HILL PANEL WILL SEEK CIA DATA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 21, 2001
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: February 27, 1975
• Content Type: NSPR

25X1A
pprove, or e ease ii i i:
I M.
CONFIDENTIAL
-I I, II . III -
? NEWS, VIEWS
and ISSUES
INTERNAL USE ONLY
This publication contains clippings from the
domestic and foreign press for YOUR
BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use
of selected items would rarely be advisable.
No. 5
1975
GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS
1
GENERAL
26
EASTERN EUROPE
28
WESTERN EUROPE
30
'NEAR EAST
35
AFRICA
36
EAST ASIA
38
LATIN AMERICA
44
Destroy after backgrounder
has served its purpose or
within 60 days.
CONFIDENTIAL
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WASHINGTON POST
27. February 1975
Hitli Panel
Will Seek
IA ata
? By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer
,
The new Senate Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence Opera-
tions will ask the Rockefeller
Commission for all of its se-
cret records on the Central In-
telligence Agency, committee'
Chairman Frank Church (D-
Idaho) said yesterday.
Church said he hoped the
request would be granted so
that the Senate inquiry into
alleged abuses of power by the
CIA and other government in-
telligence agencies could get
off "to a" running start.". He
said he did not think it would
be in the public interest ,to
have a "protracted investiga-
tion.' .
A spokesman for the White
House Commission headed by
Vice President Rockefeller,
which was established last
month in response to charges
of illegal domestic spying by
the CIA, declined to comment
on the proposal.
, At a closed meeting yester-
day, the Senate Committee
also approved 18 staff appoint-
ments for the investigation, in-
cluding that of New York trial
lawyer F. A. 0. (Fritz)
Schwartz Jr. as chief counsel.
A member of the Wall
Street law firm of Cravath,
Swaine & Moore, Schwarz, 39,
plans to begin working full
time on the inquiry within two
weeks. He previously repre-
sented International Business
Machines Corp. in government
antitrust litigation. Church
said that gave him considera-
ble experience "in extracting
evidence from government
agencies."
Burke Marshall, a 'former
assistant attorney general in
the Kennedy and Johnson ad-
ministrations and later gen-
eral counsel for IBM, was
named a committee consultant
and will assist in organizing
the investigation. He is on the
faculty at Yale law school.
Pressing for cooperation
from the administration on
various levels, Church will
meet today at 10 a.m. with
CIA Director William E.
Colby, partly to seek a waiver
of the pledges of silence that
the agency requires of its em-
ployees. 'Texas Sen. ',John
the committee, is 'expected to
Tower, ranking Republican on
THE WASHEN'GION POST Friday,1;eb. 28, 1975
- ill Lift CIA Secrecy Pledge
To Cooperate With Senate ?robe
the agency's authorization. , same time to Make public as
sources and methods" Without. much information as possible'
Church emphasized that 1 during the course of the inves-
Colby agreed to drop the re-1 ; tigation.
quirement only fiat' the I "Our rule of thumb," the
!`purposes of this Senate in- 1 senator said, "will be to hold
quiry." However, a similar public hearings whenever we
waiver probably will be pro- can and closed hearings when-
laded to a new House commit- ever we must." He indicated
tee that has also been as- that the committee would pur-
Signed to investigate the gov- sue allegations of illegal or
-ernment's intelligence agen- :improper activities by the CIA
and other agencies in public,
while conducting its examina-
tion of "legitimate national
security" operations largely in
, executive session.
Eiy George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer
The head of the Central In-
telligence Agency agreed to
-cooperate with Senate investi-
gators yesterday by lifting the
ipledge of secrecy that the CIA
requires of all its -employees.
, CIA Director William E.
'Colby promised the waiver at
'a closed meeting on Capitol
Hill yesterday morning with
:Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho),
',chairman of the newly formed
Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence Operations, and
Sen. John G. Tower (R-Tex.),
the committee's ranking Re-
Publican.
; Church told reporters after-
Wards he was 'satisfied that
Colby plans to provide all the
information the committee
'flee& for its investigation of
CIA activities, including
Charges that the agency 'en-
gaged in. illegal domestic spy-
ing on American citizens.
The CIA requires everyone
It hires to sign an agreement
Promising not to disclose any
information they might ob-
tain concerning "intelligence
attend the closed session.
Church said he plans to ask
Colby about the status .of a 50-
page report the CIA submitted
to President Ford in early Jan-
itarS7. The CIA director last
week refused to supply a copy
to a House Appropriations
Subcommittee, saying that he,
was "not authorized" to re-
lease it.
. A government official famil-
iar with the Rockefeller Com-
mission's work said all of its
records are classified "top se-
cret," including nearly 1,000
pages of testimony from past
and present CIA officials and
a substantial number of inter-
views with CIA employees.
The Commission, however, re-
portedly has been inspecting
raw files at the agency's head-
quarters and thus possesses
very little documentary mate-
rial.
Ultimately, the official
added, it will be up to Mr.
Ford to decide on any congres-
sional request for the Commis-
sion's files.. But he said there
was no understanding with the
CIA that would prevent their
turnover.
Church said he and Tower
also expect to ask the Presi-
dent to issue a directive call-
ing on all government agen-
cies.
Later in the day, in a lunch-
eon speech at the National
Press Club, Church voiced
doubts that the White House
Inquiry into the CIA's activ-
The committee chairman
ites, under acommission
'called the investigation long
headed by Vice President overdue, pointing out that
Rockefeller, could resolve the neither the CIA nor the FBI,
allegations that have been
!made against the agency.
"The executive branch can-
not, with sufficient credibility,
which also will be scrutinized,
have ever undergone a thor-
ough congressional inquiry.
Promising strict precautions
investigate itself," Church de- against news leaks, Church
dared, He said he hopeii it said any committee staffer
who discloses unauthorized in-
formation "will be fired on the
spot."
In response to a question,
;he acknowledged that there
was no way to control what
senators on the committee
might say, but said they were
all mindful of the need for
strained" inquiry and not "a !restraint.
television extravaganza,".
Church said he intends at the
Newsweek, March 3, 1975
would wind up its work soon
"and make its records avail-
able, as a starting point, for
the more comprehensive con-
gressional investigations to
come."
Promising a "muted and re-
THE SHRINKING CIA?
A number of senior hands in Washington's intelligence
community are becoming convinced that the CIA can-
not survive the current investigations in its present form.
They suspect that the job of analyzing and evaluating
intelligence data will be given to the State Department;
that paramilitary operations, like those carried on in In-
dochina, will be handed over to the Pentagon, and that
covert political operations are obviously out for years to
come. They also sense that CIA director William Colby
has erred badly by talking too openly about CIA opera-
tions, and they believe he will soon be replaced.
Senate inquiry. After that,
Church said, the two senators
will seek a similar 'meeting
with Vice President Rockefel-
ler to ask him for the
Commission's records.
The Select House Commit-
tee on Intelligence, which also
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the government's "intelligenc
community." had a brief meet
ing yesterday afternoon In
what Chairman Lucien Nedz
(D-Mich.) called an "informa
discussion" of procedural an
staffing requirements. No de
cisions were made, Nedzi said.
601007-1
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NEW YORK TIMES
27 February 1975
Erasing the
By Ray S. Cline' .
g
WASHINGTON?At the end of 1974,
Congress enaeted and President Ford
-slgried into law restrictions on the
Central Intelligence Agency's overseas
operations that virtually put the C.I.A.
'out of the business of giving covert po-
litical assistance to friendly, foreign
governments or political groups. The,
White House did not make an issue'
of the legislative restrictions, nor did
the C.I.A.
A great many critics of United
States policy in the 1950's and 1960's,
especially the young ones who grew
up in the era of retreat from Vietnam
and of worldwide detente, have ap-
plauded United States withdrawal from
the clandestine inernational political
arena. They consider covert activities
incompatible with international law,
morality and the fundamental princi-
ples of our open society.
And yet, there lingers an uneasy,
doubtful feeling about the wisdom
of this move in the minds of manK
Washington officials, especially career
public servants in the "national se,
curity establishment" and political
figures who remember the dark days
of Europe in the time of the Berlin
airlift (1948-1949) and the military
invasion of South Korea (1950).
By and large, they are not confident
that "detente" with the Soviet Union
has eliminated the dangers of Soviet
efforts to dominate smaller nations,
some of which are important to the
United States security. They also
doubt that it is really moral for the
United States to be too high-minded
to help friendly democratic govern-
ments threatened with one-party dic-
tatorship. Covert political action is a
way of aiding governments threatened
by a foreign-supported take-over with-
out sending in the marines.
The "realists" of the "national se-
.curity establishment" argue that covert
action ought to be taken in those rela-
tively few cases in which world events
can be turned' in a direction more
favorable to the United States by a
crucial marginal boost from the C.I.A.
1-eee-e4piete?eal
? ?
C' 'Covert
for moderate constitutionalists.
Proponents of selective covert poe
litical action abroad believe that all
great nations try to influence political
developments in other .countries. when
their strategic interests are affected.
The Soviet Unfelt; and China both have
a well-defined political philosophy of
intervening in non-Communist areas
to promote violent revolutionary ac-
tion and overthrow existing regimes.
The "realists" say that C.I.A. sup-,
port helped the Christian Democratic-
centered majority in Chile stay alive'
and resist the: minority rule of Presi-
dent Salvador Allende Gossens, which
would. have brought Chile to total,
ruin. They are not particularly happy
that a military junta rather than a
parliamentary regime has taken charge,
but they believe military regimes are,
impermanent whereas .establishment of.
a Communist-dominated dictatorship
with Soviet support is a one-way
street.
The Soviet "Brezhnev Doctrine," in-
voked to justify the military occupa,
tion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, guar-
?.antees in, perpetuity the security of
pro-Soviet regimes within the com-
monwealth of Communist nations.
Serious foreign policy. experts now
point out that an excellent strategic
case could be made for covert aid to,
non-Communist groups in Portugal.
The fall of the decaying authori-
tarian regime there left the country
with virtually no organized political
? structure except for the Communist
underground. The armed forces are
divided between conservative and rev-
olutionary wings. The latter seems to
be dominant and is generally tolerant
of Communist demonstrations, political
strikes and physical harassment of
dem,ocratic politicians.
The advocates of coyert political
action say the national security of the
United States is at stake, since con-'
tinuing Portuguese permission for
American bases in the ? Azores is vital
to antisubmarine reconnaissance and
defense systems in the Atlantic. Loss
of these bases, they say, would also
make impossible prolonged American
NEW YORK TIMES
15 February 1975
Majority in Poll Opposes
Rockefeller C.I.A. Inquiry
By a 49-to-35 majority, Amer-
icans believe President Ford.
was wr9ng -to appoint . Vice
President Rockefeller to heacra
special investigation of the
:Central Intelligence Agency, the
Harris survey reported Thurs-
day.
A cross-section of 1,532
adults felt that a .cominissioni
In.- omplete
Se uri3
military assistance. to Israel in the
event of another. Middle East, war..
Finally, it is noted, the Mediterranean
flank of the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization might fall apart if a Soviet-.
influenced Communist-dominated re-.
gime gained control of Lisbon.
It this happened; say the national
security professionals, what does the'
United States do? Retreat to Western
Hemisphere quasi-isolationism? Spend
massively on economic and military -
?aid to shore up NATO's Mediter-
ranean flank? If necessary, send in
the marines? Might it not be better to
let our covert. operators quietly try
to assist the moderate center in Portu-
gal to establish a working multiparty.
Parliamentary system, countering So,-
viet moves to help the loeal Cortunu-
fists, who are undoubtedly a minority
but an efficient political force? Among
these unattractive Choices, some of the
old hands, argue, covert political ac-
tion is the best.
Later, American options may shrink
to a choice between military interven-
tion and strategic retreat from south-
ern Europe and the Mediterranean. To ?
avoid this harsh dilemma, whether in
the case of 'Portugai or some other
threatened nation, the United States
ought to have an option of covertly
aiding constructive constitutionalists
and resisting the rise to power of dic-
tatorships hostile to American interests.
Some observers of the international
scene think American strength is so
-great that it materially affects what
happens in the world, whether the
United States acts or fails to act, uses
diplomatic and economic pressures, ?
or military aid or covert assistance.
There is no way to shirk this awesome
position, and the vital thing is to use
all American assets in a stabilizing,
peace-preserving role.
Ray S. Cline, executive director of
studies at The Center for Strategic
and International Studies, Georgetown
University, was from 1969 to 1973 ,
director of the State Department's
' bureau of intelligence and research.
He was the C.I.A. Deputy Director for
Intelligence from 1962 to 1966.
}independent of the White House:
'shollel have the fisignmentti
-The Assoc:cted P7es9 reper:ed.
Sixteen per cent were not sure.
The survey showed that 43
per cent ,of 'those queried
thought the Rockefeller inves-
tigation would ,end up as a
cover-up similar to that of Wa-
tergate; while 33 per cent,
thought the inquiry would get
to the root of any C.I.A. wrong-
doing. Twenty-four per cent
were unsure.
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NEW YORK TIMES
21 February 1975
C.I.A. Chief Says Charges
Ini peril Intelligence Work
By JAMES M. NAUGHTON
specie to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Feb. Senate and House and by a
William E. Colby, the director White House commission.
of Central Intelligence,. told
Congress today that "exagger-
ated" charges of improper con-
duct by the agency had "placed
American ' intelligence in dan-
ger."
? i
In rare public testimony on
Capitol Hill, Mr. Colby said that
"misrepresentations" by critics
of the C.I.A., in the news media
and elsewhere, had jeopardized
/
relations with intelligence agen-
,cles, in other nations,?raised the
specter of peril to American
'spies abroad and lowered mo-
rale in the C.I.A.
"The almost hysterical excite-
ment that: surrounds any news
story mentioning C.I.A., or even
referring to a perfectly legiti-
mate activity of C.I.A., has
raised .the question whether
secret intelligence operations
can be conducted by the United
!States," Mr. Colby said.
I At the same time, however,
he confirmed in his testimony
before the House Defense Ap-
propriations Subcommittee that
the names of four members or
former members of Congress,
including "at least a couple"
of unnamed opponents of the
Vietnam war, had been entered
in C.I.A. files. .
He said that with the excep-
tion of one file on a deceased
Congressman, which is still ex-
tant," the files were either in-
active cr destroyed in 1974, He
I did not identify any of the
Congressmen. .
Mr. Colby's appearance be-
fore the subcommittee appeared
designed, both by the agency
and most members of the panel,
to afford the intelligence direc-
tor a friendly forum to reply
to published allegations that
the agency had violated a legal
ban on domestic activities or
had engaged in other question-
able practices. '
, The subcommittee has House
jurisdiction over the C.I.A.'s,
secret annual budget. Normal-,
ly, intelligence directors testify;
only behind closed doors and,
rarely do they even make pub-e
lic the texts of their prepared;
'remarks.
Today, however, Mr. Colby
read a 20-page statement anal
answered questious for nearly
three hours as television came-1
ros whirred and repOrters andi
some sightseers looked on in a
Capitol hearing room.
Mr. Colby said that he wel-
comed an examination of the
purposes and conduct of the
United States intelligence com-
munity by the select commitl
Approv
! But he declared that "a num-
ber of responsible Americans
are concerned that a degree of
hysteria can develop that will
result in serious damage to our
country's essential intelligence
work by throwing the baby out
with the bath water." ,
: Allegations Challenged
Colby specifically chal-
lenged, as either "false" or as
"misrepresentations," several
allegations about C.I.A. activ-
ities, including the following:
CHe said he could find no
evidence to support an account
published last month by The
New York Times, quoting an
unnamed former C.I.A. under-
cover agent's description of
clandestine surveillance of dis
sident American citizens in the
New York area. Mr. Colby'
said the reporter who wroe:
the article may have been "the
victim of what we in the in-
telligence trade call a- "fabri-
cator."
clie denied speeulation
Charles W. Colson, the former
counsel to President Nixon, that',
the C.I.A. had prior knowledge,
of the Watergate burglary inj
1972. Mr. Colby said that Mr.!
Colson, recently released from
a prison sentence that resulted
from the Watergate scandals,
had a "lack of credibility
[that] should cause the charge
to fall of its own weight," but
that it was not supported by
any ? Watergate investigation
either.
CHe said various published
adcounts that police depart-
ments in the United States pro-
vided false credentials for
C.I.A. agents or otherwise as-
sisted in 'domestic C.I.A. in-
volvement had "warped" the
agency's "friendly liaison rela-
tionships" with police forces.
CHe said a charge that the
agency was planning to spy on
allied nations in contracting for
studies of overseas transporta-
tion developments had stemmed
from "an dangerous misunder-
standing of the true nature of
modern intelligence." Mr. Colby
did not state that the charge
originally was made by Senator
Richard S. Schweiker, Republi-
can of Pennsylvania, a member
of the new Senate Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence.
Mr. Colby said that shortly
before The New York Times
published its account of alleged
C.I.A. activities, "he [the Times
reporter] contacted me stating
he had obtained information of
great importance ' indicating
that CIA. had engaged in a
massive domestic intelligence
activity, including wiretaps,;
break-ins, and a variety of,
other actions."
"In response to his request,"!
Mr. Colby continued, "I met
with him and explained to him:
that he had mixed and magm-1
fled two separate subjects,
the foreign counterintelligencel 3
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effort properly conducted byl
C.I.A. and those few activities,
that the agency's own investi-;
gation had revealed and termi-
nated in 1973. He obviously did,
not accept my explanation and,
instead, alleged that C.I.A. had
conducted a 'massive illegal,
domestic intelligence opera-:
lion.' -
"I am confident that the in-1
vestigations of the President's
commission and the select com-!
mittees will verify tile accuracy
fie my version of these events."
Th.e intelligence direc.or con-
tended that such "exaggera-
tions and misrepresentations of
C.I.A.'s activities can do irre-
parable harm to our national
inelligence apparatus and, if
carried to the extreme, could
blindfold our country as it
looks ahead."
Mr. Colby did not specify in
much detail what risks he be-
lived were entailed in the public
discussion of the agency's con-
duct.
He did say, however, that "a
number of the intelligence serv-
ices abroad with which C.I.A.
works have expressed concern
over its situation and over the
fate of the sensitive information
they provide to us."
Mr. Colby also stated that "a
number of our individual agents
abroad are deeply worried that
their names might be revealed,:
wtih resultant damage to their
lives as well as their liveli-
hoods."
He told the committee that
seven of eight companies in-
vited recently o bid on a co-
vert ? but, Mr. Colby said,
proper?C.I.A. contract had re-
fused, apparently out of con-
cern that their businesses might
be embarrassed by subsequent
disclosures.
Conversely, though, Mr. Col-
by said that applicaions for
employment with the C.I.A.,
normally about 600 every few
weeks, had climbed to 1,700 in
the first two weeks of January
as an apparent consequence of
public interest in the agency.
Mr. Colby stressed that he
believed the intelligence com-
munity's ability to help
main-
tain international peace "can
decline if our intelligence ma-
chinery is made ineffectual!
