EXCERPTS FROM C.I.A. STUDY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 51
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 20, 2001
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 5, 1975
• Content Type: NSPR

25X1A
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CONFIDENTIAL
NEWS, VIEWS
and ISSUES
INTERNAL USE ONLY
This publication contains clippings from the
domestic and foreign press for YOUR
BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use
of selected items would rarely be advisable.
5 DECEMBER 1975
NO. 24
GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS
GENERAL
NEAR EAST
AFRICA
EAST ASIA
LATIN AMERICA
PAGE
1
37
42
44
47
49
Destroy after backgrounder has served its purpose
or within 60 days.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Governmental Affairs
NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1975
$xicepts Frorl?, C.I.A. ,Study,
? amid to 'The New YoTellmes - covert activities persists: 'aid., suggest that the committee
? WASHINGTON, Dec. 4? the threat to .vital U.S. on-
Following are exterpts from tional security interests
a report, "Covert Action ire posed by the Presidency' of
Chile, 1963-1973," prepared Salvador Allende tustify_the
by the staff of ihe Senatq,: several major covert attempts
Select Committee on intelli- to prevent his accession to
genee: power?' Americad
Presidents and their senior
Numerous allegations have : advisers evidently thought so.
been made about U. S. covert One rationale for covert
activities in Chile during intervention in Chilean poll-
1970-73. Several of these are
false; others are half-true.
In most instances, the re-
sponse to the allegation must
be qualified:
tics was spelled out by 'Hen-
ry Kissinger, in his back-
ground briefing to the press
on Sept. 16, 1970, the day
after Nixon's meeting with
Was the United States Helms. He argued that an
directly involved, covertly, Allende victory would be ir-
in the 1973 coup in Chile? reversible within Chile, might
The committee has found no affect neighboring nations
evidence that, it was. How- and would pose "massive
ever, the United Slates: 'problems" for the U.S. in-
sought in 1970 to foment a Latin America:
military coup in .Chile. After "/ have yet to meet some-
1970 it adopted a policy both body who firmly believes
overt and covert, of oppo- that if Allende wins, there is
sition to Allende, and it likely to be another free
remained in intelligence con- election in Chile. . . . Now it
tact with the Chilean mili-: is fairly easy for one to pre-
tary, including officers who- tact - that if Allende wins,
were participating in cop ' there is a good chance that
plotting : he will establish, over a pe-
Did the 17...S. provide..., nod'of years some sort of
covert support to striking, I. "Communist Goternment. in
truck owners or other strik--: that ease; we -would have
ers during 1971-73? The 40. - one not on an island off the
man Committee did net Coast [Cuba] which has not a
approve any such support 'traditional relationship and
;However, the: U. S. passed inipact in Latin America, but
'money to private sector in. a, major Latin-American
groups' Which supported the- cefintry you--. would have a
strikers. And in at least one - Communist ' Government,
"case, a small- amount' of joining for example. Argen-
money was passed to tine'''. ? Perk ? ? and' Bo-
the strikers' by a private sec- livia . . So I donrt think we
tor organization, contrary to should delude ourselves on
C.I.A. ground rules. ? an Allende, take-over would
Satan Arnotmts of Money not present massive problems
for us, and for the democrat-
Did the U. S. provide ie forces and for pro-U.S.
covert support to right-wing forces in Latin America, and,
terrerist organizations during indeed to the whole Western
1970-73? The C.I.A. gave Hemisphere.
'support in 1970 to one group, 1m.-the heeds of Congress
'Whose tactics became more rests the responsibility for
Violent over time. Through insuring _that the executeme have become the hallmark of
,19-71', that, group _ received branc? h. is held to full POl1' the present regime in Chile?
=lair ..sunis -.of American- cal accountability for covert- On these questions corn-
-monekithreugh,third. parties activities'. The record on Chil, mittee members may differ.
for specific purposes. And it is inixedi-and. mated ..1r4?it.a. T. So may American eilzens. Yet
as possible that money ? was :incompleteness, the committee's mandate is
passed to these groups onthe - recore'reaves unan- less.to judge the past than to
extreme tight from C.I.A.-- swered a number of oues recommend for the future.
supported opposition political -dons. These pertain bode to Moving from; past cases to
parties. . .? how forthcoming the agency future guidelines, what is im-4
The pattern: of United: was and how interested and"?portant to ncite is-that covertl
States 'covert action in Chile persistent the Congressional, action has been' perceived asi
is striking but not unique. It committees were. Were mem- a middle ground between dip-
arose in the context not only hers of Congress, for instance, lomatic representation and.
of American foreign policy, given the opportunity to ob- 2the overt use of military .
but also of covert U. S. in- ject to specific pr.ojects be- force.
volvement in other countries fore the projects Vere imple- In the case of Chile; that
within and outside Latin merited? Did they want to? middle ground may have been
Ali:retina. The scale* of C.I.A. There is also an issue of jur- far too broad. Given the
involvement in -Chile as isdiction. C.I.A. and State De- costs of covert action, it
unusual but hi no means partment officials have taken should be resorted to only to
unpreCedented., the position that they are counter severe threats to the
. authorized to reveal agency ?? national security of the Utilel
Prpliminary._ Conclusions-. -*operations only to the aptpro- ed States. It is far from clear
A' fundamental questioraised by the pattern of U.S. . The:Chilean experiencedoes' Chile. ??,
n.% priate oversight committees. that that was the case?
give serious consideration to;
the possibility that lodging:
the responsibility for nation-,
.al estimates and, conduct of
operational activities with the,
same person?the-Director of
Central Intelligence?creates
an inherent conflict of inter-
est and judgment.
- When covert actions in
Chile became public know!-
edge, the costs were obvious.
The-United States. was seen,
by its covert actione.to have
contradicted not only-its offi-
cial declarations but its
treaty commitments and prin-
ciples' of long standing. At
the same time it was pro-
claiming a "low profile" in
Latin-American relations,
the U. S. Government was-
seeking .to foment a coup in
Chile. -
This report does not
at-
tempt to offer a final judg-
ment on the political proprie-
ty; the morality, or even the
electiveness of American
covert activity in Chile. Did
the threat posed by an Al-
lende Presidency justify
covert American involvement
in Chile? Did it justify the
specific and unusual attempt,'
to foment a military coup tor.
deny Allende the Presidency?
In 1970, the U. sought to
foster a military coup in Chile:
to prevent.,Alleeders acces-
sion to power ; yet offer 197
the Governinei:It?e-according?,
to the testimony of its Olffej
cialse-didnotengage* coUpl
WaS9704441Siariai in ab4
ernation?- Or. was, the threet,:!
posed: to the' national securi--.'i
ty 'interests of the- United-i
State&so grave that the. Gev-r
emment was remiss. in riot;
seeking his downfall directly:
during 1970-73? What, ree
sponsibility does the United
States bear for' the cruelty'
and political suppression that
1
NE,1 YORK TIS
PANEL CLEARS CIAI
OF A DIRECT ROLE
IN 73 CHILE COUP
But Senate Committee Staff
Finds That U.S. Encouraged
' the Overthrow of Allende
AID FOR PLOTS TRACED
Document Says Washington
Allocated $13.4 Million to
an Influence-Campaign
By NICHOLAS Ml. HORROCK,
SDeotel to The New Voir noes
WASHINGTON, Dec. 4?The
staff of a Senate intelligence
committee said today it had
found that the United States
had encouraged- the overthrow
of the "democratically elected":
Chilean Government of Presi-
dent Salvador Allende Gossens.;
It said, however, that no di-
met involvement by the Cen-.
tral Intelligence Agency or the
American Embassy in the 1973
coup had been established.
These statements were made
today in a 62-page report is-
sued by the staff of the Sen.;
-Ate Select Committee- on. Ire
'telligence.
The document contained rela-
tively little, information -not
made public previously, either
in the committee's `report-of
Nov. 20 on its inquiry into as-
sassination plots against foreign
leaders or in accounts published_
in the press.-
Today's report was based
upon executive session testi-
mony: by.. C.I.A. officials. and
other Government officials
*ding Secretary of State Henry
A. Kissinger/ 'It- also reflected
information froin 'some secret
C.I.A., National Security Coun-
cil and State Department doc-
uments. .
_. Parts of the report, which is
titled "Covert 'Action in Chile,
1963-1973," were read into the
record of a public hearing. This
action came after the Adminis-
tration kept officials from tes-
tifying in public session on the
United States actions in Chile.
The United States Govern-,
ment, the committee staff said,!
ended a 10-year, $13.4 million
effort to deny Dr. Allende
power in Chile by "advocating
and encourasing the overthrow"
rtiii his. :democratically_ elected
government. -
L William Miler, the commit-
tee's staff director, told thei
members that the reportoq
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Uniiid-States-actiVitY in
Was repeesentative of six majoi
covert operations studied-dur-
ing the. -ccnamittee's inveStiga-1
tion. The six operations in turn,
?fere ?2...e14VSePtatiNter of 'thou-
sands' by. die ?CIA., he said
-r-These ? wein- several- of the
nevi efernenti in'the
----Artie Interniatieet Tel
and Telegraph .Cesporatiow put
$350,090.,ofits Own money into
tne,.43.3iiiialli :$1;e8Kentiat 'air,
tiiiii Of 1970, -' the 'Committee
'staff said, adding that it WI
$250,000- to the ,carapeign. oil
former President: Jorge . Ales-.
saidri and $100,000 to an anti -1
Atleilcie' NAY-- The report;''
$350,000 more had come
other States- businesses,
Which were =rained.
(1The C.I.A. was able to af-
fect:the content of a Time mag-
azine story in 1970, the report
said,: through - !"briefings- re-
quested by Time and -provided
by -the Elk in Washingtort'l
_ Thehrlefiage, the report said,
'resulted' i
. in- a change n-
basic thrust-of the. Time
on.
- Allende's Sept: 4 vi
and, in, the tinny' glity the apckfr.
..-_ 417 lieeport said that
Presidentt Richard M:Iklixon o
dered-X: aterced:UP - _effete to
Stop Dr: Allende in September
1970: ;the .C.LA-: covertly* chart-
rieled $1.1.5 . million to. El Me-
Curio, the largest daily paper
in.
Chile,, t- anti- Allende
_
coverage 41.14 tOkeeP:thit-liaPer '
solvent. -:-..,.., ,. '-, --,.-
El - Meciirinl?ziw published,
committee :A:cites:nen: confinn- '
ed, by Augustine Edwards a
apse friend of, Donald M. Ken-
t dell, president Of Pepsi,-;;Cola
pc: ,--_,,- k.
, liallieTCOMinkee's-iiisassina-
lion-report---it was noted that
iMt., Kendall had arranged a
tbreakfast. meeting, between Mr:
i Edward. Mr. Kissinger and then
Attorney 'General .1ohil N..
Mitchell. -- '-'-'---. : ..- .%.
While the conamittee. staff re-
ported that it could establish no
direct operational involvement
by the C.I.A. or United States
Embassy in the: 1973 coop, the
members agreed during a Press-
brlefing,- ,to.day that die United;
StitnOsour; had: "created the
a i
- , ,'.. 11Z -01.11* tc g `-:-P;1
AllefxWit*IlMoric e F
.:-.The.i.eij*'., `:a61e0 news
accounts published in The New
York Mules and elsewhere in
the fall of 1974 that the United
States had covertly poured mil-
lions of dollars into Chile, first
to keep Dr. Allnde from becom-
ing president and later to over-
throw his 'Government The re-
port set the total figure, from
1963 until 1973, at about113.4
million and said that between
Dr. Allende's inauglikation. in
November 1970 and his mister,
the United States Government
spent-over $7 million:
Today's he:wing included
statements and testimony by
Edward M. Korry, who served
as United States Ambassador in
Santiago during the early Nixon
years. and Ralph A. Dungan,
the Ambassador between 1964
and 1967.. .! -??? 2.
WASEEENGTCN POST
5 BEG 1975
Role
IA
Clue
..4na
Was Sp6nt. on .
-;.overt. Work
By Laurence Stern
-,washrnsq9....posi -SIMI Writer
Details .of. I !'massive"
campaign: of tiaridestine
operations over aA0-year
periOcittibinek the eleeticar-
anCtheifto Overthrow thef
government cif?the. late?,
re revealed Siesterdaji7
try .ftZSCriateint011igence:
:
In a report on what'it called',
an --".`extelitlyi and" coir-'?
tinuotis" program of- covert
?pet-Akins' conducted during -
the Kennedy, Johnson and :
Nixon- administrations; the
committee report estimated
? that the United States spent
$13.4million in Chile between
1963 and1973.
Of this amount, some $8
Million-was allocated -to,
_propaganda and support of.,
political parties; -$4.3; million
was spent to-support and in-.
fluenee the- mass, media- ofCh? ,
Central Intelligence .Agency
expenditures to one apti-
? Allende- ? newspaper;
Mercurio; amounted to $1.5.
million from Sept. 9;. 1971; to
April lt 1972: The report also
-? saki- that cm? evaluators had
--candilded -7!"!that"-- El Mercurio
4.44740: znein4:: Mitts
,?uPPorted. bY,".41A .AStagYilsi?
.1played 'twinoilortart rale in:
'aett.n)0 the-slitge for these0.:
114.973 military coupk."-'?
Tlie'ownet of EI;mercuriai,
wealthy Chilean businessman
Augustin Edwards, conferred'
with top officials of the Nixon,
administration ? on the
-a?Sept. 15, 1970 ---that
President Nixon ordered the
CIA to help mount a military.
Coup d!etat as a means of
preventing Allende's election.
The report revealedthat the
international Telephone and
Telegraph- Corp. and other
U.& -multinational firms
based in Chile funneled some
? *700,000- into that country's
presidential popular election
in 1970- in behalf of con-
servative- candidate Jorge
_
; Alessandri?Allende's . prin-.
ciPal opponent.
It previously had been
disclosed that ITT had offered
through one of its directors,
former CIA Director John A.
me
MeCone, $1' million to thwart
the Allende 'election but that
the money had been declined
by the agency.
The actual contributions of
ITT and other American
companies, the report.
disclosed, was given with the,
CIA's advice se how to "safely
channel" the money into the
1970 campaign. In con-,
tributed about $350,000 of the
total amount, according tO the.
committee.
Seri. Frank Church (D-
Idaho), chairman of the in-
telligence panel, estimated
that the $3 million pumped.
into Chile during the 1964
election would be the
equivalent to an .expenditure'
of $60 million in the United
States?allowing for dif-
ferences in population.. That,
Church noted, was more than
twice the reported amount
spent by Lyndon B. Johnson
and Barry Goldwater together
during the U.S. presidential
campaign that year. -
? In the 1964 Chilean election,
the report- revealed, more,
than half of the campaign
costs of Christian Democrat
Eduardo Frei were financed'
by the -United States without
Frei's knowledge. That year,
as in. the previous four elec-
'tions in Chile, Allende was a
candidate. The CIA spent
more than $2.6-Million in-
Frei's behalf in the 1964
presidential race_ -
The United States did not
only concern itself with
presidential elections in Chile
but congressional contests as
well. In February, 1965, the
103 Committee, which at that
-time passed on covert
operations, approved $175,000,
to support 22 congressional
candidates in Chile selected
by the U.S. ambassador and
the CIA station chief, ac-
cording to the report.
In describing the CIA-
directed propaganda to in-
fluence the outcome of the 1970.
election, the report cited the
ease of a Time magazine
article cover story that was.
changed as the result of a CIA
briefing.
"According to CIA
documents," the committee
said, "the Time correspondent
in Chile apparently had ac-
cepted Allende's protestations
of moderation and con-
stitutionality at face value..
Briefings requested by Time
and provided by the CIA in
Washington: resulted in a.
change in the basic thrust of.
the Time story" on Allende's
Sept. 4 popular victory.
The pattern of covert
financing, according_ to the.
report; spread through the
entire political and economic
sector of Chile, encompassing
trade unions, business
organizations, right-wing
extremist groups and farm
organizations .
- Funds provided by the CIA,
the report said, "financed
activities covering a broad
1
spectrum from propaganda
.manipulation of the press to
large-scale support for Chile's
political parties, from public
opinion polls to attempts to
foment a military coup. -
The report asserted that
there was no evidence.the
United States was "directly
involved, covertly" in the 1973
coup against . Allende..
"However the United States
sought, in 1970, to foment a?
military coup in Chile," the
committee staff concluded.
"After 1970 it adopted a policy
of both overt and covert op-
position to Allende and it
remained,. in intelligence
contact with the Chilean
military, including officers
who were participating in the
coup plotting."
Similarly, the report said.
that top U.S. national security
advisers opposed -American
funding of the truckers' strike
that precipitated the final-
economic-crisis of the Allende'
administration, setting the
stage for the Sept. 11 coup.
The CIA recommended that
the truck owners' strike be
supported with a $25,000 grant,
but the proposal was never
approved. The CIA did rebuke .
a Chilean cover organization
that passed on $2,300 to the
strikers.
The CIA provided $38,500 for.,
the controversial right-wing:
paramilitary organization
Fatherland and Liberty "in an-
effort to create tension and a
possible pretext for in-,
tervention by the Chilean,
military.': The organization
was publicly-calling for the
armed overthrow of Allende's
government.
The report, based on accese,
to national security
documents, said that the;
covert activities carried out ini
Chile were apparently. not.
made available to the CIA
intelligence analysts
responsible for preparing'
National Intelligence
estimates on Chile.
This meant,that those U.&
officials . responsible for
preparing, national estimates;
on Chile "appear not to have
had access- to certain
in-
formation which could have
added to.: or substantially'
revised, their assessments
and predictions. That flaw
- - ,
was telling," the report said.
The - committee heard
testirriony yesterday from two
former ambassadors to Chile,:
Edward M. Korry and Ralph
Dungan, as well as former
Assistant Secretary of State
for Inter-American Affairs
Charles Meyer.
Korry evoked laughter from
the audience when he declared
that "under Ambassador
Dungan and me, Chile made
more social progress than any'
other country in ?Latin
America."
Korry, in a heavily.
emotional presentation, ac-
cused Church and the corn-
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mittee of conducting a
political "pornoflick" rather.
than an objective inquiry. He-
wes ambassador during thes
1970 U.S. intervention.
Dungan, the ambassador
from. 1964. to 1967;. described:
the intervention "as we now-:
see in hindsight a national?
disgrace." He added,-,
however, that the excesses
occurred under. "imprecise''
congressiotral mandates,
haphazard oversight and?
money provided by
Congress."
The general outlines of the
CIA interventions in 1964 and
the 1970-1973 period have been
reported in the press. What'
the new committee report
;provided was precise detail!
and documentary evidence.
It also demonstrated,'
through citation of national
security documents that were
for the com-
mittee, that, the U.S. policy-l?
making community was split4
on the 1970 interventions withi
the State Department taking a!
dim view of intervention and
the Pentagon, White House;
and the U.S. ambassador to
Chile, Korry, supporting it.
? In describing the scope..111
CIA-financed propaganda
activity, the report detailed'
what it called a,."spoiling:
Operation" against Allende's
leftist coalition in 1970 that.?
included production of hun-
dreds of thousands of posters
and leaflets; extensive press.
and radio campaigning; sign,
painting some 2,000 walls with.
the firing, squad slogan "sit'
paredon" (your wall), and
conducting a terror campaign;
showing large photographs or,
Soviet tanks in Prague. ?
In one week during the-19641
campaign, the report said, "al
CIA-funded propaganda groupi
produced 20 radio spots per;
day in Santiago and on 44;
provincial stations; 12-minutd
? news broadcasts five times,
daily on three Santiagoi,
stationt and 24 provincial!
? outlets; thotsands of cartoonsl
and much paid press, ad-4
vertising.P ..?-. .
?
WAS} NGTON POST
30 NOV 1975
Havana Report
?. .
HAVANA?The nes media
in Cuba so far have kept.
complete silence on US.
reports of CIA plots against;
the life of Fidel Castro, Reuter:.
reported. The findings. of the
Senate intelligence committee
on the subject have not 'bee'
picked up by the Cuban press:
and there has been no officialq
. . ? .
'comment.
WASHINGTON POST
2 8 NOV 1975
-i eport,?Eixcher,-,TRiattmo
54. .4,
? . - Lbw, '
janithi
?
ieenglitiltatdidti-1 knar. it ait4.
testifYinignikt Oath lioi'Prie- ?.
.NorrYk- 1141
Senate intelligene eoroiratteis
1.17-:S:YiWvissozter , ratifired *Mee.
ErisvardAalcolni &ay mtrkssa dor, recommended to
made a. series of ? Seimaingly 'Washington 'a plan f6r
unqualified disclaimers of $OO.O0O -effort in tthe Chilean);
American intervention -in the congress to persuade certain'
1970' Chilean 1.,:pres identi 41, shifts in v.otiiig,on 24 October.',
election .:: " : - 1970.- That was the date of the
Chilean runoff election made
necessary ? because AllendeMarch r19:the:e =
falledthyjr.a majority_ in the:
It tvat,,obvious'frditil
thd.7histej-ical- record that we: popular election Sept. 4.
did nor**` itfittY mariher.that The "Forty Committee,"
/ref* tedieS?hardf4hd;"that the- the government's toodecision;
t
making body for covert jilited States' ga.v..e.nosupport
,taanKooterodg.ndiaate,. operations, authorized
that the_Viledi.;States. did not $350,000 to be spent by the
'Seek ...tri:.toistissig-4,itittiv.? Central Intelligence Agency to-.
-ihtfu:-:?,tegre-,-nie-inber..4. bribe menbers of the Chilean3
tehileattleangiess,,.a4,44A congress to oppose Allende,
li.oie.in-ore?asigire fops years and overturn the results of thei
Trwslat ? 1 popular election:- The . money2.:
was never spent, however,,
,
revelations of
the because of fears that the CIA'.s.
SepaternteliigeRce. committee complicity would leak out. '
in its assassination report list
There was another major
:vatiliCiintr14-dietthiS-and other' contradiction. According to:
;a0FectionsfsWpra the Senate report, Korry,
- received a go-ahead front!:
The--_:?cohimittee, repcirf Washington after a Sept: 144.
Ofiotes, for z. example,: C 1970 National Security Council;
message -Kerry sent . to, meeting to implenient what,
President ,Eduard& Frei; lo was Called -the:Li:tube Gold-;
a favorite i( Korry and tIlt berg" gambit to deny thdir&
Anterfeask.
electien to Allende.; This lair;
establiihment--`:' - callet f or -the- diveiSiOn;of
votes-in the Chilean Congress-.?
in??..,r-,,,e.,...?.,..;,,..?. ..._, . to the candidaeye bi Jorge
',The -rriessagM- .seekitig:1
Ur. if;ran!--/a7.""pallTi'ea_riti_ AleS.sandri, a conservativel.
and. aging politiCian.. who'
terventi on: to deny: the- MN.
, would then resign,-,leaving.thei
Chilean election tn.-Salvador
Allende.= said: 'Frei shoultl incumbent , hristia.it',
'
know'that not 4 nut or-bolt wilii Democrat, Frei,' . conz'
be allowed to reach Chil&, stitutionally- free-to- :siteceeci-;
:
under Allende. Once Allen* himself in the presidency:
comes to power we shall do a#: (Chile's' constitution bars a.
within-our power. td.condemC president from succeeding
Chile: and. the' Chileams :Op; himsqlf.) ?. '
utmost : -depriiiatiiii: ' arid l In his. 1973 testimony to the i
poverty, a policY-digned.fo0 subcc_ommittee ? -investigating
a,'1Unigtime? ha mind tiiid41. efforts by International
Celerate the hard featOrei Otkii Telephone, and Telegraph.
comrttunist .:SOciety, -in- Chile Corp. to block the election. of
__,:.1.,./,?:_,: .,,... ,,,. , : f- - .:-. ,,-:-??;,.zf Allende in 1970, Korry said
-? Statements isshedinheharr that
the United States "did not
get involved in the so-called
of. President Nixon- that 'the
-United .States plaYed4) n '. 'A Alesshndri formula. . . " ?
ar-i
terventioniit role in Chile_irs5 in a 'focitnote? to. the Senate.
a CIA.memo. disclosed-
1970 . also were stronklyi committee report, spelled out
challenged-15y the Senate :1
-_-__
committees evidence Korry's' role in the?Alessandri
' ora;
presidentially -ordered covertil "Ambassador Korry was
political war -against the asked to- go direetly to
socialist Allende: - " President Frei .to see if he
:! formula.
So- was: the testimotiy 'of- would he willing to commit'
former Secretary' of State- himself to this line of action. AI
William P. Rogers: hii snc,, contingency of, $250.000 was
cestor; Henry A. Kissinger; approved for 'covert support-
former CIA Director Richard.' of projects which- Frei or his-.
M- 'Helms, former Astistanto trusted team deem im-
Secretary Of State for Inter; portant.' It was further agreed
Amerdean- Affairs Charles, that a propaganda campaign,
Meyer and other State- be undertaken by the agency.
Department spokesnrielv (CIA) te, focus on the damage
- 'Meyer omment'earlier of an Allende takeover."
-
? this3ce*.kalia_ve the feehrtial
;?.4
Korry said yesterday that -I
3 stand by every statement I,
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yPis?eap,
"1";;N.,: :???
ve made to the committee'
and to the press." He added
that he will testify publicly at
the committee's hearings, on
"chile nfet,t_wc.ek...,_;...:
The S ena te repoic iaire nevi
significance to an internal ITT
document that was first
reported by columnist Jack
Anderson. in March, 1972. It
alluded to a Sept. 15, 1970,
message from the State
Department to Korry in
Santiago.
That memo, from ITT field
operatives Hal Hendrix and
Robert Berrelez, reported to'
high executives of the firm:
"The. big push has begun in
Chile to assure- a
congressional victory for
Jorge Alessandri on October
24, as-part of what has- been
dubbed the. "Alessandr0
Formu to. prevent Chilel
from becoming a Communist!
state. . . Late Tuesday night,
(Sept. 15 ) ?Ambassador
Edward, Korry- finallr
received a message from the
.State Department,giving him-
the green light to-move in the
name of President Nixon. The
message gave him_ maximum
authority to do all possible ?
short of a Dominican.
Republic-type; action ? to:
;keep Allende from taking:
'
? Korr,y testified in the Senate
Vttfltinalinnal-Cor porationS
StibtommitteefiOuiry that!
"there was nn:green light
anything approximating
But; he declined: to elaborate"
?'on his instructions from
Washingtonon the ground that
it would be improper for him;
to discuss the content of an
executive communication.
Sept. 15, 1970, was the day,'
_according . to: thez.Senate in-;
tel I igence corataitteei
;that president Nbionnrdere
Helm to invithieVi67-4A.:-.1114
'Promoting thiyoiip
? d'etat, in Chile.- at a: Meeting;
with Kissinger and, Attorney1
GeneraljohnN. Mitchell.
Other statements by leading
administration officials .that
appear to be contradicted by'
the evidence of the Senate
reportwere these:. ?
r .
?Iri his 1972 foreign policy,
report to Congress, President:
Nixon,in a reference to Chile,
said the United States deals
"realistically with govern--
ments as they are? right and.:
left." His administration, the!
President said, pursued a.
policy of "non-intervention."
?During his confirmation
hearings as Secretary of Statel
in September, 1973, Kissingeti
said that "the CIA was heavily
involved in 1964 in th_e_elec_tion,I
was in a very minor way in-.
volved in the 1970 election andi
since then we have absolutelyl
.;4 ha
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stayed away from any coups,'
Our efforts in Chile were to
strengthen the democratic',
political parties and give them',
a basis for winning the elec.-4,
tion in.1976. . . " ?
? Thomas KaramessineS,
Deputy Directorfor-Plans
(covert operations),, testified;
to the Senate intelligenct*
committee; that "Kissinge
left no doubt in my mind the
he was under the heaviest o
pressure to .get
complished and he in turn was'
placing us under the heaviest
of pressures to geLit ac-:
Compl is hed Kara mess i n
was speaking of the CIA'
covert promotion of a coup b
the Chilean re ili tarY 1111970:- -
-=TeStifyhig before theS
Senate, Foreign' Relations,
Committee On March-22; 1974
Rege rs - said "TheNnitedi
States government-did .rip6
engage in impr.oper,aivth
?
?Meyer.. testifyingi
THE WASHINGTON POST Friday, Nov. 29, 197$
the Senate MultitiatiOriag
Corpora tions Subcommittee:,
on Mardi 17, 1978, said: "The
policy of the government, Mr,
Chairman, was that -there;
would be no intervention'in t
political affair* Of
were ConsiStetit!i-rii
financed no Candidatets;',n
political parties befdre
artir;- Spt 8 (*da*Thrth.
popular election)..:
,,the Presfaint stated'
govern-.;
inentY---aS :therate?. . .
we
were rellgiOusIV and,
scrupulously adhering to thea
policy of the government of
the United -States . of ,
_nonintervention.
This week '..-214eyer -said-,
ruefully: "/ never. felt then nor
'now that Wasii_erjuring. or
lying. The degree. to which. ffi
was talking abouthat I knew-1
? and- aholitAvhat I didn'tq
know, will have to be
demonstrated."
Anti-Allende Campaign, U.S.
vint. o Chilean May Be Linked
? By Laurence Stern
Wasnington Post Staff Writer- ?,,
The day President Nixon.'
launched his undeclared war
of covert political operations
against Chile ? Sept. 15. 1970
? there was a series of secret
meetings in Washington
centering on the presence of a
wealthy Santiago publisher,
Agustin Edwards.
According to former CIA
director Richard M. Helms, it
was Edwards' presence in.
Washington that day whichi
may have "triggered",
President Nixon's instructions
to involve the CIA int per-
miffing, a military coup d'etatl
intended to prevent the
election of Socialist Salvador!
Allende as president of Chile.-
Edwards, a conservative;
who bitterly opposed Allendeo
_
came to Washington in what.:
one government source ?
described as "a last-minute
effort" to recruit U.S. support
for a plan to derail Allende.'s
prospects of election by the '?
Chilean- Congress, on Oa. 24,
1970. - : ? 'I.-.
The El Mercurio jib- blishing
chain of .which Edwards was
publisher and owner had
received CIA subsidies since?
the late 1950s, according to
government sources. -
Edwards gained. Presidenk
Nixon's ear through thei
helpful intercession. of Pep?-..:
siCo' president Donald Ken-
dall, a mutual .friend and.
longtime political backer as'
well as law client of Nixon.
After Allende's election,.
Edwards joined the Pepsi-
Cola organization as a vice.
president.
Helms, in his testimony to
the Senate intelligence
committee, said that prior to-
the White House meeting at
which President Nixon called,
for CIA intervention, "the.
editor of El Mercurio had
come to Washington, and I had
been asked to go and talk to
him at one of the hotels here."
Helms was reported to have:'
been- perplexed by his
structions to consult with!
Kendall and" Edwards on'
conditions : in: Chile.
feeling seems:to:be that here
he was, the director of the
United'. States Central.
Intelligence Agency and he
was being sent by the White
House to interview the head of
the Pep_sizCola Co._ and a
Santiago publisher," related a,
well-informed associate ot
Helms. -
In his testimony to the
Senate. intelligence com
inittee, Helms. said he had thej
impression that Presiden
Nixon called the Sept 15, 1970k
White House meeting on Chile
"because of Edwards'
presence in, Washington and
what he heard from Kendall
about what Edwards was
saying about conditions in
Chile and what was happening:
there." I
Helms' hand-written notes!
from that meeting reflectedI
such presidential reactions!
and instructions, as these:
"One-in.-ten chance, perhaps,
but save CliAe?,',?;',-,;, Not:
concerned risks
Net involvement of. Embassyi
. $10,000,080-. available,1
more if necessary . .
time -jobs . . . best .men we:
have . , Game plan . .
Make the economy scream',
.. .. 48 hours for plan of ac-
tion."
On the morning of Sept. 15, a
footnote to the Senate in-
telligence committee report
noted, "At the request of.
Donald Kendall, 'President of
Pepsi-Cola, Henry Kissinger
and John Mitchell met for
breakfast with Kendall' andi
Edwards. The topic of con-!
versation was the political'
situation' ,in Chile and the
plight of El Mercurio and
other anti-Allende forces."
- The breakfast meeting was
followed by a more formal
session at the White House-
. .
_
cconducted by the President,'
and. attended by Kissinger,:
Mitchell and Helms. It was!
then; as the CIA director laterl
testified; that President Nixon;
"came down very hard that he.
wanted_ something_ done (in
Chile) and he didn't much
care how and and that he was:
prepared to make money
available. .
The Senate intelligence
NEW YORK TIMES
4 Dec. 1975
U.S. Intelligence Chiefs Deny
Falsifying Vietnam Troop Data
? committee is now negotiating.
with Nixon to hear his version-
'.oltheseevents.
?CIA director William E.;
'Colby testified secretly to a-
House intelligence iu13-.
Committee in June, 1974, tbat
the CIA spent $8-,million ini
covert efforts to? prevent'
Allende's election and then,
undermine his government?
between 1969 and197.3.
WASHINGON; Dec. 3 (UPI)
?The outgoing civilian and mi-
litary intelligence directors de
nied ' today, :that there was a
conspiracy-to downgrade Corns.
munist troop-, strength in Viet-
narn.before the I9,68 Tet often.
sive ? .??
William E.' Colby. director
of Central Intelligence, told the
Hou.se. Intelligence Committee
at. the C.I.A. insisted at the
ti e: that the Vietcong had
500,D00 or more men, compared
with a military estimate: of
292,flott
Lieut. Gen. Daniel. O. Graham,
who seeking early retirement
as' head of the Defense Intel-
ligence Agency, testified that
United States military leaders
were not surprised by the in-
tensity of the Tet attack, which
killed 2,200 Americans and de-
stroyed 58 aircraft.
- Both men took issue with
statements by Samuel A.
Adams, a former C.I.A. agent,
who eold the committee in Sep-
tember that the agency and
the military deliberately falsi-
fied Communist strength to
make it appear the allies were
winning the war.
Mr. Colby, in prepared testi-
mony, said the C.I.A. preparedr
a special assessment for De-
fense Secretary Robert S. Md-
Namara in May 1967 that con-
cluded "the over-all strength
of the Communists' organized
force structure in South T(fet?
? .
nam is probably 580,004
range and may even by higher.1'
"The-500.000 figure presented
by. the in this report
could be compared with - an
official military number at that
time of 292,000." Mr. Colby
said. "I believe that these quo-
tations from official C.I.A. pub-
lications show clearly that the
CLA. did not shrink from push-
ing the case for higher figures
and made no attempt to pro-
duce 'politically acceptable' es-
timates."
Mr. Adams testified -that the
Vietcong had' 600,000 troops
at the time, along with 30,000
spies' in the South ,Vietnamese
military, and that this fact was
concealed from the public by-
the
C.I.A. and the military
Mr. Colby and Mr. GraHam
said that testimony was errone-
ous and misleading.
Mr. Graham, who preceded
Ivr.r. Colby to the witness table,
said it was estimated after the
Tet offensive that the Vietcong
had a .force of only 170,000
men and that not all of them
could have taken part.
Mr. Colby, who is continuing
as C.I.A. chief until his desig-
nated successor, George Bush,
goes through the Senate confir-
mation process, was once in
charge of the agency's "Phoe-
nix" program designed to wipe
out Vietcong double agents and
South' 'Vietnamese
Zietnamese collabora-
tor.
4
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THE NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY,. NOVEMBER 30; 1975
The Unmaking of a President
ANTOFAGASTA, Chile? Americans
suffer from. a kind of political maso-
chism, that relishes depicting United
States policy and its agents as a
wicked, corrupt force, and relatively
-recent events inn-ghileconfirm this ob-
? sessive malady: ?
- A favorite legend is that Uncle Saila
,deliberately threw out- the-benevolent
President Salvador Allende Gossens in
1973 while sponsoring a military coup
d'etat under Gen. Augusto , Pinochet
Ugarte, now chief of state.
It is sometimes contended that the
'plot was engineered by C.I.A. agents
who are held responsible nowadays for
everything from foot-and-mouth dis-
ease to famine in Bangladesh. But
many argue that the two United States
ambassadors to Chile. under Allende
engineered events producing today's
authoritarian regime.
Mr. Alle-nde, whom I knew, is not -
'around- to comment_ He committed
suicide during the putsch.. But I have
talked?with. the Presidents, who pre-
ceded and succeeded. him, Eduardo
Frei Montalva and General Pinot/let
About the only thing they. agree on is
; that the U.S. had nothing- to do with
Allende's overthrow. n
' In Santiago Mr. Frei told me he
knew both American ambassadors well
during the Allende presidency: Edward
Korry, who left in late 1971 at the end
of Allende's-first year, and Nathaniel'
-Davis, his successor.
Mr. Frei didn't pretend to know what
the C.I.A. was up to. Nevertheless, he
argued it couldn't possibly have stirred _
up the- massive opposition to Allende
_that followed a.15,000 percent rise in
inflation over three- years and a 1,000
percent drop in the value bf... Chile's
currency..
He said: "A-s. far asI'iave been able
to find out concerning what. happened
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
By C. L. Sulzberger
'between 1970 and 1973, I know of no
act of interventinn in internal politics
by either Ambassador. !Corry. or Am-
bassador Davis." - ? ???
? As for General Pinochet, who planned
and led the coup, he assured me heret
"I can swear to you as a Christian that
I. never had any kind of contact with
anyone from the C.I.A. or with any
ambassador, U.S. or otherwise. I
wanted to be free of any. obligation to
anybody.' ?
"And of course I wanted to protect
my intentions by total discretion. Why,
-afterward, even my family asked what
kind of help I received from the United
States. I told them: Not even. good
will.' In that I. am very much- dis-
appointed."-: 5 ?
- While General' Pinechet- has aim-'
pressive credibility glif$, there it every'
reason to believe this particular asser-
fion. He revealed to me details. of his-
coup -never before diatlosed:-
These _ show that he prepared. his
putsch virtually alone over a long
period; taking hardly anyone into his
? confidence. "Anyone,"_ includes the
C.I.A. whose principal function in
Allende's day seems to have been try-
ing to. help moderate democratic forces
stay alive. (The agency did oppose
Allende at the very start of his presi-
dency and was indirectly involved in
the killing of Gen. Ren?chneider in, a
mysterious conspiracy just afterward.
But it. was not involved- in the Pinochet
coup three years later.) _
General.- Pinochet began worrying
about .Communism, in '1947 when- he
commanded 'small security force at
a detention 'camp. He. thought -Chile
?? had reached the end of the road when
Allende. was elected: in 1970. ;He be...
n came known for anti-Communism but.,
the regime- mistakenly dismissed? an--
, other general named Pinochet and left
him untouched. ? ' n ? :
Thereafter he blandly concealed his.
opinions -and - was subsequently- ap-i
pointed,' army commander. ? He dis-
cussed his intentions with only a hand-
ful of high- army officers, never telling
anyone in the air force, navy or con-
stabulary because he.. felt these had.
already been dangerously infiltrated by.
pro-Allende men. ?
Finally, in June, 1973, he ordered
the Army War College to prepare a
"genie plan" to protect internal se-
curity. Each portion was drafted by
separate groups.so nobody could under/
stand the project's potential signifi-
cance.
General Pinochet decided to act 'von'
Sept. 14, -1973?four days-before- .an
independence day paxasie:This would
allow him ton-bring military units .into
Santiago for the customary: procession.
and' billet them in concentric rings-
around the city.
. But on Sept. 9, air force Gen.
Gustavo Leigh and an 'admiral repre--
senting the navy commander, Adm.:
Jose Merino, visited General Pinochet.
on his daughter's_ birthday, Leigh,.
Merino_ and the national police. com-
mander, den. Cesar Mendoza, now-
'form the four-man ruling junta that
Pinochet dominates. They asked Pino-
chet to 'take action and he agreed to
move up his D-day to! Sept. 11. But he
never disclosed details of his opera-,
tionat plan, _ ?
Thus he adducei considerable
_dence, that rio foreigner, diplomat or
intelligence- agent knew anything
about Ms.-project -ahead of time?be-
cause hardly any Chilean did. On this
point it is logical to believe him.
, THE NEW YORK TIMES;THURSDAY, DECEMBER 4, 1975
Public's-Esteemfor 18-FOund Off-Sharply
Public esteem for the Federal asked 1,515 adults, 18 *and. ol-
Bureau of Investigation, always
high in. earlier days, has de-
clined considerably n in the last
decade and particularly since
1970, the Gallup organization
reported in its latest poll, is-
,sued yesterday.
The polling organization said
that the "highly favorable" rat-
ing given. the F.ECI. in /965
by 84 percent of those inter-
viewed dropped to 37 percent
in the. poll conducted last was-another-drop of 19 points
month. Even so, the bureau by 1973 and still another de-
continued to hold the respect cline of 15 points since then,
of a majority, with generally to reach the current' low mark.
positive ratings ,utstripping At the same time, 80 percent
negative marks by a ratio of of those questioned gave the
about 5, to 1. F.B.I. plus-rating, against 16
The Gallup survey used a percent minus-ratings, with 4
10-point scale on which it percent stating no opinion.
der, in more than. 300 communi-
ties to -rate the F.B.I. from
plus-5 to minus-5. The two top
ratings, plus-5 and plus4; were
counted) as "highly favorable.".
The poll was- taken between
Oct. 30 And Nov. 3: -
The polling organization said
the "highly favorable" rating
had slipped 13 points, from
;.84 percent to -71 percent, be-
tween 1965 and 1970. There
- The 'Gallup organization -said
that early disenchantment with
the bureau began among youn-
ger adults, especially those
with a-college background, liv-
ing the East. But it added
that in the latest snrvey' the
decline in esteem had become
across-the-board, coming after
such allegations of misconduct
as the harassment of the Rev.
Dr. Martin.Luther King Jr. prior
to his assassination in 1968.
