COLBY EXPLAINS ' MISSTEPS' OF THE CIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 51
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 25, 2001
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: June 22, 1975
• Content Type: NSPR

3_ Approved For Release 2001/0M:FONM77-00432R0001003700074)---.?
NEWS, VIEWS
and ISSUES
INTERNAL USE ONLY
This publication contains clippings from the
domestic and foreign press for YOUR
BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use
of selected items would rarely be advisable.
NO. 13
GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS
27 JUNE 1975
GENERAL
32
EASTERN EUROPE
34
WESTERN EUROPE
NEAR EAST
4:1
AFRICA
A '7. ?
EAST ASIA
4E.)
25X1A
Destroy after backgrounder has served
its purpose or within 60 days.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0
1,!ASHINGTON POST
22 June 1975
asas
?
By George Lardner Jr.
Wfisbington Post Stsff Writer
s" The Central Intelligence AgencY.
: conducted a hurried, cursory check oft
.CIA misdeeds in the vvake of thei
.Watergate scandal, failed to tell the
_White House of its findings and de-
stroyed some of the records of ita
,gal activities.
CIA Director William E. Colby 'said':
ehe ordered the destruction of various
". CIA files in 1973, but said he regarded
?it as a routine step at the time.
. "Even before 1973, prior to that
time," Colby said, "people had been
tburning up collections -of files that we
really had nu business oWning. This is
a. natural process of any bureaucracy."
Now, with the benefit of hindsight,
Colby said he recognizes that he
"should have reported the missteps to
!the Justice Department, that the old
standards which made the CIA virtu-.
ally sacrosanct have slipped away.. ." '!
e The CIA director discussed these.t,
matters in an hour-long interview in
his 7th-floor suite at the agency's head- :
'quarters Friday, coupling candid ad- .
missions with repeated expressions of
conceril about the hazards of unaccus-a
iomed public exposure.
r In. Colby's view, there? has been toot
much publicity already. The agency,t
he insisted, has served the country far,
.better than it realizes., . at.
But Colby acknowledged, too, that
even he had no clear idea Of the abuses
lurking in its past until the investiga-
tion by the Rockefeller commission
was completed this month. Even more
sweeping congressional inquiries lie'
ahead. -
' The seeds were planted on May
1973, when then-CIA Director James 11..
'Schlesinger sent a memorandum to all,.
'employees calling- for immediate re-
ports on any questionable activitiesa
past or present, that they might know;
about. ?
, The impetus for.the directive cane-
from the Watergate scandal. The 1971.
tEllsbera case, burglary, which G. Gor-
don LicrdY and E. Howard Hunt Jr. car-
ried out with CIA technical assistance,.
had just come to light,' and Schlesinger
,said he intended to do all he could "to
econfine CIA activities to those which:
*fall within a strict interpretation of its
legislative charter."
The result, Colby agreed, was a rush
'job that could not even be called a
'genuine. investigation. The CIA inspec-
tor general's office, which handled the ,
*assignment, submitted a report just 11
days later, on May 21, 1973. .
d "It was an accumulation rather .an
Alum an investigation, if you get. the'.
_distinction," Colby said. 'In other,
words, the Schlesinger memo went to
'all employees. Well, the first employ-
ees it went to, was the' roininftTvd
And the command line basically
ported what it heard down through the,
regular hierarchy: what do you know,
what do you know,? what do you ,
know. And that was gathered together
and given to the inspector gAppxprA
_
. "In addition," Colby said, "few em-
- ployees went to the inspector general
.with something they remembered. But
. ... inspector general didn't go out and
look through every, file drawer in the
place or anything like that."
The report included a. section on as-
sassination plots and -schemes.. Other
:portions were just. a rehash of "old ins'
spector general reports that CIA offi-
cials pulled .out of their desks, appar-
ently including information on testing
LSD on Unsuspecting subjects, part of
.a controversial program . that lasted.
:from 1953 to 19b3.
The White House was not informed,.
but not, by Colby's account, because of.
any preoccupation with the Watergate
:scandal. The day after Schlesinger
wrote his May 9, 1973, memo, President
Nixon nominated him to become Secre-
tary of Defense, and Colby, who was
,then CIA deputy director for covert
operations, was named to take over the.
spy agency.
"This one does embarrass me a bit,"
Colby said of the failure to notify the
White House. "I think What happened,
quite frankly, is that it fell between
the t tools?of Schlesinger's leaving
and my taking over. I imagine he
ttisougat mayne i was g,omg to take
care of the National Security Council
[the White House agency which is sup-
posed to supervise the CIA] and I lane
_agine that I thought he was." . .
The Justice Department also was '
kept in the dark by virtue of a long- ,
standing agreemerit, disclosed and dee'
nounced by the Rockefeller commis-
Sion, to let the CIA decide whether a ,
I crime had been committed by its em-
ployees or agents and whether security
considerations precluded prosecution
even when a crime had taken place.
es Organized in January with the in-
spector general's 1973 report as one of .
its basic primers, the commission con-
-eluded this month that the CIA had
,engaged in "plainly unlawful" conduct
?from burglary through bugging to
the LSD ,testing and other activities.
But .Colby indicated that he never
even contemplated going to the Justice
Department at the time.
; "In retrospect, I would say yes, I
should have," the 55-year-old Colby ac-
knowledged. "No question about it, we
'Should have done it."
? Colby said he first reached that coo-
' elusion "sometime in December"?
which was the month that The New.
York Times disclosed some of the ac-
etivities recounted in the 1973 report..
. The CIA director said he realized that
'month that "I do have an obligation to
actually carry down to the Departmont
'of Justice and let them make the deci-
sion as to whether anything should be ,
,
prosecuted or not."
.Afterconferring with Schlesingera
?
. _
? Capitol Hill, Colby said he briefed
'both Rep. Lucien Nedzi (D-Mich.) and
Sen. John C. Stennis (D-Miss.), the
? chairmen of the Senate and House sub-
committees in charge of CIA oversight,
.in late May, 1973, on the agency's ime
Proprieties. But clearly, Colby agrees
.now, "that isn't enough." - ?
' Now chairman of the speCial House
-committee investigating the CIA,
Nedzi, who has recently tome under
fire for taking no action two years ago,
"asked a lot of additional questions,"
-Colby retailed, but was apparently sat-
lafied with the answers he .got and did.
not inform his colleagues. .not'?
s Colby did no characterize Stennis'
:reaction, but he has long been a stolid'
i.defender of the CIA. Apparently both
'-he and Nedzi accepted Colby's assur-
arices that corrective action ? would be
taken.
No follow-up investigation was con--
tducted, including within the CIA, to
whcthc: any cf thz-.
ties warranted prosecution or to find
:mit how extensive they actually were.:
Repeatediy, Colby emphasized that his-
'mind was on the future, on making
..sure they didn't happen again.
'`,;? He said he issued "specific instrucs
-tions with respect to each of the catee
-tgories of activities included in the in-
?spector general's report? on Aug. 29,.
4973, banning some, laying down strict
-rules for others and declaring still oth-
ers permissible.
a Concerning the CIA's "following of
!people around in America," Colby said,
?.tfor example, he "issued a directive say?
ting 'you won't do that any more' la.... Ipoint'rfrankly didn't care at that point'
whether it was 20 eases or' 40 cases. The
fact was there weren't going to be any
more."
The Rockefeller commission found
more instances of burglary, bugging,
and other misdeeds than he was aware
of, Colby indicated. Another reason for,
the escalating statistics, he said, was
the fact that he agreed with the com-
mission at the outset that the CIA
Would not interview former employees
to avoid any suggestion that the
agency .was trying to influence their
testimony.
t Consequently, Colby said, "the com-
mission knows more than I
do . . . There's a couple of cases, a
couple of incidents mentioned [in the
commission report] that I didn't know
about. I don't. challenge the fact that
they happened. Put they're not in our
records.",
'' The commission also said in its re
ciAlt.leaSe 40011,0 rabet4R0 R77-000/14
6.9*-wlfivicowds had been
r ere eVroYeenn 1973, including
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-152 separate files on the drug-testing
?
4progretn.
Colby said he had various documents
destroyed, and indicated that the drug-
testing records were among them. ? .
"We had files around here we
ehouldn't own, some of these surveil-
.lance things and stuff like that," he.
said, "and I had directed, `let's get rid
of that stuff,' in 19'73." Colby recalled.
that former CIA Director Richard M.
Helms tack a. 'similar step with tapes.
he had on leaving the agency in Janu-
ary, 1973. ? . ?
. .1
"He [Helms] said it didn't have any-
thing to do with Watergate, (that] he
was just getting rid of all this junk
people collect, you know," Colby said.
Asked whether he now felt that the
documents he ordered destroyed
should have been sent to the Justice
p.De artment in 1973 along with the in-
.spector ? ? general's findings, Colby
paused and said softly, "I guess,
..maybe. I don't know." Then he added
that not all should have gone to Jus-
tice, since ? some of the incidents were
rather flimsy, but other documents, he
agreed, probably Should have been
sent. over. .
The Justice Department is studying
the evidence compiled by the Rockefel-
ler commission, concerning both do-
mestic spying and CIA involvement in
assassination plots, to determine
whether any prosecutions ? should be
undertaken. -
Colby said he was confident that no
CIA employees will be indicted be-
cause, he said, he fells, they were act-
ing under the belief that whatever
they did, while perhaps ' "technically"
illegal, was permissible "in the course
of their dutieS."
Among Colby's August, 1973, &raw
tives was an order that the 'CIA will
not engage in assassination nor induee,
assist or suggest, to others that assas-
sination be employed," but he said an
earlier ban had been issued by Helms
in March 1972, three months before
the Watergate break-in.
Asked what prompted the Helms
edict, Colby said it was issued because
of the heavy amount of publicity stem-
ming from Colby's 1971 congressional
testimony on Operation Phoenix in
South Vietnam, which critic's chnrged
relied -heavily on torture and assas-
sination.
The 1972 directive, ColbY said, was
written "just to make clear what his
[Helms] policy and my policy were ...
to clarify the records so that it's clear
what our policy was."
The Helms order was not widely dis-
seminated, however. Neither the White
House nor congressional . overseers
were told about it at the time, Colby
said. Even the CIA's general counsel
TI-IE VDT: TIMES, FRI.134 Y, ? .).?T '2;?,
in 1972, Lawrence Houston, who is ilon! -
retired, said he never heard of it until
it .was publicly disclosed several dates
ago..
Voicing high praise for the CIA aal`
its employees de:mita the cureent furor,
Colby said he has no Idea when tne
investigations will end, but made plaid
? that he hopes they will close down as
\quickly as possible.
. "I think anyless dedicated group oZ
people would have all flown away
long ago, but this is an enormously
? highly Motivated, dedicated, talentad
:group of people," Colby said. "Our in-
telligence is the best in the world.".
Unquestionably, Colby said, the CIA
made mistakes, but he called this the
result of an old tradition that its worir
was not supposed to be talked about
a climate that no longer exists.
"If you let any large organization
-operate without controls and without
supervision, it will get in some trou-
ble," Colby said, but even so, he said,
"the country's been well served by
this agency and I think it will be well
served by it in the future, ? even.
better."
any case, Colby said with a grin,
he plans to "tear up" a lot more files
? as soon as investigators are done with
them.
Have a bonfire? he was asked.
"Damn right," the CIA director said,
pointing out the windows to the closely
guarded 219-acre site. "Right out
.there."
Colby Says
WASHINGTON, June 19 (AP).
?William E. Colby, Director
of Central Intelligence, said to-
day that over the years foreign-
?ers. had suggested assassina-
tions-to him and United States
Government employes had dis-
cussed the possibility of assas-
sinations with him, but that
he had rejected the ideas every
time. '
The 55-year-old head of the
'United States spy agency de-
clined to name the suggested
or potential targets or the per:
sons who had-made the sugges-
tions. Nor would he give the
'dates or locations of these con-
versations.
Mr. Colby said that he op-
posed public disclosure of factsi
behind th these or other alleged
assassination schemes involv7
ing the C.I.A. because "I think
there is positive harm to the
reputation of the country to;
go into great detail on these'
things." ? 1
' He said, "Our policies today'
are clear . .? I am opposed
to assassinations because
think they're wrong and be-
cause I think they frequentlyi
bring about absolutely uncon-1
rolled and unforeseeable re-I
suits .? usually worse re?sultsl
than by continuing to suffer
the problem that you're .fac-
ing." ?
Duling an intei.v?iew of inure
than an hour in his seventh-
floor office at C.I.A. headquar-
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e Rejected All Suggestions for C.I.A.
ssassinatians
ters in suburban. Langley, Va.,
Mr. Colby discussed a wide
range of issues raised during
investigations of his agency by
the news media, a Presidential
commission and -several Con-
gressional committees.
Thesetwere among his major.
'points in the .first. interview
?
he has given 'since the Rocke-
feller 'CommissiOn last Week
reported that it had found some
"plainly unlawful" domestic ac-
tivities by the agency.
o He cannot. . enivsiorf that
, agency employes would again
-feel that the political climate
in this country justified their
? violating the legal limits on
.the agency's domestic activity.
-he does not believe that
any C.I.A. employes will be
convicted of crimes or even
prosecuted for illegal activities.
He cannot be certain that
all the agency's illegal or im-
proper activities have come to
light, but argues that no Feder-
al agency could give such an
assurance about its operations.
? It is up to the Congressional
committees and the Justice De-
partment to decide whether to
make public the names of per-
sons responsible for the agen-
cy's illegal. activites.
He cco;:i A-as that foreigneas
aproached others in the agen-
cy with a plot to. assassinate
French President Charles de
Gaulle, and that it was flatly
---- rejected. He does not know
whether the French Govern-' ?
went was advised of that plot,
nor . can he say that in all
instances he would advise a
foreign government of a plot
that came to his attention. .
ClHe intends to implement
the Rockefeller Commission's
?reCommendation that the agen-
cy's inspector general's office
be enlarged but hopes that ef-
forts to police the agency will
not impair its intelligence-gath-
ering mission.
glie has not been asked to
resign and intends to stay at
his -post so long as the Pres--
ident and he agree that he
is useful.
gale thinks that a career
ih intelligence should be neither-
a bar nor a requirement for
the job of -director of Central
Intelligence.
Mr. Colby said that the Unit-
ed States had the best intel-
ligence service in the world
and that he believed a major
part of his role is to convince
this country's citizens of that.
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, June 30, 1975
* * * ?
Troubles of the CIA have all but dried
up an important source of the Agency's
information?exchanges with intelli-
gence services of U.S. allies. Word has
been passed from abroad that there's
little chance of renewal of a free-flow
of information until
vestigations of the
completed.
congressional in-
CIA have been
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THE WASHINGTON POST
Sunday; June 22,1%1
By Arthur 31. Cox
?
*,*
Cox, a writer and lecturer on foreign affairs, is a former. official in the. State.: -
Department and the CM. His next book, "Myths of. National Security," will be-
'published this summer.
? '
/TN AN ERA of budding detente the ,
1.11 clandestine operations of the KGB.:
iand CIA are an anachronism. Even so,
both sides will continue to engage In y
!secret political warfare and espionage
.as long as the other side conducts such
operations. But the decline of the Cold
..War and technological advances in in-
vfonnation-gathering clearly challenge
ethe validity of. these operations. The
time has come to add this subject to
the agenda of U.S.-Soviet negotiations
toward the goal of phasing out the
clandestine functions of both the KGB
and CIA..
For years Washington and Moseow
have used the clandestine operations
of the other side as a sort of litmus
paper to measure true- intentions. A
U.S. President or a Soviet Communist
?Party secretary might talk of peace,
'but the knowledge of on-going clandes-
tine operations is always hard evi-
dence of the other side's continuing
"ag.e4reneiva intentions. Tlus,tnt inAtee.
(ties of the KGB and the CIA reinforce
ithe continuity of each other. If the
?Soviets are going to conduct secret
political action and espionage, then we
'should, too. -
J Yet, General Secretary Leonid
Xrezhney says time and again that "the
:Process of detente is irreversible." De-
.itente means a relaxation of tensions
for the purpose of reducing the possi-
bility of war. But the clandestine opera-
tions of the CIA and KGB manifestly
increase tensions. They are,a form of
warfare.
:KGB Blunders ?
IF THESE CLANDESTINE programs
were achieving important foreign
policy gains for either the U.S.S.R. or
,the U.S., then their continuation,
;though debatable, would be under-.
standable. But that is not the case.
The KGB has had very few political
warfare successes in recent years. The
same is true of the CIA, unless the
"destabilization" of the Chilean gov-
ernment is considered a success. The
U-2 incident, ,the Bay of Pigs and the
CIA failure in Vietnam have been
highly publicized, but less is known
about some of the reversals for So-
viet foreign policy, caused by the KGB.
For example:
? In early 1969 there were a num-
ber Of serious military incidents on
the Sino-Soviet border. The S;2.fiets
demanded that the Chinese sit down
at the negotiating table to settle the
matter, but the Chinese refused. In
?
.
Sino-Soviet affairs., Soon there was a.
story in the American press indicating
that the Soviets were considering a
- pre-emptive nuclear strike against
China. In September a story appeared
in the London Evening News signed
by Victor Louis, undoubtedly the most
publicized of all KGB operatives,which
-speculated about a Soviet strike to elim-
inate Chinese nuclear bases.- These
stories were followed by a flurry of
news items, datelined from Hong Kong
to Helsinki, about Soviet aggressive
.intentions against China.
In December, 1969, under a headline
saying "Chinese Communists Appear
to Expect a Russian Attack," Joseph
Alsop reported that long-stalled talks
dealing with border incidents were
proceeding between the Soviets. and
Chinese. "It is perfectly clear," he
wrote, "that .the Chinese only con-
serted to talk at all because of Soviet
threats.._. . The language of the Chin-
:Tx annnuneeinent -o.L' the talks quite
openly implied that there had been
Soviet threats of an extremely crude
and brutal kind.'
So the KGB operation succeeded in
pressuring the Chinese to resume the
talks, but it also alarmed the Chinese
leaders so Much that they signaled in-
terest in secret negotiations with the
U.S. Soon there was ping-pong diplo-
macy, and not long thereafter Henry
Kissinger was on the way. to the break-
through which led to President Nixon's
visit to China, the beginning of more
friendly U.S.-Chinese relations , and
membership- for- China in _the United
Nations. Surely, no development in
recent history has been a greater set-
back for Soviet foreign policy.
In 1955 and '56 Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles turned down the
? \
appeals of Egyptian President Abdel
Nasser for U.S., arms aid and help in
building the Aswan dam. So the So-
viets filled the vacuum and. their re-
lations with the Egyptians became very
, close.
'..11owever, things began to change
when Nasser died in 1970 and was suc-
ceeded by Anwar Sadat. Sadat was
neither pro-Soviet nor anti-Western,.
but he was very much of an Egyptian
nationalist. He showed such independ-
ence that the Soviets began to worry
whether they_weuld have sufficient po-
litical influence to protect their vast
in-sestment in Egypt. By. the spring
of 1971 the Soviets were so alarmed
that they instructed the KGB to art;range a coup to eliminate Sadat from
August Boris Dayid ov, a senior KGB povve
officer in the Washington errtAiwol,*id For Rtiteasttt2001146408 toQJAA:47:7-004421*0049314837000A-Qo crucial Soviet
lunch with an American sp"alEfist in s) foreign policy objectives, the KGB
moved swiftly to arrest more than 90,
? r
plotters. He was astounded to discover'
that his trusted chief of intelligence,
Sami Sharaf, was a KGB agent. The
KGB had begun cultivating Sharaf in
1955, and by 1959 he had emerged as
the de facto chief, of Egyptian intelli-
gence. By 1967 he had become Nasser's
closest adviser. Sharaf was the key.
KGB agent in the plot against Sadat.
; After the failure of the attempted
:coup it looked as though Soviet Middle
East policy would collapse. The Soviets
were so desperate that they presented
,Sadat with a 15-year Treaty of Friend-
ship, pledging to stay -out of the in-
ternal affairs of Egypt and agreeing
to provide vast quantities of weapons.
.Later, even after Sadat had expelled
110,000 Russian technicians, the So-
viets continued to send planes, tanks
and ground-to-air missiles.
Sadat accepted anything he could
!get until he had achieved his purpose
;in the 1973 Yom Kippur War with Is-
rael. However, he has not forgotten
how close the KGB came to ending
his career. This explains, in part, the
restoration of U.S.-Egyptian diplomatic
relations and Sadat's extraordinarily
,friendly talks with Kissinger and now
Mr. Ford. '
; ? In the years after World War II
the Soviets' greatest concern was
that German rearmament might lead
,to a. Bonn attempt to take over East
Germany and Berlin?and to war. But
then Willy Brandt emerged as Chan-
cellor of the Federal Republic with
his Ostpolitik.. The most important
step in the policy, designed to pro-
mote relaxation of tensions with the
Soviet bloc, was Bonn's recognition
of Pankow as a separate, independent
nation, - marking the abandonment
once and-for all of the concept of a
reunited Germany. General Secretary
Brezhnev vigorously supported all
elements of the Ostpolitik, but espe-
cially Bonn's recognition of East
Germany, ,
-Under the circumstances Brandt's
sudden decision to resign must have
come as a stunning blow to the
Kremlin. And yet Brandt resigned be-
cause of the discovery that one of his
highest ranking assistants, Gunter
Guillaume, was a Spy. What happened
is now amply on the record:
. In .1956 the East German intelli-
gence service, which for years had
been directed by the KGB, sent Gull-
lauine to West Germany. Posing as an
escapee from communism, he did re-
markably well?for himselt and for
his bosses. In 17 years he progressed
from running a wurst and flower stand
to the position of personal assistant
to the federal chancellor. Despite
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:toOk7-the incredible' risk of leaving:
'Guillaume in place. It is not difficult'
to imagine what would have happen-'
.ed had Brandt's successor rejected
his Ostpo/itile,
?
Electronic Intelligence
TrillE EGYPTIAN AND German
X. stories illustrate the fact of in-
telligence life that spy operations can
be conducted with remarkable success
? over aslong period of time?and yet end
up having disastrous or potentially dis-
astrous results for policy. It is
? clear that, in an era when negotiation
is supposed to be replacing Cold War
confrontation, the clandestine operations
of' the KGB and CIA are archaic. They
are hostile, provocative acts running'
'counter to the professed objectives of'
the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.
Of course, good intelligence will.
continue to be important for both
sides'-But intelligence data does not
have to be obtained through espion-
age.
Strategic intelligence nf utmost int.:
portance can now be obtained through'
technological, rather than human,
means; We are able to observe Soviet
medium, intermediate and interconti-
nental range ballistic missile tests .
through the use of radar and .clecd
tronic interception of telemetry sign
nals. We- know what they have tested
and what they have not tested.
Through seismic and acoustic re-
ceivers we know the size and location
of all their nuclear tests. Through,
the precision cameras of space recona.
'naissance we know the size and loca-i
tion of their missile silos.
For years We have known how big,'
.and approximately how accurate, their
missiles are?and how many they.
have. We are able,- via sonar .and ?the,
er sophisticated devices and tech-
niques( to track ? their missile-firing
submarines.
The miracles of high-flying camerae,
which can photOgraph the entire
-U.S.S.R. in a few days, . combined
. with the ?information obtained from
electronic' interception, radar and.
computers, provide us with much more
accurate intelligence than we had.
:available when espionage was ram-
pant at the' height of the Cold War.
In fact, in an era of strategic parity-
or essential equivalence it is, impera:
dive that both sides have excellent in-
formation about the capabilities -of the
other. That is the only way the bal-
ance of deterrence can work.
In , the interim SALT agreement
signed i.n Moscow in 1972, both sides
acknowledged the importance of space
reconnaissance as an essential means
of verifying that the terms of the
agreement are fulfilled. If the Soviets -
had not developed accurate space re-
connaissance of their own, it would
have been in our interest to make' -
such facilities availalale to them. If ,
both sides intend to limit strategic
arms, it will be essential that inform- -'
lion about the systems of eaen be
open, not secret.
There remain, for example, problems
about verifying the limit on the num-
The high-flying cameras can locate the
missile silos, .but if the silo is covered,
the cameras cannot determine whether-
the missile within it has multiple war-
-heads. One solution is simply to as-
.sume that all categories of missiles
successfully tested with multiple war-
heads will be so equipped when placed
in the silo.
Since the days of the McCarthy era
and the national hysteria over corn-.
inunist penetration and spies there
has remained in this country- an ex-
aggerated sense of the threat of the
-KGB. Even if the FBI were not doing
its job, there are very fear vital secrets
for the KGB in the United States. We
want the Soviets to have a very thor-
ough understanding of our strategic
strength. That is the point of deter-.
-rence.
Code machines and computers have
made our codes and cryptographic
systems virtually impenetrable. Our
war plans are supposed to be secret,
but a careful reading of the annual
Defense Department posture state-
ment, the congressional hearings and
the technological journals 'gives any
trained observer most of the essential
data. There are diploMatic secrets,
but those secrets -arc very short-lived,,
usually valid only during the period
of negotiation.
Secrecy Hurts
ACTUALLY, SECRECY. is often an'
impediment to national security in a
democracy. In 1970 the Pentagon asked.
its Defense Science. Board to estab-
.
lisle a =tr. :tore& to study the effects
of the secrecy system. The, board-
concluded that as,much as 90 p,er cent
of classified scientific and technical
defense information should not be so
designated. The board members es-
timated that most secret information
would become known within .a year.
They noted that excessive' secrecy
tended to stifle inventiveness and use-
ful research in weapons systems.
One member said, "If present trends
continue for another decade our na-
tional effort in weapons research will
become little better than mediocre."
Another member concluded that,
,"while secrecy is an effective instru-
ment in a closed society,, it is -much.
less effective in an open society in
the long run; instead, the open society,
,
-should recognize that openness is eine
*of its strongest weapons."
The U. S. Moon program was open;'
'the Soviets' was secret. It was the U.S.
'which landed on the moon.
As in the Past, most essential informa-
tion will continue to come from open
sources. The technological means for
information-gathering will provide most
of the additional required material. Of
course, there will also be a continuing
'guest for information by diplomatic es-
tablishments. Just as newspaper report.;
ers have confidential sources, so dip-
lemats will have confidential sources.
-Whether the diplomat is called a KGB
,or CIA officer era fol:cigx-L'ervirr.: off
i-
cer makes little difference. If he is part
of the diplomatic establishment he has
,the same privileges and the same risks
. of being made persona non grata. ,
and the reerUitment of agent!! within'
.the opposing government: The latter
is a much more provocative -and hostile
action. When discovered, stick ,acts
sharply increase tensions. In a time
:when both sides are advocating detente,
,the risks of developing a Penkovsky, .or
Philby outweigh the benefits-.
Now it will be said that the Soviets?
'because they have a. closed society, a
police' state and an ideology which ad-
vocates conspiracy?will never give up
their clandestine operations. Perhaps .so,
but if we intend to move ahead with a
growing detente, now is the time to
find out.
It must be anticipated that there. will
be vigorous opposition in the Kremlin,
both bureaucratic and doctrinal. Never-
theless, Brezhnev and his fellow polit-
buro members have demonstrated that
their advocacy of detente may be over-
'riding. In the struggle for power. in
the Kremlin the politburo has ousted
Shelest and Shelepin, both anti-detente
hawks. It is worth noting that Shelepin
was a former chief of the KGB. Brezh-
nev and the others know that the KGB
bee made serious blunders and has some-
-times set back Soviet foreign policy. o
Phasing Out Spying
'rliFIERE IS A LONG history of nego-
Il. tiations between the US. and-So-
Nies in the field of clandestine opera-
tions, but never an attempt to negotiate
a broad reduction. There have been
many spy exchanges, some of them high-
.iy publicized, such as the swap of -Col.
Rudolf 4.--bel for IT-9 pilot :Ty
There have been' deals about provocative'
"black" radio broadcasts, and Soviet
jamniing has been reduced as inflamma-
tory political commentary has been
phased out.
Political warfare and espionage, like
..strategic missiles, form a eubject- for
negotiation. One technique that has
-worked before is to announce that we
are unilaterally phasing out certain Op-
erations and will be carefully watching
to see whether the Soviets follow suit.
This was the technique used by Preei-
dent Kennedy which led to. the partial
nuclear test-ban agreement.
As the ,phase - out proceeded both
sides would verify the implementation
of the arrangements through the tech-
'niques of counter-espionage. The FBI
.would have responsibility within' the
U.S., while CIA counter-espionage and
liaison with friendly foreign intelli-
gence services would bear responsibil-
ity abroad. The KGB counter-espio-
nage system would obviously monitor.
.whether the U.S. was carrying out its
side of the bargain. . '
Once the dialogue begins, all sorts
of possibilities will come into view.
There will, as noted, be strong resist-
ance by the hawks on both sides., If
.the Soviets are unwilling to go along,
it is important that we should know
that, especially in these days of reVievi
'of the role of the CIA, But if we have
sufficient self - confidence combined
with the common sense to maintain.
your guard while showing flexibility,
there is now a prospect for persuading.
the Soviets td join us in ending ?thei
'clandestine war. ?
ber of missiles upgraded into MIRV's..
?
.by being fitted with mungtopracritegif orRelYkstptICl/Of,t- dfAIREPPV-00432R000100370007-0
-,rwe ip oma ic oniation gathering 4
?
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007La0
NEWSDAY
13 Jun 1975
On the surface are charges of assassination plots and illegal
deeds, 8ut -underneath, there is' an everyday human side.:
Jane Morse
Newsday S...te.ff Correspondent
_ .
ntil quite recently, one of the few prov-
able facts known about the cloaked and.
secretive Central Intelligence Agency is
that its headquarters are in Langley,
1.7a., just outside WaShington. Current
probes of the. organization suggest, however, that
it may be a way out, and that anything at all could
be going on there.
Indeed it is. - .
Although the knitting and crocheting club has
actiourned for the est.n.---cea the 60-voice eherres ece-r-
t.lnues to hold once-a-week practice sessions, the
grand slam bridge club hairegular -duplicate games
every Tuesday at 6:15 and .the Bible study deal
gets together twice a week at midday.
The fact is that behind the shadowy,. faceless
say facade and in the midst of recent revelations
and investigations, there exists a not-so-faceless
bunch of individtsile linked by federal-style bu-
reaucracy that's complete with a hyperactive em-
ployee activities association, a private washroom
for the director, a credit union and a ? car pool. It
has, as well, carved-in-marble a testimonial to honor
31 of its people killed in the line of duty, a clinic
set up with the specialized equipment needed for
the prompt treatment of heart attack victims (some-
thing that's required with startling regularity it is
said),. and a "helping hand" fund that takes up
voluntary, anonymous collections to help staff anent,-
bars in need.. .
Nonetheless, these . days, anyone who veers off
the highway after the sign that says "CIA Next
Right" is apt to cause Other drivers and passengers
to risk dislocating their vertebrae twisting for a i
look. It's hardly a Worider, of course. The place has!
never been on the Gray Line tour and there are I
relatively few peopie, outside the staff and its pro-
fesiorial associates, who have . ever been inside. I
. .
The Tare visiting outsider would find that wInt's
inside is a magnificently wooded, 213.1-acre campus;
?and campus is what its called. Like most cam-
puses it's a little short on -clerking, but that's partly
because Allen Dulles, who was the agency director
when the new headquarters were built, had strong.
feelings about frees.
"He'd say, `Gee,
tie something around it to mark it for saving, even
if it had to be moved. I figure he cost us something
like 250 parking spaces," an associate recalls..
Dulles hired the architectural firms of Harrison
and Abramowitz and Frederic R. King, reportedly
outmaneuvering the General Services. Administra-
tion, which had some other ideas. The seven-story,
off-white, reinforced-concrete birilding-thaf iestified,
was completed in 1961?and promptly infiltrated..
Field mice moved in almost at once. _ ?
