses, and its paramili-
tary operations against Cuba. Certainly thousands of
people had a rather general knowledge of that massive
campaign. And yet it was not until last year that the
American public even learned that President Kennedy
had gone on to wage a covert Cuban war after the Bay of
,Pigs. Similarly, nine years ago, Drew Pearson and Jack
-Anderson reported the CIA's assassination plotting with
the Mafia. But no one paid any attention. ?
It is a well known psychological phenomenon that you
can't see what your imagination is not prepared to ac-
cept. In a recent interview, Sen. Howard Baker (R-Tenn.)
reflected on his experience over the past few years in
exploring Watergate and the world of U.S. intelligence:
"The great fear that I have is that I'll wake up 10 years ?
from now, and it will all suddenly fall into place, and I'll
realize what a damn fool I was."
eiffie, George) Cril?
16
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
7 June 1976
A U.S. Ambassador says the President
of the country where he is stationed
told him: "III talk to you frankly, you
will report back to the State Depart-
ment, and soon everything I said will
show up in Washington newspapers.-
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
WASHINGTON STAR
28 MAY 1976
By Tad SZUIC
Reprinted by permission from The New Republic
IC) 1976 by The New Republic, Inc.
The FBI and the CIA engaged in a
cover-up of highly relevant informa-
tion when the Warren Commission
was investigating President John F.
Kennedy's assassination in 1963 and
1964.
President Lyndon Johnson and
Atty. Gen, Robert F. Kennedy be-
came party to the effort which con-
sisted of withholding key facts from
the Warren Commission.
The cover-up continues even now,
12 years later: The FBI still refuses
to turn over to congressional investi-
gators some of its most sensitive files
on the circumstances of the killing in
Dallas.
A delay of six months is expected
before the new Senate Intelligence
Oversight Committee decides wheth-
er to reopen the investigation into the
assassination of President John F.
Kennedy, Chairman Daniel K.
Inouye, D-Hawaii, said yesterday.
Inouye, who spoke with reporters
after the committee's first meeting
yesterday, said the committee will
concentrate first on drafting new
charters for the CIA and other intel-
ligence agencies.
Results of an investigation of the
Kennedy assassination by the Senate
Select Intelligence Committee, which
spent 15 months studying the case,
are expected to be made public with-
in the next two weeks. Senators who
have seen the report are predicting it
will raise more questions than an-
swers.
The 172-page report, drafted by a
subcommittee, will focus on the per-
formance of the CIA and FBI before
and after the Nov. 22, 1963, slaying
and will go into the possible motives
of Lee Harvey Oswald.
The report is expected to detail
both allegedly deliberate and acci-
dental failures by the CIA and FBI to
provide the Warren Commission with
information.
The Warren Commission was
never told that Robert Kennedy se-
cretly formed ? before his brother ,
was killed ? a special intergovern-
mental committee which included
FBI and CIA representatives to look
into the ,possibility that Cuban
Premier Fidel Castro might organize
attempts on the lives of high U.S.
government officials.
THAT THIS committee existed has
been kept secret although informa-
tion about it reposes in FBI files.
The top-secret ' committee was:
created by Robert Kennedy presum-
ably out of concern that Castro might
retaliate against CIA attempts on his'.7
life, carried out directly by the agen-
cy's operatives and with help from;
the Mafia.
That anti-Castro assassination.;
plots were afoot in the early 1960s
was unknown at the time (they were
disclosed last year by the Senate Se-
lect Committee on Intelligence Ac-
tivities) and the Warren Commission',
was not told of them. Only Allen W..:
Dulles, who had been CIA director;;-
_ _
had knowledge of the anti-
Castro plots.
In its ignorance the com-
mission couldn't search
more ? intensively into the
possible motives of Lee
Harvey Oswald in killing
the President. The commis-
sion concluded that Oswald
?was the lone assassin in
Dallas, but it acknowledged
its inability to come up with
the motive.
IT DOES NOT follow, of
course, that the Warren
Commission would surely
have traced Oswald's mo-
tives had it known of the
anti-Castro conspiracies
and of the establishment of
Robert Kennedy's secret
group sometime before
Dallas. There is no proof
that Castro was behind Os-
wald.
But the cover-up made it
impossible for the commis-
sion to seriously pursue a
line of inquiry in this area
even though there had been
much discussion of the sig-
nificance of Oswald's links
with the Fair Play for Cuba
Committee (a pro-Castro
group in the United States)
and his aborted effort to go
to Cuba two months before
he killed John Kennedy.
Robert Kennedy, the CIA
and the FBI decided to keep
from the Warren Commis-
sion the fact that the special
group had been set up. To
justify its existence, it
would have been necessary
to expose the CIA's own
conspiracies against Cas-
tro. ;These were among the
most closely held secrets of
the Kennedy-Johnson peri-
od.
THAT THE CIA failed to
inform the Warren Com-
mission of anti-Castro plots
? even though the agency
was under presidential
orders to provide maximum
assistance to the commis-
17
sion ? was confirmed in a
memo on April 20, 1975,
written by CIA Insp. Gen.
Donald F. Chamberlain to
CIA Deputy Director E.H.
Knoche. It said:
"As far as we can tell
from all of the materials a*
our, d4osition, no one dis
cussed with the Warren
'Commission any alleged
plan to assassinate Castro.
There is also no evidence
that anyone known to our
records made a decision not
to tell the Warren Commi-
siute iip. ing about this
topic or any other matter."
Chamberlain added that
"we have no evidence in
our material indicating
Castro's knowledge or the
possession of documenta-
tion of alleged assassina-
tion plots directed against
him."
Two days later, on April
22, 1975, Raymond G.
Rocca, then deputy chief of
the CIA's counterintelli-
gence staff, informed
Knoche that "our records
show at every point a
marked intent to make as
much available to the
(Warren Commission) as
was consistent with the se-
curity of the ongoing opera-
tions."
ROCCA ALSO reported
. that his files do not show
whether the Warren Com-
mission was informed of a
1962 report from the CIA's
station in Guatemala ac-
cording to which a state-
ment was made at a Guate-
malan Communist party
meeting that "we need not
preoccupy ourselves over
the politics of President
Kennedy because we know,
according to prognostica-
tion, that he will die within
the present year."
Although, as Rocca put
it, the counterintelligence
staff was the CIA's!
"working-level point of I
contact with the Warrenj
Commission," plans to,
assassinate Castro were not:
"known to us in CIA staff." .1
In all likelihood Johnson,1
who knew of the anti-Castro'
plotting, also knew that
Robert Kennedy had set up
his special committee. But
there is no indication that
he shared that knowledge
with -Chief Justice Earl
Warren when the commis-
sion was organized in
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
November 1963.
Robert Kennedy's testi-
mony before the Warren
Commission likewise omit-
ted mention of his own fears
that assassinations might
breed assassinations.
BUT IT IS part of the
public record that Johnson
subsequently commented,
without elaborating, that
President Kennedy- might
have been killed in retalia-
tion for his administration's
anti-Castro policies. At the I
time, this' remark was
taken to mean possible re-
taliation for the 1961 Bay of
Pigs invasion and subse-
quent CIA operations
against Cuba.
All these facts, secret at
the time, may have influ-
enced the Kennedy family
in its decision to oppose any
reopening of the assassina-
tion probe. Again, a new
investigation might have
led to public disclosures of
the CIA plotting,, and tar-
nishing the memory of John
and Robert Kennedy.
Robert Kennedy's inter-
est in aggressive operations
against Cuba was reported
in a document written by
John McCone, then CIA
director, on Oct. 4, 1962, de-
scribing a top-level strate-
gy meeting chaired by the
attorney general. McCone
wrote that "the attorney
general reported on discus-
sions with the President on
Cuba; dissatisfied with lack
of action in the sabotage
field, went on to stress that
nothing was moving for-
ward, commented that one
effort attempted had
failed. . . ."
ANOTHER ELEMENT
of the cover-up was that in
at least 50 instances the CIA
had, according to an inter-
nal FBI memo, ignored
materials supplied by the
bureau on Oswald's foreign
connections.
The responsibility for fol-
lowing up such FBI- leads
was in the hands of an ad
hoc group built around the
CIA's so-called "D Staff," a
clandestine operations cen-
ter then headed by William
Harvey, a senior agency
official. The CIA's coun-
terintelligence office, di-
rected by James Angleton,
reported directly to Har-
vey's "D staff," and it too
was involved in investigat-
ing certain aspects of the
Kennedy assassination.
Sources contend that the
CIA actually destroyed
some of the materials pro-
vided by the FBI. Angleton,
according to those sources,
may have suspected Soviet
"plants" in the FBI materi-
al. The Warren Commission
never knew about any of it.
As has been reported
earlier, the FBI destroyed
at least one letter Oswald
sent to the Dallas police de-
partment shortly before the
assassination. Oswald de-
manded that the FBI stop
"harrassing" his Russsian-
porn wife Marina and
threatened to blow up the
Dallas police headquarters
if the FBI failed to desist.
THIS BECAME known
only last year, and the FBI
never offered a conclusive
explanation for destroying
the note.
Likewise, the FBI inex-
plicably failed to place Os-
wald on its "dangerous
list" although it did so with
other members of the Fair
Play Committee.
A CIA memorandum to
the Rockefeller Commis-
sion, which last year inves-
tigated CIA abuses, said
that the agency still feels,
as it did in 1964, that the
Warren Comrnission should
have given more credence
in its final report to the
possibility of foreign links
in the conspiracy against
Kennedy. The memo said
that there were promising
leads that were not followed
up.
This statement contra-
dicts the FBI memorandum
now in the possession of the
Senate Select Committee
that the CIA refused to pur-
sue leads obtained by the
bureau. However acute
rivalry between the CIA
and the FBI already existed
at the time ? they actual:y
stopped cooperating alto-
gether in 1970 ? and their
estrangement could ac-
count for the contradic-
tions.
THE COVER-UP is
lamong the reasons the Sen-
ate Select Committee voted
on May 13 to recommend a
congressional inquiry into
the role of the intelligence
agencies in the Warren
Commission investigation
and into Oswald's moitives.
The Senate committee
first learned of the cover-
up a few months ago. This
is the new evidence the
panel claims it has obtained
about Oswald's motives.
Sen. Richard Schweiker of
Pennsylvania and Sen.
Gary Hart of Colorado, who
constitute a special sub-
committee on the Kennedy
assassination, have written
a separate report on the
subject. -
Neither Schweiker nor
Hart has publicly revealed
thus far the nature of the
new evidence. There is said
to be great pressure to
sanitize this report while the
full secret information
would be turned over to the
Senate's new permanent
oversight committee on
intelligence or whatever
other panel might under-
take the recommendation
investigation of the Kenne-
dy death.
The Subcommittee re-
port. to be issued in mid-
June, will first be inspected
by the FBI and the CIA, to
remove what they consider
"embarrassing informa-
tion."
ALTHOUGH senators are
far from certain that the
proposed inquiry would
actually provide a conclu-
sive answer about Oswald's
motives the trail has be-
come cold in the opinion of
many senators ? the FBI
and CIA could find them-
selves under charges of ob-
struction of justice for hav-
ing withheld significant
material from the Warren
Commission.
Among the questions
likely to be raised in a new
investigation is why Dulles
concealed from the Warren
Commission, on which he
served, the plotting against
Castro by the CIA. CIA's
own records, released in
mid-May, show that the
agency had already begun
to plan Castro's assassina-
tion in March 1960, when
Dulles was CIA director,
and planning had by then
begun for the Bay of Pigs.
Excerpts from tran-
scripts of the Warren Corn-
mission's executive ses-
sions (published in The New
Republic on Sept. 27. 1975)
show that Dulles informed
his colleagues that there
were certain CIA secrets
that he would keep from
everybody except the presi-
dent. Dulles was addressing
the still unclarified question
of whether Oswald, as
maintained by some assas-
sination buffs, had been an.
undercover FBI informer_
A SIMILAR question
could be raised with John
McCone who was CIA
director during the Warren
Commission investigations
and who should be called to
testify in any new Senate
inquiry. McCone was famil-
iar , with the anti-Cas-,
plots and probably
abeut Robert Kenneti, ?-;
cret committee.
All the indicatioe . are
that the existence this
committee was known to
18
very few people: Robert
Kennedy himself. probably
Dulles and McCone. FBI
Director J. Edgar Hoover,
and a few selected associ-
ates.
Several aides of Robert
Kennedy. including a for-
mer assistant director of
the FBI, said in interviews
last week that they had not
known of the Committee.
Theysaid, however, that it
was possible that the group
could have' been acting in
secrecy out of the White
House or attorney general's
office before and after the
Kennedy assassination.
The Senate Intelligence
Committee teamed of the
cover-up in the course of its
long investigation of the
intelligence community_
After references were made
by witnesses to the Robert
Kennedy committee in
testimony touching on for-
eign assassination plots by
the CIA. the Church Com-
mittee .asked the FBI and
the CIA for their relevant
files. -
, IT IS UNDERSTOOD
that the CIA made some
material available; the FBI
refused to do so for many
months. Only recently did
the bureau agree to allow
Senate committee members
to read parts of its secret
files, but the senators have
to do it at FBI headquar-
ters.
It was in this manner that
senators learned of the
scope of the cover-up by the
intelligence agencies.
They've, now requested
additional materials from
the FBI. Some senators are
said to believe that further
vital information on the
Kennedy assassination
investigation may turn up
in the FBI files.
It remains unclear why,
after 12 years, the FBI is
still reluctant to let sena-
tors see all its files on the
assassinations. There are
no indications that the bu-
reau has been under any
pressure from the White
House ? President Ford
was a member of the War-
ren Commission ? to with-
hold material from the Sen-
ate. In fact, Ford himself'
now may be unaware of the
contents of the FBI files.
That raises again a funda-
mental question: Is the
White House in full control
of the intelligence agen-
cies?
U.S. (c;; WORLD REPORT
7 June 1976
Administration officials report an -in-
telligence backlash" in Congress, with
some members getting heat from
home over their harsh attacks on CIA
operations.
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
SATURDAY REVIEW'
29 MAY 1976
CIA Reform: How Much Is Enough?
by George C. McGhee
'The recent report of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence Activities
provides an excellent basis for congres-
sional action to reform the CIA. The
President's own recent reorganization of
the agency, however, ignores key issues
that must be dealt with by Congress.
The very word intelligence is prejudi-
cial in its own favor. Everyone agrees
that a government should base its activi-
ties on the best available intelligence. The
Central Intelligence Agency, which, as
its name implies, has been the focal point
for such activities within our govern-
ment, has been brought into serious
question. Yet it has important responsi-
bilities which are vital to national secu-
rity and must be continued. How do we
separate the good in the CIA from the
bad? How can we clarify, in the public
mind, the difference? How can we build
a new intelligence structure which can
perform the essential functions with pub-
lic confidence? In my view, the Presi-
dent's executive order has not answered
these questions.
The present agency was spawned by
the Second World War. It was created
at war's end as a "grab bag" not just for
the intelligence activities of the Office
of Strategic Services but for a varied
group of other covert activities. Pro-
tected by wartime security, these opera-
tions had not been under normal moral,
legal, or resource limitations. In retro-
spect, it was, I believe, a mistake to have
included such diverse operations under
one umbrella. It was particularly mis-
leading to call it an intelligence agency.
Obviously, much of what it did went far
beyond any ordinary definition of that
term. Moreover, it provided continuity
for wartime methods and objectives. War
was succeeded by "cold war," with little
change in outlook.
It should be understood, of course,
that the CIA does not have a monopoly
on intelligence. The Pentagon has its
Defense Intelligence Agency. The De-
partment of State, comprising some
7,500 people in Washington and 16,000
abroad, is in itself an enormous intelli-
gence-gathering organization, not limited
to its Bureau of Intelligence and Re-
search. There is no obvious cutoff point
between what should and what should
not be done by the CIA. The agency
has engaged in many activities, such as
support for the National Student Asso-
ciation, because it could get the funds
from Congress and State couldn't.
Nevertheless, as we continue to de-
velop our overall intelligence capability,
I believe we should also perpetuate an
independent intelligence agency as a
normal arm of government. There is, of
course, the supporting theory that intelli-
gence estimates by such an agency will
be more objective in assessing the suc-
cess or failure of policy. There is also
- the need for expertise and continuity in
particular specialties which can perhaps
best be provided by an 'independent
agency. A case in point is the analysis
of aerial photographs from satellites.
It must be emphasized, however, that
most CIA intelligence githering is,, like
satellite photography, quite open? and-
aboveboard. Only the results need be
kept secret. Many data are obtained from
passive radio intercepts made by the mili-
tary National Security Agency. Provided
one has a place to put one's aerial, inter-
cepts are an accepted tool. Often, how-
ever, in the search for intelligence, the
line of legality must be breached. Covert
means must be employed. Calculated
risks must be taken. Spies are used.
Someone is paid off. Forced entry is
made. We must also protect ourselves?
through counterespionage?from similar
activities by other governments. In a dan-
gerous world this is an accepted "gray"
area in which all nations must compete,
including, under appropriate restraints,
our own intelligence agency.
BEYOND THIS, however, as everyone
knows, the CIA has been engaged in a
wide range of covert activities which do
not constitute intelligence collection at
all; indeed, they are separated by a deep
chasm. What I speak of, of course, is the
whole array of covert operational activi-
ties, or "dirty tricks." This includes all
secret attempts to manipulate the rest of
the world in our favor. This is what was
on trial before the Church committee and
world opinion. It is these activities which
have, by association, blemished CIA's
legitimate intelligence function. The
principal rationale, moreover, for putting
them under the same roof, i.e., that the
same agents do both, is not believed to be
overriding. Results could be more objec-
tively analyzed by an intelligence succes-
sor to the CIA if the two arms were
separated, yet closely coordinated.
I was amazed when I came back into
the State Department in 1961, after an
absence of seven years, to learn the extent
to which the CIA had become involved
in covert activities all around the world.
The Bay of Pigs operation, which lay ripe
for plucking on the drawing board, was
only one of many. I considered most too
risky for the possible meager gains in-
volved. We were operating in many
countries. Some were close allies whose
friendship we were risking. We were still
supporting democratic parties in Western
Europe long after the countries involved
had recovered economically. Most of our
operations were relatively unimportant
to our national security.
When a government agency goes op-
erational covertly, there is, of course, a
variety of choices. You start by subsidiz-
ing foreign magazines and newspapers to
influence popular opinion, then pro-
gress to support for political parties and
discreet bribes to officials. In the past
little attention has been paid to such ac-
19
tivities; however, this is only the start.
With know-how and funds available, you
attempt to control elections, bring about
the fall of governments, or even assassi-
nate political leaders. On the macroscale
this leads to what is, in effect, uncle.:
clared-war. It was an open secret that in
Laos the CIA for years ran a war in-
volving large-scale air and ground forces.
The CIA was deeply involved in Vietnam
-before our military took over.
Where do such activities start and end?
What is their proper role? How can they
be controlled? I believe that responsi-
bility for covert operational activities
must be separated from the intelligence
function. These operations must also be
reduced greatly in scope. They must con-
stitute the exceptional rather than the
usual instrument of policy. Any decision
to employ them must take into account
the long-range impact on United States
and world opinion. People all around the
world are now convinced that the CIA
is manipulating their governments and
people. Americans abroad are suspect as
being under "cover" for CIA?our em-
bassies, our companies, our professors,
and our tourists. We are paying a high
price for marginal gains.
Authority for covert operations must
stem from our highest authority?the
President?even if he may not always be
forced to admit it. Those directing the
operations must also be responsible to
the Congress, preferably through one
joint committee of the two houses. Every
effort must be made to maintain secrecy.
Guidelines must be set. Most Americans
would insist, as a minimum, on a total
taboo on assassination?and on unde-
clared war, that is, one not first approved
by Congress. The joint committee itself
could decide what should be approved
by Congress as a whole. The agency
devoted exclusively to intelligence
should be an open operation, staffed by
professionals. It should need little
"cover." Covert operations beyond in-
telligence should be conducted by some
new, anonymous agency reporting di-
rectly to the President. Any undeclared
wars tacitly approved by Congress should
be run by a branch of the military, upon
whose expertise it would draw.
Most important, however, we must
understand that today's world cannot be
manipulated by us in such an obvious
way. A prominent CIA official once
bragged to me that their operations had
saved 13 countries from communism. He
did not mention countries where we are
considered the enemy as a result of abor-
tive CIA operations. We win dubiously in
Chile, but we lose in Cambodia. We give
Soviet arms to the Kurds and use the re-
sulting appearance of Soviet intervention
to justify furnishing arms to Iran. We
give arms to Holden Roberto in Angola,
and when the Soviet-backed Popular
Front appears stronger, we feel com-
pelled to raise the ante. What is cause
and what is effect? How do you win such-
a game?
