ROCKEFELLER PANEL FINDINGS ON CIA DOMESTIC ACTIVITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 25, 2001
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: June 11, 1975
• Content Type: NSPR

25X1A
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9- ?
CONFIDENTIAL
NEWS, VIEWS
and ISSUES
INTERNAL USE ONLY
This publication contains clippings from the
domestic and foreign press for YOUR
BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use
of selected items would rarely be advisable.
NO. 12
GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS
EAST ASIA
13 JUNE 1975
PAGE
1
27
Destroy after backgrounder has served
its purpose or within 60 days.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9
'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9-
ta1WAsrtPrrToN POST .77;faer
21;19.n.
. .
_
fte..,.:White:i1oicse -Ind night .te-k
paaiett the.'report given to President.vi
0,.:Pcirdsby the Commission on CIA Adt-1
r;Aelti41,1:it.hin the United States which.
Ford establiS,ted Ian. 4 by ex-
f,=; :ioliti-Ve'cirder and which was headed
kIj Vice President Rockefelier: pod-
Vslotoiag
is the ','Summary of Findings;
r-Certfclusions and Recommendations"
colitairied in Chapter 3 of the +e?:#4
-SUMMARY OF CIIARGE.,
sAND FINDINGS ?s.
Tie initial public charges were ,that
tile CIA's domestics activities had insj
Volved:, ? .11
,lArgescale spying, on? American
at-liens in the United States by, the:
CIA,. -Whose ? responsibility is foreign:4
intelligence: - sso,s -.,:;
2; Keeping doSsiers on- large ,num-S
.iers "of American citizens.
-t3S-4iming these activities at sAmerise
cala-W -Who have expressed ,thein is.
.410,cl:tient with varjeus :goverment'%
I?
11111:0-co ca 'gee 011h.Ci0111
entlY supplemented by others including ,
'allegations that the CIA: '
Hid intercepted and. opened per
icdar mail' in the United States fer
28- years; ? e: i
-:,e0 Had infiltrated domestic dissident
, , s
grpuns" and otherwise intervened hae
'Omestie polities;
-?so.,1-1ad engaged inifiegaL wiretap,,
inti.break-ins; and,
? Had improperly assisted other
government agencies/ '
In addition, assertions have been
-made ostensibly linking the CIA to
- the assassination of President John F.
Kennedy. .
sIt .became clear from the public'
'reaction - to these charges that the-
sperecy in which the agency necessarily'
Operates, combined with the allege-
lions of wrongdoing, 'had contributed
te widespread public misunderstanding
.of the, agency's actual practices:
detailed analysis of the facts has
convinced the commission that the
great Majority of the CIA's domestic
activities comply with its statutory..
'authority. , .
..-Nevertheless, over the 28 years of its
iiistary, the CIA has engaged in some
aCtisdties that should be criticized and
'not Permitted to happen again-both? ,
in light' of the limits imposed on the
sagency by law and as a matter of pub-
lic policy.
".
Some of these activities, were Initi-
ated or ordered by Presidents, either
Some of them fall within the doubt-,
qui area between responsibilities dele;
'#ated to the, CIA by Congre-ss and the-
'NetiOrial Security Council on the one.
hand and activities specifically pechib..
ited to the agency on the other. ,
Some of them were plainly unlawful'
and' constituted improper- invasions
'upon 'the rights of Americans.
's The agency's own Appnovadikffikr R
Undertaken for the most part in,I973
directly or indirectly.,
s trid.1974, have gone far to terminate
the -activities upon which this investi-
gation has focused. The recommenda-
tions of the commission are designed
.to clarify' areas' of doubt Concerning.
Ilk agency's authority, to strengthen
The -agency's structure, and to guard
against recurrences of these inipropri-
,Cties?
s. '.f "
.4?121'B THE CIA'S Rein'.
? - AND AUTHORITY
.st s
? Findings
':The Central'Inteliigence Agency was ?
-established by the National Security
aket,ef 1947 as the nation's first corn-:
Arehensive peacetime foreign ihtelli-
gerice service. The objective was to
provide the President with coordinat-
ed intelligence, which the cpuntry.
,tacked prior to the attack on Pearl
,Irarhofs , ?
e The Director of Central Intelligence
repiial directly to the President. The
reeeives its 'policy direction and
guid,ance from the National Security
Council, composed of the President,
the Vice President end the eeeretsries
:734 State' and Defense. ?
The statute directs the CIA to cor?::
?elate, evaluate, and disseminate intel-
ligence obtained from United . States
'intelligence agencies, and to perform
(eXtich Other functions related to intel-
ligenCe as the National Security Coun-
,eiis directs. Recognizing that the CIA'
-OUR' be dealing with sensitive, secret
Materials; Congress made the Director
Of Central Intelligence responsible for
:protecting intelligence sources' and
? Methods from unauthorized disclosure.
At the same time, Congress sought
to 'aSstire the American public that it
APIs not establishing a secret polire
e;vhich wOuld threaten the civil liber-
ties of' Americans. It specifically -for?-
?bade the CIA from exercising."police,
-subpoena, or law-enforcement Apowers
`or internal security- functions.", The
CIA was not to replace the Federal
_Bureau of Investigation in conducting
doniestio activities to investigate crime
er -internal subversion..
-1 .Although Congress contemplated that
the focus of the CIA would be on fors
.eign intelligence, it, understood that
*Stime' of its activities would be core:
ducted;within the United States. The
CIA necessarily ;maintains its head-
:quarters?here, procures logistical sup-
port, recruits and trains etnnloyees,
tests :equipments and 'conducts other
-clomestie? activities in support pf- its,
Jereign intelligence mission. It makes
'necessary investigations in the United
1States' to' maintain the security-, of its:
'facilities and personnel. ?' ?
7,-..Aciditional1ys it has been understOod,
!from the beginning that the (1-1A is'
;permitted- to coiled foreign
cenee---tbat is, informntion. concerning
.foreign capabilities, intentions, and ac-.
-tivities?from,American citizens within
iThis country by ovsrt means.
? sc'Determining the legal propriebr of
e I GOws290141111089: 0144R D erff-G9432
?ciuu.e.s.tbe application of the la to ,tlie
4.;.!
? te,)
particular fact?. involved. This tisk
-volveS consideration of 'more than- the
National 'Security Act and the direc-
tives of the National Sectirity?Council;
,.constitutional and 'other statutory pro-.
visions also circumscribe' the dOmestic
activities of the CIA. Among the' ap-
plicable constitutional proYisions-are
the ;First Amendment, protecting *free-
.dom ,of speech, of the press, and of
Peaceable assembly; and .the Fourth
Amendment, prohibiting unreasonable
...searches and seizures.-Among the stat-
.ntory provisions are those which limit'
'zilch, activities as electronic eaves-
dropping and interception of the malls.
?? The precise scope of many of these
statutory and, constitutional provisions
-is not easily stated. The National Se-
curity Act in particular was drafted in
broad terms-in order to nrovideflexi-
bilitsfor 'the CIA to adapt to changing'
,intelligence needs... Such critical
phrases as , "internal security funcs
'lions" are left undefined. The mean-.
? ing of the director's. responsibility to:
prf.itcat intc1iiccc 53UrC::::: and. meth...,
1; ads. from unauthorized disclosure has,
also been a subject of uncertainty.
-...The Word ."foreign", appears nowhere
in the statutory grant of authority,
though it has always :been understood
that the CIA'S thi.ssion 'is limited to?
matters related to foreign intelligence.
This. apparent ?statutory ambiguity,
though not posing problems in, prac-
tice, has troubled members of the pub-
lic who read. the statute without having
the benefit of the legislative history
and the instruction ,s to the CIA from
the.National? Security council. ? ?
?.. . Conclusions
The evidence within the scope of
this 'inquiry does ? not 'indicate that
fundamental rewriting of the National
Security Act is either necessary- o,r.
appropriate.- ?
The evidence does demonstrate the
need for some statutory and admin-
istrative clarification of the role and
function of the agency.
Ambiguities have been Partially
responsible for some, though not all,
of the agency's deviations within the
-United States from its assigned
mis-
'sion. In some cases reasonable persons
will differ as to the lawfulness of the
-activity; in others, the absence of clear
'guidelines as to its antherits- deprived'
'.the agency of .a means of resisting.
:pressures to engage in. activities whichl
now appear to us improper. ?
Greater public awareness of the;
? limits of the CIA's domestic authority:
,woulch'do much to reassurestho Amersl
lean people.,
.? . The requisite ,clarification can best,
'be, accomplished ,,a) threisch a .pesiiic
amendment clarifying 'the. National':
Seeurity Act provi&lon' hich (10111-'1
eates the permissible -scope of CIA'
activities, as set forth in recommenda-.
tion 1, and (b) through ? issuance of an
fgther limiting do-
the CIA, a* .set,,
? ,111,
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010070008-9
Vr- ?
'forth in recanarnesidation -
. . Recommendation (1)
Section 403 of the National Security
,
.Act of 1947 s.hould be .amended in the
form set forth in Appendix. III. to this
'report. These amendments, in um--
marY, would:
? , a. Make explicit . that the CIA's ace
tivities must be related to foreign in-
telligence. ? ? '
? b. Clarify the responsibility of the,
..CIA; to :protect intelligence sources .
and 'methods from unauthorized dis-
closure, (The agency would he respon-
sible for protecting against unauthor-
ized disclosures: within the CIA, and
.it -would be responsible for providing.
guidance and teehnical assistance to
other agency and department heads in
prOtecting ? against unauthorized dis-
closures within 'their own agencies and
:departments.) . ? ..
c. Confirm publicly the CIA's exist-.
ing authority to collect foreign intel-
ligence. from. willing sources within the
. United States and; except as specified ?
.by: the. President in a .published ex-
ecutive order, prohibit the CIA from'
collection - efforts within the United
States directed. at securing fpreign.
in-
'teiligence ? from unknowing American
citizens. ? ? .
? faRecommendation (2)
'The President .,should by executive'
Order. prohibit the CIA from the col-
lection :of information about the dom-
estic activities of United States
(whether by. overt or . covert
:Means), the evaluation, correlation,
and i dissemination of analyses or re-
ports about such activities, and the
stersge of Such' infoionatien, with CY.-
eeptions for the following categories
of persons or activities: . ",.? .
a. Persons -presently or formerly 'of-
filiated, or being considered for affilia-
tion, with the,. CIA, directly or
. or ? others 'who require , clear-
ance by ,the- CIA .to . receive classified
information; , Persons
-
Persons or activities that pose ,a.
-clear'. threat to CIA 'facilities ? or per-
sonnel, provided .that. proper coordina-
tion with 'the, FBI. is ? accomplished;
.. ? ct Persons suspected of eSpionage or
.other illegal activities relating to for-
eign' intelligence, provided that proper
coordination With ..the FBI is &Tom-
?plished. ? ? ?
, Information -which is received in-
cidental to appropriate CIA .activities
may be' transmitted to an agency with
appropriate jurisdictiois including law
'enforcement agencies. ? ' ?
Collection of information from nor-
mal library spurces such as newspa.:i
.pei.s, books, magazines and other such'
documents is not to be affected by
this order. S.
Inforrnation currently being main-:
tined which is inconsistent with the
order -should be destroyed at the con-'
elusion of the current congressional :
investigations or as soon thereafter
as permitted by law.
The CIA should periodically screen
;Its files and eliminate all Material in-
:consistent with the order. '
- The order should be. issued after
consultation with the National Secu-
rity Council, the ?Attorney General, ?
'and the Directbr of Central Intelli-
genc-e. AnY.modifinatieneef the order
'Would' be permitted only through.
amendmerts, '
C. SUPERVISION AND CONTROL
OF THE CIA
-? lo External Controls '. ?
. Findings
't ? The CIA Is subject to supervision;
And control by various executive ageno
7Ciei -and by the 'Congress:','?'
'Congress has eStablished special pro-'
cedures for review of the CIA and its.,
secret budget within four small sub- .
committees. Historically, these subcom-
mittees have been composed of mem-
doers of ?Congress with many other de--
:mends on their time. The CIA has not?
as a . general rule received detailed
scrutiny' by the Congress. ? ? '
The principal bodies within the exec--
utive branch performing. a supervisory
or cOntrol function are ' the National.
Security Council, which gives the CIA.
its policy.direction and control; the Of
of Managernent and' Budget, which
.reviews the CIA's budget in much.
the same fashion as it reviews budgets
.of other government agencies: and the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advid
sory Board, 'which is composed of dis-
tinguished citizens, serving part-time,
,in a general advisory function fpr the
President on the quality of the gather;
ing and interpretation ? of intelligence.
-None of these agencies has the spe-
cific- responsibility of overseeing the
CIA ?1:5 determine whether its 'activities
are proper,' ' ?
The Department of Justice also exer-
cises an- oversight role, through its.
"power to initiate prosecutions for crim-
inal misconduct. Tor a period of oyer
20 years, however, an agreement ete
isted between,the Department of Jus-
tice and the CIA providing that the
'agency -was to investigate allegations
of crimes. by CIA employees or agents
which involved government money or
property or might involve operational
'set laity. If, following the- investig.a-
tion, the agency determined that there
was no reasonable basis to believe a
crime had been committed, or that op-
erational security aspects. precluded
prosecution, the case was not referred
-to the Department of Justice? ? -
The 'cominission has found nothing'.
to indicate-that the CIA. abused. the .
foisction given it by the agreement..
The agreement, however, involved the
agency directly in forbidden law, en-
forcement .aetivities, and represented.
an abdication by the Department of
Justice of its statutory responsibilities,-
?, Conclusions ?
, Some 'improvement in the congres-
sional oversight system would be help...,
ful. -The problem of -.providing ade- ?
qu,ate oversight and control while ,
maintaining essential security is Met-
eaSily resolved. Several knowledgeable'.
witnesses pornted to the Joint Commit-
tee on Atomic Energy as an appromin
ate model- for congressional oves-sight
-of the agency. That committee has bad
an excellent record of providing effece
tive oversight while avoiding. breaches'.
of security-in a highly sensitive area.
One of the underlying causes of the'.
problems confronting the CIA arises'
.out of the pervading atmosphere of se--
crecy in which its activities have been
conducted in the past. ? One aspect -of
this has been .the secrecy of the
budget.
A new body is needed to provide
oversight of the agency within the ex-
ecutive branch Because of the need to
preserve security, the CIA iS not sub-
jea to the usual constraints of -audit,
judicial review; publicity or open cone
gressio.nal budget review and over-
sight. ,Consequently, its operations re.-
quire additional external control.- The
authority 'assigned the job of superviS-
ing the CIA must be gives sufficient
power ,and significance to assure ?the
public of effective supervision. .
; The situation whereby the agency
determined whether its own employees
would be' prosecuted must not be pere-
*dotted to re :Am
Beeorn' mendation (3) .
?The President should recommend to
Congress the establishment of. a Joint
Committee 6n Intelligence . to assume
the oversight ible currently played by
the Armed Services Committees...
Recommendation (4)
. Congress should give careful consid-t
eration to the question -whether the .
budget of the CIA should not, 'at. least
to some extent, be made public, partic-
ularly in view of the provisions of Arti-
cle I. Section 9, Clause 7 of the Consti-,
tution. ?
Recommendation () '
. a. The functions of the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
-should be exisanded to include over-,
. sight of the CIA. This expanded over?.-
'sight board should be composed of dise
tingtxish.ed citizens with varying back-'
grounds and experience. It should be
headed by a full-time chairman and
should have a ?full-time staff appropri-
ate to its role. Its functions related to
the CIA should include:
.,
I. Assessing compliance by the CIA,
.with its statutory authority. .
. 2. Assessing the quality of foreign
Intelligence collection.
e ? 3. Assessing the, quality of foreign,
intelligence estimates. , ?
? 4. Assessing othe quality of the or-
ganization of the CIA.
5. Assessing the quality of the man-
agement of the CIA.
6. Making recommendations with
respect' to the above subjects to the,
President and- the Director of Central
Intelligente, . and, where appropriate,
the Attorney General. .
p. 'inc board should have access
? all information in the CIA. It SiviSuld
;be authorized to audit and investigate
CIA expenditures and actiVities on its
? own initiative. ?
c. The inspector general of the-CIA
,
should be authorized to report directly
? to, the board, after having notified the
Director of Central Intelligence, in,
cases he deerhs appropriate.
? II? ' -
Recommendation (6) ?.
The Department of Justice and the
fis
CIA. should establish written guide7.
lines for the handling of reports of
criminal violations by. employees , of
?the agency or relatingeto its affairs.
. These guidelines should require that
the criminal. investigation and the -de-,
? cision whether to prosecute be made
by- the Department of Justice; after
Consideration of agency views regard-
ing the impact of prosecution on the
national , security. The agency should
be permitted to conduct such investi-
.rations as it requires to- determine
whether its operations have been jeop-
ardized. The agency should scrupu-
lously avoid exercise- of the prosecu-
. torial function.
2. internal Controls*
Findings
? The director's duties in administer-
ing the intelligence community, han-
dling relations with other components
of the government, and passing on
broad questions of policy. lreve him
little time for day-to-day supervision of
the agency. Past studies have noted"
? the need for the director to delegate.
'greater responsibility for the adminis-.
,tration of tb agency to the Deputy'
Director of Central intelligence.
e. In recent,years, the position of dep-
uty director has been occupied by a
.high-ranking military officer, with re-
sponsibilities for maintaining liaison
with the Department of Defense, fos-
tering the agency's relationship with'
a the military'eervices, and providing top,
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-0043214000100370008-9
es.
' Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9
euv ymanagement with .necessary
perienee and skill in understanding.
particular intelligence requirements of
the military. Generally soeaking, the,
deputy directors of central intelligence'
.have not been heavily engaged in ad-
ministration of the agency.
a ...Mitch of the four directorates within,.
the -CIA?I-operations, intelligence, ad:
-ministration; and science and technol-
ogy is- is. headed by a. deputy ?director
who .reports to the Director and Dep--
.uty'?Director of Central Intelligence.:
These four deputies, together with cerd
-Limn other top agency officials such :as'
the .eomptroller, form the Agency Man-
agement Committee, which makes':
many of ?the adminietrative and man-
agement decisions affecting more thanj
one directorate.
Outside the chain of command; the
primary internal mechanism far keep-7
ing the agency within , bounds As the
'inspector general. The size' of. this of-
flee was recently .shartly reduced, and
its,previous practice of making regular,
revieVes of various agency departments
.waseterminated. At the present time,i
-the activities of the office are almost.
entirely ? concerned with coordinating'
agency responses to ? the various in-"
vestigating .bodies, and with various:
types of employee .grievances.
. The office of general counsel has 'on'
'occasion played an important role in-
-preventing or terminating agency ac;
?tivities in violation of law, but many
of the questionable or uniawfuhactivi-
ties. discussed in this report were not
brought to the attention of this office..
A ,certain parochialism may have re-
suited from the feat that attorneys in
the office have little' or no legal exnerid
encili. outside thc ..igency. It. is in:nen
tent that the Agency receive the best ?
possible legal adviee on the Often dif-.
ficult and unusual situations whichC
confront it.,, .
Conclusions . e. ?
In the final analysis, t h proper'
functioning of the agency must de: -
pend in large part on the character 'of..
theDirector of Central Intelligence.
? . The best assurance against misuse ,
of the agency lies in the appointment
to that position of persons with the
?judgment, courage, and ihdependence
_
to resist Improper pressure and impor-
tuning, whether from the White House,
within the agency or elsewhere,
? Compartmentation within the agency,
although certainly appropriate for se-
curity reasons, h a s sometimes been
carried ? to extremes which -prevent
-pioper supervision and control. ea
, The agency must rely on the disci-
pline and integrity of the men and
-women it employs. Many of. the activid
ties we have found to be improper On
unlawful Were in fact questioned by
lower-level employees. Bringing such
.situations to the attention of upper
-levels of management is one of the pur-
poses of a system in internal control..
- Recommendation .(7)
h ai Persons appointed to the position
Of Director of Central Intelligence
shonict be individuals of stature, in-
dependence, and integrity. In making
:this appointment, consideration should
be ,given to individuals from outside'
the career service of the CIA, although
promotion from within should. not be.
barred. lxperience in intelligence serv-
ice is not necessarily aiDrarecitealte for
the position: management and admin-
istrative skills are at least as important
as the technical expertise which can
always be found in an able deputy.
,b. Although the director serves at
(f3 ?
'a. The Office of Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence should be re-
constituted to provide for two such.
deputies, in addition to the four heads
of the agency's directorates. One de-
puty would act as the administrative
officer, freeing the director from day-
to-day manageinent dutica. The other
deputy should be a military officer,
serving 'the' functions of fostering re-
lations with the military and providing'
the agency with technical expertise
or, military intelligence requirements;
? b. The advice and consent of the
-Senate -should be required for ?the
appointment of each Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence:
. Atecorrimendation (9) ?
.. a. The inspector general should 'be
upgraded to a status equivalent to
that of the deputy directors in charge
-of the four directorates within the
CIA. ? ? (
b. The Office of InspectorGeneral
should be staffed by outstanding, ex-
perienced officers from both inside and-
outside the CIA, with ability to under--
stand the -various branches of thei
agency. ? . ?
? c. The inspector general's .dutieS
with respect to domestic CIA activities
.should include periodic reviews of tall
offices within the United States.' He.
Should examine each ?office for corn-,
pliance, witht qTA. authority and reg-
:Illations as well as for the" effective-
ness *of their programs In implement-
ing, policy, objectives. - , ?
d. The inspector general 'should in--
InOestigate all these reports from em-
pi eyees concerning possible violations
of the CIA statute.
-itt. The tespctiter general ahauld be"
given complete !access' to all informs.;
Aon in, the CIA relevant to his ? re:'
-views. ? ,
Ari effective Inspector general's .
office will require a larger staff, more
frequent reviews, and highly qualified
personnel: '
g. Inspector general reports should
lie provided to the National Security;
Council and the recommended .execu-
dive oversight body. The inspector gen-
ieral should have--the authority, when,
he deems it appropriate, after notify-
ing the Director of Central Intern--
gence to consult with the executive,
oversight body. on any CIA' activity.
(see Recommendation 5).
-Recommendation (10)
a. The director should review' the:
composition and operation & the .0f:
tied of General Counsel and the Vest,
gree to whieth this office. is Consulted
:to determine whether. the agency is
-receiving adequate legal assistance'
and representation -in view of current ,
requirements. .
_ b.- ConSideration should be given to'
.measures which would strengthen the
office's professional capabilities and
resources-- including, * among other
things, (1) occasionally departing from
the existing practice of hiring lawyers'
from within the agency to bring in
seasoned lawyers from private prace
tice as well as to hire law school grad-
uates without prior CIA experience; ?
(2) occasionally assigning agency lawe.
.yers to serve a tour of duty elsewhere
in the government to expand their
experienced(3) enCouraging lawyers
participate in outside ptofessional ac-
tivities. ?
Recommendation (11) ?
To a degree consistent with the
-need for security, the CIA should be
the pleasure of the Prestedent, no dikiei- encouraged to provide for increased gence Agency approved commence:- -
t s serve i, F Release129104i0S1080t pAORDPUFAQ432ROIDOI Nameoe-gork mail intercept
or hould n titilPFAVga
th
' eutaide etetierienc-e late the
hcy at all levels. ai
: itfecannaienclation (12)
Omrk..
a. The agency should issue detailed
- guidelines for its employees further
specifying those activities within the
United, Ste tes which inns, permitted'
. and these which mie prohibited by.
' statute, e-seenti*,.re cz-e?r:s, and NSC
.land DCI directives.
? b. These guidelines shottici also set
hforth the standards which govern CIA
d activities and the general types ?of ac-
? ,tivities which are permitted and pro-
hibited. ? They should, among .other
things, specify that:
6 Clandestine collection of Intel/ie.
gen.ce :directed against United States
citizens which is prohibited except as
pecifically permitted by law or Dub-
': -.1ished executive ord:sr.
6 Unlawful methods or activities are
'prohibited.
a Prior approval of the DCI shall
? be required for any aeavities which
may raise questions of compliance
with the law or with agency' regula-
-ions.
? ? c. The guidelines shoala also pro-
vide that employees with laCermatiorn
On possibly impforier zeti7ities tn.
bring it promptly to the Ltte.."..ntion of
the Director of Central latelligenCd'
,,or the inspector general.
?ill. SIGNIFICANT AREAS . OF
? INVESTIGATION
Introduction -
' Domestic activities of the CIA rais-
? ing :substantial questions of compli-
ance with the law have been. closely.
examined by the commission to' deter-
mine the context in which they were
' siert:ire:hid. the pre:inure of' the times,
I the relationship of the activity to the
agency's, foreign intelligence assign-
ment and- to, other CIA activities, the co .used to authorize and eon-.
duct the activity, and.-the extent and
effect of the activity.
In describing and assessing each
:such activity, it has been necessary to
_consider both that, activity's relation-
? ship?to the legitiniate-national security
-needs of the nation and the .threat
.such antivities might pose to individual
rights of Americans and to a society
.founded on the need 'for government,
as well as private citizens, to obey the
'law. , ? , - ' ? ?
The CIA's Mail Intercepts
Findings ?
s.
At the time the' CIA came into being;
one of the highest national intelligence
priorities was to gain an understanding
of the Soviet Union and its worldwide
ectivities Affecting our national secure
ity. ? e-
. In this-context,' the CIA began in
1952 ta. program of surveying mail be-
tween the United States and the Soviet
Union as it passed through a New York
postal facility. In 1953 it began open-,
ing some a this mail. The program,
was expanded over the following two
decades and ultimately invoi"Ved the
'Opening of many letters and the anal-
ysis of envelopes, or "covers," of ia
great many more letters.
r? .The New York mail intercept was
designed to attempt to identify-persons
within the United States who-., were
cooperating with the Soviet Union and,
its intelligence forces Ori harm. the
United States. It was also intended to
:determine technical- communications
'procedures and mail' censorship tech-
niques used ,by the Soviets.
The .13irectod of the Central Intelli-
more than 10 years. the directorates and to bring persona in 1952. During the ensuing years. so
3 far as the record 'shows, Postmasters
Approved For Release 2001/08/08': CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9
'General Sumrnerrield, Day; and Blount-
;were infOrmed of the program in vary-
' ing degrees, as was Attorney General.
,Mitchell. S i rice 1953, the FBI was
aware of this program and received
'57,000 items' from it. ;?
,.?
' ? A 1962 CIA memorandum indicates'
-the agency was aware that the mail
' openings would be viewed as violating
federal criminal -laws prohibiting ob-
-strUction or delay of the-mails.
? In the last years before 'the termination of this program, out. of 4,350,000
Items of mail sent to and .from the .Slie
:viet Union, the New York intereept
?amined the outside of 2,300,000 of these
.Items, photographed 33,000 envelopes,
and opened 13,700. ?
? .??
,4 The mail intercept, was terminated
In 1973 when the chief postal inspector
refused' to allow Its continuation with-
out ,an up-to-date high-level approval.;
? The CIA also ran much smaller mail
Intercepts .f o r brief periods hI San
Francisco between 1969. and 1971: and
.in the territory of HaWail -during 1954.
and 1955. For a short period in 1957e
mail in transit between foreign coun-
tries. was intercepted in New Orleans'
? - Conclusions
, *While -in- operation. the CIA's domes-
tic mail opening peograms were unlaw-
ful. United States statutes specifically;
forbid opening the mail. ' -
S The mail' Openings also raise .cohsti-
tutional questions under the Fourtl}
Amendment guarantees against unrea-
-sonable search,' and the scope of the
New York project pose's possible :diffi-
culties With the First Amendment
rights of speech and press. ? ?
e; Meil. cover operations "(examining
and: copying of envelopes only) 'arc
legal- when carried out in compliance
with postal regulations, on a limited:
and selective basis involving- Matters
national- security; The New York.
. mail ihtercept did- not meet . these
criteria. ? ?
The *tire. and decree-of assistance, .
given ? bY the CIA to the FBI th the
New _York mail project indieate :that.
The CIA's primary purpose eventually.
,became participation with the FBI,-in
internal, security functions. According-
ly, the .CIA's participation was pr?.
ehibited under the. National Security,:
?Act.e.. ? - ? -
- Recommendation (13)
a, The President should instruct the.'
Director of Central Intelligence that
? the CIA ifi? not to engage again hi do-
einestic mail openings except with ex-
press statutory authority in time of
dwarn(See also Recommendation 23).el
b. The President -should instruct-the?
Director of Central Intelligence that
moi/ cover examinations -are to.. be in
comnliance with postal regulations:.
:they are to be undertaken only in .fur-
..theranee of the CIA's legitimate ectivi-
;ties and -then only on a limited. and
*selected basis clearly involving mat-;
2. Intelligence Community ?
Coordination
;ters of national security.- ?
Findin .
. As a result of growing domestic dis-
order, the Department of Justice, start-
'Pig in 1967 at the direction of Attorney'
General Ramsey Clark, coordinated a
series of seeret units and interagency ,
groups in an effort to collate and eval-:
!vete ?intelligepoe relating to these
-events. These efforts COntinued until
1973.? ?
The 'interagency committees were
designed for 'analytic and not opera-
tional purposes. They were created as
'a result of White House pressUre
'which began in 1307, bactue the FB$
performed only limited evaluation and
lAnalySie of the liforitatibri ifebIlected?
(on these -events. The stated purpose of
-CIA!si participation was to supply rele-
vant foreign intelligence and to furs
mish advice on evaluation techniques.
' The CIA was reluctant to become'
',unduly involved in these committees,
which'-had problems Of domestic un-
rest as their principal forcus. It repeat-
tedly refused to assign full-time per7
sonnet to any: or them.
The most active of the committees
ewas the Intellig,ence Evaluation Staff,
--which met :train January, 1971, to May; '
1973. A -CIA liaison officer attended'
rover 100 weekly meetings' of the staff,
,some of which concerned drafts of re-
'ports which ,had no foreign aspects.
.}Witch, the: exception of one instance,
;there is no evidence that he acted in
Any capacity other than -as an adviser
on foreign intelligence, and, to some
,degree, as an editor. ; ?
' On one occasion the CIA liaison off!-
or appears to have caused a CIA
agent to gather domestic information
which was reported to the Intelligence,
,Evaluation Staff.
d The commission found no evidence'
;of other activities by the CIA that
were conducted on behalf of the. De-
partment of Justice groups except for
'the supplying of appropriate foreign
Intelligence and advice on evaluation
techniques.
Conclusions.
The statutory. prohibition'on Internal-
security functions does' not preclude
the CIA from providing foreign intelli-
gence or advice ott evaluatien tecimi-
emes to interdepartmental intelligence
evaluation organizations' having some
uoinestic aspects. The statute was in-
tended tn promote coordination, not
tompartmentation of intelligence be- ,
tween governmental departments. '
e The attendance of the CIA liaison
fficer at over 100 meetings of the Intel-'
ligence Evaluation Staff, some of them'
. concerned wholly with domestic *mats ,
ten, neverthelesss created at least the
-'appearance of impropriety. The Direc-
?tor of Central Intelligence was well ad-
vised to' approach such participation
reluctantly. ? -
. -
The liaison officer acted improperly
in the one instance which he directed
an agent to gather domestic informa-
tion within the United States which
was 'reported' to the Intelligence Eval-
:nation. Staff.-? ?
- Much of te.problem`stemmed from
the absence in government of any or-
ganization capable of adequately one-
.lyzing intelligence collected by ? the
FBI on matters; outside the purvieW
e ? ? ? ?
en. ? 'Recommendation.. ?
s. A capability stfoidd be developed
within the FBI, or elsewhere in the De- .
partment of Justice, to evaluate, ana-
,lyze, and coordinate intelligence and
'counterintelligence collected by the
FBI concerning espionage, terrorism,
dind other related matters ? of internal
security.
. b. The CIA should restrict its parti.
'nation in any joint intelligence com-
mittees to foreign intelligence mat-
ters.
c. The FBI should be encouraged to
tontintie to look to the CIA for such
foreign intelligence and counterinteh
ligence as is relevant to FBI needs. ?
.Special Operations Group?"Operation
- ? CHAOS"
?? Findings
The late 'Saes and early i97.0s were
marked. by widespread violence,' and
civil disorders. Demonstrations,
marches and protest assemblies were
;frequent in a number of cities, Many
,;universities and college Campuses.?be-,
Approved For Release 2001/08/08
came places of disruption and 'unrestl=
-Government facilities were picketeci -
and sometimes invaded. Threats of-
bombing and bombing 'incidents ?cense
med: frequently. din Washington and
other major cities, apecial security
measures had to he instituted.te 'con-
trol the access to public buildings. ?
Responding to presidential requests
made in the face of growing domestic
'disorder, the Director of Central Intel,,
ligence in August, 1967,' established a.:
Special Operations Group within the
CIA to collect, coordinate, .evaluate
and.report on the extent of foreign -
fluence on domestic dissidence. ?
The group's activities, which later
-came :to , be known' as Orieratien
'CHAOS, led the CIA to collect infor-
mation on dissident Americans from.
CIA field stations oversea.4 and froth.
'the FBI. e ?
Although the stated purpose *of. the
-operation was 'to determine whether
.there 'were any . foreign contacts' with/
American dissident groups, it resulted
In the accumulation of' considerable ma-
terial on domestic dissidents and their
activities.
d? During six years; the operation com-
piled some 13,000 different files,' in-
tludin-g files on 7,200 American citi-
tens. The documents in these files finiV
related materials included the names
More than 30,000 persons and organ-
izations, which were entered into A
-computerized index. ?
?': This information 'was kept closely
guarded within the CIA. Using this ire
? formation, 'personnel of the, group pre-.
pared 3,500 memoranda for internal,
use;-3,000 memoranda for dissemina-
tion to the FBI; and .37 rnernoranda
-for distribution to White 'House and
other top level officials in the gov-
ernment.
.The staff assigned to the operation
was steadily enlarged in response to
repeated presidential requests for ad-
ditional information, -ultimately reach-
ing a maximum of 52 in 1971. Because
,of excessive isolations the operation
was substantially insulated frorinmean-
Ingful review within the agency, in-
icluding review by the Counterintelli:'
genceOtaff--of which the eperation,
Was technically a part.'
n Commencing in late 1069, Operation'
CHAOS. used a number of agents to'
'collect intelligence abroad on -any ford
.eign- connections With American dies0
dent groups. In order tti have suffi-
l'cient "cover" for these agents, the op--
,eratiou recruited persons from domes-
:
stiC, dissident groups or secruited others
and instructed them to. associate. with
such groups in this country:. ? -
,. 'Most of the operation's reeruits'seCie-'-,
itOt directed.. to collectinformation do-'?
?Mestically on American:dissidents. On.
a. number of occaesions, however; such':
Information. was reported by the re-
nits while they 'were developing
sident credentials in the United States,'
And the *information' was 'retained in
ite files er.the operation. On three Oc?
casions, an agent of the operation was
speCificaily directed to collect domes,
tic intelligenee. .
'No evidence was fourid- that any Op:
-eration CHAOS agent used or was di:
?rected by the agency to. use electronic
surveillance, wiretaps or breaksins
the United States against-any dissident
individual or group.
? Activity of the operation deCieased
substantially by mid-1972, The opera-
tion was formally terminated in March
1974. .
; ? -Cenclu.sionn
8ome domestic activities of Opera-
tion CHAOS unlawfully exceeded the
Cals'e statutory authority; even though ?
: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9
' Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 .
Abe-declared' Mission 'cf gathering ind
telligence. abreadeeas to foreign Influ-
ence on domestic dissident ,activities
was proper.
.Most signficantly, the operation be
_came a repository for large quantities
of information on the domestic activi-
ties of American citizens. This infor-
mation Was derived principallinfrom
FE; reports or from overt sources and
not from clandestine collection by the
CIA, and, much of it was not 'directly -
related to the question of the existence
of foreign connections.
It was probably necessary--for the
'CIA to accumulate an information-
base on domestic dissident activities in
'order to assess fairly whether the ac-
tivities had foreign- connections. Thd
FBI would collect information but
would not evaluate it. But the accumu-
lation Of domestic data in the opera-
tion exceeded What was- reasonably re:
quired to make such an assessment
and wee thus improper.
.:" The use of agents of the operation
on three occasions to gather informa-
tion ' within the -United States on
strictly domestic matters was beyond
the CIA's authority. In addition the in-
telligence disseminations and ' those
portions of a major study prepared by
the agency which dealt with purely do-,
.niestic matters were improper.,
Tire isolation of Operation. CHAOS
within the CIA and its independence
-from supervision by the regular chain
of command within the clandestine
service made ,it possible for the activi-
ties of the operation to stray over the
bounds of the agency's authority with-
-out the knowledge of senior officials.
The abeence of any regelar review of
these activities prevented timely 'cor-
rection of such missteps as did occur.
- Recommendation (15) ..
t a. Presidents should refrain from di-
recting the i CIA to perform what are
-essentially internal security tasks.'
1 b. The CIA should resist any efforts,
whatever their origin, to- involve it.
again in such improper activities.
- de. The agency should guard against:
allowing any companent (like the Spe- .
cial Operations Group) to become so
self-contained and _isolated from top
leadership that regular ?Supervision
,and review -are lost. , ? , ?
d. The 'files of thp CHAOS project
which have no foreign intelligence'
'value should be destroyed by the
agency at the conclusion of the current=
congresSional investigations, or as soon
-
thereafter as permittea by law. :\
el. Protection Of. the Agency Against.
Threats orViolence--
7.1e, on ? Office of Security,
Findings .
The CIA was not immune from the
,threats of-violence and disruption dur-
ing the period of domestic unrest be:,
teen 1967 and 1972. The Office of Se-
curity was charged throughout this pe-
riod with the responsibility of ensur-,
tag te continued functioning, of the'
The office therefore, from? 1967 to
1.970, had its field officers collect infor-
mation, from published materials, latv
'enforcement authorities, other. agen-
;cies and college officials 13e !ore
tcruiters were- Sent to seme. campusea.';
1,Monitoring' and communications guip-?
-"port was' provided to reel ei+e tishen-
trouble was expected. ? ? s
? The office was also responsible; with.
the approval of the Director of Central
Intelligence,' for a program from Feb-
ruary, 1967, to December, 1968, which
at first monitored, but later infiltrated,
dissident organizationApilitoatlifisr Re
ton, D.C. area to determine if the
groups planned' any aCtivitica against
cf.A of other goverment installations::
-At no time were more than 1.; perk,
sons performing these tasks, and they
performed them on a part-time basis.-
The-project was terminated when the
Washington Metropolitan Police De
partment developed its -own intellie;
gence capability.
? w
- In December, 1967, the office began,
a continuing study of dissident activity '
in the United States, using information
from published and -other voluntary
knowledgeable sources. The office,'
produced weekly si,tueticin information.
reports analyzing dissider-t activities
and nroviding calendars -Of future
events. ? Calendars were given to the.
Secret Service, but the CIA. made no
other disseminations; outside the"
agency. About 500 to 800 files.ewere
maintained on dissenting organizations
and individuals. Thousands of names.
in the files were indexed: Report puha;
'cation was ended in late 1972, and the
entire. project was ended in 1973.
? ? Conclusions. ? -'1
- The program under which the Office
of Security rendered assistance to
agency recruiters on college 'campuses
was justified, as an- exercise of the'
agency's responsibility to protect its
own 'personnel and operations. Such
support activities were not undertaken
for the purpose of protecting the'faciii-
ties or operations .of other governmen-
tal agencies, or to maintain public' or
der or enforce laws.
-The-agency sholild not infiltrate a
dissident group- for security purposes
unless there is a clear danger to
arency installations, operations or per.
'sonnet, and investigative coverage of
the threat by the FBI and local law en-
forcement- authorities is inadequate.'
The ageney's infiltration- of dissident
groups in the Washington area Went
far- heYond steps necessary to protect
the agency's.own facilities, personnel
and. operations, and therefore ex-
ceeded the CIA's statutory authority. -
'In addition, the agency undertooltIo
protect ether government departments
and agencies ? a police function pro-
hibited to it by statute.
Intelligence activity directed toward
learning from what sources a demestfe
dissident group receives its financia.
upport within the United States, and
hew much income it has, is no part of
the authorized security operations of the
agency. Neither is it in function of the:
agency to compile records onnwho at-
tends peaceful meetings of such dissi-
dent groups, or what each speaker has'
to say (unless it relates to disruptive,
violent' activity which may be di-,
:reeted against the agency). .
a The agency's actions in contributing.
funds, photographing people, activities
and ears, and following people home
were unreasonable -under the circum-.
stances and therefore exceeded thei
,CIA's authority/.
With certain exceptions', the pro- ?
gram Under -wihich the Off ie of Secu-
rity (without infiltration) gathered, or:
ganiaed and analyzed information:
'about dissident groups for purposea of
..secerity was within ihe CIA's author-
ity. a.
The accumulation of reference files
on dissident organizations and their--
leaders was appropriate both to evalue
ate the risks -posed to the agency and,
to develop an understanding of dissi-
dent groups and their differences for
security clearance purposes. But the
accumulation of information on &Imes-
:tic activities went beyond what was re-,
- ea ?
e ? 'Emenitmendation
The 'CIA should not infiltrate died-
dent groups cr other organizations al
Americans in the absence of a vqitten.
