MODERN INTELLIGENCE: MYTH AND REALITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370004-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 25, 2001
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: August 3, 1975
• Content Type: NSPR

NEW YORK TIMES
3 August 1975
Modern intelligence:.
Myth and Reality
By. William E. Colby .
WASHINGTON-The Aztecs thought
the Sun God had to he strengthened
each day by the sacrifice of a young
man or woman. Without the sacrifice
the sun could not rise.
. The myth of the Sun God's need
drove the. nation through the daily,
travail of the sacrifice.
The reality of astronomy to explain
the sunrise was unknown.
Today we have myths about our
Intelligence. They are expressed in.
sensational catchwords: "dirty tricks,"
"invisible government," "terminate
with extreme prejudice," "lie to any-
one but the President," "infiltration of
the White House," "destabilization,"
"secret war," "massive illegal."
They come from old, outmoded ideas
about intelligence: espionage, intrigue,
derring-do.
These myths achieve lives of their
own. Formal denials, evidence to the
contrary, and independent, serious,
follow-up assessments of the true pro-
portions of a catch phrase never over-
take the original allegation. The myth
becomes accepted as reality.
In normal times, these myths are'
but part of the life of an intelligence
-professional, like the anonymity and
the lonely challenges, intellectual as
well as physical, of a demanding craft.
Today, however, these individual
myths are . gaining momentum and
mass. They tend to portray intelligence
as unconstitutional, improper, un-
wanted by our citizens. They threaten
American intelligence's ability to con-
tribute to the political, economic and
military safety and welfare of our
nation. These myths threaten intelli-
.gence's ability to help our country to
negotiate with-not confront-oppo-
nents in an unsettled world.
If we believe 'these myths, we can
make our own mistaken Aztec sacri-
fice-American intelligence-in the be-
lief that only thus can the democratic
sun of our free society rise.
- We must not sacrifice a virile, a
necessary, contributor. to, the safety of
our nation, the welfare of our citizens,
and peacekeeping in the world of the
future to a handful of myths. The
reality of intelligence today is as dif-
ferent from the myths about it as the
reality of astronomy from the Aztec
.myth of the sunrise.
. Let's note some of the realities:
Our careful centralization of foreign.
information from open, public sources
provides us with a compendium and.
continuity of facts.
America's technical genius has revo-
lutionized intelligence. It has given us
new views of distant objects, new
abilities to analyze and absorb masses
of data and detail, new e fJ i /For Release 200110810Et1w0F *-Rl !0 4a3Pft0ftY?r3iM004-3
complex world of today. ? -~
To these must still be added that
information that we can only get from
the resourceful, dedicated clandestine
operator. He is the only one who can
overcome the barriers of. the closed
and hostile societies that share our
planet. He can tell us of secret plans
for tomorrow or the research ideas of
today. He tells us of the human inter-
action-something no technology can
show--among groups and leaders of
-closed societies.
Experts of independence, talent. and
intellectual integrity study this wealth
of reporting. They write objective as-
sessments of world affairs free from
domestic political bias or Government
departments' budget desires,
Intelligence collection and analysis
cover not only military threats but
political problems and economic dan-
gers as well. Intelligence forecasts of
future trends abroad permit us to.
-make national decisions, about future
foreign threats in time to react.
Intelligence permits us to negotiate
international differences before they
become disputes. And today the excel
fence of our, information now con-.
tributes to ,a new.role for intelligence:
peacemaking and peacekeeping.
With sure information about the
plans, capabilities and dispositions of
the political and military forces on
both sides of foreign crises, we-can,
clarify their misunderstandings of each
other that might lead them to go to
war; we can reassure both sides of
getting from us early warning of
hostile moves by the other side. .
Perhaps the strongest myths relate
to the Central Intelligence Agency's:
mission of covert political . and para-.
.military action. Today's reality is that'
little of this nature is done. What is
done is fully controlled by the policy
levels of our Government -and is ' re-
ported to committees of the Congress.
This, then, is the reality of modern
intelligence. We understand why the.
myths arose, as we understand why
the Aztec myth was born, but serious
and scientific investigations by the
Congressional committees examining
intelligence will clarify the need of
our free society for intelligence and,
show the, excellence of the intelligence
Adams, a descendant of John Adams and
John Quincy Adams. entered the.CIA at
a time when it seemed respectable. His
LONDON TIMES
22 July 19?5
Union federation
wins damages
from Penguin
Penguin Books yesterday
apologized publicly in the High
Court to the general secretary
of an international labour
federation for the suggestion
in one of its books that his
organization was under the
control. of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency.
The company also agreed to
pay unspecified damages to Mr
Tom Sansby Bavin, general
secretary of the International
Federation of Plantation, Agri-
cultural and Allied Workers in
Geneva, who brought a libel
action over the book,' Inside
the Company : CIA Diary, by
Philip Agee.
Mr Marshall Andrews, for'
Penguin, told Mr Justice. Eve-
leigh that the libel would be.
withdrawn from all future edi-.
tions of the book.
structure that serves it.. They should
also show the true proportions of the:
missteps of the past, and the national.
atmosphere in which they occurred.
With .this new perception of reality,
should also come clear direction and
effective supervision. This will insure'
that the new reality remains, fully'
compatible' with our free. society. For:
this, too,, is ' a reality . of. American'
intelligence, that it must conform to,
the will of -the American public as
well as our constitutional procedures.
This need not. include some new
,myth that "the public has a right to
know" everything. The citizen does
have a right to expect that this new
reality of intelligence will 'protect his
country's essential secrets.
We protect other American secrets:
proceedings of grand juries, diplomacy,,
.trade,.. income tax and - census data,
although intelligence secrets are being
exposed in unprecedented, and danger-
ous, volume.
Secrecy is not new in America.. In-
telligence professionals accept, indeed
seek, a better discipline to enforce ad-
herence to the fundamental obligation'
of intelligence, A hat it protect its?
sources.
With public understanding. of the
realities of American intelligence, we,
can avoid a useless Aztec sacrifice.'
Nor need we believe that ultimate'
myth: that America does'not have the
responsibility and restraint necessary'
to have the best intelligence' service!
in the world. .
William E. Colby is the
Central Intelligence. -
I LIS.R' S WEEKLY
21 JULY 1975
Norton nosed out the competition in
an-auction for Sam Adams's "Fourteen
Three" by slightly topping the next high-
est offer of $50,000 and bettering the cus-
tomary royalty rate and reprint split.
book, still to be written, grows out of a
A 7
Director of
to keep up with the'fast-ntovtng and what the service has~ecome. Scott Mere-
dith was the auctioneer.