I recently heard a leading English jour-
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
nalist berate America for sabotaging our
CIA just when it could have won the
struggle against communism in Portugal.
Does anyone really think a few million
dollars can control the destiny of 10 mil-
lion people?
If we are to produce-the open and wise
policies that will-earn for us the place in
the world we deserve, we must first rid
ourselves of the delusion that we can win
by the cheap and easy way of covert
manipulation. At the same time, we must
regroup and reform our varied intelli-
gence activities?building what is appro-
priate into an independent and a re-
spected arm of our government. When
we venture into the murky area beyond,
we should do so under new auspices,
strict guidelines, and complete responsi-
bility?not just to the President but,
through the Congress, to the American
people. For it is they who will have to
pay the price of any failures, as they have
done in Vietnam. 0
?
Monday, May 17, 1976 THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
Kennedy assassination questions
? More than 12 years after the assassination of
President. John F. Kennedy there are still very
serious questions that need to be answered if
that tragic event is to be laid to rest.
It is not only that small group of writers and
investigators convinced that a conspiraey was
behind the Dallas shooting who doubt that- Lee
Harvey Oswald acted alone. Polls show that 60
percent of 'Americans do not accept the find-
ings of the Warren Commission. David Belin,
senior staff member of both the Warren Com-
mission and later the Rockefeller Commission
which last year probed CIA operations, has
called on Congress to reopen the inquiry.
- Evidence has emerged showing that the
FBI had information on Oswald, yet his
name was not on a Secret Service list of per-
sons considered a threat-to the President. It
has been shown that the CIA failed to tell the
Warren Commission about its plots to kill Cu-
ban Premier Fidel Castro, and that the FBI de-
stroyed?a threatening note delivered by Oswald
to FBI offices just before the. assassination.
TIMES HERALD, Dallas
2 May 1976
4-4.1
4 ;
4.,#)
1.
-41 3
lq
.7 \If=
<
?3
e., more
ONE MORE CHORUS, now, with a
little more pizazz and guts from you
citizen voices on the back row.
Newly named CIA Director George
Bush is taking hold, as you expected,
and he said something in Lawrence,
Kan. the other day that really puts this
whole intelligence ruckus down to the
earth level where we concerned folks
can read the message.
In muted answer to 1,000 plus critical
pages from the ravenous Senate Intelli-
gence Committee staff that accuses the
FBI and of everything but
effectiveness, Bush said simply, but
tellingly:
-WE NEED. a covert (hidden, se-
cret) capability. I believe we can oper-
ate in as clean a fashion as we can. But
there are some grubby things in this spy
business .
Certainly and Congress knows it
? there are some "grubby" things in
intelligence operations. That's what it is
all about or we wouldn't have a CIA and
an FBI. You don't hand your card to the
enemy, domestic or foreign, and say
"Pardon me, old man, but.
An agent knows when he acts that it
is your nation, your society, your life ?
or his.
And the sooner we get off the
whelped backs of CIA and FBI now
trying to cleanse their houses of decades
old questionable past practices the bet-
ter chance far this society, this nation.
The opposition points have been
made ? and some were well made ? ?
but hOw the hunters had better start
listening to very cold warnings from
men like. Bush and get realistic about
The possibility, of a link between the. Ken-
nedy shooting. and U.S. plots to kill the Cuban
leader is just too strong to ignore. The Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence has reported
that on the dayMr. Kennedy was assassinated,
the CIA was outfitting an operative to kill Mr.
Castro.
Now members of that Senate committee
have called. for a new, investigation to go
beyond. the "who" to the "why," and this
seems entirely called for, given the new infor-
mation that has been revealed as well as grow-
ing public doubts about the original findings. It
may not be necessary to entirely reopen the
whole matter, but these latest questions should
be answered.
President. Ford, who was a member of the
Warren Commission, some months ago agreed
that such a limited reinvestigation is neces-
sary. With the Senate about to consider a new
intelligence oversight committee that could un-
dertake such an investigation, now is a g000
time for Mr. Ford to reaffirm his support.
chorus ? with guts
this endless donnybrook they have
initiated.
Mr. Bush, a totally reliable man
pushing to re-route objectives of the
CIA into unassailable legitimacy, now
warns that in the next decade interna-
tional terrorist threats against the
United States could be more dangerous
than conventional military or political
threats. He told his Lawrence audience
that there is increasing danger, with
proliferation of nuclear weapons and
materials, that terrorist fanatics will
acquire nuclear capabilities.
TO COMBAT this prospect of horror,
there must be support ? not endless
carping.
Relentless pursuit ? demonstrably
past constructive remedial processes ?
could decimate the entire intelligence
apparatus. It has been said here over
and over again, but the congressional
wolves have made their good and bad
points and should now move to other
areas that need repair far more than
the FBI and CIA.
In fact, if the current bushwhacking
continues the public might well demand
to know precisely what is behind all this
persistent clamor to "get" the FBI and
CIA.
To repeat, valid points have been
made and certain practices should be
abolished as totally out of American
character ? notably foreign assassina-
tion plots and the misuse of the FBI by
every American president back to
Franklin D. Roosevelt ? but we must
not lose our perspective about overall
intelligence in the headline frenzy of the
moment.
20
Sen. Frank Church., D-Idaho, who
first chaired the Senate Intelligence
Committee and then conveniently slip-
ped into the Democrat presidentiai
preferential race after getting rave
notices from networks and big press, is
making few ripples out among the
people. If we properly read the public in
the hinterlands, they are weary of
Washington's daily blast and not suppor-
tive of continued attacks based upon
very old information.
NOW WE read of the "chilling"
.Senate committee report that "docu-
ments" a 40-year pattern of "official
lawlessness"!
In 400 pages prepared by eager
young staff workers, we are told that
Presidents since 1932 have been sleazy
operators who used the FBI to track
down political enemies.
Most of this' adds up to a desire on
the part of some members of Congress
to take over intelligence operations by
imposing strict controls from a single
oversight committee.
This could be the blunder of the
century if these same Congressional
members handle other "secret" matters
by leaking information all over Wash-
ington ? and the world.
The Senate liberals ha v e been
temporarily choked off by a more
sensible Rules Committee amendment
that would require any oversight com-
mittee to share jurisdiction with other
committees now involved in intelligence
oversight.
If all worked together ? and kept
their months shut ? intelligence could
be steered in the proper direction.
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
FOREIGN POLICY
Summer 1976
REORGANIZING
THE CIA:
WHO AND HOW
/n FOREIGN POLICY 22, Peter Szan-
ton and Graham Allison wrote that the
time had come to -seize the opportunity"
and restructure the American intelligence
community. In the exchange that follows,
William E. Colby and Walter F. Mondale
comment on their proposals and Szanton
and Allison reply.?The Editors.
William E. Colby:
Indeed we have an opportunity to rethink
and restructure American intelligence. A year
of intensive investigation by a presidential
and two congressional committees, world-
wide concern over sensational accounts of
CIA deeds and misdeeds, and a series of Con-
stitutional confrontations between the ex-
ecutive and legislative branches cannot dis-
appear into our history books without
changes in American intelligence.
The first and easiest action would be to
tinker with the organizational structure of
intelligence. When in doubt, or under pres-
sure, reorganize; this is an old bureaucratic
ploy. It is also a tempting panacea for infi-
nite problems. With due respect for the ideas
suggested by Peter Szanton and Graham
Allison, but without agreement with many
of them, I believe this opportunity should
be seized in more important fields.
The fundamental lesson of the year of
investigation is that American intelligence is
? a part of and must operate under the Amer-
ican constitutional system. This perhaps ob-
vious fact for Americans is a stunning nov-
elty in the long history of intelligence. It is
as startling an idea to many developed de-
mocracies as it is incongruous to totalitarians.
It does not reverse any early American
dcarine to the contrary. but it does over-
turn longstanding and comfortable practices
which grew up before the question was
squarely faced.
Three conclusions stem from this new
status of intelligence. First, the place of in-
telligence in the governmental structure must
be established and understood in open stat-
utes and directives. The National Security
Act of 1947 made a start in this direction,
and the CIA Act of 1949 provided statutory
authority for many of the essential attributes
of our intelligence service. Both contain
several vague and encompassing clauses,
however. The resulting ambiguities led to
actions which in retrospect fall below to-
day's standards.
President Ford's executive order of Feb-
ruary 18 makes a major stride in the direc-
tion of providing 3 public charter for Amer-
ican intelligence, describing its structure and
functions and clearly delimiting areas of au-
thorized, and unauthorized, activity. Sub-
stantial parts of this order, however, should
be enacted into law, our constitutional pro-
cess of establishing and recording our na-
tional consensus on matters of public import.
George Washington once said that upon
"secrecy, success depends in most enterprises"
of intelligence. The past year has shown al-
most a total lack of consensus and even un-
derstanding of the role and limits of secrecy
in American intelligence. What were leaks
rose at times to flood stage proportions.
Strong voices are heard advocating almost
every variation on the spectrum from a mod-
ern version of "open intelligence openly ar-
rivea at" to the contention that an Official
Secrets Act should protect an intelligence
structure totally hidden in the recesses of the
executive branch. President Ford has recom-
mended legislation which will impose the es-
sential discipline on intelligence personnel to
keep the secrets they learn but leave untram-
meled the First Amendment's guarantee of a
free press.
We have laws and sanctions to protect
many secrets necessary to the preservation
and operation of our free society.. The se-
cret ballot box, the confidence between at-
torney and client, advance crop figures which
might upset the market, all are protected by
criminal sanctions against individuals who
might disclose them. Intelligence secrets.
however. are in effect only protected against
the foreign spy. But their disclosure to our
free society makes them available to the for-
eigner as well, and can cut our nation off
from sources and information which are es-
sential to its safety in a world which has not
yet been made safe for democracy. Better
protection of our sources through law would
apply to the intelligence profession the same
discipline that journalism has. found essen-
tial to its functioning.
The second conclusion from the new sta-
tus of intelligence under the Constitution is
that it must be responsible and accountable.
This burden must rest not only on those in
intelligence: it lies with equal weight on all
three branches of our constitutional struc-
ture. President Ford has moved to strengthen
executive control and responsibility for intel-
ligence. The stronger position of the director
of central intelligence, the interagency com-
mittee structure for the review of the policies
and programs of national intelligence, and
independent review and supervision by the
private citizens of The President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board. all will increase
21
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
the control and accountability of intelligence
to the president himself and to the senior
members of the executive branch.
Congress has an equal duty to arrange it-
self to exercise its constitutional role with
respect to intelligence. It must assume its full
responsibilities in all senses of the word. It
must organize and carry out full and cur-
rent reviews of the intelligence community,
assuring that it not only remains within the
guidelines set for it, but also that it is effi-
ciently and comprehensively accomplishing
the tasks assigned. Congress' other respon-
sibility, however, is to do this without de-
stroying the ability of intelligence to carry
out its duties. Thus the secrets of intelligence
must be protected on Capitol Hill as well as
at the CIA's Langley headquarters. The min-
imum number of people, congressmen as well
as staff, who truly "need to know" should
be informed and should be subject to sanc-
tions for improper disclosure. A single com-
mittee, in each House if necessary, should
represent their colleagues in this function,
ending the present requirement to brief at
least six committees.
The third conclusion which derives from
intelligence's advent to constitutional status
is that it must serve the constitutional pro-
cess. Traditionally and in other lands the
servant only of the executive, it must now
demonstrate its value to the Congress and
to the public. It must earn the large invest-
ment needed by modern intelligence, the
risks and inevitable occasional failures and
embarrassments incurred, and respect for its
professional discipline and secrecy. This must
be accomplished by sharing the fruits of the
enterprise with all participants in the Amer-
ican decision-making process.
Perhaps this is the most challenging task
ahead for intelligence. It must develop the
distinctions between protecting the secrecy
of its sources and techniques and making
available the substance of its information
and conclusions. It must face public criti-
cism and political challenge of its assess-
ments. It must maintain the independence
and objectivity of its judgments apart from
the policies and programs they may sup-
port or question. Internationally, we must
insist that an intelligence judgment is a step
toward policy, not a reflection of it, wheth-
er relating to ally or adversary. In a political
debate where knowledge can be power, in-
telligence judgments must be supplied im-
partially to all factions, to help the best so-
lution to emerge, rather than a favored one.
This will require many changes in intel-
ligence habits and concepts. The photo-
graphs must be published, the background-
ers attributed, the publications edited to
protect the sources but circulate the sub-
stance of their reports.
With these changes, intelligence can be
distributed regularly to all members of Con-
gress. not held under such high classifica-
22
tions that it cannot be circulated and made
conveniently available. The estimates will
be debated and the sage unanimity of the
intelligence cloister challenged by those close
to the struggle and fearful of irrational and
foolhardy, but real, surprises. Out of the
process, however, will come a better under-
standing of the role and value of modern in-
telligence, as well as better intelligence itself.
"Seizing the opportunity" to implement
these conclusions will mark a major turning
point in the discipline and profession of in-
telligence. In its wake may come some of
the structural changes suggested by Szanton
and Allison and by others joining in the
close examination of intelligence sparked by
I975's investigations. Some of their and
others ideas will not be adopted. and ad-
ditional ones will arise for consideration.
But the coming of age of intelligence as a
full participant and contributor to the con-
stitutional process will start a continual re-
view and renewal of intelligence to meet the
challenges of the future. Among more sub-
stantial substantive benefits to the nation
and to American intelligence, this will make
unnecessary another sensational and shat-
tering updating of American intelligence.
Walter F. Mondale:
Like most Americans. I have strongly sup-
ported the necessity of our government's
conducting intelligence activities. But after
witnc.'ssing hundreds of hours of testimony
befc.re the Senate Select Committee on In-
teliigence. I am also convinced that basic
reform is necessary.
The committee heard respected former of-
ficials of our nation talk about institutional-
izing an assassination capability in the CIA
as though it were just another option. We
studied how the United States has used brib-
ery, corruption, and violence in almost ev-
ery quarter of the globe, and saw how es-
pionage is aimed at our friends as well as at
our foes. The committee reviewed how our
academic institutions, press, and religious
institutions have been exploited for clan-
destine purposes, despite the special place
these institutions must have in our dem-
ocratic society.
It is clear to me that we have paid an ex-
tremely high price for any resulting secret
success. American covert intervention often
undermined the very democratic institutions
we sought to promote. Because of our clan-
destine activities, the United States is re-
grettably regarded less and less as an example
of democracy to be admired and emulated.
Almost anything bad that happens in this
world is attributed to the CIA?including
the murder of King Faisal. And at home,
the confidence of Americans in their gov-
ernment is weakened when our leaders use
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
covert intelligence operations to mislead the
public and short-circuit our democratic pro-
cess. I have come to believe that there must
be some fundamental changes in America's
intelligence activities or they will fundamen-
tally change America.
The proposals of Pete i Szanton and Gra-
ham Allison in the spring issue of FOR-
EIGN POLICY go in the right direction.
They improve upon similar recommenda-
tions I made last fall. I recognize the costs
in such a reorganization. and George A.
Carver. Jr.. in his comment on the Szanton-
Allison article, also in the spring issue, has
pointed to certain aspects of them. But in-
sofar as substantive problems can be met by
structural change in the executive branch. I
believe that the gains would outweigh the
costs.
The problem, however, is deeper.
As the committee took testimony day af-
ter day on assassination plots, my first im-
pression was that we were grappling with
some of the darker forces of human nature:
the undertaking of acts which would be un -
thinkable if not done in secret: the enthtt ?
siasm with which we emulated our enemy;
how patriotism and loyalty could be per-
verted to the point of dishonoring the na-
tion: the spectacle of men of great respect
offering explanations and excuses at the mar-
gin of credibility.
My initial conclusion was that the an-
swer lay in better accountability?vigorous
congressional oversight plus a system in
which officials cannot hide responsibility for
their actions. To this end, I have supported
a new Senate oversight committee with the
power to authorize all national intelligence
budgets.
But the problem, I am afraid, lies deeper
still. It is not just a problem of means, it i?
a question of ends.
When America saw itself as primarily re-
sponsible for countering the Soviets and
Communists throughout the world, our in-
telligence services responded. Since Vietnam,.
I believe America's view of its responsibil-
ities has changed. However, there has been
no redefinition of our rote in the world, nor
of the policies to be served by our intelli-
gence activities.
As a start, I would suggest the following:
> Avoiding nuclear war is most important.
It requires the best possible intelligence. The
continuing suspicion and antagonism be-
tween the United States and the Soviet
Union and the levels of nuclear weapons on
each side, place a premium on the most ac-
curate assessment of Soviet military capa-
bilities and political intentions. Agreements
to control nuclear and conventional arms
need a strong intelligence base to ensure both
sound agreements and compliance. To this
end, I believe the Soviet Union and its allies
must remain our Number One intelligence
priority.
> Containing Soviet adventurism is the re-
sponsibility of all free countries. Each na-
tion must look to its own resources first. If
U.S. help is needed, covert action could
prove vital. But, in general, I see little rea-
son why U.S. aid should go through covert
intelligence channels. Except in extraordi-
nary circumstances, nations wishing Amer-
ican support should be prepared to admit it.
The American people and the Congress must
not be left in the dark about new commit-
ments.
> Support for democracy. America remains
the greatest friend of liberty in the world,
if no longer the sole defender of every regime
that calls itself anti-Communist. But help-
ing the shattered democratic parties of West-
ern Europe survive in the late 1940s is one
thing, and seeking to overthrow a democrat-
ically elected government in Chile in the
1970s is quite anothr. Moreover, despite
possible short-term success, covert action can
be the enemy of democracy. it often amounts
to corruption and nothing is more destruc-
tive of a democratic political system than
corruption, in particular from a foreign
source. If American aid to democracy is es-
sential to offset Soviet subversion, we should
find a way to do this openly. Perhaps our
political parties can assume some of this re-
sponsibility, much as European Social Dem-
ocratic parties have in Portugal.
> Meeting the problems of hunger and dep-
rivation and building a more equitable
world economic system are urgent tasks un-
suited to clandestine activity. A foreign pol-
icy which relies heavily on covert interven-
tion and espionage will be self-defeating in
this area, for it will cast doubt on the le-
gitimacy of our cooperation and assistance.
> Clandestine activities may prove essential
to protect and advance our national interests
in certain critical situations, such as thwart-
ing terrorism, controlling narcotics, and
bringing truth to nations blinded by censor-
ship. But it has been naive for us to think
that we could change a country's history
with a couple of lies, a few guns. or a packet
of dollars. We have ignored the strength of
nationalism and people's determination to
shape their own destiny. The Marshall Plan
and NATO. along with the underlying vital-
ity of the countries themselves, saved Europe
from the Communists, not the CIA. The Al-
liance for Progress contained Castro in the
early 1960s. not Operation MONGOOSE. In
most cases. I believe- America can be more
effective if we are direct about what we
want. Diplomacy- and economic cooperation,
backed by adequate military strength?these
are the tools that America uses best to se-
cure its interests.
I find myself in the unhappy position of
not being able to take the stand that U.S.
23 covert action should be banned. 'With the
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
world as it is. I am afraid we may some-
times need it. But it is clear we have under-
taken too much clandestine activity in the
past. We need to control it through the
kind of structural changes proposed by Szan-
ton and Allison and make it accountable
through strong congressional oversight. But
beyond this. I believe we need a new state-
ment of the role of clandestine activities in
U.S. foreign policy. I hope that the next
president of the United States speaks to the
American people and the world as follows:
It will be the policy of the United
States to conduct its relations with other
countries on a straightforward basis. We
will deal with other governments in con-
fidence but not in stealth. \We will be
plain and direct about our own interests
and concerns and about what we expect
from others. We reject a policy of covert
intervention into the internal affairs of
other nations.
America will continue those intelli-
gence activities essential to its security and
that of its friends and allies. We will do
what we can to check Soviet adventurism
and to promote democracy on an open
basis, but these are first the responsibility
of the countries concerned. Covert action
will be reserved for extraordinary circum-
stances in which the security of jeopardy.
The
na-
tion or of its allies is in serious eopardy.
The era of covert day-to-day manipu-
lation of media, people, and events by the
United States has ended. American intel-
ligence activities will be restructured ac-
cordingly.
Peter Szanton
Graham Allison:
Surely, William E. Colby is right in as-
serting that the fundamental lesson of the
past year is that American intelligence must
operate within our constitutional system.
And equally clearly, Walter F. Mondale is
right in arguing that the deepest problem of
American intelligence is one of ends, not
means: a problem to be solved not by tinker-
ing with the intelligence community but by
rethinking and restating our values and ob-
jectives in the external world.