.-c3.etermirention by the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence that such action iee
necesaavy to meet a clear danger to
agency facilities, operations, or pereca-
nel and that adequate coverage by law
enfnrcernent agencies-is unavailable.
Feeconortendation (17)
?
?
All files or. individuals acremnulated
bynthe Office of Security in the pro-
gram relating' to dissidents should. lae
identified, and, except where necessary
.for a legitimate foreign intelligence ac-
tivity, be destroyed at the conclusion
of the current congressional investiga-
tions, or as .soon thereafter as permit-
ted by
v .
. 5 Other Inestigatiens by
the Office en: Security
? 171.. CIJErc,'y CLEARIINCi
INYESTZGATIONS CF
PROSPECTIVE EirflanOYEES
? AND OPERATIVES?
4indinits and Conclueione
? The Office of Security roiitinely cons
duets ,standard security investigations
of persons seeking affiliation with the
-
agency, n doing so, the office is per-
forming the necessary function of
? screening, persons to ? whom it will
make available classified ?information.
Such investigations are necessary, and
no improprieties were) found in connec-
tion with them.
B. INVESTIGATIONS OF POSS
- BREACHES OF SECURITY
e I. Persons Investigated
2.indings
it
LE:
The Office of Secuerite ii zne been
culled upon on a number of occasions-
to investigate specific .allegations that
intelligence Seurces and methods were
threatened by unauthorized disclostnes.
The commission's inquiry concentrated
on those investigations which used in-
vestigative means intruding 'on' thee
privacy of the subjects, including phys-
ical 'and electronic surveillance, un-
authorized entry, mail covers and in-
tercepts, a n d ? reviews of individual.
federal tax returns. ? .
The Verge majority of these inVesti-
gations were directed at persons affili-
ated with the agency ? such as "em-
ployees, former employees, and defec-
tors and other foreign nationals used
by the' agency as intelligence sources..
A few investigations involving intru-
sions on personal privacy were direct-
ed at subjects with no relationship to
the agency. The commission has found
no. evidence that any such investiga-
tions were directed against any con-
gressman, judge, or other public of-
ficial. Five were- directed against news-'
men, in , an effort to determine their
,sources of leaked classified informa-
tion; and nine were direCted against
'other United States citizens.
The CIA's investigations of newsmen
to determine their sources of classified
Information stemmed frczn pressures
from the White House and were partly
a result of the FBI's unwillingness to
'undertake such Investigations. The
FBI refused to proceed withcot an ad-
..vaiice opinion that the Justice Depart-
ment would prosectite ifta case were
deVeloped. ? - ? t
fonclusione
nIhvestigations of allegations ?againsit
agency einployees and operatives are
'a reasonable exercise of the director's
statutory duty to protect intelligence
sources and methods from unauthor-,
quired by the agency's legitimate secu- lzed disclosure if the investigations are
941/01ne!tilAW5c0f itle0432Fitelba
?
e director in the
rit
S u c h' investiga-
rkea%'
P
,exercise of his unrevie.wable authority
Approved For Release 2001/08
? to terminate the ereelloYment of 'any'
agency employee: They are proper mid;
less their, principal purpose becomes
law enforcement or the. maintenance.
,of internal security.
. The director's responsibility, to pro-
tect intelligence sources and' methods
-is not so broad as t6? permit investiga-
tions of persons havingto relationship
whatever with the agency.. The' CIA
has no authority to investigate news
'men simply because they have pub=
lished leaked classified ?information.
-Investigations by the CIA- should be
limited to persons presently or former-.
Iy affiliated with the agency, directly
or indirectly.,
Recommendation (18) ?
a. The. Director of Central 'Intelli-
gence Should' issue clear guidelines set-
ting forth the situations in which the
CIA is justified in conducting its own
Investigation of individuals presently.
or formerly affiliated with it.
? b. The guidelines should permit the
CIA to conduct investigations of such
persons only, when the Didecter of
Central, Intelligence first .determines
'that the investigation is necessary to
protect intelligence sourees and meth-
ods the disclosure of which might Elie
danger. the national security.
? c. Such investigations must be cos,
ordinated with the FBI. whenever' sub-
stantial-evidence suggesting espionage
-or violation of a federal criminal state
Lite is discovered. ',
Recommendation (19) ?
a. 'In' cases involving serious or con-'
tinuing -security ?violations, s deter-,
?mined by the security committee of
the United' States Intelligence Board,
the ecernelttce elnedet des settinrised
to recommend in writing to the Direc-
tor of Centre]. Intelligence (with a copy,
to the National Security Council) that
the case. be referred to the FBI for
further investigation; under proce-
dures to be developed by the,Attorney
,General.'
db. These procedues should include a
requirement that the FBI,accept such
referrals without regard to whether a
, favorable prosecutive opinion is issued
by the Justice Department. The CIA
should not 'engage in such further in-
vestigations., ..'?
. Recommendation (20)
The CIA and other components and
agencies of the intelligence community
should conduct periodic reviews of all
'classified material originating within
those .departments. or agencies, with a
'view to declassifying as Much of that
,material as possible. The 'purpose of
such review would be to assure the
yublic that it has access to all informa'-
stion that should properly be disclosed.
. Recommendation 121)
'The commission endorses legislation,
'dr'afted with appropriate safeguards
of the constitutional rights of all af-
fected individuals, which .would make.
.It a criminal offense for employees or
former employees of the CIA wilfully
to divulge to any unauthorized person
classified' 'information pertaining to
foreign intelligence or the collection
thereof :obtained during the course of
'their emPloymont.
. . ? -
2. Investigative Techniques
Findings' ? .
'Evc,n, an; tzventiatiOn
CIA's authority must be conducted by.
'lawful meant.. Some of the rest In-
vestigations by the Office of Security.
within' the. United 'State ? 'were .con-'
ducted 'by means which were invalid
at the time. Others might have been
lawful when, conducted, but .would be
P77-00432R000100370008-9
Some investigations involved physi-
cal surveillance of the individuals con-
tcerned, possibly in conjunction with
other methods of investigatien. The.
last instance 'of physical surveillance
by the agency within the United States
occurred in 1973.
'd The investigation disclosed the d the do-
-mestic use 01 32 wiretaps, the last in
71965; 32 instances Of bugging, the lest
:in 1968; and 12 break-ins, the last in
1971s. None of these activities were con-
ducted under a judicial warrant, and
only one' with ;the written approval
of the Attorney General.
Information from the income tak
-records of 16 persons was .obtained
from the Internal Revenue Service by
the CIA in order to help determine
whether the, taxpayer was a security
'iisk with possible connections to for-
eign. groups: The CIA did not employ
the existing statutory and regulatory
procedures for obtaining such records
from the IRS. e
In 91 instances, mail covers (the pho-
tographing tof the front and back of
an, envelope) were employed, and is
12 instances letters were intereeptee
'and opened. t ? '
, The state efethe CIA : records on,
these activities is such that it is often,
difficult to determine why, the In-
vestigation occurred in the first place,:
Who authoriz the special coverage,
and what the results were. Although
there was testimony that tthese activ--
ities were frequently known to the
Director of Central Intelligence, and
sometimes to. the Attorney General,
tir? files often are Insufficient to
coil-
firm such information. - - ate et,
4, _ COiletUACJAIA'
The use of physical surveillance is
not unlawful unless it 'reaches 'the
point of harassment. The unauthor-
dzed entries- described were illegal
when conducted and. would be illegal
if conducted today. Likewise, the.,re-
view of- individuals' federal tax re-'
turns and the interception and open-,
ing of mail violated specific stAutes
and regulations prohibiting sueh con-
duct. -??
Since the constinational and
tory constraints constraints applicable to the Use
.of 'electronic eavesdropping (bugs and
Wiretaps) have been evolving over the
years, the cominission deems it im-
practical to apply those changing
standards on a case-by-case basis. The
commission does believe that while
spme of the instances of electronic
eavesdropping ,were proper when co-
ducted,' many were not. To be lawful
today, such activities would require
at least the written approval of ,the
Attorney Genesal on the basis of a
finding that the national security :is
'involved and that the case ,bas signif-
icant foreign connections. ? ?
, Recommendation (22),
The CIA should not undertake phys-
ical surveillance (defined as system-
atic observation) of agency employees,
contractors or related personnel with-
in the United States without first ob-
taining written approval of the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence. .
Recommendation (23)
, in the United States and Its pos-
sessions, the CIA, should not intercept
wire or oral:communications or oth-
erwise engage in activities that would
require a warrant if conducted by a
law enforcement agency. Responsi-
bility for such, activities belongs . with
the FBI.
? Recommendation (24)
The CIA should strictly adhere to
established 'legal procedures govern.
SC'eese... to iederal incatue tea"; In-'
formation.
' ? Recommendation (2,5) ?
CIA investigation, records shonjo.'
show that each Investigation was duly
authorized., and by. whom, and should
clearly set ferth the fattual basis for,
undertaking the, investigation and :the.
results of' the investigation.
s
C. HANDLING OF DEFECTORS
, , ? -Findings 1 .
The .Office oft Security is charged
with 'providing security for persons'
who have defected to the United.
States. Generally a defector can. be
Processed and plac ed into society'
in a few months, but one' defector was.
involuntarily confined at a' CIA, instai-i
lation for three years. He was held -in
solitary confinement under spartan
living conditions. The CIA maintained
the long confinement ? because of
doubts about the bona fides of the
defector. This confinement was ap-'
proved by the Director of Central In-
telligence: and the FBI, -Attorney
General, United States Intelligence
Board and selected members of gen-
gress were aware to .some extenrof
the confinement. In one other case a'
defector wag physically abused; 'the,
Director of Central . Intelligence disa
charged the employee involved. .
. 'Conclusions eth
' Such treatinent of individuals by an
agency of the United States is unlaw-
ful. The Director of Central Intelli-
gence .and the inspector general must
he alert to prevent repetitions. . .
6, Involvement of the-CIA in Improper
Activities for the White House
. 'Findings
'..,,During 1971, at the 'request of Yarj-- ?
?Gil5 Inernt'Ol',.; of the White :Muse staff;
the CIA provided alias docuinents and
disguise material, a tape recorder,
camera, film and film processing to E.
Howard Hunt. 'It also prepared a psje
chological profile of Dr, Daniel Elise
. ?
?SOme of this equipment was later.
.used without the knowledge of the
'CIA -in ,connection with various im-
proper activities, including the entry
into' the office of Dr. Lewis Fielding,'
,Ellsberas psychiatrist.
Some members of the CIA's 'Medical.
staff who participated in the prepara-
tion of the Ellsberg.profile knew that
one of its purposes was .to support a
public attack on' Ellsberg. Except for
this fact, the investigation has dis-
closed no evidence that thetCIA knew'
or had reason to know that the aSsise
tame it, gave would be used tfor
proper purposes. '
, President Nixon?and his staff aLs.o in-
sisted in this period that the CIA turn
over to the President highly classified
files relating to the Lebanon landingse.
the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban. 'missile cri-
,sis, and?the I/tett-lap war. The reqnest
was made on the ground that. these ?
files were needed by the President in
the performance of his duties, but the
record shows the purpose,. undisclosed
to thret-CIA,:WaS, to serve the President's.
personal political,en s. est 1..e.st
ItaThie ethurniisiori. ha alsii iMioStigated:
'the*rionsettof?the ClAhtschthe ihvesti-
tatidne efellOwingethe ..,Watergate
stsstSeBe'gilihitig. in 'June l972. the.Crki
,r.eceiyeclarions 'requests*. for. infOrnia;,,
?tkon,azdi4istance in connertiontwitht,
these investigatihns. In ? a .eiumber, of
instencestOitf ,.resporlses ? Were; ,either
.incomplete SOn 'delayed : and ? some,. Ina--
terials that may; otwmati not have :con.-
tained?relevant, information were de-
stroyed..Th e commission. feelsthat *this .
conduct reflects poor judgment on the
l-
6 part ofi;the,CI.A.IUt it has?.fotind
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000111)0370008-9
? f-Y1, .1- ? tr. e
,
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 .
evidence tbatt the'CIA:participatednin
rarer Wrtergate break-in or in Ahe- post-,
by,. the nWhite,
7."intr.5...?? ? " - '
' Canclusiens":-??,.., .
"Pr a"- :the assistance? recpiested.
White iIouseJitkeitiding,.,,Ilie:
ii-fd' sg.'uis e the.--. Ca to- "
arid ?the pschological profll3 rt.
Elisberg,--:.was not' related to the ? per'',
thelageneY'.
int ell igenee furcton.i ' and was-
't...her'eforkiraproper.:,
etnidence has been ta'sZiesed.,. how-:
exeept ..D.S
wftb't,131.1ilierg :profile, that:::,the
CA. knew er'ishad reason to know that
P'-ksistance would be used in connecn
_tiara _With .. imp re per a eti vi ti es: No r-
-any.evidence been eisclosed indicating
that the CIA:.Particinatecl?in the plan-
?ning or carrying- out ? of .-either tile-
Fielding or'' Watergate: brealoins. The'
apparently. was :unaware of the
bre91-.ins until they were reported in
'
tie
mcd!n. - ? ?
.The-ren?ord does 'show, hrswever, that
Individuals ? !in -the agency -?:;failed;.,..to
Comply with ?the normal control :pro-
cedures in, proviciing assistance to:"E.
Howard. :kr,unti.,,It also shows that the
agency's failure to eboperatefullywn
ongoing . investigations-
Watergate was inconsistent,. with?its
obligations. 4-7 .?
. -'Finally, ? the - commission concludes:
that-the requests-f or . assistance by 'the
White 'Hous reflect a 'pattern' for ac-
tual and attempted misuse of, the CIA
by .the Nixoa adndaistration. t 6 Z.: .?
?' laecommenrlation (26, ? - ,
? a.A sing,te exclusive high-level
.eliannel should ? be 'established for
transmisSion Of White HOnse.Staff
requests to the CIA. This- channel
should run.betwe.eri;an..,officer...of.,,th,e
Na tiori al Security Conneil4 staff., desig-
nated by the President 'and the.ofirce
of the director or his deputy. ?.
b. All agency officers and emPloyees
should be instructed' that'any? direc-
tion or request reaching thetn directly
.and out of -regularly -established ?chan-
riers' should' be immediately reported
to the Director of Central intelligence.
?
1. Domestic Activities of the Director.
,
-.-? ? - - ? ate of Operations..:, _
'-findings and.
support Id I its '???1?4:SlionSibility z' f6r
the' collection of foreign. intelligence
:and ..conduct of iwort onerations-aver-:
'seas, ? the CIA's Directorate:. of. Opera-
:tions engages in a variety of activities
within the United States. .. .
A. OVERT COLLECTION
,FOREIGN .INTELLIGENCE
THE UNITED '
One division 'of Alie;...pirecitiollat4":
9peratibns
Igzace ovithinthe, United :S.tate.S.'Xrorn
..,xeside kits, ,businessfirmS,'.."-aricl'?fother
ifga n ;in t willing!, to i,":assist.,-.; the .
;openly. )ay Poffieers., Who identify; 'thein-`,
'selves 'as CIA emPlOyees...Such.,source.s..
-^"nrornation zre not Conwenst.tedn
'" ? ?
COnnection. with' lhese,.dellectien
'iriafe415.1,,450*,!)0.4-.(aO
yithr!-,..tihese?, voluntary-- source
.?,..azierIhei....,:te:snIts' of ..1a.1.7.ieciel-ain.:aigeneyn..
/fa m 0,--?cheekt?
'coll ctiod efforts: have.:
.,,.been";almostexcl,uSively .confined to
,oforeign*:edenbniici. political;latilitaryn.
- ,
,COitunerktingin.?/9-6 . ? .ries. This creates a_ri?s1 retlf
_
.a-Cti'vitieS:::,of ".the,..0,11$1 ftrtign Re leafs* 2/1001L/PWAiitWOk
. other legal requirements. The agency
7
YaridnoPeratiOnal.
-.61SSidents',
2i,:d.',IdiSsident..;.E.:roups.":" kith ongir
ixts ws on foreign cdntactsIoc....th.ese".-
backan.on nd inf o?rination, :do.:
irreStin.;d1Silderits1: ..ivaS??.c...1soCollected.
?atween
, t ivity ;avec or pa tern?ing
orDneration.
CFk'OS ?
4:tined:and- transalitteci;".to''other.'ipart
the.: Info rmation al-. on 5-
..phone eallsnibe,cweero.
.-,Hemisphere..(inchatie,g-n.ithe'-?:- United,
States): arid:twnt:,other,.catinta.'.es..- The
-information waslfliimited-.' to names,.
?-tele-phonelzranikers, -andnlo6ations. of
, . .
'callers,-and.'recipients..It noCin-".
.-!OlOde...t6,kontent. '?of:_sthd,-.con.Versa7..
on,* 'Isos: cc cas ionally; -;re
cerves ..reporfS,conCerning. criminal
tiyity within the United. States. PUrsu-
an* to written' relulations,?the- source
?or' .a --report of :the 1-information -re-'
calved ? is. referred to the .appropriate.
? laenftircernent ? ??????
r ',The _CIA's efforts to.:colleet?fOreign
.intelligeuCe froth .residerits of ? .the:
- 'United States Willing' to assist the CIA...
are ?.e 'valid- and necessary- element of ?
,itresponsibillty,ONOt .onlynclo; these
isersonS.,. proVide?' a ?large ? reservoir. of-
forCian 'they/are by, far
rii-ost." accessible- source of'. such,
..inforniation:? ?
_ ? _
division's ' ? On Arnerican.
citizens .and firms. representing'aetual
. potential sources -information
"constitute- a neceSsary part.."-OfZits'?le
itir_eate intellfgeace." They
donne; --P.Pear
cellect.ion or...commun.ic auCn, :4; ..
%embarrassing, ,or tenwtiu,e,.rn
'formation about .-Arrierican:CittienS:L.
. ? Th division's efforts, 'with' few excep-
tions, have been Confined to legitimate
.topies:,.. ..?
'-The collection of, informatihnf:with ?
.respect to American. dissident groups.
exceeded .legitimate 'foreign .;intelli-
gence collection .and. was beyond ..the
proper scope of CIA. activity.. This im-
propriety was recognized in some of
the _division's own .memoranda.
commission was -unable to-dis-..
cover, any specific purpose for.tbe.-col?.,
lection of telephone toll call. informa,
tion or any use 'of that information by,
the agency. In the: 'aWence of a valid
purpose, such collection is improper.,
B. PROVISION ADCONTROL . OF'
.. COVER FOR -CIA:, PERSONINEL3.,...'.
tngagee'f,in..Clatidest.
'tine foreign intellrgnc,aiiritfcs can-'
not travel, orf.nerforiro:their :duties
..openly as agency cmploy,rieSit,..,Accord-
ingly; ;',Virttially;.. all CIA
sprving., abroad ,and ;niany in' the
United States .assume- "coVer!''SS
em-
ployees,ofanother government agency
or of coroniercial enterprise. CIA in.
:valvement;. in :' certain activities, such
:as research. and. development projects,
:.are also . sometimes , conducted,' under.
, ' ?
CIA's: cover a rrangebi eat" ? ave.-. es-
! sential:40 the:;.CIA'si performance . of
..its;-?iforeigriAntelligence. Mission.: The
.inVestigatiori. has...dclosed .'no
listances ?,in.? which domestic aspects of
COVer arrangements involv.
led.,'any.:.'violations of
fly 'dpfhitin,, .htnr,ever; 'cover
accer-
sitates an element of deception which
must ?-be practiced kvithirf.the' United
?ftates well.as within foreign coryi,-.
:recognizes, this ? risk.. It tics,- installed
r'eantrols under, which coiter arrange-
r -
trrnemsnaren,Closel,y.,supervised
m pt Itp-*
1:51.1-C.. able ?
pr.EATTNG Pr. : A In.:7
,
:CIA; LIS es prepriet-z:;'?(.--.1-0,,-,11--'_
provid?,c?-.)ver and arform
'istrative . without, Pttril.lutipn 'to
.the agency. Most, of the large "onerat-
ing.proprietcries,--prim.criiy:
have been liquiclated',..and ite remain-
der. engage:in activities cfiering, little,
? or no .competition . to 'private enter:,
!,.? ;.. . ? ,
? The :only, remaining large: proprie-
tary activity isa complex of financial
companies with' assets of apPaoximz'te-
ly S20 million, that:enables the agency
to administer. certain sensitive trusts),
. annuities, e.crOws;:ins.urance arrange-
ments, and other,: benefits', and ,pay7'.
7ments provided to officers or contract
employees 'without attribution to. CIA..
. The remaining small operatin.g. pro-
prietaries, generally iving fewer:
than ,-1.0 employees': each, Lake sionat-
..triburielle?:purch...n. .
ses. c..0.11r,merit and
supp? .
? '; ?E*cept".'as 'diseussed -.in connection
With. ',"the ? Office';of ' Security' . . . the
cdriintiSsion" has' foUi.e. no ? :?ekddencii.
that anY'proPrictaries have been vied'
for operationS against 'American' cid;
.?criS ? or. investigation of ? their activi-'
ties. All of them appear to be subject.
tO. close supervision :and multiple R.;
'niacial controls within the agency:
.L DEVELOPMENT OF CONTACTS
, oigrix FOREIGN NATIONALS :
In connection with- the IA's foreign
intelligence responsibilitie., ? it seeks
,to deyoldp, contacts with foreign na-,
tiorials ' within ? the United States.
American citizens voluntarily assist in
developing-these. contacts. As far as
the commission can' find,, these activi-
ties .have not involved coercive meth-
-, These activities appear to be. direct-
eiktireiy. to' the .production of for-. ?
!eign:intelligence and to be . within the
atithority,:of. the .CIA.. We . found no ?
.eVideace 'that any of theseactivities.
have, been directed against American,
? .1;.:,ASSISTANCE IN NARCOTICS
. ,,CONTROL ?. ? ?
. ?
The
..1)irectorate. of the Operations
provides.. foreign intelligence support
to' the government's efforts to central
the:floW of narcotics and other danger-,
'o?i driles.intO.:this" country. The CIA.
,-4iordinates t',clandestine intelligence.
Collection .oVerseas and provides .oth-
er*.goVerament agencies., with foreign
intelligence .on :drug . traffic.
;;;;;:FronOthe .beginning of such efforts'
in 1969; the/CIA Director and- other
officials have7instructed employees 'to
.Make;',.ne-4tgtemlot.T.to:.,gather ,informa=.
ori eric,a ns traffick,
;ing 'in -:drugs.' If: such information is
obtained, 'incidentally,- it is -:trazirint led
? tO".;lasii.,enforceinerit-
:..;Concerns that the: CIA's narcotics-
related, intelligence activities may in-
volve-the., agency in .law enforcement
or' other:-, actions directed against
;American citizens. thus apPear_unwar.-.
?
..:-..Beginning in.. the. 'fall of 719.13, .the
directorate monitored conversations
between :the United. States and Lath
'America in an effort to identify nar,
.Cotics. traffickers.. Three months after
the program began, the general coils
sel of. the CIA was ',consulted. He it,.
32ROOnleedlgael.0a3onled Oit -w4ilkasaitinn' thieediLroteglryah wa
t-termi!,
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9
e? ? Th.Ls:nionitoring, although a 'Source'
of Valuable :information for enforce--
merit. officials, was a` violation' of a
,statute of ithe 'United States," Continu-
ation of the eoperation fo? over three'
months' without the knowledge of the:
,:Office _of: the General C'oensel_ demone
strat:the ivied for ireproVed internal
Conattltation.,-. (Set:: ,'Recommendation
16.)=.-te!..fe=;?'.
'113. ??Dente:Olic Aetivitiesof thi.4 Direct?. t`
Seance and Tethnology ?
and. Conclusions
?7:.'iThe CIA's- .Directorate of ? Science
'and Technology performs a variety of
'research and .development and ,opera-
..tionalensUpport esfilnctions for the
agency'b:eforeign intelligence .mission
eNlany nofenthese activities ? are per-,
-formed Wthe...eUnited Statis 'and in
cooneratione with priVate , corn-
:panies.. A. few of-these zeetivitiest were .
. 'improPer.'s or questionable. et ez-?
-:--As part of a_prog?am to test the' in,
fluence-of 'drugs on humans;,- research
includedtthe adminestration of LSD to.
persons 'who were unaware that they
were-being tested.- This was- clearly
legal. ..:One ,person died in ,I953,? elver
?
; entlereas a. result.. In ii)63 following
the, inspeetor, general's discovery of:
ethes e_events, new stringent Criteria:.
twerejasued ,prohibiting'-drug....teating;,
.-13T-the CIA- pa unknowing pereorls. All'
:dreg. testing programs evvere.. ended ?
1967
77'1 7
;rt. ,Iti:the,p-roCess" 'of testing monitoring
_entilpinent for, 'use overseas, .the 'CIA..
- -haliOverheard 'conversations between
;1-Aineticans. /The names of the speak-
era :1-4i-ere- net ?identified:',.the 'contents
conversations were not ? dis
seininated. :All 'recordings . were dee
atroyed when testing 'was,. concluded.:
"Such teotingshoeld:: ebt behdireeted"
'against_ unsuspecting persons in the
-United .States. Most of-' the testing'
inideetaken by tife ?agericy Could easily"
haVe been Perfernied using only agene.
cy%PerSonnel and with the full' knowl- -
?.edge `Of .1thoSe- whose .cenversationss:
_were *being -reeorded. This the pre-,
sent agency practice.::, . ?
ilOther actiVities ofr this 'directorate
include the 'manufacture of ; alias ere-.
dentials ? for use by CIA employees
and- agents?Alias Credentials . are nec-
essary to, facilitate CIA clandestine
operations,7buf the_ strictest controls
'anctaceouritability mut be maintained
'OVerhthe use of such documents. Re.,,
cent gaidelines established by the
'Deputy Direetor for Operetionis to con-
trol the use of alias documentation
'appear ,adequate to prevent ;1,1sttse ? ha
the future. est
As part: of another ,progrann photo-
graphs taken, by CIA aerial: photom-
phy equipment are provided to civilian
'agencies of,thp goi4erpment. Such pho-:
tographs- are; used to assess:natural
disasters, 'conduct 'route surveys anis:.
forest" inventories, and detect crop
blight. Permitting civilian use of aerial
photography .systems - is -.proper. The
'economy of ?operating but one aerial,
photography program :dictates the Use-
of these photographs fqr appropriate ?
'4eivi1ian: purposes. -se ' ? e ehe
-s Recommendation (27)
- -In accordance with its'present guide;
lines, the. CIA 'should not: again en-
gage in the?testing of dregs P:n nnsus-
'pecting persona.", !nee :
? . Recoenuendation (23) _
'Testing of equipment fer monitoring
conversations should . not involve un-
suspecting ,persons living' within the
United States. ' , . e ?
s?I : Recommendation (29)
A civilian agency committee should
Approved For
he re-established to oversee the civilian
uses of aerial intelligence photography'
in .orde.r to avoid any concerns over
the improper, domestic use of a CIA-
developed system.
9.,C1A Relationships With Other .
Federnl, State, and Local Agencies
CIA operations touch the interest
of rnacy other agencies. The CIA, like
other agencies of the government, fre-
quently has occasion to give or receive
assistance from ?other agencies. This
investigation has concentrated on thcee
relationships which raise' substantial
questions under the CIA's -legislative
mandate.
`tlittg4 ;00lielis'S'" ?-i
Fir, an s. .
A
'A! FEDERAL BURETI'``.'d-'
. ? ? e_ ? eni..4-
OF INVESTIGATION',
Te
11 The FBIt counterintelligence' Cpera-
tens ' often have positive 'intelligence,
ramifications. Likewise; legitimate do";
reestic CIA activities occasionally crossc
the path of FBI investigations, ::Daily
liaison is"therefore necessary be-kV/Ten
the two egencies.
Much routine information is passed
'back and ,forth. Occasionally joint op-
erations are, conducted.' The relation-
ship between the agencies has,' how-
ever, nqt been -uniformly, satisfactory
over the years. Formal liaison was cut
cif from February, 1970, to November,
1972, but relationships have improved
in recent years.
.The relationship between the bui
and the FBI needs to be clarified and :
ontlined in detail in Order to ? ensure
that the needs of national security 'are
_Met without creating conflicts or gaps
:of jurisdiction. ,. , ? , ,
:* 'Reconiniendation (30)
? The Director of Central Intelligence
end the Director- of ,the FBI should
prepare and submit for approval by-the
National Security Council a detailed
-agreement 'setting forth-the jet- risdic:,
tion of eaCh' agency and providing-fon
effective liaiion with 'respect to , all
wrnettees of mutual concern. This agree-
ment Shoelt-h 'be consistent nvith the
:provisions of law and -kith other -ap-
plicable,regontertexidatione. of- this re.,
Port.t?
E. NARCOTICS ?LAVV-4.:-
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
e imung in -late :1970,_ the CIA as.:
'Mated the 'Bureau of Narcotics "'and
'Dangerous Drugs' to -uncover possible
corruption within ..that organization;
The :CIA used one of its proprietary,
companies, to recruit agents for BNDD
and. ,gave t them. short -instructional-
courses. Over 21/2 years, the, CIA ,'e
Cruited 19 agents for the BNI3D. The
preject :was terminated in 1973,
;':,The,director was correct in , his
'Wit:ten:directive terminating the projj
ect2 The CIA's participation in Jaw ent
Comment activities in the course or
these 'activities was forbidden by ALS
lstatute: The director and the inspector.
general should be alert to prevenfin-
volvement of the agency in;pirni.lar en-
:
terprises in the-future. . n' ?
C. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE h
t For more than 20 years, the CIAi
throngh ? a ?Proprietary conducted a
schooLlon for,eign police and
? security officersein the United States
'under the auspices of 'the, Agency fon;
International ,DeVelopment ? of :the De-
'pertinent of ,:'.State. The proprietary
also sold arnalle amotintfie of. Licensed-
firearms arid 'police -equipment to the
foreign-officers and their departments.,
'eThe CIA's-activities in providing ed-
,'-ucational programs fon foreign police--
were not improper under the agency's
-other Significant domestic impact':
-Engagiree in the firearms hOsiness,
...was a oqiesetionahle. activity. ferea .gov??
'-ernrnent intelligence_eagencye It should..
not -he .renez-led ? ? ' ,
rt...4.,1 LNG RIN-4T.M.A'S FROM, 7
; P i E AGENCIES
, le fen., eteieg of LOW, at the request,
'Ci the White House, ? the-CIA con?
tributed i7.3'ift55.68 for payment. of St2- ?
!tionery and other costs for replies to
persons who -wrote the President after'
the invasion of ,Camboditht' . ?
- .
en.This , use, Of CIA fends fOr:,ii .'pnr?-?
..pase. unrelated to intelligence is im-
proper. Steps phould .be taken. to en-
:-sure against any repetition of: suele
- .-
h?Eh 'STATE' AND LOCAL gpucE -
,;';',The -CIA -handles -a- variety' of rou-
'drip security mattera through liaison
With local police departments. In ad-.
dition, it training courses -from
-1966 to 1973 to-United States police':
-officers on a variety of law enforce-
'inent ? techniques; 'and. has frequently
supplied --equipment to State and. local
:police.' tv ' " -" :'?
In general,, the coordination and co-.
?peed:ion between state and local, law-
enforcement agencies and the CIA has
, exemplary, based upon.a! desire
-to facilitate:their respective legitimate
:airns .and- goals.; , : . t?
Most of the .asistance rendered to
state and local 'law: enforcement agen-
cies - by the:pIA has .been . no more
than -an,effort, te 'share with law en-
forcement authorities the 'benefits of..
:new . methods, techniques, and equip-
--rent developed or used by thersagencY.
--elan. a 'few occae,icne, however, the
agency'- has inaproperly become in-
valved' in ..actual .police ? operations.
.Thus,. despite a generalhrule 'against
providing' manpower to local: police
forces, the CIA, has lent men, 'along
with ? radio equipped vehicles, foe the
;Washington Metropolitan Police De-
partment. to . help. -monitor antiwar
.demOnStrations.. It helped.. the same,
department stirveil a ',police informer.
-It also -Provided an . interpreter to the
-FairfalC. County;,(Virgiitia) Police De-
pgaatirtomzsi. to,. aid in a,-,eriene
In Compliance with the spirit of a
recent' act' ,Congress, the CIA ter-.
'rninated all- but _routine' assistance to.
'state ehd. local law enforcement' agen- -
cies in 1973. Such, assistance is ? now,
_being ,provided state and locaragen-
cies by the .FBI. There. is 'no impro-
priety in the' CIA's furnishing the FBI-
with information on new technical de-'
'.yeloptnents which tnay be useful to lo-
cal law enforcement..
For 'several Years the CIA?has given
-gratuities to. local police officers who'
had; been helpful to the agency.' Any.
such Practice should be terminated. ?
? The CIA has also received assistance
from local police forces. Aside from
routine 'matters, officers from such
forces have occasionally assisted the
Office of Security in the conduct of
investigations. The CIA has occasion-
ally obtained police badges and other
iadgeennttisf.ica!ion? for. use. as cover :for its
? Except for one occasion When soma ?
local police assisted the CIA In un-
authorized entry. 'the assistance re-
; ceived by-the CIA from state and local
law enfoccemeatauthorities was prop-
er. The use. of police identification as
a means of providing cover, evhile not
:-strictly ,speaking a violation of the
agency's statutory 'authority as long as
;statute; Although the: 'school- was '?-ton-;? no police function. is performed, is a
dueted the.. ? U nit e d States ? practice subject to misunderstanding
through a 'CIA, proprietary, it had no and. shduld beaveidede ? ? -
Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-0043r000100370008-9
'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 .
r Traieez ? SY.Irl- nee, r. ?
American Citizens
d- Findings
. , ?
r..2;16,,,rfraeltr inforniation is prt1S:int?
'of' an intelligence cgener:.
Cid......anainteins a number of 'files-.
an'd oine',iege ? that inclpde. biographical
information on Americans, e _
aeparld'of -its normal 'process of
f.ndeging '?pairies and ?information 'of
?fcreign". intelligence' interest, the -Di-
?rdeterat6 'of -Operations .hae indeed.
sans:7,033,000 names c.f all nationali-
ties. An estimated.115,000 of these are
kelieveri tr." be American citizens.
? ihWhere a person is believed to .be of'
.rbscilsly continuing intelligence, inter-
est,' files to collect information -as ?ree
Oseived are opened. An estimated 57,000
'out Of a total of '750,000 such files cong?
cern -American citizens. For the Most'
.part" the 'names of Americans appead
in indicee.' and,*fileS 'ectead ar
tentiel ? sources' of information or as'
kistagice 'to 'the -CIA: In :addition to ?
These flies, files on some 7,200' Ameri-
can citizens', relating primarily to their,
domestic' activities, were, as 'already.
stated, - compiled within' 'the -Direc:
tarots, 'of Operations as Part of Opens
ation CHAOS. ? nod " ? e-
a The . Directorate of Administration
;maintains a riiimber of files on persons'
s. . ' ? ? ' ?'
who have 'been issociated with the
CIA.- -These files are Maintained for ?
Security, persdnnel, training, medical
and, payroll purposes. :Yery? few are
',maintained on person&:unaware that.
they-have relationship' with the CIAa
'He veveihthe Office of Seeurity.main;
Mined 'Vas onST. AmeriCan :citizens as.:
awe:ate:I' with ? airssiclesit groups who..
,were never, affiliated. with the, agency
:because .they-were Considered a threat
::to the. Physical. _security of agency fa-'
aellities" and. employees... These files
owere also. maintained; in part, for use
in future security clearande deter,
? minations. Dissemination! of .security
,files is 'restricted. latpersons with an
.,operational' need, for .them. ??
a, The Office of Legislative Counsel
-,Maintains files- -concerning its rela-
ntionshiPs:WitheOngressmen.; ? ?-
? ? . Conclusions 1.?
"'Although maintenance ,o most of ?
the indices; files,' and records of the
"agency has been necessary and proper,:
the standards applied bY the agency at
'some -points dtiring its 'history have
permitted ? 'the: accumulation and in-
dexing of Materiels' not needed for
legitimate intelligence or *security. pur-
poses.. Included ,in this .category.' are
many 'of the files' reIated? to- Opera:
flan CHAOS and the activities of the.
Officetf:of Security-econcerning diss
dent- grouaie.ded,.dst;:?..sh
; Constantevigilanceby'the ;agency -is
essential ? ton prevent the collection of
in2ormation on United States- citiwni
*hicb,is..not needed for prosier
genoe activities. The, executive order
-recommended by the ' commissi on (Bee-,o . ?
omrnendation 2) Will. ensure purging of
nonessential or, .improper materials
frpire.agency files',-
f?dsed.l.etillegatiens. oncerning the. Th.,
Assessinatien of President Kennedyd
Numerous' _allegations - have,' .been
gnadeathat?the CIA participated .in the
'assassination.. of President John '; F.
Kennedy., The commission staff invea-
-tigated these allegatiqns. On the basis'
of the staff's . investigation; . the corn-
mission concludes that there' is' no
IVASF-TINGI:ON POST.
12 June 1975 ?
spionage' and.
Th-e folioml.ng is excerpted from. titer
CIA report of the Rockcfelics? anoviania.
sion. ? '? .
During the period of the commis-
sion's inquiry, there have been public
allegations that a democracy dpes not'
need an 'intelligence apparatus. The
commission does not. share this view.
Intelligence is informationi. gathered
for policymakers -in government which
illuminates the range of choices avail)
able to' them and enables them to
exercise judgment. Good intelligence
will not necessarily lead to wise policy
choices. But without sound intelli-
gence, national' policy decisions, and
actions cannot effectively respond to .
actual conditiOns and reflect the best:'
national interest or adequately protect
-our national security. -
Intelligence gathering involves col-
lecting information about other coun-
tries' military capabilities, subversive
activities, economic: conditions, poli-
tical developments,, scientific and tech-
nological progress, and social activities
and conditions. The raw information
must be' evaluated to determine its
reliability and relevance, and must then
be analyzed. The finarproducts--called
"finished intelligence" ? are distrib-
ute d to the President and the-political.
military and other governmental lend
era according to their needs.
Intelligence gathering has changed
rapidly and radically since the advent
of the CIA in 1947. The increased
compleXity -of international political,
economic, and military arrangements,
the increased -destructiveness of the
weapons of modern warfare and the
advent of electronic methods of sur-
veillance -have altered and enlarged
the needs for sophisticated intelli-
gence. Intelligence agencies have had
to rely more and more on scientific
and technological developments to
help meet these needs. .
Despite the increasing complexity
and significance of intelligence in
national policymaking, it is also im-
portant to understand its limits. Not
all information -is reliable, even when
the most highly refined intelligence4
methods are used to collect it. Nor
.can any intelligence system ensure
that its current estimates of another'
country's intentions or future capa-
cities are accurate or will not be
outrun by unforeseen events. There.
are limits to accurate forecasting, and
the use of deception by our adver-
saries or the, penetration of our intels
ligence services increases the possi--
bility that intelligence predictions may
prove to be wrong. Nevertheless,
informed decision-making is impossi-
ble without an intelligence system
adequately protected from penetration.
' Therefore, a vital part of any intelli-
gence service is an effective counter-
intelligence, program, directed teward ?
protecting out own intelligence system
and ascertaining the netivitiea of'
foreign intelligence services, such as,
espionage, sabotage and , subversion,
and toward minimizing- or counter-
acting the effectiveness a t hese
credible _evidence . of ? CIA involve' activities.
theats- . *
?
_
0
a-
t5 ,
&
.'zens. But we cannot ignore the invasion
of the privacy and security rights of
-Americans by foreign countries or their
agents. This is the other side of the
coin?and it merits attention here in
the interest of perspective. , -
Witnessea ? with. respoesibilities .for
counterintelligence have told the com-
mission that the United States remains
the principal intelligence target of the
Communist bloc.
The Communists invest large sums
of money,' personnel and sophisticated
technology in collecting information?
Within the United States?on our
mili-
tary capabilities, our weapons systems,
our defense etructure and our social
divisions. The Communists seek to pene-
trate our intelligence services, to com-
promise our law enforcement 'agencies
and to recruit as their agents United
States citizens holding senzitiVe govern-
. men and industry jobs. In addition, it
' is a common practice in Communist bloc'
? countries to inspect and open mail com-
ing from or going to the United States.
In an open society such as ours, the
!intelligence opportunities for our ad-
versaries are immeasurably greater than.
they are for us in their closed societies.
Our society must remain an open one,
with our tracititional freedoms unim-
paired. But when the intelligence activ-
ities of other .countries are flourishing
on the free environment, we afford
them, it is all the more essential that
the foreign intelligence activities of
the CIA and- our other intelligence
agencies, as well as the domestic nun-
oterintelligence activities of the FBI, be
given the support necessary to protect
'our national security and to shield the
privacy and eights of American citis
.zens from foreign intrusion. .