'through irresponsible exposure
or ill-founded exaggeration."
Most members of the essen-
tially conservative subcommit-
tee spoke sympathetically of
Mr. Colby's efforts to improve
the agency and to end what
the director insisted had been
"mistakes" that were "few and
far between."
Mr. Colby submitted to the
panel a cony of testimony he
had given Jan. 15 to a Senate
committee, along with five
pages of additional information
about C.I.A. activities in the
United States.
Data on Congressmen
The new information includ-
ed the statement that, "over
the past eight years, our coun-
terintelligence program holdings
;have included files on four
:members of Congress."
"With the exception of one
file still extant on a deceased
Congressman, those files are
inactive," the statement. con-
tinued. "Two of them were
destroyed in 1974. None con-
tained any material that origi-
nated in C.I.A., except for one
travel cable and two cables
quoting press announcements
of conferences."
Mr. Colby did not elaborate
on the presumably still active
file on the deceased member of
Congress.
Mr. Colby had told the Senate
last month that there never had
been any surveillance of Con-
gressmen and that, with one
technical exception, no files
existed containing data on
members of Congress, as had
been stated in a New York
Times article last December.
Under questioning today, Mr.
Colby said that such files were
the natural consequence of in-
telligence gathered by the
agency on conferences overseas
and that names of members of
Congress had been noted mere-
ly among those who took part
in the meetings.
Asked by Representative Jack
F. Kemp, Republican of upstae
New York, if the files dealt, as
Ithe account in The Times had
alleged, with "at least one
avowedly antiwar member of
Congress," Mr. Colby said that
"at least a couple" of the mem-
bers fit that description.
The rarity of the public testi-
mony was underlined by the
opening remarks of the sub-
committee chairman, Represent-
ative George H. Mahon, Demo-
crat of Texas. He noted that
there would be the customary
closed budget hearirg tomor-
'row and that the open forum
today was "not as usual."
Mn Mahon praised, by
name, each of the men who
has served as C.I.A. director
since the agency's inecption
in 1947. While not condoning
any "mistakes" the agency
might have made, Mr. Mahon
said, "I do want you to know
you are among pt:'+tole whet
believe in the in4plligence
mechanism."
The only sharp questioning
from the panel came front
Representative Robert N.
Giaimo, a Connecticut Demo-
crat who is also the second-
senior member of the New
House Select Committee on
Intelligence.
"I have yet to have heard
one word from anyone on your
side of the table or ours," Mr.
Giaimo said at one point,
about whether activities of the
agency might "infringe upon
rights of American cittzens." ?
Mr. Colby replied that he,
too, was determined to safe-
guard rights of citizens and,-
end any improper practices,:
but that such practices had
been rare.
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NEW YORK TIMES
18 February 1975
EX CIA, OFFICIAL
TESTIFIES 3 HOURS
WASHINGTON, Feb. 17 (AP)
?Accompanied by an attorney,
Howard J. Osborne, the former
security chief for the Central
Inteddigence Agency, was .queg-
tioned ? for more than three
hours today by the Rockefeller
commission about the agency's
domestic surveillanve activities.
Mr. Osborn, whose office con-
ducted an operation that Wil-
lian E. Colby, director of Cen-
tral Intelligence, has said, in-
filtrated agents into American
radical groups in the late nine-
teen-sixties, was the first of
the dozen witnesses who have
appeared before the panel to.
be represented by an attorney. ?
According to knowledgeable
sources, an inter-office memo
dated Feb. 6, warned agency
employes that they might be
prosecuted for past practices
and advised them to retain pri-
vate counsel.
Vice President Rockefeller,
the. commission chairman, in-
dicated that Mr. Osborn had
not invoked the Fifth Amend-
ment against self-incrimination.
Mr Osborn refused all com-
ment to reporters. saying he
had "never commented or
talked to the press."
? His lawyer, John W. Debelins,
when asked who was paying
his legal fee, replied, "The,
agency most certainly is not."
Two other former C.I.A. of-
ficers, Raymond G. Rocca and
N. Scott Miler, also testified
before the commission at its
sixth weekly meeting. Mr. Roc-
ca and Mr. Miler served under
James J. Angleton, the agen-
cy's former counterintelligence
chief, who last week reportedly
told the commission he had
been kept in the dark abbot
the activities of a secret unit
that Mr. Colby has acknowl-
edged kept files on 10,000
Americans.
The commission operated for
most of the day at half-
strength, with four of its eight
members, including Mr. Rocke-
feller, absent. The Vice Presi-
dent joined the hearings in
midafternoon just as Mr. Os-
born was completing his;
testimony.
Asked for his reaction to a
Harris poll indicating that a
majority of Americans think
the commission will cover up
any wrongdoing by the agency,
Mr. Rockefeller said, "I can
assure anybody that we're not"
conducting a whitewash.
For the first time in five
weeks, former Gov. Ronald
Reagan of California was pres-
ent for a commission meeting.
Mr. Reagan said he had read
transcripts of all the sessions
he had missed and that he was
confident that he had "a grip"
on the material.
Mr. Osborn, who headed the
office of security from 1964 to
1974, is regarded as a? central
figure in both the Rockefeller
inquiry and past investigations
of C.I.A. involvement in Water-
gate.
?
NEW YORK TIMES
21 February 1975
Excerpts From the Statement by Colby
Spedal to The Neer YMie Times
WASHINGTON, Feb. 20?
Following are excerpts front
a statement by William E.
Colby, Director of Central
Intelligence, at a hearing to-
day by the Defense Subcom-
mittee of the House Appro-
priations Committee:
Mr. Chairman, in May,
1973, Director Schlesinger is-
sued a notice to all C.I.A.
employes instructing and in-
viting them to report to him
or to the Inspector General
any matter in .C.I.A.'s his-
tory which they deemed ques-
tionable under C.I.A.'s char-
ter. This instruction has been
made a matter of regulation
within C.I.A. and is brought
to the attention of each em-
ploye once a year.
? Times Article Cited
As a result of the May,
1973, memorandum, various
incidents were collected and
'brought to the attention of
the chairman of the House
and the acting chairman of
the Senate Armed Services
Committees. They were then
used as the basis of a very
specific series of internal in-
structions issued in August,
1973, directing the termina-
tion, modification, or other
appropriate action with re-
spect to such incidents in or-
der to ensure that C.LA. re-
mains within its proper char-
ter. These instructions have
been carried out and are
periodically reviewed to en-
sure continued compliance.
It appears that some ver-
sion of these matters came to
the attention of the New
York Times reporter who
wrote th article of Dec. 22,
1974. A day or two before
the article appeared, he con-
tacted me stating he had ob-
tained information ?of great
importance indicating that
C.I.A. had engaged in a mas-
sive domestic intelligence ac-
tivity, including wiretaps,?
break-ins and a variety of
other actions.
In response to his request, I
met with him and explained
to him that he had mixed and
magnified two separate sub-
jects, I.E., the foreign coun-
terintelligence effort proper-
ly conducted by C.I.A. and
those few activities that the
agency's own investigation
had revealed and terminated
in 1973.
? He obviously did not accept
my explanation and, instead,
alleged that C.I.A. had con-
ducted a "massive illegal
domestic intelligence opera-
tion," I am confident
that investigations of the
President's commission and
the select committees will
verify the accuracy of my
version of these events.
I also believe that any seri-
ous review of my report to
the Senate Appropriations
Committee will show that I
essentially denied his version
rather than confirmed it as
some have alleged. The sen-
sational atmosphere sur-
rounding intelligence;howev-
er, encouraged oversimplifi-
cation and disproportionate
stress on a few -missteps
rather than on the high quali-
ty of C.I.A.'s basic work.
Mr. Chairman, these last
two months have placed
American intelligence in dan-
ger. The almost hysterical ex-
citement that surrounds any
news story mentioning CIA.,
or referring even to a per-
fectly legitimate activity of
C.I.A., has raised the ques-
tion whether secret intel-
ligence operations can be
conducted by the United
States.
A number of the intel-
ligence services abroad with
which C.I.A. works have ex-
pressed concern over its sit-
uation and over the fate of
the sensitive information
they provide to us. A number
of our individual agents
abroad are deeply worried
that their names might be re-
vealed with resultant danger
to their lives as well as their
livelihoods.
A number of Americans
who have collaborated with
C.I.A. as a patriotic contri-
bution to their country are
deeply concerned that their
reputations will be be-
smirched and their businesses
ruined by sensational mis-
representation of this associ-
ation. And our own employ-
es are torn between the sen-
sational allegations of C.I.A.
misdeeds and their own
knowledge that they served
their nation during critical
times in the best way they
knew how.
WASHINGTON POST
20 February 1975
Common Cause ?
Seeks CIA Report
Associted Peets
Common Cause, a citi-
zens lobbying group, said
yesterday it has asked
CIA Director Williant? E.
.Colby for access to the
report on CIA domestic
surveillance of U.S. citi-
zens that was given. Pres-
ident Ford in late 1974.
Mr. Ford requested the
report from Colby after
published reports of 'un-
lawful CIA surveillance.
4
WASHINGTON POST
11 F.E13 1975
? By Maxine Cheshire -I
Now You See It, Now You Don't
It could be a scene from a spy movie about the CIA:
A caller looking for E. Howard Hunt's old "public re-
lations" office, a block from the White House, gets off
the fifth-floor elevator these days and finds a blank
wall.
There is not even a door where the public relations
firm of Robert Mullen & Co. once rented space.
?
The: company, identified as a CIA cover operation
whose ties to the Watergate scandals are -still being
scrutimted, quietly went out of business months ago.
.That was shortly before a report on Mullen & Co.'s
CIA involvements was released by Sen. Howard H.
Baker Jr. (R-Tenn.).
Among other things, the Mullen firm was under
contract to provide a corporate cover for CIA opera-
tives in Singapore, Amsterdam and elsewhere.
Baker's report also claimed flat the CIA helped
former agent Hunt get a job with Mullen and the
company's president, Robert F. Bennett, knew in ad-
vance of the Watergate break-in as a White House op-
eration.
Bennett, the son of Sen. Wallace F. Bennett (R-Utah),
has moved to Los Angeles to become the public rela-
tions director for billionaire Howard Hughes' Summa
Corporation. Bennett handled Hughes' account previ-
ously at Mullen.
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NEW YORK TIMES
1/1- February 1975
The Right Focus on the CIA.
? Official documents just published by
the State Department disclose that in
1948, President Harry Truman?then
facing dim re-election prospects him-
self?approved a secret recommenda-
tion that the United States "make full
use of its political, economic and, if
necessary, military power" to prevent
a Communist election victory in Italy.
' Published records do not as yet de-
tail to what extent that recommenda-
tion was carried out, or what role
might have been played by the fledg-
ling Central Intelligence Agency. But
Mr. Truman's order of a quarter-cene
tury ago finds an unpleasant echo in
the word Richard Helms, the director
of the C.I.A. in 1970, says was passed
to him that year by the Nixon Admin-
istration?that- the overthrow of the
Government of Salvador Allende Gos-
sens in Chile was "a thing that they
were interested in having done."
Mr. Allende, a Marxist, already had
been elected, although not by a ma-
jority, and was awaiting confirmation
by the Chilean Congress, so in that
respect the Nixon policy was far more
drastic than Mr. Truman's. The latter
President, moreover, might reasonably
be considered to have had more justi-
fication, in the era of Stalin, for his
concern about Italy than Mr. Nixon
had, in the era of d?nte, for his
opposition to Mr. Allende.
The net effect, in both cases, still
was official Government sanction for
United States intervention in the in-
ternal affairs of another nation, to be
undertaken clandestinely and for the
purpose of containing or rolling back
Communism. And however different
the circumstances in which the two
interventions were approved, they
underscore the enormous difficulties of
the task now being undertaken by the
special Senate committee appointed to.
investigate the, operations of the
American intelligence community.
.The Truman documents show that
the seeds of the investigation lie deep
WASHINGTON STAR
15 February 1975
'0 ?
Lij
By Jim Squires
cNcngo Tribune
The Central Intelligence
Agency has warned em-
ployes they may be prose-
cuted for past "agency
practices" and reminded
them of their "constitution-
al rights to remain silent" if
questioned by the Justice
Department.
In an interoffice memo-
randum, the agency said it
"hopes no one will be
charged with a criminal of-
fense." But the. memo ad-
vises employes to retain
"private counsel" and im-
plies that in case of prose-
cution they will be on their
own.
The two-page directive,
dated Feb 6, was signed by
David Ii. Bice, deputy
director of the agency's,
clandestine operAitardPlYgu
"
110?????111?11CaMMINICIMMIk
IN THE NATION
By Tom Wicker
in the origins of the Cold. War. But
in the mere eight months allotted to
its operations, the Senate committee
cannot possibly rummage back through
the history of the past thirty years
to examine every covert operation
undertaken abrOad?even if the rec-
ords were clear and easily obtained,
which they aren't, and even if cir-
ctunstances had not so greatly
changed. It would be difficult even
to cover such ground back to, say,
1960; and the task is made infinitely
more complicated because the com-
mittee also is investigating the F.B.I.
and numerous other Federal agencies
concerned with intelligence (Senatoe
Howard Baker of Tennessee says
there are nineteen such agencies al- ,
together).
The committee is charged with
looking into the operations of these
agencies at home and abroad, but
the concerns that led most directly
to its establishment were domestic?
disclosures that the C.I.A., in apparent
violation of its charter, had been con-
ducting surveillances of, and keeping
records on, American citizens. It
would be natural, therefore, if the
caminnitee were to place its major
emphasis on uncovering and prevent-
ing unlawful activities threatening the
rights of American citizens, rather
than in investigating covert opera-
tions abroad; the latter, in any case,
present delicate problems of interna-
tional relations that the committee
will be reluctant to rais.
Statements by Senator Frank Church,
the chairman, and Senator John Tow-
er, the senior minority member, sug-
gest that the committee will place its
major focus on domestic violations.
sion, which has been ac-
cused of carrying out illegal
domestic spying.
MANY EMPLOYES of
the clandestine services,
the so-called "dirty tricks"
sections of the agency, have
interpreted the memoran-
dum as another sign that
CIA Director William S.
Colby is unwilling to back
employes who now might
face prosecution for carry-
ing out the orders of their'
superiors.
Others interpreted it sim-
ply as a warning to the
clandestine operators to
keep their mouths shut.
CIA sources said the long-
standing feud between the
agency's clandestine em-
ployes and the "overt" side
(intelligence gathering and
analysis). has i_n_te
EfitiERe4IVSNAM
ri
Fl-trF1
It can hardly be argued that that is
not a vital subjct of investigation
and, in the case of the F.B.I., the
primary one. Senator Church, more-
over, is privately determined to ex-
amine the record of covert operations
abroad in sufficient depth to develop
guidelines and policies to control them
in the future.
Still, the danger seems clear that
in demanding so much of this single
committee in so short a time, and even
with the best efforts of its members
and staff, the Senate may get far less
than it or the nation expects. The
question of domestic violations of law
by the C.I.A. is already being studied,
for example, by President Ford's so-
called "blue ribbon" commission under
Vice President Rockefeller; and while'
the makeup of that panel does not
inspire confidence that it will conduct
a searching inquiry, over-concentration
on the same area by the Senate com-
mittee is bound to cause much dupli-
cation of effort.
Yet, the wording of the Rockefeller
commission's charter so tightly limits
it to investigating C.I.A. domestic
operations as to foster the belief that
the Administration has good reason to
fear any probing by the commission of'
the C.I.A.'s covert operations abroad.
Indications mount that those opera-
tions?as in Chile?have been exten-
siva and unsavory, to a degree, un-
dreamed of by most Americans.
The record of these operations
should be subjected at last to the
most searching scrutiny?not that the
past can be redeemed but that the
future may be guarded. If Senator
Church and his committee find them-
selves unable to single out covert
operations to the extent necessary,
they should have no hesitation in
recommending further investigation,
and for as long as it may take, of this
dark chapter in American history.
Vi.7A1
under fire for illegal domes-
tic activities.
NOW THAT the clandes-
tine side is in trouble, the
weight of the director
(Colby) has come down on
the overt side," said one
source. "It has become
very clear that management
is no longer with us."
The 13iee memo implied
but did not specifically
state that the. agency would
not help employes accused
of crimes. "It is understood
that the agency will supply
attorneys in civil matters,"
said one agency source.
"But if it is a criminal of-
fense, each employe must
get his own lawyer."
The Blee memo, sent to
supervisory personnel, sug-
gested that all employes are
past agency practices to see
if they conflict with crimi-
nal statutes" and that "they
may be asked to volunteer
information."
THE JUSTICE Depart-
ment has been reviewing
previous CIA activities for
the last few weeks to deter-
mine if any agency em-
ployes should be prosecuted.
The probe centers on two
areas of CIA operations, the
agencys. counter-intelli-
gence division and the
office of security, which is
charged, with protecting
agency secrets.
Colby has acknowledged
publicly that both sections
of the agency carried out
some questionable domestic ?
activities, including surveil-
lance and infiltration of
+Conti-war dissi-
tlitlegal entry.
04-#04-411,11M000
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NEW YORK TIMES
16 February 1975
ES, CITIZENS USED
By F113.1. ABROAD
Bureau Confirms Practice,-
Authorities Say lt -Does
Not Violate the Law ?
By JOHN M. CREWDSON
Spc..iat to The New York Tim,
WASHINGTON, Feb. 15?.-The
,Federal Bureau of Investigation
periodically dispatches Ameri-
can citizens on intelligence-
gathering missions outside the
United States, according to a
42-year-old. Florida man who
?pays he and others have been
used for that purpose.
The man, Joseph A. Bur-
?ton, who for more than two
years, beginning in May, 1972,
posed as a Marxist in order to
.infiltrate revolutionary groups
here and abroad, told The New
York Times that he had made
"abbot 10" sorties into Canada
at the F.B.I.'s direction. -
Another undercover ppera-
tive, a woman. with Whom Mr.
,Burton occasionally worked,
confirmed in a separate inter-
view that she had made a
month-long visit to China near-
ly four years ago in connection
with, her work for the bureau.
The F.B.I., according to a for-
mer high official there,-has "no
!right to run [intelligence] oper-
ations in a foreign country?
that's the C.I.A.'s jurisdiction."
But neither he, nor legal au-
thorities in and out of the
Government who were asked
about the practice, could point
to any statute prohibiting the
bureau from gathering intel-
ligence overseas.
James Murphy, a spokesman
at F.B.I. headquarters here,
confirmed in a telephone inter-
view that the bureau has in the
past sent American citizens
abroad for intelligence purpo-
ses, but he declined to discuss.
specific cases. ?
? Mr. Burton, an auctioneer and I.
antiques dealer who lives in!
Tampa, Fla., told The Times;
that he ended his relationship
With the F.B.I. last summer at-
ter becoming concerned about
the legality of some of the
tasks he had undertaken, in-
cluding the Canadian ventures.
He said that, last month, his
doubts led him to write to.
ClarenceM. Kelley, director of
the bureau, seeking assurances
that his work outside the Unit-
ed States was 'legal 'and pro-
per."