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 CIA-RDP77-00432R0 0100370004-3
advisers believe that the agency should
be maintained in its present general
form. and have the capability to mount
covert operations. The Adrninistrntion
is not likely to accept the advice of for-
mer Defense Secretary Clark. Clifibrd
and others who argue that the CIA should
be split into two separate units: one
for intelligence gathering and one for
covert operations. White House officials
believe that this could be inefficient,
since the two functions often involve
the same agents. In addition, there is
the fear that putting operations under
a separate and smaller agency might
bring them too close to Pentagon
influence. ?
Public Budget. The goals of the
White House are to restore public con-
fidence in the functions of the intel-
ligence agency and establish an effec-
tive congressional watchdog organiza-
tion. President Ford, say his top aides,
now favors the creation of a special
joint committee, drawing members from
both the House and Senate, that would
have the power-still not spelled out
-to oversee the operations of the CIA.
Such a step was recommended by both
the Rockefeller ' Commission, which
looked into the domestic transgressions
of the CIA, and a blue-ribbon com-
mission on foreign policy that was cre-
ated by President Richard Nixon and
headed by Robert D. Murphy, a for-
mer Under Secretary of State.
Also wider consideration by the
White House is a Rockefeller suggestion
that at least part of the CIA budget
should be made public; it is now en-
tirely hidden, in the nooks and cran-
CHICPGO TRIBUNE
30 JULY 1S-75
Hies of other agencies' appropriations.
Furthermore, the President is mulling
over a recommendation made by both
the Rockefeller and Murphy commis-
sions that, as a general rule, the di-
rector of the Clx should be chosen from
outside the agency-a point that is
agreed upon in principle by none oth-
er than Director Colby, 55, the ar-
chetypal insiderat the agency.
Colby's experience has been almost
entirely in the covert field from the
time he parachuted into France in 1943.
to lead an underground operation until
he served as head of the CIA's plans, a
job he left to become director in June
1973, just a year before the roof fell in.
Since the beginning of 1975, Colby has
had to spend most of his working hours
coping with the criticisms of the or-
ganization. He has testified 36 times
this year before a variety of congressio-
nal committees," maintaining his poise
admirably and replying frankly to hos-
tile questions. Indeed, Colby is being
criticized privately at the highest levels
of the Government for being needlessly
apologetic. One senior official charac-
terizes him as "the kind of guy who,
when he is given a parking ticket, ad-
mits to seven felonies."
Sooner or later, quite possibly by the
end of this year, Colby'seems certain to
be asked to leave-a fate that he ac-
cepts philosophically. Says one White
House aide: "He inherited all the skel-
etons in the closet and issued all the cor-
rective memoranda, but that's not going
to make him any less expendable. He
should be allowed to see the investiga-
tion through, then retire with honor."
Tough Questions. The search for.
Colby's successor as director is already
quietly under way. One prime possibility
is Elliot Richardson, now the U.S. Am-
bassador to Great Britain, formcrly-
Under Secretary of State, Secretary of
Defense and Attorney General. Rich-
ardson earned a national reputation for
probity-when'he quit as Attorney Gen-
eral during Richard Nixon's Saturday.
Night Massacre rather than accede to
demands to take the pressure off the Wa-
tergate investigation. Other names being
mentioned: former Treasury Secretary
George Shultz, former Assistant Attor-
ney General William Ruckeishaus and
former Deputy Defense Secretary Cy-
rus Vance. Whoever is chosen is like!
to face tough questioning during his con-
firmation hearings. "There will be one
hell of a fight and an attempt to tie him
down," predicts a senior policymaker.
But finding the right man for the
top job will be only part of the answer
to the fundamental question of what
kind of a clandestine operation the U.S.
is prepared to conduct: How dirty should
the dirty tricks be? The Hill and the
White House will have to come to a.ba-
sic accord on the matter, then work out
a reasonable way for Congress to mon-
itor the work of the agency. Until this
happens, the CIA will continue to be a
badly shaken organization working be-
low its potential to serve.the nation.
The agency is also defending itselfagainst 13 law-
suits aimed at prying out information. In addi-
tion, because of the new Freedom of lnformatian
Act, it has had to answer nearly 4.500 requests
from individuals and organizations demandins
copies of any information about themselves in Cta
files (in 90c of the cases, there is none).
forinteiii'
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e
.. AL
e
n
i
llity. 't
AWASHINGTON-There' is considerable`, irretrievably damaggedf its abii.y:
` . i. it-to.. ore, should in Cl`ford s view be re-
talk here these days about. changing. the ..gather -Intelligence 'is, permanently - im-.. .moved from CIA to a separate agency
Iaw governing. intelligence operations...; paired. ...Clifford, the . other- hand, reporting to the White House and over-
Even ;if the. Rockefeller Commission, briefly concedes that we should have a = seen by a joint congressional committee:
the. Murphy'; Commission, the Church CIA but.'insists that the old days` of spy- That committee, . Clifford believes,
-Committee, and others produce little ac- . ing are'-gone, replaced by technological.'' ` must be small and well chosen to pre=
tual result, they've declared open season -means. 'vent leaks, but it should control the en-
on tee 1947.law-reason enough perhaps So what about a new law and
budget and give `advance a
uidelines:tire' CL
=
.
g
p
, Jo consider some alternatives.' : for'!the' c o n d u c t'" of ' intelligence. grovel to foreign covert operations. It. is
.::.Two of; the men most, qualified to.dis- operations? The key -- clause .,.most con- :the President Clifford believes; who
'cuss such. achange=-from opposite view . tested is the catch-all one. 'which says reeds oversight. He can't be expected to
points-are least likely to engage in ac-.1..:'.- the CIA. shall perform' such other func= appoint his own overseers in the adv'
tual'rewriting of the'law tho either nay Lions-as shall beassigned to it by the'-, isorv board and the CIA director..
,have sorime infhuence.onitr`:., National Security Council. That was in Walters; with atrace- of -stoicism In
i... Ore_ is; Clark CL'fiord, 'who as a young ciuded 30 . years ago, says Clifford, be i his otherwise folly manner, says the CIA
:lawyer was asked ;ini194o by .President ;?cause without experience in the field it can operate under. any guidelines. the
Truman` to `s t u d y `: unification of the `- ' .was impossible to foresee all continQen- Congress can write and adds that it has
-jat:med:services. and 'establishment of a ties; it Holy should be dropped. Walters never in the past had trouble with leaks
central.; repository of intelligence irfor-: -.:believes it's still impossible to.foresee, fro;a the oversight committee. This, of
mation..'That was- the .beginning of an and thereby foreclose action to meet, all. course, begs the question. The commit-
intimate acquaintance'. with intelligence.-, contingencies; the clause should stay. - tee, in the past, took the view that it
,that?incitided later pests as chairman of., The new law Clifford envisages shou''d didn't wart to know all those things that
the President's Foreign"' Intelligence Ad- s' provide for a full-time White house offi were going or..
