MAJORITY SAYS SAVE THE CIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 25, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 1, 1975
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003-70002.5
CONFIDENTIAL
INTERNAL USE ONLY
This publication contains clippings from the
domestic and foreign press for YOUR
BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use
of selected items would rarely be advisable.
S SEPTEMBER 1975
GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS
GENERAL
EAST EUROPE
WEST EUROPE
NEAR EAST
AFRICA
EAST ASIA
LATIN AMERICA
Destroy after backgrounder has served
its purpose or within 60 days.
CONFIDENTIAL
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5
U.S. N 1 2 - 4 1 S ) 2; WORD REPORT
25 August. 75
LGA ST THE ct:
S
It's now possible to piece together much of the story 1960s. He added that he had no grounds to assert that t
about the Central Intelligence Agency that is being late U.S. President John F. Kennedy-and his brother, then
presented to committees of Congress. U.S. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, were directly
involved in the
lots
These committees are investigating charges that the
CIA plotted assassinations of foreign - leaders, helped
engineer coups to overthrow governments, spied on
U.S. citizens in this country, opened and read thou-
sands of private letters and listened in on private
p
.
Senator Richard Schweiker (Rep.), of Pennsylvania, a
member of the Senate Committee, has urged that the
investigation of John Kennedy's 1963 assassination be re-
opened because, in the Senator's view, the plots against
tro provided a political motive for a possible. Cuban
involvement in the Kennedy shooting, which the investiga-
ivionths will elapse before the Senate and House tors did not consider.
Committees,complete their inquiries-and the final Several former Kennedy aides have rejected that pol5sibil,
official findings are published. Much of the testimony nay. Theodore Sorensen, a onetime Kennedy speechwriter,
J
has to reporters after testifying at a closed session of the
as been o wen behind closed doors. Yet a substantial Senate Committee and said: "It's very clear to me that
part of the disclosures has become public. President Kennedy at no time authorized, approved, con;-
The following report tells what is now known of the doned or even knew of any assassination plot as an instru
"case" against U:S- intelligence organizations. meat of U.S. foreia policy against a leader or any foreign
~~~ ~~~~-~~ ASSASSINATION ~k ~_~ country." Former White House aide Richard Goodwin has
quoted President Kennedy as warning in 19o1 that involve-
Did they CL-4 actually go out and kill--or try to kill-foreign went in foreign assassinations could bring retaliatory attacks._
leaders in` the name of the U.S. Government? This. is the According to Mr. Goodwin, the President said: "if we get
biggest mystery of all into that kind of thing, we'll all be targets."
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Operations, Lawrence R. Houston, a former general counsel for the
which is investigating assassination charges, has taken all its CIA, told reporters that in 1962 he informed the,then
testimony in ?ecret. But much has emerged from public -Attorney General, Robert Kennedy, about an aborted CI3
statements outside the closed hearing -room by Committee, plot with the Mafia to kill dlr. Castro: According to 11r_
members and witnesses, and from other public sources. Houston, Mr. ! ennedy gave the -impression that he was
PViost of this-information concerts the charge that the CIA leaning of the plot for the first time but that he "wasn't
organized repeated plots to kill Cuba's Communist Premier, terribly' perturbed about it." Mr. Houston quoted Mr. Kenne-
Fidel Castro. dy as saying, If you're going to have anything to do with the
One Committee witness was John Roselli, a former mem_ 1VlSen come to me first."
ber of the Al Capone gang and Iona a part.of an organized- Senator Church, head of the Senate investigating commit-
crime syndicate known as the Mafia_ Roselli, according to tee, said he has found no "hard evidence linking a President
Committee members, testified that he was recruited by the
CIA. in 1961 to kill Premier Castro, -
his younger brother, Raul Castro,
and the Cuban revolutionary lead-
er Chz Guevara.
Another witness was Robert Ma-
hen, a former, top aide to billion-
aire Howard Hughes and once a
Federal Bureau of Investigation
agent, who said he worked several
years for the CIA on a retainer of
$500 a month,'beiruaing in 1954.
In a news conference following
his testimony before the Senate
Corarnittee, Mr. Maheu said he
was ordered by the CIA to enlist
the help of two underworld Figures
to "eliminate" the Cuban leader.
He identified the two underworld
figures as Ioselli and the late Sam
Ciancana, who was murdered re-
cently in Chiczgo before he could
be called' as a witness. Senator
Frank Church (Dem ), of Idaho; chairman of the Committee,
said there was iio reason to believe the CIA was involved in
Gia
na's death. . .
According to Mr. MMaheu, the two men were to use their
Cuban "contacts to smuggle two poison capsules into the
Castro household, and, when the word was ,given, the cap-
sules were to be used to kill. "But," Mr. Maheu said, "the
plan was always subject to at 'go- signal which never came."
Of his o rn knowledge. Premier Castro himself has said
that he knew of at least a dozen serious attempts against his
life by counterrevolutionary groups under CIA control Most
of the attempts, he told news XP.por, r , oc a red in rrhho~ Arm ' chief Schneider Lir. r plied: "In my judg-
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to any of the alleged CIA assassination plots.
More accusations. Besides the plots against Fidel Castro,
the CIA is also accused of:
? Having had a hand in the assassination of South Viet-
nam's President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963, the assassination of
Gen. Rafael Trujillo, dictator of the Dominican Republic, in
1961, and the killing of the Prime Minister of the former
Congo, Patrice Lumtunba, also in 1961.
0 Helping to promote-the 1973 coup which resulted in the
overthrow and death--either by suicide or assassination--of
Chile's .Marxist President Salvador Allende, and possible
involvement in a 1970 plot that resulted in the assassination
of Chile's Army chief, Rene Schneider.
Comparatively little has seeped out of the closed Commit-
tee hearings about alleged plots in countries. other than
Cuba.
Senator John Tower (Rep.), of Texas, the Committed vice
chairman, declared at one stage of the hearings that the
panel had found no evidence of direct CIA involvement in
the killing of South Vietnam's President Diem. And former
White House aide Sorensen said he told the Committee that
President Kennedy gave orders that the U.S. take no part in
anti-Diem plots. ... I
CIA officials have acknowledged giving millions of doli.trs
in aid to. political parties and groups in Chile, but have
denied any part in killings or coups in that country.
The Senate Committee finished its hearings on the a?sassi-
nation phase of its investigations on August 12, with Secre-
tary of State Henry A. Kissinger as the final witness.
After testifying, Secretary Kissinger told reporters , he
knew of no U.S. policy or plots to assassinate any Foreign
official's -or leaders anywhere during the Nixon and 1:ord
Administrations in which he served.
Asked specifically whether the United States bears any
responsibility for the deaths of Chilean President Allende or
E
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ed to the subcommittee. by the CIA was that of a Thai
operative of the agency who was accused in 1973 of attempt-
ing to smuggle narcotics into the U.S. There were also
charges of misappropriation of CIA funds and allegations of
mishandling of classified documents.
Some disclosures about CIA operations have come from
outside the congressional hearings or federal agencies.
Documents made public in a civil suit by the Socialist
Workers Party showed that CIA spies practiced for overseas
assignments by infiltrating and reporting on the domestic
political activities of the party and its youth affiliate, the
Young Socialist Alliance. -
AND MORE YET TO COME
After months of investigations by the Rockefeller Commis-
sion and by Congress, the evidence on this country's massive
intelligence operations is voluminous. But the full story is yet
to be told. And the final verdict on the legality or propriety
of some operations is yet to come. So is a decision on what to
do about regulating or restricting intelligence activities in
CIA: "BEST IN ' ORLD" .
Director William E. Colby sums up his defense of the
CIA in these words: It may have done some things in
the past which were either mistaken or wrong. But.the
CIA today is the best intelligence service in the world.
- .. It is the envy of the foreign nations. . . . I think we
need good intelligence. I think we have got it--and I
think we should continue."
Charges against the CIA, Mr. Colby maintains, have
been exaggerated-especially those charges of "mas-
"
sive
domestic spying. In
a report to President
Ford, the intelligence
chief acknowledged that
in the surveillance of "dis-
sident" Americans, which
is known as "Operation
CHAOS," the CIA some-
times "may have over-
stepped its bounds." But
he insisted "any steps
over the line in CIA's 27-
year history were few and
far between and, if
wrong, stemmed from a misconception of the extent of
CL-Vs authority."
"Certainly, at this time;" the Director assured the
President, "it is my firm belief that all activities of the
Agency are within the limits of its authority."
Assassinations. On assassination plots against for-
eign leaders: l Ir. Colby has steadfastly refused to discuss
publicly the specific charges that are under investigation
by congressional committees. He says "I think there is
WASHINGTON POST (POTOMAC)
10 August 1975
7HE FAST T ' 4,
The new addition to the President's Council of Eco-
- nomic Advisors, Paul M*cAvoy, comes from- a-
quiet little street in Ipswich, Massachusetts, where
novelist agora Upolko is a neighbor. The street:
Wi lla-Vain ..., . "I'm going to Nome, Alaska,
to publish a CIA newsletter," cracks New York
Times investigative reporter S aymosr Penh,
asked about rumors he might love the Times, Ac-
tually, he says he left town a couple of weeks ago to
work for several months on a long-promised book
on national security for Random House. He says he
will then work out. of the Times' office in New
York while his wife attends medical school there.
the future.
When the congressional committees broke off their hear-
ings for an August recess, their investigations were far from
finished. They will be resumed when Congress returns to
work in September. -
The Senate Committee, which so.far has concentrated on
assassination charges, will turn to other allegations against
the CIA. It will also look into the intelligence activities of
other federal agencies, such as the FBI and the Defense
Department. The House Committee will pursue a similar
course.
Then will come hearings on legislation expected to pro-
pose tighter supervision of intelligence operations---and
probably to limit their scope. One proposal would specifical-
ly forbid assassination plots. And attempts will probably be
made to force at least the figure for the total intelligence
budget into the open. _
The outlook is that Congress and the White House will be
embroiled in controversy over intelligence matters for
months to come. Ieavn~
positive harm to the reputation of the country to go into
great detail on these things."
But the intelligence chief emphasizes: "Our policies
today . are clear. . . . I am opposed to assassinations
because I think they're wrong and because I think they
frequently bring about absolutely uncontrolled and un-
foreseeable results." -
Over the years, Mr. Colby has related, foreigners have
suggested assassinations to him, and employes of the U.S.
Government have also discussed the possibili ty of assassi-
nations with him. But each time, he says, he rejected the
idea.
In a June appearance on NBC's "Meet the Press"
telecast, Ir. Colby warned that "any attempt to dis-
band" the CIA "would leave our nation vulnerable in a
world in which we now sit 30 minutes away from a
nuclear missile aimed and cocked at.us, in a world in
which our economic resources can be throttled by
hostile foreign nations." - __.r
Director Colby has expressed concern that the effec-
tiveness of U.S. intelligence operations may be damaged
by the publicity given CIA operations in the current
investigations and the curbs on CIA activities that might
be imposed. This is a concern shared by many in
Congress and in the Administration.
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger has said:-"There
have been some abuses, but I consider the intelligence
function of the CIA is vital for the conduct of foreign
policy and I hope that the CIA will not be damaged."
President Ford has given assurance that any recom-
mendations he makes to tighten supervision over U.S.
intelligence agencies "in no way will preclude these
-intelligence. agencies from carrying out their legitimate
foreign-intelligence responsibilities."
THE WASH=I' CTOT STAR
18 August 1; 75
!fs,-And, Slats .
. Sen Frank Church, D-Idaho, says he would disap-
pove of any CIA involvement in current anti-
-Communist activity in Portugal, although he feels
such Covert activity may be proper. "This is a case,"
he said, "where a covert action bythe CIA could be
said to-at least conform to our values as a country and
to our professed principles." But then he added: "i
can't think of anything that would help the Commu-
nists more in Portugal than to have us messing in it
and get exposed and then let the Communists point to
the fIA for having intervened secretly in Portuguese
affairs. That could keep most spies cold for awhile.
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 NEW YORK TIMES
31 August 1975
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SIGHTSEERS CAPE
AT PULMIAR BARGE
Huge Craft Slowly Sinks
and Rises 4 Days Later
Off California island
. Spedai te, The 5,m, York Times
CATALINA ISLAND, Calif.,
Aug. 30-Last Sunday- a thou
sand or so vacationers on the
beach at Isthmus Cove here
were treated to a remarkable
sight.
A great covered barge, longer
than a football field and re-
sembling an ocean-going dirig-
ible hangar, began sinking
about a 'quarter of a mile off-
shore. She went down so slow-
ly that hours passed before she
finally vanished below the sur-
face.
An ungainty vessel then
Moved into the cove. She was)!
longer than two football fields,l
with a great derrick devi
arising amidships. The vessel
positioned herself directly
over the spot where the barge!
had sunk and dropped her an-i
chors. For the next four days:
the_ vessel perched motionlessi
over the submerged barge, likel
some prehistoric sea bird hatch-
ing a giant egg. .
The barge was the H. M. 1F3.-I,
which stands for Huhes Ma-
o Barge, and the ship squat-
Last year the Glomar report-
edly retrieved part of a sunken
'Soviet nuclear submarine from
,the bottom of the ocean 700
miles off Hawaii in a covert
operaiion from the Central In-
telligence Agency. The submer-
gible barge is a support vessel,
reportedly used to attach a gi-
ant submarine-grappling claw
to the Glomar from below.
Until the secret mission be-
came known. to March, the pub-
lic had been told that the Glo-
mar and her barge were a proj-
ect financed by the billionaire
,Howard-R. Hughes to mine val-
uable mineral nodules from thei
ocean floor.
rr The vessel's cloak and dagger
background made the Glomar
,and her barge a subject of in-111111.
.tense interest among vacation-1
This interest was heightened)
.by the site of the Glomar activ-1
.ity. Isthmus Cove is one of the)
two populated areas on ibis`
-largely undeveloped island,
which lies 26 miles off the Cali-
{fornia. coast The cove isi
crowded with hundreds off
boats..
'drive-in theater," said a visiting!
accountant-
Permanent residents here say
that the latest visit is the
;barge's fifth trip to isthmus
Cove in he last four years and
the Glonrar's fourth.
They say the barge first came
_-BALTIMORE SUN
27 August 1,975
CIA not at home
Philadelphia (KNI)-De-
pending on your feeling
about the CIA, this news
may either be disturbing or
relieving. The mews is that
there is no one home at the
Philadelphia office of the
CIA. When you call the local
office of the CIA (215-MA 7-
1390) a recorded message
says: "This is the Central In-
telligence Agency. . . and
due to other commitments
there. will not be a repre-
sentative in this office until
Tuesday, September 2."
struction at a Pennsylvania
shipyard. On the next four
visits, the Glomar came here,
too. Each time, residents say,
the barge went to the same
spot and submerged The
Glomar moved in and perched
over her for several days and
then moved aside as the barge
rose out of the sea-
The operation is self-con-
tained, providing its own power
with electrical generator aboard
the Glornar and a work barge
named the Ore Quest. The
project requires a small flotilla
of auxiliary vesseLs, including
:thtree tugs, several security
launches, and an ashor-pulling
vessel. called Me Happy
Hooker.
Whatever the Glomar and the
submergible barge are doing,
they are not mining mineral
nodules. Where the barge sub-
merged the depth is only 159
feet and the ocean floor is flat
and sandy,
Throughout the operation
most of the Glom crew-re-
portedly more than 100 then
,and technicians-were confined
to the ship. The few allowed
ashore were close-mouthed and
answered vacationers questions
with silence or, shrugs.
Lights Up Love
At night the Glomar was a
blaze of lights, illuminating
much of the cove.
"Do you want to know what
the Glomar is doing?" asked
,'Lillian White, manager of the
'lone hotel here. "FII tell you
what it's doing. It is frighten-
ing the buffalo away from the(
isthmus. There hasn't been one
_here since the Gloru.3r arrived."
Catalina is the home of 500
buffalo, whose ancestors were
'left here many years ago by a
movie crew that brought them!
in for a Western film.
Last Wednesday, the Glomar;
moved to one side and during
the night the barge emerged
again from the ocean bottom.
On Tli;hrsday night the Glomar
returned to her berth in Long
.Beach and the giant barge was
towed off northward.
During the day, a lone buf-
falo appeared in the hills over-
looking the cove and then went
back over the crest
"See him?" said Mrs. White.
"He's the lookout for the herd."
By afternoon some 50 buf-'
IV-ASHINGTON STAR
19 August 1975
LOS ANGELES (AP) -
The mystery ship Glomar
Explorer, built by Howard
Hughes and used in a secret
CIA mission to salvage part
of a sunken Russian
submarine, will perform an
undisclosed mission off the
California coast.
A spokesman for Global
Marine Co., which runs the
sophisticated ship, would
not disclose what the new
mission would be.
. Meanwhile, in the first
formal public assertion that
the federal government
owns the ship, the Justice
Department announced in
Washington it is seeking an
injunction to prevent Los
Angeles County from levy-
ing a $7.5 million, tax
against the vessel.
The government still has
not formally acknowledged
the submarine-raising
operation conducted by the
ship for the CIA.
The injunction is being
sought in U.S. District
Court in. Los Angeles on
HUMAN EVEIITS
23 August 1075
A
n
grounds the ship is the
property of the United
States and thus not taxable
by a state or any of its sub-
divisions.
The Los Angeles County
tax assessor slapped a 25
percent fraud assessment
on Hughes' Summa Corp. in
June because, he said, it
told him in 1974 the ship
was registered in Delaware
when it was in fact regis-
tered in California and tax-
able there.
On the nature of the-
upcoming mission, Taylor
Hancock, a Global Marine
spokesman said:
"We're free to say that it
(the Glomar Explorer) will
be doing some experimen-
tal work by the isthmus," f
near Catalina Island, about
23 miles off the California
coast, said Taylor Hancock.
A CIA spokesman, asked
for comment on the latest
events affecting the Glomar
Explorer, responded: "We
haven't said ' diddly-squat
about any of these tales."
Sen. Barry Goldwater (R.-Ariz.), a member of
t'-e Senate lnteliigence Committee, charged last
.~:eek.t:`:et attempts "to protect the Kennedy name"
were splitting the panel. In an obvious reference to
Chairman Frank Church (D.-Idaho). Goldwater said
that ''it appears efforts are being made to divorce
former President John Kennedy, and his brother,
Attv. Gen. Robert Kennedy. from assassination at-
temott, on Fidel Castro in the early 1960s. Gold-
water said he resented .impressions "that the CIA
was out of control and conducting private, wars
against foreign leaders without presidential au
thority." From the inception of the agency in 1947,1
Goldwater said. Presidents have "directly or indi-
rectly approved all actions taken by the CIA."
tr How accurate are the accusations of ex-CIA
agent-turned-revolutionary Socialist Philip Agee in
his book, "Inside the Company: CIA Diary"? Well.
Penguin Books. which brought out the edition in
England, has publicly apologized in court to Tom
Gavin, the general secretary of- the International
FEderation of Plantation, . Agricultural -and Allied
Workers in Geneva. for Agee's suggestion that his
organization was under control of the CIA. Penguin
has agreed to pay unspecified damages to Gavin,
who brought the libel action over the book, and has
promised to withdraw the libel from all future edi-
tions.
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.INSIDE THE CIA: INVESTIGATING THE INVESTIGATORS
Lecture by Daniel Schorr
Washington Correspondent, CBS Mews
for the
Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies
Paepcke Auditorium
August 19, 1975
i Two years ago -I stood on this platform, talking about
Watergate, saying, as I recall, that it would not end before
'President Nixon left the White House, It took another year
for the unraveling of V-latergate to be comr,pleted_ with. r es gna-
tion. But what I did not anticipate is that a year later I
would be back on this platform talking about the Son of _1,iater-?
gate --- the investigation of the CIA.and the rest of the intel-
ligence community.