Thecommission has received estimates,
.that Communist bloc intelligence forces
currently4a number well over 500,000
worldwide.
- The number of Communist govern-
ment offieials in the United States has
tripled Since 1960, and. is still increas-
ing. Nearly 2,000 of them are now in
this country--and a significant percent-
'age of them have been identified las
members of intelligence or security
-agencies. Conservative estimates for the
number of unidentified intelligence of-
ficers among the remaining officials
'raise the level to over 40 per cent.
? In addition to, sending increasing num-
bers of their citizens to this country
openly; many of whom have been trained
, in espionage. Communist bloc countries
also piace considerable emphasis on the
. training, provision of false identification
and- dispatching of "illegal" agents ?
that is, operatives for whom an alias
identity has been systematically devel-
oped which enables them to live in the
United States as American citizens or
resident aliens without our knowlecigenf
their true origins.
While making large-scale use of. hu-
man intelligence sources, the Communist
,Countries also appear to have developed
electronic collection of *intelligence to
an extraordinary degree of technology
,and sophistication for use in the United
States and elsewhere throughout the
world, and we believe. that these coun-
. tries can monitor and record thousands
. This commission- is devoted to anal ?
. , aka glegkolati orp3Torre a t ions. Amer-
77-00
, Approved ForRkileasve21001108108 011A
the interest of protecting the privacy seriously disturbed at the real possibility
? a rig t o e uneasy if riot
end Ft Amity rights cit American citi-
Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9
-
,(1,1???? rr -e? a ,rei
1 %..0111%. 1 A. W141.?
11 June 1975
Triumph and Deleit: The C.I.A. Record
JOILN M. CROWD-SON
Special to The New 'York Times
- WASHINGTON, June 10?Thel
Central Intelligence. Agency.
that bewildering mixture of
espionage' and sabotage, is fon
the most part held firmly below
the surface of public conscious-
ness by the national security
statutes. which prevent the
slightest disclosure a its size,
shape or intentions.
? Periodically, however, one of
the mooring lines frays and
breaks and sends a part of
the agency bobbing into full
view, generally to the embar-
rassment of the C.I.A. and the
rest of the Government as well.
- The most recent such unin-
tended revelations are the news
, accounts'of the C.I.A.'s involve-
ment in undercover surveil-
lance &Unities at home and
assassination plots abroad, ac-
counts that led to the just-com-
pleted inquiry of the Rockefel-
ler Commission, whose final
report was issued today.
Kennedy Words Recalled
? The sting that the C.I.A. will
doubtless feel from the commis-
sion's findings, however, is by
no means unique in its 28-year
history. President Kennedy un-
derscored that point on Nov.
28, 1961, when he told an au-
elence of C.I.A. employes with
a touch of sympathy in his
enice, "'Sour SUCCCISSCS arc un-
heralded?your failures trum-
peted."
There have been many of
both since 1947, when the
C.I.A. was established by the
National Security Act as the
nation's clearinghouse for in-
formation obtained from
around the world, by ()Vert
and covert means. The informa-
tion, was needed by the highly
specialized agencies of th eFe-
deral Government.
Mr. . Kennedy's remarks,
however, had a special poig-
nancy, for they came seven
months after the failure, loudly
trumpeted, of the most ambiti-
ous operation then conceived
by the intelligenc ageency-eth
invasion of Cuba by a ragtag
band of exiled anti-Castro Cu-
bans who were set ashore at
dawn on April 15, 1961, on
the beaches of the Bay of Pigs.
In May of the previous year,
an American high-altitude
re-
connaissanc aircraft called the.
? U:2 was brought down over
Sverdlovsk in the Soviet heart,
land.
Admission Put Off
But although the plane, which
had been photographing Rus-
sian military installations, was
flown by a civilian pilot under
contract to the C.I.A., the agen,
cy managed to avoid a public-
admission of its operational
role in the affair until . more
e than three years later. .
In the years before the Bay
of ? Pigs debacle; the C.I.A., its
various divisions and sections
hidden away in an unprepos-
sessing collection of Govern-
ment buildings, was able to
maintain an almost invisible
presence in Washington. free
from both scandal and honor.
? Little was written about the
agency, either with or without
its blessing. Its top -officials
were known to and courted
by a select group of Washing-
:ton: reporters, ? but .the tidbits
the agency handed out, which
usually illuminated develop-
intents in the Communist world,
were rarely attributed publicly
to their true source, r
? In the early' cold-war years,
it was believed that the nation
!needed. a single system that
could ...collect and . evaluate
,peacetline intelligence from a
ivariety of sources and ? dean.
iat the same time, with. the
!increasingly aggressive ',Corn-
imunist intelligence services?if
I
necessary; on their own terms,
Th.e .C.LA.'s teak, it was ge-
nerally conceded, was one thati
needed doing, and its well-bred;
and Ivtnedticated officials were:
left almOst without supervision.
to do it in their own way..1
" ? A New Headquarters
Ie 10C1. the yere of the!
Cuban. invasion, the ; C.I.A.
moved lock, stock. and cloak
into what was?for a.; semise-
cret agency?unusually 'visible,
futuristic glass - and -.concrete
headquarters in Langley, Va.,
across the Potomac River from
the Capital. : ; ?
? Perhaps as in outgrowth of
those two events?one rein-
toreing the agency's . public
identity and the other calling
its judgment into question?the;
comfortable, if . claudestine,
niche that the C.I.A. had carved
out for. itself became a topic
Cf erewing interest and inquiry.?
c Since its inception. in: 47,
the agency had been ...accused
almost daily of. propping ? up
foreign political parties, inter-
fering with foreign elections
and inspiring bribery, bomb-
ings, kidnappings and murders
in countrieS around the globe.
. Iji many instances, the char-
ges were merely the unfounded
euspiciops of the Cd.A.'s adver-
saries; in ? others, they, were
subsequently proved true.
any case, they were invariably
dismissed as unworthy of a
response.
But as the hoStility between
the West and East that had
marked the nineteen-fifties be-
gan to fade, so did the public's
acceptance of the .C.I.A. and
its epeointed mission of , guard-
ing: against the Communist per-,
:that their' Personal and business .activi-
'ties which they discuss rreely over the
telephone could be recorded and ana-
iyzed by agents of foreign powers.
This raise a the real specter that se-
lected American users of telephones are
potentially subject to blackmail that can
seriously affect their actions, or even
lead in some cases to . recruitment as
espionage agents.. - ; 20, ?
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9
By the mid-nineteen '
the first .hazy outlines had be-
gun . to emerge of the C.I.A.'s .
'nterconnections with some of;
institutions in this country and!
the major political and sociall
abroad. Then came the disclo-
sures that the C.I.A., or ati
least its emissaries and its un-
accounted-for dollars, had i,
the two intervening decades!
seemin,gly permeated' every fa-
cet of Amerlean life?business,
finance, journalism, academia,
local -government, unions and
even the arts.
cf subversion abroad, these dis-
Unlike most of the charges
closures were substantiated.
The C.I.A., it was learned,.
-had arranged with Michigan
State. University to provide
"deep cover" support for agen-
cy operatives in Vietnam dur-
ing the previous decade.
Through a maze of private
foundations of varying degrees.
of legitimacy, it had helped
to fund the activities of th'd
Natienal Student Association,
the-American Newspaper Guild,'
the respected literary magazine;
Encounter and, scores of other;
'enterprises, %respectable. and .du-
bious alike. . ? 1
Accounts emerged of the
. .
C.I.A.'s agreements With Amen-
can multinational corporations
that .had sometimes allowed
age.ncy? o.perativestn pose eS
their employe.: end innre caftan
involved the exchange of ? eco-
nomic and even political intel-
ligence between agency. offi-
eials and widely traveled busi-
ness executives. - -
:What was net known at -the
time, but was discovered later,
was that some three dozen
American journalists stationed ,
abroad were employed by the
C.I.A... as undercover infor-
mants, and that the agency
was training the members 4,f
a -dozen local police forces in
this 'country in the handling
ef explosives ,and detection of
wiretaps; ? - ? ? ?
Allegations Confirmed
Meanwhile, some of the. alle-
gations ? of :C.I.A. - interference
in the affairs of &her nations
were being leimported or con-
firmed." ? ? .
? In 1965; ..example, he
NEW YORK TIMES
June 1975
Report of C.I.A. Panel
Goes on Sale in Capital .
Special to 1:171-e-:::;c: 'Zeck Times
? W.ASFIlhIGTON, June 11?
Copies of the report of the.'
:Rockefeller commission* on
?Central Intelligence Agency
activities \ in the United,
States made public yester-
day, WeOL on sale here today '
at the Government Printing
Office bookstore. The pri,lt-
ing office said copies would
soon be available in Federate
abookstores in. 17 other mejor
iState ? 'lei-pent:Ile-ill. 'finally-eliad
rodthceded e truth of a five-rear-
charge by Lee Kuan Yew,
,the Prime Minister of Singa-
pore, that e C.I.A. *agent had
offered him a $3.3-million bribe
IC) COVEZ' ri_eensurecastudi
agency (nee-anion in that court
Some of the less well-publi-
cized discleseres, such as th.,
expendittuce previously denied
by the C.I.A. of several hundred
million dollars to support th
anti - Communist propagandiz
ing of Radio'Irree Europe an.,
Radio -Liberty, were oversha
cio.wed 'by the revelation tha,
the agency had waged a covert
muitimiiiioh dollar effort to-de
stroy the effectiveness o'
Chile's Marxist President, Sal
vador Allende Gossens.
The ,C.I.A.'s involvement in
the Vietnam war resulted i
Operation Phoenix, inspired In
the C.I.A. and put into effec
by the South Vietnamese Army
It resulted in the deaths o
more than 20,000 "suspected'
members of the "Vietcong in
frastrecture" ?and allegedly i
;the torture of others.
t ? Antiwar Demonstrations
It was a domestic adjunc
to the Vietnam war, the publi,
(demonstrations- of oppositior
that periodically arose in mos
of: the nation's major cities
,that was largely responsibt,
for. the scrutiny that the C.I.A
has undergone by the Rockefel
ler? Commission and that wi
be continued by two Congres
taaaai onrnrr4;i C-4,,,t ? ?
The C.I.A., ,the commissioi
reported today, inserted it'
operatives and informants int,
domestic antiwar groups are
maintained an "excessive'
number of dossiers?mere that
7,000?on persons whom it be
lieved were associated :vitt
political dissidents? foreig-
pon-ers or both..
' The Rockefeller Commission
also investigated, but did no
publicly report on, what ma
prove, to be the greatest ember
rassment in the C.I.A.'s histo
?the now apparently substan
?tiated reports that the agene
attempted to murder Premie
Fidel Castro of Cuba and no
sibly other foreign leaders.
.A? Senate investigating ? corn
mittee, ? --headed by. Senato
Frank Church, Democrat of Ida
ho, is-inquiring into that topit
'
. ' ?
??? . The 299-page, sine:lel-
spaced report, weich sells
for $2.85, can be obtained by
sending a chack payable to
the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, die Government
? Printing Office, Washington,.
D.C.., 20420. .
The printing office.. said
-that 26,383 copies of the re-
eport id been relined, Wi,030.
.of them for public consump-
tion: 10,00o for the et.1 n,
commission itself, and the
remainder for libraries
throughout the country.
?
'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 .
"LL
'ETP2ETTCITTRNT A Jt, nattrrTT3,SDAIr -JUNE 12, 1975
':REVIEW OUTLOOK
31.Eatelligenee
A public auc:it of the CIA was de-
sirable and overdue; few people be-
lieve any longer that the work of any
government agency is so sensitive
that its general performance should
be exempt from public scrutiny.
-
But those findings of the Rocke-
feller Commission that have been
made public are only interesting
and useful; they are not . shocking
and appalling. Considering the web-
spinning propensities of espionage,
CIA professionals have displayed
,considerable reluctance to stray out-
side their legal turf and. when they
have *done so it has usually been be-
cause of White House pressures.
Pre-audit speculations suggesting a
-gumshoe agency gone wild are now
revealed to have been mainly mole-
hills.
That knowledge will be useful In"
clarifying the CIA's role and, most
importantly, emphasizing the need
for the CIA and FBI to coordinate
their responsibilities. Nothing about
the Rockefeller report suggests,
however, that the CIA's specific
operations should be put in a fish-
bowl where its effectiveness in gath-
ering intelligence would be ham-
pered. As AraiS Control chief Fred
C. Ikle says in a speech quoted else-
where on this page today, effective
intelligence gathering will become
ever more vital, not less so, in the
years just ahead.
It can be argued with considera-
ble power that those CIA misdeeds
uncovered in the Rockefeller report
stemmed primarily from too little
intelligence, not too much. The
CIA's CHAOS operations, which in-;
'volved it in illegal domestic spying,,
derived from fears by both Presi--.
dents Johnson and Nixon that U.S.
anti-war dissidents were being aided
and encouraged by foreign powers.:
At a time when campus buildings'
were being bombed and burned,
central cities were aflame and na-
tional leaders wek-e being threatened
with physical violence, should it be
any surprise that an American Pres-
ident would want intelligence infor-
mation? It should not, and the fears
of both Presiclen.s that they were ,
not getting sufficient intelligence no
doubt explains why the CIA was?
given an assignment that would nor-'
_
melly and legally be the exclusive
job of the FBI. As the Rockefeller
report shows, CIA Director HcIsns
nonetheless warned President Nixon
,1969 that such work was outside
the. agency's charter.
. But the circumstances surround-
ing the formation of CHAOS dcitions
trate the importance of good intelli-
gence. As it happened the CIA could
find no evidence of foreign incite-
ment of U.S. domestic disorders.
Good intelligence tells a President
what is not true, SS i;sor Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP70432R000100370008-9
true. In the civil disorders of the
ana the CIA -
12(10s and early 1970s, ethe fact that
an intelligence agency could reas-
sure national leaders, that there was
no. foreign ? intervention probabls
acted as a protection to American
civil. liberties, rather than a threat.
These are, of course, even more
serious possibilities for presidential
miscalculations in a nuclear age, as
Mr. Ikle suggests. Given. the poten-
tial effects of such miscalculations it
is absolutely vital that the President
net .be planed in a position' wherehe
is making decisions based on fears,
rumors or hunches. .
Other doubtful activities, of the
CIA no doubt can be, and, in fact,
have been, tightened up through
procedural processes. But surely it
will come as no surprise to .
cans, or to the Russian KGB, that
the CIA for some years routinely
...scanned mail between the U.S. and
.C.cmmuniss countries. Or that it con-
ducted wiretaps and other forms .of
*nee-veillerice- on its own employes as
part of its internal security. proce-
dures. ,
We still don't knew of course,
'what role the CIA played ill alleged
assassination plots overseas. While
this issue may be far more serious,
it's idle to discuss such matters on
the slender knowledge presently
available.
? It is not idle, however, to say that
the CIA's' intelligence services are
vital and, to be effective, many of
the procedures will have to remain
secret. The Rockefeller Commission
'as:snort suggests that as long as
Americans trust their Presidents
they probably can trust the CIA.
And Presidents get public scrutiny
almost daily,.
Notable and Quotable
Fred C. Ikle, director of the U.S.
. Arms Control and Disarmament
'? Agency, in a speech to the Pittsburgh
World Affairs Council Tuesday night:
One aspect of the flow of information
from the government to the public greatly
worries me. This is that we have yet to
learn hov.? and where to draw the line in
ftblatiab o c ills of soott.,,,. uo fall to
draw "...Ito line properly, if ?;-c cannot rr.
tam the privacy of certain intelligence ac-
tivities, our arms control efforts will be-
come paralyzed. If we cannot find a way to
protect our .legitimate Intelligence opera-
tions, *e will jeopardize future SALT and
other arms control agreements.
Today's arms control agreements ac-
knowledge a situation of partial trust. We
have enough trust to make a contract with
our adversaries, but not enough to rely on
the contract without monitoring compli-
ance. Our ability to negotiate significant
agreements depends on our ability to ver-
ify those agreements are being kept.
Arms control, if we want to be serious
about it, is a deadly serious business. It
concerns matters of life and death for the
? nation. It ties us to a potential adversary
with immense power, the sternest inteinal
controls, and a pervasive system of ,se-
crecy. To have meaningful and reliable
'arms control, we have to know what the
'other side is doing. And we cannot find out
simply by asking. We must have reliable,
intelligence operations, and we need opera-
tions that can be kept secret. Yes, secret;;
because unrestrained publicity, would pro-
vide a road map for deception or counter-
measures. thus rendering arms control
verification well nigh Impossible.
It is simply a fact of life that the effec-
ti-7ene5o of certnin procedures to monitor
arms control depends on their being un-
known to those who are being monitored.
We cannot inform the party whose conduct
we wish to verify of each and every step
we take to check Its compliance. This is
particularly true of procedure to judge the
?
; reliability of arms control agreements: -
t At this time, our intelligence services
; are under severe public scrutiny. Unques-
tionably, a democratic nation is wise to
; monitor carefully every facet of its govern- ?
ment operations, particularly those that
cannot be conducted in Mil public view.
; Ar i it goes without saying that all bur gov-
; ernment agencies?including the intelli-
gence services?roust operate within the
'
But the current rash of publicity and
leaks is soinething that goes way beyond
our tradition of openness and the public's
right to know. Of course, we all can delight
, in a good spy story. And the temptation
must be strong today to publish titillating
accounts of delicate intelligence operations
and to be the first in going public. I be-
lieve, however, the American public will
not long feel entertained by indiscretions
that disals?g our national intelligence capa-
bility. .
This' capability, built up over many
years, has permitted our government to
assess the military effort of our potential
adversaries so that we could meet threats
realistically. And It has made it .possible
for us to move forward with arms control
agreements on which we could rely. Now
this capability might be wrecked by irre-
sponsible public disclosure. Whether our
adversary receives such information from
a paid spy, or reads it in a self-serving
book or A well-meaning newspaper?the
end result is the same.
Our lawmakers; I am sure, will have
the widest public support in drawing a dis-
criminating line between legitimate se-
crecy and irresponsible concealment, be-
tween mischievous disclosure and the
openness democratic societies must have.
I am sure the American people will sup-
port?indeed deniand?adherence to a code
of ethics, or where needed a code of law,.
that protects both the nation's standards of
decency and its safety.
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 .
_
1?TEVI YORK TTME
12 June 1975
,e OttMa WiethI
Major Reorganization
. Fy CLIFTON DANIEL
Spesdal to The New York Times , , ..
is widely regarded as -a?Cool
professional and a good soldier,
think he should take retirement
in stride. ? ?
Of the seven directors the
C.I.A. has had in its 28 years,
only he and Mr. Helms have
been intelligence professionals;
unless . Allen W. Dulles, who
was director for eight years
and spent 14 of his 411/2 work-
ing years in intelligence, is
also counted as a career man.
' Choosing an outsider, as a
director, and limiting his term
to' 10 years, would be one of
Iseveral:meaSures recommended
iby the Rockefeller commission
to reform the C.I.A. and bring,
it under stricter control.
1 3n, Recommendations
1 Among the 30 rtcomrnenda-
tions of the Rockefeller com-
mission were the following: - com-
mission were
should establish
a. joint committee on intel-
?ligence to assume oversight-of
the C.I.A. now extrcised by
the Armed Services. com-
mittees. .
? qCongress, should consider
making the C.I.A. budget pub-
i
lic,. at least -to some 'extent,
to eemnlv with the Constitu-
subject Pi Itter in117"-lart," Mr- then. which requires that public
Nessen said, "and I would look txpenditures be published.
- for quick action." -, ? 41The functions of the Pres-
;. ;Officials examining the Rock- idea's Foreign Intelligence Ad-
efeller commission recammene visory Board, a body of distin-
dations today fould them more guished citizens with- no pow-
ers, should be expanded to in-
clude oversight of .the C.I.A.,
and it should have a full-time
chairman and staff. . ...
. With those changes in the
oversight structure, the C.I.A.
should become more accotln-
table to outside agencies, and
less a power unto itself offi,
cials said.
. However, the Rockefeller
commission also proposed ma-
jor changes in the , internal
structure of the intelligence
agency. In addition to favoring
and independent director with
a 10-year maximum term, the
commission recommended the
following: -- , . ?
, taInstead of one deputy direc-
tor, who is always a high-rank-
ing military officer, the agency
should :have two. One would
act as administrative officer;
the other would be a military
officer. : . - .
qThe inspectpr general of.
the C.I.A., now Dr. Donald
Frank Chamberlain, should be
inquiry. On the contrary, since upgraded .in status and given
, becoming director in 1973, Mr.
-Colby has been terminating va-
tiouS Of those activities.
Presumably, he will remain
?ineoffice at least until the pend-
Congressional 'investiga-
',bons 'of the intelligence corn-
-munity are concluded. Then,
according to a man familiar
:with the Rockefeller commis-
Sion's intentions,, a new direc-
tor will be sought. .
.?"After all this," he said.
.1`when we start out again, we
/iad better start with a new
:man. ,
Friends of Mr. ColbY? .who
WASHINGTON, June 11?A1-'
ready zensured by the Rockee
feller commission for some
"plainly unlawful" acts, the
Central Intelligence Agency
now faces a major eeorganiza-
lion?if the commission's rec-
ommendations are fully imple-
mented.,
President F.ord has apparently
not decided which recommen-
dations he will adopt and how
he will implement them, but he
made it ? known today that he
favors prompt action on them.
Ron Nessen, the President's
,Press secretary, said that Mr.
Ford was sending a memoran-
dum, to the secretaries of State,
'Defense and the TreaSury and
the Director of Central Intel-
ligence asking for comment on
the ? recommendations. The
President wants replies "as
'icon as possible," Mr. Nessen
said, "in a matter of weeks
at least."
' With the replies in hand,
Mr. Ford will decide which
recommendations he can apply,
,administratively and, which
would ? require Congressional
petion.
"The-President considers the
drastic than they appeared at
first glance yesterday, wrapped
'as they. were in the lawyerly-
llanguage . . the commissiOn's,
report.
. Among other things, the next
?Director. of Central Intelligence
very prob'ably will not be a
Career intelligence cffice,r, ? as
the present: director, William
X:e.Colbee? is and one former,
edirector, ,is
Helms, was:
nn.Recornniendation number
eieven ,of' the Rockefeller corn-
(mission said that, in the selec-
etion of C.I.A. directors, neon-
?sideration - should be given to
?individuals outside the career
,service Cf the C.I A.. althouph
'promotion from within should
not be barred:"...
Colby"s Future .
e: -There was no general expec,
:.tation here* that Mr. Colby
'would be dismissed. He bears
-no direct personal responsibili-
nty, for the improper domestic
4ctivities of' the C.I.A. that led
the Rockefeller sommission's
a larger staff and greater re-
sponsibilities. His duties would
include the investigation of re-,
poets from employes that the
agency was violating the law.
The Rockefeller commission's
eel:4)ft disclosed that recently,
when the C.I.A. was coming
undei attack for improper prac-
tices, the professional staff - of
the :nspectem general's office
had been cut from 14 to fivee
gThe office of the agency's
general counsel should be
strengthened by occasionally
bringing in outside lawyers, oc-
casionally assigning agency.
P.ALTI MORE S UN
12 June 1975 ?
nteiligence nien
'rive mixed re
By HENRY L. eemeinrr
Washington Bureau of The sun
Washington ? The reaction
of the intelligence community
yesterday to the Rockefeller
commission report ranged from
dismay to a judgment that it:
findings had been fair to the
Central Intelligence Agency.
From the CIA itself, the offi-
cial reaction was silence. CIA
employees said privately the
agency could not comment pub-
licly while investigations by
two congressional committees
are still under way.
Still privately, other agency
sources spoke of reduced mor-
ale, dwindling contacts with
foreign intelligence services,
and growing distrust on the
part of agents abroad. They at-
tributed these trends to the im-
pact of the Rockefeller com-
mission report and fears that
the agency no longer can keep
its secrets.
plummeted and the 'agency's
foreign. contacts have been
damaged. -
"It will take a long time to
turn it around,? he said. -
But . high officials of :the
agency were said -to have found
the commission's findings to be
fair, under the' circumstances.
This was the public reaction of
the recently organized Associa-
tion of Retired Intelligence Of-
ficers. The group was formed
specifically to counter what it
regards as misconceptions
about the agency.
, David Phillips, former chief
of CIA Latin American opera-
tions, now spokesman for the
association,, said the report
"disposes of some allegations
and considerable speculation
concerning CIA and its .actiyi-
ties.
"Many of the organization's
? However, a group of retired unique problems are highlight-
or resigned intelligence officers ed," Mr. Phillips said, "and CIA
said the report on CIA domestic mistakes, including errors of
operations was "fair and objecT judgment and cx. ace
tive." ? . ?
' aired. Much of this is put into
The report concluded that a the perspective of earlier years
when times and needs may well
have been different in many
critical respects."
He warned, however, that
investigators should tread care-
fully in their approach to the
agency's overseas operations.
Exposure of contacts and meth-
ods, he said, could cripple or de-
stroy essential activities
abroad.
series of CIA domestic activi-
ties in the past?all discontin-
ued?had been "plainly unlaw-
ful" and recommended a series
of reforms.
? The bleakest reaction came
from a career intelligence spe-
cialist. In his judgment, jour-
nalists had overreacted to the
specifics of wrongdoing with
the result that CIA morale hits
the Governmept, and encourag-
ing C.I.A. lawyers to participate
in outside professional activi-
.
ties.: ?
a This -last set of recommenda-
tions suggested that the com-
mission thought that C.I.A: law-
yers were out of contact with
their own profession.
'The commission's report dis-
?
closed that for 27 years the
agency had only one general
counsel, Lawrence Houston. He
-retired last June 29. -
The reorganization proposed
by the Rockefeller commission
*was not the most drastic propo-
sal considered, C. Douglas Din
Hon, vice chairman of the corn-
,
mission, disclosed today. ,
: Mr. Dillon, a former Secretary
of the Treasury, said in a tele,
phone "r.versaticn from Ne3v_
York that the commission had
tan:ed ahotrt cutting the' agency
in two, -separating its intel-
ligence-gathering and analyz-
ing functions from its opera-
tional arm.
"The commission just didn't
think that would be wise," he
lawyers to work elsewhere in said. ?
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP :
77-06432R000100370008-9
112
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 ?
NEW YoRiz: TIMES
12 June 1975
? ? ,1 ? ?1,,, ? ? ..` ...? ? "- . 4
Iiiouiry alie ecornrnen.ctations
ea
Ey?317.,7rOT,V-2..IP. M. HERSH .
-SpeCial LC; The York T4rxe3
a WASHINGTON; June 11?The
officiel who provided much of
the basii information for the
initial account in ,The New
-York Times of domestic spying
last Deceinher. ?praised the
Rockefeller commission today
fcr compiling what he termed
on "exhaustive" report on the,
Central Intelligence Agency's
illegal activities. :
But the source, Who spoke
only under the ,continued gua-
rantee of anonymity, criticized
the ccminission's recommenda,
tions as being too weak and
not providing, for explicit statu-
tory'idt* ith appro-
priate puriishinent?for future!
wrongdoing. ' . ? ' I
The official, who has had
'direct access to highly classi-
fied intelligence ,information,
-estimated that 90 per cent, or
more of the allegations he
knew about had been described
lathe commission's report. "I
was kind of shocked :by the
-details," he said. "I didn't think
the commission would turn out
that much detail." '
?
Spying on Congressmen .
One conspicuous omission,
he said, dealt-with the C.I.A.'s
domestic spying on members
of Congress. The x Rockefeller
commission -report made no
menden? of such files, et:he:ton
William E. Colby, Director of
Central Intelligence, -told a
House subcommittee last March
5 that files on at least four
present and former members
of Congress were maintained
by the C.I.A.' s -special domestic
counterintelligence unit.
One such file showed' that
ethe agency had maintained a
dossier on Representative Bella
S. Abzug, Democrat of Manhat-
tan, since 1953-17 years be-
fore she was elected to Con-
gress?and had illegally opened
some of her mail.
Mr. Colby- further testified,
that "a number" of the. dories-
tic counterintelligence files had,
been destroyed, an assertion'
that also was omitted from
the Rockefeller commission's
report.
i: Other sources with some in,
ilependent knowledge of the
domestic spying activities sub-
sequently noted in telephone
interviews 'that the commis-
sion's report did not Mention
the destruction In late 1974i
of between 150 and 200 C.I.A.
domestic files on black dis-
sidents, nearly all., of which
included photographs of some
kind.
No Cover-up Seen
Sources -close to the ROcke.;
feller conirnisSion conceded
that such information had not
been included in the final re-
port, but emphasized?as one
put it?that there was no
evidence that this was an at-
tempt to hide anything. "A
lot of files on blacks were
not destroyed," one source
said.
"It would be a mistake,"
another source said, "to put
rac s -w on
say that the ones [files] that
were destroyed were the hot
ones."
"We found everything that
was humanly possible on that
operation." he added.
-In effect agreeing with that
statement, The Times's basic
'intelligence source predicted
that the Senate Select Commit-
!tee on Intelligence, whose
chairman is ? Senator Frank
:Church, Democrat of Idaho,
'would be unable to significant-
ly advance the commission's
findings?at least in the area
lof illegal domestic activities.
"They're nice enough people,"
he said of ,the staff members
of 'the Senate committee, "hut
not substantial enough to
handle this."
Intensive Interviewing
any -further information about
domestic spying, the source
said, would have to result from
intensive personal interviewing
of C.I.A. domestic operatives
who -may not have officially
reported all of their activities.
The Times's source attacked
the 30 recommendatj
Rockefeller commission a's be-
ing totally inadequate.
"There are too many recom-
mendations that say that the
C.I.A., the President and the
director [for the' C.I.A.1.`shOuld
not' do things without imposing
criminal sanctions," he said.
"We need criminal sanctions
to hold the bureaucracy in
line." the ' source . continued
"Times have a way of chang-
ing2nd world views chanoe.lhy name! in The Times's ac-
, , 7
Without criminal ?sanctions, it's' count, and added: "I fear that
oeaselble that conditions couldithe jcernalist has been the vice-
arise which would involve acti-itini .of what we in the intei-
yities like those now being crHligence trade call a fabricator."
ticized. Don't forget, justifica-,
.- ? No Evidence Found .
tions change with the times." ' Soules close to the Rocke-
. End to Further Inquiries 'feller commission said that. de-
The, source concluded the ine spite repeated checks, they had
terview with what amounted been unable to find any 'do-
to a plea for an end totfurthericumentary- evidence' of such un-
inquiries.- "It's- time to .returni der cover C.I.A. activities in
to normal for ? the C.I.A.," he New -York City. The former
said. "This h-as been upsettipg C.I.A. 'agent identified himself
even. more ,so for the analytical as having worked for the a.gen-
types than the covert types cy's domestic operations divi-
[in the agency]." . sioni there. , .
He added that many C.I.A. - In a telephone interview this
morning, the former C.I.A.
operative?who depicted New
York City as "a big training
ground" for undercover agents
?expressed skepticism that a
filll account of all the -C.I.A.'s
domestic activities would _ever
he compiled. '
"It's so easy to ecover up,"
analysts, those ,who research
data. and prepare intelligence
estimates, "were deeply disap-
pointed to find out that their
agency, which they. have re-
spect. for, was involved in this
kind of a thing." , ?
The Rockefeller commission he said. _ 'You're never.. going
report also did not deal with to find out what really hap-
the allegations, as published pened; all the details and all
by The New York Times last the people involved will never
Dec. 29, ? ? ? came out.
domestic operative who said "They'll clean up their shop
he had conducted break-ins, a little but in 10 or 20 years
wiretap operations and other it'll start agiain," he added.
illegal activities while investit "It's ail so cyclical.'
gating antiwar groups .tai I -awl ? The former. C.I.A. ? raaro-has
York City in the late ninzteen- Irefused thus far to aaree to
sixties on,: early oo-ataan,sev,?
discuss his activitieS wiiis mem-
enties.
In Congressional testimony
last February, Mr. Colby said
the agency had been unable ?
to identify the ? former -C.I.A..
man, who was not identified
hers at the Rockefeler commis-
sion or the Senate committee
headed by Mr. Church. -
CERISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
12 June 1975
? CIA and indivickial
__Beyond all the necessary laws and guide-
lines, the Rockefeller commission zeroes in on
. the. bottom-line need for integrity in CIA
employees and the contribution such integrity
? has already made to reform. "Many of the
Activities we have found to be improper or
unlawful were in fact questioned by lower-
level employees," says the commission. It
rightly urges that such voices be heard on up
the line.
These recommendations come at a time
when Congress is considering valuable legis-
lation to protect federal employees from
- department harassment or retaliation when
they speak out in public. Such speaking out
- often follows a failure to be listened to within
an agency.
integnty
C'7
- 'CIA employees also Ought to be protected in
this regard, while observing their special
responsibilities in preserving legitimate se-
crecy. There has been some questioning of the
' Rockefeller recommendation that it be made a
? criminal offense for employees or former
employees to disclose "classified" informae
tion.
Here a criterion in the proposed legislation
could be useful. It protects employees in
disclosing inforrriation to which citizens are
entitled under the Freedom of Information
Act. This act has provisions for determining
the legitimacy of "classified" labels. Surely
employees of the Public, no less than members.
Of the public itself, should have all the rights
specified in,the Freedom of,Inforniaticii A.
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-Ii6P77-00432R000100370008-9
Approved For.Relase 2091/08/08 CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9
WASHINGTON POST
11 June 1975
.; ? ,??
' ?
s Pselawrence l'eleya: ?
s. west:test= ?est SZA:f Vir?tr ?
? ?
"EV his. own account, Rich-
t
-M. isl'eirns was present at
:the Central Intelligence
?`,Agency. "from the day its.
floors onened"in
?
By -the-'account of: t17,'
Il.oekefeller-cemmissionts ?in-?
situene into- CIA ? domestic' ace
'Helms was'. also
something of a Johnny-on-?
the-spet'Wben the. CIA was
.t"nvOlving itself in a variety
f. activities.. that the corn-4
Inission-d.esCribes ..either
improper nt? simply; Illegal,
'.i.-"Heltna ? and? 'CIA... Director
DUIles on May '17;
l954e met.; with ? Postmaster
Plenerale. Arthur S?tantner-
Tield.to.discuSs continuation
of a;:pregratit "-under Whieh
CA was oponingmail
oming.;-frariae:.andegeingte-
the SovietilJnionrs:r
; "According to Helms!' con-
temporaneous. memorandum
of .the .meeting;" - the ?Rockee
;feller ? ?" cornmissi on . report
said, "Dulles' described., the
importance of"; the maiL prpe
ferany.andasked that 11-he ? ale
lowed tc5-'.7continue: No ? me.mn
itorreaPpearse4oehavesheens
friadeof ?.'COVert?.;.-maileenen
HelmSethen 41, was chief
ftf operations:- in the- Plans?
pirectorate'of CIA; moving-
up? the -hureaucratie ladder
appeinted .The
reetor.Forpentrale,,,-Intelli=?:":
tericieea-SpOSition' he-held:
Irani 196,ituti41,-.1.973..eseLee:::: ???
is-eTheee'romtnieSioii:e; report._
Does- net-tree-elle Imeeriseeto',
the top. He -.Simply appears
periodically.:; : , ?
; He is criticized bY ".the
tom.mission at one point: for
l'poor judgment" for de-.
troying tapes --and- docii-
Trrents within days of receiv-
ing ? a .request from Senate.
Majority Leader Mike "Mans-
field in January, 1973, not to
-destrny any material that
might have some relevance'
to the. Watergate investiga-.
tion. ? ?
But Helms is not criti; ?
cized often in the report, ?al-
though it finds fault with?
variety of CIA activities: s. ,
? After . describing. ? how
Helena and.. then CIA
Executive Director William .
? E.. Colbyhdldup transmittal'
of .evidence 'from .7th e CIA to
the ? Watergate. :Prosecutors
Untile January; 173, the ?
:port asSertat...`eThe: agency:is.
.subject tri-rierwits.,?criticism.
for ,this.notidtice.;.:
sidti?iSserte(ethat"ethe? CIA's,
dornestic aii- op eni n g. ? ? pro,
granas, unlawful."
That ?'?'-prri:gram" e. Continued
through' ,the': ? Eisenhower
ad Thi nistrati , after being
':?i, "
instituteciein" 1952, arid was
not terminated- Until:1973e kr',
In 136r;Dulles end Reims;
then the-deptit- director-for"
plans, mete.With the new.
PostmastereGeneral,'
ward Day,cetii- ? inform him
that mail *as bel.t.'g Opened,
e Ten -yeaelateri.:1-1eIrneOise
then CIA ilrect-ot;' Met; sen.:"
arately with, :Postmaster
General .Wititen ;VI: Blount
and AttaineY" General JOhn?
N. MitchelL "to discuss, the
Mail project". according: to:
the reporte'Neither objected:
to2ite said i.
when the::CosinniSsion.? rport e:
to Operation
Chabs.,e4:JpreciaP"operationse
bFe. the,
CIA to 'aoilect-nrid evaluate.
information, on, -foreign on
taCts with. American dissie
denti-?-edIehnii role is'cen-
tral.ep:ses";
''epesPite.::e"Xeittist.rieknowl:?:.
etigeinSfi.f.in:,-a.Sept.- 8;-26
memo taf..."statutory- and,sde-
-factoesesjaeoecriptign ea-art..
agetleY; eedemes tic: -
rnolve-
ments" in connection with
the 'super-secret Operation,
Chaos, Helms eit other tithes
indicated thet he was aware
the Cie'. had 'gone. heYorid "
the limit.- ? . ? , -
.Heirris sent a -report pre-
Pared by the CIA, entitled
"Restless Youth," to special
presidential assistant for na-
tional security affairs Walt
W. Rostow, on Sept. 4,1968,,
analyzing student revolu-
tionary movements. ,
-"Yau -will," Helms wrote
in a cover memo to RoStow,?
"of course, he 'aware of the
peculiar sensitivity which at-
taches to the fact that the
CIA has prepared a report
-on student activities:- both.
..itere and abroad.". ee. e
;iive'sneenths later Helms
,.."senVeq.,-!:anothereee; COPY of
Restless. Youth to Henry'
AiLlrXissingerstheti:President
-;NistOtil,Sz'staSsisfanCe :for, eita4.
'This- is an:. area net
within' the 'charter of this-
-...agencere. so I need not eme
hasize how eXtremeiy- "Sem-
sitiveethis.rnakes the paper'
Helms wrote Kieeirtger;
"SheitleenYone lenrit of its::
existence ???rottld -:-Prome
most _7114:1
concerned."
Thee.' State Department
in a f: statement
night.' that.' the- section e of
"Restless .Youth" 'dealing
with radical students -in
America 'is only 12 pages out
ei a totel of 234 and that
"there is -no' indication in
this section that it la derived
from surveillance or- any,
sensitive' ee,,urcee . or -meth-
ods." ? ' '
Kissinger has'.. -denied
denied
-knowledge of domeatic Intel-
ligence gathering activities
Approved For Release 2001/08/08:
ese's
by the CIA. ?
Helms' memo, the" state-
ment said, did not indicate
that the information in the
-report "- resulted . from
, ?
"unusual or illegal investiga-
tive-activities" and it was
"assumed- that Director
,Helms'.. cautionary note was
?directed at emphasizing that
it was' net. within the Agen-
cy's,
charter to ..."de analyses
on ::Aieerican student. aCtivi-
tiez,,i rather than any itnpli-
_cation that the analysiSeit-
se:Le was based on illegal or
improper investigative activ-
ities."
Hehns :?rejected one '-at-
tempt by the CIA to. ue dts
agents: to collect informa-
tion on domestic dissidents,
known as !Project One," ac-
tordi.ngto the report. But a
Second.i program,. e:called
"Project . Two," :involved
!`agentsebservations, of do-
inestic;activities," according
to the report, and these ob-
servations were turned over
to "Chatite ? ? ?,??
:eass a ? -i'esult, tlie report
said ;'a linnted euanitity of:
intelligence on domestic.r.dis-
,?sident was;e:col-:-
lected and -disseminated.
Director helms etestfied
.thatr,"-hesWas not aware 10:-
this Collection and dissemi;
nation,". the report said. ,
" Chaos: used three'ag,ents
to gather information on -do-
mestic racilcal activities- din--
ing-.13heL,..period:efrone.;.1.989'4: e
through5,1971,eicdoeding s7". to
the refrort. "Helms-"teStfied:
'that haswas-not aware of the-
d-omtac use ???:"Ihesee
dgente',7:7.tirie rei5Ort said. e e.
er-Even within the CIAshossie
Chaos was a controver--::
NEW YORK TIMES
5 June 1975
CIA. ROLE CHARGED
IN LEBANON'S STRIFE
? spedal to The New York Times.
BEIRUT, Lebanon, June 4? .
Palestinian guerrilla leaders
nad their Lebaoe5es leftist sup-
porters have accused the United
'States Central Intelligence
-Agency of providing arms, mu-
nitions and directives to the
right-wing Phalatigist party,
made up of Christians.