Arlsory Board and secretary.of defense:. .cial-pot the CIA;.du?ector as proposed' There is only one huge caveat in Wal-
.The
l -..The other, is Lt. Gen:.Vernon Walters,.. by the Murphy group ;or; the national .' ters' acceptance- of - guidelines.': If you
director, of the Central Intel- security ? adviser as'. now :provided-to ' write them, ? he says, you. must also
ligence--.A:gen_cy, who was beginning his acb as liaison between: the President and write in a mechanism for adapting them
;acti e; career.: ~n the field three the'inteliieence community. He would.be to changing public attitudes about intel-
'.' ea-s before' Clif ford's' vrork started. ? a- htif fer between ~ President and CIA; . ligence. .
'_ \o?.,' taeir vie;;s-overlap only at the:-.assuring trtat each- understood the othet?:- Operations that seemed appropriate in
',far:.:Qdge ,'walte-s ariefly .concedes trial completely.;_: ti a I950s.ate not accep!able. in the 19705,
the.probes:may'oe_beneficial;,hut tier., `Coven :'operations, the._meddlitig `ut z ?he..s'lys and~he .doesn't:. yant.,jo:,.be
emphasizes that tile. ' .0i i F tp~~{e 2p~jiF 8/OlgerM4OV7titi( 32OW001603y0a*-31990' standards' for
ously threatened situuatWii ana may be . Clifford and Walters agree' must. be things done-or not done-iii 1975.
 NEW YORK TIME
31 July 1975
Books of The T.'he Times
ThO? Unma 1h .Of a S.Q.Y.
By RICHARD R. LINGEMAN
INSIDE THE COMPANY. CIA Diary. By Philip
Agee. B40 pages. ' Stonehill ? Publishing
Company. $5.95..
Philip Agee's "Inside the Company" Is
,not a -diary of nearly '10 years with the
Central Intelligence Agency, as the subtitle'
,might suggest. As he explains in the.
foreword, the diary form. is a device to
organize his material. What Mr. Agee
has done is to reconstruct the events
he experienced from memory and supple-
mental research. Thus the book Is more
history than diary, with large-chunks of
material on the political, social and eco-
nomic backgrounds for events be observed
as an operations officer in Ecuador, Uru-
guay and Mexico from 1960 through 1968.
The book was first published in Britain
to, avoid the kind' of C.I.A. censorship that
shredded parts ',of Victor Marchetti and
'John D. Marks's-"The CIA and the Cult of
Intelligence." Its, most valuable purpose is
that of exposure, with Mr. Agee playing
the "whist'_e-blower" who brings heretofore
secret information into the light of public
revelation. Although previous "outside"
.reporting on the C.I.A. has given us a
pretty good idea-.of how the agency plies
its sub rosa trade, we have never before
had such a detailed account of its opera-
tions written by an insider, albeit a rela-
tively low-level one whose service was
limited to Latin America.
Open Window on a Secret World
Circumscribed as Mr. Agee's vantage
point is, it nonetheless throws 'open a
window on much of the C.LA.'s secret
world, and it is doubtful that the agency's
methods elsewhere differ much from-the
ones Mr. Agee describes. In his eagerness
Ito tell all, however, he almost swamps
the reader at the outset while describing
his preliminary training at the C.I.A.
school at Camp Peary. Va. Here the "diary"
uals or even a Soviet secret agency confer- (read, the left) was silenced, with C.I.A.
tion. help, there was no incentive for reform.
~ It is when Mr. Agee moves on 'to his
first assignmentin Ecuador that the story An Arguable Conclusion .
loses its textbook quality - and,. gains. in it is here that the diary becomes a'
authority. Here again, lie' leads off -vrith . political document. Mr. Agee's analysis
what seems to be the. entire file drawer of South American conditions is informa-
as he describes, the mission of the Quito tive; his conclusion that only. revolution
"station,", the political situation in Ecua- (presumably of the Cuban type) can end
dor, all the various. pending -cases and gross economic inequities is certainly ar-
.? even the cryptonyms of various 'informers guable.
--as well as their real names when he Yet as an account of Mr. Agee's conver-
can remember them. This background is sion "Inside the Company" falls rather
useful, though, because it sets the stage flat; deep introspection is lacking, and
for Mr. Agee's description of what he the convert seems to have made a rather
and his colleagues.did: In Ecuador-and abrupt flip-flop from amoral C.I.A. techni-the countries where Mr. Agee subsequently cian to knee-jerk Marxist-Leninist. 'So'.
served-the C.I.A, mounted an aggressive, when he tries to assess the meaning of
sometimes highly effective campaign of the C.I.A. in terms of- his newfound faith,
countersubversion against leftist groups. Mr. Agee falls into a ritualistic denuncia-,
If it did not control-the country's destiny, tion of it as the inevitable "secret police
it certainly amended the political scenario of capitalism." The C.I.A. is a tcoi-and
in significant ways. one that occasionally slips out of control
? 1'
came a silent partner in the gov-
ernments. Mexican authorities co- .
operated with the CIA to such an
extent that the Company could .
tap 40 key telephone lines.
Using agents to tap phones and pen-
etrate the Ecuadorian Communist party,
Agee & Co. worked out an elaborate ruse
to discredit a leftist named Antonio Flo-
res Benitez.. They concocted a report in
the name of Flores, depicting him as a
violent revolutionary. The paper was se-
creted in a tube of toothpaste. One of
the agents at the airport then concealed
the tube up his sleeve and let it fall out
while examining Flores' luggage. When
the document was "discovered," the en-
suing uproar in the press helped discred-
it the government.
Comely Agent. A military junta
took over, much to Agee's satisfaction-
Still he kept close tabs on the generals.
The book reports wide penetration of -of American foreign policy and especla ry The mistress of one of his agents was
Ecuadorian life-the Government, the po- the President and that is something else-. he official stenographer for Cabinet
lice, labor, left wing, right wing--even the something more complicated and ambigu- . the
eetin official A gee was privy P
organization embracing, , among other controllable by public opinion in convinc- before the new governors. The CIA con-
groups, the Boy Scouts and the 'Junior ing and distur?ing detail. centrated heavily on discovering the se-
crets of Cubans, Soviets and satellites.
Agents installed eavesdropping bugs in
apartments. Lip readers studied films
taken of Soviet officials strolling in their
embassy gardens. If the subtle approach
failed, the Company happily played the
role of pimp for overamorous Soviet a-
- Appro-VIe fi -For`RGtE'a e- 2001108108 "CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370004-3
b I UGUST 1975
Company Man
INSIDE THE COMPANY:
CIA DIARY
by PHILIP AGEE
640 pages. Stonehiil. $9.95.