'Present-day two-legged infiltrators might get
by the guards at the toll-booth-like main entrance
gate (they seem to be accustomed' to, unannounced
visitors arriving to pick up and haul away passen-
gers) butrto :park or to g'et---1-nore- than ? 20--Yards
.4.... 16 1.1. ? ? ? 4 ? ?14,I ...a. Li. jL,ti. S C.
expected, guards?behind signs warning that. such
thin as' cameras, firearniS and, incendiary. devices
are prohibited?will point Yeti toward -a-'reception
room stOck'ed.". with magazines --and phones.
There, .one.:?:of three receptionists will smilingly
offer a visitor'slorm to-be filled-out in duplicate.
Once you-receive the seal of approval (a clip-on
cardsaying- "Visitor"); sit's entirely possible that
you might even get inside someplace as -emetic as
the self-service--: postal-, tenter_ . It will ?-? happen,
though, bnly-if the_.perscn.,--avhom you're meeting
or the escort wbo's assigned :10-you is agreeable.
From the .reption roam on, you must -have corn-
-
'The building is roughly- a quadrangle. In the
center is an.enclosed patio that ycu'd pass if headed
for the "open' cafeteria . or the Muzak-free but
cocktail-lounge-like --Rendezvous :Room. ?Alcohol,
.though,_ does not cross. the bbrder of any govern-
ment . food" Serv-ice installation. 'The- Rendezvous
Room-is, instead, noted for its- $2.20 daily. all-yoti-.
.can-ea t 'criffeta "" ' ? :-
When the- tvea- tiler permits, nuanbers::Cyf 7:6M-
ployees opt for outside eating at rustic tables on
the groundS?beind the building.. Still others-patron-
-52e a second cafeteria that duplicates the first with
the same vaulted ceiling and expanse of glass that,
as interior decorators have- established, brings the
outdoors in. The latter cafeteria, though, lets in
only the outdoors and certain well-cleared CIA
enTloyees, ? ?
. ? S.orneeof the same employees were no doubt in-
velved - succeeeful 1962 coup that ? resulted
in the elimination of the building's there-tithe
?Iy" cepressmg -gr
ng is?-egtiers-.7. were
rushed in. arid fina/ly agreed -on:white wells intme-
tuated by colored doors and panels, each: shaded
to fellow the other likeaspokes in a color wheel.
The new loolc? was a hit-with most employees,
although one senior. official is suppoeed to have;
itrkbilhaisfeittliagrAklettSe /08j08 PCIPPREfP571;11i9bilti'RIYINA6017300#7tili the .1t-erY!
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0
of a visitor shown around the 'home of a newly!
rich woman. "Madam," the visitor said, "111 pay!
kr -the drinks but I won't go upsbirs."
Ups'airs, one hears, there are still some proh-,
leens? with perrs1 clutter. Personal clutter is "the
enemy of good design," according to a 7-pege bock-!
let, end employees are admonished that they may.
he aiding the opposition when they tap-e cartoons
to their ofilice.sales _or pile ji.mit on top _of _them.
- The -CL-C has won thedesign-c!Utter rin thel
first floor, though, and in style. Bright cc-rite-Moor-
' ary paintings borrowed from Washington art col-
lector VirioTnt 'Nlelzaz are pcxeitioned- eff.ectively
on. various walls, and . an Exhibit niu in the
soutle.est area is currently displaying near eastern
ancl.Indo-Pakistani art objects from the private col-
lections of CIA erneloye.s. The agency's own !in
arts commission is at the moment being chewed out
by in-house c-iitics for putting phony grass beneath
the magnolia trees in a, small patio off the cafeteria
area, but it has been lauded for other moves. It
, gave its approval, for instan, to _"wrapping" th
1.four mein banks of elevators in floor-tc-ceiling blow-
.ups of antique maps, one of Rome, one of Paris, one
of London and one of St. Petersburg in Cznrist-
: ? The- elevator interiors fell into waggish hands,
and, although stand-rd "no smoking" sig,r.e are
carefully posted, they're in such not-so-standard
!
Languages as Japanese, Persian, Hindi and Hausa,
? as well as French and German: If a Chinese-speak-
ing ePy ever penetrates the place, he-probably would:
feel- encst at home using. the 'sta.irse w"..nce: floors are:
numbered in various. Asian ?and. foreign.nornerals_?-
---, He -should net, however, bet any omeney, on.
getting_ that far. -..-
Anywhere on "Campus," you...n tell,' the regue.
.iere free, the ernn.iii-trarlp at a giariep. Thp rprra::
lots have their pictures ? on thiere ID cards and'
? seem. to favor hanging them on chains around_ their
necks. They're &sae-the-ones ?whoel-dpret sop fo-
! gawk- at- the :portraits- of_ former? CIA directors-
' that 'are-spaced out along one of. the firstrilcor.
corridors: Or at the framed display of CIA medals.,
some' of. which have to be stashed-on the'prees/
until they're.nct too hot to be handled by?-re-cibi-
ents whose- cover or operation. might bq blown if.
NEW YORK TIMES
22 June 1975
rjVa SmEtates
Co ledure
CELL tinquirry
- The Central Intelligence Agency
obviously does a lot nobody else
knows about; just as obviously it gets
blamed for things it didn't do, because.
what is known makes it a natural
suspect. Unhappily for the beleaguered
agency, mobster Sam Giancarlo was
murdered last week, and an investiga-
tor would have to be moribund himself
if he didn't wonder about the C.I.A.
Mr. Giancana was killed in his
Chicago home. There were six bullets
in and around his head, but no wit-
nesses. There is no known evidence at?
all that the C.I.A. had anything to do.
with 'the murder.
?
? Mr. Giancana and aooth-; under-
world figure, John Roselli. were re-,
cently publicly linked with a C.I.A.
assassination plot against Fidel Castro..
The plan was allegedly hatched in the
! they took delivery.: Or at the: copy :a George.
Washington's- letter articulating his own sirbneo
feelings of the necessity of intelligence.sgathering-
arid the need to keep it secret.'
. -
'?It's hard, of .course, for- a? newcomer not- to st -
.and stare. What the CIA may really be- running:-
is a snelsri-xnusetun with research
Even the librazy_ are more seetifacts and
memorabilia. For one thing, there's the bigewooderr
seal that identified the agency's. old headquarters
in midtown Washingten It was-Seved in an in-
formal.. Sunday' morning salv.age operation per-
formed by a thoughtfol-his-torjemincleeestaff ,tnercie
.
, ? There's also the historical -intelligence collection
...
ot some, _20,0W "tradecraft" books- frequently con-
sulted by intellig---e-n-ae_offic-eis-- in -,e.arck ore.. Pit-eel
dent.; The library'Oeemain collection'ie now pr'?=ar-et.
ily a:body of abelit: 75,000 reference- books pluS ai
worldwide selection of telephone directories and;
enough newspapers 'to- provide the English with;
a few centosiete worth of fish-and-chip wrappings.i
ITo keep further abreast of current -events andl
thinking, the CIA training _office--; from time toi
Itime,' invites guests such as Missile-man - I'Vernheri
i von Braun, authereeclitor-educator Irving F...ristol,;
!Marquette University Journalism See'nool Dean;
!George Reedy. and former Strategic Arens Limi.ta?
! tion Talks negotiator Paul ---lefitz.e-ito speak beforel
?
employees in a bubble-domed 5C0-seat auditoriunoi
;
, attached -to the main building. Keeping up also 1
;
means that ,the Northern Virginia. Community C01-1
1 .h-..ee sends over- instructors to hold regular after--i
werk-hour classes in a variety of subjects. 1
- That last move, .though, seems like a Caels-to-;
Newcastle waste of effort. As one of the rideriti
intellectuals puts-it, .f.' the CIA closed down- teener- !
row as a spy operation, it ebold reopen the follow-
ing day as one of ens- country's leading universities. i
Enough academic .expertise could be rounded up,
on the premises to set up shop immediately in;
everything from "A" for anthropology to "Z" foe!
zoology. For a language-studies department alone, ;
the new university could call on people with i
competence in 97 different tongues and dialects, '
not including the desk officer, who has achieved
international recognition 'for .his hobby, ifyth-
Century Latin. /1,1 ? - -
Closing days of the Eisenhower Admi;
nistration in 1960 and carried forward
during the beginning of the Kennedy
Administration. Mr. Giancana was
supposed to testify soon before a
Senate committee investigating intel-
ligence activities.
Mr. Giancana's business associates
-presumably include a number capable
of homicide and perhaps some with
the motive; he had reportedly been
testifying about underworld matters
before a Federal grand jury. There has
.been at least one other mob murder
recently in Chicago.
Yet in the current atmosphere espe-
cially, the C.I.A. is not immune from
suspicion; what, used to be considered
the paranoia of the fc.?w is now the
rational skepticism of many, including
respected writers in respected jour-
nals. There are constant reports to
feed the skepticism:
0, Vice President Rockefeller said.
the asSasalnatfon of Jolla an Robert
Kennedy and. "a real problem of
amnesia among those still around"
made it impossible to determine
conclusively the involvement of the
Kennedy White House in Castro,'
assassination plots.
o President Ford indicated he will.
turn over to the Senate committee
minutes of National Security Council
meetings at which assassination was'
discussed. One source who had read
the minutes said. "There were some
pretty bizarre suggestions, as though
a. group of guys were sitting around.
and talking over a beer." ? .
?At the C.I.A., one spokesman (who
asked to remain unidentified) said:
"They're going ? to pin the crucifixion
on us next." It was only gallows
humor and may prove as' ineffective.
as most in the genre.
The Rockefeller Commission itself
accused the agency of violating the
rights of thousands of Americans. The
Senate Committee is 'said to have
enough evidence of the Castro affair
so that it will not seriously miss Mr.,
Giancana's testimony. There are re-
ports that Mr. Rockefeller and Henry
Kissinger are seeking the resignation'
of the C.I.A. director, William E ?
Colby. It might be a while before any-
one get around to the crucifixion.
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RW77-00432R000100370007-0
TTIr'"
33 01121F.: 1975
TH2 CIA
T'
rar-.
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003470007-0
ssassindion Plot ThcLt Failed
Of all the charges of wrongdoing by
the Central intelligence Agency, the most
disturbing arc those that implicate the
agency in plots to assassinate foreign nil-
ers who were deemed inimical to U.S. in-
terests. Among the putative targets were
Congolese Nationalist. Leader Patrice*
Luntztrnba and Dominican Republic Dic-
tator Rafael Trujillo, who were assassi-
nated in 1961; South Viet Nam Presi-
dent Ngo Dinh Diem, who Was murdered
in 1963; and Cuban Premier Fidel Cas-
tro. The allegations are being investigated
by a Senate committee, which last week
continued to question past and present
CIA officers about the alleged plots. At
TIME'S request, Charles J. V. Murphy, a
former editor and Washington
correspondent of FORTUNE,
talked with his long-time sourc-
es in the U.S. intelligence field
about the charges and sent this
report:
The suspicion is that two
Presidents?Dwight Eisen-
hower and John Kennedy
?authorized or condoned foul
plots by the CIA to do in sev-
eral foreign leaders. Democrat-
ic Senator Frank Church of
Idaho, who heads the Senate
investigating committee, has
claimed to have "herd evi-
dence.' of the agency's com-
plicity but nothing that would
implicate any President. Still,
in the singular relationship of
the agency to presidential au-
thority, evidence of a CIA as-
sassination plot would seem to
implicate one President or the
other, even both, unless, of
course, the CIA had become a
Jaw unto itself. What the
Rockefeller commission report
revealed was "in all likelihood
just the tip of the iceberg." ac-
cording to Church. The real
likelihood is that so far as the
actual assassinations are con-
cerned, there was never much
more to this floating body than
a deceptively shimmering tip.
Castro, however, was another
matter. The n3ency version or
the charges is this:
TRUJILLo. Former senior
officers of the CIA maintain that neither
the agency nor Presidents Eisenhower
or Kennedy had anything directly to do
with the dictator's death. Officials in the.
American embassy had tried to per-
suade Trujillo to resign to end the do-
mestic unrest that the U.S. feared might
make the country ripe for Communism.
They had also been gingerly in touch
with leaders of the political opposition
and as a token ofsthe American interest
in seeing a change. had provided one
faction with three rifles. A group of sev-
en or eight men ambushed Trujillo on
the road from' hiS honse to the presi-
dential palace. Whether any of the U.S.-
supplied rifles were used in the killing
has never been determined to the se-
nior CIA men's satisfaction. -
LUMUMBA. The Soviet Union sup-
W12 11 s I FP?
IZ wOara4s4nn
Approved For Klease
ported him with money and arms in the
contest to take the former Belgian Con-
go out of the West's orbit. While the
CIA supported President MoTse Tshombe
of Katang,a against Lumumba, it had no
part in Lumurriba's arrest and murder
by Katanganese soldiers. He was a ca-
sualty of African tribal politics.
DIEM. The coup against Diem was
planned with the knowledge of Dean
-Rusk and Averell Harriman at the State
Department, Robert S. McNamara and
Roswell Gilpatric at the Defense De-
partment and the late Edward R. Mar-
row at the U.S. Information Agency.
The U.S. hoped Diem's overthrow would
halt the domestic turmoil that had weak-
ened South Viet Narn. But the CIA's di-
rector, john A. McCone. vigorously op-
posed the overthrow of Diem on the
reasoning that none of the generals en-
listed in the coup would be half as ef-
fective a leader as the man they wanted
to bring down. After the coup, Diem was
murdered. Former senior CIA officials
insist that the slaying was the private
work of the Vietnamese generals' junior
officers and was done without the U.S.
Government's foreknowledge.
CASTRO. Though Castro is still alive,
it is not because the CIA did not con-
sider various ways of doing him' in. The
det:an on the "maximum leader's" life
burgeoned over a span ofsoase two years
into a corpus of schemes. As best the
principals remember, the idea first
emerged in the late spring or early sum-
mer of 1960 as a simple, even simple-
minded plot to poison Castro's-food or
slip him a poisoned cigar. By some ac-
counts, the notion originated with a se-
nior officer in the agency's Western
Hemisphere division whose ideas inter-
OS STOREY ested Colonel Sheffield Ed-
wards, director of the agency's
Office of Security. Edwards
passed the idea on to Deputy
Director for Plans Richard M.
Bissell Jr.
He instructed Edwards to
explore the feasibility of the
project. For help, Edwards
turned to a former FBI agent
and. later Howard Hughes as-
sociate, Robert A. Maheu.
? Matieu, then a private consul-
? tant and investigator, was be-
lieved to have a line to Mafia
interests that, had operated
gambling casinos in Havana.
Through the connection, Ed-
wards sought to find out
whether the Mafia could pro-
duce, if need be, a man in Ha-
vana in a position to liquidate
Castro.
- Through Chicago Mafia
Chieftain Sam Giancana, who
was murdered last week in his
suburban Chicago home, and
his lieutenant. John Roselli,
?. the da recruited a gangster re-
puted to be in Castro's eatou-
rage of bullyboys. In late Sep-
tember I3issell and Edwards
informed Director Allen Dul-
les of the results of their ten-
with Dulles was in the most
general terms: he was merely
encouraged to test the ground
. further.
? ? ; The medical section of the
CIA produced some exotic pills and even
"fixed" a box of fine Havana cigars. The
cigars seem never to have left the lab-
oratory, but the pills ware turned over
to the Mafia. The would-be assassin was
to have been paid S150,000 if he suc-
ceeded; some earnest money, "a few
thousand dollars," was turned over to
him. Giancana and Roselli expected
something more important than money:
both were under investigation by the De-
partment of justice and hoped to escape
prosecution. In due course, the pills
moved to Miami but no farther.
No one seems to know why nothing
happened. Perhaps the man in Havana
got cold feet. Or he may have been eased
out of his former close proximity to Cas-
tro. By some accounts, Giancana and
Roselli found a replacement for the orig-
inal assassin and turned the pills over
to him. The substitute later claimed to
have put two separate three-man teams
of infiltrators ashore in Cuba. If he did,
nothing more was ever heard of them.
There is. a further mystery as well.
It would scarcely have been in charac-
ter for Dulles to proceed in such a del-
icate, potentially notorious enterprise
without Eisenhower's sanction or at
least the authorization of the National
Security Council. But there is no record
of such authority.
Prebhetss of One of -Die-
seas senior lieutenants in the Cuba busi-
ness later stated he was advised by Bis-
sell on two different occasions that the
plan had White House authority. Bissell
claims to have no memory of making
such a statement. But he has also said he
would not dispute his colleague's mem-
ory. Vice President Nelson Rockefeller
has described "a real problem of a .mne-
sia" that 'pervadesthe recollection of the
principals still alive. Bissell swore an
oath to keep secret whatever they were
called upon to do in the national inter-
est. In their view, amnesia may well be
another word for integrity in these times
of damaged vocabularies.
With the advent of the Kennedy Ad-
ministration, the CIA plainly assumed
that the new President would favor the
enterprise against Castro. In February
1961 Bissell brought a new personality
into the plan: a CIA officer. named Wil-
liam K. Harvey. Long retired and liv-
ing now in Indianapolis, Harvey was a
pear-shaped . fellow with a. swinging
stride. An intelligence officer of the di-
rect-action school, he habitually carried
a revolver in his belt.
Bissell charged Harvey with the re- -
sponsibility for preparing the ground for
what in the jargon of the intelligence
trade is called an "executive action."
That is the term for an action calcu-
lated to neutralize an adversary. The
means may include defamation of char-
acter by propaganda or luring a leader -
out of his post of influence with the
nromise of a fine villa on the Cote d'Azur
and a bottomless Swiss bank account.
The form, in theory, also includes as-
sassination, though the CIA possessed no
machinery for this kind of executive ac-
tion. Harvey had no authority to act,
4821ROWD37tOOIRacid advise.
In the wake of the failure at the Bay
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0
of Pigs in April 1961 Dulles and Bissell
both left the agency. They were succeed-
ed by McCone as director and Richard
M. Helms as deputy director for plans. ?
Helms, who had known nothing about
the schemes against Castro until he suc-
ceeded Bissell, did not inform McCone
about them until some months after Mc-
Cone took charge. His reasoning: "Har-
vey was merely looking into various pos-
sibilities. If he came up with anything
realistic, that would be the time to both-
er John with the decision."
By then, of course, the Mafia con-
nection was dormant, but a blunder
threatened to blow its cover a year later.
because of an unrelated bit of skuldug-
gery in October 1960. As TIME has re-
ported, Giancana became upset because
his girl. friend, Singer Phyllis McGuire,
took up in Las Vegas with Comedian
Dan Rowan. It was arranged to have
Rowan's hotel room bugged. Through
ill.chance, the snooper was caught in
the act of planting his gear. The inves-
tireai ion progressed slowly, but eventu-
ally the Las. Vegas police insisted on put-
ting the evidence before the FBI, and
Maheu informed Colonel Edwards that
Giancana and Roselli expected to be
protected. By May 1962 the FBI got in
touch with Edwards about the matter.
With Edwards in tow, CIA General
Counsel Lawrence Houston warned As-
sistant Attorney General Herbert J. ,
? Miller Jr. that the clis's connection with
the Mafia faced exposure if the snoop-
ers siere prosecuted. A day or so later,
Houston and Edwards met with then
Attorney General Robert Kenney.
was upset but apparently not unduly
alarmed. There would be no prosecu-
tion. His parting words were: "If you
people want to get involved again with
Mafia types, I want you to consult me
first." It was Houston's impression that
Kennedy had not known of the oper-
ation until that afternoon but had no ob-
jection to its going forward.
Special Meeting. In. August 1962
the assassination project came under
?
discussion at the highest levels of the
Government. McCone called a special
meeting of officials?among them Rusk,
McNamara and Murrow?to discuss the
growing Soviet activities in Cuba. Mc-
Cone and another man present remem-
ber that McNamara raised the question
of disposing of Castro. Murrow at once
objected to any discussion on that point.
McCone echoed the protest. Neverthe-
less, a memorandum circulated two days
later by Air Force Major General Ed-
ward Lansdale. a counterinsurgency ex-
pert attached to McNarnara's office, in-
cluded a mention of a plan for
"eliminating- or "liquidating" or other-
wise doing Castro in?no one remem-
bers the exact phrase.
When the memo was hand-carried
to McCone. he hit the roof. He tele-
phoned the Pentagon and demanded
that the memo be w ithdra wn at once.
That was done, but a copy, with the ob-
jectionable terms blanked out, somehow
-survives, and was the object of much
speculation among the Rockefeller and
;Senate panels. Two incw th.:i after the Au-
gust meeting. the Soviet missiles were
discovered in Cuba. In the turmoil, Har-
vey's executive action and the Mafia
connection all disappeared into the void,
never to be revived.
Approved For Re
TIME
23 ;TUNE
7 I
Lunch with the President.
The Rockefeller commission's re-
port on the Centre: Intelligence Agen-
cy is something of a s indication for the
New York Tmies, which bloke the sto-
ry of CIA domestic spying in an article
last Dec. 22 by Investigative Reporter
Seymour Hersh. Yet for months the
Times sat on an even juicier part of the
CIA story?President Ford's concern
:over the agenay's alleged role in foreign
assassination plots?but chose not to
print it. Times editors last week were
standing by their decision, but the ep-
isode underlined the hazards of giving
and taking off-the-record information.
Shortly after Hersh's. CIA story,.
White House Press Secretary Ron Nes-
sen called Clifton Daniel, the Times
Washington bureau chief, and told him
that invitations Were being sent for an
"informal" lunch with the President. On
Jan. 16, seven top Ttmesnien were ush-
ered into a small dining room in the East
Wing for lamb chops with Ford, Nes-
sen, ? Chief of Staff Donald Rurnsfeld,
Economic Adviser Alan Greenspan and
Special Consultant Robert Goldwin.
The gathering was cordial, though Ford
occasionally interjected -Now this is off
the record" and -This is not for pub-
lic." Talk eventually turned to the
Rockefeller commission. Ford ex-
pressed concern that the inquiry could
uncover embarrassing CIA activities not
related to domestic spying. "Like what?"
asked Managing Editor A.M. Rosen-
thal, always the reporter. Replied the
President: "Assassinations,"
Ford's Cormosr(!. e,LI-
hors gathered in Daniel's office and
agreed that since the lunch was off the
record, the Times could not print the
President's disclosure. When Daniel
tried to get Nessen to relent and put the
quote on the record, the press secretary
stood firm. A day or two later, Daniel
chatted with Reporter Hersh about the
CIA's possible role in foreign assassina-
tions, but Daniel says he did not reveal
the President's mention of the subject; in
any case, Hersh kept busy on the story's
domestic angle. "Why didn't I tell him to
drop everything and get on the foreign-
assassination story?" asks Daniel. "Be-
cause it Wasn't new. What was new was
that Ford was concerned. We couldn't
print that story. I don't take my word
lightly. I don't think gentlemen and jour-
nalists are mutually exclusive."
Word of the lunch eventually got to
CBS Newsman Daniel Schorr, who on
Feb. 28 reported the President's concern
about CIA assassinaticn plots. Schorr's
report stirred a mild sensation, and for-
mer CIA Director Richard Helms de-
nounced the reporter as "Killer Schorr!
Killer Schorr!" But by then the Rocke-
feller commission was well into its in-
vestigation, and its final 'report pleads
?not too convincingly?that there was
? not enough time to examine the subject
fully. Schorr refuses to identify his
source.
Did the President deliberately make
that off-the-record lunchtime disclosure
in order to keep the paper?and the
hard-charging Hersh?off the assassina-
tion trail? Government and corporate
Officials occasionally try to -lock up"
news . organizations with strategically
placed not-for-publication disclosures.
In the President's case, it is unlikely that
he spoke out of guile. "I don't know how
devious the President is," answers Ron
Nessen, "and I'm not going to ask him."
Managing Editor Rosenthal sees no
skulduggery in the President's remark.
Says he: "How did he know that we
would respect the off-the-record part?"
Leaky Table. Net everyone at the
Times is entirely pleased that the paper
elected to be so trustworthy. "As far as
I'm concerned, when you've got that
many people around a table, nothing is
off the record,- says Associate Editor
Tom Wicker, who attended the lunch.
"But I work here, so I accepted the de-
cision." Says Hersh: "Things have a way
of leaking?which is why it's ridiculous
to make those agreements."
Ridiculous it may be, but journalists
often find it essential to let their sourc-
es say things privately that they would
never say otherwise. Some of these
sources may try to entomb sensitive in-
formation by using the off-the-record
stratagem, but the presidential luncheon
. episode seems to prove, as Seymour
Hersh says, that such things do have a
way of getting out.
U. S NEVIS & WORLD REPORT
30 JUNE 1975
*
-
The operating budget of the Senate
committee investigating the CIA has
zoomed from the original $750,000 to
nearly 1.2 million dollars. About 90
staff members are now at work, includ-
ing a battery of experienced interroga- .
tors, plus a number of specialists with
CIA or FBI experience.
lease 2001/08/0&: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0
ars?
TheWashingtonStar
Garry Wills
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0.
Aboliih the CIA: it's
the only cleansing
The Rockefeller Commis-
sion did not fulfill its pur-
_pose. It did not because it
could not.
The purpose of an expert
panel making a report to
the President is to clear up
public doubt about murky
situations. The Warren
Commission on the assassi-
nation of John F. Kennedy,
the Eisenhower Commis-
sion on violence, the Kerner
Commission on riots, the
Walker Commission on the
Chicago convention ? these
and other reports were con-
troversial.
But their investigations
were thorough and their re-
sults were made public. The
controversy arose from an
irreducible minimum of
confusion in events and of
prejudice in hearers.
law or the federal statutes.
Assuring us of that was the
job of the Rockefeller.
Commission and, by the
President's own statement,
the commission failed.
Why the failure? Was it
the fault of Rockefeller, of
Ford, of staff members; a
goof in timing, publicity, or
organization? None of these
things. The fault is in the
CIA.
What was desired was a
convincing assurance that
the CIA has not been out of
The contrast with the
Rockefeller Commission is
obvious. Even President
rowel, whils tesestretulating
Rockefeller and saying the
report could restore CIA
credibility, Went on to add
that there can be no cover-
up because other investigae
tions will follow, or because
Ed Levi is a fine man.
" The President accepted
the report while saying we
should withhold judgment.
Yet the report's job was to
.facilitate judgment, and to
convince the rest of us that
its own norms of judgment
were sound.
Ford assured us he did
not want to be a Monday,
morning quarterback. But
that is just the assignment
given to investigators.
. The reference to Attorney
General Levi's integrity
was beside the point. The
report should have had its
own credibility, entirely
aside from criminal pro-
ceedings.
? The attorney general, in
this case, may not prose-
cute individuals for any
number of reasons ? am-
biguity in the law, the stat-
ute of limitations, the death
of participants in illegal ac-
tivities (which go back 20
years, the President tells
us), the use of "executive
privilege" to protect Na-
tional Security Council '
members.
The failure to prosecute
now does not assure us that
the CIA has stayed within
the law ? either the moApprord
WASHINGTON STAR
16 June 1975
control and engaged TnT
shabby activities. That
'assurance will never be
forthcoming, because it has
been out of control and en-
gaged in morally shabby
operations for some time.
t The CIA has inculcated in
its members and leaders a
feeling that they are above
the law; that anything they
do for what they conceive to
be the national interest is
justifiable; that all outsid-
ers, even officials, must be
died to and tricked; that any
attempt to check their
power is an attack on the
country's security and must
be foiled.
? Apologists for the CIA
arc right in one respect:
awn cannot neatly separate
the CIA's foreign from its
domestic activities. Not
when the foreign activities
are vast, secretly financed,
\ and do not recognise for-
eign or international laws:
, Take just one problem:
How do you prevent people
from blowing the -CIA's
Multiple covers? The agen-
cy has thousands of present ?
employes it must keep an
eye on ? and growing num-
bers of ex-employes who
must be watched, silenced
or intimidated.
. To provide fronts, :the
;agency throws out ever
.more corporations of its
own, and plants men in
other organizations ? and
these, in turn, must be
,watched. Among other
things, the CIA is a set of
interlocking businesses that
handle millions of dollars.
' Each cover must be
covered. There is an end-
less proliferation of spies to
4py on spies. If anything,
the spinning-off of Hunt and
McCord into careers of
'Crime may cause the CIA to
increase efforts at watching
kts own. And that means
Watching them all, all the
fest of their lives sa an end-
Less, and endlessly expand-
rite tes!:.
Just look at the amount of
tan-hours and money ex-
pended to prevent one
t
t The name of the CIA is
never going to be cleared
The more v:e learn about it,
the more despicable it ap-
pears. Its directors have
lied to Congress. Its mem-
bers have routinely broken
,the law inside the agency,
and some have felt commis-
sioned to do so even after
they leave the firm. Its de-
fenders fall back on every
sleazy argument available.
The only cleansing thor-
ough enough, the only one
proportionate to the agers
cy's offenses, is abolition.
The CIA is a secret em-
pire with more resources
for protecting itself than for
protecting the country
Intelligence work goes on in
many bureaus where it can
still be controlled, They
should be maintained and
expanded. The CIA should
be "terminated with ex-
treme prejudice."
to its instigators. Let a Mar-
chetti, or a Philip Agee,
make themselves wealthy
and famous by spilling the
beans, and what will fol-
low?
Howard Hunt has already
demonstrated that an ex-
CIA agent is not above
trying to shake down the
president of the United
States for cash. The CIA
has good reason to fear that
men will start talking.
The fear that men will
talk is an unhealthy thing in
a democracy. It gets more
unhealthy as the number of
men being gagged multi-
plies, and the justification
for their silence diminishes.
What the CIA fears is the
light of day.
We taxpayers have, with
billions of dollars, furnished'
a thousand dank little cel-
lars we know nothing about,
and our own menet, will be.
used in the future to make
sure we learn-as little about
them as possible.
If you doubt this, look at
the recommendations of the
Rockefeller Cotrunission it-
self. After criticizing the
CIA, and saying it should
stay, out of domestic spying,
the report makes these four
exceptions:
I. When the agency is
keeping a watch over its
owe mambas:es, present or
past ? a large domestic
personnel.
2. When it is countering
agent, Victor Marchetti, the actions of people outside
ForkRedeasetED011.08/980bRAINArdom
Crorn publi shine a book thanag,e.p ' teD7
the effort looks economical "facilities or personnel."
at.
1:1.-^ ? ?
? The spies must spy not only'
on their own spies, but on
anyone who Might be
spying on these spies.
3. When a domestic target
is "suspected of espio-
nage." In the past, receiv-
ing mail from abroad was
enough to qualify under this:
proviso.
4. When ? information
"incidental" to foreign ac-
tivities has been uncovered
and is referred to other
agencies.
in other words, even the
commission, in trying to cut
back on the CIA's home ac-
tivity, specifies four powers
by which it can police its:
own, maintain its domestic
fronts, use deceit about its -
financing, and harass those
who are suspected of for-
eign activities or any illegal
activities.
We are asked to give the
agency money for guarding
its spies from exposure. We
pay to insure our own
deception. If the CIA is
authorized to cover up, it is
de facto authorized to avoid
accountability. It makes no
sense for the Rockefeller
Commission to call for ac-
countability.
The CIA is already a cyst
in our government, a can-
cerous growth more loyal to
itself than to any law, for-
eign or domestic. It is an
enemy of our enemies; but
also an enemy to us.
With such friends we
41x need enemies. One
tliot "reform" a can-
cer. One cuts is out.
II:111
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0
_ BALTIMORE SUN
23 June 1975
eairrv Wills
C mmo
s .? To criticize the CIA, one
need not feel any animus to-
ward it on ideological
grounds. Even if one agreed
entirely with the agency's
goals, and had no objection to
Its past record, there would
still be two solid arguments
against it. These arguments
.are not political; they derive
:from common sense, and can
? be stated simply: .
? ? Lit is hard to keep a se-
- cret. -
2. The bureaucracy spends
most, of its time servicing it-
-self.