More than 300 people have
been killed in fighting between
the Phalangist militia and Pa-
lestinian guerrillas since April
13. .
ke-,441%
s
Nes"
sial oper-ation. In:Dee:either;
1977, in response to internal
criticism of ? the program,
Trelnas stated' in a memo,-
"Cho Is a legitimate emu-
.ter intelligenee function. cf
-the agency and cannot be
stopped siniply -; because
some members of the organ-
ization do not like this "acdv-
ity." . .?
-In dealing with the Water. ?
gate affair, tile- corneae-es-len -
report broadly summarized
previously known informa-
tion" and concluded that it
found no evidence that the
CIA- either - pard,cipated in
or knesir in adyan-ces of the
Watergate breaknin ?- or the
break-in at -thee offices of
trist: - : , y
, "The cornmissioti,
ers the agency's ?:4elay of
nearly a .yearein...instituting
such an investigatiOn, (of n
possible CIie
:Watergate break:in)" the
agencyee failure promptly to
:disclose relevant: informe-
tien. in, its possession; 'and ?
. the agency's destruction-- of
Someematerials ' which' rcar
have 'Contained relevant in-
formation to .,.-.reflect, poor
judgment and to. be: eubj ect
to eriticism." 1 ? esee _
Although this criticiim is
-directed at "the CIA. by' the
sconimiskon; the narrative of
the report shows that all, of,
. ? _
.,thelactiOnS . failure's !.criti-
cized .2were- in Helths" con-
troL. ? - - 4.??
? e - e, ?
There' was, :heavy fire early
today in the Chia neighborhood.
Sporadic sniper fire continued
through the day, causing ten-
sion in the capital,
Many Palestinian
a.nd Lebanese leftists believe
that -the Plialangist militia has
received guns and munitions
through a Lebarjese military air
base and the small port of
Jtmeye, north of Beirut. .
? Kemal Jurriblatt, a 'Socialist
; leader who is On e to the So-
viet Embassy here, said at a
, hews conference: -
"From our intelligence, it art-
pears that the Phalangists are
in rapport. with the Israelis and
have received. directives, arms
and ammunition through the
? cc...LA.", .
CIA-RDP77-00432R00M00370008-9.
'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 .
`.711.1.INGTON STAR
71. June /975
'
411%,
IV t't:
'est .7a.mes Vtlekeesen '
, tea:angle:15ts star :7;?iet ? ?
Cf: all the it!rbr over the
ing ni the release of the
.-Reckcfeller commission re-,
CIA's domestic
ctiviZ!es' and
eeciSion not to publish
1;z ?findings on allegations
ezif -agency drivolvement in
(GV erseas. assassi-
natiem plots; the report
7..,rn:.lents nothing in the wry
,,,;.?triti a 1 r eve! a7"
? ,
.? ? ? ? ? *????
... the post-Watergate ?
? a., :this 'immediately trig-
ters:snspicions of, a - cover-
"tst-s,.''stisoicions that were
07,voiced by the conserv-
..itatiVe,-establishment nature
:OF the panel, some of whose
c'tnembers had had previous
....ties with the:' intelligence
-clornmunity. ? ? ..
V There is a political rule of.
. ,
fihutrib;.- hoWever, that- ?.the
mac
" t difficult problems are;
reierrel ? to n sympathetic
nt.pettei.
,dent Ford issued no, guide-
lines ori helpful hints, ? the.
7, report appeart it, walk the -
'fine line, that he obvieutly..
wantcd To conduct ? .an
:investigation that 'at least
`sippears.satiSfactory but not
,one that would impair .the.
CIA. , a a
?
1; ALONG WITH its find-
, ?
Ings of - 'wrongdoings, the
:.report Contains: ? judicious
recommendations' for im-
proved:congressional over-
'sight and nadministratiVe
*reforms that would 'prevent
? Such 'wrongdoing in , the
,?future.',.'
Even though' all ? the
commission's major' find-
ings confirm -reports n al-
ready in the press, the sys-
Ana ywis
ttmatic snooping, ' opening
of mail and compiling of
15
,41 g ?
, . . .
dossiers on Arne:lain citi-
zens,. most of whom were
engaged in anti-war et. civil
*rights activities, is .
staggering. as tetitline,d ejn..
tthe rePort.,' ?
It ? describes ::21-Year
. program .of. surveillance in
which at least an estimated.
.130,000 pleces?of mail to
.and fraM. the:Soviet Union
were opened and a seven-
year program .of spying on
Americans' in whichfiles
Were. opened on 13,000 peo-
ple ,and ? organizatiens ? and,
index records t kept ? on
another 300,000ie:e.. e
The name: of this ? proe
gram, begun. in 1967 at the
inSistence't of' President
.Lyndon ...Be, Johnson,, tells
something .about the Cold
'War mentality:., "Operation
'CHAOS,' . was its name,
which, calls to Mind , the,
,sinister "KAOS". agents in
the:.:,television coraedy
seriesi!!Get Smart!",,e
REPORT reletio tells
of '32 illegal domestic wire-
?taps, .32' electronic bug-
gings,? and:12 burglaries by
the CIA. By comparison,
CIA Director William Colby
tOldi la . Senate e'Committee
last January that there had
been 'files opened On.10,000
American' citizens and only
five .breakiins arid , 21 ..tele-
phone Yana:a ;
'..One :barrier 'to any ,Possie
ble 'cover-ti ei?: is , that Presi-
dent....FOrd ,is7'.turning? over ,
the )80:page ':chapter ? 'on
assassination plots: and the
material, Oh. :which it .is,
based to the special Senate.
committee athat e?iS :., also
investigating: .the
Under,the chairmanship of
Frank Church of 'Idaho, a
liberal Democrat and foe of
the Vietnam war, the panel
is not likely to whitewash,
the agency.. .. : .?
Church tyesteeday.
BALTIMORE .SUN
. 12 June 1975
eteat ataattal
el k
Zt,
-
.characterizede?die ? cummis-
elan neer; as "limited -in
scope" end. sad:: the z?ecorn--
raendations. did not go far
enough. ?
,?"What is needed is
prohibitirais in the
law with penalties attached
to. violations of the law," he
said in an interview on pub-
lic television. . ?
. /FORD'S DECISION to
give the assassination
material to the committee
'inspired ? some cynical
speculation that the Kenne-
dy and Johnson administra-
tions. were involved in the
assassination plots and that
Ford Would probably ? be'
just as' happy to let the
Democratic-controlled Sen-
ate committee reveal this. '
It also dismayed ? some
conservatives such -as. Seri.
. James Allen,' ,D-Ala, . who
grumbled that the
Congress's record for leaks
'Ford. might ,"just as well
have put it on national tole-.
vision." - . ? -
His. refusal to publicize.
.the potentially embarrass-
ing assassination allega-
tions pleased other con-
servatives, however, many
of whom in his party are
restive under the Ford-
Rockefeller leadership and
are looking for an excuse to
support someone like- for-
mer California Gov. Ronald
Reagan. ?
:SUCH TACTICS would be
terribly risky in the post-
Wastergate era; -however,
particularly with such a
potentially , explesive . sub-
ject.' ? Some ,observers,
moreover, doubt that Ford
is capable of planning and
,executing such a maneu-
,VertiAt any rate, there is
also a strong suspicion that
some of the plots had their
inception in the Eisenhower
administration. ? . ? .
CIA could h ve read o
Washington (AP)?While the
Central Intelligence Agency se,
cretly tested Lysergic Acid Die-
, thylamide?LSD---in the 1950's,
, dozens of the nation's doctors
were busily performing similar
research and publishing the re-
sults in public journals.
Anyone could have walked
into a medical library and read
them.
But the espionage agency
Appr etEiFtit 2i001t0
searcn to o something that
was ethically forbidden Of doc-
tors: To; find out ,what would
happen if the mind-altering
drug were given to, an unsus-
pecting subject.
The flocketiter commission
report on the agency released
Tuesday briefly described the
LSD tests, noting that one per-
son committed suicide several
days after having an adverse
reaction to a dose of LSD ad-
ministered without his itrel-
: CIA-RDP77-0043
"There is little doubt what
diC-1 'L (S ever
eriathdrat -.t cerripli-
eit:TTi. that eiteinate: ow "
ttelte one eaeieitineettive:
Anotheia 5outhern-
thouglq tie ,change of
r.ziLr,als cr ris.ring the
cbaatcr a:; atioatioinations
over .the, wer..--kend showed
'that the acIrniniration
still-
a knack for fouling up,
-ilhich the 1..opular
Mayaguez reficc.: operation
hoc,. ?
"7r.s a mists.kc rat to re-
lease' the had r.tuff your-
call'," says o-..e veteran
1-Zepublican poi. "In this
day and age opie
think of toe many reasons
why you didn't," ? ?
. .
? One reason ECrtle people
are thinking et is that- the
commission's investigation,
which it didn't have time to
complete, would suffer by
comparison to the ? one
Church's cnrnrnittep js ex-
SOME SOURCES at. the
White House were critical
. of Rockefeller because of
the commission's failure to
advise the President until
two or three 'weeks ago that
it was limiting its investi-
gazion of ,the alleged assas-
sination . plots to . their
dornesticimplications.-: 4
.. The .: commission . mem-.
- tiers defended their, work)
however, and attributed the
-absence of new?revelations
to an aggressive press. "I
think we made as? careful a
study as we could," said C.
Douglas Dillon,- the New
York investment banker
who served in both the
Eisenhower and Kennedy
administrations. '"We
couldn't find anything that
amounted to anything that
the press had not already
fcund out."
te5ts
the CIA was doing with LSD
was both unethical and, unnec-
essary," Solernon Snyder, Kr.-
fessor of psychiatry at Johns
Hopkins Dniaersitv.andta veter-
an LW researcher, said yestei-
day. ?
Dr. Snyder and other psychi-
atrists who were involved in re-
search with the psychedelic
drug in the 1950's said yester-
day that the scientific litera-
t e,soLttiggioiesa& full of re-
M WL,1 lfvvrth humans
taking the drug.
Approved For Release 200f/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9
No intelligence agency can do its job effectively
unless it can keep its operations secret.
hat's why the investigative hysteria in Washington
is so dangerous for U.S. security.
d times, perhaps even six times, greate
i than the U.S. will have in its order o
battle-10 to 12 million pounds for th
oilly tv,-0 million for the U.S
? Weights and numbers in these mogul
;:tudes far surpass anything needed for
? defensive strategy Of deterrence. Ho
d0C3 the U.S.S.R. intend to use thi
power, cnce it materializes? This is
i question for which the. President, th,
? Secretaries of State and Defense, an
1 the Congress must look to the CIA tt
' provide an answer. No other institUtio
is equipped to give one.
? But the tilt of the .military balance
only one of the uncertainties, and no
necessarily the most dangerous one, thz
!-eeset American prospects. During tlu
. , past several years, the CIA, by reasor
- ? cf the tightening interdependence o
.? nations, has been drawn deeply into ecr
nomic analysis and estimating. Effort
by producing nations to cartelize trad
in basic commodities, the political re
alignments in groping evolution arour
the Persian Gulf, the strategic role to
assigned to the oceans of petrodollars
the contest for national or bloc advau
tage?all bulk increasingly large in th
CIA's purview.
This has ha.ppened because the ecJ
the President, one sharp enough to corn- :1
i.nomic events abroad have come to bea'
mend a summary alert. ? so crucially on national decisions affee
ing foreign policy, and because the mio
uscule intelligence mechanisms availabi
in State, Treasury, Commerce, and Agr
culture could not begin to handle the jot
In the view of William E. Colby, ti
Director of the CIA, "It is becoming
impoiAtant to our national security ?1-,
watch the machinations of foreign cal
_
t But no one
by Charles J. V. Murphy.
In the hangman's atmosphere that '
currently envelops the immediate pros-
pects of the Central Intelligence Agency,
an important point has been strangely
overlooked. Why was this agency, so rich
in intellectual talent, once full of ?n, '
now gravely wounded, created in the ,
first place ?
The all-but-forgotten answer is that
the CIA was brought into existence by
Congress in 1947, at President Truman's
request, for the straightforward purpose
of preventing another such shocking
lapse of vigilance as the one that made
possible the disaster at Pearl Harbor,
six years earlier.
An inquiry by a joint committee of.
Congress
Congress that lasted through seven re-
crimination-laden months, from No-
vember, 1945, to May, 1946, elicited the
embarrassing revelation that all the es-
sential intelligence exposing Japan's
preparations for war, even the departure
of the .Tapanese fleet, had come into
American hands befcre the attack. The
failure to perceive what was in the mak- ,
ing was found, in hindsight, te have re-
sulted from the fact that no agency in
the government had ever been charged .
with pulling such intelligence together.l
The fateful political and military +
clues, in jigsaw pieces, had all been col- ,
lected by the State, War, and Navy de-
partments, each in its own parochial 'in-
terest, in the form of radio intercepts,
diplomatic dispatches, and routine mill-
aryintelligencereports.
' office or per= had the authority, cz
duty, to make a grand assessment for
A question of Soviet intentions
What makes the existing situation
strange is that the primary task laid
upon the CIA eighteen years ago?to be
the watchman of national security?has
never been more urgent than it is today.
For example, the Soviet Union has in
advanced development, even partly in
tels as to follow Soviet or Chinese.
deployment, the most powerful array of sue development."
strategic nuclear weapons that the mill- ,
tary technologies have so far produced. The three spotlights
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, I
Yet, at an hour when the government'
a professional strategic-weapons'analyst need for objective, sophisticated, timel:'
not given to exaggeration, describes the and many-faceted intelligence cou
array as "quite awesome." It includes scarcely be more acute, the CIA is
four third-generation land-based ICBM danger of being scattered to the fot
prototypes, plus a fifth that has lately winds. Three full-bore investigatior
appeared on the test range; a bigger and into the agency's philosophy and opel
faster missile-armed submarine; and a ations are in progress in Washingtoi
supersonic bomber having an intercon- When they have finished their probina
tinental capability. Four of the five every consequential activity since
ICBM's and the 1,500-mile submarine- founding, even the most sensitive, wil
launched missile have all been MIRVed have been brought into the open by on
?fitted, that is, with from four to eight panel or the other.
independently targetable warheads. ?A presidential commission, seven pr,
If the dePloymenti of these weapons vete citizens under the chairmanship o
should proceed to the some 2,400 ICBM !Vice President Rockefeller, is to rends
launchers sanctioned by the SALT a report this month, after an inquir
agrez:ments of 1972 and 1974, and if the Ithat begnn arly in ..Tanualy and sum
U.S. stands on the weapons it now has in moned just about every senior CIA
place, the Russians can be expected to officer, active and retired, into its chum
end up, four or five years hence, with a ,bers for questioning. The Senate Selec
superiority in nuclear throw-weight five ',Committee on Intelligence, under the
Approved For Rarlease 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9
'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 .
cinairmanaleip of Democrat Frank .
Obarch ef Idaho, inns started out on a
traeted., no-holds-barred inquiry into
centroveleial aspect and incident
12ne ageney'e cznaien.
.I.:3r--T:.!rarn oat and 12!:'.1relilla. of
S;:.7.:;:y--ftV C.. -7.:=1.C.b siati! nes ambled by
Cheareh cleanly signal that the
'.e.rate's 1.311P.17F.: Of the show is likely to
be en the boards i'Ve months. Nor will
tleet tine end of the ordeal. A corn-
nPnion House select Committee under
eeepnesenitative Lucien N. Nedzi, Demo-
ctat from Michienein no ices (-..nivish and .
isolationist than Church, is to parallel
an untrammeled exploration of the CIA's -
operations with a horizon-filling loch
into all the federal intelligence activi-
ties. including those of the FEL
Eelcre the curiein is rung down en all
this, the CIA will be the only national
intelligence service on earth stripped of
its secrets. For anyone who recalls the
mood in Washington when the agency
wan being put together some three dee-
Lien, ago, such an outcome is almost past .
believing. From the start, President
Truman, Congress, and the executive
departments most directly involved in
foreign policy?State and Defense? '
e.acre all agreed that its .worl: should
never suffer much public exposure.
The agency's authority and functions
were deliberately left vague in the en-
abling legislation, and the specific tasks
laid upon it by the National Security
Council were kept under tight classifica-
tion. Congressional knowledge and sanc-
tion of its operations were limited to.
several oversight panels consisting of,
all together, a dozen or so senior mem-
bers of -the Armed Services and Appro-
priations committees in both Houses.
Until lately, the overseeing was re-
spectful and trusting, but it did go on
all along. The late Richard Russell of
Georgia, chairman of the Senate Armed
Services Committee and the most influ-
ential man in Congress in national se-
curity matters, long refused to have .
William Fulbright, chairman of the ,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on
his panel, because he considered Ful- ?
bright a blabbermouth.
Now that protection, that immunity,
has been demolished. And the strangest
thing Of all is that the blowing of the
agency's cover was largely brought on
by a dubious piece of journalism?the
long, report in the New ,York Times of
December 22 that the agency during the
Nixon years, "directly violating its char-
ter, conducted narnassivd'illegei domestic,
intelligence operation" against individ-
uals and groups who disagreed with the
Administration's policies in Vietnam
and other matters. Six months of investi-
gation have pretty well established that
these charges were greatlAnyogvesated
a rcir
After tha ?deal
- Director Colby, to he sure, helpeei to
whip up the storm with his too-ready
admission that his " pre.de.cleseors- had
countenanced certain "illegal" activities.
He failed to Make it sufficiently clear at
the outset just .what the mistakes were,
and that what had been done was in any
case done .on presidential authority.
Whether misdemeanors or something
worse, providing a measure of support
for the Watergate break-in and in the
Daniel Ellsberg affair was certainly im-
proper and unwise. (In each case, a top
official of the CIA authorized the sup-
port, but reluctantly.). The deplorable
outcome, in any case, was to generate a
suspiciousness in Congress and an up-
roar in the liberal press that have forced
. the CIA further into the open than is
good for a secret state mechanism. It now
- has no choice but to stand in the dock
while its role and mission are examined.
"The big problem," Representative
Nedzi says, "is determining the role of
secret institutions in a free, democratic
society." But that is only one problem
beside Other problems. We should also
be asking ourselves whether the U.S.
can remain "a free, democratic society"
ssithout the kind of secret organization
that the CIA has to be in order to do its
job effectively..
There seems to be no reason to doubt
that the ordeal of investigations and
hearings and reorganizations will leave
the CIA weakened and its operations
curtailed. The agency's main business is
collecting and ? analyzing what in the
trade is called "high-level positive for-
eign intelligence"?information con-
cerning the actions and intentions of
other states that bear, for-'-ill or other-
wise, on the American situation. That
function, including available clandestine
techniques for enriching the harvest,
especially of a political and military na-
ture, is not likely to be taken from the
Agency, although the sharing of the
-product between the executive and legis-
lative branches is certain to be broad-
ened, not without risk, perhaps foolishly.
But the functions that have kept the
CIA in hot water at home while it has
prosecuted the Cold War abroad?clan-
destine activities ranging from classical
espionage and counterintelligence oper-
ations to political actions aimed at
thwarting hostile developments in other
countries?are plainly marked for per-
emptory amputation.
. .
The leakiest vessels in town
In fact, the CIA, for all practical pur-
poses, is already out of the covert poli-
tical action business under a prohibition
imposed in the last hours of the Ninety-
third Congress by a little-noticed amend-
1 a little-known California Deme,crat, P.
resentative Leo Ryan. The new law ice-
bids the President to use funds appro.:
priatcd to the CIA 'Zoe any operntion
abroad (except fon collecting informa-
tion) without justifyina the in'eended
use in a detailed reper.!, to Conainees----
including specifically, :the seventeen-
member Senate Foreign rieia.tions Com-
mittee and the tliirty-lour-niareher
House Foreign Affairs Committee. 'Iles
two bodies are esteemed by the 1.717e.eik.)-
ington. press corps es the leakiest "ns-
sels in town..
. No President in his right mind would
enter into such a transaction. Disclosure
would almost certainly doom any secret
enterprise; and bring embarrassment to
whatever foreign movement the U.S.
government wished to help.
The CIA has been unique arnong na-
tional intelligence organizations in that
.it is subject to legislative oversight and
lays out its -operations before members
of Congress when it asks for fundo.
In Britain, MI6, the agency's counter-
part on the clandestine side, is lodged
discreetly and impenetrably inside the
Foreign Office and serves the Prime
Minister directly. Parliament through
tthe generations has tolerated the sepa-
rateness on the practical grounds that
certain necessary state business is most
usefully pursued in secrecy. Yet, in spite
of the potential weakness in the CIA's
armor, friendly intelligence services
have for a quarter of a century worked
trustingly with its officers, and indeed
vied with one another for a special re-
lationship, admiring as many did the
CIA's unmatched technical resources and
the lagh quality of its people.
A business dependent on trust
Now that relationship has been shaken
?not because of a loss of confidence in
the agency itself, but rather because in
the eyes a foreign intelligence estab-
lishments the CIA is no longer permitted
to keep its secrets from Congress and
the press. A recently retired senior CIA
intelligence officer, who had intimate con-
tact with all the major non-Communist
services and still remains in touch with
them, finds that many of his old friends
are reluctant to work with the agency.
"These people are worried and scared,"
he said. "Our business is tremendously
dependent on trust. If they have some-
thing sensitive, they're loath to share it
: with us, lest it come out that they had
been involved."
Colby himself, shahen hy the recoiling
of the CIA's foreign collaborators, is-
sued a warning at a congressional hear-
ing that "the almost hysterical excite-
ment" about the CIA could jeopardize
its effectiveness. The wonderment and
i4;tar:iyhoagos 4erAg_kbigiaillak:43ffotratthyobralqed
in friendly for-
Approved For Release2001/08/08.: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9
eign capitals by the compulsive undress-
ing of the CIA was vividly expressed,
by a diplomat experienced in this Work
when he exclaimed, aghast, "You Ameri-
csins don't have a country over there.,
'You have a huge church."
The Administration might have been
expected to try to block the Ryan amend-
ment, but instead let it slip through Con-
gress without serious 'challenge on the
floor. The reasoning behind the inaction
was .blatantly political. Given the mood
of Congress, the loss of American zest
for foreign involvements, and the un-
cloaking of the agency's role in Chile
and other' countries, the decision at the
White House was that an arm's-length
stance would most become the President
until the Rockefeller Commission issued
its verdict.
In President Ford's defense, it should
be said that he does not have enough
fingers to plug all the leaks in the dike.
The CIA has an excess of troubles these
days. It is a victim of, among other
things, the Pervasive mistrust of govern-
ment secrecy. Watergate, along with all
its other bad consequences, tipped the
balance in the contentious issue of the
government's right to secrets. Some peo-
plo apparently believe that the govern-
= et has no right to any secrets, a view
that, if it prevails; will be fatal to the
function of intelligence.
One result of the heightened suspicion
of secrecy was the amending of the
Freedom of Information Act. Under the
amendments passed in the final weeks
of the Ninety-third Congress, any fed-
eral body, even the CIA, must respond
to any request for a classified document.
If the response is negative, the govern-
ment can be compelled to justify its
grounds for refusal in court.
In original intent, the law was meant
to prod the government into letting
scholars and journalists look into classi-
fied files no longer deserving of asecurity
lock. But the language of the law, if al-
lowed to stand, could open thafiles of the,
CIA to the public. Several teSt..cases are
now before the courts.
Fenced in by the Forty Cornmittae
The CIA has also been a casualty of
detente. Henry Kissinger's objective
throughout the six and a half years that
he has been. guiding U.S. foreign policy
has been to convince the Russians, and
the Chinese too, that the Cold "War was
finished as far as the U.S. was concerned.
Curtailing the CIA's covert interven-
tions has been one way of getting - the
lfiessage to Moscow and Peking.
Kissinger was able to bring about this
curtailment in his capacity as the Presi-
dent's deputy in the transactions of the
National Security Council, to which the
CIA is generally responsible, and, most
. . .
directly, in h's ehairreenehin t
Forty Committee. This committee takes
its curious name from the number cu a
top-secret NSC memo stipulating its re-
sponsibilities,.one of which is to set the
metes and bounds of the covert
activities. , . . -
:How far the CIA's political activities
abroad have Shrunk can be judged from
its ? inaction in Portugal, in a kind of
situation where in the past its talents
would have been resolutely brought into
play. After , the military takeover in
April, 1974, it gradually became appar-
ent that the Communists dominated the
Armed Forces Movement. The only prac-
tical way for Portugal's NATO. partners
to prevent a Communist takeover was to
foster, discreetly, a coalition of the Con-
servative moderates and the Socialists
under the Socialist leader Mario Soares.
-But Secretary Kissinger was loath to
.commit the CIA to such a campaign, it
its 'role be exposed and the outcry in
Congress and the press against CIA
meddling in the politics of other coun-
tries be redoubled. When Europeans fi-
nally mustered the resolve to fill the
vacuum and set about rallying support
around Soares, it was too late.
An inspiration at State
'Until the advent of the Ad-
ministration, the clandestine side of the
CIA was the ascendant side, under an of-
ficial with the bland title Deputy Direc-
tor for Plans. His Directorate of Plans
managed some' 7,000 people, or about
two-fifths of the CIA's total 'force of
about 17,000 (now somewhat fewer as a
result of firings, early retirements, and
attrition), and consumed about half of
the agency's budget of some $600 million
a year. The resources at his disposal in-
cluded several highly professional air
services, of which.Air America has been
the most publicized.; various paramili-
tary organizations now in 'skeletal sta-
tus; a superb -worldwide comimmica-
tions system; and some hundreds of -of-
-eficers'attached to or working out from
some 'fourscore 'stations abroad, mostly
In enibassies and consulates.
When the CIA was set up in 1947, it
was ill equipped for the war Of ,vVits that
covert political action demands. Its only
going resources :it the start were the
straightforward intelligence-collecting
and counterintelligence functions that it
had been able to salvage from the demo-
bilized Office of Strategic, Services.
The mechanism for :countering the
Communist political subversion then epi-
demic in Europe was the inspiration of
the policy-planning staff of the State De-
partment. Basically, the intentewas to
provide the U.S. government with a co-
vert instrument for funnelingiunds into
non-Communist political organizations.
_
;?,-_,..7.-nals and the cr-
garaztion of public n1eo,tings and dem-
onstrations, all toward. the end of making
sure that Europe's rtill feeble parlia-
mentary proc..,esse not paralred
1:Ccf Coraiounion-t.
The
and a resourceful vs.-.7,sz an. of 055 service
in the asz.:Trblod the basic
machinery of the CIA.'s political-action
sele-ices behind a fau2de called the Office
of Policy Coordination. His ketadquar-
ters v,,as in a group of -orefab structures
belonging to the new agency, situated
along th4,,, reflecting, that strotches
in front of the Lincoln Memorial, The
CIA provided him with funds, but he
looked th the State 1)::-..partznent and the
Pentagon for guidance ar.d. targets. He
did the work. they wanted done but could
rot er not do I.Urnselves,
The Zt111;31C for votas
This was the period; 1947-50, that
witnescee. the Soviet subjection of Ru-
mania ned Czechoslovakia and the strug-
gle to save Italy, Greece, even France
and West Germany, from going Commu-
nist. Wiener's organization, spiritedly
, supported by the CIA's expanding Intel-
ligence and counterintelligence services,
played a telling, perhaps even decisi, .),
role in the defeat of the Communists in
the Italian elections of 1948 and in the
Greek elections of the early 1950's.
Considering the stakes, the expendi-
tures were modest, only a few million
dollars in each operation. And the ex-
perience was valuable in the education
of the small, elite body of political-action
tacticians whom Wisner recruited-
-a good many lawyers, with a sprinkling
of -eftnornists, historians, bankers, and
journalists.
' In 1950, General Walter Bedell Smith,
.Eisenhower's wartime Chief of Staff,
was made director of the agency. He
. soon decided to bring Whiner's opera-
' tions-under his direct control, alongside
.cov.ert intelligence. He put Wisner in
.charge of both functions, which gaye
-rise to -the Directorate of Plans, but
Wisner continued, as before, to take
-guidance from -the White House in all
'covert political action.
After Smith came .Allen Dulles, who
took over in 1952, in the early months
of the Eisenhower Administration. In-
tuitive and bold, Dulles had penetrated
the German Foreign Office during World
War II while in charge of OSS opera-
tions in Europe. While still Smith's
deputy at the CIA,' he had broadened the
political-action siervicee to -meet tin. Cam-
. monist covert war in new sectors: the
European labor movements and student
and youth organizations. ?
The CIA has 2.1bad image these days,
partly because so-much of the commen-
- Such- funds -werit:mostlylor-the support ? tary Abut; t the agency has been hostile or
Approveaor Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9
'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9
nninfoerned, and to some minds anything
dcea F. ::119 at least faintly sinister.
But there certainly was nothing sinister
au t the CIA's pelitical actions. There
t:es; been a cloak of secrecy sometimes,
ta Ise sure, but never e. deer. When the
fz1 story cesnce out, it will ;)e. clear that
Lha rassch-numored plot to kill' Fidel
Centro back in the early 1960's was not
Latched by the CIA. -
To a large ex-tent, the "dirty tricks"
in political action have consisted. cf ef-
farts to.counter Soviet activities by re-
cruiting intellectuals, mostly from the
-universities, training them in parlia-
mentary tactics; end dispatching them
abroad to duel with KGB "agents of in-
fluence" and. their dupes at various in-
ternational congresses and conferences.
The CIA presence was there by invita-
tion of the host countries. The shared
- purpose was to keep the KGB and the
Inca? Communist apparatus from turn-
ing these meetings into anti-American, .
anti-NATO demonstrations, and foment-
ing disorder in friendly societies. -
Gloria Steinem, now a leader in the
women's liberation movement and edi-
to2 of Ms.. magazine, worked with the
CIA in helping to organize some of the
volunteers who attended the World
youth Festivals in Vienna in 1959 and
Helsinki in 11.62.. The CIA people, zhe
later explained, "wanted to do what we !
wanted to do?present a healthy, diverse
:view of the United States."' ?
The CIA has involved itself in some '
dangerous and violent operations, of
course. It has proved itself to be pretty
good, for example, at conducting small-
scale warfare. In the ruin of. the Ameri-
can intervention in Vietnam, and with
the CIA's world role and mission in dan-
ger of irrational truncation, it is impor-
tant to recall the effectiveness of the
agency's paramilitary operations in In-
dochina. The successes proved to be only
temporary, as matters turned out, but
the disasters that overwhelmed them
were not of the CIA's making.
The CIA's small-war intervention in
Laos, beginning in the early 1960's, was
a highly effective enterprise. It consisted
Mostly of supplying Meo tribesmen with
rifles, some artillery, air resupply, pay
(a few dollars a rnanth), and communi-
cations, together with training and ad-
ministrative support that never engaged
more than a few hundred CIA people at
any one time.
After ten Years of marehing and
countermarching. the battle lines were
about where they were when the agency
first set about organizing the a/leo tribes-
men. Only after South Vietnam and
Cambodia fell were the Communists able
to prevail in Lacs. The so-called secret
war there, not really.secret at all, took
the lives of eight CIA men, and cost
Approved For R
about 1 iniftion a week hi the last years.
A te.,Iter in'ey inVin:harn ?
. CIA?guerrilla-warfare specialists also
operated cffective17.7 :in Vietnam in the
early 130's. In these years the director
of the CIA was John Me-Con e, a ben man as as admired at the agency fon his
acumen as Dulles had been for his verve
and style. Looking back, MeCone regrets
that the U.S. did not stick to doing things
the CIA's way in Vietnam.
"In 111.61-62," he recalls, "we had
sound Plan?an exnerienced military as-
sistance group in Saigon and the begin-
nings of a covert U.S.-d keeled operation
calculated to teach the Vietnamese how
to arm for and fight a guerrilla war. The
aim was to keep the Diem government
afloat without carnmitting sizabie
. ground forces. Sure, that part of it waa
covert, but no more so than the Ccmmn-
nist force already in the field.
"I remain convinced that if the CIA
had been left to develop that strategy,
. with the Pentagon's help, the Vietcong
would have been held at bay, and Hanoi's
Soviet and Chinese suppliers would
never have let the action escalate on any-
thing like the scale that the increasing
direct American military intervention
brought on. The war might still be going
on, on a small scale, in the ccuntayside,
but the United States would have es-
caped a massive failure."
ee
Win oneslose one in Chile
On the political-action side, McCone
points with pride at the CIA's handling
of Marxist Salvador Allende's first
serious challenge in Chile, in 1964. "As
early as 1962," he says, "President Ken-
nedy had decided in the National Secur-
ity Council that the agency should see
to it that Castro's agitators did not take
Chile into the Communist camp under
Allende's banner. In 1964 that decision
was confirmed by President Johnson.
"A sounding indicated that Allende
might well slip in. Our effort was cen-
tered on promoting in public discussion
the proposition that it was in the com-
mon interest of the Christian Democrats
and the other non-Communist parties to
come together against a Communist par-
ty heavily financed by Cuba and the
Soviet Woe. That was all the political
action amounted to. Nothing more. A
handful of intelligence officers experi-
enced in political organization, frugal
expenditure; and a good case."
That time the CIA succeeded. Six
years later, however, when Allende made
his next bid; the attentioi. .if the White
House WAS occupied elsewhere. The
CIA's covert political function was on
the way out. Suddenly, in early Septem-
ber, 1970, the State Department awak-
ened to the fact that Allende had
emerged in first place in the presidential
electian, with 36 percent of the -popular
vote to just under :7,5 percent for .the
Conservative candidate and not quitri
percent for the Chrisan Democrat. Iss-
asmuch as no cari aasejceitv,
the choice was thr!:;:',-22 '.;;L:to thi.;
ture. With barely seven weeks left lielf.ore
the legi3:1:ektu.re was to vote, the National
See.urlias Council et:dared the CIA to
head off: Allende, if it cateld, by whiepirig
!up sentiment in friendly journals for an
- anti-Communist coalition. But the bugle
sounded too late.
McCone defends covert action suell, as
the CIA took in Chile as a valid means of
'. defending national interests. "Where
situations favor covert action, the Pres-
ident must consider cuch action, and the
Congress -must tolerate it, provided le Is
in direct support of a declared national
policy. Covert action is a rational al-
ternative to an overt response, as in Viet-
nam, that can turn costly, unavailing,
and humiliating. Covert action is a use-
ful, even indispensable means of self-
defense. As the agency has employed
this method in many Situations, it was
the only way of making the voice of
reason heard in foreign places."
Today the CIA's capacity for covert
action is in shards, at least temporarily.
And the responsibility does act He with
Congress alone. When James Schles-
inger, now Secretary of Defense, moved
into the CIA directorship ,in January,
1973, he had an unmistakable commis-
sion to dismantle the Directorate of
? Plans, among other things.
! Schlesinger succeeded Richard Helms,
a wartime OSS officer who had risen in
that n"band of brothers". under Dulles
and Wisner to become Deputy Director
for Plans in 1962 and director of the
agency in 1966. President Nixon's men
pushed Helms aside because of his re-
fusal to let the agency be used as a
shield for the Watergate break-in. His
abrupt departure, to be Ambassador to
Iran, was taken inside the agency as a
signal that the old guard of profession-
als was in for a change.
A hand-carried letter
The grapevine was right, as it should
be in any intelligence service worth its
salt. A force reduction on the order of
7 percent was executed at once, produc-
ing the dismissal, resignation, or early
retirement of about 1,000 people. The
cuts fell most deeply on the Directorate
of Plans, where the senior layer was all
but peeled off.
Among the most prominent casualties:
were officers who had come put of the
OSS, and had spent their careers in
Plans, alongside Helms. Two senior of-
ficers were given a hand-carried letter
in the morning, notifying them that their
elease!2.p4l1/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9
Approved For Rele
services would no longer be required.?
after the clOse of that day's business.
The counterintelligence service?the
? test by far in the non-Communist world
and the binding element for many of the,
others.--was cut in half. Three senior
ers cult in disgust after their chief,,
Jarnr_.=s Angleton, was let go. All in all,
the share of the agency budget going
into clandeatine services was severely
compressed. To Schlesinger, the depar-
? ture of the' "old boys" was no occasion
for weeping; to him, they were "relics
of the Cold War." ? ?
The Directorate of Plans was renamed'
the Directorate for Operations. To take,
charge of it Schlesinger promoted Wil-
liam Colby, a Princeton man who, like
Helms and Wisner, came into the agency
from the OSS and had passed his whole
career on the clandestine side. For nye
years (1962767) he was chief of the Far ;
East Division, and fon three years
(1968-71) he ran with skill and resolu-.
Iution the. controversial Phoenix plan ,
aimed at uprooting . the Communists,
from villages in South Vietnam. ?
The man who came In from the cold
' The ascent of a veteran black-side
man to be head of what was left of the
old Directorate of Plans?and later to
be head of the shrunken CIA?was not.
2.3 Odd as it loolcecl. Caby l-tad COrtie in.
from the cold. He had perceived that de-
tente had altered the role of the CIA. He
had also come to realize that, given the
mood of Congress, the indifference of
the press to the strategic value of intelli-
gence, and the American people's mount-
ing aversion to foreign involvements,
the clandestine side had become so
nerable as to make it all but ineffective.
Colby, then, is resigned to the pros?
-
pect that the CIA will change into some-
thing different from the CIA he worked
in for so many years. "Just tell us in
the intelligence business what the nation
wants and does not want," he said at a
congressional hearing, "and we will do
our best to satisfy it."
He is too knowledgeable and serious a'
man, however, to be willing to see the
capability for clandestine political action
struck down entirely. The President, he
says, must be left with a mechanism that
in certain situations will allow him "a
choice between a diplomatic protest and
sending in the Marines." But even that
remnant is in jeopardy, unless the Presi-
dent is prepared to fight Congress for it.
If the black hide should be extirpated,
? or transferred elsewhere, the agency
wouldn't be without work. Two crucial
functions are not in dispute: the collec-
tion a intelligence information and the
analysis of what is collected. Within the
collecting process, the CIA conducts
? three different programs electrohic sus.-
veillance (listening in on electronic
Approved For
ase 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9
emissions of all sorts) ; photographic
reconnaissance utilizing satellites and
the high-flying LT-2 and SR-71 aircraft;
and tile collection of intelligence, both
covert and overt, by people.
Lookino into a cleseti sociely
McCone always held that the anaiyti-
cal process, leading to the drafting of
the National Estimates from the grist
brought to the mill at Langley, Virginia,
was the agency's most important (and
least .appreciated) function; Spying by
means of high technology has had the ef-
fect of legitimizing the clandestine side
of the collection process, and has given
the analysts More hard intelligence to
work with than ever came from human
spies alone. In combination with over-
the-horizon radar and electronic tech-
niques for monitoring alien communisa-
tions, the spying satellites supply the
only reliable and comprehensive means
for looking down into a closed society
and listening in on seine of the business
, being transacted there. .
Cameras and film have improved to the
'point where by some accounts something
on the ground only a foot or so in length
can be identified in a picture taken 100
miles above. The interpretive techniques
have also gained in sureness. The photo
interpreters are able to determine with-
is these "W7_. can se
that on a certain date the Teussians
ersetly 1,618 ICFM's deployed. We ?
almost absolutely sure of the number
? 3-31it?krowing what is in place is orn
that
21.114,dy..
jected,cn ths magnffiers at the Nation
Photographic Interpretation Center r
southeast Washington can't tell t?,_
photo interpreters ilcr-.7 many weapon
of that type are to be deployed and wile
or the charactcristion .cf the follow-o
weapon no doubt already in preparatio
under concealing roofs. All that is hie
den inside Russian heads, and is aece
tamable only by the clandestine method
now in disrepute?the gleanings of a
agent, the secrets spilled by a defect?.
:ari-vem.r3 over Cola
The CIA's functioning in the Cuba
missile crisis in the autumn of 196
during McCone's stewardship, illustrate
both, the value Of high-in-the-sky sur
veillance and the value of down-on-the
ground covert intelligence. McCone,
engineer by training,. found the nel
technology of intelligence fascinating
"Technology," in his words, "gives in
telligence a new cutting edge." But he
also put a high value on clandestine in
telligence, and was willing to spen
in narrow to the physical dime"-, money cn the chance a getting it.
sions and technical characteristics of In the summer and early fall of 1962
the new Soviet weaponry as it comes into the CIA collected from agents in Cub:
view?submarines and warships being some 1,300 reports of Russian missile'
assembled on the ways, prototype tac- being moved about the island. State De
tical aircraft being taxied on the tarmac, partment Sovietologists, however, toli'
. rocket engines firing up in the test beds, Kennedy that it would not accord witi-
radar dishes under construction.
the Soviet mentality to put offensive nu
? The CIA does not do all this demand-
clear weapons into another country.
ing work alone. It flies the satellites in MaCone was persuaded that Khrush
chest would try to do something to offset
partnership with the Air Force, which
provides and launches them. The cam-
the American success with its ICBM's
eras and film, together with the inter-
and his conviction crystallized as a re
pretation of the pictures, are 'the re-
suit of the information being fed to MI6
sponsibility of the CIA. The Defense and CIA contacts by Colonel Oleg Pen
Department's National Security Agencykovsky, a member of the Soviet Stet
has done a first-class job in monitoring
Scientific Committee. Penkovsky was at-
the telemetry broadcast by Soviet mi tached to the Soviet equivalent of th
s-
American Joint Chiefs of Staff; he knev
quences of Soviet technicians on the 1
sues on test flights, and the drill se-
when weapons were scheduled for de-
missile ranges. gployment, and was able to pass along
From the data accumulated by these Iword that for some reason only a small
n
and other means, the CIA and its col-
umber of the only Soviet ICBM in ad-
laborators are able, in the case of a vanced development, the huge SS-6, were
Soviet rocket, for example, to come up to be released to the ready forces.
with a fair estimate of its performance. in the meantime, a heavy ship move-
? They can determine the rate of accelera-
merit out of the Black Sea was being
tion, burning interval, exhaust temper-
tracked into Cuba. It was much too large
? ature, instant of cutoff, Fpeed, trajec-
to be explained away as economic aid.
tory, the havior in trajectory,
even The Soviet embassy in Washington had
be
acknowledged that the U.S.S.R. was giv-
the payload; an"! the 1,cm...racy 1:71-
in g some antiaircraft missiles to Castro
pact. It's a masterly exercise.