I ball it "son of Watergate" because it has the same ear-
marks -abuse of power when no one is looking, cover-up.
when someone starts looking, panic when the looking goes too
deep for the cover-up to be maintained,
The CIA situation also has a direct family relationship
to Watergate. The strategies and the 'Personnel. of ?Watergate
came from the CIA's Ray of Pigs operation. Ater gate was covert
operations turned inward. Techniques deemed acceptable for
bringing down foreign enemies looked less acceptable when used
to bring down domestic enemies. !,'ore simply, an unlovely flock
'ofchickens has come home to roost. a
It was, in fact, Watergate which caused the first thorough-
going inspection of the CIA chicken coop. Director Richard
Helms, who had withheld from the FBI information about CIA's
earlier help to its alumnus, Howard Hunt, which Hunt used for
the break-in on Daniel Ellsber g's psychiatrist, had been shipped
off to Iran early in 1973.
His successor, James SchiesJer, in i Miay, 1913, called on
all employees to come forward and report to the Inspector;
General, or directly to him, any improprieties they knew of.
They ? knew of hundreds, large and small. Within twelve. days they
were compiled into a fat book, titled not 'Tae?ort on Gross
Improprieties, but "Flap Potential Report." For the ,-motivation
was not so much a zealous rooting, out of wr ong-doing as a
prudent preparation for dealing with situations, like Howard
Hunt's wig, that might come unstuck and embarrass the agency.
The Flap Potential Report expanded and acquired new tit Les.
she Skeletons Report" and,. finally, with that urbane 'humor
which is the hallmark of the intelligence professional, it
became known as "the Family Jewels."
By August, x.973, when the plan had- been evo]J ed. to dis--
posd..of "the Family Jewels," Schlesinger had gone, on to greater
things at the Pentagon and been succeeded by his executive
director, ?illiam Colby. The plan was sim?`pl e -- a series of
directives to ban henceforth all those activities that :night,
if ekpcsed, cause embarrassment because ille;=:al or improper.
The mass exposure of Watergate had ended the sense of immunity
from exposure. One directive said: No more illegal opening
of mail! Another directive said: No more assassination
plots! st~~,-o~~u,~relscDovo~o2cA-'~74~~P~3~5!
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"Operation Chaos" -- the spying: on domestic dissidents ---
was to be dismantled and henceforth prohibited. Also, no more
experimentation with drugs on unwitting subjects. And some
restrictions were imposed on detailing of CIA personnel to the
White House and other government agencies.
Bill Colby has expressed pride that the CIA's misdeeds
.are discovered by the CIA and corrected by the CIA. if there
was any sense that individuals, or the agency, might be account-
able for Nast illegality,, it was not era:^ediately apparent.
Helms, under oath before Congressional committees, dissembled
about covert operations abroad and surveillance at home. Helms
has since been under investigation by the Justice Department
for possible perjury. No report on the. discovery and correction
of CIA improprieties was -made in 1973 to president Nixon --
understandable since he might have used such a report in his
desperate battle for self-oreservation. But President Ford
wasn't told about it either until he asked -- and then not
very willin`ly.. The CIA is accustomed to operate on a need,
to know basis and there was apparently some uncertainty about
the need of the President of the U.S. to know such unpleasant
things.
By and large, the public ' CIA. rumpus of 1975 was the
internal CIA rumpus of 1973. Without, going into detail which
might jeopardize sources, let me say that the public CIA
scandal stemmed partly from a leak of the internal CIA .
report which -- ironically -- was written in the. hope that the
whole thing could be worked out quietly and never become
public. -
The public exposure came mainly in.three waves that
rolled over the r=eeling-intelligence agency.
First, in September 1974, covert operations, like
Chile -- an issue raised by Seymour Hersh in the New York Times,.
Credit-for at least an assist must 'go to Rep, Michael Harrington
of Mass., who, invoking his rights under House rules, read the
secret transcript of a briefing by Colby to an Armed Services
subcommittee, then protested to enough other Congressional
groups so. that one could be reasonably sure the story would
get out.
It was an issue of $11 million spent first in trying to
block and later to weaken Allende in Chile, the first Marxist
to come to power in a democratic election. In fairness, one
must say that it was a classic Cold War operation that may
look questionable from the perspective of a d6tente period.
I have myself seen top secret 1970 memos discussing proposals
to bribe members of the Chilean Parliament to vote against
Allende -- proposals rejected not as immoral, but as probably
ineffectual. But papers on covert action were never meant
to be read by weak-kneed constitutionalists.. ,W1e'a.re, after
all, dealing with professionals more accustomed to operating
under the rules of the il.iarquis de Sade than the Marquis of
Queensbury. .
That controversy produced a sharp reaction 'against covert
.political operations. By last December Congress was voting, that
such operations ciould only be conducted in the future with the
express authority of the President, and timely infon-ration to
Congress. And, if .the CIA is to be belie- ed, such operations
at low level anyway in a period of Detente -- have now been -
practically ended.. W ich, if you -look at the current situation'
in Portu,-al, may or may not b e a
J good t Leh
hi t~-.
The covert operation issue had hardly ebbed when the
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Sy Hersh, in the New York Times. A banner headline on Sun-
day, December 22. It spoke of "massive" spying and files kept
on left-wing groups and anti-war protestors. This issue had
a.rauch treater impact than: the issue of -llende in Chile.
For this was us - Americans, and not some far away Latinos.
So, President Ford asked what this was all about,' and
Colby sent him a report in Vail. after Christmas that said,
yes, some such things had haopened, but not massively. :?nd,
for the first time, President Ford learned of the 1973 Inspector
General's report. But not all of it because he had only asked
about domestic s rve l1 ?
For reasons not fully known, Colby then decided that he'd
better level with the President a little more.
3, he called P:ir So, an January.
on Ford d in the 'ti,;rh,! te. House.- and verbally
briefed him on some other things that hadn't come out yet,
if_ciuding .CIA involvement in assassination conspiracies,
c .President Ford was. shocked; Not so shocked, h r -'
or nay be becaus..otir.,e.ve,.y --
G he was so shocked --, that he agreed with
Colby that she skeletons in the CIA's closet should' be kept.
from public gaze. To avoid damaging the reputations of past
Presidents and the current conduct of foreign affairs... that
as I. understand it, was his reasoning. '_
He appointed a commission -- with Vice-President Rocke-
feller as last-minute choice as chairman after Retired Judge
Friendly of New York had pulled out whose members were
better known for loyalty and discretion than for tearing the
Joint aoart, And he- cave that commission the carefully restricted
mandate of looking into CIS. domestic activ:z ties, an area where
a aamage assessment indicated the worst was already out.,
But, 1n? reaction to the domestic spying controversy,
Congress moved to launch its own investigations, with. much
''z errnandates. President Ford worried about what an unrestricted
investigation would uncover; and he ;rorried aloud to some
people, and his worries about what might come out helped to
insure that they would come out.
On Feb. 28 of tl-,i s year the third wave started rolli nT
over the CIA. On that day, on the C13S Evening; Ide 'is, T reported
that President Ford was concerned about assassination plots
after having been briefed. Uy.Colby, on the subject.
A: kw;ardly now, to keep the issue from being left or. his
doorstep, President Ford asked the Rockefeller com2rission to
1,et into the subject its mandate had been devised to keep it
out Q`;` 'By stretching "domestic activities" to include foreign
assassination conspiracies with significant domestic recruitin ,*
the Rockefeller commission .was able to take on the assassination
of~Gen. Trujillo in the Dominican =republic, and the many, unsuc-
c
..ssf ul at empts, some Uimes in orccrt with the Mafia, to try
to get Castro of Cuba.
t
As the Rockefeller Comrnission prepared to issue its
report in June, President Ford had another change of mind.
He decides; that the chapter
1 on assassination plots let'., too
many . cue stions unre-solved -- especially the chain of command
to past Presidents -- for him to Want' to issue it under his
aegis. So instead of trying to steal the thunder of Congress
on assassinations, he passed on the thunder to the Senate
Select Committee, encouraging it to get out a report on this
subject as soon as possible.
That Senator Church's bi-:,artisan
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And so in recent weeks, in the hearing room of the Joint
Atonic Corm ttee, reputed to be the securest spot on Capitol
Hill; there-has been 'a strange procession of witnesses ranging
from John aosselli of the Mafia to i?IcGeorge Buncly of the For!
Foundation, from Robert ilaheu of Las-Vegas to Richard Goodwin
of New York. .
It has been possible to. trace the main assassination
conspiracies from CIA officials do award and outward ?---
against Castro from 1959 and well into the Sixties, shortly
before and even after the assassination of President Kennedy,
raising a Question that I'll `o into later. Against Trujillo,
from which the CI4 tried to pull back, but too late. Against
Chilean Gen. Rene Schneider, whose elimination in 1970 appeared
necessary to block Allende... a plot that wasnt meant to include
assassination, only kidnapping, but was botched-.- Against
Lumumba in the Congo, where the CIA never decided to assassinate
him, but supported his opponents who did decide to: that
indigenous conspirators could tell the CIA was, jumbling up a
couple of advertising slogans, "Fay now and leave the driving
to us."
Ambassador Helms has said. that as far as he knew the CIA
was never responsible for assassinating a foreign leader. And.
Senator Church called that statement "correct, but not complete."
What it omits is what Richard Helms. contrived not: to know, what
the CIA considers itself not responsible for, what it tried
to do and failed, and the targets that did not qualify as
leaders. I am-informed for example, that Iran's former Defense
Minister, Bakhtiar, who had a falling out with the Shah, was
killed in 1970 in exile, the CIA reportedly having provided
some friendly assistance to the Iranian.secretP police in the
form of surveillance to keep track. of him. But, alas poor
)Bakhtiar! He'll be mentioned under covert operations, but
won't make it in the Senate's assassination report for reasons
that some may consider rank snobbery. Not having been..a
leader, he didn't qualify for assassination.
The greater difficulty, though, is tracing assassination
plots from the CIA ur) ro d -- dete ,, fining what, if an~r, element
there was of Pr esideritial resoonsibility. The plots spanned
four Administrations -- iron the late Fisenho -her until the
early Nixon. Presidents are not in the habit of lea', inr- behind
rae:zos say in._-, "I want P_-?emier So-and-so rubbed out and advise
of. completed action by 'close of business Friday.
Helms and others of the CIA say the agency initiated
nothing,-, but acted in response to Presiden_tia1 "concerns,"
Aides to Presidents --*ALL of them, from John Eisenhower to
Henry Kissinger -- deny that the President ever ordered or
-condoned an assassination.' There is a contradiction there
;which may never be fully resolved, for in the end one is left
vrith subjective evaluation of incomplete evidence. When the
committee was considering, the Kennedys and the Castro plots,
Senator Church said that -the CIA was like "a rogue eleohant
Off on a ram?,Page of its on." And Senator.Gol&rater said the
CIA acted on!,, on Presidential orders. i?Iore recen_tl the
subject has been Nixon and the. killing of General Schneider
in Chile. r
And I.hgve not seen Senators Church and Gold;-rater,.
quite "reverse their positions, but Senator Church is going
after Nixon tapes trying to pin do:vn- just what the ex-President
.meant in 1970 when he said he wanted everything possible done
to- stop Allende from coming to po:ver. There Sen. Church
seers to see not a rogue elephant, but a rogue President.
It may be that the question of Presidential responsibility
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for assassination conspiracies may came. down to-.the judgmental
matter of what, the King had in mind when he said, "Jho will..
rid. me bf this turbulent priest?".
What we have so far been discussing.are activities the
agency is no longer conducting, bi sinesS Sit is essentially
out of since at least 1973. They are, iA, that sense, and if
you pardon the macabre expression, dead issues.
But there are some issues that I think you should be
alerted to that are quite live -- live because they require
not only judgement about the past, but action in the future.
One of those problems has to do with the consequences
of the.-CIA's tendency to assume that its operations were some-
how? beyond the law and therefore required no accounting.
"Cover," which is a tool of the intelligence trade, blended
effortlessly into "cover up." The .CIA didn't want to be
d ed into the Watergate scandal, so, as the record shows,
Helms Cave-orders that evidence and i tnesses who knew about
aid to ho:?rard Hunt before ilaterE.ate lb, ' with -,ld from the FBI.
The CIA didn't want its reputation hurt, and maybe operations
blo:rn, so Helms told less than the' truth about Chile, and
about domestic spying. And, in the Rockefeller report you will
find documentary evidence' that when the CIA -rent in for mail
opening, there were written internal warnings that the activity
was criminal --- not so that it should be stopped, but so that
the necessary cover story should be ready in case the operation
was blown. The CIA had an enormous preoccupation with what
its people called "flap potential."
There was one other "flap potential" the CIA covered up
at a time when it might have been relevant. It never told
the Warren Commission in 1964 that up until shortly before, the
assassination of President Kennedy -- and even after -- it
had-been n ersistently trying to kill Castro. Nor was it
mentioned by commission ,,.ember Allen Dulles, who had been
,CIA director when the plots were first hatched. Even without
this know?,rledg e, a secret :Marren staff report, b William
Coleman (who'is now Secretary of Transportation theorized
-about Castro revenge as a possible motive for Lee Harvey
Oswald, who played the role of Castro defender and, according
to his wife, hoped to--o to Cuba as a hero. But CIA Director
John McCone and his deputy, Richard Helms, appearing before
the -Viarren Co ission, questioned by a member named Rep.
Gerald Ford, said they knew of no reason to suspect a oviet
conspiracy, or a Cuban conspiracy. And they never mentioned
the CIA's eff1orts to kill Castro.
It- is important that you understand what I am saying,
and especially what I am NOT saying. ' I am not saying there
was 'any. indication that Oswald was put up to it by Castro,
or by pro-Castro Cubans, or-- another theory of the Warren
staff report --- by anti-Castro Cubans. I am only saying that,
considering Osww.ald's pro-Castro activities, and the CIA's
admitted surveillance -of Oswald in Mexico City, it knew that
efforts to assassinate Castro might have been relevant to a'
full? inquiry, and it failed to give ,,that information to the . .
een accused of a great many
Warren Commission. The CIA has been"
things -- including involvement in the Kennedy assassination,
of which there is no evidence.. Perhaps if the CIA didn't
have'such oenc nt for covering up so many'things, it wouldn't
get accusea of so many other things.
There is another current problem, so vexing-that it is
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hardly discussed. There is a massive new capacity for electronic
eavesdrop?ing that makes our anti-wiretap laws obsolete. The
CIA and the super-secret rational Security Agency can almost
literally pick conversations out of the air by monitoring the-
micro-wave radio channels that today carry most of our long-
distance and some of our local calls. The CIA did some ea-ves-
drouping.at random a few years ago, just testing equipment,
until its.general counsel warned against it. It can also link
.its tapes to a computer that will retrieve any call that has
mentioned a certain name or a certain subject. It did that,
for several months with all calls between the U.S. and a Latin
American country as part of a narcotics investigation. But it-
was stopped in that period when they started worrying about
illegal activities.
Is the CIA eavesdr?onJing on Americans t.Qday? Well, the
Russians monitor U.S. phone calls from their embassy in Wash-
-ingtbn and their installations in New York and an Francis-
r.o, linked to satellites in orbit. . And the CIA keeping; track
of the Russians, has developed a capacity for eavesdroppinc
on Soviet ea.-esdropping. It is useful , and on occasions
Con:?ressmen ha-:e been called and .?rarned that they were being
overheard by the Russians. But it involves some -eavesdroppinr
on Americans. And it is probably illegal. Beyond the li Inited
use that is being made of this fancy new equipment, lies the
ca-acity for almost unlimited eavesdropping that has far
outpaced our legal protections. President Ford, without
announcement, has asked Attorney General Levi to worry about
it. And I suppose he is worrying about it. I suggest that
maybe you should worry-about it, too.
Finally, there is one other concern that !,believe
warrants at ten lion. You'll recall that President Eisenhower,
after his retirement, expressed his concern about the g royrth
of a "defense-industrial complex." Well, there, also seems
to ha e developed something that could be called an "intelli-
gence-in us trial comolex.11
The cooperation takes many forms, some rather familiar.,
such as the use ofAlmerican companies with foreign interests
to provide cover for CIA agents. and Payment of money. But it
has a?Par ently gone much further towards what can only be
called the joint pursuit of common objectives. When former
CiA Director _HcCone, on behalf of the ITT, offered the Cif ?
more than a :million dollars for an operation in. Chile that
the ITT :ranted .to promote; the CIA refused it. ; But this
suggests th t the. rent-an-agency idea had been broached
before and pt.rhaos used before.. .
The CL itself is big business. One of its wholly thcu;h
secretly owned "=proprietary" companies has made a lot of
money ily?n charter fli`hts, and another has lost a lot of
money on }Tn? ~ ket the agency a-?::
~1*7 4A el 1 - aren4ly being better
at aol' +.1ca_Ninte11_gence. . If there is anything. the CIA. is
skittish about revealing, it is how much money it gets and
what it does
:.it rm it, and whether it is a money-making pr ?o p-
osition.. By which I don't mean necessarily counterfeiting;
the agency recently denied that it ever counterfeited dollars.
But there are sins; amid all time secr
h
ecy, t
at the CI S
is like a conglorerat6 company, and at home shim- shoulders
with other such companies. Are there danga .,rs_ ? ~?r
don't really know until we know more about it. But we need
to - know more about `?:h-Ie ther, over the years, the of enc ;T may have
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confused corporate objectives with national objectives.
When the CIA worked with the Mafia, . J. Edgar Hoover objected
that a Government agency shouldn't open itself to blacks::i1 by
organi ed crime. The disaffected lieutenant of Howard Hughes,
Robert =,aheu, says that Hughes wanted to run a large covert
operation for the CIA so that he could exact- concessions front
the U.S. Government when needed. Hughes did do one rrulti-
::tillior_-dollar- operation for the CIA -- the Cloniar Explorer
that tried. to raise a Soviet submarine from the Pacific. hot
to -mention his publicity people, the Mullen company, who
served as a CIA front.. And not to mention so-called cam-
paign contributions through Bebe Rebozo to President Nixon.
And.Hughes did ask'favors not only from the CIA, but other
-
government agencies -- when he wanted to buy an airline, or-
acruire more Las Vegas hotels than the anti-trust laws
allowed, or stop atomic testing in Nevada.
We need to know more about the CIA., which employs more
economists than the Treasury Department, as a big business
and its associations with other big business.
survive. And that may be true. But there are some who say
we'll have to know a few more of its secrets if we are to
survive. The agency may be a lot better today than it has been
in the past. Born in Cold War, its had a tough time adjustin"
to detente. Operated so long without accountability, it's 41
trying to adjust itself to requirements for accountability.
T, is
paying a heavy price for casual cover-ups of the past
by.pressure now for almost total disclosure. But, as with
Watergate, the chances are that things won't get better until
t:-e know the worst.
-
Note: Not for release before delivery 8:3p p'T August 19
There are likely to be?changes and additions during delivery,
but Mr. Schorr stands behind this text.
JMATS EJE s
2 AUGUST 1975
'vTo.;2 CIA=.Head Says.
-S'. 'hfeaten=eci bar -USSR,
Whine Secretary-of State 'Henry Kissinger-was
'
.
touting detente last-week. and trumpeting the. forth-
-Conference- summit'' in Het- r_1
sinki, U. Gen::;Vemon Wal-
ters, the deputy .director of the
Central I n telligence.. Agency,
painted a far. less cheery ver-
sion .of world: events t o jour
..nalists.?-At. a-'luncheon at the
Army-Navy Club-hosted by
_ the American Security Coun-
of .of.. fifth on `the horizon;' They're third generation
missiles, they're not anything they've just cooked up..-,
"We see them building larger and more powerful
submarines,.. we see? them increasing the 'number of.
tanks and modernizing the tanksWe see, in other
words, in'all areas a tremendous military effort being
m
,
ade to modernize and improve the Soviet forces be-
'yond what seems to me to be necessary for either de
terrence or defense..'.' _
;Twenty years ago; said Walters,"the CIA was t6ld
it was. "facing_a?ruthless and implacable enemy who
is determined to destroy us byall"means in their pow
--er..We must match theirdedication with ours and their
'ruthlessness with ours."'
Walters 1' indicated he. didn'.t:.think things had.
changed. much:, since that time.J Are we facing: that
type of enemy;the one you referred to?" he was asked.
"Well," said. Walters,. "I think the factors may'have
changed, tint 'I don't think- the-long-term goals, have
changed very much.