The Rockefeller Commission report
Red Cross. (One is touched to read that detailed its transgressions. Two congres-
when the . station chief was transferred, : sional investigations are probing its
a local civic group gave -rim a medal. . involvement in assassination plots and
"in recognition of his work with youth domestic spying. The press keeps pro-
and sports groups in Quito.") The book. ducing fresh disclosures. With all this
goes on: going on, the CIA looks less like a clan-
Not content merely to inform the police destine fraternity and more like an open
of the whereabouts of a guerrilla band,. society. New sensations would seem im-
the Quito station also persuaded them possible to find, a ,d few, if any, are con.
to exaggerate the number of guerrillas, taicred in the !at--St CIA expose by for-
still operating when the arrests were an- men Agent Philip Agee. His book, Inside
nounced to the press. Forged documents rre Company, is a sheaf of accusations
were planted on leftists by compliant,
police, who then leaked their "discovery" and recollections that can no longer as-
to the newspapers. Numerous propaganda tonish a world grown familiar with the
cgmpaigns were concocted and financed; vagaries of secret services. Nevertheless,
militant-action groups were formed to pro- Agee's tales are worth attention, less for
yoke anti-Communist crackdowns; an unre- their shock value than for the descrip-
mitting campaign to force the Government Lions of a subterranean arena.
to break off diplomatic relations with If ever the CLa recruited a candi-
Cuba was carried out-all these in addition date of uncompromising devotion, Agee
to "normal" intelligence gathering. There - seemed to be the man. When he joined
were no coups or bought elections but "the Company" fresh out of No-,
nonetheless Ecuador' was Chile written tre Dame in 1956, the graduate ex-
small--or rather Chile on an annual budget, perienced an epiphany atop the
of '$500,000, 'which was all the Quito, Washington Monument. In a so-
station had to play with. liloquy straight out of a Loyalty -
We tend to think overmuch of C.I.A. Day pageant, Agee claims too have
bungles; what Mr. Agee's book shows sworn, "I'll be a warrior against
is that, left to itself, the organization is Communist subversive erosion of;:
frequently all too. effective. The trouble freedom and personal liberties
is that the means determine the ends, around the world-a patriot ded-
and 'the ends, in the sense of larger icated to the preservation of my
moral and -policy consequences, are lost
sight of. Mr. Agee's own disillusionment . country and our way of life."
came when he began to assess these- Under the curious cover name
larger implications. He concluded that the of Jeremy S. Hodapp, Agee was :
agency was playing a powerful yet largely assigned to the U.S. embassy in.
negative role as defender of a corrupt, Quito. Ecuador, and then in Mon-
exploitative status quo. Not only the tevideo, Uruguay. Hodapp's good -
C.I.A.'s activities in South America, but works later made him aide to the
also other military and internal-security U.S. ambassador in Mexico. As
aid programs, merely shored up the- described by Agee. the CIA's pen- :
ruling minority-the 5 per cent con= etration of these South American
trolling over one-third of the wealth-by nations was so thorough that it be-
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370004-3
ficials. One was lured into bed by a
comely agent, where his performance
-said to be remarkable-was photo-
graphed and recorded for possible fu-
ture use.
.In a scene reminiscent of the Wa-
tergate bungle, Agee kept watch one
night, walkie-talkie in hand, while two
technicians and an engineer tried to bug
the Czech legation in Ecuador. The
agents were caught in the act by four
guards. The fast-talking engineer saved
the day by taking the guards aside to
allay their curiosity while the techni-
cians furiously ripped out installations.
The encounter is one of the few
memorable passages in a book stuffed
with detail. Indeed, Agee includes so
many facts and names that the book has
two glossaries, one for. the cast of char- -
acters, another for organizations-as if
the reader were wading through War
and Peace. Perhaps, in a sense, he is. The',
events in Inside the Company are a mat-,
ter of life and death; below their flat
prose there moves a complex universe of
national intrigue and human paradox. ;
--The greatest paradox is Agee him-
self; his conversion- is never fully ex-
plained. The .superpatriot simply
decides one day that he has been.
on the wrong side all along: the
good guys were the revolutionar-
ies. "The CIA," he writes with
pious hindsight, "is nothing more
than the secret police of American
capitalism, plugging up leaks in
the political dam night and day
so that shareholders of U.S. com-
panies operating in poor coun-
tries can continue enjoying their
rip-off."
With his new vision as a.
Marxist socialist, Agee quit the
CL4 in 1969 and wrote his book
abroad while bugged and hound-
ed, he claims, by Company agents.
Agee profited from the experience
of Victor Marchetti, another dis-
illusioned CIA agent and co-author
of The CIA and the Cult of Iri-
telligence. When Marchetti set out
to publish his exposd in the U.S.,.
the CIA took him to court and scis-
sored out 168 passages. To avoid
this fate. Agee first published his Agee,' the Americans are always one-
book to Britain. Once it was out, and a dimensional operatives, their indi ,,e-
bestseller, the CIA decided to make no at-:. nous agents pliant and money-seeking:
tem
t at censorshi
in the U
S
p
p
.
.
Although the CIA also refuses com-
ment on the book's accuracy, indepen-
dent intelligence experts, unable to
The New York Times Book Review/August 3, 1 975 -
Is there a sceret police of American capitalism?
Inside the Company
CIA Diary.
By Philip. Agee. -
629 pp. New York: .
Stonehill. $9.95.
It almost takes the stamina and
interest of a Soviet spy to get through
Philip Agee's attempt to relate every-
thing he knew and did during his
12 years as a Central Intelligence
Agency operations officer-his selec-
tion, training and assignments in Ecua-
dor, Uruguay and Mexico in the 1960's,
and his. final disillusionment and resig-
nation at the end of 1969. Too bad
"Inside. the Company" is such a task
to read, because there is important
information buried in its 600. or so
pages that the general American public
should understand, particularly with
today's debate over the past and future
roles of the C.I.A.
Agee, however, wants his book to
be more than just an expose for
his readers. He wants to. convince
them that -"the C.I.A;, after all, is
nothing, more than ? the secret police
of American capitalism, plugging up
leaks in the political dam, night and
day, so that shareholders of United
States companies operating in poor
countries can continue enjoying the
rip-off.". To, support this thesis, the
book is weighed down with polemics
which Agee thinks of as "the more-
difficult political and economic reali-
ties that give the [covert C.I.A.] opera=
tions meaning."
To ' my way of thinking they don't.