Put these two insights to-
: gaiter, and you- see that a
: huge intelligence agency has
the bureaucratic problem
multiplied severalfold, since
? it is servicing a particularly
vulnerable thing?its own se-
. crecy. And all the servicing
efforts in turn have their se-
crecy protected.
? 'Bernard Shaw puts the bu-
reaucratic problem perfectly
In: a brief parable. A wealthy
Edwardian couple with one
-servant got as much service
ng annther Jamul; with nine
servants. The house that gave
-living space tollpersons (the
-couple and their 9 servants)
was of necessity larger than
that accommodating 3 per.
sons?and much of those 9
, servants' work must go to the
; upkeep of the larger mansion,
seven though it was made
large in the first place to
house them.
The cook can no longer
cook for 3 (counting herself),
sh3 must cook fort!. Nine ex-
BALTIMORE SUN
17 June 1975
Sense Argues IPown CIA
tra persons' clothes must be
washed, beds made, hours ar-
ranged, conflicts adjudicated;
accounts watched, habits cor-
rected, in order to get the 2
persons' needs looked after.
Soon the employer must
work harder to keep up this
wasteful empire. Or, if he
lives off others, they must be
harder, worked, or a greater
portion of their work must
pay for the wasteful upkeep of
the lord.
You see the parallel?gov-
ernment is the employer, and
the taxpayers are being
worked to keep up the canni-
balizing efforts of the bu-
reaucracy. As such, Shaw's ar-
gument tells against all large
bureaucratic agencies.
But recast the fable to al-
low for the secrecy factor.
The nine original servants
must conduct hidden liv.es.
Even the large house built to
contain them is not enough.
They must be maintained se-
cretly elsewhere, .a new ex-
pense; they must be brought
to the house in secret?a five-
fold eYpense, for the transpor-
tation itself, for the secrecy
measures around it, for trans-
porters paid both to transport
and to keep the secret, for the
off-hours and double-time of
the transporters' servants'
employment, and for the peo-
ple who have time to make all
these quiet arrangements and
keep them in operation.
The housework must be
done at night, or in odd hours,
as if by magic. Scheduling
presents great difficulties. So
Kissinger says scrutiny
of CIA hinders his job
' By DEAN MILLS ?
Washington Bureau of The Sun - .
Washington? Henry A. Kis- hope it will not be damaged by
singer, Secretary of State, said these ... investigations."
yesterday that the recent loves- He said it is "essential for'
tigations into the activities of the United States to have a
the Central Intelligence Agency first-rate intelligence organize-
have hampered the conduct of tion under the strict control of
American foreign policy but the political leadership."
have not been "a major impedi- . Mr. Kissinger said he thinks
ment." the revelations of the investiga-
, Mr. Kissinger, answering tions have not disturbed foreign
. questions in an appearance be- leeders as much as Americans,
fore a conference- of the Public because the foreigners take for
Broadcasting System here, said granted many of the intelli-
the investigationS". have shown. gence activiae.s censured here.
that there "obviously have been "There is no other country in
some abuses" of power by the , the world where an intelligence
CIA. agency could be subjected to
"But," he added, "I consider i the public scrutiny that has
the CIA essential. for thq, aon- ? been the case here," he said.
duct of our foreign policyrattroved For Release 2001/08 08
does hiding the source of pay
given to these servants. Be-
sides, some servants' activi-
ties must be hidden from their
' fellows. That involves still an-
other house, another transpor-
tation system; another fake
conduit of pay, and another
system to check up on what'
these servants do that their.
fellow servants cannot see. ?
Beds are made in the sev-
eral abodes, tunnels dug to
connect them, and more peo-
ple paid to keep the secret of
hots, or whether, these things
are being done. The main
house is filled with secret pas-
sages, so all the servants do
not collide. Men must be hired
for that carpentry, must
therefore be checked, and .
watched, and paid well to
keep their secrets. When a
'servant leaves, he carries se-
crets with him, and another
servant must be hired to
watch what he does outside
the service. The bureaucratic
problem, bad - enough, be-
comes a 'nightmare in no time
when multiplied by the secre-
cy ,teeLor.
That is what the current in-
vestigations of the Central In-
telligence Agency are all'
about. And, naturally, we tax-
payers are paying for the pea-
ple to find all these secret tun-
nets whose construction we al-
so paid for. We pay the hunt-
ers and the hunted, the hounds
and the foxes, and both multi-
. ply like rabbits. It is Alice
time in this industriousWon-
. derland.
BALTIMORE SUN
23 June 1975
Proxmire
raps calls
to end CIA "
Washington (AP)?Senator
William Proxmire (D., Wis.), a
leading critic of the Central In-
telligence Agency, said yester-.
day that calls for abolishing the
agency are "foolish and danger-
ous."
"'re disband the CIA and
give ? the military intelligence
agencies free rein could result
in a? new cycle of ominous-
threat estimates followed by a
dramatic increase in the de-
fense budget,"- Senator Prox-
mire said.
"Talk of disbanding the CIA
is unreasonable," Mr. Proxmire
said in a speech prepared for
delivery in the Senate today
and released yesterday.
"Strong measures must be
taken to insure that future vio-
lations,of the law or good sense
cannot occur," Mr. Proxmire
said. "Criminal penalties must
be written into law.
' "But disbanding the CIA
would shut our eyes and ears
during a period nf tieneinn in ilia
Middle East and elsewhere," he. ?
said.
"The CIA is the only organi-
zation that can provide this da-
ta without self-serving biases,"
he said.
Senator Proxmire said mili-
tary intelligence services are
subject to a number of strong
pressures including "the natu-
ral tendency to inflate the for-
eign military threat and get
more money from Congress.' ,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE
21, JUNE 1975
L ETTERS TO THE EDITOR
? Raps CIA inquiries
CHICAGO-.As a former staff officer
of the Office of Strategic Services [the.
predecessor of the CIA) I view the in-
vestigations of the CIA as a product of
the. "new 'morality" which now besets
our politicians. ?
With thousands of dedicated career
people involved in gathering vital intel-
ligence necessary ?for our nation's very
? existence, it seems picayune to submit
this agency to the pick and shovel tech
niques of 1976 candidates and the media,
which now feel the need for a new road
'show.
There is need, I admit, for new legis-
lation which would compel the. CIA to
be accountable for expended funds and
for an overseer committee, but the 'com-
mittee should be in the Senate, not the
House. Lawrence L. Hollander
: CIATRDP77-00432R000100370007-0
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003/00074
WASHINGTON STAR
26 June 1975
.Letters to tho editor'
'Your columnist ?Garry Wills''
proposal that we abolish the CIA'
provides us with a clear example of
neo-Jeffersonian folly. To the liber-
al mind, the solution to unchecked
power is it abolition. Institutions
are evil inasmuch as they restrain
the creative and virtuous individu-
al. Lurking in the background of
liberal idealism is that nation of
small farmers that would theoreti-
cally allow maximum liberty for the,
individual by severely limiting govm
ernmental power over his life.
But it is clear that our system is
founded on the restraint of power,
not its non-exercise. And, for the,i
most part, our institutions have.
'exerted a force to expand individual -
liberty, not to restrain it. The end.
result of the abdication of power:.
wielding in a society would be, in
my opinion, not a Jeffersonian para-
dise of free men tilling their own,
part of the soil, but rather a Hobbe-
sean purgatory of bellum omnia
contra omnia (-the war of all
.against all")
The CIA is a necessary and vital'
agency whose functions are indis-
pensable in today's world. The solu-
tion to its excesses lies in regula-
tion. not abolition. Mr. Wills'
proposal for its demise leads us no-,
where but backwards into a never-
never land of fantasy.
R. Peyton Howard
Washington, D.C.
'
As a CIA retiree whb served 23 '
years with the agency, I resent
deeply the implicit suggestion by
Wills that all those who are serving
and have given service with CIA '
should put on sackcloth and ashes
and be stoned in the public square.
During those 23 years, I suffered
some fools in the organization and
found it necessary to work with the ,
occasional bastard. (There must be
.a few such folk in, say, the depart-
ments of Agriculture, Commerce, or,
perhaps, perish the thought, even in
the journalistic profession.)
Bastardly they may have been,'
but, with a single exception, I had
utmost respect for their capabil:,.
Ities. I consider it a privilege to
have been associated with the;
organization. Not once did I lose the
conviction that what I was doing
was, at best, significant and impor-
tant for America, and, at worst,
simply dull, plodding work.
Paul E. Carr
'McLean, Va.
?
I realize the necessity for freeciom
of the press, but Wills' opinions are
verging on the brink of tyranny. His ?
cute phrases such as cyst and
"cancer" are irresponsible and
sickenipg. If he's so smart,. whv '
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA4bP77-00432R000100370007-0
? ?
alaaaaaa---?.a.a.-aa7a
a wasps' nes
doesn't he suggest some sort of a
.solution other than elimination?
I would like to know who he thinks
,would handle our foreign intelli-
gence if the CIA were abolished.
Albert E. Crandall
Rockville, Md.
?
: 'Ask Garry Wills who has been the
imperialist al)(1 the confiscator of
property and muntries in the past:
'50 years ? the communist totalitar-
ian socialists, the Nazi totalitarian,
socialists, the Mao Tse-tung totali-
tarian imperialist expansionist
' socialists, the Brezhnev totalitarian
'imperialist expansionist socialists
(Soviet Union), the Pham Van Dong
totalitarian socialists imperialists-
, expansionists? Or the United States
.and its CIA?
Ask Garry Wills who are the ex-?
ploiters and oppressors of peoples
the United States and its CIA, or
the Soviet Union and its KGB? The
'foremost authority on the Soviet
Union's socialism is Aleksandr I.
Solzhenitsyn, who wrote "The,
Gulag Archipelago." He says. "The
Soviet Union lives under the rule of
serfdom. Free citizens are not at all
free. They are free neither to
.choose their employment, nor to,
fight for a fair wage for it, and even
in their day-by-day lives, they are
'obliged to conform to the whims of,
the petty local party bosses."
. Solzhenitsyn says the petty local
party bosses are generally KGB,
and the KGB has infiltrated every.
'country in the world. They have.
assassinated our agents and other'
agents, universally. They have
penetrated our schools and Con-
gress. .-
Anton B. Kamenev
Washington, D.C.
* t *
Garry Wills doesn't want to cut
out the cancer; he wants to kill the
patient. '
?
H. Nelson Filton
;Alexandria, Va.
In an 'article you published on'
? June 15, David Wise said; "There
have, of course, been coups in.
which CIA played a role and in
!whieh, foreign leaders have been
killed, notably Diem in South Viet-
nam in. 1963 and Salvador Allende in ?
? Chile in 1973." a
, Seymour Hersh of the New York;
--Times invested a ?large aineunt-
time and effort investigating the
charge that the CIA was involved in
-the .coup that overthrew Salvador
Alende. I asked him about his find-
ings a few weeks ago, and he said
that he had been able to find no evi-
dence cf any CIA involvement.
Mr. Hersh, who was largely re-
sponsible for the exposure in the
press of the .My Lai massacre, is :
.certainly not one who would conceal
evidence of CIA involvement in any
wrongdoing. If Mr. Wise has found
evidence that neither Hersh nor.:
anyone else has uncovered, he'
should ? reveal it. Otherwise he
should be asked to retract his "of
course" assertion. .
Reed J. Irvine,
Chairman.
Accuracy rri Inc
Washington, D.C./.
? ? a
Can honest and intelligent Ameri-
cans really view it as wrong for
local, county, state and federal po-
lice organizations to work together
for the common good of all? .Per-,
haps some governmental big-wheels
have' more to hide than us ordinary
folk and; therefore, a greater fear
of being exposed for what they are.
A few years ago, when a woman
was attacked and killed in New
York City; neorhy riti7anc were
condemned for not going to her aid ;
or calling the authorities. According
to the logic of CIA critics, if one of ?
'those citizens had been a CIA em-
ploye and gone to her aid, he could
-have been chastised for doing so be- ?
cause it would not have been within
the sphere of his agency's mission.
Such rationale is most astounding. '
? Many federal agencies adhere to
the principle that their emplayes ?
would be remiss in their duties if
they did not report suspicious ac-
tions, potentially detrimental to the
U.S., to appropriate authorities..
With this tenet, a good cit4en must
certainly. agree.
Elmer Gettis
:Falls Church, Va.
What's source
for the goose .
I'm stumped. Would you please;
tell me the difference between a
'a-'source" (identified as such a
dozen times in a New York Times
'News Service story you ran under
the headline, -Plot by CIA to Poison
Cuba's Top Command Is
closed") and a spy? Or do they both
add up to hypocrisy?
Maybe this is one of the reasons
most Americans have a low opinion.
' of both the press and the govern-
ment. Both of you could learn to be
n lot more honest.
? Deriis M. WDonnell
Forestville, Md.
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003-70007-0
RIGHT OF ALL CITIZENS
SICURE THEIR HOUSFSi
.ISVIOLATED: EVERY DAY
THE STRANGE
BUREAUCRATS. OF THE -
INTEL. 14(";...ENCECOMMIINiTY--
_ .? ?
:TAD .SZ_OL-C
nierica.ns have; always, believed that' the
ight to prisiaty is sacred. Vki&stwdder
tofies tald by travelers to the Soviet Unian
rid other dictatorehips who take for
ranted that their hotel roorns and phones:
re bugged and that tney are to/Amsted: But
c.,..vawe. discover there is literally .no piece
?ithin the United States safe from the
ii-
egal snooping .of the CIA (which le re-
tricted by law to foreign. operations) and
he _many other government agerieies
nOwn as the f`Intelligence CarzarininifY.
a: One. extraordinary ..ekemr46 is ;tf-feArily
aSe.r:bearn: tribsmittei.eiribedded in .the
all of the Dial Office at thet-V,hite House's
.? . .
Ms transmitter' nicked up -and relayed tea,
. . - , .. -?. .
eTtiO ,
tti.:
lorilbetliVeen..Richar'd M Nixon and his
idee,-frierldSrancil visitors duting-larieaSt
eveial months iri.19/0? the year the farm:ail
sresidentl.fe-UnChecf.h is -Secret ddrneatidin-1
elligehbe program.:.Rres:fclentfartelepfjoi,i,e'l
orversations 4ricLdtng those conducted:
vet'. ;`SeOpre7- .scrarno1er I faiei'i:;ii6:1-6!:',)Ci.1
ick40-up-0:1:1.1.!te laser transmitter
The:existeneein the 'p reside ntial offi-agf
is highlY Sophisticated device, .knawrilayEl
he code name. Easy Chair remains one
I the most senSitioe -OtoSelsiguarded;'and.1
ntrigUing secrets of the Nixon peridd:qhis?
nowledge is 'restricted to about a doze
ey.pastand present officials of the inteltig'ill
rice Canirnimitj:-.BLit the precise ptl,i*.a.s4i
ttiqoPeratiOn,_the eZeOt:i0eritity Of tfloSe*4
theeinetellatiOn. Of the lesti-4;
. _ _ .
eVice? under. a, coat of fresh paint on the
'sal pffice. Wall, and the 'ultimate disoo-
ition of the
insirtiment remain unclear
or we kno?ii: if Tapes were made of
hese transmissions?which is, perhaps,
he most crucial question.
It is also not known if Nixon himself was
Ware of and consented to the installation. If
e did, the laser system complemented his
idden recording devices that produced the
arnous White House tapes. (In any event,
he laser device picked up with infinitely
ore clarity every word uttered in the Oval
fice, eliminating the "unintelligible" gaps
hat affected the tapes. In addition, the laser
ystem permits, unlike a tape recnrder, the
dentification of every individual voice in a
ooin and the separation of sevensl simul-
aneous conversations.) It is not known
where the laser beam signal was received,
ut technical experts believe that such a
his Is the:third article in a Monthly se.des
? - _ _?? -
n America's Intelligence APPVA141141:11yrAT,
!ding the 12
device has a transmission range of under a
half mile along a clear line of sight. The laser
beam must be aimed out a window?it
would be deflected by a wall. In the case of
the Oval Office it had to go through the
panes of the French doors leading to the
Rose Garden.
Highly reliable sources told Penthouse
that one or more senior officials of the Secret
Service and the Central Intelligence Agency
are familiar with the "Easy Chair" situation in
the White House, although they could not
say whether they learned of it only when the
laser device was discovered and removed
early in August 1970, or whether they knew
at some earlier date. The sources would not
rule out that the late J. Edgar Hoover, then
director of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, was also privy to "Easy Chair."
In any event, this super-bugging of the
presidential office looms as one of the most
bizarre episodes in the still unfolding story
of domestic spying carried out by six suc-
cessive administrations, but climaxing most
spectacularly during Nixon's tenure.
Penthouse learned of this bugging of the
Oval Office as a result of a lengthy investi-
gation. According to highly authoritative
sources, the person who installed the laser
transmitter, possibly on a second attempt
when an original device did not function
properly, is a foreign-born individual em-
ployed as a painter by the government and
apparently controlled by one of the intelli-
gence agencies. His name as well as a
number of other relevant details are with-
held from publication to avoid causing suf-
fering and embarrassment to persons inno-
cently involved in this operation.
Investigations by Penthouse have also
produced the significant fact that officials of
the General Services Administration, which
is responsible for the maintenance of gov-
ernment buildings, have been under strict
orders from the Secret Service since 1970
not to discuss with outsiders anything per-
taining to the painting of the interior of the
White House. The Secret Service also is-
sued orders that all inquiries on the subject
be immediately reported to it. These orders
tants, dissidents in general, and real or sus-
pected radicals.
e Court records, disclosed in April of this
year (months after Ford ordered the inves-
tigation of the Intelligence Community),
show that at least twenty federal agencies
still maintain electronic surveillance of
Americans at home and abroad. Overseas,
particularly in Germany, the targets are U.S.
military personnel. This surveillance in-
cludes telephone tapping and the secret
recording of face-to-face conversations
either through hidden devices or informers
secretly wired for sound. (It is unclear. how-
ever, whether all this surveillance is based
on court orders or is conducted illegally.)
The immense scope of this activity Can be
appreciated from this list of .agencie-en-
gaging in domestic and foreign electronic
surveillance of Americans: the FBI; the CIA;
the National Security Agency; the Defense
Intelligence Agency; the Department of the
Air Force; the Postal Inspection Service: the
IRS Intelligence Division; the IRS Inspection
Service's Internal Security Division: the
Drug Enforcement Administration; the
Treasury's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco. and
Firearms; the Naval Investigative Service;
the Administrative Services Section of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Defense Mapping
Agency; the Defense Nuclear Agency; the
Defense Security Assistance Agency; the
Defense Supply Agency: the Defense Civil
Preparedness Agency; the Defense Ad-
vanced Projects Agency; the Defense
Communications Agency; the Defense Con-
necting Audit Agency; the 502nd Army Se-
curity Agency Group: the Office of the Depu-
ty Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the U.S.
Army in Europe; the Investigation and Police
Information Division of the U.S. Army in Eu-
rope; the Army Criminal Investigation
Command; and the Defense Investigative
Service. It must be kept in mind that all this
spying is outside normal criminal surveillance
by law enforcement agencies. In addition,
acting on requests from nineteen federal
agencies and scores of local law enforce-
reenS units. the U.S. Postal Service (which
ha 's an intelligence unit) is currently tracing
apply to painting foremen and their crews as and recording the origins of mail delivered
well as to other GSA employees. Penthouse to thousands of American citizens. Our gov-
sources were unable to say, however, wheth- ernrnent. from the federal down to the state
Cr these orders are exclusively related to and municipal levels, appears to have em-
the "Easy Chair" incident, barked on a veritable snooping binge( It
Beyond the new disclosures of White should be recorded, however, that tile Pen-
House bugging, recent investigations, in- tagen makes a point that only five of its
eluding those by Penthouse, also strongly agencies are authorized to conduct elec-
suggest that the cover-up of secret domes- tronic surveillance.)
tic spying activities by U.S. intelligence ? CIA director William E. Colby informed
agencies has continued in 1975, despite President Ford of possible illegal activities
President Ford's instructions that all rete- by his agency, including domestic spying
vant information be supplied to the investi- ? and conspiracies to carry out assassina-
gating panels: the Rockefeller Commission tions of foreign leaders. only after a part of
and the two special congressional commit- the veiI of secrecy ,.vas lifted in press reports
tees. But the White House has excluded cer- last December. This information had been
tam n top-secret material from information withheld for nearly two years even though
given to the Senate and House panels. These former CIA director James R. Schlesinger,
are the facts: now secretary of defense. ordered CIA em-
? Civilian and ' military intelligence ployees as far back as 1973 to report to him
agencies maintain political files on tens of activities exceeding or violating the CIA
thousands of American citizens, ostensibly charter. He received a number of seen re-
for reasons or4national ecurity" and crimi-' ports. Colby inherited this material in 1973
nal investigations, but just as often to satisfy and secretly requested the Justice Depart.
the political curiosity of overzealous gov- meat to investigate illegal CIA actions?
ernment sleuths. There are _files on sexual, raising the possibility of criminal prosecu-
drinking, and ?the? personal habits and tions Toje4t,..e.g4aki CIA officials?but he
Raligii@e120:01008008gICIPPROPM1100143213APYN4A1Weildtliform Ford of it until the
cials, artists and writers, civil rights miii-
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003700070
seasentation of hie fifty-paee written rep:tr.!
eel Dece.rnber and his supplemental "oral"
apart on assassinations.
The CIA maintains its awn secret list of
known as the BIGOT file, in ed-
ition to 10,000 name files of Americans
ospected in some manner of foreign intel-
.gence connections or some vague form bf
'.:bvE.,rsion. The latter list includes antiwar
rtd civil rights activists. Penthouse report-
et. in its June issue that the CIA maintained
ince the 1950s separate dossiers On the
at senators Joseph McCarthy and.Roberl
t;err. as well as on Senator Hubert H. Hum-
hrey?in addition to New York congress-
.'oman Be.ila Abzug. the only member of
ongre.ss that the CIA has publicly admitted
eeping a mean. The BIGOT file is made up
f persons who are regarded as "bigoted"
gaisist the agency.
Besides keeping dossiers on thousands
;Americans, the CIA is also known to have
aintainsti surve.siilance on Supreme Court
ustice William 0. Douglas; Representative
lande Pepper. Florida Democrat; former
epresentative Cornelius Gallagher, New
Repub!ican; and the !ate senator
e.tteset loano. a Missoeri Democrat. The
interest in Douglas and Gallagher was
pperently based on their contacts in the
aminican Republic: Douglas visited th6re
1952 and had close ties to former presi-
en; Juan Bosch. one of whose advisers
.ad CIA links of his own. (And allegations
ase been made that the CIA played a-rote
e he 1981 assassination of the Dominican
:tato. Rafael L. Trutillo.) Pepper was re-
tertedly a targE.st because of his ties to Cu-
... _feet-nee F:3ristse a meter a:ea of C!A
;aerations. Long. according to sources.
rcesed the agency's interest ,because of
ns to foreign corporations operating in
he United States. ?
CIA sources say that many "enemies" on
he BIGOT list have been targets of agency.
ugging by "Easy Chair" laser devices. The
dvantage of such devices is that they are
sually untraceable and do not constitute
ctual Wiretapping for which, at least in the-)
ry, either a 'court order or a "national secu-
ay' clearance by the attorney general is
equired.
The government secretly condoned the
roduction of awesome antipersonnel ex-
losive devices, such as flashlights and
elephone receivers loaded with explo-
ryes, by the B. R. Fox Company; a private
ompany in Alexandria, Virginia. Some of
he officials of this company are believed
o have had past ties with the CIA's pare-
ilitary operations branch. There is no evi-
ence that B. R. -Fox, which mysteriously
ent out of business last November, was
ctually owned by the CIA. But Fairfax Coun-
eauthorities reported upon inquiry that the
ornpany never requested nor received the
acessary permit for the manufacture of ex-
losiVe devices in the Fairfax jurisdiction.
telligence sources indicatethat other such
Ompanies are presently operating else-
here in the United States.
The CIA obtained from the Civil Aero-
a.utics Board and the-Federal Aviation Ad-
inistration a special certification for one
fits "proprietary" airlines. Southern Air
ransport Inc.. ea.errpting it from the require-
ent of flying approved charter routes.
uthern-staircraft are thus able to be used
nywhere in the world witbout Mina ro.ute
e
eports with the CAB. Approv -dt or
ft to deal with nre.seurs fierii.current in-' Hareem Os-Am:Id Vii-:Z; the on as.sessin.
vestigations. the CIA established at its Ford. who was a member of the Warren
headquarters last February a secret "CON- ? Commission, said that "so far" he has seen
FOUND Task Force." designed to counter no evidence to dispute the original concke
charges against the agency. CONFOUND is sicns. David W. Belin. executive director of
supported by ORA, the Central Intelligence the Rockefeller Commisnion and formed
Retired Association, formed last March-20. counsel to the Warren Commission. totektIsa
C1RA's board of governors includes some of same view. (But George taToole's reccetty
the best-known former senior agency off i- published book . The Assassination
cials. The CIA, according to informants, also which was excerpted in the Apri; Penthouse,
sought to plant at least two of sits former presents what may be called the first snien-
officials on the staff of the Senate committee tific evidence that Oswald was innoce-stE)
investigating the Intelligence Community. Meanwhile. the Rockefeller Commission
0 Its naval operations ranging from the has received allegations in form of testimony
sublime to the ridiculous. the CIA has been from private groups E. Howard Hun
involved with billionaire Howard Hughes in the ex-CIA official and convicted Watergate
various ventures, including the ship de- burglar, had been arrested in Dallas
signed to retrieve a sunken Soviet subma- utes after Kennedy's shooting. I hint heeds,-
rine, and it continues to operate?from a flied this charge az., wE.,11 as pub!ished re;mIts
room in a small York hotel and from a the: he was in Mexico City in August 193.
postal box in Par.arna?the Apollo. a myste- at the. same time as Oswald (see Hunt litter-
rious motor yacht loaded with electronic view. Penthouse 1\.tay 1975,)
and communications equipment. The There are also new doubts surrouncralg
3000-ton Apollo. which is almost 500 feet the murder of i?obert F. Kennedy in Los
long, usually operates in southern European Angeles in June 1953. and the special 76 -
waters. vestigating bodies may took into it. tu
This article will examine in some detail Charges of CIA and FBI involvement in
the domestic activities of the U.S. Intelli-
gence Community?many of them clearly il-
legal and a clear and present danger to the
democratic process.
For over twenty-five years these activities
have often been in direct violation of U.S.
laws. (The CIA. for example, is barred by
federal law from domestic intelligence op-
1968 assassination of King in Memphis
were made early in April by the Rev. Jesse.
Jackson, who succeeded King in the lead-7'
ership of the civil rights movement. This;
accusation coincided with recent asser-
tions by James Earl Ray. the convicted
sassin, that he did rot act alone and with his
request for a new trial. Acting on Hoover'erations and from domestic police func- orders, the FBI had been wiretapping Ki
tions.) In addition. this domestic espionage during the years preceding his death.
has violated the civil rights of Americans on Hoover memorandum, disclosed severat,
whom SeCrCt fi'es ha.ia bee6 agQ. the. sitior! *mai,
whose phones have been tapped with or- disrupt, discredit. or otherwise neutrali
without court orders, and whose mail has the civil rights movement."
been opened or. at least, monitored through: Political power struggles may have &sat
Postal Service "mail. covers" on behalf of been behind the installation of the "Easy!
various intelligence agencies. And there Chair" laser device in Nixon's office in 197ittn
have been many unexplained accidents. This secret transmitter is similar to the one
deaths, and "suicides" in the U.S. involving accidentally discovered many years ago in-
persons who had connections with intelli- side the Great Seal of the United States in.
gence work, the office of the American ambassador in
Moreover, the intelligence agencies. Moscow. Such devices, unlike standard'
using their immense manpower. and finan- hidden microphones and transmitters, can-
cial and technolooical resources, have nOt be located by electronic sweeps. The,
been part of great political power struggles instrument in the Oval Office was appare,n
in this country going back at least ten years. discovered by a Secret Service agent who
"Keeping files on citizens may be the least noticed an extra dab of paint covering thei
some of these agencies have been doing." spot on the wall where the device was irn-i
an intelligence expert with long experience planted. The paint caught his eye because
in Washington remarked recently. of the way in which the light was being re:
Some major American political assassi- fleeted by it at that particular moment.
nations, on which official files have been It is possible that Nixon had personal
closed, may become the subject of new ordered the implanting of the laser device
scrutiny by Rockefeller and the special con- obtain a more accurate secret record of a
gressicnal committees. If nothing else, a conversations in the Oval Office and chose
psychological climate has developed faeot_ to keep the Secret Service in the dark about
ing the reopening of investigations of the it. But it is also possible that, because of the
murders of the Kennedy brothers and the extraordinary importance of policy deci-
. Rev. Martin Luther King. sions made in the Oval Office, one of the
This climate, in which the CIA and the FBI intelligence services may have installed the
are being publicly linked to these and other device. (There is at least one other case of
political assassinations, evidently led Presi_ such spying in the White House: during
dent Ford to remark at his news conference 1971, a navy yeoman attached to a Pen-
on April 3 that "it is my understanding that tagon liaison office in the National Security,
the Rockefeller Commission may. if the facts Council regularly supplied the Joint Chiefs
seem to justify, take a look" at the charg_ of Staff with the most top-secret materials
es that the CIA was involved in the 1963 from NSC meetings as Well as the most sen-
murder of President Kennedy aid ftia i ,.sitive foreign,polioy ddcirnents handlodt,
was a conspiracy involving more than one Henry A. Kissinger, who then served as
gunman. This would be the first fresh official special assistant to tile president for natio*
look at the Dallas assassination since the at security affairs.)