Asked if he had noticed "any change since the so-
cil, -Walters, -in- accents Simi- WALTERS-;
lar'to Solzhenitsyns; tontendedvthe_United States
in a "tougher: power situation than George Wash
An-ton'- Continental -Army.-_-''
Valfey Forge
when it -was confronted with a`superior'force of
British troops.
:We hope detente will work;"':he: said, "but at the:
'Same time wecan't help seeing-the Soviet Union de-
ploying four new different types of ICBMs, with signs
The CIA says it cannot tell all of its secrets and
.Approved For Release
called period''of detente," Walters replied: "I don't
think so.". Asked if Americans should feel threat- I
ened, the deputy CIA director put it bluntly:,-1 would
feel threatened.-
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THE WASHINGTON POST Sundax, August 3i, 29;5
By Arthur N. Cox
Cox, a writer and lecturer on foreign affairs, is a former official of the
State Department and the CIA. His next book, "Myths of National
Security-The Peril of Secret Govertsment," will be published in Septe,nbcr.
HE WORD `SECURITY'," Justice
"THugo L. Black wrote in the Penta-
gon Papers case, "is a broad, vague gen-
erality whose contours should not be In-
voked to abrogate the fundamental law em-
bodied. in the First Amendment. The guard-
ing of military and diplomatic secrets at the'
expense of informed representative govern-
nt provides no r e a I security for our
public."
The past four yens have amply confirmed
ate late justice's wisdom. The Watergate
ioverup and the secret bombing of Cam-
aodia both demonstrated the dangers in
permitting the executive branch to define
"national security" unilaterally. There is a
clear need to oversee and to limit the execu-.
th,e's use of "national security" for conceal-
ing operations and controlling the flow of
Information.
The problem of executive accountability
can only be resolved by Congress through
meaningful legislation. And yet, despite re-
cent experience, very little is being done. In
2 sense, indeed, there has been retrogres-
sion. Last year government information sub-
committees in both houses actually drafted
Legislation and completed hearings. The
pills, providing machinery to ease classifica-
aan procedures and rules, got nowhere in
ire face of strong executive opposition. But
it least they were drafted. This year no
,egislation was written, no hearings have
seen held. The sad result is that it is still
passible for a President to hide behind
"national security."
The need for congressional action is rend-
ered all the more campelling by the Supreme
Court's July, 1974, decision ordering the
release of the White House tapes. The un-
animous decision was widely hailed, but
in the rush of events, inadequate attention
was paid to the fact that, for the first time
in history,, the court also endowed the
doctrine of executive privilege with con-
stitutional grounding, most essentially iii
matters of national security.
The Complex Present
OST SO-CALLED security information
if is classified under rules laid down in
executive orders issued by various Presi-
dents-lioosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower and
Nixon. The legal authority for these orders
has never been made clear, though in each
, Approved
case the Justice Department was apparently
relying on implied constitutional powers. In
any event, it is these orders which provide
the basis for the classification system and
for the markings.."Top Secret," "Secret" and
"Confidential."
There are, however, precedents for con-
gressional oversight. The Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 provides for coverage of sensi-
tive atomic energy information under a spe-
cial security classification labeled "Re-
stricted Data" but goes on 'to state that. a
joint congressional committee must be kept
informed-fully and currently-on all mat-
ters relating to development and application
of atomic energy. Thus, for more than two
decades, Congress has maintained oversight
of information involving nuclear weapons,
and there has never been a leak of "Re-
stricted Data" on atomic energy from Con-
gress.
Congress also adopted the Freedom of
Information Act in 1966, under the prodding
of Rep. John Moss (D-Calif.), That law placed
the burden of justifying the withholding of
most types of information squarely on the
executive, but it also permitted the gov-
ernment to withhold any information "spe-
cifically required by Executive Order to be
kept secret in the interest of national de-
fense or foreign policy." In other words, all
so-called national security information was
protected from public disclosure.
This situation has been modified some-
what. by amendments decisively passed over
President Ford's veto in 1974. One amend-
ment provides that a citizen or media rep-
resentative may ask for release of national
security information which, it could be
argued, no longer need be classified or
which had been improperly classified- If
such. a request is denied, the amendment
provides, the requestor may take the issue
to court and the contested documents may
be examined in camera by the court to de-
termine whether they should justifiably
be with held. These changes htay relax the
secrecy system somewhat, but it is difficult
to imagine that many judges would over-
rule the executive on a question possibly
involving the national security.
The executive branch sees no need
information- and material" is working w11,
according to administration officials. The
?order, replacing a 1953 Eisenhower order,
does make it harder to classify documents.
It reduces the number of departments and
bureaucrats entiti.?: classify documents.
And it provides for dcci4?:: itication in six
to 10 years, except for certain information
which may remain classified for up to 30
years.
In spite of these modest improvements,
however, the classification bureaucracy
remains vast. Rep. William S. Moorhead
(D-Pa.), who, has studied the problem, has
described the classification bureaucracy
vividly: "There are 55,000 arms pumping up
and down in government offices stamping
`Confidential' on government documents;
more than 18,000 government employees are
wielding `Secret' stamps, and a censorship
elite of nearly 3,000 bureaucrats has au-
thority to stamp `Top Secret' on public
records."
Through the years the secrecy system
has burgeoned. The federal archives report-
edly now contain a billion classified docu-
ments. There are more than 11,000 corpora-
tions, university research centers and
"think tanks" which have been cleared by
the Defense Department to handle and
store secret information. The management
and storage of these tons of classified docu-
ments costs the taxpayer hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars annually. And yet expert
witnesses before congressional committees
including Dean Rusk, McGeorge Bundy
and members of the Defense Department's
Science Advisory Board-say that not mare
than 10 per cent of the information should
ever have been classified in the first place.
But the Ford administration, following its
predecessor's lead, has recommended that
the classification system be protected by
criminal sanctions. S-l, a bill to revise the
federal criminal code, sponsored by two
conservative senators,. John L. McClellan
(D-Ark.) and Roman L. Hruska (R-Neb-),
with strong administration backing, provides
severe criminal penalties, for the unlawful
communication of "national defense infer
mation," a new category. This would include
intelligence material, various types of mili-
tary information and atomic energy '-re-
stricted data." For all other national secur
ity information, the bill says, a person womild
be "guilty of an offense if, being or having
been in authorized possession or control at
classified information - . , he knowingly
communicates such information to a perms
not-authorized to receive it."
The security provisions of the bill, no
before the Senate Judiciary Commkttee, ar
obviously sweeping. If they are enacted
not only government employees but all per
sons in defense industries, universities
research centers who ever had authorize
access to - classified information would b
subject to criminal penalties. For the firs
time, the leaking of any classified ipforma
tion, no matter what the degree of sensiti
vity, would be a crime.'
Congress Has Authority
hbPiTE administration protestations, i
is clear that the system of executib
orders controlling secrecy ciassificati4u
needs to be replaced. Too many lies, to
much, waste and too little freedom of in
formation have resulted from that system,
further congressional action. President What is needed is congressional oversigi?'
Nixon's March, 3972, order on "classifica. plus new guidelines and new machinery
lion and declassification of national securit t
bilitTh
i
a
ere
s
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 Approved For Release 2001/08108 : -CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5.
question that, no matter what the Justice. make the final decision in any clash be- A Fine Line
Department may. argue, Congress has the tween the commission and a secret-holding t - HIS BILL once
constitutional authority to set the boundar- agency. In the past, the chief executive has f passed, could provthe
les, the basis for appropriate revision of the
almost invariably come down on the side espionage legislation as they would apply
Thus, in 1973, former Chief Justice Earl of security. Would future Presidents weigh classified, information. Section 794 of the
Warren had this to say: "Whatever secrecy the arguments for freedom of information. present act makes it a crime to transmit to
is to be permitted concerning governmental more carefully? There is reason to believe- foreigners without authority information
records in the highest as well as in the .they wobitt For the re.
he
lowe
l
ec
lons shou
d to fixed by law.-
-Former Justice Arthur Goldberg spoke to
the point in 1972 when he told the House
government information subcommittee, "1
have no doubt that Congress is authorized
to enact such legislation." .
It will never be possible to achieve
absolute accountability 'because the execu-
tive branch is responsa,ie for implementing
the laws. If a Presideflt . and his assistants
.want to violate laws under the cover of"
secrecy they can".probably do so. But one
way t6 drastically reduace the possibility of
such violations would be for Congress to
establish a Security Ilmformation Commis-
sion,within the executhve branch. The com-
mission would be composed of five distin-
guished citizens, -with appropriate exper-
ience, appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate. A major
role of the commission would be to establish
a new classification system based on the
principle that information should not be
classified without strong grounds for pro-
tecting it from our adversaries, and that
information should be made available to the
public as soon as possible. The commission
would have an attpn?af~ rt~af to ;-,,.,. IV
the guidelines established by Congress were Jew-e` information should be accepted;
being Except for the special exemptions, these
o implemented. provide that "Top Secret" be downgraded
The commission woul;:l serve as the Presi- to. "Secret" after two years and that "Se-
dent's principal acviser ,on matters of free- cret" be lowered to "Confidential" after two
dom of information and as an advocate with- years. But the Nixon order says that "Con-
in the executive branch.for the premise that fidential" information should be declassi-
essential information must be available to
fied only after six years. This is not justi?
Congress. The commission's chairman should liable because, the lower the classification,
be a member of the National Security Coun- the stronger the case for early declassifica-
cil. The commission's task would be to at- Lion. Congress should set the limit for "Con-.
tempt to balance the needs of essential fidential" material to one year. This would..
secrecy and those of the public's right to make the classification time span five years-
know. Clearly, the commission would not for "Top Secret," 'three years for "Secret"
attempt to substitute itself for the CIA or and one year for "Confidential." Occasion.
the State or Defense Departments in deal- ally there will be disputes between Congress.
ings with Congress. When, however, the and the executive about continuing classifi-
c
ommission that owe of these agencies
cation for certain information, but these. and ability were appointed as members of
was
significant information should be resolved by the security informa44 the security information commission. The
which could safely be made available to tion commission.
Congress, it would be the commission's task commission should influence a new trend in
to so inform the President government toward this philosophy: When,
in doubt, err on the side of freedom of in
The President, of course, would have to formation rather than secrecy.
'Was
Star ~, ~ s17, 1975
'Slither: to
slide; gde'
Funk & Wagrnalls Dictionary
One good example of the obvious
slanting of your news was last
May's front-page article entitled,
Flow Our Subs Slither Along Soviet
Coastline." One never sees an arti-
cle about Russian ships "slither-
ing" along our coasa- and certainly
'there has been ample proof that
they are patroling and observing
our operations.
By your efforts. to picture the
CIA. the FBI and al police work in
the worst possible light. one won-
ders just where your allegiance lies,'
All anti-war groups, demonstrators.
peace marchers are made to appear
as pleasant, non-violent, well-man-
nered, docile persons by you. Those
of us in this general area who have
seen the destruction, harassment
and violence of these groups know
differently.
As far as the police using spies to,
einfitrate these groups, good for
them! They are representing k the
taxpayers of this country who don't
want it taken over by revolutionists.
ca~uac wiui 1I16eu ur
views would carry some weight within the reason to believe that it is to be used to the
executive, and the commission's reports to - injur
of the U
it
d St
y
n
e
ates or to the advan-
Congress would of necessity indicate wlieth tage of a foreign nation." That intent clause
er the executive was adequately taking into ? has always been difficult to :prove and
.account the interests of freedom of informa- should be. dropped. The language would be
tion. improved if it simply provided that the un-
The commission would make regular re- authorized transmission of information, clas-
ports to the congressional government in- sified by law, to a representative of a foreign
formation subcommittees on implementation government would be subject to criminal
of the law. It would also adjudicate requests penalty.
for classified information from individ- However, leaking classified information
ual members of Congress. to a congressman or to the media is not
Further, if Congress is to make sound espionage, nor is publication of such in-
decisions about appropriations for defense . formation by a newspaper, book publisher
and other national security programs, the or TV network. Yet a need exists for-some
national intelligence "estimates" must be- kind of sanction against such leaks since
made available to,the appropriate commit- there is information which should be held
tees and subcommittees. Such estimates can secret to protect genuine considerations of
be effectively "sanitized" to remove all ref- national defense. One of the difficulties
erences to intelligence sources and methods, about assessing penalties is the fine line
thus reducing any security risk. The com- between authorized and unauthorized dis-
mission should be given the responsibility closures.
of ensuring that such. estimates and other When the President, secretary of state
classified information are properly guarded or other high official leaks security 'in-
on Capitol Hill. formation, no questions are raised. Nor are
As for current information, the time they raised when a President or cabinet
limits contained in the Nixon order for member, after retirement, includes "Top
the declassification of "Top Secret" and Secret" information in his published mem
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH-
5 august 1975
CIA's Weak Future
Now that Clark Clifford has joined the
pack of liberal knife-wielders who won't
stop short of eviseeration of the CIA, we.
have-the final authoritative word on the
subject; We can look forward now to a
weak intelligence system seen daily
through glass walls, as the proposed
split-up agency vainly combats-the
machinations of the Soviets and the stu-
pidity of sanctimonious Americans who-
won't let us sully our hands with the dirty
,business necessary. to survive.
Joyce Ferrell
,-.-Concord Village . .
oirs. Since high ranking officials use classic
fled information for political or personal
advantage, it is difficult to jtatify severe
penalties when lower ranking officials reveal
information as a?matter of conscience. Penal-
ties could include public reprimand, loss
of job and loss of eligibility for future
government jobs. The security information
commission 'could be given responsibility
for establishing and monitoring the adminis-
tration of such non-criminal sanctions.
Clearly, there are ^ no panaceas for cote
trolling government secrecy, but if Congress
enacted the measures outlined here, a long
step would be taken towards establishing
essential accountability. In time, public
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oul .
SEPTR4B ER 1c,75
I I WAS CALLED OPERATION PBPRIA1IF
THE LEADERS WERE THE TOP FOUR MEN IN THE -
' CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
AND THE TARGET WAS CONTROL OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.
IT COULD HAPPEN HERE AND A CONTROVERSIAL
EX C1A AGENT TELLS E;\ACTLY HOW By PHILIP AGEE.
continued
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S :TURI}AY REVIEW
6 Sept. 1975
The Condor's Bite
by Karl E. Meyer
T confess to a certain queasiness before
i seeing Three Days of the Condor,
the first "big" post-Watergate film; star-
ring Redford, Dunaway, et al. The movie
was sired by the kind of conglomerate
that can turn a condor into a boiled
turkey. A Paramount release, it is pre-
sented by Dino de Laurentiis, produced
by Stanley Schneider, and directed by
Sydney Pollack, none of whom are re-
nowned as political controversialists. Be-
sides,,how seriously can you take Robert
Redford?
The answer, so far as Condor goes, is
very seriously indeed. There is nothing
rubbery about the bird's bite; this is, I
found myself thinking, the most provoc-
ative film about the corruption of Amer-
ican institutions to reach the commercial
screen. It asks us to believe that The
Company, a.k.a. the Central Intelligence
Agency, can exterminate its own em-
ployees, on American soil,. and do so
with every expectation of getting away
with it. The film is also technically bril
liant, and its performances have a rep-
ertory excellence, but this I found less
of a surprise than the disenthralled bru-
tality of its story.
The exterminats, so to speak, are CIA
researchers working in a New York
brownstone behind a doorplate reading
"American Literary Historical Society.".
One of their number is Joe Turner
(Robert Redford), whose job it is to
pore over foreign books to see if some
obscure potboiler contains a coded mes-
sage. As the film opens, Redford believes
he has indeed found such a code in a
third-rate novel that has been mysteri-
ously translated into various exotic lan-
guages. He. reports his discovery to Com-
pany headquarters and, on an otherwise
uneventful morning, ducks out the back
door to buy lunch for his colleagues.
While Redford is gone, the extermina-
tors arrive-an execution squad led by
a contract killer, Joubert (Max von
Sydow),. who works with surgical non-
chalance. Redford, lunch bag in hand,
returns to find that his six co-workers
are corpses. He dashes to a street tele-
phone and reports the murder to Hig-
gins (Cliff Robertson), the New York
station chief; Redford is so rattled he
nearly forgets his code name, Condor.
Redford is ordered to "come in," and he
reluctantly agrees to a rendezvous m ,a
West Side alley on condition that as
colleague whose face he knows will also
be present. In the alley an attempt is
made to kill Redford, and the familiar
colleague, an appalled witness, is mur-
dered.
Ltrl _ E. _Meyer, a film buff and former
Washington Post correspondent, was co-
author of The Cuban Invasion, the first book
None of this vivid footage will help
in the next CIA recruitment campaign,
and one can understand why Redford
feels he must hide from his own employ-
ers. He does so by abducting at gunpoint
Kathy (Faye Dunaway), a photographer
who lives alone in Brooklyn Heights.
Using her apartment as a base, and with
Kathy's half-willing assistance, Redford
penetrates the labyrinth of The Company
and finds why he has been marked for
death.
It transpires that a CIA-within-the-
CIA has evolved, directed by the agen-
cy's fanatic Middle East section. chief,
who has been confecting his own plans
for the subversion of oil-producing
states. Unwittingly, Redford had stum-
bled upon the book code used by this
network; to forestall exposure, the sec-
tion chief had, ordered the elimination
of Redford's entire unit. Eventually, CIA
higher-ups locate this fault in the sys-
tem, and Max von Sydow is now paid
to turn his. guns on the. insubordinate
operative-which von Sydow does, with
aplomb, in Redford's presence, and then
coolly invites Redford to become a con-
tract killer, too.
But Redford has other plans. Instead
of "coming in," he tells the story to The
New York Times; when the local station
chief hears this, he looks at Redford as
if he were mad but recovers quickly
enough with the curtain line, "But will
they print it?" (The bow to The Times
was not in James Grady's 1974 novel,
Six Days of the Condor, on which the
film was based, but makes a nice lead-in,
if pat, to Redford's present . venture,
which is, of course, the filming of All
the President's Men, about a certain
story that was printed.)
I have retold the plot in some detail,
even at the risk of spoiling some of the
suspense, because the film raises issues
of such agonizing importance. Can we
believe that the CIA operates "think
tanks" in New York under spurious
names? Of course. Can we also accept
that the CIA, on occasion, will hire gun-
men to wipe out its own? Ditto, if with
a little more difficulty. But finally, can
we believe that CIA agents can be mur-
dered in the streets of New York with
only a lying item in the press, planted by
presumably compliant police? Too many
people would have to be implicated in.
such a cover-up, too many friends and
relatives would begin asking questions;
we are not yet a totalitarian country. As
film, Condor is more a warning than a
documentary.
Still, I think it a mistake to be too
literal-minded. Condor is really about
what can be called the diabolus ex
machina; suggestively, von Sydow's CIA
code name is Lucifer.. We are within a
machine gone berserk-the opening cred-
its are in computer printout type, and
t some of the most unnerving footage is
in the CIA central operations room, rem-
iniscent of Kubrick's similar room in
Dr. Strangelove, with John. Houseman,
in a superlative brief appearance, play-
ing a jaundiced Wasp version of Strange-
love. The Company is run by men who
are less immoral than amoral, believing
that the higher needs of national security
can sanction any crime, and that the
worst crime is to let the outside world
know this. And that I find very easy to
believe: see the Rockefeller Commission,
report, passim.
Indeed, it is sobering to consider the
prophetic paranoia of the movies. The
Manchurian Candidate (1962) was
about a conspiracy to assassinate a Pres-.
ident, the chosen weapon being a sniper's
bullet. In State of Siege (1973), the
Costa-Gavras film with Yves Montand
in the lead, the CIA was shown training
Uruguayan police in torture techniques
-and the picture was attacked for being
simplistic (which it was) and inaccurate
(about which I'm not so sure). Then
there was The Day of the Jackal (1974),
about a conspiracy to kill General de
Gaulle, with a professional killer hired
for the job. It now develops that the CIA
was approached on just such a scheme-
a.story as yet unconfirmed, and I would
like to believe that even The Company
is too fastidious to treat with jackals.
But I wouldn't go to the stake on that.