Instead they offer a distorted picture
of many ugly .and often unnecessary
attempts by United States agents to
manipulate politically unstable Latin
American countries. According to.
no one on that side acts for noble
or even patriotic reasons. The political
and economc "realities" in Agee's
vouch- for details, think most of it rings world also never seem -to include
true-a fact that should shock only the disruptive acts by Cuban 'or Soviet
naive. In a world full of other intelli- agents, though bombings, strikes and
gence agencies and dirty tricks, a good
deal of the CIA's work may be defended
as useful and even necessary.
The most volatile aspect of this an-
gry volume remains the author's indis-
cretion: he has blown the cover of hun
dreds of CIA men and Latin American
agents. Agee took the step to discredit,
and cripple the CIA, surely knowing he
guerrilla warfare were being promoted
by their Communist agents. I don't
believe such actions justified the total
C.I.A. interventionist response, but by
leaving them out Agee defeats his-
overall purposes.
Agee also sees his book as a means
to "neutralize the C.I.A.'s support to
repression" in third world countries-
an objective he hopes to accomplish
and women. The ex-agent, who now: by exposing names of Agency "officers
lives on the Cornish coast in England, so that their presence . . . becomes
blandly claims that "as far as I know, no untenable." The close attachments de-
one has been endangered as a result." veloped between C.I.A. and host coun-
pened The CIA to the will not people reveal named by what its has hap- former try ry police and intelligence os coua-
employee, but it is known that the Com- tions has always been a scandal; it
pany has changed its operations in Latin is a United States national policy
A A e hit h d h d followed just as conscientiously by
e -
ca
abroad. If Agee limited his naming
names to those in the police end
of things it would be understandable.
He does not. Page after page of C.I.A.'
covert operations-intelligence gather-
ing as well as political action-are
listed along with the names of
Americans directing them and the hun-
dreds of Ecuadorian, Uruguayan, Mexi-
can and other nationals who have
served as-paid or unpaid C.I.A. agents.
There are so many indiviuals named
along with their cryptonyms and pseu-.
donyms that two full appendices. are
devoted to explaining them. When
Agee was in agent-training he found
the use of acronyms "rather complicat-
ed" and "confusing." His own use
of names and cryptonyms is no less
confusing to readers who don't plan
to become agents. _
This torrent of names, however, .
raises a question about some of Agee's
sources and the purpose of his book.
In a recent Playboy interview, Agee
said that '1 had no notes from my'
C.I.A. days; I had to find contemporary
sources to refresh my memory, so
I could reconstruct events." In a 15-
page section early in the .book, Agee
lists some 24 covert C.I.A. operations
which he said were under way in Ecua-
dor in December,, 1960, when he was
first assigned there. He not only lists
the operations but also the real names
and cryptonyms of. 34 Ecuadorians -
whom he identifies as C.I.A. agents
working on these operations.
It is hard to believe. a man without
notes could sit down- 12 years later :
and fecall from, memory that many
agents' names or reconstruct intel-
ligence operations without any assist-
ance from individuals who themselves
had been collecting that very same
information. Thus it seems likely that
during Agee's 1971 trip to Havana
for research, the "considerable mate-
rial" he found there was of this intel-
ligence variety: Both Agee and Cuban
intelligence have, in a sense, an identi-
cal goal-to disrupt C.I.A.. activities
in Latin Amerca. Agee's book certain-
ly ly has done that, though any major
public response apparently will come
only with a Spanish edition of the.
book.,
Once the American reader gets
over the twin hurdles of Marxian
polemics and exposure for destruc-
tion's sake, the book has real rewards.
It describes how the C.I.A. functioned-
in Ecuador and Uruguay between 1961
and 1966 far beyond any point of
public or even Congressional under-
standing of the. intelligence agency's
mission. True, Presidents Kennedy and
. g
men
me-an ar . Unite lit I up- volution to coun-
With some justificatici pfRele e- tk-W !8bs432g4Jb4b %t rica. What each
the Company now bite cal tin "our alter Pincus is a Washington jour- President did not say was that he
first defector." 8 James Arwo!or ; nalist and consultant for NBC News. S
 'had directed the C.I.A. to fight back,
using covert methods. In short, the
United States was exporting Counter-
revolution.
As Agee puts it, when he arrived
in Quite in December, 1960, the Ecua-
dor C.I.A. station's basic. campaign
'was "to promote a break in diplomatic
relations between Ecuador and Cuba."
To support that effort, according to
Agee, the C.I.A. financed anti-Castro
political candidates and even gave,
money to those running for office
in labor union and university student-
government organizations if they were
.anti-Castro. Through Equadorian po-'
lice the Agency arranged for the bug-
ging of pro-Castro leaders and even
directed C.I.A.-paid surveillance teams-
to follow specific individuals both in-
side and outside leftist organizations.
False documents were placed in news-
papers through a respected newsman
who Agee says was a paid C.I.A. agent.
The agency also apparently con-
trolled a hemisphere-wide news ser-
vice and used it to circulate misinfor-
mation to aid in the anti-Cuban pro-
gram. At one point, Agee describes
how one . pro-Castro individual was
framed when a phony report was
slipped Into a toothpaste tube and
planted on him so that. it would,:
be "discovered" when he returned
to Quito from Cuba. Since there were
no Soviets in Ecuador--.there were
no diplomatic relations -between the
two countries then-agency attention
focused almost entirely on the Cubans
and the inherent instability of the
country's own politicians. Inevitably,
American money and attention became
a major factor in Ecuadorian politics.
In Uruguay, Agee describes only
a . slightly different atmosphere. There
NFWS, Greenville, S. C.
10 July 1975
William Colby, of -tie CIA
stand up-to Congressperson
'Bella Abzug and 'some of her
left-wing associates at a
'hearing, the other. day.
Bellowing Bella was com-
plaining as usual because
the CIA had kept files on
some members of Congress,
including her, in cases in-
volving overseas connections.
Bella thinks that-isn't crick-
But Colby pill it in-th&i
right perspective. Why, he
wanted to know,'should Bella
and other members of Con-!
gress be. immune from. scru-1
tiny. in security and foreign
operations instances when all
.other. Americans are not
immune?
-In other words, does Rep.;;
Abzug consider herself above,;
V
'the urge p
guayan or total ? ,olvement in Uru-
ffairs 1Lhc rn n and student
affairs airs al-k, the peasant urn
contaminated by education, free press, politi:
cal debate and other dangerous institutions.
What Solzhenitsyn may lack in the way of
democratic credentials, however, he more
than compensates for in uncompromising
zealotry. Not only does he believe we made a
mistake in not pursuing to success our abor.
tive invasion of Russia after the Bolshevik re?
volution, and not only does he insist we
should not have recognized the Soviet Union;
in 1933, he also comes close to saying that we
should have let the Germans win World Wat
II-because he saw in them hope for elimin-
ating the Soviet regime. Beyond that, little
matters for Solzhenitsyn. .