Warren Comrnissicn issued its report more The Oval Office transmissions could be
RtiLitagwooyftwolvpciwkijimititiolist RtriiciroilAt feywhere in the White House or
i4tAgackutive Office Building
13 They could also be picked up, technicians
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0
say, in the Treasury Building a block away considered a federal rather than a state of- evities of CIA-connected Cubans: many e
ie Secret Service is part of the Treasury tense becaose such murders would most L-ern arrr.d. i(: iocal crime. There ,s talk a: a
Departnent) or in the Commerce Depart_ likely be planned in a federal office) and -Cuban Mafia" using CIA Cuoans, and there
raent building three blocks away. But, be_ current investigations by the Justice De- have been numerous instances of terror
cause laser beams can travel only along a Penment could lead to indictments of CIA . tcnsbings and assassinations. But the Iced
line of sight free of any obstructions, it would Personnel. ' police and even the FBI often find that some
be necessary to have "repeaters" located If this happens, one may well ask why
somewhere on the White House grounds to "higher-ups" in the government, including
redirect the beam emanating from the Oval members of the White House "Forty Commit-
Office windows to reception points. If, in- tee." which must authorize foreign assassi-
deed, the president was spied on by one of nations by American agents, would not be
his intelligence agencies, the American liable to prosecution. The Forty Committee
government was in a greater state of disin- is presently headed by Henry Kissinger and
tegration than we ever realized, a case of legal accountability may develop
Policy power struggles likewise seeMed against him and his predecessors. It may
to loom behind the CIA's own violent reor- even be argued that presidents of the United
gc.nization in the wake of the disclosures States can be named as co-conspirators in
last December that the agency had en- foreign assassinations, inasmuch as they
gaged in :massive" spying on Americans. supposedly must clear such acts when
CIA director Colby, anxious for a scapegoat. Americans are used. But traditionally presi-
apparently chose the chief of the Counterin_ dents haVe been protected by the so-called
te.11igence Staff, James Angleton, as the doctrine of "plausible denial," under which
public culprit, although knewlecigeable they are able to officially ignore this type of
agency officials believe that Angleton had activity. Moreover, the Fcrty Committee
relatively little to do with it. The belief in the keeps virtually no records. thus depriving
intellinance. Community is that the spying courts of needed evidence. And no official
scandal gave Colby the long-awaited op_ is likely to incriminate himself in court?.
portunity to dismiss Angleton. a powerful should it ever come to that. .
operator who had carved out his private It is obviously impossible to separate
empire in the CIA. Angleton had become a completely the CIA's domestin and foreign
thorn in the side of Secretary of State Kis_ activities. The agency, after- aila has its
singer because of his control over the flovv of headquarters in the United States and all its
secret intelligence between the U.S. and operations are planned and coordinated at
srael. Kissinger, it is said. felt that Angleton its sprawling building at Langley, Va., just
was interfering with his intricate Middle outside Washington. Because of all the
Eastern policies and persuaded Colby to support requirements at home. the CIA's
remove him as soon as possible. operations inevitably spill over to American
Angleton was quietly replaced by George cities. It is this spill-over factorthat has often
Constantinides, a fifty-three-year-old Mid- led tn the abuses and violations.
aicik.3t n.,1-.0 has ei:.s.,atad ts The CIA r"!nrrle that it ?e't,c? !Cbg,,fly ,n1
CIA's Near Eastern Affairs Office since American territory when it engages in train-
1972, and is unlikely to create problerris for ing. and recruitment, the contacting of
Kissinger. But nothing was said about Americans and foreigners who may possess
Richard Ober. the official who ran the CIA's useful intelligence information, and the in-
Domestic Operations Division (renamed the vestigation of potential agents or informers
Foreign Resources Division in 1972) during it may wish to hire (as distinct from campus
the period when the agency was engaged in recruitment for CIA careers). Few CIA critics
spying on antiwar militants. Ober Currently would dispute this claim. Likewise, there
is assigned to the National Security Council appears to be nothing wrong with the work
staff where, presumably, he enjoys Kissin- here of the agency's Technical Services Di-
ger's protection. Angleton, who stayed on vision, which concentrates on intelligence
for three months to assist Constantinides technology and the equipping of agents for
during the transition, was awarded on April? foreign missions, or the Office of Security,
7, 1975, the CIA's Distinguished Intelli- which supposedly does what its name sug-
gence Medal in a surge of bureaucratic iro- gests. In fact, "overt- CIA offices in dozens
fly. Colby managed to be in New Orleans on of American cities are listed in local phone
the day of the award and Angleton received directories.
it from Colby's deputy, Lieutenant General The trouble, however, is that the CIA also
Vernon A. Walters. Another power struggle runs "covert" offices and operations
had run its course. throughout the United States?the ones Col-
As we've noted. the CIA is forbidden by by does not mention in his increasingly fre-
federal law to operate in the United States quent public appearances in defense of the
except for managerial, policy. training. and agency. Here are five examples:
support functions related to its foreign oper- 1. The Miami area is the center of major
ations. But this prohibition has been vio- covert CIA operations. The principal opera-
rated to a steadily increasing degree since tion is Support Station East, headed by a
the CIA was founded twenty-eight years senior CIA official named Paul Holle,vell, in sssrepte of the agency's domestic activities
ago. The violations range from supporting charge of all the activities in Florida. A spe- te s: often verae on the illecial. _
local police departments and spying on cial section deals with anti-Castro Cuban _ _
American citizens to managing a huge cor- refugees, many of them veteran ? of the Bay This story is further complicated by Gio-
oorate empire. shielding mysterious private of Pigs invasion and other CIA adventures in bal Marine Inc.. a publicly held company
which de-
companies producing lethal devices for use Cuba. The Cubans are used as intelligence (unlike the Summa Corporation) .
k
at home and abroad, supplying tax covers sources and as infiltrators into Cuba (al-
signed and operated the Glomar.yr:Aye
for such companiesnas Howard Hughes's though this activity has been considerably for Summa and the CIA. Under Securities'
Surnma Corporation, which built the subma- curtailed over the years). r eugenio Martinez. Commission ruIss. public
.
and Exchange companies must provide "full disclosure" o
rine-recovery ship G/pmar ExPIdrer (it saved one of the Wateroate burglars, was still on a
their activities: Global Marina calked up
Hughes over 59 million), and conspiring on Set CO-a-month CIA retainer when he joined profits from the Glomar Explorer operations.
United States soil to commit foreign asses- En Howard Husit's Cuban-American team for
sinations. Conspiracy to commit murder is a Sieverly Hills and Washington break-in but, according to an SEC staff study. its pub-
lic reports were "inaccurate and incomplete
major criminal offense under the United lee other Hunt accomplices were ex-CIA due to the classified aspects." Thus far the
States Penal Code (it probably would be --s, n1nkgil
Approve For tAl.iWrg.atiMrraegdiirfceporfeegs-
VacrurrhWP a broad ruling on
14 ' ? - :-. Global Marine's pubic reporting. If one is
Cubans with criminal records are "uctcuch-
able" because of CIA protecticn and invoca-
tirsen cf "national security."
"Sa/pport East" uses the facilities of Mial7li
Internastional University for operations i
Latin America and provides technical and
fasancial support for far-flung CIA missions_
But. most important' of an.. it contscts a
v,crldwide network of double agents uncles
Os.'eration SEEBOLT, one of the most sensi-
ti-ve CIA missions. A special staff known as
thae "Green Light Group- runs SEEBOLT
le..etati of the agency's Clandestine Services
chiefs in Washington. It is in close touch.
with the inter-Agency Defectors' Committee
(IDA), a major source of double agents. De-
spite many valid objecticns to turning an
Arrerican city into a major espionage center.
CIA cfficials insist privately that this activity
is all really part of foreign. cperations. ?
The Miami group has its counterpart. Sup-
:sort Station West, in Burlingame, California.
This station. near San Francisco, concen-
trates on Asian operations in roughly the
cense manner in which the Miami station
vearks on Latin America and Eurcpe. There
is also a large covert CIA station in Denver.
and there is one in Las Vegas. vinare the
Mafia provides a fertile field for foreign and
domestic intelligence. ?
2. in the overlapping of the CIA's Id-reign
and domestic functions, the agency's rep-
resentatives in Los Angeles first persuaded
Pcssa--rd Heehee'e, Seremo: Cceccrc,tion te
beild the S350 million (in taxpayers' money),
deep-sea mining ship, the Glomar Ex-
p:cier. and then went to the Los Angeles
County tax assessor to inform him in secrec
that the vessel belonged to the Unite
Steste.s government. The Summa Corpora-
t:crl thus was not subject to local taxes ia
excess of 59 million. But this is where the
CIA got caught in its own game of secrecy:
:he ship's license, filed under oath with the
Coast Guard, states that the Glomar Explor-
er belongs to the Hughes interests. Los
County was thus cheated .out
taxes. Inasmuch as the CIA did the lying,
seay well become the target of tax frau
peesecution. The same may happen with
festerai taxes, although the IRS has not yet
teen heard from, and we may face the ex-
naardinary situation of a federal agency.
YS) suing another federal agency (CIA) for
tax fraud. And there is the additional fact
teat the CIA representatives were intro-
deed to the tax assessor by an FBI agent.
secgesting further intra-governmental col-
It.sicn. The CIA's request that the tax asses-
see. cooperate in the secret cover is another
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007:0
made, however, it would affect other public
companies with secret CIA contracts, pos-
sibly blowing their covers.
3. In the CiA's operation of its vast corpo-
rate activities?the so-called "proprietary"
Companies?the agency has always badly
needed the secretive cooperation of federal
and state authorities. It is, of course. a matter
If subsequent legal determinaticn whether
the incorporation of the proprietaries and
their operations have been in violation of
laws. The existence of the CIA corporate
empire, estimated at some 5200 million an-
nually in sales and services, has long been
a secret and there have been no court tests
of the legality of these proprietary come
panies. Since none of these companies has: -
publicly owned stock, problems with the:
SEC are unlikely to arise.
The CIA began putting together its pro-'
prietary corporate network in the early.
1950s in order to acquire dornsetic and
foreign covers for secret operatiorit and to
Oar:inert' funds discreetly to its overseas
operatives. Only top CIA officials know how
smarty of these companies are or have been
in existence?what is known of the opera-
tion suggests that the agency has been clos-
ing down some of them and creating others,
according to need?but the system is being
used to this day. Colby, in fact. confirmed it
earlier this year when he denied a charge
that profits generated by the proprietaries
an be uSed for covert foreign operations,
thus bypassing restrictions written into law
by Congress late in 1974.
Most of the proprietaries were incorpo-
rated fe Delaware, a state that does not levy
local corporate taxes, and there are reasons
to believe that the CIA even has its own
incorporating company in Dover to handle
the business away from prying eyes. CIA
officials say, however, that in some in-
stances officials in the office of the Dela-
ware secretary of state had to be informed of,
the true nature of the proprietaries to avoid:
blowing the CIA covers.
Probably the oldest major proprietary is
the Pacific Corporation, with headquarters
in a third-floor suite in an office building at
1725 K Street in Washington. Incorporated
in 1950. Pacific is one of the principal CIA
holoing companies because it provides fi-
nancial and management controls for other
irrportant proprietaries. Pacific's president
is Hegh L. Grundy, believed to be a long-
time CIA official, who actually lives just a
few blocks away from the agency's Langley
be.adquarters.
Operating directly under Pacific are Air
Arre.rica. Inc.. the "private" CIA airline thee
has operated planes and helicopters for
yeao:-.. throughout Indochina in support of the
ageocys "clandestine army" in Laos and
eerier paramilitary activities. Air America is
fuected by the Agency for International De-
ve:opment (AID), which has often served as
a cover for the. CIA's operations in Asia and
eee.ahere. The CIA refunds AID through a
complex bookkeeping system involving the,
corceatrnent of CIA appropriations through-
o: ;he federal budget.
?
Pacific also owns Civil Air Transport Co.
Ltd.: a Taiwan-based scheduled airline
arcein as CAT. CAT. in turn, owns majee
aircraft repair and overhaul facilities on
Teewan. The third known CIA ,airline is
Se.n.r.rn Air Transport Inc.. which is also the
with a number of unusually large antennas for interviews and the CIA has refused c
Ine roof). has. interlocking directorships Ments on its links with the company.
wen Air America. Between 1966 and 1972 it As a rule. CIA proprietaries pay taxes
!eased aircraft from Air America as well as meet other official requirements, but
from-Air Asia Co. Ltd.: another proprietary director Colby had to arrange for a specie
controlled by Pacific. According to Federal dispensation from the now defunct Pri
Aviation Administration records, the present Commission so that Pacific Corporation'.
ownership of at least four jet transports books would not have to he opened tort
:eased from Air America and subsequently commission's inspection.
-eturned toil is "unknowe." These planes. in' In addition to proprietaries, the CIA
tact, are not even registered anymore with "fronts" and "conduits" through compani
the FAA. At present. Southern 'o,.vrts three. it does not run outright but supports finesi
transport planes, one of them a DC-6 clay. The fronts and the conduits provid
(bought from Air Asia). A DC-68 was sold to covers for CIA operations at home an,
Ethiopian Airlines in 1972. .1 abroad. The best known of the fronts was
(Southern's attorney is James H. Bastian.! now disbanded Robert R. Mullen public re
who is vice-president and secretary of the i lations company that employed E. Howe;
Pacific Corporation. Bastian. inCidentally, is, Hunt after his resignation from the CIA
the registered owner of several apparently 1971 until his involvement in the Waterg-
uninhabited townhouses in Washington.) break-in. Interestingly the Mullen cornea
Most of Southern's operations have been; also handled a public relations account f
in Latin America. including eight flights to. the Howard Hughes interests. The cow
Chile in 1971 (on earthquake relief missions pany, as it developed in 1974, was c
for LAN, the Chilean national airline, ac 7: trolled bye full-time CiA case officer. Th
cording to a CAB certification) when thelate are many other such fronts.
president Salvador Allende was still in'. Some of the most interesting CIA c
power, but very little is known of the current duits?channels for transmission of fu
use of its planes. Its operational hc.',adquar-* and other materials?were the Germa
ters are in Miami. but at one point Southern' companies broken up after the war by the
was leasing one of its aircraft to a U.S. oil!, Allied military authorities. These cornoani
company working in the Niger in Africa and: .included such giants as the Farbenindustrie
another to a company in Alaska. 1 A.G., the huge Nazi conglomerate, and,
Late in 1973. Southern was officially for there are indieations that the CIA planted its
sale and it filed a petition with the CAB for i agents in new firms resulting from postwar
"cancellation of certificates" for charter, decentralization, including their United.
routes. But the airline then changed its. States subsidiaries. These and other
mind, and on December 31. 1973, became a , companies?some of them famous Amen-
"commercial operator" under FAA Requla-
can business institutions?serve the Clf.
s ?pee through the supply of invoices for materiat
tion 121. No longer under the CAB'
ating authority, Southern has greatly in- a.edsery!cez., that were never rendercc aea
creased its anonymity?it no longer has to
that money can be easily shifted abroad far
file documents showing aircraft purchased
the agency's operations. It was through the
or sold, detailed financial statements, and a branch offices of a large New York-base
log of all civil operations listing the number banking and currency firm that the CIA so
of hours flown by aircraft types, tonnage car_ dollars for piastres in the back market in
ried on each route, intermediate stops. and Vietnam.
the number of trips made over each route. 4. The case of the B.R. Fox Company.
As a "121" contract operator, Southern has According to its letterhead this company
s
no restrictions on where it may fly?except specialized in "custom designed electronic
those by foreign governments. Under the specialties," but in reality it manufactured
new status, Southern cannot advertise for lethal explosive devices. As noted earlier.
commercial work. but this seems to be the there is no direct evidence to connect Fox
least of its worries. 'the CIA. However, one of its directors, Mi-
Other Pacific subsidiaries include the chael Morrissey. had past links with the
Pacific Engineering Co. and the Thai Pacific
CIA's Paramilitary Operations Branch, ac-
Services Co. Ltd. The nature of their ac_ cording to agency officials. It is also known
tivities is unknown. Foreign Air Transport that Morrissey. according to memoranda
Development Inc.. another proprietary, has written by him, had been in contact with
Lieu.tenant Colonel Lucien Conein. a former
gone out of business. And over the years the
CIA and its subsidiaries have dealt with senior CIA official currently serving with t.
Drug . Enforcement Administration (DEA).
such companies as Lao Air Development
Inc.. operating in Laos under Air America. Conein admitted to newsmen teat he had
_ been approached by Morrissey. but insisted
and Birdair, the company that flew the Cam
bodian airlift for the U.S. air force in 1974 he never became involved in any dealing
and 1975 with him.
Acting through other channels, the CIA Fox, which operated from a watehouse a
had been funding since 1965 a Washington 2701 Fairview Drive in Alexandria. Virgini
firm named Psychological Assessments (it also had an office at 15 Abingdon Square
Associates. Inc.. whose function was to in New York City), produced a fire of "Astro-
conduct psychological assessments of horror items. These lethal devices included
American citizens hired for foreign em- explosive-filled telephone handse:s. bcoby
ployrnent and to study brainwashing tech- trapped magazine clips for the M-16 rifle:
niques of foreign intelligence agencies flashlights and cigarette peeks full of ex-
PAA was organized by two former CIA offi- plosives, a "fragmentation halt and an
dials. Samuel B. Lyerly and Robert E. Good- exploding camera.
now. (Goodnow has since cone to live in Fox's ce.tatoguenotes ',See "The intoana-
Australia for unexplained reasons.) PAA tion contained herein is CLASSIFIED by the
operates in complete secrecy. Admission manufacturer for U.S. Government use only.
to the office. in a residential uptown section The handling and storage cf this material
rncst. mysterious. Southern (not to be con- of Washington, is obtained by pushing a should be done so mindful of its sensitive
fused with Southern A i rwRytts1,.120teghe 6101w/telt srpmi td.tip,piag h5Ftdmil.nnTiemobt the exolosive hone
1625 K Street in WashingtMlh'av5UirdYrIgiNTAAYptegtiftneffldtbrglArrivighdr-e harileiellf-eVi-c-e-iS described: "Size 113.25"
. .
is
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0
75" x 0.5. Use the inside telephone hand-
et. Automatic charge fired at (blank) sec-
ads following lifting of instrument hand-
iece. Easy and quick installation to under-
ide of mouthpiece. Any de.-.si red time delay
n be preset. No switches. presetting, or
atteries. Simply install 4-wire module....
niature unit... rugged and durable. All
and wired. Unlimited lifetime with proper'
ndling,"
The exploding cigarette pack,. described
s an "anti-disturbance explosive.- func-
ons as follows: "Electronics and explosive.
odule packed inside cigarette pack..
hen the pack is lifted or moved in any
anner. the explosive is set off. Simple op-
ration. Only one switch. . . . A built-in elec.
onic counter is factory set for 90 seconds to
flow time for evacuation of the area.... The
ircuit will stay armed for a period of 21/2 to 3
ears.... Explosives are not included and
the cnly thing to be added." In the flash-
Vit. the catalogue explains. the "normal
n'Off switch on the side activates the op-
ration.- Then the catalogue adds: "This is
n example of an explosive anti-distur-
ance dummy unit. Anyother items desired
be so modified may be submitted for such
valuation."
That the CIA may have been the intended,
(not actual. client for the Astro line is sug-
ested in Fox's classified catalogue. which
ays that the explosive devices "have been.
esigned and manufactured for sale to au-
crized agencies of the United States gov-
rnment, specifically intended for applica-
ron outside of this country." A well-informed
overnrnent official remarked in an inter-
iew that "t can't think of anybody outside
he CIA who would want to buy this kind of
tuff?and I'm not even sure the CIA would::
ut the mystery remains: if the CIA was not:
he client, for whom was Fox working?
oreover. as we've said earlier. Fox never-
equested or obtained the required license
or manufacturing explosives in Fairfax
ounty. Hew did Fox get around it?
Nobody seems to know what has hap-
ened with these assassination devices
fter Fox Company suddenly went out of
usiness. It may be something the Rocke-
eller Commission and the congressional
ommittees will wish to explore as they look
into charges that the CIA has been involved
in foreign assassination plots.
5. The CIA is explicitly forbidden by law to
xercise domestic police functions. But it
has Secretly collaboratea with numerous
police departments throughout the U.S. in
support of their political intelligence func-
tions. One of the most notable examples
was the agency's "formal liaison" with the
Metropolitan Police Department in Wash-
ington, D.C.. going back to the late 1940s.
Maurice J. Cullinane. the new MPD chief,
acknowledged in a report last March that the
Washington police borrowed agents, au-
tomobiles, and electronic surveillance
equipment from the CIA to help them spy on
political activists in the capital. This "Cul-
linane Report" was one of the most detailed
admissions by any .U.S. police department
on its political intelligenee work. The
department's intelligence division spent
$1.7 million since 1958 on political surveil-
lance. The refatiOn4hip beideen tilt:. CIA and
the Washington police became particularly
active in 1959. when the agency trained at
feast seventeen MPD officers. twelve of
cations." Even the department's moral general William B. Saxbe.. about the-i)
squad received wiretap devices from the Under a secret program known as COlel-
CIA. Between 1958 and December 1974, the TELPRO, initiated by Hoover in 1956. the
Washington police had also been training FBI ran for years a counterintelligence cp-
"selected CIA employees" in interrogation eration aimed at domestic dissenters. Al-
techniques. Police departments in the though the program was formally terrealated
Washington area have also provided CIA in April 1971. these activities. includirg the
cficial s with local police credentials to fa- harassment of radic-als. we.nton at leas:until .
cilitate domestic undercover work. 1973. Among COINTELFROas targets were
Former CIA director James Schlesinger the Socialist Workers' Party. the Young So-
suspected the CIA may have been engag- cialist Alliance. the "New Left." American
ing in illegal activities shortly after he re- Communists."black extremiSts." and -white
placed Richard M. Helms. now U.S. ambas- !hate groups." COINTELPRO was oricinalfy
sador to Iran. In an internal memorandum to ?aimed at foreign intelligence agents in the
"all CIA employees" sent out on May 9. United States, a proper FBI functica. but
1973. Schlesinger said: Hoover. without clearance from successive
? "I shall do everything in my power to con- :attorneys general, applied it to doseestic
fine CIA activities to those which fall within a groups as well.
strict interpretation of its legislative charter. In 1969, for example. the FBI sent a fake
I take this position because I am determined ;threatening letter to a black Baptist minister.
that the law shall be respected and because !Donald W. Jackson. to force him to abandon
this is the test way to foster the legitimate his civil rights work at Tougaloo College in
and necessary contributions we in the CIA Mississippi. The letter was sent in the name
can make to the national security cf the of a nonexjstent "Tougalco College De'ense
United States. I am taking several actions to -Committee," whose members were said to
implement this objective: I have ordered all be armed. And in 1972. a Florida resident
the senior operating officials of this Agency was recruited by the FBI to infiltrate and
to recort to ma immediately on any activities disrupt radical groups in. the United States
now going on. or that have gooe on in the and Canada. The informant. Joseph A. Bur-
pas?, which might be construed to be out- ton, told newspaper interviewers that as late
side the legislative charter of this Agency. I as 1974 he was told by the FBI of its efforts
hereby direct every person presently em- to put the Vietnam Veterans Against tee.. ;ler
ployad by CIA to report to me on any such out of business in Florida.
actesities of which he has knowledge. I invite One of the FBI's most astonishing unau-
all ex-employees to do the same. Anyone thorized efforts was against the srrieai So-
who has such information should call. my cialist Workers' Party and its affiliate. the
secretary (extension 6353) and say that he Young Socialist Alliance. The party had not
wisa es to talk to me abouractivities outside.: been prosecuted since 1945. but the FBI
ClA's charter.' . . Any CIA employe:E.. who files on the disruption program runs to an
believes that he has received instructions amazing 573 pages. the bureau's harass.
which in any way appear inconsistent with .ment of the party reached the point where.
the CIA legislative charter shall inform the last December, a federal judge in New York
Director... immediately." ordered the FBI to desist from conducting
Schlesinger evidently received substare surveillance on a national convention of the
tial response to his request because Colby. Young Socialist Alliance. Another instance
when he succeeded him later in 1973. be- of unauthorized FBI activity came to light
den turning evidence over to the Justice when it was learned that the security chae.1 of
Department for investigation and possible the American Indian Movement durindthe
prosecution. However, for reasons that re- Wounded Knee takeover ia 1973 had beena
main unclear. Colby apparently failed to paid FBI informer. Evidently. neither Heceees
notify the president of his move. Ford be- death nor Watergate has taught the FBI any-
came aware of it only after the domestic thing about the need to observe the consti-
spying.scandal broke cut late in 1974. tutional rights of Americans.
Subsequently. David Blee, deputy direcz It seems as if every government agency
for of the CIA's Directorate of Operations has been involved in SOM. e form of spa:noon
(Clandestine Services). advised CIA em- Americans. Thus the CIA, with the cc:s.a.e.:a-
ployees by memorandum that they should tion of postal officials has been intercept-
retean private coonse: in the event of legal ing. reading, and copying since 1953 un-
proceedings against them in connection counted thousands of first-class lettere writ-
with the: Justice Department's investigation. ten by Americans to addresses in tha Soviet
But the CIA is not alone when it comes to Union. Former CIA director Richard Helms
:Ilene! domestic political operations aimed: refused to stop the interception in 1959. but
at American citizens. The FBI, as we now are, Colby testified that the. aaency suast and-ed
beeinning to discover, was among the tee operation in February 1973. He eon- etess:
culprits. The new attorney general. Edward the orograrn was "illegal."' So frantic
H. Levi. told a congressional subcommittee this mail reading by the government that zee
eselie.r this year that J. Edgar Hoover had CIA developed, at great cost. a special Ira-
amassed at least 164 files containing fold-' cnina to unseal and reseal envelopes of a;-
r with informatioe. some of it derogatory. ery conceivable size in a matter of S"COO?3
on "presidents. executive branch employ- During 1974 the U.S. Postai Service ser-
ass. and seventeen individuals who were \:eilled.and recorded the origins of all mail
members of Congress." The files, were received by nearly 4.500 Americans. Th.n
marked "OC.- meaning "Official aro Conti-, CIA was no longer requesting such re-et
! dential.- Levi added that the existeece of covers last year. but the Postal Service was
these files was not made known by the FRI to acting on the behalf of t h 5, Naval. trues;i-
i the Justice Department. of which the FBI is a gence Service: the Army Intelligence Com-
part. until early 1973 In other words. thc mend: the Air Force Special Command: in=
' Hoover files were a secret from dozens of Air Force Spacial Investigations Office: tea
them in "intelligence activity, The CIA gave ; attorneys general over the years. (The ores- Interstate Commerce Commission: he
"
the department what was dAlocisi rtdis.FiligiAVOctWe:ricieAt'ibikeY-WAVVskoolitlii 91 E-front: the Health. Educe-
lamps ca1sable of interceptirKoral commu- I
4wssb'oral.ri b.7-YYftet. tion anort are Department; the Agricta-
r11
16
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0
ure, Department: the IRS: the FBI: the Postal
nspection Service: .the Drug Enforcement
drninistration: the Secret Service: the Coast
uard: the Interior Department: the Labor
apartment: the Justice Department: the
mmiere.tion and Naturalizaticn Service:
ustorns: the Royal Canadian Mounted Po-
ice: and a vast number of local police de-
artments and tax offices.
The Internal Revenue Service. throuch its
pedal service staff, was also involved in
omestic espionage. A congressional in-
estigaticn established that the IRS had
1.458 files. on individuals and organize-
'ons (including 706 persons from Nixon's
enemies list") for reasons that clearly rad
othing to do with tax collection.. In Miami:
he IRS cranked up its "Operation Lep-
rechaun- designed to assemble data on :he
sex and drinking habits of prominent reSi-
dents. including the state's attorney.
The National Security Agency. a superse.-
cret outfit dealing with code breaking and
electronic intelligence, is currently continu-
ing to monitor all overseas telephone calls
and cables. During the Nixon period. the
NSA.was an enthusiastic supporter of Nix-
on's domestic intelligence program. par-
ticularly when it came to breaking into
foreign embassies. Admiral Noel Gaylen
then the NSA director, has been rewarded
with the post of commander-in-chief of all
U.S. forces in the Pacific (CINCPAC).
- There could be an endless list of the intru-
sions of our government into our private
lives. Let us conclude with three of the more
EDITOR & PUBLISITK
14 JUNE 1975
investigative stories
As a result of a New York Times_
investigation first published on Decem-
ber 22, 1974, the Rockefeller Commis-
sion this week (June 10) released a re-
port that substantially confirms alle-
gations that the Central Intelligence
Agency has conducted unlawful and
uncontrolled domestic operations.
On the release date, the commission
also recommended tightened controls on
the agency and criticized the Justicc
Department for abdicating "its statu-
tory duties" for more than 20 years in
a secret agreement with the CIA.
The events of the week substantiated
stories that both plagued President
Ford's administration in its early days
and shocked Washingtonians from the
highest levels down.
Although hardly as shattering as the
Watergate revelations, the CIA investi-
gation revealed a number of suspect
operations conducted by the agency
long before the commission report.
Among early allegations by Times
reporter Seymour M. Hersh and others
were:
?charges that the CIA had estab-
ished files on at least 10,000 American
citizens as part of a special agency
unit. This now has been confirmed by
the commission which said that a unit
called Operation CHAOS had main-
tained 13,000 files on individuals as
well as 11,000 FBI memoranda and
3,500 internal memoranda. A computer
system, it was revealed, has indexed
over 300,000 names and organizations
that apparently are not connected with
espionage. An additional 800 files were
created on dissenting organizations
with some 12,000 to 16,000 names in-
dexed in them.
?charges that the CIA had used il-
legal methods for their operations in-
cluding break-ins, wiretaps, and mail
inspection that began as early as the
1950s. The commission found that the
CIA had logged-32 wiretaps, 32 bug-
gings, 12 break-Ins. None were con-
ducted under auclicial :?arar.ill.t and
only one was with the approval of the
Attorney General. Further, mail open-
ings in New York City alone accounted
for more than 4,350,000 incidents.
?charges that the CIA,. had followej
anti-war and other cauliPPAQVArk.Or
tors. This was confirmed.
?charges that the CIA had set up
a network of informants in anti-war
groups. This too was confirmed al-
though the commission reported that
CIA actions went far beyond just moni-
toring such organizations.
?charges that the CIA had placed
members of Congress under surveil-
lance. This too was confirmed.
?ell^ -gee the t the agecy 1rd -
stroyed many of the filesn proving its
guilt just prior to the CIA investiga-
tion. In this instance, the commission
found that some files on a test of LSD
on persons who were unaware they
were being tested were destroyed. In
one instance, a person died (1953).
?charges that the CIA had estab-
lished a secretive unit for domestic in-
telligence operations. The report con-
firmed that Operation CHAOS was in-
deed this unit and that in some in-
stances had overstepped its legal
authority.
Further in the report, it was revealed
that among those individuals kept un-
der surveillance by the CIA were news-
men who were watched in five different
investigations in an effort to determine
their sources who leaked classified in-
formation.
The report's section on reported plots
to assassinate foreign leaders has been
withheld although the commission has
collected information on the subject.
The one allegation that the report
pointedly did not confirm was the use
? OARADE ? JUNE 15, 19,5
'striking examples: in 1969 Henry Kissinger
recommended names of his closest aides
land several newsmen to be bugged by the
FBI for "national security" reasons: the CIA
investigated the personal life of a Nixon
carnpaien adviser in 1968: and a deputy
attorney general proposed in 1975 that
"internal passports- be issued to aliens in
the United States, a step that could -have
led to a national identification system en the
Soviet model. However Attorney General
Levi vetoed the scheme.
Spying and covert activity is now an cfli-
cial government pastime in the United States.
Can the president or Congress arrest this
trend toward an American police state? The
answer is vital in determining the kind of
society in which we will live. 9-i-a
Of the word "massive" in conjunction
with CIA operations. According to
' Times associate editor, Clifton Daniel,
the commission report avoided the word
and used in its place terms such as
"considerable," "large scale" and "sub-
stantial."
The commission report served a dual
purpose in the eyes of many reporters.
? The first was ita confirmation of re-
ports by Hersh as well as some allega-
tions made by a former CIA Inspector
General. This confirmation, many feel,
was necessary since the running of
stories on the highly secretive CIA was
considered both daring and, at times
perhaps, speculative.
The second' purpose was to clear the
Rockefeller commission of any charges
of a possible whitewash of the entire
subject, although.e.vEal Ll(ings includ-
ing the assassination attempts were
withheld from the public.
Daniels' article in the June 11 edi-
tion of the Times traced the history of
the story from its appearance to Wil-
liam E. Colby, director of the CIA, who
denied the allegations.
Daniel reported that on January 16-,
Times publisher Arthur Ochs Sulz-
berger and principal editors had met
with President Ford for a luncheon at
the White House. During this occasion,
Daniel reported, ". . the President,
under questioning, used the word 'as-
sassinations' in a discussion of the
activities of' the CIA." His conversation
was off-the-record, however.
As well .as tighter restrictions
through a Congressional committee, the
commission also suggested that the
'President tighten executive control by
making the Foreign Intelligence Ad-
visory Board an effective watch-dog
agency, open the CIA director's job to
people outside the government and put
a 10-year limit on the director's term
of .service.
Q. I understand that Columbia Pictures is secretly
negotiating with Victor Marchetti, author of The CIA
and the Cult of Intelligence, to write a film called
The Director. It would be based on the clandestine
activities in Italy of William Colby, director of the
CIA. In this film Colby would be depicted as having
fallen in love with Clare Boothe Luce, who was U.S:
Ambassador to Rome when Colby' was CIA chief.
there. Is any of this so??L.G., McLean, Va.
A. Marchetti and a Hollywood studio have been
cussing a screenplay to be entitled The Director.
Releall 2001/08/08 : CiA-RDP77-0042R000100370007-0
.. ? , ?
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0
THE DUAMI HERALD
12 JUNE 1975
Otert
o counter
etion Cal4d-
tance the ,Soviets
By MIKE ACKERMAN
With WILLIAM MONTALBANO
(o) 1913, Miami Herald Publiehine Co.