IN Condor all the elements miraculously
fuse together: a tight script, superbly
paced. direction, and acting of credible
polish. What can happen, in a spy thriller
cute politics, when the elements fail to
cohere is sadly evident in The Wilby
Conspiracy, a well-intended film set in
apartheid-ridden South Africa. Sidney
Poitier plays a black revolutionary so
virtuous that we cannot believe in him;
Michael Caine, his English accomplice,
obviously doesn't, because Caine goes.
through the motions with his tired reflex
mannerisms. In fact-and this was not
the intention of director Ralph Nelson-
we find ourselves exulting in the villain,
a South African security officer played
by Nicol Williamson. The screen comes
to life when Williamson leers, and it is
a pity that his legendary talent, so in-
frequently seen, is squandered on cine-
matic kitsch.
Wilby shows that high-mindedness is
not enough; Condor proves that a prin-
cipled film can be as compelling as Jaws.
In fact, the panjandrums who run the
Motion Picture Academy can be grateful
for Jaws, because when it comes time to
hand out the Oscars during the Bicenten-
nial year-of all years-the mechanical
shark may spare the Academy the em-
barrassment of honoring a film that sug-
gests we live in a country in which a
good guy is surpassingly hard to find. 0
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DAILY TEGRAPH., London
28 July 1975
DAVID FLOYD on Russia's "concessions" at Helsinki
A FTER many long months of
frustrating; negotiations West-
ern statesmen are going to
Helsinki . this week to sign the
"Final . Act " of the European
Security Conference without ? hav-
ing extracted any substantial con-
cession from the Russians over
"Basket Three_"' Under this head.
ink it was hoped that some pro-
gress would be made towards im-
proving the flow of people, informa-
lion and ideas across th
I
e .
ron
Curtain.
Now thiit the final documents to
be signed are available it can be
1 seen that. even on paper, the
Russians have given very little
fore Helsinki.
In fairness to them it must be
said that neither the Soviet lead-,
ers nor the men. who rule Eastern
E
urope ever let it be thought that
they were going to open up the
Communist world to Western influ-
ences in the interest of " di tente ? .
away. In practice things will re-
main very muesli as they were be-
4
T 99
kd h-1. UU
s
number -of publications they will bounds to him. He. is not sup-
import and make them more easily posed to approach any Soviet
available to their citizens, institution or even any Soviet citi-
There is no question here of a zen directly, but only through the
free flow, .of information or even Press department of the Foreign
of .fiction into the Communist Ministry, which carefully monitors
countries_ nnr an
s
,_-- his __ .
y
ug
h
i
R
-
- -
n
ussia and East-
ern ,Europe will cease to control
very carefully what their people
are allowed to read. There is little
hope here that the average Soviet
citizen, or Polish or
Czech citizen,
. :,,
... _
.. h
a
fails to comply with the u s11 11", ,
trict.
rules. At the same time. Communist
correspondents in the West are free
to come and go and write as they
please
Nov th
R
e
ussians have promised
to: ?aoout the outside world to improve the .journalist's lot. Ap-
or the ideas circulating there. plications for visas will be examined
h
t
obta f
?
y
e rut:610- 1
o mmmatitnr about ine West Acavst ltocl.11[I will be im-
gical battle bet~aen East and West would be, by travelling there and proved; access to sources of infor-
must go 011, they said. And they being free to make their own con- mation will be extended; and it is
tacts
.Pro t "the e n efforts t up a stubb-
orn I
inquiries. signatories
to Wes t-
su m?f t h h
e
t
n
o
ls
v
of
ate
r
t
professi
Helsi
ki
na
acti
ity
flow of people and ideas. dertake to facilitate tourism on an ,. will neither render , journalists
It was only x-r)hen it seemed pos- individual or collective basis." liable to expulsion nor otherwise
sible that their stonewalling This will make little difference penalise them., But the Soviet
prevent the Helsinki "sum mit might to practice in the West where an authorities will, of course, be the
.from taking place this month. and one who wishes and has the moneY` arbiters
timate to what is and is not
.
that Mr Brezhnev's programme of can go abroad, and to a. Communist As was to be expected, the Soviet
events for 19Te might be upset, country if he chooses. But Corn- concessions on--the flow of informa-
that the 'Soviet negotiators ielded munist Governments do not ack-
a little. The ti ad tiatorWestern- diplo- howled -e the right of their citizens noon are slight indeed. This was
g not the fault of the Western neg
mats gave in: anything to get it allo travel to abroad at all: they are tutors, nor perhaps even the
e
over and done with. only as a favour, and Soviet ones, so much as of the he sys-
then usually in closely controlled tem itself. After all, even in the
And yet 1Basket Three is really groups.
the essence of the whole affair. The It is safe to say that those who midst of the recent Apollo-Soyuz
ether "baskets " are mainly state- are . most interested in the West found "technicalr difficulties "a to
ments of general principles govern- and whose minds are most open to avoid taking TV pictures which .
log East-West relations; and their Western ideas will have the least would have revealed that Anoilo
central political purpose, from the chance of travelling. There is no ' was twice as big as Soyuz. Tech-
Soviet point of view, is to legitimise suggestion that Communist Govern- nical snags can always be found
Russian domination of post-war ments will cease to select very for evading agreements.
gains in Eastern Europe. Basket carefully who may have the coveted
Three was to be the price the prize of a trip abroad. But for Mr Breztincv and the :`.
Russians had to
a
fo
th
i
p
y
r
e
r Pon- . Then there is the Soviet apparatchiki to have
gacal gains. Western question of Helsinki having to
If Mr Brezhnev was so anxious tit access to reliable infor- g given a little e away
mation about the Com ? ing will up have the seff tem soften-
to have his summit meeting- munist
and countries, the principal channel for rary, the Soviet system. the
ce
the Russians, we are told, fought which is provided by the despatches ont
all the ter,confiden will
like tigers" to have it in July- and reports be all the greater, both-confidence
oth in their
then, it was argued, he must be respondents of news age Icies, news- :treatment of their own people and
ready to make some concessions, to papers and radio and television sta- nn their relations with the subject
i lower a little the bbetween tions workinn nations of Eastern Europe.
East and West. barriers arn concessions ton or g Pin Communist capi-
as he made? peo le who read the re- The Znc decade iv the Shrus-
ults of their work realise under
Union, since the re
of hhru
As far as the fC w of information , what 'diffi
of co
cult conditions they have they, has been one of consolidation.
is concerned, the Western negoti to operate, and stabilisation. The hopes of
ators pressed for a Greater avails d,
liberalisation " raised b Khrus-
y
ability of Weste ai publications in
. ': che'
w
M
~
s w avering rule have
the East. While 'Communist pubis-
any restrictions
been for-
cations are avar'~l:ble in unlimited .
The - gotten, and most of those -who quantities in ail West, the entry Moscow cisrhed and nt working in pressed for political change in the
p Soviet system are now silent, in
Of IVestci?n news rapers, periodicals by obstacles hedged
ai every side prison camps or a ,
and e,t books into Communist coup- formation to his obtaining any in- . ~.a psi phi e lc n the
tries and tdistribution there apart from what the ss, or-- luckier ones has been
tr subject their the strictest control authorities wish him to have. He drast. Jewishe migration has been
and jct shin Now at Ileintrol cannot leave Moscow without et- drastically redu?re
The K
B has
censo
e
the
he
iun s S~taes will under- mission, and half the Soviet Union dents.~ally suppressed the dissi-
take to increase 41 to ,> is in any case r ne I LA! ,
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erne eggs ir,.
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5
That is not to say that all is
well with the Soviet system. Dis-
content is widespread--=among re-
ligious believers and intellectuals,
among the non-Russian population
and among the young people, for
whom Communism or Marxism has
no appeal.. Industry, geared to
military needs. cannot satisfy con-
sumer demand. Agriculture, hope-
lessly inefficient. cannot feed the
population without periodic pur-
chases of grain from the West.
But these are now the constants
influence on foreign or domestic
policy, and where any thought dif-
ferinz from that the State thinks is
c?rn~?hed." .
The same can be said with equal
justice of the political regimes of
all the countries of Eastern Europe,
which have been brought into line
in the 30 years since Yalta. The
latest to trv to step out of line.
Czechos1ov2k;a, was taumht a brutal
lesion in 19,8, since when an -un-
easv calm has descended on the
wdole area. Once a.pain the peg e
l
of Eastern 1~'?ro.tp ipgrn.pd the
11"n?n cf Munch in 1g38. V2l.ta in
1045. C7echnclnvakia in 7948 and
Hungary ;n 7QSR that th"v had little
to hnne for from the West.
With 27 .divisions stationed per-
manently in Eastern Europe. and
another 50 ready to move in at
short notice, the . Russians are
of the system, which no Soviet
leader seriously hopes to remove
The system has other advantages.
..As Alexander Solzhenitsyn said re-.
cently in Washington: " It is a sys-
tem which has no legislative organs.
is without an independent Press
and without an independent judici-
arv, in which the people have no
LONDON OBSERVER
3 Aueumt 1975
'A NECESSARY summing up
of the political outcome of the
Second World War' was.Mr
Brezhnev'. modest definition
of the main achievement of the
Helsinki jamboree. In so far
as the assembly of 35. nations
recognised the status quo in
Eastern and Central Europe,
established by Russian.arms in
the interest of Russian power,
I suppose it is fair enough to
call this a summing up of a
political outcome. But neces-
sary ?
Certainly far from necessary
to us, or to anybody else ex-
cept the Russians. That it
seemed very necessary :o Mr
B,rezhnev we know from the
way he has gone on about it
for so many years. But one
still has to ask why the leader
of one of the greatest Powers
in the world finds it at all
necessary to devote so .much
time and energy, and to invest
so much prestige, in the realis-
ation of a rather childish get-
together, which neither in-
creases the security of the
Soviet Union (or anybody
else), nor adds a millimetre
to its real stature. . .
Russian .motivations are
always complicated- and
usually obscure. ? Historians
still argue about the true in-
tentions of Nicholas I towards
Turkey on the eve of the
Crimean War. Not all. the
..secrets of all the archives
yield up a firm answer-and
,,one good reason, it seems to
me, is that Nicholas himself
did not know what his own
intentions were.from one week
to the next.
pr-in ahead with t e Process of
political. econornic and Military in-
tecratinn. It is on this ?cituation
that the Het inki summit is to put
The virtuous formulations in the
Helsinki documents have no more
relation to political reality than did
the Yalta agreement which "guar-
anteed " free elections in Eastern
Europe or, for that matter, than
has the Soviet constitution which
",guarantees " all the democr-,tic
freedoms to Soviet citizens. The
Western statesmen who go to Fin-
land, some reluctantly, some less so,
may believe they are serving the
cause of " detente," whatever that
is. They are certainly not serving
the cause of freedom.
EDWARD CRANKSHAW explains the
importance of the summit for the
Russians: `They long to be respectable'
We are similarly in the dark
about what went on in the
mind of his grandson, Nicholas
II, when, in 1898, he startled
an unbelieving world by de-
manding a grand disarmament
conference, the forerunner of
all others. He got his confer-
ence-at The Hague. Nothing
was done about disarmament,
of course, but certain rules for
the conduct of war came out
of it. Some historians insist
that Nicholas was moved by
genuine idealism, in the spirit
of the old Holy Alliance.
Others see in it a rather des-
perate attempt to stop Austria
re-equipping its army with.
new guns which Russia could
not match. Nicholas himself
would have been hard put to it
to say which was right. I think
the contemporary Soviet
leadership is also unsure about .
its immediate objectives.
So historians will doubtless
be arguing about Helsinki for
many years to come. Was it
conceived as a genuine move
towards. detente, or as ?a
means of strengthening the
Russian hold on Eastern
Europe, or both ? If the first,
what can this sort of meeting
achieve that is not achieved
better by quiet diplomacy ? If
th`e, second, how. can speech.
making in Finland, strengthen
a position which depends on
force of arms ?
My own view is that much
of the drive towards Helsinki
carne from a need to feel
good, which was frequently a
,complicating factor in pre-
revolutionary Russian states-
manship, and is now surfacing
again after the Stalin era,.
during which the idea of good-
ness did not arise. We are so
familiar with the need of the
English to convince them-
selves of the nobility of even
their shabbiest actions, that
we forget that other nations
may be similarly afflicted. It
is a characteristic of English
politicians that they often do
not care what others think of
them, provided they can con-
vince themselves that they are
acting with motives of the
highest. rectitude.
Russians, on the contrary,
tend to be rather touchingly
eager for others. to believe
them, and the bigger the lie
the greater the need. They
long to appear respectable.
Helsinki has been a sort of
apotheosis for a man like .MMlr
Brezhnev, who achieved high
office under Stalin and man-
aged to hang on to it by
methods very far removed
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from the respectable.'
Sealed with
red tape
?Again, Russian statesmen
shave never liked untidiness.
_They are great believers in the
virtue of formal documents,
signed and sealed by all con-
cerned, and neatly done up
with red tape-even if the ;
documents mean very little.
Russian statesmen have always,
felt most powerfully, with all
the passion of anarchic spirits,
the need to go by the book.
How much more must this
apply to Russian Communists,
proud custodians of the one
and only book, men who assure
themselves every hour of their
waking day that all their
actions accord with the grand
theoretical design. How does
-East Europe fit into this de-
sign ? Certainly they are all.
powerful in Eastern and
Central Europe : nobody is go-
ing to drive them out and they
know it. But what is their
authority for this indubitable
power?
It is all very well for them
to tell themselves that they
exercise no power other than
their strong right arm, upon
-which all fellow Communists
may rely. This has come in
useful in the past and doubt-
less will again. But it cuts very
little ice in the larger world,
and the appearance of tanks
in rebellious city streets does
..not immediately bring to
mind an image of moral recti-
tude. What Helsinki has done
is bring all Europe and North
America to something like a
declared joint recognition of
a situation only tacitly
acknowledged so far. And
this, I think, is as spiritually
uplifting for Mr Brezhnev and
his friends as it is depressing
for all those Poles, Czechs,
Hungarians, etc., who have
found comfort in the refusal.
of the West to c;ree that.
current arrangements are in
any way sacrosanct.
Mr Brezhnev had something
to say about national sover-
eignty, too. ' It is only the
people of each given State,
and. no one else, that has the
sovereign right to resolve its
internal affairs and establish
internal laws.' This observa-
tion, said our Mr Wilson, is an
important statement, which he
took very seriously. But what
does it mean ? Mr Wilson
seemed to . think that it
inhibited Russian intervention
anywhere, that it meant the
end of the Brezhnev doctrine,
that had it been spelt out
before 1965, Czechoslovakia
would not have been invaded.
I wonder. Russia can send
troops wherever there are
Communists in power and
Whenever it likes, without in
the least technically infring-
ing national sovereignty. All
it has to do is to declare that
the comrades in Prague, or
wherever, have appealed to
Moscow for help against
counter-revolution. The War,
saw Pact forces may then
swarm in to the rescue.
I think that Mr Wilson, and
all of us, will find that the
'Sunday, August 31,1975- --
.
THE WASHINGTON POST
.11
sovereign right Mr Brezhnev
was tizinking about was the
sovereign right of the Soviet
Union to do what it likes with
its owtt' citizens and to reject
all outs5de protests. MrBrezh-
nev most he free to go on
using the KGB to persecute
Jews for applying to leave the
country,: to torture a Bukovskv
slowly to death, to consign a
Grigoreir.ko to a lunatic
asylum, to stop ordinary Rus-
sians from travelling abroad
and mix: g with foreigners at
home.
The Berlin Wall still stands.
There is nothing we can do
about it, and of course it is
better to have a working. re-
lationship with a Russia which
is at least a more civilised
place than it was some years
ago than cut ourselves-.oif
from it entierely. But there are
working a'xrangements and
working arrangements. Russia
has not recanted its open
declaration of ideological
warfare undler the banner of
co-exi'stence' And ideological
warfare'to tluem is not simply
a matter of intellectual de-
bate : it means no holds
barred in strengthening sub-
versive movements wherever
they can be .found and con-
trolled in then name of Conn-
tnunism.
This is unft:iendly activity,
and should he seen and
treated as sucl`i. In so far as
Helsinki helpe d to dress up a
hostile Power in a cloak of
respectability, it was not only
a betrayal of ithe victims of
oppression, it was self.
betrayal,. too.
issi o' r Papers Photo - Q a e 107-
MILAN. Aug. 30 (UPI) -,Corriere. is published by thel Other photographs show Kis-I
An Italian weekly has pub-!newspaper Corriere della Sera singer reading -? or a hand
lashed telephoto pictures of., and has a circulation of 800.-1 said to by his holding - rrem.
Secretary of State Henry A.
Kissinger looking at a ' hand-
written note from President
Ford, and secret documents,
some of which are readable.
The photographs were taken
at the European summit con-
ference in Helsinki last
month, it said.
000. It said the photographs oranda marked "`Top Secret."
were taken by Franco Rossi The magazine says they:
with a 600 mm. telephoto lens
from the photographers' gal-
lery overlooking the confer-
ence floor July 30, the opening
day of the summit.
Mr. Ford is shown passing a
note to Kissinger which reads
in part: ... Do we have to
0 Predict a "coalition" gov-
ernment in Saigon within a
month.
0 Describe relations be-1
tween France and North Viet-
nam as "strained"
? Report Chinese "advisers"
in Cambodia who seem to bed
commanding C o mm u. n i s t:
6rces.
In some of the photographs I play East and West in [not
published Friday the text of legible] confrontation. WV hy'
the documents is readable, but not amplify HOPE which all
in others the reproduction is want get our, actions end atl 0 List Joan Baez and Cora
unclear and the magazine sup- t that." Weiss among "peace activists"
plied an Italian translation of The word "hope" was under- who turned out to welcome
what they reportedly said. (lined twice as well as capital- South Vietnamese Commu-
The magazine, Domenica del lized. In ists to New York.
26
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the- -agreement had been signed Russian ecariofny._..to ? save it
lithe: Soiriet Union failed to notify from the catastrophe of totali- firm resistance tti Communist
t; the:', Urrited: States of Egyptian- tarian central planning geared expansion, hacked by the mili
o
;Yom Kippur war. - of which she
;had: adr:ance knowledge. Moreover,
? any one ' who remembers how the
?tSovie?ts summoned Henry, Kissinger
i, to Moscow td arrange a. cease-fire
-after having refused to. go along
r.with U.S.?.pleas for U.N. action-
..knows, -:that A he Russians used
detente.' ,-to save the Egyptian Third
Army CC~rps from destruction and
1 td'-';depr,ivel'Israel of a .deserved
iilitary$ victory. To this day, the
=Soviet 'r'ole in the Middle East has
rbeen'destabilising, not peaceful.
And.' in Vietnam? When even
the Vfe'tnamese sought to persuade
;Hanoi not to go for total military
war production. And make, tary means to rnaloviets' b I,*
marched through the streets
with pictures of Stalin!-tram
seizing power over a people
from whom they' just-, received
barely l per cent. of the vote?
Wherever there is trouble in
the world' today one looks in
vain .for.- a..shred of hard
evidence that the Soviets are
foli?viing a course of detente..
But that's rot quite true. They
are following ddtente of a kind
-their: kind.. Their. version of
detente is- very simple:: they
take. take, take and give nothing
in return.
Detente means we give the
Soviets' sophisticated Western
technolo;v-especially civilian
computer technology. We also
finance truck plants, nitrogen
fertiliser factories, natural
gas
production, etc.
You-- night--' think that 'a
country that. needs such tech.
nological assistance must at
least be doing -something all
right agriculturally. Not so. In
addition to giving the Soviets
our superior technologyo , we
must also sell them food" o their people. -
Western.'-workers are being
called upon -to bail out the
WASHINGTON POST
1 September 1975
prime acthe Commurrrst gains? Is i,
purpose is not rehs-ted to the United States atteunpting to
private profit. liberate Czechoslovakia, Poland,
Our businessmen seem to Hungary, East Germany? Do we
have an unshakable faith, in the- have political parties' in these
-power of commerce to achieve countries-or in the Soviet Un- I
practically every imitginabie- ion itself-that serve as instru-
goal-to end war, ex,: ird jus-: mentalities-of our Government?
lice, raise living strr.ndards.