Colby believes that with high-technol- for defenzive purposes, but McCune
ogy surveillance so far advanced, "we
asked himself
in Cuba' unless they had some-
himself why the Russians wanted
i
, ?
could drop all the covert political opera- SAM thing to hide.
tions and the country would stand." He
McCone persevered, and in October
offers an example of how precise the
Rase 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432AbtfiSiiitbiO0NI-Ving President Ken-
Approved For Release 2001/08108: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 ?
neily to authorize U-2 photographic
fiigLts over Cuba. The photographs taken
the f!rst three days revealed the con-
off numerous missile sit, Each
r.!;.s7:,'d ar.171,7;ular "trar;sold'al"
:form in the positioning. of .the rocket
lains.chers. From documents Penkovsky
halgivnn then, the CIA men at once
rrovniscd ft arrangement as standard
fc the and SS-5's with the Red
Arrn.- in Europe. The E.S-41 had a range
of alout 1,200 miles, and the SS-5 about
2,z00. From Cuba, they could reach most
of the cities in the U.S.
By then, the photo interpreters had
been able to fix-the total number of So-
viet ICBM's, in the operational forces at
about seventy, only a fraction of what
the U.E. Strategic Air Force had in
place. There .was no doubt then that the
? balance Icy with the U.S. McCon.e said
so, and 17:onnedy had this knowledge
when he decided to move to a showdown.
Ciir:E;a.;
With the new capabilities in high-tech-
nology O. urveillr.nce., and the increased,
reliiince on theia, the Cfr. has p.,issed
into its third nz-c.
period v.-as the first. It emphasized clan-
destine political action, but it also
brought clang all the: pioneering techni-
cal apparatus. The McCone-Helms per-
1.9,51-73, was the second age. Tech-
nology came to command the rna.Sor as-.
sets, but the black side was given strong
Sti'port. The Schlesinger-Colby metes-.
sion introduced the third age, bringing
on a withering away of the clandestine
side, and an almost complete dependence
on technology, together with analysis
drawing mostly on open printed matter
an cl!.pion-tatic rcp.orting.
Is the nation thereby made more vul-
nerable? For policing the hazy SALT
covenants, in the face of the Soviet re-
fusal to allow on-the-zround inspzictior
the U.S., and the whole non-Corm-au:11s
world for that matter, must look primer
Ey to. photographic s atdlites. A camera
7.'ecord oTiiy what is ern
view, it is posciLis to tool or bind cm
render eef the ry?_:?;..E:;:riE now in pace
The Russians could make it much mar
difficult for us %;e comprehend thei
rocket telemetry, and there is some enu
picion that they have undertaken t
do so. Their submarine pens have bee,
roofed over. There are even disturbi,
indications that they are edging past th
proscriptions placed upon antiballisti
systems by raising the power of t
radar S in place and testing what coo/
be experimental ABh1 warheads fr
antiaircraft launchers.
The meaning of all this is not den
But the pattern is worrisome. It supple
the best of reasons for keeping reckles
hands in Congress off the CIA. EN
How Our Man in Tehran Brought Down a Demagogue
It may be instructive for Americans to be reminded, after
tne grand-scale squandering of lives, prestige, and wealth in
Indochina, that another U.S. government, only a generation
back, was capable of exercising power and influence deftly and
un.r.ib.trusively in a potentially dPrAning in emotional situa-
tion, and achieving success at a very moderate coat. The CIA
exercised power that way in Iran in 1953. The performance
was a gem in the art of clandestine political action.
The CIA task in Iran, laid upon it by President Eisenhower
in the National Security Council, was to unhorse -a rabble-
rousing politician, Mohammed Mossedegh, memorable other-
wise for an uncontrollable impulse to public weeping, who had
maneuvered his way into the premiership two years earlier.
Mossedegh had expelled the British, seized the Anglo-Iranian
Oil Co.'s refinery at Abadan and nationalized its properties.
? A British boycott failed to bring Mossedegh around. He plotted
with the Communist party of Iran, the Tudeh, to overthrow
Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and hook up with the Soviet
Union. To the Kremlin it was an attractive, if nettlesome,
prospect, promising access to oil supplies and to the waters of
the Persian Gulf.
To head off the danger that Iran would become a Soviet ally,
if not satellite, Allen Dulles of the CIA dispatched to Tehran
! his Middle East operations chief, thirty-seven-year-old Kermit
Roosevelt, grandson of T.R. He entered upon his mission under
a cover that stayed on. Roosevelt's plan, which the Shah ap-
proved and in which the British were to be invisible partners,
THE. WALL STREET JOURNAL,
Friday, May 30. 1975
I? CIA DEFENDERS rally to protect the'
spy agency from its critics.
Rockefeller's special investigating 'corn-
I,
mission, 10 its early-June report, will defend
!
?the CIA's oft-attacked covert operations.
Director Colby goes public with a series of
!speeches asserting the need for covert activ-
ity. Ford associates ridicule a proposal to
Irequire that secret : operations have the
Fireederot's.- wr1itt.41. apprcval -.plus advance
briefing of 50 legislators. Officials warn of
ecrigvcssional Icals.; as we:1 ascliplvalatil
-stories if a _presidentially approved opera.,
called for the Iranian Army to seize Tehran, arrest the usurpa
and install a new Premier.
In mid-August, through bad luck, the enterprise failed. A
attempt to arrest Mossedegh misfired. The Shah fled to Born
and shrieking mobs roamed through the capital. In Washin
ton, Eisenhower's counselors urged the abandonment of a to
gamble; but Alien Duiles ;,r.Q:skteri that Ro,,,eveit be given
head.
From a private house, never showing himself, workh
through half a dozen junior CIA officers and a small numb
of Iranian intelligence officers, Roosevelt succeeded within
week in steeling the Palace Guard in Tehran for action, a
? whipping up sentiment against Mossedegh in the press, amo
the merchants, and in the bazaars. Once the army mov
Mossedegh's strength melted away. The Shah returned to
palace, triumphant. Roosevelt left Tehran as inconspicuou
as he had arrived. The enterprise cost the U.S. little more tb
his modest salary (about 0.2,000 a year) and his travel
penses, plus an advance to the Shah's bodyguard of "a few te
of thousands" of dollars for back pay, a debt that the Sb
quickly repaid. ,
? The Iran operation supplied the CIA Directorate of P1
with a useful model. "The lesson was," as one official recen
put it, "that a clandestine outfit need not take open comma
of a coup, or revolution. The intelligent way to control eve
is to recruit the right people, drill them carefully,, and man
ver them into the right spots."
1. 'don ihou'id -blow up. ? ? -.? ''- ?,-! ,i? ? -;
. Administration leaders hope to persuade
Congress, after its current inquiries, to set
up a permanent joint committee on intelli-.
genes. It would monitor CIA activities but
limit the danger of leaks. Officials complain
that CIA -men now shy away from taking
strong positions for fear of. leaks. .
?
Ford's .teammates, along with' conserva-
tives Goldwater and Tower, praise Sen.
Church's CIA probe for a "responsible" ap-
proach-so far.
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA4aaP77-0043214000100370008-9
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9
WASHINGTON STAR
9 June 1975 -
'tee dine-tee ite
,
ei
? Dy Jeremiah O'Leary
eleass Star Staff Writer
WILLIAMSBURG Three miles
west of Virginia's colonial capital on
Route 143 toward Richmond, the only
entrance to Camp Peary resembles
the main gate of any U.S. military
reservation with its guard shack, an
armed M.P. and a chain-link fence
topped with barbed wire.
The sign at the threshold reads:
"Armed Forces Experimental Train-
ing Activity. Department of Defense.
Camp Peary." There is nothing to
indicate a super-secret function, but
Camp Peary is a great deal more
than it seems to be. Since 1951, this
'10,000-acre tract of woodland and
marsh an the banks, of the York
River has been the principal training
center for the CIA.
The 50,000 residents of York and
James City counties and the 10,000
inhabitants of Williamsburg have
only the dimmest notion of what goes
on inside Camp Peary. The eight re-
tired generals and admirals who live
at nearby Queen's Lake are close
enough to hear gunfire and to see
planes landing and taking off at the
mile-long runway at ,Camp Peary
bet they do not ask questions. .
, Williamsburg's weekly, the Vir-
hgtaia Gazette, tettpgeari Camp paegy
as the CIA's training base three
years ago using second-hand acs
!counts but no reporter from that
paper or any other is known to have-
set foot in the camp until I did re-
cently. That is because the listed
public relations officer is also Camp
Peary's security officer.
,
MUCH OP WHAT has been written
about the CIA's activities at Camp
Peary emerged only in the past
several years and nearly all of it
consists of disclosures from a hand-
ful of former CIA officers who are
disillusioned with the agency or ac-
tively antagonistic toward it. The
writings and statements of men like
Philip Agee, Joe Maggio, Victor
Marchetti, John L. Marks and Pat-
rick J. McGarvey revealed much
about what the CIA was doing at
Camp Peary, but these sources disa-
greed among themselves on some
specifics of the activities at the CIA's
West Point. , ?
'Marchetti and McGarvey both,
however, linked Camp Peary with
CIA assassination plans, including
Operation Phoenix in South Vietnam.
Marchetti said a number of contract
employes trained at Peary for the
counter-terror program that he said
accounted for 40,000 dead Viet Cong
infiltrators. .
? McG arvey, of Upper Marlboro,
Md., said one of Camp Peary's mis-
sions was training in "neutralization'
of an infrastructure," to which he
added,' "Essentially, that's, saying
you're killing people.". ?
? - ?
?
CAMP PEARY was well enough
'known when it came into being in
1942 as a training camp for World
?War H Navy Sea Bees.
Three times the size of. Williams-
burg, Camp Peary encompassed a
large portion of Bruton District in-
York County, including Magruder
Village, Carter's Creek, Bigler Mill
Pond and yet today the place does.
not appear on maps of the historic
region. ?
There also are two 17th Century
structures at Camp Peary that are
erroneously remembeded in Willi.'
arnsburg as the Porto Bello Mansion. ?
Boarded up and numbered as all
military base buildings are, the two
buildings were actually the customs
houses for the colonial governors
when Williamsburg was a port. for
shipping on the York and James
rivers.
?
Nearly 70,000 sailors trained at
Camp Peary until the state of Virgin-
ia acquired the site for a game pre-
serve' and reforestation project in
1948. When the camp became the
CIA's covert training center during
the Korean conflict, it effectively
vanished from the public view.
The very isolation of Camp Peary,
which is closed to the public and.cices
not encourage visitors, has trans-
formed the place into a dream world
for conservationists and nature-
lovers. Herds of deer are so tame
that they wander fearlessy on the
lawns and show up for daily handouts
from the kitthens of CIA wives.
In one late afternoon visit,. I saw
beaver, muskrats,'ground-hogs,
foxes, wild turkeys and every variety
Of bird common or rare to these lati-
tudes. ?
CAMP PEARY today has a small
permanent cadre of less than 20 in-
structors and their families, the MP
contingent, some maintenance per-
sonnel including a fire department,.
and a fluctuating student population
in several courses of varying length
that probably does not exceed 150. In
? all, the population of Camp Peary Li,
placed at about 300.
There, is a training course for
newly hired officers entering train-
Ping (presently the training class has
about 35 JOT's: average age, the late
twenties.) There is also a Basic
Operations Course; an Advanced
Operations Course and periodically
there are senior seminars for veteran
officers and mid-career courses
somewhat like the periodic re-train-
ing courses known as "in-service" to'
the FBI at Quantico, Va.
If assassination ever was a part of
iCIA training, agency officers say
every employe including those at
, Peary have now been' requited to
submit a signed statement to Colby
;tatting whether the-j have ever.
'known of or been involved in any dis-
cussion or plaillor an assassination.
Ai PEARY today, the men and
women are trained in the use of
small arms, including 9 mm pistols
and Swedish submachine guns, but it
is denied that assassination has any
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77_430432R000100370008-9
part in the curriculum. It is acknowl-
edged that there are escape and eva-
sion tests, with trainees trying to
evade "capture"; some close-corn-
;bat work in simulated villages and in
border-crossing ? in which trainees
get a workout trying to penetrate a
? frontier system like that along the
Iron Curtain.
? For parachute training or heavy
' Weapons work, the CIA's people go to
places like Ft. Benning and FL
Bragg.
"This is a place like Benning or
Parris Island," said one experienced
source. "We teach self-defense,.
unarmed combat and the like. Flat
and heel of the hand, not fists cr ka-
rate. There's a lot of work in the gym
and we have good rifle and pistol
ranges." .
. THE EMPHASIS, they say at
Peary, is now on self-protection be-
cause of the growing incidence of
terrorism around the world with
Americans as targets. There is a
course at Peary on the protection of
CIA officers' homes and a sophist-.
caned ,,,,?; .;,4..,,. course that in-
volves curiaus means of erashiag
into and evading other autos simu-
lating terrorist roadblocks. This'
course was so interesting to King
Hussein that he arranged for one just
like it in Jordan.
There are no more foreign nation-
als training at Peary. The last non-
U.S. personnel to train there Were
members of the bodyguard of the
late King Faisal of Saudi Arabia. The
Saudi stett5ents were at Peary when
the King was slain and promptly
went home to Riyadh.
. ? But Camp Peary is no longer:
exclusively for use of the CIA, either.
There are now a small number of
State Department officers on student
status and soon there is expected to
be a quantum 'expansion. It is reli-
ably reported that the Defense Intel-
ligence Agency, which once trained
personnel at Ft. Holabird in Balti-
more and now uses Ft, Huachuca,
?Ariz., will soon shift its training
-Operations to Camp Peary.
? MOST OF THE students live in.
modern brick barracks, a BOQ
(Bachelor Officers Quarters) for the
men and WOQ for the women train-
ees. There is a small but well-ap-
pointed club, stamped from the mold
of officers' clubs all over the United
States, complete with swimming
pool. The permanent staff has mod-
est ranch-style houses for which they,
pay $135 a month. There are some
older homes here that existed before,
Peary leccarrie a naval trainie ; base:
and some of the childless couples and
married M.P.s ;lie in these.
? Only bare concrete floors, now
beginning to sprout saplings in the
cracks, remain of the World War II
wooden barracks used the Sea Bees
and many of these areas are nearly
?
'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-IRDP77-00432R00-0100370008-9 ?
hiddenty the iitvinrbrush.- "
? At least two of the old farm houses, ? .
especially remodeled inside and with
scenic views of the 2iver and lakeso
are set aside for VIP visitors. Colby'
is A periodic vis:tor T4ibers he wants to
get away from his weekly grind and
his publicly listed Bethesda home
telephone. Former CIA Director'
'James R; Schlesinger, now secretary
or defense and nominal landlord of..
;Camp Peary, i3 ?a dedicated bird- ?
'watcher and often comes ,to the
.reservation to pursue his hobby. ?
. It is reported but unverified that,
!certain key members of Congress
also are permitted to use Camp
.Peary as. a vacation spot because. of.
WASHINGTON POST
? 12 Jtni 1975,..,
it arnlieleri fishing and liunthoe'2.
and absolute isolation. It is also rc-
pooted that Peary is used by the CIA
as a "safe house" for defectors co
others. ? . ?
se The -;CIA ccsatinues to send is
trainees into outside communities co
training enIssions. Right now, the
exercises in tailing, surveillance, ce-
-cret meetings and !nessage drops
are being conducted in and around
Richmond department stores. with,
.instructors watching ? and marking,
'the traine.es as they work againsf,
veterans sent down from-Washington
'to test their skill at the requirements
of espionage. on the streets. ?
IN ThE PAST, the dazette,eclitori-
Ihy'TE DIRECT YOUR ATTENTION to a relatively brief
VV and unobtrusive passage in the Rockefeller com-
mission report which is reprinted elsewhere on this page
todsy. Entitled .Chapter 2, "The Need for Intelligence,"
it the
a consideration that is easy to overlook in
the insh to judge the CIA's misdeeds, The CIA's past
exC,esses and misdeeds are critically important. But so
is this country's need for an effective intelligence sys-
tem. This need is not rooted in outdated and excessive
apprehensions, but in an appreciation of contemporary
reality: the world, is 'complex and fast-changing, 'and
some- nations in it are hostile to our own. The proper
purpose of the extraordinary purgative exercise now..
being direated at the CIA?of which the Rockefeller
.commission report is a part?is to ensure that, without aS-
saulting citizens' rights, policy .makers will continue to
have the inforination and analysis they need_ to make
,decisions. This .is basic. ? ? ' ? ? ,
? Now, while a much greater proportion of this inf or-
platen could be made public and thereby shared and'
tested in timely fashion, it nonetheless remains neces-
sary .in our view that much of the collection and analysis
of it. must be done on a discreet, that is to say, secret,
basis. We shape and execute domestic policy in the open,
or, we should, on the presumption that all of us have the
nation's 'best interests at heart. But in the formulation
of national security 'piney it would be foolish, to ignore
that some of those who would observe the. policy-making
process have interests in conflict with'?our own. That is
the rationale for some secrecy in this area. For a news-
paper to accept this rationale even while it does its daily
darndest to unlock official secrets is merely a necessary
'fact Of life in a society. trying at once to be faithful to
its highest domestic values, and to survive in an often-
hostile international environment. Citizens must, we be- .
lieve; accept both requirements as legitimate and hon.
_arable,
any took Urnbrasse at Camp Peary ess
-the presumption that it was a train-
ing ground for assassination and sur-
veillance. The paper called on. the-
. .Virginia senators ad Rep. Thomas
N. Downing, D-Va, in whose district
canos5 is loczted, to investigaw.
and put a step to kali.. ? ?
':'Downing said he has had a blanket,
invitation from ,. CIA . headquarters'
:Since 1.972..to make an inch-by-inth)
examination of Camp Peary whenev.
er he wishes. He said he had been as-
sured by the CIA that there neve'
? was any training at Camp Peary in
assassination or with mini-nukes and
added, "I think that's. probably
,true."
trr
Weal fence'
It must be understood that nations?arid, especially,
but not exclusively, those which are our adversaries?
commonly try to penetrate or confound each other's
intelligence systems: This makes it essential to iirotect
one's own system by erecting defenses that coma under
the name of counter-intelligence. The Rockefeller, com-
mission report shows the danger here:. some activities
undertaken in the name or form of counter-intelligence
led the CIA outside its charter and outside the law. It
is Wrong, however, to label any effort to establish guide-
lines for counter-intelligence procedures?procedures
which unavoidably take place on domestic soil?as astep
which legitimizes domestic "spying." Hard discussion is
needed on the report's proposals that the CIA be per-
mited to collect information on employees and, in co-
ordination with the FBI, on persons posing a "clear
threat" to its facilities or personnel and on "persons
? suspected of espionage or 'other illegal activities relating
,,to foreign intelligence." This discussipn must proceed
from a double awareness of past pitfalls and continuing o.
counter-intelligence needs.
The -commission notes, for instance,- that some Corn-
munist countries "can" monitor Americans' private
phone conservations by the thousand; this makes some
Americans "potentially subject" to blackmail. That a
foreign power "can" tap an American's phone does not
excuse the CM from actually having done So. It is one.
of this country's proudest boasts that, at its best, it holds
itself to standards that it expects ne other' country to
meet. But it would 'be frivolous to proceed from there
to conclude that the large intelligence effort which, say,
Russia 'has mounted in this country can safely be ignored.
In the drive to ensure that the CIA is cleansed of its ex-
ceises and improprieties,, its legitimate functions must
not be. impaired. - ? . ? ....,
?
THE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER
3 May 1975
? .?
NO Intelligence easti for Federalists
Sir,?In ? the Guardian (114 that. it has received CIA 'money'
2) you quoted Mr Body, MP for might cause great 'damage to.'
;1Iolland-with?Boston, as saying. the Federal Trust and adversely.
'that "the Federal Trust has
affect its sources of donation,
reeeiet; great tleai of ..:tottey and income?Yours, etc, ?
from the _CIA." . (Sir) John Foster,
. This statement is cunipletelY Chairman of Trate,
untrue. The Federal Trust has ? Federal Trust for Education'
never received any money from 'and Research,- -
the CIA in any shape or form. 12a Maddox Street,
Such an allegation to the effect, London WI.
?.
. ??
,
NATIONAL REVIV
6 JUNE 1975
ES Signs of .the times: A lecture agent
has advised David Phillips, the CIA
man who has resigned from the Agency
to undertake its defense, that whereas
' eon expect to make from $5,000 to
' $10,000 a year on lectures defending
the Agency, he could make between
$50,000 and 100,000 a year attacking
? it.
Approved For Release 2001/08L83: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9
)2
NEW YORK
11,.7'1.71rs 1975
yfted'Por Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9
? ? ?,..?
? '
Optation aos
,
? ?
..Instead of the whithviash that many critics had pre-'e
dieted, the Rockefeller Commission's report on the
mestin activities of the,: Central Intelligence Agency:
a. trenchant, :Actual, and plain-spoken dactiment, it
presents an apt:ailing picture of '.illegal and impropen,
zclions conducted against American citizens in a wide
. range of activities andover a long period of time., ?
The National security Act of 1947 establishing the
C.I.A. ex-plicitly,forbade'the agency from exercising any,
"police, subpoena, .cr law-enforcement powers or in-
ternallsecunity functions." Althougt. the word "foreign"
is nowhere used in thee statute, it was clearly understood
that the, C.I.A. was to engage cnly in-collecting.;foreign;
Intelligence.
,
. .
Yet -when domestic turmoil began to develop in thet
mid sixties in. Campus demonstrations, rebelliqnsein thei
black 'Slums and the. v.iidespread protest moireinent
.against the Vietnam war, the. 'CIA. under Richard' Heints'.
reSponded to the pressure.? feoin President Johnson to
investigate domestic dissidents in the hope of finding
? embarrassing links te Communist countries. .
NO such' links were ever found, but the White Honsee,
pressure to purstie this ai'll-o-the-WiSp greatly intensi-
fied during the first four years o2 the Nixon Administra-
tion. It would be laughable 'if. it were not sinister that'
-the .code name, for this wholly illegal investiga-
tive project was "Operation Chaos." ? . -
It ishorrifying to learn that the CIA. had under:C.6\7-er ?
contacts monitor the meeting's of grOups such as the.
;Southern Christian Leadership Conference and. the
_Washingtdri Urban League. It, maintained files on nearly
a thousand organizations. By August, 1973, when C.I.A.
:Director Colby virtually ,rialted this project; "tho paper'
trail left by Operation Chaos included soniewhere in the
area ..of"..13000. Tiles on. -subjectS !arid individuals," the
report-discloses. Linked to this was a. computer system'
containing an,index. .of over 300,000 names and organize,'
' tions, almost . all of them of United States, citizens and
:organizations unconnected with espionage.
Mr. Helms and the high officials of the Johnson and
Nixon Administrations with ;whom he dealt were well-'
. aware that they were breaking the law. Thus, in submit? e..
ting to Henry Kissinger a report on ."Restless Youth,"
.Mr., Helms wrote in a covering memorandum early in
1969 that a section on American students Was "extremely;
-sensitive" -because the whole area was 'outside, the,:
agency's charter. ??
t For twenty years beginning in '1953, the.0e14.-
veyed mail between this country and the 'Soviet .Union,',
opening several thousand letters each year. This, too;i?
was in clear violation of the law and'wasfinally haltede
at the insistence of the Chief Postal Inspectore' ;
Like the Federal Bureau of. Investigation ? under the
late .J. Edgar Hoover; thp 'C.I.A. ire selected instances,
engaged: in wiretapping and burgIary?sometimes on its
own and sometimes in collaboration with the
- What emerges from this report's account of Operation,:
Chaos .a.nd of mail interception., wiretapping' and Other
misconduct is the picture of an embryonic police state.
the press disclosures that forced this Presidentially
di-
rected inquiry by the Rockefeller Commission and the -
further investigations to .come by the Senate and
committee- have served to- alert the nation to: a develope,
ment profoundly dangerous to constitutional democracy...
e it ? C.I.A. Reform.
The revelations in the Rockefellenreport clemonstratei':
'the unwisdoni of freeing the Central intelligepce Agent7I
from all the, normal legal' and institutional , procedures
that 'serveto review and restrain the. exercise of power,
by ordinary government agencies. The law' establishing:
the CIA. placed total reliance upon pie good judgmenite
' 24'
, ,
:of the. President and the C.I.A. director.
Even at the ,outset, in the Truman and2EisinhOwe...4?:.
Administrations and under the canny leadership of Allen
Dulles; this reliance proved inSufficient to prevent some.
iliegal activities such as the extensive mail interception:,
program.. Under later, ,Pretidents this control systerri(:
totally faired. , . ,
The recommendations of the Rockefeller COmmisalai",'
soundzs- far as they go, largely add up to imposing the
restraints that help control other bureaucracies/it urges
that Congress seriously Consider Making
budget "at least to some extent" a matter at public.?i
knowledge, instead of concealing 't--as is now done?
in fictitious items listed in various departmental budget.:
, Quite apart from all the obvious dangers such loose,,
,practice presents, it does not even seem to meet the
explicit requirements of the Constitution.
The agency has not only been largely irmnune from'
the inquiries of the General Accounting Office, Congress's
investigatory arm, but also-has felt free to mislead th&
Office of Management and Budget, the President's agent
for fiscal control. Amending the law and exectitive orders
to make it clear that the C.I.A. can no longer esc:ape,
? normal budgetary control; would do much, all by itself-
to uncover and perhaps prevent the expenditure of large
sums of Money on illegal operations.
o The C.I.A. has traditionally had an understandingwith
the Attorney ,General that the agency would investigate
any criminal charges against ;its own employes and riot
refer them to-the Justice Department. The commission is
right to urge that this "gentleman's agreement" be
:abrogated and that the Justice Department reassumeits
,proper prosetutorial role.
The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
nand -the Congression?: supervisory committees have all
tailcd in. their trust. Had they been vigilant and aggres:
slve the shocking misdeeds now being exposed could!
never have Occurred or would soon lave been curbed:
The commission wisely recommends that the power of
the, advisory board be strengthened and that Congress
it long last establish a joint committee on intelligenne.,
but, not too much reliance can be placed on either, ,of
these reforms. esr - -
In this dangerous world, the UnitedfStates tntst' have
-a well-run agency, tb gather intermation about foreign
nation's, especially _those that may have hostile designs.'
The,c,Xcessei.and aberrationPof' the CIA. do not erase
that necessity nor do they cancel out the useful work
!the, agency has performed atitimes in assessing various
international situations. .
The ehallerige to President Ford and to .Congress is to
devise institutions ,.and prOcedures Strong enough and
supple enOtighto enable the C.I.A.*to _perform its essen-,
'tat overseas tasks without simultaneously swirling out
CoritrOl:',.and becoming a' covert menace to the very,
,..freedoms it is, supposed to be. protecting.
* .
sassmacion Blot
lie best way to avr.Oid- suspicions of, a. cover-up-
not to .'coyer up.ePreSident iFerd's explanations for
withholding those portions of the Rockefeller Corn-.
nfision's report concerning allegation of political assas
?sination.s. Only compound the Injury .already inflicted
'by massive leaks and innuendo on' this sordid' issue.
It no excuse to say,: as, theePresident :did, that the
? stt6j.ebt "extremely 'sensitive." Indeed it is, which'',
-is :Why a full and, authoritative statement is the !only,
e.,;n4y-ta':nrevent letlf,truths? and gossip from acquiring
a life- and credibility of their ,own: For the _President
`;simply to refcr,, darkly to Unspecitied incidents of the
ast:, fifteen .cOr. twenty year" is in itself' a Veiled
.iiirlietnient susceptible to misuse for partisan political.
.purposes. -?:.
The President personally broadeneckr...tht . Rockefeller.
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100870008-9
'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9 ?
WASHINGTON P3i
11 June 1975
" Controversial', Acts Muhl. to -stem ltratiter Ti
e e By William Greider
Sy4ellinstto.n Pos4 Staff Writer
???? :The Rockefeller commis-
,sion's report on the Central'
..Intelligence Agency's do-
mestic ? Misdeeds sidesteps
Some 0 -crucial, questions
_about who's to blame and
will probably provoke new
debate over how to control
the secret agency. .
' The. investigation compiled
and analyzed a mountain of
? previously secret data, made
public yesterday, on the do-
mestic activities which got
:file. CIA, in trouble last win- ;
;ter when they were first re-
vealed. The commission cair-s,'
. eludes that many of these?
spying on. political . dissi-
dents,' mail ? openings,-keep-
ing 'secret files on"Ainerican
'.eitizens?went beyond the
proper lirnits of the CIA's
charter,. if not beyond the
raw Itself. ?
t
But the findings.get fuzzy
;when it .comes to resolving
the conflicting testimony of -
hien-,officials ever who au-
thorized these enterprises.;
'Jrhe blame falls More on the
system, less on individuals,-
:some' of whom are still' in ;
gOvernment. In *short, the,,
the report did not answer the.,
,
question: who is lying?
.
Secdnd, while, the commis-
sion recommends that
Wide variety of CIA' practWil
ees, from burglary to ma,
Opening, should be permae
nently forbidden, its recom-
Mendations for "reforms!'
may also be read -as legiti-
mizing some Of the CIA's con:.
.troversial surveillance activ-
ities inside the , United
? States. s
The eight-member ? comn
mission, chaired by .the Vice
President, ,? was born six;
months ago amid wide-
spread skepticism:- because,
its membership was domi-
;naked by cold warriors long.
:associated with the "intelli-:
gence community." Now that
the commisison's, report is
public, questions seem likely
to continue.
The commission proposed.
amendments to the Nation-
al, Security', Act of ; 1947 to
,
eliminate "ambiguities"
abopt what-the CIA can and
Neivs Auttysts
cannot do, but the eigtifica-
tions in some ''cases'. might
actually ;strengthen t h e.
agency's ability to- partici-
pate;.in domestic ' security"
cases. ' '
'The prOpesed.arneridments,I.
.for instance, would say .'ex
.plieitlY what many , people
'assumed was already k in the-
Jeweethat the CIA activities'
.imust'-concentrate' ?
? eign intelligence" only.' Yet .
'they would also grant teh':
ageocy explicit 'authority,
? "for -providing guidance and
.technical assistance' to tithee
'agency a n d department
:heads in protecting. against
-unauthorized . disclosures.
',within their own. agencies;
Tend 'departments." ;..
;Language stieh ' ae,
"guidance 'and technical ,as-
:
sistance" ie 7 subject- to,
stretching ;when a. bureauc:
racy seeks to expand its
role. Would "technical ;Stie
sistance" Cover the red wig,
, and spy camera which the
CIA-. provided to the ?White'
House '"plumbers"? ''Could
the CIA- assign undercover
.agents-for:"guidance" to an-,
other federal agency that is
-chasing domestic .suspects?::.
? ??
,Likewise, the commission
called on President Ford to
,issue' an' executive order de-
fining, more narroWly. what
; domestic surveillance activi-
'ties the CIA can properly'
undertake on American' citi-
eerie: It is: at .least arguable
that: the propdsed
might authorize some of the
very spying on ;domestic po=0
litical dissidents which 'pro-.
yoked the current contro-
versy.
? The exeeutive; order, for.
instance, .would permit Sur;;;
veillance on anyone. associ-
ated with the CIA, past or.
presente for security pure
poses. ? That* means the
agency could birddog author
and ex-agency 'official Victor-
-Marchetti, which it edid .in
.a71.., ' ? se: .
:Coniniission's assignment', le include,y?,the reports
United, States: :involvement ,through C.LA .in the uglyi
business oi'piotting ef forc!grt What-4
ever fact' the c.ommission's inquiry established should
now be .made public, along with whatever additional
material emerges from the independent inveStigations
,now being made by two Congressional committees.
In the absence of such disclosure, Mr. Ford's state,
ment that "I am totally opposed to political more fatuous
assassinar
Directors of CIA Since 107
Since its formation in 1947, the Central intelligence
'AgencY has been headed by:
,
- ? Rear .Adm. Roscoe H. Hillenkoettet,, 11947 to
1950. ;:
Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, 1950 to 1953.
Alien W. Dulles, 1953 to 1961.
? John A. McCone, 1961 to 1966.
0 Richard M. Helms, 1966 to 1973.
'7! James R.. Schlesinger, 1973 (two months).
? 'William E. Colby, 1973 to present.
,
The 'agency would be per-
mitted to collect informa-
tion, secretly or otherwise,
'on any "person or activities"4
;that pose a clear threat .to
::ClAe facilities ? "Provided-
'that proper coordir tion
with' the 'PRT.. is aeeerne
pneetenee .'nene ,einnee-
mine if an individual or.or-
ganization is ? a threat?. The
dire c tcir: 'of central intelli-.
s
t . That is the same rationale
that the CIA used to justify .
'placing at least- 12 infiltrae
-tors in, Washington area an--
t _ iwar groups-7Women's4..
Strike for Peace, the Wash-
ington' Peace Center, Con-
gress on Racial Equality and,
the Student Nonviolent Co-
Ordinating 'Committee,'
among others: Those partic-
ular activities went too far,'
the commission concluded,.
;but the basic rationale was,
accepted , ;
',"The CIA thOuld not
'trate dissident "'groups Or;
other organizations of
Americans," the commission
?
,said, "in the absence of a'
:written determination by,
-the director of central intel-
ligence that such action . is .
neceSiary to meet a clear
'danger to agency facilities.
'operations or personnel and,
that adequate coverage by,
law enforcement agencies is.
unavailable.' . ? ? ? ?
. If you turn. that proposal,'
.;inside out, it says the CIA:
can infilerate those Political
,groups. if its director says
okay and the FBI isn't ;
ci6lng job?wnich is ap;
:proiximately the situation'
which government officials
:claimed in 1967 when that
surveillance was begun.
, The proposed executive
Order 'would also allow the
; other illegal activities relat-
ing to foreign intelligence,"
provided again that it coor-
dinates' its operation with
:the FBI.
in the past, while the
limits were vague and ill-de-
fined; the general assurhp-
wes that the FBI had
'sole jurisdiction for investi-
gating espionage cases. This
?new language could be inter-
:preted as actually expanding
the': CIA's" right to earobe
these matters [while still
barring it from law-enforce-
ment functions]. Further,
the 'commisSion endorsed the
CIA's efforts to get new
legislation impoeing
penalties on any of its em-
ployees, past or present, who
'divulge classified informa;
tion. ? ? ,
Specific questions of?whet
exactly happened inside the
government which led to the
string of improper activities
are also only partially an-
swered; by the commission's
final report." '
? The cornmission conclude
ed, as former CIA 'Director
RIchard M. Helms has in-
sisted, 'that the intelligence;
agency was: under consid-:'
erable pressure from' two,
Presidents?Lyndon B. John-
son and'. Richard M. Nixon?'
to pursue investigations; or
domestic peace groups and
their possible links with
foreign governments..
Beyond, that g en er a?I
f re m ?work, - the .report
.begged more specific clues-.
-lions about which White'
.House officials Odd which"
CIA' officials what to dn.
Helms, according to the re-
port, elternately resisted
pressures to get into domes-
tic spying and then launched
.spying projects. Helms kept
these activities super-secret,
even 'from top officials of
tio
.CIA to investiedga
n," is n reassn WOO 1 00MOSIt9
? Yet 'he ,testified
WWI- Release 2001108/08txeslitteRID.F677
1
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001Q0370008-9
-that' -he Was 'Unaware that'
this collection aimed at'.
"foreign collection data".?
had strayed substantially
into the 'forbidden area of.
.4onlestie politics.
, Did Helms 'really know
what was happening r:r did.
his subordinates, run wild?
The commission blamed the
'misstep" on the structure,
..not the individuals involved:.
WASHINGTON POST
12.. June 1975
? ..,C160frettiOd
, _ ?.
? 'list .:Of Central intent-
"tence t Agency directors
publithed in yesterdssy's'Vesh-
ingtonn Post; the name e of
F. Reborn. "Jr., who
headed the" agency from ,1e65
1.0 Was. .inadyertently,
WASHINGTON STAR
11 June 1975
jus/L
id G
AMA. "RR% A
a LIM) i lit H:ot
By Leslie Oelsner
New York Times News Service
1.. The Roltefeller commis-
sion says the Justice De-
? partment "abdicated its
statutory duties" for more'
than 20 years through a se-
- cret agreement in which it
:gave the CIA the power to
? decide whether or not to
prosecute, criminal charges
involving agency employes.
? The commission charged
? in the report made public
? yesterday that the agree-
ment "involved the agency
directly in forbidden law.
enforcement activities" in
violation of the law that
created the cm and limited'
its powers.
But the commission said
'it had found "no evidence"
that the CIA "abused" the
prosecutorial decision turn-
ed over to it by the Justice
, Department.
THE AGREEMENT was
ended in January, when the
department "directed that
cases with a potential for
tcriminai prosecution be.
t referred to it for considera-'
thin," the report said.
, ? But the commission call-
ed for new guidelines, ir
writing, requiring that both
,the criminal investigation
? and the decision of whether
or not to prosecute be made
by the Justice Department:"
. A Justice Department
spokesman, in confirming
last night that there was
such an agreement, spiairjrb
26
CMISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
12 June 1975
nnInn nvishoe governmen
1
ets
-Writing in "The Invisible Government"
, years ago, authors David Wise and Thomas
Ross noted that the intelligence community
:had achieved "a quasi-independent status and
'power of its own" and that "the public, the
.,President, and the Congress must support
steps' to control the intelligence establish-
ment, to place cheeks on its power, and to
make it truly accountable." . _
With the release of the Rockefeller commis-
sion's findings on the Central Intelligence
Agency, that message is even more relevant
today. ?
It is pointless to argue whether the CIA's
indiscretions and illegalities were "massive."-
The fact remains that the agency spied upon
thousands of Americans for many years,
infiltrated domestic groups, monitored phone
calls and private mail in the United States, and
tested drugs on unknowing human guinea pigs
. . all in violatiorfof its 1917.charter.
Much of the blame must be placed on former
presidents who misused the CIA, sometimes
for. purely political purposes, and congres-
sional oversight committees more interested
in maintaining -dertability" than getting 'at.
the facts. The cold-war thinking that led to
these circumstances within the U.S. in-
telligence community is perhaps under-
standable, but it in no way justifies the degree
to which laws were broken and power abused.
? The Rockefeller commission did a good job
in reviewing and interpreting CIA files, but
much more needs to be done. Congressman
James V Stanton, who will head the new
House investigative subcommittee, correctly
described the report as "a starting mark." It
'remains for the two congressional committees
to delve further into the CIA's past perfor-
-mance. ? 2?. ?
More important than probing the agency's
...history, however, and absolutely essential to
- reestablishing its credibility, will be the steps
taken to prevent future illegality and abuse.
The commission report recemmends that
the CIA charter be changed to emphasize its
proper role in matters of foreign security, that
executive and' joint congressional branch.
oversight committees be established, that the
agency's budget be made at least partially"
public, and that the CIA cease from maintain- ?
ing files on Americans. Any Citeet director, the
. _ report rightly states, must be a person with
"judgment, courage, and independence to .
resist improper pressures." ,, . ? '7
'And the Reckefeller commission gets to the
heart of what has caused the recent furor
when it introduces a passage on investiga-
tive techniques and their misuse with this es- -
sential declaration: "Even an investigation
within the CIA's authority must be conducted
by lawful means." Aiding accountability in
this regard would be the commission's recom-
mendation that the CIA record who has
'authorized each investigation, why, and with
what results.
As we have stated before, it is time for a
thorough study of the CIA with a view to an.
overall restatement of its mandate andBine-
tions, including, for example, whether the
subversion of foreign governments is ever an
acceptabte CIA activity.
In today's world, there remains a very real
need for the sometimes unpleasant work of an-
- intedigence gathering and analysis agency of
'enevernment Put what has 1..nr.117.94:1"0 ,d is
did not know whether it had
been a "slip" and a mistake
by department officials or
"a tacit agreement."
The spokesman, Robert
Havell, also said it was his
? "understanding" that a
:whole. series of attorneys
general during the 20-year
? life of the agreement had
:not, been told of, it.