A-parallel survey of the pub- Gallup organization said.
lic:s regard for the Central In-
telligence Agency found that
the C.I.A. had scored consider-
ably below the F.B.I. The poll-
ing group said that 14' percent
of those questiohed. had given
the CI.A. a "highly favorable",
rating, compared with the
F.B.I.'s 37 percent. In 1973,
the C.I.A. also ranked well be-
hind the bureau but :still got
"highly favorable" marks from
23 percent of the sample, the
WASHINGTON POST-
2 DEC 1975
Bruce Retirement
BRUSSELS?David K.E.
Bruce, U.S. ambassador to
NATO, said he will retire at
the end of January?but not
because of a dispute with the.
White House.
In a statement, Bruce, 77- ,
said he had_told Secretary,a.
5
State Henry* KissingeT
September he wished to retire
in January. He labeled asi
"-utterly -? inaccurate" a!
Newsweek magazine reportl
that he resigned in anger alter1
learning, via leaks, that his:,
job had. been offered to'i
outgoing- . CIA, Director':
Williana E. Onlby,....,L
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THE NEW YORK REVIEW
13 November 1975
Someone to Watch Over You
The Abuses of the _
Intelligence Agencies
by The Center for National
Security Studies, edited by
Jerry J. Berman -
and Morton H. Halperin:
Center for National _Security Studies
(122 Maryland Ave., NE,
-Washington, DC 20002), $-2.25
- ,
Garry Wills _
This is a dizzying computation of all
the snoopings, publicly known so far,.
performed by our public servants upon
their putative masters. With admirable
restraint the report attempts to collect
and document every instance of illegal
activity undertaken by our various
intelligence agencies. It gives the de-
fense offered by? the agencies, the
authority under which each- agency
operated, and the statutes apparently
infringed. It is a_ very, useful and
complete handbook on official crime.
We can surmise that the tally- is not
complete,. since it arose from spot
investigations, odd suits, and accidental--
confession. But already the count is '
almost self-defeating. The hundreds.
under surveillance, the thousands photo-
graphed, the hundreds of thousands
filed. The "watch lists" in readiness for
emergency detention. The blacks. The
kids. Hit lists. Enemies. The "enemy
within" is us. The deadpan recital ofit
all tends to dissolve in the mind. Everett
Dirksen- claimed, "A million here, a,
million there-in time that adds up to ;
real money." It doesn't, of- course,'
That kind of addition tarns-Magically,'
at some unthinkable number-into sub- -
traction. We know fairly well what -we,,
are-getting for $1.98. But not for forty
billion. Much the same thing happens
by = the thousandth wiretapping or ?
break-in recorded here.
. We must summon up a gratitude to
E.' Howard Hunt. One or two of -hfs-.
comic break-ins, complete with celebra---
tory self-photographing sessions=or.2
one intimidating "interview" with red -
wig ? and voice-modulator-reminds us
what all these figures really mean. The
break-in at the Democratic National
Committee_was small potatoes set be-
side the hundreds of FBI "black- bag" ?
jobs; but its very $1.98 size smuggled it
izi toward the imagination past TV com-
mercials and situation comedies. Water-
gate, was the- sit-corn of scandals,
"Haldeman and Son," your friendly
garbage collectors tripping over each
other's feet.
-
_those who -found the Nixon -tenure
in office peculiarly sinister fail to
notice its redeeming feature: Nixon
distrusted everyone, even- J. Edgar
. Hoover. Even Richard Helms. Anyone
Outside his sight. He had to rely on
private flunkies for everything-to con-
trol demonstrations around the White
6
House (call over John Dean from the
Justice Department), to conduct the
war on drugs (use the scrubbed feroci-
ty of Egil Krogh), to keep track of
Teddy (put Tony Ulasewiez on the,
trail of boiler-room girls); to draw up a-
master Plan for spying on everyone-
including the spies (have young -TO-m7
Huston teach J. Edgar his tricks).
. \POor Huston, how he wronged the ?
Director: he, thought him temiss in the?
patriotic breaking of laws. He had to
admit, before the Church- committee,
'that Hoover had been doing the very
things he- proposed; but :Huston
thought Hoover was above all that--;
and Hoover had to slap down the kid
for being such a simpleton.
Nixon had the apparatus of a police
state at his disposal, but he was too
devious to use it. Right-wingers con-
stantly make the Mistake of thinking
that liberals live up- to their own
pretensions. The pretensions give them..
license to sink down toward their'
enemies' level. If you' want real and
systematic perfidy, you do-'.-not get...it
with Nixon, who sabotaged ? himself
with a., saving gracelessness. You get it
with Truman, with his tests for securi-
ty risks and front organizations. Or
with Kennedy, and his _harassing of
socialist groups. Or with Lyndon
Johnson, who warred on Black Pan-
thers. (Eisenhower stepped up CIA
activity abroad-a_ subject dealt with
glancingly in this report, and one
hope to return to in a later piece.. But
Eisenhower had- little, if any, interest
in nonmilitary-i.e., ideological-spying,-
a taste -that made sophisticates of
"intelligence" consider him soft.)?
It was during Truman's time that the
Attorney General's List was published,
a proscription list unparalleled in our
history, the basis of all later black-
listings. It made a man's job fair game
if he had given money to, or accepted
membership- in, or attended-a meetings
of, any one of hundreds of - organiza-
tions branded for discrimination but-
not charged with any crime. A new-
public _category had been created, the-
noncriminal non-American. - _
It was during Kennedy's regime that
the FBI launched its "COINTELPRO"
action against the Socialist Workers of
America-sending letters to empl6yers,
planting "disinformation" to scuttle a
registered and - above-board political
party. There is something touching
about the FBI's own memos on this
_
operation. On the one hand, the, party
was flagrant. in its un-Americanism: it
"has, over the past several years, been
openly espousing its line on a local and,
national basis through"-are you ready'
for the revelation of its dastardly
tactics?-'"running candidates for public
office." The FBI, thwarted by this
openness, had to arrange a Disruption'
Program (its own term) to "alert the
public." Alert it to what? TO the
socialist "line"? Yet the party's very
offense was the public dissemination of
this line. And how did the FBI___alert
the public? By openly professing its .
own line? No, by secret slander, anon-
ymous notes, and forged provoca-
tions.*
That is what sinks in: through the
-
reading of this dreary catalogue, this
-list of spy work extended_ over ? dec-
ades, descending to the pettiest tricks-
the sheer lawlessness of the 'activity
used against legal dissemination of
"un-American" ideas. The , customary
defense df the intelligence agencies is
that they may- have been carried away
by their eagerness to capture criminals.
The constable's excess is an enduring
problem when dealing with a wily
crook. But what we see documented
here, on page after page, is . the
conscious and deliberate and extensive
breaking of laws by a whole series of
public agencies (the CIA, the FBI, the
IRS, military teams, the NSA) against
people who have broken no laws,
whose proscribed activities are -not'
even preliminary- to ,the breaking of
laws, whose real offense is not crimirial
activity but disloyal thinking. Under
liberal regimes, for decade after dee:
ade, we have had a thought-control
approach to internal surveillance. This
was known; it was supported by the ;
public; it was- endowed ,by the Con-
gress-and even- now there is little
compunction about what occurred.
The reaction of a majority of Ameri-
cans,- to this report, shocking as it. is;
will be: So whiat?
_ . -
What makes thisLreactiirri. po_ssiblei
: Not merely the press of a cold war or
the quirks of a single senator. We have
to grant; J. ?relgar one thing-he called
things un-American, and Americans
agreed with him, for years, emphati-
cally. The rejection of Nixon (and of
Watergate) has nothing to do with the
more serious and dangerous spying on
Americans by other Americans that has
been accepted as "the American way"
for decades, and maybe for centuries.
Maybe it is the American way.
In- 1921, Gilbert Chesterton applied
for entry to America as a visiting
lecturer. Ile was stunned by the ques-
tions he had to answer. \Vas he an
anarchist? A polygamist? Did he advo-
cate the -overthrow of America by
force? Ile .was applying in the after-
math of the Palmer raids, but the
procedures or admission had been
settted for years; and they amused a
man who had traveled widely without
*Thanks to pretrial discovery, there is
a particularly full account of the FBI,
activities against the Socialist Workers
Party and the Young Socialists- Alli-
ance. All these documents will soon be
published in a paperback by the Path-
finder Press- (410 West St., NYC
10014; $1.95). It is no wonder that
intelligence agencies -try to stay out of
court
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ever -undergoing such an inquisition:
"I have stood on the other side of
Jordan, in the land ruled by a rude
Arab chief, where the police looked so
like brigands that one wondered _what
the brigands looked like. But they did
not ask me whether I had come to
subvert the power of the Shereef; and
they did not exhibit the faintest
curiosity about my personal views on?
the ethical basis of civil_ authority."2
Only Ainerica, the land of the free,.
asked hirri- what he thought about the
kind of freedom it was peddling?and,
asked him not as a settler or possible
immigrant, but merely as a visitor. He
especially loved the idea that sub--
verters of the .nation would be docile
in declaring, ahead of time, their
intention to subvert.
There is a na? assumption, among
Americans, that everybody knows what
his or her ideas on government are,
and that they will declare this mental
baggage whenever challenged. We make
such challenges not only to visitors or
prospective citizens, but to- people
already certified as ,American?are they
American enough? Hence , loyalty
oaths, security checks, Americanism
committees of the Legion, un-Ameri-
can activities committees of the Con-
gress, and Freedom Trains to teach
Americans how to be more?American.
America is not merely a country,
but an Idea. An Ism. So we do not
settle our Americanism by immigra-
tion, by citizenship, by obedience to
the law. We have to prove our Ameri-
canism by recitals of a catechism about
our inmost thoughts. Chesterton, being
as generous as he could to this odd
trait, noted a certain danger of tyranny
in it but supposed that we raised an
ideological test because we had not
gathered ourselves together as a nation
by the more gradual methods of
Europe, with a racial or geographical
or historical unity inbuilt by our'
circumstances: "America is the only
nation in. the world that is fnunded on
a creed. That creed is set forth with
dogmatic and even theological lucidity'
in the Declaration of Independence,
perhaps the only piece of practical
politics that is also theoretical politics
and also great literature."_ Chesterton
restated Lincoln's claim that this coun-
try was conceived immaculately in
freedom by its "dedication to the
proposition that all men are created
equal."
It is very dangerous to derive citizen-
ship from a proposition. That means
that every citizen must subscribe to
the proposition. And that means
we must know the citizen's mode of
thought in order to grant him a charter
of participation in the national life.
Unless we know the inner workings of
his mind, we have no clear assurance
of his citizenship. Living within our
borders is not sufficient. Attending our`
schools is not, sufficient. Even sub-
mitting to our electoral process is not
sufficient. -
Those surprised by McCarthyite ex-
cesses of the cold war had no excuse
for their surprise. The readiness to clap
Nisei into detention camps was not.
questioned by liberals during World
War II. Liberal organs of thought cried-
out'against Girman-speaking citizens in
World War I (and threw Karl Muck into
jail without legal process). Even those.
who attacked the House Un-American.
Activities Committee attacked it as un-
American?by that very process saying
there was an American way of thinking
and acting that had been violated..
Liberals did -not protest the harass-
ment, the provocation, the infiltration.
by illegal means of the Ku Klux Klan
or various fascist organizations. Indeed,
the FBI has lived many years of its
red hunt by blunting criticism with
the question: Do you want to be dis-
armed against the fascists or the Klan? -
Since Americanism is something to.
be striven for daily, and to be demon-'
strated on demand, there is a presump-
tion that any citizen is not- American
until he or she proves it. that is why
politicians are introduced as "great.
AMericans," or real Americans, or true
Americans. There are no un-English
activities committeei - or un-French
committees. Why un-American? Be-
cause the full protection of our laws is
not given automatically. You must
earn it by demonstrating a patriotic
mentality. '
.. ?
The:record .a this- report is a lont
series of incursions on the legal rights-
of"-Americans, of-men and women who
were ideological. suspects' and therefore
second-class citizens, Open prey to
anyone with a purer ideological claim.
For instance: In 1968, the Ku Klux
Klan was going to hold a meeting in
the conference facilities of an Alabama
motel, The FBI,. as part of its general
harassment of the Klan, went to the.
national headquarters of the motel
chain and asked that t.?Klan be
denied thii .site.., The bureau also used'
the IRS; a 'dummy organization of its
own, 'and forged materials to discredit
the Klan. What has any of this to do
with 'law enforcement? Nothing at all:,
It was conscious war against ideas?war
not conducted openly by politicians
and publicists, but secretly by our
national police force. It was an ideo-
logical 'Purge, in which any rneans*.were
sanctified by the holiness of the cause.
People were slandered, set against each
other, intimidated?all with our tax
dollars and without our knowledge.
Laws were broken; but... by the law
enforcers. A second-class citizenship,
outside the law, was established for
Klan members.
What was done to the Klan was
done even more zealously against com-
munists, leftists, black activist groups,
and civil rights leaders. Provocateurs
were sent into organizations, to prod
them into breaking laws. A 1968
memo on the New ? Left t.,set the
bureau's goal: "to expose; disrupt
and otherwise neutralize the activities
of this group." The activitiei, of the
group?not its illegal activities. The FBI
long ago gave up the nar-row: aim of
investigating crimes. It now polices the
mental health of America,- trying to
destroy any group it does :not-approve
of. ??????
The FBI may have established the
pattern for our modern ideological
. policing; but this .repOrt. shows how
readily all other enforcement agencies
followed that lead. Military-intelligence
units moved into the. area of citizen
harassment very actively in .the wake
of 1967's riots. The army center at
Fort Holabird opened files on at least
80,000 nonmilitary citizens of the US,
and spread its lists by computer to
many other bases. The files were
FBI-inclusive,, with material on sex
lives and other private habitsfor use in
ideological blackmail. Military agents
were sent to- infiltrate groups that
might take part in any demonstration.
The center at Fort Holabird set up a
code for 770 organizations, and by
1969 it was receiving 1,200 reports a
month, to build up a surveillance
record on, domestic activities that
would outreach _even the FBI's'. This
information was ordered destroyed in
1970, but a Senate investigating com-
mittee found solid evidence that it still
exists in various forms, thanks to the
computer system that spread the infor-
mation.
Local police forces, when they do
not cooperate with the FBI, compete
with it. The FBI's war on -the Black
-Panthers used -local arrests on various
charges (like defective. lights on cars)
to harass the Panthers and dry up their
.bail fund. At times the harassment
became entrapment?but who cares,
since they were' Panthers. The IRS has
-long been trained to get people on tax
counts, when they are really wanted
for something else. This practice goes
back to Al Capone. We declared him a
?second-class citizen and then _found
some law to put him'away with. It was
Robert Kennedy's approach to "Jimmy
Hoffa.
The National Security Agency has
added its own expensive talents to the
American snooping effort. It automati4
cally plucks out of cables and radio-
grams information keyed to proper
names or certain words. The CIA uses
citizen fronts as cover for-its foreign
activities; it claims to have infiltrated
student organizations to train agents
for work. 'with overseas leftists. It
prefers to manipulate even ftiendly
types (like writers for Encounter) to
maintain control over the channels of
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ideological exchange. The reaction of
people like Arthur Schlesinger Jr. to
the Encounter revelations shows how
we have come to expect ;ideological
self-policing. The CIA was working-on
the right side, wasn't it? The inappro-
priateness of having a Secret police
covertly run the magazine and radio ,
stations did- not -strike people, so long ;
as the operations 'were- well run, were
on our side-.
Indeed, the CIA was long welcomed
by liberals as a kinci_of -good FBI, an
FBI of -our very oWn.:The 'good guys
were doing- the 'Manipulating in this
case. But Ti5f,',Souise-7--th'aiS what most
of the nation has'all.alo thatight of
the FBI itself. It was?the-good guys,
and it was out to get the had guys.
Who cared how that was done? Since
they were bad guys, you could net
. handle them with kid gloves. Agencies
that deal with them have to destroy
the law in order to save it. Un-Ameri-
cans don't deserve the protection of
the law, anyway. And who was un-
American? We all are, until we prove
different?take our loyalty oaths, sub-
mit to security cheeks. Stand up and
be counted. If you are .not willing to
be Snapped on, manipulated, obseryed,,
then you must have something, to-
hide?foundation in itself for a prior
assumption of un-Americanhood. The
only good American, the only one who
deserves to be free, is the one who
puts his freedom at the disposal of our
secret police system. Alas, that 'makes
most- of us pretty good. Americans. ?
It happened?all the?long tale of
:deceit,' laid out in patterns_ in this
straightforward - account?because we
let it happen; in some measure; wanted
it 'to happen. We had :an Axle-de-an
'proposition* we must, be :dedicated to.
If the Klan did not accept .the'abstnict
proposition' of human. equality, its
thoughts could be persecuted, entirely
aside from the enforcement of laws.
And. so we 'advance the'-1984 equa-
tions: freedom can only be .gtiarded by
destroying privacy; only 7-secrecy can
protect the open society; and :the law;
must be denied those Americans who I
are ? sneaky ',enough to obey-- the lawl
-while thinking things we do 'not like.'
Right;-Comrade? ?-?
NEW YORK TIMES
2 8 NOV 1975
Anti-C.I.A. Plan Rejected -
. SAN DIEGO, Nov. 27 (UPI)?
The Academic Senate at the
University of California's San
Diego campus has rejected a
resolution that would have pro-
hibited
Fb members from doing
research for the Central Intel-
ligence Agency: Fewer than half
of the organization's eligible
niembers,-- all- tenured faculty
members, took part in the mail
ballot. The vote was 232 against
the motion and 152 in favor.,_
N.EW YORK TINES
1 DEC 1975
Tigers
Or
Jellyfish?
"The time hos come to bring
(the investigations of this mat-
ter to an end. One year of
Watergate is enough."
?Richard Nixon, Jan. 30, 1974
"It is time . . . to end the self-
flagellation that has done so
much harm to this nation's ca-
pacity to conduct foreign policy."
?Henry Kissinger, Nov. 24,1975
By Anthony Lewis
BOSTON. Nov. 30?Suppose that
during the Senate Watergate investiga-
tion President Nixon had directed Gov-
ernment officials not to appear as .
witnesses in public session. Would the
Senate committee meekly have dropped
its plans to question H. R. Heideman
and the .others in open hearings?
Would the press have let this pass
without a murmur? -
Of course not. Senators and editors
would have been outraged. But move
to 1975?from Watergate to the C.I.A.,
from Richard Nixon to Henry Kis-
singer and Gerald Ford?and outrage
is in short supply. -
The Senate intelligence committee
has public hearings this week on Amer-
ican covert' activities in 'Chile.. But
Secretary of State Kissinger has re-
fused to appear, saying it would be
"wholly' inappropriate" to discuss in ,
public "any real or purported covert
operation." And President Ford in-
structed C.I.A. officials not to ap-
pear.
The U.S. role, in upsetting the con-
stitutional government of Chile is as
important as Watergate on any rea-
sonable scale of values. Yet there have
been no loud noises from Cipitol Hill
about the Ford_ Administration's pe-
ABROAD AT HOME
remptory refusal to take pert in what
could be highly instructive hearings
on the subject. And the affair has
had scarcely any notice in the
press.
Will Senator Frank Church and his
committee really stand still for a new,
unilateral privilege allowing executive
witnesses to decide when their appear-
ance is "appropriate?" Is the committee
going to forget about evidence sought
from Kissinger long ago but not sup-
plied? One such item is a desk calendar
that might show whether C.I.A. offi-
cials were truthful when they said
8
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Kissinger never called a halt to the
coup attempts begun in Chile in
September, 1970.
The Senate committee's seriousness
will also be tested by Richard Nixon's
attempts_ to set terms for his appear-
ance. He says he must be questioned
in California, by just two committee
members, and he reserves the right
to invoke "executive privilege." Two
courts have already given short shrift
to the notion that he retains any such
privilege. He is subject to subpoena
like anyone else. Is the Church com-
mittee afraid to issue one?
There are questions for the House
of Representatives, too. Its intelligence_
committee has subpoenaed vital evi-
dence on covert actions from Secretary
Kissinger, and moved to hold him in
contempt for failing to produce it.
But there is talk that the House leader-
ship plans to kill the contempt
citation. Is that true?
And why is the House committee's
chairman, Otis Pike, not moving to
extend the artificial January deadline
for its work? There 'have been delays
beyond the committee's control, and
the deadline is now quite unrealistic. If
it were lilted, Secretary Kissinger and
others would have to take the House
inquiry's requests for information
more seriously.
The press also has some questions
to answer. It rises in a chorus of out-
rage when a judge prohibits stories
that might prejudice- the defendant in
a criminal trial. But it yawns when the
Secretary of State and the President
try to keep the public from learning
facts crucial to an understanding of
the way ? America operates in the-
world.
Time magazine., which did hard
investigating in Watergate, dismissed
the Senate committee's assassination
report in a page, devoting its cover to
shopping. Most of the press let the
subject drop after a first flurry of -
stories. A week later the Washington
Post began pursuing some intriguing
clues in the report, such as the indica-
tion that Nixon was roused to covert
warfare on Chile by his friend Donald
Kendall of Pepsi-Cola.
Congressional investigator of co- -
vert activities remarked sadly the
other day: "We get all kinds of pres-
sure not to do things?and almost
none to go on with our job." Why are
Congress and the press so much more
pliant now than they were in Water-
gate?
One reason is a natural respect for
secrecy in the nation's intelligence
services, though in fact plots to mur-
der foreign leaders or overthrow their
governments are not "intelligence."
But there is also a personal reason.
Henry Kissinger is a genius at soften-
ing up legislators and journalists?at
co-opting them. One person on Capitol
Hill said:
"Every time we get close- to a nerve,
we find that it leads to Kissinger. And,
then, soon, we get the pressure to
protect him."
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NEW YORK TINES
2 Dec. 1975
ROSENBERG FILES
TO BE RELEASED
Justice Agency and the C.I.A.
Waive $35,00* in Fees
WASHINGTON, Dec. 1 (UPI)
?The Justice Department and
the Central Intelligence Agency
have waived nearly -$35,000 in
search fees for release- of the
files on the convicted atom
spies, Julius and Ethel Rosen-
berg, officials said today..
?The Justice Department said.
it ?was waiving $20,458 in
search fees because of the.
"public interest and historic,
significance" of the espionage'
case. The C.I.A., meanwhile,
disclosed that it waived last
week its $14,155.30 fee on 953'
pages of Rosenberg documents.
The Rosenberg?. sons, Roberti
and Michael, won a Federal
court order releasing the files
under the Freedom of Informa-
tion' Act. But . they have been
unable to 'pay the large fees
for searching through the files,
and 'copying them. ? t ? ? -
Both. the- Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the C.I.A. had
said anyone seeking copies of
the' ,documents ? would have to
pay a copying charge of 10
cents a page. But Deputy Attor-
ney General Harold R. Tyler.
Jr. said he had ordered the
search fee waived after receiv-
ing several requests.
Mr. Tyler- said, "The Rosen-
berg, case is close to being
unique in terms of both current
public interest and .historical-.
significance. . -
?
"I . am convinced that my,
action is in the public interest;
in this particular case inasmucli
as release of these re-cords
benefit the general public fari
more than it will any individual
requester." ,
"In taking this- action," he,
said; "I wish to affirm my
belief that public examination
of. these records will . demon-
strate beyond reasonable doubt
the integrity of the investiga-
tive, prosecutorial and judicial
processes as they were carried
out in the Rosenberg se." -
The Rosenbergs were electro-
cuted in 1953 after being con-
victed of passing atomic secrets..
to ? the Russians.* Their -sons.-,
who use the name: Meerepok
which is the name. of. their
adoptive parents, had: not re-
quested the waiver . but had,
threatened court action' to get
the. charge -removed.
The waiver requests were
made by Prof. Allen Weinstein,
a professor of history at Smith
College, and by: reporters for
The Washington Star and The
Washington Post.
? Mi.: Tyler ordered the F.I3-.L
to make the papers available
as soon as possible to all who
wish. to see themm. The entir.
bureau file consists of about
29,000 pages.
The F.B.I. had already waivedP
a charge' for the time that ex=
ecutives ? spent reviewing . the
documents to remove informa-
tion that would encroach on
the privacy of innocent persons.
.inci other matter exempted by
'the Freedom of Information Act.
Tyler said this charge
'2ifoUld have totaled $215,000.
NEdi YORK TIMES
5 Utt., 1975
ROSENBERG FILES
OF CU RELEASED
? ?
Growth of Soviet At-omit
Research and: Reports ?v.
' Fuchs - Described
4;
- ByPETERtIHSS,
Special to The-NewTork rimer
WASHINGTON, Dec. 4-4
initial- batch of 894.: pages
Central Intelligence Agency
files have been released on
the 25-year-old case that sent,
Julius and Ethel Rosenberg to
their deaths for plotting atomic
spying in behalf of the Soviet
Union.
'A look at the documents,
releaied under the Freedom of
Information Act suit brought
by the Rosenbergs' two sons
hoping' to clear their parents'
names,..supplied.some footnote*
to history today at a Rosslynct
Va., C.I.A. office. r
They included the following:,
? IlTwo. pages. of a study of
Soviet military intelligence,.
contending that the Soviet's.
atomic quest started relatively
unplanned; as a result of pre.
World War II_ Comintern re-
cruitment Of scientists for
foreign Communist fronts:, By
1943, the study' said,. Soviet
officers were receiving detailed
informati6a.on atomic reatearcii,
by their allies?England, Cana-,
da and the United-States.
/IA 1960 report from a source
in East Germany on Dr.-Klaus
Fuchs, termed in the other stue.'
.dy the first :atomic spy for
, the' Soviet military, 'asserting"
that he carried out "extensive
calculations for. a breeder reac-
tor with a relatively high burn-
out of about 60 percent" while
in prison in Britain:
? 9A C.LA. report to the Fe;
-deral ?Bureau of Investigatio
dated 'May .19, 1950;., citing 'a
Nail security booklet as having
listed Dr. Fuchs before the 1941
German invasion of the Soviet
Union as an "extremely clang
rous ? securitV- risk" who might
be used by the Russians. _
, ? -.Start of friveltigafiOns ?
? Dr: Fuchs had worked at
the Los Alainos, N.M., ?atomic
bomb project,- as a,,: German
refngee with the British scienti-
fic mission. His volunteered spy.
confession led to his-. arrest
in England Feb. 2, 1950; and,
a 14-year prison term, and set
off American investigation;
that led to the Rosenberg case...
Harry Gold, a Philadelphia
chemist, . was -:arrested as the
agent to iehom,?Dr. Fuchs_ gave
information. This led to the.
arrest ..of David Greenglass, a
wartliffeArr?irtilichinisl., toil
Alamos, for giving 'data to Mr.!
Gold, Mr; Greenglass identified
Julini .ROsenberg, his brother-
in-law, Ethel Rosenberg;.i
his sister,- as other alintacts.
The"' newly released do-.
cumen*showed that the C.LA..
tried=tot-tritce AnatolliC Yakov-
lev, ''agOnst, whom -the- Rosen-
berg_ iictictinent",-is still: out
standlit es3vIr:NZold's spy sa-
periot?.--TIfte agency'rePorted Mr
YakCjilet,eivholeft.-tbe united
Statesjittei serving *as-,Soviet
vice cdristil in New York, fro
1941 tct-I948; had become vice
consul in Paris.
A June 29, 1962, C.I.A. report,
long after the 1953 electrocu-
tions of the Rosenbergs, said
that the Soviet official's true
name- was Yatskov, that he
served in France from 1946
to 1948 as a_ scientific and
technical intelligence officer,
and that he then returned to
the Soviet Union,- where he
got' into some, unexplain
troubles "because of- relatives
and then wound up in an intel-
ligence "illegals directorate'
- chs CpBed likttfr.
An April s I960;: C.I.A., do-
cument said. that Dr. F?chs
Jutcl recently- been appointed
deputy director of the Central,
Physics Institute for Nuclear,
Physics in, Dresden; East Ger--
many. - , "
He was termei "still- a- briP,
liant scientst...dedicated
cally.to cOrrununi.cm...now mat--
tied- to devout Communist
seven years his senior." _..
"Fuchs is now very bitter;
as a result: of his years im
British prison and: has corn-I,
pletely.withdrawn himself front
sobial .1Contacts in. Dresden,'
the repott _ ?
TheJ winding Qtratia'ot.,thei
investigations were indicated
by l-Feb.?21, 1950, C.I.A. me-
morandum to the F.131.-, report-
ing that an informant whose
name,,is blanked out had told
or an incident- of Dr. Fuchs's
last trip' to the United,- States
which he "now considers im-
portant"- ?
"Fuchs had borrowed a hat
from an accnieintance," the me-
morandum - rebated. "When
Fuchs- forgot it,, the acqualin-
tance refused to, pick up 'the{
hat at-a certain restaurant and
insisted that' it be brought over
by [thef-r.blanifed,!out name]."
Newly:'released d
cuments here include an
with Dr. J. ,Robert Oppen-
heimer, director of the Los Ala-
mos atomic bomb project, call-
ing Dr. Fiichs's wartime "scien-
tific contributiOns commendab-
A March -9, 1964, me-
marandum reported that in
"usually ? reliable" informant,
had reported that "ail the So-
viet state security personnel
involved in the Fuchs case -in
England received awards." "
Thea material was obtained
by the Rosenberg sons, Michael
and Robert Meeropol, who won
the release yesterday of 29,000
pages of F.B.L data on the
case.
9
NEW Nov.ORK TIMES
23 v 1975
CAMPUSES ASSAIL
CIA'. RECRUITING
Efforts to Enlist Minorities
Protested at U.C.L.A.
By EVERETT R. HOLIES
Special to. The New Tort Times
SAN DIEGO, Nov. 22?The
Central Intelligence Agency's
renewed efforts to recruit
blacks and other minority stu-
dents at large. universities has
led to protest rallies and picket
lines on three campuses of the
University of California.
Faculty members joined stu-
dent demonstrators this week
in San Diego, Los Angeles and
Berkeley, demanding not only
expulsion of on-campus agency
? l'c'ruiters but also "full disclo-
sure and unznedia* cancella-
; tfon. of all-other ,assoCiatione
with the agency. ?
; _Z...The7 intensified 'recruiting of
; ferialoritY? -students:- for`. foreign
I Work, --ordered by
1,Wilijam E, Co1y.the -outgoing
Director of 'Central Intelligence
'because Of need. for C.I.A.'S
I staff ..to' reflect; the -diversity
qt American: society," centered-
. on ,the three, campuses, 3vher
the. -agency has enountpre
:Aarp hostility in the past.:
The agency has nat.:changed
rembuiting techniquei, a
i spokesman said in Washington.
"We. have about a doze
!regional recruiting offices, as
i before, across the, counary," he
,said. -"We place ads in college
!newspapers; we work' through
?college-placement 'agencies, and
*have a fair number of walk'
;Mt, The sal* as it has been
;since the inchOtion ?of the agenf.:
.The spoke smarr'aid that ap-
plications were "way up."
I -I The most forceful
!action came on the San. Diego
campus Tuesday when the fa-
culty Senate, with support from
ithe Black Studies Third College
land- tbe Center for Chicano
)-Stu, dies, mailed out ballots to
700 members for a referen
fclInn on severing all ties with
:tlia agency, incIttding anSx fund,-
activities as well as recruit;
t rnivemity officials denied the
iexTstence of any agency-fi--
!Inknced projects on the campu
4
Jas.
A straw vote taken. at an'
earlier faculty meeting showed
f6pr out of-six of those attend:
.ing opposed to what speakers
?Eletiounced as "this shocking
invasion of the campus by an
;agency of Proven involvement
an, political assassination and
;other insidious ations."'
;
At Berkeley, 300 sturents and
faculty _attended two rallies in
:Sproul Plaza, organized; by a
'coalition of student organiza-
tions that passed resohnions
condemning the presence of the
agency recruiters "on campus
'and demanding repudxaticnofj
'all connections with agency
programs. -
picket line Was set up
arciund the campus placementj
office where minority students1
wera,? intetyiew.ed. t2t
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:Thurs., Nov. 27, 1975 Xoit Sitgeleg Zanies
Students in Saxon Melee Face Ouster.
UC San Diego Orders Probe of CIA Recruiting Fracas
SAN DIEGO?Students' DIEGO?Students whq,
roughed up University of California'
President David Saxon during. a
,to UC Sari. Diego Tuesday face-we-I'
"hie' probation: and perhaps clismrse4.,
university officials said Wednesday.
- Saxon, who, was jostled and spat
upon during a demonstration protest-
ing his refusal to ban Central Intel-
ligence Agency recruiting on cam-
pus, said he was "both saddened and'
shocked" by the incident.
"I abhor the recently revealed re-
prehensible activities carried out by
members of that agency (CIA) in the
name of 'national security," Saxon.
said in a statement issued Wednesday.
"But I abhor even more the vi-
olence done to reasoned discussion-on
the San Diego campus in the male erf:.:
righteousness_ - ,,, ? , -
"I refuse to acknowledge that even
the most Proper ends' are served by
iuchimproper means; esperially_so at
positions '-' '
: $peakers at the Berkeley rat
lies included State Assembly',
Man _Kenneth Meade,;'several
;Professors and leadersof th
Aisociated Students Council
the Education Liberation.Fon
he Sparticus YoUttcl---LeAu
xrd the Peace- and Ireedo_
4SY.
...: 7.-
IA: -;;i': ._,Affice Is PiCketed
1:_ ,
t Two' rallies - were. held. 0
II* LoS Angeles campus virlie
10.01students- picketed the rd
clad VolunteereService Office?,
110 up 'at the U:C.L.A. Griduatel
tchool of -Management: ::for
'j
job interviews. ? -
Winston Doby of- the vice)
rncelloes office defended the f
gency recruiting `before one;
Ethe meetings. .. s ,4
,"We have to recognfze, thei
iIA. is a. legitimate agenCy';
nyerned? by the San*, -emplay4
int rules asther.govem7,4
int agency ,7 htSaidr. '-, :'1?_.1
Tba. campu&protests: eruPte&I
klIntriiit the ' diselosure-'iliat,
administrative' 'representative*
and Los
the San Diego, Berkeley
nd Los Angeles campuses had
attended a: conference on Oct.
23 and 24 at the C.I.A.'s head-
quarters in 'Langley, Va., in
response to an- Aug. 23 letter
from Mr. Colby to the Universi-
ty of California's president, Dr
David Saxon. -- .
Mr. Colby asked specifically
for representation from the.
three-Campuses because of their
heavy minority enrollments, ex-
plaining that although ?the gen-
eral volume and quality of
applicants for C.I.A.' emplq-'
ment has never been higher,'
the agency was having difficulty
in attracting young people from
the minorities. - . 1
Members of the Faculty Sen-
ate acknowledged that, what-;
' ever the outcome of their mail
refenrendum, it would have no
binding force on the University!
administration. ' .
the- university; where intellectual
freedom is of central importance."
Saxon said he was "ashamed" of
the. "attack, on the integrity of our
commiinity",-and "estecially ashamed
that it wasyneCessary for me to leave
in-a-police car."
William McElroy, UCSD chancel-
lor, said he had. ordered his vice
chancellor to investigate the incident
and recommend probation or possible.
dismissal for the students involved.
- Saxon was surrounded by jeering
students Tuesday as he walked from
a meeting he had agreed to on the
gymnasium steps to answer questions-
of students and staff. _
A campus security officer said
there was no indication of trouble be-
forehand but that tension mounted as
Saxon answered questions about pos-
sible CIA recruitment on. the campus.
? As Saxon walked away toward a
classroom to address an Aracirmic -
Senate meeting, his way was blocked
at timesty students withlockeciarms. ?
? One student Spat at hint and one
tore at his coat. Campus police
formed a wedge- and ,forced- a way,
through the crowd for him. One offi-
cer said Saxon appeared shaken but
maintained his composure ,
The demonstrators, chanting
CIA slogans and waving signs, forced
'their way- into the room where the
Academic Senate was meeting, forc-
ing the session to end abruptly. .
Saxon, followed by students, was
guided through a side door by plain-
clothes campus police who took him
away in a police car.
During the confrontation on the
gymnasium steps, Saxon did not say.
whether the CIA had recruited at.
UCSD. He did say he would not set
himself up as-"a moral God to others" ?
and would not Interfere with the,:
right of citizens to choose for them--
selves what. is moral or proper.' In
reference to the CIA; he said the
alPlicY was "a PerfecArlegal
Zation*. ?
4gerfey,
?
1.02kostam
?
,..Faculty._ at UC - San Diego-__,
Rejects Move Against CIA
- Front a Titeies
? SAN DIEGO?Faculty members
have-rejected a resolution calling for
a halt Central Intelligence
'Agency' activities att?-_XC San Diego
and a fultdisclosure of all CIA opera-
, tions at University of California cam-
puses, a UC San Diego spokesman an- -
-nounced Saturday. ? -
- The action.- camk: four days after
UC San Diego students protesting the
, CIA's presence on campus jeered and'
spat on UC President David Satin
during-an outdoor discussion of the
CIA's role there.
After the confrontation, a meeting
between Saxon and the university's
Academic Senate was disrupted by
students who forced their way into
the conference room, causing Saxon
to be escorted off campus in a police
car.'
The defeated resolution was *Put to,
the faculty for a mail vote after fa-
' culty critics of the CIA assailed the
agency's campus minority recruit-
tient program. They charged the
CIA with being "at the center of the
corruption of this society."
10
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Staff. WM.,?
The controversy was fueled by dis-
closures that outgoing CIA Director.
William E. Colby invited administra-
tors from UC San Diego, UC Berke-
ley and UCLA to Washington to dis-
cus the agency's recruiting needs..
Faculty and student critics of the
CIA's campus involvement have
sought the banning of all activities
by the agency at UC schools'. ?
San Diego's Academic Senate had
asked Saxon to form a statewide
committee to look into and make
public the CIA's UC functions, and
Saxon's ill-fated appearance before
the body Tuesday was to discuss that
request.
Saxon has emphasized the agency
is "a perfectly legal organization" but
added he would not "interfere with
the rights of citizens to choose for
themselves what-is proper."
UC San Diego- Chancelor William
McElroy was not available for com-
ment on the ballot results released
Saturday but is on record as defend-
ing the CIA's campus presence.
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XIS angebtg Cim Sun., Nof.30,1975
An Attack on theThiversiiy-
A:university is a sanctuary of the intellect. The
suppression of ideas by force, even those ideas we
think are fraught with death, is alien to the spirit-
and 'purpose -of a. university-, where intellectual dis-
caiirSe must be free from coercion.
The-point would be clear enough- tO 'students of
the-University of California at San _Diego had the
po..* invaded the campus to stop their discussion
Of: -the Central Intelligence Agency and ban their
demonstration against the agency.
But the attack on the integrity of the university
originated within the community itself and caine
frOnla minority of students who shoved their way
into a classroom and forced an adjournment of an
Academic Senate . meeting with University Pres-
ident- David Saxon. Ten campus policemen had to
form .a protective guard for Saxon to get him safely
throiigh the crowd of protesting. students and
had to leave the campus in a police car.-
The issue was the volatile one of possible-CIA re---
cruitment on the- campus, and Saxon, before meet-
ing-with the AcademirAenate, stopped to answer:
questions from- the students on the steps of the?
school's gymnasium. His position that the CIA was -
a 'legal- organization. with a legal right to recruit on,.
- campus brought a chorus of obscenities- from. the,.
protesters.- One student spat at him and another"
:tore at his? coat.- -
Saxon - who demonstrated-hiS: Own commitment.,
academic freedom - by quitting- the university
'-'-rather -than .Sign aloralty oath in the McCarthY
era, told the-students he would not, set himself up
as a "moral God to others" and would not "interfere.
with the right of citizens to choose for themselves
what is moral or proper."
. Saxon later said, "I abhor the recently revealed
:reprehensible activities" of the CIA, but he added in
reference-to the protesting students, "I refuse to ac-
knowledge that even the most proper- ends are -
servedhy such improper means, especially so at the
university where intellectual freedom is of central
importance.". , ? '
. That should be the first lesson taught at-any uni-'
verSity, and-ft should be reinforced by the example:
-..?of those who have Jong left the universities and
hold-positions of power in this society. . _
Christian Science Monitor
25 November 1975
CIA on campus
Given the recent unsettling revelations of
abuse of power 135, the FBI and CIA, it is
understandable that some students-and fee--
ulty members at -several University-of Cal-'?
ifornia branches are protesting Central In-
- teiligence Agency recruiting on campus-'
-While protesters certainly hare- a. right to
voice their opinion, we think they tniss
essential point. _ . -
For too many years the FBI and CIA tended-
to be staffed largely by persons of similar
background. There was too little room for
dissent or any questioning of the activities that-
eventually got these departments into so much
trouble. While there has been a recent trend to
upgrade the status of women and include more
minorities in government, the intelligence!
agencies lagged behind and thus missed out on .
_ a valuable segment of societii. -
A comparison can be made- to militari-
officer training programs on campus. Now
that antiwar ? sentiment has died down and?
many schools have divested themselves of the',
research contracts which brought with them a-
'degree of financial dependence on the federal
government, it is interesting to note that
ROTC programs_ are enjoying renewed inter-
est ? particularly among women andminor-
ities.
Like the military services, intelligence-
agencies should, as outgoing CIA director
William Colby_ recently said, _ "reflect the
diversity of American society." Too, there is-
no reason why departments, of government-
should not have the same access to potential
employees as private corporations. Having
CIA representatives on campus could afford
an opportunity for skeptics to probe the extent
to which the agency is getting its house in
order, as well as provide direct and valuable
criticism to the CIA.
-The rebuilding of confidence in government
could well be aided by Such things as CIA
recruiting on the nation's campuses.
1
THE NEW
YORK TIMES, TUESD'AY,-goirEMBER ZS, 1975
C.I.A. Seeks Money to Repair Leaks
ByLMACHARLTON
sPeeimiq Th? Kw Tort mu
1.