But two aspects of these attractive and
WASHINGTON POST
21 MAY 1975 .
large-minded concepts are troubling. One
is that Colby, after a professional lifetime
in the executive branch, asks Congress to
rectify the constitutional balance, while
Mondale, a leading figure in the Congress,
looks principally to executive leadership for
improvement. It is hard not to conclude that
the country would be far better off ha'd
Colby spent the last eight years in the Con-
gress while Mondale occupied the White
House. The second is that while focusing on
constitutional and high policy issues is help-
ful in clarifying the transcending problems,
it also tends to foreclose attention to lesser
but still quite important questions.
This is the nation's first opportunity in
a quarter-century to rethink what it wants
? from intelligence and how to get it. Absent
further scandals or disasters, it .will likely
be the last such opportunity of this century.
Once the constitutional balance has been
struck, and once we have, stopped asking our
intelligence agencies to perform unjustified
or repugnant or useless acts abroad, there
will still remain the problem of how to im-
prove the performance of these agencies at
what has always been their major task: pro-
viding the U.S. government with early and
authoritative understanding of developments
abroad. In recent years, the community's
analyses and assessments have proven high-
ly variable in quality and far from satisfy-
ing. Their too frequent misuse and nonuse
by policy-makers is a closely related problem.
The already receding opportunity for reform
should be used to insure not only that the
community operates within constitutional
boundaries and in the service of a support-
able policy, but that it performs its hardest.
least glamorous, and most important task
to higher standards, and that the results are
heard. Neither alertness in the Congress nor
policy leadership in the 'White House, essen-
tial as both are, will solve those latter prob-
lems. Their solution will require far strong-
er incentives within the community to treat
the work of analysis and assessment as par-
amount, and to enlarge the skills and pre-
serve the neutrality necessary for such work..
They will also require arrangements which
more reliably confront decision-makers with
the results. In short, organizational reform_
Senators Named to New Unit on CIA
Senate leaders yesterday
named the 17 members of
the newly created perma?
nent Senate Committee on
Intelligence Activities, with
a hint that Sen. Daniel K.
Inouye (D-Hawaii) will be-
come chairman.
Majority Leader Mike
Mansfield ..(D-Mont.), an-
nouncing the eight Demo-
crats who will serve, gave
Inouye's name first. There
had been speculation earlier
that he would become chair-
man.
Another Democrats: Birch
Bayh (Ind.), Adlai E. Steven-
son (Ill.), William D. Hatha-
Way (Maine). Walter (Dee)
Huddleston (Ky.), Joe Biden
Jr. (Del.), Robert B. Morgan
(N.C.) and Gary W. Hart
(Colo.).
Republican members,
named by Minority Leader,
Hugh Scott (R-Pa.), are Clif-
ford P. Case (N.J.), Mark 0.
Hatfield (Ore.), Barry Gold-
water (Ariz.), Howard H.
Baker Jr. (Tenn.), Robert T.
Stafford (Vt.), Strom Thur-
mond (S.C.), and Jake Garn
(Utah).
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
24
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
GENERAL
WASHINGTON POST
16 MAY 1976
_
Jack Anderson
Teii6rist. Tisk ?TourrAs-
A. terrorist group his rebuilt a com-
mon tanker truck into a modern Trojan,
horse to infiltrate America's bi-
centennial celebration and Canada's
Olympic games. Confidential law en-
forcement reports show many terror-
ists have now fixed on.these two events
'at their next battleground.
-.- The 'terrorists have transformed the
tanker truck into a rolling headquar-
ters. On the outside, the truck looks
perfectly normal. It even has spigots
that can drip oil. But instead of petro-
)eum products, the tank holds a terror-
ist office, dormitory and arsenal. It can
accommodate 15 to 20 raiders from the
hellish side of politics. American agents
know about this mobile terrorist com-
mand post, but they haven't caught up
with it yet. .
Modern terrorists come from all sides
Of -the political spectrum, but they
share the concept that their cause will
profit from disruption, disorder and
bloodshed Some are highly trained
commandos, skilled in the nightmarish
uses of our modern technology. The
government reports warn ominously
that terrorists might even use "nuclear
materials" as radioactive poisons or to
build bombs.
The United States and Canada are
working together to prevent the terror-
ists from spoiling the bicentennial and
Olympic spectacles. Both the FBI and
Royal Canadian Mounted Police are re-
doubling their efforts to stop the ter-
rorists before they strike. The Customs
Services of both countries are watching
for smuggled weapons. The State De-
partment has appointed a_"s2o_rdinato_r_
for combatting terrorism." An informal
White House task force and the Cana-
' dian Ministry of External Affairs are
also working on the counter-terrorist
campaign.
The classified working papers of the
two governments read like grim text-
books on insurgency warfare. The offi-
cial documents show how the terrorists
plan to follow classic' guerrilla warfare
strategems, mixing with the local popu-
lace between hit-and-tun attacks. The
terrorists also employ smuggling tech-
niques from the worldsii)fiRtestiationaL
Wednesday, Noy 19, 1976 The Washington
crime and espionage to move their
weapons across borders.
The official reports discuss a variety
of disguise-and.diversionary tactics
that the terrorists are known to use.
They convert the ordinary into a cam-
ouflaged 'weapon. For example, cam-
'era-laden tourists are a. standard sight
at such events as bicentennial pageants,
and Olympic games. But the official re-
ports warn some "tourists" may be dis-
guised terrorists,- and' their cameras
may be deadly Weapons. -
Lawmen have discovered, for exam-
'pie, that the new Polaroid cameras
with large film padcs can conceal small
pistols whose grips have been removed.
The ordinary Kodak film box, one intel-
ligence report says, may be used by ter-
rorists to hide tiny lethal devices
known as "Dutch mini-grenades."
Government agents have also
learned_ that terrorists may conceal
small machineguns in attache cases.
Trigger extensions protrude from the
ease. What appears to be an ordinary
briefcase _cap be held "under, the arm_
(to) fire into a crowded area," according
' to one document.
Intelligence reports suggest that the
terrorists are most likely to strike in Ju-
ly, the month that the bicentennial cel-
ebrations reach their climax and the
Olympic games open. Enormous num-
bers of tourists are expected at these
events.
U.S. and Canadian customs officials
have pinpointed, some of the terrorist
organizations that are expected to
cause trouble. The Japanese Red Army,
as a prime example, is described in the
confidential reports as a group of now
more than 30 anarchists. Yet they suc-
ceeded in shocking the world by mas-
sacring 28 people at the Tel Aviv air-
port in 1972, hijacking a Japan Air
Lines plane in 1973, bombing Shell Oil
tanks in Singapore in 1974 and seizing
the U.S. ethbassy in Kuala Lumpur in
1975
There is also the Fuerzas Armadas de
Liberation Nacional Puertorriquena,
which ostensibly seeks Puerto Rican in-
dependence from the United States.
___ACe.Ording to the 'official documents,
Star
. _
this terrorist group blatantly claims
credit for 10 U.S. bombings in October
1975. The official reports warn this
group may work with the Puerto Rican
Socialist Party, controlled by Fidel Cas-
tto, to disrupt the bicentennial. .
An anti-Castro terrorist group, .the
Frente de Liberacion Nacional. de Cu-
ba, may "cause problems" at the Olym-
pics because of Cuba's participation in
the games. This. group, according to the
documents, "is known to possess a large
amount of C-4explosives, which it may
use against pro-Castro and Soviet tar-
gets."
Perhaps the strangest group of ter-
rorists, identified as a bicentennial and
Olympic threat, is the "Rastafarian
Movement." The intelligence data say
the group is also known as "the Niya-
bingi Order, the Miyamen, the Beards-
men, the LoCksmen, the Rude Boys and
the Dreads." ,
The Rastafarians, one of the oldest of
-- the terrorist groups, is an all-black cult
? originating in Jamaica in 1930. They be-
-. lieve "that the past Emperor of Ethio-
pia, Haile Selassie, was the living God
. . . and that the ways of the white
man are evil."
The documents say that the Rasta-
farians advocate the liberal use of mari-
juana and have been associated increas-
ingly with violent rebellion and terror-
ism. In New York City alone, they have
an estimated 3,000 members of varying
levels of activity.
Law enforcement agencies on both
sides of the border are beefing up,their
anti-terrorist campaign. But the key to
defeating the terrorists lies with the
populace. Terrorists need confusion,
chaos and a submissive populace to op-,
erate successfully in any country. They
describe themselves as the "fish" who
will hide this summer in the sea of tour-
ists.
If the people of the United States and
Canada deny the terrorists the strate-
gic hospitality they need, the fanatics
among us will have more trouble and
less success.
int United Features Syndicate
Soviet Milibry Spending Up 5 or
By Henry S. Bradsher
Washington Star Staff Writer
Soviet military spending has been
rising for the past three years at an
annual rate of 5 or 6 percent, the CIA
says in a new study that predicts con-
tinued but perhaps slower long-term
growth.
In what- it called "a major revision
of past estimates," the agency raised
its calculations of military spending
6%, CIA Esti ates-
_ -
from 6-or 8 percent of the Soviet -iwo-thirds larger than the Soviet .
gross national product to between 11GNP.
and 13 percent since 1970. In the corn- ' A 17-page CIA study, which was
ing fiscal year the United States circulated on Capitol Hill yesterday,
plans to spend on defense slightly said about 90 percent of the increase
under 6 percent of a GNP roughly - ?
2 5
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
In its- estimates came from "changes
in- our understanding of ruble prices
and costs," and the rest from- broad-
er information on. Soviet armed
forces. The estimate of Soviet mili-
tary spending last year-was approxi-
mately doubled, the study said. _
TRE REVISION "does not affect
:OUP appraisal of the size or capabil-
ities of Soviet military forces," the
Study pointed out. Nor does it change
, earlier estimates that Soviet military
spending in 1975 was about 40 percent'
more than American, when calculat-
ed in dollars,
But it does show Kremlin leaders
more Willing to-give their armed
, forces priority over consumers than
previously realized,, the CIA said. It
did not attempt to. judge foreign poli-
cy attitudes which lay behind-this..
The study emphasized the tenta-
tive nature of the-conclusions drawn -
from "a major reassessment . . .
undertaken in the face of an unusual-
ly large body of new information."
The estimates have "a margin of
uncertainty, which for some items
could be substantial."
This uncertainty seemed certain to .!
provide the basis of continuing dis-
pute among various intelligence
analysts and on Capitol Hill over the ?
size and significance of the Soviet
military effort.
THE NEW information has been "
available for a year. Pentagon
analysts, who have long contended
that the CIA was pegging the Soviet
mijitary effort-too low, have argued
for the agency to admit it has been
wrong for years. But now the way the
data is used could provide the basis
for further argument._ . a
-;
Former Defense Secretary. James,
R. Schlesinger has in recent months
said that on the basis, of the new
information the Soviet Union. is:
devoting -"at least 15 percent" of
GNP to the military. Lt. Gen. Daniel
0. Graham, who retired from run-
ning the Defense Intelligence Agency
when Schlesinger was fired by Presi-
dent Ford last autumn, has put. the
figure at 15 to 20 percent.
Commenting on the new CIA study,
? Graham said he found it "to still be
extremely conservative. . . I find it
incredible that they didn't go to 12 to
16 percent" of GNP on the basis of
information with which he was famil-
iar. '
-
. "It is awfully toughlor a group of '
analysts? to admit that they were as '
wrong as. they (the CIA) have been,"
Graham added. "It's nice to see that
they do admit as much as they do."
SEN. WILLIAM Proxmire, D-Wis.,
whose subcommittee of Congress's
Joint Economic Committee has held
annual hearings on the Soviet and -
Chinese military effort, commented.
that "the revised intelligence esti-
mate has little to do with the size or
effectiveness of the Soviet defense
program:' These are unchan ed b
the Soviet military machine has been
I shown to be more inefficient and
wasteful, Proxmire said.
Proxmire and other congressional
critics of Pentagon warnings about
the growing size of the Soviet armed
forces have often used a CIA esti-
mate of a 3 percent annual growth in
the Kremlin's military spending. It,
was based on dollar calculations.
The new study estimated the
growth at less than 3 percent in 1971
WASHINGTON POST
5 JUN1976
Atomic Fuel
In Taiwan
-Not Inspected
By Don Oberdorfer
Washington Post Staff Writer
International Atomic En-
ergy Agency inspectors
checking Taiwan's research
reactor early this year failed,
to inspect- 10 fuel rods con-
taining a total of one-half ki-
logram of plutonium, ac-
cording to-a report that has
caused concern among gov-
ernments acquainted with
the case.
U.S. experts said this
amount of plutonium would
not be enough to make an
explosive device, though it -
would be enough to provide
some laboratory experience
in handling sensitive materi-
als that, in larger amounts,
could be used for bomb-mak-
ing.
American officials famil-
iar with the incident said
the Nationalist Chinese in
charge of the reactor report-
edly told the IAEA inspec-
tors that the fuel rods had
been taken to another loca-
nd 1972. But new weapons, especial-
?. While this is not unusual
in some nuclear operations,
the governments hearing
the report were surprised?
and concerned?that the in-
spectors evidently did not
insist on going to the other
site to inspect the fuel rods.
David Fischer, assistant
? director for external rela-
tions of the Vienna-based in-
ternational inspection
agency, said the January in-
spectors' report from Tai-
wan showed "no significant
amount of material unac-
counted for" and "no reason
to suppose any kind of irreg-
ularity."
Fischer said it is his un-
derstanding that inspectors
would not normally see ev-
ery fuel element during
their semi-annual inspec-
tions. Such a physical inven-
tory of all materials is re-
quired less frequently, he
said.
The Taiwan Research Re-
actor, which was supplied by
Canada, is similar to a Cana-
dian-supplied reactor uti- ?
lized by India to make a nu-
clear explosive device. The
Indians secretly built a re-
processing facility to con-
vert used fuel rods to weap-
ons-grade atomic material.
tion.
26
ly "a new 'generation of strategic
missile systems," pushed it up to 5 or
6 percent for 1973-75, for an average
over the five years of 4 to S. percent.
Procurement of those missiles
probably has peaked and the annual
rate of growth will taper off until the
next generation, the study added.
Pentagon officials have reported that
next generation now under develop-
ment in the Soviet Union.
TIIE ARMED forces are now "ab-
snibing almost 20 percent of the out-
put of Soviet industry," the CIA`,.
estimated. Other sources said thi
and other calculations of the militani
effort had not yet been coordinate:d?
with CIA estimates of the entire Sov)----',
et eacnomy, however, and thus Old;
new study was considered very tentat-1
?
five by economic analysts. -. .. ?
?
"Because the resource impact of;
the defense effort on the Soviet',
economy has been considerably!
greater than we previously recog-
nized," the study said, "we now real-
ize that Soviet leaders have been -
more willing than we thought to forgo,
economic growth and consumer satis-
faction in favor of military capabil-
ities.
I. I "Nevertheless, we see no evidence
' Ithat economic considerations are,
!deterring the Soviets from continuing -
*the present pace and magnitude of f
their defense effort."
In recent weeks there has been evi-
dence that a majority in the Soviet ,
leadership is seeking to restrain mili-
tary spending. This has developed
since the death last month of the!
- powerful defense minister, Marshal
Andrei A. Grechko, and his replace-.
ment with a military production ex-
pert rather than another soldier...
U.S. officials said they are
confident Taiwan possesses
no such reprocessing opera-
tion. They said that the
United States is concerned
about the case of the unin-
spected fuel rods primarily
because it seems to demon-
strate inadequate procedures
and a lack of zeal on the
part of the international in-
spectors.
Nuclear material and fa-
cilities supplied by the
United States and most
other advanced countries
are sold on condition that
they be used only for au-
thorized purposes and that
they be subject to periodic
on-site inspection by teams
of the Vienna-based interna-
tional agency.
' The IAEA has been
sharply criticized in some
quarters for having only 60
Inspectors to police more
than 300 nuclear facilities
around the world. Congress
has added $5 million for
IAEA to a pending military
assistance bill in 'an effort to
improve the inspections.
Nationalist Chinese Pre-
mier Chiang Ching-kuo said
last September that "we ad-
mit we have the ability and
the facilities to manufacture
nuclear weapons, but - we
will never manufacture
them."
Taiwan has formally
agreed not to make an at-
omic bomb by ratifying the
nonproliferation treaty.
Taiwan is in the early
stages of a multibillion-dol-
lar nuclear power program
that seeks to generate
nearly half of the island's
power needs through nu-
- clear power plants by 1985:
The United States is selling
Taiwan the nuclear fuel and
most of the reactors and
other necessary equipment.
American experts pointed
out the extensive Taiwan
nuclear power investment is
in a sense a hostage against
weapons production. This is
because the United States
has the ability to shut, off
the required flow of ura-
nium fuel if there is evi-
dence that Taiwan is cheat-
ing -on its international com-
mitments.
The United States did not
stop shipments of ? essential
nuclear fuel to India after
that country's atomic explo-
sion. The Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission is holding
hearings to determine
whether the fuel shipments
Should be stopped.
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1.
WASHINGTON POST
9 JUN: 1975
Opium Poppy Fields Said Destroyed
Mexico Heroin Flow
By John M. Goshko
? Washmaton Post Staff Wylter
The 'United States and
Mexico announced yester-
day that almost all the.
opium poppy fields in Mex-
ico?the source of most of
the heroin.' entering the
United States?have ? been
destroyed by an intensified
eradication prOgram.
The announcement was
made jointly here by Attor-
ney General Edward H. Levi
and Mexican Attorney Gen-
eral Pedro Ojeda-Paullada.
They said that the eradica-
tion campaign can be ex-
pected,to reduce the availa-
bility of Mexican heroin in
the United States by late
this year.
Their statements were
made in an atmosphere of
cordiality. But , they came
against a liackground of re-
ports that efforts to stem
the cross-border drug traffic
may be endangered by crow-
ing rancor between narcot-
ics agencies of the two coun-
tries.
Washington Post 'ibecial
correspondent Marlise Si-
mons reported from Mexico
City that Mexican officials
are extremely angry at what
one characterized as the
"insolent and inept behav-
ior" of U.S. Drug Enforce-
ment Administration agents
operating in Mexico.
_
Simos
quoted Mexican.
official sources as saying
that "American agents and
agents Provocateurs are act-
ing against our Will and be-
hind our backs" to engage
In entrapment of narcotics
dealers' and other activities
that are against Mexican
law.
The Charges ete denied
here Washington hy
Ojeda-Paullada and by DEA
Adminihrator Peter B. Ben-
singer. Ojeda- Paullada told
_ . _ _
WASaNGTON POST
2 2 wh_
eroin Hits at Horn
The WikIlington Post '-et, aerial" redonnalisinee' ti
relations, because Attorney 3 subsequent destruction 13.5
' G,enerat Levi and Mr. Ben- herbicides sprayed froniliel-
singer 'lave accepted fully icepters: ,
? that U.S. officials in Mexico- In addition; the American
must at in strict accord- officials added. the 'MeXi-
ance with Mexican laws and cans have increased "their=
author*. There have been . campaign from -a once-a-
- and am sure there Will kear;lour-niOnth effort to a
continu?e- to be from/time to- year-round program; Since
4 time differences of opin it takes only 90 days to Culti-
, ion ' ata lower'levels But . vate. a poppy crop; the, offi.
there if absolutely no cri- cials noted, .'ear-arou-nd sur-
sis.," - veillance should hinder nal.: ,
Some DEA officials said cOtics traffickers'from rear-
privately that the Mexicans irig field -or finding new lo
had certain -complaints cations. ?
about 'U.S. activities but . Figures released :by the
! they have been acted on by' Mexican government say
Washington and resolved.
owe
. "There is no crisis in our spot Poppy fields and their _
Bensinger said, "These re-
ports are false on each
count. The, only , ones who
benefit from something like
, this are the drug dealers."
Still, the reports of fric-
- tion have been so persistent
that many law-enforcement
sources are: inclined to be-
lieve that they have some
-basis in fact: There were;
hints, in the guarded com-
ments Of some officials, that
the Mexicans might have
been angry but had agreed
to. ? withold open criticism
in. exchange for Washing- ?
ton's promises to correct the
situation.
In any case, the atmos;
phere yesterday, both in the
appearance of the two. attor-
neys general before the
Press and in ? a. subsequent
visit by Ojeda-Paullada and
Justice officials to . Presi-
dent .Ford at the White
?
House,. was almost deter- t
minedly upbeat.
Levi and Bensinger- put ,1
particular stress on how the
Mexican government's ex-
panded drive against poppy
growing had greatly re-
duced production , in the
Mexican fields. ?
They- said that the most
, significant, features-- of this
?campaign involved the use
that; as of the, end of May,
. approximately 30.500 poppy ,
fields covering an estimated
18,500 acres had been de-
stroyed. By contrast, -Ben-
singer pointed out, during
all of 1975, the Mexicans, us-
ing searches on foot. suc-
ceeded in destroying only 4,7
700 fields: ? .