What we have here is a version No policy for peace-whether
of the "trickle down '? theory it goes by the name of detente
x else-can be sue-
applied on an international. or someth]
e
h
e
e
But we in the American trade. threat t
to peace comes fr-mu. In
union moie.nent don't buy the our era, that threat comes
i" trickle down " there-v. We mainly from the Communist
don't buy it at home., and we world-from its imperialistic
don't see why we should buy it drive to dominate world society.
abroad, It l has never worked Not accidentally, the greatest
for' U.S.
threat to workers' rights eman-
We believe that thus cause of ate
.S from the same source.
social-and economic justice in- There is a peace to he had by
the United States nirrst be per-.- accommodating to this threat-
.sued'directly and head.-on. That's or by remoulding our institu-
what the, AFL-CIO 'is in busi?.- Lions and values in its image, or I
ness for. We also believe the in an image more to its liking.
cause of peace must be pursued But that is not a peace in which
di
l
rect
y not 3s a hdf fll thkf
,.ope-ora.e worers o the world , can
out from dubious conimerdal ? hope to advance their deepest
relationships. (We might not to' aspirations for a better life.
forget that Ge.rmarn? was Bri? Whatever our. Government
Lair, s chief trading partner on:: may (1o. whatever our capitalists
the eve of both would wars.) may do, we will not accom-
The fact -is that a policy of medate to the commissars,
U.S. Marketplace an Issue
By Murrey 11arder
Washington Fort Staff Writer
Ford administration poli-
cymakers now recognize
that they face an ever-wid-
etting are of debate over the
impact of ? U.S.-Soviet de-
tente on the American mar-
ketplace.
The demands of American
longshoremen for a larger
slice of jobs and money out
of the grain trade with the
Soviet Union is unlikely to
be an isolated. phenomenon,
administration officials con-
cede. Nor is the crossfire
from political rostrums over
the cost and consequences
of detente, with a presiden-
tial campaign just begin-
ning.
In blunt terms thaf- defy
the ability of official strate-
gists to reply with simplistic
answers, the recurring ques-
tion is thrust at the
administration: "What do
we give away and what do
we get back?"
In the days when his ;crrs-
tige was at its height, Scere-
tary of State Henry A. Kis-
singer could overwhelm
most of his questioners with
sophisticated, geopolitical
discourse on the benefit of
reducing tension with the
nation's principal adversary
in the nuclear age.
Kissinger's return from
the Middle East, with a new
Egyptian-Israeli accord, can
recoup part of his deflated
capacity to impress Con-
gress with his diplomatic
skill, his associates believe.
Even Kissinger enthusi-
asts acknowledge, however,
that the controversy about
U.S.-Soviet detente policy
has spread beyond the abil-
ity of Kissinger or any other
official to resolve.
The unavoidable problem
for the administration, U.S.
planners agree, is that if the
policy' is sustained, it will
bring the United States and
the Soviet Union increas-
ingly complex relations that
involve competing stakes for
cross-interests in the Ameri-
can society.
That has been illustrated
by the conflicting interests
of the dockworkers and 1lid-
dle Western farmers over
the shipment of American
grain to Soviet Ports. The
dockworkers demand more
ship-Iriidii g Work or no Bail-
ings.The farriers insist that
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presidential language on de terference in internal af-
tente.
in Minneapolis, to the Le- fairs.
pion, the President eau- President Ford also has
tioned that while detente cautioned that if the SALT
from the constant crisis and
dangerous confrontation
that have characterized rela-
tions with the Soviet Un-
ion," detente is "not a li-
cense to fish in troubled
waters."
Soviet interference in Por-
tugal drew a particular ad-
monition in the President's
speech, as it did in Kissing-
er's address in Birmingham
five days earlier. Yet, the
Soviet Union, for its part,
equally has warned the
West against outside inter-
ference in Portugal's politi-
cal turmoil, with both sides
citing to each other the Hel-
sinki declaration on nonin.
he would ask Congress for
$2 billion a year more for
new nuclear weaponry. This,
the Russians recognize, bar-
gaining-chip talk, with a pre-
cedent, although nuclear
arms bargaining-chips have
a history of developing into
weapons whether negotia-
tions fail or succeed.
In private, U.S. officials
do not claim that the
stronger language that the
Ford administration is em-
ploying represents any un-
derlying shift in. detente
strategy. On the contrary,
they disavow that.
Essentially, said one high
official, the administration's
Alonday, Sept. 1, 1975 7HE WASHINGTON POST
Soviets Tall Their Gains
detente language is "more
skeptical, more realistic, and
more conscious of the prob-
lems in the relationship,
rather than emphasizing
what has been accom-
plished."
The "language of. 1972,"
he said, "is not going to
wash in 1975" in the United
States," and "the Russians
themselves have to be
talked to in sterner terms."
One burden that the Fort
administration carries in the
political controversy over
detente, as a result of Nixon
administration hyperbole, is
a public misconception that
the United States threw
open its technological se-
crets to the Soviet Union in
the shower of agreements
dramatically signed in three
summit meetings. That im-
pression was intensified
when the recent Apollo-So.
yuz joint space mission was
shown to be lopsidedly de-
pendent on U.S. technology.
In fact, the 11 U.S.-Soviet-
agreements on technical co-
operation, ' ranging from
joint work on artificial
heart research to peaceful
atomic energy, housing,
health, science, environment
protection, transportation
and other fields, are still in
early stages of development.
. After much bargaining
over how to proceed, 140
projects in more than 60
technical fields have been
planned, but most are in the
exploratory phase. A knowl-
edgeable American source
said last week that "the rec-
ord to date is uneven, and
the process is slow. But
there is enough on the posi.
tive side to warrant contin-
ued effort."
By Peter Osnos cies and shortcomings. {
feel really secure.
Washington Post Foreign Service Did the United States lose . In the jargon of disarma-
MOSCf?
Aug
31 - If
s
r
,
.
rope represented a "great d
the
Soviets c lose by Or-
detente is a two-way street, psychological victory" for by
what has the Soviet Union the Soviets, presumably at veal.ing what they lack? The
offered in exchange for ben- the expense of American in. e on
efits bestowed by the United terests. The critics ri the yardstick. erd. depends
ctkof dete
t
S
n
e
tates?
and be seen to be equa
And it is a fact that Mlos- have a natural constituency 1 'the eyes of the
The
ns
e
nd
d
o
we
a
w
.
r
oes not Iend c
w is jubilant this autumn in the United States because What Moscow and Wash-
itself to lists. Who gives and over the results of a confer- so man ? `
J nmcricans still har- ington are negotiating in
who gets in international ence that it first proposed bor vast reserves of fear and
relations is exquisitely con- more than two decades ago, mistrust of the Russians. By SALT II -- the Strategic
plex, no matter how easily The accord, said Pravda, .their reasoning, anything Arms Limitation Talks - is
that parity.
the tally may be drawn by the Communist Party ' etvs- that is not a clear American If the talks are successful,
skillful speechwritars at- paper, starts "a new stage in advance is automatically . a if ' suspicions can be con-
tacking or defending the ad- the relaxation of tensions setback.
tro,~Ied and the theories of
ministration's record in the and was a major step on the On the Soviet side, there deterrence are correct, than
course of the ctyrning, elec- way to consolidating the are undoubtedly Russians a SALT agre..ment will
give tion campaign. And the principles of peaceful coex- who believe that concessions the world. a g
"bottom
line" of detente is istence"-the sort of num- to the West - such as the ged meas-
certain to be calculated as e of detente as defined oy
bing Russian. rhetoric that emigration of 100,000 Jews Webster's - "a relaxation
carefully here as in Wash- Americans tend to ignore. and thousands of other ml- of strained relations or ten-
ington. i But senior Western diplo- norities - weakens Soviet sions (as between nations)."
For example, the Euro- gnats here say such ceaseless resolve and internal con- The pact, however, will
pean security accord, signed praise for the Helsinki docu- trols, fundamental elements not end competition be-
at last month's summit meat, including its rigor- of Kremlin power. tween Moscow and the Nest
meeting in Helsinki, has ously crafted. provisions on "There is already too lit- for international influence
been attacked in the United "non-interference" in the in- tie order in Russia," a So- in, say, the Middle East,
States as a "sellout" of East- ternal affairs of others, viet diplomat commented _1 Portugal or Latin America.
ern Europe in which the would make it "psychologic. quite seriously recently. Detente is not peace. as the
West gave Moscow its long. ally" much harder for the Finding common ground French writer, Andre Fan-
sought ,recognition of post- prelim to intervene militari- for two such completely dif- tame, recently put it. cr'else
World ;tsar II boundaries in ly as it did in Czechoslova- ferent societies, formulated it would be called peace.
kin in 1968. on entirely different princi- How closely Moscow and
exchange for some limply pies of economic life and
worded Soviet affirmations `'If restraining the Soviets , Zt opera tor. are prepared to
is one of the im octant ob- personal freedom, is hard cooperate beyond the nu-
of go od intentions on hu- jectives of de peg"along- enough. But add to that the clear issue depends on how
man-ri hlts issues. - lingering conviction among each views the advantages
i time Western ambassador
On the other hand, it , said "then this definitel many on each side that the for itself. Where the be-
- r_right be argued by some has ,to be counted more
a long-term goal of the other fits end, so does a willing-
Kremlin critics that Moscow plus than a minus." is conquest, or at least domi ness to compromise.
symbolically accepted a per- To cite another example nation, and the task of Early in the present stage
maneirt t U.S. presence on the example building two-way confidence of Soviet-American rcla-
ef the difficulties in dclin-
Soviet borders in Europe irg gains: Some Americans becomes enormous. tions. Moscow signaled a
and also pledged at the claimed that this summer's That is wiry detente must willingness to lot Jugs Co 10
highest political level to ;~poikti Soyuz space mission begin with the simple but Israel in substantial nurn-
conduct a' more open rave undue benefit to th ultimately all-important hers if that would start the
society: two tenets that vo- Soviets because they came premise that the United flow of American technol-
se? Stalin would certainly m contact with technology States and the Soviet Union ogy and financial credits the-
have fowiri hard to swallow. far in advance of their otvn. want to avoid a war that Kremlin regards as irnpor-
Sen. Henry Jackson (D- But to Moscow the price of would lead to mutual anni tart for the Soviet Union's
lvash.); a presidential aspi- wanking with the United .hilation and are willing to development.
liana, has said the final act Stages was to lift the veil of set aside differences to At the I ei,.,ht of Moscow's
of the Conference on Secu- secrecy from its space pro- avoid a holocaust, interest in 1973, a strbstan-
rity and Cooperation in Eu gram, exposing its intrica. . Unless this notion is fully tial tdueation tax designers
accepted, neither nation will to discourage emigration
30
ing doctrine of mutual de-
terrence is that both super.
powers must be equal in
terms of nuclear strength
l in
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was dropped after ' U.S. corn-'
plaints, and around 35,000
people left the country.
Then in 1974 Sen. Jackson
announced from a White
.House podium that Moscow
was, in effect, prepared to
let Congress decide whether
Kremlin emigration policies
met American standards.
Trade was the U.S. leverage.
But that direct challenge
to Soviet authority was too
much, and the compromise
collapsed. Now emigration
has dropped to a relative
trickle and the Russians are
lining up most of their busi.
ness deals elsewhere. .
Russians these days say,
that their eagerness to buy
U.S. products, expertise and
grain should have nothing
to do with the way their
country is run. They cite
American trade and aid to and' fundamental change. tent with detente in The
countries like South Korea seems improbable. United States plainly wor-
and Spain to show that the I Experts believe, however, ries Moscow. Politburo
United States has long dealt ? that any modification would member Boris Ponornarev
with non-democratic govern- entail a fine balance be- told a group of visiting con.
ments. tween Western pressure in gi,essmen recently:
"We can have detente the human-rights area and a "We can conceal neither
without trade. But we will combination of political, mil- our surprise nor alarm when
not pay for detente with our itary, technical and cornmer- a certain circle of political
system," a Communist func- cial agreements that give figures . . . keeps stub-
tionary said bluntly. Moscow a vested interest in i bornly saying over and over
Nevertheless, there are the deepening ties. 1 again that it is only the So-
Westerners here and liber- That is the pattern of the viet Union which allegedly
al-minded Russians who do past three years. They have stands to gain from the eas-
believe that ' over an ex- been good years for the Rus- ing of tension."
tended period there can be sians, stable and relatively The Kremlin's concern for
some easing of the restric prosperous. Perhaps as a re- preserving its improving
i tions on free expression that suit, Soviet publicists. from -position may mean it is sus-
make {?
Soviet life so. alien to Leonid - Brezhnev on down ceptible to greater demands
our own-if Kremln self-as- declare their -conviction in from the United States. Thy-,
surance continues to grow. detente at every opportu- imponderable is what Mos-
The Soviet state today is nity. cow will do if it, starts to
authoritarian. But Russia The process, say the Rus- feel the one-way street run-
has been that way under. sians, should be ning the other way.
czars and commissars alike, "irreversible," and -discon-
DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
20 August 1975
THE H I K. MIRAGE
HOW QUICKLY "the spirit of Helsinki " is being tested
and found wanting. President Fono yesterday singled
out Portugal as one of " some serious situations " America
was ivatching, " for, indications of the Soviet attitude
towards detente and co-operation in European security.
On cue, Pravda, the Russian Communist party newspaper,
.launched a slashing attack on interference " in Portugal's
domestic affairs by leaders of " the Nato bloc." . So for all
the fine words. in the Helsinki document,. there is still
no common language between the democracies and
expansionary Russian Communism.
East Germany has : now completed the installation
along '100 mines of its frontier with West Germany of
16,000 explosive booby traps. They are mounted on the
eastern (i.e. East German) side of the frontier 'fence.
When set off by tripwires, they unleash a spray of shrapnel
over !a 30-yard range. So much for 4' free movement of
populations," another of the Helsinki desiderata. Another
item from yesterday's news: - the Soviet Union has shipped
armoured cars, heavy machine guns, heavy mortars and
bazookas to Angola. What does Pravda have to say? The .
imperialist forces and their Peking allies are trying to
Fortunately for the whole of the Western alliance;
there: is -growing evidence of a groundswell in the United
States against. further pussyfooting around with Russian
expansionism ; President Foro knows this, and .is reflecting
it. Iff there was 'no progress in the current strategic arms
limitation negotiation with Russia, he said, he " would
have no choice " but to "ask Congress for an additional
two to three billion dollars for nuclear arms, on top of
the $9.8 billion in the defence budget. America's maritime
unions have " blacked " grain shipments to -Russia. By
doing so, they are talking the languagedlussia understands,
unleash a civil war in Angola."
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LOS ANGELES TIMES
25 August 1975
A high-level Kremlin official told a visiting U.S.
congressional delegation earlier this month that
Moscow was looking forward to "real' progress" in
the negotiations on mutual reduction of forces in
Europe, which resume Sept. 22 after a summer re-
cess.
We hope this signals a change in Russian attitude
toward the talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Re-
duction, as they are called on the Western. side. Up
to now, Soviet participation in the negotiations has
been marked by bald attempts, to perpetuate the
Warsaw Pact's advantage in tanks and military
manpower, while narrowing or eliminating NATO's
offsetting edge in sophisticated weaponry.
The I~IBFR talks had their origin in congressional
pressure for substantive reductions in the U.S.
troop presence in. Europe. This country's NATO al-
lies argued that if-there were to be American with-
drawals, they should be made only in the context
of a parallel reduction in Soviet forces in Central
Europe.
U.S. policymakers agreed, and ultimately per-
suaded the Soviet Union to enter such negotiations.
The sincerity of Russian participation up to now,
however, is highly suspect.
The Warsaw Pact nations enjoy an edge of well
over 100,000 men in military manpower in the
area; Communist tanks outnumber those on the.
NATO side by 15,500 to 6,000. The numerical ad-
vantage has, if anything, increased since the MBFR
negotiations began.
Since Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces out-
number those of.NATO, the United States and its
allies properly felt that the Communist countries
should be willing to make proportionately greater
reductions in the interest of balance. The Russians
argued instead that numerically equal reductions
Europe: Keeping Our .Guard E
P
should be made on each side-a formula that, if ac-
cepted, would perpetuate the Russian advantage.
Moscow also argued, with greater Justice, for in-
clusion of European-based nuclear forces in the ne-
gotiations. The proposal was resisted by the United
States and its allies, but in fact concessions in this
area could be made without real jeopardy to the
military balance in the heart of Europe.
Such concessions should be offered, if they
haven't been already, in return for reductions of an
acceptable magnitude in Soviet tanks and manpow-
er.
The United States currently has some 7,000 tacti-
cal nuclear warheads in Europe; few military ex-
perts seriously believe that many are needed. De-
fense Secretary Schlesinger has been reported will-
ing to accept the withdrawal of at least 1,000 U.S.
nuclear warheads from Europe. Others think up to
3,000 could safely be removed, and some experts
use even larger figures.
It is essential, however, that this country's NATO
allies be reassured that removal of a substantial
number of nuclear warheads would not upset the
balance of military manpower; we trust that such
reassurances are being offered in the discussions
that are being held at NATO headquarters this
month in preparation for resumption of the MBFR
talks.
It may be that the Soviet Union is confident that
unilateral reductions will be made in American
forces anyway, and thus will be unwilling to make
any compromises whatsoever. If that turns out to
be so, there will be all the more reason to suspect
that the Soviet-inspired European security confer-
ence, which proclaimed a new era of peace and
cooperation in Europe, was a sham.
32
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prestige value by the austere stand-
ards of Romanian society and violate
the law which prohibits Romanians,
from possessing more consumer
goods than their incomes would en-.
able them to purchase.
To crack down on bribery Presi-
dent Nicolae Ceausescu.has estab-
lished a special department under
jurisdiction of the secret police.
Unlike the Soviet Union, however,
Romania has expressed no desire to
actually incarcerate Western busi-
nessmen. Instead, upon formal
conviction on such charges as
"industrial espionage" or "under-
mining the economic welfare of the
Romanian people," Bucharest usual-
ly seeks to extract horrendous fines,
bail and damage payments in lieu of
imprisonment.
Thus, an Austrian plastics produc-
er recently had to pay $300,000 to ob-
tain the release of two of his sales
representatives sentenced to 10 years
each in a bribery case.
A WEST GERMAN manufacturer
of industrial pumps has just shelled
out a record $800,000 to free his sales-
man who had been convicted of pay-
ing a R1nomanian official $4,000 to
clinch a deal.
Fines . Bid damage payments range,
from $15, to $25 for each day of the
sentence,., the rate being variable and
negotiabl't?', apparently depending on
Bucharest's interest in continuing to
do busine,, Is with the manufacturer or
supplier ir.Wolved.
Accordi jig to one reliable East-
West trade- source here, more than'
100 "purcl ases" of convicted sales
represent Eutives are expected this
year.
Although'%Bulgaria is barely on the
threshold o`k big business with the
West, it ton has launched a drive
against bril Fery. Earlier this year a
number of ts senior foreign trade
officials were tried, convicted and
sentenced to) terms of up to 15 years
in prison.
THE MO(r extensive' campaign
against bribery and other foreign
trade shenanigans has just been
mounted by Zrugoslavia under whose
worker self- ttnaragement system
enterprises are free to deal with
Western customers and suppliers di-
rectly. "
Under-the-table deals are alleged
to have amounted to several hundred
million dollars in recent years.
THE BIGGEST CASE INVOLVES
Yugoslav executives now awaiting
trial in Belgrade on a catalog of
charges of -fraud, embezzlement and
bribery in a series of export-import
deals.
More than SO other company and
government officials are in pretrial
custody and under investigation,
among them, allegedly, a deputy
minister and a section chief of the
ministry of foreign trade.
They are suspected, according to
district prosecutor Milan Simicevic,
of activities that go "far beyond
classical white-collar economic
crime, extending into the realm of
economic subversion to undermine
our entire social and political sys-
THOUGH FEW details
have been disclosed, the es-
sence of the charges in-
volves the purchase of vast
quantities of inferior indus-'.
trial goods and consumer
products abroad and their
resale at usurious prices in
Yugoslavia.