Now Solzhenitsyn is urging the Americar
people, in effect, to rekindle the cold war and
get ready to fight a hot one, no matter ho%
much he denies it. In the meantime. he telh
us to. make no agreements of any kind *i;t
Moscow. If the world destroys itself in a nu.
clear Armageddon, well, at least the hated
Soviet Communists will be. destroyed, too.Sm
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SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, London
20 July 1975
By ROBERT CONQUEST
T WO rather different voyages
are now in progress. In one
of them, out in space, the Soviet
rocket Soyuz has parted from
:Apollo ` after the spectacular
rendezvous. In the other
Solzhenitsyn continues his tour
of America and, after an initial
docking failure, may yet meet
President Ford.
.1. feel, rather better qualified
than most people to comment on
these two events. I am an old
rocket buff, a. member of the,
British Interplanetary Society for'
many years before the first arti-.
ficial satellites. I lately had a long
and most amicable morning with
Solzhenitsyn. And I am just back
from a tour of the United States
where I met political and trade
u; ion leaders, academics and res
po nsib a journalists (while avoid-
ing the irres},on';ihle, such as some
sections of the British Press in
,Washington).
The'roeket display, as is widely
recognised, is of fairly marginal
technical significance: its main.,
point is as a demonstration, a
propaganda exercise, in favour of
"detente." Solzhenitsyn, on the
other hand, in the tradition of
Russia's Holy Fools, has been blurt-
ing out truths, has been the child
pointing out that the glittering
raiment of detente is largely
imaginary.
This has produced, in America,
itself and in our own Press too, an
enormous volume of abuse, mis-
representation and denigration
from owners of ideological shares
in this phantom company.
But let us note that even Soyuz
contains striking confirmation
of all that Solzhenitsyn stands for.
The genius of the Soviet space
apparently, runs the logic of Solzhenitsyn
Many congressmen still' seem ready to do
anything in the name of anticommunism, and
so they cheered Solzhenitsyn when he ad-
dressed them a few days ago. When President
Ford declined to receive him at the White.
House, there was -so much criticism the Ptes.'
.ident backed down and issued an invitatiorl.
One can only wonder about Kremlin's react;
tion to all this. How would we react if the to-.
bles were turned? Fortunately, the United'
States does not have a prominent exile whc
.might publicly call for our downfall. But if
.there were, imagine what might happen if the
Soviet government, while saying it was for
detente, invited him to give an address in the
Supreme Soviet.
Solzhenitsyn does merit our respect as a'-
great writer and a courageous man. As such;
he deserved a hearing. Now that he has had
it, I hope the American public will tune him
out and consign him to his proper place as a
literary giant and a political oddity.
We can then get on with the business of
working out ways to live peacefully in a dan-,
gerous world--and in the bargain perhaps
contribute to a climate which could breed
more freedom in the U.S.S.R. and elsewheret
programme was Sergei Koroiev.
This was admitted only after he
had died. Before that, the
w h o l e thing was attributed to
harmless academicians of the
second and third rank who were
allowed to meet foreigners, go
abroad and behave in a manner
appropriate to the New Soviet Man.
Korolev could not be trusted to
do this. He had started his contri-
bution in a scientific prison, in`
exactly the circumstances which
Solzhenitsyn himself experienced
and which formed the theme of
'the "First Circle."
When released, and given com-
fortable quarters and fine labora-
tories, he remained totally cynical
about the Soviet order. He used to
say that even then (as with Sol-
zhenitsyn's heroes), he remained`
ready to move with the minimum,
prison bundle, at the usual
3-noment's notice..
. And now, to put it crudely,
-Korolev's product is generating
fantasy in space, while his col-
league is telling the truth on earth.
He is pointing out, in fact, and in
the bluntest and most tactless way,
that, though there may be a peace
in the sense of armed truce
betwden the present-day Soviet
Union and the countries of the
West, the idea that the Kremlin's
motivations have basically changed,
or are likely to change, as the.
result of trade, conferences, hand-
shakes and mutual expressions of
goodwill, is a false one.
To do the Russian leaders
justice they at least have always
proclaimed that detente is " a
method of struggle."
For them " detente" is different.
from " cold war " merely in the
tactical sense which Aesop devel-
`oped 2,000 years ago in that
famous fable where the Wind and
the Sun try in turn to remove a
traveller's cloak, the first by cold
blasts, which only make the man
clutch A he garment more tightly
about him, the second by increas-
ing warmth. The sun, of course,,
wins.
-
There are two types in America
and Europe who do not wish these'
facts to be made known. . First
there are those'who, for whatever
reason, are motivated by an anti-
Western automatism. Secondly,
there are " men of goodwill " who
are so concerned with, or person-.
ally committed to, the rosiest
opinions about pseudo-detente that
they cannot believe the truth to
be otherwise.
Both types have found Solzhen-.
itsyn a nuisance. On the advice of
the detente faction in the Ameri-
can Administration, President Ford
was originally unable to fit in a
talk with him-being busy with
such matters of state as a meeting
with a basketball team.
At a lower level (lower in,
every sense) there has been vicious
sniping at Solzhenitsyn. To under-
mine his vast moral authority is
not, indeed, an easy task. Nor can
it be argued very convincingly by
those in the trendy bars of the
Washington Press corps that he
does not understand Russia.
Still, there are ways: he is a
difficult customer from a cruder
society, he does not understand
how such bonds as trade and
official visits will gradually erode
Soviet hostility (even while free-
dom of movement of 'people and
ideas remains under total ban and
while Soviet-ruled populations are
subject to a vast campaign of anti-
Western "vigilance," even when it
is recalled that the highest points
of German-Russian trade were in
1914 and 1940 respectively).
But above all he can be got at
i -as in a widely condemned and
particularly nasty little piece in
the Guardian the other day-
through those in the West who
agree with him. These are all
" red-necks " or idiot trade ' union
leaders, proponents-of course-of
" cold wai." One would gather
that none but Neanderthal patriots
from the Ozarks hold the view of
the Soviet leadership which Sol-
zhenitsyn. puts forward, or have
qualms about " detente."
In fact, of course, it is common
to almost all serious students of
the Soviet Union and of foreign
affairs in the ::United State's and
'here too: by everyone who writes
and thinks of these affairs, in fact,
except for appeasement-minded
journalists and some circles in the
American Administration.
The phrase " cold war" is of
course the litmus paper for the
Guardian attitude. Cold war, bad;
detente, good-these appear to be
the furthest limits of political
thought such minds can attain. But
during the recent prevalence of
detente we have seen Russian
cannon blasting the way into
Saigon, Russian tanks pouring to
the edge of the Golan Heights;
the Russian-sponsored C u n h a I
h i d d i n g for dictatorship in
Lisbon . , .