DEA officials estimate ?-?
that Mexican brown heroin
?a term denoting drugs proc-
essed from Mexican- fields
into 'heroin?accounts, for
roughly 85 to 90 per cent of
-the heroin currently--enter-
lug the United States. They
"Say that this has been the
case since 1972, when the,
supply of poppies grown in
Turkey and processed into
berpin in France was Cur-
tailed drastically by diplo-
matic and law-enforcement
'action. .
Officials at DEA said that
no one can estimate with '7
any' accuracy the. actual
amount of hei-oin coming
into the country annually. ,
Their belief that from 85 to
90 per, cent currently origi-
nates in Mexico is based on.
the fact that Mexican heroin
accounts for a similar per-
centage of the amount
seized by _U.S. narcotics
agents..
Despite predictions that
Use by Burma's Youth Invigorates Control Effort
BY 'Lewis AL Simons
Washington Poet FoTsign Service
MANDALAY?Burma the
apex- of :Southeast Asia's
,-Golden Tiiangle and a ma-
jor source of illicit heroin, is
snow facing a serious drug
'addiction problem at home,
particularly among the
-children of top government
officials.
The dothestic crisis has
added impetus to the gov-
ernment's drive- to destroy
opium poppy- fields -arid
jupgle heroin laboratories.
Until recently, the ,sole mo-
tivation behind the govern-
ment's efforts was that drug
trafficking funded die wide-
spread insurgency along the
Burmese border.
27
"The army hal always
:taken the drug problem seri-
husly," noted one knowl-
edgeable Burmese .in this
northern cit, "because they
have " to face, the weapons
the insurgents ,buy- with
.'drug income. But now that
some ministers and colonels
find their children are
booked, the government is
the eradication ? Program
will, redUce the Supply of
Mexican heroin by late in
the Year,-Levi and Ojeda-
; Paullada both cautioned
that it will probably "take
somewhat- longer before
the effect of the program
on' the U.S. heroin market
is. billy Telt" .
Bensinger- said that this
is because there is no way-
of telling 'hew much Mexi-
can heroin: is already in the
United States in storage or
the smuggling pipelines
that bring', it across the
border. , ?
.The DEA head -noted,
however,. that ,the price of
Mexican heroin?a key -in-
dicator of its availability?
has been going up recently.
The "street 'price" of a milli-
gram?the amount that it'
brings when sold by retail
den re r s to addicts?has
gone from $1.15 in Decem-
ber to $1.25 at present, he
In her report from Mexi-
co, .. Simons- said approxi-
mately 30 DEA 'officials are
assigned to that country to
-perform lials,on Wcirk.- and
exchange information with
their- Mexican counterparts.
Under :the Cooperation
agreements between the two
countries, 'their activities
are supposed to be carefully
circumscribed. The D E A
agents are permifted to
carry guns, for example,
only; when. actually operat-
ing with -Mexican agents;
And capture of drug sellers
by arranged 'buys," a com-
mon tactic in. the, United
States, is. forbidden by Mex-
ican law.. -
However, Simons report-
ed, the American agents in
Mexico are alleged by Mex-
ican officials to have violat-
ed these rules with ill-dis-
guised frequency ? a -factor
that she said forms the basis
of many of the Mexican
complaints? -
;suddenly paying a lot more
attention to the matter."
Among those children of
top officials believed to
have a drug problem is one
of President Ne Win's- three
eldest sons. According tore-
liable Burmese and-Western
sources, the young, man is
said to.be a heroin addict.
? . Capitalizing oh the grow-
ing addiction problem in
Burmese towns and cities,
and the drugs-insurgency
link, the 'United States has
given Burma 12 helicopters
and a small- spotter plane
undet? a..$13 million grant
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
-Tor use. igainst 'growers and
traffickers.
An ? additional grant for
six more helicopters has run ?
into U.S. Congressional op- .
? position led , by Rep. Otto
Passman (D-La.) despite as- .'
surances earlier .this .month _
by Sheldon B. Vance, special
adviser to Secretary ofState
Henry A., Kissinger; that
Burma had achieved an im-
pressive' record in the last'
nine _months with the assist-
ance of the U.S. helicopters,
which are, unarmed civilian
versions of the Huey heli-
copters.
' Passman, sources in .Ran-.
goon said, apparently is con-
vinced that the ? Burmese
armed forces are using the.,
helicopters against insur-
gent armies of minority.
ethnic groups that are striv-
ing for., autonomy or inde-
pendance from the 'Central
government in Rangoon.
The Burmese counter that
while it is often imPossible
to differentiate between
traffickers and insurgents,
they do not Use the helicbp-
ters against minority forces
as such.
"In most- cases, they're
one and the same," said
Kyaw Min, the author of a
recent series -of articles, on
Burma's drug problem.
To illustrate' his point,.
Kyaw Min displayed to a
visitor a, stack of photo-
graphs taken by Burmese
army photographers follow-
ing a raid on April 26 near
the eastern border town -
Along Hsat.
NEW YORK TIMES
2 7 MAY 1976
By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, May 26?The?
State Department has apparent-
ly given the A.F.L.-C.I.O. the
right to veto all applications by
Soviet and other Communist
trade union leaders to enter this
country.
This practice, reportedly of
long standing, was acknowl-
edged today by the State De-
partment after a Soviet news-
paper complained that the
United States was not living
up to the Helsinki agree-
ment's call for wider East-West
exchanges.
? The paper charged that four
Soviet trade unionists were
barred from accepting an invi-
tation from San Francisco Bay
unionists to visit this month?
in reciprocity for trips by the
Americans to the Soviet Union
in 1973 and 1974.
In confirming that the visa
applications had been denied,
the department conceded in
effect that A.F.L.-C.I.O. national:
leaders were given an unofficial
veto authority.
It has long been assumed
in Washington that George
Meany, president of the A.F.L.-
The phOtOs showed mod-
ern mortars, Browning auto-
matic rifles, -grenade launch-
ers, light , machine guns,
rockets an bandoliers of
ammunition.
Next .to the arsenal were ,
large quantities of either
and drums of other chemi-?
cals, beaters, basins, buckets
and other equipment used
to convert raw opium into
refined heroin.
The raid, which' was car,
ried out ..with the assistance.
of the U.'.-donated ? helicop, -
lers, netted 30 pounds of,:
heroin -and 288 pounds of
raw opium, said Kyaw MM.
Government officials said
233 rebels,were manning the,
camp. Two soldiers: and nine
insurgents were reported
killed.
U.S. sources like to stress
that the' United States pro-
s-ides no assistance or advice
to the Burmese: "The heli-
copters represent our only
form of aid to this govern-
ment," one - source said.
"They maintain and fly
them themselves."
The helicopters, based at
Meiktila, 90 miles south of
Mandalay, have also been
used heavily against opium
poppy farmers,. members of
minority groups who are not
directly active in the insur-
gencies. So far this year, ac-
cording to 'US. sourCeS, hell:
copter-borne troops have de-
stroyed 17.000 acres -of. the
70.000 acres used to grow
poppies in i3urina. '
By contrast, the United
Stites hopes to help the gov-
ernment of Mexico wipe out
,just ,10,000 acres of poppy
fields in all of .1976. Mexico
is the major source of illicit
.- drugs entering the United
States.
Burma's policy, unlike
that of neighboring Thai-
land, is to destroy the poppy
tields first and, -iyurry' about,
providing farmers with a
substitute crop later. The
system is quick, but it in
:creases minority groups' ha-
tred of the central govern-
ment.
The United Nations is ex-
pected to begin a 46 million
crop substitution program in
" Burma soon. A smaller but
similar program in Thailand
has so far produced limited
results.
The U.S. interest, accord-
ing to an American source
in Rangoon, is limited to
helping the Burmese gov-
ernment stem the flow of
heroin out of Burma,
through Thailand, and into
the United States, where it
comprises between 10 and 20
Per cent of annual consump-
tion.
According to an informed
source in Mandalay, a pleas-
ant, sleepy city of half a mil-
lion on the Irrawaddy River,
the local addiction problem
is "serious and growing ?
quickly." No figures are
'available, the 'source said,.
I but a drug treatment center.
has been established at a
local hospital.
In the capital, Rangoon',
with its population of 2 Mil-
lion, official figures show
thit, as of last year there
were 994 registered addicts,
with 12,134 in all of Burma.
Total population is 31 mil- ?
Hon.
An article in the Rangoon
Working People's' Daily said
an official survey revealed
that of those registered for
treatment, "the majority of '
the addicts are the children :
of affluent people such as !
merchants and traders."'
. "This is nonsense, ex-
claimed U Ba Gyaw, head of ,
-the government's news and
periodical corporation.. "We ?
have no real problem. There
may be a few' youngsters
who .Smoke marijuana or
use heroin- once or twice,
, just for a kick, but addiction
is small-scale indeed."
But a Rangoon attorney
said that ? based on his dis-
cussions with government
doctors and the number of
drug-related eases he has
handled, "I wouldn't be sur-
prised if the addiction fig-
ures were 18 to 20, times
higher than the official sta-
tistics."
Although U.S. -officials
profess to be "reasonably
optimistic" about Burma's
chances of reducing its drug
output, the, odds' on elimi-
nating the traffic are virtu-
ally nil. As one U.S. source
put it, "As long as a kilo of
heroin can be bought. for
$325 in northeastern Burma
and sold on the streets of
New York for a quarter of a
million, there's no way
they're going to dry it up."
C.I.O., and his fiercely anti-
Communist executive council
had influence in denying Com-
munist entry visas, but this
was the first time the State
Department had publicly ac-
knowledged this practice, which
apparently goes back at least
to the 1950's when the cultural-
exchange program began.
Visa Rejection Confirmed
Frederick Z. 'Brown, the de-
partment spokesman, confirmed
that the four visa applications
had been rejected.
"In handling the visa applica-
tions, we gave due weight to
the view of the mainstream of
organized labor in the United
States," Mr. Brown said. "The,
national A.F.L.-C.I.O. is firmly
opposed to labor exchanges
with Communist labor officials
on the grounds that such ex-
changes would equate our free
trade unions with Government-
controlled trade unions."
Later, in answer to further
questions, the department said
that it had never given permis-
sion to any Soviet or other
Communist trade union official
to visit this country in that
capacity, although some such
officials many have come as
tourists or in other guises.
U.S. Seems to Let A.F.L.-C.I.O. Veto Union Visitors
thi- country the reqeust
Ernest Lee, director of inter-
national affairs of the A.F.L.-
is routinely rejected. Under the
C.I.O. confirmed in a telephone current law, any Communist
conversation that the A.F.L.? Part yofficial, or representative
o
C.I.O. routinely opposes visasf an organization controlled
to any trade union leader fronn by the party, is automatically
the Soviet Union because such: denied entry unless a waiver is
an official is only "a Govern-i granted.
ment trade front" who does not; Such waivers have never
really represent Soviet workers.' been give nto trade unionists
Mr. Brown said the view of coming to meet American trade
the A.F.L.-C.I.O. was "very im- uniobists, the official said.
portant" to the State Depart- The denial of the visas this
ment. Privately, officials said time, however, has attracted
that the A.F.L.-C.I.O. has al- more attention because of the
ways had what amounted to
!Istrong backing the invitations
a
"veto" right on any Communist,ihad in the San Francisco area.
unionle d r ! David Jenkins, a labor leader
in San Francisco, said in a tel-
'George eMany Won't Have It
ephone conversation that in
"It is a unique situation," !November 1973 and in Novem-
one department official said, ber 1974 delegations of labor
adding: "You may notice that leaders and some others from
in all the exchange agreements the bay area had visited the
with the Russians, there is no Soviet Union and spent consid-
!mention of trade union ex- erable time with Soviet trade
changes. There are exchanges unions. ,
of doctors, teachers, business- He said the San Francisco
men, editors, publishers, farm- building trades council adopted
ers, young people, language a resolution inviting a delega-
teachers, but no labor leaders. lion from Soviet trade unions
That is not accidental; that is to return the visit this month.
;because George Meany won't
have it." were notified that four Soviet
The San Francisco sponsors
!
In practice, another official representatives had applied for'
said, if a Soviet trade union
visas: Georgi Y. Kanayev, dep.
iofficial applies for a visa to
2g
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1 ?
tit"7chier of the international
department of the Central So-
viet Trade Union; Vitaly
Provotomv, chairman of the4
Leningrad district trade union;
Aleksandra P. Reksha, secretary
of the Odessa district trade
union; and Igor Y'. Yurgens,
consultant in the central Inter-
national Department.
, , _
' Late last month the depart-
ment decided against the ap-
plication on the usual grounds
noting that "the national A.F.L.-:
is opposed to such visits
ion principle." .
As a result Of, the rejectiOn2,
the two California_ Senators,:
and the bay area Congressmen,.,.
i were asked, to appeal the deci-
sion, but they were told last
'week?that 'the,, decision wage
final.
WA? 11\TGJUIV 19 POST
Rote in Ili- ta worded statement -tharr
*s1)ith public Ato assurances by.
?
U.S. officials that no
Amen.
mte as can material was involved,
there were signs that India
used 'U.S.-supplied heavy
water in its nuclear test pro.
gram.
The Connecticut Demo-.
crat is chairmanof the Sen-
ate Government Operations
Committee, which has been"
investigating the adequacy
of safeguards, in- transfer-
ringnuclear material to for
-
Laid to U.S.
? _Reuter
. ?
Sen. Abraham A'. ftibicoff
said yesterday there were
"disturbing indications" that
the United States supplied
an essential ingredient used
in India's first nuclear ex-
ploSion in 1974. ? eign countries:-
- He said in ? a strongly Cemmittee Investigations
t NEW YORK TIMES
30 May 1976
NEW YORK TIMES
8 JUN 1976
'SALT 'Violations': .
For . more than a year conservative critics of the
Strategic arms limitations talks (SALT II) with .MOscow
have sought to discourage agreement by charging that
the Soviets had been violating the 1972 SALT I treaty
in order to gain military advantage over the United
States. These charges have -been rejected not Only by
President Ford and Secretary of .State Kissinger, but by '
former Defense Secretary James SChlesinger.-
The disclosure,that Moscow. now, has achnowledged, a
'violation does not alter, that picture. The violation, which
....occurred in March, was a technical one. Moscow had
Informed . the United Stites in 'advance, that it would
occur. And measures- have been taken to rectify.' the
two-month infraction. ' ?
That was not the way it ,was leaked, -presumably by
,.some Pentagon, source, to Aviation. Week and Space -?
Technology, which has taken the lead, in, -the -past in .
charging Soviet SALT I violations. .That Publicatian's
'report made no mention of the. fatt'thaethe treaty`gaVe
Moscow four months to dismantle-. land-based
missiles after new missiIe4aunching ' submarines, 'their
replacements, took to sea. Nor 'did it -indicate that the ,
issue had been resolved through the SOviet,American
Standing Consultative ComMittee,.. that Moscow:- had
agreed in April to put no further new submarines to sea
until the dismantling? had proceeded apace and that the
.dismantling was now virtually finished.
The Soviet Union blamed bad winter :weather for the
fact that by, the end of March only 11 of. the 51 missile 1
? silos had been destroyed, a complicated process, but gave
assurances?verified by American'
'5!,
all '
, had been taken out of operation..
This episode is typical of the confusion, stirred by
'previous, charges of SALT- violations. None-sat the half, 7
'dozen alleged violations of the past has been proven.
The 'Soviet-
,--jateral American interpretations of thekSALTI provisions,
.-,-which Moscow had never accepted, and also took some
'advantage of treaty -ambiguities; None of these issues
:,was of major importance, and Moscow backed off when
'-challenged in the Standing Consultative Commission.
, ? *bat is proven by the alleged violations?and; the
-outcome of their investigation by the United States Gov-
ernment?is that unilateral American verification by sat-
ellite and other intelligence means 'doe's .vii.hrk and $liat
? the Standing Consultative Commission is effective in
resolving ambiguous-and disputed occurrences. The expe-
rience gained in the process shows that mutual limitation
Of strategic arms is possible and should he pressed
vigorously to the further stage of missile reductions.
MOYNIHAN CITES
YOTE-BIJYDJG
Py KATHLEEN TELTSCH
ti;Intal to The New York Times
UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., May
29?Daniel P. Moynihan, for-
mer United States represntative
at the United Nations, says he
was aware his term here last
fall that vote on critical Gener-
al Assembly resolutions were
bought and sold by diplomats.
? There were not many cases,
perhaps only a half-dozen in-
stances, but in one a vote went
for as little as $600," Mr. Moy-
nihan said in a telephone inter-
view.
; It -should not be too surpris-
ing that such sales go on he
said, considering the high cost
of living in New York for dele-
gations from poorer countries,
and especially for delegates be-
low the rank of ambassador,
who cannot get?by on their sa-
laries. "There was a lot of loose
money around and an influx of
small, impoverished countries
to UN. membersip at about the
same time," he said.
Mr. Moynihan declined to
identify those involved by
name or by country.
Other Inducements Cited
According to delegates, there
are few cases of money's ac-
tually changing hands. There
was no suggestion that votes
had been bought by any major
, power such as the United
States or the Soviet Union.
"When the larger countries go
after support, there are other
wan of doing it such as an
offer of a loan or profitable
trade agreement," one diplomat
remarked.
Another delegate said 'there
were more subtle, ways of ob-
taining supporting votes than
bribery. One of the most com-
mon is to invite the leader of
a small country for a state visit
during which a friendship pact
is approved and an offer of
techqical assistance may be
thrown in.
Mr. Moynihan said he did not s
find it shocking that countries P
. .
Ihavi that 21 tons of heaVy
water supplied by ,the
United States was used by
India -in- nuclear reactors
supplied by Canada to pro-
duce plutonium,' "which is
atom bomb material," Ribi-
coff said.
"The' United States has
never publicly aciniowl=
edged exporting heavy
water to India," he said.
"Instead, U.S. officials said
only that Canada supplied
the research reactor used by
India to produce the pluto-
nium for its explosion."
engage in bargaining and saw
not much difference in whether
votes went for cash or wheat.
"All countries sell their votes
in one way or the other," he
commented. "I don't find it sur-
prising or shocking what coun-
tries do to maximize their in-
terests."
The former United States de-
legate made a similar statement
about bribery in an interview
!with CBS News when he was
asked whether votes were
bought at the United Nations.
' a number of other delegates
I said they were certain that
vateshad been sold-for thou-
sands of dollars on some criti-
cal' issues. .
Two diplomats from widely'
different regions and political
groupings, who asked not to be.
identified, gave ;Millar accounts
of one attempted transaction:
A delegate from one of the
poorest 'countries was said to
have been approached and
handed an envelope by a North
Korean representative with an
urgent request that he pay
careful- attention to its con-
tents. This occurred at a time
when both North Korea and
South Korea, which are not
members but have observer sta-
tus, were pressing General As-
sembly members to vote for ri-
val resolutions on the situation
in Korea.
When he opened the enve-
lope, the delegatefound that iti
contained not only propagand
material but also $3,000 in $100!
bills. The diplomat involved'
could not be reached for com-
ment, but the two others ac-
quainted with the affair said
they were certain that the mo-
ney had been returned. ,
A North Korean spokesman
at the United- Nations, when
asked about the report, said the
accounts were absolutely
untrue.
CBS News 'said in a broadcast'
Friday night that diplomats at'
the United Nations had offered
$1,000, an an Argentine diplo-
mat and an envelope full of mo-
ney to an Arab diplomat, but
that the money had been re-
fused in both cases. A spokes-
man for the North Korean ob-
erver termed the reports corn-
letely false.
29
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
Western Europe
DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
aLy_ .,F7 6
How smack of soft Government and
tactics- make a mockery of scifeguar
Foreign eyes
in Britain"
RUSSIAN plans to build a
huge new embassy com-
plex in the leafy " IVAllion-
aire's Row," Kensington?
London's' biggest property
development since the war
?seem likely to bring sub-
stantial increases in the
small army cf 'men from
Moscow already based here.
It takes a minimum of eigh-
teen trained men to Mount a
full scale watch on a suspec-
ted- spy and it is with that
and other figures in mind that
the men responsible for Bri-
tain's security are looking at
the project.
Strict control on the numbers
of Russian diplomats has been
maintained since Lord Home's
expulsion of 105 of them in 1971.
Nevertheless many Conserv-
ative M.P.'s fear that with the
Russian plans for expansion and
present efforts to push trade
between the countries. Whitehall'
may have' to consider easing
restrictions on the envoys and
commercial officers.
This concern is growing
after the Foreign Office decision
not to expel two bungling Hun-
garian spies who were caught
photographing the atomic wea-
pons ? establishment at Burgh-
field, Berkshire, two weeks ago
This lenient approach is not
uncommon now when dealing
with Russian and, Czech diplo-
mats involved in spying opera-
tions.
Russia now has 354 men
posted to Britain compared with
550 before the 1971 expulsions.