To finance the deals, the
defendants allegedly bor-
rowed heavily from unsus-
pecting banks and defaulted
on the loans. They reported-
ly -deposited profits. in
numbered Swiss bank ac,
counts, intending to recoup
them on trips abroad.
In one case, a. scrapped
marine diesel engine worth
$20,000 was resold in a
series of profit-making
transactions to its ultimate
purchaser for $1.2 million.
One of the key figures in
the Yugoslav probe is
Slobodan Todorovic, cur-
rently in custody in Bel-
grade's central prison after
he was reportedly kidnaped
from Austria by Yugoslav
secret police agents.
TODOROVIC WAS once a
high-ranking Yugoslav
executive who was fired
from his post with a Bel-
grade company in 1962. He
left the country for Italy,
then set up 30 different
trading companies for ob-
scure import-export and
switch deals with friends
and former business associ-
ates in Yugoslavia. To fi-
nance the purchase of im-
port merchandise, they
obtained loans from Yugo-
slav banks which allegedly
wound up in their and Todo-
rovic's pockets.
Todorovic is reported to
be just one of scores of
"free-lance" Yugoslav pur-
chasing agents abroad.
Some 140 are said to over-
ate in Frankfurt, Germany.
The majority are in the
business of buying inferior
goods which they resell,
through a network of offi-
cial` middlemen, to compa-
nies at home, with everyone
involved in the deals al-
legedly pocketing
commissions.
Belgrade's prosecutor the
other day described these
as "crimes against the peo-
ple and the state," an omi-
nous hint that he may de-
mand the death penalty,
too. -
But whatever labels the
Communist governments
choose to attach to under-
the-table East-West deals,
they do seem to prove that
business is business, re-
gardless of who owns the
means of production of
reaps the profits.
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By Henry S. Bradsber
Washington Star Staff writer
LISBON - The dramatic
shift in the Portuguese po-
litical situation which has
put the Communists oaa- the
defensive raises questions
about the sudden ability of
anti-Communists to organ-
ize themselves effectively.
The disciplined Por-
tuguese Communist party
(PCP) achieved a strung
position in the 16 months
since the old Lisbon regime
,fell because other political
elements were disorganized
and confused. But in the
past month a. series of
events has eroded Commu-
nist power.
'They might have been
separate events with sepa-
rate causes. But to many
observers here, there seems
to'be too much coincidence,
too clear a pattern in recent
developments _ especially
the widespread attacks on
PCP offices - to be simply
spontaneous occurrences.
WESTERN countries
interested in the fate of
Portugal had been lament-
ing the disarray of anti-
Communist forces. Whether
they helped organize those
forces is not publicly
known, but they have help-
ed finance them, according
to informed sources.
Western European coun-
tries had been lamenting
the incoherence of anti-
Communist forces in Portu-
gal. It would therefore be
logical to assume that they
-did give them tactical ad-
vice.
Much has been made of
Soviet influence in Portugal
since the April 25, 1974,_
revolution. against the
Salazar-Caetano dictator-
ship. The PCP leader, Alva-
ro Cunhal, came home from
Thu,s& y: August 2l, 19713
long exile in Eastern Eu-
rope a few days later to
rouse his underground
party.
Responsible 'Western esti-
mates of secret Soviet fi-
nancing for the party since
then have ranged from Si
million to $3 million a
month. Some of the results
have been visible in a corps
of full-time PCP workers,
more extensive propaganda
and far more wall posters.
than other parties manage
to pull up. ,
What has not been so well
publicized is that Western
European Social Democrat-
ic parties also have been
pouring money into Portu-
gal. They started much
later than Moscow, but in-
formed sources now esti-
mate the flow of money
from West Germany,
Scandinavia and - other
areas to be greater than
Soviet financing.
THIS WESTERN' money,
has gone primarily to sup-
port the Socialist party,
headed by Mario Soares. It
won 38 percent of the votes
in' last April's constituent
assembly elections, and
other moderate and centrist
parties got 33 percent, while
the Communists and their
allies got only 18 percent.
Asked about. foreign
financial support, a Social-
ist party spokesman said it
was too sensitive to discuss.
He noted that it is illegal for
political parties in Portugal
to receive foreign money,
but he did not deny that his
party was getting it.
But money has. not been
enough. Neither were votes.
The non-Communists
were unable to gain advan-
tage from their popular sup-
port. The Communists, ex-
ploiting a foothold in the
armed forces, had grabbed
and held key positions in
the national government
and local administrations.
THE ANALYSIS at the
top levels.of the U.S. gov-
ernment as well as in West-
ern Europe was that the
anti-Communists lacked the
experience, organization or
tactical knowledge needed
to resist the skillfully
organized efforts of the
Communists. Leaders such
as Soares were considered
to be poor organizers, with-
out a background of hard
infighting.
The Communists, on the
other hand, knew exactly
how their minority position
could be used tactically to
best advantage. But some-
one needed to advise the So-
cialists and other anti-
Communists.
The first thought that
springs to mind in such a
situation is that the CIA has
been involved.
Senior Americans - not
those in the embassy here
- have insisted that the
CIA has been too crippled
with caution by investiga-
tions into its covert roles,
particularly in Chile, to get
involved here.
Somebody needed to tell
the anti-Communist ele-
ments here how to pull
themselves together, the
U.S. officials have said, but
it was not going to be a U.S.
job.
INTERVIEWS in West
Germany a month ago turn-
ed up strong bipartisan sup-
port for help to the anti-
Communists here. Some of
this support was for action
through political party
channels - German Social-
ists to Portuguese Social-
ists, But some suggested a
willingness to engage in-
more covert operations.
The emergence of the
anti-Communist forces
began last month, as offi-
cials in several foreign
capitals were saying that
organizational help was .
needed here.
On July 3 the Catholic
church (to which most Por-_
tuguese belong) lost its
main radio station in Lisbon
to the Communists after a
lengthy struggle. In a coun-
try with 35 percent illitera-
cy, radio is a major influ-
ence. The church became
more militant.
On July 7 the Socialist
party lost its main news-
paper to the Communists,
and the armed forces lead-
ership voted to ignore politi-
cal parties. The Socialists
quit the cabinet, where they
had been ineffectual in the
face of Communist pres-
sure.
SHORTLY thereafter, at-
tacks on Communist offices
began in small towns. More
than 50 have now been sack-
ed, often with. Communists
shooting into angry crowds.
Some observers suggest
that the attacks develo. d
out of local passions, with
one town hearing of an at-
tack elsewhere and decid-
ing to imitate it.
This explanation,.and the
whole militancy of the anti-
Communists now, seem
inadequate'to other observ-
ers, however.
On Tuesday the Soviet
party newspaper Pravda
angrily denounced the at-
tack on Communists here
and implied that if the PCP
loses its influence it will be
a result of outside influ-
ence. -
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WASHINGTON POST
21 August 1975
NATO Ra '. ar
Pennetrated by
it Rescav
By Michael Getter
Washington Post Foreign service
BONN. Aug. 20-The dra-
matic helicopter pickup of
ithree East Germans inside
'Czechoslovakia last Sunday by
a civilian U.S. pilot has touched
doff considerable behind-the.
scenes concern among Ameri-
ican and NATO officials.
The pilot, identified as Bart-v
Meeker, 34, apparently man-
aged to elude NATO radar
monitoring systems that are
,!constantly focused along West
,Germany's frontiers with East -
j ern Europe. probably the most
heavily defended in the world.
Although there were con-
jilicting reports about just how
:many times .Meeker made sim-
ilar flights, he claims to have
done it on at least two occa-
sions. This means he crossed
and recrossed NATO's most
sensitive front lines undetect-
ed at least six times.
The episode has touched off
an investigation about how
Meeker was able to make these
flights and completely elude
NATO's high-po:rer radar sur-
veillance network and ground
border patrols. sources said.
The helicopter Meeker was
flying was a small one and
undoubtedly he was able to fly
three East Germans-two
men and a.14-year-old girl-
whom Meeker lifted out of
Czechoslovakia in his small
craft.
Earlier, news agencies
that interviewed Meeker by
telephone in the hospital
reported.: .
Meeker said he had re-
ceived $4.000 for each of his
flights to Czechoslovakia, but
denied that the ' payments
were fees.
"These were guarantees- in
case anything would happen
to me, that my family would
be all right, my family to be:
I'm engaged," he said.
"I've noticed negative com-
ments in the press that I'm
simply a soldier of fortune
. selling my services in
each one. But what people
don't realize is that each one
took about two months and
during these two months I
Was not emnicyed, I earned
no money at all." -
for hip 'and -elbow wounds he
suffered. when Czechoslovak
guards opened fire as he was
loading his passengers.
Talking of the previous
rescue flights, Meeker said
he . had made them at this
time, last year, one on Aug;
15 and the other Aug. 17. He
said he had brought out four
refugees on each of the 1974
flights.
Meeker said that he ex-
pected to lose - his license to
fly in Germany, but he
added: "It doesn't matter if
I lose my license or not-no
one will ever lend me a heli-
copter again.
criminal - charges will be-
pressed. "I think some steps
will be taken, but more of a
hand-slapping nature thane
of a heads-must-roll nature,"
he said.
Meeker's lawyer ` said
Meeker had returned to
West Germany several.
weeks ago from Isfahan,
Iran, where he was training.
pilot's of the shah's army. _
Meeker said that he was
born in Hartford, Conn., and
raised in New York City,
but that his family now lives
in Wakefield, R.I.
His father, William -
Meeker, said - he was
"stunned at first" when he -
heard of his son's exploits.
"But after I thought about it
I wasn't surprised." he said.
One of the pilot's two
younger brothers, Craig,
said that before Barry
Meeker enlisted in the U.S.
Army in 1966 he had been
rather apoliticaL
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low and underneath' the elec. for Americans - employed ;in
tronic eyes of the radar. Dart- that area. i
ing around mountain areas to Unauthorized crossing 4of
elude radar would also make the borders here Is illegal
detection difficult. but there were no immediate
The affair raises impor- indications that Meeker
tant questions for NATO - faces charges.
countries that have invested Officials also indicated
billions of dollars in a vari- they had no information on
ety of electronic monitoring the whereabouts of the
t
sys
ems designed to detect
all kinds of activity along
the frontiers with Eastern
Europe.
U.S. officials here say
they have no information on
Meeker or his whereabouts.
The pilot checked out of the
Traunstein City Hospital in
Eavaria today and left no
forwarding address. Accord-
ing to a telephone operator
at the hospital Meeker left
with "some friends."
.It is unofficially reported
that Meeker has decided to
sell the rights to his per-
sonal story to the West Ger-
man picture magazine Stern
and will give no further free
interviews.
U.S. officials here say that
the episode caught them by
surprise but that they were
able to determine quickly
that Meeker was not an em-
ployee of the CIA.
Many questions were
raised by his activities.
Meeker reportedly was not
.registered with the U.S. con-
where he reportedly worked `ffi i ?i n `Prate gu eto'to vr. otestt
for a West German helicop ov t protes- over r the violation of Czech
ter rescue service. Registra- frontiers by Meeker's heli-
tion with the consulate is copter.
not mandatory. but is normal
Meeker underwent surgery
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The Washington Star
Thtirtdny, August 21, 1975
State Dept. Shuffle
Be R
By Jeremiah O'Lqary
and Roberta Hornig
Washington Star Staff Writers
U.S.. Ambassador to
Saudi Arabia James E.
Akins, who has been ac-
cused by his critics of being
too soft on Arab oil export-
ers, says he has been in-
formed officially. that he
will be relieved of his post
Dec. 1.
His replacement is part
of a reshuffling of key State
Department officials who
.have differed over energy
policy. Saudi officials say
they fear Akins' removal
signals a new, harder line
in U.S. policy.
The 48-year-old career
diplomat and Arab special-
ist said in an interview last
night that he has been told
he will be replaced after
two years in Riyadh and
that he does not have a new
assignment. Informed
sources said Akins will not
get a new assignment,
which is tantamount to end-
in a foreign service ca-
reer.
According to reliable
sources, Akins will be re-
placed by the current
ambassador to Canada,
William J. Porter, also a
veteran Arab specialist. In
turn, Porter will be re-
placed ? by Assistant Secre-
tary of State for Economic
Affairs Thomas Enders,
these sources said.
WASHINGTON POST
30 August 1975
THE OFFICIAL version
of- this reshuffling is that.
Secretary of State Henry A.
Kissinger wants to send the
61-year-old Porter to Saudi
Arabia because he is the
leading Arabist in the
State Department. Enders
ostensibly is going to Otta-
wa because his economic
expertise would be useful in
dealing with the United
States' No. I trading part-
ner. State Department offi-
cials have declined com-
ment on the diplomatic
shifts.
But sources close to the
situation have asserted that
both Akins and Enders are
being removed from their
crucial ttesitions in forma-
tion of U.S. energy policy
because of pressure tactics
and State Department per-
sonality clashes.
Reliable sources have re-
ported that Kissinger has
bridled at some of Akins'
reports from Saudi Arabia
about the key issue of oil
price policy. These sources
said Kissinger has tended to
blame Akins for Saudi
Arabia's adherence to de-
cisions by the oil-export
cartel to :raise oil prices.
AKINS, some sources
have alleged, is a victim of
the pro-Israeli lobby, which
regards him as too soft on
the Arabs. .
Rowland Evans and Robert Novak
' e Cost
Secretary of State Henry
singer's latest tour cue force
A. Kis-
oi Mti-.
eastern shuttle diplomacy has brought
frowns rather than smiles to high of-
ficials back in \Vashington who have
this private complaint: we have paid
far too much for too little.
T:te source of their complaint is
r,ccret aid assurances made by Dr. Kis-
singer to -Israeli Ambassador Simcha
signment of Porter to re-
Akins said last night that place Akins means a
he has been an advocate of change in U.S. policy to-
moderation by Saudi Ara- ward that country. Saudi
bia on oil prices and added, officials say they think the
"I have told them there is change means the United
no justification for a price States will take a harder'
increase." He said no one . line toward Saudi Arabia
has worked harder than he and other nations in the
to bring peace'between Is- Organization of Petroleum
rael and the Arabs. Exporting Countries now
Enders, chief architect of that it appears the danger
the U.S. effort to organize of a Mideast war is dimin-
oil consuming nations. for, ishing.
coordinated action in deal- The reaction.of the Sau-
ing with the oil producing dis will be better known on
nations, reportedly has col- Sept. 24 when the OPEC na-
lided on policy matters with tions meet in Vienna to
Under-secretary of State for discuss the next round of oil
Economic Affairs Charles price increases. U.S. offi-
W. Robinson. Officials fa- cials have been hoping that
miliar with the situation say Saudi Arabia, the dominant
that Kissinger is backing nation - in the oil cartel,
Robinson in the policy would support a moderate
dispute. increase of 24 cents a barrel
Enders' assignment to against the expected push
Canada would remove him by Iran and Algeria for an
from the center stage, increase of up to $1.54 a
despite the importance of barrel.
commerce between the U.S. VrAETI1ER assignment
and Canada. of Porter to Saudi Arabia
AKINS, who is in Wash- . signals a new U.S. hard line
incton on home leave, said remains to be seen. Porter,
last night that "I didn't 'who speaks Arabic, has had
know anything about (his experience in Iraq, Lebanon,
impending replacement) Palestine, Morocco, }and
until I read it in the papers Algeria. He also possesses
Tuesday," when syndicated the diplomatic skill of acting
columnist Joseph Kraft re- tough or bland according to
ported it. Akins said he im- his instructions.
mediately asked the State Akins, on the other hand,
Department for an expla- possesses another kind of
nation and was told to re- toughness -- he is known
turn to his post in order to for being almost painfully
receive Kissinger when the blunt. He once 7:.fn m'ed
secretary visits Riyadh State Department c::iicials
next week. that he would not rapport.
The Saudi government the official administration
also learned of the decision line on Vietnam it, his
to replace Akins from press speeches and gave then'
retnorts. Secretary of State Dean
The Saudi Foreign Minis husk an unsolicited anal-
ter , Prince Saud, said in ysis of 'what he thought was
New York that his govern- wrong with U.S. policy in
-?ment is concerned that as- ' Southeast Asia.
T O cf
. SS,-,IL
breathtaking new aid request of $0.3 n),-11t ),n),-11t not even imagi?title. Tiather,
billion for next year will surely not there is fear here that the aid promised
be met, the Israelis agreed, to a Sinai Israel could an drastically distort the
settlement only after a secret antler- Elideast's rriilitary power balance, that
standing that they will receive more the latest Kissinger triumph will, ironi-
U.S. aid than ever before--probably Bally, reduce the regions stability.
between $2.5 billion and $3 billion Accordingly, ugly questions are be-
Thoughtful policymal,ers here fret lug raised in offical Wahington as
he good news rolls in from Jerusalem
because this lavish expendituro has `
little. Even Kissinger's de- and Cairo. Did Kissinger promote a
fel-t~;ht. so
feudcrs concede progress on the Syrian Sinai settlement in preference to a
generat alideast peace conference in
Diritx in WYa shington. Although Israel's 'front is unlikely and an overall settle-
37' 1
Geneva mainly to refurbish his own
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5
political standing here? Such questions,
which an angry Kissinger in private
attributes to "sickness" in Washington,
are being raised not by fanatical Kis-
singer-haters but by sober colleagues
in the administration.
The answer to Kissinger's motives
depends on just how .likely was a new
shooting war between Israel and the
Arabs if there were no Sinai agree-
ment. Although a few officials believe
the danger was negligible, Kissinger's
warning of imminent war is accepted
by some of his critics. But even while
granting the necessity for the latest
Kissinger shuttle, there is little room
for e4ultation over its cost and con-
sequences.
The cost became apparent about two
weeks ago when Israel raised the ante
on its aid request to the eye-popping
$3.3 billion, including some $2 billion in
U -S. military hardware. One key U.S.
official told us chances of Israel's get-
ting $3.3 billion are "exactly zero." But
Israeli military specialists who visited
here last week understand that and
still are satisfied with Kissinger's un-
revealed promise.
Whatever the exact amount, Israel
is sure to emerge from the Kissinger
shuttle with immense military superi-
ority in the 1lideast. Contrary to the
misimpression among the U.S. public
and Congress, Israel is much stronger
militarily today than it was on the eve
NEW YORK TIMES
31 August 1975
Mideast
of the surprise Egyptian attack in '
October 1973 and could easily win a closet to a st.ccessful 1yeneva onfer-
two-front war. Any extra hardware in-
creases' that advantage.
Consequently, just how much aid
Kissinger has promised secretly be- of massive Israeli arms requests. The
comes critical. If it is close to the re- $3.3 billion is no one-time proposal. Of-
quested $2 billion in sophisticated ficials here fear Israel might want
hardware, military experts fear it $3.5 billion to $4 billion a year into
would so unbalance arms in the Mid- the next decade.
East th
t A
b
a
ra
states would be panick-
ed. The result could be, in the short
run, Arabs returning to . Moscow for
arms, in the long run, war-two cala-
mities Kissinger has toiled for years
to avoid.
Yet, Kissinger had to guarantee
much of the Israeli request to avoid
opposition to the Sinai settlement from
Shimon Peres, Israel's hawkish mini-
ster of defense. In justification, sup-
porters of heavy Israeli aid say Israel
is more secure and more apt to be con-
ciliatory with a sophisticated arms
supply assured.
Past experience, however, has indi-
More likely, the latest Kissinger
shuttle may lead to annual repetitions
That Kissinger will be returning
home from this shuttle not in failure
but with an initialed agreement car-
ries some side benefits. It may lead,
the House to reverse itself on Turkish
aid. Chances for Congress' approving
Hawk missiles to Jordan will be im-
proved. And Henry Kissinger will
seem a little more like the diplomatic.
miracle-maker of yesteryear.
For how long? "About one month,"
replies one State Department official,
who sees congressional probing on
grain shipments to Russia, SALT
cated precisely the opposite: military agreements and CIA intervention in
superiority directly proportionate to . Chile quickly pressing in on the Secre-
Israeli intransigence at the bargaining
table. Moreover, considering popular
Israeli opposition to the Sinai conces-
sions, there is no hope whatever for
serious negotiations on the Syrian
front.. Nor does anybody here believe
the Sinai settlement leads one step
Will Not
o Duch for
Arab Unit
By JAMES M. MIARKHAM
ALEXANDRIA-The interim agreement betweeii-
Egypt and Israel has already become an apple of .
discord in the Arab camp.. .