WASHINGTON, Nov. 24?
The Central Intelligence
Agency, a harried homeown--
er of latc,'.,js worried about
leaks?antribout cracks. in
its foundatiork-wo_rn linoleum
in the cafeteri& and deterior-
ating curling In the parking
lot.
These , sant' details were
disclosed in an application
for 26.3 million worth of
building repairs filed by the
agency with the House Public
WorksCommittee Nov. 3.
They docinnent the condition
of the $49 headquar-- -
ters', completed. in 1962, that
is situated on, 201 -wooded,.
fenced, guarded and secluded
acres .in McLean, Va., eight
miles-from downtown. Wash-
ington., I -
_ agency spokesman,
asked if IV would be possible
to have photographs taken
of some of the items-needing
repair, laughed and said
that the building was, indeed,
"falling down," but that se-
curity was not. No press pho-
tographers have ever been
allowed in, he said, and none
will be now.
'
The application said that
the headquarters had en-:
dured more thin- a normal ?
burden_ of ? wear and tear. -
"This facility has been in -
use continuously 24 hours
a day, 365 days A year for
more than a 'decade," it said.
Other ft Listed-
The' largest single _
$2,350000-is far
, tiro -0 -air' automatic fire
sptinkier system, to meet- re- ,
vised 'Federal- fire- safety'
standards. An additional
$495,000- is sought to install:
electrostatic precipitators on
the chimney' stacks, to com-
ply with environmental
protection regulations.
The parking lots need new, ,
lighting, and, in spots, new-
roadways' or curbs; elevators.
, require overload alarm's, and,
the dining and kitchen areas,
? need- $75,000. Worth- of new:
linoleum and ? "refurbish-.
ment," the C.L. said.
With such little extras- as
$8,500 for a sewer connec-
tion, $363,000 for new- heat-
ing lines and $907,000 for
new heating and cooling sys-
tems, it all adds up to $6..3
million.
The site of the headquar-
ters is no secret. On several
of the surrounding highways,
there are signposts reading
`!C.I.A.," and Suburban buses
' stop at its gates. But the
buildings?there is a huge
. central building plus several
Much smaller ones?cannot
be:, seen, The agency bought
up... adjacent acreage when
it was learned that there
were.: plans to.., build apart-
Meg buildings that would
? offer tenants an unauthor-
? ized view of the C.LA.
The alteration application,
which requires committee ap-
proval, does give some bare
facts and figures. It cost the
Government $36.3 million to
? acquire the land and existing
buildings; it costs $3.8 mil-
lion annually for operation,
maintenance and repair, and
the agency estimated that
the :"renovated facility"
. would have a . "useful life"
of 40 years. ,
There is, . the application
said, about one million
square feet of "occupiable"
space. What it does not state
is the number or parking
spaces_ for employees, or
even for visitors. The C.I.A.
does not disclose how many
people work for the agency,
but it is unofficially estimat-
ed that there are 12,000 em-
ployees at the headquarters.
11
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THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
Monday, December 1, 1975
spies
co
In the shadowy worldwide?
struggle between intelligence arid
counterintelligence agencies, the
Soviet Union's KGB is expanding
steadily (it now numbers an esti,'
mated 300,000, sources say) even
while the U. Central Intelligence
Agency faces a continuing-barrage
of investigations and headlines.
Here is an inside look at the
KGB through the eyes of veteran
U.S. intelligence sources.
_
By Benjamin Welles -
Special to The Christian Science Mon-itor
' Washington
Almost a year ago the KGB, the huge SovieT
espionage conglomerate, -received- a totally unex:
pected bonus in its seesaw battle with the CIA, its
American rival. -
CIA Director William E. Colby fired ,James
Angleton, the veteran counterespionage chief, and
three senior deputies in a power .struggle marked
by press leaks of suspicious accuracy from the
CIA's highest levels. Mr. Angleton was a veteran of
31 years who had helped detect such top KGB spies
as Harold "Kim" Philby and George Blake.
According to Mr. Colby's associates, Mr. Angle-
ton was too Independent and too intent on
expanding his authority. Moreover, it is said he had
developed intimate cooperation -with Israeli in-
telligence, one of the world's best, and both Mr.
Colby and Henry A. Kissinger had decided to wrest
this plum back for themselves.
The abrupt dismissal of Mr. Angleton and his
three top aides ? Raymond Rocca, Newton Miler
and William Hood ? represented the loss of more
than 100 years'combined experience in possibly the
Approved For Release 20
e coid
most secret aspect of U.S. Government operations:
counterespionage. Without it there can be no true
security.
For the last year the CIA and its sister
intelligence agencies have been reeling between
internal sqUabbles, press exposes, and vice-presi-
dential and congressional investigations. ?
What his the KGB been doing in the meantime?
"Expanding steadily," say those in a position to
know. Moreover, it has been maintaining a highly
professional silence. There was, for instance, no
gloating over the CIA's discomfiture: The con-
trolled Soviet press merely reprinted brief news
extracts.
KGB remains powerful
A huge, rich, and powerful bureaucracy, the
KGB numbers 300,000 including border police and
internal security detachments. Created in the
1920s, even before the Red Army, it is the
U.S.S.R.'s "senior" service and; despite various'
name changes, has remained all-powerful. Its
chief, Yuri Andropov, holds Politburo (Cabinet)
rank. Its colleague service, the GRU, the arm of
military intelligence, is smaller,defers to the
KGB, and in fact is headed by an ex-KGB officer,
Piotr Ivanovitch Ivashutin.
Between the KGB and the CIA there is a
'fundamental difference, specialists note. The CIA
is licensed by the 1947 law creating it essentially to
-conduct espionage, counterespionage, and political
subversion overseas ? not against Americans at
home. From recent congressional exposures, how-
ever, it would appear that the law has been violated.
.by successive CIA directors. One of them, Richard
Helms, told Congress recently they "made their
-legal peace" with such-violations.
-- The KGB, by contrast; is empowered both to
police 200 million Soviets at home and also to carry
out abroad espionage, counterespionage, dis-
information and "wet affairs" (Soviet jargon for
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personal?Violin-et-1r: Itffiniit?WartYpett -orapies:
"legals" and "illegais." * ?
, The. "legals" have official cover inside em-1
itassies.trade, or airline offices, or even as Soviet;
newsmen. The "illegals" are the "moles", who,
korrov?,- deep and stay hidden deep in various,
private guises for years iintil activated. The better.,
trained are virtually undetectableunless beirayectl
;by defectors, and their numbers are unknovim The
UlegalSizhnwevert are easier to follow,
**- '
ii
Numbers rising-1n-
_
*CtIficAT9,-,:intel4gence.*J,959,b4,d?O0i
KGB legali outside die Soviet union* addloday haiti
its eyes ort,' perhaps, 9;000. in the alone thet
United Nations, Washington,.and in Soviet offices'.
across the Country, there were some 300 knownT
legals in 1959; today there are at least 900:
"Presumably with this constant rise in numbers*:
they must begetting more results," said ayestem,
Ever since 1959, specialists, say, the KGB has
been cooperating closely with services it has
trained to high proficiency, such as the ones in:
Cuba, Hungary; Romania, Czechoslovakia, and.
Poland:. Each service relentlessly seeks recruits.;
among its own ethnic refugees lathe
The Western' intelligence - comintinity using
metieulous, record,keeping such as lime-testecE
passport Mardi; Can often track KGB officers-T,
from post to rpost despite false names?'?even,
false beards : Their operating methocisdre closeir:
studied.
_ .
. The KGB has a-simplistic Slogan'. "Any Amer.'
-icon Can be bought'," said an experienced observer.'
The annual Visit of more. than 130,000 American:
tourists to the-U.S.S.R. makes recruiting, easier.-,i
although the KGB's main interest lies in American!
officials, such as code clerks or diplomats with
access to government information. College-age
Americans ideologically hostile to their own
administration also are sought as long-term pene-;
tration agents into key government divisions such'
theIBior
?=-- By rough rule_of thinti?-Weiterd intelligence
Officials estimate that 44 percent of Soviet citizens
abroad areen KGB aOignment.'wby scinianyt
Essentially they say,-because espionage is
relatively -cheap and highly Cost-effective, Its
economic and' militarybenefits to the..U.S.SR arel
incalculable -- and often overlooked:-
By-stealing U.S. military and secrets.
the U:S.S.R: can save billions otrubles,,Minpower,,.
and time,: and thus concentrate It& Lhilted re-/
sources on, -keeping, military.;:'paritv_if not
superiority with the U.S Without effectivejan
continuing esliOnage.:(Moscow?woold fitll:
gerously behind the richer and more lthi
,adiranced
-tr
IVELTIMORE
21 NOV
_
Christ versus Castro
tirashinotonitireauoil7se sun" ?
? r
Washington?Thomas Parrott, a CIA officer, gave his:
sarcasm full rein in testifying before the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence Activities about Gen. Edward
Lansdale, a non-CIA man brought in by President Kennedy'
to oversee the agency's major covert action program.,''
"I'll give you one example of Lansdale's perspicacity,"
Mr. Parrott said in testimony. "This plan consisted of
spreading the word that the Second Coming of Christ was
imminent and that Christ was against:Castro [who' was an-
. ti-Christ. .
"And you.wcrald spread this word around Cuba, and then
on whatever date it was, that there would be a manifesta-
tion of this thing. And at that time?this is absolutely true
?and at that time just over the horizon there would be an
American submarine which would surface off of Cuba and'
send up some starshelLs. And this would be the manifesta-
tion of the Second Coming and Castro would be over--
thrown.. . Well, some Wag called this operation... Elimi-
nation by illumination." _
Approied-Por 'Release 2001/Cf8108 :
Deti3tie1 Cam- etie ta thel
political leaders in Washington and Moscow; sayl.
the experts; to the intelligence professionals, it.'
means nothing-Theirwork goes on, irrespective of;
political climates. Soviet dignitaries who meet U.S.':
industrialists, bankers, politicians, union leaders,:,
or artists are either ? KGB. graduates or on KGB
assignment.2----
- One-typical example iSAlekszoidie Shelepin whO4
-has successively headed the Young Communists
(Komsomoll, the.KGR and, litterly;--.thesocallecli
Soviet trade union Movement_ In this. latest role
mission was to penetrate, and -destroy- th
.ICFM the noncoirtinuntsk hiterriatiOnif- trad
linlimmOVernenr
-.:_eitensibly- Mr. Shele*n irai. retired "in dis-,
-grace" after a recent- visit to-Britain where his
sinister' fame led to noisy protests. But he is
reported active again in the KGB "illegals'"
directorate: - _ -
The only effective" answer to steady KGB-
expansion- is counterespionage,. say U.S. in-
telligence veterani: recruiting agents already in
the enemy service -.7 admittedly difficult rthough
not impossible- ? or luring- defectors for their
information...'-
During "Cold war'1990Sand' '60s; defectionsl
iiere frequent and helped the CIA-catch such-KGB,
spies as Philby and Blake in Britain, and others
NATO and WW ?
? ft was in-190.that the CIA's Mr. Angleton and hisli
staff aicertained on the basis of defectors! reports;
that Philby, the British embassy's liaison man inj
Washington, was a- top KGB agent. But successive;
British governments were loath tolbelievg it, wick!,
not Until 1963 philby's bluff end in hiS flight to-
Moscow-. Today, 25 years after his exposure,"
Philby is still "in," working for the KGB-
controlled-press service Novostiy on U.S. and-.
British developments His nemesis Mr. Angletori:
on the other hand is "out:"
_ Starting in the mid-1960s, however ? along withi
the U.S. escalation in Vietnam? defections such.
as the ones that unmasked Philby began fallingoff,,.'.
and with them authoritative insightinto the KGB::
MOredver the U.S. intelligence community began
squahblingwithinitself_ In. 1969 the late J.' Edgari
Hoover abruptly canceled all FBI liaison with-thea
CIA od counterespionage .because President John-.;
ion- had refused td- defend . him publicly againsti
senatorial charges that the FBI was tapping, the::
phones of U.S, senators. Mr. Hoover's pique ended
telephone taps on some 2,000 ot_raore Soviet "bloc":
_
personnel across the U.S. -
"-Maybe it was Vietnam, or the student riots, or.,
the race thing or exposure journalisth or Congress,
you nameit," said an experienced. inforinantii
?"but, since 4197,0-- or:a0.- we've-had. few _vaNab,,,"Tbe climate of i
defectors
defection liaiheen ruhred7
shouldaEGB officer Comeover to usiiciw? They'reri
rtmning eadiaintelligenceivork?anyway.."r4
WASia NGT011 STAR
2 3 NOV 197 5
,
Moscow Hits CIA Death Manning
_
Moscow?Radio Moscovt said yesterday that CIA;
plans' to assassinate foreign leaders, revealed in a;
Senate report were "contrary to elementary norms of?.
hunianityi.international law and morals."
The reaction to the report from Radia Moscow and'
'other:Soviet news media- came on the same day that;
the official press- crowed over the U.S. withdrawal of
its U.N,,resolution urging amnesty for the world's po-;:
!Meal -
:Tass, the Soviet news agency, said the revelatiOns
the ? CIA 'plots have resulted in 'sa-WaVeCifindignatiOn.
from the public in the United States' and added that
the assassination plots had "the approval o the White;
House." , -
,
13
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1:1AsiarGTCli POST
2 DEC 1975
Richard Hdrris UV"
Allen Dulles and the olitics of
Three yO,eritefte:r resignation
Director of Central Intelligence, Allen
Dulles was asked by iftiend if he Would
have been : teMake. the heat'si
during, the U-2. and Bay of Ptgs af-1:
fairs?to state ptiblicly$ and falsely,
that he alone had been ultimately
responsible for any errors of Secret
service committed in those times of
crisis.
"I've always felt," he replied, "that I
should assume full responsibility for
anything the Agency has done. I should
Shield and protect the President in any
way I can."
Were he alive today, Dulles might .
well stand before the Church Corn-
mittee and solemnly swear that he had -
never discussed CIA assassination plots:,
Mr. Smith, who served as a junior-,
intelligence analyst for the Contrail
Intelligence Agency in 1967-1968,,
is the author of a book. on the
World War If Office- of Strategic
Services. He is currently at work
on a biography of Allen Dulles. .
With Presidents Eisenhower. and
Kennedy. Given his personal ethic as a _
public servant in seven presidential.;
administrations, It is entirely, c-on-.-
ceivable that he, protect' the.1
reptitatiens. of those Chi:efi-executives,,3
even ,ir it were__ personally
barrassing, or to the, detriment of his.;
beloved ietelligence service.
But it is inconceivable that Dulles-
would have hidden such sensitive state;
secrets- from the President. "I am!
under his orders," Dulles. would often':
Say. "He is my boss." . -
No plots for political- murder could.,
have gone forward in CIA:without a'
"gentleman's agreement" between the.-
CIA chief' and his ?"boeik" -.Nor iWarit
Dulles one to shy away from raising the:
question-with the man on high if, under
extreme Circumstances, he felt the-
Practice. of assassination might serre.
the nationalinterest. - ? ? ,
He had struggled with this issue even-
before he took charge of CIA.
As chief of the OSS office in. Swit-'
zerland' during World War II, Dullee ?
Was approached by dissident Germans
of the Third ReiCh, who proposed to cut;
short the life of Adolf Hitler. With
Washington's knowledge and approval,...
he gave an encouraging wink to their ,
efforts. 'The plot ended, of course? in
failure.. . ?
_ .
Reflecting, After the' war, on that
he tqld an audience of the..
New York Bar Association that, iii a
totalitarian state, assassination might
be the only means available to over- -
throw a modern tyrant. Those words
werespoken.in 1947?weeks be.forethe..
LI Central Intelligence Agency came into
existence. Six years later,. Dulles
became its director;.:--'
Early ut his regime a visitingl;
West Gerniii general suggested to an
assembled groupof CIA executives that:
the Agency "liquidate". East Ger-'
many's Communist strongman Walter.
Ulbricht. An immediate objection was
heard from Richard Helms, the future ,
CIA director, then one of Dulles' to0:,
aides. POlitical murder, said Helms, :
was simply not a viable practice for an:
Intelligence service. But Dulles cut him.,
short. "Don't a' take my people toe:
seriously,' he told thegeneraL "We're'.
prepared to consider anything."'
Others at thetable tried to suppress k
grin. They knew Dulles would never!
give serious thought to having Ulbrick
killed; but hi was-always eager to
establith the reputation, of his Agencr
particularly among conspirators of the
Old Worldaorsinister expediency and'
derring-do'.. ; .
In reality, assassitiation was &ill
considered- --"counter-productive" by '
most practitioners of secret service.i
When CIA overthrew the left-wingi
Arbenz regime of Guatemala in 1954,
extreme care was taken to insure that
President Arbenz and his top advisera?
should,escape unharmed, lest they,
acquire political immortality throught
martyrdom. ' ? .!
? 4
The question was raised anew in 1957,1
after the Suez' debacle, when, Egypt's',
Nasser was Washington's bete noir or
the day.:After a dinner eparty at the
home of Walter- Lippmann, as the men,
were segregated-for brandy and cigars,
conversation turned to the "Nasser,
problem." ?
"Allen," said one of America's:
leading foreign correspondents with;
tongue-in-cheek, "can't . you find an.
assassin?" DulleS' face assumed Ai,
deadly. serious expression. Leant*
back in a large leather chair, he struckl
a match, lit his pipe, took:a few puffs,;
thee replied, "Well,: first you would'
need a fanatic, antaa who'd be willing::
to kill himself if-he were caught. And he.
couldn't be an outsider. HO have to be
an Arabi': Dulles .stoped and shook his
head in apparent consternation. "it,
would be very difficult to find just the
right man.7.
Mast of the listener i were astouricied
The usualrf-discreet Mr:Dulles, having
delivered a reasoned response toe..
.111,1Eai CA
31 October 1975
14
ssassina.tion
'rniiitild.jest, had shown.
nus _
consideration of political ni
? It wasn't long before Fidel' Castra;
outshone Nasser as leading political!
villain in Washington's eyes. At
President Eisenwhower's direction,.
CIA worked out a plan, on the
Guatemala model; for Castro's over-.
throw. Theobject of the operation, as it
followed a complex and confusing
course of development in the year
preceding the Bay of Pigs disaster, was
-to provoke a general insurrection,
throughout the island.
Dr. Richard Bissell, then chief ofi
CIA's Clandestine Services and Dullest
technical alter-ego ; presented to thel
director a scholarly dissertation on hoWi
this political upheaval was to be atei
complished, In Bissell's academie
scenario, the revolt would 'receive ani
enormous boost from Castro's demise:'
The Cuban dictator seemed more the
dynamic "evil genius" of his regime'
than Guatemala's Arbenz had ever,
been; his removal from the scene thus,:
presented a certain grisly logic. With
_ _ _
the Cuban Army. bereft of its com-
mander and thoroughly' -demoralized,
the.insurgents 1,vottld, in theory, have ani
open field.
. There was much about the finati
Cuban plan, particularly the militaryl
details of a half-baked 'invasion
strategy, that Dulles never fully
grasped. -But he did take a personal
,interest in Bissell's blueprint for;
revolution. Castro's assassination was'-
integral to that blueprint. Dulles un-
derstood that. And when he finally gave-
his nod to political murder, it could be,
only because he-had himself received a
green light?tacit or explicit?from
Divight Eisenhower and JohnKennedy.
Dulles 'might "consider ,a0thing" if
he felt it would preserveand protect the
imperialt ?powtr of'. the United States..
But he was too Politically astute, tom
dedicated- to-American representativei
government, to allow his Agency
to-
become a "rogue elephant,", hatching
plots abroad without the sanction of the,
nation's highest.elected official.
Allen Dulles liked to remind his aides
that he and they served at the pleasure
of the President. If his CIA committed
acts seen in-hindsight, as morally ,
reprehensible the final responsibility',
must be sought in the Oval Office
Colombia: The government has decided not to
renew the contract of the United States-owned
Summer Institute of Lirvatiistics, frequently
accused of acting as an information network
for the cr A. Its work will be taken over gradually
by Colombian scientists. Peru's attitude towards
the institute's activities is still under discussion.
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NEW YORK TIMES
2 7 ii0V 1975
Piffiab fo the Rescue
. By William Safiye
? WASHINGTON?For the fun of 'pub-.
licly examining the -spy. system we.
have called in from the cold, ,a blown.=,
cover charge must be paid: America's-
much-needed intelligence community is
rattled and _depressed, and finds' it
difficult to function.
In -White House offices, the word
"Piffiab" is heard in connection with
rebuilding the morale is well as the
control structure. of our intelligence
system. It is an extruded acronym of
the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board: PFIAB.
For years, this has been the most
blue-ribbon of all the boards and com-
missions that abound in Washington.
Its monthly sessions . are regularly
attended by a dozen of the nation's
most respected citizens,- including -
inventor Edward"Landl scientist Ed-
ward Teller, publisher Gordon Gray, .
lawyer Leo Cherne, writer Clare Booth
-Luce and ex-everything George Shultz.
Unfortunately, Piffiab in-the past six
years has been dominated by Henry
-Kissinger through Nelson ,Rockefeller,
a member before becgrning Vice Presi-
dent; its staff and budget are-small, its
oversight .capability theteby limited,.
? The idea -now is to change all that
by bringing in a few more prestigious
people and giving the board much
more to do. A few weeks- ago, Presi-
dent Felt intended to expand the
board to fifteen members, including
? 411.ane Kirkland, secretary-treasurer
of the A.F.L.-C.I.O., the number two
man in organized labor ind well-
'versed in C.I.A. alfairs after his serv-
ice on the C.I.A. investigative -panel.
9John Connally, who had served on
Piffiab twice before, resigning ? when
he was indicted; in fairdess, acquittal
ought to be followed by reinstatement.
clEdward Bennett Williams, whose
representation of unpopular clients and
ownership of the embattled injury-.
ridden Washington Redskins uniquely
qualified him for C.I.A. involvement;
like Kirkland, Williams is a Democrat
?in fact, treasurer of the party. -
\ 9William J. Casey, retiring president
of the-Export-Import Bank, ex-S.E.C.-
head who Was one of the organizers
of' allied intelligence in World-War II.
White House. aides went over this
list-with Henry Kissinger, who will not
be criticized in this space on a national
holiday. The Secretary of State had
no objection to Williams, in whose box
he sits to cheer the Redskins on, or
to Connally, whose use of power he
had come to respect in years past, but
Kirkland and Casey were anathema.
Mr. Kfrkland's sin was in his fierce
denunciation of appeasement in the
name, of detente, and his warm ap-
proval'of some of Senator Scoop Jack-
son's speeches; worst of all?in State's
eyes?when Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn,
..came to Washington, the Soviet writer
was:the house guest of Lane Kirkland
, and his- Wife, Elena, who- is also Un-
ashamedly pro-Israel. ,
. Secretary Kissinger' gave no special .
-.reason far opposing Mr. Casey, bnt
House aides' assumed -that he cement?,
bered the work. of. the Murphy Coin-
mission: 017 that panel, Bill Casey was
one who insisted that the National
Security Adviser not also wear the
hat of a Cabinet officer: .
President Ford yielded to Kissinger
on, Kirkland, but not on Casey, who
had also been slated for Piffiab's
chairmanship to replace George W.
Anderson, the former Chief, of Naval
Operations. The President decided to
appoint Casey as. al member but to
keep Admiral Anderson on as chair-
- man; after the firing of James Schles-
inger,. it suddenly seemed a good idea .
to keep: aboard a man suspicious Of _
Soviet SALT intentions.
These appointments are scheduled to ?
be made. "between Peking' and Vail,"
In the- travel-marked White House
calendar, and will dovetail with some:.
far-reaching structural recommenda-
. tions about the scope of Directer of
Central. Intelligence's job and the de-
gree of intelligence .oversight to be
exercised within the executive branch.
An Office of Management and Budget'i
task force is now working on options
about the "nature of the assignment
George Bush has been nominated ,for..
This .is known as the "Option Three
routine!",: Option One will he to leave
the _
everything, e way, it is, with the
Director of Intelligence trying to play
the dual role of C.I.A. chief and over-
-all intelligence-community defender
(which is now impossible); Option Two-.
. will be to appoint -a White House in-
telligence czar (which would frighten
everyone and raise an uproar); and '
Option Three (which is the one. usually
chosen), to ask Congress to separate
the job of director from the job of
administrator of C.I.A.
That's not all. -Plans call for Piffiab's-
-staff to be beefed up so as' to handle,.
an important new source of informa--
tion: copies of all reports by the
spectors General- of the various
gence agencies. Every spook knows,.
how significant that would, be: Thet
Inspector General's report of May 21-,
1973, was the basis for almost all the
information brought out by all thesub--
sequent committees and commissions.
With such changes, and despite the
separate pressures of church and State,
America's intelligence system can -
come out of its bunker. We will better
be able to know what our opponents .
are doing- and how strong we need to
be. On this weekend, the prospect of -
having our intelligence community
again doing its job?and only its job?
is no small matter to be thankful for.
15
THE ECONOMIST NOVEMBER 29, 1975
CIA
Cloak, dagger,
poisoned cigars
Washington, DC
Which tactics are appropriate for a
western democracy to use in imple-
menting its foreign policy? Although
proud of constitutionalism and orderly
processes at home, is it entitled to fight
fire with fire overseas? If the KGB, the
Soviet "committee on state security",
employs methods of subterfuge, decep-
tion, covert intervention and even
assassination to achieve its goals, does
that mean that the western intelligence
services must respond in kind?
Difficult though they may seem to be
today, those questions had self-evident
answers for a generation of Americans
who felt that the United States had a
responsibility to go to the ramparts in
the cold war and hold back the com-
munists at every turn. Towards that end,
and towards an ordering of the world
that would comply with what were con-
ceived to be vital American interests,
almost anything could be justified.
So it was that high government of-
ficials, whispering and conniving and
talking in codes with the abandon of
children at play, plotted to take the
lives of Mr Fidel Castro, and Patrice
Lumumba who led the Congo for a
short time after its independence from
Belgium.
Those plots and the paraphernalia
for them?poison pens, tainted cigars,
exploding seashells, contaminated
diving suits and other playthings?were
detailed last week in an interim report of'
the Senate select committee on intelli-
gence. Although no official of the Central
Intelligence Agency could ever have
been found actually holding a symbolic
smoking gun, according to the report
the CIA men in effect loaded the
weapons and encouraged others to do
the dirty work. A foreign leader did not
have to be a communist or a pro-
communist to get such attention from
the CIA; he could have displeased
Washington in some other way, or even
have been a former friend.
The committee said that the agency
had also become involved in other plots,
albeit ones originated overseas, against
Rafael Trujillo, the dictator in the
Dominican Republic, Ngo Dinh Diem,
the president of South Vietnam, and
General Rene -Schneider, the chief of
staff of the Chilean army who refused to
block the accession of Salvador Allende
to his country's presidency and therefore
became a candidate for kidnapping by
American-supported right-wing elements.
Plotting was a bipartisan pastime,
and the names of Presidents Eisen-
hower, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon
all emerge sullied from the committee's
investigation. It is clear that assassina-
tion, and other forms of intervention
that stopped just short of it, were delibe-
rate aspects of national policy. What is
less clear is how direct and efficient
the chain-of-command really was?
whether presidents actually ordered
deathly deeds or were spared the un-
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pleasantness of doing so by intentional
vagueness and what the committee called
"circumlocution" in government com-
munications. Precise blame is thus dif-
ficult to assign.
The Senate committee, led by Mr
Frank Church of Idaho, released its
much-delayed report with a good deal
of fanfare and emotion. As television
cameras- whirred away, Mr Walter Mon-
dale, a Democrat from Minnesota,
said that the investigation documented
that "Americans are no good at killing
and lying and covering up?and I'm
glad that that's the case." The White
House made an unsuccessful last-minute
attempt to prevent publication of the re-
port, and Democrats in the Senate,
during ? a secret session, blocked any
vote on its release, lest the tally be too
close and thereby stir doubts about the
propriety of public disclosure of such
delicate information. But most mem-
bers of the committee remained de-
fiant. "There may be temporary in-
jury" from its publication, conceded Mr
Richard Schweiker, "but I believe
the countries of the world will recognise.
that our willingness to examine our
past and seek a better future openly,
without flinching, is an indication of the
greatness of our country."
Indeed, the importance of the unusual
document?peppered with codenames
and embarrassing euphemisms?lay
less in its substance, much of which
was already widely known, than in the
phenomenon of its publication. The
process is, in the view of Mr Henry
'Kissinger, the secretary of state, a simple
matter of "self-flagellation"; but as far
as the Senate committee is concerned,
it is a matter of high patriotism, a
demonstration of the resilience of the
system of checks-and-balances in the
American system of government. "The
story is sad", the committee concluded,
"but this country has the strength to
hear the story and to learn from it".
NEW YORK TINES
2 6 NOV 1975
Plots Report Draws Attention to Helms!
. -
By JOHN. M. CREWDSON
Special to The New York Ttmet
WASHINGTON, Nov. 25?The
Senate Select Intelligence-,Corn-
mittee's?report on assassination,
plots inspired by the Central;
Intelligence Agency against.
foreign leaders has served to
refocus attention on the record
cornpilectliy Richard M. Helms?
now the-American Arnbas.sadt*
to Iran,' during much of
26-year career wibr the agency.
The-- principal finding cori-
cerning Mr. Kelms the com-
mittee's long. :report, released
last ;week,. Was that, he had,
failed,' while a peputy Director
of the C.I.A., to inforrn?agencT
nqUWhite House, superiors ,of,
efforti to kill Prime Minister.
l.Fld1 Casiro of Cuba,.sornething,
the.' Senate ,:terined,
4gra7ve,-error in judgment." ?
-R0if Hessen, the Presidential.
press secretary, ' said ' fallowing
the report's release that Pres-
ident Ford had seen- nothing
in its findings that would cause
him to reconsider Mr. Helms's?
;continued service as Ambassa-
dor. A State Department
spokesman said today that he
had seen no indication of any
such reconsideration either.
Mr. Helms served. for. seven
years- as Director of 'Central
lIntelligence, the agincy's lop
post, before being named Am-
bassador in-1,972. .
The Rockefeller Commission,
set up by President Ford earlier
this year to inquire, into the
1C.I.A.'s domestic aCtivities,. cri-
ticized Mr. Helms in its report
last June for "poor judgment"
in destroying tape recordings
and ocuments that might have
related to the Watergate scan-
dals.
The commission said the
destruction was ordered after
Mr. Helms had received a re-
quest from Senator Mike Mans-
field of Montana, the majority
leader, to retain in agency files-
all materials of possible rele-
vance to the Watergate case.
"'Some of the C.I.A.:s activities,
including domestic surveillance
and the assassination plots, are
under study by Justice Depart-
ment prosecutors, who are also,
'according to department offi-
cials, examining for possible
perjury some of Mr. Helms's
testimony during his February
1973 confirmation hearings for
the Ainbassidorial post he now
hqlds. -
Mr. Helms told the- Senate
Foreign- Relations Committee
during those hearings that the
C.I.A. had never atteMpted to
overthrow the Chilean Govern-
ment of President Salva droAl-
lende Gossens or passed money
to political opponents of the
Marxist leader.
Testimony. About Hunt
_ Mr. Helms also told the com-
mittee that E. Howard Hunt
Jr., nne of the convicted Water-
gate conspirators, had not
anain_tainecita relatiOnship With
rthe?.,:c.i.A. -after Mr.-. Hunt, :s re-e
tirement as a C.I.A. officer i
'1970. '7'
Mr.- Helms,, else said, in an-
iviee to- a question; that -h
could not recall whether durin,?
his tenure, as director, the CIA.
had been asked to become in-
volved in an interagency effort
to share intelligence relating
to the anti-Vietnam war move-
ment in the United States.-
; A`I dont recall whether we
were asked," Mr. Helms, testi-
fied, "but we were not in-
volved, because it seemed to-
m that .this was a clear viol'a-.
tion of what our charter was."
The National Security Act of
1947, which 'established thei
C.I.A., prohibits any domestic'
police or surveillance 'Junctions
'
- '-'3u2st1ce .:Department lawyers
are understood to-be:comparing
those statements .by Mr. Helms
with subsequent evidence. that
Mr. Hunt received Unwitting'
assistance -frOm ,the C.I.A. in
the 1911. burglary of the Cali-
fornia office of Daniel Ell-
sberes psychiatrist, that the
spent: upwards $10
million in .an effort to over-'
throw the Allende Government;
and, that the ?C.I.A., under M.r.v.
Helms, was involved in the
surveillance of' domestic dis-
sidents. and -in formulating the
Nixon Administration's-- aborH
tive Huston- plan for broadened
domestic surveillance. .
One well-placed 'Justice De-
parenent source, asked about
it investigation of the eiridence
published in the Senate pan,el's
assassination report, indicated
that no determination on the
illegality of such plots had. yet
been made, and that in Mr.
Helms's particular case there
Was . "no law against lying"
to one's superiors in Govern-
ment.
The source predicted, howev-
er; that Mr. Helms would 'even-
tually "have to answer" for
some aspects of his conduct.
The Justice Department is
understood to .be reluctant to;
proceed with any prosecutions
stemming from, the alleged.
CIA. activities until lawyers
there obtain conies of the testi-
mony ':and*. evidence 'collected'
by the Senate intelligence com-
mittee, something that, Com-
mittee sources' have suggested,-
may not be.forthcoming.
One "committee aide said to-
day. however, that the panel,
did intend to turn over to the
department for investigation ,
some of .:.the conflicts in the
testimony produced by
in-
quiry.
A spokesman at the American
Emiossy-- in Tehran, said last
week that Mr. Helms would
have "no comment" on the '
findings made in the assassina-
tion report, -which included the
following: _
9That Mr.. Helms, follOWing
the unsuccessful iBay of Pigs
invasion of Cuba in April 1.961,
ordeied,the -reactivation e yi
effortv,in.olVing
derworld,,,figures? to kill Mr.!.
'Castro that had been. initiated 'j
irf.Cqnjunction With:the inve4
sion.;;Mr: Helms, the panel said,
did- not tell John McCone, then
the Director of Central Intel-
ligence, that the assassination
, effort had been renewed. Mr. if
IHelms was then/Deputy- Direc-
tor for plans: '
I 9That - Mr. Helms rjever''
stepped forward to correct the
record when, he learned in 1962"
that Robert F. Kennedy, then!'
I the Attorney General, had been
; misled irito believing that the--
plots against Mr. Castro!s lifc-;
had ended after the Bay of
'Pigs inyasion,-, and:' that whent
Mr. McCone was infOrmed by!
Mr. Helms the following yeart"
of the Bay of Pin assassination
plot, he was not told of the,
subsequent-effort in 1962.
q'That Mr. Helms authorized'
a C.I.A. subordinate to ap4
16
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proach a prospective Cuban as-
sassin in 1963 and represent
himself as Mr. Kennedy's perso-:
narreptesentative, although the
Attorney General's approval
"to speak his name" in such.
a. fashion had, not been sought..
,
The Senate report also said
that Mr. Helms had failed to.
inform the Warren Corrunis-
sion-,-.- which investigated thei
I'llurider. of President Kennedy,
of, tne- Ol6ti_lon Mr. Castro's;
life because the? "precise ques-
tion" had not been asked.
Aeter. Mr. Helms became the
17,1.A. chief In 1966, the report
i?sicivhe tqlla Dean Rusk, then
the Secretary of State, that _a
Cuban C.I.A. operative who had
expressed_a deire to kill Mr.
.
Castro a and to whom the
agency .had offered an assas-
sination - device,' had not been
part of" an assassination plot.
? Finally, when President
-Jobnscin asked in 1967 for a,
complete:report on the C.I.A.'s
involvement in attempts on Mr.
Castro's life, Mr. Helms briefed
the President orally on an in-
ternal agency report on the
;matter but. did not mention at
least- one such plot that had
:taken place during Mr. John-
son's Presidency.
Although Mr. Helms's testi-
'ninny during his confirmation
.hearings in 1973 were the only.
statements thus far reported to
be under examination by the
Justice Department for a po-
tential perjury charge, public
records show that the Ambas-
sador has apparently been less
than. candid with congress on,
other occasions.
; In May 1973, for example,
!Mr Helms, recalled- from Teh-
'ran to answer questions about
the CIA's involvement in the
of Dr. Ellsberg's psy-
chiatrist, told a House armed
?, services subcommittee that the
;C.I.A. had no authority or cap-
ability to place under surveil-
iance newsmen to whom sen-
Isitive- national security infor-
mation had been leaked.
The C.I.A. later acknowl-
edged, however; that it had
placed five reporters who had
'been the beneficiaries of such
leaks under surveillance in 1971
and 1972. ? ?
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WAShINGTON POST
22 NOV 1975
cIA No
'Rogue
Pephant7
_.? By Laurence Stein,
Washington Post Staff Writer
The US. - espionage!
establishment was carrying
out its basic' institutional
role-7-though one little un-
derstood by ? most
Americans?in the
assassination case studies'
described by the Senate in-
telligencecommittee report.
Although in its epilogue the
committee described the
assassination plots as
"aberrations." the mass of
evidence in the 347-page
report suggests that each of ,
the episodes took place within
a firm -context of national,
policy going all the way to the
Oval Office.
Irk. one way or another, the
five assassination targets
were regarded as personages
inimical to U.S. national
security interests. At the same t
time, the tvarious ad-
ministrations in the White
House did not want to be
saddled. with : the ?pent
responsibility for thedownfall
of the individual leaders or
their governments.
But the testimony- of wit- ,
nesses who were?- central ?
. News Analysis-
participants in the events
covered by the assassination
report tends to push the trail
of responsibility to the door of:-.
the White House. '
Richard Bissell. the Central
Intelligence Agency deputy
director for plans (head of the
dirty tricks division) and a
principal Castro assassination-
plotter, told the Committee.the
schemes were authorized by
"highest authority'.'?by-,
which he meant the President. .
As Sen. Howard H.. Baker'
(R-Tenn.) pointed out-in a
supplementary report, Bissell
testified that it would not' have.
been "consonant with the
operations of the CIA" to
conduct operations of such
extreme sensitivity without
the President's knowledge and.
permission.
The recurrent theme in the.
testimony of the upper-level
CIA functionaries was that?
they were acting within a
framework of authority within
which all their programs and
schemes had an ultimate,
presidential sanction.
The CIA has been described
as a "king's army" at the
disposal of the President when
he has to resort to secret
action to carry out his foreign
policies. And the- Senate
committee, in its un-
precedented detailed portrait,
Approved
Carl T. Rowan
edneulay, December !3.l975 The Washington Star
U.S. likely to continue
fomenting coups abroad
One of these days the
Church and Pike commit-
tees will drop their last
bombshells about U.S. plots
to assassinate foreign lead-
ers and overthrow foreign
governments. Once the
cries of shame and outrage
have faded, the American
people are going to have to
come to grips with a simple
question:
Do we want to control the
ideology, determine the
leadership, of foreign gov-
ernmentsor do we not?
I know what the public
pretense is. We've endorsed
a U.N. charter/and a hun-
dred other ? documents
pledging not to interfere in
the internal affairs of other
nations.
But everyone has always
known such declarations
were Merely hypocritical
gestures toward the kind of
world that ideally ought to
exist.
Since World War IT it 'has
been accepted as routine
that the Soviet Union would
spend billions of rubles, em-
ploy thousands of agents, to
ensure the existence of re-
gimes friendly to Russia in
Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Poland, East Germany;
etc., and would intervene
with troops where money
and espionage failed.
It has been accepted as
part of international compe-
tition that the Soviets would
finance newspapers in
Latin America and Africa,
the Chinese would arm
rebels in East Africa, the
Indians would, subvert any
'of 'the upper IeVela.--,OV. the:-
American espionage system_
describes an age*/ that is
anything but the -"rogue,
elephant" that the committee
chairman. Sen. Frank Church;
(D-Idaho) once suggested it.
was. ?
Former CIA Director;
Richard M.. Helms, recalling
his departure from the White'
House on Sept. 15,- 1970, with
President Nixon's orders to
prevent the election in Chile of
Salvador Allende, a Socialist,'
later testified: "...If I ever
carried a marshal's baton in
my knapsack out of the Oval
Office, it was that day.."
Despite titillating accounts
of exploding -seashells, con-
taminated diving suits and
exotic' poisons that fill -the
pages of the report... the un-
derlying truth is that the CIA
has functioned as ,a strongly
hierarchical bureaucracy that
owes its final, allegiance on
operational matters to the
For Release 2001/08/08
regime in Bangladesh that
seemed even a remote
threat to India.
? The U.S. contribution to
this atmosphere in which
there is, no such thing as an
"independent" small or
weak nation, and in which
even the strongest are con-
stantly in danger of subver-
sion, has been:
? The use of billions of
dollars to finance "friend-
ly" labor unions, political
parties, newspapers and
magazines all over the
world.
? The supplying of
money, arms, damaging
information and even man-
power with which to destroy_
any person, party or politi-
cal force that a handful of
Americans deemed to be a
"threat" to the U.S. or its
power position in.the world.
President Ford said in his
press conference last
Wednesday that he has
ordered the CIA not to plan
or participate in the assas-
sination of any foreign lead-
er. But Ford insisted that
under certain circum-
stances the United States
must "undertake covert
operations."
What the President really
was saying is that despite
all. the idealistic Charters
and joint communiques we
have signed, we will go on
interfering in the internal
affairs of other countries.
Perhaps all the great
powers ought to cut out the
phony. baloney. Israel, the
White House.
_
. William, Harvey, the CIA
agent put- in, charge of-
recruiting underworld figures,
for the Castro poison schemes,
repeatedly followed this line of ;
testimony: ?
"I was completely con-
vinced during this entire
period that this operation had
the full-authority of the White
House. either from the
President or from someone.
authorized and known to be.
authorized to speak for the:
President."
The CIA's involvement in.