There are 87 diplomats and offi-
cials at the Embassy; 56 in the
Soviet Trade.' Delegation; 102
with quasi-official agencies; 71
factory inspectors; 15 officials of
international organisations and
23 journalists. In addition there
are some 500 diplomats and offi-
dais representing Communist
satellite countries whose secu-
rity agencies are directly con-
trolled by the K.G.B.
After Lord Home dealt so
forthrightly with the 105, who
were not mere names picked out
of the hat but were proven
spies, the Russians in their con-
stant efforts to rebuild their
organisation turned to their
Eastern European satellites and
the Cubans to cany out missions
for the voraciously inquisitive
K.G.B. and its supporting mili-
tary and political intelligence
organisations. .
30
improvised Russian spy
ds
By NORMAN KIRKHAM,
Military attaches have always
been regarded as legalised spies
and Lt. Col. Lajos Hajma and
Captain Andras Toth of the
Hungarian embassy were merely
carrying out a mission which
British military attach?might
well attempt to carry out in
Hungary.
Russian representatives cannot
travel more than 35 miles from
the centre of London?a piece of
tit-for-tat because of the restric-
tions imposed on Britain's 82
diplomats and officials serving
in Moscow. But these restraints
do not apply to the Iron Curtain
diplomats or the Cubans whose
D.G.I. espionage setup is con-
trolled from the Kremlin.
_ TOM DAVIES
and the Close-Up team
It is because of this Commun-
ist evasion, of the restrictions
which are strictly applied to ,
Western .,diplomats in Russia_
that Lord lipmc told us: "It is
a false calculation that if you
catch- spies on the job you will
Impress' the Russians and their
satellites by dealing with them
leniently. These men should
have been sent packing at once.
"I-have no doubt that detente -
or not, the Russians and East I
Europeans will go on with intel-
ligence operations here. We must
not relax our guard. The leopard
does not change its spots."
But it is the cost and com-
plexity of maintaining that
guard which is making life so
difficult for our spy catchers. In
Moscow the British Embassy uses
Russian chauffeurs and handy-
men, but they bring their own
doormen and chauffeurs to Bri-
tain and it has long been a rule
of counter-espionage that the
most important man in a Soviet
Embassy is usually not the Am-
bassador but is the K.G.B. chief
who could be anything from
First Secretary to one of those
lowly chauffeurs.
There are other types of spy
as well. Espionage these days
is not confined to military affairs;
industrial espionage and agents
of influence are just as
important.
Mr. Cranley Onslow, Tory
M.P. for Woking, is particularly
concerned abobt the activities of
the 71 Russian industrial inspec-
tors who have privileged access
to many sensitive aspects of
British goods, systems and
are sent over when a deal is
concluded to supply Russia with
British goods, systesm and
machine tools. Their ostensible
function is to train in the use
of equipment and to keep quality
controls on goods. They some-
times live in industrial towns
with daily access to the factories
over periods of some months.
Britain exported 010 million
worth of machinery, transport
equipment, textiles and other
goods in 1975 and there are firm
promises that trade between Bri-
tain and Russia will move for-
ward dramatically in the next
? few years. This means that
inevitably there will be yet more
factory inspectors coming to live
and work here..
They are already in position in
every aspect of British industry.
They are at Vickers, which
makes tanks and warships, they.
are at the Swan Hunter ship-
building firm, they are at the
John Brawn Engineering works,
they are at precision machine
tool companies, computer labora-
tories and chemical works.
The companies involved are
obviously aware of the dangers
involved in their presence and
take care to keep them away
from secret areas, but as anyone
who has worked in a large con-
cern knows, it is only too easy
for an inquiring mind to collect
details of military, and industrial
processes.
Another equally important
aspect of the modern spies' work
is to act ,as an 'agent of influence
a man ,Nho can drop into the pub
for a pint and then not only
report back what his workmates'
attitudes are but can attempt
both 'political and cultural sub-
version. It is this aspect of an
agent's work which the West
finds so- difficult to Carry out in
Moscow because of the barriers
interposed between Western
representatives and the Russian
people. .
An analysis of the Institute
for the Study of Conflict points
out that Soviet intelligence acti-
vities are continually increasing.
This fact emerged :from an exam-
ination of the growth of official,
Soviet representation in Western
Europe. It has doubled since the
early Sixties to well over 2.000
throughout Europe and that does
not include the satellites.
Professor Leonard Shapiro,
Chairman of the Institute's COun-
cil told us: "We have estimated
that around half of those accre-
dited as diplomats to N.A.TO.
countries are usually engaged in
intelligence operations of one
kind or another.
"Russia's policy of detente
has, in fact increased, for the
Kremlin, the importance of sub-
version in the West. Apart
from industrial and military spy-
ing, the aim is to spread propa-
ganda and sow disinformation.
They are out to create a favour-
able climate of opinion."
Apart from the problem cre-
ated by the sheer number and
industry of the Russian agents
legally operating in this country,
our counter-espionage teams
have the problem of the divided
opinion which exists in the
? F-dreign Office about' what to do
with spies when they are caught.
There were many senior men
in the F.0'. who were horrified
when Lord Home brought off his
mass expulsion and for a long
time before that they had
carried out a softly-softly policy.
This policy was in accord with
' Sir Harold Wilson's own policy
of pursuing detente with Russia
during his early years in office
before detente became
fashionable.
This was a situation which
infuriated our hard-worked spy-
catchers who more than once
caught Russian spies red-handed
and were forced to let them go
in the interests of higher policy.
They were especially furious
when we gave back the Krogers,
the expert man and wife spy
team, in exchange for Gerald
Brook who had got himself
jailed for acting as an agent
of an anti-communist emigre
organisation.
The Russians brutally mis-
treated Brook to force us to
give up the Krogers. We did so.
It may have been the correct
decision on humanitarian
grounds. But it did no good to
our counter-espionage agents
who saw two of their prize
catches being given back.
It was the softly-softly pro-
tagonists who won again over
the question of expelling the
Hungarians?and were promptly
rewarded by a diplomatic clout
round the ear from the Hun-
garian government.
There are in fact a number of
intriguing aspects of this affair.
The first is: what were they
doing there in-the first place?
For the Russians have an excel-
lent spy-satellite system and
undoubtedly have fine quality
pictures of every brick of the
Burghfield establishment taken
from their Cosmos satellites.
I Is it then the people who
work in the factory who interest
the Hungarians and' not the
bricks and mortar or the shape
of the chimneys?
Or is there a John Le
Carre twist and did the Russians
? send the Hungarians there
: knowing that they would be
Picked up?our own reporter
was quickly questioned by a
friendly but firm policeman last
week?in order to hurt Anglo-
Hungarian relations which have
been steadily improving in
recent months?
And if the British authorities
really wanted to keep the affair
quiet precisely not to disturb
this new relationship how did
the story get out? Was it a
proud local man anxious to
claim credit? Was it a dis-
gruntled spy-catcher trying to
make sure that the Hungarians
didn't get away with it?
There are many juicy permu-
tations to delight Le Carre
fans, but the reality is deadly
serious: Britain is under con-
tinual attack by an army of
Soviet agents, an army which,
because of detente, is likely to
grow rather than decrease, an
army with a new headquarters
planned ? surely with a con-
scious irony ? for Millionaires'
Row.
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1'
sondai.4-430:11..976
Tift tAgiiiNdtdri kist
Twa,
t ?
By George W. Ball
HAUNTING EUROPE today is a specter of .commun-
ism less ectoplasmic and more substantial than the
one conjuredup in the Communist Manifesto of 1848. On
June 20 and 21 the Italian people may cast such a large
vote . for. the Communist:Tarty as to Provide it. with. a.
dominant
:dominant place In in Italian coalition government; two.
years from now a left-of-Center: majority with a Com-
munist component- could force a cOnstitutionaL crisis in ;
F? rance;:
-Though the prospect 'disturbs the-chancellories of Eu-
rope, it upsets Washington even more, creating nervous
palpitations in the White House and deepening Henry
Iiissinger's Spenglerian gloom. If Communists were to ,
participate in Western governments, "there would," he
told a meeting of. our ambassadors, "be a shocking
change in the established.patterns of American policy."
It would, he implied, mean the effective end of NATO
and ? according to a. State Department spokesman ?
require the United States to "reassess" its policies to-
ward Europe.
In contrast to most Americans (and particularly to the
secretary of state and his staff), many Europeans are in-
tellectually reconciled to the prospect of Communists in
the Italian government. Their more relaxed view of the
prospect reflects the fact that the Communist Party has
been a familiar feature of the Italian political' scene for
many years.
What hai.made its entry into government an immi-
nent possibility is the coincidence of a number of fac-
tors. Most important, no doubt, are the economic reces-
? sion and inflation, aggravated by the quadrupling of oil
p- rices which has borne heavily on a country with almost
no indigenous energy. In addition ? for America is by
no means without blame ? our efforts to milk the thea-
trical potential: of detex!e:. have helped give Western
ommunista respectability and, led the Christian Demo-
crats to-be less fearful of a dialogue with the Commun-
ists. If the Presidentond. the secretary of state can hob-
nob with Breziinev and his cronies on the television
Screens of thoworld, What is- wrong with Italy sharing
governmental power with the Communist leader, Enrico
Berlinguer, and his colleagues, who are, after all, good
Italians and ? at least in Berlinguer's case ? of distin-
guished family?
Such a conclusion would find little. support if, regard-
less of the Communists, the Italian political structure
were not already near collapse from decay and corrup-
tion. To many Italians the Communists appear not as
-conspirators seeking to seize control of the government,
- but rather as the-only plausible alternative to the Chris-
tian Democrat. and 'a few small:parties that no longer
seem capable of running the country. "If we?had.nOt al-
ready tried fascism and thus knew, how.: frightful that
-was," an Italian friend recently told'ine, "that is .whefe
we would be turning now -
? Musical Chairs: .
THOUGH has had 37 governments in the past
_. three decades, they have all been Christian Demo-
cratic variations on the tawdry theme of power ? a few
gray men playing monotonously at musical chairs. Mean-
'while, the locusts have eaten the years: Italian industry,
the Christian Democrats, the Catholic Church ? all have
failed W.:Adjust their parochial interests to the conflicts
and pressures building up in a society marked by mas-
sive economic and' social changes.
Ball, a former under secretary of state, "is now a
New York investment banker. His latest book is "Diplo-
macy for a Crowded World."
31
' During Italy's "economic miracle" in
the 1950s and 1960s, the booming hid;
instrial cities of the Piedmont and Lom-
bardy attracted vast migration of.'
young peasants from the bleak, rocky,
farms of the Italiaii boot. Torn fronithe?
tutelage of family and priest and,sub-
jected-to the squalor of the slums, these
;young, migrants beeame easy prey to a
Communist Party that filled a vacuum.
-Much.as ward bosses Assisted the green-
horns during the great waves of Ameri-
can immigration, the Communist Party
provided a substitute for family and
church, paternalistically helping work- '
ers find jobs and housing, organizing,
festivals and arranging leisure activi-
ties and, at the same time, conducting
an incessant indoctrination. As a result,
in the last regional elections, the Com-
munists won 33.4 per cent of the vote,
only 2 per cent less than the Christian"
Democrats.
Meanwhile, the' Church led the Chris-.
tian Democrats into bitter and divisive
controversies. Incited by the Vatican_ to.
Oppose the modernization of Italy's, me-
dieval divorce laws in 1974; the Chris-
tian Democratic Party suffered -defeat_ ,
An a referendum. Today it faces an-
other disaster over a similar issue, that
of abortion.
-With \ the Church discredited as its
central defining element, the Christian
Democratic Party has largely lost its
identity. In addition, through. years of
indulgence in shabby politics, the party
has spawned an overgrown bureauc-
racy quite incapable of collecting di?
rect taxes, administering anti-inflation
measures or imposing industrial discip-
line on an anarchic labor force that is
completely out of hand. The enfeebled
Christian ,Democrats have had to rely
on tacit Communist approval to stay in
power, although the Communists them- .
selves have been barred' from formal
participation in government ever since
1947. ?
The "Historic Compromise"'
THE COMMUNISTS have their own
thoughts about participation in
government. Even if a Communist-So-
cialist coalition had become mathemati-
eally feasible, the Communists would
have resisted coalition with only a
small' majority. Atavistically sensitive
to Mussolini's destruction of the grow-
ing Communist Party in 1926 and the
'recent experience of the Allende gov-
ernment. in Chile, Berlinguer and his
colleagues fear that, without the ac-
quiescence of a large segment of the
electorate, their assumption of author-
ity might trigger a right-wing reaction.
To assure adequate support, and a
sharing of the risks, Berlinguer has pro--
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
posed an all-embracing coalition gov-
ernment to *include not only Commun-
ists but Christian Democrats and Social-
ists, an initiative he has called the "his-
toric compromise." The concept is not
new; it has been prevalent in Commun-
ist circles under different labels Mike
the days of Palmiro Togliatti, the par-
ty's first post-war leader. But Berlin- *
guer's personality has helped give the'
proposal credibility.
The scion of a Sardinian land-owning
family, he is almost the antithesis of the 7
archetypal Communist thug. Present-
ing himself as a patriotic Italian, he has
professed 'acceptance of Italian partici-
pation bath in NATO and the Common
Market for the time being. He has from
time to time spread the message that la-
bor should work hard and has made
the ultimate pledge to democratic prin-
ciples by announcing support for "al-
ternation," which means that, if voted
out of office. the Communists would
rr....n.it to the v.'11.1 ,-r.f parliament and
the electorate and retire from power.
Moreover, he has tried to. make clear
that he would never, play the sedulous
ape to the I.:carn out would conduct
an Italian government in the interests
of the Italian people.
Though he has rejected Moscow's
claim as world communism's 'leading
center" and has repeatedly 'announced
the independence of the Italian Com-
munist Party, pressures on him to pup-
port broad Soviet policies are obviously*
great. Berlinguer himself has said that
"there is no no-man's land in the great
arena of the class struggle," and he has'
added that, if it were not for "our un-
breakable ties of, solidarity with Soviet,
Aussie, the other Socialist states and
the whole revolutionary working class
of the world . . . we should lose our
Identity as a Communist Party."
He and his colleagues have left little
doubt that they would support the So-
viet proposal to trade off the liquida-
tion of the Warsaw Pact for the liquida-.
tion of NATO. They would almost cer-
tainly oppose the continuing outlays
necessary to maintain adequate NATO
defenses and would make increasingly
difficult the maintenance of American
military bases and installations in Italy.
(13,000 of our own fighting forces with
45,000 civilians are now stationed
there.) One need notunderline the re-
sultant impairment of effectiveness of
the 6th Fleet in the Eastern Mediterra-
nean, where American interests are vi-
tally touched by the Arab-Israeli con-
flict and the troubles between Greece
and Turkey.
A further, but rather desperate, as-
sumption from which many Italians
draw comfort is that, even if the Com-
munist Party should achieve a role in
government, it would tffl be only a mi-
nority within a larger amalgam and,
hence, could be kept in its place. But to
argue, as some do, that Communist par-
ticipation holds no peril because Italian
Communist voters are not "real Corn-
mutilate" quite misses the point. For the
party's representatives in the,. goverf-
ment would not be a gross-section of
the Communist electorate but discip-
lined professionals, rigidly committed
to a party line and party, tactics. While
the Communists might cultivate the ap-
pearance of responsible behavior for a
period of time, the apparatchiks could
well use that period in an effort to fur-
ther the spread of Communist control.
But what of the widely held argu-.
ment that the Communista are- needed
to restore Italy's flagging economy?
For a period they might, to be sure, try
to arrange a respite from industrial.
strife, since Berlinguer has himself sug-
gested the need "to combat attitudes
that negate the human and social need
to work" and to restore "the competi-
tivity" of Italian industry. This is be-
guiling stuff for some Italian industrial-
ists whose predecessors admired a man.
who could make the trains run on time.
Long-Term Goals
v ET, EVEN though the Conunun-
A ists might make a show of reliabil-
ity for a brief period, that does not
mean either that they could effectively
control Italian workers over the long
pull or that they would, be prepared to
go very far down' that road. Italian la-
bor today is the most militant in Eu-
rope and within its ranks are strong
extremist elements: 'Thus, if Commun-
ist leaders within the Italian govern-
ment acted to salvage the rapidly disin;
tegrating Italian economy, it could well
mean that, as the American journalist
Claire Sterling has pointed out, Moscow
itself might undertake to finance and
ineite a more radical Communist fac-
tion, since it dares not, risk a Western
Communist party moving towards
"bourgeois collaborationism" for fear
of 'creating' deep disquiet among the
uneasy Communist regimes in* Eastern
'Europe. .
Still, even without the fear of their
own left wing or of mischief from Mos-
cow, Berlinguer and his company
would not play a role of moderation
very long. They are by no means mere
"agrarian reformers" and the party has
made its long-term objectives clear. It is
committed, according to the party
weekly Rinaacita, to bring about a radi-
cal liquidation of the Christian Demo-
cratic power structure, impose "pene-
trating controls on the use of profits
and investments" and employ a "new
use of representative democracy" to
bring about a "profound social trans-
formation" leading to a "new social hi-
erarchy" and the "hegemony_ of the
working class." If retrograde groups.
prove too "recalcitrant," Berlinguer
has made clear that "we Communists
will never be afraid to resort to the
scalpel when needed."
Thus, in spite -of all the fine talk of
"the many roads to socialism" and of
"humanist Marxism" ? which rejects
the domination of the Party in favor of
32
"social self-aianagement" or "pluralist
socialism" and would tolerate free de-
bate and 'free access to information ?
there is no reason to think that the Ital-
ian COmmunist Party, once in power,
would adopt such heresies. Berlinguer's
professions of liberalism are clearly a
tactic by. which power is to be gained;
once it is achieved, they would be
promptly jettisoned.'
One has only to read the party's liter-
ature carefully to note that every
_
avowal of democratic purity has been
regularly countered. by a reassuring
message to the faithful that interprets
or qualifies what has been said' to bring
it into accord with Leninist orthodoxy.
All such statements must, therefore, be
understood for what they are intended
to achieve. They are tactical moves to
advance a relentlessly pursued' objec-
tive; the dictatorship of the Italian state
' by the party which, as in the Soviet Un-
ion and other Communist countries, is
a totalitarian structure organized on.
the principle of "democratic central-
ism." There is no room for dissent in
party procedures, no tolerance of oppo-
sition -voices. Once the hierarchy has
made a decision, further debate is
ruled out and anyone who tries to or-
ganize a dissident faction risks expul-
sion.
Nonetheless, public opinion is unpre-
dictable, whether in America or Italy,
and it would be a mistake to take it for
granted that the forthcoming elections
will necessarily show an increase in the
Communist vote or that Communist
participation in government is inevita-
ble. Though some Italians may vote
Communist in the conviction that the
Communists are the wave of the future,
some of my Italian friends who voted
Communist in last June's regional elec-
tions will, so they tell me, "hold their
noses and vote for the Christian Demo-
crats" when control of their country is
at stake.
It is, of course, possible that, if the
Communists do pile up the largest vote,
the Christian Democratic Party might
split, with the party's left wing agree-
ing to join the Communists and most of
the Socialists and Social Democrats in a
watered-down version of the "historic
compromise." If, on the other hand, the
Communist vote should be less than ex-
pected, Berlinguer might prefer to stay
out of the government, continuing to
exercise a veto by private treaty with
the Christian Democrats.
In a situation with so many varia-
bles, American policy should be subtle,
flexible and realistic. Instead, our ap-
proach to the problem so far has been
distressingly haphazard. To be sure, the
secretary of state has announced that
we would regard the entry of Commun-
ists into the Italian government as "un-
acceptable," but that sounds as though*
America were Queen Victoria rebuking
the lower classes. To reject as "unac-
ceptable" an event we can only margin-
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
Apkoved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
Talliaffect is -a kind of diploniacy of the
absurd we have tended to practice all
-too'frequently in recent months.
Nor was Kissinger any, better advised
? when he said ominously; "If Commun-
ists should 'enter European govern-
ments, the political 'solidarity of the
.West, and thus NATO, would he Inevit-
ably weakened, if not underinined . . .
And in this Country, the commitment
, of the American- people to maintaiathe
? balance of power in Europe'. . . would
lack. the ? moral base on which it has
stood for .30 years." , Earlier, in his.
. speech to American, ambassadors, he-
had slated that "it is Inconceivable that .
' the ..United States could maintain
, ground forces In Europe if there is.mcv: ;
jor Communist participation in West- ?
. 'ern governments." .(-- - , ?
Preiumably, Kissinger hoped that, by
pointing to America's anxieties, he
,would deter some Italians wha_might
otherwise vote for the Communists, but ?
on balance the effect of these messages
was probably adverse. Some Europeans -
have interpreted the secretary's state-
ments as further evidence of the unre-
liability of American, security commit- ?
ments. Others resented them as an ef-
fort to meddle in European internal af-
fairs.