He has received no, reply to
that letter or to an earlier one.
F.B.I. officials will not say
whether a reply is forthcoming.
Apart from bis concern that
he may have violated the law,
Mr. Burton's account, of his ac-
tivities, and that of his fellow
operative, provide an insight
into a little-known aspect of
the F.B.I.'s operations at a time
when the agency is coming un-
der increasingly stringent scru-
tiny.
Last month, the Senate set up
a select committee to examine
intelligence-gathering by Feder-
al agencies, including the F.B.I.
and the Central Intelligence
Agency, whose occasionally
overlapping jurisdictions have
created some difficulties in the
past.
Talk of Albania
Although his forays outside
the United States were con-
fined to Canada, Mr. Burton
said, "There was some talk of
my going to Europe and also
going to Albania. The bureau
would have let me go to Alba-
nia. They wanted me to go." i
He was in the process of se-I
curing an invitation to visit the
tiny Communist country, he
said, when he decided to break
off his relationship with the
bureau.
Mr. Burton said he was once
asked by an F.B.I. superior
whether he would "like to go to
Mexico, walk into the Chinese
? embassy and say that you've
got this organization in Tampa
and that you want to work with
the Chinese."
Mr. Burton then headed a
sham "revolutionary" group in
Tampa, called the "Red Star
Cadre," that, he said, had been
set up as a front for his F.B.I.
work. He said he told the in-
quiring agent that he would not
"insult the Chinese by trying to
pull something that stupid on
Ahem."
During the Canadian trips, he
recalled, his instructions were
to develop contacts with mem-
hers of the Canadian Commu-
nist party's pro-Chinese wing,
and to report to the F.B.I. on
their activities, including any
signs that the organization was
!passing funds from China to
!Maoist groups in the United
;States.
On two of the trips, he said,
; he was accompanied by an '
!American woman who had
!adopted a similar radical pose
,in the New Orleans area, and
who told him that she had visit-
ed China to gather political in-
telligence for the bureau.
The woman, a 36-year-old-
housewife and mother, con-
firmed in an interview in the
Southwestern city where she
now lives that she spent four
weeks in China in 1971 with
one of the first groups of Amer-
icans allowed into that country
after President Nixon's an-
nouncement that he would visit
there.
When first asked about that
trip, the woman said, "It's bet-
ter riot to discuss any F.B.I.
operations outside the coun-
try."
But after being assured ano-
nymity, she conceded that she
had entered China "before Nix-
on". as part of a "delegation
made up of American radicals,"
and had made "four or five"
trips into Canada as well.
The woman asked that she
not be identified for fear of re-
6
prisals from the left against her
or her husband, with whom she
had worked in penetrating left-
ist political organizations in
Louisiana and elsewhere.
'A Detail Specialist'
The reports she submitted to
the F.B.I. upon her return, she
said, were filled not only with
information about her traveling
companions, but also with her
observations of Canton, Shang-
hai and Peking, the Chinese
capital, where, she said she had
been introduced to Premier
Chou En-lai.
? "I was concerned about ev-
lerything," she replied when
'asked what sort of information
i she supplied to the bureau. "1
;was a detail specialist."
Asked whether she now en-
tertained any misgivings about
her work, her voice trembled as
she said, "I spent a month in
China, wondering if I was ever
going to go home again: won-
dering if they were ever going
to find out what I was doing.
"I feel like I've put my life on
the line for a good cause, and I
don't feel like that all ought to
go down the drain because
someone wants to make a sen-
sational story."
The former F.B.I. intelligence
official said he had read the
woman's reports on China, but
could not recall whether any of
the information had been
shared ;Yid: the C.I.A.
Hoover's Strategy for 'Glory'
On more than one occasion
when the F.B.I. sent a covert
operative abroad, the official
said, J. Edgar Hoover, then di-
rector of the bureau, would "in-
struct us not to advise" the
C.I.A. of the intelligence that
, was produced.
"He wanted to outscoop the
C.I.A. " the man said. "He
wanted the F.B.I. to come back
with valuable information
:which he would give to the
President over his signature, so
he would get the glory."
Added the official: "He was
wrong."
When first asked about Mr.
Burton's activities, officials of
the bureau here said that all
queries should be addressed. to
Nick F. Starnes, the special
agent in charge of the F.B.I.'s
'Tampa field office, under whom
Mr. Burton had worked.
Mr. Staines, who last week
was notified that he was being
transferred to the bureau's
Washington field office, said
repeatedly in a recent interview
that he would not respond in
any way to Mr. Burton's disclo-
sures or charges beyond the
following statement:
"Joseph A. Burton volun-
teered his services to the Tam-
pa F.B.I. office in May, 1972,
and was able to establish con-
tact with several ? Marxist-
Leninist groups.
"He was paid for his service
in providing information and
expenses incurred in connec-
tion, with its acquisition.
"During his periods of assist-
anct to the F.B.I. Burton was
;instructed not to engage in any
!illegal activities and we have no
linformation indicating he did
eneage in illegal activities.
I
, 'Burton's services were dis-
continued in July, 1974, at his
own request, as he indicated he
desired to provide security for
his family and because he was
no longer willing to be associat-
ed with the Communist revolu-
tionary movement."
The former F.B.I. official said
that the bureau maintains,
agents in a number of foreign'
capitals who serve as "legal at-
taches" and who have their of-
fices inside American embas-
sies. But he said that their role
was officially limited to per-
forming a "liaison" ? function
with foreign policy agencies
and that they were barred from
"positive," or active, gathering
of intelligence,
Not Special Agents
?
! Mr. Murphy, the spokesman
:for the bureau here, said that
;the F.B.I. was "not operational
outside the country," and,
without confirming that either
,Mr. Burton or the woman had
!ever traveled abroad, he point-
'ed out that neither was a spe-
'cial agent of the F.B.I.
Asked how he would describe
the pair, Mr. Murphy replied
that they were considered
"paid informants."
A spokesman for the CIA.,
which is charged by law with
the gathering of intelligence
outside the United States, said
his agency would have no com-
ment on any reports concerning
the F.B.I.'s external intelligence
operations.
! Told of the bureau's descrip-
tion of him as an "informant,"1
IMr. Burton bristled.
"What information did I sell
;them?" he demanded. "When
they called me and told me to
:go to Canada, was I selling
!them information? When they
'asked me to set up 'Red Star,'
I was I selling them information?
! "If the bureau asked me to go
i to Canada or Pennsylvania or,
anywhere," he went on, "at
first they would say, 'Po You
want to go?' After a while they
just said, 'You're going to Can-
ada."
Full-Time Help
Both Mr. Burton and the
couple from New Orleans paint-
ed out repeatedly that they had
worked virtually, full time for
the F.B.I.
Mr. Burton Produced a letter
from Mr. Stames showing that,
in addition to travel and other,
expenses, he was paid $2,113
for his work for the bureau din-
ing the first seven months of
last year.
The New Orleans couple said
that during their service as un-
dercover intelligence operatireee
they received an average 51
"about $16,000" a year /17UM
the bureau.
Told of Mr. Murphy's eWan-
ation that, because he had ryl:
graduated from the F I
!Academy as a special agene
was officially considered an
!"informant," Mr. BI:n9,1
!laughed and replied:
"The only thing I didn't teern
[by not attending the acadenyj
is how to pick up a phoet and
say, 'This is not your F.B.L We
didn't do it, no, we don't know
them, thank you for not calling
us.'
"That and the karate course,
think, are the only two things I
missed."
Dismissing an informant 1";
."somebody who, asks, 'Hum
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much Will you give me for some
information,'" Mr. Burton em-
phasized that he received in-
structions from and made re-
ports to his F.B.I. superiors on
a daily basis, and that he was
directed both here and abroad
to act "in other than a passive
role."
As his first Canadian assign-
ment, he recalled, he was in-
structed to attend a conference
of the Canadian Communist
party's ' pro-Chinese wing, an
organization of which he said
he eventually became a voting
member and to which he peri-
odically donated funds supplied
by the F.B.I.
I Without seeming to do so, Mr.
'Burton said, he had been able
to cause a "rift" among some of
the leftist organizations repre-
sented at the conference. Upon
his return to Tampa, he said,
the bureau "congratulated" him
on his success.
Displaying anger at what he
deemed attempts by bureau of-
ficials to play down the impor-
tance of his activities, Mr. Bur-
ton asserted that last July, just
'before he broke with the bu-
reau, he was told by an agent:
"If you want to do a book on
your association with the bu-
reau someday after this has all
settled down, we would be
more than happy to help you,
and we will supply you with a
publisher."
Mr. Burton said he declined
the offer, saying that, "By the
time you cut out everything I
want to put in, there wouldn't
be any book."
?
NEW YORK TIMES
28 February 1975
House Unit Votes to Block
2 C.I.A.-Inquiry Resolutions
WASHINGTON, Feb. 27 (Up)
?The House Foreign Affairs .
Committee voted 19 to 9 today
to bury in committee two reso-
lutions calling for investiga-
tions of the Central Intelligence
Agency in connection with the
coup that toppled the late
Chilean President, Salvadore
Allende Gosseus.
. Chairman Thomas E. Morgan,
Democrat of Pennsylvania, said
the resolutions by Representa-
tive Michael J. Harrington, De-
mocrat of Massachusetts, were
unnecessary because other
committees of Congress were
going to investigate the matter.
White House lawyers and the
State Department's Congres-.
sional liaison official both
ureed the committee not to ap-
prove tile Harrington resolu-
tions.
7
WASHINGTON STAR
21 February 1975
S ys CI
al mew btA
By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer ?
The head of the Central in-
telligence Agency yesterday
protested that American intel-
ligence operations have been
jeopardized by "the almost
hysterical excitement" over
CIA missteps.
Testifying before a House'
Appropriations subcommittee.
for nearly three hours, Wil-
liam E. Colby cbtriplained that
allegations of legal or impro-
per domestic spywork by the
CIA have been blown out of
all proportion and have placed
its legitimate activities in dan-
ger.
At the same time, the CIA
director submitted a series of
what he called "minor?
changes" in a report that he,
gave the Senate Appropria-!
tions Committee last Month.
Continuing investigations,
Colby said, showed that the
agency's counterintelligence
files over the past eight years
"have included files on four
members of Congress."
He said under questioning
that "at least a couple" of
these unidentified members of
Congress turned up in counter-!
intelligence dossiers because;
of their anti-Vietnam war
;
activities, but denied that any;
of them had been under
"active surveillance."
In his report to the Senate
last month, Colby had said
that only one former member
of Congress had appeared in
, the CIA's counterintelligence
program files.
Colby strongly defended his
beleaguered agency and main-
tained that its missteps were
! "few and far between . . . and
in no way justify the public
outcry which has been raised
against CIA."
Flanked by two aides at the
public hearing, which will be
followed by a closed session
;today, Colby said the
!furor has touched off chagrin
among - cooperating intelli-
gence agencies abroad, fears
among a number of individual
CIA agents that their
lives might be jeopardized by
public disclosures, and con-
cern among Americans who
have collaborated with the
CIA that. th&T businesses
might be ruined by
"sensational misrepresenta-
tion" of their work with the
agency.
Within the CIA, Colby said,
"the morale, to be perfectly
honest, right now is bad." Just
a couple of weeks ago, he
added, the agency asked eight
firms to hid on a CIA con-
peratio s
? 4?,..
frekie legit9
with the trouble the CIA is
in today."
The CIA's domestic activi-
ties are under investigation by
a special presidential commis-
sion headed by Vice President
Rockefeller. The agency also
faces broader inquiries, along
with the rest of the nation's
intelligence comthunity, from
select Senate and House in-
vestigating committees that
have been created in the past
month.
Addressing himself to some
specific allegations, Colby de-
nied a report in The New York
Times quoting an anonymous
ex-CIA agent as declaring that
he and other agents had taken
part. in telephone wiretaps and
break-ins in the New York
City area.
The slim, gray-haired CIA
director said the agency had
been unable to identify any
such ex-employee and as a re-
sult suspected that the Times
reporter, Seymour Hersh, was
"the victim of what we in the
intelligence trade call a fabri-
cator."
Colby also denied what he
'described as charges that the
CIA manages a $200 million-a-
year corporate empire "which
could circumvent the will of
Congress." He acknowledged
that the agency maintains
"certain corporate support
structures" as a cover for- its
operations, but insisted that
they are meticulously man-
aged and audited by CIA
officials.
The CIA director declined,
however, to discuss at the pub-
lic session reports that the
agency worked with the Bu-
reau of Narcotics and Danger-
ous Drugs in the early 1960s
to bug apartments in various
metropolitan areas as "sex
traps for foreign diplomats?'
"I won't say sex and intelli-
gence never got together," Col-
by told Rep. Bill D. Burlison
(D-Mo.), but "I'd really like to
talk about the relationship
with the BNDD privately if I
could."
Under questioning by Rep.
Joseph P. Addabbo (D-N.Y.)
Colby also refused to give the:
subcommittee a copy of the 50.:
page report on the CIA's do-
mestic activities that was sub-
mitted to President Ford al
few weeks ago. ? !
Colby said the report con- ;
tained "essentially" the samed
facts he was giving the sub-
committee in summary fash-
ion.
1
But as for the report to
1Mr. Ford, he said. "I am not
authorized to release that."
Colby refused to elaborate cm
the reasons. ?
I
I In his report to Ihe Senate
tract, and seven of them de- IA poropriat ions Con?nittengetl in, a A.(0 ht._ .
APproAlicri#30.40AVUOtigh08 ilehrE)1177c00432R0004003of-
0ake l
) e so first time that CIA
ficers had occasionally spied'
:on American journalists and
:political dissenters, opened
the mail of private citizens.
'planted informers inside do-
mestic groups and assembled
the agency's own secret files
on more than 10,000 Ameri-
cans.
In the updated -eport sub-.
mitted yesterday, he also said;
the agency conducted tele-
phone wiretaps on 27 persons,i
including foreigners: in the
United States between '195L
and 1965, when the practice P
was stopped?instead of 21 in-!
dividuals as previously re-i
ported.
But he denied again that.
any of these activities
amounted to a "massive, il-
legal domestic intelligence
operation" in violation of its
charter prohibiting such activ-
ities.
Rep. George H. Mahon (D-
Tex.) interrupted: "You denied.
the allegation that it was a
massive effort, but you didn't,
deny something happened." -
Colby replied that the CIA,
had conducted what it con-
sidered a legitimate counter-
intelligence effort "directed?
at possible foreign links to
American dissidents . . . in:
response to presidential cone
cern over this possibility."
; The CIA -director also sug-
gested that the files on the
four unidentified members of
Congress had been rather in-
gress had been rather in-
nocuous and occasioned large-1
ly by their attendance at anti,'
war meetings in foreign coon- t
tries which the CIA moni-
tored.
:
"They were not under sur-
veillance by the CIA in any ;
case," Colby said. and then
added, "They were not under,
active surveillance." He said
two ? of the ? files were de-
stroyed in 1974 and none COP-
tained any material that origi-
nated in the CIA except for
one travel cable and two ca-
bles quoting. press announce-
ments of forthcoming confer-
ences.
Except for one counter iri-
telligence file "still extant o!.
a deceased congressman," an':
CIA director reported that
remaining dossiers have bee!_
shipped to a CIA records cen-
ter and thus classified as "in-
! active."
1 Despite the poor morale a'
:the agency. Colby did a.-
Iknowledge ' one silver
that he attributed to reecti!
publicity. Normally, he said.
the CIA gets some 600 job in
-
gullies every couple of weck.A.
but in the first two weeks (if
January there were 1,700 aq
them.
recruits these day-.
he said.
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1
l'1114SWEEK
17 FEB 1975
INVESTIGATIONS:
The FBI's Turn
. When the furor over "domestic spy-
ing" first broke several weeks ago, the
Central Intelligence Agency was in the
eye of the storm. Of late, however, the
resulting inquiries into the U.S. intelli-
gence establishment have broadened out
?in Congress and in the press?bringing
the Federal Bureau of Investigation into
some heavy weather of its own. Unlike
the CIA, the FBI is empowered by law
to conduct surveillance and other intelli-
gence-gathering operations in the U.S.
But a recent spate of seamy
revelations has raised ques-
tions about the bureau's
tactics and . the way it
has used?and abused?the in-
formation it gathers.
Under .the leadership of
J. Edgar Hoover, the FBI
stooped to some squalid strat-
agems. In the mid-1960s,
NEWSWEEK learned, the FBI
planted electronic "bugs" in
two houses of prostitution in
the Washington area. "There
was a national-security ra-
tional.?:e" explained a highly
placed source, "The bureau
hoped to obtain tapes of for-
eign diplomats in compromis-
ing situations, to be used pos-
sibly in blackmailing them
into working for the U.S." But
sometimes the bugs also
picked up congressmen and
other important Americans.
Hoover, according to NEWS-
WEEK'S source, passed such
information to. Lyndon John-
son ,who enjoyed placing a
stack of FBI dossiers conspicuously on his
desk while subjecting vulnerable con-
gressmen to. some political arm-twisting.
'Club': Hoover could play the same
ambiguous game. In the mid-'60s, the
FBI discovered that an Eastern congress-
man was among the victims of a ring of
blackmailers preying on homosexuals.
Hoover, NEWSWEEK learned, personally
assured the legislator that he would be
spared any publicity. Hoover extended
the same courtesy to other congressmen
the FBI had found in compromising situ-
ations. Such promises of protection were
no doubt comforting, and indeed it was
the FBI's job to shield people from black-
mail. But the mere fact that the agency
had such information could have been,
as Rep. John M. Slack of West Virginia
put it, "a way of getting a congressman
under a club."
Among the .more serious charges of
FBI abuse focused on a fifteen-year
-counterintelligence" program: (COIN-
TELPRO), which was aimed at both
political fringes and at black and white
extremist groups. Before the program
was terminated in 1971, the bureau had,
by its own reckoning, mounted 2,370 sep-
arate "operations"?digging up or simply
fabricating derogatory information about
their subjects and then leaking it to
"friendly news media" or other recipients
in order to get the subjects fired, evicted
from apartments, denied credit or other-
wise harassed. In one such case, accord-
ing to court papers filed on behalf of
several members of the Trotskyist So-
cialist Workers Party who are suing the
FBI, agents visited a Florida shipbuild-
ing concern and told an official there that
one of his employees, SWP sympathizer
Ernest Able, was a Communist. The com-
pany fired Able, allegedly citing the
FBI visit as a reason for dismissal.
COINTELPRO's tactics were as vari-
1,0
namese. That story was gleaned from
testimony before the Senate Watergate
committee in 1973. Similarly, the Times's
Seymour Hersh discovered a 1973 al-
legation before the House Armed Serv-
ices Committee that former CIA director
Richard Helms had withheld from the
Depai tinent of Justice letters written by
Watergate break-in conspirator James
McCord, who warned that Nixon cam-
paign officials were planning to pin the
burglary on the CIA.