.covert political warfare got its ?
start in the idiosyncratic
relationship between the
Dulles brothers during- the.
Eisenhower administration. .f
John Foster- Dulles, the-
Secretary of-State, according
to intelligence veterans of that_;
era, did hot trust the State
Soviet Union, the. People's
Republic of China, Canada,
West Germany (to name a
few) will be interested in
who our next presidential
candidates are. All of them
will drop a few subtle
speeches, even sneak
around a few dollars, to
influence the outcome.
My guess is that the
American public will go
along with Ford in approv-
ing "covert foreign opera-
tions."
, The dilemma then is: how
does anyone guarantee that
a covert operation to deny
an Allende the presidency
in Chile will not lead direct-
ly or indirectly to Allende's
.murder?
We pumped millions of,
dollars and vast quantities
of arms into Chile to bolster
right-wing forces opposing
the Marxist president
Salvador Allende. Our
agents encouraged and fi-
nanced the coup in which
Allende was killed. Do we
say we engaged in "covert
operations," which Ford
will continue to sanction,
but that he had nothing to
do with the murder of Al-
lende?
Only shameful sophistry
permits the drawing of any
such line. ?
The likelihood is that
Americans will go on med-
dling and scheming abroad.
And that conniving and sub-
verting will continue to
mean death for a lot of for-
eign leaders. And occasion-
ally some of our leaders.
would gall his brother, Alleri;.:
the CIA director, who would
deploy the clandestine ser--
vices of the CIA to the task.
The tradition of CIA covert
operations with its clubby,
swashbuckling, secretive,
panache, took firm root in the-
Dulles' days. During the
1950's, the clandestine
programs of the CIA were,
rated within the government
aS a success, primarily i'n,
battling Communist mass
organizations in Europe.
The agency survived the
humiliating fiasco of the Bay,
of Pigs in 1961 to entangle.
itself in a continuing series of,
misadventures during the
1960's?some of them
chronicled in the
assassination report. ;.
It had once.been a boast of
Allen W. Dulles that
Americans never heard of the
Department bureaucracy on. CIA's., successes?only its4
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WASHINGTON STAP.
2 2NON/ 1975
The assassination usiness
The interim report of Senator Church's select .,.
committee on intelligence, "Alleged Assassina-
tion Plots Involving Foreign Leaders'," probably
will do us harm abroad, as President Ford has
said. 'It Will be "exploited.'. .to do maximum
'damage to the reputation 'and foreign policy of
the United States:: , .
number of senators must agree with Mr.
Ford, yet they chose -not to suppress this sordid -
report. Why?. ?
Perhaps some of them feel that, it would be
inappropriate for the United States to doctor or s
embroider its official record. Amerians hive no
"official" history, in the totalitarian-sense. You
can't imagine a report so injurious issuing from
the Kremlin or the Winter Palade, but the con-
trast is not altogether unfavorable ta,American
custom..
' Even when a free- soCiety tries' hard to hide
discreditable truths about the past, the effort
often fails. Someone tells. So 'maybe -it is better.
to have the full story, carefully told and evaluat-
ed, than to have the bits and-pieces of old skele-.
tons falling out of the closet one by one:. -
These, however, are mainly tactical consider-
ations. What we need to digest are the long-term-
lesSons, which are often dull.
Nothing is duller, for instance, than perspec-
tive.*Assassination as an instrument of policy
? did not originate in the U. S. nor with the CIA.
The exceptional' thing about the plots against'
Lumumba, Allende, Castro and Trujillo' none
of which panned out ? is that they were aimed
at foreign leaders in "peacetime." We view it as
unsporting perhaps, but not morally repugnant
in quite the same way, that this country success-
fully plotted-to intercept and shoot down a plane
carrying the Japanese general, Yamamoto, who
had commandedthe attack on Pearl Harbor.
That was in "wartime." In our age, the distinc-'?
tion is not always easy to make. In the years
covered by the report, many of the accustomed ,
differences between war and peace had collaps-
ed.
What we have here, accordingly, isa manifes-
Station of that doctrine called "globalism" -- a
doctrine having at its base the notion, that vital
American interests were imperiled by, a crum-
bling colonlal ' order' in the Congo, or a
Caribbean .dictatorship,- or the alignment of an.
offshore
offshore island with the communist bloc. Ameri-
can interest in the world was a seamless whole.
'failures. However now that so'
much Of the agency's clan-
destine history has been laid
bare in congressional and.
execlutive investigations, the'
claimdoes not stand the test of
public scrutiny.
18
Globalism involved, " further, an illusion--that
? with the tight plans and tricks AT would seize
history,by the throat and exert control over dis-
tant events, however petty. '
/
The. Senate report mast be seen not only as
comment on the perils and follies of
as: scalding. self-indict:dent by Congress
which makes the laws and handles the money.
One can't expect Congress. to rise above the
prevailing standard of judgment and ethics at
large, and Congress in the Fifties- and Sixties':
was as much under the spell of globaliszn as the
rest of us. What we can expect is that Congress
rise to the prevailing level of judgment and
morality, which probably would have condemn--
ed-the assassination of foreign heads! of state.
Certainly Congress ought to exceed its constitu-.
end.), in vigilance. One can expect Congress to'
know more and do more, when it's timely, about
.the secret projects of creature' agencies thaw
Congreia knew or did in this period about the
git". Executive secrecy was involved; but 'Con--;
tress has ways of penetrating that veil when it :
wishes, And'-in the present case, exposure came'
tOo'long after the fact. . I?.i
In a recent Columbia Journalism Reyievi
afti-
cle,.reprinted in. The Star last Sunday, former.
Sen. Williain Fulbright had sOme wise ?bier-
, vatioas about the present national mOocl.of
relation and, self-flagellation: Of these, per, ')
haps the wisest Was that as We 'open the Old t
closets full of dusty skeletons Yle tend to dwell ;
';;Ort.the sensational facts and give "short-Shrift to"
? , ti*policy questions.", -
. .
,
The policy questions' raised hyAie Chard ''
contraittee report may be too .obvious.to nee
dwelling._on. Some are questions of prciperi
? administrative procedure ?'for instance the tint,
Checked capabity of a President -to overbear the
'!Cautions of the professionals,. as Mr. Nixon did
in his.,design against Allende. Others. are broad--
er.: Can a democracy be much good' at cloak andi
dagger stuff? Do these operationt even when-
they succeed, sufficiently affect events, ori,
'American- interests to justify..t he risks and,
opprobrium? C.n Congress, give the CIA the dise
oration it !weds and also Protect the country and'
'the country's good nartie alainst its blunders
and abuses? These questioas may be dull, but3
they beat 'poisoned cigars7lit: ultimate impor--
tance.
. .
THE PHI LA D EL PH IA INQUIRER
25 November 1975
Government: That CIA Again
It seems that the security-tight offices of the CIA are full
of leaks. There are water leaks, steam leaks, 'chimney leaks
and even foundation leaks. The problem was leaked out in a
five-year, $6.3 million plan the CIA filed with the House Public
Works Committee for renovating its 10-year-old headquarters
in Langley, Va.. _
?
You can now add another abuse to the list of charges against
the CIA ? abuse of the English language.
The assassination report by the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence said the CIA had a cardinal rule of never calling it
murder. It mentioned such things as "stand-by assassination
capability," "incapacitating," "terminating," "removing from
the scene" and "altering the health" of the victims: There was
'even a consultant group called the "Health .Alteration Com-
mittee."
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Suiday, Nov. 231 1975
ME InSHENGTON POST
ommiss ion
rr
,-aert
..,, ?
, ?
-George Larchter. Jr: .
wangton Post staff Writer -
. The most autspoke
-:defender-- of the Wa'rre
- - /
f:Conintisition's inquiry in
President Kennedy's!
,assassination said yesterder
that it should be reopened. .,
DavidW: Belin, who served!
as. a, staff lawyer on the
Warren Commission and more
? recently as executive director
'Of the' Rockefeller Com-
mission, called on Congress to
-order a thorough new in-
vestigation in light of-
widespread skepticism about,
, the Warren Commission's
Work' and the withholding- of:
-evidence?from it: by govern.:
ment offreials,andagencies. '
' The Central,?Intelligence
Agency, the FBI anththe late
Attorney Genera' Robert_F.:
Kennedy himself, ;Bell
-protested; . in - a ?publ
Statenteti:ti: ,all-- failed to)
disclose -:, to :the : Warren
commissiiii.'-evidence coni
earning plots to assassinate
lcuban Prentier Fidel-Castro. i
? Belin.? a, Dei Moines- at2i
torney, also-pointed out that;
the FBI has recently admittedi
its failure.to disclose evidence
of-threats made to the FBI by
Lee- Harvey Oswald several,
days before the Nov. 22, 196.V.
'assassination, of the President
in DallaS, ? '
. ,Speaking out on the 12thf?
anniveriary of the murder,
Bella Maintained that .a new
inquiry would reach the sam
central conclusioit --at
Oswald "killed PtoUidenCl
Kennedy and (Dallas P.olice4
Officer. (-J.D,)!Iippit,' but hei
said a fresh inVestigatio ?
might also shed additinnalj
light "on what motivate
l
Oswald. .- ." i - ' - i ?
"Belin voiced doubt, that
reopening of the inveStigation'
so many years after- the/
assassination, "would disclose
--... ........---
the exist-e-nCe of any foreign,
conspiracy,'! but. be 4d. notl
ruleAut that possibilityi
Althoughlite, Warren:
Cot/mission fotmcino credible
evidence of "any foreign,
conspiracy', he pointed out
"the Warren. Commission didt
not - have any informatiori
concerning CIA assassination,:
plans- directed against Fidel
Castro and possible;
ramifications of such plans."
In the past; Belin has
resisted, suggestions that the,
investigation be reopened, on,
the grounds that some wit-
nesses have died and:-..the
recollections of others are not
likely to be as accurate now as
they were in 196e. Despite-
that, he said he felt. afresh,
objective and independent
inquiry would "greatly con-
tribute toward a rebirth-of
confidence and trust ...in.,
government."
' Belin remained silent about .
the relevance of CIA-
assassina tion,,...schelithig
ciwyer Asks
eo enin Probe
?Nen.----.COm-
Commission earlier this year, iari -
be ca use i of the 'secrecy:im.i
pbsed by the administr.ation;o
but the, Senateintelligence
.committeelastWeek released
eVisi broader Study, ofi-CI)!
murder attempts:. and ton;
ipiraties: .
The- Senate report showed
that .the CIA and to. a- lesser
extent the 'FBI and Attorney
General Kennedy were all
aware of some of the efforts to
kill Castro when the -Warren
Commission asked for any.
information bearing on
whether the- ostensibly .pro-
Castro Oswald might have.
been part of a conspiracy..
Belin, also called for release
by the CIA?as well as by. thel
National: Arefilyes?oli alt
information- OsWeldi
and Ort?-? The Kennedy:
assasaioationi Includedin thei
Autopsy photograpte and r
..raywtoLEXe_sIdelli Kennetr.
BALTIMORE SUN
25 Nov. 197$
mission decided to suppress
because, Belin said; of "the
personal family deshis of thei
Kennedy family" called
this:. "perhaps the worst
mistake made by the com-
mission."
Belin said he felt -reopening;
the- Warren inquiry would:
serve to refute "the- most:
extreme and vocal
assassination critics," who, he
charged, have deliberately
misrepresented the overall
record of evidence that the
commission had before it.
- Finally, Belin asked in his
statement-for a review by the
National' News Council or
some similar forum of the
news media's. continuing
Coverage- of President Ken-i,
nedy'sassassination.
' In any case, he maintained,
that a reopening of the Warren
investigation itself wbuld
show how- the public can at
times' .!`.he-..Mislect,01....sP.P-i
sationalisni, 'dertragoguer
and ' deliberate ..,
misrepresentationof the
overall -record," eapeciallx
wbew,there;,is-. insufficienh
knO,Wledge Of the
record. ? 1
The disclosures of the
Senate intelligence committee
in the past week would also
appear to give the Warren
Commission critics something
to complain about. FBI
Deputy Associate Director
James B. Adams
acknowledged at a Senate-
hearing Wednesday that the-
FBI submitted secret reports
on seven Warren Commission
critics to the Johnson White,
House in 1966 at the request of
then-White House aide
Watson.' , =
Included in the FBI parket,i
A- dams acknowledged, was'
Waffle record information undl
_ _
photographs of at least one or
the critics in the course of
"sexual activity.", .
ThO Reath of JFK.
For years "conspiracy theorists" have been
charging that the Warren Commission (I) in-
competently failed to follow all 'leads in the
John F Kennedy agnassination case, or (2) de-
liberately conspired to keep the truth hidden.
Last spring Senator Church responded to a new
wave of sensational charges with -a promise that
his committee studying the intelligence com-
munity would take a new look at the assassina-
tion investigation. Vice President Rockefeller
said his commission conducting a similar study
would take a similar look Both commission and
committee had their hands full with other mat-
ters and as a consequence could deal with the
assasidnation only in passing But it is interest-
ing to note that today the executive director of
the Rockefeller Commission, David Belin, and
two members of the Church Committee, Sena-
tors Schweiker and Hart, have called for re-
opening the investigation into the murder of
John F Kennedy.
These calls proceed from different perspec-
tive and with different anticipation. Mr Belin,
who was also assistant counsel of the Warren
Commission, believes the new investigation
would prove the commission came to the right
conclusion: He believes a new study would res-
tore public faith in government institutions and
19
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demonstrate to the public how easily it can be
misled by clever sensation-mongers. Senators.
Schweiker and Hart believe the study will prove
the Warren Commission did a poor job and
came to the wrong conclusion.
We believe that the preponderance of the ev-
idence suggests that Lee Harvey Oswald . was
the assassin and that he probably acted alone,
or at least without the assistance of any organ-
ized group or government. But it is troubling to
learn from Church Committee that both the
:Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central
Intelligence Agency lied to the Warren Commis-
sion during, its investigation?and that one
member of the Commission, former C.I.A.
Director Allen Dulles, was aware of that and al-
lowed- his fellow inembers to be deceived. This
makesit possible to believe there was a conspir-
acy after the assassination. Until this is ex-
plained, the conspiratorial-minded will always
believe the most bizarre theories.
. For a more important reason. Congress
should take a new and detailed look into the
Kennedy assassination. If the F.B.I. and C.I.A.
could get away with lies to a special commis-
sion once, they could again. Congress needs to
find out how this happened and what can be
done to keep it from happening again.
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THE WASECINGTON POST saftircgii; Nov 22 1925
CIA Schemes, Gadgets Would
Amaze Even Ian Fleming
Robert G. Kaiser
Wastfin9ton Post Staff Writer
The late Ian-Fleming, who invented;
James Bond; the archetypal spy ofl
our die; likedtOimplY that Bond was
more than just it invention?that his!
"license to exotic partners in
espionage his remarkable
gadgets were more than figments of
Fleming's imagination.
That hint of verisimilitude helped
explain the. success of Fleming's
James Bond novels. Now the Senate
intelligence committee 'has demon-
strated that Fleming's hints could
have been stronger. It was all true.
Well, nearly au true.
Bond usually got his man. The'
Central Intel4ence Agency agents'i
exposed by the Senate comMittee:
?spies with 644 names like Qj-WIN,,,
WI-ROGUE-?-:nr.Ter gottheir man.
WI-ROGUEV,=(an acronymicaY
,pseudonym )..t ks "an essentially
stateless soldrerof fortune . . . a,
forger and ldrOfer bank robber,".
.according. to*fiAternal CIA report.i
Be was "a:'?i*.*Twith an unsavory
;reputation whiY0Ould try, anything
:once, at least*edprding to theCIA's
station officeeiOlib Congo.
The CIA dispatched WI-Ro-GU to7.
the Congo "after providing him with
plastic surgery and a toupee so 'that_
Europeans traveling in the Congo
would not recognize him," according
to the Senate committee., The
Agency's Africa Division had
recommended him for the mission: ?
"He is indeed aware of .the precepts.
of right and wrong, but if he is given
an assisgnment which may be
morally wrong in the eyes of the
world, but necessary because his case
officer ordered him to carry it- out,
then it is right'and he will dutifully
undertake appropriate action, for its-
execution without pangs of- con.5
science..." So reports the Senate
Committee, quoting the _Africa.1
Division: .
WI-ROGUE was in the Congo at the
same time as QJ-WIN. QJ-WIN "was'
a foreign citizen with a criminal
background recruited in Europe," the
Senate panel learned, "not. . . a maw
of many scruples,' in the words of
another CIA operative.
These men, were "assets" of the '
Leopoldville "station", of the CIA,'
though neither knew of the other's
status. Then one day they met. A CIA.
at inthe Congo reported on the
encounter in a cable to Washington:
?"QJ-WIN, who resides same hotel
as WI-ROGUE, reported WI-ROGUE
smelled as though he in intel
telligence) business. Station denied
any info on WI-ROGUE . . QJ-WIN
reported WI-ROGUE had offered him
$300 per month to participate in intel
net and bemember 'execution squad':
When QJ-WIN said he not interested,
WI-ROGUE added there would be
bonuses for special jobs. Under QJ-
WIN questioning,. WI-ROGUE later
said he working for (America) ser-
vice (i.e., CIA) .
The CIA's department of gadgets,
the Senate committee discovered, is
called the Technical Services
Division, or TSD. In 1960 TSD con-
sidered a number of schemes "to
undermine (Fidel) Castro's
charismatic appeal (in Cuba) by
sabotaging his speeches." For
example:
...A scheme to spray Castro's-
broadcaSting studio with a chemical
which produced effects similar to
LSD,_ but the scheme was rejected
because the chemical wa 'unreliable
. . . TSD impregnated a box of cigars
with a chemical which produced'
temporary disorientation, hoping to
induce Castro to snioke one of the
cigars before delivering a speech,"..
but that one also apparently did not
get off the ground.
The most ambitious scheme of 1960:
was a plan"to destroy Castro's image
as `The Beard' by dusting his shoes,
with , thallium. -salts,, a strong:
depilatory that would cause hisbeard..:
to fall out_The depilatory was to be
administered during a trip outside
Cuba, when it' wasanticipated Castro,
would, leave his shoes outside the door
of his hotel room to be shined: TSD
procured the chemical and tested it on
animals .. .
But that idea was dropped, ap-
parently' because- "Castro canceled:
his trip: ? ,
(The committee retold these stories;
from a report prepared, by the CIA's):
inspector general.)
Some of TSD's inventions failed to;
work., The division produced some
capsules of lethal poison for potentiali
assassins who hoped to drop one of the
pills into something Castro. was
drinking. But "the first batch of pills
prepared by. TSD . would. not
20
-
' dissolve in water." --
Another of TSp's- inventions could,
never be used because of the un-
witting generosity of James Donovan,.1
a New York lawyer. who negotiated
the release of Cuban exiles. captured
during the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion.
Someone in the CIA had 'the idea
that Donovan could make a gift of a
diving suit to Castro, known to enjoy
deep-sea diving. According to the
committee report:
"The Technical Services Division
bought a diving suit, dusted the inside
with a fungus that would produce a
chronic skin dieases (Madura foot)?
and contaminated the breathing;
apparatus with a tubercule bacillus."
But Donovan, who had been,
negotiating personally with Castro,
subverted-this plan by giving the
Cuban leader ?on his own initiative;:,
without consulting Washington?a
different new diving suit, untainted by.
Madura foot or tuberculosis. After
that, it seemed inappropriate to
_ _
present Castro with a second diving
suit.
The Senate committee learned that
the CIA has, had a committee to pass
on the use of biological and chemical
substances. In one CIA document it
was referred to as the "Health,
Alteration Committee."
In 1960 the CIA's Near East Division
asked the Health Alteration Com-
mittee to endorse a "special
operation" to "incapacitate" an Iraqi
colonel who was thought to be
"promoting Soviet-bloc political
interests in Iraq." The committee
said a "disabling operation" could be
undertaken:?
According to the Senate committee
report, "The approved operation was
to mail a- monogrammed han-
dkerchief containing an in-
capacitating agent to the colonel from
an Asian country .
The CIA informed the Senate
committee that the colonel in question
"suffered a terminal illness before a
firing squad in Baghdad (an event we
had nothing to do with) not very long,
after our-handkerchief proposal was
considered."
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Sunda)", No_v.:13. 1970 THE WASHINGTON POST/
JFK and the CIA:
By Robert Sam Ansa
? This is an excezpt from "They've Killed the President!
- published last week by Bantam Books, Inc., c' 1975 b
- Roberts Sam Anson. Anson, national political co?
J) 11 Revisited -respondent for New Times magazine and a publ)
television producer in New York, is a former Time co)
respondent and author of "McGovern: A Biography.,
1 being embarrassed, and the agency embarrassed him
I not only in Cuba and in Vietnam but in the Soviet Union,
where in 1963 the Russians arrested a Yale history
_
professor and charged him with committing espionage
against the Soviet Union. Kennedy, after receiving
assurances from the agency that the professor was
"clean," had personally appealed to Khrushchev to
release him, and Khrushchev, as a gesture of his esteem
for Kennedy, had agreed. But when the professor
returned and met with Kennedy in the Oval Office, he
reportedly, admitted that he had indeed been pying for
the agency. Kennedy was livid.
The President had already sacked CIA director Allen
Dulles and his deputy, Richard-Bissell, and installed his
own brother to honcho the ageners covert operations,
but apparently more shake-ups were required.. His-
desire to splinter the CIA into a thousand pieces and -
scatter it to the winds did not escape the attention of the
agency.
poqR HOWARD HUNT. After Watergate people
were ready to blame him for just about everything, and
considering his background ? spy, burglar, devotee of
plots and assassinations ? it wasn'treally surprising.
The cruelest charge, of course, was that he and his
friend Frank Sturgis (who Hunt said wasn't all that good
a friend, since they had only met in 1972, althqugh
Sturgis put the beginning of their acquaintance in 1961)
had been two Of the "tramps" arrested by the Dallas.
police behind the grassy knoll ' shortly after the
assassination. -
-
The accusation received considerable publicity, es-
pecially after comedian Dick Gregory repeated it on
national television. David Belin and the Rockefeller CIA,
commission lent to-great pains to prove there was
nothing to it. Belin really didn't mind the effort; indeed
he was delighted, since the accusation was so patently
preposterous. Photo experts were called in,.
measurements taken, witnesses interviewed, and in the
end the Rockefeller commission was ableto reportwhat
virtually everyone knew from the beginning: whoever
the "tramps" were, they were not Howard Hunt and
Frank Sturgis. The height was all wrong. So was the age.
As a matter of fact, except to Gregory and a few others,
they didn't look like Hunt and Sturgis at all.
Such, however, typifies the investigation of whether
the Central Intelligence Agency was involved in the
murder of President Kennedy. There was, there has
never been, any investigation at all.
The CIA was an inevitable suspect. Kennedy and the
agency had long been at loggerheads. The CIA's failure'
to correctly estimate the resistance of Castro's forces'
at the Bay of Pigs was only one of a number of-incidents
Almost on the eve of the missile ...crisis the agency:.
without the President's authority, pulled off one of its
patented anti-Castro capers which had at first amused
Kennedy. Kennedy did not find this one funny; nor did;
the Russians. ,
What the men from Langley did 'was sabotage a ship-
ment of Cuban sugar bound for the Soviet Union. The op-
portunity presented itself in late August, 1962, when a,
British freighter filled with sugar bound for Russia sail
ed into San Juan harbor for repairs. The CIA managed to
contaminate 14,000 of some 80,000 sacks of sugar by in'-'jecting them with an allegedly harmless substance-that
would give the sugar a foul taste. The purpose was Mutt- ,
dermine the Russians' confidence in Cuba's chief export
crop. When Kennedy found out what had happened he,
warned the Russians, prevented the ship from sailing,4
and excoriated the agency for creating a "dreadful",
precedent for chemical sabotage." The Russians, who
were busily installing missiles in Cuba, strongly
protested the incident in n series of diplomatic notes.
After the missile crisis and the growing rapproche-
ment with Castro and the Soviet Union, the agency.
def led Kennedy's orders to turn off exile raids on the
Cuban homeland?just as it had prepared to defy him at
the Bay of Pigs. Before the invasion the agency
prepared a plan for the operation to go forward even if
Kennedy got cold feet at the last moment and tried to
stop it.
The President's orders had also been disobeyed in
Vietnam, where, three weeks before his own death, Ngo
Dinh Diem had been overthrown and murdered, ap-
parently with the active complicity of the CIA.
The disobedience, at whatever level, enraged the
President. At the time of his death he was planning a
full-
scale review of the agency's activities. He did not like
- THE AGENCY had grievances against the President.
as well. Hunt was not the onlyCIA man to believe that
Kennedy had betrayed the agency and its people at the
_ _
_ _ _ _
Bay of Pigs. The bitterness was increased by what Hunt
termed Kennedy's "heaping guilt on the CIA." Even
John McCone, whom Kennedy had appointed to succeed
Dulles and who was supposedly his ally, deeply dis-
agreed with the President's moves to normalize
relations with Cuba.
The agency was also fearful of a whole range of Kew.;
nedy initiatives that grew Out of his American Universi-,
ty speech in the summer of 1963, from arms control to
the banning of atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons
to accommodation with the Communists in Laos to the
reevaluation of the entire American commitment to
Southeast Asia. Shortly before his death Kennedy had
approved the first withdrawal from South Vietnam of
American advisers. A thousand advisers were to be call-
ea home by the end of the year ? a token number
perhaps, beta clear sign of where Kennedy was heading.
On his return from Texas he had said he would conduct a
'full-scale policy review of U.S. relations with South.
_Vietnani. One of the first moves was meeting with Am-
bassador to Saigon Henry Cabot Lodge. He and Kennedy
were to have lunched at the President's Virginiaestate
on-Nov. 24. CIA liked none of it.
, Indeed. John Kennedy was one of the agency's op-
ponents, potentially its most dangerous adversary. The
CIA had a motive. It had the means. It had the experien-
ce. It had the disposition. The agency could have killed
him, and far better than anyone else covered its crime.
But did it? If Lee Harvey Oswald was the assassin (or a
member of an assassination conspiracy), and if he was-
still an intelligence agent (as he certainly seemed to
have been during his sojourn in the Soviet Union) on Nov.
22; 1963, and if finally, he was acting with the agency's
approbation when he killed Kennedy, then, of course,
the answer Is self-evident. But there are a number of
hurdles to cross before reaching that conclusion.
It is by no means certain, in the first place, that
Oswald was an assassin. Much of the evidence, along
with his casual behavior immediately after the _shots
were fired, points to the contrary. However cool and
calculating killers are supposed to be,. it is difficult to,
imagine someone who has just shot the President of the
United States pausing to drink a Coke, then strolling out-
side in no evident hurry, getting on a bus, getting off,
21
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hailing a cab, offering it up to a little old lady, and finally,
as the police and FBI closed in, making good his escape,
which turns out to be to a local movie theater.
Oswald's excuse for "fleeing" the scene of the crime-
was that he thought that, because of the assassination,
work would be suspended for the rest of the day. The.
assumption was not illogical. Work, as it happens, was;
suspended for the rest of the day, and besides Oswald 11
other workers left the Book Depository after the,
assassination. There may have been a conspiracy, but it -
wasn't that big.
Some critics have found Oswald's going to the movie;
theater suspicious, a sign perhaps that Oswald was an;
intelligence agent. George O'Toole, ..a former CIA man-.
who suggests that the FBI may have been- involved in
Kennedy's killing (a not surprising contention, con-
sidering the bureau's and the agency's mutual
detestation), points out that movie theaters are a
favored rendezvous for agents.
Oswald's apparently having been an agent does not
necessarily mean he was a CIA man. Army intelligence,
in particular, has nearly as large a budget as the agency,
and more than three times as many agents. Far better
than the CIA, Army intelligence was in a position to
know the arrangements of the President's trip to Dallas,
as well as the security precautions the Secret Service
was taking to ensure his safety. Chronically short-
handed, the Secret Service worked with Army in-
telligence as a matter of routine.
ALMOST SURELY Oswald was an intelligence agent'
of some sort. While in Dallas, New Orleans and Mexico
City he was in close, even intimate contact with other in-
telligence agents or contract employees of the CIA. On
Nov. 22, however, he could just as well have been
operating without the agency's sanction, or , though this
seems less likely, without its prior knowledge. There
are numerous instances when the CIA has lost control of
its own people, and, one presumes (though the agency
has yet to admit it), when one of its agents has been turn-
ed Against it.
Another possibility is that Oswald was "taken Over"
by an extremist faction within the agency, or a group.
close enough .to it tn heeNme,okOswalcl's i;oacnd..
there area number of cases when-this has hap-
pened. When individual agents have acted not only con-
trVy fo. Okbyders_of the.President hut .those of ,.the
leadership of CIA. One longtime observer of the agency,
journalist-,,graWt?McCulloch,.:says...:.! '
--.,71liat sort of thingis inevitable, given the sort of peo-
ple the CIA recruits-CIA looks for guys who are bright,
loop; natnrallysompetitive. Ideology does not mean
nearly as much as the instinct to win. If you take one of
these guYi;i:.and give him a job, Well, he's going to do it
whatever ilt.takes.-Maybe there are things the agency
??.htm to Is him. he
cisn'i'"--d-cikEUf he does -them- inkway. Ho* will the
agency eier find. out? It's just partof -winning These
guys areirained to win2.!..:,
- Cuba produced that feeling in many agents, of whom
Howarcillunt is merely the best known,The cause of the
exiles ca:tne in time to be the cause of the Americans who
worked with them; - ?
THE COMING to power of Fidel Castro was a disaster
not only for U.S. foreign policy, but for organized crime.
The mob was anxious to see Castro removed from the
scene at the earliest possible moment. So was the CIA.
During the agency's planning of the Bay of Pigs inva-
sion one of the sources it turned to for intelligence infor-
mation on the disposition of Castro's forces was the
mob, whieti at the time stiff maintained a considerable
apparatus on the island. ? .
. Before and after the invasicin the mob was also trying
-to secure Castro's assassination, sometimes with the
agency's help, sometimes without it. Frank Sturgis,
who as a casino operator in Havana had lines to both the
CIA and the mob, was twice approached shortly after
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the Cuban revolution by organized - crime figures.
wishingto enlist him as an assassin; Sturgis declined,
but reported the conversations to CIA friends in
Havana. - .
The CIA itself had been talking of eliminating Castro
since the closing days of the Eisenhower ad-
ministration, and Sturgis' report may have freshened
interest in the project. A mob hit rather than an
assassination by the agency itself would provide the CIA
with what was known in the trade as "plausible
deniability" if, as ultimately turned out, the attempt
went askew.
By early 1061 the agency and organized crime were
deep into discussions on how best to eliminate their com-
mon foe. Reports vary on how the initial contacts were
made. What the stories agree on is that after protracted
discussion John Roselli, the suavely vicious Mafia capo
of Las Vegas, agreed to recruit a team of hit men for the
CIA.
All of this was unknown to all but one of the men of the
Warren Commission in 1964. 'The exception was Allen
Dulles, and he was hardly talking. The mob, after all,
worked for him.
Even now the full truth about the CIA and the mob is
far from clear. What the few brief glimpses down the
?corridor have provided is chilling enough: the two- most
secret and powerful organizations in America working
hand and glove in a relationship so intimate that for;a11.;
practical purposes there has ceased to be a distinction,
between what is done in the name of intelligence Anct
whar is-Clone in the narne otcrime.. Everything, even'
murder, comes together under a. single heading:.
national interest."
_ . .
? THE MELDING together of American intelligetIce
and organized crime is the key to understanding John:
Kennedy's murder. Without that understanding the cOn-'
spiracy is like the jumbled pieces of a puzzle, each, of
them odd-shaped, impossible to connect. But lay in &at
keystone and suddenly what has all seemed so bizafte
for so many years makes terrifying sense..:,
- One way or another all the major figurea connectectto
the assassination are-also linked to the agency andlhe
mob. ? ?-?
There is Oswald, the apparent agent antcaLT
tact with other CIA then, many of whom have their own
ties to the mob. He lists as the address for his fictitares
pro-Castro organization a building whose tenants:in-
clude both mob and intelligence figures. After the
assassination a large quantity of Oswald's literature
turns up in the office of one of those tenants, Guy
Banister, a private investigator employed by New
Orleans crime boss Carlos Marcello and a man who-in
the past worked on CIA operations. One of his close
friends in New Orleans is David Ferrie, an identified
agent who also works for the mob. Another reported
associate is Clay Shaw, like Ferrie an identified agent..
_
After the assassination Oswald is shot to death by Jack
Ruby, a man with numerous connections to Cosa Nos'ira
figures, who is also involved with Cuba and Cuban ex-
iles. When a story arises that Oswald has met with a
prominent exile figure to plan the assassination, the
man who conveniently appears to debunk it turns out to
be a reported gunrunner for an agency-backed
'organization. Later, an Oswald look-alike is found to be
one of the leaders of an exile organization reportedly
backed by both the agency and the mob.
Finally, when the pressures for a new investigation of
the assassination are boiling over, the man who announ-
ces he has solved the case is a district attorney who by
his own admission has numerous contacts with Cosa
Nostra figures. During the trial he dismisses all referen-
ces to the Cosa Nostra and-fixes-blame on an odd-lot
assortment of conspirators. The trial ends in farce and
the prospects for a new investigation are obliterated. In
the process the CIA gains sympathy.
Just how many coincidences can be piled atop one
Approved' For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000 100.380003-3
another before one has to wonder? One especially win-
ders when the groups involved are neither Boy Scouts
nor, as Jim Garrison once put it, "retired circus
clowns." They are two secret violent societies whose
fates are inextricably intertwined. Many things bring
them together. One of them is Cuba. Another is hatredof
Friday14ovember2T, 1975 Thi Vtashinipii-Star,
John Kennedy.
.e
Few people know of their alliance, and only one is in a
position to do anything about it. He has sworn that' he
will. Before he can, he is murdered in Dallas on Nov. 22,
1963.
Coincidence.
stro Survived a Wave
By Jeremiah O'Leary
Washington Star Staff Writer "
At the very moment
President John F. Kennedy
was shot on Nov. 22, 1963,
two CIA officers were
handing a specially made
poison pen to a Cuban offi-
cial to be used in assassi-
nating Fidel Castro.
That meeting with a
highly placed but anti-Cas-
tro Cuban official known by
the CIA cryptonym of AMt
LASH ? was one of at least
eight plots launched by the
CIA from 1960 through 1965
to kill the Cuban leader; ac-
cording to the interim' re-
port- of the Senate Select
Intelligence Committee.
Testimony made public
yesterday by the committee
disclosed that the late De-
smond Fitzgerald, head of
CIA ? covert operations
against Cuba, and an uni-
dentified CIA case officer
met AM/LASH in a foreign
city to give him a ball-point
pen rigged with a hypoder-
? mic needle' so fine that the
victim \ would not notice its-
insertion. At the meeting,
probably in Mexico City,
Fitzgerald recommended
that the Cuban agent use a
deadly commercial. poison
called Blackieaf-40. The
two CIA men also assured
AM/LASH that the CIA
would give him everything
he needed, including' *4
high-powered rifle, a tele-
scopic aight, a silencer and
all the money he wanted to
kill Castro from a distance.
- ? ?
ONLY WHEN Fitzgerald
and the other CIA officer,
left the Cuban agent did
they learn that President
Kennedy had been assassi-
_nated by a pro-Castro ex-
Marine named Lee Harvey
_Oswald at the very moment
. the poison device was being
handed over for use against
_
_
Castro. The committee ob-
tained the information
about this bizarre meeting
from a CIA inspector
general's report and inter-
views conducted in 1967.
The CIA plots to kill Cas-
tro spanned the Eisenhow-
er, Kennedy and Johnson
administrations and involv-
ed.CIA attempts.to use both
Mafia figures and anti-Cas-
tro Cubans. The means for
assassinating Castro in-
cluded fijj 1and offer $150,000 for Ca '
poisons and explosives and
the liquidation of the Marx-
ist leader was discussed
openly in the highest coun-
cils of the government, in-
cluding the White House.
The first serious plots
against Castro were brewed
in the CIA as early as Au-
gust 1960. The committee
report said Richard Bissell,
deputy director of plans,
authorized the two attempts
to murder Castro and other
Cuban leaders in the period
before the 1961 Bay of Pigs
hrhsion. Bissell was depu-
ty director from January 1,
1959, until he was fired_ by
the Kennedys in February
1962 because of the failure
of the Cuban exile invasion
_run by the CIA. ?
The committee said,
Richard Helms, ? who suc-
ceeded Bissell as deputy'
director and is now ambas-
sador to Iran, authorized a
second attempt on Castro's.
life through the underworld'
figures in the year after the
Bay of Pigs disaster. The
committee developed evi-
dence that CIA Director
Allen Dulles knew and ap-
proved of the- first plots
against Castro in 1960. The
committee said there is a
note in Dulles' handwriting;
joining with Bissell in ap-
proving a memorandum by
J.C. King, then head of the
CIA's Western Hemisphere
division. King recommend-
ed "thorough consideration
be given to the elimination
of Fidel Castro."
mier- the anti-Castro effort
BISSELL AND Col. Shef- from Edwards at Bissell's;
field Edwards, director oil request.'
_
the CIA Security Office, _ .
testified that they were cer- Harvey's program,'. with,
tam n both Dulles and his the code name of ZR/i
deputy, Gen. Charles Ca- RIFLE, was then tailored,
bell, knew about and au- to resume dealing with the
thorized the first phase of syndicate figures for anoth-
the plot involving the er attempt against Castro.
underworld figures. ? Meanwhile, Helms suc-
The first concrete evi- ceeded Bissell as deputy
dence of the initial under- director of. plans in Febru-
world operation, the corn- ary 1962 and ordered Har-
raittee said, is Edwards' vey to get in touch with
statement 'that Bissell Rosselli but to avoid Maheu,
asked him to locate some-, and. Giancana. The poison
one who could assassinate pills were, brought out
Castro. Edwards said he again and Rosselli testified,
called on ex-FBI agent that this time the Cubans
Robert A. Maheu, later an would go after not only
aide to multimillionaire Fidel but Raul Castro and
Howard Hughes, to handle Che Guevara as well.
the job. Maheu and one of
Edwards' men agreed *to- Harvey- obtained arms.
atmroach Las Vegas gam- boats and radios for the
b ' g figure John Rossella_ _ Cubans but they never left
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tro s assassination.
Rosselli went to Miami to
recruit Cubans to carry out ,
the contract and in the
process brought in two
other criminals, Sam Gian-
cana, and Santos Tref-
ficante. The two Mafia men
recruited the Cubans while.
the CIA undertook to fur-
nish poison pills for them to,
use in killing Castro. But
Maheu and Giancana en-
gaged in a keystone come
dY caper by hiring a detec
tive who got caught in'-
stalling an illegal
in a Lai Vegas room he-
cause of Giancana's com-
plicated love life. The FBI
also picked up word that'
Giancana wa's involved in a
"contract" on Castro's life._
The CIA had to step in with
difficulty to persuade
J. Edgar Hoover and the
Department of Justice to
spare their Mafiosi aides
from prosecution and
presumably from telling
everything they knew.
THE 'POISON. PILLS fur-
nished by the CIA finally
were smuggled into Cuba
just before the" Bay of Pigs
invasion but the would-be
Cuban assassins did not
accomplish their mission-
and returned the pills.
Late in 1961, another CIA
official, William K. Harvey,
who was in.charge of a pro-
gram called Executive Ac-
tion for disabling fareign?
leaders or assassinating
them as a, last resotook
lots
Florida. The connection
was broken off but nobody
ever told the Cuban assas-
sins that the $150,000 offer
had been withdrawn.
EARLY IN 1963, Fitzger-
ald replaced Harvey and
headed what was called
Task FOrce W. Fitzgerald's
efforts were turned to ex-
ploring strange plans such
as the exploding seashell'
and. the contaminated div-
ing suit for the Cuban lead-
er. But his principal activi-
ty was 'contact with AM/
LASH, who could not make
uptis mind whether to kill
Castro or defect. The CIA
finally terminated relations.
with AM/LASH_in 1965.
The- committee wet far
from precise about how,
much of these assassination
plots was known by or au-
thorized at higher levels of.
the government John'
McCone, who succeeded'
Dulles in November -1961.
said he knew nothing of the;
assassination plans. Helms,
testified he -didn't know-
whether McCone- knew or
not but said McCone had
never told him not to assas-
sinate Castro. Bissell re-
called that he and Edwards
briefed Dulles and Gen. Ca-
bell but that,
"circumlocutious"
Ian-
guage was used.
Edwards, according to
testimony, deliberately'
avoided using any "bad"
words" such as asaaaainate.
or kill.
? ,-
THE COMMITTEE was
inconclusive also about
what was known by Presi-,
dent Kennedy, his brother,
Atty. Gen. Robert Kennedy,
and later by President Lyn-
don B. Johnson. The Kenne-
dys, after the Bay of Pigs,
neyerteased in their deter-
mination that Castro's
regime had to be over-
thrown as a menace to the
U.S. and the Western Hemi-
sphere. President Kennedy
ordered creation of Opera-
tion MONGOOSE in April?
1962, and placed it underi
control of Robert Kennedyi
and Gen. Maxwell Taylor::
In turn, the chief of opera-
tions was. Gen. Edward;
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380003-3
Ian-Wale, who had a repu-1
.tation for dealing with
situations like that in Cuba.;
The committee developedi
testimony. that Lansdale
labored ceaselessly on-
plans for disrupting the,
Cuban regime and that he
was prodded hard by the
Kennedys to produce more
sabotage and infiltration.
Lansdale dealt wth the,
attorney general and the
-White House Special Group
in the months prior tn the'
missile crisis of 1962 and he
was in contact with Harvey
and Helms at CIA on carry-
ing out the many objectives
of MONGOOSE.