"The inter-Arab cold war is just beginning," warns
the pro-Libyan Beirut daily As Safir.
Arab critics of Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat
fear that, a disengagement agreement in the Sinai
will actually be far more than an "interim" accord;
that it will effectively detach the principal Arab
military power, Egypt, from the confrontation with.
Israel.
This, in turn, it is argued, will stall movement to
a resolution of the thornier outstanding Arab busi-?
mess with Israel: the occupied Syrian Golan Heights,
the occupied West Bark of the Jordan River and the
proclaimed "rights" of the Palestinians to a home
of their own.
The government-guided Egyptian press has been
striving in the last-few weeks to allay these qualms.
it has insisted that Mn Sadat is concluding only a
military, not a political, pact with Israel; that a sec
and disengagement in Sinai is but another step to-
ward an over-all settlement; that Egyptian blood was
not shed for purely Egyptian interests.
.But Arab militants-for example, Marxists within
the Palestinian movement-say that Egypt has
sinned not only in Sinai. They charge that Mr. Sadat
tary of State.
The reason for such impermanence
is that the second interim Sinai agree-
ment, like the battle of Blenheim, may
well be interpreted as a "famous vic-
tory" purchased at great price with
minimal effect.
0 1975. Field Enterprises, Inc.
has totally reoriented Egypt's economic and political
posture, rebuffing the Soviet Union and wooing cap-
italist investors. The deeper these new interests be-
come entrenched, the radicals argue, the less likely
it is that Egypt would ever again go to war.
There is perhaps some truth in this analysis, which
predicts that Egypt will now begin to focus upon,
its own long-neglected economic well-being.
"What preoccupies me now is peace," Mr. Sadat.
'told a group of American Congressmen this month,-
"because without peace we cannot start the major
plans of reconstruction we have for our country.
The Arabs' Choices
This preoccupation presents the dissenting Arab-
states-Syria, Libya, Iraq-and the Palestinians with
tough choices. To start with, Syria and Iraq are
locked in an almost obsessive feud, with Baghdad
trying to out-radical Damascus to demonstrate the
purity of its variety of Baathist socialism. Libya's
attacks on Egyptian moderation are not at all con-
sonant with the more modulated criticisms of the
Syrians, the Iraqis and the middle-of-the-road Pal-
estinians, who want to keep on civil terms with
Cairo.
Egypt does have- the support' of such financial
powers as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iran (which,
though not an Arab state,?is becoming more'deeply
erm:eshed in the region). The conservative Persian
Gulf states, through subsidies to Syria, Jordan, Egypt
and the Palestinians, also make their influence felt..
It is President Hafez al-Assad of Syria who has
consciously built a new, though unsteady, Arab co-
alition to keep Egypt from backsliding. Last March,
when. Secretary of State Kissinger was shuttling in
these parts, the Syrians announced the formation of
a military "joint command" with the Palestine Liber-
ation Organization. In the intervening months, Mr.
Assad rrlade overtures to his Jordanian neighbor,
King Hussein, whose army had systematically elim-
inated the Palestinian guerrilla movement in Jordan
beginning in "Black September," 1970.
Lobbied by Israeli pressure groups, the United
States Congress helped the Syria-Jordanian rap-
prochement by delaying an Administration request
to sell Hawk ground-to-air missiles to King Hussein.
By the time Mr. Kissinger shuttled in this time, the
King and the Syrian President were announcing an-
other "joint command."
38
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370002-5
The joint. command with the Jordanians (as with"
the Palestinians) exists more on paper than in fact
but the point is to remind Mr. Sadat that he is facing.
not just a disgruntled Syria but an Arab front de-
manding further Israeli withdrawals.
The Egyptian press has' astutely welcomed the:
Syria-Jordanian move. qtr Sadat has found that, in
dealing with fellow Araaa ,.- with Israelis a positive
attitude pays the most divitiends. (After the Israelis
scuttled the Marc), shuttle, ne opened the Suez -
Canal.)
The Syrians have also been pressing a campaign
to ,eel Israel from the United Nations. This dip
lomatic assault gives them some leverage in dealing=
with the Israelis on the Golan Heights. But it has.
also led to friction with Egypt, which surfaced at the.
Kampala meeting of the Organization of African
Unity and, last week, at a conference of nonaligned
At Kampala, the Egyptians enraged the Palestiit=
fans by watering down an expulsion resolution. Mr.
Sadat .has said tht; "Kampala stand" will remain
WASHINGTON POST
27 August 1975
S. Rejects Libya
Egypt's Position. In fact, it seems to be incorporated'
in the so-called "secret clauses" of the Sinai accord.
The Sinai agreement will press down on the di-
vided Palestine Liberation Organization more than
.on any other Arab group-with the possible except
tion of Syria. The-Palestinians have been unable to
halt the process of piecemeal Egyptian political con-
cessions to the Israelis. Already split into radical
"rejectionists and moderates like Yasir Arafat, the
Palestinians. have now somehow to come to terms
with Mr. Sadat.
The Palestinian moderates seem inclined for the
moment to attack the perfidiousness of the Ameri-
cans, and the Israelis, avoiding a frontal break with
the Egyptians. It is an unhappy choice for men like
Mr. Arafat: A break with Egypt risks isolating them
in the Arab world, but the longer they waffle, the
more the radicals can undermine their hold on the
organization. .
James M. Markham, The New York Times bureau
chief in Beirut, has been reporting on the current
Middle East peace talks.
- Pla*ne, . Training;
United Press International
The. State Departure t 1
signaled dwith " With regard to the request
i.bya's m disenchantment en e to bring 56 Libyan air force
Y in Aram - Ik personnel to the U.S. for train-,
iied raeli affairs and turned back
5S Libyan air force personnel h in-we have cann t a Lock`
eed that we cannot approve,
who sought training in the
the
United States and blocked the ap thio:!. at this time be-
United
export of eight cargo planes. cause of of the current state of
relations with Libya but that
Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.), :we shall keep this case under
who had protested an applica- active review."
do". by Lockheed Aircraft I The trainees were to study
Corp. to train the Libyans in maintenance' of C-130 aircraft.
America, disclosed the State In a letter to Aspin, Robert
Department decision and J. McCloskey, assistant' secre-
settlement, has intensified'sig-tary of state for congressiorisl
nificantly over the past few relations, said in part:
months and has been the ma-
jor consideration in the for, We share your concern
Fnulation of our policy toward about the efforts r attitude t -
the Libyan government. ward our to reach lt.
Middle East peace settlement.
"AA's a result we have re-! J ibyan opposition to a setti~-
: ezsed to approve the export to ment, and to moderate Ai` b'
p bya of any Military related leaders who support such ;
items, including, as ypu point called it a welcome shift. if,
l out, eight additional C-130 air- f U.S. policy."
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THL NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY,. AUGUST 11, 197S
U.S. Interest iri Southern Africa
dependence," the Afro-Asian and Com-
munist majority in the United Nations
NASHVILLE-Americans cannot re-
gard with unconcern the -worsening.
situation in sub-Sahara Africa. The,
United States has a vital stake in
maintaining access to the vast mineral
wealth of southern Africa and in the
security of tine Cape sea route around
Africa. Around the Cape of Good Hope
move the -tankers that carry oil to
fuel industries and homes in Europe
and America.
Unfortunately, the last year has
witnessed a steady deterioration of the
situation in southern Africa and in
the western Indian Ocean area.
-Several members of Congress have
returned from a visit to Somalia in
East Africa and reported on the mis
site-supply base the Russians have
constructed near Berbera on the Gulf
cf Aden.
To the south the new dictator of
Mozambique, the former Portuguese
overseas province, has proclaimed his
nation a "People's Republic" in the
Chinese-Communist style In Angola,
t the former Portuguese province on the
South Atlantic, all is chaos. Rival guer-
rilla movements and Marxist factions
battle for power in a vast land rich in
oil and minerals. . -
The world has been- repeatedly
shocked by the brutal actions of Idi
Amin, the absurd dictate of Uganda
who has been aptly described as' a
village tyrant.
In Zambia, land was nationalized
recently, indicating anew the impos-
sibility of economic cooperation be-
tween free-world countries and Afri
can socialist regimes.
Despite the appalling results of "in-._
VAIL, Colo. (UPI) - Secretary of
State Henry A. Kissinger has heated-
ly accused W. Beverly Carter, . re-
moved from his post as ambassador,
to Tanzania, of conducting "a per-
sonal publicity campaign" and
denied the diplomat was being
moved out of the State Department.
"I think Ambassador Carter would
be better advised to deal withore-
sponsible officials in the State De-
partment than to deal in a personal
campaign of his own."
"We are trying to maintain a
principle that terrorists cannot ne-
gotiate with American officials,"
Kissinger told reporters. "We are
doing this to protect thousands of
Americans who could become vic-
tims all over the world...."
40
I persists in trying to impose more of
the same on Southwest-Africa, the
enormous and territory on the South
Atlantic which South Africa has 'ad-.
ministered intelligently and respon.
sibly since receiving it under a League
of Nations mandate.
The United Nations is opposed to
true self-determination for the people
of Southwest-Africa, which it insists
on calling Namibia.
Not all the news is bad, however.
South Africa's policy of "detente" with
the more responsible African states
to the north is making substantial
.headway. With success in making
social and economic adjustments at
home and a breakthrough to relations
,with such African countries as Ivory
Coast and Liberia, South Africa is the '
strong stabilizing force on the African
Continent. Meanwhile, Rhodesia con-
tinues to maintain orderly, Western-
style Government and wide prosper.
ity, while turni:ig back the assaults of
revolutionary guerrilla forces.
The United States' role inside Africa
is necessarily minimal. What is most
important is that the United States
employ its influence to sustain- re-
sponsible, orderly governments and
to oppose the expansion of revolu.
tionary regimes. Southern Africa is
the mineral treasure house of the
Continent. It is very much in the
national interest of the United States
to maintain access to the gold, ura-
nium, coal, chrome, copper, platinum
and other strategic materials in the
subcontinent. Access will be denied
if Marxist regimes extend their sway.
At the same time the United States
has a special strategic interest in the
Cape of Good Hope. Despite.the re-
r
opening of the Suez Canal, the vast
bulk of the tanker traffic will con-
tinue to use the Cape route. It is
essential that this traffic not be in-
terrupted or threatened by the grow-
ing Soviet fleet in the Indian Ocean.
In order to protect United States
security interests in the Indian Ocean,
the United States is planning to de-
velop limited support facilities on the
small island of Diego Garcia. These
facilities, while necessary now, may
be inadequate to meet the needs of
the 1980's. A common-sense solution
for the United States would be to
seek permission from South Africa
to establish a missile-handling facility
at the Simonstown naval base near
the Cape.
Representative Samuel S. Stratton,
Democrat of New York, recently said
that United States ships in the Indian
Ocean must either go to Norfolk, Va.,
-'or Subic Bay in the Philippines for
missile facilities comparable to those
the Russians enjoy-in Somalia. And
the United States is in danger of losing
control over its base at Subic Bay as
the Philippine Government seeks to
appease Peking.
Viewed over-all, the situation in and
around Africa is changing very fast.
The United States must make a prompt
adjustment to changed political and
strategic realities. If the necessary
new security arrangements aren't
made, Soviet and Chinese Communist
imperialism will be fastened on a vast
global region.
Anthony Harrigan is executive vice
president of the United States Indus-
trial Council, a nationwide association
of conservative businessmen. This is
a press release offered by the council
as a. newspaper column.
accurate.
CARTER, A BLACK, apparently
incurred Kissinger's anger by violat-
ing U.S. policy in dealing with ter-
rorists to obtain the release of four
students kidnaped in Tanzania.
Kissinger was asked about reports
he ordered Carter to be tra.nsfered-
from the State Department to the
U.S. Information Agency.
"Ambassador Carter is not being
transfered out of the State Depart-
ment," Kissinger said. "We have
avoided any statements out of the
State Department" on the case and
said reports- have not been fully
Carter was envoy to Tanzania for
three years. Last May, 19 guerrillas
from the Popular Revolutionary
party in Zaire kidnaped three Stan-
ford University sliedents and a Dutch
woman who were working at an ani-
mal research station in western
Tanzania.
THE 'TERRORISTS, whose very
existence as a revoltionary group the
government of Zaire had refused to
acknowledge, released one of the
hostages so she could deliver to
Tanzanian authorities ransom de-
mands. Subsequently Carter arrang
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By Bruce Palling
SDeeial to The Washington Post
PUA, Thailand-Since the
collapse of the rightist fac-
tion in the.Laotian govern-
ment in May, more than 10,-
'000 Meo tribespeople have
slipped into mountainous
and isolated northeastern
Thailand.
. Unwanted 'by the Thais,
they are living. in squalor
with little food. Because of
their long association with
U.S. efforts against the
Communist forces in Laos,
they are"- regarded suspi.
ciously by the Communist
Pathet Lao who now donli-
nate the government in Vi-
entiane and by the Commu-
nist government In North'
Vietnam. Many of the refu-
gees say they are afraid to
return to their Itornes in
Laos.
Counting other Meos and
Laotians who fled into Thai.
land earlier in the war,
there could be as many as
30,000 refugees from Laos .
now in Thailand, vastly out-
numbering refugees from
Cambodia and South .Viet-
nam. -
Observers in Laos have
expressed suspicions that -
the. anti-Communist That
armed forces want to use
the Meo as a buffer against
the Pathet Lao, much as a
force of Chinese troops
loyal to Chiang Kai-shek
was permitted to operate in
northern Thailand for years
as a buffer against China.
According to reliable
sources in Bangkok, U.S.
Ambassador Charles White-
house also 'thinks there is
merit in - this idea. Last
month the head of the Thai
internal security. command, be singled out for harsh nated about 22,000 pounds of
Gen. Saiyud Kerdphol, paid treatment because of their rice a week.
a secret visit to Mai Charim, association with AID. According to the refugees,
a remote village 30 miles Recent reports from Laos, more than 30 villagers have
southeast of here, where however, have not indicated . "died in the past six weeks
about 5,000 refugees have -l that the Meos who remained from hunger and exhaus-
settled, to evaluate the have suffered any mistreat- tion. The only ones who
buffer idea.
ment. have enough money to buy
clans in North Vientiane Vietnamese have of re- _ At Pua, the food are those who sell their .
- i1~Teos are clus-
cently been saying privately tered into a school com- ceremonial silver necklaces -
that such a plan would be pound where they live in and bracelets at low prices
considered a serious threat. shelters they built them. to Thai traders.
Certainly the Thai Foreign, selves. As I walked around By all accounts, conditions
the makeshift village, old are worse at Mai Charim,
Ministry wishes that all the men in the traditional color- where at least 80
Meo would go home immedi. ful Meo costume-black persons
ately to avoid provoking the trousers. decorated with are said to have died of.dis-
Pathet Lao-dominated gov- Patches of psychedelic wo. ,eases aggravated by malnu-
erllment in Laos. ven cloth-would come up trition. Permission to visit
the village was denied.
The Meo are best known to my interpreter and ask:
circulating in Bangkok that
backed "secret war" in - While it appears that the U.S. embassy had been
northeastern Laos under the there are only about.50 of providing assistance to sev- .
command of Gen. Vang Pao. yang Pao's former soldiers eral thousand of Van; Pao's
Not surprisingly, Vang in this, camp, the villagers former troops in northeast
Pao was one of the first offi- still seemed to have faith in Thailand. The aid was sup--
cers to flee Laos in May and his ability to preserve their? posedly only for food, and
he was followed by several semi-nomadic way of life reportedly has stopped.
planeloads of his former with its slash-and-burn agri- Thai Foreign Minister
troops. culture and opium produc- IVTaj. Gen. Chatichai Choon-
Thousands of other Meos flora.- havan has visited the office
fled western Laos which had The refugees told no of the U.N. High Commis-
been the area of the country ? atrocity stories, but said sinner for Refugees in Ge-
least affected by the war. they feared for their safety, neva, to request-aid for the
About 5,000 Meos are liv- if they had remained in
ing in a refugee camp in Indochinese refugees here,
Pua, a tiny town. 400 miles Laos. They had seer long-es- and U.N. officials have been
north of Bangkok in' Naiv tablished local officials dis- to Bangkok to study the sits
-
Province and less than 20 missed and replaced by un-'
miles from Laos. About 1, known Pathet Lao officers, agreed agreed. The ol agency ha to solicit donations
tions
700 of the refugees came and there were rumors that ' from member countries for
from a large irrigation pro- the Pathet -Lao wanted to an emergency program to
ject supported by the U.S. arm them to fight Thailand
feed and house the refugees.
Agency for International in the future. ? Senior Foreign Ministry
Development in neighboring Despite stat:enlents by De- sources in Bangkok say they
Sayaboury Province in Laos. fense Minister Maj. Gen. intend to resettle .all' the
The 1,700 tribespeople left Pramarn Adireksarn about itos, including 3,000 to 5.-
the project, with its tractors, ' the high cost to Thailand of
experimental fish hatcheries supporting port.ing Indochinese ref- 000 former Van,,, Pao troops,
around Mai Charim from
and of ;harss apparently be- ugees, no one at Pua was re-
where it is hoped that they
cause they feared new fight- ceiving arjy assistance from
ing and thought they might the Thai government.: Chris- will slowly drift luck into
Laos.
tiara World Vision has do- -
12
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NEW YORK TIMES
15 August 1975
Iiv eO .i rmes n tl ice eat
The following dispatch was Their future is uncertain.
written by Matt Franjola, an . Their presence is an irritant
Associated Press correspond- to. already shaky Thai-
ent who recently visited re- Laotian relations. And the
Grote settlements in northern door to America is closed to
Thailand of Men mountain them.
tribesmen who fled Laos after "We were soldiers of Vang
the Communist-led Pathet - Pao and the Americans,"
Lao took control of the coun- said one Meo leader, refer-
try. ring to Gen. yang Pao, who
NAM LAN, Thailand headed a mercenary army
(AP)BAN Thousands moun- ; :supported by the American
Central tain tribesmen who fled Laos awho Intelligence has' been Agency
in the last two months are and n granted
asylum in the United States.
barely subsisting in the .._- _
les
n
g
near here, ,easy,
J 7
sick and in some cases starv-
e ing.
They walked for up to four
weeks over rugged terrain
only to `find themselves un-
welcome in this country and
not safe from Pathet Lao
raiding parties even here, a
day's march into Thailand.
They are Meos, members
of an independent primitive
enemy," the Meo leader said.
"If we go back we have
nothing to 'eat, and they will
kill us or send us off to study
where we will, never return
to our families."
The mountain people left
when the Communist-led
Pathet Lao began to take
control of the country in
May. Some came from north-
. clad, silver-bedecked women, . border that to the hill people
who were on the pro-Ameri-. is only an invitation of the
side of the Laotian war. - , city men far away. .
Thai and Western experts Many Women and Children
s
estimate that 12,000 Meo But nearly half made their 1- the refugees. For the time
f
re
ugees are living in tempo- f way on foot from around
nary shelters in this area o
northern Thailand, and Thai Long Tieng, the former C.I.A.
medical' authorities say that miles s the tral Lf es 140*
80 per cant of of imare
' fering from malnutrition, -more than a three-week walk
,
malaria and. anemia. Some through the jungle-covered
18,000 more have sought sierras. Three quarters of
? ~. them ? were woman anrd
.alb, ""'e Vl P tv1 . !
refugee settlement . at Pua, i
BALTIMORE SUN
21 August 1975
north of here, said that more
than 133 of his people had
died of malaria or lack of
food during the long march.
In the Ban Nam Lan area,
about five miles from the
frontier, 5,700 refugees are
virtually imprisoned in a
jungle area bordered by Laos,
a Tai Communist insurgent
base and two rivers.
Thai authorities permit
only half a dozen a day to
leave and walk four hours
to the village cf Mae Cherim
to buy essentials.
Thai authorities here in
Nam Province have spent
$40,000 on the refugees, Gov.