Such stories may be only the start of
a deluge.' All told, five official committees
are or will soon be investigating various
aspects of U.S. intelligence: Vice Presi-
dent Nelson Roekefeller's commission
on the CIA, select committees in the
House and Senate and two House sub-
committees. An expansion of the Free-
dom of Information Act, enacted over
President Ford's veto, will; take effect
4
Oliphant 0 1975. Denver Pa.,
'Of course I brought them with me?how do you think I got here?'
ous as its targets?ranging from "dirty
tricks" to what Massachusetts Rep. Rob-
ert Drinan last week described as down-
right "1,.w1essness." In the late 1960s, a
former government official told NEWS-
WEEK, the FBI hired a prostitute with
venereal disease to seduce several New
Left leaders in California in the naive
belief that contracting VD would dis-
credit them with potential campus fol-
lowers (she purportedly met with at
least some success).
Deal? Many of the recent disclosures
about the FBI and the CIA come from
once-secret Congressional testimony.
Two such stories have surfaced about
FBI bugging of Martin Luther King's
telephone and bedroom. The New York
Times reported that LBJ ordered?and
Hoover approved?an FBI check of
five of Spiro Agnew's phone calls during
the 1968 campaign to determine whether
the Republicans were trying to make
their own deal with the South Viet-
next week and will make the files of all
government agencies more accessible.
The FBI and CIA vill get a taste of the
same treatment they seem to have given
some citizens: invasion of privacy.
?JAMES R. GAINES with ANTHONY MARRO and
STEPHAN, LESH ER in Washington
wpm, STREET JOURNAL
21 F 1975
?COLBY SAID CHARGES against the CIA:
are exaggerated and could harm it.
' The Central Intelligence Agency director?
'told- a House subcommittee that. "the almost
hysterical excitement that surrounds any
news story mentioning CIA . . . has raised
the question whether secret intelligence,
operations can be conducted. by the U.S."
Colby said agents abroad fear their names'
will be disclosed, endangering their lives:
-Although. the CIA has made "a few miz-
steps," he said, operations against antiwar
dissidents focused on possible foreign ties
and were "neither massive, illegal nor do-
Colby withheld' for closed hearings
his discussion of reported' WA sex traps
? to 'gain data front foreigners. But he
comntented: "I won't say that sex and
? intelligence never got together." - -
Colby corrected testimony he gave the
Senate earlier, saying the agency had files.
on four members of 'Congress,, not one, and:
has done four break-Ins in the U.S.. not
three. He denied any CIA Involvement In,
Watergate after contacts with the Water-
gate burglars prior to the break-in.
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Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001004360007-1
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Tuesday, Feb. 11, 1975
1 The Hornets' Nest at Langley
? By ROBERT KEAThsv
WASHINGTON ? By now the United
States must have the world's most-publi-
cized secret spy service. ,
The Central Intelligence Agency's deeds
and misdeeds are spread through the daily
press. Its ex-employes publish books and
articles?some telling . all, others loyally
covering up some things for "the com-
pany.'" As usual, assorted foreigners still
blame it for causing trouble by exploiting
such varied folks as Cambodian Buddhist
monks, Ustashi terrorists, Panamanian
students and the entire Austrian army.
More importantly, an eager Congress
and a reluctant Executive Branch are into
the act. Several congressional committees
threaten to strip away CIA secrecy in
search of alleged illegal domestic and un-
wise foreign activities. Meantime, a new
Vice President, until recently an official
overseer of the intelligence game, heads a
presidential commission appointed to do
much the same. And Nelson Rockefeller
already concedes "violations or abuses" of
the CIA charter did occur.
All this produces hard times at Lang-
ley, Virginia. That's where the CIA has its
headquarters and most of its staff. And
that's where William Colby, as direc-
tor of Central Intelligence, manages?nom-
inally, at least?the entire American intel-
ligence community, including the Penta-
gon's Defense Intelligence Agency and
other organizations. Agency morale is
down and there's gloom about the future.
A kind of "what-did-we-do-to-deserve-
this?" atmosphere pervades.
Despite the repercussions, though,
there's wide agreement that scrutiny is
Overdue. CIA (and other) ventures into for-
bidden domestic police work may not be as
"massive? as alleged, but transgressions
did occur. More than one President called
on his secretive snoops to investigate, and
even harass, political foes. Meantime,
newer members of Congress complain that
committees charged with overseeing intel-
ligence operations were negligent, and
they're out to change that. They complain
the old boys on Capitol Hill deliberately
went too easy on the old boys in the spy
trade; where the money went, and why,
Congress didn't want to losow.
For example, the late Senator Allen El-
lender of Louisiana for years was one of
five Senate watchdogs. Yet when ques-
tioned once on the floor about secret fi-
nancing of war in Laos, he made it clear
he hadn't been 'told much.
s
"I did not know anything about it. . . .
I never asked, to begin with, whether or
not there were any funds to carry on the
war in this sum the CIA asked for. It never
dawned on me to ask about it," he said.
According to many critics, that was typi-
cal of the rather casual supervision of in-
telligence operations by Congress.
-But no more. Many legislators now de-
:nand accountability, and the Executive
P.ra.nch realizes it must be provided. The
CIA itself concedes times change, and it
must be more open. "The employes of the
agency and I are *holly committed to
being responsive,". Mr. Colby recently told
a Senate committee.
Another Casualty of Vietnam
Ip part, this change reflects a broad
disenchantment with many aspects of for-
eign affairs. The origins of that may lie in
Vietnam. For years, Congress acquiesced
Iii war there and financed it regularly. But
today's legislators, determined to prevent
a rerun of that conflict anywhere, search
suspiciously for signs of new American in-
volvement in unsavory foreign climes.
This produces laws which inhibit and dis-
may Secretary of State Henry Kissinger,
who believes Congress is meddling mis-
Thievously in his affairs. And it makes the
CIA?which has often conducted clandes-
tine "dirty tricks" in foreign countries?a
prime target for congressional wrath and
suspicion.
? "It's all part of the general attack on
foreign policy," complains an agency ?
hand.
Yet this shouldn't be surprising. This is
the age of official detente, and many
Americans think it's time to scrap Cold
War leftovers. They no longer feel they're
Sighting world communism, rushing into
every perceived breach with guns and
money. This creates more dispute about
what the government does abroad (as at
home, thanks to Watergate). Because of its
supporting role in foreign policy, plus do-
mestic misdeeds, the CIA and other intelli-
gence agencies no longer get their reveren-
tial treatment of ()Id.
But the many investigations under way
.do raise troublesome questions. Issues in-
volved include those of what should be the
The CIA has attracted a
? swarm of critics, but is it-
possible to have internation-
al arms control without
good intelligence capabili-
ties?
size, mission and control system for the in-
telligence community. There also are
lesser questions of who should ? be in
charge, and what are the possible long-
term adverse effects of the investigations
on morale and efficiency.
For example, there's dispute about how
Congress should oversee intelligence activ-
ities in the future. Capitol Hill's conserva-
tives might prefer the old way of knowing
little; the new activists, however, want to
know all, But if they learn all, will they
also tell all?to the detriment of national
security?
Keeping some secrets is essential to the
intelligence trade. Thys some administra-
tion officials worry about how to reconcile
congressional desire to keep informed with
their claimed need to classify certain in-
formation. An agreement on supervisory
procedures, as well as a trust which
doesn't how exist, will be needed.
Congress is also looking at the size and
diversity of the intelligence community,
which may include bits of some GO govern-
ment agencies. It seems likely a smaller,
less overlapping structure will emerge,
probably with tighter controls within the
Executive Branch as well as more strin-
gent congressional oversight. Mr. Colby of-
ficially manages all intelligence activities
already, for example, but officials say he
doesn't really control the Pentagon's DIA,
among other agencies. New legislation
could tighten the cornmand and control
system.
Meantime, Mr. Celby has given Con-
gress an additional problem. He, says there
are "good" secrets (the names of agents,
for example) and "bad" secrete (Informa-
tion which would embarrass the govern-
ment but wouldn't damage security if re-
vealed). While he promises to be more
talkative than his predecessors, he also
wants new laws to keep ex-employes from
sa6s ttios
talking too much. He their revf 8
can injure the national interest.
"To improve this situation," he told
e
Conress, "we have proposed legislation,
and ''I invite this committee to support the
strengthening of controls over intelligence
secrets." Already, the idea?which hasn't
been detailed yet?has been denounced as
an unconstitutional effort at prior restraint
of free speech. Meantime, some agency
hands oppose it on tactical grounds; they
think Mr. Colby is compounding CIA prob-
lems unnecessarily by seeking such contro-
versial laws now.
? And that raises another issue: Should
Mr. Colby keep his job?
. He isn't universally admired within his.
own shop, and there is sniping at' him from
outside. Mr. Kissinger, it is rumored, be-
lieves the CIA boss told Congress too
much, making possible various press leaks
which got it into trouble. Others say Mr.
Colby is a bad manager of the huge intelli-
gence community. Some of his employes
think their boss should have a broader
background in analytical work, which 'is
the CIA's main activity (Mr. Colby's some-
times daring career has mostly involved
clandestine operations). Meantime, others
believe a new chief is needed to restore
credibility. They don't necessarily criticize
Mr. Colby; they merely contend that an
impressive outsider must be recruited if
Intelligence work is to regain public re-
spect.
Another fob in jeopardy is that of Rich-
ard He, Is, CIA director while much of its
dirty Work occurred and now Ambassador
to I.ran: There are indications Mr. Hclms
placed his personal concept of the national
interest above the need to tell Congress the
truth; that could get him fired.
A Mammoth Reappraisal
More basically, the whole- concept of
clandestine operations is in trouble.
Though officials claim it has done the
country much good, the public knows
mainly about operations which have gone
wrong?the Cuban invasion and assorted
Indochina operations, for instance. Mr.
Colby argues that the capability to pull
jobs in foreign countries must be retained
as a useful foreign policy tool; others say
clandestine actions no longer make sense,
if they ever did.
Even some former spies doubt the wis-
dom of keeping a clandestine division on
the payroll for emergency use. Like most
bureaucracies, it might create work to jus-
tify its existence, causing trouble overseas.
One old hand suggests that keeping such a
unit in reserve is ludicrous; it would prob-
ably never be used anyway because it
lacked appropriate skills. Therefore, Con-
gress must decide whether to retain the
capability whigh has produced the stuff of
countless spy novels, or to give it up.
There's also doubt about the future ef-
fectiveness of other intelligence branches.
Some employes wonder if they can attract
new blood once the civilian job market
nears normality. "We don't all run about
with submachine guns in our briefcases,"
laments a retired operative, but he fears
that image may keep bright recruits away.
If so, the CIA's main work could suffer.
That is the analysis function, which seeks
to make sense of random bits of informa-
tion, most gathered by open means, so pol-
icyrnakers can reach decisions with some
knowledge of what they're doing.
One concerned official is Fred C. Ikle,.
director of the U.S. Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency. He says an effective
CIA is needed to help prepare for strategic
arms control talks with the Missions, and
to monitor the results.
Approved For Rylease 2001/08/08: IA-RDP -0 4321460n 60131060_1aid recently, "that
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP7%083M011B08a0007-1
25 FEB 1975
In our zeal to. expose Improprieties of they
past, we might damage beyond repair the
ability of intelligence organizations to do
their job in the future. If that happened,
arms control would . come to a dead
end. . We cannot have arms control
Without good intelligence capabilities."
Thole are future possibilities. Already,
it's said, the intelligence dispute is having
Immediate effects on operations. Foreign
Intelligence services are supposed to be re-
luctant about passing -along information
for fear confidences won't be kept. With
CIA morale down, some employes seek
other work. Bureaucratia ways spread
within the agency, annoying some and de-
laying clandestine assignments of others
(a good 'thing, gay critics). An outsider
can't judge the validity of such complaints,
but they raise ,issues the investigators
-must consider as they probe and poke into
-the intelligence community;
? What will come of it all is uncertain.
;But more adverse publicity for the Ameri-
can spy trade seems unavoidable. , A
smaller, more centrally? controlled commu-
nity alSo seems likely. But as the many in,
.vestigators delveanto the intelligence busi-
ness, many officials hope they will keep in
mindethe difference between doing it over
and doing it in.
Mr. geaticy, a member of the Journal's
Washington bureau, covers foreign affairs.
LONDON T DIES
3 February 1975
Deportation
vinav
au Iasi
of alleged
CIA man
By STaw:otrtir MP s
TendI et. i to ask the
Foreign and Commonwealth
Secretary to deport Mr Cord
Meyer, the American diplomat
named recently as the leader of
the Central Intelligence 'Agency
in Britain. Mr Thomas Litterick,
'MP for Birthinaharn,,Selly Oak,
also wants government action on
-CIA work in Britain.
He has tabled questions-to Mr
Callaghaa and to Mr Jenkins,
the Home Secretary, for answer
this week. Mr Jenkins will be
asked if he is' satisfied with
security arrangements andabout
CIA 'activity.
The main business of the
CIA is disruption and sub-
version", Mr latterick said yes-
terday. "The- CIA has been
entertained by British govern-
ments in this country for 20
years." Britain had helped it be-
cause the CIA was an agency of
a friendly state but the CIA did
not recognize any state as
friendly, ",not even the United
States
Mr Litteriek said hiformation
about the activities of the
.agency . had ..come - to light
recently through hooks and
statements in Washington. He
Ii ad no inside source .of informa-
tion. ?
Mr Meyer was -named in an
American magazine Counterspy
last week labour specialist
on temporary assignment ? to
oversee the British situation".
The CIA's pub.lic:relations
William E. Colby, director of the
Central Intelligence Agency, has taken
on a tough public-relations job. He is
trying to reenlist public support for the
agency at --a time. when people have
been jolted, by charges that it illegally
spied on American citizens. He is also
trying to persuade Congress to be gen-
erous with its appropriation for the
agency, just after admitting- that the
names of four past or present members
of Congress had been entered in CIA
files.
In a rare public appearance at Capi-
tol Hill Thursday, Mr. Colby warned
the House defense appropriations sub-
committee that there is some .question
whether the CIA can keep doing its job.
Be acknowledged that the agency had-
been guilty of. "some small missteps,".
-but Said that "exaggerated" news re-
ports and "hysterical" reaction to them
were threatening to cripple the nation's
intelligence system. _
- Mr. Colby' probably lost some points
with the House panel in one respect: He
cited four mistakes that he said the
CIA had found in his earlier testimony,
before the Senate Appropriations Com-
mittee. In each case, the new informa-
tion on the CIA's "missteps" made
them seem slightly more serious than
the previous report had done. IL devel-
oped, for instance, that the agency had
been keeping files on four congress-
men, not one, and had tapped the
phones of 27 persons?not 21?between
1947 and 1965. One wonders if further
investigation would uncover still more
serious errors. ? ?
Mr. Colby's principal point, hoWever,
is unchanged: that the CIA should not
be penalized for its past mistakes te
the point of losing its effectiveness in
the future.
The point seems to us valid. It needs
to be weighed, however, against the
NEW YORK TIMES
16 February 1975
COUNTERSPY EFFORT
BY C.I.A. IS REPORTED
? --- ?
WASHINGTON, Feb. 15 (UPI)
?The Central Intelligence
Agency infiltrated the Atner-
ican antiwar movement in an
effort to get its own men, mas-
querading as radicals, recruited
by Soviet intelligence, a former
deputy C.I.A. director said to-
day.
Describing the double-agent
gambit as "an error .in judg-
ment," Ray S. Cline said the-
agency hgd edone it because
President Johnson and Nixon
were "absolutely obsessed"
with the belfef that the Rus-
sians were manipulating the
Vietnam protests.
never able to establish a "Rus-
sian connection" within the
equally valid worries of those who do
not want the. CIA's intelligence-gather-
ing skills, turned against American citi-
zens, tho our own government had
secretly declared war against dissent-
ers. ? ?
Trying to balance Theseopposing scon-
cerns,. we come up 'with the following
conclusions: ?
. The CIA has a job to do that is im-
portant to all of us?namely, finding
out what ? foreign governments .and
movements are up to so that our own
planners may take their intentions into
account. To do this it has' developed
specialized skills which. are by nature
1. :extralegal, .apd are consequently very
. ?haid- to, control by -law.. The problem,
put bluntly but. realistically, is to- set
rules- for the CIA whicji will enable it
to Skirt the laws of other governments
while adhering faithfully to the laws of
otir own. ? ? -
We know of no way to-do this except
the way that has-in fact been used: to
expose, fully and mercilessly, CIA
transgressions against the rights of
American citizens. If this has, caused
problems for the- CIA, the solution, is
plain enough. It is to stop doing the
things that cause it embarrassment
and, concentrate exclusively on the job
it's supposed to do. ?
We' have no 'interest whatever in
making it less risky to commit crimi-
' pal acts or to tamper with. the rights of-
American citizens. Foreign' intelligence
agencies and secret police are often as
?willing to trespass on the rights and
privacy of their own citizens as they
are on those of foreigners, and the citi-
zens of many foreign countries take
this imposition as a matter of course.
The American people will not accept it,
and should not. Mr. Colby must under-
stand this if he and the CIA are to suc-
ceed in their public relations effort.
American dissident movement.
It is now under investigation
itself, to determine whether it
broke the law- by spying on
Americans.
Mr. Cline, a C.I.A. ,employe
for 27 years and a deputy di-
rector from 1962 to 1966, dis-
closed details of the infiltration-
operations in an interview that
enlarged on information al-
ready made public by William
E. Crdily, ftp Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence.
Mr. Cline said the counterspy
operation?in which one intel-
ligence agency puts out an
agent as "bait" to be recruited
by a rival agency, and to work
within it as a double agent?
appeared at the time to be "a
classical counterespionage oper-
ation." Now, he said, he con-
siders it "an error in judgment."
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'VS1
( Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1
WASHINGTON POST
23 February 1975
? 'INSIDE THE COMPANY: CTA Diary.
By Philip 4gee. Penguin Books, Lon-
don. 640 pp. 95 pence
By PATRICK BRESLIN
WHEN VICTOR MARCHETTI wrote The
CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency censored 339
passages and a judge upheld 168 of the
deletions. The book was published last
year with intriguing blanks where mate:
rial deemed too sensitive had been.