Most of the testimony
agrees that the word
"assassination" was not
used in dialogue involving;
the Kennedys, Lansdale or
the White House group. But
at a Special Group meeting
on Aug. 10, 1962,.,someone
raised the question of
-liquidation of leaders." in
Cuba. The testimony differs,
on who- raised 'liquida-
tion". Harvey testified that
Defense Secretary Robert
S. McNamara brought it.
up, saying, "Shouskin't
consider the elimination or,
assassination of Castro?"
? ,
McNAMARA SAID he
does not recall that.
McCone and, the late Ed-.
Ward R. Murroiv of USIA
raised vehement objections.
at the August meeting and;
the matter was dropped,
Nevertheless, Helms con-
tinued to consider that he.
had continuing authority to
press on with the plots and
Lansdale told Harvey to.
develop a plan for "liquida-
tion!' of Cuban leaders.
The missile crisis, the
death of Kennedy and the
accession of Johnson to the
White House appear to have
ended the assassination
plots against Castro. Helms;
said .he banned assassinaw?
tion, five years after he be-;
came director of the'CIA in
1966. _
NEW YORK TIMES
3 Dec . 1975
Seymour HeririsVinner
Of John Zenger Award
The University of Arizona'S
1975 John Peter Zenger Award,
has been won by Seymour M.
Hersh of The New York Times
for his -articles on domestic
surveillance by the Central In-
telligence Agency and other
, investigative reporting.
Mr. Hersh, a 38-year-old
;University of Chicago gradu-
ate, won a 1970 Pulitzer Prize
for his exclusive reporting of
the My Lai massacre in Viet-
NEW YORK TIMES., DECEMBER 5, 1975
Power and Corruption
By Tom Wicker -
No wonder the latest Gallup Poll
shows a. Sharp decline in-public esteem
for 'the Federal Bureau of Investigation
and the. Central Intelligence Agency?
from 84 percent "highly favorable" to
the F.B.I. in 1965, for example, to only
37 percent today. And only 14 per-,
cent of a sample of 1,515 adults were
any longer, "highly favorable" to the
C.I.A.
These figures clearly reflect the
long, dismal series of disclosures that
both, agencies have abused their pow-
ers, been misused by their political
masters, threatened in various ways
the constitutional rights of American
citizens they were supposedly protect-
ing, and participated in such repre-
hensible schemes as murder plots
against foreign leaders and character
assassination plots against Americans.
The latest of these unlovely dis-
closures is that the F.B.L has been
supplying secret dossiers, conducting
illicit bugs and taps, and carrying on
other 'forms of political surveillance
for every President at least back to
Franklin Roosevelt.
That merely confirms what most
critics of the security agencies have
believed all along?that they were not
so much evading or thwarting politi-
cal control as succumbing to it. So
far from operating against the wishes
of Presidents and their advisers?in all
Administrations of both parties in the
last forty years?they were mostly
doing either what they were told, or
what they correctly perceived that
their superiors wanted them to do.
Several things need to be said abouT,
this?the first of which is that, as apol-
-ogists for Richard Nixon have insisted,
a certain double standard of accounta-
bility has been at work. Whatever Mr.
Nixon's misdeeds, it is now undeniable
that he was by no means the first
President to order wiretaps, punitive
tax investigations, political surveil--
lances of his "enemies," and the like.
His critics should be careful, also,
about too glibly suggesting that Mr.
'Nixon was a worse offender than his
predecessors. There is ,no great dif-
ference lb wiretapping the Democratic
National Committee and the Mississippi
Freedom Democratic Party.
In one sense, it might even be to
Mr. Nixon's credit that ,he used his
private "plumbers" in 1972 rather than
perverting the F.B.I. as Lyndon John-
son appears to have done in 1964. Nor
does it seem likely that Mr. Nixon
knew more of what was being done
in his service than Mr. Johnson did, or
President Kennedy before that.
Presidents can hardly be impeached
in retrospect, and that Mr. Nixon was
; The Zenger award, which
consisfs of $500 and a cita-
tion, is to be presented Jan. 17
at the annual convention of the
Arizona Newspapers Associa-
tion near Phoenix.
24
.not doing much that other Presidents
had pot done?save his deliberate par-
ticipation in the post-Watergate cover-
up ? is not a reason' to- regard his
forced resignation as unfair or unwar-
ranted. Times changed, and placed
Mr. Nixon in .a different public atmos-.
phere, in the midst of which) more
became known about the seamier side
of 'his ? AdministratiOn than had been
known about any before.
That truth will not spare those of'
us who condemned Mr. Nixon from
the charge of his partisans that we
were looking the other way when ear-
lier Presidents were trampling over the
Bill of Rights. Nor should it. But a
more important point is implicit in
that charge although it is not usually
conceded by those who make it.
It is that to a great extent such
abuses of power as we are learning
about are inherent in the existence
of this kind of power. That is not to -
apologize for efforts to drive Martin
Luther King to suicide, or to poison
_Patrice Lumumba; or to wiretape re-,
porters to learn the' sources of Feaks,?
as unfortunate aberrations or unavoid-
able evils?regrettable, but just a part
IN THE NATION
of necessary intelligence and security,
work.
Most of the repellent events recently
disclosed had nothing to do with real,
rational intelligence or security Con-
cerns. Instead, they represented self-
serving political acts, the obsessive
pursuits. of men corrupted by power,
the capricious exercises. of that power,
by _those who' had it, simply because'
they did-have it. '
Thus, whatever real- problems. of
Communist subversion from within and
without may have threatened the
United States since the 1930's, they
could hardly have been greater threats
to constitutional rights and individual
liberty than those that came to be
posed by the great security agencies,
with their power to operate both in
secrecy and in the name of national
security, their unlimited budgets, their
freedom from supervision?above all,
their subservience to political masters
who were enabled by the mere exist-
ence of such agencies to- flout- the
Constitution and the law for their own
political purposes or obsessions.
No one in Congress or the executive
branch has even begun to face?let
alone answer?the consequent philo-
sophical and institutional questions:
Can secret police agencies ever be
made compatible with political and in-
tellectual liberty? By what methods of
control and accountability can they
be made so? Control. by whom, ac-
countability to whom?
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Christian Science Monitor
24 November 1975
Ervvin.D. Canham -
The new
cover-up?
Under pressure of public indignation, the
special prosecutors appointed by former Pres-
ident Nixon, the Ervin committee of the
Senate, and the House Judiciary Committee
pressed their inquiries of Watergate and its
related crimes right up to the highest sources:
in the Republican administration.
When will public indignation force similar
investigations, right to the top, of the abuses in
domestic politics by the FBI ? and with the
apparent knowledge if not instigation of
Democratic Presidents Kennedy and John-
son? Congressional probes so far have only
gone part of the way.
The harassment of the Reverend Martin
Luther King Jr. took place largely during the
Kennedy adminstration, while Robert Ken-
nedy was Attorney General. How much did he.
and his presidential brother know about it?
How much did they authorize? And at the
Democratic Convention in Atlantic City in
1964, wiretapping by the FBI of Mr. King and.
others seems to have been directly demanded
by President Johnson. What-are the facts? '
Political use of the FBI is even, more
appalling than the clumij, burglarizing of the-
Watergate offices of the Democratic National
Committee. Beyond that event, of course,
were many other developments, culminating
in the effort to cover up and lie about it. -
What kind of cover-up has there been of-the
espionage abuses in the last two Democratic .
presidencies? And- what were those abuses?
-What was Lyndon Johnson's relationship to,
the FBI? What role have congressional lead-
ers themselves played? Is the Church corn-
mittee really getting to the bottom of these
matters, or is it seeking to protect Democratic -
leaders? .
It will be healthy to bring these matters to
light, no matter how painful. Disclosure can
lead to clean-up. Attention mustbe focused, as
Attorney General Edward Levi is evidently
focusing it, on ways of preventing FBI abuses
in the future.
One way will be to see that no future FBI
director attains the political and personal
untouchability of J. Edgar Hoover. Whatever
may have been Mr. Hoover's services to his
country, and many of them will not be denied,
the build-up_ of dictatorial authority should
never happen again. -
It is now clear that the CIA internationally'
and the FBI domestically were doing for years'
things which are contrary to basic American
principles. They were the tactics of the
enemy. In the end such tactics are self-
defeating. Now, to the nation's shame, they
are coming to light. Are we sure they will not
be repeated?
Steps are being taken to draft new rules
within the Justice Department and in Con-
gress to render effective at last legislative
oversight of how vast sums of taxpayer money
are being expended for ways going far beyond
intelligence-gathering to mtirder and sabo-
tage. If there is any category which should be
labeled un-American activities, it is in this
realm Of lawless, bloody deeds.
There is a madness in power. There is
delusion in self-justification and self -right-
eousness. It is easy to believe that deeds in a
righteous cause are all themselves right. But
the end does not justify the means, and usually
disgraceful means do not even attain the
desired end.
The United States has partially awakened'
Approved For Release
THE BALTIMORE SUN
30 November 1975
James J. Kilpatrick
r: ?
Occasionally Our Leaders
Must Think the Unthinkable--
Washington.
Now that the dust has settled from the
great CIA report, perhaps a couple of
sober questions may be asked.. Was this
particular report in the national inter-
est? Is tyrannicide ever morally justi-
fied?
I would answer the first question, no,
and the second question, uncertainly,
yes; but on these Issues there is abundant
room for reasonable-minded men to dis-
agree. The questions defy easy answers.
Consider, first, the report itself. It is
described by the Senate Intelligence
Committee, with emphasis, 33 an inter-
im report. The implication is that other
findings on other attempted assassina-
tions are yet to come. The committee's
conclusions, tentative as they are, are
something less than final. What compel-
ling necessity, we may inquire, demand-
ed release of such an interim report? I
know of none. '
Even as an interim report, the com-
mittee's conclusions are remarkably in-
conclusive. Descriptive words recur: Un-
certain, incomplete, Insufficient, doubt-
ful, speculative, unclear, conflicting..
The committee studied our govern-
ment's role as to five men: Lumumba in
the Congo, Castro in Cuba, Diem in Viet-
nam, Schneider in Chile, and Trujillo in
the Dominican Republic.
The findings boil down to this: In two
of the cases (Lumumba and Castro), as-
sassination proposals went beyond mere
discussion and reached a stage of specif-
ic planning. In the other three cases,
there was talk only. In none of the five
taws did CIA agents make an actual at-
tempt. There is a "reasonable inference"
that President Eisenhower authorized
an assassination effort as to Lumumba,
but the inference is offset by evidence to
the contrary. Other presidents are
.cleared.
That is the sum total of 8,000 pages of
testimony, thousands of hours of work
by staff members, and 347 pages of an
interim report. What a mountain of la-
bor, one is minded to observe, to produce
so small a churchmouse. For these un-
certain, incomplete, and inconclusive
conclusions, what price must be paid?
The committee report provides a rich
meal for America's detractors to feed
on. By reason of this publication, the
CIA's vital task will be made more diffi-
cult the intelligence services of friendly
from the era of disgraceful deeds but it has not
yet fully clarified the record and agreed upon
remedial measures.
New rules on paper will_pot do it. Possibly
the greatest lesson to emphasize is that
presidents of the United States and those on
whom they rely should be persons of integrity
and character,- capable of looking into them-
selves and saying of some proposal: "That just
isn't done." -
nations will think twice about cooperat-
ing in the future. A mass of highly sensi-
tive material has now been compiled in
written form; it will be a miracle if this
material is not leaked or stolen. It is-a-'
strange exercise in national masochism(
thus to flagellate ourselves before: the.
World.
The committee, of course, fedi, Oth.
erwise. "The Committee believes -the
truth about the assassination allegati'ons'
should be told because democracrdew
pends upon a well-informed electorate:.
We reject any contention that the fads.
disclosed in this report should be kepts
secret because they are embarrassing to
the United States."- No one can quarrel ?
with the committee's abstract defenseor,
the people's right to know. But do the
people have a right to know everything:
Do the people have a right to knowIllt"
intimate, sordid details spelled out, in,
this interim report? For my own part., I,
deny it.
The plot against Ltunurnba evoty
from an apprehension, soundly based,,at -
the time, that the Soviet Union, through-
Lumumba, was about to take overthe
Congo. Look at a map of Africa; contem-
plate the consequences. The plot against:
Castro evolved from the actual physicals
presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba -ethe.,1
first such Communist penetration in the
Al .4:J1
Western Hemisphere. ? .?
The civilized mind recoils from atilt:
thought of murder in cold blood. In the.
two cases, this was what the CIA was
plotting. The specific schemes ?deadlyp
bizarre and ludicrous?both repel and
fascinate the reader. Each of us may
form his own judgment on presidential
Involvement. "It is my personal view,"
says Senator Howard Baker (R., Tenn.),
"that on balance the likelihood that pres-
idents knew of the assassination plots is
greater than the likelihood that they did::
not." This is a chilling business to broig:
on.
L ?
01: P. ?
But is there no case?no case whateli.i,
er ?in which tyrannicide could be justi-
fied? If it had been possible to arrange
the murder of Hitler in, say, 1938, and -
thus to have averted the fearful consequ-
ences of his madness, would this have,
been a moral act? My own feeling is that,
in the dangerous world we live in. our
leaders must occasionally think unthink-
able thoughts; and in the overriding Tie,
cessity, must not flinch from doing the
.? /et M
unthinkable deed.
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ZrozeitS *net FrE, Nov. 21, 197:
SHUNNED BY PBS
KCET to Air
CIA Critique
BY DICK ADLER
T. Timet Staff Writer
Knocking the usually lugubrious and occasionally pain-
ful fund-raising antics of a public television station has
become almost a national pastime. Most print critics can't
resist wishing out loud for a few well-made commercials,
and both Cher and Johnny Carson have taken very funny
shots recently. .
But in case you wonder where those membership dol-
lars so lumpishly cajoled from your wallet go, take a look
at a fascinating documentary called "The Rise and Fall of
the CIA" on xcur this Sunday-evening at 7:10. For $850,
the amount raised between an Alistair Cooke blurb and
yet another smiling demand from Jean Marsh, Channel 28
has purchased exclusive local rights to an important pro-
gram turned down by the networks, the PBS and most in-
dependent commercial stations.
"The Rise and Fall of the CIA" was originally made in
three 30-minute segments byWorldin Action, the excel-
lent documentary unit of England's commercial Granada
Television, and aired there last June to considerable ac-
claim and ratings. The programs were screened by PBS in
Washington this past summer, In hopes they -would be
purchased for use on the entire public network, But the'
PBS screening committee objected to certain aspects of
the programs, found them "fairly superficial and shallow"
and claimed that they "said some questionable things
about the CIA" (according to a PBS spokesman), so they
were turned down. Other prospective buyers also balked;
only WNEW-TV, Metromedia's New York outlet, the Dal-
las public station and ECE'T have so far decided to let
their viewers see the programs.
PBS, of course, is entitled to make its own program-
ming decisions. What is somewhat disturbing in this in,-
stance is that, according to reliable sources, atileast,ttio
representatives from Corp. for Public Broadcasting?the
governmental agency which is designed strictly:to admin-
ister . funds for PBS?were present at the screening in',
Washington, and that these CPB representatives' played a
role in the- rejection,
Joe Dine, a CPB 'press,, official in Washington, :admits
that a senior CPB programming executive and Thisassis-
tant were present at a screening of mrhe Rise and Fall of .
the CIA," but doesn't See any iMpropriety. "I couldn't say.
categorically_ thatsthe.CPB's opinion didn't have anything::
to do with the rejection by PBS, but it wasn't an official-
decision on the part of CPB not to use the programs. We
don't make programming decisions," he says. 'Others ques-
tion. ev_eh the ,,over-presence. of g _government agenoT.-
Such as C158 at the screening of a series of programs criti-
cal of another government agency.
_ . .
THE DE-27:37: F.EE PRESS
23 Noverfc. er 1975
THE QUESTION
A Senate panel reported
that the CIA instigated
assassinationplots
against two foreign lead-
ers, and became involved
in plotting that led to the
death of three others. Do
you think a tighter reign
should be kept on CIA ac-
tivities?
HOW YOU VOTED
NO. 76.6 percent. COMMENTS: "How?cars they remain an
? Aired. F intim En-gland
CET'S-PrOgrarn 'Chief; Charles Allen, says that he first
heard of the Granada programs when they were aired in
England in June, and that when PBS turned them down
he moved to buy the package for Channel 28. The fact
that CPB may or may not have been part of the original
rejection doesn't bother him. "In a sense, a turn-down by
CPB might be considered the highest form of praise," Al-'
len says. "It was CPB who told producer Lewis Freedman..
that a series of one-minute programs on, the BicentenniaP,
wouldn't work."?
The three- Granaciai'programs,.Smoothly welded into one:
75-minute unit, certainly leave' themselvesopen to a Cer-
tain amount of criticism, but charges of superficiality and
shallowness wouldn't immediately, seem to be among
them. The research, by producers Mike Beckman, Allan
Segal and their staff, appears to be prodigious. It is true
that they rely for on-camera information largely on the
words of disaffected former CIA employes, notably
ex-deputy director Tom Braden. BUt the producers say'
that current CIA officials turned -down their requests for
interviews.
And even allowing for an extra portion of axe-grinding ?
by these disgruntled former CIA types, "The Rise and Fall
of the CLAN presents such a wealth of documented infor-
mation in such a cool and lucid manner that the overall
indictment is impressive. Visual imagery is as important
here as on-camera interviews: a- party of .retired OSS and,
CIA veterans, looking mostly like- the sort of people you
see at the. ball game; newsreel film of the Cuban invasion
force in Miami which helped blow the project's cover and
led to the Bay-of--Pigs fiasco-; -paid Vietnamese CIA agents
bringing in the heads of Viet Cong prisoners bounty.
Braden?a-Credible Image
If there is a star in the program, it is Braden?he is the
central thread which weaves the rest of the material -
(from such former CIA links as E. Howard Hunt and
army liaison Col, Fletcher Prouty) into a generally believ-
able scenario. Braden has' the jaded, cynically wise and
droopy-eyed manner of a spoiled spy, most effective when
he is talking about things like "the Battle for Picasso's
Mind" (the CIA's attempts: to recruit intellectuals to- its .
cause, including the Secret subsidy of Britain's Encounter
magazine) and the way one phone call from CIA chief Al-
len Dulles to his brother John Foster Dulles helped. to win :
over a recalcitrant State Department official.
Unless you're an ex-agent yourself or have some other
special interest in the CIA, there will be a loti of new and,
perhaps startling information for you in the program.
How the CIA overthrew the Moussadegh government in
Iran, for example; or how much the "secret war' in Laos
cost U.S taxpayers ($2 billion); or how the CIA. tipped off
the U.S. Army that My Lai .was a supposed Viet Cong
stronghold. .
What ordinary viewers can do with such information is
another question, but at least it will be there for possible
future use. For that, no thanks to PBS?and many thanks
to ECET for giving us the chance to-decide for ourselves
what vio should know. . _
effective secret service if we make all of their activities pub-
lic?" . . "We're already exposing ourselves too much to our
enemies" . . . "Who would hold the reign, the Russians?" ...
-I believe id functional autonomy for the CIA" ... "The whole
wave of concern to expose the CIA is merely a communist plot
to weaken-the U.S. security."
YES, 23.4 percent COMMENTS: "Someone should be held
accountable for all of these CIA atrocities" . .. "The CIA's ac-
tivities should be la) percent under control of a six-man Sen-
ate committee, maybe then the CIA will remain within its
legal and moral boundaries'' "What kind of nation are we
when we attempt to assassinate any world leader whose par-
ticular phillosophy differs from that of the United States" .. .
"It's a sorry state of affairs when the CIA has to stoop to
murder" . . . '!The CIA should not act like the mafia."
26
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BALTIMORE SUN
29 Nov. 1975
FBI, CIA. Criticized._
- Sir: The Orwellian and dread.;
ful disclosures that have been re-
vealed by the U.S. Senate
Senate Intelligence. Committee)..
investigation of the FBI and
CIA's clandestine and invidious'
surveillance of. Dr. Martin. Lu-
ther King, Jr. and thousands of:
other citizens are chilling and
stultifying. Thoughtful and ra-
tional citizens must be grateful
to Senator Frank Church and
his colleagues for their courage,
persistence and sedulous efforts
in ferreting out the facts in this
matter.
The revelations graphically
dictate the need for stronger and
more effective control and moni-
toring of the manifold activities
of the FBI and CIA by the Con-
gress. Moreover, steps should be
immediately taken by the Presi-
dent and Congress in order to as-
sure all citizens that their human
and constitutional rights will not
be violated by their government.
? ?
The petulant and reprehensi-
ble actions of J. Edgar Hoover
germane to Dr. king and other
citizens convey a- frightening
perspective to, the -Actonian ad-
monition: "Power-tends to cor-
rupt and absolute power cor-
rupts absolutely."- The escutch-
eon of our nation has been __
tar-
nished by the illegal and inhu-
mane actions of the FBI and
CIA. ? .
-The Bicentennial, given the.
grim and dispiriting Watergate.
debacle and the current CIA and
FBI revelations, provides a basis -
for a stronger resolve to effect 'a .
recrudescence of decency, civili-
ty and respect for the rule of law
in a free society. ,
Samuel L Banks.
? Baltimore.
coumoa JC.IriTiNAL 1:324 R77/.77:w
NO VI' 9 ER / DECEMBER 1Q75
A famous dissenter
calls for a halt to media 'inquisitions'
and challenges some versions
of his own legend
WIL1 FUL3R1
by s
Heresy though it may be, I do not subscribe unquestion-
ingly to the Biblical aphorism that "the truth shall make you
free." A number of crucial distinctions are swept aside by
an indiscriminate commitment to the truth ? the distinc-
tion, for instance, between factual and philosophical truth,
or between truth in the sense of disclosure and truth in the
sense of insight. There are also certain useful fictions ? or
"myths" ? which we invest with a kind of metaphorical
truth. One of these is the fiction that "the king can do no
wrong." He can, of course, and he does, and everybody
knows. it. But in the course of political history it became
apparent that it was useful to the cohesion and morale of
society to attribute certain civic virtues to the chief of state,
even when he patently lacked them. A certain dexterity is
required to sustain the fiction, but it rests on a kind of
social contract ? an implicit agreement among Congress,
the press, and the people that some matters are better
left undiscussed, not out of a desire to suppress in-
formation, but in recognition, as the French writer Jean
Giraudoux put it, that "there are truths which can kill
a nation." What he meant, it seems, was that there are
gradations of truth in a society, and that there are some
truths which are more significant than others but which are
also destructible. The self-confidence and cohesion of a
society may be a fact, but it can be diluted or destroyed by.
other facts such as the corruption or criminality of the
society's leaders. Something like that may have been what
Voltaire had in mind when he wrote, "There are truths
which are not for all men, nor for all times." Or as Mark
Twain put it, even more cogently, "Truth is the most
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valuable thing we have. Let us economize it." .
In the last decade ? this Vietnam and Watergate decade
? we have lost our ability to "economize" the truth, That
Puritan self-righteousness which is never far below the
surface of American life has broken through the frail
barriers of civility and restraint, and the press has been in
the vanguard of the new aggressiveness, This is not to
suggest in any way that the press ought to poll its punches,
much less be required to do so,. on matters of political
substance. ? I myself have not been particularly backward
about criticizing presidents and their policies, and I am
hardly likely at this late date to commend such inhibitions to
others. I do nonetheless deplore the shifting of the criticism.
from policies to personalities, from matters of tangible
consequence to the nation as a whole to matters of personal
morality of uncertain relevance to the national interest.
By and large, we used to make these distinctions, while
also perpetuating the useful myth that "the king can do no
wrong .''- One method frequert4r., employed when: thin;s.-:.
went- wrong Was 'imp} i to blame sorneone else --in- a
ceremonial way. When I began publicly to criticize the
Johnson Administration, first over the Dominican interven-
tion in 1965, then over the escalating Vietnam war, I was at
some pains to attribute the errors of judgment involved to
the "president's advisers" and not to the president himself
? although I admit today that I was not wholly free of
doubts about the judgment of the top man. -
Our focus was different in those days from that of more
recent investigations, especially Watergate, but also the
current inquiries concerning the CIA. and the multinational
corporations. It was sometimes evident in hearings before
the Foreign Relations Committee on Vietnam and other
matters that facts were being withheld or misrepresented,
but our primary concern was with the events and policies
involved rather than with the individual officials who chose
? or more often were sent ? to misrepresent the
administration's position. Our concern was with correcting
_
mistakes rather than exposing. embarrassing, or punishing
those who made them.
In contrast, a new inquisitorial style has evolved, which
is primarily the legacy of Watergate, although perhaps it
began with :he Vietnam war. That protracted conflict gave
rise to welt-justified opposition based on what seemed to me
? and still does ? a rational appreciation of the national
interest. But it also set loose an emotional mistrust ? even
hostility ? to government in general. Somehow the policy
mistakes of certain leaders became distorted in the minds of
many Americans, especially young ones, as if they had
been acts of premeditated malevolence rather than failures
of judgment. The leaders who took us into Vietnam and
kept us there bear primary- responsibility for the loss of
conne-Ince in government which their policies provoked. I
am as certain today as I ever was that opposition to the
Vietnam war ? including my own and that of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee ? was justified and neces-
sary. Nonetheless, I feel bound to recognize that those of us
who criticized the war as mistaken in terms of the national
interest may unwittingly have contributed to that surge of
vindictive emotionalism which now seems to have taken on
a virulent life of its own.
he ? emotionalism has not survived without
cause, to be sure. The Watergate scandals
. provoked a justified wave of public indigna-
tion, and. a wholly necessary drive to prevent
. such abuses in the future. Moral indignation,
however ? even justified moral indignation
? creanzes cer.ain problems of its own, notably
the tendency of indignation, unrestrained,
to become self-righteous and vindictive. Whatever the
cause and antecedents, whatever too the current provb-
eation,-ther fact remains that the anti-Watergate movement
genera:ed a kind of inquisition psychology both on the part
of the press and in the Congress.
If once the press was excessivery orthodox and unques-
tioning of government policy, it has now become almost
sweepingly iconoclastic. If once the press showed excessive
deference to government and its leaders, it has now become
excessively mistrustful and even hostile. The problem is not
so much the specific justification of specific investigations
and exposures ? any or all may have merit ? but whether
it is desirable at this stage of our affairs ? after Vietnam
and I,Vate.rgate ? to sustain the barrage of scandalous
revelations. Their ostensible purpose is to bring reforms,
but thus far they have brought little but cynicism and
di illusion. Everything revealed about the CIA or dubious
campaign practices may be wholly or largely true, but 1
have come to feel of late that these are not the kind of truths
we most need now; these are truths which must injure if not
kill :he nation.
0,-nsider the example of the CIA. It has been obvious for
yea:; that Congress was neglecting its responsibility in
fg to exercise meaningful legislative oversight of the
nation's intelligence activities. A few of us- tried on several
occasions to persuade the Senate to establish effective
oversight procedures, but we were never able to muster
more than a handful of votes. Now, encouraged by an
enthusiastic press, the Senate ? or at least its special
investigating committee ? has swung from apathy to
crusading zeal, offering up one instance after another of
improper CIA activities with the apparent intent of eliciting
all possible public shock and outrage. It seems to me
!unnecessary at this late date to dredge up every last
Igruesome detail of the CIA'S designs against the late
President Allende of Chile. Perhaps it would be worth doing
!? to shake people up ? if Watergate were not so recently
behind us. But the American people are all too shaken up by
that epic scandal, and their need and desire now are for
restored stability and confidence. The Senate knows. very-
well what is needed with respect .to the CIA - an effective
oversight committee to monitor the agency's activities in a
careful, responsible way on a continuing basis. No further
revelations are required to bring this about; all that is needed
is an act of Congress to create the new unit. Prodding by the
press to this end would be constructive, but the new
investigative journalism seems preoccupied instead with the
tracking down and punishment of wrongdoers, with giving
them their just deserts. .
My own view is that no one should get everything he
deserves ? the world: Would become a charnel house..
Looking back .on the Vietnam- war, it .riVer occurred .to me
that President Johnson was guilty of anything worse than
bad judgment. He misled the Congress on certain matters,
and he misled me personally with respect to the Gulf of
Tonkin episode in 1964. I resented that, and I am glad the
deceit was exposed. But I never wished to carry the matter
beyond exposure, and that only for purposes of hastening
the end of the war. President Johnson and his advisers were
tragically mistaken about the Vietnam xvar, but by no
standard of equityor accuracy did they qualify as "war
criminals." Indeed, had Mr. Johnson ended the war by
1968, I would readily have supported him as my party's
candidate for reelection.
Watergate, one hopes, has been consigned to the history
books, but the fame and success won by the reporters who
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: ?
uncovered the scandars of the Nixon administration seem to
have inspired legions of envious colleagues to, seek their
own fame and fortune by dredging up new scandals for the.
delectation of an increasingly cynical and disillusioned
public. The media have thus acquired an unwholesome
fascination with the singer to the neglect of the song. The
result is not* only an excess of emphasis on personalities but
short shrift for significant policy questions. It is far from !.
obvious, for example, that Watergate will prove to have,:
been as significant for the national interest as President:
. Nixon's extraordinary innovations in foreign policy. The
Nixon d?nte policy was by no means 'neglected. but it
certainly took second place in the news to Watergate.
milady ? to take a more recent topic of interest
to Congress and the press ? it strikes me as a
matter of less than cosmic consequence that
certain companies have paid what in some
cases may be commissions, and in others more
accurately bribes, to foreign. officials to ad-
vance their business interests. Such laws as
may have been' violated were not our own but
those of foreign countries, and thus far the countries in-
volved have exhibited far less indignation over these pay-
ments than over their exposure by a United States Senate
subcommittee. I should not have to add, I trust. that I
do not advocate corporate bribery either abroad or at home;
nor would I object to legislation prohibiting the practice.
At the same time the subject does not strike me as de-
serving of a harvest of publicity.- It disrupts our relations
with te countries concerned, and what is worse, it smacks
of that same moral prissiness and meddlesome impulse
which helped impel us into Vietnam. Furthermore, "com-
mission" payments are not unknown in government bus-
Mess in the United States, .and hypocrisy is not an at-
tractive =it. Even in our business dealings with Italy
or Saudi Arabia, there is relevance in the lesson of Viet-
nam: whatever the failings of others, we are simply not
authorized ? or qualified ? to serve as the self-appointed
keepers of the conscience of all mankind.
A recent instance of misplaced journalistic priority,
which came within my own domain, was the media's
neglect of the extensive hearings on East-West d?nte held
by the Foreign Relations Committee during the summer and
fall of 1974. The issues involved ? the nuclear arms race
and the SALT talks, economic and political relations between
the United States and the Soviet Union and China ? were
central to our foreign policy and even to our national
survival. At the same time that the media were ignoring the
d?nte hearings, they gave generous coverage to the
nomination of a former Nixon aide as ambassador to Spain,
a matter of transient interest and limited consequence.
To cite another example: the press and television gave
something like saturation coverage in 1974 to Congressman
Wilbur Mills's personal misfortunes; by contrast I do not re-
call reading anything in the press about the highly informa-
tive hearings on the Middle East, and another set on inter-
national terrorism, held in the spring of that year by Con-
gressman Lee Hamilton's House Foreign Affairs Subcom-
mittee on the Near East and South -Asia. The crucial
ingredient, it seems, is scandal ? corporate, political, or
personal. Where it is present, there is news, although the
event may otherwise be inconsequential. Where it is luck-
ing, the event may or not be news, depending in part. to be
sure, on its intrinsic importance, but hardly less on compet-
ing events, the degree of controversy involved, and whether
? it involves something -new" ? new, that is, in the way of
disclosure as distinguished from insight or perspective.
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The national press would do well to reconsider its
priorities. It has excelled in exposing wrongdoers, in
alerting the public to the high crimes and peccadilloes of
, persons in high places. But it has fallen short ? far short :?
in its higher responsibility of public education. With an
' exception or two, such as the National Public Radio, the
media convey only fragments of those public proceedings
which are designed to inform the general public. A super-
star can always command the attention ofthe press, even
with a banality. An obscure professor can scarcely hope to,
even with a striking idea, a new insight, or a Iuc
simplification of a complex issue. A bombastic accusatic:,1
a groundless, irresponsible prediction, or, best of all.
"leak," will usually gain a congressman or senator hia
; heart's content of publicity; a reasoned discourse, more
. often than not, is destined for entombment in the Congres-
sional Record. A member of the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee staff suggested that the committee had made a mistake
holding the 1974 d?nte hearings in public; if they had bee
held in closed session and the transcripts then leaked, t1::
press would have covered them generously.
We really must try to stop conducting our affairs like
morality play. In a dernocracy we ought to try to think
our public servants not as objects of adulation or of
revilement, but as servants in the literal sense, to be lauded
or censured, retained or dispensed with, according to the
competence with which they db the job for which they were.
hired. Bitter disillusionment with our leaders is the other
side of the coin of worshipping them. If we did not expect
, our leaders to be demigods, we would not be nearly as
shocked by their failures and transgressions_
The press has always played up to our national tendency
" to view public figures as either saints or sinners; but the
practice has been intensified since Watergate. President
Ford was hailed as a prince of virtue and probity when he
came to office. Then he pardoned President Nixon and was
instantly cast into the void, while the media resounded with
heartrending cries of betrayal and disillusion. Many
theories, often conspiratorial, were put forth in explanation
of the Nixon pardon ? all except the most likely: that the
president acted impulsively and somewhat prematurely out
of simple human feeling.
Secretary Kissinger, for his part, has been alternatel
hailed as a miracle worker and excoriated as a Machiavel-
lian schemer, if not indeed a Watergate coconspirator. I
myself was criticized by some of the Kissinger-hating
commentators for "selling out" by cooperating with the
secretary on East-West d?nte and the Middle East. Until
that time it had never occurred to me that opposition itself
constituted a principle, and one which required me to alter
my own long-held views on Soviet-American relations and
the need for a compromise peace in the Middle East.
NIv point is not that the character of our statesmen is
irrelevant but that their personal qualities are relevant only
, as they pertain to policy, to their accomplishments or lack
of them in their capacity as public servants. Lincoln, it is
said, responded to charges of alcoholism against the vic-
torious General Grant by offering to send him a case of his
favorite whiskey. Something of that spirit would be refresh-
ing and constructive in our attitude toward our own contem-
porary leaders. None of them, I strongly suspect ? includ-
ing Dr. Kissinger, President Ford, and former President
Nixon ? is either a saint or a devil, but a human like the
rest of us, whose prover moral slot is to be found some-
where in that vast space between hellfire and the gates of
heaven.
A free society can remain free only as long as its citizens
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exercise restraint in the practice of their freedom. This
principle applies with special force to the press, because of
its power and because of its necessary immunity from
virtually every form of restraint except self-restraint. The
media have become a fourth branch of government in every
respect except for their immunity from checks and balances.
This is as it should be ? there are no conceivable restraints
to be placed on the press which would not be worse than its
excesses. But because the press cannot and should not be
restrained from outside, it bears a special responsibility for
resirairting itself, and for helping to restore civility in our
public affairs.
or a start, journalists might try to be less thin-
skinned. Every criticism of the press is not a
fascist assault upon the First Amendment. One
recalls, for example, that when former Vice-
President Agnew criticized members of Con-
gress and others, the press quite properly re-
ported his remarks, taking the matter more or
less in their stride. But when he criticized the
media, the columnists and editorialists went into transports
of outraged excitement, bleeding like hemophiliacs from
the vice-president's pinpricks:
More recently, since Watergate, the press has celebrated
its prowess with a festival of self-congratulation, and
politicians have joined with paeans of praise. The politi-
cians' tributes should be taken with a grain of salt in any
case ? they have seen the media's power and few are
disposed to trifle with it. The real need of the press is
self-examination, and a degree of open-mindedness to the
criticisms which are leveled against it. Journalists bear an
exceedingly important responsibility_ for keeping office
holders honest; they have an equally important responsibil-
ity for keeping themselves honest, and fair.
I make these general criticisms of the press with some
embarrassment, because during my thirty-two years in
public life I was treated for the most part with understanding
and generosity by the press, most particularly by the major
newspapers in my home state of Arkansas. Such complaints
as I have ? and I have a few ? are essentially aspects of
the more general problems cited above.
To my considerable personal discomfort I have found
myself from time to time under journalistic examination to
determine ? it would seem ? whether I was a saint or an
agent of the devil_ Knowing full well that I was not the
former, and daring to hope that I was not one of Satan's
minions either, I have sometimes experienced a curious
sense of detachment when reading-about myself, as if the
subject were really someone else. In truth, I have never
thought of myself as anything but a politician ? until ray
recent retirement ? trying to advance the national interest,
as best I understood it, while also doing my best to service
ray constituency, readily if not happily compromising be-
tween the two when that seemed necessary.
The Arkansas press ? including the two statewide
newspapers, the Gazette and the Democrat ? came closer
than Others to accepting. me on those terms, reporting my
often heretical views on foreign policy with reasonable
objectivity while also noting my efforts on behalf of
agriculture, education, and industry in Arkansas ? efforts
in which I took and still take considerable personal pride.
Even in my last, losing primary campaign in 1974 I was
pleased and proud to have the support of the Gazette and the
Democrat.
The sophisticated national press ? though usually gener-
ous and sometimes flattering to me personally ? has
nonetheless had a tendency to pose certain rather tedious ?
and in my opinion largely meaningless ? "paradoxes"
about my personality and my role. Is Fulbright truly a
humanitarian idealist, or a racist under the skin? An
"international peace prophet," as one friendly writer re-
cently put it, or "plain old Bill," regaling Arkansas rubes
with talk about the price of cotton and chickens? How too,
they have asked, anguishing on my behalf, can an "ur-
bane" internationalist like Fulbright survive in a southern
"hillbilly" state like Arkansas? But most of all my friends
in the national press have pointed ? more in sorrow than in
anger ? to the "paradox" of my "humanitarianism on a
global scale" as against my early opposition to civil-rights
? legislation and, more recently, my dissent from aspects of
our Middle East policy and my differences with the Israeli
lobby in Congress.
All these questions have been posed as a "moral"
dilemma, in much the same way that our presidents have
been viewed as either saints or sinners. What I perceive in
this approach is not a genuine moral dilemma, or even art
authentic paradox of personality, but another manifestation
of that Puritan dogmatism which pervades our national life,
including ? to a far greater degree than is recognized ?
our liberal intellectual community. In the case of the eastern
liberal press, the dogmatism is reinforced by arrogance ?
the arrogance of people who regard themselves as duly
appointed arbiters not only of the nation's style and taste but
also of its morality. The "paradox" posed about me by a
number of writers has never greatly impressed or interested
? me because it is not really my paradox but theirs. "How,"
they are asking, "can a man who shares so many of my
opinions and prejudices fail so woefully to share them all?"
In fact there are a few rather simple explanations to the
so-called "paradoxes" in my career. While believing in the
necessity of international cooperation and of the United
Nations idea, I have also believed that education and
economic opportunity were the best avenue to racial justice
in the United States. I did not vote for civil-rights legislation
prior to the late sixties for two very simple reasons: first,
because I doubted its efficacy; second, because my con-
stituents would not have tolerated it. I felt able to challenge
some of their strong feelings on such matters as the Vietnam
war; I did not feel free to go against them on the emotionally
charged issue of race. And as far as the "paradox" of world
? peace as against the price of cotton is concerned, I see no
conundrum at all ? I have always been interested in both.
Coming finally to the "paradox" of my "urbane"
internationalism as against my "provincial" Arkansas con-
stituency, I take this as no more than a conceit of the eastern
"establishment." It has not been my observation that the
representation in Congress of New York, Massachusetts, or
California has been notably more responsible, intellectual,
sophisticated, or humane than that of Arkansas. I have
always felt attuned, responsive, and at one with my home
state, and although the voters of Arkansas decided after
thirty years that they wanted a change, I have little doubt
that I survived a lot longer in politics in Arkansas than lever
would have in New York or Massachusetts.
Rather than for my moral qualities I should prefer to be
evaluated for my specific positions on specific issues, for
my contributions or lack of them as a public servant. That is
what counts in a democracy, or in a mature society. It
matters little to the nation or to posterity whether a president
or senator met some individual's or group's or newspaper's
particular standard of political "purity." For my own part I
do not regard myself as a fitting or even interesting subject
for priestly exorcism. If my career is judged worthy of
review by journalists or historians, I very much hope that it
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will be for what I contributed or failed to contribute to my
country and my state. The purity or lack of it in my motives
is an issue strictly between me and my Maker.
cannot stress too strongly that my criticism of the press
in this regard is not especially personal. Looking back
over my long career ? to my many speeches on
foreign policy, to the hearings, legislation, and other
? activities of the Foreign Relations Committee during
my chairmanship ? I am bound to conclude that I
have been treated by the press with overall fairness
and generosity. It is the general practice of moral-
izing to which I object, rather than the moralizing which
has been directed toward me, most of which has been
generous, some of which indeed has been flattering.
I have been more distressed personally by what has often
seemed to me an arbitrary and prejudiced standard of
''newsworthiness" in the national press, particularly as
applied to the Middle East. I have noted repeatedly, for
example, the quantitative disparity between the press cover-
age of Palestinian guerilla attaCks within Israel and of Israeli
attacks upon South Lebanon, although the loss of civilian
life in the latter has almost certainly been greater. I even
made a statement On the subject in the Senate in August
1974, but the statement itself was ignored, consigned to
entombment in the Congressional Record.
Another instance of dubious "newsworthiness" arose
following my final major speech as a senator, a discussion
of the Middle East at Westminster College in Missouri. The
New York Times reported the main theme which was the
danger of a world crisis arising out of the Arab-Israeli
conflict ? with reasonable accuracy, although the headline
FULBRIGHT, AT FULTON, GLOOMY ON WORLD - sug-
gested that the gloom lay not so much upon the world as on
the speaker. The Washington Post ? not for the first time
involving a statement critical of Israel ? did not report the
speech at all, although it was otherwise widely reported
around the country. Some months later, by contrast, the
Post found prominent place, including a picture, for an
article recalling adverse comments I had made on black
voting in the Arkansas Democratic primary back in 1944.