Sawatdi Prapanich said. Pro-
vincial refugee sources said
that it would cost $1,000 a
day to meet the basic mini-
mum needs in rice alone.
"If they have no rice and
die, that is their probiern,"
said the Governor. "We did
not ask them to come. We
have poor Thais who need
help."
The Government says that
it has run out of fund
for
being those here who can
afford' it are buying rice
brought in by Thai Army
helicopter at 20 per cent
more than the rate in the
provincial capital, but Lao
Teng says in Pua that "in
two weeks we.,will run out
of money.'
Scavenging in Jungle
in silver jewelry, and Thai
merchants are paying only
80. per cent of. the regular
market price for it, Meo
refugees said.
At the Ban Nam Lan site
about 2.000 refugees have
enough money for two more
weeks; the rest already are
scavenging in the jungle.,
They set out daily to hunt
for roots, berries and other
edible plants. All stands of
bamboo in the ? area ? have
been scoured for edible
shoots, and all the palm trees
have been cut down for the
small heart of palm. .
"If it were not for the
bamboo shoots, we would
have . died already," said
Muoi Ya, 36 years old. "We
reed salt. We are weak and
sick. Mothers cannot nurse
their babies."
Some rice and medical aid'
has been-. donated by the
Y.M.C.A. and Roman Catholic
groups in the north Thailand
city of Chiang Mai. But these
donations have been small
compared with the need.
Of 100 donated sacks of
rice, 23 were taken by cor-
rupt- Thai officials in the
jungle camp, Meo refugees
say.
No Thai official comment
was available -on the report. 1
Thais and Westerners com- !
ing from the area in recent {
weeks have made similar a
reports.
of ogees i Thailand,
T
Of all the peoples allied with America in Indo-
china, none paid more dearly than the Meo hill
tribesmen of the CIA "secret army" in Laos. Whole
villages were decimated, sometimes by fighting and
sometimes by exhaustion from incessant moving.
Some villages were cut off from their lands so long
that children grew up believing rice fell in bags
from airplanes.
Today, as tens of thousands of America's former
Vietnamese clients await homes in the United
States, tens of thousands of primitive Meo hill folk
are in remote border areas of Thailand, where they
fled as Laos was taken over by the Communists.
Newsmen who have visited the Meo report they are
exhausted, hungry and sick. Thai officials, who are
struggling for better relations with the Pathet Lao,
can ill afford much sympathy. "If they have no rice
and die, that is their problem," Sawatdi Prapanich,
governor of Nam province, told an Associated Press
reporter. "We did not ask them to come. We have
poor Thais who need help."
Unlike the Vietnamese, the primitive Men, who
farm by moving from hillside to hillside, cutting off
the brush and cultivating each slope until it is ex-
hausted, would be tittle helped by blanket admission
to the United States. The office of the United Na-
tions High Commissioner for Refugees is now work-
ing with Thai and American authorities to ease their
move into the hills of Thailand. U.S. officials say
they "expect to make a substantial contribution" of
cash to the arrangement.
That seems the least that can be done. Estimates
of the number of Meo who crossed from Laos range
as high as 40,000. Even if Bangkok agrees to let
them stay, provincial and local Thai officials al-
ready reportedly are demanding bribes to distribute
aid rice. Fellow Meo who were already living in
Thailand ironically form the backbone of that coun-
try's pro-Communist insurgency, so the temptation
for both sides to compete for the refugees' remain-
ing military-age men will be strong. The Mao are
among the world's best opium raisers, and their cur-
rent impoverishment assures that many will turn
quickly to that illegal source of support, thereby in-
viting further trcuble with the Thai authorities. The
impartial auspices of the U.N. high commissioner
may well be helpful in resettling the Meo refugees.
But that must not become an excuse for less direct
U.S. interest in tribesmen who were America's chief
ally in the clandestine adventure in Laos.
143
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BALTIMORE SUN
8 August 1975
n i
te l
/71.1 61 _F1
..e
ngues UQS . aides
By CHARLES W.CORDDRY
Washington Bureau of The Sun
Washington-China, in
gesture both interesting and
puzzling to officials here, has
recently tried, to sound out Ma-
nila on possible Chinese use of
naval and air facilities in the
Philippines, where the issue of
future United States base rights
is soon to come to a head.
.Intelligence sources who re-
ported Peking's feelers saw in
them some evidence that China
may want to expand its mili-
tary operations beyond its own
borders with a potential open-
ing in the Philippines. Manila
and Peking established diplo-
matic relations June 9.
More realistically, the intel-
tigence sources suggested that
the Chinese-in view of Man-
ila's earlier public campaign
over changing the status of U.S.
bases-were hedging their bets
by expressing an interest in use
of facilities before the Soviet
Union might make such over-
tures to Philippines President
Ferdinand E. Marcos.
Though Mr. Marcos, during
the fall of South Vietnam,
publicly questioned the reliabil-
ity of the United States and the
value of the U.S. bases, his atti-
tude seems to have changed
markedly, so that there is no
visible expectation here of his
ending the U.S. presence.
What is expected, officials
indicated, is the negotiation of a
WASHINGTON POST
5 September 1975
I C_, hi n a
more equitable administrative light cf the Vietnam outcome.
arrangement, from Manila's The Chinese leaders appar-
standpoint, under which the ently avoided Mr. Marcos's in-
bases would be seen as Filipino quiries, officials here said,
facilities on which American though they had the impression'
forces operated by Philippines that the Filipino president in-
permission. The United States ferred China wanted a contin-
was granted the "right to retain ued American presence in the
the use of the bases"-more ex- far Pacific as counterweight to
tensive rights than it later got the Soviet Union.
elsewhere-shortly after Filipi- Against this background, it
no independence was granted in was taken as a puzzling devel-
1946. opment that a Filipino official
The facilities in question are lately in Peking was asked by
chiefly the big Subic Bay Naval Chou Kwan-hua, the Chinese
Base, a prime repair and supply foreign minister, about the pos-
area for the U.S. fleet in the sibility of China's having simi-
western Pacific, and Clark Air lar access to air and naval in-
Base, a key installation for the stallations.
U.S. Air Force in that area. The Filipino official was re-
The Pentagon would put ported to have said he would
these bases very near the top of pass along the inquiry to Presi-
any global priority list, now es- dent Marcos, and to have added
pecially, in view of the turn to a that he personally thought a
forward strategy in the Pacific "friendly power"-China
based on air and naval power. -should be entitled to privi-
The alternatives would be to leges similar to those of the
fall back on Guam, which United Sthtes.
would be regarded as unsatis- No early change in the sta-
factory, or to Hawaii. tus of the U.S. bases is expect-
When President Marcos was ed, officials said. They thought
in Peking in .June, arranging negotiations, however, would
the establishment of diplomatic start fairly soon, probably in
relations after years of opposi-`October.
tion to recognizing Communist i In his latest expressions, Mr.
governments, he was under-;Marcos has said the United
stood to have sought to learn States could continue to use the
China's attitude toward the bases, which the Philippines
American bases in his country. would control, to maintain "an
This was after he had public- effective presence over the air-
ly questioned the wisdom of re- and sea-lanes" of the western
liance on the United States in Pacific.
of .' br a 9 0'-C.',
United Press International relations with China. which he
Assistant Senate Democratic said reflected a change in his
Leader Robert C. Byrd (W.Va.) i attitude of some years al:o.
said yesterday his recent 10-Byrd said his personal reap-
day visit convinced him that
China does not harbor any ex pt'aisal was based on "the
pansionist ambitions, nor does; Rifting ueeessitiea..underiying.
'
n
national se
curity
it seek.'to becoiYit?-a ivor-ld`su-lour . ow
nerp7EVeg-? :: :., lwhieb, -I. believe 'is bini,,.
-Byrd: also' .sx;d ? Ghi-na `nd cr eas nlV threatened' by
longer considers the United .t otti ing So let power and ae
States a threat to its tcrrito-;g'ressive inclinations."
of the Soviet Union" and said
she foresees a Russian effort
to dominate North Vietnam
and establish bases south of
China's borders. and create
dissension in Inner Mongolia
aid. ,among .-:Cbinesa:. fniinorri;
I es
ltar.:rr?-v }ltd cAentr::?the
United States need have no
fear of Bed China as a threat
to our own country in the
rial integrity or existence as a! He . clescriheci China as'-foreseeable future or as long
socialist state and that, in '.' thorout hiy distrustful of they as the Sino-Soviet rupture
turn, the United States should !intentions, words, and actions jcontinues," Byrd said.
not fear China as a-threat inL-
"the foreseeable future ..." 4
He called for a gradual'
movement toward normalizing
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WASHINGTON STAR
25 August 1975
The gradual pace of U.S.-Cuban rapproche-
ment is quickening and it is high time for more
bilateral conciliatory gestures by both govern-
ments that will help bury the machete.
It is almost as if Fidel Castro and Henry Kiss-
inger have fallen into the rhythm of taking turns
at moves that will ease the tensions of 15 years.
The anti-hijack treaty was the first real ice-
breaker. The July decision of the Organization
of American States to terminate the mandatory
isolation of Cuba removed any need or reason .
for further stand-offishness between the es-
tranged neighbors.
It is almost silly for Havana and Washington
to be taking so much time to put the official
stamp on a historic inevitability. Castro has
been.signaling for months that he would wel-
come an end to Cuba's pariah status and a nor-
malization of relations with the U.S. Kissinger,
although Cuba is far from his highest priority,
also has publicly stated that the U.S. is ready to
discuss a new relationship any time Cuba
wishes.
Washington reacted to the hijack treaty by
lifting the 25-mile limit on travel by Cuban diplo-
mats at the United Nations and increasing their
range to 250 miles - just enough to permit them
to come to Washington. Then Castro gave back
$2 million dollars in hijack ransom money to an
.American airline and the U.S. cooed its grati-
tude. Now the U.S. has taken a genuinely impor-
tant step to lift some of the economic sanctions
against Cuba.
While it is true that the U.S. decision last
week applies only to third-country sanctions and
technically is not a bilateral matter with Cuba
at all, there can be no question that it was a
major step to dismantle the regulations that af-
fect trade with Cuba. There are scores of U.S.
firms with subsidiaries abroad that have been
unable to sell their products to Cuba under the
regulations that are now waived
The practical effect of the latest decision is to
WASHINGTON POST
5 September 1975
Sol 11. Lin6fvitz
permit overseas branches of American firms to
sell their manufactured goods in Cuba in free
competition with other foreign factories.
Collaterally, the U.S. decision will gratify such
countries as Canada, Argentina, Mexico, Spain
and others where American subsidiaries have
until now been ruled out of the Cuban market.
The export of American foreign-policy stric=
tures via corporate foreign investment has been
a sore point in these friendly countries.
The U.S. also has lifted the regulation that no
vessel in the Cuban trade can be refueled in an
American port. This will have the salutary ef-
fect of increasing the number of vessels in the
world merchant fleet that can call at both Cuban
and U.S. ports. .
When members of Congress were told of the
impending State, Department announcement of
the softening of the ban on third-country trade
with Cuba, they applauded the decision. So do
we. Now we believe President Ford should lose
.little. time in removing the barriers to direct
trade between Cuba and the U.S., and initiating
direct talks toward a full restoratidn of diplo-
matic and economic relations:
There are stumbling blocks to total rap-
prochement, to be sure. There is the question of
expropriated U.S. property, the status of the
Guantanamo Bay naval base, the presence of
basing facilities for the Soviet Union and, con-,
sidering Ford's 1976 election bid, the domestic
political peril of being seen as soft on Castro.
The anti-Castro Cuban refugee community will
make trouble on the issue.
But we believe it is in the self-interest of the
United States to restore trade and political rela-
tionships with Cuba without delay. The continu-
ation of the cold war with Cuba can no longer be
justified on any grounds, now that Castro is out
of the business of exporting revolution. He may
not be all that lovable a leader in American
eyes, but it no longer makes sense to pretend he
isn't even there.
What Future for the Pancc-l
OAS Secretary General Orfila re-
cently called the Panama Canal "the
most explosive issue in Latin Ameri-
ca." A lot of other concerned Latin
American and U.S. leaders have for
sonic time been warning us about the
canal issue and what it may mean to the
whole future of the hemisphere.
But most Americans have not been
listening-especially Congress.
As though to prove how hard it has
not been listening, just before the Au-
gust recess the House of Representa-
tives passed 24d-164 the Snyder
Amendment to the State Department
appropriation bill, which would have
kept the State Department from even
negotiating about a new Panama Canal
The writer, former U.S. ambassa-
dor to the Ormni:ation of_.4nierican
States, is chairman of the U.S.-Latin
American, Commission.
treaty. Only vigorous efforts in the
Senate kept that body from adopting
the Byrd Amendment to the same ef-
fect..
These developments came some
45
weeks after 38 senators and 126 repre-
sentatives co-sponsored a resoiutina
that sharply opposed the basic objec-
tives of a new treaty.
Obviously there must be some
reason otherwise thoughtful members
of Congress are lining up as they
are with respect to such a potentially
dangerous issue. The answer is clear
enough:' Neither the administration
nor those members of the Congress sup-
porting a new treaty have directly re-
sponded to the arguments and con-
cerns of those who are opposing the
treaty. Rather, they have been content
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to let the opposition build- In the ap-
' -parent expectation that once a treaty
is negotiated they will be able to make
their case effectively.
But time is running out and opposi-
tion is building- Meanwhile, Ambassa-
dor Ellsworth Bunker and Panamanian
Foreign Minister Juan Tack make
progress toward a new treaty which
may face rejection in the Senate. If
that happens, we may find that the
Panama Canal has become a tinderbox.
It is long past time to take a hard,
look at the arguments being advanced
against the new treaty and to deal
with them forthrightly. Good questions
are being asked and they deserve re
?sponsive answers.
Will the new treaty mean a, surren-
der of United States sovereignty over
the Canal?
The simple answer is that the
United States never had sovereignty.
The 1903 treaty specifically gave the
United States authority which it would
have "if it were sovereign." Obviously,
these words would not have been nec-
essary if the United States were, in
fact, sovereign. A new treaty which
recognizes that fact and goes on from
there to work out a mutually agreeable
arrangement for control of the terri-
tory can hardly be called a surrender
of United States sovereignty.
Will a new Panama Canal treaty
prejudice our national security?
The fact of the matter is that the
greatest danger to the security of the
United States would be the continuance
of the present status of the canal. If
there is not a new treaty, we will be
running the grave risk that the canal-
which is, of course, exceedingly vulner.
able under any circumstances-may be
damaged or destroyed by irate Panam-
anians. By the same token we may find
ourselves in the positon of having to
defend the canal by force against a
hostile population and in the face of
widespread, if not universal, condem.
nation. Since the new treaty will spe-
cifically include provisions for a, con-
tinued U.S. defense role with respect
to the canal, it -is hard to see how a
new treaty could be adverse to our na-
tinal security.
Will a new treaty weaken the United
States position by exposing the canal
to political instability and violence?
If any course is designed to expose
the canal to political instability and vi-
olence, it would be an anachronistic ef-
fort to maintain in effect a treaty ne-
gotiated in 1903 which is no longer re-
spected, which is looked upon by Pana.
manians of all political persuasions as
an affront to Panama's national dig-
nity and. as a colonial enclave, and
which is viewed throughout Latin
America as the last vestige of "big
''4riday, Sept. 5,19,5 THE WASHINGTON POST I
By Michael Arkus
Reuter.
.:.RIO DE JANEIRO-Clau- his house ill the Rio suburb
dio Elias Barros, 18, left his of Sao Goncalo with his two
home one evening recently
to collect his brother from
school in Rio'de Janeiro's
plush seaside neighborhood
of Copacabana.
A few minutes later he
lay dying in the street, shot
in the back at point-blank
range by a policeman, ac-
cording to scores of eyewit-
nesses. The policeman. de-
filed the shooting.
In Sao Paulo, Brazil's
largest city, Ignacio Medei-
ros, 22, Joao Diniz, 19. and
Francisco Nogueira, 17, all
students with impeccable
records, left a night club in
their car and tried to take a
tape recorder from a
friend's vehicle, apparently
as a prank.
Spotted by- a policeman
and pursued by a patrol car,
they died in a hail of bullets
despite their appeals to po-
lice not to shoot, according
to the prosecutor's report.
small children to buy cold
drinks when he was picked
up by police.
. -Two days later he was
found on a lonely stretch of
road, with second-and third-
degree burns over half his
body, abandoned as dead by
the policeman who had tor-
tured him, according to the
prosecutor.
These three cases under-
line mounting public con-
cern at the countless num..
ben of accusations of beat-
ings and torture made
against police throughout
the country.
:According. to many law-
abiding citizens here, it is
not even the greater or
lesser frequency of such oc-
currences but their total ar-
bitrariness that is the prime
cause of concern. -
This correspondent was a
witness to the immediate
aftermath of the death of
Claudio Barros.
ltubem Ferreira, 29, left - Claudio was a ;janitor in
lb
stick" diplomacy. Under the new
treaty the United States would be able
to protect its position while allowing
Panama a greater responsibility in the
canal's operation.
Will a new treaty adversely affect
U.S. commercial interests?
Admittedly, the canal is important to
us commercially, but obviously its eco..
nomic significance has diminished con-
siderably as world commerce patterns
and technolpgies of shipping have
changed. Today large vessels cannot.
use the canal and a major expansion of.
the present capacity may be necessary
-possibly a sea level canal. If the situ-_
ation remains as it is, it is hardly
likely that Panama would accede to
the modernization required. In order
to accomplish that, there must be assur-.
ance of Panamanian cooperation pre-
cisely as called for in the proposed
treaty. -
In the light of these facts, it cer-,
tainly requires no extended argument
to recognize that efforts on our part to.
adhere to the 1903 treaty would be
both damaging to our national inter-
ests and in -derogation of our hemis-.
pheric objectives. By the same token
the new treaty would demonstrably of-
fer the prospect of increased security.;
for the canal and the futherance of our
common goals for the Americas.
ode of- Copacaban`ars apart-
ment blocks, but lived with
his foster mother and 11 fos-
ter brothers and sisters in
the slum above the suburb. -'
He survived the floods of
1966, which killed his
mother and two sisters, only
to be cut down himself
shortly before realizing his
life's ambition of entering
the army.
Claudio was black, his fos-
ter family white. '
On the day he died, he
was trying to separate one
of his brothers and several
other boys who were fight.
ill.,.
Osmar Rodriguez. one of
the many eyewitnesses told
this -reporter:
"A police car approached
and one of the policemen
began clubbing Claudio's
brother, Jorge. Claudio told
him to stop it. The police-
man called him a dirty nig-
ger and grabbed hold of
him,
"A second policeman
shouted: `Get him. Shoot
him.' The policeman fired
and Claudio lay in the road
writhing and agonizing, for
15 minutes without the po-
lice letting anyone get
near,"
The crowd's anger was im-
mediate, and they stoned
the police car. Helmeted Rio
police were called in and
went to work clubbing and
Arrested anybody they could
lay hands on--including two
more of Claudio's brothers.
The policeman who is al-
leged to have fired and his
companion were also ar-
rested. They said Claudio
had a knife. But then they
also denied shooting, claim-
ing that the shot came from
the crowd.
. Several witnesses told
journalists they saw the po-
liceman take out his revol-
ver, shoot, and then put in a
fresh bullet.
Dalva Neves, Claudio's
foster mother, was a first re-
fused -acinlittance to the po-
lice station, only a block
from the scene of the shoot-
Weeping, she was finally
allowed in, together with
several othe rwitnesses and
journalists.
Inside the station, Dalva
Neves said, the policeman
charged with the shooting
laughed in her face when
she accused him of murder-
ing her son.
Outside, crowds began
roaming the street again,
shouting "murderers" and
"sons of whores," smashing
windows and street signs
blocking traffic.
More riot troops were
brought in and went about
their,
heir work clubbing and
The following dad:, a po- j
lice. lieutenant said
"elenien ts" had been incit-
ing the crowd.
Sonic of the evidence
given by the eyewitnesses
will not be accepted be-
cause they are minors.
"Apparently you are allowed
to be shot dead when you
are under age, but not to
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