To_Communist, leaders, Kissinger's
Concern about the ?diiiiiiegration
? NATO and the. _dimMished American
role-in Europe could only be taken as a
- spur to action, since the removal of the
United States from Europe has long
been a central" objective of .Kremlin
strategy. Thus, by assuring the Com-
munists that their entry into European'
? governments would do the trick, we
showed them the way to their heart's
desire. ?
? However, though warnings based on
threats to Europe's Security probably
did. more harm than- good, the Italian
people should still be put on notice that
Communist entry into government
would jeopardize their- economic well-
being. To be effective, such a warning
should come -from Italy's European
neighbors rather than , the United
States, though it should be part of a co-
ordinated strategy. Unfortunately, the
habit of coordination has largely atro-
phied during recent years of American
unilateralism. And in this case ? ap-
parently with no transtAtlantic consult- .
ation ? the secretary of state has by.
his solemn finger-shaking elicited an
angryriposte from German Chancellor
Helmut Schmidt. Thus, instead of a Con-
certed strategy, as a'result of our go-it- '
alone policy we have produced bicker-
ing among Italy's friends that could t
only encourage the Communists. .
Today the member nations of the Eu-
ropean- EcOnomic Community are in a t
position to send theirsiellow member, a
Italy, a clear, forceful message. Al? c
though the member states of the Corn- ? t
munity cannot tell the Italian people
how to cast their votes, they can, and C
should, make clear what would happen s
if the inclusion of Communists in the r
government were to lead to anti-deni
cratk political measures or to some-
.
thing approaching' a centralized, regi-
mented economy.
? After all, the treaty of Rome -explic
itly states that the Community is dedi-
cated' to strengthening the ."safeguards
? of ,.peace. and liberty" aiid-,the whole
??:fiinction of. the Common Market as-
sumes the free _movement Of the fac-
tors of production. -, . -`
. Action to head off a Communist take-
over should not, however, be confined
tO 'threats of economic sanctions.
Within the structure. of the Community
a complex network of relationships
transcends national line& ? -relations
among, members. of. different profes-
- slow; relations among political parties
. and politicians, relations among scien-
tists, farmers and industralists. Now is
the time for the Community to use its
Influence and resources to help rebuild
an effective counterforce to the Italian
'Communists.
Certainly, the Community'. has much
to offer ? such as a more liberal treat-
ment of Italy's agricultural produCts,
.development funds for the underdevel-
oped south and credits through the _
Community's newly developed special
lending 'authority. But, most of , all,
there must be an urgent dialogue be-
tween the center parties of the Com-
munity nations and the Christian Dem-
ocrats to provide advice and encour-
agement and help heal the parochial di-
visions that prevent common action.. ?
The French and German govern-
ments showed their effectiveness
within a European framework by bols-
tering Mario Soares and the Portuguese
Socialists; now,, by Concerted action
within the framework of the EEC, they
might well slow the drift in Italy, par- '
ticulany if the effort took the form of
affirmative help as well as negative
threat ?
This is dearly a case where America
Should do everything possible to de-
velop a concerted strategy with its
Western allies; while contenting itself,
for once, with a silent supporting role.
Clearly, the EEC has the capability of'
reducing the level of economic activity`
In Italy seriously by a whole range of
devices ? from imposing restrictions
on agricultural imports to stopping the
flow of' regional assistance funds. As
the ultimate sanction, the other mem-
bers could expel Italy from the Corn-
munity.
The extent, if any, to which measures
of this kind should be taken presents
serious- philosophical and moral ques-
ions. Few would argue that the mere
inclusion of Communists in the Italian
oy_or_nment_ should, by itself,
he occasion for economic actions
gainst Italy, but the EEC member
ountries should ,make it known that
hey are holding a watching brief. If it
hould once become clear that the
ommunists were systematically de-
troying democratic institutions and
egimenting the Italian economy in vio-
RitIon ofthe Orinciples orlhe Ceinimon.:
Market, the question would assume a
different. aspect' 'It would not be \
whether the EEC countries should pen-
- alize 'a Member nation that elected
'Communist leaders. by- its .own demo-
cratic.processes, but rather whether
sanctiona-should be used? to prevent, the
destruction of democracy by the tradi-
tional nietliodslof communism ? sub-
version, intimidation and conspiracy.
, The secretary of state made a tactical
blunder ,when, without, consultation
with our Principal allies.who are much
closer to 'the situation than ,We, he an-
nounced that the entry of Communists
into a European' :government &mid
? jeopardize the Whole structure of At-
lantic"security arrangement. Hei also
ignored both logic and experience
when he contended that such an event
? in one country will "be likely to pro-
duce a sequence of events in which
,other Etiropean countries will also be
-tempted to move in the same direc-
tion."
No Dominoes
HAT,.IN FACT, would happen-if
? the Communists should join -an
Italian coalition government? Even the
- prospect of that event has already trig-
gered a mass capital flight; its actual oc-
'.curience would mean the exodus not
only of Capital but of many of Italy's
leading financial and industrial figures.
Investment would dry up; multina-
tional 'companies Would try to extricate
themselves from their Italian commit-
ments, even at the cost of closing plants
and increasing unemployment. The
Italian government would be forced to
impose tight defensive controls. If the
EEC were to? take no action under the ,
"mutual - help" provisions of the Rome
Treaty,- and if the EEC nations, to-
gether with the United States, failed to
support a rescue operation through the
International Mbnetary Fund, Italy
could quickly find herself in a severe
financial panic, with mounting infla-
tion, labor strife and increased unem-
ployment. Faced with a financial panic,
the Communists in government would
almost certainly opt for repressive mea7
sures, that would unequivocally disClose
their antidemocratic instincts.
Far from inducing other European
states to follow Italy's lead, the result-
ing uproar might rather be expected to
induce a sense of fear and revulsion. If
. it were clear that Italy was on the way'
to isolating itself from the rest of Eu-
rope, communism for other European
countries could rapidly lose its appeal.
Certainly, one might expect such a
reaction in France, where the situation
sharply differs from that of Italy. In
France the economy is basically
healthy; the government, while experi-
encing troubles, is still strongly in com-
mand, and the Communists are a mi-
nority of only one-fifth kept in check
by a rapidly growing Socialist Party
that commands 27 per cent of the vote
and is strongly led by Francois Mitter-
33
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
rand, an ambitious and effective politi-
cian.
By 'contrast, Georges Marchals, the
French Communist leader, is an unpo-
pular party wheelhorse, an, ex-Stalinist
now engaged in. a political. St. Vitus
dance, recanting traditional Commun-
ist principles and loudly shouting halle-
lujah as he totters down the sawdust
trail toward democratic redemption.
Repudiating the dictatorship of the
proletariat, he expresses shock at inter-
nal repression in the Soviet Union. An-
nouncing his devotion to "pluralism,"
to "alternation" and to all the civil
rights of a free society, he is. more a
- comic figure than .a persuasive convert
to democratic principles.
Nor are events phased favorably for
the French Commimists, since they will
probably have no chance to join a
French government 'prior to the parlia-
mentary elections of 1978. By then,
with any luck, the French economy will
be ticking over. more rapidly, anent-.
ployment . will have , declined and the
Italian experience may have been ab-
sorbed for good or evil..
To be ' sure, unexpected develop-
ments could radically change the sequ-
ence of events. The most disturbing
might well be the passing of the Tito re-
, girlie in Yugoslavia or some serious out-
' break of violence in Spain. Of these
two,' the Kremlin's meddling in a post-
-Tito Yugoslavia could have the most di-
rect and, explosive- consequences, and it
- is an imponderable that cannot be over-
looked in charting the evolution of Eu-
ropean politics. 'Although the Red Ar-
my's entry irito Yugoslavia without a ,
fight is improbable ? no matter how
THE NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY MAY 29, 1976
is Losing the Edge
national support, habits and dogmas
of the major contributing partners.'
We worry immensely about the quan-
titative superiority of Warsaw Pact'
tank forces yet there are 30 different
types -of antitank missiles in NATO-
when five suffice; (2) seven types' of inventories.: .. ? . ? ,
aircraft, Six types of recoilless. rifles, The restating proliferation* of cow 1
'four types Of wire-guided antitank .
fusion, duplicated research and financ-
mortars'..,
weapons, three types each of ?
' :ng, overburdened :support systems:
rifles and machine guns in the small and -doctrinal assumptions on how to
use which weapons greatly hampers .
development of a -rational . defense
force. And, Dr. Tucker says:
"W. ,411??????011, ems,
.
. 1
.d.hur
PARIS?The North Atlantic alliance,.
whose ministers 'nave just l'i-isheci
meeting in Oslo, is not only in a con-
dition of political anxiety but its milltary forces increasingly reflect the
failure of any sensible arms standardi-
zation to evolve. As a result, the im-
pressive economic-industrial base and
qualitative technological -advantages
of ,the coalition over the Soviet-
dominated Warsaw Pact have to a
d extent faded
away.
Becauae ;of nationalistic rivalries
among the Western `allies, comp.etitiort
in developing their individual ordnance
industries to seek. export markets
causes needless overlain. And a fail-
ure by NATO itself. to ,agree on basic
requirements for such things as air-
craft missions, antitanIZ and anti-
aircraft defense, needs, leaves the
alliance with a costly hodgepOdge of
far too many types of equipment.
The political Will needed 'to harmo
nize this situation is latking: Yet
almost every partner agrees that hunk
dreds of millions" of dollars could be.
saved with proper .rationalization of
the Atlantic arms industries and that
more and better equipment could thus
. be made available for less money.,
A comprehensive draft study of this
situation has been prepared for the
Atlantic Institute by Dr. :Gardiner
Tucker, former Assistant Secretary
:General of- NATO. In the .study's pre-
liminary version, Dr: Tucker deplores
"extreme duplication of effort with
different countries performing similar
research, carrying out parallel devel-
opments of, essentially equivalent
weapon systems."
The resulting waste -of. resources,
he says,. has allowed the Soviet bloc
to close the qualitative, gap' in many
weapons and. pull ahead of the West
in others. Moreover, 'proliferatiOn has
seriously degraded the capability of
our forces to operate together or to -
supply one another." ?
As examples of this he cites: (1)
31 different types of antitank weapons
well contrived the pretense of an invi-
tation by some dissident group ? the
'possibility of a dominant Kremlin influ-
ence in Yugoslav- affairs is a haunting
nightmare for the West. Given the geo-
graphic factor, Yugoslavia's continued
independence of the Kremlin is of par-
ticular concern to all Italians ? Com-'
munist and non-Communist alike.
It is well that Kissinger has taken
note of -this possibility and warned the
Soviets that America would regard any
interference in Yugoslavia with great
concern. But here again a strong case
could be made for a concerted warning
to be given through NATO itself. For,
though technically' outside the NATO
defense area, a Yugoslavia independent
of the Kremlin is a significant factor in
the European power balance. It is one
the West dare not neglect.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
By C. L. Sulzberger
? (5,000-man),Ace Mobile Force -(A.M.F.)
Sreated for deployment t?ci crisis 'areas.
. ? ? ? -
? The latter profusion means each of'
.A,Ael.F.'s seven national units must
i ? - "As modern weapons systems may.,
maintain its own, logistic services and. more'
require a decade. or fthm the'
it takes more then twice the necessary initiation of development to full de- ?
einefgency time to deploy. Likewise. ployment, and as weapons once intro-
NATO's standing naval force in ? the -duced. may remain in the 'active,
Channel and Atlantic lacks common inventories for one to three decades,..
. frequencies for data transmiasion and standardization can only come slowly'
standard systems of identification of eyen when the objective is fully sup-
friend and foe. Half the "so-called
"friendly" planes shot down in a re- ported."
cent :maneuver were "destroyed" by
their own side's weapons. - - -
The evidence assembled by Dr.
Although the alliance has at last Tucker is deeply disturbing. Al.-
standardized fuel for its tactical air- though the population of the North
-craft, the nozzles which inject it are Atlantic partners, their wealth and
still different. NATO navies possess _their industrial capacity considerably.
100 :-varying types of ships from ? exceed those of ,Waraa* Pact. mem
? destroyer-size up,. 36 types of radar bers, they lag, far behind in the
for fire-control, 40 'different types of quantitative forces, maintained by the
:gun larger than-30-catiber, Therefore two. bloca,., especially in the size of
nearly 40 types of ammunition must conventional armies and numbers of.
be manufactured for and distributed
to an allied flotilla.
In no sense are the. alliance's
tanks and artillerY:pieces.
But time and again Western Poily-
annas have soothed worriers with the
forces today interoperable. Each de- assurance that the Atlantic altianCe's '
pends to an unhealthy degree on 'the' smallei. armies; based 'either on volun-
teers or short-term conscripts, are
better-trained and motivated than
'Proliferation has those of the sullen reluctant- East;
also that our well-known tochr.c::4,-!::.,.
?
superiority gives us an immense quali-
seriously degraded
the capability of
our forces to
operate together.'
34
tative edge.
The, first assumption is at best
dubious. The second is rapidly becom-
ing untrue. And the Western partners
have no one .but themselves to blame.
All they must do is demonstrate the
political sense to use their talents
more 4.1-0
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
_Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
piaim June11, 1976 THE TASITINGTON POST--
-- ":),?
. .: ...,
-. ? : . .. .
.,----..Ply- Robin Wright ..-- ' . I spent 'four &tie with. the. Ian," the war name of CY-
avecla to The Wosklington Post . mercenaries in, Sari AntOsno rus-born Costes Georghiou.
IfISBON, June 16.?"The ' do -Zaire in early February. One MPLA . official even
Americans, they are- nothing. One Of them,'.Derek Barker ' congratulated' me on the
We are not .out to get of Aldershot, , . England, is story 'shortly after my ar.
, them, only the people who, among the _13 going on trial rival June 1:
sent thenvin." ? , i . Fric!Ay?''' ' ' 'i - - -, ', - There was never any at '
In saying this Ruf Mon- ' 'It gives special, credibil- ' tempt to harm me bodily. I
teiro, Angolan 'prosecutor' ity to.. the -evidence tit, hear' was allowed a meal from the
for the trial of 13 foreign from:-..a. ,Western journalist- ? Tropic? Hotel, for which I
mercenaries in Luanda, ze- who. Sew them ,in action,"*?:? had to pay. I was even al-
red in on- the government -the statd prosecutor ex.! lowed to call my parents in
purpose in holding the Arial; plained during .ene of threeci' Michigan when I expressed '
which' has become a media interviews. when he. de- concern about how the news
event in Angola, even over- mended my testimony. ?.; of my detention would at-
shadowing coverage? of the': ...lerefused,.pn grounds that fect thy father's heart condi-
new nation's first 'election' I-Went to, Angola as a jour- ? tion,' I was expelled early
two weeks from now. , nalist, not as a participant, this morning.
The real "verdict" at the and that it would break the The best explanation for
end of the tribunal is ex- 'journalists' code of profes- the action may have come
pected to be a strong warn- sional ethics to get involved from the MPLA army com-
ing to Western powers?is- in an event I was covering. L mander who escorted me to
sued in the hame of all-new added- that all the informa-- the airport?and who led -
and ; Vrogrestlivel!.' goy:ern:7', titer t".had was ? published the attack on San Antonio
meritp?that. they ban no , and on- public record.
do Zaire.
, longer expect-to be: able - en Tuesday, four days af. . This trial is very- itapor-
.:?.,ter thethird interView I Was ,__ tent to. us and our progr
sympathizers- through Mill- . ,arrested and detained for 28 restive "iillies,!' 'he- said, '4At
Promete tb4iir .,,eyetents , or
, tary involVenynt and merce; hours by the ecret police;._ the, Mose' ,irespOrtant time,.
nary :troops. - ? , ? :-...- -..,., or DISA, who tried to intim- , ?
whinbig we are trying, that theY
to tell .. ,
., The 13 'mercenaries, ' iii: ..: idate me into. giiing ..,_ testi-, .,. , ea : .
the poWers ' .'.
eluding. three. 'Americank_i pony. rough Joni-
.._ - .. - . -, ..- unit foret new nations i..their ways on
were captured in the last--:=_4.--- The DISA -official Who in-% ?th ,
taryt.aid to: our enemies nr
'm i
-days of the Angolan civit;'' "terrogated e for ,', four mereonaries _ to
war Which-pitted the pro-So. hours yesterday.-used sex, ou. refuseek i
'viet:-PoPular Movement for . - aril tattles- tO Oen* weakens our -ease
agree. . to help verify the faeti." ? - ....- ?,,
' s.,: - ,
the Liberation of: , Angola reent.--At first, h,i- said i- rt
-- . the -''iii the trying eyeett the ""e we
"" 'unlit 't.
., against" . two pro-Western government was stiii gonsid'...?,. -,
re
groups.. As to the Amer- . ening pressing - charges- . a; help us tell
te-sentA message i
cans, Monteiro _said, -"They ,. against me frit being with - . lryta.Won't -j
the, truth, we :ean't let you -i
were there-only- a few days the mercenaries and that ..., .., . . :.
an committed no atrocities. theybelieved ,T .Was ? an _, :r ka m centering
-tfr O messagessage was dear:
- - star
One is it baby." Technieally Ather-ican intelligence agent. Far"
all are ;.threatened with I could -bargain . Nile c r im f n al. charges
ori spe--
- - He stlid
death sentences. _ ? .... for my freedom only by tea; ; : against 13 -individuals, the- '
Perhaps the most ominous_ tifying. I- refused: r ,: trial will pointedly focus on
sign of the tone of the event - He also said-! would be"mercenarismforeign in-
is the :official attitude _to,-., -released if I agreed to-' pro...L.- tervention. It will be a poli-
ward the foreign press-, videregnlar intelligence re- tical trial, Almeida admitted' ,
London: Deily ;Telegraph porta to his office pa devel- this week, "with a message, i
reporter Gerald Kemp was opments in' the United '; your people should listen' ..ri
. officially reprimanded ' by States and the southern At- to". -'- ' . '. 1
Angolan Director ef Infor- rican countries I Over. I re- IOW agencies reported
'melon Luis . de Almeidai fused. ' ? `, , - these other, deeettirtents:
Yesterday, for an editorial.- .; The official,. who would- - ? Cuban Prime Minister Fi-
his paper ran on the trial. . not divulge his name, then- ' del CaStro, welcomed a unit - -;
The authorities reeent eaY Said he would let Me see the of about 100 Cubans return-
charges that the tribunal ? entire seven Yoh:Ones of, eVi-- .?ing.from Angola, the "Yugo-
will be a "show" affair.. - a
...ence if I. agreed to verify slay" news agency tanjug re-
They have struggled to give :.the material with - which I- ported. Castro said Sunday
it legitimacy by' inviting the
,...:
:...was familiar. I refused: agairit:, " eight that Cuba was gracitt-
foreign press to attend, --al.; : At that .poirit he abruptly-- ally withdrawing its forces
'lowing an American lawyer _. left the room without telling from 'Angola.
.to defend two of the merce- me my status or how much ?. In Brussels, 'U.S.' Defense
? naries and British official longer i would be detained.Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
to Witness the trial, and by Before my return to said at a meeting at NATO
establishing an international Luanda, officials of the vic- defense ministers that there .
eomniission of inquiry to ob- torious Popular lgovenient was no concrete evidence
serve. the event and after- for the Liberation were ? yet of any significant Cuban
ward Write a report on the aware that I had reported withdrawals ;from Angola.
"Mercenary phencimenon." from the north en the al- Five other ministers, citing
The government asked me leged execution of 14 British' their own intelligence re-
to testify at the trial about mercenaries ' by thercenary ports, concurred in Rums-
information I obtained when commander "Colonel Cal- feid's assessment. ; -
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
East Asia
FOREIGN POLICY
Number 23
Summer 1976
?MESE POLlTiCS
AND A\11-4,RIC4:\ POLICY:
A NEW LOOK
AT THE TRIANGLE
by Roger Glenn Brown
The triangular relationship between the
United States, the Soviet Union, and China
remains at the very heart of the foreign pot--
icy calculations of each country. But at least
in the case of China, according to the fol-
lowing article, that relationship also plays a
critical role in the internal power struggle.
The author, a senior analyst at the CIA
who is presenting his own views and not an
official position of his organization, traces
the complex interrelationship between do-
mestic politics and foreign policy in the
formative period between 1968 and 1972
when the contours of the Sino-Soviet-U.S.
triangle began to emerge. His analysis focus-
es on two major turning points which are
still only dimly understood: the 1969 bor-
der crisis with the Soviet Union, and the fall
of Defense Minister Lin Piao and most of
China's top military leaders in 1971. He
uses the insight gained to offer perspective
on the unexpected eclipse of Teng Hsiao-
ping earlier this year and to forecast in gen-
eral terms the direction China's foreign pol-
icy will now take.