There are no blanks in Philip Agee's
e1nrnce
With this review of Philip Agee's CIA diary, Inside the Company, Book World is departing
from its usual practice of reviewing only books available in the United States. We are doing
so because of the unusual interest the book generated when it appeared in London Janu-
ary 2, and because of its relevance to the current investigation of the aims and methods of
the Central Intelligence Agency. Because of copyright restrictions, the book cannot be
bought at stores in this country, although it will be available in an American edition later
this year. It is now available in England and Canada in Penguin editions selling for 95
pence and $2.95, respectively. For more on this subject, see Joyce Illig's Book Business col-
umn on page two.
in the late 1950s, vaguely dissatisfied, un- which communism thrives."
side the Company: CIA. Diary. This enthusiastic about going into a business
densely detailed expose names every CIA career, facing two dreary, wasted years in
officer, every agent, every operation that the army. Bid at Notre Dame, he had
Agee encountered during 12 years with learned patriotism, and that the enemy
"The Company" in Ecuador, Uruguay, was communism. One of his proudest mo-
Mexico and Washington. ments came as chairman of the exercises
Among CIA agents or collaborators; in which the school's patriotism award
Agee lists the current President of Mex- went to then Strategic Air Command
ico and his two predecesSors, a former chief General Curtis Lemay: Agee re-
president of Uruguay, a former vice pres? called with respect rather than irony Le-
ident of Ecuador; U.S. and Latin Amen- may's Strangelovian cadences: "If we
can labor leaders, ranking Communist maintain our faith in God, our love .of
Party members, and scores of other politi- freedom, and superior global air
'clans, high military and police officials,. power..."
and journalists. There is grist for a hun- The U. S. was the bastion of democracy,
tired Latin American 'Aratergates in these with the energy, the wisdom, and the re-
pages. sponsibility to make other nations in its
Agee tells of CIA interventions in elec- image. But time had to be bought. The
tions in Guyana, Brazil, and Chile. -In the communist menaCe had to be held back
Dominican Republic, he says, the assassi- long enough to give democracy a chance
nation of Trujillo was carried out by CIA in the poor nations around the globe.
agents using weapons sent through the Bored with the prospects facing him at
diplomatic pouch. He relates almost hi- home, seeking something meaningful,
larious instances of incompetence. In hoping to avoid the draft, Agee joined
Buenos Aires, the officer in charge of op- the CIA in 1957. Four years later he might
erations against the Soviet Embassy have joined the Peace Corps. The motive-
couldn't find it while driving his Wash- ton would have been the same.
ington superiors around the city. To faci-
litate breaking into automobiles, one ea-
After a stint as an Air Force officer (for
ger beaver in Ecuador cluttered the CIA
cover) and CIA training, Agee arrived in
office with 200 poods of car keys. One Ii-
Quito, Ecuador in late 1960. During the
nally understands why the Watergate
glory years of the Alliance for Progress..
bunglers were caught. and the New Frontier, he fought the holy
In his book, Marchetti sought to reform war against communism by bribing politi-
cians and journalists, forging documents,
the CIA, to argue that it had strayed from
its purpose, to criticize bitingly but con-
tapping telephones, and reading other
structively. Agee's aim is different; he people's 'mail. He learned that a bought
,
.wants the entire operation dismantled. and paid for senator in Ecuador was
The CIA managed to delay the Mar- worth $700 a month, raised to $1,000 when
chetti book, and then to censor it. Agee he became vice president.
side-stepped the CIA by publishing in CIA goals in Ecuador during those
England through ? Penguin Books. His. years were to disrupt the Left and to con-
book is available since last month in most tribute to the isolation of Cuba by forcing
of the English-speaking world except the Ecuador to break relations. In pursuit of
U. S. On its paperback cover is a picture these goals, every political group was
of the bugeed typewriter Agee thinks the Penetrated and corrupted, riots and dem-
CIA planted on him while he was writing. onstrations in which people were injured
A hardcover edition is expected to be were encouraged and supported. Two ci-
published here within the next few.. vilian governments fell but relations
months. with Cuba were finally broken. Agee left
Inside the Company, more than an ex.- in 1963 confident that the ?necessary so-
pose, is a unique chronicle of the 1960s, cial and democratic reforms could now
that decade of disillusion. Like so many 'take place: "CIA operations promote sta-
young men, Agee emerged from college bility through assisting local govern-.
ments to build up their security forces ...?
and by putting down the extreme left...
Through those programmes we buy time
for friendly governments to effect tho re-
PATRICK BRESLIN was in the Peace
Corps in Colombia and has worked and
studied in other Latin American couri-.
tries, including Chjle for most of 19'72- forms that will eliminate the injustices on
But what if the friendly governments
are not really interested in reforms?
.What if improving the security forces ac-
tually lessens the chance of reforms?
Agee's next station was Montevideo, Uru-
guay'. He was there for three years, and
would learn that "these Uruguayan poli-
ticians are interested in other things than
land reform," that Uruguay was the
"model of corruption and incapacity."
.. Nevertheless, CIA doctrine said
strengthen the security forces first. Agee
would complain that the main problem
vial local military
intelligence was "the Uruguayan militalia
tradition of keeping aloof from politics.?
There was a silver lining, though?the
Deputy Chief of Intelligence, "a rabid
anti-communist whose ideas border on
fascist-style repression,"Yould some day,
Agee hoped, be chief of intelligence.
Meanwhile, another. CIA officer kept
close to a "very wealthy fascist-oriented
'lawyer and rancher ne : active in trying
to persuade military leaders to intervene
inpolitical affairs." ' '
What the CIA did in Uruguay;' accord-
ing to Agee; was prop up'a corrupt, decay-
ing government by making it capable;of
crushing a widespread and- growing
movement for radical reform. In the pur-
suit of "democracy" the CIA pushed the
military into politics. Uruguay today is
run by the military through a civilian fig-
urehead president,- Congress is closed.
there is no free press, and there are no re-
forms. e.
It was in Uruguay that Agee startee
wondering about what he was doing. On;
morning he sat in the office of the chief c-'
police. From the floor above came .
screams- To-f someone being tortured
the screams increased in intensity, te
chief turned up the volume of the seer.
game on the radio. Agee learned Ire -
that the torture victim was a commenn: ?
whose name he had turned over to the re;
lice a few days earlier. "Hearing thn
voice ... made me feel terrified and hz.qi:
less. All I wanted to do was to get aw:,.
from the voice and away from the police.
headquarters. Why didn't (we) say ane-
thing? ... We just sat there embarrassed
and shocked. I'm going to be hearing that
voice for a long time."
But it was a faraway event which seems
tO Th ave disturbed him more. Lyndon
Johnson's invasion of the Dominican Re-
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jattlalic in 1985 was an overreaction Agee
Couldn't accept '"It can't be that I'm
against intervention as such," he mused,
"because everything I do is in one way or
another intervention in the affairs of
other.countries. Partly, I suppose; it'.s the
immense scale' of this invasion- that
'shocks." Agee and his fell OW CPA officers ?
thought Johnson's explanatiOn for the in-
vasion?that 58 trained communists were
ahonfto take over in Santo Domingo?so
absiud . they adopted it: "Fifty.-eight
trained communists' is` our new Station
Password and the answer is 'Ten thou-
sand marines'" .
The'invasion led Agee to question all
CIA efforts in Latin America. Counterin-
surgency seemed to hive stemmed the
Communist threat. But where were the.
reforms? "The morel think about the Do-
ininican invasion the more I wonder
whether the politicians in Washington
reallY want to see reforms in Latin Amer-
ice.' Agee began to think about leaving
the-Company. ' '
1966 he was transferred to desk
duties in Washington. The. paper, work
was dull and he jumped ata chance-to-go
to Mexico the next year under the cover of
an embassy attache working on the 1968'
Olympic Games: Rather than controlling
agents and running operations, his job in
Mexico was to meet people and make con-
tacts. It provided him with a way of estab-
lishing distance from The Company. By.
the time the Olympics were over, Agee
had ended his CIA career. He resigned
with the conviction that he had become "a
"servant of the capitalism I rejected" as a
university student. "I became one of its
secret policemen. The CIA, after all, is
nothing more 'than the secret police of
American capitalism, plugging ui:v leaks
in the political dam night and day so that
shareholders of U.S. companies operat=
jag in poor countries can continue enjoy-
ing the rip-off." _ , .
In the next couple of years, Agee de-
cided to write this reconstructed diary to
tell everything he knew. Not only would
he expose the CIA; he would work against
it: "I have also decided to seek ways of
getting useful information on the CIA to
revolutionary organizations that could',
use it to defend themselves better."
He spent the last three years writing
the book in. Europe, , making research
The Trashhaglon Merry.erso. und
.==a?R, meow
romams
CIA Weiq t Aetio
trips.ito Cuba, and dodging the CIA.J.At
one point he lived on money advancedz,by-_
a woman he believes was a CIA agent try-
ing to gain his confidence. His training in,
deceit served, him well. .during thos,e
years. , -,, f ?,`
The appearanoe of Agee's, book now,.as
several committees in Washington are he-.;
ginning to investigate the CIA, poses an.
interesting challenge. Until recently, our
elected representatives have generally
managed to stay in the dark about what
the CIA does. Until recently, former CIA
Director Richard Helms's plea that"Tote-
ve just got to trust us. We are honorable
men" was enough. With the revelations or
domestic spying, it no longer is, and;
everyone concerned is loudly and right-.
eously opposed to CIA activities at home,:
Agee has provided the most complete
'description yet of What the CIA does
abroad. In entry after numbing entry, I?T..
S. foreign policy in Latin America is pic-
-tured as a web of deceit, hypocrisy, and
corruption. Now that we can no longer-
plead ignorance of the webs our Spiders
'spin, will we continue to tolerate CIA wc-
tivities abroad? _ - -
?
THE. WASHINGTON POST
- Thursday, Feb. 27,1975
? ?
' Jack Anderson
? and Les Whitten
Top CIA officials.are debating
whether to bring legal action.
against Philip Agee, whose
,book about his life in the CIA
has caused havoc.
Agee listed everyone who had
worked with. him in the CIA in
Latin .America. He also added
names provided, he said, by "a
small group .of Mexican com-
rades who I trained to follow the
comings and goings-of CIA peo-
ple before I left Mexico City."
It has cost the CIA "several
million dollars," according to
inside sources, to transfer the
agents who had been fingered
and to protect its operations in
Latin America. ?
The CIA, however, couldn't
protect all the local people
whom Agee, listed as CIA "col-
laboretors." Among them were
many who had only routine
dealings with the CIA in such le-
. gall/late activities as drug con-
trol, anti-hijacking techniques
and anti-terrorist operations.
A number of them have been
bar:6sec' with threatening
phone calls. 'One reported that
his daughter's. life had. been
I threatened and the wall in front
of his home had been defaced.
In Uruguay, a taxi driver
, whose name appeared.in.Agee's
book stopped at a traffic light.
Another car Pulled alongside
him, and an assailant emptied a
pistol at the taxi. The driver mi-
raculously escaped injury. ?
In Ecuador, an engineer on
Agee's list appeared at the U.S.
embassy to plead for protection.
CIA officials doubt that they
can bring legal charges against
Agee as long as he stays out of
the country, our sources say.
Agee told us by transatlantic
telephone that he hopes to re-
turn home but that he will wait
until he gets the green light
from his legal adviser.
He is represented by Melvin
Wulf, en American Civil Liber-
ties Union attorney, who said he
will withhold his advice until he
talks to the Justice Department
and learns its intentions.
"The only action they could
'bring against 'Agee," Wulf told
us, "would be an espionage
charge, and that would be' a
fruitless prosecution."
Indeed, this may be precisely
what the CIA has in mind. Our
own CIA sources say Agee has
been kept under surveillance
and that he has been spotted in
the company of Cuban intelli-
gence agents in Paris and Lon-
don:
Agee doesn't deny .this. "I
have seen them in 'Paris and
London," he, acknowledged to
us. "I go straight to the Cuban
embassy. Whether they were Cp.-
ban intelligence officers or not,
I don't really care."
-
nst Agee
'He added meaningfully; "I
support -the Cuban
revolution." He emphasized,
that he had never been de-
briefed by either the Soviet
KGB 'or Cuban intelligence. But
on his own initiative, he told us,
he had gone to insurgent lead-
ers and had informed them of
his CIA activities against them.
"I am for the liberation move-
ments," he said. _ ?
One source showed us docu-
mentation, which suggests but
doesn't prove that Agee is under
Cuban discipline. A press re-
lease, which Agee issued in
London on Oct. 3, 1974, appears
to have been written by the Cu-
bans. Our source showed us lan-
guage peculiarities, which indi-
cate it was translated from col-
loquial Cuban Spanish.
This is denied by Agee. "I
wrote that," he declared, "right
on my own typewriter in Corn-
wall (England)." But he ac-
knowledged that it had been du-
plicated for the press in the of-
fices of a left-wing Latin Ameri-
can publication in London.
Our CIA sources also believe
that Agee pulled his punches on
Mexico's President Luis alley-
erria after ? receiving instruc-
tions from Havana.
On Oct. 3. Agee denounced the
Megi Call press for omitting his
account' of a "close relation-
ship" that he, claimed existed
between a CIA official and .
Echeverria.
"Mexican comrades have torn.
me," said Agee, "that the refer-I
ence to Echeverria's relation--
ship with (the CIA man) was:
probably omitted by official-
censorship order, in itself not:
uncommon there, in order to'
save embarrassment to the in-
cumbent." Agee carefully'
added that Echeverria "may
have broken with the CIA when
he became president." .
A subsequent Agee interview,
linking Echeverria with the
CIA, was published in the De-
cember issue of the Colombian:
magazine "Alternativa."
Fidel Castro, eager to con-
tinue his good relations with
Echeverria, sent a member a'
the Cuban politburo,'? Carlos
Rafel Rodriguez, on a secret,:
one-day visit to Mexico City on:
Dec. 18 to placate the Mexican'
president, according to our CIA*
sources. ?
Not long afterward, Agee got.
together with the interviewer,
Gabriel Garcia Marquez. a left-.
wing. Nobel Prize writer. in ?
Spain, say our sources. Both .
men issued syternents exoner-
ating Echeverria.
Agee denied to us that he re-.
ceived aby instructions from.
Havana to soften his attack on
the Mexican president..
?1073, United Feature Syndicate
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_
WASHINGTON POST
_93 1 75
Book
. .Business
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDF'77-00432R00010036000/-1
By JOYCE ILLIG'
Shaft for Strciight Arrow
CONFLICT over the United States publi-
cation rights to Inside the Company: CIA
Diary, the former CIA agent's book re-
viewed in this issue of Book World, may
deflect Straight Arrow's plans to publish
the book here in May. An oral agreement
was made last October between Straight
Arrow and Penguin, the book's London
publisher, but no contract was signed.
Now, the ? oral agreement is being by-
passed and new arrangements made for
ArneriCan publication of the book.
The first signs of trouble appeared
about two weeks ago when Philip Agee,
the author, visited Canada to promote the
publication of his book there. Diane
Cleaver, managing editor of Straight Ar-
row, went to Canada to discuss final de-
tails of the contract with him; then, dur-
ing the discussion,- Penguin released
North American rights to the author and
Agee decided that he should get an agent.
"I said that would be fine," said
Cleaver, "and I gave him some names.
They didn't include Scott Meredith, The ,
next thing I knew, Meredith was handling
the book and offering it to other publish.
ers." *, ? : .
The outstanding problem in the Octo-
her agreement was-over the mass paper
hack rights, which Straight Arrow
claimed and Penguin denied had been in.
eluded in the deal. "That's when the prob-
lem. started," according to Cleaver. "We
,would never have made an agreement at
that time, when we were the only pub-
usher willing to publish it, that did not
elude mass market paperback rights.".
'Straight Arrow was not interested in mak-
ing an offer to Meredith for hardcover
rights alone. -
Cleaver said they had an agreement to
pay Agee a $12,000 advance, offered a60-
40 split on the paperback and had a set
advertising and promotion budget..
(Originally, Penguin aecepted an advance
offer of $8000, according to Cleaver. Then
when negotiations started, Straight Ar-
row decided to "make a concession" and
go to $12,000).
"There has never been 'any question
that we would publish until the agent
came on the scene," said Cleaver, "and
then I thought what would happen would
be that the agent would negotiate with us
for some satisfying thing for Agee so that
he wouldn't feel that he wasn't getting the
right exposure." .
Meanwhile, the Scott Meredith Literary
Agency, which had been offering the
hardcover and paperback rights sepa-
rately to such New York publishers as
Doubleday, Praeger,, New American Li-
brary lnd Bantam,. was expected to close
a deal for simultaneous hard and _ .?_
soft-
cover ytwiC
aatavst the cud LUC week.
The book is listed in the Straight Arrow
catalogue, and salesmen for Simon &
Schuster, Straight Arrow's distributors,
have been selling it and orders are com-
ing in. "We're all scheduled to go and
'could have the book out in eight weeks,"
said Cleaver. "We're taking a firm stand
that we have a right to publish consider-
ing a-commitment since last October:,
[Penguin Books Canada Ltd. reports a
large number of requests for the book
from congressional staff members fr
'Washington, and an order of 3000 copie'
from the Harvard Coop which could is
be filled. The Canadian distributor is ex
pecting a shipment of 15,000 copies Iron
'England this week and has ordered 10,00C
copies of the third printing, which will hr
available in March. The first Penguir
printing of 25,000 copies Was quickly sal
out in England and in Canada, where 11,-
500 copies have been sold since the end a
January with back orders for 7500 more.]
Lack of Forsyth .--
WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY Jr. is in the SWiSf
Alps writing what he calls "my first nove
and almost certainly my last." Buckle:
goes to Rougemont, a small village nem
Gstaad, to ski and write his books. So far
be has finished about 140 Pages about E
:CIA agent who was recruited in his senioi
,year at Yale. Ne began to plan "a Freder-
ick Forsyth type thriller": a few months
ago in New. York in discussions with Sam
Vaughan, president of Doubleday.:
After serving in the army, Buckle.yis
protagonist is given a very mysterious
mission in London, "details of which are
unspecifiable at this point," according to
the author. Buckley had intended to fin-
ish his novel with the Bay of Pigs but said
"I'm having a little trouble trying to fig-
ure how to stretch it out that long beraus
I'm only in 1952. So I.might have to get
?sort of foreshortened grip on the resolu
tion."
Buckley's own background in intelli
gence should provide solid material fo
his fiction. According to Gary Wills,a for
rner associate, he is an ex-CIA agent a
his association with E. 'Howard Hint i
well known. -
JOYCE RUG writes regularly on th
publishing scene for Book World. -
25 PPR 1975 Us2r1 but Necessary Mechanism
BALTIMORE SUN
b
William L. Colby's opinion that CIA transgres-
-Sions "in no way justify the public outcry which has -
been raised" can and should be dismissed as just
that?his opinion. It is an opinion tinted by a career
:of loyalty to the agency; the Rockefeller Commis-
sion and the House and Senate select committees
will come. to their own opinions on precisely the
same subject after their investigations.
-- Mr 'Colby's plea for a responsible and systematic
?approach to the three parallel investigations cannot
and should not be similarly dismissed. The lingering
pain from the Watergate trauma should not lead the
nation to conch* that government agencies oper-
ate at all times as the White House did under Ri-
chard' Nixon. Nothing has appeared yet to suggest
that the investigators will find in Mr. Colby either
the cavalier disregard for truth or the arrogant con-
tempt for Congress and public that characterized
;the Nixonian guard. On his record thus far, Mr. Col-
:by. whatever his opinions, has been relatively forth-
'coming when questioned by congressmen. At times,
he has even told them more than they thought they
were asking.. His performance has been in sharp
contrast with that of. his predecessor, Richard
Helms, whose distorted priorities have forced him
into a series of embarrassigiow
23 N
u n AlleERAIKEV . rt-rd
realize that only through co-operation with Congress
and the Rockefeller. Commission can he re-establish
public confidence in his agency. ? ?