Intelligence is like an air condi-
tioner in the summertime. It is nice
to have. But it is no good unless
you use it.
The Soviet KGB and the Cuban
DGI are experts in translating intel-
ligence into effective covert action.i.
They use a worldwide network of'
allied Communist parties to help.
The CIA must be able to counter-
balance these activities. That, pure
and simple, is the 'case for covert
action. However great the uproar in
the United States over its propriety,
covert action is g necessary tool of
the CIA. ?
AN EXAMPLE: ,
One steamy morning in aa Latin
American?country a few years ago,
a source tipped me that a Commu-
nist group was secretly plotting
takeover of the port workers' union.
They planned to sow discord
among the workers by spreading
rumors of corruption, by disrupting
meetings, and by stealing an up-
coming election through a secret
sympathizer on the election corn-
mittee. ?
That was intelligence. The Com-
munist takeover could have mortal-
ly wounded a new, weak and unsta-
ble democratic government._ _
. My CIA station chief directed me
to act on the intelligence. I sought
out the incumbent union leader, a
tough, basically honest but un-
lettered former stevedore. I told
him what the Communists were
planning, and I offered to help him.
FOR TWO WEEKS, I lived with
the man in a safe house- outside the
-Capital-- City. By the time he went
back to his union, he knew propa-
ganda theory; he knew how to
counter Communist attempts at dis-
ruption; he knew how to guard
against election-rigging. He was his
country's foremost authority on
parliamentary procedure. He also
had a modest sum of money to start
a health insurance plan among his
workers.
He won the election. The new
government still had its problems,
hut at least it did not also have a
Communist . union threatening to
close down the country's ports.
That was covert action. Most of
the operations I ran between 1965
and 1970 as a CIA street man were
in this field. I worked in Latin
America and in Africa. _
Covert action is an attempt to -
clandestinely influence the politics
of another country without showing
your own hand. Like it or not, it is
a major part of the intelligence
business.
? ? ? Approved Fi&r.
To those who insist we have no
business interfering in the affairs
of other countries, I say, "Fine, if
no one -else will interfere either."
- EVERY MAJOR intelligence
agency in the world has covert ac-
tion specialists. It is true of the
British MI-6, the French SDT, the
Israeli'Moisad, and it is even more
emphatically true of the . Soviets,
the Cubans, the Chinese and the
East European satellites. All use co-
vert action as an adjunct-to' diplo-
macy.
Once, the CIA leaned heavily on
covert action as a clandestine
means of furthering the objectives
of U.S. foreign policy, as a halfway
house between diplomatic gumbeat-
ing and military intervention.
Today, if the CIA again needed
to help, the Latin American union
leader, it would legally have to ad-
vise between 50 and 150 members
of the House end Senate. In those
circumstances, it might as well take
an ad in The New York Times.
In countries where covert action
used to be the CIA's bread and but-
ter program, the term isn't even
heard anymore. I know that first-
hand.
About five years ago, the CIA ?
rightfully ? began cutting back its
covert-action operations. The agen-
cy recognized that it didn't need co-
vert operations in every banana re-
public.
NOW, THE 'PENDULUM has
swung too far the other way. We
are out of the business altogether.
The Soviet KGB admits to no re-
straint. Cuba's DGI encounters no
public pressure to curtail its wide-
spread international activities: We
have dropped our guard, but they
keep punching.
Covert action can follow many
paths, and the Soviets and the Cu-
bans have been down all of them.
In the mid-1960s, local terrorists
allied with the DGI firebombed the !
offices of a moderate newspaper in
one Latin American. -country. I I
passed funds to the publisher to get
the newspaper back on the street.
In another country, Communist
infiltrators secretly engineered the
takeover of a Muslim religious or-
ganization, intending to use it as a
platform for anti-government and
anti-American propaganda.
I FORMED a counter organiza-
tions that was more rigorously or-
thodox. It was nonpolitical. Given
? an alternative, the country's serious
Muslims opted for what some of my
.. CIA friends. teasirtgly called ? the
"Abdul Ibn Ackerman Benevolent
Society."'
In another country, Communist
agents were successful in placing
one of the ix _ syfeepatletzere_eo
Rely*KG29911031/914
party.
In a prolonged and often angry
dialogue with a young moderate
who was a natural antagonist of
the sympathizer., I persuaded him to
enter public life. He did, and came
to be a vital counterweight to Com-
munist influence. He may one day
be his country's president.
On other occasions, I worked ?
with another union leader to break.
a general strike called by the Corn; .
.munists to upset an elected Latin-
American government. Once, I pro-
vided advice and ? financial aid to.
African politicians locked in an!.
election battle with Communist and!
Communist-leaning parties.
Although covert action is usually ?
directed against a clear Corrimunist
_threat, theee are exceptions.
Once in Latin America I worked
covertly with other case officers to
help cool both sides in a Latin
American border dispute that came
.perilously close to bloodshed.
? THE MOST EFFECTIVE covert
operations are pot the ones that
make '.eadlines.
In Moscow, the Ic.C.31.; never
-makes headlines. It Ls well-trained,
well-financed and historically com-
mitted to the art of covert action.
It is the pride of a society. which
has elevated conspiracy tca life-
style.
????
Americans take for granted that
back-room maneuvering plays a
la1.ge role in their own domestic po-
litical flux. Why do they then recoil
with horror at the reality of clan-
destine political intrigue at the in-
ternational level?
International politics is not a po-
lite bridge. game. There are no Mar-
quis of Queensbury rules. The
choice between black hats and
white hats is not always clear.
?
Often, the CIA is critized for
backing right-wing dictatorships as
an alternative to Communism.
But if you ask me whether the
United States is better ?off with a
friendly military junta than with a
hostile Communist government, my
answer is "Yes."
?
MILITARY JUNTAS do not last
forever. They allow for the possibil-
ity of eventual change toward more
democratic forms.
" Perhaps Communist dictatorships
don't last forever either. But the
fact is that no institutionalized
Communist government has ever
been overthrown.
Even in countries where they do
not hold power. Communist parties
pose a clear and present danger of
irreversible dictatorial change.
They are organized conspiratori-
ally. They play the game of covert
action to the hilt. -Often, they have
r00432ROM1r000000711(Pd in the mili-
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NEW YORK TIMES
24 June 1975
*
OvIet Intelligen.ce
,T
By JOHN M. CREWDSON .
Special.to The New Yotic Times '
WASHINGTON, June 23?The
Soviet intelligence service has
been able for at least a .year.i
to intercept and record tele.
phone conversations within the
United States between Govern-
ment officials, military leaders
and private citizens, according
to informed Federal intelligence
officials.
One official said today that
the National Security Agency,
which has the responsibility
of; . insuring the security Of
domestic communications, had
been aware of the practice "for
some time," but that there was
,..'nothing that can . be done
'about, it, absolutely nothing
`nothing." .
The reason, he said, was that
the interceptions were made:
at the point that the conversa-
ttions, chiefly ? long - distance
,ones but including scme cross-
-town calls, entered the extem,
sive microwave relay network
that passed them through the
air to satellites or between the
radio relay stations that stretch
acroosss the United States.. ?
Sensitive Channels Separated
? The Russians, the official
said, had developed the ability
to reparate certain sensitive
rehannels?fi6in: the yyriRcl. .64
;Teo:lucre:las that make up -these
traHsmissions, allowing them
to ?? monitor calls' to and from
"the military, Congress, anybo-
dy?you name ? it, they can chi
it."
A White House official fami-
liar with the Soviet operation,
which until two, weeks ago
was among the American
Government's best-kept secrets,
said that telephone calls placed
and received by members of
Congress "undoubtedly must be
among those that were over-
heard."
An spokesman for Senator
Frank Church, the Idaho Demo,
crat who heads the Senate corn--
mittee inveatigating intel-
ligence activities, .said today
that the panel's staff had been.
instructed to find out how long,
Such external eavesdropping
had been going on and what
ihad been overheard. ?
ents Rep' oriedly Intercept and
ecord Phone Conversations in rir.8
r'rhe 'first- hint that foreign -
operatives might be eavesdrop-
ping on domestic telephone
'communications inside this,
'country was a brief allusion
to that possibility in the recent-
ly released report of Presiden
Ford's commission that investi-
gated the activities of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency.
The Chicago Tribune reported
today that a six-page section'
'of the report containing the
reference, prepared by Vice
President Rockefeller, who
headed the commission, had
been "censored" for security
reasons-by White House, State
Department 'and N.S.A. offi-
cials.
Censoring Denied
.,, A _spokesman _for the, Vice
tary, the press,' the police. When
the right moment comes, they can
act with terrifying speed..
That is what happened in Portu-
gal. The speed of the Communist
--rise to power there did not surprise
me. The tactics the Conimunists
used there are not new. .
But they have seldom been as
successful as they were in Lisbon.
Perhaps there is a reason why not.
My conviction is that commu
nism has not prospered more be-
-cause the CIA's Clandestine Servic-
es, through covert action, has
served as a powerful check on
Communist aspirations.
President said today. howeveral
that the 'report "was not cen-
sored by anyone," although the
commission had sought "the
advice of experts on classifica-
tion as to certain sensitive mat-
ters," and that as a result a
'few passages nave been "re-
!
phrased."
' The' interception of electronic
intelligence, or `Vint," as it
is' known, has become within
the last two decades an increaa
singly costly and time-consum-
ing undertaking of both the
5oviet and American intel-
ligence communities, and to
a lesser degree of the other
technologically advanced na-
tions as well.
1. 'The United States- for 'axe!
ample, reportedly deVelored
the ability some years ago to
THE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER
2 June 1975
'listen in, via a satellite p-oised
over Moscow, to the conversa-
tions of Soviet leaders oVer
radio-telephones installed in
their limousines.
? One former intelligence offi-
1.
cial described today the collec-i
tion of such intelligence aS.
"very expensive" because of;
the resources required to moni-
tor and cull it, and of "veryl
marginal value" because of its,
sheer bulk and the fact that:
much of it was case in indecip-
herable codes.
Officials said today that the;
Soviet interception of microw-;
ave . telephone transmissions
was believed to have been ac-
omplished with fixed anten-
nas,, such as .those on the roofl
of the Soviet- Embassy here,"
S. S
seer s
? - ?
:From SIMON WINCHESTER, Washington, June 1, ,
1
.A.. Secret, deal betWeen ? the
Persian Government and a. big
American defence ? contractor,.
. .
.w.luch.. leaked into 'the ?press
here?today, would not only have
further strengthened Iran's
domination of the Middle East
oil regions but have . com-
promised some of America's
most - sensitive intelligence
secrets. . ?
.
? The project was the building
of an intelligence . communica-
tions system, at a price which
could be. as high as $500,000,
in the ? heart of the Shah's
increasingly powerful- empire.
The corporation involved ? is
Rockwell ? International, which
is based in California,: ,
? The' . story began with. a
series of ostensibly unremarka-
ble asa.dvertisernents which,
started'. appearing in news:
pa-oars"across this country last
'November includingone on the
sports page of a. Washington
paper, and which _ called for
"engineers, operators and ana-
lysts" who had a keen interest
in " communications analysis,
voice processing, and intelli-
gence operations." .
These ads, it has now been
disclosed, were the initial phase
of the big deal, which is now
being regarded with ;Amite con-
cern here. ,
.The leav about the- loss of
US secrets has arisen because,
- as part of the? deal Iran has
won the right to recruit former
members of two of America's
most clandestine intelligence
agencies, to help to build . the
new message-intercepting and
code-breaking centre. ?
The contract with Rockwell,
made ,it- is understood at the
Shah's personal request and
signed with the blessing of a
little .known. State Department
office. calls for the recruiting
of former officers of the,
National Security Agency and
its Air Force subsidiary, the
Air Force Security Service.
Both of, these agencies, which
make it their business to collect
radio,- cable-and ? diplomatic
traffic intelligece from alt over
the world a?nd subject it to
the most sophisticated kind of
code-breaking, operate with . a
degree of secrecy that makes
CIA sound like the local public
library.
The new Persian agreement
? which goes under the code
name "ibex" is uniuue in
that it is the first time Ameri-
can military aid has been pro-
vided without any kind of con-
Until- ? suaervision ny the. US
Government.
- It is assumed that the Shah's
immense and growing influence
in ? Waehinetem and his- close
personal ties- to the- 135 Ambas-
Sador in Tehran, the former
CIA chief, Riehard Helms, -led
to the writing of this: extraor-
dinary contract. ? ,?
The 'contract document,
believed to have been :signed.
in February or March, called-
for Rockwell ,to start a ? pro-
gramme, to take between five
and 10 years; to build the- Intel-
ligence .systeni. apd an initial
payment of $50 millions; was
demanded ? .
The proposed facility will.
make use?in much the same.
way as the NSA headquarters,
at Fort ? Mead, Mainland ? a
battery of expensive and
sophisticated- radio monitoring,
apparatus, with a number of
electronic monitors carried in ?
C130 aircraft on constant intele
ligence-gathering patrols. Ibex.
it is thought likely, will be of
special use against Soviet-,
forces and diplomats based in
neighbouring Iraq.
But the Americans concede
that Many more producers of
radio and cable traffic in the
Persian Gulf region could, in
theory, be monitored by the.
Shah's new. facility ? and
American military groups them-
selves could have their ladle).
messages so listened to.
. There is concern that inter-
nal security work may be per-
formed by the radio monitors ;
the Persian secret ? police for
example, could use them to.
Locate dissident- .groups in the;
remoter parts of rural Iran.
That check, that vital Apiaretioetl For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDFW-00432R000100370007-0
at-ice, no longer exists,
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0
LE MONDE
Paris, 12 June 1975
CONTROL TO BE RESTORED
It would be easy to write that the Rockefeller report on the CIA contains
no new elements for action concerning the abuse of power which, since the end
of last year, some American opinion had been looking forward to. It confirms
at least three-fourths of the accusations made against the Agency (more precisely,
the Central Intelligence Agency) last December by our colleague of the New York
Times, Seymour Hirsh. In the wake of his investigations, "revelations", "leaks",
calculated indiscretions, etc. have abundantly nourished the curiosity of the
public, which saw for the first time a little opening of the cover of the sanct-
uary of the American state.
Two points need to be made at the very outset. The first is the very fact
? that there is a commission of inquiry appointed by the President, which today has
submitted the result of its investigations. It should also be noted that the task
of Mr. Rockefeller and his associates was precisely circumscribed, namely to
focus on "counter-espionage" operations conducted domestically by the CIA. This
concerns legal matters with diverse, complex aspects which are secondary when
compared with the wide range of external actions based on the large technical
capabilities for intercepting and decoding signals in the atmosphere which the
"place" ("maison") in Langley, outside Washington, has become known for in our
time.
The three hundred pages of the Rockefeller report contain a documentation
which one may still judge to be inadequate but one could not imagine the issu-
ance of a similar report in any Western democracy.
The second point is that it is disastrous that an organization with the
great mission that the CIA has, frequently became involved in actions beyond
its assigned mission: it matters little that it occurred most often at the
instigation of the White Hese that the CIA compromised itself on affairs which
were not within its 1-0M,TY'tianf'". And jnef an off-hand remark about the neglig-
ence of Congress which over a twenty-year period has not shown the slightest
sign of taking a close look as to what was going on and was carried out under
the name of the three famous initials.
As a matter of fact, the responsibility of the Congress is perhaps a
heavier one than that of the Executive. For, it is the legislator who is
concerned here: it is he who defines the prerogatives of the important services
of the nation. All irregularities revealed and condemned in the Rockefeller
report are deemed to be "against the law": for sure, they are not compatible
with good sense and good taste. Legally, things are little bit more delicate.
The act by which the CIA came into existence, the "charter" invoqued to prevent
its involvement in domestic police functions, dates back to 1947 and is not
marked by clear logic. It has, among other things, been erased and over-
loaded with and superceded by hundreds of "directives" from the White House,
some general in nature others more specific; they constitute what is called -
officially! - the "secret charter" of the CIA. It seems that the White House
has decided to refer the integration of this confusing matter to Senator Frank
Church, who heads a CUWASSiOn of inquiry of the Senate on the conduct attrib-
uted to the CIA. He firmly intends not only to change the practices but also
the statutes of the obscure institution.
The CIA has shown by its cooperation with the Rockefeller inquiry as well
as with the two special Congressional commissions which were created for the same
reason and in the same spirit, that it is vitally interested not to come out of
the shadow but out of the semi-darkness into which certain of its marginal activ-
ities had spread, to devote itself in good conscience to that which will always
be its untouchable and hence irreproachable domaine: espionage abroad, world-
wide by a super-power.
20
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.50
Approved For Release 2001108/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-6
,cone
-da restaurer
. ,
1.1 Serait facile 'd'ecrire que le
rapport Rockefeller sur In C.I.A.
n'apporte pas d'elements nou-
veaux sur le -proces en abus de
peuvoir que, derails le debut de.
l'annee, !al intente une partie de
l'opinion americaine. H continue
au moms aux trois quarts les
accusations portees en decembre
dernier contre 1' e agence (puis-
s'agit, pour etre pr?s, de la
Central Intelligence ? Agenc y)
par n.otre confrere dn e New-York
Times a, M. Seymour Hersh.' Dans'
le sillage de son enquete,
lations e fuites *, indiscretions
dirigees, o n t surabondamment
nourri In curiosite du' public. qui
voyait pour In premiere fois s'ens .
trouvrir le -voile de ce sanctuaire ;
de In raison d'Etat americaine.
Deux remarques s'imposent
d'emblee. La premiere .est le fait
meme y ait Cu commission
presidentielle d'enquete et clue
celleci livre aujourd'hui le resula
tat de ses investigations. Encere.
faut-il noter que .1a ache de
M. Rockefeller et de ses assistants
atait etroitement eirconscrite aux
aspects des operations de ? contre-
espionnage interieur menees par
la?C.I.A. II s'agit l?'aspects liti-
? gieux a de nombreux points de
vue, mais plus tine secondaire? en,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE. _.1\4,9NTiroli
19 June 1975 - -
Jos ph Hrsch
comparaisOnf?dur aon illaetfon'"
ex riear tie l'inanense labora-
toire a. licher et a decoder l'uni-
vcrssaue la e malson A de Langley,
aux environs de Washington, est
fievenue de nos jours. ,
Les trois cents pages du rapport
Rockefeller contiennent tine do-
cumentation qu'en pourra tou-
jours juger iusuffisante, mais
dont on n'imagine pas l'equiva-:
lent dans line autre democratie
occidentaIe.
Seconde remarque : s'il est fatal
qu'une organisation de l'ampleur
de la soit frequemment
tentee d'outrepasser le cadre des
missions qui lui sont assignees, il
n'en reste pas moms que c'est le
plus souvent it l'instigation de,Ia
Maison Blanche que la. C.I.A. S'est
compromise dans des affaires qui
n'etaient pas de sa competence.
Et ne parlons tale pour memcire
de l'incurie du Congres qui, vingt
aus durant, n'a pas montre in
moindre velleite de regarder de
pres ce qui se passait et se per-
petrait it l'enseigne 'des famenses
trois initiales.
i , ? ?
En In matiere, sa responsabillte
-est pent-etre encore plus lourde
que celle de l'executif. Car c'est
hil, le legislateur, s'il s'en soucie,
qu'il revient de definir les attri-
butions des grands services de In
nation. Toutes les irregularites
relevees et denoneees pat: le rap-
port Rockefeller sont censees etre
o contraire.s ,ii, In loi, : it coup
elles sent contraires an bon
sens et an bon gout. En droit. les
choses sont beaucoup plus Hones.
L'acte de naissance de In
la e charte inVoquet pour
condamner son ingerence dans Ia
police interieure, date de 1947, et
n'est pas d'une logique limpid?.
II a ete, en mitre. rature et sur-
charge par les centaines do e di-
rectives a 'emanant' de In Nielson
Blanche, tantet de style general,
tantot d'usage particuller, qui
constituent ce qu'on appelle ?
officiellernent ! ? ? la e -c'aarte
secrete de la C.I.A. Il ? semble
(Luc la Nelson Blanche alt pris
In decision de transmettre Nate-
gralite de ce fatras an s.enateur
Frank,. Church, qui dirige une
commission d'enquete senatoriale
sur les agissements prites it la
CIA., et quo soutient le forme
propos de reformer nen seulement
les pratiques, mais les statuts de
cette tenebreuse institution.
La C.I.A. a montre par sa
cooperation it l'enquete Rocke-
feller commie, aux travaux des
deux commissions speciales du
Congres creees dans le meme
esprit, qu'elle etait la premiere
interessee ii sortir non pas de
l'ombre, mais de In penombre oC
certaines de ses activites margi-
nales se deroulaient, pour se
consacrer en paix a ce qui de-
meurera toujours sen domaine
intouchable et d'ailleurs inatta-
lane : l'espionnage du reste du
monde par une superpuissance.
r' Afterthoughts" ? _ _ I
Afterthoughts on me CA
The Rockefeller Commission report on withholding of information damaging to the
mistakes committed by the U.S. Central In- CIA.
?A
telligence Agency in the past was not a A A
whitewash. On the contrary, it uncovered and Not all, but most of the abuses confirmed or
reported to the public several highly improper
actions which had not been sniffed out
previously by any investigating news re-
porter.
The worst examples of such newly disclosed
impropriety included giving LSD to an unwit-
ting person who subsequently jumped out of a
10th-story room to his death. Others included
keeping a defector in solitary confinement for
three years and "in one other case a defector
was physically abused."
The major published allegations against the
CIA were confirmed. There was widespread
abuse of the rights of American citizens. The
CIA did exceed its charter on a very broad
scale. It did allow itself to be used improperly
for political purposes.
This confirmation of published charges and
disclosure of more that had not been suspected
by reporters can, and should, be the beginning
of the restoration of public confidence in the
integrity of government processes in Washing-
ton. It is noteworthy that many newspapers
both in the United States and abroad assumed
that the Rockefeller Commission report would
be a whitewash, and some rushed to a
whitewash conclusion on the first day after
publication. Only after reading the text was it
generally realized that this was a remarkably
honest job. ?
:lee principal subsequent criticisms were
hat the report had not expressed sufficient
outrage over the mistakes it had uncovered or
cenfirmed. Another was that it had not gone
beyond its mandate which was limited to should be pet-Sons of "stature, independence,
disclosed in the report occurred after 1961
when the CIA moved from various antiquated
and obscure buildings scattered around Wash-
ington into its superpalace at Langley, Vir-
ginia.
This was in the middle of one of the most
expensive and exclusive suburban residential
districts around Washington. The building
looks like a junior Pentagon, and not all that
junior. It is highly visible from the air and
scarcely concealed from -heavily traveled
highways. It lost its anonymity when the move
was made.
No one Could weigh the extent to which life
in a supersplendid building contributed to
what can be called delusions of grandeur. The
ill-starred Bay of Pigs affair was conceived
before the move was made, but during the
construction process. The widespread surveil-
lance of American citizens by the agency, in
confirmed violation of its charter, was trig-
gered by the radical movements of the '60s
which grew out of black unrest and antiwar
protests. But it remains a fact that the CIA
was largely anonymous and largely non-
controversial while it was living in humble
quarters. Did it share in the "arrogance of
power" which marked the Johnson-Nixon
era?
A A A
Remedies proposed by the Rockefeller
Commission largely deal with way a ad na'eaes
of improving supervision over CIA activities.
Particularly interesting is the recommenda-
tion that in the future directors of the CIA
-
that this does not necessarily exclude perso
from within the service. But it says "consid
eration should be given to individuals fr
outside the service" and it adds that "manag
ment and administrative skills are at least
important as the technical expertise whi
can always be found in an able deputy."
All CIA directors up to 1956 were recruit
from outside the CIA. They came either fro.
private life (John McCone, Allen Dulles)
from the military services (Gen. Wal
Bedell Smith, Admiral Hilenkotter). In 1
Richard Helms became the first CIA three
promoted from the ranks of the servic
William E. Colby, the present director, is al.
from the career CIA service.
The above should be read against the fa
that the report finds that Presidents Johns
and Nixon used improper pressure on the?C
to do things which it ought not to have don
The implication is that Mr. Helms, a car
service officer, was less able to resist t
pressure than a person from outside
service who because of personal position
personal wealth would have had enoug
"independence" to resist presidential pr
sure.
A A .1-
The Rockefeller Commission consider
but discarded a recommendation to separa
the CIA's open appraisals of information fro
its clandestine overseas' operations. Congr
should consider this idea further. It is difficu
to see how ,Clandestine operations can
conducted from such ?A ":",-sert" buildiag
the palace at Langley. If the covert work we
separated and moved into physical obscurit
the overt and vital work of intelligen
evaluation could go on at Langley with less
improper activities inside AM:44W~ Relt*egfitiCAY68/ WPA-qi30011 4 661 1 2R0
)1 derdo paraphernalia of fenc
Perhaps. But there was no whitewash, and no needs underlining. Tfie repo goes on o say guar s, Aria passes.
21
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CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION
19 MAY 1975
7.1
4_4 el
)
4.
0
"4
- .J1 i4-.411 .1 t:/
1
ttisciosure Drarlir.)ts
.2.. 0
Innrry Van Dye*
ST. LOuta
A dir4l.t.sttre that a Wa.shienton
University oublic re:nip:is man had
been :amyl:U=3 the Ottnial Letel-
ngencee Agency with infer-neat:on oo
*lee foreign travel ?pleces of faculty
members over the past few years
has pr .,ted the university to begin
drafting formal guidelines to govern
itS cone,...e.es with eoverament jowled-
:ors.
The grio'elines, which will be pre-
;axed by a ur_iversity-wide commit-
et-o' that is now being formed, ep-
arently will be one of the first
acknowle.dged attempts by
-v Arnericen university to spell out
early its etc il members' rinlen; and
pom!biit:ee inthis tielelish area.
At issue is .eleether, and nr.der
what eircumsternes, information
sieculd giver. to the whose
-eterest in netiocal eecerity and in-
-motional politics might sometimes
an counter to the rights of individ-
al professors and the desi-e for a
ll'omeete cf tmet among scholars
rom eiff=zent conntriee.
The *:'iashinoton University case
e.s implications for other American
iversities. Many of their imerni-
onally knowa scholars regularly
ttend foreign conferences at which
ev have access to sensitive infor-
nion end ars in contact with sci-
atists, ;lectors, teed scholars from
rnmuais: countries.
The disclosure that prornptcl the
uldeline writing at Washington
rtiversirj involved the activities of
an Gaehler, former director of the
..ews bureau in the university's rr.ed-
1 s-chool. Mr. Gashler, who be-
erne director in 1966, says it
-ented to him from the oeteet to be
rfectly reeeonable to cooperate
1:11 the one...
He understood, he recalls, that
ra.ws bureau hen given
gents access to faculty tavel. plans
or several years before he arrived.
Every year the hterean circulated
memorandum to factity tat=bers
as'..ting them to detail their travel
ptans. presumably for use in pub-
licity releases. Mr. Cashier's under-
standing was that CIA. agents from
the agency's St. Louis off= had
come around resularly and had
been given access to the information
the faculty Members supplied.
Mr. Cashier also was, by tarn-
perament, a good source for the
C.I.A. A politleally conetrvative mart
who .b...ts seen active for raw years
as an ofelen: in the Naval Reserve,
he says he .1-el:eyed it was the duty
cf any petriotic American to beLo
the C.I.A. when he could.
He remembers, for instance, a
lecture at a Navy training session
that made preciaely that point. "It
was pointed out," he says, "that a
lot more communists are involved
in [intelligence work] than our peo-
ple, so the thought occurred to me
that whatever I could do toward
getting us some information woeld
be a.patriotie gesture." ?
BriteFnao Saught
So Mr. Cashier cooperated. Acting
at !east in part on his information,
c.t.A.. agents would telephene pro-
feszors who treveltecl to overseas
conferences and reottest a meeting.
Sometimes the agents would seek
such meetings before the trips so
they could outline v.hat information
they wanted the peolessors to. look
for and identify the foreign scholars
in whom, they were interested. At
?
other times they would esle for a
leriefaeg only after a .peee:eseor e?-
.tterreed Lomee.... ?
.In acy. case, the connection
twv.na the news -.bore-en:se h-treoal
solicit:16ml of travel plans and the
calls from the c.i.A. eventually
prompted eon:tone to bring the mat-
ter* to the attention of William H.
Danforth, then vice-chancellor for
the medical school and new chan-
cellor of the entire university. Mr.
Dar.fortla told Mr.. Cashier to cad
his relationship with the cane, and
the annual solicitation of travel
plans was suspended.
Sensa ol Patriotic Duty
For a while, the Gashier-tter-i.
connection was interrupted. But as
protests against the war in Indo-
china escalated in the late 136C's,
Mr. Cashier's sense of patriotic
duty drew him back into contact
with the agency.
"One thing really sticks in ray
mind," be recalls. n.o.er.c.
building was burned [in 19703, and
the students were: really getthri'g
away with a lot of things I consid-
ered really unpatriotic. I guess the
nest time I got a call from :herr:
[the C.I.A. agents) asking if I could
help, I felt that I. could."
Thus Mr. Cashier's ofice again
became a conduit for information,
although evidently on a less com-
prehensive basis than in the days af
the annual memorandum.
? Late in 1973, however, his activ-
ities again came to the attention of
the medical-school administration,
and he was again told to end his
C.t.A. contacts. Tne oreler came this
time from Saralee! 13. Gum, ee?ho
:end enre-ed .Dani".oreh
vice-char.cellor.
That might have been the quiet
end to the matter. Instead,? the story
turned up last January on the front
page of the Si. Louis Gro?lee-Derno-
eratozbout the time that iaterest in
the eerie's -dcraestic zetivijes had
been. heightened by. laoionurrs in
the. r.etional press.
Faced with the p...n'elleity, the
versini. reeporided .i-Ippeintieg a
committee, of. faculty eteeentems to
invest p-as. Not ban ago com!
eeittee, heeded by John W. Olney,
faculty. issued a short report that
*csica.ly corroborated the f,...cts in.
the newspaper story,
"Faculty members or their car:e-
t:ries assume, end are correct to
assume, that when the news bureau
contact.; theta for faculty informa-
tion. it is the bureau's intent to dis-
seminate that ir,frh-mation for pur-
poses strictly, ber.eflcial to the farl...i-
ty and medical rzhool," the commit-
tee said. "Relaying such information
on to the C.I.A. wouit: cer.ainly
ree. interpreted
some faculty members.
"M.r. Cathie: meicreewledges re-
questing faculty ieformation from
the secretaries of feculty for the
sole purpose of relaying it to the
cetet. . . The commit:: iee.'hoid.s that
the news* bureau has eeiicited
its-
formation under an inappreneelate
guize." ?
?
Guicleilnos *Pnreptersael
The Olney committee also pointed
directly at the broad issues involved:
"To many facylty. C.I.A. interest
in their activities can seriovly com-
promise their standing in their pro-
' fessional cernmunizies, can bring
into question their independence and
bona fides in their contacts with
forei;r: colleagues and ,-an inhibit
titern in the parratii of their legiti-
mate academic iaterests...
;2=2 LISZ such impormnt issues
were involved, the committee said,
clear guidelines for 1-12..11irtz; rela-
tions with.the C.I.A. Soc a r.ecessity.
The committee to develop the guide-
lines :s in the process of being
appointed by Mr. Dar.forth.
Mr. Gas%ler, in the meantime
continuing to serve as directc.-..-
alumni affairs but. h...s Ivett rvd
.
of his th..-! news
1;urreau. The univel-,..ity says his re--
:novel from the nee.; job had t.eer.
plartaded before the or his
ca.), i,:volvicytent- and occurred for
a p.onthiatriet all the me:lit:al-school rsaaas u elo,d to it.
WASHINGTON POST (POTOMAC).