SEVERAL previous ,
attorneys, general, includ-
ing Herbert Brownell Jr.,
, who held, the post at the I
? time the agreement began,
said in interviews earlier in
? the day that they had no
recollection of any such
agreement.
? The spokesman said, too,
that as far as the Justice
Department knew, no 'CIA
employe had been prose-
tcuted during 'the entire 20
years ? apparentlyathee
;cause of the agreement.
The Rockefeller commis-
sion stated that in 1954, the
CIA "pointed out" to the
Justice Department that
"in many cases involving
CIA, prosecution would re-
quire public disclosure of
? siti
r hltkititigt3
now so greatly needed is principled leadership
and responsible monitoring. Some activities
may have to remain covert, but the CIA must
relinquish some of its independence in favor of.
accountability. _
As CIA director William Colby himself has ?
said, the intelligence profession in the United
States "must be. . . conducted on American
principles and. . must be more open and.:
responsive to our public than the intelligence .
activities ohother nations."
? said. "But? subsequently,
the director of the CIA sent
a letter to either the attor- ?
..ney general or the deputy
attorney general saying,
"This is how it will work and
'we will do it this way ? the
;investigations ? unless we
hear to the contrary."
; "AND !".:,0 FAR as we can
'determine," ha went on,
"the letter went unanswer-
;ed. So that procedure went 1
of till January of this
:year."
He added: "So far as We
,know, no one was prose-
cuted during that time."
The Justice Department'',
."responded," the commis-
sion said, that the agency
should itself ? investigate
"allegations affecting its
operations" and "not refer
? the case to the Department
. of Justi ce. "
HAVELL, the Justice
spokesman, gave a some-
what different account.
"We found out, about the
agreement," he said; "in'
December. of 1974," when
CIA* Director William E.
Colby "mentioned the
agreement when he was
over here conferring with
people" in the wake of the
exposures about the CIA in
the New York Times.
? "The best we can deter-
mine," he said, "was the
CIA director or the general
counsel (of the CIA) in 1954
met with the deputy attor-
ree.y gsaetal (William P.
-Rogers) and they discussed
how to deal witn that sec-
tion of Title 18" that re-
quires the agency head to
report crimes committed
The CIA was created by
the National Security Act of
1947. The act's statement of
the CIA's powers and duties
includes the following
proviso after the list of
powers: ? "Provided, that
the agency shall have no
police, subpoena, law en-
forcement powers, or inter-
nal security functions."
Presumably, this is the
language that led to the
Rockefeller commission's
by their employes to the conclusion that the secret
attorney general. . agreement had "involved
7 CIA"ThiPratiOQPittleDtPt003T001a8m9y directly in for-
' ercie-o :nt me meeting, -. ne :bidden. law enfurcement al-.
. tivities.", ..., ,nt
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9
Kiii.irilaniGTOAT POST
?31/147, 1975 . ?
40/RE4 7/7)
. -
T3OR THE nr.sT TIME in 30, years.7
.L ti?Goneezess ia addressing itseifi
,to the cueetion of what role it can.
or should play irt the secret intelli-
geace operation of the Executive
'Branch. Up to now its oversight corn- ;
raittee3 have either 'been passive recipi-
ents of . CIA secrete and FBI progress'.
reports or .avid investigators of pub-
licized covert action operations.
The nroble,zrz is' riotthe past tut the
future_ It shoule: not be too much of
!a challenge for he Special Commit- ,
1 tees now at work to come up with
! satisfactory post-mortems regarding.,
! the charges against the CIA. What
will be difficult for the Senate and ,
'House Inteiligerce Committees to ,
handle is the basic long-term issue:
How far can a permanent commit-
tee of the, Congress play a construc-
tive future role in guiding, control-
Jing or second-guessing the White
;House in running its secret business?
, What can Congress do beyond control- ,
ling, the size and organization of the
SS ccerenunity through ita
appropriations power? What, price
will the nation pay for congressional.,
?intervention into America's secret in-
telligence activities' . at home or
abroad?.. ?
The answers to these questions are
, likely to be different for each cat&
gory of secret operations with .which
,the Congress may wish to concern it-
self. These cover a broad range?in the
case of CIA alone from covert action
(Paramilitary,, propaganda and polit-
' ical) to espionage and counter-
espionage. Each type of 'operation
; varies in the degree of secrecy with
which it is carried out and therefore
the degree to which it can Or should
evade oversight. At one end of the
spectrum are such "noisy" paramili- '
tary actions as the Bay of Pigs or the .
,1"secret army" operation in Laos. At
the other encLeare quiet intelligence
operations?an American agent within
a Moscow ministry or a KGB officer
? working for the CIA in a Soviet em- ?
.bassy in Asia. In cases like these the
-slightest hint, inside or outside the
committee rooms of Congress, can de-
stroy the operation.
Another' pertinent element affect-
ing the. question of congressional ac-
cess' is .the fact that these three main
tyPes of operations ? action, Intel-
ligence and counterintelligence ? are,
generated within the Executive in;
tsharply different ways.
1
Covert political action operations
like the anti-Allende program in Chile:
are ? the most accessible to congres-
sional scrutiny. action projects as-
signed to the CIA are generated at
the 'White House level and require
a formal policy decision at the National
Security Council level (the Forty Corn-
Approved For
,
on
ri
aenet-
"
oly
mittea).. Suet decisions are on the
bureaucratic record. Tbat record may
be hidden, but history -has shown that
it is almost impossible for the ..A...mer-
lean government to cart3r.ont- a large-
scale secret action without 'that 2etiC12
being exposed by Co ngreA' u,r the press.
_. _-_ ____-______.. ...,-__?_.;,.?_--...- ___
The Executive is unlikely to disregard
this fact of life even if tempted to in-
tervene secretly in the Persian Gulf
or in the shaky.Eoethern tier of NATO.
A. precise curb .on the Presideni.'s
freedom in using his "third arm" to
-achieve foreign policy aims has. re-
-cently -been added by Congress in an
amendment to the Foreign Aid Act.
He must now inform Congress of any
on-going -. non-intelligence operation
--
.abkoad'?vhich he considers to be in
t144afional interest. ',,
' Granted that this 'or any future presi-
dent is unlikely to disregard -this re-
quirement for lerge-scale actions,
ordinary political action on a small
scale is bound to, Jae-Lain within kas_
- discretion. .
- Congress and the public tend to
1, equate political action with coups, cam-
. ter-coups and secret funding of election
..___ . .. _.. . .._ _
" campaigns, but the day-to-day COre -Of !
'secret political action, both for the
CIA and the KGB, is the maintenance
of confidential contacts with high-level
'a government officials, politicians, and
i labor leaders around the globe.
i'
IThese persons may be straightforward
intelligence agents supplying informa-
tion, yet the simple fact that they are.
1 committing espionage for the U.S.
gives, them a bias, in .favor of the ,
I American interest as they pursue their ;
7n-orinal political or governmeot Careers.
But the principal so-called'agents of
influence" are men who do not spy.
for the CIA, but .who for personal t or
- career reasons, and often without the,
--payment of money, Will act to further
American foreign policy aims in their
country. They may he bankers, indus-
trialists, media executives or senior
military officers as well as politicians
. and labor leaders of the right or the
left The only requirement is that they!
be in a position to exert personal in-
fluence of 'one kind or another in their
own societies. . .. .
It is this ground-level of Politica/
action that cannot, and should notolte
- open to name-by-name scrutiny by a
congressional eommittee. It makes no
:
sense for an. oversight, committee to
second-guess the State Department or
the CIA, on -who shovIdeor should not.
a be on the list of secret political con--I
' tarts, for it h;:a nothing to contribute i
, in the way of expertise or political!
1
judgment., Here, at the agent level,
I e,
i the Congress cannot oversee the Execu-
.tive's conduct any more than it can
;
- By E.crey RfC
1A Blank Wall' .
?
?
CONGRESS moves its overi,
VV sight function from 'political;
'actio-n operations to sacret. intclIigenec
; work abroad, it faces similar, 'if not.;
' greater, limitations. .4-'..n1-1 here it musi.
? deal with the programs of three federal'
agencies: the CIA, the Defense Intel-1
; ligence Agency and the National Secur-
ity Agency. ? .
The requtrernents for foreign
intel-
ligence, both open and secret, are.:
'generated within the intelligence corn,
yr:unity as a whole. The main priorities'
are set by the White House .and the:
Departments of State and Denmse
directly or through the analysts within'
the various intelligence staffs through-
out the government. These information
;objectives come out of. the strategic'
land' tactical concerns of the diplomatic!
and Military policy-makers and reflect
their needs. The only function of in-
telligence is to serve those needs.
Congreee ? is not :et,- incoPabfae!
;"everseeing" the seeret intelligence!
'operations of the CIA or the DIA de.'
signed to satisfy these requirements;
but it. can be argued that- secret for-
eign intelligence operations are none,
of Congress' business This is an axiom
in the European democracies.. What
Congress can do is to determine how
, much money is to be spent on foreign
intelligence collection?and not much
:more. ?
Thiaa does nett mean that Congress
rcannot be .infarmecf about foreign' in-
telligence collection. It can be briefed,,
on the priority intelligence 'targets; on
the kinds of information being sought
by what means and ozi the year's per-
formance vis-a-vis those targets by the
CIA, DL4. and NSA. Yet these brief-
ings will naturally reflect the Execu-
tive's estimates of its own perfor-
mance?and the Congress. is bound to
. .
accept this self-evaluation, for' It will
have no basis for questioning these
judgments'.
Not-cran Congress ride herd on indi-
vidual intelligence' operations, how-
ever politically sensitive. It is up to
the Exec:Wye to decide whether the
recruitment of a high-level agent in
Moscow will affect detente adversely,
or whether the penetration of a friend-
ly Foreign , Office is justified by the
information' to be gathered weighed
against possible embarrassment if the
operation comes to light.
Only in such-large-scale technical
Intelligence Operations as the 1.1-2 and
the Glomar Explorer affairs can Con-
gress justifiably demand some degree
of prior consent. It is conceivable that
a standing committee might. send .a
handful of investigators into the halls
stipulate the open contacts maintained
our TA0
rttl8Wel1lk15P77004311460CFMOTAIIMIDIA to ferret old
RatV
_
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001.00370008-9
lees expen'sive? intelligence operations.
to which they cie their bosses =tight
take exception, but the less in security
tvould leti?dly? be repaid by any- im;
provernents ?in the quality 'of intellio
gcnce ecitection. - ?
The same Wall faces Congress :
in oiserseeing the collection of conn
munications . intelligence by the. Na-
tionat Security Aeency. The electronic
monitoring of foreign civilian and mill-
laity traffic and the cryptographic anal-
ysis of foreign coded messages are -
the sensitive sectors of an nation's
Intelligence effort As an ultra-secret
element of the Washington intelli-
gence community, NSA cannetthe. ex-
amined or monitcred from the outside'
? by Congress or by other elements
of the ? Executive. ?
Congress can impose-arbitrary limit.:
, . . .
on the NSA budget, the number of Its
. overseas monitoring stations or the size
of its Fort Meade headquarters, but it
canitot judge NSit's efficiency or use-
- fulness. It can, oi course:get an evalu-
: ation of the NSA "product" by query-
ing the "consumers," but that again
will be an Executive 'judgment it can-
not examine .critically...
Maximum Security ? .
rOUNTERINTELLIGENCE . opera-
? tions abroad are even More impen-
etrable to oversight or control. They
are, to start with, almost. completely
self-generated, .for they normally arise
out-of the actions of 'other intelligenee
Services?a KGB officer cultivates the
-society of an American Embassy clerk,
or a local citizen walks into the Em-
? bassy to announce that he is a,Soviet
agent and wants to work for the Amer-.
leans. In short, a CIA station reacts
AO events. Only in the rarer . cases of
shaping a recruitment Attempt direct-
ed at a presumably susceptible Soviet
ior East European intelligence officer.
does a station take the initiative.
There is no policy level in Washing-
ten at which a congressional commit-
? tee Can grapple with these operations,
Nor can the Maximum security re-
quired to conduct them against a vigi-
lant hostile service be ? compromised
without degrading or destroying, item.
Once the need to knew is extended to
Congress and counterintelligence files
are .scanned for the names ef targets
and agents, the counter effort becomes,
a farce.
! The same restrictions apply. to, the
counterintelligence work of the FBI.
!against foreign intelligence operations
Iwithin the U.S.
Domestic counterintelligence work
against American citizens is, forth-
nately, much mere easily, controlled:
? ,
by tile Congress. The political intelli-
genie targets"of the FBI are generated i
by instructions from FBI headquarters i
to its field offices. Whether or not any!
FBI counterintelligence peagrata ex-
ceeds the proper limits of the policies:
laid down by the Department of Jess'
tics, or the Attorney General is: ex-.
eeeding his legal authority, can be -
determined by an examination of those
instructions.
. ? ? - ?
'?-. Congress, as- a whole also has the
authorityto define what erganiziitione
in-American society are a threat to the
nation's. internal security. It can re-
strict, or blot out, any list of "subver-
sive" organizations.... ft ? can bar the
sur.veillance-ni any American not erie
ended in susriect-crintiretle actMt It;
can '''restrict within exceedingly pre...!
'else limits the right of any federal
agency to; tap a telephone or examinei
: a bank account. ?.?
A Frail Instrument
oriONGRESS MAY AND hopefully
intwill take whatever legislative-or:LC--
thins it can, but tightening the. laws not remove public concerns about-
."domestifs, spying." The people and:
the press are on jealous guard against.
our overzealous guardians, be they
the FBI or the CIA, in the police or
the Pentagon. The search for- illegal?
? euzveillance, wire-tapping, . room:butte:,
break-ins and improper files has.
. :lately become almost daily preoccu-
pation of the press and the President
land the Congress have responded with
; vigor to the public's demand for the
:facts?but again these are, facts of the
past
I'. What can. a standing oversight come
reitteedo tck Prnt futurecal*4a,cds;',
? The question is not one. Of .the lat-e
; or agency directives, but of the con- .
duct of persons . or units. in. the
federal -government who wilfully or
ignorantly violate the law or exCeed
the Waits of their bureaucratic chant
ters. Can a committee reach into the
more, secret recesses of the, White'
House or the federal security'bureaus
? cracy to detect in, advance and fore-
stall illegal actions against American
1 citizens? ?-? :: ?
Congress is -a frail instrument to rely
: upon. for this demanding task. Thenere
: erations of the White House plumbers,
the Pentagon's wholesale. compilation
of dossiers of American civilians, the
FBI's ? extensive program of investigasi
tion and harassment of American dissi-i
-- _dents, the. CIA's. participation Ini
-
several. incidents of. domestic surveil-1
lance?all eluded.the,attention of Cern!
gress while. they were- going on -Ant
oversight .committee tan. review over-I
. all expenditures, scan policy instruc-
tions and put -searching,. questions to
. senior ? officials. It .cannot detect
fractions of policy or law -by errant:
federal officials in Los' Angeles, New !
-York, or Washington. .
A New Overseer ? ' ?
rpHEItE 1S A ?praetical solution,. one.'
'which is coming into xogue :.in:
t other sectors of our society. It is to
approaciethe pro.blein frorr.
_
.-up rather than from the top down.
!, A counterintelligence ombudemani.
is Washington could well serve aetthe!
evezseer of our guardiSais. He. ehouldi
:
Lea man of cha.zacter and experience.,
widl-lziovr.7, figure-with an estzhlisheel.
reoi:tation--semeone IE, Pio f. SDiAlUti
DaE31 or. Watergate arrc. Re would xe,
quire only a. small staff of invostiga-
tcws and A well-publicize.d address and
telepborke number.-
. The crr.buclsman, or his staff,: would
no available to any federal employek
in the .White House ox-ha any. intelli-
gence or Investigative agenny who has
reason to suppose that he, tis ly)ss or
his zgenry are carrying oat actic;
that are improper or illegal. ?i? ?
Thia--syotera .would permit a.: lov;iy"
clerk or a presidential appointee, dis-
creetly and without throat of'reicribik.
.tion, to blow the whistle on what of-
fends sense of -legality. He, can
make his complaint in the full confi-
denca that he will be taken seriously.
and his charges investigated. ? ,.
The ombudsman offers the same op-
portunity to any- American citizen:
whose rights tire violated by" a federal
-
intelligence agency. The improper tar-
gets of , domestic investigation or 'ha-
rassment have a right to be heard, and
at no cost to them.' Crank complaints
are inevitable, but a bright investigator'
can winnow these out without wasting
time. ,
? An ombudsman this could
tecriz under the authority OF the Senate?
Judiciary Committee or of A !Joint,
Committee on Intelligence-;--ii one
were to be set up: ?? ?
? Why 'an ombudsman?and lieta'con-
gressional. committee?
. Both the man in a classified' job' and
the put-upon citizen, are much more
likely to trust a known individual than
an anonymous committee of part-time
metrpers. Leaks to the press generally
are not addressed to the Management
of 'a newspaper, but to a known jour-
nalist of proven discretion. The com-
plainants will also knoei their Charges
will not be caught up in the maelstrom
.of politics and publicity-prone legisla-
tors, for an . apolitical ombudsman?
and only such a person?can act with-
out regard for what party occupies the
White House or runs the committee.
The current politicking regarding
"domestic spying" is too conspicuoue
?
to, be missed by anyone. -
e Obviously, the problem 'does not
lend itself easily to foolproof'sclutioni,
there -frequently being a basic contra-
diction between .the nation's need to
'act secretly and the' public's need to
rnow. But if internal security matters.
are. to bekept out of politics and yet
properly policed, a neutral cmhudsman
may well be the best mechanism. It
is ani experiment worth trying, and
Congress can make the experiment at
little expense or risk.
23
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9
_
74, ,
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9
(INTE.PITATIONAL -=11..T.1 ON )
2 J-Li:74E 1975
g t\sr PinP-
-,Elet re Is
t.!
Foe :;s5 years, Da.Vid Atlee Phillips
-served as a CIA agent in more than half a
dozen Latin American nations. When he
resigned three weeks ago to form a group
called the Association of Retired intelli-
g. ence Officers, Phillips, 52, was chief of
the CIA's Latin American operations, a
-post he occupied at the time the Allende
government was overthrown in Chile..
Last week, Phillips discussed the CIA's
pant roles and present troubles with
NEy.'SWEEK'S Andrew Nagorski. Below,
thhalr eneneesa.tsion: ....... ?
=GORSKI: Your new organization is
rather unique. What is its purpose?
PHILLIPS: Right now the CIA is at the
center of a great controversy. There's no
question that we have a public-relations
problem of some magnitude. That can't
be handled from within. The institution
? is not geared for it. And so I decided to try
and do it from. outside.
O. Cinen the past record of CIA covert
financing, how can anybody be sure that
your organization isn't a CIA front?
A. No one can "be absolutely sure
excent for William Colby [the director of
the rill.; and me and my wife. But chasm
the intense scrutiny that we're under
now in Congress, it's inconceivable for
anyone to think .that Mr. Colby and I
would try to fool Congress.
?0. The CIA spent millions of dollars to
:."destabilize- Chile. Doesn't that make
the U.S. at least indirectly responsible
for the coup and the murder of Allende?
A. Any involvement, you must say
truthfully, has some effect. But the CIA
was not behind the strikes that led to the
" coup that toppled Allende and was not in
contact with the coup plotters. .
Q. What, then, was the CIA role in
Chile?
A. It was in a way the same sort of thing
that happened in Western Europe after
the war. NVe were preserving certain
democratic -sectors. It was keeping some
people who looked like they were about.,
to go down in the very bad situation that
was going on in Chile in a position to be
able to stay in business until the elec-
tions. I don't want to go beyond that.
Ch But isn't that a brush-off?
A. Not at all. I'm simply saying that
when I went to work for the U.S. Govern-
? ment as an intelligence officer I signed a
secrecy agreement that I must honor.
0. Did the CIA have prior knowledge
of the coup?
A. Yes, Weird.
?
Q. And did it do ani.,,thing to notify
Allende?
A. On many occasions over a periocl,of
months we heard that there was going to
be a coup or there wasn't going to be one.
So the question never arose as to wheth-
er we were going to adyise him.
0. On what ground can the blatant
interference in domestic affairs that the
CIA seemed to be involved in in Chile be
justified by a country that claims to
represent democracy?
A.I was an intelligence operator and a
professional and I was not involved in
policymaking. So I'm not the man to ask
those questions.
C. ut after 25 years in the agency you
,
presently alive and living :n Ielawsna.
0. Was there any link between the
assassination attempts. on Castro and
the assassination of Kennedy?
A. To my knowledge, no, and I'm
convinced that I'm right The reason is
that when Lee Harvey Oswald went to
Mexico during that famous trip, my-job
was to know what was going on in and
around the Cuban Embassy, and I am
convinced that he was reburied by the
Cubans and went back to Dallas alone.
He also approached the Soviets and I
think they both thought he was a rather
strange man and sent him on his way.
0. What do you see as the effect of the
current investigations of the CIA?
Photos by Robert IL McElroy?Newsweek
Phillips: 'The CIA right now is the most open intelligence agency in the world'
really have no feelings one way or
another? .
A. Yes, I don But I just retired so
anything that I might come up with right
now would not really be objective. I will
only tell you this: I am absolutely con-
vinced that at this time major covert
actions are not necessary or justified in
Latin America. That's the reason why,
during my tenure of the last two years,
the few things that were going on were
quickly terminated. . ? .
0. How many times did the CM
attempt to assassinate Castro?
h A. Oh, no! As I said before, I have a
secrecy agreement.
0. But will you agree that the CIA has
been invoked in assassination attempts
-on foreign leaders?
A. In 25 years, many of them spent
Working . with Cuban matters, I have
never known of anyone within the agen-
cy planning or discussing assassination
ofa foreign leader?never. But there's no
question that there's something there ?
that I didn't know about. The one thing .1*
do know for sure is that Fidel Castro is
. ?
A. I see them as positive. I have no
philosophical problems at all with the
idea that we should be so thoroughly
investigated. In this country now, given
the wavy things are after Watergate, there
is nothing less that will do.
? 0.1s there a danger of the CIA becom-
ing too open an institution? .
? A. Yes, but there is no other way. The
-CIA right now is the most open intelli-
gence agency in the world. ?
? 0. Some people suggest that the U.S.
would-be better off without a CIA. .
A. That's just beyond my comprehen-
sion. I've found in 25 years that the world
is still a pretty difficult place and there
are certain jobs to be clone. In the area
that I know about, in Latin America, it's
also true that we have the duty to know
what other people are doing. Over the
last five years more than SO Soviets have
been expelled from ten Latin American
countries. We have the responsibility of
knowing what they're up to. Incidental-
ly. in that last five years not one CIA
officer has been expelled from Latin
America, despite all the headlines.
? 29
Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9
e.
? K7.7
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9
LONDON TIMES
?S June 1975
?
.Newspaper lawyers and journalists attempt to persuade senators
to redraft stringent new i
legislaton governing
,?
;. .
? y;
American
press bargains to preserve I4:t(s sekvom
F.t?OM Fred Emery
Washington, June 4
News organizations in the
United States are we ing to
have deleted a part of a pro-
posed law that is tantamount to
an cfficial secrets act.
Lawyers for several lerge
newspapers -as well as members
of a reporters' committee are
having a meeting today with
staff members of at least three
: liberal senators. ,
The newspaper representa-
tives find unacceptable sections
, of the Act relating to espionage
; and the theft of Government
Isecrets. ?
The leading .senator involved
i
in the talks s Senator Birch
Bayh, one of the co-sponsors of
; the new criminal code drafted
i under Senator John McClellan,
chairman of the judiciary sub-
. conarnittee on criminal laws
It is now. being said that Mr
Bayh sponsored the code only
on the understanding that he
could have his amendments
accepted later.
Civil libertarians who object
to other provisions of the pro-
posed code such as a return to
capital punishment, had been
counting on the "First Amend-
ment Mafia" as press defenders
are called, to sabotage the Bill.
. Reports of the press "doing
- a "deal" to achieve new laws
that it can live with, are taus-
ing rapid rethinking. What the
House of Representatives might
do with its companion Bill is
another matter.
, The whole issue is?a.n explo-
sive one. Any attempt to re-
strict the public's right to know
can, in the end, be counted on
to raise a howl.
The howl is, of course, not
universal. The recent refusal by
the Supreme Court to allow Mr
Victor Marchetti to break his
contract ?with the ? Central Intel-
ligence Agency (CIA) and pub-
.lish all the facts he wants to,
has not been taken -up as a cru-
sade. . ? -
? A more fascinating constitu-
tional point is that Mr John
Marks, his co-author of the
book The Cult of Intelligence,
.has been similarly gagged. The
Supreme Court justices' 'think-
ing on the matter has not been
revealed, but it is apparent that
Mr Marks, who had . no
contract with the CIA, saw his
First Amendment freedoms
"tainted" by association with
Mr Marchetti.
But what is being opposed
in the. proposed new law
affects everyday news. If its
ROLLING' ,STONE
19 JUNE 1975
CAPITOL CHATTER
? , ?
We may have given up our
embassy in Cambodia but we
haven't relinquished our prop-
aganda options. Early last
month a new radio station,
calling itself the Voice of the
Future Nation and claiming
to represent the Khmer Rouge
(Cambodian Communists),
suddenly began broadcasting
in Cambodian from a candies-.
tine site. It was not, however,
on the frequency which the.
Khmer Rouge revolutionaries
used for their broadcasts in
the past.
One of its first news reports:
that several of the 'traitors"
of the Lou Nol regime, includ-
ing former Premier Long Bo-
set and General Lon Non,
younger brother of the former
president, had been beheaded.
Sounded reasonable enough
but Le Monde correspondent
Patrice de Beer saw both Lon
Non and Long Boret laughing
and chatting with soldiers at
the Ministry of Information in
I'hnom Penh alier their al-
leged execution.
Someone was apparently in
a hurry to get the word out
that the former Phnom Penh
government leaders had been
executed, even if it wasn't true.
Longtime observers of Amer-
lean involvement in Indochina
believe this is the latest in a
long line of "black" (covert)
radio stations operated by the
CIA in Indochina. Historical-
ly, these "black" broadcasts
have been used to make revo-
lutionaries seem more extreme
than they actually were, by go-
ing well to the left of the ac-
tual content of Communist
broadcasts.
Meanwhile, ex-CIA agent
Victor Marchetti, (coauthor
of The CIA and the Cult of
Intelligence) is warning' that
the upcoming CIA investiga-
tion by Congress is going to
*force the agency to turn its
employees into public rela-
tions agents. Marchetti
warned that the agency will
mount a massive publicity
campaign; including tested
measures of "disinformation"
to confuse and discredit CIA
opponents. ?
. "It's now or never for us '
and the CIA," Marchetti cau-
tioned. "If Congress does not
conduct a thorough investiga-
tion and place sonic vety tight ?
controls on the CIA, we aren't
; ever going to get another
chance."
***
One of the CIA's newest lines ?
8. *isiIttc-t hiittitm 7fOrlD8 9
provisions were to be taken
literally-, it is doubtful whether
those who reported the CIA's
recovery of the Soviet sub-
marine or the alleged CIA
planning of assassinations of
foreign leaders could , have
escaped prosecution.
It might have been risky, too,
to report explanations of the
Pentagon Budget, unless
officially authorized.
Congressional sources pleaded
that they were not trying to
" get " at the press, only
those who leaked information.
The receipt of a leaked secret
by a newcpaperrnan was ea
being made an offence.. This
eliminated the notion of
"stolen" goods, which is, in
any case, strenuously argued
here as the United States
Government possesses .no copy--
right.
However, a newspaperman's
subsequent communication of a
leaked secret?showing it to
his editor, for example?even
without its being published.
would have become a crime.
There were to have been two
offences: of "disclosing" and
" mishandling " what for the
first time is being re t'efined as
"national defence informa-
tion ". The law would have
LO1VDON TIMES
27 May 1975
'
applied to ? all who had ? eve
been "in authorized poss
sion " ? and the unauthorize
would have been guilty if the
refused promptly to return th
information (if-in the form of
document) to those empowere
to reclaim it.
The definition of "tiationa
defence information" alarrae
the ,reporters' ? committee. /
included "military capability o
the United States or of a
associate nation . . . milita
planning , weapons develop
:tient . . intelligence opera
times, activities, plans, estimates
analyses . . . and intelligenc
with regard to a f oreie
pcwer ".
Another offence proposed i
the Bill was simply: that of " dis
closing classified Information
In essence, it would hay
punished the leaker, not th
recipient, who is ? 'express'
exempted.
Most people, even ? thos
working for the press, agre
that espionage laws shoul
have bite. But Senatot t?
McClellan's drafters, trying
ensure that there will not be
re-play by budding Danie
Ellshergso evidently went tot
far.
negations of CIA ey
for Europe cause genie
By a? Staff Reporter
r. Mr David Steel, Liberal MP,
Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peeleles,
, and vice-president of Britain in
Europe, has dismissed allega-
tions that ? pro-European youth
'organizations had received fin;
.ancial backing from the Ameri-
can Central Intelligence' Agency
as "a sigh of the sheer despera-
tion in the anti-Market cam-
.paign . .
Referring to allegations by
Mr Richard Body, Conservative
-Ml' for Holland with Boston,
Mr Steel: said at a youth press_
conference in London yesterday
that Mr Body had "latched on
to 20-year-old- allegations about
CIA finance of European youth
campaigns-" and tried to .relate
thent to the present referendum
campaign. Mr Steel added: ?
Tin Britain in Europe organiza-
tion was founded only a few
months ago. We shall be publish- ?
ing our finances in full, as we are
obliged-to under the Referendum '
Act, and it will be seen that not
one penny of -our income has
derived from CIA sources..
Of' business is selling tickets
for rock concerts. Employees
at the CA's Langley, Virginia,
headquarters-can take advan-
tage of one of Washington's
unique fringe benefits by buy-
ing their tickets at a top-secret rity Agency's Civilian?Welfare
Ticketron outlet administered Fund at the NSA's Fort
by the CIA's. Employee Achy- George Meade, Maryland, of-
Approved For Release 2001/08/08
Mr Body has been picking up ye
ancient political fag ends whi
therefore taste very nasty. MG
of the people on the platform th
morning were toddlers at the tir.
these reports refer to, so even
every one of the far-fetched asse
tions were true they are total
irrelevant to our " Yes " ca
paign.
Similar allegations about Cl
finance 'fer pro-EEC you
movements were made In t
.current issue of Time Out.
The Britain in Europe can
phign' claims that most o
organized youth wish to stay i
Europe, and there were eigh
representatives of youth mov
ments on the Press conferenc
platform. They included M
Tony Kerpel, national chairma
of the Young Conservatives
Mr David Cockroft, organizin
secretary of the Young Euro
pean Left; Mr Simon Ilebditch
the international vice-rhairma
of the Young Liberals; and h
Colin Maltby, chairman of the
Federation of Conservativ
Students.
mum about the -whole matter
?an internal memo gives in-
structions that there is to be
"no publicity" about the CIA
outlet or a similar one admin-
istered by the National Seco-
- 30
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9
NEW YORK TIMES
.11 June 1975
Report:.?triam
4?
t
',:LYCLI'TONDANEL
iisses to Thr Nyv York TIons
VshaSIIDiGTON, June 10?For
'nearly six. months this town
hss been hung upon one word
? relating to the domestic activi-
ties of the Central Intelligence
?igeney. The word is "massive.?
? ?, If the Rockefel-
?,ete ? ler . commission,
:a ? ?' which investigated
? Analysis the C.I.A.'s domes.;
?
- tic operations, did
ant e
, nothing else in its
? ?
report, Which was released to-
day, it should hayedisposed of
that hang-up.
Nowhere in its report did. the
,coscsnission use the term mas-
? sive, either, in confirmation or
'denial, although that word was
the one used in the original
newspaper report of illegal do-
mestic activities, which led di-
rectly to the establishment of
the commission. -
t That first report, written by
Seymour M. Hersh, appeared
In The New Yeti: Times.
ham E. Colby, Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence, responded di-
rectly to it in his -appearance
. !before . the Senate ApPropria-
tions subcommittee on intel-
rlfgenc.e the .following January
i? deny," he -said: "the
charge in The New York Tithes
of Dec. 22, 1974, that 'the Cen-
tral Intelligeece Agency, direct-,
. violating- its charter,. .con-1
ducted massive illegal domestic
operations. . . "
r.Vice president -Rockefeller,
hhairmana Of the Presidential
commission, and his vice chair-
hien, Douglas C. .Dillon,. both
followed the Colby line in sub-
:sequent comments on their 'in-
vestigation of the C.I.A. They
;.said they cou; i not accept the
!word massive.
roNo piroseeutions Recalled ??
-
,,During that time, the report
said, there was an agreement
between the Justice Depart-
ment and the C.I.A. "providing
that the agency was to investi-
gate crimes by C.I.A. employes
of agents which involved
Government money or property
or might involve operational
,security." It was left to the
C.I.A. to decide whether any
:of its employes should be
prosecuted for such offenses.
g. One man who has known
'the C.I.A. for most of its 28
' years could not recall today
-
a. aSSlV e
a single peoserention against a
C.I.A. agent?a remarkable re-
cord for an organization with
15,003 or more employes. ?
Yet, the report by the Rocke-
feller Commission contained
many examples of clearly ille-
gal actions by the agency. In
one case, a foreign defector
was "held in solitary confine-
ment under Spartan living con-
ditions" for three years. That
'would be a clear violation of
the rights of habeas corpus
land due process, which apply
to, aliens as .well as citizens
in the United States.
- As for murden?that is, as-
sassination plots ? against
foreign leaders, with which the
agency has been charged?the
Rockefeller commission said
nothing. It undertook an inqui-
ry because of the public furor,
"but time id not permit a full
Investigation," its report said,
and ? its evidence was simply
turned over to President Ford,
who intends in turn to give
it to the Department of Justice
and to congressional 'com-
mittees.
the President had raised the
issue 'initially. On. Thursday,
Jan. 16, he gave a lunch at
the White House for-group that
had entertained him previously,
as Vice President, at lunch in
New York the group included
the publishersof The New York
Times. Arthur Ocns Sulzberger,
and the ? newspaper's principal
editors. ?
On that occasion in January,
so far as one can recall; 'the
President for the first time used
the word "assassinations" in
a discussion with newsmen on
the activities of the C.I.A.
The President's manner was
grave, his tone was hushed.
. . Exactly what he said, al-
though it was of the gravest
import, was never reported.
That part Of the conversation
was off the record, and, after
an unsuccessful effort to have
it put on the record, The New
York Times respected the Pres-
ident's confidence.
But the substance of his re-
marks began to leak out, and
in six weeks they were being
heard on the CBS Television
Evening News and elsewhere.
Various sources reported that
the President had made these
points.
gine C.I.A. as an institution
was needed to protect the se.
Stetes and abet:Id not be de-
sire:x.1
47For ,that rea.soe, he had
picked- e. commission te investi-
gate charges against the CIA.
that could be relied upon to
understand ari. respect, the
agency's national defense role.
lgThe charges against the
C.I.A. were that it had illegally
engaged in activities against
Americans inside the United
States, in violation of its char-
ter from Congress. The Rocke-
feller commission was therefore
limited to investigating the
agency's domestic activities.
If the commission should
wander into the foreign field,
it would stumble upon all kinds
of activities, including assassin-
ations?and it was then and
only then that the trigger word
was used..
There was no discussion, ho
elaboration.
ciThere was nothing to he
gained by opening the Pando-
ra's box of assassinations. It
would only lead to futile recri-
minations. Well-meaning
people in the past had ordered
activities that seemed right and
proper at the time, but might
seem' wrong and improper in
the light of new circumstances.
The new generation should not
pass judgment on the old.
nl'hose were the themes of
President Ford's concerti . in
January, after he had read the
charges against the C.I.A. and
had a briefing 'on them from
William -Es Colby, Director of
Central Intelligence, a briefing
that included some informationi
on assassinations.
Expression of Confidence
Those were the Seine themes
sounded last night at the Pres-
ident's news conference in the
White House Rose Garden.
There he announced his inten-
tion to release the Rockefeller
commission's report on the
C.I.A.s domestic activities and
to send the commission's infor-
mation on assassinations to the
Justice Department and to the
Congressional committees
vestigating the intelligence
community.
Mr. Ford said, "It remains
my deepest conviction that the
C.I.A. and other units of the
intelligence community are vi-
tal to the survival of this cout-
curity interests of the United nntry."
Liesore;e7g -17ds...--Tc7rif?id.7?"-Ence, in
the Rotkefelier ccrawksiszt
members, he responded to a
question about whether Viche
President Rockefeller had . em- ?
barrassed him- in conducting
the investigation by saying,
"The Vice President and I un-
derstoo-d each other perfectly."
Again and again he empha- ?
sized, by using the word
"domestic", that the corn:7ns..
sion was supposed to investi-
gate only the activities of the
C.I.A. inside the United States.
He even absolved the corn-.
mission of the charges against
the agency by, saying that he
-
himself had "suggested that-
the commission undertake an'
investigation of any domestic
involvement in . political assase
sinations." . . ?
President Ford did nht ex-
plain, nor was he ask0 to,
explain, the nuance involved,
in the use of the term "domes-
tic" involvement. Presumably,
he was thinking of the recruit-
ment of rnafia gunmen or other
hirelings in this country to
commit assassinations abroad.
The President was particular-
ly emphatic in his disinclination.
to pass judgment on the acts
of his predecessors. . -
"I think historians will make
those judgments better than.
anybody in i975, including.;
muself," ? Mr. Ford said. For
that reason he cautioned the.
House and Senate committees*
that would receive the assassin-,
ation evidence "to use the ut-
most prudence in how they
handle the material."
In particular, President Ford
was as pains to disavow any
intention of 'discrediting the
possible candidacy .of Senator
Edward M. Kennedy, Democrat
Massachusetts, for the Pres-
idency by casting reflections
on his brother, the late Pres-
ident Kennedy, whose role in
alleged plots against Cuban'
Premier Fidel Castro has been.
publicly discussed lately.
In brief, for six months Pres-
ident Ford has not changed
his tune. He has been nothing.
if not consistent.
As consistent and loyal as
he may have been, however,
the case against the C.I.A. is
now out of his hands and Mr.
Rockefeller's; it may be in har-
sher hands than theirs.
WASHINGTON POST (PARADt)
1 JUNE 1975
the former
.CIA member
whose book,
..."Insidet7ne Company?aCIA
Diary," has proved so.
troublesome to the agency,
has been lactUri=F in
England on his CIA ? ?
experiences.
Agee's book, published.
abroad but not in this
country, reveals names and
places, mostly in Latin
SPY
America where he worked
for the intelligence ser-:
vice. His literary revela-
tions in the form of a
diary have caused the CIA
a good deal of anguish and
anger. CIA chief William
Colby is determined to
-prevent Agee's book frem
being published in the
U.S. It is available, how-
ever, in Canada and Eng-
land, and except to those
Of the intelligence com-
munity, It is mostly dull.
? Last April. Agee lectured
at the London School of -
Economics, as the adver-
tisement below announces.-
'ANNOUNCEMENTS
- ?
. P111'1.;14' -: ?
Author of I'Nsinr, - THE COMi'A.NY
? ? ?a CIA diary.. ?
Will speak at - the old theatre
? London School of Econotplcs.-'1
? lioughton St.. Aldwych. W.C,2, ,
FRIDAY.. Aor11 18. 7-30 p.n.
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9
rar24Em .
9 JUNE .1975
' [De!eted
?
Because U.S. statutes designed to pre-
vent the disclosure of state secrets are
- deemed too vague, such sensitive Feder- ?
al f.1 :lei es as the departnients of State
mar Defense arid the Cent-al Intelli-
gem) Agency have keg written their '
owe rales. They require employees- to.
sign agreements that they will not di- ?
yuige classified information they may
learn about in the Cc urse of their work.
For many years there was no protest to
this arrangement But then three years
ago, a onetime CIA administrator named
Victor Marchetti challenged both the
.system and the specific agreement he
nimself had signed as a condition cf his
employment. Marchetti is the co-author
of a hook titled "The CIA and the Cult of
. intelligence." He contended that the
agreement he signed violated the First
; Amendment by abridging his rights to
! speak or publish. Last week the Supreme
Court indicated thet the government's
power to e:efeace Marchetti's agreement
may be constitutionally valid.
In fourteen years with the CIA. Mar-
chetti rase to become exeev tive assistant
to the deputy director?and was privy to
, a, great deal of classified information.
When he decided to publish his book in,
the Spring of 1972, the CIA cited the ,
secrecy agreement and won a Federal-
court injunction requiring Marchetti to
7 submit his manuscript for censorship.
The CIA deleted 339 passages. then
. agreed to trim the total to 168. But
Marchetti, collaborator John D. Marks .
and publiSher Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.,
. went back to court_ and won tne right to ,
restore all but '26 of the excisions. !
On appeal, Judge Clement F. Hayns-1
worth of the Fourth Circuit restored the
deletions to the 1C3 desired by the CIA.