Still another instance of dubious "newsworthiness" in
my experience occurred in April 1971 upon the occasion of
a lecture I delivered at Yale University, again concerning
the Middle East. On that occasion too I was critical of
Israeli policy. The New York Times and other newspapers
provided fair and accurate coverage. The Washington Post
did not report the speech at all, but on the following day.
carried art article on the Israeli reaction to my speech,
headlined ISRAELI PRESS LASHES OUT AT FULBRIGHT. Later
still one of the Past' s coluainistx dr.voted a whole column of
vinnat-paioh to my unreported speech. Recently, the Post
may ha'. cad a change of heart as they did publish on the
,
op-et Taz-e of July 7, 1975 a statement of my views con-
=mins the appropriate' settlement of the conflict in the
Mlddie East.
The ultimate test of the press's fairness is its coverage of
op;r1Es of which the writers and editorialists do not ap-
prove. In my own experience as a critic not of Israel itself,
but of the Israeli lobby and of what has seemed to me the
excessi-, e. responsiveness of the United States government
to demands made upon it by the government of Israel,
the press has frequently failed to meet the test of fair-
ness and objectivity, tending both to an arbitrary standard
of newsworthiness and to a shifting of attention from"
the event to its author, from statement to motive, from
sone to singer. I have in recent years been called "cranky,"
"crmhety," and "obsessive" about Israel and the Middle
East ? by contrast, it is sometimes lamented, with my -
"courageous" or "inspiring" leadership on Vietnam. All
this signals to me is that the writer does not sympathize with
my views and has devised an excuse to avoid reporting
them. To mylnowledge the reporters who have made these
personal charges have neither general psychiatric.
qualifications nor specific familiarity with my state of mind.
If indeed I have been "crochety" about the Middle East, it.
is not Israel which has brought me to that state but
journalists who have thwarted my efforts to communicate
views which could,. I readily concede, be judged mistaken
under dispassionate examination, but which I myself have
long believed and still believe to be rational, at least
arguable, and pertinent to the national interest.
I have always had a good deal of admiration for
Washington's overshadowed evening newspaper. The Star
suffers from. the ignominy of having achieved few if. any
Watergate scoops, but over the years it has demonstrated
certain less flamboyant virtues, such as confining its opin-
ions to its editorial page. The Star has rarely been friendly
to me or my positions on foreign policy in its editorials; at
the same time it has usually given fair and objective
treatment to my statements and to the proceedings of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The Star even pub-
Es-.ad a favorable review of my 1972 book, The Crippled
C.'nnt, although the paper's editorial writers could hardly
have zTnroved its main thrust, while the Post sought out as
i!s reviewer an obscure controversialist from Pine Bluff,
.L.:nsas, who had little to say about my book but a great
to say about my signing of the "Southern Manifesto"
in 1955 and my many personal shortcomings ea he pet=
ceived them.
In addition to The Washington Star and dr.: press in
general in illy home state of Arkansas, I have always felt a.
spezial rec_tard for the smaller, regional newspapers around
the country. The steady decline in their numbers and variety
is a substantial loss to the country. Few of them have scored
any ?great scoops of investigative journztlism. but many of
them combine a genuine regard for objectivity in the news.
with a good deal of conunon sense and sound judgment in
their editorials. Their principal failing in . my opinion has
been an excess of deference to. the large.. national news- .
papers.
. -
he special strength of the writers for the
eaira4=---aa,a-atA
smaller newspapers is journalistic "distance"
tea
' ? a virtue much celebrated but rarely prac-
ticed by their more famous Washington-based
colleagues. The latter tend to express "dis-
tance" through vituperation, but more com-
monly cultivate all possible intimacy with the
high officials whose activities they report. The
officials in turn usually find it advantageous to respond,
with the result that some of the elite of the Washington
press corps have effectively made the transition from ob-
servers to participants in the making of public policy. Free
as their writers are from such temptations and aspirations,
the smaller newspapers. seem to me, by and large, to come
closer to fulfilling their journalistic obligations to report the
news accurately and interpret it with personal detachment...
They often seem -better able, as the historian Bernard A.
Weisberger expressed it, "to-see men and events in whole
and human perspective ? that is, always fallible, and not
always the masters of their own -destiny. Or, in short,
historically."
- - __ ? .
?
-
commend to the press in conclusion, a renewed
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awareness of its great power and commensurate responsibil-
ity ? a responsibility which is all the greater for the fact
- that there is no one to restrain the press except the press
itself, nor should there be. After a long era of divisiveness
and acrimony in our national life, we are in need of a
reaffirmation of the social contract among people, govern-
ment, and the media_ The essence of that contract is a
measure of voluntary restraint. an implicit agreement
among the major groiips and interests in our society that
none will apply their powers to the fullest. For all the
ingeniousness of our system of checks and balances, our
ultimate protection against tyranny is the fact that we are a
people who have not wished to tyrannize one another. "The
WAS?: NGTON STAR
24 NOV 1975
Charles Bartlett
republican form of government," wrote Herbert Spencer in
1S91, "is the highest form of government: but because of
this it requires the highest type of human -nature ? a type
nowhere at present existing." We have shown in times of
adversity in the past that we are- capable of this "highest
type of human nature." We would do well, if we can, to
call it into existence once again. It. has never been needed
more. 12
_
William FirIbrigia is the former United States s;arettor .lwrn
Arkansas. lie was el:al.-mon of the Senate Forrriz,rn Relathars
Conanittee from 1939 to 1974 and iv nolii of (morsel to tire lawf rot
of Hogan and llort:s-orr in Washington.
Today's morality and yesterday's;
The Senate Selecr!Corn::.
mittee has issued an assaSi
sination report. whic,I4
should never have .been)
published about acliritiesf
that should never have beers,
contemplated. "These
deeds must not be thought'
after these ways,' whisper-
ed Lady Macbeth, "so it
will make vs mad." Sen..
Frank Church, D-Idaho?"
and, his -committee' col-
leagues, confronted by the`
dark deeds of three admin-
istrations, chose the risks ofv
stirring indignation. against
the nation ,over the risk to:
themselves of affronting thel
public's right to know.
Their report documents;
the "arrogance of power"
phase of American foreign
policy but it has already'
been discredited by the out-
come in Indochina, the bril-
liant perceptions of William
Fulbright and a pronounced
shift in the political mood.
The report holds the initia-
tives of an era in which the
struggle was the main thing
up to the judgments of an-
era of which -political
Literality is everything.
The committee did its job
thoroughly, exploring. each:
CIA -fling at ,Macbethian
diplomacy with such zeal-as
to leave the nation no resort
to the refuge of "plausible
denial." Since these mar-
ginal, illegal plottings gain-
ed justification from the
great Care that was taken to
,
enable t.P.S. officials to snovi
clean hands, this absolute
disclosure has the result Of
making all these operations
seem doubly ridiculous. '
The senators maintain'
the nation is obliged to suf-
fer the embarrasSnient.
their clean-breititink., I
order to securea.'moraU
base for the futurertei
.theory is thatakPosuie
the humiliatioaAif. a fail*
"mea culpat:', niakel
policy-makers more caul'
tious and covert operator
more aware that thei
machinations -must ulti-
mately face the test of operi
scrutiny. -
But was it really necesti
sary to muddy the past NA
inSure conformity with'thel
guidelines of theriew.rrioral-
ity? The intelligence prei
cept of cold war days- irQ
which !` acceptable norms of
hunian. ..behavioE?clog;not
Need the.0
It is no secret that the Central
Intelligence :Agency strayed beyond
its sphere of Influence when it got into
the domestic security business;- but
that does not alter the fact that the
United States needs the CIA.
For example, it has been suspected
for years that. the Russians have been
pouring more into military spending
than they said they were. Just how
much or to what extent was not
known, for the Soviets
understandably, don't go around
,bragging about it.
Something of substance, howevec,
has come to be known; and the CIA is
responsible for bringing it to light.
afaity'7.
re-
pudiated by President Ford
and CIA Directar, Colby.,
Congress can affect- the fikr,
ture by enacting edicts
against the Macbeth option;
and by obliging CIA direc4
tors to forswear it on confini
mation. ?
Toying with the 'theory;
that the CIA was an animat
on the loose, the senators
suggest -that full" 'disclosurei
was crucial to restore disci-
pline within the govern-1
ment. Their report tries tol
soften its impact upon' the)
records of dead Presidents)
by impugning the CIA'sj
chain .'of' command in thol
days of derring-do. Puttin
the personalities ahead
the institution., was an easy
choice for the senators.
Ilowe!ier, it does notl
make, art-honest historicat
record. Protecting the chief',
executive' was a crucial as-
pect of these operations.
The lesson of the U-Z debai
cie was that President*
must never be involved ir0
any.way. But While the line*
of authority had to be 01,4
,scored, the !agency's meect
for ..policy guidance from
the top, was implicithe
TRIBUNE-DEMOCRAT
Johnstown, Pa.
lIt Nov. 1975
1971 the Russians have been spend-
ing more each year on military
preparedness than has the United
States: further, the CIA says that a
reduction in such Soviet spending is
unlikely.
The importance of this information
lies in the fact that the United States
now knows that it cannot, or at least
should not, drastically reduce its
military spending in the face or
continued Russian emphasis on that
front.
We do not, of course, know how or
where the CIA got its information: but
we would like to_ bet that none of us
would be aware of what the Russians
37
? .%
misdeeds,
Wilcnature of -these verv.,-;' -
tures. The: plotters! were.
after all career government
officials', hardly type* who;
go off on' theirawn to slay
heads of staie:, , .
- .
"Do it. but. don't tell me,
is a machination which ha.
become second nature to
politicians. They learn it ir
coping with campaign fi--
nance laws. But just as the,
Watergate burglary wasi
triggered by the _Nixon;
aides,who prodded Jeb Matj
gruder,,, the _assassination!'
-plots 'were launched: by
:prnddings from the Oval -Of-i
fice. Those were day's M1.
which it was fashionable fori
the ablest officials to re-1
spond with alacrity to their.
'feedings. of the President's;
wishes.
The damage of this act jaf
penance may outweigh its,
fruits.. But the senators are
solemn in avowing that this!
country "must not adopt thg,
tactics of the enemy." They
can be assured.arleast that
the enemy wilt -not adoPti
their method of conscience-,
cleansing
The agency has estimated that since are doing if it were not for the CIA.
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GMIESIS
Dec emb er 1975
Now, for the first time, exclusively in
Genesis, an ex-CIA intelligence officer
exposes the perpetrators and the victims
of the bloodiest and may frightening
conflict yet?the war within America's
Central Intelligence Agency.
The dirty little dramas played out every
day in the .secrecy-shrouded offices of
the CM are a time bomb, ticking steadily
and inevitably toward destruction-
threatening to blow the Agency apart
even sooner than the catalog of dirty
tricks surfacing daily in your newspaper.
The author of this brutally frank, explo-
sive report is an insider?who, after six
years with the Agency, remains in daily
furtive contact with colleagues who re-
main behind to carry on the internecine
corrbat. Jesse James Leaf, now manag-
ing editor of this magazine, tells here the
ert,re shattering and shameful story.
at this moment, while Congress
ahC media probe the rarefied heights
of a.;=, dirty tricks?assassinations, bug
gins. Wegalities of every description?
ano*.'-er more dangerous war is being
fougni within ,the halls of Agency head-
By Jesse James Leaf
quarters itself. This is a civil war which
has already torn the Agency apart, re-
sulted in two bloody purges and has
reduced the efficiency of this once-
respected organization to practically nil.
It is a sorry spectacle of pettiness,
bureaucratic bumbling, hypocrisy and
indifference which has caused untold
misery to loyal employees and irrepar-
able damage to our national intelligence
effort.
The decline of the CIA didn't come
about overnight, and it hasn't ended yet.
The Agency is an organization without a
heart. It has virtually ceased functioning
under attacks frOm its critics and con-
servative direction from within. It is torn
by ideological suspicion, held back by
unimaginative and frightened leader-
ship.
"... Co/by will be the next
sacrificial lamb. . . A new
generation of old boys is on
the way up.. ."
The. trouble stretches back to the
1960's, "a time of agonizing reappraisal"
to quote a current non-cola commercial:
Our national priorities were under ques-
tion and under fire?Viet Nam, Cities
under the torch, the moral strength of our
nation enduring daily testing.
First Kennedy, then Johnson and
Nixon sought to defuse the explosive
unrest igniting the youth in this country.
The word came down to hire the dissaf-
fected, to get the dissidents into the
establishment?let them see how it feels
to be on the frcnt line. The hope was that
the ponderous machinery of government
would bureaucratize them.
The Central Intelligence Agency was
no exception. During the 40's and 50's,
CIA. recruiters had an easy time looking
for the best and the brightest. The
formula was simple enough?love of
God, love of country. They scored in the
best places, and the product was com-
fortably uniform. CIA's rate of defectors,
dropouts and the disgruntled was far
below comparable Government agen-
cies. It was a tight, happy little ship.
But came the halcyon days of the 60's
33
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FOR IDENTIFICATION ONLY
This is, to ossify Hs*
JESSEZ*if-AMES LEAF
is siop:!:.?? if Tim U:ibsi mik
? c:
CENTRAL; INTELtIGENCE
:4AGENCY?!
\, ?
FOR
and -changes were taking place?social
changes the ?CIA establishment misun-
derstood. In an orgy of self-confidence,
it absorbed hundreds of bright, young
professionals, funneling as many as 400
a year through its Career Training
Program?the Agency's six-month in-
tensive course where the craft of intelli-
gence snares equal billing with building
the mystique of CIA esprit de corps.
What really- happened during this
period was the setting of a time bomb?
the Agency was sowing the seeds of its
own destruction. They had marched
blindly into new territory without taking
the trouble to plot the land. They had
supposed that the world outside the
well-guarded gates of Agency head-
quarters in McLean. Virginia, like the
cloistered world inside, had not really
changed. Trapped with an ideology that
stood still, they paid no attention to the
waves of dissent that had already
washed through the Washington Civil
Service Corps. At the State department,
junior officers had successfully or-
ganized and were effecting changes in
the old-line, pin-striped ranks. HEW,
Labor and HUD were all suffering and
growing under the impatience of their
younge,r professionals. Member de-
partments of the President's Cabinet
were being carried, kicking and scream-
ing, into the 1970's.
Not so the CIA. The incoming. recruits
found an organization that was begin-
ning to ossify. The gung-ho warriors who
made up the OSS during World War II
and the cold warriors who followed in the
50'S had become bureaucratized. The
Agency, which had prided itself on its
cocked hat professionalism and free-
wheeling organization had become a
refuge for fattening civil servants with
expanding waistlines. Small men with
narrow vision?empire builders, petty
political infighters and gossip
mongers?ruled the CIA. The games
that had to be played shifted from the
world stage to the smaller halls of
Agency headquarters. Like old, mangy
lions, they coveted their lairs?secure,
workless jobs, fat pay checks, gilt-
edged fringe benefits. The CIA was full
of white-shirred, crew-cut, big-assed
old-timers petrified that they were losing
control of events, that time was overtak-
ing them. The new Agency professional
represented a new order they didn't
understand and were therefore suspici-
ous of. So they sat on them.
And discontent grew.
. In the Directorate of Operations (then
called Plans), many of the younger case
officers had trouble justifying to them-
selves some of the stupid and illegal
operations in which they were forced to
participate. The decline in the Agency's
clandestine operations abroad meant
that large numbers of the younger offi-
cers had to mark time, sometimes for
'years,' in dead-end clerical jobs or
make-work assignments.
In i'ne Directorate of Intelligence, in-
coming personnel were thrown into a
mire of conflicting egos, ironbound
cliques and petty prejudices. Trained to
be political and economic analysts, and
chosen for their intelligence, ambition
and initiative, they quickly became
aware that the way to the top lay in
keeping your mouth shut and your nose
clean. And they soon !earned of an
invisible "shit list" which predetermines
the future of every employee at the CIA.
The "list" is totally subjective and irrefut-
able. Work, ability, dedication have no
effect on its judgements. An ever popu-
lar topic of. discussion over lunch or
drinks is the "list." How far will Ed go?
Well, he's a New Yorker, and pushy?no
more than a 13 (GS-13, lower level
supervisory). Dick?a playboy, too wild..
He's going nowhere. Neel?dull-witted, a
square. He's going places.
Not that being a clod is a prerequisite
for promotion at CIA, but it helps. It
means that Neil poses no threat, he does
what he's told, won't step on anybody's
toes. A non-entity. Perfect CIA supervis-
ory material.
The ethical bankruptcy of the CIA also
took-, its toll, working against itself and
alienating precisely the kind of intensely
moral, self-righteous people it tried to
recruit. Well-documented are the
Agency operations in southeast Asia
! and other questionable activities per-
formed in the name of saving the world 1
Ifrom Communism. But I'm talking about l
the dirty little dramas played out every
day in the offices of the CIA.
During one of our bull sessions, a
member of the group, a Mormon, told us
that during a routine discussion with a
'personnel officer, a number of photo-
graphs fell out of his 201 (personnel) file.
They showed him in various stages of
undress, and from all angles?
'apparently taken during his entrance
physical three years before. He tried to
obtain an explanation for this invasion of
privacy and to have the photographs
removed from his file. Unsuccessful, he
was left with no alternative but to resign
from an organization he felt had so little
decency.
I must admit that the incident was
amusing?to some of us?but not to the
women who were part of our coterie.
The role of women in the CIA is a
little-known, but particularly unsavory
chapter in its history. The Agency has
bowed to social pressures and stepped
up its hiring of female professionals. The
recruiters carefully screen- out outright
libbers and potential troublemakers. The
end product, the CIA professional wo-
man, is almost universally ugly, silly,
incompetent and, as it turns out, easy
bed bait.
Think about it. These were the serious
girls in school. Wallflowers at dances.
Studious. Unattractive. Socially and
psychologically immature, they would
have languished in big city singles bars,
or as political science teachers at some
small university, or spent their lives as
housewives.
But the Agency gives them new life
Surrounded by their male counterpart,:
in a flamboyantly one-sided male-femal,
ratio, they become the office sex object:
in an essentially closed 'and chauvinistic
society. Sex, or its promise, become:
the way to hold their jobs and then thE
way up. The aging; middle class subur
ban husband types who make up th
supervisory levels at CIA go ape. .
Of the professional women I knew
i most were having affairs with other
! Agency men, not surprising given ths
closed nature of the company. But
these, most were cavorting with their
superiors, and I can name severe,
women who owe their jobs directly to
steeping with their bosses or their boss-
es' friends. I know of several divorces
directly resulting from these liaisons. We
lost respect for the people involved ancJ
the Agency lost competent people who
were passed over or transferred in favor
of bedmates.
Left in the backwash are the truly
bright women who have something more
to offer the government than a willing
vagina. Almost without exception, they
have had it made abundantly clear that
their future with the Agency holds limited
promise. Those in the forefront or
change have either quit or remain locked
in lower level jobs. With no outlet at work,
and little opportunity to develop normal
outside interests, they are a pool of
disenchanted and bitter people at emo-
tional war with the Agency.
Let me stress that these relationships
' are carried on with the full knowledge of
the higher-ups. it fits into the peculiar
sense of CIA morality that such activity is
34
condoned so long as the men involved
are part of the club?the "old boys" who
run the CIA. Similar activity by any
i other member of the staff is greeted with
the seif-righteous indignation reserved
for the morally hypocritical.
This is the atmosphere those hun-
dreds of impatient. idealistic profession-
als who led and followed me into the CIA
found. With jobs lacking challenge, ad-
vancement a matter of putting in your
time and wearing a clean shirt, and
chaffing under the confines of an ex-
tremely conservative and stagnating
bureaucracy, the younger professionals
grew restive. Their growing discontent,
coupled with the highest dropout rate in
the Agency's history (70 percent of my
incoming class resigned within three
years), found notice at the top. Annoyed
at this unseemly display of insolence, the
brass decided to squelch the growing
mutiny?but "without actually endanger-
ing the ideological or administrative
structure ? they found so personally re-
warding. This is the typical Agency
reaction, the "catalyst" reaction?to en-
gineer an appearance of doing some-
thing without actually doing anything. It
is a device Agency insiders soon learn to
expect and they consequently become
programmed into chronic inaction.
It was decided to call an Agency-wide
meeting of younger professionals to dis-
cuss the state of CIA, entertain discus-
sion and criticism and offer possible
solutions. I think you can pinpoint the
beginning of the end for the Central
Intelligence Agency to that meeting held
at the Agency's futuristic auditorium in
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1970.
The meeting was doomed from the
first. It was set up by invitation only, the
invitations dispensed, of course, by the
brass. Needless to say, the people who
should have been there weren't. Those
who did turn out, the bootlickers and
chosen fair-haired boys (and girls), were _
window dressing' for the.brass. They sat
through self-serving public relations,
speeches, and listened to each other .
ask meaningless questions.
Absolutely nothing of substance was
raised or solved at the meeting. The
Director was satisfied that he respond-
ed to demands for change and had
shrewdly disarmed the budding re-
volutionaries. The lackies who attended
had the chance to show their faces to
Richard Helms and his beaming hon-
? chos.
Under the naive belief that the meeting
marked a turning point in CIA employee
relations, a band of young professionals
organized the Junior Officers Study
Group, a self-styled employee action
committee patterned after similar or-
ganizations in other Washington
agencies?but with one major differ-
ence. Where other groups, such as the
one at State, were seriously trying to
effect change from below, and played to'
generally responsive ears, the Agency ,
group served to draw out the troub-
lemakers for easy disposal. Of the 20
members who formed the hard core,
most have left the Agency, some to
better jobs in Defense, State or private
industry. A handful have had curiously
explosive records of promotion within
the CIA.
The history of the JOSG is a depres-
sing chronicle of what happens when
Young Turks, even castrated Young
Turks, buck the established CIA authori-
ty. . ? -
Flushed with good intentions, they
began a modest program of gentlemanly
reform. "We started with a low profile,"
says one member of the group. "We felt -
that if we made constructive recommen-
dations to office chiefs, they would pay
attention to us. Rather than attack the
system because we were fed up with it,
we took a more conservative tack than
comparable employee action groups,
say at State."
What the group was unprepared for
was the Agency's paranoid distrust of
criticism and change.
JOSG's first substantive action was in
the area of Equal Opportunity Employ-
ment. In 1970, the CIA, contrary to
established procedure in other Govern-
ment agencies, had no full-time Equal
Opportunity Employment Officer. The
group tried to obtain statistics on how
many minorities were employed at CIA,
but were refused the data. Representa-
tives of the group appealed to Col. Red
White, then Executive Director of the
CIA. Despite the innocuous nature of the
request. White exploded. Unable to
abide this insolence, White ordered the -
group to end the investigation and dis-
band immediately.
Group members were sh_ocked by the
negative intensity of the reaction. They
dropped their name and went uncter-
ground, meeting.secretty and informally.
Through a contact at the Office of Per-
sonnei, they were able to secure the
statistics, which they published as a
report and distributed to every office and
division chief in the Agency.
The response was predictable. At the
middle level, they were greeted with
stony silence. The most liberal of their
supervisors offered lukewarm (but clan-
destine) encouragement. When copies
of the memo reached the upper levels,
the catalyst response was applied.
Richard Helms, then Director of Central
Intelligence, a figurehead who serves as
public image of the Agency, but who
rarely dirties his hands in the day-to-day
operations of the little people, was pub-
licly impressed (or, more likely, was told
to be impressed). With great flourish, he
ordered a fulitime EOE Officer ? to be
established at CIA. To this day, there has
been no substantive change in the racial
makeup of the Agency.
. This apparent early victory buoyed the
group, and it began to attract hangers-
on and draw out the discontented. The
Agency Suggestions Committee was re-
ceiving an increasing number of radical
solutions to the ills which afflicted the
CIA?hiring and firing procedures, or-
ganizational weaknesses, poor produc-
tivity, unresponsive personnel proce-
dures. As is their custom, the Committee
had a difficult time deflecting the spate
of suggestions it received. One of the
more radical suggestions?which hap-
pened to be my brainchild?was a total
reorganization of the Office of Current
Intelligence. It called for the elimination
of several supervisors?one of whom
was my boss. The Suggestions Commit-
tee replied that it couldn't act on my
suggestion without my first plotting out
the work flow of the 300 analysts in the
OCI, that is, supply productivity reports
on each supervisor, map input of raw
data and outflow of finished intelligence
reports, and apply salary figures to
output. In addition, my suggestion,
which was supposed to have been
confidential, found its way to my super-
visor's in box. This made for a strained
confrontation and assured my place on
his shit list?bronzed for posterity. To-
day, he is Director of OC1.
Still under the critical eye of suspi-
cious superiors, the Group continued to
press for modest reform?establishment
of a day care center, changing the dress
' code, improving_ the company
magazine.
The meetings and memos continued
fitfully for two years until William Colby
'(now Director of Central Intelligence)
replaced White. Where White was bla-
tantly hostile, Colby was a snake. He
openly encouraged the JOSG, even
invited members to working lunches in
the Executive Dining Room. Privately, he
quashed them at every turn.
Meanwhile, employee discontent was
reaching alarming proportions. Security
leaks, which were virtually unknown in
the past, became a roaring deiuge. Jack
Anderson was receiving more classified
documents than he couid count. Report-
ers and columnists knew more about
what went on in the Agency than insiders
themselves. Viet Nam and Watergate
were beginning to take their toll as well.
In addition, the Agency was visibly
'falling down on the job. Operations
overseas were being blown or subverted
by foreign intelligence seuices, negat
??
ing whole operations. At home, mis-
takes, oversights and mistaken judge-
ments were effecting poiicy action deci-
sions. Clearly something was wrong. The
old confidence was failing.
? To his credit, Nixon correctly asses-
sed the 'problem, putting the blame on
the "old boys," the sludgy holdovers
from earlier days. Now carrying the
weight of middle age and stagnant
ideology on their shoulders, the career
Agency upper level had slowed to a
snail's pace and worse. They were hold-
ing the Agency back, keeping their fat
thumbs on the younger members. When
innovation and dynamism were desper-
ately needed, they plodded their old
rutted roads?and the Agency was suf-
fering.
IRealizing this, Nixon brought in a
? professional hatchetman?James
Schlesinger. His job was to move in
quickly, institute a purge, and move out
again. This would leave the Agency lean
and tough, yet protect Colby (who was
next in line for the Directorship) and the
rest of the upper echelon.
The excuse for cleaning the Agency's
house was the Government-wide Reduc-
tion in Force (RIF) Program which had
earlier helped Nixon justify slicing
budget requests from pariah agencies
i like NEW and HUD. The word came
!down that 10 percent of the Agency's
17,000 employees were getting the ax.
; But Schlesinger. an overrated ad-
!ministrator with the perception of an ox,
never bothered to study the agency he
was supposed to reform. He never un-
derstood the protective mechanism so
expertly constructed over the years. He
was supposed to remove the deadwood,
'but what Schlesinger didn't realize was
that dead wood floats to the top. By
working through Colby, he put the chick-
en coop in the hands of the fox. He tried
to get the blood flowing again with the
clots who blocked it in the first place.
The purge lists were drawn up by the
middle level, precisely the decaying
undergrowth that should have been
hauled off years before.
It was like a mandate from heaven.
The old boys saw the chance to secure
their empires; settle old scores and
eliminate those smart-assed young guys
with their long hair and wise sugges-
; tions. Rather than deadwood, the 1973
1RIF (followed by a second purge in
' 1974) removed the live wires, the Agen-
cy's most valuable assets?the uncon-
ventional, the most innovative, the ques-
tioning, the impatient. One employee
'who survived the bloodletting says that
1"Everybody with 'spark! was cut. It's no
' fun to ride the elevators anymore." (Rid-
ing
the elevators is a popular Agency
Ipastime?a place to catch up on the
latest news and gossip.)
I Perhaps the saddest cases were
;those older employees who, in some
distant past, crossed the wrong person.
'CIA employees work for years under the
cloud of past grudges?petty people
who wait for an opportunity to strike at
old enemies for slights, mistakes or
prejudices sometimes a decade old.
One colleague, an Agency employee for
22 years, was marked by his Division
Chief and forced into early retirement
during the RIF. Early retirement is a
? particularly effective weapon because it
35
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denies the RIFee the generous benefits
available to other employees. Before he
left, he waged a three month battle to
save his job. He circulated the depres-
sing history of Agency indifference to
younger officers, writing at one point
"This is what you can expect after
serving your country with loyalty and
dedication for a quarter of a century."
The 1973 and 1974 RIFs had a
traumatic effect on the CIA. They sent
shock waves through the organization
that are being felt today. Those who
were left heard the warning loud and
clear: Don't make waves, don't criticize,
don't stand out.
It has been downhill ever since. The
depleted agency has been shaken by
reassignments, reorganizations and rev-
elations in the media about Watergate
and other dirty tricks. There is a com-
plete breakdown in morale. A new
ideological split has developed?this
time a cleavage along political lines.
Liberal employees are shocked and
disheartened by revelations implicating
the CIA in the use of experimental drugs,
murders and other unsavory business.
The conservatives are keeping quiet and
NEW YORK TIMES
1 DEC 1975
?e??
Restoring Fait
out of sight. The result is a CIA whose
effectiveness as an intelligence gather-
ing and interpreting agency is next to
useless.
Concerned over their Senate tes-
timonies, the higher-ups have removed
themselves from the daily operations of
the Agency. Directives have come down
to analysts instructing them to be esper
cially alert to substantive problems
suggested by incoming intelligence be-
cause nobody upstairs is minding the
store.
Without direction, and ,vith yet another
RIF threatening this year (this time di-
rected mainly at tele Directorate of Oper-
ations). agency people are playing it
close to the vest. There is a lack of
professional pride and concern in the
product?the finished intelligence re-
porting which is the bread and butter of
the Agency. Whole branches are un-
dermanned and nobody seems to give a
damn. There is a "who cares" attitude
prevalent today that would have been
unthinkable five years ago. Employees
now think of their Agency work as just a
job they hold at a time when they're lucky
to have a job.
' Nobody is really worried that the CIA
The interest in and die skepticism about the cOnclu-
sioris reached by the Warren Commission investigating;
President Kennedy's assassination are greater now thairi
at any time since theiteport.: was, first 'released. .BVett:
Belin..."_ a former Commission lawyer arid.;.C..
Staunch: defender Of its work;- now, urges that the
inquiry be reOpened.
" The Most powerful arguinenta",fdr doing so come not;
from any of the veteran assassination buffs,but ernergel!
from the secret recesses of the.-PM.I. an -the
themselves.. - _
? *Although the C.I.A. was actively working on ways,
to achieve the death of Fidel Castro-t-including arming
woUld-be assassin on. the-,day of President Kennedy's,
murder?Allen Dulles, thin director of C.I.A., failed to
inform his fellow commission-members of-that prograrri;
nor did any employee of the agency come forward with.
such information.
,
*Having failed to inform thecommissibrk of, the anti?.;
Castro plotting; the agency-also.- failed- to provide the;
potentially' Significant information?.that it involved;
members of 'the Mafia.
*The: F.B.I. failed to inform the-commission that it
had received a threatening letter from Lee Harvey,
Oswald, the President's assassin, less than. a month
before the President's death; and it went on? to destroy
the letter.
*The failure of the F.B.I. and the C.I.A. to disclose
these items of information increases the importance of
such still unanswered questions as the extent and nature:
of Lee Harvey Oswald's relationship with the F.B.I.; the
explanation of the ease with which he was able to travel
in the Soviet Union; the reason for the smoothness of
. his re-entry into American life after recanting his defec-
will be abolished--organizations have
an institutional momentum that can't
easily be stopped. And it is expert :in
covering its tracks. People are pro-
tected, jobs diffused, blame defocused.
Colby will be the-next sacrificial Iamb.
More and more "grey" types are being
promoted to higher positions?faceless
men who won't rock the boat, who have
families to worry about, whose main
concern is their pension security. A new
generation of old boys is on the way up.
Incoming professionals are cut from
the same mold. No more chances taken
with ideologues. No more boy geniuses,
no more sparring with the ambitious. No
more creativity, its too risky. "This new
crop of youngsters," reports an old
Agency hand, "looks like they all came
out of the late, late show."
The result is a scared, rump CIA
whose intelligence product has declined
and whose overseas operations are im-
potent. It is an organization of people
keiebing quiet, unwilling to take a
chance, afraid to take a stand.
And that's no way to run an intelli-
gence organization. p
tion to the Soviets, etc., etc., etc. . _
Mr. Belin, while continuing to believe that the Warren._
Commission's conclusions are correct, notes that many'
Americans think otherwise: He suggests that a new
investigation by itself will restore governmental- credi-
bility. That is. hardly likely. FeW Americans were
prepared a decade ago to believe in. official cover-ups
and murder plOtting; yet even then. they grew increas-
ingly skeptical of the Warren Commission's findings.:
Having: learned to their borror all those hitherto.
unthinkable revelations, their damaged faith IS
be entirely repaired' by one more ?
? *- _
Nevertheless, some highly desirable, goals. are within-
reach and it is essential ithat they be pursued. Much-
skepticism about government in-general flows from the-
belief that secret agencies of government are Unadcolint;
able and out of. control and that there is an,autoinatict:
reflex: in. Washington to sweep- embarrassments- under'
the rug. This belief was bolstered just a fewslays ago
by the Administration's frantic efforts to smother, the
assassination report.
Such. skepticism can only be eroded over time; but
the flaws in the Warren Commission investigation offer,
an excellent opportunity to begin dealing with such!
issues- and to dispose of some questions about the
Kennedy assassination, as well. The American system.;
of self-government can hardly be deemed tribe working'
effectively so long as-major questions relating to cover-
ups in the investigation of a Presidential murder remain;
. -
unanswered.
A Congressional investigation laying out, all the now-
sequestered evidence and-seeking to establish the extent
of the cover-ups, the reasons why they were undertaken
and the identities of those responsible for them might--
help in the restoratiOn of the Government's reputation
for integrity and responsibility.
36
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GENERAL
DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
13 November 1975 '
MOSCOW'S FEAR OF SAKHAROV ?
WILL ANY LEADING Western politician in office speak
up about Russia's refusal, reported from Moscow yesterday, ?
to allow Dr ANDRE! SAKHAROV to go to Oslo ta collect 'his_
Nobel Peace Prize Will Mr Wn,soN? Will President
Fon? Will President GISC,ARD D'ESTA/NG? Alas, it is
to be very much doubted. Yet all three, along with many
other heads of Government, signed the Helsinki declara-
tion, which among other things sought to promote the free
movement of individuals and ideas. All have since praised
it, adding solemnly that, of course, the test will be in its
application. Mr WILSON even went so far as to express
the opinion that, if the Helsinki agreement had been in
existence at the time, the invasion of Czechoslovakia by
Russia could not have taken place. Dr SAKHAROV is the
leading campaigner for civil rights in Russia. His
eminence_ as a scientist is such that Russia dare not
Smdai, November 23, 1975 The Washington Star
Why do we
By Arthur Miller
Detente at present is a body without a
soul, but its promise is enormous if we will
seize it.
The fact is that the Helsinki accords
bind both sides to respect elementary
human rights. Why are we so powerless to
speak to this issue? Is it that we fear the
other side will start making noises about
the race situation in Boston? The tortures
in our client-state, Chile? The re-arrest
under fake charges of the South Korean
poet, Kim Chi Ha ?
?The answer to the dilemma is, not to
sweep our own sins under the same rug as
the Soviets' ? or for that matter, the sins
of South Africa ? but to rise to the chal-
lenge that detente implicitly raises; to
open our own actions to the same measure
and standard that we and the Soviets have
signed and agreed to. The truth of the mat-
ter is that with all our failings, we are still
the freest country in the world, and if it
should turn out that foreign criticism
forces us to take anew and resolute look at
our own injustices, why must we fear such
a competition?
The truth is that such criticism is going
on anyway, but from the other side, not
from ours, at least not openly, not as part
of our relationships with repressive re-
gimes. And I repeat, this super politeness,
at least in part, stems from a clouded con-
sience. But the Congress has the power to
begin clearing that conscience by requir-
ing certain minimal standards of respect
for civil rights at least in, those countries
whose dependence on our support is nearly
total. And if you say that we cannot be
held responsible for what another govern-
ment does, I can only answer that we are
already responsible when that government
cannot exist excepting with our support.
This is not a question of coming out with
high-class speeches, supporting academic
or intellectual freedom. We are supporting
repression. We can stop doing it. And in
the process we can turn to our new trading
partners and say, "We meant what we
signed to in the Helsinki accords; we are
actively working to eradicate injustice and
unfreedom within our country and in those
countries dependent on us ? what are you
_
suppress him or do away with him, as would happen to
lesser mortals. Yet they dare not let him accept his Nobel
prize because it would spotlight their weakest point, the
lack of law and freedom for their citizens.
The record of Western leaders on such matters is
_
nota good one. President FORD originally refused to accept
a visit to the White House by ALEXANDER SOLZHENITSYN
-when he was in America, because Dr KISSINGER had
advised him it would be bad for "d?nte." When he
belatedly changed his mind, SOLZHENITSYN was no longer
interested. Shortly before his visit to Moscow last month,
President GISCARD D'ESTAING received a letter from Dr
SAKHAROV urging him to intercede with Mr BREZHNEV
to secure an amnesty for political prisoners in Russia. It
was not even acknowledged. Why are the leaders of the
West so mealy-mouthed and timorous?. It must be a
source of amazement in Moscow.
cut our tongues out on
human rights in other
countries?
:doing to Carry out the obligations in regard
to human rights that you signed to?" This
is not interference in another country's
internal affairs; it is an attempt to imple-
ment a signed agreement.
This article is excerpted from a state-
ment American playwright Arthur Miller
gave last week at a heating of the Senate
Permanent Subcommittee on Investiga-
tions.,
- The question inevitably- arises as to
whether we should refuse, for example, to
sell wheat until the human rights provi-
sions of the Helsinki accords are lived up
to. I believe it would be unwise and unpro-
ductive to equate so many bushels with so
much liberty. Besides, enlarging com-
merce not only benefits both sides
materially, it is also a manifest of good
will and good faith and as such can serve-
as a base upon which to buildAnew forth--
rightness in, our relationships with the.
Soviet world_ To again think in either/or
terms at all -times and in every instance
can only lead back to impotence, and on
the Soviet side must lend justification to
those who can see only a threat to Soviet
power. in any deepening relationship with
the United States_
Detente may indeed be a gesture empty
of human content, but so is a letter of in-
tent that precedes a binding contract. As-
with such a letter, everything depends on
the next steps, and we apparently have no
intention of taking such steps. It is the
business of the Senate and Congress to de-
cide whether such steps should be taken to
implement the Helsinki agreement.
For example, a specific number of
writers in Czechoslovakia (a country
where large numbers of ?Soviet troops are
stationed) is denied the right to publish
their works in the Czech or Slovak lan-
guages. Certain of them have had their
unpublished manuscripts seized from their
homes. Many, if not most, of these writers
are former members of the Communist
party and have never advocated a return
to capitalism, nor do they now. Their chief
sin is to have advocated an indigenous,
independent Czech culture responsible to
their own people rather than the demands
of Soviet authorities. The blacklist against
these writers is so broad that the regime
has found it impossible to staff a literary
magazine or newspaper.
It should be added that even in other So-
cialist countries the Czech situation is an
embarrassment. In Hungary, for example,
I could walk with Hungarian writers and
meet with them in restaurants without a
secret policeman dogging my footsteps.
Not so in Prague, where a plainclothesman
will take a table a few feet away, openly
and brazenly warning all concerned that
the regime is observing them. Czechoslov-
Ida lives under a permanent state of
McCarthyism from which there is no ap-
peal.
The situation of the Czech writers and
intellectuals is not unique in a world where
repression, jailing, and the outright mur-
der of writers by their governments is
ordinary news. But there is one respect in
which they are special; they have nowhere
to appeal for relief. As citizens of a Social-
ist country, it is futile to look to other So-
cialist states for support, and their case is
ambiguous in the eyes of the European
Left whose anti-capitalist stance mutes its
indignation against repression in the East.
In am not telling you that the Czech
writers look to us for help. It is far worse
than that. I believe they have long since
assumed that we have decided to collabo-
rate with the Soviet Union as a trading
partner and that it is unrealistic for them
to expect us to rock the boat. And this is
why their situation is so meaningful; it has
all the earmarks of the long future in
which small nations especially must settle
for a modicum of prosperity in exchange
for which their souls will be excised, quiet-
ly, remorselessly, all for a good cause, the
cause of peace between the giants.
37
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I do not believe we have to cut out our
tongues in order to reassure any other
country of our peaceful intentions, or that
we must adopt the impotence of moral eu-
nuchs so that the volume of trade may
grow. The Senate and the Congress, it
seems to me, have the obligation to decide
whether Czech repression is in contraven-
tion of the Helsinki accords. If it is, then
the State Department should be instructed
to ask the Soviet government what it in-
tends to do about the matter as a signatory
to the agreement. If, for example, the
Christian Science Monitor
28 NOV 1975
existence of this blacklist is denied, the
Senate can discover evidence that it in-
deed exists. If the Soviet government still
refuses to attempt to correct the situation
? indeed, if no concrete result comes of
the whole effort ? something vital will
nevertheless have been gained.
The United States will have at least
begun to establish before its own citizens
and the world that its power exists not only
to make the world safe for American busi-
ness, but to hasten- the evolution of hu-
manity toward a decent respect for the
human person. And if such approach can
Charles W. Yost
Should U.S. tie aid to human rights?
Washington
_ One of the numerous subjects of controversy
between the executive and legislative
branches of our government is whether the
United States should extend assistance to
nations persistently violating human rights.