For the more serious propon-
ents of the American Administra-
tion's current policy, the disadvant-
age has always been that an
atmosphere of the utmost cordiality
towards a power that you admit-
tedly do not trust enough to give
it supremacy in armaments contri-
butes to the psychological disarma-
ment of the West.
I would suspect that even while
Soyuz and Apollo bombinate
amicably in the vacuum overhead
Dr. Kissinger himself, if not his
lesser followers, welcomes. the
strengthening of the West's resolve
which arises from such bluntness
as Solzhenitsyn's. -
Meanwhile., one could hardly
express the issue more clearly than
one of the major bugbears of the
"liberals," George Meaney, did a
year or two ago:
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WASHINGTON STAR
1 Augus t 19 75
Wfflkn mn F. Buckley Jr.
A- A_
The
_
The gradual re7iection of
Solzhenitsyn by the Ameri-
can intellectual establish-
ment was predictable. For
one thing he is entirely
independent, moving
through the cosmopolitan
scene without tripping over
any of the lilliputian nets
that ensnare most of us.
Now Newsweek magazine
has come up with the killer
designation: "The exile
found himself ignored by`
some influential liberals
and embraced - apparent-
ly to his discomfort - by
the conservative right." If
only they can thus taxono-
mize him - a member of
the conservative right -
they can pin him ? up in a
showcase along with the
rare and grotesque butter-
flies, let him go on there
with his writhings and -
forget about him.
The extensive story in
Newsweek does not tell us
just how Solzhenitsyn is'
embarrassed by the support
given to him by the conserv-
ative right. When he insist-
ed that Senator James.
Buckley of New York be
invited to hear his speech in
Manhattan, he was hardly
shrinking from an associa-
tion with the right. On the
other hand, his principal
sponsors were the trade
unions, the organized voices
of the working man - and
they gave him a tumultuous
reception. Unremarked in
Newsweek.
"His writings. glorify the
wisdom of the simple peas-
ant and the righteousness of
the most rural communi-
-ties," wrote the editors. So
did Thomas Jefferson's, the
founder of the Democratic
party.
He speaks of the "deca-
dence of Western society.".
So does the New York Re-
view of Books, Noam
Chomsky, and Herbert Mar-
"He hates cars and
cities." So does Ralph
Nader.
"He was shocked to find,
that interest in Soviet af-
fairs seemed to be limited
to the far right." Well,'if
that is so, I too am shocked.
Interest in Soviet affairs
was very great among the
far left during a period
when much of it was servile
to the Soviet state. New-
sweek seems to be suggest-
ing, though I doubt it was.
intentional, that American
liberals have lost interest in
the Soviet Union now that
they acknowledge it as a
slave state bent on main-
taining the captive nations
in captivity, and manufac-
turing more and better
hydrogen bombs with which.
to threaten us.
If Solzhenitsyn is a far
rightist who appeals to the
far right, he goes at it in a
most unorthodox way. Hav-
i g declared that the Rus
sian people are the natural
allies of the American
workers, he commented in
.one of his recent speeches
about "another alliance
at first glance a strange'
one, a surprising one - but
if you think about it, in fact
one which is well-grounded
and easy to understand:
this is the.alliance between
our Communist leaders and
your capitalists."
"This alliance is not
new," Solzhenitsyn remind-
ed his audience. "The very
famous Armand Hammer,
who is flourishing here
today, laid the basis for this
when he made the first ex-
ploratory trip into Russia,'
still in Lenin's time,' in the
-very first years of the Revo-
lution. He was extremely
successful in this intelli-
gence mission and since
that time for all these 50
" - . with regard to Moscow's
present line, we are told that we
must' accept the politics of reality.'
That means the Berlin Wall, mine-
fields along the frontier, ransom
for Soviet Jews, and acceptance of,
say, the persecution of Lithuanian
Catholcs as an 'internal Soviet
affair."'
" Well, we don't see it that way.
We don't want to start any :
wars, but. we insist on something.
that seems to disturb a lot of
so-called intellectuals-we insist on
emphasising the difference between
democracy and dictatorship."
And so says Solzhenitsyn. And
stigmatize 001zhenitsyn
ous and steady support by
the businessmen of the West
of the Soviet Communist
leaders." Doesn't sound to
me like a typical far right
talk. . . .
Solzhenitsyn went on 'to,
discuss a recent exhibit of
United States anticriminal
technology which the Rus-
sians bought up with fasci-
nation. The difference being
that we were selling our
scientific paraphernalia not
to the law-abiding for use
against criminals, but to
criminals for use against
the law-abiding: rather like
inventing a guillotine for
the. purpose of chopping
meat, and then selling it to
Rosespierre for other uses
"This is something which
is almost incomprehensible
to the human mind: that
burning greed for profit
which goes beyond all rea-
son, all self control, all con-
science, only to get
money." Far right talk, .to
NEW YORK
4 August
the editors of Newsweek. As-
a veteran of a number of
.right-wing rallies, I take
leave to pronounce this as
an unorthodox way to ce-
ment relations with the.
capitalist class.
What Solzhenitsyn is of
course proving is that the
deep resources of humanity
lie for the most part in the
conservative community.
This is despicable. Because
conservatives, by and
large, do not believe in the-
shifting standards of right
and wrong which, for in-
stance, can bring a Barbara
Tuchman, a James Reston,
or a John Kenneth Gal
braith to travel to mainland
China and report back their
boundless enthusiasm for
the work of Mao Tse-tung.
If his tormentors truly suc-
ceed in identifying Solz-
henitsyn as a member of the
far right, they will succeed
in identifying themselves as
the heartless, mindless
robots they, in f?et, so often
are.
TIMES
1975
let O t
reams
By Anthony Lewis
In his speech to the Helsinki Con-
ference, President Ford emphasized its
pledges of freer movement for people
and ideas. "It is important," he told
the leaders of thirty-four other coun-
tries there, "that you recognize the
deep devotion of the American people
and their Government to human rights,
and fundamental freedom."
How embarrassingly hollow those'
words must have sounded. For Mr.:
Ford had just had a chance to demon-'
strate his devotion to human rights in
the simplest way-by meeting a man
who symbolizes the struggle for them
-and he failed the test.
The decision not to invite Aleksandr' Solzhenitsyn to the White House has'
been deplored by now from all points
of the ideological compass. For sheer
political inepitude it was in a special
class. But beyond that, the episode
teaches us some things about the na-
ture of political life.
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tatdrs in the United States seized on
Soizhenitsyn's presence here as a
way to dramatize their argument that
detente is a mistake because the
Soviet Union can never be trusted. The,
only way to deal with Communism,
they say, is to oppose it everywhere
by military strength-and increase the
already enormous burden of the arms
budget.
President Ford and Secretary of.