While these investigations go on, he will have the
job of running and maintaining an agency that is, by ?
the nature of its assignment, a delicate and difficult
mechanism. It is also, to many Americans, an. ugly
mechanism, a reminder that persons and nations are
less civil and less civilized than they like to think
they are. Free societies need to take a skeptical look
at such agencies from time to time, and the look
now- getting under way in America is surely long
overdue. The investigators must not flinch from
their job of determining the extent to which the
rights of citizens may have fallen victim to opera-
tions of the CIA and other intelligence agencies. But
what is most important now about these investiga-
tions is that they are in fact getting under way under
a .mandate to dig deeply into the serious questions
that have been raised. While they proceed, it is
worth remembering that much of the CIA's work,
distasteful as it may be, happens to reflect realities
that show no sign of disappearing soon from interna-
tional life. The persons charged with that work de-
serve a sympathetic hearing when they ask that
i d ofesdio ally and dispas-
drgIA-FiMelMh6618* 067-1
?
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WASHINGTON POST
24 February 1915
Alsop
The KGB's 'Safe House'
Thus far only one fact Of real im-
portance has emerged from the rump,
.us about .domestic surveillance by the
--CIA and FBI. This country, in fact,
turns ont to be shockingly vulnerable
to the Soviet Union's ruthless, omni-
present KGB *because of a shockingly
incompetent and ill-advised counter-
' intelligence system.
, As. an illustration, consider the truly
bizarre ukese issued by the .late
Edgar Hoover toward the end of the
1960s. By order, the director of the
PBI provided .a gigantic; gloriously
-convenient "safe house" for the KGB's'
? all too numerous agents and any other
'spies happening to be in Washington...
'A "safe house," of course, is the
Intelligence community's lable for a
place where foreign agents can meet.
their local contacts in perfect security
to make payoffs or to transmit orders
Or to pick up information. Just to add
an extra touch a fantasy, the Hoover-
provided safe house was no less than
the second center of -the U.S. govern-
ment, the huge U.S. Capitol with all
its grounds and dependencies. .
Under the terms of the Hoover
ukase, the Capitol complex was put
strictly off-limits for all the FBI's
? countointelligence men.. Yet the 'FBI-
has a legal monopoly on all Counter-
intelligence Within the territorial
limits of the United States. Hence
Hoover's ukase meant that known SO- ?
viet- spies, who were known to be
about to make an American contact
known to be dangerous, could still
be sure of doing so with perfect im-
punity?provided they just named a
rendezvous in the -off-limits part of
Capitol Hill.
'All this seemed, downright incredi-
ble to me when it was first reported
by Ron Kessler of The Washington
Post. My own check has fully ? sus-
tained KesSier's story, however. There
is only one significant point that re-
mains in some doubt. It is no ? more
than 95 per cent certain that the Hoo-
ver ukase !remains in full force and
that Capitol, therefore, continues
to be a KGB safe house. That 95 per
cent certainty is too close for com-
fort, one must add.
Furthermore, I think .I know why
,Hoover issued his ukase. For back-
ground, you must first understand
that the KGB maintains an enormous.
number ofispies in this country. As a
measure, remember that we are prior-
ity No. 1, Whereas Great Britain is no
more than priority No. 4. Yet when the
KGB greve over-bold in Britain, the
Foreign Office had' to expell 105 well- r_
authenticated KGB men. _
Second. von muSt understand that
with such -ample human resources, ,
the KGB. tuls long given a lot of its
men part-tithe or full-time assignments
on Capitol By the rit1-1960s,
there were somewhere between 20 and?
30 KGB men dealing with the U.S.
Congress or with the countless staff
people the, Congress and its commit-
tees -emploY.,
This does, not mean that KGB
were constantly seeing senators and
representatives. On the contary, they
were known to concentrate rather
heavily Ott the lawmakers' personal
staffs and also, on the committee
. Joseph Alsop, who until the first
of the -year wrote a syndicated col-
- unin that appeared on. the opposite
page. three times a week; is 71-0W writ-
ing a syndicated monthly- column.
This is the second of Mr. Alsop's
.new columns.
staffs.
But this is almost a distinction with-
out a .difference. Nowadays, in truth,
domineering and able staff members .
largely control the thoughts and acts
of all too many lawmakers, especially
in the Senate. Great numbers of .lett
of center staff members on the Sere ?
ate side of the Capitol also constitute
a quasi-independent power bloc. They
all Work together, all Protect one ane
other and often join to extend their.
blOe's power by planting friends and
allies in new senatorial offices.
I myself believe that this unknown,
unseen power bloc ls an unhealthy
new political growth. Yet I must hast-
en to add that it was not and is -not
necessarily improper for these people
s-sor indeed for anyone else on Capitol
Hill?to' see the -KGB men who have
swarmed there for se -long. The KGB
men, of course, were all masquerad-
ing, and still are masquerading, is
.rnass ?correspondents, embassy secre-
taries, trade expert and, so on:
ParticUlarlY on the left of the poli-
tical spectrum, however, the FBI
watch that J. Ed-gar Hoover staffed
with his ukase showed an astonishing
number of KGB contacts on Capitol
Hill. It would have looked remarkably
bad if anyone had made a public issue
of them. Furthermore, President John-
son was tempted to do just that toward
the end of his second term; and Presi-
dent Nixon actively wished to do just
that in 1969.
It Was about' then that the Hoover
ukase was issued. I feel sure, there-
fore, the aim was to suspend the FBI's
former careful watch on the Capitol
14-
rjj erder 'to be protected from Con-
gress' if the White House went too
far in its revelations.
So there you have it?a horrifying
story which is pretty likely to be go-
ing on this minute. The story is hor-
rifying, of course, because foreign esp-
ionage is a damnably Serious busi-
ness, even in a free society like ours.
It is so serious, in turn, because it is
dangerous to have a government, a
press, an academic world and the ranks
of science all bristling with people like
Kim Philbey; Guy Burgess and Don-
ald MacLean. I hope and think this is
not our situation; but this is certainly
the situation the KGB has been going
all out to produce ever since the Unit-
ed States, became the unique giant
power in our- half of the world.
If you reflect upon this story, you
And that its main lesson is the singu-
larly unprofessional character of the
FBI approach to counterintelligence?
at 'any rate under the leadership of the'
aging J. Edgar Hoover. Nor is this at
all surprising. To have truly profes-
eional counterintelligence you have
to know the story from the' beginning,
which is in Moscow in the case of the
KGB.
The CIA, of course, is supposed to
know all about- Moscow. But another
appalling revelation of the current
CIA-FBI rumpus is the bloody bitter,-
mess of the FBI-CIA feud. The two
agencies never worked together until
new liaison arrangements were made
by new leaders a year ago. This Idnd
of crippling non-cooperation can too
Tee"-, tt,so.
Again. the rumpus nas glaringly re-
vealed the ? recurring dominance of do-
mestic, politics in the FBI counter-
intelligence work, at any rate in the
Hoover era. It was politics that caused
the former FBI director to create the
KGB safe house. It was politics, too; ?
that caused him to ignore President
Johnson's order to have a look at the-
peace movement's foreign links, there-
by spurring Johnson to call in the CIA.
In short, the foolish may credit the
argument that the CIA-FBI rumpus
has uncovered a grave threat to our
civil liberties. But more sensible peo-
pie will instead perceive an open invi-
tation to the KGB.
THE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER
11 February 1975
Helms may
have to
leave Iran
From HELLAi PICK
Washington, February 10
The Administration may soon
have little alternative but to
put Richard Helms on pro-
longed leave of absence as US
Ambessador to Iran : or'it maY
even have SO find a replacement,
for him.
The Adininistration is deter-
mined be avoid any ackhowledg-
'tient that 1,1r Helms may have,
acted improperly in his pre-
vious post as director of. the
CIA. But it May be able to
hide its embarrassment behind
the fact that Mr Helms mill
he in such frequent demand for
the various investigations into.
the CIA's conduct that he
-cannot devote .himself as fully
as he should to his ambas-
sadorship. ?
Mr Helms is in growing trou-
ble. And his 'troubles may
engulf other members of the
Nixon Administration, includ-
ing Dr Kissinger., Lawyers are
today weiehing up the,questicn
of whether Mr Helms commit-
ted perjury in his testimony to
-the Foreign Relations Commit-,
tee two years ago, when he din-
correctly said "No" in replY to
a question whether the CIA was.
?involved in at to
overthrow the Allende Govern-
ment in Chile.
The Committee has now pub-
liSheet testimonyebV Helms in
trhieli he admitted CIA i.neol-
'venient, and also volunteered
the information that " there :
was. no doubt" that .the Nixon
Administeation wanted the
Allende regime oyerthrown.
This may spell more frouble
for Dr Kissinger, who heads the
so-called Forty Corimuttee,
which is supposed to superviso.
and direct the CIA's subversive
activities overseas.
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'NEW YORK REVIEW
20 FEB 1975
A New Soluti n f r the CIAi
Stalin did establish one useful prece-
dent. He made it a practice ?to
bump off whoever served as head of
his secret police. He never let
anybody stay in the job too long.
As a successful dictator, Stalin
seems to have felt that anybody
who had collected so many secrets
would be a No. 1 menace to
security, if he ever went sour, Stalin
thought it safer not to wait.
I think we ought to take Stalin's
example one step further. I think
we ought to get rid of the CIA
altogether, lock, stock, and burglar's
kit.
We know from recent revelations
how J. Edgar Hoover in his lifetime
tenure as FBI chief collected dos-
siers on the sexual and drinking
habits of congressmen and high
officials. The mere rumor that such
secrets were in his files made
Hoover the most feared man in the
capital, the untouchable of US poli-
tics. A similar character could build
up a similar empire of fear in and
through the CIA.
Those who think it enough to
establish new oversight committees
should remember that there have
been CIA committees in Congress
since the agency's formation and
they have, invariably overlooked the
abuses they were supposed to over-
see. As for forbidding the agency to
engage in "dirty tricks," how en-
force such a restriction against an
agency so secretive, so far-flung, and
so habituated to doing-iri political
leaders of whom it disapproves? It
is hard enough to keep a tight rein
on public 'agencies right here in
Washington.' How to control, some-
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, March 3, 1975
In spite of ,the Central Intelligence
Agency's top-level co-operation with
investigations into its operations, one
official offered this comment: "Before
Congress rears away the secrecy of the
intelligence community, it had better
decide first Why the secrecy was estab-
lished in the beginning. The chief of
the KGB in ;Moscow must be rolling
on the floor of the Kremlin with
laughter."
tone r;.Li. )....444,,44.41.14144?4446tomiimpiia4:4
times 10,000 miles away, the kind.
of adventurers, screwball; and in-
triguers an agency like the CIA'
. I
naturally attracts?
The US government is inundated
daily by tidal waves of intelligence.
We have a mysterious electronic !
NSA which taps and tapes all the
communications systems of the
world; its huge "ears" in Pakistan.:
and Turkey. record the slightest
Kremlin sneeze. Even in remotest
Siberia, no babushka can milk her
cow without being caught on candid
camera from US Satellites on eternal '
patrol.
. In the Pentagon are separate intel-
ligence branches of the army, air
force, and navy,.each with its own
military attaches abroad, and over
all of them is a defense intelligence
agency, a DIA. The State Depart-
ment has its -own intelligence and
research. division; fife Foreign Serv-
ice is its eyes and ears abroad, The
departments. of Commerce, Labor,
and Agriculture have attaches of
their own in. many US embassies.
Businessmen and Washington torre-
spondents who use their publicly
available studies on countries and
commodities know how much more
reliable they are than the spooks.
The Treasury has its narcotics and
other agents. Internal Revenue, Cus-
toms, and the Post Office have their
oi.vn gumshoe men. There is the FBI
and there is the Secret Service.
Nobody seems to know how m?uch
all this costs or how many are
employed. Congress does know that
CIA expenditures hidden in certain
.crevices of the budget add up to.
several billions of dollars. The exact
amount iS unknown.
.__Vriginally we were told when the'i
CIA was established by Truman in
1947 that it was necessary?as its
name implied?to "centralize" all!
these intelligence activities and sum-.
marize for the White House the'
information flowing in from them.
We were not told, and perhaps
Truman never intended, that the
CIA would soon be engaged in
James Bond melodrama around the
world, making and unmaking gov-
ernments not ? to our Jiking, and irt
the process sentencing other
is
tions'
tiOns' leaders like Mossaddeq of Irani
and Allende of Chile to death..
Watergate has already shown us that
to practice such crime-as-politics'
abroad is to invite its application
sooner. or later to politics at home.
As an intelligence service the CIA
has been a bust. The Bay of Pigs
and the Vietnam war are only the
Most dramatic demonstrations that
public officials would have been
better informed?and adopted wiser
policies?ff they had simply read the
newspapers and put all that "classi-.
fied" information in the waste-
basket. The CIA has made "the US
look like the world's. biggest Mafia'
while helping to trap it into one
serious mistake after another. Never
have so many billions been squan-
dered on ? so much misinformation.1
In its twenty-seven years of exist-
ence?even at' $2 billion a year?this'
giddy operation must have cost
upward of $50 billion. Why not get.
rid of it before it can . do more
damage?
liven when, occasionally, the CIA
analyses were accurate they have
gone into the bureaucratic Waste-;
baskets because they conflicted with
?what officials higher up wanted to
hear. . One example is the sour
fePterts about the Vietnam war
which turned up in the Pentagon
Papers. Another example- (see the
exclusive in The Christian Science,
Monitor, January 23, 1975) was
the studies showing there was "no
evidence to suggest" that the anti-
Vietnam war movement was insti-
gated from abroad. The Nixon
White House nonetheless ordered
the agency to go,,abead and compile
a list of 10,0004g::.iess-,-peaceniks
suspected of being foreign agents.
A. government, like an individual,
hates to heat 'what it doesn't want
to believe.' This is why no intelli-
gence agency in any society ever
really understands?or can afford to
let itself understand?what is going
on. The bigger the intelligence agen-
cy, the more powerfully its sheer
inertial weight reinforces the mis-
conceptions of the ruling class it
serves. Hence the paradox: the'
more "intelligence" a government
buys the less intelligently it oper-
ates. The ?CIA will go down in the
books as a vain attempt to change
history by instittillonalizing assassi-
nation. It deserves a dose of its own
favorite medicine. 0
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Behind the CIA purge
An American Correspondent writes:- ? ? ? - - -
With the left wing American mess launching a massive
attack against the CIA for "domes!ie spying", which has
resulted in the recent resignations of four leading officials, a
deliberate smokescreen or deception operation has been set
into motion to deceive the public as to the true situation inside
the upper hierarchy of the Central Intelligence Agency. The .
belated news media attack has been carefully managed by the
liberal element to exploit the Watergate fiasco and tighten
the grip of Director of Central Intelligence, William Egan
Colby, over various CIA officials who do not agree with him
and the official Kissinger policy of d?nte with the Soviet Union.
In a managed stage-play sequence, similar to a Charlie
McCarthy-Edgar Bergen act, the New York Times belatedly
gave the cue for a general attack when left wing reporter
Seymour Hersh "broke" the story of illegal CIA. activities.
According to plan, the resulting press furore "prompted"
-President Ford to request a report on the situation from CIA
director, Colby, which did indeed corroborate the fact that
the CIA engaged in domestic surveillance activities in violation
of its charter?something known for years by most Americans
and previously reported by Intelligence Digest (November
1972, "Crises in Western Intelligence Agencies"). Using this
Pavlovian reaction, Colby then ordered the resignations of
four top officials in the CIA'S Counter-intelligence Division.
These were James J. Angleton, division chief; Raymond Rocca,
assistant .chief; Newton S. Miler. chief of operations; and
William J. Hood, executive officer. What the managed press
failed to report was that these "resignations" were in fact a
purge by Colby which resulted from a long-standing difference
in' policy over d?nte with Russia. Ang.letoh, and his top
subordinates disagreed totally with Colby over the interpreta-
tion of CIA intelligence from heffind the Soviet bloc. This
intelligence does not support the contentions of Secretary of
State Kissinger.
The power behind President Ford
This latest purge by Colby' reflects the attitude of Kissinger
as expressed through President Ford. The so-called Ford-
Kissinger policy is.nothing more than an extension of the
Nixon-Kissinger policy. In reality, this should be termed the
Rockefeller-Kissinger policy?as it actually has been from
the beginning when Kissinger was brought into the Nixon
administration. At any rate, an already weak CIA has been
further weakened and will be weakened again in the future
when, amid the glare of publicity, four Congressional com-
mittees begin further inquiry into covert CIA operations. In
line with the Kissinger policy, Colby and the liberal faction
in the CIA seek to continue the purge of the anti-Communist
element, particularly those, connected with the overthrow
of the Allende Marxists in Chile.
It is difficult for the human mind to grasp the foil extent*
of the power wielded by Vice-President Nelson A. Rockefeller,
THE INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
FEBRUARY, 1975
WASHINGTON POST
23 February 1975
his family and his collaborators. A recent report, submitted
to Congress by two University of California Professors,
revealed that 15 members of the Rockefeller family are
directors of 40 corporations which have total assets of 70
billion dollars. 1 he boards on which the Rockefellers serve
.have interlocking directorates svith 91 major US corporations
controlling combined assets of 640 billion dollars.. . This is
indicative of the gigantic Rockefeller power behind the Purse-
strings of America. It is real power?the power of the .
Almighty Dollar! It is now being brought to bear againSt
the CIA faction opposing the dangerous course of d?nte.
CIA evaluations for 1075
Regardless of the opinions of President Ford, Vice-
President Rockefeller, and Secretary of State Kissinger,
several CIA intelligence analysts are forecasting a determined
political offensive by Moscow in 1975 to exploit the Western
World's economic and political weaknesses and to strengthen
and further the international Communist revolutionary
movement. Soviet military strength will continue to grow,
especially .its Strategic Rocket Force which already has
throw-weight superiority over the West. The Soviet military
clique is steadily gaining more power and influence in the
Kremlin. The CIA analysts believe that d?nte may slip into
disaster for America and the West. '
Kissinger policy projections
There arc definite indications that the Kissinger policee
will call for the transfer of full sovereignty over the Panama
Canal to the left wing government of Panama by tfle end of
1975?contrary to the opinions of many American military
and business leaders who desire to retain it under US control
for at least another decade. The Kissinger policy also allows
for joint US-Soviet .intervention in the Middle East should
the situation become "grave".
This, of course, would be a gigantic step and would call for
US seizure of select oil fields in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and
possibly even Iran. Russia would occupy select regions in
Syria, Egypt and Iraq and NI ould secure control ?ler the Sues ?
Canal. There could even be a joint Soviet-American occupation
of Iran. Such events are very remote?but within the realm
of strategic planners. It must be clearly pointed out, however,
that any joint intervention in the Nliddle East will be primarily
to the advantage of Russia since that nation atone has the
present force to carry out such an operation effectively. It is
also expected that Kissinger, with the full consent of Rockefeller, ?
will urge diplomatic recognition of Communist Cuba before
the end of 1975. American forces are gradually being with-
drawn front Taiwan and full diplomatic relations may be
extended to Peking later this year. These are all potential
fruits of d?nte?a hazy pipe dream which has necessitated
the further silencing of opposition in the CIA and elsewhere.