The author's conclusions carry major im-
plications for American foreign policy. They
suggest that our present relationship with
Peking may not be stable enough to survive
the intensified power struggle which is like-
ly to follow Mao's death. Time becomes
more important, and hard chokes on the
status of Taiwan and relations with the So-
viet Union become more urgent. Even if
this presidential election year sees no move-
ment in Sino-U.S. relations, 1977 is almost
certain to become a year of decision. ?The
Editors.
On March 2. 1969 an unusual incident
occurred on the frozen Ussuri river near the
desolate island which the Chinese call Chen-
pao and the Soviets call Damansky. On nu-
merous occasions since the early 1960s. there
had been periodic nonshooting skirmishes
in this and other areas along the disputed
40
Sino-Soviet border. On March 2, 1969, for
the first time, Chinese soldiers opened fire
on a Soviet patrol, killing 7 soldiers and
wounding 23. On March 15, the Soviets
retaliated with a full-scale military engage-
ment in the same area during which hun-
dreds of troops on both sides were killed
and injured. Following these conventional
military exchanges, Soviet spokesmen hint-
ed in a number of forums that a nuclear at-
tack on China might become necessary. By
August 1969, the situation had deteriorated
so badly that some Western observers were
convinced that war was inevitable in the
near term. In short, the events of 1969
marked the most serious crisis in the entire
history of Sino-Soviet relations.
The Role of Internal Politics
The 1969 crisis has always been difficult
to explain. On the face of it, the Chinese at-
tack at Chen-pao seemed irrational. Why
should Peking risk even local hostilities with
the Soviets to assert an historical claim to a
useless island? And if Peking's goal was to
demonstrate that China could not be pushed
around, then why was an area chosen where
Soviet troops were heavily concentrated and,
as the March 15 clash showed, quite capa-
ble of humiliating the Chinese in pitched
local battles? Most critically, why would
China's leaders want to plunge into a foreign
policy crisis when they were in fact prepar-
ing for a major domestic political event:
the Ninth Parry Congress which opened in
early April?'
Perhaps no completely satisfying explana-
tion of the origins of the crisis will ever
emerge, but a good case can be made that the
initial Chinese attack on the Soviets was the
outcome of intense political infighting with-
in China. bcith over who would set Chinese
policy and whether Peking should execute a
major departure in its foi ergo policy by lin-
pi-ovin; relations with the United States.
l'or sorrh: years prior to the crisis, radical
elements in the Chinese Communist party
had been dominant in China, and foreign
policy had been characterized by a xenopho-
bia which had left Peking isolated interna-
tionally. During 1968. however, a number
of events, including the opening of the
Paris peace talks on Vietnam, the Soviet: in-
vasion of Czechoslovakia and the election
of a new American president. gave more
pragmatic Chinese leaders a chance to argue
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1'
for a shift in Chinese policy toward an
opening to the United States.
prolonged stagnation in Sino-
U.S. relations could well contrib-
ute to undermining the political
power of those individuals and
groups within China which are fa-
vorably disposed toward. Washing-
ton. . ? ."
In the fall of 1965, Premier Chou, En-I4
convinced Chairman Mao Tse-tung to move
in this direction, but this decision was ap-
parently reversed in February 1969 because
of intense opposition from Chines mili-
tary establishment and radical leaders like
Chiang Ching and Yao Wen-yuan who had
gained prominence during the Cultural Rev-
olution.'
The radicals opposed the opening for
ideological reasons: Defense Minister Lin
Piao and the military opposed it because it
would have been a triumph for Lin's princi-
pal rival. Chou. and because they wanted to
leave the door open for improved relations
with Moscow. In retrospect, it appears that
Mao and Chou were reversed on an initia-
tive in which they had invested considerable
prestige, and, given the advances made by
Lin just two months later at the Ninth
Party Congress at the expense of pragma-
tists and radicals, one can make a case that
both Mao and Chou were in a precarious
political position in early 1969.
Under these circumstances, a clash with
the Soviets would serve the interests of Mao
and Chou in a number of areas. Most impor-
tant, it would be a strong reassertion of
Mao's personal authority following the Feb-
ruary setback on U.S. policy and the trend
toward greater power for Lin and the mili-
tary. Second, it would be a setback for those
within China, like Lin and his supporters,
who were arguing that Sino-Soviet relations
should be improved. Third, the resultant
increase in Sino-Soviet tension would pro-
vide dramatic justification for a future open-
ing to the United States. In short, it would
serve both the foreign policy and domestic
political purposes of these key Chinese deci-
sion-makers.
This line of explanation, however, raises
some very difficult questions. If Lin and his
supporters on the politburo had been strong
enough to reverse Mao and Chou on the
question of the first steps toward the open-
ing to the United States, why would they
not have had enough clout to prevent mili-
tary action which was not in their best in-
For details or) this period and a similar argument. see
Rnbert W. Sutter. -Toward Sino-Americare Reconcilia-
tio:1- (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Harvard Uni-
versi(y, 1975). .
41
terests? Moreover, since Lin was in charge
of the defense bureaucracy, how could a de-
cision requiring a military action be taken
without his approval?
While it is possible that Mao and Chou
confronted Lin directly on this decision and
simply ordered him to take steps to imple-
ment it, it seems more likely, given the inter-
nal political situation, that they pursued
their goals by circumventing the normal
chain of command and directly ordered Chen
Hsi-lien, commander of the Shenyang mili-
tary region, to attack. the Soviets. Because
Chen.'s own personal ambitions were well
served by an increase in tension on the Sino-
Soviet border, it is likely that he would have
obeyed an order from Mao, even at the risk
of involving himself directly in the internal
power struggle in Peking." In retrospect, it
appears that the attack was not carefully
planned by China's central defense establish-
ment, but, instead, was arranged on short
notice and executed without the knowledge
of higher military authorities in Peking.
CC. . . Washington should consider
recognizing Peking before the aged
chairman leaves the scene in the
hope that this might influence . . .
the succession struggle. .
This interpretation of the March 2 clash,
in short, has Mao and Chou acting hastily
for highly political reasons rather than mak-
ing a rational and detached determination of
what China's national interests required.
That they were prepared to risk the death of
hundreds of Chinese soldiers. and even war
with the Soviet Union, is thus a measure not
only of bow high they calculated the stakes
in the internal power struggle. but also of
how badly they wanted to discredit those
within China who opposed the opening to
the United States. Certainly the message that
Mao could count on the loyalty of China's
second most powerful military regional com-
mander would not be lost on Lin in the
continuing power struggle.
While there were ups and downs in Chi-
nese propaganda throughout the remainder
of 1969. tension in Sino-Soviet relations re-
mained high. Nationwide demonstrations
began the day after the clash, and by March
7 over 200 million Chinese had participat-
ed in mass rallies denouncing Soviet revision-
ism and vowing vigilance along the border.
The intended impact on the domestic rivals
of Mao and Chou was unmistakable. Anti-
Soviet sentiment was strong among the Chi-
? Chen Hsi-lien was sabsequently made a commander of
the crucial Peking rn:litary region. was named a vice
premier in 1975, and is a key figure in the succession
struggle now underway.
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
nese people and an) one favoring lessened
tension with Moscow was treading on very
unpopular gro,.incl. Nloreover. the Chinese
continued. aggressive border patrolling until
August when the Soviets responded by drop-
ping veiled hints about a possible nuclear
strike. The crisis atmosphere reinforced the
position of the Chinese pragmatists who
were receptive to the overtures for improved
Sino-U.S. relations which were coming out
of Washington.
In what was almost certainly a compro-
mise between the pragmatists and their op-
ponents, the Chinese agreed in October to
open negotiations on the border dispute with
Moscow, and then in January 1970 an-
nounced they would be willing to resched-
ule the aborted February 1969 Warsaw talks
with the United States. While it quickly be-
came apparent that they were not taking the
Sino-Soviet border talks seriously, the Chi-
nese tried to keep up momentum in relations
with the United States by meeting in War-.
saw in February 1970 and then scheduling
another session of the bilateral talks for
May 1970. Thus, the policy of an opening
to the United States wcis well served by the
March 2 crisis: though, as discussed below,
Lin's drive to expand his power and influ-
ence in party affairs was not derailed but
only slowed. In this context, the Sino-So-
viet clash of March 1969 was a prelude to
the decisive confrontation between the prag-
matists and the military which came to a
crisis two years later.
Watershed: The Fall of Lin Piao
By almost all surface criteria, Lin won a
stunning victory at the Ninth Parry Con-
gress, primarily at the expense of Chou.
Chou's power base was in the governmental
bureaucracies, and of the six men drawn
from this sector on the politburo in 1968,
all but two, Chou and Li I-Isien-nien, lost
their positions at the Congress. Eleven mili-
tary men were added to the politburo, a
majority of whom were apparently Lin sup-
porters. Lin's close ally Chen Po-ta was
added to the crucial Standing Committee of
:he pc,litburo, and, more importantly, the
C:ongrcss formally adopted a nels- constitu-
tion designating Lin as Mao's suc.cessor. Lin,
it appeared, was well on his v:ay to supreme
power within China. Anc! yet, just over
two years later, China's most powerful. de-
G.nse minister had fallen from office follow-
ing an intense and ultimately violent strug-
gle within the Chinese leadership."
Lin's fall was far more than the purging
of a single individual. It was preceded by an
elaborate conspiracy against Mao that in-
volved a large number of individuals and
was followed by a purge of virtually all of
China's ranking central military leaders. In
42
retrospect, the Lin Piao affair represented a
crisis stage in the struggle for power between
the pragmatists and elements of the military
that had been under way since the Winding
down of the Cultural Revolution in 1968.
In relative terms, the radicals played only a
marginal role.
Many previous explanations of the Lin
Piao crisis have played down the role of
foreign policy issues.4 In contrast, I believe
that these issues and, more specifically, their
effect on resource allocation and the bamce
of power between the pragmatists and the
military, are central to explaining the events
that preceded Lin's abortive 1971 coup.
In brief. Lin appears to have consisz.-.;:ttly
opposed any steps toward rapproclae:nent
with the United States throughout 1969
and 1970. He apparently seized on the U.S.
invasion of Cambodia in the spring of 1970
to persuade Mao both to cancel the sched-
uled Sino-U.S. talks in Warsaw and to make
a series of reconciliatory gestures toward
Moscow.
This shift in China's foreign policy was
reversed following the Second Plenum of the
Ninth Party Congress in August 1970,
when the balance of internal political forces
began to tilt against Lin. New and authori-
tative anti-Soviet pronouncements were
made and an ideological justification for im-
proved relations with the United States was
endorsed publicly by high foreign ministry
officials!' By December 1970, Mao felt
strong enough to extend the historic invita-
tion to President Nixon.
By early 1971, Lin and his military sup-
porters were faced not only with rapid prog-
ress in Sino-U.S. relations, but also with an-
other major foreign policy change: improv-
ing relations with Japan, a nation that vir-
tually all Chinese military men looked upon
as an historic enemy and as a potentially
very powerful future enemy. This issue,
also, was hotly debated by the Chinese
leadership.
Policy Issues and Power
At a critical point in any policy debate
between leaders at the pinnacle of power,
differences over issues become so intense that
it is not the policy itself which is para-
mount, but rather the authority, power, and
influence of the leader advocating the policy.
And at this juncture, the debate over policy
is transformed into a struggle for who will
hold the ultimate power to decide the issue.
Debates over foreign policy issues occur fre-
By far the best analysis of the changing balance of
Forces within China at this time may be found in Doak
Barnet's outstanding study, Uncertain Passage (Wash-
ington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974).
See, for example, Philip Bridgham, "The Felt of Lin
Pia," China Quarterly, July/September 1973.
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
APproved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-I
quently in China; but if one opposes a
whole series of decisions, one becomes a
prime candidate for being stripped of all
;ower and purged from the party and gov-
ernment.
In this context. the key question is not
whether Lin opposed the openings to the
United States and to Japan, but tchti he
judged these issues important enough to risk
strong and repeated opposition to policy
that clearly had the approval of Mao him-
self.
Part of the answer to this question lies in
the rivalry between Lin. and Chou. Very
early in the protracted debate over policy
toward the United States and the Soviet
Union. Lin put his prestige on the line and
argued that the United States would remain
deeply involved militarily in Asia and would
therefore remain a principal enemy of China.
Chou made a different estimate which even-
tually proved correct. Lin also probably ar-
gued that in the proper circumstances MOS-
cow would be willing to make a significant
move to decrease Sino-Soviet tension and
that this option should be explored. Chou
countered that Moscow would offer only
unsatisfactory gestures: and in this, also,
events proved him right. So in policy de-
bate after policy debate, a certain dynamic
propelled both Lin and Chou to attack each
other, in order to discredit the policy-maker
as well as the policy.
The roots of Lin's intransigent position.
however. probably lie even deeper: He and
his supporters realized that the power they
had attained, as well as the even more ex-
alted status they were seeking. were jeopar-
dized by the implications of the policies ad-
vocated by their rivals, the pragmatists. The
increased sense of security that would grow
out of improved relations with Japan and
with a nuclear power like the United States,
Lin and his supporters reasoned, would
lead to pressures for smaller military expen-
ditures, especially in the areas they believed
to be critical?nuclear weapons, missiles,
and aircraft. Their influence and authority
would also decline. Thus, rather than see
their power drained away by the pragma-
tists' program. Lin and his supporters first
A major doctrinal departure was apparent in a No-
vember speech by Chou's close associate Chic.? Kuan-
hua, now China's foreign minister. Chiao reformulat-
ed and expanded the concept of peaceful coexistence by
stating that it applied to relations between "all coun-
tries whether they had the same or different social sys-
tems." This contrasted sharply with the precious au-
thoritative statement on the subject made by Lin at
the Ninth Party Congress. Lin at that time had made
an important distinction between the principles to be
applied to capitalist and socialist countries, stating that
the former should be dealt with on the basis of peace-
ful coexistence while relations with the latter should
follow the principle of "proletarian internationalism."
Chiao's statement marked a clear and unambiguous
shift away from an ideologically based foreign policy
to one emphasizing state-to-state relations, and there-
by constituted a major victory for the pragmatists.
43
opposed this program at every possible junc-
ture. and, when this failed, attempted to
seize power. This attempted coup lead to
Lin's death when the plane in which he was
escaping to the Soviet Union crashed.
The Politics of Resource Allocation
Discussion of the parameters of China's
Fourth Five Year Plan (1971-1975) began
in late 1970 and continued after Lin's
death in late 1971. Allocation of China's
scarce. resources was a subject of much de-
bate?a debate which inevitably became en-
tangled with the foreign policy issues.
Like many policy debates within China,
this one found its way into the media,
though in slightly disguised form. Through-
out the summer of 1971. numerous articles
in People's Daily as well as some Radio
Peking broadcasts focused attention on the
problem of whether "electronics- or -steel
and iron- development should be given pri-
ority. An article that appeared in People's
Daily in June argued that one group of -po-
litical swindlers- within China (i.e.. Lin
and his group) saw "atomic technology and
jet engine technology" (i.e., electronics) as
the key to enhancing China's power and
status in world affairs. A Radio Peking
broadcast on August 20 was even more
pointed. It charged that the same group of
"swindlers- believed that advanced weap-
ons were the "key to victory," and that. once
China possessed them, "all imperialists will
be finished and overthrown." Significantly,
these views were sharply contrasted with
those of Mao, who was quoted as condemn-
ing any strategy premised on the concept
that "weapons decide everything."
Recent intelligence studies on expendi-
tures for procurement of new military equip-
ment bear out this interpretation! Indeed,
the rise and fall of the influence of Lin's
military coalition is starkly reflected in the
statistics presented in these studies. During
the period when Lin and the miliary were
n an ascendant position?roughly from
1968 until the end of 197 I --rn Rita ry
spending on procurement in all fields in-
creased dramatically, with a growing pro-
portion going to aircraft and missiles com-
bined. Following Lin's fall from power in
1971, while amounts expended for procure-
ment of land arms and naval forces declined
only slightly. expenditures on new aircraft
and missiles fell dramatically. In overall
terms, the reallocation of resources is shown
by the fact that since 1971 military pro-
curement has decreased in relation to total
industrial production (see chart below).
The findings of these studies have been declassified
and are available in U.S., Congress, Joint Economic
Committee, Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy
in Government, Allocation of Resources in the Soviet
_ Union and Chi na--1975. Hearings, June 18 and
July 21, 1975 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1975), pp. 4445.
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
250
200
150
100
50
0
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
Trends in China's military procurement
and industrial production
Index 1965=100
61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75
I do not mean to imply that foreign pol-
icy issues were more important than the
more general issue of civilian versus military
rule in Lin's fall from power. But foreign
policy issues were an integral part of the
struggle between the pragmatists and Lin's
military coalition. Mao and Chou were un-
doubtedly engaged in a broadly-based cam-
paign to prevent Lin and the military from
expanding their power further, and to do so
they not only confronted this issue specifi-
cally, but .also used the thrust of their for-
eign policy program to focus the debate on
the concrete issue of resource allocation.
Thus the debate over resource allocation and
foreign policy was the immediate catalyst for
Lin's- fall because it brought the question of
the continued predominance of the military 7
in Chinese politics and society to a head.
Just as Mao and Chou used a foreign pol-
icy crisis to further their domestic goals in
1969, so in 1971 they used their diplomatic
program for the same purpose. In the unset-
tled period following Lin's abortive coup.
Mao and Chou systematically exaggerated
the threat of war with the Soviet Union to
create a crisis atmosphere conducive to party
unity during the purge they conducted of
pro-Lin military figures, a tactic similar to
the one they used in the 1969 Sino-Soviet
border clashes.
All of this leads to the view that there is
not as wide a division in China as there is in
the United States between the worlds of the
foreign and domestic policy-maker; indeed,
it is reasonable to conclude that the small
number of men at the apex of China's po-
litical structure do not make any significant
distinctions between the spheres of domestic
and foreign policy.
Implementing the Pragmatists' Program
In the aftermath of Lin's fall from pow-
er, China's pragmatists, under the skillful
leadership of Chou, implemented a wide
range of policies designed to enhance China's
power and status in world affairs. On the
diplomatic level, Chou moved to exchange
representatives with the United States fol-
lowing Nixon's 1972 visit to Peking and to
fully normalize diplomatic relations with
key nations such as Japan and West Ger-
many. Ideology in foreign affairs was de-
emphasized, and China's main preoccupation
was the orderly expansion of state-to-state
relations. During the Cultural Revolution.
China had diplomatic relations with only a
handful of states; within two years of Lin's
fall. China had normalized relations with
virtually every nation in the world.
In the economic sphere. Chinese planners
projected savings from the cutback in mil-
itary spending foll.,.-04-ing Lin.'s fall, antic-
ipated earnings from the export of oil, and
made a case for major technology imports 7
from the West to contribute to the modern-
ization of China's economy.7
This drive began in early 1973 and by
the end of 1974 the Chinese had signed
contracts with Japanese and Western Eu-
ropean businesses and U.S. subsidiaries in
Europe for over S2 billion in turnkey manu-
facturing plant technology, an amount
which (allowing for inflation) comes clos.e
to the total of all Soviet plant technology
transferred to China in the 1950s. Across
the board, China's trade with Japan and
the West has expanded dramatically in the
1970s.
This expansion of economic tics with the
West has significant political implications
since it represents a substantial relaxation of
, the doctrine of -self reliance,- an ideological
code phrase for policies aimed at avoiding
long-term economic dependence on external
powers. Indeed, the technology transfers in-
volved financing through deferred payments
and the stationing of between 2,000 and
3,000 foreign technicians in China between
now and the end of this decade.8 This em-
phasis on economic modernization through
expanded ties with Japan and the West is an
extremely controversial issue in China, pe-
riodically attacked by radical critics of the
pragmatists. In terms of foreign policy, ex-
panding China's economic ties with Japan
and the West is the most concrete symbol of
its emergence from the isolationism of the
Cultural Revolution period. These ties are
' The political implications of China's petroteum ex-
porting capabilities are discussed in the fall 1975 issue
of FOREIGN POLICY: See Selig S. Harrison, "Time
Bomb in East Asia," and Choon-ho Park and Jerome
Alan Cohen, "The Politics of the Oil Weapon."
'An excellent article on this subject is Alexander Eck-
stein's "China's Trade Policy and Sino-American Re-
lations" in Foreign Affairs, October 1975.
44
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-i
extremely significant because as China's
economy is geared more and more to reliance
on the non-Communist world, moves to-
ward expanded economic ties with the Sovi-
et Union become more. difficult, decreasing
the chances of a Sino-Soviet reconciliation.