15 JUNE.1975
By Rudy Maxa
* One of the CIA's least favorite former em-
ployes, writer Victor Marchetti, is at his Virginia
home working on a spy novel that is an "interpre-
tive history of the CIA in fictional form, a CIA God-
father." The courts are still considering whether
the CIA can censor all of Marchetti's writing as the
agency did in the case of The CIA and The Cult of
? Intelligence, the best-seller he wrote with John i
Marks.
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WASHINGTON POST
15 June 1975
r:Rowland Evans an iriXe'7;:i rriro;viit
577
ebuke to Harrington
12 after the CIA's activities in Chile
were exposed by The New York Times:
He was called on the carpet by then.
committee chairman, Rep. Edward
Hebert of Louisiana, who suspected
Harrington himself as the leak for The
Times expose.
Denying he was the leak, Harrington
was excused by the Armed Services
s Committee after his Sept. 12 interroga-
tion and the matter appeared closed.
But on May 25, Harrington read former
CIA Latin America chief David A.
Phillips' defense of the agency in a
signed an Sete in the New York Times.
Phillips wrote that it was a "myth"
that the CIA "encouraged the Chilean
plotters who toppled President Salva-
dor Allende-Gessens and funded the
strikeei leading to the coup" against
Marxist Allende.
Angered once again, Harrington
wrote a circular letter to House col-
leagues suggesting that they do what
he did last June: obtain access to Col-
by's still-secret testimony to the Armed
Services C/A oversight committee. He
also asked, for access himself to other
classified committee documents.
That letter triggered the disciplinary
action by the committee. It voted unan-
imously on Tuesday (with 13 of 40
members present) to deny Harrington
access to any more classified material
at least until the House Ethics Corn-
niittee (officially the Committee on
Standards of Official Conduct) exam-
ines the whole question of access to
a committee's secret testimony by non-
committee members?a direct rebuke
? to Harrington.
,e?
' Despite private advice from the
parliamentarian's office that the House
.Ethics Committee lacks jurisdiction in
-a case looking toward a possible re-
'bnke of Massachusetts Rep. Michael
Harrington, a liberal Democrat who
has led attacks on the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, the Ethics Committee
expected to meet next week to cons
.aider the case.
.- The move against Harrington, an out-
spoken CIA critic particularly in the
;Chile affair, has been hatching for
almost a year, the result of smoldering
:resentment over what some Armed
Services Committee members say psi-
.
vately was Harrington's violation of a
-signed secrecy pledge.
e-? -Harrington signed the pledge on
-June 4, 1974, as a condition for obtain-
'Ing access to secret testimony given ?
to the Armed Services subcommittee
on CIA oversight by CIA director
William Colby on the agency's activi-
ties in domestic Chilean politics be-
fore and during the Allende regime.
? The secrecy pledge signed by Har-
rington was as follows: "The contents
of such classified information (Colby's
testimony) will not be divulged to any
unauthoriged person in any way, form,
'shape or manner."
., Angered over what he regarded as
'eongressional apathy in the CIA-Chile
, %affair, Harrington subsequently in-
:formed the chairman of the Senate
rorcign Relations arid House Foreign
? Affairs Committees, as well as other
congressmen, members of his own
staff and one highly reputable report-
!en that Colby's teStimony contained
'political dynamite. The general trust
of Colby's testimony was given by Har-
rington at least to the two committee
, chairmen, and possibly others.
. Harrington admitted as much to the
Armed Services Committee last Sept.
THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE
21 JUNE 1975
President Ford's as-yet unannounced
presidential campaign committee in
the home state of former Gov. Ronald
Reagan will include at least two of
Reagan's long-time aides and political
Mr. Nedzi unresigned
The House of Representatives has.
overwhelmingly rejected the resigna-
tion of Chairman Lucien N. Nedzi of
the Select Committee on Intelligence
Activities, and ' whatever its motives
its decision was a wise one.
The select committee was appointed
by Speaker Albert,in February, mainly
to investigate charges against the CIA.
It consists 'of three Republicans and
seven Democrats, S01116 of whom---not-
ably Michael Harrington of Massachu-
setts and Ronald Dellurns of California
?are inveterate liberals and bitter
critics of the CIA.
When it was. learned earlier this
rrionth that as chairman of an Armed
Forces subcommittee Mr. Nedzi had
been briefed by the CIA on some of '
14e very activities to be investigated,
I 1 se the seect committee Is
D etnoc
ra
demanded his resignation. He appeased
them by agreeing to turn the CIA in-
vestigetion over to a su tta
hcommi e.
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which he would noti be a member. But
In the interest of objectivity he also re-
fused to name Messrs. Harrington and
Deilums to the subcommitte, which so
inflamed them that the compromise fell
apart and Mr:. Nedzi submitted his
resigna tion.
Anti;CIA elements whipped up senti-
ment in favor of accepting Mr. Nedzi's.
resignation, pointing out that it would
be almost unprecedented to reject it
(but neglecting to say that it would be
just as unusual to accept the resigna-
tion of a committee chairman over in-
ternal commmittee bickering].
Fortunately the House rejected the
resignation on Monday by the sur-
prising vote of 290 to 64. A majority
of both parties supported the phairraan...
For the most part, the vote was taxen
advisers, including state Republican
Chairman Paul Haerle.
Hearle and state Attorney General
Evelio Younger, the state's top Re-
publican officeholder, will be co-chair-
men of the Ford campaign committee,
with Anita Wentner Asheraft, vice
chairman of Reagan's 1970 re-election
finance comma' tee, to take over as
active head of the Ford California
campaign later this year.
For Mr. Ford, the quiet acquisition
of Haerle and Anita Ashcraft is a
major coup, establishing his political
clout and proving that Reagan, a pcs-
sible contender against the President
for the 1976 nomination, does not own
his own state.
Haerle was an all-out conservative
backer of Sen. Barry Goldwater's pres-
idental nomination in 1.9(54. Northern
California chairman for Reagan's first
gubernatorial campaign in 1960, Haerle
became hie personal appointments sec-
retary for the next three years. More
recently, Haerle has been out of tho
inner Reagan circle?but all his past
Republican credentials are with the
former governor. ?
With David Packard, board chairman
of Hewlitt-Packard, as national finance
chairman for the Ford campaign,
White House operatives feel the Presi-
dent has made more solid progress In
California than any other state. Top
r0Ordinatnr fnr the cast- is Mr. Ford's
close personal friend, Leon Parma,
ivice president of an Diego-based
Teledyne Corp. and one-time adminis-
trative assistant of conservative Rep.
Bob Wilson of California.
A footnote: Haerle has been criti-
cized for his imminent move to the
Ford camp on grounds that the Repub-
lican state chairman should be neutral.
But Haerle won't change his mind,
A 1975. Meld Enterprisers. Ina
as a demonstration of confidence in Mr.
Nedzi personally and in committee
chairmen in general. But to some de-
gree it also reflected a feeling that
the investigation of the CIA should not
be turned over to a bloodthirsty clique
whose clear purpose is to emasculate it.
In either event, we're better off as
a result Either the select committee will
be immoblized or more likely it will be
abolished and the investigation turned
over to a more objective group.
An investigation is needed, and very
likely there should be some congres-
sional action along the lines recom-
mended by the Rockefeller Commis-
sion. We're enW.lez.1 to some assurance
that the CIA will never again venture
as far beyond its authority as it did in
the decade before 1973. But the Iasi
thing we need is a destructive witch
hunt carried out by fanatics and based
on excesses which almost certainly no
longer exist.
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WASHINGTON. STAR
17 June 1975
House Has a Cloak
for CIA's Dagger
?
' In the morning, Rep. Michael Har-
rington, D-Mass., was cashiered, 1S-
13, by the House Armed Services
Committee amid high talk of treason,:
anarchy and the decline of the West.
? In the afternoon, Rep. Lucien
Nedzi, D-Mich., by a vote of 290 to 64,
was handed back his crown as chair--
man cf the Select Committee on Intel-1.
ligence Activities to a chorus of "For
he's a jolly good fellow."
? It seemed an appropriate double.
'observance on the eve of the third
anniversary of the Watergate break-,
in, which precipitated the country's ,
greatest cover-up to date, and it put
the House of Representatives on,
record as being a safe house for the :
CIA.? ?
Nothing the agency did, the House
was saying, was so reprehensible as .
talking about it.
HARRINGTON'S crime was that./
he tried to bring to the attention of
Congress allegations from CIA Direc-
tor William E. Colby that the CIA
spent $8 million dollars bribing Chi-
lean officeholders, and labor officials'
and in creating economic chaos for..
the Marxist government of Salvador:.
Allende. .
Nedzi knew all about this and moni"
? but he understood that the House
didn't want to know, and so he never
? told. He also found out about murder,
but he kept that under his hat, too.
He offered to resign in the face of out-:
rage from several members of his4
WASHINGTON POST
19 June 1975
VI.
Foreign Policy
Faults Control's
'committee,,' but the }toys e 'Wouldn't-1
have it. Nedzi is perhaps the chicken
in the chicken coop, but the House
.wants it that way.
The members have heard just;
)enough about poisoned cigars (for
Castro), a poisoned ring (for De;
Gaulle) to realize that they do not
want to bite into the poisoned apple
of more information. If they do they
might have to do something about it.
Besides they want to teach their
dissidents and upstarts a lesson. It is
the revenge of the Cavemen.
Harrington, yellow-haired and
pumpkin-faced, has an "up-the-
rebels" air that enrages them. Be-
cause he did laugh at the classifica-
tion system, and did talk about ne-
?
-
MaatonallSerwEINIZrz=21
Poime off View
-,1:5621sessoaan61111
farious deeds to unauthorized periorts,
he offers the perfect battering-ram for
the demolition of the Select Com-,
.rnittee. '
IF HE CAN BE denied access to
classified -information, he obviously,
will be disqualified for service on the
CIA panel, and the group can be
solved without further fuss.
Dangerous people like Rep. Jarnes
Stanton, D-Ohio, who marked his
;deabtless fleeting chairmanship of the
special subcommittee by announcirm
that he knew of successful assassina-
tions, can be evicted from the.
premises, and the inquiry can be
turned over to "national security"
freaks, who can be trusted to endorse
the "no name, no blame" report of the
Rockefeller Commission.
7 Everybbdy will be happy, except
those souls in the country who object
to political assassination in peace-
time and who would rather know if
it's been tried1 even if it turns out to
be at the direction of John F. Kenne-
dy, and his brother Robert.
'Vice President Nelson A. RockefelT
Associated Press
.i.'A presidential-Congressional' 1port says.
commission studying U.S. for. , ' The current process for Bp-
; ;proval of covert actions in-
eign policy says in a draft re- i volves the submission of pro.
port there Is inadequate eon. Iposals to the so-called "40
Vol over covert operations 'Committee" beaded by Henry
launched by the Central In-, A. Kissinger in his post as the
telligenee Ogency :against fr.c.' President's national security :
eign countries. : . ... ',: -adviser. .
. In recent years, the .pro, ,
, 1 The draft report sa,,,S that
--14,-.'d"rPs for - airrovin::', cc'Yert? 1.,-,!_atise 'of Kissinger's other,
operations "have become quite! -duties as secretary of state, ;
informal" and at titres the 1 ',the 40 Committee "has rarely:
'President has or de red the l met" and consultation is fre-
'normal review pro e es s by- I quently done o v e r the tele-
passed altogether, a draft of phore
the, AlurphY C9111111issicHAISfi 6 vett FliSrffe &a iV-12e0 Veleri0 8
ler has stepped forward' as the hie':
;nan against the Kennedys. He said'
On "Meet the Press" that the "White
'House knew" about such activities."
He was preceded, of course, by for-
mer CIA Director John McCone, who
went before the cameras and invited
the country to believe that an at-
tempt had been made on Fidel Castro
in the Kennedy years and even trans-
posed the date of the installation of
missiles -on the sacred soil of Cuba",
to make the point. .
, ADAM WALINSKY, former aide to
Robert Kennedy, told of a CIA-Mafia
collaboration on Castro which was
foiled by Robert Kennedy; Some
Democrats are nervous, however,
that the Kennedys may have had a
hand in doing in Ngo Dinh Diem of.
South Vietnam.
But the evidence against that is
that Richard Nixon illicitly re-
quested all CIA files on Vietnam and
?found so little dirt that Charles W.
:Colson had to call in E. Howard Hunt
:to fabricate the "smoking pistol".
cable implicating the Kennedys. ?
But the peoples' representatives
'cannot be expected to assume the
'burden of these troublesome and
, squalid matters. They are not self-
conscious on such occasions, as wit-
ness their 10-year flight from the
Vietnam War'
. The Republicans are showing Ger-
aid Ford they understand his tender-'
-I-IC=3S fc.;r thc The, 'cmccrats protecting can
,claim that they are the
Kennedys and sparing the country
much woe. '
The tides of freedom and openness4
that ran strong in the House for three
giddy months early this year have
been turned back. F. Edward Hebert,
deposed as Armed Services chairman
by the freshmen, resumed his old seat
for the Harrington auto-da-fe.
The House ahd the CIA now are,
working hand in glove. CIA has the
.',dagger; the House is providing the
cloak: -
IniSsion executive 'director,
:acknowledged the existence
'of. the draft report but said
has been changed and prob-
ably will be changed again"
.by commission members who
include Vice President Rock-
efeller.
The draft version ? tecom-
fliends that the President's na-
tional, security adviser be
prevented from holding'
-other
-other Cabinet position. It also ?
recommends that all covert
activities be made known to
Congress but says the Presi-
dent should not have to .give
his personal' endorsement of
such operations in order to
avoid harmful effects, ,
Headed by retired Ambassa-
dor Robert Murphy of New
York, the 12-member Commis-
sion for Reorganization of the
Covermnent's Foreign Policy
was created in 1972 by Presi-
dent Nixon and Congress. The
commission is scheduled to
hAi4R01371X-0 043 woppl
?
NEW YORK TIMES
14 June 1975
A highly .placed Iranian,
moved by the latest news
about operations of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, told
,a story this week to an
American correspondent.
When Richard M. Helms,
former head of the CIA!,
was named Ambassador to
,Iran in . 1973, ViaclUnLr Y.
Yerofeyev, the Soviet Ambas-
sador, went to the Iranian
Premier,' Amir Abbas Hoy-
eyda, and inquired sneering-
ly, "Why did the Americans
send their No.. I spy as Am-
bassador to Iran?"- Itemier
Hoveyda looked the Soviet
Ambassador up and down
and, replied, "The :-nztkcans'
are our friends ? at4least,
they don't send us their No.
10 spy.'!,-
*
00370007-0
24
NEW REPUBLIC
28 June 1975
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0 ?
Playing Fast and Loose With Truth
Led Astra
by Morton H Halperin
One technique of the Central Intelligence Agency,
discussed only in passing in the Rockefeller Commis-
sion report released two weeks ago, is dis-information. As
Philip Agee discusses in his book Inside the Company, the
agency has expensive facilities for producing fake
documents and other means for misleading foreigners.
As with other CIA methods, dis-information has been
turned against the American people. The clearest and
most important domestic dis-in forma tion project of the
agency Was the effort, still going on, to discredit the
Seymour Hersh story on the CIA's "massive, illegal
domestic intelligence operations" and to conceal the
scope of CIA domestic activities.
From 1953, when a program to open first-class mail
began, CIA officials had no doubt that they were
engaging in illegal activities. By May of 1973, if not long
before, they knew that they had engaged in extensive
violations of the legislated mandate to avoid internal
security matters. Yet every effort was made to conceal
this knowledge.
In May 1973 jarnes Schlesinger, then director of
Central Intelligence (DCI) and now f.::.cretary of
Derpn,:r., C Prj pracr.rit anri frIrrnor emplr,veoc of the
CIA to bring to his attention any activities that they
believed to be illegal or in violation of the CIA charter.
This memorandum produced some hundreds of
responses and an inspector general's report laying out
many, but apparently not all, of the activities described
in the report of the presidential commission.
Schlesinger's response was to order an end to some of
the activities. He made no report to the oversight
committees of the Congress or to the public. Soon
thereafter he or his successor, William Colby, reduced
the inspector general's staff and ordered him not to
conduct any investigations of agency operations.
As the full extent of the Nixon adrninistration's
paranoia about domestic dissidents became public,
questions began to be raised in the Congress about
whether the CIA had been drawn into any ,of these
activities. It had, of course, in the -massive way
discussed below, but CIA officials at first saw no need
to inform Congress at all. Richard Helms, Schlesinger's
predecessor as director of Central Intelligence, and.a
man ubiquitous in the Rockefeller Commission's
account of CIA misdeeds, was probed on the question
by Sen. Clifford Case. Helms had been nominated to be
ambassador to Iran and the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee took the opportunity to ask him about reports of
CIA domestic activities. In light of the Rockefeller
.Commission's descriptionof operation CHAOS, direct-
ed at domestic dissidents, and Helms' role in it, one has
difficulty deciding which is .inc.-)re astonishing?his
answer or that Helms remains ambassador to Iran.
Here is the text.:
Senator Case: If has been called to my attention that in
1969 or 1970 the WikprikikiedsiR'deiRegliS02,061108108 : OPAIRi3R774)3242R1101340037NRicti..,enee operation"
by the CIA
agencies pin in the effort to learn as n: tick as they could-about
the antiwiir 'movement, and during this period US Army
Intelligenee became involved and kepi files on US citizens.
Do you brow anything about any activity on the part of the
CIA in .that connection? Was it asked to be invc-!ved?
Mr. Helms : I don't recall whether we were as;:ed, but we
were not involved because it seemed to me that was a clear
violation ofWhat our charter was.
Senator Case. IV:rit do you do in a case like that?
Mr. Heins. I would iimply go to explain to thc President
this didn't seen: to me to be advisable.
The Rockefeller Commission apparently considered
deception of the American public and possible perjury
as .beyond the scope of its inquiry into CIA domestic
. activities. Thus it neither reports nor comments cm this
testimony. Statements of current Director William
Colby are treated, in the i same way. One needs,
therefore, to refer to the published hearings of the
Senate Armed Services Committee preceding Colby's
confirmation. to learn that he saw no reason to report to
that committee, even in closed session, on the results of
the investigation launched just a few months before as
a result of the Schlesinger memorandum. Indeed, in
July 1973, Mr. Colby had this exchange with Sen.
Senator Symington. As I understand it, you do not
intend to participate in any way in any domestic intelligence.
Mr. Colby: I do not, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Symington. Would this prevent you front
helping to make policy regarding the collection-of inielligence
on domestic groups?
Mr. Colby. I believe it would; yes, Mr. Chairman. I--do
no! see thofas within my responsibilities at all.
Senator Symington. Would the 1947 act prohibit the
OA from collecting, or providing the support necessary for
collecting, intelligence within the US on domestic groups?
Mr_ Colby. I believe that is the same question,
essentially.
Senator Symington. Yes.?
Mr. Colby. And it would prohibit me fro:n doing.that.
Sometime after, Mr. Colby. decided to give the sub-
committee to which he 'reports some account of the
illegal and inappropriate activities uncovered in the
. Schlesinger investigation. This testimony, which has
still not been made public, produced no congressional
action. In desperation one or more middle level officials
. of the CIA gave Hersh the bare outlines of the story.
Before publishing his article, Hersh, faithful to New
York Time; tradition, conferred with Colby. The DO, by
his account, attempted to convince Hersh, and no doubt.
, Times executives, that the stcfry was 'fundamentally
wrong and misleading. The Times was in this caSe not
persuaded and on December 22, .1974 published
Hersh's account under A four column headline reading
"Huge CIA Operation Reported in US Against Antiwar
Forces, Other Dissidents in Nixon Years." The opening
sentence reported that the CIA had conducted a
25
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0
against the antiwar movement and other dissidents.
?That phrase?"massive illegal domestic" was to
become the focus of a massive illegal domestic CIA
campaign to discredit the Hersh story. As will be
shown, every fact save one in the Times story is
confirmed by the commission.
The agency pulled out all the stops in the effort to
divert attention from its activities to a discussion of
how Sy and the Times could have gone so wrong;
suggestions were put about that both were eager for a
Pulitzer Prize to get even for The Washington Post's
Watergate coverage; hence the need to rush into print
before the end of the year. Reporters with little or no
prodding came to talk of Sy's carelessness and bias.
Although neither Hersh nor anyone else could get
additional detail or further confirmation of the story, it
would not die and Colby was forced to confront the
Congress. He picked his target carefully, a closed
session of the ultra-friendly subcommittee of the
Senate Appropriations Committee. His opening state-
ment was released to the press and billed as a complete
description of the agency's domestic activities. This
January 15, 1975, statement has to be read carefully,
along with a correction sheet issued quietly a month
later, and compared to the Rockefeller Commission
report in order to appreciate the subtleties of dis-
information as practiced by the company.
The DCI in this statement denies the Hersh story
fully and frontally. A month later testifying before the
House Appropriations Committee he characterized his
earlier testimony as a flat denial of the Times allegations,
stating that "this operation was neither massive, illegal,
nor domestic, as alleged." The operation he was
referring to was CHAOS. That is as good a place as any
to begin a comparison of the Hersh story,,the Colby
statement, and the report of the commission appointed
by President Ford. In the process we can review the
facts brought about by the official panel while
examining the agency dis-information campaign. We
will then be in a position to consider the tone of the
Rockefeller report and its recommendations.
peration Chaos. As Hersh acknowledges, he was not
able to get many details about the special unit set up to
investigate domestic dissidents. Even its "Get Smart"
name had not been revealed to him.
These are the facts he reported:
O Files were compiled on 10,000 American citizens.
O Specific individuals were targeted, including one
antiwar member of Congress.
? Information on the targeted individuals was collect-
ed from a variety of sources including informants who
penetrated antiwar groups. .
O There were names of others in the files, including
other members of Congress.
5 The activities were conducted by a special Unit,
reporting directly to DCI, set up initially to look for
evidence of .foreign involvement in the -antiwar
movement but growing into a domestic intelligence
op' r. IOU .
t> The group produced a
antiwar movement, one of
Kissinger.
While claiming to deny the entire story as it related to
the special unit, Colby in his sta ternen t con fi rinecl.rna n y
of the facts. However he carefully lAft the in-lose-do creafed sonic 7000 ietei fn American citizens
that the unit neverALIIMMdbFe9t501PRE"A ssio/i9 t.CY8 : CAIRRIV07N4-MOR:
,drga/,',Oz.
its. The computer
series of reports on the
which was sent to Henry
exploring the links domestic dissidents might have had
to foreign grot.ips.? .
Colby conc'eded. that there were files on 10,000
Americans. He acirnitted that agents had infiltrated the
'antiwar movernerit as part of operation CHAOS. He
said that the) had limited to gathering informa-
:tion abroad, although he admitted that some reports
were submitted On the activities of American dissi-
dents. He denied:that surveillance had been conducted
on antiwar Congressmen and, after an initial denial,
'confirmed that there were files on four members of
,Congress. In five.pages of testimony, Colby failed to
. touch on the other specific facts in the Hersh story.
!The basic ployWas to divert attention away from the
'details,of what the special unit had done and focus it
instead on the disputed accuracy of the Times story.
Until the Rockefeller report was published, this ploy
had largely succeeded. The Times had pulled Hersh off
the investigation claiming that he was part of the story
and could not cover it objectively. Many reporters and
observers were convinced that there had in fact been no
massive effort and nothing very illegal, only as Colby had
put it, a few occasional missteps brought about by
intense presidential pressure.
. The writers of the Rockefeller report were well
'aware of the controversy over "massive illegal domes-
tic" and they were not about to explicitly confirm the
characterization that had been made the touchstone of
the accuracy of the. Times story. However they leave the
reader in little doubt. The operation, the eight
conservative commissioners concluded, "unlawfully
exceeded the CIA's statutory authority." Sc much for
-illegal." As to "domestic," they write unanimously that
the operation became a "repository for large quantities
of information on the domestic activities of American
citizens" and that "much .of the information was not
directly related to the question of the existence of
foreign connections with domestic dissidence."
Notice the use of the adjective "large." The commis-
sion staff must have wan ted to avoid "massive.- Earlier,
they had referred to a "veritable mountain of material,"
and a paragraph summing up the activities of this unit,
which at its peak had more than 50 employees, reads as.
follows: ;
By August 1973, when the foregoing Colby memoran-
dum was written, the paper trail left by Operation CHAOS
included somewhere in the area of 13,000 files on subjects
and individual.; (including approximately 7,200 personality
or files); orer 71.000 men:ay-an:1.a. re;-ort5 and ILIteri;
Iron the t-"SI: oL'er the FBI; l
almost 3,500 memoranda for internal use by the operation.
In addition, the CHAOS group hact generated, or caused the
generation of, over 12,000 cables of various types, as well as:
a handful of memoranda to high-level government officials.
On lop of this veritable mountain of material was a
computer system containing an index cliver 300,000 names.;
and organizations which, with few exceptions, were of United
Shitfs titizens and otganizntions apparently ant ant:tried
f?wit.I.: espionage.
13y any standard other than-that of directors of the
this. was :a ?1112.SSIVe 017141-+Ati011:
The commission, in the process of describing and
deploring the CHAOS operation, confirms all the
Harsh fact::: with one possible exception. There were-
26
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0'
system of CHAOS had indexed some 300,000 names of
citizens and domestic organizations. Specific individu-
als, those with -201 files," were the targets of
information gathering from many sources including
the penetration of antiwar groups. While the commis-
sion found no evidence that a congressman was
specifically targeted, the "inaccuracy" in the Hersh
story is simple to explain. An agent of the CHAOS
operation "became involved as an adviser in a United
States congressional campaign and, for a limited period,
furnished reports to CHAOS of behind-the-scenes
activities inthe campaign." The activities were,. as
Hersh reported, conducted by a special 'unit reporting
directly to the DCI. This unit Was, as he explained,
originally set up to gather evidence of foreign
connections and grew into a domestic intelligence
operation. Finally, a series of reports was produced and
at least one forwarded to Kissinger.
In describing these reports, the commission blows
the agency cover that, as Colby put it, this was a
"counterintelligence operation directed at possible
? foreign links to American dissidents," and that it was a
proper activity observing the limits on CIA domestic
activity.
The commission report describes some eight studies
prepared by the CIA on the antiwar movement in the.
United States in the period between November 1967
and January 1971 and forwarded outside the agency.
These studies reached the same conclusion: there was
no evidence that foreign governments or agencies
? controlled or directed domestic dissident movements or
provided financial assistance to them. The agency
didn't have any doubt about this, nor does the
commission report on any evidence to the contialy.
If the agency knew that its efforts were not directed
at studying what it kneia, to be a nonexistent
connection, neither did it have any doubts about the
impropriety of what it was doing. In sending one study,
"Restless Youth," to Walt Rostow in the Johnson White
House, Helms wrote that "You will, of course, be aware
of the peculiar sensitiVity which attaches to the fact
that CIA has prepared .a report on student activities
both here and abroad.' In forwarding a second copy of
the report to Henry Kissinger in February of 1969,
Helms was even more explicit:
lit an effort to r,12o:d-out our discaion of this subject: i.ve
;nwe included a :?ecm on A mcrican 51ndents. This iz:an area
not within the if b.:r ThAgettry, so not emphasize
t. remely tl:is mal..es the paper. Shaul,'
'earn of its exist, P:ce? it would proc.? ina:g embarraS5itiS. . . .
In addition to confirming all of the facts. of the Hersh
story regarding the CHAOS unit, the presidential
commission provided considerably more detail of its
operations. Several items are worthy of note in light of
the CIA effort to paint the unit's activities as proper.
On three occasions, the commission notes, ac.:?nts
who had infiltrated the antiwar movement were sent
on specific assignments wholly concerned with domes-
tic activities. One of these assignments yielded 47
separate disseminations to the FBI with such titles as
"Plans for Future Anti-War Activities on the West
Coast." As the commissionexplains, the bulk of these
'reiated soleVio aomestic activities.
_ .
Another agent reported on the high-level leadership'
activities of a?clissident group, and a third infiltrated the
group planning May Day demonstrations.
'Approved For Release 20011cwo
aa. he CHAOS unit had a watch list of some 1000
organizations and thousands of individuals. Forty-one
names from this list were sent to the unit opening mail
in New York; it sent back a two-file-drawer load of
material obtained from the illegal opening of mail.
Names from the list were also supplied to tl?n
National Security Agency, identified .by the commis-
sion delicately only as "another agency." NSA rnoni-
toted the overseas phone calls of those on the list, in
.violation of their Fourth Amendment rights, and
provided some 1100 pages to the CHAOS -unit.
Other. Domestic Surveillance Programs. Thus far I have
discussed all of the facts in the original Hersh story
related to surveillance of domestic dissidents except
.one. This is the assertion that CIA agents followed and
photographed participants in antiwar demonstrations_
Not so, said Mr. Colby in his January statement to the
Congress. He went on to detail several instances of
surveillance of American citizens but said that they
related to leaks of information or assassination plots.
According to the Rockefeller Commission report that
statement to the Senate committee was simply false.
Participants in antiwar rallies were followed by CIA
agents as part of a totally different program that is not
mentioned at all in the original Hersh story.
Colby touched briefly on these activities in his
statement, telling the Senate committee that beginning
in 1967 the CIA office of security, acting out of fear of
the safety of its installations in the Washington area,
has inserted 10 agents into dissident organizations to
;.-Ither information "relating to plans for dernor.stra-
t;:r.,n:.:, Or IOCCI1r.:-.1715."
The presidential commission tells a different story
The program, which ran froin February 1967 to
December 1968, involved many different agents,
although no more than 12 at any one time. These
agents penetrated a number of different organizations
including the Women's Strike for Peace, the Student
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, the National
Mobilization Committee to End the War, and the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference. The
infiltrators sought to learn whatever they could about
the organizations, including their domestic sources of
funds and the names of those who attended meetings.
To learn their identities, some of the participants in
these meetings were followed home. In the words of
the report, "the Agency's .infiltration of dissident
groups in the Washington area went far beyond steps
necessary to protect the Agency's own facilities,
personnel and operations."
The DCI made no mention in his.statement. to the
congressional committees of yet a third CIA operation
directed at domestic dissidents. This entirely separate
project, run by the Office of Security, maintained more
than 5000 files on dissident organizations and individu-
als including some 12,000 names, and published weekly
from 1968 to 1972 "Situation Information Reports"
dealing with dissident activity in the US.
titer illegal activities. The Hersh story reported that in
addition to the activities directed at domestic dissidents,
the CIA had also engaged in dozens of other illegal
activities, including "break-ins, wiretapping, and the
surreptitious opening of mail." These, Hersh reported,
were a "different category of domestic activities carried
8 (;) telAsRDPV7430.32ROM100-878QCVA spec t ed foreign
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0
intelligence." These facts too were fully confirmed in
the Rockefeller report. The commission provided the.
details Hersh could not get and it yields insight into the
agency's view of its relation to the laws of the land.
The commission report devotes considerable atten-
tion to the agency's programs to open first-class mail.
These operations, running from 1953 to 1973, were the
largest, clearly illegal and unconstitutional programs
discovered by the commission. Colby in his statement
to the Senate committee dealt with these allegations in
deadpan fashion in .a single page. He asserted that the
primary purpose was to identify individuals in active
correspondence with Cornmunist countries for "coun-
terintelligence purposes, the results being shared with
the FBI.? That sentence would not enable one to infer
that the CIA did not even inform the FBI that it was
operating the program. It was only when the bureau
approached .the postal authorities to propose a similar
scheme of mail covers that the agency told the bureau
what it was.up to and agreed to share the fruits.
Colby's .statement does not acknowledge that the
roerarn was ille;a1 end smconstitut it is
from the commission report that Ive learn that the
agency was aware from the beginning that the
operation was illegal and that CIA officials, including
Richard Helms, deliberately deceived postal authorities
into thinking that the operation was limited to mail
covers, Le., to the copying of information off envelopes.
The details .of how the agency deceived postal
-authorities provides an interesting study of CIA dis-
information techniques as applied to other government
agencies. The discussion of."crwer stories" to use with
the public should the operations' existence leak.
provides evidence of the conscious nature of the CIA's
use of false information to mislead the public.