Q. It is my understanding that several years ago the
CIA planted an agent named Tracy Barnes in the
.office of Kingman Brewster, president of Yale, to
spy, on student activities. Is that so? Has another
CIA agent succeeded Barnes? What happened to
Barnes??H. T., New Haven, Conn.
A. Tracy Barnes, veteran CIA agent, suffered two
coronary attacks and died in Saunderstown, R.I., in
1971 at age 60. Prior to that he was involved with
Richard Bissell of the CIA in the planning of the
ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, When that
operation failed, the CIA assigned Barnes and an
associate, Wally Lampshire, to set up a new depart-
ment, the Domestic Operations Division at 1750
Pennsylvania Ave., Washington, D.C. with the dbjec-
tive of infiltrating and obtaining intelligence from
various foreign groups in the United States. In 1967,
the CIA offered Barnes early retirement which he
accepted. He then returned to his alma mater, Yale,
where he worked as a special assistant to Kingman
Brewster, specializing in alumni and community rela-
tions. At no time did he spy on Yale students or their
activities.
.16
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CHICAGO TRIBUNE
16 FEB 1975
?? ? ? ? -
?e.
t
- ? :
'011-A;SIOGTONn-Sniin. in.-. the.. gold :
hreacf of rumor mills anc the silver
mr-ne. of Phantom::: spiders,n the tales,
3pt6C1- like. steam. froni:the.,sewera and
so.UndS: from; the ?.keyhole'S. ? ? '
',They. are born pool of. fact spoken by
:innocent: who, want, to, help. and fic-'
anni.;Whispered by-.-the. guilty :who Seek
Thse often-told,:nfrequeritly
embet-
1jh? .and. as yet ?'unPro.Ven stories.: are
nourished in the tortured brains of
reporters,. .politicians,' 'and. conspiracy
freaks who believe, the full story of the
icandai-which felled a President has yet
to surface :? ?
-.PEW' HAVE .ever: appeared in print
. . .
eei fact, or: fon-that matter, ever- will.
But they have taken on lives of their
own and their- newsworthiness is hardly
a gauge of-money and manpower spent
in pursuit of them.- ?
As simple as homemade sin or bizarre ?
to test .the wildest ireanination,
these tales almost always center around
"it"?"it" being what "they" were try-
ing7tO:coVer up with all that 1y-ng, and
"they" being whoever was lying at the
Lixner- ?
With the investigation.s into the Cen-
tral ? Intelligence Agency [CIA], the
spookiest of all spooky things in Wash-
ington, has come a whole new rash Of
clues; leed?, and tips?all- of which, of
course, lead to "it."
The principal characters in most of
them are former.. President Richard
Nixon, who bears the ultimate responsi- ?
bility for keeping "it" secret; Richard
Helms, former CIA director .and now
U. S. ambassador to Iran, whose ac-
counts of his own participation are as
plentiful as Mother Goose nursery
rhymes, and ex-CIA man E. -Howard
Hunt, whose failure to get anyone to
believe him may make him one of the
most mysterious characters in Amen-
an history. history. . .! ? ?
.One of the hottest "new" scenarios is
an old one. The real reason the White
House tried so hard to cover up the.
Watergate burglary is:
- The Hunt Connection?A close person-
al relationship developed between Hunt
and Nixon when, Hunt was.the CIA po-
litical liaison in the planning of the Bay
of Pigs iovasidn and Nixon was head-
ing the National Security Council as
Vice President in 1960.
SUPPORTING evidence if plentiful.
In a *conversation five days after the
Watergate break-in, H. R. Haldeman,:
Nixon's chief of staff, tells the Presi-
dent that the CIA and Helms will coop-
eras in coverup efforts because "itj
and
tracks back to the Bay of Pigs
atergate:
?ice trut
? ;
?
? the whole Hunt problem":
'" ?At leaSf One.' INVatergate--ccinneOted:
lawyer has piece of brush for this
Lire. His client,: be discreetly tells .asso-
ciates; liedeabout the- CIA- because. Nix-
on was. more afraid of the "Hunt prob-
lem" than anYother. .'? -
And there are numerous witnesses
-who Were involved in the. Bay of Pigs
-affair- who say they are sure Hunt
-briefed the then-Vice President Nixon
several: times. Some say he also briefed -
President John F. Kennedy, who was
let in on the planned invasion?to Nix-
on's dismay, shortly ,before the 1960,
Presidential election..
? But the connection runs into trouble
when: [1] Nixon: denies it; [2] Hunt
denies it, and [3] -nobody who was con-
nected with the Bay of Pigs operation
can say they remember seeing Hunt and
Nixon in the same. meeting.
The list of "ifs" is endless. Some are
epic. -
In the same conversation which
spawned The Hunt Connection, there
are indications that CIA Director
Helms was more than .willing to go
along with the coverup. But he didn't,
or at least he says he didn't. ?-,
The Helms Connection?There are as'
many theories about Helms, complete!
with supporting evidence, as there arei
differing sworn accounts by. CIA oh-!cials. ?
One line being pursued by some fair-
ly credible investigators is that Helms ?
? indeed was willing to go along. This is
?supported ? by sworn testimony that
Helms ordered other CIA officials to
withhold evidence from , the ,FBI and.
indications that he committed perjury
on more than one occasion.
Even more damning is evidence that
the agency was being kept informed of
Hunt's activities in the White House;
both by Hunt and by another member
of the Watergate break-in crew. Euge-,
nio Martinez, who Was still on a CIA,
retainer.
7 After all, didn't Helms once approve
a S20,000 Joan from agency funds for
Hunt and didn't ho help Hunt get a job
with Robert It. Mullen & co., a public
relatione firm in Washington that served
as a CIA cover? ? .
But if all that Is true, why was
Helms fired by Nixon? Why didn't the
CIA ultimately take responsibility for
the break-in? Wasn't it CIA resistance
that helped uncover attempt to ob-
struct justice? ? ?
One high-ranking CIA official, who
was in a position to know, offers this
explanation: Helms was fired for refus- ?
ing to claim the Watergate burglary
team and to use secret CIA funds to
buy their silente.
man in Washington,"'sayS thosofficlal.
"Ile wotild automatically do everything'
he could, to make the White House 'be-
lieve he was cooperating and at the
same time figure out a way not to do
it. But when he got the call from the
President asking him to use the money,
there was nothing left to do but refuse, ,
.That call is What they're trying to coy-
er up." ? . ? , : t
That's "it," all right. Helms became
"Deep Throat" for Washington Post re-
porters Carl Berstein and Bob Wood--
.ward, feeding information to the news-
paper personally or. thru -Robert Ben.
net, *a Mullen company official' in the
,pay of tho CIA. ? .,?', .
f Did the CIA official hear the ? call?
No. Did Helms tell him about it? No.
, "Hell, no," says an associate: "All
Helms was trying to do was protect the,
agency. What Helms was really afraid
'of is what is happening now. Investiga-
tions- of the CIA uncovering violations":
of its ,charter. What the CIA feared
imost is that everyone would find ,out it
was carrying out domestic spying."
. The CIA has obviously been trying to
cover up something: What is At"? _
? The Mafia Connection ?"What you
rd" nit.3-t3te1y pia on the CIA if you
E-Es t-ail," assures an old CIA
erez-y, "Ls Murder One. The New York
Times th'e!e-r. there were four of. 'em.
C-c-t names ned everything. Mafia's
le=1,-;eg contracts from the CIA."
wl-o's been killed? Fifty voices
unison: i_Volin Kennedy.
.Robert F. Kennedy. Martin Luther
1,-n7-7. and don't forget the shooting of
Gorg Wnueee. Didn't Tony tilasewice
;????egate ..krthur Bremer? Wallace
tl-intes- C. R. E. E. P. is respon-
sib:e.."
- sAnt about The Hoover Connection?
They $ay, Z. Edgar Hoover lmeri
about the CIA. When he
L'ed poise was found in his toothpaste
and he "was carried out in a blanket
and kept hidden uetil the funeral" by
'CZ?. C1,1'.7?2.7-* S.
The Cuban Connection?Hunt was the
genereement's political contact with the
C7E:ans. The Cubans were training itr
Neer Orleans to attack Castro. Lee Har-
vey Oswald trained with those Cubans.
Teeee, the CIA trained the killer of
Ke.anedy.
"No, it Corrects a CIA an
Cubans. "You don't under-
51 the agency ECLA]. You're taking
Cza -s:olclor. apple just like Helme wants
y-?n to." . .
1-1:e Golden Apple Connection?
An???:.?,:ii-e? to the Golden Apple,
Fietens was willing to do ar.p.hing to.
-p:ote-ct Cae. agency even if it. meant
1-:1;.1z.g a
-The V.-atergate burglary .and all this
destic spying business is exactly
what they at Congress to look at;"
the Golden Apple says.. 'Thee Congress:
won't look at the fact that the CIA isi
really one big illegal clandestine opera-
bi-:in. Everything they do abroad is pat-
Ontly illegal and if -anyone stops tong
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enough to examine the law,.tbat will be
the-end of the CIA." - ? .
Tbe Iranian Connection says our L11111-
eace in the -Middle East is now th
most crucial goal of the nation's for-
eign policy. Iran and .Saudi Arabia are
the most vital to the U. S. roIe...The
CIA is the dominant force in both cOun-.
"It -trains the palace. guard in both,
countries, says the. proponeht of .the
Iranian 'connection. "Whoever protects.
the king controls tile country and
Helms is the most effective 'single force
alive in Iran. He installed the shah..
Why do you think he hasn't been
indiCted?". , . . . .
Well, what ? about Henry ?KiSsing,e.r?
Doesn't he control foreign policy?: -
The Kissinger Connection?as the top-.
national security adviser and secretary.4
of State, Kissinger is in a position .to--;
control. the .clandestine CIA operations.'
The CIA sins are his. That is "it." That
is ,that. .'they.". have been protecting.
"NO," SAYS a. former Kissinger staff
member. "Henry has been . locked in
mortal combat with the CIA. He has.1
been used by them for their own ends..
He'll be out in skt months because he'll I
be useless to them." . ?
,
Who is ."them." Who's running this.;
whole business?. Who's responsible?'-;
Kissinger is Helm's boss, Isn't he? ..
"I'm not sure," says- a-retired. Penta-
gon official who professes the Kissinger !
theory. "I'm convinced the CIA is a I
computer,. a human computer. Do you ;
know what I mean?"' ,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
24 FEB 1975
.With critics nipping at their heels, the
senior officers. of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency are finally?and grudg-
ingly?going.along with Director Wil-
liam Colby's view that the Agency
must be less secretive. Previously, any
kind of "open door" policy was
unthinkable. Now it is seen as needed
if CIA is going to survive its troubles.
1Some diplomats are spreading the un-
diplomatic view that Richard' Hehns's
testimony before Congress on. CIA
activities while he was the Agency's
Director have proved so embarrassing
both at home and abroad that he
should be asked to resign as U. S. ;
Ambassador to Iran. 1
Word from a Stare Department offi-
cial: "The Communists are about to'
take over Portugal and" we can't even
considerany form of covert action that
might help prevent it?not in the
present political climate."
co,n1
NEW YORK TIMES
23 February 1975
The C.I.
And Its
Critics
By Tom Wicker
. Every time the Pentagonwants more
money, it starts talking about the dan-
gers of war. And every time any_so-
called "national security" agency finds.
itself being criticized, it replies that the
national security is being endangered.
. Director William E. Colby- of the
Central Intelligence Agency has taken
to that classic bureaucratic pattern,
claiming that "exaggerated" ,charges
against the C.I.A. have resulted in "al-
most hysterical excitement" that has
"placed American intelligence in dan-
ger." But who's hysterical? Mr. Colby'
sounds nearer- to it than anyone else.
In fact, Senator Frank Church of
Idaho, who will chair the special Sen-
ate committee to investigate the "in-
telligence community," said in a
statement following Mr. Colby's
though not specifically in response to
it?that he was "surprised in recent
days at the hysteria of those who are
fearful that this committee is out to
?
wreck these agencies." So should any-
one be- surprised who knows Mr.
Church's moderate temperament, the.
responsible makeup of his committee,
IN THE NATION
the 'fact that its senior Republican
member is the conservative, military-
oriented John Tower of Texas, and that
another member is that stanch de-
fender of national security, Barry
Goldwater of Arizona? Some wrecking,
crew!
Who's being hysterical might also be
'judged by the fact that Mr. Colby was
not forced to call a news conference
or to issue a press release to get his
fears for the national security on the
record. The House Defense Appropria-
tions Subcommittee, which "oversees"
the C.I.A. budget to the extent that
anyone does, provided him a hospitable
forum and three hours in which to
state his views openly?something
C.I.A. ,directors rarely do except when
they want to sell the public on the
great job they say the C.I.A. is doing.
The subcommittee did not, predictably,
provide searching cross-examination.
Nevertheless, since Mr. Colby was
clearly trying to suggest that the
C.I.A. is being maligned and the nation
endangered by irresponsible criticism,
certain responses have to be made?
aside from that excellent., pieee of.
country wisdom that "bit dogs bark
loudest." For one thing, the oldest
bureaucratic defense knoWn to man is'
to try to shift the focus of attention
from the substance of charges to
18
?those WhO Make them-to convince'
"the public that *the critics are the
-problem, rather than the thing. being
criticized.
Even before that friendly House
.,subcommittee, for example, Mr. Colby
'conceded that' the C.I.A. at one time
or another had kept files on four
members of Congress, some of them
"anti-war." How do we know there
were not others? For that matter, how
does he know? And just recently, in
an interview with Barbara Walters on
"Today," Charles Colson made a strong
case that the C.I.A. knew in advance
Of the break-in at the office of Daniel
Ellsberg's psychiatrist. Saying that
-was "beyond dispute," Mr. Colson
continued: '
"They processed the so-called 'cas-
ing' photos, the 3 provided all the equip-
ment . . . it's very clear to me that
they knew abofat that and actively
participated in it and assisted it, pro-
vided the means for it, helped with the
operation from beginning to end . . .
some of the memos I saw certainly '
went as high as Mr. Helms." (Richard
Helms was director of the C.I.A. in
.1971, when the break-in took place.)
,Mr. Colby has questioned Mr.. Col-
son's credibility, which is indeed ques-
tionable---but 'more so than that of the
C.I.A., whose way of life is secrecy,
and undercover operation? More se
than that of Mr, Helms, whose testi-
mony on several points. has, been
misleading. or incomplete? The point is
,that a multiplicity of such allegations.
of plainly illicit activities:?not just by
the C.I.A. but by the F.B.I. too?have
come to public attention. The sub-
stance of those allegations needs to be
examined and verified; and if any. of
them can indeed be verified, perhaps
others must be sought. In the course of
doing that, questions of the credibility
and responsibility of those who make
the allegations will answer themselves.
One does not need to take Mr. Jeb
Magruder, for example, as a pillar of.
credibility to be' struck by his re-
mark in a lecture this week that had
it not been for the Watergate expo-
sures, the Nixon Administration would
have become a "perpetual Presid-
ency." By 1976, he said, according to
the Associated Press, "we would have
been in the position to elect whom-
ever we wanted to elect. Once you
learn to use the levers of power it
becomes easy." Were the F.B.I. and
the C.I.A. such "levers of power"?
Could they ever be? -
Mr. Colby does not seem to under-
stand that the question really is not
the difficulties presently being caused
for the C.I.A. The question is about
what Representative Lucien Nedzi of
Michigan has called "the alipromiate
role of secret institutions in a free,
democratic society." The C.I.A. is not
a value in itself, to be protected or
fostered at whatever expense to sucn
a society. It exists only to serve that
society, and it does not do so if it
undermines, threatens or ignores the
rights of that society's citizens, no
.matter what "national security') justi-
fication it tries to plead.
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CHICAGO TRIBUNE
9 113 1975
LONDON TIMES
30 January 1975
Magazine
names
CI chiefs
abr ad
From Fred Emery
Washington, Jan 29 -
On the eve of the new Senate
committee's investigation of ,
American intelligence a radical
periodical in Washington- has
published the names of the sup-
posed Central Intelligence
-Agency chiefs in 101 cities round
the world.
The quarterly, Counterspy,
claims that it is doing no more
than to make Americans aware
of what host countries already
know.
More luridly, Mr Philip Agee,
the former CIA officer who has
vowed to undo the CIA in the
cause of world revolution,
Writes in his first article printed
in America that the "key is
secrecy and when it is peeled
away there, standing naked and
exposed for all to see, is the
CIA secret policeman ".
Mr Agee's book Inside the
Company was recently Published
in, Britain.
A CIA spokesman today
sighed: "There is very little
we can do about it, except
neither to confirm or deny."
An informed agency source.
suggested that the list was out
of date: the magazine claimed
it was accurate as of last June
and contained as many staff
"working under diplomatic
cover as we were able to locate ".
The list is interesting for some
omissions: apparently there is
no CIA station chief in Peking,
or he is still unknocvn. Likewise
no one is listed for either
Tirana, or Ottawa. And their
men in Havana and Jerusalem
are unknown.
But their man in Moscow is
there and many others in East
Europe, as well as in Nato.
countries and the Third World.
For London the well-known
Mr Cord Meyer is listed but it
is stated that he is due to be
transferred in June. According
to Counterspy, he was a "labour
specialist on temporary assign-
ment to oversee the British
situation ".
Mr Agee claims that the
quoting of names in his book
has caused hasty replacements.
Senator Frank Church, the
newly elected chairman of the
Senate select committee to in-
vestigate the CIA and all other
intelligence agencies, has
spoken of the need to avert
disruption of the CIA as an
intelligence body.
However ? he has also spoken
of the threats various abuses
have posed at home. He stated
today : "There's a terrible
threat to freedom implicit in
a federal police that is operat-
ing secretly and outside the
law and conducting investiga-
tion and surveillance over
lawful activities of American
citizens."
Mr Church's committee?as
well as the House judiciary
committee?will have before it
the example of an Arizona pro-
fessor who lost his university
job.
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?
im Squires.
17?774.4:4--ce-z .7"77
-
!
t't sty n s
WASHINGTON?Henry 'Kissinger is
pouting again because Congress keeps;
making foreign policy and Jerry Ford's
eyes are sad and bleary from reading
his own economic predictions.. .
But the. real Problem In this town,
and the only one that's really any fun,
belongs to the new Senate select com-
mittee appointed to investigate the mis-1
behavior of the nation's spies.
. Consider the dilemma. Who will do'
?
the investigating?
IN THE PAST, if a congressional
committee wanted to investigate the:
White House, it could round up few ex-
FBI 'agents or former members of the.,
Central Intelligence Agency and say,'
"Go get 'em." ? ' .
If the FBI was the target; .then CIA
agents would gladly do the job. If the
CIA gede d? investigating, ex-FBI.
agents could always be trusted with the
task. ' - ? .