Last year's Foreign Assistance Act included
a "sense of Congress" amendment that called
- on- the President, 2`excep1 in extraordinary
circumstances," to reduce or deny - security
assistance to "any government which engages
in a consistent pattern of gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights."
Since many of our regular military aid
recipients, such as South Korea, the Philip-
pines, Brazil, and Indonesia, have been ac-
cused of violating human rights, this poses a
serious dilemma for the President and Secre:
tory of State. Liberals in the Congress , think
the administration is evading application of
the amendment. They threaten to put forward
legislation reserving to Congress itself a voice
in determining which countries are in viola-
tion and should be denied assistance.
This controversy arises from a con-
frontation between two contradictory cur-
rents in American foreign policy. The first is
an evangelistic concern, going far back in our
_history, for liberty versus oppression, democ-
racy versus authoritarianism, free enterprise
versus communism -- a belief-that what is
good for America must be good for the rest of
the world.
The second current, arising in part from the
same source but bent by the cold War, is the
presumed need to assist any country, -what-
ever the character of its government, which
seems threatened by communism and whose
"loss to the-free world" we beliexe might tilt
bal
the ance of power.
The administration conceives of the latter
imperative as being overriding, whereas the
Congress ? reflecting the post-Vietnam pub-
lic mood of skepticism about military aid in
general ? sees much less need to be inhibited
by strategic considerations.
The-difference is aggravated by consid-
erable fuzziness about just what "human
rights" comprise.
Most people would agree that genocide,
large-scale domestic slaughter such as was
practiced in Burundi and Uganda not too long
ago, constitutes a gross and outrageous viola-
tion of human rights.
There is also widespread revulsion against
systematic torture as it was practiced by the
colonels' government in Greece.
More difficulty arises, however, when we
only lead to counter-charges against our
selves, so be it. The failures of America
society are known everywhere now; w
can only gain by learning how others real
ly see us. Perhaps our rightful pride in our
freedom does need to be measured agains
our injustices, and so openly as to be an
elementl in the 'diplomatic process. W
have nothing to hide for those with eyes to
see. And if we have to take it once we dish
it. out, perhaps this new necessity will help
us, if only for our pride before the world,
to revive that will, that insistence and
faith in our capacity to make a soecity that
is just to all. .
attempt to equate human rights with the
democratic political rights to which Amer-
icans are accustomed ? free elections, free'
speech, free emigration, etc.
Not only communist countries but almost all
"third-world" countries seriously limit the
exercise of such rights.
Is it appropriate for the U.S. to insist that
other peoples adoptits form of government
and its political liberties, even if their tradi-
tions and experience have not_equipped them
to do so effectively or meaningfully?
Leaders of third-world _countries contend,
moreover, that economic rights and freedoms
? sufficient food, health care, and employ-
ment ? are far more important to- their
peoples than political rights.
They sometimes claim that the U.S.-- is in
violation of "basic human rights" by its
economic neglect of the substantial proportion
of its population still living below the poverty
level. Others point out that Americans are
quite ready to denounce restrictions on
emigration as a violation ef_hurnan rights, but
have for 50 years been severely restricting
immigration, which equally denies freedom of
movement.
This whole subject of human rights has
many gray areas.. There is therefore serious
doubt whether the U.S. should apply its
political and economic standards to others, or
wage ideological crusades of the sort it has
condemned when carried-on by communist
states.
On the other hand, the U.S. is certainly
under no obligation to provide aid, particu-
larly military aid, to governments whose
behavior it strongly disapproves, which en-
gage, in the language of the Foreign Assis-
tance Act, "in a- consistent pattern of gross
violations of internationally recognized hu-
man rights." A widely, if not universally,
recognized human right is the right not to be
imprisoned, certainly not to be tortured, for
the expression of dissident political views.
There would seem to be only two or three
cases where stfategic considerations are still
so overriding that the U:S. should feel obliged
to continue military aid to governments which
display a consistent pattern of violation of
human rights of this gross and internationally
recognized character. In other cases the U.S.
could in good conscience terminate its aid.
The author of this article writes from a
background of 40 years as a United States
? diplomat.
?197? Charles W. Yost
38
NEW YORK TIMES
5 Dec. 1975
SOVIET SUSPECTED
OF ARMS VIOLATION
U.S. Intelligence Officials
Raise Questions About
a NeiRadar Station
By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
? Spezia: to The Nem York Times
WASHINGTON Dec. 4?Amer-
ican intelligence officials have
reported to the Ford Adminis-
tration that the Soviet Union-
recently constructed a large-
scale ra.dar station on the Kam-
chatka Peninsula, raising new
questions about possible viola-
tions' of the 1972 treaty limit-
ing strategic. arms.
According- to -well--placed Ad-
rixiMistraticA officials, the Rus-
sians have built- very modern
"phasedLarray radars" in the
Kamchatka area of the north-
eastern Soviet Union for use in
testing systems of defensive
weapons known as antiballistic
missiles.
This suspected violation a(
the strategic arms agreements'
is similar to the other alleged
violations in that it points up
the fuzziness of some aspects
of the 1972 agreements.
'Current' Ranges Questioned
Article Foilt of the 1972 trea-
ty allowed two operational sites,
in Moscow and at Grand Forks,
N.D.?the latter site has subse-
quently been mothballed ? and
provided that in addition ABM
radars could be emplaced "for
development or testing within
current or additionally agreed
test ranges."
Because this raised questions
as to where each side had its
"current" test ranges, the United.
States delegation to the nego-
tiations told the Russians on
April 26, 1972, that it under-
stood that the Soviet Union had
only one ABM. test range, near
Sarysagan in Kazakhstan, Cen-
tral Asia.
High-level discussions are
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now under way within, the Ad-1
ministration on whether the
Kamchatka radar violate the
19972 treaty on defensive mis-
siles, and what to do about it.
The sophisticated "phased-
array radars" scan by electfonic
means. The smaller, dish-shaped
radars scan mechanically, and
are less suited to protect
against incoming missiles.
Aft,: Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr.,
the retired Chief of Naval Oper-
ations who was told about the
Kamchatka site, told the House
Select Committee on Intelli-
gence this week that it was a
"clear and precise" violation.,
Some Administration officials
are not so sure.
As with other alleged Soviet
violations of the 1972 ABM
treaty and the accompanying
limited accord on offensive
weapons, it is almost impossible
to prove that the Russians did
not technically comply with the
agreements.
' Despite several charges of
Soviet violations, the Adminis-
tration has consistently, con-
cluded that, at worst, the Soviet
Union was not living up to the
spirit of the agreement. Presi-
dent Ford' has stated there wyre
"no violations."
? A Storm in Washingten -
Nevertheless, the Soviet ac-
tions have created something of
a political storm in Washington,'
of which Kamchatka issue -isl
only the latest flurry.
Thursday, Dec. 4, 1975
Political conservatives such
aseAdmiral Zumwalt 'bl to mean that ABM components the Russians' have -repleced
candidate for the Senate in
Virginia, or Senator Henry M.
Jackson, an announced condi-
date for the Democratic Presi-
dential nomination, are .arguing
that the- actions -demonstrate
that the Russians cannot be
trusted and that the Admin-
istration was naive. -
Moreover, the direct role of
? Secretary of State Henry- A.
Kissinger in .negotiating -the
1972 accords and Current ef-
forts to conclude , a treaty on
offensive weapons is a factor.
Charges about the Russians
have .been turned into argu-
ments that- Mr. Kissinger was
deliberately closing his eyes to
violations, deceiving the Prtsi-
dent, Congress and. the public
?--something he vehemently
1
denies.
The issue has been clouded
by its complexity. Very few
people can understand the tech-
nfcal aspects. The Administra-
tion, moreover, to protect 'its
confidential diplomacy, has re-'fused to, disclose the allegationsi
publicly. Thus, information is;
provided,, for the most past,'
he a contentious way ber`criticsi
such as Admiral Zumwalt, or-,
in highly, selective and incom-
plete briefings eV Adrainistrae
tion officials.
'We interpret the reference'
in Article Four," the American'
delegation to the negotiations
said in April,- 1972, "to 'ad-
ditionally agreed test ranges'
THE WASHINGTON POST
will not ocate a any o er
test ranges without prior agree-
ment between the governments
that there will be such addi-
tional ABM test ranges." Unit-
ed States ABM ranges are at
White Sands, N.M., and at Kwa-
jalein Atoll in toe Pacific:
No Soviet Yes or No -
The Russians, however, did
not confirm or deny the Ameri-
can statement, merely replying
on May 5, 1972, that "national
means permitted identifying
current test ranges."
Presumably, the new radar
in Kamchatka would be useful
to monitor Soviet long-range
offensive missiles that are fired
regularly either from Kazak-
hstan or Siberia, land in Kam-
chatka or go over it and end
up in the Pacific Ocean.
The Saryagan range has been
used in the past to monitor
Soviet intermediate-rarige mis-
siles fired from a test site east
of Volgograd, officials said.
What trouble American offi-
cials-Is whether there is proof
that the Russians have built
a new ABM test range in Kam-
chatka or whether they hey
merely modernized an old one.
There have` always been old-
fashioned dish-shaped radars
in Kamchatka; the Russians
could say that it always was
an ABM test range and thus
permissible.
It has also been charged that
be 1 d t th
Schlesinger Backs
A Wary Detente
By Murrey Marder
Washington Post Staff Writer
Former Defense Secretary
James R. Schlesinger said
yesterday that the United
States must pursue detente
"without illusion" that the
Soviet Union is prepared to
live peacefully with the West.-
"To the contrary,"
Schlesinger told the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee,
Soviet leaders . . have
indicated that-detente is itself
a reflection of their growing
military power, which in their
interpretation-, has forced
concessions from the West."
A detente policy is desirable
to try to reduce political
tension. but "strictly on the
basis of mutuality,"- he said.
Schlesinger warned that
"concessions grantee in order
to elicit future goodwill will
all in that objective."
This was.Schlesinger's first
public testimony since he was
fired by President Ford on
Nov. 2. The reasons given for
his dismissal included
Schlesinger's differences with
Secretary of State Henry A.
Kissinger about the conduct of
detente policy. ? - -
Schlesinger spoke in
philosophical vein yesterday
without personal
recrimination, although his
differences with Kissinger on
approach to the Soviet. Union-
were evident. Schlesinger
repeated the same points
yesterday afternoon in an
address to the Pacem in
Terris conference at the
Sheraton-Park Hotel, Where
he was paired against Pen-
tagon critic Rep. Les. Aspin
(D-Wis.). '-
Before the Senate com-
mittee, Schlesinger said he
saw no evidence that
Kissinger withheld from
President Ford information
about alleged Soviet violations
of 1972 nuclear arms accords.
Retired Adm. Elmo R.
Zumwalt told a House com-
mittee on Tuesday that there
were "gross violation's" by the
Soviet Union, and that
President Ford was "badly
briefed" by Kissinger about
them. ?
Schlesinger, in response to ,
questions by Sen. Clifford-B. -
? Case (R-N.J.) said, "I would
be -inclined, until I see
evidence, to disagree." He
said information about the
allegations was known to only
a few officials, but Nie.
President was, aware of the..
alleged violations."
? e
He- said the Soviet Union
"clearly stretched" in-
terpretations of the
agreement,. exploited "am-
biguities," and one action
"could be interpreted as a. . .
violation." Schlesinger said
that was "the use of radar in
an ABM (anti-ballistic
missile) mode."
Soviet deployment of the
heavy 55-19 missile was "not a
violation of the treaty,"
Schlesinger said, but "may
'have been a violation of the
spirit of the treaty."
John Trattner, a State
Departme.nt spokesman
speaking for Kissinger said
yesterday: "We have no
, evidence that there have been
any violations of the SALT I
agreement."
Schlesinger reiterated to the
Senate committee his con-
their light missile, the SS-11,
,with a much larger weapon,
'the SS-19, after both sides had
agreed not to convert light-mis-
sile launchers into heavy ones.
Two years- ago the Russians
began digging - underground
works identical to their missile
silos, in possible violation of
the treaty's irohibition against
new missile silos. But the So-
viet Union said the 150 to
200 new silos .were for com-
mand - control centers, and
American intelligence accepted
that explanation. The Russians
have also been accused of
covering up work on submarine
construction and , on mobile
missile launchers, contrawning
the accord.
In turn, the United- States
has been charged by the Rus-
sians with covering up some
Minuteman missile sites while
new concrete was being
poured. The accords called on
e_ ach side not to impede the
ability of the other to check
on compliance.
Achniral Zumwalt also
charged this week that the Rus-
sians had begun interfering in
other waYs with American
Satellites flying over the Soviet
Union, bnt Administration offi-
cials denied that American ca-1
rabilities had been impairede
tention that the United States
is endangered by the Soyiet.
Union's swiftly growing
military power. H& again' said
that the Soviet Union by the
1980s can overtake present.
U.S, advantages in numbers of
nuclear warl*ads and missile
accuracy.
-Given the current con- -
figuration of world power. he
said. "it is our historic destiny
to be the guardian of
freedom."
Several members of the
generally pro-detente Foreign -
Relations Committee disputed
'"historic
.destiny" 'theme: The sparsely
attended hearing, however,
.wa.s._ never. acrimonious, and ".
speakers on both- sides often.--i
were barely audible.
Schlesinger said he agrees
? with the need "to control the
wholly needless expansion of
? the strategic nuclear forces on
both sides, which continue to
grow without in any way
augmenting security." -His
prime concern, he said, is "the
dwindling of American con-
ventional power" which
"forces us in- the direction of
greater reliance on the threat
of nuclear response."
At the Pacem in Terris
conference, Schlesinger
echoed his theme that if the
United States is strong enough
to resist Soviet "exploitation"
of detente, in- time the two
nations may move toward "a
live-and-let-live policy." This,-
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Schlesinger said, would be
-true detente."
Aspin countered that the so-
called "spending gap,"
through- which' the Soviet
Union is allegedly out-
distancing the United States in
military expansion. "is in its
Awn way as phoney as the
WASiaNGTON STAR
25 NOV 1975
missile gap of the early ?i
1960S."
In addition, as a result of"
tension between the Soviet
Union and China, Aspin said,
28 of the 31 divisions added by
the Soviet Union in the last
seven years "have gone to the
Chinese border."
Aspin maintained, "The
question is not 'How much are
the Russians spending?" but,
"How much is enough for the
-defense of this country and its
vital interests?"
The war of Moynihan's tongue
It was inevitable that Ambassador Pat Moyni-
han's blunt diplomatic style would becorhe con-
troversial at the United Nations. This war of
'Moynihan's tongue, as one might call it, haS
been brewing for weeks. Its intensification ?
now that the British ambassador to that body
has compared Mr. Moynihan to Wyatt Earp arid
King Lear ? gives us yet another opportunity to
express our enthusiasm and support for the
_ambassador.
We are aware that deft circumlocution is a
more customary norm in diplomatic language.
Nations having vital business to transact do not,
for good -reason, 'clobber one another every day
With ripe words from Roget.
But what is going on at the General Assembly
these days is not diplomacy. Unlike the Security
Council and some of the UN's specialized agen-
cies, the General Assembly has no vital business
to transact. Its agenda is crowded with symbolic
issues. It is not deliberative; most of the voting
is done in predictable blocs. Its voting system,
in which nonentities like Byelorussia have equal
weight with the U. S., is the ultimate parody of
the majority principle. Faute de, mieux, the
General Assembly has turned more and more to
theater. Its idea of a high old good time is to
bring before the assembled nations a posturing
blowhard like Yassir Arafat or-Idi Amin, and to
? hang upon his words as if he were a Winston
Churchill or a George Washington -- or even a
Solomon. Indeed, that shrewd political realist
Nikita Khrushchev caught the drift of things at
the UN years ago when, failing to register suffi-
ciently with words, he commenced banging the
.table with a shoe.
The professional diplomatic community in this
city and elsewhere, having a certain vested
interest in quiet diplomacy, has not yet recon-
ciled itself to General Assembly theater. It is
reluctant to patt with the pleasure of meek sub-
mission to rabid speeches and resolutions that
contravene every political and social value, the
Charter is supposed, to represent.
This may explain why Mr. Moynihan, whose
working principle is to tell the tru,th even when
it hurts, has become the target of an intrigue to
banish him to the decent obscurity of Harvard.
: The selection of the United Kingdom's UN
Ambassador, Mr. Ivor Richard, as its spearcar-
rier is a bit odd, ;of course. Mr. Richard is de-
scribed to us as a Labor Party politician of no
special consequence, but it is remarkable that
his sup6riors in London unleashed him. It must
be disconcerting to Mr. Moynihan, as it is to us,
to see good friends running for cover during the
shootout.
But we think it would be a great misfortune if
Mr. Moynihan lost heart and quit, as he came
near doing last Friday. The only grievance
against him is that he is saying what has needed
saying for years, and saying it with the bite and
passion toMake himself heard even in the din of
Turtle Bay.
Indeed, his recent sayings do an undeserved
service to the General Assembly ? a service
probably recognized as such by a number of
delegates who are in no position to make their
silent approval clear.
It is the Counsel of despair to think that the
General Assembly is beyond redemption..Enjoy-
ing as it does a certain importance in the world,
the General Assembly should not be allowed to
sink into absurdity and irrelevance. It is, if you
want to put a label on it, neo-colonialism at its
most condescending to take the view that since
the views of some UN_ majorities are fatuous,
they should be heard in timid silence.
.Ambassador Moynihan takes the view that
what is said and done at the General Assembly
does matter ? that if its words and acts go
unanswered they may give a color of respect to
causes'and principles which this country funda-
mentally opposes.
We take the same view, and we are glad that
Mr. Moynihan is there to speak for the silent
millions. He should not conclude that because
our friends in London are momentarily shell-
shocked by the sound of eggshells popping it is
time to give up and go home. And we are glad
that President Ford has emphasized that view
to Mr. Moynihan this week.
40
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THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY:- b-ECEMBER 1, 1975
Schlesinger and Kissinger
ZURICH?I shall never forget, when. ?
President Kennedy was assassinated,
the pain we felt for 'America and
the bewilderment and disillusionment ,
experienced by the many former
soldiers in World War II and former
inmates? in Soviet camps and prisons. `.
It was all the worse because of the
inability or the lack of desire tby the
American judicial authorities to un-
cover the assassins and to clear up
the crime.
We had the feeling that powerful,
open-handed and generous America,
so boundlessly partial to freedom,
had been smeared in the face with
dirt, and the feeling persisted. Some-
thing more than respect was shaken? -
it was our faith.
Despite the dissimilarity of events,
I had a very comparable feeling at the
time of the abrupt dismissal of Secre-
tary of Defense James R. Schlesinger,
a man of steadfast, perceptive and
brilliant mind. 'Once again,, the feeling
was that America had been insulted.
I realize that President Ford acted
in full conformity with the Constitu-
tion. But woe betide a system in which
it is sufficient and expedient to govern
guided only by one's personal or
party's election interests.
There is something higher than. jur-
isdiction, and that is decency. There is
something beyond juridical right, arid ?
that is good sense. There should at
least be decency toward one's allies.
After all, the Secretary of Defense is
not merely a member of the American
Government. He is in fact also respon- '
sible for the defense of the entire free
world. -
It would have been a friendly act--
first to have received consent from
the allies. As for good sense, this in-
volves the way things are handled. A
leap-frog succession of officials in such
a post can only impair the defense of
the country. (It was noted who was
pleased by the dismissal). .
There are rumors that the dismissal
was linked to another name. It is an
irony of history that the two names I
almost rhyme. ? -
When I was hi the. United' States
last summer, I avoided direct ques---
tions from the press on assessing the..
character of Secretary of State Henry,,'.:
A. Kissinger. But his present triumph,:
and the blinding misinformation being
spread to this day about his activities;
compel me to speak out bluntly.
?
Defending his policy of- unending
concessions, Mr. Kissinger repeats the
one and same argument almost like an ?
incantation: "Let our critics point out
the alternative to nuclear war!" More
than anything, it is this phrase that -
exposes the nature of Mr. Kissinger:,
in particular, it exposes that he is
'least of all a diplomat,
"Alter" in Latin means "other (of
two)." An alternative is a choice be-
tween two possibilities. This is a sci-
entific concept, but even scientific
situations often allow a much broad-
er choice. But diplomacy is not a
By Aleksandr I. 'Solzhenitsyn
ft is ?ari of the arts I
concerning the nature of man. To con-,
struct diplomacy on an "alternative" is
to put it on the lowest and crudest
level.
An art does not recognize alterna-
tives within itself; it would fall apart
if it developed only on the basis of
two possibilities. No, in every instance
art has a thousand choices. Every art
has a spectrum,- a keyboard of possi-
bilities. From ancient times to the
present, the art of diplomacy has con-'
sisted of playing on this keyboard. ?
How many great diplomats of the
past have won negotiations even with
empty hands or backed by inadequate
power, in circumstances of military
weakness, conceding nothing and: pay- ,
ing nothing, defeating the opponent
only by intellectual and psychological ,
means. That is diplomacy. 1
Mr. Kissinger endlessly deafens
with the threat ": . but otherwise,
nuclear war." He obscures the fact ,
that this: same nuclear war hangs
equally over the -head of his oppo-
nents (at least as of ft/day, until new
successes by Mr. Kissinger).
And in these equal circumstances,
under the same threat, his opponents
are always winning and he is always
yielding. Let him learn something from
his oprnnents?how is it that they _
operate so- successfully in the nuclear ;
age? The answer would be: They'study
the psychology of Mr. Kissinger.
What an absurdity: The United
States was the first to introduce
nuclear weapons to the world. Should
it because of this have become weaker,
and should it because of this surrender
its positions in the world?
dispute not - only that Mr.
Kissinger has the life experience
, necessary to understand -the psychol-
ogy of Communist leaders, and as a
result sits- at, the negotiating table as
if blindfolded. I also dispute that he
is on the high diplomatic intellectual
level ascribed to him._
It is not diplomacy, to, negotiate ,
with a preponderance of power behind L'
one's back, with an abundance of
material means in one's pocket, to
submit to all participants in the
negotiations, to pay them all off and
thereby to create unbalanced and
temporary grounds for transition to
further concessions.
The celebrated Vietnam agreement,
the worst diplomatic defeat for the
West in 30 years, hypocritically and
very conveniently for the aggressor
prepared the way for the quiet
surrender of three countries - in
Indochina.
Is it passible that the prominent
diploniat could not- see what a house
of cards he was building? (The Soviet_
press, in its rage against Andrei D.
Sakharov, damned his Nobel Peace
Prize as "the ultimate in political
pornography." The press aimed in the
wrong direction and was three years
too late. This abuse would have been
more suitable for the Nobel Prize'
shared by the aggressor and the
capitulator in the Paris agreement.)
A similar alarming feeling of shaki-
ness is' aroused by the Middle East
agreements of Mr. Kissinger (as far as
I know, many Israeli leaders do not
regard them any higher), although
there has not been -the'-kind of open
capitulation to which Vietnam -was
doomed by the same pen.
Mr. Kissinger does- not concede that
any concessions whatsoever are being
made. Thus, it appears: "The Western
countries have not set a goal of _ _
ideo-
logical detente" (that is, they have not./
i
even tried to eradicate the coldest,
aspect of the cold wars, so what is
their goal?). Or as he said on Aug. 15,A
1975: "It is not we who were on the
defensive in Helsinki." Three months '
have passed and we ask: If it was not ,
you, who was it?,
The very process of surrender of
world positions has the character of
an avalanche. At every successive
stager it becomes more difficult to
hold, out and one must yield more and ,i
mote. This is evident in the new i
conditions across entire continents,:
in the unprecedented encroachments ,
by the Soviet. Union in 'southwestern.
Africa and In votes. in the United:I
Nations. ' ' ' .-
Mr. Kissinger always has an emer-
gency exit available to him. He can
transfer to a university to lecture to
credulous youngsters about the art of
diplomacy. But the Government of the
United States (just as those youngsters)
will have no emergency exit.
There is another favorite argument
_ by Mr. Kissinger: In the nuclear age,
we shall not forget that peace, too,
"is a moral imperative?' Yes, that is
true and not only in the nuclear age
(indeed, this nuclear age is an obses-
sion for Mr. Kissinger) but only if -one
correctly understands peace as the
opposite of violence and does not
' consider Cambodian genocide and
Vietnamese prison camps as the attain-
ment of peace.
But a peace that tolerates any
ferocious forms of violence and any
massive doses of it against millions
of people?just so long as this does
not affect us for several years yet?
such a peace, alas, has no moral
loftiness even in the nuclear age.
Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, the dissi-
dent Soviet writer now in exile, won-
the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1970.
This article was translated from the
Russian by Raymond H. Anderson.
la
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Near East
NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 1975
U.S. and Lebanon: Echoes of 1958
to Moslem demands ter modifi- - - -
, By JAMES M. MARKHAM cation of the requirement of
Special to The New York Times Moslem-Christian balance, Mr.
BEIRUT, Lebanon, Nov. 26_ Kissinger wished Mr. Karami
As would-be mediators from the
"well in your effort to encour-
age all concerned to show the
Vatican, France and the United moderation and spirit of corn-
Nations come and go, the promise that would seem to be
American_ role in the Lebanese necessary if there is to be an
crisis has been obscured end to the violence and the
Moreover, that
tole remains a sub-
commencement of a process of
political accommodation lead-
News ject of,speculation ing to a new basis of stability
Analysis and controversy with security for all your coun-I
because of the trymen."
overt support for Mr. Karami has been the
the Prime Minister, a Moslem, champion of gradual change in
and of questions about the Lebanon's political system,
supplying of guns to Christians. which has the effect of giving
In 1958, shortly after United
States.. marines ? landed on
Beirut's beaches in the midst:of
a civil war, they- established
liaison' witha highly disciplined
a predominant role to the
Christian comnfunity though it
is . nawa minority. American
'officials do not hide their belief
that it is partly the intransi-
gence' of sortie Christian lead.
Christian party called the Pha- erst including the President,
lenges -Libanaises, which was
thought to be the bedrock of
anti-Communism in Lebanon.
The Americans reportedly fur-
nished the Phalangists with
weapons and a radio trans-
mitter.
An identity of interests was
created?at least in the Arab
mind?that the Americans are New York to address the Unit-
still living with. Times have ed Nations General Assembly.
changed, though, and today the 1
.. President Franjieh and the
that blocking-, reform.
, Infrequent Contacts
The letter is said to have
outraged Mr. Franjieh, who has
been irritated at the American-
Government since last year,
when narcotics detectives, lead-
ing specially trained dogs, in-
spected the higgage of his en-
tourage when he arrived in
hardly disguised_ official policy
of the United States Govern-
ment is sympathetic toward the
Prime Minister, Rashid Karami,
who is a centrist, and chilly
toward President Suleiman
Franjieh, a Christian allied with
the Phalangists.
Signal front ICssinger
The policy was signaled on
Nov. 6 in a letter from Secre-
tary of State Henry A. Kissinger
--conspicuously addressed to
Mr. Karami, not to Mr. Franjieh,
and made public by the embassy
?that said: "I want you to
know that my Government very
much hopes to see an end to the
fighting in Lebanon and fully
supports your Government in
its efforts to bring this- about."
Ther. in an _apparent bow
Christian Science Monitor
14 December 1975
Americans Still Try
to Live Down Old
Phalan gist Link _
'small town; such signals are
not missed. .
Though the Americans seem
to' be backing Mr. Karami, their
policy remain's the subject of
some mystery as well as con-
troversy because it is not clear
whether they are arming the
Phalangists or some favored
faction in the Christian camp.
American officials insist that
their hands are clean?that the
days of 1958 are over. The
United
Leba-
non, they maintain, is that it
should remain stable since in-
stability endangers the much
larger enterprise of Mr. Kissm-
gees painstaking Middle East-
ern diplomacy. If Syria and
Israel were to come to blows
in Lebanon, the Sinai agree-
ment between the Israelis and
Egyptians' and. other accords
still in embryo would-be, shat-
tered.
This assessment is, widely
accepted by European diplo-
mats and others essentially
sympathetic to American policy
in the Middle East.
Third World's Assessment
Another view, sometimes
voiced by third world diplo-
mats, is that the Americans
need the Phalangists to keep
the Palestinian guerrilla move-
,..
ment preoccupied and on- the
' defensive, so it is less likely to
upset Mr. Kissinger's diplomacy.
Partisans of the second
school of thought recall a
quickly forgotten incident last
July, when Representative Les,
Aspin, Democrat of Wisconsin,
American Ambassador, ,G.. Mc. pointed an accusing finger at
of
Murtrie Godley, see each other a Lebanese .representative
Loh Industries named Sarkis
infrequently. However, Kr- G. Soghanalian, *who had re-
Godley is on good terms .with ceived embassy and State De-
Mr and is a ? friend partment approval for the sale
of Raymond Edde, a "Christian, of $25co00 worth of handguns
icentrist who would like to suc-- and ammunition to unspecified
ceed Mr. Franjieh next year. clients here.
Mr. Soghanalian, who is
A lively 'conversationalist; known' to have contacts cin
Mr. Godley, in what appeared- the Lebanese right, denied that
to be a series of calculated, he had- intended to sell the
indiscretions, aired his- feelings iweapons to the Phalangists, the
on the remains of the cocktail !Palestinians or- any of the
!Igrowing private armies. None-
and, dinner circuit iliejrut theless, a State Department of:
Israel grows wary
U.S. may desert it
Accommodation with
PLO urged by some
By Francis Ofner
Special correspondent of
- The Christian Science Monitor
142 Jerusalem
There is a crisis in relations between Israel
and the United States.
- Israelis are more apprehensive than ever
about being deserted by the U.S. on the issue
Of the Palestinians.
_ They were alarmed when the U.S. last
weekend let go through the Security Council
an agreement that they, bitterly opposed
because it - included an invitation to the
fieral 'ailurect a repotter. that'
the 2,000 Colt pistols were des-
tined for "responsible elements!
?that is, Christian! elements."'
That was before the factional
conflict exploded into a confla-
gration that has taken at least
4,000. lives and -assumed inter-
national dimensions. It was
also before the Sinai disengage-'
ment accord and before a.
, marked .evolution in official;
[American- thinking on the '
'Palestinian question, which, cUl-
minated two weeks ago in the
testimony Of Harold H. Saun-
ders, Deputy Assistant Secreta-
ry of ,State for Near Eastern
and South' Asian Affairs, who,
;said: "The issue is not whether
!Palestinian interests should be
expressed in a. final settlement,
but how. There will be no peace
until, an' answer' is found." -
'Hard-Liners Have Lost Cini?
This attitude, which has un,
settled the Israelis, has not
been lost on the Palestine
Liberation Organization nor ?on
other Arabs who closely fall-Ow
American decisions.
"I think the hard-liners have
lost but," an Arab diplomat
who knows- the United States
;said of -Lebanon. "I think the
, Americans ? have decided to
. back the mainstream rather
' than to try to profit from the
divisions in Lebanon for short-
term gains."
"I wouldn't call:it a construc-
tive attitude," he continued,
"but at least it's not divisive."
' A well - placed Palestinian
guerrilla echoed the theme:
"We are even hearing that the.
Americans are not selling guns
to the Phalattists," he said.
If it is a fact that the Ameri-
cans are not arming the con-
servatives or sanctioning indi-
rect sales,- the United ?States
may ' begin, to shake off the
image that has stuck since
11958. But a number of skeptics
remain to be convinced that it
is not sanctioning gun sales
here still.
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to a
special council debate on the Middle East
scheduled for Jan. 12.
They were not assuaged by the U.S. ? in a
note to the Soviet Union Tuesday ? proposing
a preparatory meeting, from which the PLO
would be excluded, to discuss reconvening the
Middle East peace conference at Geneva (as
distinct from the Security Council). In any
case, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A.
Gromyko lost no time in rejecting the U.S.
proposal later Tuesday.
Things may well be brought to a head long
before Jan. 12. Egypt has taken the initiative
at the UN to have the PLO represented in the
immediate Security Council debate which the
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Lebanese are seeking after Tuesday's Israeli move on the Israeli side on the 'Palestine issue.
air raids on Palestinian refugee camps in Mr. Rabin, as well as his Minister of Defense,
Lebanon said in Israel to be guerrilla centers. Shimon Peres, are still agaihst. any recogni-
For Israelis, the key and agonizing question kion of the PLO ? even if it were first to
now is: What price will the U.S. extract from recognize Israel.
Israel for a U.S. veto of any future Security But contrary opinions now, are being heard
Comjell resolution deemed inimical to Israel, 1a- -
particularly on the PLO issue? -,A;_everai /*ulster& favor a.phai1im. of nottjon,
- Israeli Foreign Ministry sources here as- They...include Justice Minister Chaim Zsdok,
mune that Israel could expect an American H isim_henister Avraham Ofer, and Health_
Minister Victor Shemtov. Foreign Minister.
Yigal Allon is-somewhere between Mr Rabin
and this ministerial group. - -
At the weekly Cabinet meeting last Sunday,
it was decided to discuss the question of "new
foreign policy initiatives" at one of the next
meetings. Unofficially it was confirmed that
1 by "initiatives" was meant Israel's approach
to the PLO.
David Anable reports from the United
Nations:
Israel is under extreme pressure here. And
now, ironically, Israel's air raids on Palestin-
ian refugee camps Tuesday have precipitated ,
veto for a resolution that would: -
I. Expressly recognize the PLO before the
PLO has recognized. Israel and undertaken to
live in peace with it, or
2. Impose on Israel by-force-a solution _to
the Israeli-Arab dispute. ,
Indeed, that much emerges from a cable
that President_ford sent to Israeli Premier
Yitzhak Rabin on Dec. 2. -
But the Israeli diplomats who maintain daily
contacts with the State Department and the
White House still expect to be asked by
Washington to pay a price for a veto.
- _Because of this.. somethinchas started to
Garry Wills
Monday, Moventber 24, 1975
the very issue against which-the raids are
thought partly to have been in protest ?
participation of the PLO in a Security Council
debate.
That had been expected Jan. 12 at the
earliest, but Egypt moved Wednesday to have
the PLO represented at the immediate Secu-
rity Council meeting requested by Lebanon to
discuss the raids.
The Arab aim is to drive a wedge between
Israel and the United States, not least over
aoeeptance of a role for the PLO.
This week the Israelis were under fire here
in yet another General Assembly debate on
the Middle East as well as in nearly all the
Assembly's seven committees.
"You can move from committee to com-
mittee today," said Israeli Ambassador Chaim
Herzog to his General Assembly au-
dience,"and you will discover that this obses-
sion with Israel, which has been imposed upon
you, has become a mania which has by now
perverted this organization into. . . a body
which is rapidly losing any vestige of -cre-
dibility in the eyes of decent people."
The Washington Star
Why U.S. should fight
'new racist crusade'
Is there racism in Israel?
Unquestionably. It is a na-
tion made up of human
beings, and one of the most
persistent of the human
vices is racial antagonism.
There is a prejudice against
Arabs within Israel's origi-
nal borders, and a denial of
" civil rights to those within
the occupied territories.
But Israel's record of ra-
cial prejudice is positively
angelic next to America's.
Our treatment of Indians,
blacks, the Nisei, Puerto
Ricans, Chicanos Kees been
despicable in the past and
. has ?risen,-in recent years,
to a level merely bad. But
remember that, with only
one, exception (the Nisei),
our prejudice was loosed on
people whowere not allied-
to enemies in war time. ?
, ?
firaelis linve been fight-
. --ingArabs;.off and on, for 30
.years,. and there is a long
history of cultural, antago-
nism before-that. This had
-. to -affect the treatment of
Arabs within the Israeli na,
lion. But this treatment has
been so careful that one of
/the charges often made is
that Israelis patronize the
Arabs by demandini less
them! ?
or anyone wipe out the re-
maining stains of racism in
our country.
Then' why the equivalent
assault On Israel? Because
the assault is not equiva-
lent. The General Assembly-
was dot attacking Israel for
the incidental traces of rac-
ism in its practice. It was
attacking the very basis of
the Skate of Israel's exist-
ence. It was saying that
Israelis had no right to the
ingathering of their perse-
cuted brothers within the
sanctuary of Israel.
The monstrous reversals
in this General Assembly
vote are hard to exagger-
ate. Israel was founded as
an asylum for the principal
vietims- of racism in this
century. It took its origin, in
large part, as a remedy to
racism at its worst. Yet for
trying to escape the racism
of centuries of European
practice, it is now called
racist.
-And those great defend-
,ers of racial equality, who
voted for the General
Assembly resolution, are
themselves renewing the
very racism that led to Is-
rael!s foundation. They are
. prescribing a whole country
not. its faults or correct-
able practices, but its very
reason for being. ?
-In?doing this, they pros-
cribe as well a whole
? people, each member of the
Jewish faith no matter
where he or she lives. The
connection of any Jew to Is-
rael's hopes will be used to
- If the Geneial Assembly.
were to-vote that Ameri-
cans are racist, the charge
would have a great deal of
truth to it. But k- would be-
hypocritical and irrelevant.
. It would not be mounted by
-
? people with records much
better. It would not help us
call the individual Jew a -
racist, and to deny his or
her civil rights in other
countries.
The response of Congress
was entirely in order. The
President spoke too soon
when he said we should not
even consider pulling out of
the U.N. That is exactly
what we must consider, ?
very cautiously but very,
thoroughly. Moreover, the
President should order
Rogers Morton to stop play-
ing games with Commerce
Department .information on
the Arab boycott. We should
make sure that our aid and -
trade with other countries
in no *ay lends de facto as-
sistance to the racists' cam-
paign against the State oft
Israel.
Anti-Semitism, has been
in the world' a very long
time; yet the shocked re-
sponse to Hitler's obsceni-
ties offered us hope that we
would see its- demise in our.
lifetime. There has been
motion toward the realiza-
tion of that hope ? e.g., in
the way Christian churches
have expunged the remains
of prejudice against the .
Jews from their theology
and liturgies.
That is why it comes as
such a blow to see the force
and reach of the new anti-
Semitism expressed in that
vote of the General Assem-
bly. Whatever obstacles we
can place in the path of this
new-racist crusade, we are -
obliged to place there, while
seeking peace for all man-
kind.
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Africa
Zn .ritgeltii Tiniet Sun, Nov. 23,1975:
ui GERAth J. 1111NliEle
The American withdrawal from
Southeast Asia unleashed _a spate of
national soul-searching. Americans
began to ask themselves and their
government uncomfortable but long
overdue questions concerning the
origin of U.S. involvement, the dyna-
mics of escalation, the covert war-
making powers of the executive
branch, and the perception of U.S. in-
terests abroad, and assured them-
selves that no such venture would
happen again.
Yet something similar is happening
again. Once again the United States
Gerald Bender, former director of
the UCLA Interdisciplinary project on
Angola, Mozambique and Bissau, is
the author of several articles and a
forthcoming book on Angola, and has
consulted with the State Department
on the country. He lives in Los An-
geles.
isinvolved in a foreign civil war, this
time in the newly independent Afri-
can nation Angola.
While publicly the State Depart-
ment either denies or refuses to *com-
ment on allegations of American in-
volvement in Angola, the CIA has
been quietly intervening. The pat-
tern is familiar, but there is one ma-
jor. difference: The Administration,
and the CIA have not been able to
hide their activities- from the Ameri-
can people.
Earlier this month while Secretary
of State Henry A. Kissinger was
strongly condemning the "extra-con-
tinental" interference in Angola, Wil-
liam Colby, the lame duck director of
the CIA, and Joseph Sisco-, undersec
retary of state, told_ a closed session
of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee that the CIA has been covert-
ly supplying two of the contending
Angolan parties with rifles, machine
guns, vehicles, ammunition and logis-
tical support.
What are the origins of the Ango-
lan war, which has prevented the
emergence of a unified nation and
claimed between 20,000 and 30,000
lives in 1975? What are U.S. interests
in the area? How did the United
States become involved and why?
Ethnic, racial, class, regional, and
ideological differences divide the
three Angolan nationalist movements
?the Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the
Nationalist Front for the Liberation
of Angola (FNLA), and the Nationa-
list Union for the Total Independence
of Angola (UNITA). In addition, an
intense distrust and personal animosi-
ty exist among the movements' lead-
ers.- ,
? .
41-t"
rawn Into
ngo an Conflict?
1
Each of - the movements draws
most of its supporters from one of
three major ethno-linguistic regions.
The FNLA is located among the ap-
proximately 700,000 KiKongo speak-
ing peoples of the northwest; the
MLA has traditionally received sup-
port from the 1.3 million ICiinbundu
speakers in the north-central part of
the country around the capital Luan-
da: and UNITA is firmly based
among the more than 2 Million Ovim-
htmdu in central Angola.
-Angolan nationalists were never
able to-form a common front during
the 14- years of armed struggle
against Portuguese colonialism. The
principal rivals have been the MPLA
and FNLA, whose relative strengths
vacillated throughout the colonial
war as well as during the past year.
At the time of the Portuguese coup
in April, 1974, the FNLA was almost
universally acknowledged to have
the largest and best equipped army.
?he FNLA has received most of its
krms and- training from Angola's
northern neighbor, Zaire, whose
President Mobutu apparently feels
that the best means of securing his
1,300 mile borderiiitii Angela would.
be to have his brother-in-law, FNLA
President Holden Roberto, at the
helm of government. Since 1973, the
FNLA has also received considerable
arms, money, and military training
from the Chinese who, fearing the
MPLA's growing dependence upon
Russian istance, have thus extend-
ed the Sino-Soviet rivalry to Angola:
The MPLA turned to its foreign
supporters for help in avoiding an
FNLA onslaught. Russia, which had
been the principal- supplier of arms
and money during the long colonial
struggle, enthusiastically responded
along with ,Yugoslavia, Cuba, and a
number of A frican countries.
By late spring of this year, the fre-
quent minor clashes between the two
nationalist movements grew into an
all-out war. By the end of September
the MPLA controlled 12 of the coun-
try's 16 district capitals.