A 'careful reading of the Colby statement gives no
hint as to the scope or dimensions of the program. The
DCI lists each of the operations reported by the
commission with the significant exception of 12
separate operations to open the mail of American
citizens who had no connection with the agency. But
there is no suggestion of the magnitude revealed by the
commission report:
Seiti.;!iCs g;% by the CIA show that in the last full year
of its operation, the New York mail intercept handled
approximItely 4,350,000 items of mail and examined the
outside c,:er 2,300,000 of those items. Photographs were
taken of the exteriors of approximately 33,000 items. Some
8,700 items were opened and the contents analyze.d.
Selections for opening were made on the basis.of a watch list
given to the crew and upon various other intelligence factors.
During the last year, approximately 5,000 of the selections
were m.7.ie on the basis of the watch list.
In the l:ist year, the program made over 3,800 separate
disserni!!ati,,ns of information deriped from the project within
the Agencv and sent some 1,400 separate items of
.inform:7tion to the FBI. At the end of 1972, the active watch
list of ncores totaled approximately 600. The number of
nam es :cat: varied from month to month as they were
supplied by CIA components and the FBI.
Although only mail ioming into the United Slates was
intercepted inlhe early yeiirs of I he proient, both outgoing and
incoming mail were involved during most of the project's
operation. CIA personnel estimate that, overall, approxi-
mately 30 percent of the mail intercepted was outgoing.
The project nol only disseminatedjurrengn formally Iot t
r elease 0 18/08
provided file data backegaPrPY.f., FP-arlomparrtn n?t d /0
,
28
computerized machine record system containing almost
2.000.000 entries. Institutional and organizational files
were also maintained for reference and analytical purposes.
One minor CIA ploy not cleared up by the commis-
sion report concerns the opening of mail to and from
non-Communist countries. The original Colby state-
ment talked of opening mail to and front "two
Communist countries." In a correction sheet released a
month later that phrase was changed to "countries,
mostly Communist." The commission does not com-
ment on change (as noted it refers not at all to these
Coiby -,t.i.e.-n.ent-;) and seetns to suggest that only nail
to and prom Communist states was opened. Colby told
the Senate that the last of the ,mail surveillance
program ended in 1973. He neglected to mention that
this was only.because a postal inspector, who had been a
CIA official, ordered the agency to end the program_
The Rockefeller Commission report deals with the
charges of illegal wiretaps and burglaries in a single
section in which it discusses agency "special coverage"
of American citizens. As usual we find Colby with his
numbers too low and with no hint of illegality_ The
DCI's statement reports four break-ins; the commis-
sion found 12. Colby admits to 27 wiretaps; the
, commission found 32 and 32 bugs in addition. It also
found J. illegal examinations of tax returns ancithe 12
individual mail openings described above. The commis-
sion reports more than 100 cases of "special coverage"
involving one or more of these techniques.
Despite the alleged comprehensive nature of his
description of CIA domestic activities, Colby did not
report on other illegal or unauthorized activities noted
by the commission in its report. Among these are:
O giving LSD to unsuspecting Americans, one of
whom killed himself as a result
O holding a defector in solitary confinement in the
United States for three years
0 aiding the Bureau of Narcotics in violation of the
CIA charter
e giving gratuities to local police forces
e securing telephone records for the National Security
Agency.
,In many of these and other cases the Commission
reaches the conclusion that the agency clearly violated
its charter, the laws of the land, and the Constitution.
^ he Report. When the Rockefeller panel was appointed
by the President, many critics predicted that this panel
:of eight establishment figures, including, besides the
Vice President, Ronald Reagan, Lyman Lemnitzer and
C. Douglas Dillon, would produce a whitewash. First
, reactions to the report reflected pleasant surprise.at the
detail provided. However a closer look makes plain why
the commission reveals what it did. The tone and
recommendations of the report reveal the next line of
defense to which supporters of the CIA are retreating.
Early in its deliberations the Rockefeller Commission
must have become aware of the Schlesinger study and
? the inspector general's report covering most, if not all,.
of the episodes in the commission report.. The
.commission members knew that the Church commit-
tee investigating this matter for the Senat:, had this
material and would eventually make it public. To fail to
provide the information ,now would be to discredit the
entire commission and its recommendations when the
SCIIALREWThile2itmonitosylc**oba te on what to
do got underway. A report issued nowwithout detailed
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-6
facts wouid have been branded as a whitewash.
The candid tone of the report has earned it a
respectful hearing. Many editorial writers and com-
mentators have adopted the tone and approach of the
report. The abuses are to be deplored but we need a
secret intelligence agency to counter the Communists.
The commission's style is reflected in the second
chapter of the report titled the "Need for Intelligence,"
which notes that the "United States remains the
.e..
principal intelligence target of the Communist bloc."
The chapter closes with this curious sentence:
Americans halie a right to be uneasy if not seriously disturbed
at the real possibility that their personal and business
activities which they discuss freely over the telephone could be
recorded and analyzed by agents of foreign powers.
One would suppose that this is intended in some %Ar ay to
justify the same intrusions on our privacy by the CIA.
Having set the tone in the, opening section, the
.commission remains consistent. Flagrant abuses of the
Constitution are described with no sense of outrage.
Agency explanations of the need to take the illegal
actions in order to perform its assigned missions are
accepted in general without question. The commission
members evidently believe that the agency has the
right to investigate what it calls "dissident" organiza-
tions and individuals even if they have broken no laws
and show every intention of remaining law abiding.
The commission knows a "dissident" when it sees one.
Thus it reports without comment that such peaceful
and nonviolent groups as the Women's Strike for Peace
and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference,
among others, are dissident groups but reports that a
few non-dissidents such as Father Hesburgh somehow
crept into the files.
When it turns to recommendations, the commission
lays out the approach likely to be adopted by the Ford
administration, the agency and its supporters. First the
report notes that many of the activities discussed in the
report were terminated in 1973. It presents a total of 29
recommendations of various kinds. On the whole they
add up to saying that the President and the. director
should issue instructions that the agency roust obey the
law. Various internal monitoring mechanisms are to be
'beefed up and a joint congressional oversight commit-
tee is to be created. The budget of the agency might, the
commission suggests, be made public at least in part and
other material should be declassified. At the same time
the commission endorses a law making it a crime for
present or former employees to divulge classified
information learned in the course of their employment.
The commission doesn't even comment on the fact that
such a law would have made criminal the.leaks that
forced the information in the report to surface.
Most important, are the commission's recommenda-
tions on what domestic security functions the agency
should have. The basic commission approach is to avoid
the problem of the agency violating its charter in the
future by authorizing it to do the things it has done in
the past in violation of its charter. lithe recommenda-
tions of the commission ere accepted, the .--,gcncy
would be able to resume most .of the . progiattri4 it
terminate.d.in 1973 subject only to whatever deference
it chooses to give to the Constitution' and the general
laws of the land.
These startling suggestions are stated so matter of
factly as recommendations (1) and (2) that they have
occasioned little comment. In recommendation (1), the
commission proposes that the agency be permitted to
approach willing sources in the United States openly ?
and be prohibited from efforts directed at unknowing
American citizens. It would thereby sanction covert
operations aimed at gathering intelligence from
foreigners in the United States. Then, in recommenda-
tion (2), the commission would authorize the agency to
engage in collection of information about American
citizens in the following circumstances:
a/ Persons presently or formerly affiliated, or being
considered for affiliation, with the CIA, directly or
indirectly, or others who require clearance by Me CIA to
receive classified information;
b) Persons or activities that pose a clear threat to CIA
facilities or personnel, provided that proper coordination with
the FBI is accomplished:
cl Persons suspected of espionage or other illegal octioities
relating to foreign intelligence, provided that proper
coordination with the FBI is accomplished_
Thus, the agency would have authority for most of
its domestic programs. These proposals would, of
course, give the agency the domestic police and internal
security functions that Congress explicitly denied to
the CIA when it set up the agency in 1947. It would
ignore the warnings issued then about the dangers of a
super secret agency coming to operate at home and
infringe on the liberties of American citizens. And it
would do so in the face of 200 pages of its own
evidence that those fears were well founded.
The legislative history of the creation of the CIA is
very clear. Congress intended that the agency do
nothing in the US but maintain a headquarters and
train its personnel. That there was to be only one
exception to this rule?the overt collection of informa-
tion about foreign activities from willing sources in the
US?is made explicit in an exchange between a
congressman and Alien Dulles in a cloae.cl House
hearing on the bill creating the agency.
In light of the evidence presented by the commission,
it would be foolhardy to do anything but return to this
original understanding. The CIA must be told by the
Congress that it may not operate at home. Congress
must spell out in explicit detail all of the things that
cannot be done. It must then make the violations of this
law and failure to report the violations to the Attorney
General criminal offenses. The right to sue for civil
damages should also be made available to those whose
rights are violated by the agency.
Nothing short of this will be sufficient to create even
the 'possibility that the agency will not in the future
succumb to external or internal pressures and resume
its massive illegal domestic surveillance' .
In the domestic field what must be done is clear. The
connni,aiion has givriea all the fai. ',a 51-1,,Aln-2ed to
conclude that a secret spy agency cannot be permitted
- to operate at home. We can expect a new dis-
information campaign to assure os that all is well and
that ive need only to adopt the commission proposal, lf
the Congress and the public fall for that line they will
get the government they deserve.
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Arbeiderbladet, Oslo, 12 June 1975 (Norwegian Labor Party)
INVESTIGAIION OF CIA -
Paranoia is Greek and is used as an indication of illness characterized
by systematic, firmly-anchored delusions. There are a number of variations.
One of them is inventor-paranoia.
, It was the latter Variety that during the course of the Vietnam decade
insinuated itself in the office of the American president. In the Width
House in Washington enemies of society were discovered all over the. American
society. Active and passive critics of USA's war in Vietnam were shadowed
and photographed. Demonstrators' mail was opened, their telephones were
tapped. Dissenters were duly recorded in files by the tens of thousands.
This began seriously under President Lyndon B. Johnson and was developed
further quickly under President Richard Nixon. Nixon was not only convinced -
that the Americans who openly declared disagreement with the Vietnam policy,
.in reality all those who were a danger to the country's morale (he often'
used those words), but also he went a step further: Nixon critics were
suspected of belonging to a network centered iniXoscaw. Ultra red and
contagious.
TheWatergate'hearings disclosed that it was during Nixon's presidency--
at the president's order--that the American intelligence organization CIA
systematically began to overstep the statutes Congress had passed for the
organization's activities. When CIA was set up in 1947, Congress had
established by law that CIA should limit its activities to other lands.
The Federal police, FBI, would be responsible for domestic security.
In 1970 Richard Nixon had reached the point where he had convinced
himself that J. Edgar Hoover, FBI chief, no longer had the necessary
fervor and the right drive for hunting down comnunista and foreigh agents.
Monday evening the so-called Rockefeller Commission publicized its
300-page report on CIA's activity. For the first time the legal infringe-
ments we have cited were officially confirmed. The report also describes
other excesses and infringement of internationally-recognized human rights.
CIA agents, for example, experimented with the drug LSD on people who were
unaware of this. One defector was held in solitary confinement for three
years because CIA had suspicions that the man was actually a planted spy.
What makes the Rockefeller fommission: report especially. effective is
the composition of. the commission. None of the eight members can be
described as a dissenter. Vice President Nelson Rockefeller has long been
a member of the Foreign intelligence Board;vhich is charged among other
things with keeping an overview of CIA but which has never followed up
reports of excesses. Five of the members have had in one way or another
contact with the intelligence organization.
The Commission correctly places emphasis on the fact an effective
intelligence organization isof decisive importance for national security
and often also a medium to serve in the relaxation of tensions. The
Commission has found it to be necessary to recommend that a permanent
control mechanism be set up, a control commission under the President's
authority and a control committee consisting of members of Congress. ,
CIA's budget in part ought to be made public, according to the Commission.
President Ford has decided to classify the Rockefeller Commissien report
on CIA's assassination plans ?against foreign politicians and chiefs of state.
. We underttand that this sensitive matter is so delicate that the President
sooner or later will be compelled the make public what the Commission has
learned.
And some hope that the leaderg'in t6Li KrcAtan WILL follow the lead of
the American example and set up an investigating commission to find out
if the KGB has committed excesses and infringed on human rights1
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Gransking
av CIA
Paranoia er gresk, og bru-'
-kes som betegnelse pa en'
sykdom .som er preget av
systematiserte, fast forank-
iede vrangforestillingere Den
fins i en tekke varianter. En
av dem er oppfinner-para-
_,
:neje.
Det var den siste avarten
soul i? 'pipet av Vietnam-ti-
ret snek seg inn i ameri-
:
kanske presidentkontorer. I
Det ?hvite bus i Washington
-ble det oppfunnet sarnfunnS-
'lender overalt i det ameri-
kanske samfunn. Aktive?og
'passive kritikere av USAs ?
krig i Vietnam ble skygget ?
.og fotografert Demonstran-
-tenes post ble apnet, deres
lelefoner avlyttet. ? Dissenter-
ne ble behOrig arkivert til
sammen titusener av navn.
Det begynte for alvor. un-
der president Lyndon B.
John. an, og det titviklet seg
resift videre ? under president
'Richard . Nixon. Nixon i-ar
?ileke? bare overbevist cm' at
de amerikanere som hadde
seg uenige i . den
'amerikanskel Vietnam-poli-
tikken,... i virkeligheten elle;
som en var farlige for same!
funnsmoralen (hart brukte;
ofte det ordet), men han gikk
et skritt videre:
tikere-ble mistenkt? for a til-;
hplre det'nettverk som hadde'
sitt sentrum I Moskva. Ultras''
:'rfacit og smittsOmt.
Watergate-hOringene .av-
slOrte at det var i NisrOns.
.presidenttid pa presiden.
tens befaling at den ame-
rikanske etterretningsorgani-
saojonen CIA systematisk be-
gynte a krenke de ? statutter
Kongressen hadde vedtatt for
? organisasjonens virksomhet.
Da CIA hie opprettet 1 1947,
hadde nemlig Kongressen ved
lov' fa-stslatt at CIA skulle
.begrense' Sin virksomhet til
andieslan? Det lelderale p0-
litiet, FBI,
skulle feresta den
indre overvalingen.
? I 1970 var Richard 'Nixon
nadd? det' Stadium home han
?
klarte overbevise seg
om at FBI-sjefen J. Edgar
Hoover ikke leriger hadde
den neldvendie-e elorl ne (let
rette pagangsmot i jakten pa
kommunister og fremmede
agenter.
Mandag kvelcl offentlig-
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
16 June 1975
By James Nelson Goodsell
Latin America correspondent of
. The Christian Science Monitor
It was just before midnight. Moonlight
glinted off the waters of the Caribbean. The
lone car on the coastal highway, a chauffeur-
driven limousine, sped westward toward the
Dominican city of San Cristobal.
The limousine's two occupants, chauffeur
and passenger, at first failed to notice the
green Chevrolet that followed them ? and by
the time they became aware of the vehicle, it
was too late.
. The Chevrolet pulled alongside, spraying'
;teei limousine with rifle and carbine bullets,
Both cars came to a halt. The chauffeur,
? .
?-gjorde han den sakalte Roc-
'kefeller-kommisjonen sin 300
alder lenge rapport om CIAs
-
vLrksomhet.. For fOrste gang
:Ufr. de lovbrudd vi her har ?
nevnt, off isielt ? bekreftet..
Rapporten forteller ogsa om
andre overtramp og brudd
pa internasjonalt anerkjente
menneskerettigheter. CIA-*
agenter eksperimenterte for'
eksempel med rusgiften LSD,
og lot intetanende mennesker
bruke, den. En overlOper ble
holdt i enecelle i tre an fordi
CIA , hadde mi. stanke om at
mannen egentlig var en plan-.
tet spion. ?
Det som gjgir Rockefeller-
kommisjonens rapport smrlig
virleningsfull, er den sam-
mensetning kommisjon-en har
hatt. Ingen av ' de Atte
medlemmene kan betegnes
som dissentere. Visepresi-
dent igelson Rockefeller har
lenge s-rt medlem av ethe
Foreign Intelligence Board*
? som blant annet er palagt
overoppsynet med CIA, men
som tidligere aldri har fulgt
oem meldineer om overtramp.
Fern av' de andre medlem-
mene har i hvert fall pa ett
eller annet stadium hatt riser
kontakt Med etterretnings-
escaped, but the passenger was killed.
The scenario marked the end of the 30-year
dictatorship of Gen. Rafael Leonidas Trujillo
Molina.
The whole incident, which took place May
30, 1961, was long thought to have been solely
the work of Dominican patriots, including
Antonio Imbert Barreras, the driver of the
Chevrolet, who himself became a general in
the years after the assassination of General
Trujillo.
But this weekend, there is mounting evi-
dence? that the United States Central In-
telligence Agency (CIA) had a hand in the
affair.
? In fact, Washington sources say that the
U.S. contributed "significant material sup-
port" to the Trujillo assassination.
Efforts this weekend to reach General
Imbert, the lone survivor of the team of
assassins, failed, but other Dominican sources
say that "there were lots of CIA agents in
Santo Domingo,' in the weeks before the:
Trujillo assassination."
If all this information proves true, it will be
the first specific instance in which there is
proof the CIA successfully participated in the,
.organisasjonen.
Kommisjonen legger m
,rette vekt pa 'at en effekti
etterretningsorg anisasj on er
?av r avgjdrende betydrling fo
len nasjonale sikkerhet, o
ofte ogsa et middel I avspen-
ningens tjeneste. Kommisjo-
nen har funnet det riktig a
anbefale at det na opprefl_.
permanente kontrollmeka-
nismer, en kontAillkomrni-
sj on under presidentens.
.mynelighet og et kontiollut-
; valg bestaende av kongreess-
medlemmer. CIAs budsje
bOr bli delvis offentliggjort,
mener konunisjonen.
?President Ford har beslut-
i
tet A hemmeligholde Rocke-
feLler-kommisjonens rapport
om CIAs attentatplaner ma
titenlandske politikere og
regjerings:sjefer. Vi forstar
at dette er Omtalelige sake;
ja sA delitkate at presidentm
fOreeller siden blir ric6dt til A
offentliggjOre det kommisjo-
pen kan fortelle om dem.
Og sa haper vi at Kreml-
1s.oretar
t ampriknndr. c e'npel
nedseen tindersaelses-1
pa.mang.,...4..."m"?*4",monsaftsmativ,.
kommisjon ior a iirme ut om
IThairsp ofs
TITTITZFIVeiuert
assassination of a foreign leader.
. Speculation that the CIA had a hand in a
number of such assassinations has been
growing since the first of the year.
Just what the motive was for participating
in the Trujillo assassination is not clear, nor is
it clear at what level in the administrations of
either President Kennedy or President Eisen-
hower it might have been ordered. T
assassination took place four months after
John F. Kennedy became President and only
weeks after the unsuccessful Bay of Pip
invasion of Cuba, which had been organiz
under President Eisenhower although carried
out under President Kennedy.
The Trujillo assassination sparked a mas-
sive roundup of anti-Trujillo Dominicans.
Accordir.g to a Dominican government source,
one of those picked up, who had been involv
in the acutal assassination, said after having
been tortured, that the arms used in the
incident had been supplied by the CIA.
It seems that no CIA agent was direct
involved in the Trujillo assassination. But
apparently quite a few gave material and
perhaps physical help iri'settirp. up the etent.
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BALTIMORE SUN
17 June 1975
Will West's broadcasts to East die? -
cis1s-at to .roe
Ey GENE OISH1
5s; Sun Staff Corresprndent
' Munith?Radio Free Eu-
rope is undergoing a crisis of
confidence and morale after a
being hit by a budgetary
Squeeze and another wave of "
layoffs. ?
Some see it as the begin-
ning of the end for the radio
station, which broadcasts dai-
ly to Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Romania and Bul-
garia to inform the people
there about the events in the
West as well is developments
in their own countries.
- While not all see the future
so darkly, there is general
agreement that the budgetary
difficulties .faced by the or-
ganization - will reduce the
? effectiveness and quality of
aot only its broadcasting but
also of its highly regarded re.;
search 'operation..
The same could be true for''
Radio Liberty, also based
here and which broadcasts in-
to the Soviet Union. But the
next round of staff reductions
of about 150 apparently will -
fall most heavily within Radio
Free Europe:
The mood at Radio Liber-
ty, therefore, while not bright,
is not quite as pessimistic. ?
At Radio ? Free Europe I:
some see the present situation
as a crisis comparable to the
? early 1970's when both Radio ?
'Free Europe and Radio Liber-
ty were cut off from the funds
from the Central Intelligence
a
Agency.
At that time, there was op-
position in Congress "against
continuing the two operations
out of regularly budgeted
:funds. Senator William Ful-
bright (D., Ark.), then chair-
man of the Senate Foreign
;Relations Committee, in par-
ticular, questioned the'pro-
priety of continuing- the two
stations during a period of
East-West detente. - -
; Since then, both organiza-
tions have gained respectabil-
ity with the creation of the
?Board for International
Broadcasting in Washington
to oversee their operations.
The ' board is criticized
here, however, for not being
'vigorous enough in looking
after the interest of ? its
charges. Under its steward-
ship, the two stations have
had to cut their staffs by a
third because of insufficient
funds. . ? , -
? David Abshire, the chair-
man of the board, told con-
gressional budget commit-
tees, for example,' that be-
cause of the devaluation of
the dollar and inflation an op-
eration that cost $30 million
in 1968 would cost more than
$80 rnMicn for fiscol Asi V.
Nevertheless, the board
asked for only $65.6 million
?
for fiscal 1976, and only be-
cause of one-time needs to.
make up for overdue pension
fund contributions, renovation
of the building and replace-
ment of old equipment.
For fiscal 1977, he prom-
ised to reduce the budget re-
quest to $57 million, which is
the reason for the reduction in
staff which already is begin-
ning.
Radio Free Europe sources
Said the board made the com-
mitment without studying the
inevitable consequences. One
source called it a "verdict of
slow death," adding, "in two
or three years we will be ex-
tinct."
One department head said
the cutbacks mean the loss of
some of his top talent, with no
possibility of replacing them.
Because of the German labor
laws, he said, the cutbacks
cannot be made selectively to
weed out the least effective
personnel.
Many of those being laid
S create
uro e
? .7
off, he said il are the Ounger
members of the staff, "our.
fresh blood, the people Who
represent our future."
Others noted that, even if '
funds were available, it is dif-
ficult to find qualified persons
willing to come to what could
become a moribund organiza-
tion.
The cutbacks, according to
Radio Free Europe sources,
will mean cuts in programing,
which currently ranges from
19 hours a day for Czechoslo-
vakia to 8 hours a day for Bul-
garia, to an estimated total
audience of about 30 million.
Perhaps of More general
concern is the likelihood of
cutbacks in research. Radio
a Free Europe subscribes to
more than 600 East European
newspapers and periodicals,
zdcI it! rdri tr.!
transcribing radio reports
from the various. East-bloc
countries
Its publications, including
special reports based on this
information as well as sur-
veys of the East-bloc press,
are sent out to more than 1,-
100 subscribers, who include
universities and other aca-
demic institutions, individual
scholars, journalists, Western
foreign ministries as well as
the United States State De-
partment. .
While the research section
at Radio Liberty is not quite
I as extensive, it keeps tabs ow
more than 500 newspapers
and journals, most of them
from the Soviet Union, but al-
so publications that deal with
the problems of the country
published in the West.
. Both organizations receive
a constant stream of scholars
and journalists who make use
of their archives, which gen-
erally are acknowledged to be
the best of their kind in the
world,
' Radio Liberty, moreover, -
has a growing collection of
the so-called samizdat docu-
ments?underground publica- ?
tions of Soviet dissident
groups?which Albert Boiter,
its chief of research, says is
more complete than what the
KGB, the Soviet secret police,
has.
While both organizations
Are products of the cold war,
advocates insist that the oper-
ations are even more essential -
during a period of detente.
The two stations, for ex-
ample, intend to broadcast de-
tails of the declarations on
freer human contacts to
which the Soviet bloc will
agree at the European Securi-
ty Conference but is not likely
to publicize.
Others say that the two
ta4,1.4.1V?AAN ?0?11C au,4-? 111?
creased because the Voice of
America, a State Department
operation, has softened ? its
broadcasts and reduced its
commentaries in the interest
of detente. ?
It is also noted that the
Voice, the BBC and other
Western broadcasts heard in
the East report mainly on
events around the world and
do not deal as much as Radio
Free Europe and Radio Liber-
ty with internal developments
of the countries to which they
broadcast.
Alexander I. Solzhenitsyn,
the Russian novelist expelled
from the Soviet Union, for ex-
ample, said after his exile
that his main source of infor-
mation on what was happen-
ing in his country was Radio
Liberty.
One broadcaster noted that
Moscow was increasing its
foreign language propaganda
broadcasts and to cut back on
U.S. broadcasts to the East
would be a "one-sided conces-
sion to the Soviet Union."
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BALTIMORE SUN
15 June 1975
es t
really
41 f
?:By DEAN MILLS ?
'
Washington.
; The United States has long regarded
C the United Nations as an unpromising
child, but one which?thank God?at
least had the admirable habit of obedi-
ence. Now that even that virtue has dis-
solved in a fiery show of independence,
What's a parent to do?
Spank, prescribes Daniel Patrick'
, Moynihan, who has been picked to be the
. next U.S. ambassador to the U.N. be-
cause his ideas on the organization ap-
peal to President Ford. In a well-publi-
cized article in the March issue of Corn-
montrim and a 02in in rarant tactirrinny
before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Mr. Moynihan laid out his
formula for whipping the U.N. back into
? ? shape. ?
The problem, as Mr. Moynihan sees
it, lies largely in the Fabian socialism
which many Third-World U.N. members
absorbed, while still colonies, from a
dying British Empire. The solution, he
argued, is to. prove the advantages of
American (or Japenese) capitalism over
these unhealthy socialist transplants,
V and to expose the hypocrisies of Third-
World officials who see political injus:
tice everywhere but at home or .in the
Soviet Union.
In his testimony Mr. Moynihan also
endorsed the suggestion of Arthur Gold-
berg, a former U.N. ambassador, that
S. the United States withdraw from the or-
e gahization if Israel is expelled.
? Mr. Moynihan's get-tough attitude
seems to be in tune with public, as well
. as presidential sentiments. Mail to the
- U.S. Mission to the U.N. and public opin-
ion polls show disillusionment and anger
with the behavior of a General Assembly
. dominated by the Third-World bloc. ?
But there is another view. It holds
that the United Nations, despite faults,
has accomplished immeasurable?and
generally unremarked?good , for the
world; and that American delegations;
far from being too passive in the defense
of U.S. interests, have been too stubborn
in demanding their way. And although
' the United Nations seems to have be-
come a populai? target among liberals as
well as conservatives, it was this view
which predominated among Mr. Moyni-
han's less publicized isUnsNePor
Former Senator Wilrfam u rign ,
1
,
serv
exchanging weather information, for al-
locating radio frenuencies. Bad as our
-situation now is, it would have been im-
measurably worse?quite .possibly be- ?
:..yond repair." . ? ? ? : .? ? ,
And even most critics of the. U.N.
would not dispute its usefulness as a sup-.
plier of policemen and observers in crime
es?from the first' Middle East war:inee
1948 to the most recent Middle EtaStn.
War..
Mr. Gardner divides the U.M.'e funtese,
tions into two systems, the rhetorieaL;
and the active. The latter does mostenfe
the work and the former?the debatezeof ?
the General Assembly and other vorgOtir'
--:-gets all the attention. e ? _I I 11,1
It was three General Assembly vcifee--7
in the last session that crystalized the
growing American anger with the:
"tyranny of the majority." The: Assem-
bly expelled South Africa, accorded
ser Arafat, the Palestinian leader, thee'
honors of a head of state, and adoptet
the "Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States." ..:aLsee
The Ford administration's critic:3.4;4;
not, on the whole, blame the administek
tion ?or the American public?for being-
' angry over these actions. Indeed, eneleya
of them share the annoyance. But moat ,
of them differ radically from the .admineit
i.tr,tien diagneisin: the
hind those unpleasant symptoms antilite
prescribing a treatment that might help.6
, The General Assembly, they argue, Was',
only registering, not generating, thee
anger felt in the Third World toward dig
? United States. Any treatment milk'
? therefore deal with the reasons .for-tha--;
anger, not with the General Assembly;
Mr. Gardner agrees that the assets:1-e;
bly's double standard on the Middle Eist.
and on economic and human rights
tions "is often deplorable" But, he said
in his testimony, "It is an unhappy fa
that United States leadership has been'
badly damaged by Vietnam, Watergate,,
economic mismanagement and neglect
of Third-World interests. So if that UeVII,
reflection is ugly, it's not the: mirrom
ee?
that's to blame."
As treatment, these administration
, ? critics propose co-option and co-opera--
tion rather than confrontation. The ling
ed States would, for example, conce,-
. that Third-World producers of raw ma-
terials have gotten bad deals in the past,
?.. and it would work to set up a .system to:
protect both consumers and producers
from wild price fluctuations. It would.,
work to ensure that Multinational cor-
porations do not exploit weak govern-
? rnents. It would work to draw develop-
ing countries into wider participation in ,
the financial agencies that affect them:
so critically.
Above all, the critics would have the
united States make a bigger effort to"
get the United Nations to work: to beef
up its detegations?quantitatively ana4
qualitatively; to make the U.N.-a central"
part of its diplomacy, rather than a for--
-
a former chairman of the Foreign Rela;
tions. Committee, said the United States,
accustomed to getting its way in the
early years of the U.N., has turned into a
poor loser. "It seems to me that the
great-power role has gone to our head .
and 'we have not learned to take the
brickbats and setbacks philosophically _
and the tail-tweaking with good humor. ?
When opposed, we pick up our marbles
and go off to play by ourselves, making ,
the situation only worse." .
The witnesses for the defense in the
U.N. hearings had little trouble making
a case for the organization's utility in
the nuts-and-bolts business of running a
planet. Indeed, even most of the U.N.'s
severest Critics concede that if it were
abolished overnight, something would
have to be invented to take the place of
the two dozen specialized agencies it op-
erates
To the extent that some aeencies
touch on areas with political as well as
practical content?the International
Atomic Energy Agency, for example
--their effectiveness may be diluted by
national jealousies. But in less ideologie
cal areas, the international bureaucracy
can have decisive clout. U.N. agencies
have all but 'wiped out smallpox, have
made English the universal language of
international traffic, and have made na-
tional stamps valid for the international
mails. . ?
The various international financial,
economic, and trade agencies that oper-
ate:under the U.N. or in close co-opera-
tion with it have been essential in pro-
viding the ground rules for international
barter and the funding for economic de-
velopment in poorer countries. While the
General Assembly and the Security
Council dominate the decreasing amount
of news space devoted to the U.N. these
,days, it is these agencies of economic co-
operation that do the most work. They
use 90 per cent of the U.N. system's an-
ual budget of ;1.5 billion. . .
Richard N. Gardner, a former deputy
assistant secretary of state who is now
the U.S. member and the rapporteur of a
committee appointed by the Secretary
General to propose changes in the U.N.'s
system of economic agencies, told the
Foreign Relations Committee:
"It is a useful 'exercise to ask where ?
we would be today had we had no United
Nations economie system-no institu-
tions for trade
and monetary co-opera-
tion, for economic development aid, for
agriculture, population and environ-
ment, for the establishn olAy 1121Avi opsehrited.ake'its'
ReigtagapippmgAg4e.e g Es 7.004
grace u y w en it oses. ? I 4
?
33
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,THE NEW YORK?TIMES, MONDAY, JUNE 2, 1975-
-Detente Is Said to Give the KG.B.