State Kissinger allowed that view,to.
occupy the field by their foolishness.
But the special importance of Sal-
zhenitsyn -does not lie in any par-
ticular political stance, or in his own
Christian-Slav mysticism. It lies in
his person, his witness, his words.
'Solzhenitsyn has shown the world
that one human being, through his
courage and his. art, can inflict moral
defeat on the most powerful of tyran-
nies. He has reminded us of the poten-
tialities of the human spirit. And of
course that achievement transcends
any narrow politics. ,
The United States cannot ordinarily
help the victims of tyranny by means
of bombs or missiles. We do not live
in that kind of world. Our recourse
has to be to other ways of pressure:.
political and economic and. psycho-
AT HOME ABROAD
logical. One of the most important
things we can do is simply to make
JAPAN TIMES
25 July 1975
ra 5 ante
Hero
By Max Lerner
clear that we have a commitment to
human rights-a commitment going`
beyond immediate political considera-
tions.
For those who live under oppression,
it can make all the difference to know
that somewhere outside others care
about them and share their views of
humanity. That is why those who
suffer discrimination in South Africa
.give such an emotional welcome to
visitors from abroad. And it is exactly
the same for dissenters in the Soviet
Union.' It would have been a restoring
symbol of hope, for them, if an
American President had shaken the
hand of Solzhenitsyn.
A second lesson of the episode, a
sad one, is that we suffer these days
from political leaders without ideals,
without dreams. Their interest is
limited to the immediate, their vision
to- power.
Consider the reason finally given for
the decision of state to keep away
from 5olzhenitsyn,. After v.irio::s pa-
thetic excuses from the WLte- House,
Mr. Kissinger gave this explanation:
Solzhenitsyn's "views," if they be-
came our "national policy," would
threaten "military conflict."
ilow happen to think that that
stated reason had nothing to do with
the case. I think Henry Kissinger just
cares much less about human rights
and decency than he does about power'
and short-term political objectives. He
Watching Alexander Solzhenitsyn on TV, on the Meet -the
Press program, one saw a transplanted hero, with a Dostoevs-
' kian growth of beard and fierceness of eye, coming on with the
intensity of a major prophet. Because the setting was the fa-
miliar American one of electronic journalism the torrential
flow of his talk had to be, sliced up into question-and-answer
segments. When the'Apocalypse comes it will be measured out
in two-minute driblets, with time out for a commercial.
Solzhenitsyn's American tour is not just a 'case of another
visit by another famous foreigner. It is a historic test of what '
happens to a hero when he gets ripped up from his native soil
.and transplanted to a foreign one. Does the magic of heroism
get muted, the halo tarnished? Does the sense of the extraor-
dinary dissolve when dipped into the everyday?
The Soviet leaders, when they packed Solzhenitsyn off on a'
'plane to Switzerland, may have gambled on this happening.
They hoped that with the transplanting to Western. Europe and
America the bloom would wear off the rose.
Will it? The danger of its happening is clear enough. As long .
as. Solzhenitsyn spoke and wrote from within the belly of the
monster itself, putting his life on the line, courting peril, dar-
ing the Soviet masters to stop him, the rest of the world --
. including his critics on the left - watched in awe. They didn't
dare speak out against him. But now that he is out of extreme
danger, appearing securely before American audiences, vis-
iting with 'a delegation of American senators, his .critics no
:longer are inhibited.
The whispers get louder. Isn't he a cold warrior, as witness
his quoting Melvin Laird on SALT I? Isn't he old hat, hobnobb-
ing with George Meany and the other old men of American
conservative labor? Is-Ti't he a fanatical anti-Communist, who
sustains the right-wing governments
of such countries as Chile and South
.Korea, despite their brutal character,
because he thinks them helpful to his
policy. And he does not want to let
anything get in the way of his doing
business with Leonid Brezhnev.
But in a way it would be worse if
Mr. Kissinger really meant what he'
said. For the suggestion is that an
American President dare not meet a
person with bad ideas, however great
a ;human being, lest the President be
infected with his views and make
them "national policy." Try to imag-
ine Jefferson or Lincoln or Roosevelt
-afraid of ideas.
We ask our politicians to do the'
work of the day, and we should not
expect them to show the same concern
as artists for eternal truths. But we
may begin to. wonder, in this age,
whether something has happened to
make political leaders everywhere--
not only in the United States-such
narrow, humorless, insensitive crea-
tures.
It is our own fault, as citizens, if
we begin to see life in the politicians'
limited terms. There is more in- the
stars than that. Generations thrill to'
Mozart that do not know the poli-
. ticians of his age. Men will remember
and read Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn when
Gerald Ford is a footnote to history:
' name of a President who pardoned
' is criminal predecessor.
will get the United States into trouble with the. Soviet Union?.
Isn't it dangerous to talk of the Russian people being buried by
their rulers? Isn't he just a Catholic writer carrying the same
old anti-Communist message that other exiles have carried the Poles, Lithuanians, Latvians and the .rest?
Isn't he a stick-in-the-niud conservative, and a mystical one,
too, with all his , talk about religion and love of the Russian
earth and the soul of the people? Isn't he enveloping the.
-American people of the Heartland with the same mystique?.
The answer ,is, of course, that one can disagree with particu-'
lar views of Solzhenitsyn and still see his continuing heroic
quality. He could have made an easy adjustment to his exile.'
He could now be mouthing all the fancy rhetoric that would go
down beautifully with the -intellectual elites of. New York,
Washington, Paris, London, and they would be carrying him
on their shoulders,- before they dumped him in time: But that
isn't his style. He is in dead earnest, he is consumed with an
inner. fire, and he won't let anyone near him get out of reach
of the flames.
On the question of President' Ford's failure to see him, Sol-
zhenitsyn's answer - that he didn't come as a guest of the
American Government and didn't expect to be received by Mr.
Ford - is good enough in its own way. Yet something must be
added. As long as the rulers of one great power would deem it
an unfriendly act for the head of another great power to talk
with a major intellectual' figure from either country, there is
no common climate between the two, and as yet no world in-
tellectual community.
Solzhenitsyn is especially good on the question of commu-
nication between peoples.. The experience of one people, he
says, is communicated back to another by its great writers. He
adds that the burden of experience borne by the Russian
people has been tragic. This is true of the American people,
too, if our. writers and thinkers could only express it.
Asked whether he regards the West as in decline, Sol.
zhcnitsyn answers no; that it is only the will' of its ruling
groups which is weak. He might have added that the pe_-
ceptions of its intellectual communities are also confused. I
Solzhenitsyn can act as a seer, and invoke the experience of
the Russian people to make the people of the West see more.
clearly, he will play a great historic role outside Russia, as be
did within Russia. '
C. pyr'ight 1975, Los' Angeles Times
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