He found that Marchetti had "effectively
relinquished" his First Amendment
!. rights "by his execution of the secrecy
agreement and hit entry into the confi-
dential relationship." ?? At that point last
summer, Marchetti's book was pub-
lished?with blank spaces where the
deleted material would have appeared.
' But Marchetti wants to write more and
his lawyers next appealed to the Su-
preme Court. They argued that Marchet-
ti's case marks "the first case in the
nation's history" in which an author "is
perpetually required ... to submit his
books and articles ... for censorship.'
Test: But the High Court decided to let
the Haynsworth decision stand, possibly
because the Marchetti case is now sched-
uled to be heard again in the district
court to determine if the newly amended
Freedom of Information Act forces:relax:-
atien of the classification rules. Mar-
chetti may not be the only potential
litigant. A book by former CIA agent
Philip Agee has already appeared in
England. where the agency cannot reach
him legally. If it is published in the U.S.,
yet another test of the government's right
to forbid disclosure of classified material
may be on the docket
? --Jou:ow IC FOOTUCKvirth DIANE C.AMPER tn Washington
?
CPELCAGG
11 juNE
Jerall terHorst
TO
IvAsizINGT0N?The unsuccessful plot
to oust Rep: Lucien Nodal ID., Mich.l
as chairman of the. Select Committee
on Intelligence has little to do. with the
charge that he is a CIA patsy but very ;
much to do with a power play by a few -
Democrats with political and ideological ?
motives.
One certain result is that the House
panel, already months behind schedule
because of .backstage bickering, now
stands to lose whatever credibility still
remains for its inquiry.
Convinced over the.weekerid that they
would lose badly, the insurgents corn,
premised. Nedzi will name a subcom-
mittee to deal with the CIA. aspects of
the probe.
The cover story for the power grab is
that Nadel, in his regular capacity
head of the Armed Services subcom-
mittee on 'intelligence, .learned about
CIA involvement in assassination plans
-
and domestic surveillance more than a
year ago and did not immediately "go :
public" with his knowledge or call for
a full-scale congressional inquiry.
BY SITTING on that information. say
hi:. Democratic accusers, he has a
-conflict of interests" in his special
capacity now as chairman of the Select
Committee that the House set up in
January to look into unauthorized proj-
ects of the CIA, FBI, IRS. and other.,
intelligence-gathering agencies.
What's really at stake, however, is
something else. It is indicative of the
fact that if it hadn't been for this ex-
cuse, the oust-Nedzi band would have
found another reason to further -their
own interests on the panel.
Rep. Robert -Giaimo ED., Conni? a
ringleader of the cabal, is in line to be
chairman if Nedzi leaves via resigna-
tion: or House vote. Rated one of the .
most effective, if unpredictably anti-es-
tablishment New England lawmakers.
Giaime has more seniority than NedZi.
He was disappointed, when gpeake:r
Carl Albert did not hand him the gavel.
THE WASHINGTON POST
10 JUNE 1975
By Jack Andersen
. and Les Whitton
I ? Church for President ? Sup-i
.porters of Sen. Frank Church
(D-Idaho) are frustrated over hisl
refusal to enter his name in the;
presidential sweepstakea, He;
has forbidden them from seek-
ing the Democratic presidential;
:nomination in his behalf as long
?.as he is running the Senate in-
vcstigation of the CIA and FBI.
?
i Church has told them firmly
ithat he doesn't want to mix pres-
sai4 lie woult1 quit. if Nedzi -
stays -on, but flow tie wii rcroztin..
The ether theec pushieg, for ouaI.er
Nodal ware Represeatatives James V.
Stanton lOhlol and two ultra-liborals
and. long-tirne allies of the" Nlichigaa
Democrat?Michael Harrineton 1.1\laas.1
and Ronald Dellums
What h.ar gotten Nedal ;inta trout:114i,
; apparently, is his reicsal to allow the
; committee's inquiry to turn into a epee-
tacular veadetta against the nation's
: intelligence-gathering agencies.
What, ria'nes the CIA patsy . charge
against islz,(3?,i so transparent is that it
is not a new revelation 17,y any means.
As far back as last December, CIA
Director William Colby had testified
; publicly before the Senate Armed Serv-
lees Committee that Nedzi was among
the regular group of CIA :overseers. to
whom information on past activities
had been provided. That was all on the
record at the time that Albert designat-
ed Nedzi :as chairman, and the. House
voted its approval in January. By raiz-
ing it now, the dump-Nedzi group clear-
ly shows its ulterior motives.
INDEF.!), WHEN Oa, etarlr-Nedzi
: group move?: inie the open last week,
"Nedzi already had placed on the agen-
da, two weeks from now, a full airing
of alleged CIA involvement in assassi-
nation plots. Nedzi was prepared, to tell
the panel what he had been told and
? also to let them. quiz Colby directly.
His position is that as a CIA overseer
Lit was his duty to make sure that ha-
proper activities no longer were going
an,- and to consider safeguards against
any rectrrence?not merely to conduct
splashy hearings -into long past histo-
ry."
. What's at stake now, however, goes
! beyond Nedzi's personal integrity or
that of his accusers. The integrity of the
committee's eventual findings has now -
been irreparably damaged.
Mversal Pros UnclicaIII
idential politics in any way with
the investigation. Yet he contin-
ues to stir enthusiasm for his
candidacy in the attitudes he
expresses toward government
In condemning CTA assissinaa
tion plots, for example, he de-
clared strongly: "The notion
,that we must mimic the Commu-
nists and abandon our princi-
ples (is) ... an abomination."
? Then he added enaphatlearly:1
"Ours is not a wicked country,
and we cannot abide a wickedj
government." ? ?
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : ClgRDP77-00432R000100370008-9
'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RD1577-00432R00a100370008-9
', (7, ru..rrtz?
t'
? ? ?
hold-inn the 350-pane doe-
tiraent aioft for reporters to :.;ef!, Vice
President Nelson Rockefeller last week ?
prepare.f. to deliver to the White Housc
Es correnaission's report on the alleged
fanpreeeriatiee and machinations of the
CIA. "We've done a good job, I think," .
said Reciesfeller. "There's been no stone
untamed, there's no punches pulled."
Then the Vice President gave a brief;
synopsis of the report on the agency, ?
which his eight-man panel had been
preparing for the past five months:
"There nee things that have been done
that are he contradiction to the statutes,
but hi cee-aparieon to the total ECM] ef-
fort., they are not major."
That tantalizing glimpse of the ea-
gerly awaited report's contents was all -
that was vouchsafed the public. Ac-
cepting the volume four days later, Pres-
ident ?Jerald Ford took the report home
for what he cailed a "long weekend's
reading.- Later, White House sources
indicated that Ford would probably
mike the report public this week.
Domestic Spying. Initially, Rocke-
feller and his panel were commissioned
by Ford to look into allegations about
domestic spying--made principally by
New York Times Reporter Seymour
xlerch?that the CIA had conducted a ,
massive domestic intelligence operation
in the U.S. during the late '60s and ear-
ly '70s against antiwar activists and dis-
sidents. If so. this was seemingly a vi-
olation of the agency's charter that
banned -internal security functions."
But as Rockefeller's investigation
went on, other stories appeared in the
press linking the CIA to assassination .
'plots against Cuba's Fidel Castro, the
Dominican Republic's Rafael Trujillo
(killed May 30, 1961) and Viet Nam's
Ngo Dinh Diem (shot to death Nov. 2,
1963). In March Ford directed Rocke-
feller to investigate such charges.
The Rockefeller Commission also
looked into the recurring speculation
that Castro had tried to gain revenge
for the CIA's attempts on his life by us-
ing Lee Harvey Oswald to kill John F. ?
Kennedy. Like the Warren Commis-...
sion, the Rockefeller group concluded
that there was no credible indication of
any such conspiracy behind Kennedy's
death and Oswald acted alone.
The document delivered last week
by Rockefeller contained nothing about
any assassinations of foreign leaders. In
explanation, Rockefeller said that his
coeunission did not have eneegh time
to look into the allegations thoroughly.
Said the Vice President: -We didn't feel
we could come to a conclusion on par-
, tie! information." ?
As explained by Presidential Coun-
sel Philip :Buchan, the White House li-
aison with the commission, the mem-
bees found that the study of the
assassinations "wan almost a bottomless
subject. If they v,ere to go into the
whole thing, it would have taken more .
time and resources than they had." The
group could have asked for an exten-
sion and a larger staff, but the mem-
bers clearly had no stomach for dig-
ging deeper into those affairs of the
CIA. On Monday afternoon, four days
before the report was delivered, the com-
mission voted unanimously not to in-
clude any material on the foreign as-
sassinations. However, the White House
has opted to hand over the commis-
sion's tentative research on the subject
to the Senate's special eleven-man com-
mittee, ? chaired by Senator Frank
Church, that is vigorously probing all
U.S. intelligence activities.
Misused Powers, As for the CIA's
domestic transgressions, the commission
reportedly absolved the agency of much
blame, noting that Presidents Lyndon
Johnson and Richard Nixon drove the
CIA to overstep its bounds. Johnson had
? ohsve belief that foreign money
and influence must have bean behind
the students' revolt and the antiwar
movement. Nixon also prodded the CIA
to misuse its powers and spy on dissent-
ers. The commission called for tighter
controls on White House ?access to ;he
agency and tighter congressional over
sight of its operations.
Just how poorly Congress has been
performing its ,task of monitoring the
CIA- came to light last week in an in-
cident involving Democratic Congress-
man Lucien Nedzi, the chairman of one
House committee that supposedly
watches over the CIA. The New York
Times reported that Nedzi had been
briefed more than a year ago by the
agency about its involvement in assas-
sination plans and domestic espionage
and he had done 'nothing whatsoever
about the matter. Particularly. Nedii did
not mention it when he was made chair-
man of the special committee created
by the House in February to investigate
charges that the CIA had violated its stat-
utes?.a seeming conflict of interest.
When Nedzi did not deny that he
had known about the CIA's shadowy ac-
tivities ail along, five of his six Dem-
ocratic colleagues on the investigating
committee hotly called for his resigna-
tion as chairman. If Nedzi does not go
quietly this week, his fellow Democrats
on the committee made it plain that if
The Momo Cain Connection
and
The story of the CIA's efforts to en-
mission: kill Castro. For help, Giancana
list Mafia aid in assassinateag Cuba's
Fidel Castro continues to unfold. In
1960, during the waning months of
Dwight Eisenhower's presidency, TIME
has learned that the agency went to ;
Momo Salvatore ("Sam") Giancana, a
high-ranking Mafia don who ruled Chi-
cago's gangland with a bloody hand. The
Approved F9i Reit4sP1011410t9081:trA3R1312717110:0432RODOW037
_
turned to one of the most nimble an
conniving figures in the Mafia: Richard
Cain, who had been the Mafia's agent
in the enemy camp: a detective on Chi-
cago's police force.
Among his other accomplishments,
Cain spoke Spanish fluently. With the
consent of the CIA, intelligence sources
f?'?
-
V.4
C:47 41, ?
E.
neceesary, they would force el-lot:se vote
to get him cut.
With ;.s.:tadzi's committee inca.pc',
tated and the Paeckefellet? Commission's
report handed in., the job of puersuizg
the investigation of the a2aa was left in.
the hands of the Senate c.:(1remkte,--, T Tr,
der Church, a liberal Democrat from
Idaho who may run foe his oartre
oomination in 1076, the coot-
mittee has been zealously holding pri-
vate hearings since May 15. After the
Rockefeller Commission handed in its
report, Church accused it of ducking the
assassination isstre. As to the Vice Pres-
ident's claim that the CIA was not guilty
of "major" nor, Church norjiy
dared: "I don't regard murder plots as
a`minor' matter."
Church has bard evidence for his
harsh statement. During his three ap-
pearances before the Senate committee
?more than ten hours at the witness
, table?CIA Director William. Colby said,
according to intelligence sources, that
'the agency had worked with Chicago
'gangsters on Plans to kill Castro. In one
case, the .hit man was to have been a
Cuban army major who was close to the
Cuban leader. The allotted fee for the
job: S150,000. (For another example,
.? see box.)
An Aleom:nation. To .find cut p-ior
about the assassination plots, particulan-
? ly who authorized them, Church will de-
vote the rest of this month to closed-
door hearings on the subject. Not only
does Church plan to recall Colby and
.other CIA officials, past and present, but
1 he will call the Mafia's John Roselli, who.
reportedly was signed up by the CIA to
direct some of the schemes to assassi-
nate Castro. Church also plans to ques-
tion Rgbert Maheu, the onetime FBI
agent and aide to Howard Hughes, who
is said .to have 'recruited Roselli for
the CIA.
"Ours is not a 'wicked country, and
we cannot abide a wicked government,"
says Church. He prefers to talk not of
"assassinations" but of "murder?a sim-
pler, clearer term." Says he: "The U.S.
cannot involve itself in any way in mur-
der. The notion that we must mimic the
Communists and abandon our princi-
ples [is] an abomination."
When it draws up its final report on
the CIA, Church's Senate committee will
face the same dilemma in proposing so-
lutions that Nelson Rockefeller outlined
when his commission began its study in
January: "We must have an intelligence
capability, which is essential to our se-
curity as a nation, without offending our
liberties as a people."
Spanish-speaking toughs on the Windy
City's West Side. Some of the hoodlums
were sent to Miami and Central Amer-
ica for training in commando tactics.
' Exactly what the Mafta reagers ac-
complished against Cuba is stW unclear.
Some intelligence officials doubt that a
single guerrilla from Chicago ever set
foot ori the island. For his part, Cain
later was to boast how he had led hit-
and-run raids on Cuban power stations.
U.S. sources sa that the CIA spent
iirn the operation,
(111 LIt7
? Approved For Telma -216A08/011k9K-OpP7T-7-22141311S9p1AVOD08-9
12 June 1975 10 Jure 1975
while Giancana laid out 1390,060 of the
Mob's own funds for 'Cain's expenses.
'When some Mafia officials objected to
the paj.ments, Giancana contended that
the funds should. be considered as "ice"
(protectioninoney).
What did Gianc:tnn. get for his in-
ve..-tment? In Oc.tobe7 1960, the CIA did
hint a favor that was beyond the pur-
view cf the agency. Giancana was fum-
ing because his girl friend, Singer Phyl-
lis McGuire, was interested in Come-
dian Dan Rowan. The cta arranged for
burglars to break into Rowan's hotel
room in Las Vegas and search for ev-
idence that might cool the romance.
But in 1964, for all the ice he had
carefully laid away, Giancana seemed to
get no special treatment from the
? Government. Haled before a federal
grand jury looking into. the Mafia's af-
fairs in Chicago, Giancana refused to.
talk and served twelve months in jail for
contempt of court. Released in 1966, the
don moved to Mexico for a while but is
now back in Chicago.
? Cain had been forced to quit the Chi-
cago ?!..,olice in 1960 after he was caught
spying on Mayor Daley's conunissioner
of investigations. Incredibly, he was
hired in 1962 by Cook County 'Sheriff
Richard Ogilvie (who was to become Il-
linois' Governor six years later). Resum-
ing his role as a spy for the Mob, Cain
was fired by Ogilvie for his shenanigans
in 1964. Finally, in 1968, Cain was jailed
for his part in a Mafia operation. 11.e.?
leased in 1971, he became the Still ab-
sent ,-,lanc.,:na's man in chi, go.
There, on Dec. 20, 1973, two men'
wearing ski masks and carrying walkie-
talkies surprised hlin in Rose's Sand-
wich Shop, a sleazy restaurant that had
? color stills from The Godfather on one
i wall. One man held a 12-gauge shotgun
. under Califs chin and blew the ? head
off the man whose quarry had once been
Fidel Castro.
NEW YORK TIMES
30 May 1975
HO'w, tc'.) Run 'the. t? I A
To the Editor:' ?
Some. sense and niuch nonsense "a15'-'
O pear in the .presS concerning the Ceti--
' tral Intelligence Agency. secrecy
which intelligence requires breeds fee
'and suspicion. If . there have 'indeed:
",been abuses, they must be corrected
atthe?source. ? We need not expect
. find 007's under our 1164 nor, should'
:see 'the . .aS in American.,
K.o.)Ei., with all that Sheba cempariso*''
implies.' '
So lone as We have ..dangerons.
verSariea, we Must provide onrseiveif
with, a oak: defense: establishment In
telligence is its vital adjunct.' without
which this nation and its allies . mud'
deploy military and diplomatic re-
sources in ignorance of the. enemyik
means and intentions. ?
, What is needed is a C.I.A. which /IX'
one has ever heard of except at .a bu-
reau of xperts?no scandals, no.pub;.:
hefty, nol riskse--a silent, elite civdi
1?seryice as dedicated, as the profttesionalg. ?
? military branches. This is. surely what,
tIthe Agency has.sought to achieve. It is,
. the duty of . the Administration, the".
National' Security Council, the Con;
!Iress .and v1r. Colby to preserve?
,supervise -and ,,se ,the , sophisticate<
OCTOR DISPUTES
KyNNEDy
REPORT
? t ? ci!
4 p
Tr
.. ? ?
Says Pa Misstated Vieis
on Press iden-es.' Slaying'
? PrITSBURI-I, June
Dr. Cyril Wecht, saying that his
views of President Kennedy's_
murder were distorted by the
Rockefeller commission, wants
the comniission to 'release, a'
transcriProthis statements.
"If that transcript shows in
any way i, have withdrawn dr
revised my: thoughts 'of the
Warren Report, "I'll eat the
transcript on steps of the White
'House," said-Wr. Wecht, a for-
ensic'pathologist who ? is the,
coroner of Allegheny County.
The Central Intelligence'
Agency- report sought to put
to rest all of the theories sure
rounding the circumstances of
President Kennedy's death, in-
cluding claims ?that more than
On..; gunman was involved and
that Mr. Kennedy has beei.
struck by bullets from two
directions. The report said it
had found no such ,evidence.
Dr: .Wecht denies the State-
ment by the report that he
"testified that the available
evidence all points to the Pres-
ident being struck by two bul-
lets coming from the rear, and
that nostippozt can be foond
for theories which postulate
gunmen to the front or right
'front of the presidential car."
Dr. Wecht said that was a :
'"flagrant" misrepresentation of
1what he told a commission
I torney, Robert Olsen, in a fi-
lhotir interview on May 7..
1 He said he still maintained
that at least two gunmen were
involved in the plot and that
Lee Harvey Oswald alone could
not have inflicted all the
wounds sustained by Mr. Ken:'
nedy and :forrner goy. John
B. Connally of Texas.
"Believe me, I hammered thiS
point and made it perfectly ?
clear," Dr. Wecht said. "It is
utterly reprehensible and; de-.
ispicable but? also a great come
lpliment that they would. eon.;
'cider my testimony that much
of a threat." ?
? He said he had first become
suspicious of the Rockefeller.
commission's objectivity when
;David Belin was appointed ex-.i
lecotive director. Mr. ge.lin had;
!been chief legal; couriseI for the;
'Warren Commission.
non, ,4
. Prcsfdent Ford held
?G press conference vecter-
clay in the Rose Garden ct
the White Rouse and
closed' he will -make pubtic
:today the major portion of
the Rockefeller commission.
,report on domestic activi-
ties of the Central intelli-
gence Agency. Foliar:in
his prepared statement on.
the stools of the 7cport.
Or, Friday the "Commis-
sion on CIA Activities With-
in the 'United States" pre-
sented its report to me. I
read the report this week-
end, and have dceided it
should be made, available to
the public. It will be released
tomorrow.
I thank the Vice President
And the other. members of
the commission and their
staff. It :will be obvious to all
those who .read the report
that the commission has
done an extensive job of
looking into the allegations
that the CIA exceeded its
authority by conducting do-
meatic operationa in viola-
tion of its statute. rend-
ing of Eil.^ revert leed,= rue :10
the conclusion that the panel
has been fair, frank and bal-
anced.
I will ask the Attorney
General to study all ma-
terials gathered by the com-
mission on any matter to de-
termine whethett any action
should be undertaken
against any individuals.
I am asking each of the
federal agencies and (*part-
merits affected by the report
to study its recommenda-
tions and to report back to
me with their comments on
the report
In aaldition to investigat-
ing the original allegations
Of improper domestic activi-
ties 1,)y 4the CIA, the commis-
sion. at. my request, subse-
quently looked into allega-
tion* eencerning. possible do-
mestic! involvement in as-
sps,Sizo tion. :Wmitpts, Th
(!4[0111-!tion It a s. reported'
that it did not complete
every e.spect of that investl-
resources of the agency with supreme,
wisdom, Skill and restraint if it is to,
serve the needs for which it was,
created. LAWRENCE H. McGmt,
1101,v...York,.May,21; 1975t-
/34
fmtion,
have developed coneernin
these allf.?jationf! have bee
turned ? ai.-er -to rae ID. class
fied fora:. -
F,;ecense thc-
of assassination allegatio
.is incomplete : and .becaus
the allegations involve e
tremely sensitive. matters,
have decided that it is noti
the national interest to mal
public materials relating
these allegations at this tim
However, under procedtar
that serve the nation
'Interest, I will make oval
note to the Senate at
HOUSe select cornmittc
these materials together wi
other related materials
the executive branch.
I know that the membe
of the 'Congress involv
will exercise utmost pr
dance in. handling such I
formation.
As I have stated p.
violas-1y, I am opposed
political assassinations. Th
administration has not a:
will not use such means
instruments of nation
poll's:a Hee:ever, in fairies-
none of us should jump
conclueions as to events VI
may have occurred in t
past.
After I have furth
studied the recommen,
tions of the commission.
will order or submit to
Congress the necessary in
sures to insure that the
telligence community fu.
tions in a way designed
protect th e constitutio-
rights of all Americans.
It remains my deep n-
sonal conviction that
CIA and other units of t
intelligence community
vital to the survival of
country. As we take t
steps necessary to insure t
proper functioning of t
intelligence community,
must also be certain ti
the United States mainta
I he, inteili.;ence cz.pabi'
rccez:t:ary fur the tuti p
teCtiOr. of, our national int
estfL
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9
? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010030008-9"
NEW YORK TIMES
11 June 1975
1 -t:../4"'-?7"'',
-.AA- .t, ka OM DP n SOil or
- A ,, .4.
) ' ?
Lion .... On tap Of this.veri- -
7.!ar7antarfal!iI. NAUGHTON table mountain of material
.1.1.7eds/ tn The New Y.TrIc Ttmts
. WASHINGTON, June 10?Thel
Rockefeller commission .repotin
on domestic a activities of the:
Central Intelligence Agency, in.!:
;sued today by the White House,
stated that the agency illegally
assembled a "veritable moun-
tain" of files on American citiz-
ens and groups "apparently un-
1connected with espionage." '
? The commission's' 299-page
report affirmed in virtually eve-
ry respect an account in The
New York Times last Dec. 22
cf a "massive, illegal domestic
intelligence operation against
the antiwar movement and oth-
er dissident groups in the Unit-
ed States." .
;.The report stated that "Oper-
ation CHAOS" the agency?
title of a secret program con-
ducted between 1967 and late
I973?and some other C.I.A.
activities "wereplainly illegal
and constituted improper inva-
sions of? the right of Ameri-
cans." The commission said it
was convinced, however, that
"the. great ?majority of the
C.I.A s? domestic ? activities
e.omply with its stautory au-
thority." ? ? .
? - According to the report, "The
piaaer trial left by Operation
'CHAOS" alone contained about
'13,0'30 files . on subjects and
,, .
individuals and produced a
individuals ' and produced a
computerized index of the
names of more than 300,000
United States citizens and or-
ganizations.
The. commission called for
"the drawing of reasonable
lines" between the conflicting
goals of individual rights and
collective national security. Its
report was, with few excep-
tions, worded in carefully mut-
ed terms that encouraged the
continuation of a vigorous pur-
suit of intelligence within clear
legal limits.
.. ? But the bulk of the report's
scattered conclusions was a
confirmation of the allegations
contained in the Dec. 22, 1974,
news' account in The Times
by 'Seymour M. Hersh. . The
commission was established by
President Ford ore Jan. 4 to
inquire into those and subse-
quent ? published . charges
against the agency.
What follows is a comparison
of the central ele,nents of the
Dec. 22 news account and ex-
cerpts from the various sec-
. .
tions of the commission's find-/
lags that bear on the original
allegations: ?
FILES ON CiTIZENS
? NEWS ACCOUNT: "An ex-
Itensive investigation . . . has
established that intelligence
Ffites ,on at least 10,000 Amer-
icon citizens were maintained
by a special unit of the C.I.A."
? . COMMISSION: 'The paper.
,trail left by Operation CHAOS
included somewhere in 'the
! atea of 13,00() files on sub-
jects and individuals (iriclud-.
Ang approximately 7,200 per-?
sonality or '201 files); over
? 11,000 memoranda, reports
. and letters from the F.B.I.;
and almost 3,500 memonanda.
for internal-use:11y the owprove
r a s a computer system cone
'taming an index of over 300,-
000 names and organizations
which, with few exceptions, -
were of United States citizens
, and organizations apparently.
? unconnected with espionage."
"Approximately 500 to SCO
files were created on dissent-
ing organizations and on in-
dividuals [in a separate effort ?
by the ,C.I.A. Office of Secu-
rity]. The chief of the special
branch 'guessed' that some-
where between 12,000 and
16,000 names were indexed
to these files." 4
- ILLEGAL METHODS' ,1
:NEWS ACCOUNT: "Sources
said a cheek of the C.I.A.'s
*domestic files . produced evie
dence of dozens of other illegal
activities by members 'of' the
C.I.A. inside the United States;
beginning in the nineteen-fif-
ties, including break-ins, wire-
tapping and the surreptitious
inspection of mail."
COMMISSION: "The com-
mission's inquiry ' concen-
trated on these investigations
. [of news leaks by .the Office
of Security] which used in-
vestigative means intruding
on the privacy.of the subjects,
including physical and elec-
tronic surveillance, unauthor-
ized entry, mail cove'rs -and:
. intercepts, enci reviews of las,
dividuals of individual Fede.
eral tax returns." - .. ? .
: "Five [of these investigas
tions] were directed against
newsmen, in an effort to de-
termine their ? sources of
leaked classified information,
and nine were directed against
other'United States citizens."
"Even an investigation
'Within the C.I.A.'s authority
must be conducted by lawful
means.* . . . The investiga-
tion disclosed the domestic
use of 32 wiretaps, the last
.in 1965; 32 instances of bug-
ging, the last in 1968; and I2.
break-ins,
break-ins, the last in 1971.
'None of these activities was
conducted under a judicial
warrant, and only one with.
the written approval of the
'Attorney General." .
"For a period of approxi-
. -
mately six months, corn-
mencing in the fall of 1973, ?
the directorate [of opera-
tions] monitored telephone'
cenverSaticns between the
United States and Latin
America in an effort to iden-
tify foreign drug traffickers
. . e the monitoring of tele-
'phone calls, while a source
of -valuable information for
'enforcement officials, was a
violation of a statute of the
United States." .
.? "An intercept project in -
New York City was the most
extensive of [four] C.I.A. mail .
Operations, and lasted for
20 gears. [It] had expanded
by 1959 to include the open-
ing of over ? 13.000 letters a
year . . . in the last full
year of its operation, the
New York mail intercept han-
dled approximately 4,350,000
items of mail and examined
the outside of over 2,300,-
rRHicesheeTtlaidtro
ccoun, an
ta?e,
.na
graphs were taken ? - the.
.eateriors of- approximately
33,000 items. Some - 8,700
items ? were opened :and the
,contents analyzed."
"While in operation, the
C.I.A.'s domestic mail 'open-
ing programs were tuilaw-
fn
. SHADOWING CITIZENS
n -NEWS ACCOUNT: "The
C.I.A. authorized agents to
follow participants in anti-
war and other. demonstra-
tions:" - ?? ?
COMMISSION: "In- somen
instances, the agency- identi-
fied leaders or speakers at a
meeting [of dissidents] by
photographing their automo- ?
biles and checking registraa
eon records. In other, caseke
it .folloWed them home in' or-
des' toldentify them through
,the city directory. .Photo--
graphs were also 'taken at:
. several major demonstrations
in the Washington area and
at protest activities *in the
vicinity of theWhite House."
_ . .
INFILTRATING DISSIDENTS
NEWS ACCOUNT: "The C.I.A.
also set 'up a network of ine
formants who wee ordeed - to
penetrate antiwar groups."
COMMISSION: "[A- project
of the Office'of Security] was
initially aimed at monitoring
public demonstrations which rector; nf .Centeel ,tr.te.ingence
might develop into picketing 49731..beagn' to ? crack. down on
of agency buildings. Almost the. elks; operations' e
from the outset, however, it ? '',''fCOMMISSION:'"Ai part of
.149
4'4 ea 6'1
Cl I 14)
Fin di
6,- 'The Office of Leg- .
islative* Counsel Maintains
Congressional . files for use
in its iegiciative .tiaisore clu-
*ties . ..-geneially, these files.
'contain the following types of
documents: Correspondence'
between the member and the
C.I.A., excerpts from the
Congressional Record dealing
with the ?? member, constitti-
?-ent employment or personnel
requests forwarded to the
agency by the member, short
, biographies and political de- t
.sariptionS of the member and
? copies of all foreign cables -
containing the name of the,
me...Tiber
_
[Althritiah the cormniSsion
report is silent on dissident
a files- kept'- one members of l;
'eCongress, William E: 'Colby,
the Director of Central. Inten
., . ,
ligence, has testified that -belt
? names of four, preSent orf ?
. former members of Cosigressel
-including "at least a tioup:e"
eantiwar members,: nverefesin ?
files.] - -e-N VI
. FILES: DESTR0'0.11.4'.
NEWS A.CCOUNT:4"Sbrnt'
sources also reported tfiat there
was ;'..widespread papeidteshred
fit
ding the agency shortly after
ilcuneitilefeeSchlesingerathet,di
became a project for placing
'assets' in suitable organiza-
tions in order. to obtain in-
formation concerning in-?
tended demonstrations di-
rected at !C.I.A. properties.,
('Asset' is a term used by the
C.I.A. to refer to agents or
informantts other than em-
ployes.)"
"By late June, 1967; the,
agency sought to obtain
whatever ?information it
could regarding the sources
and amounts of income of
each of the infiltrated or-
ganizations. One 'infiltrator
was sent to' dissident rallies
in New York, Philadelphia
and Balitmisre. One was.
called upon to maintain a
continuous check on the
movements and activities of
certain prominent dissident
leaders whenever they ar-
rived in Washington, D. C.-
infiltrators were charged
from time to time with ob-
a program to test the:tint-Jul
ince of drugs on, humans, re-
-searclr included the adrninis-
tzation' of LSD to persons
'who were unaware that they t
were being tested. 'This was
clearly illegal. One erson
died in 1053, apparetiq as a s
result" ? - yet..
_sen"Unforttinately, lira-
"Red records of the testing
conducted in these drug pro-
-grams are now available. All
the records concerning the
program were ordered de-
: stroyed in 1973, including a
Atatal of 152 separate files." e
Collecticn ;of t: [Data on
-"telephoned calls-"befvfeen.
:Americans and' -tt'flathers -;
'abroad] *as tiermina.tedttin
May,. 1I73 ? and 'the FtC.F.X.*C-'
:claims' that 'all: information
obtained by the agency Inas
been ':destroyed." -
ede ;eat
-.e
SECRET UNIrtem'
?
NEWS ACCOUNT:a "I'vIpst,Of
taming specific information
LheF.Idoniestic-,sitrveillariCeq!and:
on individuals, groups or
nmeaccIateetion' of !dontstie.-in-;
planned demonstrations."
teiligeiii:e was conducted, the
MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ; sourcmgsaidn, by onettot the
NEWS ACCOUNT: "At lenst most clandestine in. _the
one avowedly antiwar member Uritted:States intelligenee-arn-
of Congress was among those mwnity,-the Special Operations
placed under surveillance by Branch of Counterintelligence."
the C.I.A., the sources ,said.
Other members of Congress
were said to be included in the
COMMISSION: "The _C.I.A.,
upon the instruc ion of the
? Director' of Central Intel!!-
C.I.A.'s dossiers, on dissident gence, esta.blishde within the
'Araeric:74." countaririteThgenee Malt a
: special operations group in
_august, 1967, to collect; co-
? ord.inate, evaluate and-report
, on foreign contacts,' ? with
American dissidents,'" le The
group's ? activities eilater]
came to be known as :Opera-
tion CHAOS." at,
: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100876668e5ensitivity ofa?.1.the
35.
COMMISSION: "The. com-
1 mlasion diseoaered no evi-
dence suggesting that any of
these investigations [involv-
ing physical and electronic
surveillance] were directed at
! any Congressman, judge or
'other public official."
Approved For-Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010037000879
BALTIMORE SUN
1.2 June 1975
Eginen3. Furgurson ?
?
TISOTSi'l ancW_Alitaar
. Washington.
To a newspaperman, there
might seem only one side to the
issue of the censored chapter in
the Rockefeller commission's CIA
report: the alleged assassination
plots involved were official mat-
ters financed by the taxpayers,
and therefore they are the peo-
ple's business.-
- That is the rationale for disclo-
sure, not only of a cabinet mem-
ber's financial holdings but PASO of
the most sensitive intradepart-
mental conversations. And if the
information is not forthcoming
voluntarily or through official in-
vestigators, then it is the news-
man' io deto to siphon it out. ?
0
But there is another side, that
isf the government professionals.
who must analyze and recom-
-mend policy, and plan for eventu-
alities that may never take place.
Their point of view clearly is self
serving, but there is a reasonable
case to be made that it also serves
the ntiblic. That rosition-in srainisei
eat by John flyisasetteis, Jr? a 44-
year-old career diplomat, in the
current issue of the Foreign Eery-
NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
11 JUNE 1975
PUTTING THINGS IN FOCUS
. -
"Will candor survive the stnhe
Leg ship of state?" he asks. Ha
seems to doubt its .
Sylvester maintains that "can-
dor within the government is at
least as important for our country
as government candor with the
people, Good decisions in govern-
ment depend on accurate and
frank efficial reporting and
straightforward use of expertise."
9 ? 51
Daniel Ellsberg's leaking of
the Pentagon papers, among
many other recent examples, en-
cited civilian insistence that the
government be more forthcoming
with the public. But the response
within government is to be still
more inhibited. Sylvester says.
He compares this accurately
to the days of the political hunt
for scapegoats after the fall of
China a quarter century ago. For-
eign service officers learned then,
he recalls, "that their reporting
might soon end un in the public
re:ere. and thee' a-dvitsaitly
be politically propitious and dis-
creet." The multitude of leaks
lately has brought back that atti-
tude,-carried to further extremes..
. Sylvester says this is "wide-
'spread and deleterious to the
worhing of responsible govern-
ment." It causes "blander, more
cautious official reporting. . . in-
creasingly, supposedly analytical
classified reports are written
more like press releases."
- The attest sensitive memoran-1
da are distributed less widely, he
continues, and often are dispensed
,with in favor of telephone calls.
As a result, subordinates too fre-
quently are inadequately or erro-
neously informed, and able to of-
fer less useful aid to their seniors.
an.
The diplomat suggests that be-
fore senior officials can be confi-
dent that secrets will remain so,
"at least one case of unauthorized
disclosure of confidential infor-
mation Will have to result In pub-
lic'penalties rather than fame and
fortune."
? On reading that, ? he public
might he grateful for his maces.
?len that "the dividing line ,
tween what should or should not
be secret ? is at best fuzzy, and
one's view will inevitably depend '
on whether ene's seat is in or on
of authority." '
Sitting outside., yet coneraiser
ating slightly -with him, we wil
-add that the occasional disdosur
of classified information woul
not seem such a disaster if th
? public were more sophisticate
about it.
0 0
For one thing, the existence o
contingency plans to do seeming!
putrageous things does not nem
that those missions are serious'
contemplated. There are plans fo
every contingency that can be fin
agined at the Pentagon, the Stat
Department or the CIA, just i
case, and the thinkers there woul
not be earning their pay if the
' .did not devise them. The press,
course, is repeatedly guilty o
making contingency plans see
the equivalent of accomplishe
facts.
But as for the gap in the CIA
report, the way for the geTere-
411,44t? 1.40 99VUU letWASL 114101 auuw,
assassination plots?coritingeney
or otherwise?is not by ex post
facto censorship. It is by prior
and total abstinence.
? ?
-?The supposedly mountainous "domestic surveillance"
program which some media folk and politicians ascribed
to the Central Intelligence Agency turns out to have been
overblown considerably in the
- That is' the conclusion_
drawn by the presidential corn-
mission which delved into the
allegations:? And it has facts
and figures to hack_ its assess:.
rnent.
The CIA does not emerge
with a clean bill of health. The
probers, headed by Vice Presi-
dent Nelson _Rockefeller found
that the cloak-and-dagger boys
did indulge in some illegal or
Sen Church dubious capers.
. , . But their transgression
suchas bugging, wire-tapping, and opening letters?hard-
ly were on a massive scale.
A number of the illicit or questionable activities
operation was ' deen so
great that, during one. field
, survey in November,- 1972,
-even the staff of the C.I.A.'s
Inspector General was :pre-
tcluded from reviewing CHAOS
. files or discussin its specific
operations."
"There is no ind!intion
that the C.I.A.'s general coun-
i Se! was ever cOnsulted. about
.the propriety of Operation
, CHAOS activities." ?
"Some domestic actfvities,
of Operation CHAOS unlaw-
fully exceeded the
? statutory authority."
Approved For Release 2001/08/0 _ ',`!CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9
occurred many years ago and have long since beei
discontinued. - :
? Nonetheless, Rockefeller & Co. did recommend some
reforms?in the shape of new legislation, executive orders
or administrative impreements ?? to better define the
agency's area of operations and see that it sticks to it.
;.? But it also emphasized?as President Gerald R. Ford
did in his Monday night press conference?that the CIA
remains a vital organ in the nation's defense, and that it
must have sufficient scope and freedom from prying eyes
to permit it to carry out its function effectively. Let's
never lose sight of that overriding necessity. As for the-
--'MURDER PLOT' CHARGES
that have been flung at the CIA, the Rockefeller commis-
sion kioked into them, but its investigation was incom-
plete and inconclusive. 'At Mr. Ford's direction, the ma-
terial it gathered will be given to the Justice Department
and two Congressional committees, including the Senate
group headed by Frank Church (D-Idaho).
Exactly where that trail will lead, or what will de-
velop, rio one can safely predict at this time.
In the circumstances, most Americans would be well
advised to heed another bit of advice Mr. Ford gave:
Don't leap to conclusions, or make hasty judgments on
:the basis of rumors, leaks and specujation. _
?
Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9
POST
10 ara(1 1975
Joseph Kraft
ore.
t
A fatal flaw shadowed the Rockefel-
ler corerrission on the Central Intern-
dgence.? Ager.e.y from its first days. Not
:that a fix was in to whitewash the
egeney and smear past Democratic,
Presidents, as some seem to believe.
On the contrary, President Ford paid
? too much attention to persons in the
press 'and television determined to
blacken the intelligence community. As
*a result, he gave the wrong mandate
? to the wrong commission, and he is
stuck With a report which only proves
.the need for more serious inquiry.'
The starting point was a story 'in
The New York Times which asserted
that the CIA had undertaken massive
domestic surveillance in violation of
congressional proscriptions against
such activity inside the United States.
, Without apparently realizing it, Presi-
dent Ford accepted that diagnosis as
the heart of whatever might be wrong
In the intelligence community. ,
He established a commission domi-
nated by persons with broad political
and foreign policy experience. To these
practical men, he gave the narrow man-
date of looking into activities by the
CIA "within the United 'States which
rise to violations of the charter." As
staff director he visited upon the corn-
erdssior.tavid 3e14o, lawyer ighIy
sensitive to moral questions who had
served Mr. Ford on the commission in-
vestigating the assassination of Presi-
dent Kennedy.
? Within a week the Rockefeller com-
mission received from the CIA the so-
called inspector general's report ? an
account of various CIA transactions
'prepared in response to questions from
- a former director, James Schlesinger.
There were deletions in the inspector
? general's report, and the commission
speedily determined that the deletions
dealt wtih the matter of assassinations.
BALTIMORE SUN
4 June 1975
..Fidom of Inf?rmati?n be due to plain old bureaucratic desire for se-
crecy. The reason Congress enacted the new amend-
ments was that the FBI and other agencies found
ways to thwart the spirit of the original Freedom of
Information Act while staying within the letter of
the law. Congress is required to review the adminis-
tration of the new act next March. Then it can de-
cide how much new help the government needs, it
any, and whether changes in the law are needed.
The real problem in public access to government
information is not that a burdee has been impeeed
on some officials, but that some officials are still
keeping the public in the dark about the public's
business. Conscientious bureaucrats who want to
publicize information covered by the Preedom of
formation Act are often prevented from doing so by
'superiors. These so-called "whistle blowers" are in',
the tradition of Ernest Fitrzereld, who. made ro9.te
cost overruns on the CA, and was fired, and Dr.
jacqueiine Veerett, wo pliblieiZet.1 suppressed
su-
?Ies linking cyclamates to cancer, and was punielsed
. by the Food and Drug Administration. Legislation
pending before the Senate would make it less likely
that conscientious efforts to publicize public infor-
mation would lead to penalties. It deserves to be en-
? acted. ,
Approved For ReIgase.20 1108/-08 :--CIA-RDP47-004-32Reeeteeanow-9-7---77?
lath
At first the commission was disposed
to exclude that issue from considera-
tion on the grounds that it had noth-
ing to do with domestic surveillance.