By DAVID BINDER
Special tome Nevi 'York Times
' ? WASHINGTON, June 1?The
K.G.B., the Soviet Union's se- -
curity and intelligence organi-
zation, has. taken on some new
foreign assignments and a big-
ger' work load at home as a
-result of East-West detente,
-Western espionage specialists
say. ,
While detente has increased
the ability of the K.G.B.?the
- initials stand for the Russian
words for Committee of State
Security?to infiltrate Western
countries, it has also given it
more work at home keeping
surveillance over the larger
number of foreigners moving
around the Soviet Union.
For the United States, the
Central Intelligence Agency
and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation are similarly oc-
cupied.
' The Soviet Union, the espion-
?age specialists said, has 1.083
'nationals working in the United country, and supervision of the ligence role, they tend to be
States as diplomats and trade 175,000 border guards assigned maVericks, according to a
representatives, whereas 10 to protect the frontiers. No tWestern expert. /They have
.
'years ago, there were 4561 Western intelligence agency-is
? ? .....
more defectors than we do,"
Soviet citizens in such roles, known to have such pervasive he added.
.: It .k in the Ls:reign field where
mlre".ends
of oeviet an', rest, eeeecre. . , inee are also reared
at. vs e. ,... ?
? European trade representatives i Outside the Soviet IJnion, Ithroughout the Soviet Union,
in the past, despite the large
somewhat less effective than
are visiting the United: States,! the K.G.B. _operates much as although not as much as during
and the number of East Eu- do other espionage' organiza- the rule of Stalin. But ordinary
ropean student visitors and tions, although it has greater, Soviet people would no more
- East European seamen here is, manpower. and more sophisti- ;think of talking critically in
Up. , 1 cated technology than most, public about the K.G.B. than
Counterintelligence officials Of its estimated total of 420,-, they would' of disrobing in
assume that 40 per cent of 000 employes, the K.G.B. has, front- of Lenin's mausoleum.
the Soviet diplomats in the about 10,000 officers assigned! . One reason for continued fear
United States are full-time in- to foreign operations, of whom of the K.G.B. is its large and
telligence officers. It is as- 2,500 are abroad. Between 50,- still active "wanted list" of
sumed that this may rise as 000 and 80,000 officers are Soviet political enemies. A 460-
high as 75 per cent in other assigned to internal security page document contains ab-
countries. - - work, Western specialists be- streets on 1,132 Soviet citizens,
'Broadening of the Base' lieve. is stamped "sovershenno sek-
By contrast, the Central In- retno." cir "top secret." -
, "It means a broadening of telligence Agency, which focu-
. Nureyev on the List
4he base," a counterintelligence ses on foreign activities, has
*official here remarked. It
makes the totality of the United
States a target. Their opera-
tions are alwayS damned good
and their technology is first- of whom 8,600 are listed as family particulars, the dossier in Middle East posts.
rate?very good trade-craft." ? Mr. Sakharov told the C.I.A.
special agents. entry says: ? .
But there is no comparison In the judgement of K.G.B.'s "While on tour in France officers who dealt with him
between the situation of the Western counterparts; its on June 16, 1961, he betrayed that once, when he had written
Committee of State Security _ an objective analysis of the
officers are much more securi- his country. In 1962, the Lenin- an
political scene that
did not correspond in all details
with the official Soviet view,
15 K.G.G. officers who have de-' Another entry lists Nina V. thilysuopuerhiaovreeeambarriklleida
brilliant career.
fected to the West in the last' Paranyuk, a ship stewardess i
20 years the following picture who fled at Melbourne, Austra- Take that back and write it
a
igger Work Load!
defector" appeared in February;
agency in foreign work. cow. There must be receipts
, "They provide the cement at each end. This creates a
that holds the whole thing virtually unbreakable security
together," an analyst re- system.
marked of 'the K.G.B. With a K.G.B. , ,personnel ? at home dence doesn't exist," he said.
degree of professional admira- tend to ?keep to themselves. i
This is explained in part by Among the uses that Leonid,
tion, he added: "If I had their,
Western specialists as a result I. Brezhnev the party chief,
system, then it is the. only has for the K.G.B. is its daily
way I would do it?to have of the hierarchical system of the summary of "vital events" in
a K.G.B. I see it as part of K.G.B. Officers have military-; technology, science, economics,
the main show, an integral and style rank? from lieutenant defense and political affairs.
well-integrated part of Soviet to general?but are paid five, !Once a. week, the K.G.B. secrer
society. They are not a freak to six times more than the Once
also provides the leader-
show." , Iship with: a "broader view"
3 Instruments of Power lof domestic and international
In. 'the Soviet Union the affairs. ,
K.G.B. has three main in- The K.G.B. has an elabor-
struments of power, as far as ate apparatus for dealing with
the Western analysts can deter- civilian dissidents, the so-called
mine. Fifth Chief Directorate, with
the Communist 'party's Polit- subsections assigned to Jews,
the Communist party is politba- young people, intellectuals and
ro by the K.G.B. chairman, Yuri religious figures.
V. Andropov; control. of all Intimidation of the political
Effectiveness Abroad Declines
essential communications net-
works and code used in the dissidents over the last four
years has , largely eliminated
the problem for the time being,
in the view of Western speci-
alists. . .
1974, was a captain of military
counterintelligence assigned to
the Sixth Armored Guards Divi-
sion in East Germany, "Dissi-
(equivalent rank in the armed
forces.
But the rank system, a spe-
:cialist said, creates "a lot of
lincest and infighting?back-
stabbing because of rank."
I The K.G.B. is also "extremely
compartmentalized," he added,
,even in comparison with West-
ern intelligence organizations.
Although K.G.B. officers per-
meate Soviet society, including
the armed forces, in which they
play the sole counterintel-
number of agents it has in
the field and the high' quality
of many of them.
"The great successes of the
K.G.B. were in the nineteen-
thirties and nineteen-forties,
when they had ideological re-
cruits," a Western analyst
comemnted. -"Now revolution-
ary ?n is dead and Soviet
life is marked ? by increased
bureaucracy."
This, too, is seen as a reason
for the relatively high number
of K.G.B. defectors.
Man example, Western spe-
about 16,000 employes, of: It ' lists such seeming in cialists quote Vladimir N. Sak-
whom'4,000 work abroad. The nocents as Rudolf Nureyev, the harov, a.K.G.B. agent who de-
F.B.I., dealing with internal se- dancer,' who defected to the fected to the West in 1971
curity, has 19,500 employes, West in 1961.?After noting his after having served four years
and that o e en ty- conscious than Western grad City Court sentenced him
ligence Agency in terms of the agencies. . to seven year's deprivation of
United States agency's ordeal As gleaned from some of the, freedom. He lives in London."
of Congressional and executive
investigations, according to an
informed Administration offi-
cial. ? emerged. ha, in 1956. Tne entry says so that ties can undeestand
The K.G.B.,. he said, has "no
less forces and no less budget." Only One Notebook . that she was "sentance-d to it at home." .
I
"I don't want to paint it 12 death T ')R los7 The Soviet intelligence offi- " u ---?." in the powerful Western in-
feet high," he added, "but it cers keep almost no files in
is still alive and well and plays the field. They destroy ,copies
a very major role." of telegrams received at the
"The K.G.B. is praised, not "residence?a legal cover sta-
attacked in Moscow," he said.
Around Washington these days,
such statements are not made
about the C.I.A.
Broadly, the K.G.B. combines
the domestic work of the F.B.I.
and the foreign intelligence-
gathering of the C.I.A. It is
the secret police in the Soviet
Union and .the hiligrence
Austria; countries?chiefly the
Security System Effective .
lUnited States and Vest Ger.
In the prevailing Western Imany-e-K.G.B. officers are also
view, the K.G.B. has proved lunder instruction to 'wield
highly effective in maintaining ("political influence" wherever
tson such as an embassy?with- security in the Soviet Union-- they can.
in 24 hours. . to the degiee, as a specialist '. A correspondent Of The New
Only the "rezident" (chief said, that Western intelligence York Times in - Bonn . ronorts
or a statjon) may keep a Str-'2li agencies ha.. e 'never perietrat- that the'agents woek uneer the
notebook. The sheets are ed the Politburo" and have guise of diplomats, trade offi-
cials or journalists to cultivate
private relationships with poli-
ticians and businessmen?the
numbered and the notes are only "gotten closc to the Cen-
handwritten: When he is send- .tral Committee" of the Commu-
ing a report it is photographed nist patty
and the film it placed in a It has also kept dissidence purpose being, to "convey Soi-
boobvtrapped casktte.1
p gy dfairpReiliiias904MVI
a .V#-Wgrolit3gRiptctr03700307- d warnings" on
. st ece ? critical issues. .
?
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_ .? .
Posed as 'a Journalist
? . An official of the Krupp con-
'tern, which has millions of
dollars in trade with the Soviet
Union, spoke of one such intel-
ligence officer posing as a jour-
nalist: "I like- to talk to him
because he makes no secret
at all of whom he really works
for. You know that anything
you tell him goes straight to
the ? Lubyenka [K.G.B. head-
quarters]. -
-, It is telling, perhaps, that
few of the. K.G.B. men who
have come over to the West
manage to make headway - in
the new lives arranged for
them, despite their abilities as
espionage agents.
, . "We set them up in business
and' they go bankrupt," a West-
tern anaiyst remarked. "Most
Iof them can't handle being
alone 'and on their own."
1! In K.G.B. usage', the United
!States remains the "main ad-
yersary"?as it has been -since
the collapse of Nazi Germany.
This is 'reflected in such sta-
tistics as 800 attempts to re-
cruit American citizens for
espionage purposes over the
last 10 years?most of them
outside the United States. It
is also evident in the tremen-
dous amount !of attention paid
by 'the K.G.B. to acquisition of
military, industrial and scien-
tific secrets, the analysts said.
, ,
' 'The K.G.B. formed a scientif-'
ic-technical directorate in 1962
and recruited science and en-
gineering graduates to staff it.
It employs 500 to e;OU ofticers
abroad, many of them in the,
United States. .
4i, Concerning the more James1
NEW YORK TIMES
8 June 1975
Many of Soviet Emigrants
Reported Asking to Return
MOSCOW, June 7 (Reuters)
?The Communist party news-
paper Pravda says that the
Soviet Embassy in Washington
has received "hundreds of ap-
plications" from recent ,emi-
grants who want to return to
the Soviet Union.
The report was in an article
yesterday by Ytiliyan Sem-
yonov, who has been touring
the United States as a special
correspondent for Pravda.
"There are hundreds of ap-
plications lying in our consu-
late, and many of them are
tragic," he wrote.
- Mr. Semyonov quoted from
one of the letters:
"I came here with my two
children, and I know there can
be no forgiveness for me. But I
beg you to allow my children,
who have not yet come of age,
to return to the motherland."
The Soviet Union normally
,refuses to allow the permanent
return of emigrants, who usual-
ly have to renounce their
citizenship to gain an exit visa.
,Bondish asPeeti?of eapionagel
work, the Soviet secret service
has been credited with perfect-
:inggenious coding systems, tiny
lass assination weapons and un-
!telling devices to promote co-
vert operations. But Western
specialists believe the KBG is
still basically agent-oriented
and remains far behind ,the
C.I.A. in technology.
There is no evidence that it
has displayed any of the scien-
tific daring, technical know
how or financial risk compara-
ble to the successful C.I.A. ef-
fort-to recover part of a sunken
Soviet submarine last summer
in the Pacific northwest of Ha-
waii. That venture, involving
a salvage vessel specially built
by Howard Hughes enterprises,
is said to have cost more than
$350-million.
Nor is there anything in the
ambitious Soviet submarine-de-
velopment program comparable
to- the electronic surveillance
missions of United States Navy
submarines, which are said to
have tapped Soviet coastal com-
munications cables, monitoring
on;shcre missile firings !and!
identified individual Soviet sub-:
marines by their sound pat-
terns.
As ,for covert operations
abroad, the K.G.B. maintains
a strong capability, in the
estimate of Western analysts.
Aimeng the most recent
K.G.B. involvements in insur-
gencies weie in Portugal's
African territories in Cambo-
dia and Laos and in the
Dhofar region of Oman. Po-
tential guerrilas are recruited
by the .K.G.B. and then' passed
on to the G.R.U.?the Soviet
military intelligence service?
for training.
The K.G.B. maintains a very
large operation in Thailand, a
New York Times correspondent
reports, presumably to control
operations throughout Indo-
china., -
??
' Must Wait on the Porch
Visitors to the Soviet Embas-
sy, where the K.G.B. has ,its
offices, are asked to wait , on
the front porch and staff mem-
bers come out to meet them.
Western intelligence operatives
assume the 15-member Soviet
trade delegation in Bangkok
consists primarily of K.G.B. of-
ficers since Thai-Soviet trade
amounted to $6-million last
year. The rent and services
for the trade delegation are
estimated at $500,000 annually.
Since 1958, the Thai Govern-
ment has expelled nine Soviet
officials after they had been
identified by Western intel-
ligence agencies as K.G.B. offi-
cers.
Western analysts believe the
K.G.B. has abandoned its prac-
tice of, "wet affairs"?the So-
viet euphemism for covert ac-
tions like assassinations.
' According to Oleg A. Lyalin,
a"wet\affairs" specialist who
defected in Britain in 1971
causing the expulsion of 105
Soviet spies, the K.G.B. halted
its political assassination! pro-
gram in 1959. But Mr. Lyalin
said that the K.G.B. retained
!plans for assination and cab I
!otage of vital installations in
the event of a war threat.
1 In the opinion of Western
'specialists, the K.G.B. has re-i
ceived orders from Mr. Brezh-
nev not to undertake any
operations that would com-
promise or undermine his poll-
ee/ ? of relaging tensions with
the. United States and other
Western countries.
Close to '10,000 Soviet and
Eastern European trade repre-
sentatives visited the U.S. last
year, as against 1,249 in 1964.
There are 45 Soviet students
here, and 50 other scholars are
engaged on research projects.
The number-of Soviet-bloc sea-
men arriving in American ports
has risen from 1.300 to 13,000
since 1964.
An area in which the K.G.B.
continues to excel, especially
in less developed countries, in-
volves "disinformation," the
practice of misleading people
with forged documents and the
planting of distorted informa-
tion in the press. ?
! For a dozen years, it is said,
Ithe K.G.B has financed a
political' weekly in India called
'Blitz, which disseminates,
propaganda damiging to the
United States.
Another fairly recent change
in K.G.B. priorities nbted here
is increased emphasis on China-
watching. It formed a special
China department about 1970.
The K.G.B. has a network
of ."old China hands," and is
sending young recruits to An-
Yang University in Singapine
to iearn Chitee,i-, but it, is
evidently weak on reliable In-
telligence about China, the ana-
lysts said. "
?
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Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0
TE O-CRISTtAN SCENCE MONITOR
Monday, June 16, 1975 .
Over the years the Communist Party
has made littie headway with British
voters. But today Communists hold
key posts in zonio of the country's
most .117erful trade unions, a cause
for growing c ncern in an economy
where the uni*ns call the tune.
rinufri Abe
Staff correspondent of
? The Christian Science Monitor
London
Just a carrot's throw from the boarded-up remains of
'Covent Garden's former fruit and vegetable market
stands a grimy office building, fronted with thick
t. frosted glass and crumbling stone and marked with a
barely visible, small brass plate. Inside, light bulbs
hang unshaded from their wires. The walls of the
. waiting room are bare and dingy. It is the headquarters
of the British Communist Party. *
Despite the seedy anonymity of their King Street
;? offices, Britiain's Communists are today the focus of an
unaccustomed glare of public comment and concern.
Columns about their activities, known and guessed at,
appear frequently in the national dailies. Politicians of
various persuasions speak out against the Communist
threat. And ordinary Britons tend to answer questions
s about Communist influence with faintly embarrassed
phrases such as, "I've never been a 'Reds under the
beds' person myself, but. . . ."
? The reason does not lie in any sudden electoral
success. The Communists' parliamentary performance
'remains as dismal as their headquarters.
? Rather, the reason lies in the current power struggle
between Parliament (regardless of which party is in
r power) and militant trade-union leaders.
. Ills widely accepted here that some union leaders are
using vast wage demands and inflation as, blunt
instruments to push a, virtual economic revolution past
a feebly protesting Parliament. And since Communist
power, overt and covert, i3 concentrated in the unions,
. there are fears here that:
1. The Communists are actively fomenting industrial
strife andee,' nion-Pai-liamert cenflict los their own ends.
. 2. Their allies have infiltrated the Labour Party's
parliamentary ranks to weaken that party's tradition-
ally strong democratic ideals and to undermine its
leaders' ability to resist union demands.
3' The C"Pgii9M4adikk514tVloirestfiriffelds
if they could, use the present turmoil as a stepping- *
stone to something nearer real, preferably irreversible-
political revolution.
'A faithful Moscow satellite'
All this sounds far out in a country so solidly
democratic, so skeptical of wordy ideelogies, so firmly
attached to that curiously British mixture of common
sense and self-deprecating humor. What are the facts? .
The British Communist Party, with a membership of
about 29,000, ranks as one of Moscow's faithful
' satellites. But there is no solid evidence that Commu-
nist officials in British unions respond to strings pulled
from Moscow.
On the visible parliamentary level the Communist
Party is a complete failure. The party has no seats in
the House of Commons', nor has it even come near
? winning any over the past couple of decades.
? Out of a total vote in last October's general election of
just over 29 million, the Communists managed to gather
- in a paltry 17,426 votes. '
On the less-visible parliamentary level, however, a
rather different picture emerges. Some of the Labour
, Party's "social democrats," who comprise the bulk of
the party and almost all the present Cabinet, appear as
? anxious as their Conservative colleagues about the
motives and loyalties of some extreme left-wingers in
Labour's ranks.
? How much influence?
? ? Lord Chalfont, a former Labour minister who is now
an independent peer, put the point discreetly to the
? House of Lords earlier this year:
`!. . in what I have to say I shall suggest that the
governing [Labour] Party provides, in one way or
another, shelter for a number of people who are almost
certainly committed to undermining the existing
political system in Britain."
How much such back-benchers can influence Labour
Party and government policy is an open question.
Assessments vary greatly according to the political
viewpoint of the speaker. But with Prime Minister
Harold Wilson holding only a very narrow majority in
.. the Commons, the votes of the extreme leftists in his
own party can on occasion be of immenseimPortance to
him.
On the trade-union level, the Communists have a
. much more obvious foothold. Indeed they have clearly
put most of their intellectual and ideological eggs into
this basket, under the watchful eye of their tireless
industrial expert Bert Ramelson.
: C - RE41.07-43 abIR.G13464 OiNtitigt7 1 percent of
36
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Britain's trade unionists are Communist Party mem-
bers, the party has managed to get itself into a position
of influence out of all proportion to its numbers.
' More than 10 percent of union executives now are
card-carrying members of the Communist Party. Many
other union officials are active sympathizers or follow
the Communist Party line. In total, some industrial-
relations specialists reckon, from 30 to 40 percent of
, union officials are probably Marxist in their outlook.
- In addition, the Communist Party succeeded last
September in getting one of its members (Ken Gill) on
to the general council of the Trade Union Congress
(TUC), the central body of British unionism.
Methods, worker apathy blamed
The outdated operating methods of British trade
unions, and widespread worker apathy, are most
usually blamed for this formidable Communist-cum-
leftist foothold in the union movement.
Postal ballots, for instance, are few and far between.
'Hence, a well-organized, vigorous minority is often able
to get its candidates into office because of minuscule
turnout (sometimes as low as 5 percent or less) or
occasionally by straightforward manipulation of the
ballot.
Of course, it is perfectly legal for anyone to run for
union office. The current spate of concern arises over
how elected officials may use or abuse their influence.
According to one leading trade unionist, the Commu-
nists "never cease working in their cells, magnifying
every grievance into _major proportions, and struggling
to get into positions of influence."
In the words of Lord Shawcross, a former attorney
general in Clement Attlee's postwar Labour govern-
ment, "There are forces now actively and openly at
work whose object it is to bring our existing society and :
estahliahment tn rent I apse" (May is sneer+ tn the Wirlpr
Share Ownership Council in London).
Similarly, as Lord Chalfont pointed out in his speech
to his fellow peers, the Communists use all the leverage
they can muster to sway the Labour Party. According
to Lord Chalfont, Mr. Ramelson claimed last year that
"the Communist Party can float an idea early in the
? year, and it can become official Labour Party policy by
the autumn. . . . We have More influence now on the
.Labour' movement than at any time in the life of our
? party."
' -
Anti-Communists rallied
The Communists have burrowed their way into the
union movement in classic fashion ? via the formation
--of small, highly active, cells. The second most powerful
union in Britain, the Amalgamated Union of Engineer-
. ing Workers (AUEW), provides a vivid example of the
party's mode of operation and its results.
, The AUEW is a prime Communist target Its 11/4
WASHINGTON POST
15 June 1975
1
Radio
hey Cha
E 01
??
By Richard M. Weintraub
Washingtor Post Staff Writer ,
Free Europe has gi- meat, Capt. Tomaz Rosa, said
million members include only about 2,500 registered
Communists. Yet of the 52 men on the AUEW's National
Committee, 16 are card-carrying members of the
Communist Party, according to Lord Chalfont. About
half the National Committee are either party members
or sympathizers.
Until five years ago the mighty AUEW appeared to be
slipping inexorably toward total Communist control.
With union election turnouts sometimes as low as 21/2
percent, the Communists were able to tuck their men or
tacit supporters into more and more union offices. "A
majority of such a small percentage are always
Communists with chips on their shoulde:'s," explained
John Boyd, the union's newly elected and fervent anti-_.
Communist general secretary, in an interview.
1
Hence, in 1969 Mr. Boyd rallied the anti-Communists
and managed by one vote on the National Committee
(meeting as a rules committee) to switch the union to a'
postal ballot. The result was a dramatic increase in
participation, often rising well above 30 percent, and
the defeat of many Communist candidates.
However, the Communist's counterattacked last
month. The National Committee (meeting again as a
rules committee as it does every five years) narrowly.
voted to retain the postal ballot. But, taking advantage
of a mixup in committee members' credentials, the
leftists managed to reduce this majority to a tie. Union
president Hugh Scanlon (a former Communist Party
member) later used his vote on the seven-member
National Executive to throw the postal ballot out.
? Such tactics, repeated throughout the union move-
ment, give the Communists and fellow travelers '
national scope. "There are very few unions in Britain
which don't have a Co-nmunist cell," says Mr. Boyd.
"Fundamentally the Communists look upon their aim
nrd aject life as being to undermine what they ,
consider is the capitalist society."
Under normal conditions Britain's mixed economy -
and open society muddle along sufficiently well to make
the Communists' real national impact of little impor-
tance. But today's conditions are far from normal.
Weak governments and successive economic crises
have undermined the authority of Parliament. Militant
trade-union leaders have taken advantage of the
situation, defying attempts at wage control and even
flouting laws enacted by Parliament.
If is a moot point how much the Communists are
responsible for today's highly charged climate of
anxiety and confrontation. What is certain is that it is an
ideal atmosphere for them to exploit.
Their motives and methods, along with those of the
rest of the extreme left, have therefore become the
focus of far greater than usual concern. This is
especially so since - grave economic and political
challenges still lie-ahead.
-
'Ven no guarantee to Portugal in an interview with:, Wash-
'about limitations on its broad- ington Post Correspondent
casts and has made no chances Patirok Chanipman that ..RPF
in its programing as a result had given "assurances" that
-of discussions with the Por- it would broadcast nothing to
ftugtiese, RIPE officials said. harm "the Portuguese revolu-
....
A member of the Porte- tion" or "the politics and di.
Suese 'Armed For p?iiVe'd;IfttftilzIkItifage$213011106/1091,
37
?1co-untries." Rosa .said he had-
noted "small, changes" in RFE
programing.
With over 80 per cent of
;As programs transmitted from
its facilities in Portugal, RFE-
'.officials have been highly con-
cerned over 'what orie of them
has called a "live-or-die" sit-
uation.
While contingency plans are
,heing drawn up in case the
contra(t for the facilities is
'not renewed or is abruptly
canceled, officials in Wash-
.
4ligion admit thai it would be
:difficult if not impossible to
:replace the Portuguese facil-1
which could harm the move-I
2nent in Portugal," Ralph Wal-;
;tor, head of RFE's ? Munichi
:operations, said in a telephone
interview.
"I have described to Capt.
Rosa our policy about broad-
casting on Portugal, which is
;a reportorial policy," Walter
Walter, who has handled.
?most of the contacts with they
'Portuguese, said that the Por-
tuguese are sent summaries of
;TiFE's daily broadcasts
. -that tapes. of all broadcasts',
:7are available to Lisbon author-
ities as they are to German.,
?iues.
"The Portuguese have been
;concerned 72446tAgagti
Q1101430137:
lgovernment officials. He.
',added that there had been no
AMA:Vs-gy the Portuguese for
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370007-0
tat
The Board for International
Broadcasting, which was cre-
ated to take over responsibil-
ity for both Radio Free Europe
and Radio Liberty after Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency ties
were severed in 1971, has re-
quested funds from Congress
to update transmitter facilities
?in Germany.
elladio Free Europe broad- t:
?
easts to Poland. Hungary, r
Czechoslovakia, Romania and
Bulgaria. Radio Liberty
governments.
William P. Durkee, retiring
president of Radio Free Eu-
rope Inc., said in a telephone
broadcasts to the Soviet interview from New York
that Capt. Rosa had been
fully briefed about the nature
of RFE programming both in
New York and in Munich and
that he believed that the "as-
surances" about which Rosa
spoke stemmed from his bet-
der understanding about RFE
broadcasts.
Union. Total budget requests
for the two radios this year
amount to over $65 million,
a large portion of which is
;for pensions and related items
!stemming from staff cutbacks.
The radios often have been
I sharply criticized by the So-
viets and Eastern European
WALL STREET JOURNAL ,
I 3 Juno 1975
Portugal.
By ARTHUR ScHausINcan an.
. The hints and whispers and mumbles
from Washington are that Portugal is
about to go Communist. that it will consti-
tute a fifth column within NATO, that it
will give the P.ussians an opening to the
Atlantic; and oh if the CIA were only alive
and well in .Lisbon. ?
? Poltugal going Communist is not a
happy prospect. It is also a considerable
exaggeration. The Immediate prospect, if
- the democratic forces' fail to sustain them-
? selves, is not a Communist takeover. It is
rather the establishment of a military re-
gime, Nasscrite in its model and 'neutralist
in its foreign policy, using the Portuguese
. Communist Party for counsel and support.
I Such a regime might well deny military
? bases to the United States, but. there Is no
? reesen io suppose that, any more than
Egypt or Peru, it would turn overnight into
a Soviet satellite.
' Moreover, if such a regime comes to
power, it would be against the wishes of
the Portuguese people as expressed in the
; recent election?and this is why the pessi-
mism spilling out of Washington is so de-
pressing. President Ford and Secretary
Kissinger appear to have given up the bat-
. tie for Portugal; the Portuguese people
have not. In the election, the Socialists
? took 38% of the vote, the Popular Demo-
: crats, a center party, 26% and the Commu-
!.nists a wretched 12.5%. But, where the
Communists are giving the dominant
!Armed Forces Movement unconditional
support, the Socialists, under the leader-
,
? ship of Mario Soares, have irritated the
military by their demands for democratic
liberties. So, when Communist printers
shut doWn the respected Socialist newspa-
per Republica, the military, despite mass
? Socialist protests, decided to go along with
? the Communists.
The question now is what the Western
democracies can do to help the Socialists
In their struggle to keep Portugal in the
democratic world. On this question there
are two divergent approaches: the Ameri-
can strategy and the Western European
strategy. ?
? ? Our strategy derives from the fact that
we (Le., our masters lit Washington) really
preferred the old regime in Portugal?the
.rightwing dictatorships of Selazar and
Caetano. We found it convenient to deal
with them, and we supposed that Portu-
guese authoritarianism had: unlimited life
expectancy. Our policies both toward Por-
-tugucse *Africa lint; Portugeil itself were
based on this supposition. Our intelligence
Was gravely mistaken. The Portuguese
army was a good deal less sanguine than
.we were about the Portuguese capacity to
hold on to its African colonies, and Portu-
guese generals eventuA
S elf Fu1f him
13phivtild PopiRel
tion against the regime we had so stoutly
' supported.
Taken by SurInise?
When the revolution occurred, we were
evidently taken by surprise. The Common
Market countries of Western Europe
promptly welcomed the emergence of "a
democratic Portugal." The United States
maintained a sullen silence for three
weeks until our ambassador was finally in-
structed to. deliver a god-will alma-age to
the new government. That was a year ago;
and since then we have been acting as if
we thought a Communist Portugal to be in-
evitable.
Our first ambassador after the revolu-
tion, Stuart Nash Scott, was quickly re-
cailed because he rejected State Depart-
ment defeatism and wanted to work with
democratic elements in the new. regime.
His successor, Frank Carlucci, has report-
edly had difficulties because he also sees
possibilities for positive action. But the
Secretary of State has taken a sour line al-
most from the start, expressing a concern
for democratic processes in Portugal that
he had ably concealed during the Salazar-
Caetano years. In April he told a group of
West European journalists, according to
The New York Times, that "he believes
that by next year Portugal will be a Com-
munist nation or a neutralist nation under
heavy Communist influence." On May 23
President Ford himself threatened the
Portuguese governmeet (in a statement
that lir. Rissing,er felt obliged to qua/ay
the next day) with excommunication from
NATO if it does not shape up and ship out
Its Communists.
The argument for this, I imagine, is
that lectures from such exalted personages
will shock the Portuguese military into
good behavior. This notion displays our
usual gross misunderstanding of the psy-
chology of small revolutionary states. Lit-
tle is better designed to strengthen the
Board of Contributors
The Ford administration
seems determined to con--
sign Portugal to Commu-
nism and thereby assure the
fulfillment of its own proph-
ecy,
Alan Hovey, RPE vice
president, said that "the only
guarantee we give to any-
body is that we will continue
to adhere to the internal
policy 'guidelines which re-
quire us to report the news
of that area [Eastern Europe]
and the rest of the world
objectively, comprehensively
and accurately."
Hovey, Durkee and Walter
all said that there had been
no change in RFE program-
ming.
Prophecy?
II" and calls for appropriate action. One
hopes that the Ford administration, after
proving to the world that the United States
is stronger militarily than Cambodia, will
not be rendered dizzy with- success and
I send the Marines on to Portugal.
The Western European strategy is very
I different. It deserves a hearing if only be-
cause it is Western Europe after all that
would be most immediately threatened by
' untoward developments in Portugal. The
; delusion that Washiagton, thousands of
miles away, knows better than the people
L's the. neighhorhood got us into enough
teuble in Vietnam. There seems no great
need to carry it forward into Portugal. .
The Western European view is that the
struggle for Portugal is far from over.
Many West Europeans see the events in
Lisaasn ;as a zalutary remindsr ea! the- ?:.,,;.,
of detente. The fact that, for diverse good
reasons, the United States and the Soviet
Union have a stake in avoiding nuclear
war does not mean that communism has.
become a benign and ? ennobling, faith. In-
deed, the big losers in the short run have
been the Communist parties of Italy and
France. These parties have recently pres-
ented themselves as national and parlia-
mentary parties which, if trusted with
porker, would devoutly respect the rules of
the democratic game. Such claims look a
little tattered note. The ambition of the
Italian Communists to join the government
has been very considerably set back; and,
while the French Socialist leader Francois
Mitterand will certainly continue the So-
cialist-Communist electoral coalition, this
Is only because he feels, perhaps rightly,
that he is wilier than his Communist allies
and will use them more than they can use
Within Portugal the West Europeans re-
ject the American idea of giving up the
fight and arc trying instead to stay in close
and to help the Socialists. Two days after
Mr. Ford's statement, tho Comm-,n Market
countries agreed to offer Portmeal better
trading opportunities, financial aid and in-
dustrial cooperation so long as such help
might encourage the maintenance of