The Rise and Fall of Teng Ilsiao-ping
While these policies were being implement-
ed, Chou's health began to fail and Teng
Hsiao-ping, an able, flexible, and pragmatic
administrator who had been purged during
the Cultural Revolution, was groomed to
succeed Chou as premier. At the National
People's Congress (NPc) in January 1975.
Teng was elevated to the Standing Com-
mittee of the politburo, named a vice chair-
man of the party and the highest ranking
vice premier in the government, and given
the key post of chief of staff of the People's
Liberation Army. The NPC also appeared
to place a capstone of legitimacy on the
pragmatists' program, both in the domestic
and the foreign policy areas. With man-
agerial skill and enthusiasm, Teng threw his
strength into implementing and expanding
this program. As did Lin, following his
triumph at the Ninth Party Congress. Teng
appeared to be on his way to a position of
power in China second only to Mao.
And yet when Chou died of cancer in mid-
January 1976, Teng dropped abruptly and
unexpectedly from public view, and in Feb-
ruary Hua Kuo-feng, a relatively junior
member of the Chinese hierarchy, was named
acting premier. Following two months of
intense infighting which included massive
public demonstrations, Teng was stripped
of all his party and government posts and
Hua was named premier as well as vice chair-
man of the party.
Many of the circumstances preceding
Teng's unexpected fall are similar to those
which preceded Lin's all in 1971: Just as
in 1971, planning for China's Five Year
Plan (1976-1980) was underway in 1975,
and an intense debate over expenditures for
advanced military technology broke into the
media. this time complicated by the issue of
whet her China should import large ottan-
i ies of Wesiern military technology." Just
a: in 1971. when policy toward the United
States and the Soviet Union was in ques-
tion. the debate over resource allocation be-
came intertwined with the discussions over
foreign and defense. policy which must have
preceded President Ford's visit in Novem-
ber. the surprise.- release in December of a
Soviet helicopter crew previously charged
with espionage against China, and the invi-
tation to former President Nixon to make
a return visit to China_
A full explanation of Teng's unexpected
45
eclipse will have to await further evidence.
What appears clear at this juncture is that
like Lin. Teng attained a position which, if
he had succeeded Chou as planned, would
have made him Mao's designated heir appar-
ent, an extremely dangerous slot in view of
the fact that everyone who has previously at-
tained it has been purged. Like Lin. Teng
had been rapidly expanding his power base
by placing his supporters?most of them re-
habilitated after having been disgraced dur-
ing the Cultural Revolution?in key party
and provincial posts.
In short. Teng may 'well have provoked
a coalescence of forces against him precisely
because he was so rapidly expanding his
power and influence. Whatever differences
there may have been over issues, these may
have been reinforced by the power struggle.
seemingly a permanent fixture of the Chi-
nese political system. Once a leader appears
to be gaining too much power, his oppo-
nents gain the powerful support of Mao and
move against him.. In 1971. that leader was
Lin Piao: in 1976. it was Teng Hsiao-ping.
, Hua Kuo-feng
Hua Kuo-feng is a relatively unknown
quantity in Chinese politics. He appears to
be a compromise candidate, acceptable to
pragmatists and radicals as well as to key
military leaders, who enjoys the trust of
Mao himself. After rising in the ranks of
the party in Hunan?Mao's own native
province?Hua was called to Peking in late
1971, and may well have gained the con-
fidence of top officials by playing a role in
the investigation and purge of pro-Lin ele-
ments in the military establishment. 'While
his position between 1971 and 1973 is not
known, he became the eleventh ranking
member of the politburo at the Tenth Party
Congress in 1973, and was named sixth
ranking vice premier at the NPC in 1975.
, He is in his mid-fifties and far younger than
any of China's other senior leaders, a factor
which may have been influential in his at-
taining his present position.
Since January 1975, Hua has also held
the key government post of minister of
public security, an especially important fact
since this has placed him at the center of
successful efforts throughout 1975 to main-
tain public order by preventing various po-
litical campaigns from getting out of hand.
Hua presumably either still runs the security
ministry personally, or has named one of
his close deputies as acting chief of police
'This question is obviousty of major concern to the
United Sr:, For a discussion of whether the United
States should export military technology to China, see
Michael Pillsbury's "U.S.-Chinese Military Ties?" in
FOREIGN POLICY 20.
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
and security operations. Given this back-
ground and responsibility, it is highly un-
likely that Hua was chosen to preside over
a return to the disorder of the Cultural Rev-
olution, though he may well preside over
the purge of those who have become too
closely aligned with Teng.
Hua's pronouncements to date on foreign
policy issues suggest that, at least for the
immediate future, he plans no major depar-
tures. In his banquet remarks during Nix-
on's visit in February, Hua stated unequiv-
ocally that the Soviet Union was the main
threat to world peace, and that Peking want-
ed to see the implementation of the Shang-
hai Communiqu?nd further improvement
in Sino-U.S. relations. In his remarks at
the close of the Nixon visit. Hua was care-
ful to toast Ford, an apparent effort to
reverse the negative reaction in Washington
to the timing of the Nixon visit. Hua's
views on the key question of continued im-
portation of 'Western technology are not
clear. and any statements or actions he may
take in this regard will be a key indicator
of the future course of Chinese policy.
Implications for U.S. Policy
While predictions on Chinese politics and
policy are extremely risky, the evidence avail-
able to date indicates that the pragmatist's
foreign policy program will not be seriously
impaired by recent events. The United States
can expect to deal with leaders like Hua
who are basically favorably disposed toward
maintaining and expanding ties with Wash-
ington and the \Vest. At the same time, it
is reasonable to presume that Hua's admin-
istration, lacking the prestige of the Chou-
Teng administration, will be more vulner-
able to pressures from its domestic oppo-
nents. These pressures are likely to inten-
sify further when Mao passes from the scene,
an event certain to usher in yet another?
and even more intense--seruggle for pow-
er in China.
With these observations in mind, it is
possible to offer some comments on the im-
plications of U.S. action?or inaction?
with regard to China. Since a premise of
U.S. policy since 1969 has been that rela-
tions between Peking and Moscow are like-
ly to remain hostile, these comments must
begin with a discussion of the level of Sino-
Soviet tension.
Overall, tension in Sino-Soviet relations
between 1970 and late 1975 remained rel-
atively low compared to the crisis atmos-
phere following the border clashes in 1969.
This reflected the extension of the prag-
matists' control, the fact that the domestic
situation was fairly stable, and the greater
recognition China received from the inter-
national community. Since the jockeying for
power that preceded and followed Chou's
death in Janua-ry, hOwever, anti-Soviet prop-
aganda has intensified, and at some point
during the protracted and delicate succes-
sion process now under way, it is not in-
conceivable that a group that would judge
its interests served by a provocation such
as the 1969 border clash could become pre-
dominant in China?perhaps led by Hua
himself. 'Whether or not such a situation
evolves depends, in part, on events outside
China, particularly on the actions of the
Soviet Union and the United States.
U.S. moves to establish full diplomat-
ic relations with China would probably
strengthen the pragmatists' position and
Peking's commitment to expanding ties with
non-Communist countries. Paradoxically,
such developments would probably also
lessen the tendency toward periodic crises
with the Soviet Union. Not only would
there be less need for China's leaders to play
up the Soviet threat in order to deflect at-
tacks from domestic critics, but?with in-
creased self-confidence in the international
arena?these leaders would probably be
more willing to enter into serious negotia-
tions with the Soviets over the border issue.
If Moscow were careful to take Chinese sen-
sitivities into consideration by making a sub-
stantial conciliatory gesture (such as a siz-
able drawdown of its forces in the border
area), some form of mutually acceptable
border arrangement could conceivably be
worked out.
A Sino-Soviet border agreement should
, not, in the long run, he counter to U.S. in-
terests. In fact, it would be of some benefit.
The primary effect would be to decrease sub-
stantially the chances of some future border
incident?a development which is obvious-
ly in Washington's interests. In any case,
China's own interests are at odds with those
of the Soviet Union throughout Asia, and
a border agreement would not end the Sino-
; Soviet struggle for influence and power there
I or in the rest of the world.
I Furthermore, even-if there were some im-
provement in Sino-Soviet relations, the
United States would still have leverage for
maintaining competition between the two
:wers. The Chinese. pragmatists, having
iieen strengthened by normalization of re-
: Izions with the United States, would prob-
.11,1y pursue even further their search for pow-
,: and prestige through conventional di-
plomacy and economic development_ Indeed.
given the right circumstances, a pragmatic
C:hinese government might in the future be
amenable to expanding substantially its cul-
rural, economic, and perhaps even military
i ties with non-Communist countries in gen-
eral and with the United States in partic-
ular. The recently completed purchase of
----
46 Rolls Royce fighter aircraft engines and
\
. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001004090024
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
manufacturing technology from Great Brit-
ain is a clear indication of .Pekines strong
interest in purchasing Western military tech-
nology. Should the Sino-U.S. relationship
advance along these lines, there is little doubt
that there would be serious Soviet concern
and that this would express itself in in-
creased Sino-Soviet tension, thus inhibiting
any moves toward Sino-Soviet reconcilia-
tion.
At the same time, expanded ties with the
United States would directly or indirectly
provide greater resources for meeting the
military coalition's goal of strengthening
China's military capabilities. An ameliora-
tion of internal antagonisms on this issue
would be likely to increase support for the
pragmatists among at least some el,-:nents
of the military, a development w1-.1-a in
turn would contribute to the strength and
stability of a Chinese leadership with vested
interests in maintaining good relations with
the United States.
Alternatively. prolonged stagnation in.
Sino-U.S. relations could well contribute to
undermining the political power of those in-
dividuals and groups within. China which
are favorably disposed toward Washington,
and lead to an increase in rhe relative pow-
er of either pro-Soviet elements in the mil-
itary, the radicals, or some coalition of both
groups If this happens. China might well
revert to a self-imposed isolationism similar
to that of the Cultural Revolution or seek
a general accommodation with Moscow.
While these developments are unlikely as
long as Mao lives, once he dies they could
emerge as the consequence of a post-Mao
power struggle.
Since these eventualities are clearly not in
the best interests of the United States, I be-
lieve that Washington should consider rec-
ognizing Peking before the aged chairman
leaves the scene in the hope that this might
influence the present configuration of po-
litical power within China and thereby the
succession struggle certain to intensify fol-
lowing Mao's death.
Obviously, in formulating U.S. policy
toward China, a number of complicated
problems other than the internal political
balance in Peking must be taken into con-
sideration. With respect to the difficult issue
of Taiwan, the United States could follow
the "Japanese model," formally recognizing
Peking while maintaining a close economic
relationship with Taiwan. The Soviets have
almost certainly resigned themselves to U.S.
recognition of Peking at some point, and
their opposition is likely to amount to little
more than pro forma objections and a mi-
nor propaganda blitz. Indeed, some policy-
makers within Moscow might even welcome
Sino-U.S. diplomatic tics, especially if they
believed this would reduce the chances of Chi-
nese adventures like the 1969 border clash.
Finally, recognition of Peking would be
applauded by Japan as well as the major
powers of Western Europe, all of which have
- long since established formal diplomatic ties
with China. In short, the negative reper-
cussions of breaking diplomatic ties with
Taiwan could be mitigated and in any case
would be more than offset by positive re-
sponses from our most important allies in
Asia and Europe.
Writing in 1970, the noted French schol-
ar Michel Tatu argued that "there will have
to be a Washington-Peking dialogue, even
at the risk of ... offending the Soviet Union.
When this takes place the triangular setup
_ will have become fully operative, and the
Sz.-s will probably be in the most
r:ssition of the three powers.
L'ss f:!ttered by ideological prejudice
:h.ln the having no need for perma-
nent as,lvcrsaric and seeking none. the Amer-
1,e in a better position to react
the hostility of each of the other two and
hring about the world equilibrium which is
their main obiective.-10.
Tatu's observations and the gradual im-
provement in Sino-U.S. relations since 1972
suggest that at some point the very logic
of the triangular relationship will lead to a
U.S. decision to follow through on the
Shanghai Communique and formally rec-
ognize Peking as the sole government of
China. The only serious question is wheth-
er or not the United States will continue to
(ielay this decision until the balance of in-
ternal forces within China alters and Peking
embarks on a policy of isolationism or ac-
commodation with the Soviets, which in ef-
fect would undermine the logical underpin-
nings of the entire triangular equation.
" Michel Tau. The Great Power Trgle: Wash-
ington-Mcsz:vw-Peking (Paris: The Atlantic Institute
For Inter-rational Affairs, 1970), p. 26.
?47
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1
WASHINGTON POST
3 I v?N?r
Saigon's
Secrets
Seized
Thieu and U.S.
Didn't Destroy
ClaSified Files.
'By Don Oberdorfer .
Washington Post Staff Writer
North Vietnamese in-
vading Saigon took over
virtually complete files, of
the South Vietnamese
arm ed forces, national
police and sth.et intelli-
gence agency, including
highly classified data
which had been furnished,
by the United States, 'ac-
cording to the last chief
CIA analyst of Commu-
nist strategy at the U.S.
Embassy there.
Frank W. Snepp, who left
Saigon on the final day of
U.S. evacuation last year
and resigned from the CIA
this January, said the secret
files of former Smith Viet-
namese President Nguyen
Van Thieu were also left' be-
hind.
Calling these unintended
legacies "a tragedy," Snepp
said they may reveal to
Communist authorities a
great deal about U.S. intelli-
gence operations and permit
them- to identify well-placed
U.S. agents behind Commu-
nist lines as well as "anyone
who helped us in the slight-
est degree."
, Snepp's statements in an
interview confirmed por-
tions of an extraordinary
book-length memoir, re-
cently published and broad-
cast in Vietnam, by the
North Vietnamese Army
Chief of Staff, Gen. Van
Tien Dung. Dung was Com-
munist field commander for
the final campaign of the
war:
At South Vietnamese po-
lice headquarters and mili-
tary general staff headquar-
ter g "we found that top-se-
cret files and documents of
the puppet commanders
were intact," Dung wrote.
"A modern enemy computer
containing the records of
each officer and enlisted
man of the puppet armed
forces of more than a mil-
lion was still operating."
? "Giai Phone', a recent
book on the fall of Saigon
by Tiziano Terzani, an Ital-
ian journalist who remained
in the capital after the take-
over, reported that double
agents' inside''South Viet:1
nam's Central Intelligence;
Organization - were able to
save "all the dossiers that ?
hid been compiled over the'
years by the secret police in
collaboration with the ,
American CIA."
Snepp, who is writing ai
? book of his own on the col-
lapse of South Vietnam, 'at-
tributed the failure to de-
stroy vital documents and ,
other records to mistaken
belief by senior ' U.S. Em-
bassy officials in "smoke
screens" and "ambiguous,'
signals" which suggested
that a negotiated settlement
was possible This "wishful'
thinking," shared in Wash;
ington, put off the destruc-
tion of files and evacuation
of- key intelligence agents
,
untili was oo late, Snepp.
said. ?
Snepp said the CIA's chief
in Saigon, Thomas Polgar,
as well as Ambassador Gra-
ham Martin were deceived
by hints of a negotiated deal ?
in April 1975 and we-e err:
couraged in their belief by,
high officials in Washington."
At the same time, however,
"consistent intelligence
from the ground was- that
there would be no negoti-
ated settlement, and this
was from the most reliable
sources," Snepp said. .
The North Vietnamese',
general's ? account 'of deci-
sion-making in the Commu-
nist command gives no indi-
cation that a negotiated deal
was considered during the
final Saigon drive, and ev-
ery, indication to the con-
trafy. Dung relates that the
order for quick 'liberation cf
Saigon came from the North
Vietnamese Politburo in the
third week of March, 1975.
He reoorts successive orders
after that for the Saig.on at-
tack with no sign of letup.
Dung refers contemptu-
ously to "perfidious diplo-
matic maneuvers to check ?
our troops' ' advance, and
avoid total defeat." He
attacks the "U.S, CIA clique
in' Saigon" for condticting
what he claims were -"many
. .
plots." CIA station
chief Polgar, who is of Hun-
garian: extraction, was a key, ,
figure in Saigon contacts
about a negotiated deal with
Hungarian and Polish dele-
gates of the Intefnational
Control Commission.
Secretary of State Henry
A. Kissinger evidently
placed credence in the possi-
bility of a negotiated deal to
forestall the attack on Sai-
gon.- Kissinger has said pub-
licly that North Vietnam
"changed their signals" and
"appeared to shift suddenly .
to a military option" on
Aoril 27, three days before
the fall of the capital. But
the Dung account?and the
intelligence reports cited by
Snepp?indicate there was
no possibility ok negotiations
and thus ?there _WEIS no shift
in signals.
Snepp said several, key
points in the recent detailed
memoir by the North '
namese general have con?
vinced him that the Commu-
nist side ha-d a spy with . ac-
cess to the most important
information of the South Vi-
etnamese government. At the
same time, he added, the
United States had accurate
Intelligence within days
about Communist strategic
decisions cited in Dung's ac-
count.
The crucial difference,
Snepp- suggested, was that,'
the, _ Communists believed
the intelligence they were I
getting, but the ? United
States chose to ignore 'its ac.
? curate intelligence data in a
concentration on "smoke
screens" and "wishftll think-
ing" about negotiations.
According to Snepp, the
account by Dung gives these
indications of Communist
intelligence powers:
' ? Dung reports receiving
a "flash cable" at his field
\command postS March_ 13
from Defense Minister Vo
Nguyen Giap in Hanoi say-
ing ,that the Politburo and
high command believed
South Vietnam might aban-
don the Central Highlands
in a "strategic retreat."
Dung . was instructed to
quickly encircle Phubon, a
key area in a retreat path.
' According to Snepp,
Thieu had been seriously
considering such a retreat
in great secrecy for only a
few days before that, and se-
cretly informed his cabinet
and the JOint General Staff
-March 13 that he had de-
cided to exe,cute the with-
drawal Plan. The South Viet-
namese general in charge
of the withdrawal was in-
formed March 14. The pull-
ont began March 15.
The United States knew
nothing of Thieu's order un-
-til March 15, Snepp said. By
then, Dung's troop's were al-
ready moving to- cut off the-'
retreat at Phubon. The
quick North Vietnamese ma-
neuver led to the" destruc-
tion of nearly the entire
force being withdrawn from
the highlands?the equaiva- ,
lent of two division. This
was to -,be Thieu's strategic
reserve. "That loss spelled
the end of South Vietnam," -
Snepp said.
? Dung quotes "our intelli-
gence reports' on a tnajor
assessment session held by
Thieu on the fourth floor of
the presidential palace in
Saigon Dec. 9-10, 1974. This
assessment, which predicted
only moderately big Com-
munist attacks during 1975,
was quoted by Dung in his .
memoir. Snepp said the quo-
tation was a remarkably ac-
curate summary of a U.S.
CTA estimate?which he him-
self drafted?supplied ,:for
? Thieu's.use in the year-end
assessment.
-After learning of the Sai-.
gon assessment, the Hanoi
Politburo amended its plan
for a two-year- campalIgn to
liberate the South. While
still- pl..ning for a 1;975-76 .
campaign, the Politburo
added a guideline for libera-
tion in 1975 "if opportunities
presented themselves," ac-
cording to Dung. 7
This was done in Hanoi on
Jan. 9, 1975. According to .
Snepp, the United States ob-
tained an accurate
gence report within 10 days
of. this decision.
? Dung quotes a secret re-
port, sent by Ambassador
Martin to Washington on
April 19, 1975, "on the true
situation" in the South. Ac-
curately summarized by
Dung, this repOrt was
drafted by Snepp for Martin-
to use in persuading Thieu
to resign the presidency and
thus -make way for the ru-
mored "negotiations."
According to Snepp, Mar-
tin took a copy of the report
to Thieu at the presidential
palace on April 20, while Ca- ?
bling another copy to Wash-
ington. The report was a de-
cisive factor in Thieu's de-
cision to resign, which he
announced Apri 21..
Snepp said he helped pre- ;
pare?but does not Stand by I
?another classified U.S. re-
port which was quoted in
the North Vietnamese gen-
eral's account of the final
days of the war. This esti-
mate, cited as evidence that
Thieu was "forced to fight a
poor man's war," said that
South Vietnamese firepowe
had decreased by nearly 60
per cent due to bomb and
ammunition shortages, and
that South Vietnamese mo-
bility was cut in half, by
shortages of aircraft, vehi-
cles and fuel.
Snepp said these esti-
mates were prepared by
U.S. officials in Saigon early
in 1975 in an effort to sel
Congress on the need to ap-
propriate additional aid to
South Vietnam. Snepp said
'the phfase, "a poor man's
war," was originated by the
United States for this pur-
p6se.
The former CIA official
said these estimates were
-billingsgate" ? numbers
pulled out of the air for U.S.
political reasons. He said he
did not know whether or not
North Vietnam believed
these numbers when its
spies obtained them in Sai-
gon..
48
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100400002-1