But President Ford himself, in an ap-
parent effort to put the assassination
question out of bounds, mentioned it
to a group of visiting editors. In re-
sponse to the resulting howl, Mr. Ford
then included the assassination item
on the 'corn-mission's agenda. The Win-
mission delegated Mr. Belin to look
into the issue of whether the assassina-
tions had anything to do with domestic
actions by the CIA. -
Mr. Belin plunged into the assaesi-
nation question with zest ,and largely?
on his own. Because they had domestic
implications, lie went deep into charges
?
that the Kennedy administration had
plotted to.assassinate Fidel Castro of ?
Cuba and Rafael Trujillo of the Do-
minican ,Republic. Because they had
no domestic associations, he went much
less deeply into charges regarding as-
sassinations of President Diem of
South Vietnam and President Lu-
mumba of the Congo. -
Meanwhile the commisaion bowled
along. Vice President Rockefeller, not
fidny cognizant of Mr. Belin's work,
indicated the report wonld show no
C reat violatiaret eil the chatter by the
CIA.. He and his staff indicated that
the full report would be turned over
to the President and then made public
as a matter of course.
But the White House legal staff was
aware of , Mr. Belin's work. It was
clearly not definitive and to them it
looked to. raise more questions than it
-answered about a highly emotional
subject. So they :raised the issue with.
the commission, and eventually worked
out the compromise whereby only the
report on domestic surveillance be-
comes public at this time.
'- Attorney General Levi complained recently that
the new Freedom of Information Act amendments
had created terrible administrative burdens on the
.Department of Justice, particularly the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation. The amendments took effect
three months ago, and immediately the number of
requests to inspect files jumped some 40-fold. There
have been increased requests at other agencies, too.
The Internal Revenue Service, the Central Intent-
fent..? Agency, the Securities and Exchange Corn-
mistion, the Food and Drug Administration, to name
those feeling the greatest pressure. In many cases
the agencies cannot do the job properly without
more help and more money.
In which case, the money ;hould be forthcoming
from the Congress. This newspaper strongly sup-
ported the enlargement of the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act. It would alsi; supped, whatever increased
cests Fre reeeSsary to make the law werk. So would
Congress, we are sure. However, the time to deter-
mine just how great a burden the new law creates is
not now but after the law has been in effect for long-
er than three months. Some of the burden may be
due to increased demands for information, but some
ee- What all this iiroves is that domestio
eurveillance is not the heart of what
is wrong withthe intelligence commu-
nity. On the contrary, domestic surveil-
lance and the assassinations both come
from a larger, parent problem. '
The basic fact is that the intelligence
community was born and given M-
crease during the. period of intense.
celd war. The struggle against intern
tional comenamism looked to many'
people like a do-or-die affair. Within
that context it seemed legitimate to.
read the mail of American citizens sus-
pected of helping, the enemy, and to
take extreme measures against heads
of foreign governments thought to be
? helping the enemy, and to take extreme
measures against heads of foreign
governments. . ?
Now, however, the struggle against
communism has given way to detente.
Far from playing dirty tricks on the
reds, the chief intelligence' function is
to monitor _compliance with various
agreements in arms control and other
areas. The North-South struggle has
replaced the East-West struggle in in-
tensity, and a major intelligence re-
quirement is for better information on
nolitical and economic events in, the
ende.raeveloped world.'
intelligeace e(yriilnunity has not;
' adjusted Well to these changes. Hencei
the continued eold-war zealotry of so.
many intelligence operatives; hence the
failure of the correct -CIA estimates on,
Vietnam to get through at the top; hence
the constant fight between the analysts t?
and the dirty-trick artists, and between;
the military and civilian ? specialists.
The task ahead is to accomplish the ?
'adjustment The best that can be said -
for the Rockefeller. report is that it
points in taitat ? direction. .
?0 1975, Field Euterprises.-711e.:?
137
'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9
THE NEW YORK .TIME,`THURSbAY,:TUNE Li; 1975.
? ' . .,... .
, , .
. cuth.Vietnam Reds' Piesoed 7hell' 1? re
. v.3 ports; he disappeered. Actually&
_ ? i e ? . , ,, sit is now known, he- and his
" ''' tread. to The Sem V,rk T)ro'es '
1.-1 4.:11ir ,Fi.ORA LEWIS .. for Negotiated End .,, entourage were returned:tosthe
.: palace for 48 hours, thee men:
pet in one room and the wornwettt
PARIS, June 11?As the.
Mirth ; Vietnamese forces
pressed ever closer to Saigon,
the South Vietnamese Corn-.
muniste Provisional ' Revolu--
tionary Government . asked
France to arrange negotiations
with ever' more urgency, ac-
cording to authoritative French
sources.
Inform:khan on. the politics
of the approaching end of the
war and some of its aftermath
has' now become available here:
According to the. French, the
Vietnamese Communists be-
came certain that they were
:winning the war after the fall
of Ban Me Thuot on March 10.
? However, still uneasy about the
timetable and the cost in lives,
? they, were expecting to be un-
able to move into Saigon be-
fore late summer and possibly
only after a ferocious battle.
There were; the 'sources here
are convinced, three possibil-
ities from the Communist point
of view. The first was- to get
President Nguyen Van Thief.'
replaced by a senior Saigon
personality who would nego--
tiate a coalition with the Pro-
vincial Revolutionary-- Govern-
ment, possibly the former De-
fense Minister, Gen. Tran Van
Don. -
After the fall of Hue, that
was discarded as unnecessary.
Then the second possibility, was
considered, to insist on replac-
ing Mr. Thieu with a personal-
ity of the "third force" who
had been 'in contact with the.
Provincial Revolutionary Gov-
ernment, such as Gen. Duong.
Van Minh, and negotiating a'
government with him. .
The third possibility was
straight military victory, and
the second idea was also dis-'
'carded as this third possibility,
Seemed more and more easily
within Hanoi's early reach.
? e Fear of Being Eclipsed '-
The Provisional Revolution-
ary- Government preferred ne-
gotiations for fear of :being
eclipsed and left powerless by
the North Vietnamese if the
war ended with the entry of
Hanoi's troops in the southern
capital and without any agrees
tnent, according to evidence
here.
. That is ? what did happen.
The new information is that
the Provisional. Revolutionary
Government now has virtually
Xtothing' to say in the South.
Saigon is being run by a North
Vietnamese military committee
whose head, though southern-
?er by birth? wears the North
Vietnamese Army uniform and
beayart of Hanoi's team.,
?
, On only two ceremonial oc-

being "like Hitler iis his bunker,
4casions has the known Provis- talking about imaginary divie
tonal Revolutionary Govern- signs." ,
!tient' leadership' appeared in He turned ower over t h.
.
Saigon since the take-over, and vice.presidentP, Tr - o is
Tran Van Huonge,
then- it disappeared from view. r - . . a
The ministers who figure on the !who lasted a week and then!
Provisional Revolutionary Gov- !handed' over to General Minh
ernment's'cabinet list have not By . that 'time, there was no.;
taken over -the-Saigon Gtivern- !longer 'any question of negOtias
ment departments, which func- Itions, .Which might ? have been
tion with unknown or invisible !possible some weeks--earlier
North Vietnamese Communist 1 On .the day Ambassador Mar-
heads. ? - - . !tin left 'Saigon,: by helicopter
iit- Le Dunn, the head 'Of thetlf min the American 'Embassy:,
!party, has been shuttling. hese compound,. he went to pay a;
formal .fareaVell, call on Ambas-
sador:Merillon, whose embassy
was around the block. -
The . American Ambassador
tween Hanoi and Saigon an, a
Small Ilyushin jet. ?
_According to the information,'
all . officials with whom- the
French Ambassador, Jean-Marie: presented' ..the French Ambas-
Merillon, who has since left, seder with a pagoda statue aS
idealt after the take-over were: a . farewell present, and took
;northerners who_ did not . give: his leave. , .
their ?,.,... , . , A little after 4 that afternoon.
I nartin,-
I ? es-as . Merillon the sen- Ambassador ' Martin' h"rded
i - his helicopter. But the lift con-
tort French diplomat in Vietnam,
L
ources said. He told the South tinued until 8 o'clock the next
who argued with' Mr. Thieu
morning. -
sources
that he should leave, the
Witnesses in . the, French
'Vietnamese President that it compound next door --could
was the only way to save a watch as the Americans rose
,vast .number of hetes in Saigon floor - by floor - through, their
and probably' Mr. Thieu's own Embassy to reach the helicopter
platform, and the Vietnamese
?
throng pushed after them, kept
a floor behind by the Marines.
' Hanel Taniti'Enter
lire. , ? .
? Even after the unexpectedly
rapid advance of North Viet-
namese. troops had made the
-fall of Saigon a foregone con-
elusion, Mr. Thieu insisted on Shortly after' the last heli-4`
fighting to the bitter . end. copter -took off,. guards shoot-
French. diplomatic. reports say. ing to . keep more refugees
he argued that he could estab- from trying to clamber aboard
lish an enclave. in Saigon- and or ride its skids, an American
the Mekong Delta and negotiate turned up with his suitcase. It
later, from a better position.? was too late. He was sheltered,
The United States Ambassa- in the. French Embassy for, a
d6r, Graham A. Martin,, was so while, and eventually, sent
preoccupied with organizing hoe.
? By that time, the first North
the American evacuation in the. Vietnamese tanks were moving
last few days of Mr. Thieus, down Hal Trung Street, past
Government that,, he did not the side entrante of the French
take part in such exchanges,
on their way to the
the information indicates. The ?
Presidential ? Palace. The lead
French reports said Mr. Martin'
delayed arranging evacuation tank was firing its cannon to
Mr eight to ten days beyond ea e way
'Washington's Wishes .and then -
Otherwise, there was no
'barely had time to work it out s righting as they entered Saigon.
Gen. Minh was awaiting them
Generels Advise Departure In the palace. He was taket
However, the French believe I nfk, inssi Jeep, to .the: radio staa
that the Central Intelligence
Agency mission in Saigon,
which rejected Mr. Martin's
persistent optimism evensas the
situation was crumbling, dig
help persuade Mr. Thieu to.
leave. , ???
On th-e nieht before Mr/11114
'finally, agreed to go, his gets.;
erels, headed by the chief of
the general staff, Cau Van Vieni
told him it was' the only waY:
to save Saigon. More than one
Vietnamese described Mr. Thieu
to diplomats in ,those days as
38
Approved For Release 2001/08/0-8.: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9
:'in: another. Then he was .
bome. s ? '
A few days later, commifni-
cations with the outside world
were cut.
:Apart from, the French Vas-
. haSsyswhere.there are still 153
people with .`a. tenuous radio
link abroad, the only Western
diplomats left in Saigon are a
oBelgian, and a Swiss, without
-Staffs or communications.
! The Polish and Hungarian
''..delegations to the International
? Control. Commission remained,
sbut, the report said they- were
confined to their quarters ex-
cept when they too were ad-
mitted to the 'two"victory
ceremonials. and their tele-
phones have been cut. A Soviet
mission that had been accred-
ited to the Provisional Revolu-
tionary Government in Lee
Ninh before the final offensive,
was -evacuated to' Hanoi.
NoSov;eie .c-hes 'elin:o-
triatiO.haire 'been permitted' to
-cOme to Saigon.
--The.' conclusion- of informed
sources here, is.. that Hanoi, is
now 'ih no -hurry, .to decide how
. ,
to .deal with Saigonpolitically,
arid that ?there' may be a long
delay e in. setting-. up a. - new
South Vietnamese .Government,
if, ever that.isedone.e. e;
? The view. in .Paris ? is -' that
Hanoi' has :now decided Seto
maintain direct control, a step
Ithat' the . sources said. was
"bmind to, come sooner' or la-
:ter" =but that they think carne
much - sooner than Hanoi.
+Planned or than might have
been the case. -
. 'Ambassador Martin's argu-
ments for refusing to urge
-President Thieu to leave earlier
when the', French, at least;
sthought a negotiated-end was
still possible, were that Mr.
Thieu's departure would pro-
-yoke wild panic and chaotic..
collapse in Saigon.
? So far as, the French know,
his instructiOns from Washing-
ton were vague during this per-
iod and such 'decisions were
1..eft; to this,diseretiore ?
th
?
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010037a008-9
CUP:ROI/1M MAiir,,N; ?rD
26 ray 1975
MARTIN woorAdicorr
Romen? Catholic Church
ix ' ?
eoute V ittnain;' long in the
forefront of the fight against
. .
cemmunisme is now attempting
? the radical readjustment neces-
sary if it is to survive.
But it is split between left
? and: right-wings, who ? - are.
already quarrelling' over two
itrottez, or rather 'personalities.
As _soon as communications are
zest:A-et!, Rome will be faced
witti difficult ..problems here.
The leftwing Catholic groups
,called for the immediate resig-
nation of Mgr Henri Lemaitre,
a Belgian. priest who is the
apostolic delegate to South Vie-
tnam, and of Mgr Nguyen Van
Thuan, Deputy Archbishop of
'Saigon, a nephew of Diem,
and a staunch antitC'emmunist.
These various groups have com-
bined to send a letter to the
Pepe asking for the removal of
theae two men if they don't
voluntarily resign. .
' One letter to the apostolic
delegate. couched, in Com-
munist-style lance 'age, bluntly'
ht.:I.:used him . of having
"dragged the -Church into a
policy of collusion With: the
American imperialists and their
valet Thieu,' and ?otf having
itftirtively tried to impose an?
anti-C?ommurrist bishop on
Saigon." /3-3, this it meant the
appointment earlier this month
of 'Mgr Thuan, who has the
right if succession should the
present Archbishop of Saigon,
Mgr Nguyen Van Binh, resign
or die. It ended by demanding
that Mgr Len:Aare resign and
-leave Vietnam "immediately on ,
receipt of this, letter."
? One of the leading figures of
the Catholic Loft is Father.
Huarnh Cong Mirth,. who has a
parish on the outskirts of
Saigon, and who,. it now
appears, - ran a clandestine
group called the Movement of
Ca.tholics.for the People. Father
Minh, -a serious, bearded, young ?
men, !Mho never wears clerical
robes exeept when saying mass
and signals his priesthood only
by a small gold cross pinned
to his vAtilite shirt, says his
group is ".a movement of cons-
oientisation, not a. pressure
group." , The movement.
emerged from underground
ealstence ca the (hay before the
Pall of Saigon .intd has 'since
cid meetings and , produced
,o magazines which welcome
e liberation and speak of the
eed for Catholics to help in'
riding socialism in Vietnam. ?
Father Minh is not a Cotn-
unist, or if he is, he is e-
ery good actor. Ire says: "I'
hall always be a Catholic:
all always be' tied to the
warn and to :dome. But our
atholic life here in Vietnam
ust change: We have been a
mall, privileged, and favoured
miraOrityn Now we rnteet -help
in the work of building socia-
lism
"Our starting point is our
Christian ideals and the start-
ing point of the Communists
is different but we can co-exist
and work together. They expect
religions to wither away so they
see no reason for, combatting
us unless we combat them."
Father Minh claims ? that
North Vietnam's 'attitude to its
own e 'C at h oil c s t changed
markedly when they saw, priests
and 'Catholic laity taking an
active part in the. defence of
the North against bombing and
when they found, after reluc-
tantly recruiting Catholics into
the army, that they made excel-'
lent soldiers and did not hack
patriotism. "
But, Father Minh says, these
first few weeks could be of vital
importance for the, future of.
Catholicism in Vietnam.. The
liberationeof Saigon and South
Vietnam -as immediately wel-
comed by manY bishops and
priests, teeinaise some with,
strong anti-Corritilnist records.,
'The- Archhishbp of Saigon:
Issued a pastoral letter,. as did
the Archbishop of Hue, and the
Bishop of Dalat. Others, like.
the Bishop of koritum, the last'
French ',Bishop in Indo-China,
have apparently remained*
Silent '
,
But generally the initial'
response 'awas' such as to give
the Communists no cause for,
? suspicion. One well known anti-
Communist priest organised an
immediate festival for his
entire parish. including non-
Catholics and the NLF soldiers
' camped nearby, killing, three
'beef cattle and two pigs. He
explained to an' amused congre-
gation that since 'the young
men of the 'parish no longer,
had to pay bribes to evade mili-
tary service he expected their
families 'to hand Over a similar
amount to- pay for the feast.
, -
The NLF soldiers joined in
the laughter, but the 'new auth-.
oritles could be forgiven for
dismissing the Catholic wel-
come as superficial. The whole,
history of Catholicism in. Viet-
nam is inextricably intermin-
gled first with French colonia,
lism, and then with anti-Corn-
animist nationalism. The Diem
lobby in the United States 'was
, virtually started by a Catholic
social democrat. Joseph But-
tinger, who dater became a
historian of . Vietnam. Diem
'was, of course, backed bsr.
Cardinal Spellman. During the '
French wax in Indo-China the,
Cathelie areas were the back-
hone,of resistance to the Viet-
minh and that contintiee tfe be
the case in South Vietnam.
? The officer corps of the lold
Vietnameae National Army was
heavily Catholic, and Catholics
continued to he represented out ;
of au proportion. to their actual.
numbers?about 9 per cent ? of
the total population of South
Vietnam--both , in the army
and. in the bureaucracy 'e.fteh
Diem. .
Catholics have not only been
prominent in support of the
southern, regimes, including'
that of Thieu, who was a Catho-
lic but they have also
been prominent in new anti-
Communist initiatives.' One
such was. the' Nhan Xa (Revo-
lutionary - Social Humanist
Party); a descendant of Diem's
party,, the Can Lao. Mgr Thuau
was associated with 'both, pare
ticularly the latter; formed in
1966 to created a real' altert.14-
tive.to the Communists. ?
Irt The same line of succei-
sion of anti-Communist -Catholic
opposition groups was Father
Tran Huu Thanh's Anti-Corrup-
tion Movement which emerged
late last year and forced a few
reforms on the Thieu Govern-
ment. Father Th?anh .is still
here, at the Redenaptorist
Church in ? Northern Saigon
Father- Thant). says: "I am
still an ? anti-Communist But
under the 'new circumstances
the Church must pursue a
policy of careful. cooperation.
Then I think. it will viable."
He considers it foolish to "try
to appease'? the authorities' by
demonstrating against 'Lemaitre
and Thuan. "Let matters take
their course. the apostolic dele-
gate in Hanoi after 1954 left
after one year, a decent intei-
val. Rome does not need Oa be
told its business by. a bunch
of young priests.
Father Minh.. on the other
hand, argues ? that "this is a
very delicate moment for ?the
Church in South Vietnam. The
new Government does not want
to get into a quarrel with the
Church. But if Catholics persist
in opposition then naturally
something will happen.
Lemaitre and Thuan must go."
Whether they do or not, the
'Church in Vietnam obviously
faces a difficult period. -Father
Minh Cis' right in saying that
39
the rhafority of bishops and
ether senior 'priests are anti-
Communist right-wingers.
For instance, 'of Saigon's 400 r
priests, perhaps io are known h
as "rightists"' hut they Include h
all 11 deans and meet other
Church dignitaries.
Southern Catholica may
benefit from a certain detente
that 'has developed recently bet-
.ween Hanoi and the Vatican.
Southern. priests who have
given confession to Catholic
soldiers frona the North are
amazed at how "old fashioned"
they are.
Some of the restrictions ca
the Church in North Vietnam,
which virtually. locked it aaay
from world Catholic develop-
ments for 20 years, are now
apparently being lifted. South-
ern Catholics, the majority of
Vietnam's Catholics, may there-
fore now benefit from Hanoi's
experience with tie smaller
community in the North And its
? understanding of new develop-
ments in Catholic thought'
ra.rtietilealy in the- third
world churches. "I am not a
pessimist," Father Minh says.
The Church has survived in
the North. We Catholics of the
Left now have .a chance to try
to educate the Catholic- born-
! mu.nity as a whole to work with
' the Communists, even to build
socialism with ,them."
One la reminded of the
Catholic chaplain Lam-
pedusa's? The Leopard, reassur-
ing, his master that the Church
I would always stand with the
nobility. And if Mother, Church
had to abandon the nobility,
The Leopard ? snapped, would
she not do so instantly, and
would she net be wholly
justified in doing so?
Nevertheless, there are
clearly difficult times ahead for
the Church in Vietnam ?
.difficult times that it will no
doubt survive but in a much
different form. ? '
? '' '
gia;sLataaamitaaaaievaearamiaateaseas
' Approved For Release 2001108/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9
.-Q1A1
4'4
fra
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9
1,CNDON ODSMV
25 May 197$
on ju in
ef
?.4s, ?
from MARK FRANKLAND in Bangkok
"-!THE American defeat in
'Indo-China has forced the
ruLing class of Thailand to
look at reality, and it is
.,,scar,cd by what it sees.
Until recently, this country
was seemingly one of the
_happiest and most promising
ree.2 American; clients in Asia.
_'-Today, the most popular
.guessing game in Bangkok is
how long it will be before it
,goes Communist.
? Even allowing for the
,exaggeration in any predic-
- tion made at 'this moment of
.uncertainty in Asian history,
?. the -queasy feeling here is of
.great concern to South-east
eAsia.. Thailand is the key, to
'
:the rest of the region.
ere This is partly a matter of
geography, for it lies between
.Burma and Malaysia and the
now Communist States of
,41-tdo-Oh?ina. But it is even
-emotes a question of examole,,
Lar i.E Thailand v?ith it" '- t
-natural resources, with the
.most revered monarchy in
-Asia (and possibly the world)
and. a Buddhist religion in
.-,which almost all Thais take
epart, cannot resist the Com-
.:munists? what hope is there
;for countries with few or
-none of these advantages?
The Thais have every
:reason to be confused: con-
sider the news they were
.having to digest this week-
:.end. Vietnam.'s Army may not
;be at .the door, but its diplo-
mats are already in Bangkok,
'dragon-like with indignation
that Thailand let America
-use it as a rear area through,-
out the Indo-China war.
? A : Hanoi delegation is
: ostensibly here to discuss the
"-establishment of diplomatic
relations, but its immediate-
,' purpose is to frighten, the:
Thais into closing down-. the-
American military bases-.
There was also disconcert-
ing news from the rest of.
, Indo-China. In Cambodia, the
Khmer Rouge had lust oceue
pied the temple of Pine
Vibran, which sits on the. That
'',border and is believed: bse
, many:Thais to belong to Thai-
land.. The Laotians, . whom
Thais used to regard. as
;laughable poor relations, were.
showing great aplomb in eas-
ing out USAID. the?Amerieen
-foreign aid: organisation, that
-once can .Laos like a second.
:Government.
Any -Thai who wanted to
know what his Government
;Svae going to do about the
'Americans in Thailand could
only scratch his -head.. The
-.Mayaguee affair and the
_ violent speeches made during
:the demonstrations against
,
T)--7 -
the US Embassy here seemed
to make it impossible for the
Government-' to wriggle out of
its already public commit-
ment to close the American
bases by next 'March.
Yet the Government was
plainly- worried about the
effects of a pullout. The
Americans spend e lot of
money and employ 'a 'lot of
Thais. Senior Army officers
own much of the land around
the bases and do very well out
of the bars and brothels that
have been built there. ?
There was more evidence;
too, of the _radicalisation of
Thai domestic politics that
began. with the overthrow of
the military oligarchy in 1973.
Strikers armed with steel
pipes, the favourite .weapon
of Japanese student revolu-
tionaries,, had closed down
the Dusit Than, an extrava-
gant new Bangkok 'notei that
might have been designed by
Busby Berkeley for one of his
Hollywood spectaculars, and
where guests spend more in
a day than a Thai coolie earns
in a month..
A member of ?the Gevern-
ment said it was the fault of
outside agitators.. The head
of the- hotel workers' union
replied it. was a simple matter
of workers fighting . unjust.
capitalists. .
The confusion of. ordinary.
Thais may be judged by some
disarming remarks: the other
day by the university profes-
sor who was an unwilling
caretaker , Prime , Minister
from the time of the generals'
overthrow to the installation
of the present elected Govern-
ment this year. Life. as Pre-
mier- had been -so difficult,.
he said, that he- sometimes
used to hide away in .a sump-
tuous layatory in-Government
Hbuse that- had been, built
for the State visit of Qneen-
Elizabeth:
What there could well. be
-in. Thailand Is a -very for-
midable Communist revolt in
which the emergence of a-
CoMmunist Indo-China would
be a factor?as- an example
and :source of supplies and
training?but far from the
most important one:. . ? e
Both foreign diplomats and
Thais believe that the condi-
?tions for- such an insurgency
already?exist. ,Therens. greet -
inequality, even by Asian
standards, which foreign aid
and investments have helped
to increase and which the
pnlincians,.albeit now demo-
cratically elected,' seem un-
willing or unable to do much
about.,.
Cohefent Mariist thinking
-
is,. catching On the
student -and workers' organi-
sations which were set up
after the overthrow of the
generals.. The peasant farm-
ers on the great fertile plains,
that are the envy of the rest
of South-East Asia, are fail-
ing into the hands of money-
lenders, The only easy scfurre
of credit, and so are no
more, master of their land,
even when they ,still have
legal title to it. ..
'- Power and Wealth are con-
centrated in Bangkok, where
the woes of the previnces are
too often ignored. ?- And if
the Government does promise
redress, . corruption.- in the
Civil 'Service,. the Army and
the.. police is. so great that
men of influence can usually
deflect any decision that
affects- their 'interests. .
.. The-beginning of an insurg-
ency have of course been
present, for a decade. in -the
border areas where- zere
Thai, minorities live: moun-
tain; tribes in the North, Viet-
namese .and Laotians in the
North-East and Malays in the
South. .In spite of American
counter-insurgency advice and
equipment, and Thai Army
operations (sometimes. be-
cause of them) the revolt has
grown steadily, if unspectacu,
lady.
, It is still manageable,' but'
it does offer- a base to Thai
Communists with their, eyes
on the Thai. heartlands.
Not all this is apparent to
the-people in. power in Bang-
kok, at least not to the point
of taking actions ? -that
diminish their position and
privileges. But the shaming
of the Americans- lin Indo-
China has started to open Thai
eyes: to the Americans' failure
to. help: Thailand, too, on to a
better course of: development
The. Thais are.. Too,king into,
all the' agreements- they have
with die Aratricane: and find
only signed- with the'
then .USe Secretary di' State,
Dean Rusk, that Offers- con-
crete -support, end: that, is in.
the event of a foreign inva-
sion of Thailand?the . least
probable of the dangers, fac-
ing the country.
T.TEw r, T.; T.7 ris e e,
c":3-c 12 Jume 1.97
. . .
-Thus thee Thais' are boey?
trYing: to. 'soothe .the ,Vietna-
.emeie,. while huildifbie ;their
main, new bridge to .Peking.
But the thief. danger- Li
within: a political and social
system that may break under
pressin ,of ;is, n snaking.
Unless the Government can
do something about that, both.
Thailand. and much Of South-
Ea.st Asia is in trouble.
1
Regime inCariibodfa
Charges 3 Nations
gept lier Backward
.n.
-7:BANGKOK, Thailand, June
11 (Reuters)---Cambodia's new
Gbvernment today blamed
France, Japan and the United
states for the 'country's eco-
nomic backwardness.
.? In a commentary monitored
here, the Phnom Penh radio
-declared: "The old and new
aggressors have caused the
weakness of cur country. If
there had been no foreign at-
tacks, Cambodia would have
become a powerful country?'
- :It accused France, which
'governed Cambodia as n
-protectorate for 90 years until
1953, of having prevented devel-
opment of weaving and hand-
crafts industries.
The old and new colonialists,
the radio said, "wanted to keep
our country in a colonial. situa-
tion. They stole our raw mater-
ials to ship them to their own,
? countries."
:The radio accused the "Sa-
The radio accused the ".Tap-
anese fascists, then the United
done the cenne ""'''''' tO ace
Cambodia from developing and
of bringing their own goods
to Cambodia to compete with
'local products. - .
onIt accused the ousted gov-
ernment of Marshal Lon Na!,
which seized power in a coup
on March, 1970, against Prince
Norodom Sihanouk, of having
sold Cambodia out to the Amer-
jeanisnce the Communist -take-
over last April 17, the''chief
aim had been "to make Cambo-
dia a country with modern,
powerful agriculture," the com-
mentary said, adding: . -
"After -that we will be able
to transform our farming coun-
try into a country that is also
industrial." . n i ?
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9
DVOAPISMISIMer..921ML4S116*-7.. . lerror
??? -
' Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R00010037b008-gt'
or ea fears.
ea, el
eee
III
a.lions
disbanded
4.1'w renege on conlitlitmerat
? nose Peter Hazelleurst -?
O Tokyojune.1..
. In Spite of strong warnings .
?that : the, United States... will '
teivenee if- - North Korea ,
' launchee an attack ? against the
South,- the- regime in Seoul hate ?
'hours'. private- fears . that ? the
' United-, Nations peace-keeping
force -might :soon be dissolved
and Congress might back away
from, its military- commitments
in rhe future.' .7
These, fears were -outlined to
-The .Times today by one of
PreSident,-, Park 'Chung Bee's
? confidantes; *_Mr Park . Joon
Iiyueeeheirman. of the, ?poliey,
planni-ng committee of the .rul-
ing ;?? Democratic, Republican
.Part-ea. ; ". ?
; He also -claimed that :Waste,
ington?-? has deliberately ? kept
the .South Korean Air Force
naincier: strength in the 'past
: because-American leaders were
convinced ? that Seoul- ,might
launch a strike against ? the
North and 'endanger the policy
of detente with China , and:the
Seviet? Union.
.:,,?Expressing ---South', . Korea's
most immediate, fear,' Mr Park
said in: Tokyo that his- Govern-
' ment 'believes 'that- events in
Indo-China might encourage
many, non-aligned: nations, to
support ? North Korea during
the-forthcoming session of the
United -Nations General: Assem-
bly.
H We fear that resolutions
:supporting North -Korea and
calling for the Withdrawal of
the United Nations!, forces in
. the South will be passed by a
majority for the first time dur-
ing. the ...next. session of the
United Nations General Assem-
bly.
-"In the past our resolution
calling on the Security Council
to make alternative arrange-
ments to substitute the United
Nations Command was passed,
but it looks as though two con-
flicting resolutions will go
through this time. It is going
to present the General Assem-
bly with an embarrassineesitua-
,_
tion.
"However, ? the communist
resolution in the Assembly will
not have any legal or political
meaning because the Security
Council is responsible for the
United Nations forces in
Korea. But it will mean' that
the North will win a majority
in- the General Assembly for
the first time in history and it
will give them propaganda
value", Mr Park said.
He said that iv spite of firm
security *pacts with China and
the Soviet. Union, North Korea
had been invited to join the
. block -of non-aligned nations.
Mr Park admitted . that the
? Foreign Ministry .were toying
with the idea " of requesting
non-aligned nations -.to
admit-'.' South Korea:' as a
eath en' " This woUld demon-
strate how absurd North
Korea's claim is", be- added:
Describing the United
:Nations General Assembly as
the "absurdity of-modern
times", Mr Park said-- that the
South would claim, in future,'
that the body does not have
the power to come to, decisions
on the Korean issue: ' '
"Issues-in the `' General
Assembly are . no longer
decided on merit. ?They are
decided on the 'basis of
? whether- a country-' is allied
with the United States, and we
fear many Third World nations
? will vote against us simply
because they oppose ' the
United States-.Middle - East
Policy"; he said? ?
"We- are not going to let
our fate be 'decided .by the
United Nations General - Assem-
bly in future and we' will maii-e
tarn that the Security Council
is responsible for peace-keep-
ing arrangements on: the.
Korean peninsula. ?
":But, quite frankly; we are
"16re-or -less*resigned that the
UN'"-----and will be dissolVed
within the next few years. This
does not mean that the United
States forces will go; but the
withdrawal of the United
Nations forces will demoralize
our people", Mr Park said.
" (At present the - United
Nations forces in Korea consist
of i38,000 American troops and
a small symbolic force of
troops representing other
members of the command, in-
cluding a contingent of approx-
imately 20 British officers and
Mr Park said the regime is
convinced that if the North
launches an attack it will not
come in the form of a conven-
tional military offensive across
the demilitarized zone (DMZ).
"What we are afraid of is that
they will infiltrate guerrillas
into the South by sea, air and
through tunnels under the
DMZ in an attempt to foment
an uprising against President
Park's government.
"Our troops can counter an
attack across the DMZ. Our
morale is high and we are con-
fident we can beat the North
in conventional ware if we con-
tinue to receive military equip-
ment. However, we know they
have 80,000 specially trained
guerrillas who could be sent
into civilian areas in the rear."
Mr Park, who is visiting
Japan to discuss security
arrangements in East Asia,
said warnings that the United
States would intervene if the
North attacks the South
"appears to have given the
communists something to think
about.' ' ? -
we ?are still peSsitaisten
about just how- long the co6
sensus in the-. United- States
will last. The ??? promises are -
better than nothing and we
have -no other choice- but -to
remain silent. But we a-re tin-
easy.
N ,
"The-ruling' party in .:se.ert-
ington does not have a work-
ing majority, ? the -Democrats
are divided and our necurity
pact is not as streng as the
one which binds Nato.- To be.
quite honest we are., scared to
make moves to ame-nd the pa-et-
because we ? have ? fears that
detrimental clauses might . be
written in to . make matters
weese."
Harking back to the trauma-
tic shock of the collapse of
Indo-China, Mr Park - said:
"For us it's an awful situation. ,
Vietnam was given enough
promises but they still lost.
Everyone in the, United States,
is saying that American troops
must not be involved in
another war in Asia: And why
should they?
"We have told them 'that' we
wit fight by ourselves if they
give us enough arms .*But they
won't. They say - :eon have
enough. Frankly 1 think it's a
stupid policy. If they modern-
ize our army and give ustime
to train our soldiers with new
equipment we can -fight.' If
they wait it will be another.
repetition of Vietnam." e
Echoing the resentment of
the armed forces, Mr Park said
that - the ? Americans :delibera-
tely refused to build up South
Korea's air force in .recent
years to correct the imbalance
in air power .on the peninsula.
(The -North is reported to be
equipped with more than 600
fighter-bombers as compared
with 210 obsolete American jet
fighters in the South.).
In an indication that the two
allies have clashed sharply
over the issue, 'Mr Park said
Washington bac: refused to
modernize the air force in the
past on the groted that 'Ameri-
can air power vas available.
"But the trieh is that the
'Americans refud to give us
the equipment because --they
feared that the\ South might
attack the Nona and endanger
their policy of 'd?nte with
China and the Soviet Union in
recent years. That's nonsense.
" First it was, the' Administr-
ation and now .we have fears
that Congress eiglit stand in
the way. The level\ of supply
was so low two yeats ago that
we were forced to 'look else-
where for arms and tpend our
much-needed foreign exchange ?
on equipment. The Americans -
I ; think, they realiae taw .we
did not like it at-the line but
e-ere correct-". Mr Park, Aid.
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : C1A-RD"P77-004-32R000100370008-9
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370008-9
1'71*.LnINGTON POST
12 June 1975
Rowlind Et;ais'-a'na'R-6b'ert Pir6talz
? eTh ba U.? Par.
SEOUle--;?President Park Chung Hee,
vowing to fight for the last inch
-of land even if U.S. forges leave Korea,
told us South Korea could and would
develae its own nuclear weapons if
the U.S. nuclear umbrella is with-
drawn,
In one of his rare interviews, the
Korean strong man also declared he
would hot relax tough internal tee-
eurity measures ?while the military
threat from 'North Korea lasts. Recog-
nizing that restoration of full civil
liberties would help him in the U.S.
!?Congress, he insisted such relaxation
could' make ienrea another "Vietnam
and therefore gave no hope for ,major
enange.
'Thus, Gen, ..i?ark is set apart from
other ?East Asian leaders traumatized
by the Indochina debacle and looking;
for eaccommotiation with the rising
Communist tide. Facing the gun bar-
rels of the North Korean garrison
state, Park relies heavily on his 'U.S.
alliance. But he will not appease
American critics by actions he says
Would weaken security and is Pre-,
pared to go it alone if necessary:
Park gave responsive, often blunt
answers for nearly two 'hours in his
-Office at the Blue House?his first
areetien, with A foreign reporter in
eight' nuniths. Small to the paint of
frailty, the 57-yeanold professional sol.-
dies in his 15th year of rule seemed
in excellent health and supremely eon-
lident the course be follows is correct.
While declaring his own faith in of-
'tidal U.S. reaffirmations- of support for ,
''South Korea, Park told us, "There were
and still are quite a number of Kor-
:bans doubting the commitment of the
United States" since the fall of Viet-
'nem. What if those doubts are well
founded? ' "Even Without assistance,
one people are determined to fight to
the last man and not to concede an?
inch of our territory." .
He. next confirmed for the first
time that South Korea, if abendoned
by the U.S., would go nuclear. "We
lave thea capability," the 'president
said, but are not developing it and are
honoring the nuclear non-proliferation
. 'treaty. Then he bluntly added: "If the
'U.S. nuclear umbrella were to be re-
'mewed, we have to start developing
9
lnfIexibiIIb7T,
our nuclear capability to save our-
selves." ?
' The nuclear umbrella and eirpower
compeise the major U.S. deterrent to
a Communist attack, but Park also
argued the U.S. 2d infantry division
here plays "an' essential role in deter-
ring , attack." , If American gr o un d
troops were removed, "the enemy will
be inclined to make a miscalculation"
and "American word would carry far
less credibility." Chuckling, Park said
the U.S. soldiers play the role of full-
back in eoccer football as a last line
of -defense.. In other words, the 2d
? division would not be in the heart of
, ground combat.
. As for his May 13 decree banning in-
ternal dissent, the president -said that
otherwise "we might become another
Vietnam." Is there hope for relaxa-
tion? "It depends on the actions of the
North Koreans. If the threat from the
North Koreans is reduced, we should
be able to relax security measures. If
it is heightened, we would have to
take tighter, restrictions. There la no
,other way."
Park seemed to fully appreciate the
difficulty his crackdown causes him in
ashington, calling it "one of my big-
gest headaches." Many America'e
would say "very nice" (Park, speaking
'in Korean, used the. English words
? "very nice") if students were allowed
-
to demonstrate. But, he added,' that
would undermine security and make
the nation vulnerable to Communist
attack. ,
Park cited three examples of de-
mocracies curtailing civil liberties me
der extraordinary conditions: Canada's
crackdown on Quebec separatests, Gen.
de Gaulle's authoritarian measures
during the Algerian crisis and US. in-
ternment (in "concentration camps,"
said Park) of Nisei Japanese during
World War II. Granting that human
rights are abridged in South Korea;
said the president, Americans should
note there is "no trace of human'
rights" in North Korea.
Other Park pronouncements:'
?
? Provocation: If instead of a front-
al attack North Korea makes a prove-
Cation by attacking South Korea's five
sleall western coastal islands, retalia-
tion against North Korean rear areas
"would play into the hands of the
..
42
Communietsee Instead, the islands, -?
nestled along the Norih Korean coat,
should be made "invulnerable" to et- ?
tack. e "
Airpower: Combined - U.S. and
South Korean airpower is in "pre-
carious balance" .with North Korea's.
But since "there is no guarantee that ?
Americans will remain ? in Korea for-
ever," South Korea needs more of its
? own planes.
te Four-power pect: The plan by op-
, position leaders here for the U.S.,
Soviet Uraion, China and Japan to
guarantee Korean peace is "highly un-
realistic." Great power guarantees did
not work In Indochina and would "not
he backed by any strength" in Korea.
Park Chung Hee is clearly not. in-
nlined toward new arrangements in -
handling his menacing northern neigh-
bor. His insistence on harsh internal
.security measures, his appeal for con-
' tinued U.S. military presence here and -
his determination to survive?even to '
? the point of going nuclear?if the
' Americans leave are all linked to an
Iron resolve that Korea shall not be-
come a domino. That rescilve, rare in
nervous East Asia after Vietnam, may
more than compensate for the aggra-
' hvatteee? eaeeed U.S. officials by ?ark's -
; , , - ? n
?
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONTIR
30 MAY 1975
?
'U.S.' stilt most powerful
despite Vietnam, Heath says
Salt Lake City
"Former British Prime Minister Edwar
Heath said recently that despite its defeat in
Vietnam the United States was still the mos
powerful and influential nation in the world,
Speaking at the commencement exercises
of Westminster College here, Mr. Heath said.
. "Don't be deluded by the charge that South-
east Asia is the failing of America. What is
failing is not America, but an illusion: That
the postwar strategy of the containment of
communism has . . . universal application."
,ANOWSZAMIOIMSOIN.1111,11.
?
--e-
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003700D8-9
? 10.11:Xi '!:$4