The third movement, UNITA,
which has received the least amount
of external aid and is consequently
the weakest militarily, tried to stay
out of the fight between the other
two movements. But neutrality was
possible only for so long: UNITA had
to choose to fight with one group or
the other to avoid being crushed by
them.
Ideologically, UNITA is closer to
the MPLA, but now has thrown its
lot in with the FNL,A. One important
reason for UNITA's decision is that
.the party could obtain weapons from
the FNLA's patrons (e.g. Zaire, Chi-
na, the CIA, France and South Afri-
ca) while the Russians and other
MPLA suppliers had little interest in
? arming a potential rival. Angola is at
war and UNITA, above all, wants
arms.
For the past two months, the com-
bined forces of the FNLA and UNI-
TA?with, considerable help from
Portuguese, South African, Rhode-
? sian and French Mercenaries (many
of whom admittedly fought in Biafra)
?have dislodged the MPLA from
most of the territory it held in the
central and southern regions of the
country. According to one State De-
partment analyst, "These white
troops have made the difference and
turned the war around."
The introduction of white mercena-
? ries into the conflict seriously esca-
lated the war. In only three weeks
they moved 600 miles with tanks and
armored cars from Angola's southern
border, They are now close to Luan-
da, the MPLA stronghold, and threat
' en to provide Holden Roberto with
-1 the necessary firepower to carry out
his vow to "flatten the capital." To
stave off this threat, Cuba and Mo-
zambique- reportedly have sent be-
tween 2,000 and 3,000 troops to help
the MPLA defend the capital.
The alliance between the FNLA
and LTNITA is tenuous and destined
to collapse if they ever defeat the
MPLA: UNITA was initially founded
in thern mid-1960s by dissident mem-
bers of the FNLA, led by UNITA
President Jonas Savimbi, who once
, served- as. FNLA President Holden
Roberto's -foreign minister. Savimbi
charged at the time of his break with
Roberto that the movement was
dominated by one man (Roberto) and
"flagrant tribalism." He has repeated .
similar charges during the decade
which has followed, including only a
few months ago.
In fact, after almost 20 years, Hold-
en Roberto has, been unable. to dele-
gate meaningful authority or to at-
tract significant"non-Bakongo cadres.
Moreover, at the outset of the coloni-
al war in 1961, the principal victims
of Bakongo attacks were thousands
of Ovimbundu coffee plantation
workers. When the FNLA assumed
almost total control of northern An-
gola in the fall of 1974, one of their
first acts was to expell 60,000 Ovirn- -
btindu working on the coffee estates.
Today the tension between_ the. two
groups is manifest in Huambo?the
capital of the FNLA-UNITA newly
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proclaimed Popular and "Democratic-
Republic of Angola?where UNITA
and FNLA. soldiers have frequently
been exchanging gunfire. Unless An-
gola is partitioned, it is highly proba-
ble that the FNLA and UNITA will
meet as enemies, not allies,, on a fu-
ture battlefield
U.S. covert support for the FNLA
and UNITA has been largely indirect
and disbursed mainly- through neigh-
boring Zaire. Zaire has supplied arms
and equipment from its own forces
which the United States has been _
re-
plenishing. In fact, Zaire turned over
so much materiel to the FNLA over
the past 12 months that President
Mobutu was forced to tell Holden
Roberto in late May or early June
that he could spare no more. Furth-
ermore, the Chinese warned Roberto
about the same time that they could
promise no further military aid be-
yond 1975. The Zairian and Chinese
warnings to Roberto, which coincid-
ed with some of the MPLA's most
impressive victories, apparently wor-
ried Kissinger; since it appears that
U.S. covert aid to the FNLA in-
creased substantially this past- sum-
mer. - -
In addition to using Zaire as a con-
duit for covert aid, the State Depart-
ment is trying to persuade Congress
to agree to a more than five-fold in-
crease in overt military assistance to
Zaire (from.-$3.5 million to $19 mil-
lion), and a three-fold increase in
economic aid (from $20 to $60 mil-
lion).
The drop in the price of copper and
the increase in the price of oil are
two important factors, along with the
heavy burden of the intervention in
Angola, that resulted in a major eco-
nomic- crisis which caused Zaire to
default on over $8 million- in loans
during the past two. months. U.S.
firms have about $750 million invest-
ed in Zaire, which could be jeopard
ized if this crisis continues. Kissinger_
sees Mobutu as one of Washington's
strongest allies in opposing Russian
interests in Africa, and therefore he
would like to help him out of_his dif-
ficult economic circtunstancm_lf 'the
war continues,. the United. States
probably will have to assume an
ever-increasing role as the supplier
of military equipment.
U.S. involvement in this civil war
appears aimed , at preventing the
MPLA from exercising power in An-
gola, in the. belief that the party's ad-
vocacy of socialism and its heavy de-
pendence on the Soviet -Union for
arms and financial support imply
that it is a danger to U.S. "interests."
But what are American interests in
the area: Economic? Strategic? Dip-
lomatic?
The total value of fixed U.S. in-
vestment in Angola is very small?
under $70 million, the overwhelming
majority of which conies from one
company, Gulf Oil Corp. Ironically,
and significantly, Gulf does not ap-
pear to: share Kissinger's or Colby's
fear of the MPLA. Saydi Mingas, the
MPLA finance minister in the transi-
tional government, recently re-
marked in Washington that relations
between- his party and Gulf were
"very good." The company does-not
perceive the MPLA. to constitute a
greater threat to its operations than
the FNLA or UNITA. The oil compa-
ny is concerned abOut U.S. interVen-
tiona concern which . hit - been _
quietly communicated- to the, State
Department.
Does the United -States have strata.,
gic interests in Angola? 'In: a 1970 Na-, ,
tional Sectuity.Council study (NSSM ?
39), Kissinger argued that the United
States had no strategic interests
there. Colby made it clear in his re-
cent testimony before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee that
the United States still perceives no
strategic interests at stake in Angola.
Is the United States then interested
in scoring ,diplomatic victories
through its Angolan involvement?
Sen. Richard C. Clark (D-Iowa),'-,
chairman of the Foreign Relations.
Subcommittee on Africa, argues that
rather than bolstering American dip-
lomatic efforts in Africa, we.. are
alienating a number of African lead!,-,
era. Moreover, Kissinger has little:
support for his policy within his own
_African bureau. After a thorough re,
view of the Angolan situation within
the State Department this past Juni:,
the bureau almost unanimously rec-
ommended that the United States
stay out of the conflict. ?
If no solid case can be made to sup-
port American intervention to
protect economic, strategic or diplah
matic interests in Angola; why hat-
the United States become involved in
? the Angolan 'tragedy? "To. stop So
viet domination," Administration offi-
rials argue in an accent Which has a
decidedly cold war, rather than de-
tente, ring to it.
Unquestionably an INIPLA-clominat-
ed Angola would be more sympathet-
ic to the Soviet Union than to the
United States. After all, the Russians
gave them the means to resist Portu-
guese colonialism which had been ta-
citly supported by the United States.
Moreover, some leaders consider
_themselves marAsts, which Places
-them closer to Soviet, not American,.
?perceptions of the world. But does
this really spell Soviet domination?
.DOes this really justify putting mil-
lions of dollars worth of American
weapons into the hands of other An-
WASHINGTON POST
2 6 NOV 1975
45
? -plans and white mercenaries?
-.. Similar concerns were recently ex-
pressed about Soviet aid and marxist
rhetotjc in Guinea-Bissau and Mc:,
; zambique, but neither country -has
-shown signs of Russian domination.
!-In: fact, FREL1110 already:has dem,
1-enstrated its independence from the
':)..Soviet Union on. at least two impor-
Aant issues in.recent months. And Idi
7:Amin 's recent rupture with Moscow
; should have put to rest the myth
that Russian arms are tantamount to
Russian dornination..It is a dangerous
. trap to measure the politics of Afri-
? can. leaders 1,y-the source of their
; ants:Pride is a more reliable guide.: Amo erican official official has suggested
that Chinese arms to . the FNLA or
the flattery bestowed upon China by
Holden Roberto indicates that he or
his party are Maoists. -Nor has it been
suggested that South African arms to
-,.T.JNITA bind them to:a support- of
z- apartheid.. Neither can it be argued.
support. of both groups_
::gnarantees they will be friends of the .
United States . in the future. . Both
,'tJNITA's -. Savimbi and FNLA's -
'berto 'have strongly.attacked:the
United States. in the past ancti;they.
? will undoubtedly dolt again -lathe
future. -
tiian emulating the familiar.,.
'-_-??oprse of intervention and escalation ?
in Vietnam, the United States-should -
take A second look at Angola. If de-
tente still has. any meaning, the Unit-,ed.,
States _ should .be e?chausting, all-_
_?_diplornatic means to reach an accOrd;',
with 'the: Soviet Union to reduce thlevel of e
7,14?1C7.c.T.at-1.1Cr,,.,... than:j9Af417
? -- ?
-As long as: the- major.. powers in.
Onjunction *with- dozens of secon
powers pursue policies of: unilateral'
intervention instead of multilateral.
,ireconciliation, any hope for peace in.
Angola remains dim:. Until . the Rus-
sians,.- Chinese and Americans can
.?
.agree-1,o end this war by proxy, the
?:carnage in Angola will continue. The
; c!essation of international interven-
tion is no guarantee that Angolans
will reconcile their differences, but it.:
-would at least afford them the:oppor-
, --tunityl to try to resolve these differ-
ences at the conference table and not
? on the battlefield: ...1?_;1' :
ussian 'Vietnam'?
?
lMFORT-ANT political event oftheearii
thetilici World iS the kremlin's burgeoning intervention
'lithe Angolan civil war. Nothing faintly like it has been
? seen- since- the .period10 years ago when the United States
started sinking; deeply into the quagmire of Vietnam. ?
Now _AS thei,, A great power is committing military
supplies-and manpower to help a favored client in a local
-struggle Lr power. Now as then, the other great power is
-qoming wore or less. reluctantly to the support of the ;
other side. It is, frankly, inconceivable, that the Russians
will end up-putting_ half -a million men ashore in Angola.
But already they seem to have furnished some hundreds
of "advisers," plus tens of millions of dollars in military
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supplies, plus a few thousand Cuban proxies to take a
role in or at least near the actual battle. From a random
and intermittent guerrilla conflict, the struggle in Angola..;_
has become?thanks mostly to Moscow-the- most
savage war currently going on in the world.
. What is behind this rampant Soviet adventurism? Why
has theKremlin gone halfway to the South Poleto all but
openly commit its prestige to the fortunes of a rather
'routine African politician,- the- Popular Movement's
AgOstinho Neto, Who may or May not 'remain a -loyal
Client when?or -if?he establishes real power?' Angola
"dOes" Offer certain conventional great-power lures: a
'good Atlantic port opening on the sea lanes-'around the
-Cape, oil and minerals in apparently plenteous quan-
tities,' the opportunity to stick a thumb in China's eye.
One wonders, though, if ' the real point of Soviet policy is
not something else. Moscow perhaps sees a post-Vietnam
international setting in which its own power is waxing
and American power, or Americans resolve, is on the
wane. Angola may be a test case to establish how much
Soviet intervention the international traffic will now
bear. _
Since Angola' is. important in itself, and since the Soviet
performance does., isuggest '-an experiment in power-
, flexing, it m,akea-- a difference -how -the- United States
responds. We would not want this countrytostand idlyhy
,while the -Russians play out their imperialistic game.
'That would be an invitation to further power plays. But
-we doubt the need;and correctness of getting, back into
Covert '.competition with Moscow, as the United -
Statesso far with uncertain results?is in fact doing in
-Angola: The United States would do better to come before
theInternationar community with clean hands, produce
the ey_iderice of Soviet intervention, and use the means of I
-
diplomacy and public pressure to call on the Russians to ?!
go home. Surely some members of the Third -World
understand their own self-interest in discouraging great-
power military interventions. Secretary of State
Kissinger was entirely correct to warn the other day that
Soviet intervention in Angola is inconsistent with
professions of detente.
Alternately, the President could consider leveling with
the American people. He could, for instance, send up a
message to Congress saying that it matters, for the
following good strategic, economic and political reasons,
which group of Angolans runs Angola, and that the
United States should consider supporting a modest open
program to give a little help to its friends. Why not? If the
case for support cannot survive disclosure and debate,
then let that be the end of it. Meanwhile, the important
thing to do is to, keep the' eyes of the world sharply
focused on exactly what the Russians are up to in Angola.
Friday, November 21, 1975 TI-E CHRISTIAN 4CENCE MONITCL
Angola: nsing East-West test
Joseph C.
Suddenly? the great powersare focused on Angola
A yearago it was just another Porttiguese colony.
_
Nov. lila begin rival supply operation& goth seem to have reached full
flood by this past week. There is still the decisive military campaign
ahead.
The Soviet-backed MPLA forces are at the moment on the def ensive.
Their main base is Luanda, but it is almost on the ruing line.
Everything north of Luanda itself is in
National Front/Unita hands. The northern
anti-Soviet forces claim to hold even the
power station which _supplies electricity to
Luanda itself.
On the southern front the anti-Soviet forces
have had a spectacular advance up the sea
coast. They have taken nearly 700 miles of
coastline- and now are within 200 miles of
Luanda. They think there is nothing of
military importance between their present
front at Porto Amboim and the outskirts of
Luanda.
The military prospect would seem to be for
the southern forces to push on up to the
Luanda area and attempt to join their north-
ern allies for the encirclement of Luanda.
Diplomatic observers point out that the
Angola affair is a reversal of what had long
been the usual pattern in such matters.
Previously, American supplies moved openly
to anti-Communist forces while Moscow sup-
plied its clients indirectly Or clandestinely.
In this case Soviet supplies have come
ashore at Luanda openly. Aid to the anti-Soviet
forces is unofficial; indirect, and more or less
clandestine. Newsweek Magazine's correspon-
dent Andrew Jaffe asked a British pilot who
had flown him to Huambo from Lusaka who
had hired him. He got the facetious reply,
"You can say we work for MI61/2." (MI6 is
British military intelligence.)
The Soviets had the legalistic advantage that
their clients were in control of Luanda which
had been the Portuguese capital of the whole
'of Angola. Their movement has been recog-
nized by most countries Which tend to vote
with Moscow as being the legitimate new
government of Angola. Hence they can claim
to be backing the legitimists while anti-Soviet
forces are backing the rival faction which as
_yet does not control the old capital.
- -Today, it is the cockpit of nations.
Russian trucks, tanks, guns, planes, "advisers" and pilots are
reported seen in Luanda, capital of the Soviet supported MPLA
(Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola). - ?
American planes are reported landing cargoes of guns at Kinshasa in
neighboring Zaire. From there they are reported going to the northern-
forces of the combined National Front/Unita groups which control both
the northern and southern parts of Angola. British pilots are reported
flying men and weapcins to the southern National Front/Unita forces.
Western correspondents are getting as fast as possible to Huambo
(formerly Nova Lisboa) which has been designated as the capital and
command center for the National- Front/Unita forces. They report
white troops speaking with a South African accent, Americans training_
local troops, and military equipment of American and West European.
manufacture.
News reports suggest that the military Supplies going to the northern
anti-Soviet forces are following the same supply line-from Belgium to
Kinshasa which was used during the civil warn the former Belgian
Congo. Supplies to the Soviet-supported MPLA are supposed to have
come by sea Supplies to the southern anti-Soviet front presumably
come from and through South Africa or through Zambia: -
Cuban troops are said to have arrived in Luanda The Chinese are'
giving sympathetic support to the anti-Soviet side. This aligns the
Chinese with both Americans and South Africans.
For an explanation,pull out yot-ir map-of Africa and note that Soviet
naval forces based at Luanda, or any other of the several good harbors
of Angola, would be on the flank of the oil supply line which carries
Persian Gulf oil to Europe. The great tankers must go around the Cape.
The Suez- Canal is not deep enough. West Europe's industrial /fabric
would come to a halt in a few weeks if anything ever cut off that flow of
oil. _
Soviet naval forces have a protected harbor on the Somali coast at
Berbera. They also enjoy harbor facilities at Conakry in Guinea. So far,
they have no naval facilities on either side of the southern part of
Africa. A base at Luanda would be of only marginal value to their North-
Atlantic submarine patrols, but would make it possible for their surface
forces to circle the African continent. This would help them in both the
South Pacific and the Indian Ocean.
If the local communists in Portugal and Spain could drive the
Americans from the Iberian peninsula, the naval balance of power in
both North and South Atlantic would be altered to Moscow's advantage.
For the above- reason the Western countries have obviously
undertaken a substantial military supply operation to aid the - anti-
Soviet factions in Angola. It would appear from reports that both sides
waited only for the official Portuguese withdrawal from Angola on
116
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East Asia
WASHINGTON POST
2 3 NOV 1975
Jack Anderson
The Threat in Korea
- , -? - .
Despite a slight cooling of tensions in Republic of China. I do not believe that
Korea, the north's recklessly ambitious China is interested in a new war on the
? Kim II Sung could rekindle the Korean Korean Peninsula...
War at any time. "With a longstanding invitation to visit
But General Richard Stilwell, the U.S. Moscow, he has (also) attempted to visit
commander in Korea, has concluded from Soviet leaders, ostensibly to persuade
computer studies that he has the military them to support a move south, whereupon
power to stop an invasion in its tracks. It the 'longstanding invitation was with-
would take a blizzard of bombs from drawn."
Guam-based B-52s, however; to do the job- Nevertheless, Murphy warns that Kim's
These are the findings of ReP? Jnnn ties to the twoCommunist superpowers are
Murphy, D-N.Y., who has just spent a sufficiently secure that "in the event Kim
week in Korea questioning the top mrn" unilaterally invades the Republic of:ti
menders and browsing through, secret Korea, China or Russia would not let North
papers. He headed a congressional
delegation of Korean War veterans, who - Korea be extinguished."
It Murphy's view; Kim is caught in an ?
returned to their old battleground to assess - economic vise and "the time is running ;
the danger of a new war. ' - out." Murphy cites the apPrehensions ofti
In a "Personal and Confidential" report U.S. officials, therefore, that "Kim may
to House Speaker Carl Albert, the blunt- think this winter is 'now or never,' and he
spoken Murphy warns tersely: "The may go for broke trying to reach Seoul."
problem in the near future is that Kim II Using computers to calculate the moves
Swig is essentially irrational and could available to Kim, the U.& command
spark a deliberate attack with a resultant believes a push down the traditional
massive military response from South central invasion routes could be stoppeion
Korea." five days. Therefore, Kim's best bet, the
. The US. intelligence directorate in the computers indicate, would be to, diive
Pacific has a similar opinion of Kim but down the shorter, northwestern route.
expresses it in more bureaucratic But the computers show that the Coin-
language. "Kim is a zealous nationalist billed Korean-American forces, with the
and a dedicated Communist wholly artillery firepower, tactical air support
Capable of executing faulty judgements and 3-52 bombing strikes available to
based on misconception," the directorate_ them, could stop the North Koreans "in
has stated. "He also suffers from tunnel their tracks." _Declares- Murphy: "The
command assumes North Korea could
only, last from 30 to 60 days without
massive aid from their Russian. and
Chinese allies." ,
vision where the Korean peninsula is
concerned, and he is not interested in
global detente, which can only hinder his
goal of reunification by force of arms."
? ?
According to Murphy, both china and In case of a North Korean attack,
'Russia have a restraining hold upon the Stilwell is prepared for "an immediate,
impetuous Kim. "It is generally known violent and successful response," and lie
that since the 'shocks of Spring'?the fall ' has "supreme confidence" in the SOtith_
of Saigon and Phnom Penh?Kim_ has Korean Army which is "well trained and
attempted to exploit what he perceived as fit." _
a weakening US. stanceln Asia. But Murphy is gravely alarmed over the
"He went to Peking to ask for help, but- Substandard equipment, which the 'South
his 'adventure was not encouraged,., Koreans are stuck with. The supplieS that
there..." Murphy asserts. "Kim is looked. the U.S. left behind after the Korean War,
upon as unstable by his former ally the he reports, were mostly World WaiII
THE WASHINGTONPOST Thursday, Nov V, 1975
Indonesian Funding of Costly
vintage and are now "woefully obsolete!'
Yet 80 per cent of the military ex-
penditures since 1950, he alleges,. "has
been used to maintain the old equipment
originally left by the U.S. forces." -
The result is that "large units" of- the
South Korean Army "are still equipped
with the old M-1 rifles?or no rifles at
all?while the North Korean Artily- is
equipped with fully automatic AK-47
rifles."
And half of the South Korean Air F6ree
?consists of F86-F sabrejets..
Although the North Koreans -have
superior equipment, he notes that both
Russia and China are withholding-their
advanced arms from an indignant
Reports Murphy: "Kim II Sung, ac-
cording to our intelligence, has- 'com-
plained bitterly' over this practice andhas
been refused access to the much more
advanced MIG-23, the so-called Fox-Bat,
which the Russians provided the Arab
nations during the 1973 Yom Kippur War._
"China has followed the same pattern as
Russia and has provided the North
Koreans with a lower level of military
technology than it currently possesses."
, Murphy calls for the US. to bring the
-- South Korean Army "to parity with the-
North Korean Armed Forces in terms of
sophisticated weapons and weapons
systems."
Quoting from actual speeches, he also
warns that Kim "promises to violate the
truce and- start a new war if the United -
States pulls out of Korea." The U.S.
presence north of the Han River, Murphy
therefore contends, "is the psychological
Sand military obstacle that prevents North
Korea from attempting an invasion of the
south."
? - He urges: "The Congress should make
no mistake that the relatively symbolic
forces of the United States in South-Korea
? are niairitaining peace and security! 'hot
only on the-peninsula, but ultimately in the
WesternPacific."
United Feature Syndicate. Inc.
ByMartinWoollacott Space Project Stirs Criticism
/L
? JAKARTA? When the S.
space agency shoots ?another ex?le of theThat $1.5 billion would buy
"Palapa" into orbit in July, Indonesian government's an awful lot of the little dams,
Indonesia will 'share with the , fatal fondness, its critics say,
roads, bridges, health centers,
for illusory and gimmicky schools and small factories
shortcuts to "modernity" and desperately needed by? the
economic growth. impoverished peasant mass of
Thus "Palaparwhich i,vill Java, 80 million people living
crown a- communications at the highest agricultural
improvement program density in the world. The same
costing $1.5 billion has become . is true of the many smaller but
a focus of controversy is welt ' only slightly better-off
as pride. . communities on the outer
United States, Canada and the
Soviet Union the distinction or
actually possessing one of
those icons of modern
technology, a communications
satellite.
One of the poorest nations in
Asia is joining one of the most
expensive clubs inthe world?
islands from Sumatra to the
Moluccas.
"Instead," said an
Indonesian journalist, "they
are going to get President
Suharto live on television, plus
the facility, which none of
them will ever use, of being
able to telephone someone at
the other end of the 'ar-
chipelago." The exaggeration
is pardonable-as a. means of 47
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dramatizing the difficult
choices the Indonesian
government inevitably faceS.
The archipelago com-
munications program was
conceived in the afterglow ,of
the oil boom, when Indonesia
thought it was going to have so
much money the only problem
would be how to spend it. ,
That Euphoria has vanished
now, but the program is not '
one of those projects the
government plans to scale -
down or postpone, for, it is of
central . political and ,
psychological importance to
the army generals, assisted by
technocrats, who have run -
Indonesia since the fall of
Sukarno.
The very name assigned to
the satellite is indicative; it
refers to one of the most
famous events in Javan
history. Gajak Madah, prime
minis ter of the Empire of
Majapahit, swore an oath, it is
recorded, that he would not
eat white. coconut meat
(palapa) until the unity of the
realm was restored.
That was in- the 14th cen-
, tury, ? but' ramshackle
medieval empires
Majapahit itself lasted less
than 100 years ? - are
Indonesia's only real :
historical claim to have
existed as a' nation, rather
than a as a collection of
separate' societies unified only
by the experience of Dutch
rule.
Thus "palapa" means
unification, which Indonesia's
rulers, despite the everyday
rhetoric of speeches and
propaganda, see as a task only
half completed at best.
In this they have good
reason. In Java itself, three
-
separate sub-societies, each
with its own language and
history ?Javan, Sundan, and
Maduran ? share the crowded
iiland territory. Outside Java,
on the 3,000 islands of the
archipelago, another 11 major
sub-societies, and hundreds of
smaller ones, exist. ,
"Palapa" will carry about
3,000 simultaneous phone
conversa tons and one color TV
channel. The rest- of the
capacity appears to have been
earmarked for military use
and the Ministry of Education,
with some "spare."
1 this, however,, will cost
"only" $150 million. The other
$1.35 billion is being spent on
the upgrading of conventional
telecommunications ? the
extension of the existing
microwave system and of the
telephone net in urban areas.
Flop. tht_gLw er risen
--pint of view, the program will
do four important things."
First, it will- provide swift
military communications for
an army still fearful of revolt,
riot and rebellion.
Second, it will make
nationwide television
broadcasting possible,
leading, it is hoped, to the
cultural and ideological
unification of the country.
Third, it will permit
nationwide education
television, seen as a quick way
to better education in, a
country where 40 per cent of
the 6-to-14 -age group still
receive no schooling.
Finally, it will greatly
improve existing telephone
links between main centers
while at the same time
bringing into the system ?
? through the satellite ? small
and distant but politically or
economically important-
'communities.-
But the program- faces a
number of problems;
?Existing phone lines are
already badly overloaded (it -
costs $1,500 in bribes to-get a
phone. installed) and clearly
could net easily.accommodate
the new traffie. - ?
?There is little TV
programing and what there is
is poor. ?. ?_. _ ?
--:-And there how is no
educational TV, although a
crash program is under way to'
train 1,000 producers,
directors, and writers abroad..
Educational TV has not really t
worked anywhere else in the
underdeveloped, world,-
skeptics point out, asking whys,
it should work' now. in.
-Indonesia.
The government has great
hopes-that thapromm will be,
of immediate political use in ?
the 1977 elections and has, a-
l. vision of villagers all over
Indonesia gathered around the,
communal TV set to listen t&,:
pre-election chats from
! President Suharto or to'absorb;
the gospel of Sukarno's "fiver;
principles" night after night.
"It's not so laughable," said:
a diplomat. "The new-
? programs will go on about'
development and moderi'
nization ? and, right in front;:'
of you, in the shape of the very''.
. TV itself, will be proof of that
development." The governi-s!
ment, an heir of the magical:
and mystical tradition .of-r
-
Java, is putting its faith thisl.
time in a piece of Western7:
scientific magic. .
The program can lasi:3
defended on rational grounds-,1;
but in the end it is an ac.t`tit,L
faith.
, ?
wAsha NGTON POST
"erVIRMV,
2 4 NOV 1975
The. U.S.- Vietnam Relationship.
AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD Vietnam has come
full circle. From regarding. that Asian land as a place
where our very national destiny would be shaped,
Washington has withdrawn to the view that we must first
Of, all care for the welfare of the few American citizens
who happen still to be there. This is a prudent policy; one
Wishes it had been adopted, say, a decade earlier. It also
is. showing some signs of success.
- For months after the Communist triumph in April, the
Vietnamese insisted they would not deal with the United
States in any way until Washington acknowledged its aid
commitment in the Paris accords of January, 1973. That
comriunitrnent, however, was hedged on the "(an-
ticipation) that this agreement will usher in an era of
reconciliation." One government that signed it, Mr.
Thieu's, no longer exists. Washitigton has, correctly,
pronounced the agreement "dead"?dead as a -basis
for policy and dead in terms of public support for it. By
releasing nine Americans (mostly missionaries) out of
the 50-odd who stayed on after April, and by accepting
1,600 Vietnamese refugees back from Guam, Vietnam
demonstrates in deed if not word that it thinks the Paris
accords are dead, too.
The Ford administration, which had taken a rigid
bargaining position, at once relaxed a bit and authorized
some token private relief shipments by the American
Friends Service Committee. Secretary of State Kissinger
explained that there was "no obstacle to the principle of
normalization" and that the United States was ready to
reciprocate Vietnam's "gestures." Vietnam at once
made its own response, inviting the House Select Com-
.
?
mittee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia to meet its
representatives in Paris. This committee, set up last
September under the chairmanship of Rep. G. V. Mbn-
tgomery (D-Miss.), has a membership spanning the
- familiar spectrum -'of American opinion on Vietnam. It
seems to have successfully conveyed to the Vietnamese,
however, that on the particular issue of alp' 820
_ Americans officially listed as missing in agtion in
Indochina, it speaks with a single voice. 21r. Mon-
tgomery is going to Paris with Mr. Kissinger's
blessing?an all too rare example of congressional-
executive collaboration on an important foreign policy
matter._
Whatever their previous views, most Americans, we
surmise, have lost their zest for engaging any of the
issues still posed by Vietnam. Neither revenge nor guilt
nor strategic purpose stirs more than small eddies. This
makes it impossible for the Vietnamese to play on
American divisions and passions, as they once did, for
ends of their own. It makes it feasible, however, for a
careful policy of normalization to be worked out with
adequate public support. We think Vietnam would be
foolish to expect a nickel's worth of American aid. But
the Vietnamese still have political reasons of their
own?offsetting the pressures they feel from China and
Russia?to cultivate a relationship with the United
States. In brief, they need us more than we need them.
This is the reason one can hope the Vietnamese are
coming to realize that they cannot treat the few
Americans left in their country as hostages, and that all
Americans share an interest in receiving what
satisfaction is possible with respect to the MIAs.
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Latin America
WASEENGTON POST
2 7 WA WS I
? The Washingtoifgiry";Gii:Riiiiiid-
,
Senate Testimony Accuses Castro
,
By Intelligence Directorate." The
and Lett Whiiiezt
Despite .the balmier'.
Caribbean breezes blowing
between Cuba and the United
States,, secret Senate
7-testirnony warns that Fidel
Castro-is still trying to spread
?-hii. ' revolution.: to U.S..
territory.'
The. veteran' investigator
AllOnso Tarabochia, testifying
? belttrid,closed doors of _the
Senate Internal Security
subcortimittee, charged that_
the Cuban leader. is-
collaborating with the Shviet
; KGB to undermine democracy.
in?Puerto Rico. "-
"Nieete
than 200 Puerto
Ric**etivists. have -visited'
Cuha"i"jarabochia reported; ???
Ianwere trained in,
,terrorism....This number does
- "'of_ include the 60 or 70 Puerto
Rica is ,who traveled to Cuba
he . Vencerem os
Brigade.".'
- This- T.brigade- has been
portira.Yed as, ? fresh-faced?
young_ _Americans.,? eager
merely to help Cubans chop
? sugar cane. But Tarabochia
testified that the Venceremos
Brigade "iS controlled by the
..KGB throne the Cuban
WASFIINGTON STAR
3 DEC 1975
:William F. Buckley Jr.
?
DGI, as the, directerate is
better known; reported
directly to Castro.
Selected. members of the
brigade, ..according to
Tarabochia, are hip deep in.
Puerto Rican revolution. His
tale of intrigue and sub-
version, incidentally, has been
-.confirmed to us by US. in-
telligence Sources. ,
? - "Detente and the lifting of
the blockade of Cuba" may be
the tune Castro is whistling,
,said Tarabochia, but ,below
"the surface.., there are "no-
indications that, the. Cubans _
have renounced' their policy of
subversion." r ?
? Castro's main front For.
Puertirititan revolution said ?
Tarabochia, is .the ,Puer to -
Rican _Socialist Party. One of
its leaders was caught with a
cache'of bombs sunk in a
,"five-foot-deep hold covered
by a concrete slab located
under a 'cabinet" in Puerto
Rico. Exotic acids and
detonation devices were found
with the bombs., ,
In-the United States, the
revolutionaries have enlisted
Puerto Ricans in New York
Chi,' Chicago, Philadelphia,
-Albuquerque; Boston,
Bridgeport and several Other ? ?
cities. Although Castpo's -siren
song of peace began early this '
year, one key Puerto' Rican
revolutionary front was
founded as late as March.
Tarabochia, using elaborate
charts, traced the Puerto
Rican and Cuban activists to
such citadels of terrorist
training as North Korea.
He found a trail of 16";
bombings traceable'to Puerto
Rican revolutionaries in
Newark, New York and,
Chicago. The bombers, using;
timers ranging from cheap?
Tirnexes to 17-jewel watches,...
hit police stations, an; Exxonl
'building,.Union Carbide and a;
_bank: - '
- Directing the terror cam-J
paign_for Castro and the KGB,
according ,to' the secret,
testimony, is Manuel Pineiro
Lozada, former "dirty tricks",
chief of the Cuban intelligence
service.
To legitimatize the cam-
paign for revolution; Pineiro
Lozada. has tried to bring in
liberal leaders and ,has even
lured some American Indian.
activists. So far, however,,
Tarabochia reports- that the-
Puerto Rican people are firm
in their destr_e_to_r_e_qt_aki_withj,
? -.-.:--_Look:who's talking, about _evils in Chil
What is going on in the
matter of Chile? If one
'reads the cosmopolitan
'press and views the tele--
yised /media, one would
think Chile the ganglion of
all social and political evils ?:
of our generation. Now.
_there is a great deal going"
on in Chile that is unpleas-
ant, and there are some
things going on inChile that
-are outrageous. But the
fixed stare in the direction
of Chile, given the circum-
stances of its recent histo-
ry, can-,only be compared
with the outrage that swept
the manipulable world
when Franco executed five
murderers a couple of
months ago.
?
The perspective is 'pro-
vided by scanning the spon-
.sors of a resolution carried
through the United Nations
General Assembly, excori-
ating Chile for its denial of
.human rights. These spon-
, sors 'included Algeria,
Bulgaria, ,Cuba,_ C.zechoslo-
vakia and Poland. There
'isn't an Algerian, Bulgat-
jart, Cuban, Czechoslovak
or Pole. who would not con-
sider as idyllic, in compari-
son with his own, the life of
a typical Chilean. '
We voted for that resolu-
tion, but with a gesture of
reluctance that becomes a
great power singling out for
alarm a williwaw while
idnoring the typhoons in the
big- and sassy parts of the
- world, most conspicuously
the Communist states.
Ambassador-Moynihan, in
his electric motion calling
for world-wide amnesty fof,
political prisoners, deliver-
ed a' brilliant speech sin-
gling out the important dis-
tinctions. He quoted
I Stephen Spender, who went
I - to Spain during the 'civil
, war to act out his con-
science in protest against,
Franco ? only to discover,
as George Orwell did, and
eventually, Arthur Koes-
tler, that the other side was
at least equally guilty of
atrocities: s, -
"It came to me," Moyni-
han quoted Spender at the
U.N.. "that unless I cared
about every murdered child
indiscriminately; I didn't
really care about children
being murdered at all."
Thus Moynihan, quite
properly,_ deplores the sup-
pression of peaceable politi-
cal dissent everywhere ?
and asks his colleagues to
meditate on one or two
anomolies that don't re-
ceive much attention at the
U.N. ? -
He pointed out that 23 of
49
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the co-sponsors of the usual
anti-South African resolu-
tion of the assembly have
political prisoners of theft"
own; and of course the fig-
ure for Chile is comparable.
He went on to say that there
are, in South Africa ?
which shares the general:
obloquy along with Chile ?
about 100 political prison-
ers, so far as we know. And
how do we know? Because '
,there is a vigorous opposi-
tion press in South Africa. -
He quoted from the Monthly
Bulletin of- the impeccable
International Press-Insti-
tute, whose African director
recently wrote, "The un-
palatable fact is ? and this
is something that sticks in
the' throat of every sell-re-
specting African who will
face it ? that there is more
press freedom in South Afri-
ca than in the rest of Africa
put together."
The press is not that free
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in Chile, but it is freer than
in most of the countries that
have criticized Chile,
Moynihan progressed. How
do we know what is going
on inside these ,countries?
Much has been made of
Gen. Pinochet's refusal,to
permit a U.N. "working"
committee investigating
human rights into Chile.
"This is true," Moynihan .
said. "But it is only part of
the truth. The whole truth
would include the fact that
Amnesty International and
the International Red Cross
were permitted to visit
Chile. Moreover, if the visit
of the working group had
gone through, it would have
been the first time in histo-
ry that any government had
permitted such a visit."
NEW YORK TMES
2 6 NO' 4 1975
-And then Moynihan quot-
ed a letter of Prof. Milton
Friedman published in the
Wall .Street Journal: "On
the atmosphere in Chile, it
is perhaps not irrelevant
that-at two universities, the
Catholic University and the
University of Chile, I gave
talks- on 'The Fragility of
Freedom,' in-which I explic-
.itly-characterized the exist-.
mg regime as unfree, talked
about the difficulty of main-
taining a free society,- the
role of 'free markets and
free enterprise in doing so,
' and the urgency of estab-
lishing those preconditions
for freedom. There- was no
advance or ex post facto
censorship, the audiences
were large and enthusias-
tic, and I received no subse-
quent criticism."
"More and more,"
Moynihan said, "the United
? Nations seems only to know
of violations of human
rights in countries where it
is still possible to protest
such violations." Causing
one to ponder the question,
yet again: what is it that
accounts for the extraordi-
nary success of the orga-
nized left in training the
attention of the world on the
Chiles of the world ? while
ignoring the Cubas.
The Worst of Both Worlds
-SANTIAGO, Chile ? From 1970 to
Chile's Allende Government ex-
perimented with a- socialist medley
and ended up with chaos, bankruptcy,
falling production and anarchy. Since
1973 -the Pinochet Government has
held the country in leaden dictator-
ship's Vise, .
:?Salvador Allende Gossens, a likable
politician with a record of humanitar-
iakideas, was like a tubby fox, a good
talker, popular with the ladies. But he
simply wasn't up to the job of -control-
ling left-wing extremists in his coali-
tion. Revolutionists called. MIR took
Matters into . their. hands,. . seizing
farms, factories and 'destroying all
semblances of order.
:;Augusto Pinochet Ugarte is of an-
ether Cut. Hefty, with slate-blue eyes
and brutal mouth, he practices karate
At. 50. Possessed of a hooded counten-
arice,.he would .have made a fine poker
pla-yer. He seized power by force and,
keeps it by force;
His Government is. headed by a
junta of ..armed forces commanders
whom-he dominates. But the. army has
.bee.n outside politics for two genera- -
dons (although by no means always)
and is unaccustomed to civilian ad-
ministration, consensus and public re-
lations. So it coldly makes war?the
one -thing it knows. The enemy is the
peaple.
This is not fascism with one mono-
.lithic party And fake elections. There
are no parties. It is plain old-fashioned
dictatorship helped along by five
secret police forces (the most in-
- fapous of which is called Dina) and
no inhibitions about locking up, tor-
turing or even occasionally killing
those suspected of opposing it.
_General Pinochet told me the sit-
- uition when he took over two years
ago could be summed up as: "Chaos,
misery, destruction.", Today it is ter-
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
By C. L. Sulzberger
ror, unhappiness, despair. He assured
me there were no convicted political
prisoners in jail, only 516 "detainees
waiting to be tried under the state of
seige." Diplomats estimate over 4,000
are locked up and moderate opposition
leaders claim the figure is even higher.
The President says perhaps 2,000
people died in the 1973 fighting, but
that only 100 have been killed in guer-
rilla and anti-guerrilla shootouts since.
The opposition believes between 10,-
000 and 15,000 have been slain or.
simply -"disappeared."
General Pinochet admits there is a
police toughness but denies the Gov-
ernment "accepts the principle of tor-
ture." -Neutral observers say "sadistic
and refined torture" exists. The Chris-
tian Democrats- acknowledge reports
abroad on torture are exaggerated but
it is "frequent" despite_ protests by
some army officers.
The official line is that the press
and education are unrestrained, That
is nonsense. Education is a tragedy.
Unsuitable military rectors have been
appointed to all universities. Leading
intellectuals were fired, others fled.
Economically Chile was left a sham-
bles by Mr. Allende?and remains a
shambles: Unhappily, the price of the
main export, copper, fell by two-thirds
while the cost of oil imports soared.
Up to 23 percent of the workers are
unemployed. Hunger is common.
It is often said the monetarist
theories of Prof. Milton Friedman and
his Chilean acolytes are 'the mode.
However, President Pinochet told me:
"The Friedman philosophy -cannot be
applied effectively here although many
of his suggestions to us were interest-
ing." The right-wing financial establish-
Del, the conservative Catholic lay or-
ganization.
By contrast the Catholic Church
hierarchy, which opposes Opus Dei,
contains a large majority against Gen-
eral Pinochet. Cardinal Raul Silva En-
riquez, the primate, takes a firm anti-
Government position. Pinochet claims
he and Cardinal Silva are "good per-
sonal friends" but the Cardinal "is sur-
rounded by hostile_ people."
The President assured me- the his-
torical personage who most influenced'
him was Diego Portales, an early
Chilean statesman. Strangely enough,
Portales destroyed militarism, jailed
independence war heroes, and institut-
ionalized open opposition. ,
Having abruptly experienced two
contrasting governmental systems,
Chileans have become politically pol-
arized. Destroyed on the surface,-Com-
munism's infrastructure remains intact
underground. Even the Christian Dem-
ocrats don't demand quick elections
because they see, no current alterna-
tive to the detested military.
What should the United States at-
titude be? One cannot recommend
economic sanctions, which would
heighten the suffering of a hungry
people. But a strong Washington posi-
tion against dictatorship and torture
will be of long-term help in encourag-
ing eventual democracy.
There is a story that Cardinal Silva
warned Mr. Allende he couldn't sur-.
vive unless he cut his ties with' the
extreme left and that he has warned
General Pinochet he can't survive
unless he cuts his ties with the ex-
treme right. Allende, a clever leader,
wasn't strong- enough to control his
zealots. Pinochet, a strong leader, isn't
clever enough to control to COritiol his
zealots. Meanwhile schizophrenic
Chile has been eviscerated.
50
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