But the new intelligence committee is
rlinrgo.r1 wif ;rt?recillgof tng hail the
FBI and the CIA and anybody else who
might have been spying when they
shouldn't have been. -
At first the committee thought of bar:-
rowing a few iavestigators from anoth-
er federal law enforcement agency, for
instance, the Drug Enforcement Ad-
ministration which carries out fancy
cloak and dagger operations all over
the world. Oops! Not them. 1
Fifty-three of DEA's top agents are
ex-CIA ?men. Everybody knows that
only ex-priests and former Mouseke-
teers ,have stronger loyalties to their
past.
Then someone suggested that if de-
tente is really all its cracked pp to be,
the Soviets would let Congress borrow
a few of its spies. They seem to know
what's going on in the FBI and the CIA .!
anyway. But ales, a lot of Soviet XGB
agents really are CIA or. FBI agents,
and simply cannot be trusted. '
- When in need of manpower, official
Washington usually -looks to the pill-
tary. But not for spies. The Pentagon's
top investigator for the last several
years is a former FBI agent. Beside?s
he has been accused of trying to use
les?
?
?
information he gathered in his last-big
case to blackmail his way back' to a-
top FBI job. .
Some of the best sleuths in town are
newsmen. So, why not arm them with
subpena power and turn them loose?'
Okay, which ones? Some journalists.
are ex-CIA agents. Other journalists
are current CIA agents: And most jour-
nalists ;Can't tell .agent from
'Mary Poppins.
The committee has looked around for
a few good ex-cops. But the best ones
have all become' big city mayors and
the worst ones are in jail. Almost all
the rest were either hired by the Re-
publicans in 1972 or have already been
retained by the Democrats for 1976.
Sen. Howard Baker [R., Tenn.], the
only Watergate committee. veteran on
the new panel, has suggested rounding
.up some of the Watergate committee's
old gumshoes. But there's a problem
there, too. Some of the hot topics of
interest in the new investigation are
things the Watergate committee prob-
ers passed over lightly and saved for
their books. -
BY WEEK's end the new committee
bad only one staffer, but it was still
hopeful.
_This problem is not entirely new. It
was the same one faced by the Nixon
administration back in 1971 when it
was trying to find out who was lealdng
government secrets and couldn't trust
a single one of the regular government
spies to do the job.
A check with old hands from the Nix-
on White House had turned up one
promising lead. It seems that Charles
[Chuck] Colson, you remember him,
has this friend, E. Howard somebody
or the other, who has a lot of other
friends who do jobs like this. They are
all experienced and looking for work.
WASHINGTON STAR NEWS
19 FEB 1975
Foncia "Wail Read
The federal government acknowl-
edged yesterday that the Central
Intelligence Agency intercepted the
mail sent from abroad to anti-war
activist Jane Fonda in the early
1970s.
Justice Department officials said
the "mail cover" placed on the ac-
tress would be explained, possibly
later this week, in a brief filed in Los
Angeles federal district court.
Miss Fonda is suing the gcvernet,
ment for 52.8 million damages, ,
charging there was a conspiracy by
the government to harass her for
her anti-war work. The .1wig list of
defendants includes former Presi-
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VIE NEW REPUBLIC
1 1975
Covering
Intelligence
On Sunday, December 22, 1974, The New York Times led
its front page with a 4000-word article by Seymour
Hersh that began: "The Central Intelligence Agency,
directly violating its charter, conducted a massive illegal
domestic intelligence operation during the Nixon
administration against the antiwar movement and
other dissident groups in the United States, according
.to well-placed government sources." In his next
paragraph Hersh added that "intelligence files on at
least 10,000 American citizens were maintained by a
special unit of the CIA. . . ."
No series of news stories since Watergate has had sO
quick an impact on government, while generating so !
much discussion among journalists, as the Hersh pieces
that began that Sunday and continued to appear over
the next three weeks. The way the stories were
written, their 'placement in the paper by the Times'
editors, the response by the executive and legislative
branches and the impact on other newsmen all tell a lot
about the state of post-Watergate journalism.
Because of the way the first story was written, many
newsmen, including me, doubted whether Hersh really
could document the serious charges implied by his
dramatic lead paragraph. In the six columns of type that
followed, Hersh did present a plausible story of how
James Schlesinger looked into the Alleged domestic
activities after taking over as CIA Director from
Richard Helms in early 1973. He also reported the
concern felt by current CIA Director William Colby,
who succeeded Schlesinger. What Hersh didn't do,
however, was to name any individuals or organizations
that had been subject to surveillance or infiltration as
part of the "massive" program.
Investigative reporting is a highly competitive field.
When one newspaper publishes an exclusive story its
competitors are likely to concentrate initially on
comments from those who dispute the published
allegations. That process happened to some degree
here. But no flat denials were made by the CIA or the
White House. Hersh had covered those bases. Hersh
noted in his first story that CIA Director Colby "had
been informed the previous week of the inquiry by The
Times." How much Colby had been told of what Hersh
knew or planned to write is hard to say but one later
paragraph of the story offers a clue: "When confronted
with the Times' information about the CIA's domestic
operations earlier this week, high-ranking American
intelligence officials El take this to mean Colby or an
aide] confirmed its basic accuracy but cautioned against
drawing 'unwarranted conclusions." It is hard to
believe the Times would have published the story it did
without such an assurance from someone at the top of
the CIA
What the Times and Hersh did to follow up that first
story reinforced the impression that they had solid but
unpublishable evidence. At the same time, however,
they.created additional doubts among newsmen that
the story was as firm as portrayed. The next day no new
facts or allegations were printed. Instead the Monday,
December 23 Times led with a call from Sen. William
Proxmire for Helms' resignation as US ambassador to
Iran and Proxmire's demand for "an investigation by
.the Justice Department of alleged domestic spying by
the CIA." The Proxmire story was the first of several
to run during the next week that were generated by
calls from Hersh seeking comments on his initial story.
Hersh, in fact, had called a Proxmire aide in Washington
the day his first story-came out, soliciting a statement.
Monday's Times also carried an article that tended to
blur criticism of Hersh's piece.' In a separate front-page
story from Colorado where President Ford was skiing,
Times White House correspondent John Herbers
reported Colby had called the chief executive andi
"assured him 'nothing comparable' to what was
described in the article was going on now." In Tim
Washington Post that same morning, Mr. Ford was quoted
as telling newsinen that Colby assured him "nothing
comparable to what was stated in the article was going
on over there,. . ." a statement that cOuld apply to the
,past as well as the present. The President also said he
'told Colby he "would not tolerate any such activities
under this administration," the remark that apparently
justified the Times' second page-one story.
On Tuesday the Times did some more questionable
editing. Helms was reported to have denied categorical-
ly that the CIA had conducted "illegal" domestic spying
when he was director. But directly following that
statement, Hersh wrote that, James Angleton, the
agency official who had run the counterintelligence
office and who was now retiring "agreed with some of
the allegations that were published Sunday by The New
York Times ." Angiet^n's which had 1-,een giver. t-?
United Press International ? not to Hersh ? was that
there was "something to it," meaning Hersh's first
story. What Angleton had also told UPI ? and what
was left out of the Times ? was that the published story
had been exaggerated.
Hersh thereafter quoted Rep. Lucien Nedzi, chair-
man of the House CIA oversight committee as saying
on television, "there's been an overstepping of bounds"
by the CIA. Only much later, in the jump of his story
did Hersh complete Nedzi's statement: "There was
some 'overstepping of bounds,' Mr. Nedzi said, 'but it
certainly waSn't of the dimension that we're led to
believe . . , of what has appeared in the newspapers."
In subsequent days Hersh front-page stories contin-
ued to appear in the Times, some of them containing
relevant but hardly fresh or important information.
Hersh's aggressive searching for additional informa-
tion did turn up one new source ? a former CIA agent
who talked of carrying out domestic surveillance in
New York city. It was the only new information on
alleged CIA activities Hersh was to bring forward prior-
o the CIA's official statement. Nevertheless the impact
of the original Hersh article plus his constant search for
publishable comment brought important reactions.
The President, for one thing, created the blue-ribbon
Rockefeller panel to investigate the CIA.
On January 15 Colby appeared before a Senate
Appropriations subcommittee and save the CIA's
detailed response to the Hersh allegations.. He specifi-
tally denied a "massive illegal domestic operation," and
the facts he presented supported his denial. The CIA
had put together files on 10,000 civilians between 1967
to 1974, but 6000 of the names came originally from the
FBI for overseas checks. Colby confirmed that 10
agents had infiltrated dissident groups in 1967-65 as
pail a A prograin to protect agency facilities in
20
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Washington, and another 12 or so were placed in
groups in the 1970s 5o they could travel abroad to
gather information on radical activities overseas. He
also said that in 1971 and 1972 newsmen thought to be
getting leaks of classified information were tailed.
Hersh's charges had not been fully corroborated, but he
had come close.
Where was the rest of the press? During the early
Watergate days the press had held back. Reporters
good aloof from the CIA story too, in part because it
seemed not to be a developing story, except for the
moves to investigate the original charges. One other
possible motive needs to be examined, and it has for me
a personal side. While I was assembling material for this
p!ece on the press and CIA, Sy Hersh, who is a friend,
suggested that perhaps I am too close to the subject to
1....-rite about it. That may be true. I have strong feelings
about investigative reporting and the responsibilities
accompanying it. I also have past ties with the CIA'. In
1959 I unwittingly was part of a CIA-sponsored
elelegation that attended the Vienna World Communist
Youth Festival and a year later, with a CIA-paid-for
plane ticket, I flew to India to attend a Youth Congress
?arty meeting as the American representative carrying
greetings from President-elect Kennedy. In between
t--.eo events I was offered but turned down a job
with the CIA. On two occasions in the 1960s when I ran
:r...n.aressional investigations for the Senate Foreign
Reiations Committee, I had to deal directly with a
number of CIA personnel, including Richard Helms. .
I stipulate my association not as a mea rulpa for what
:o'.:ows. I'm doing it because to understand the press
:overage of the CIA, the FBI and other intelligence
agencies, the public should realize that over the past 20
years; for many newsmen, these organizations were
Most often sources of information for stories, and not
stories in themselves. For foreign correspondents, in
country after country, CIA station chiefs were often
the best men around to give an estimate of local
conditions. Reporters almost never attempted to find
out what the CIA was up to. In Washington there are
other newsmen`, editors and columnists who, like me,
have past connections to the CIA or its officials. -
These connections do not mean that reporters never
have written critically about intelligence. My articles
about the CIA and Watergate ? and former Director
NEW YORK TIMES
21 February 1975
AFRICANS DRAFTING
A PROTEST ON DAVIS
Special to The tlew York Times
ADDIS ABABA, Ethiopia, Feb.
20?Foreign ministers of 43
African countries were prepar-
ing a resolution here today to
express their opposition to the
appointment of Nathaniel Davis
as the United States Under Se-
cretary of State for African af-
fairs.
Africans have exprassed wa-
riness about Mr. Davis's assign-
ment to Chile during the time a
rightist coup overthrew the re-
gime of President Salvador Al-
? lende Gossens. They suspect
that the Central Intelligence
? Agency was involved in the
overthrow and that Mr. Davis
'might have been involved in the
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Helms' questionable role in that affair ? speak for
themselves. With the Hersh story, however, I remained
cautious, believing that the CIA had been drawn into
domestic activities, but not convinced that these
involvements were either massive or illegal.
Other journalists have taken different tacks. For
example The Washington Post's editorial page editor Philip
Geyelin worked briefly for the CIA more than 20 years
ago. He, too, has been uneasy about the Hersh articles.
When the Rockefeller commission was appointed, the
Post editorialized that the panel's makeup was sufficient
to a task that did not involve treating "a gaping wound
in the nation's side.. . ." Because of the Post's editorial
line, rumors quickly circulated that Geyelin's CIA bias
was showing-. When the Post later ran a story about a
1950s CIA mail cover on then AFL President George
Meany intended to make sure that agency funds were
going to the correct trade union people, Hersh called
Geyelin to see if he were the source of the story. He said
he wasn't.
What are we to draw from all this? First that the post-
Watergate press is more openly critical of itself ? in its
questioning of colleagues and in writing frankly and
critically of how it operates. Second that the grey Near
York Times has decided to undertake what I consider
advocacy journalism in its news columns. Times
managing editor A. M. Rosenthal denies that. He firmly
told me the first Hersh story was not played"in order to
bring about an investigation," and those stories that
followed were only carried on page one because they
C intrinsically- interesting or important."
Rosenthal sees it, an editor who sets out in a series of
articles to influence events"becornes a participant," and
he is opposed to that.
I believe Rosenthal is wrong. Like it or not, he and his.
counterpart in The Washington Post are participants.
Their front-page story selections set an agenda for
government. The Hersh story makes the point. It was ?
vulnerable to criticism. The White House, CIA or
congressmen could have nailed the overstatements and
tried to ride out the storm. There was, however,
enough truth in the Hersh piece and credibility in the
Times' presentation to force serious, quick action which,
one hopes, will be of a positive sort.
Walter Pincus
coup.
The resolution is to be made
public at the final meeting of
the 24th session of the minis-
terial conference of the Organi-
zation of African Unity tomor-
row, a delegate said today.
The delegate, from a black
Arrican country, said "we do
feel strongly about . this?it
seems to us a deliberate affront
?to our interests by the Ameri-
can Government." ? ?
He said this was the first time
the organization, formed in
1963, had attempted to in-
fluence American foreign poli-
cy.
The resolution would fallow
the objections to Mr. Davis that
have been expressed by Repro-
sentive Charles C. Diggs Jr.,
chairman of the House 'Foreign
Affairs subcommittee on Afri-
ca.
: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007a
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RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.
4435 WISCONSIN AVE. N.W.. WASHINGTON. D. C. 20016, 244-3540
_
.PROGRAM The Ten O'Clock News
DATE
STATION
WTTG TV
February 11, 1.975 10:00 PM CITY Washington, D.C.
COMMENTARY
ALAN SMITH: The Rockefeller Commission is but one
of several panels set up to probe the CIA and.other U.S. Intelligence
Agenci;es. The other committees, either in operation or gearing
up, are on Capitol Hill.
And their possible impact on national security is
the concern tonight of syndicated columnist and Metromedia
commentator Robert Novak.
ROBERT NOVAK: The many congressional investigations
of the Central Intelljgence Agency have just begun and already
there's two obvious and profound effects on the CIA. First
of all, the Agency's covert operations, the so-called dirty
tricks around the world are absolutely dead. The real question.
that they -- there could be .a very useful CIA dirty trick operation
in Portugal today where there's a tremendous danger of a Communist
takeover. And a communist takeover wouldi movelthe U.S./with 0
strategic bases in the Azores islands. klf!-1JQ1
Secondly, the undercover agents for the CIA all
over the world are going in to their CIA superiors and telling
them, I quit. In other words, they're unwilling to risk their
lives when there's a chance of them being blown out of the
water.
How, this is just the begining of these congressional
investigations. The Agency's going to be criticized, uncovered
and taken apart in the weeks to come. And so I think there's
a good chance without the covert operations and without the
undercover agents, and the CIA turning into a bunch of clerks
sitting out in Langley reading for.,ign newspapers and foreign
magazines. And I think it's about lime for Congress to ask
itself this question: has detente extended far enough that
this is kind of CIA that the congressmen really want.
SMITH: Bob, I believe it's Senator Russell Long
who has some reservations about the ability of some members' -
of the Senate committee to keep their mouths shut about what
they hear in these closed sessions. Do you feel Senator Long's
concern is warranted?
NOVAK: Absolutely. I think that this is the greatest
danger to the CIA. The officials are worried about it because
congressmen are notoriously incapable of keeping a secret.
SMITH: Syndicated columnist Robert Novak.
22.
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Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1
1E NEW YORK Trmis, SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 1975
Data on Oswald Apparently Withheld
From Key Warren Investigation Aides
By BEN A. FRANKLIN
5pKia tThworTims
WASHINGTON, Feb. 22?J.
Edgar Hoover sent a memoran?
dum to the State Department in
1960 raising the possibility that
an imposter might be using the
credentials of an American de-
fector named Lee ? Harvey Os-
wald, who was then in the So-
viet Union.
This memo from the director
of the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation and two subsequent
State Department memos relat-
ed to it were apparently not
shown to investigators of the
Warren Commission, which ex-
amined the assassination of
President Kennedy and deter-
mined that Oswald, acting
alone, was. the assassin. -
The late Mr. Hoover's warn-
ing of the "possibility" that an
impoSter could be using Os-
wald's identification data, in
the Soviet Union or elsewhere,
came more than two years be-
fore the murder of the Ameri-
can President in Dallas on Nov.
22, 1963. The imposter theory
was rejected, by implication
but not .directly, in the pub-
lished eeport of .the Warren
Commission, and its signifi-
cance could not be determined.
The body Of the man who the
commission concluded had shot
the President?and who was
shot to death by Jack Ruby two
days later?was identified by
his mother and other relatives
and also by fingerprints and
other physical features as that
of Lee Harvey Oswald.
But the apparent withholding
of information from the com-
mission supported a theory of
some critics of the commis-
sion's final report that the pan-
el had come to its conclusion
regarding Oswald without hav-
ing had all the facts.
A spokesman for the F. B. I.
said, in response to questions;
that "we can 'definitely state,
without hesitation, that a copy
of the Hoover memo was shown
to a member of the Warren
Commission staff in the pres-
ence of an F. B. I. agent." How-
ever, the spokesman said that
he could not identify the com-
mission staff member to whom
the memo reportedly had been
shown. Neither J. Lee Rankin,
the former general counsel of
Ithe commission, nor any of his
.former staff aides who were
most involved in investigating
.Oswald's background said they
'could remember seeing it.
However, Howard P. Willens,
now a private lawyer here,
himself in an interview today
as tile commission lawyer who
hed reviewed the F.B.I. file. Mr.
Willens, who was then com-
mission's special liaison officer
to the Justice Department, said
today that "while I do not think
that anyone can state now with
the necessary precision whether
or not he saw the Hoover
memo, it is my best recollection
that I did, in fact, see -that
memo."
"1 do not want to be in a
public debate with my old col-
leagues," Mr. Willens said, "but
I know that tehere was discus-
sion of this among other on the
staff concerned with the activ-
ities of Oswald abroad. I am
concerned with continued public
references to the notion that
the commission overlooked ob-
vious facts." -
Suggests Reopening Inquiry
Shownsthe F.B.I. memos and
the two. State Department
documents?discovered in the
National Archives here by a
private resercher ?W. David
Slawson, a lawyer who checked
out rumors about -Oswald for
the commission in 1964, said
he thought the assassination in-
quiry should be reopened. -
Mr. Swanson, who is now a'
law- professor at the University
of Southern California, said he
and other investigators had
never been shown the memos.
"We were the rumor runner-
downers, and we certainly
should have seen this material,
as we did a great deal of other
stuff that we showed to be un-
founded," he said.
"It may be more significant
that we did not see it, in terms
of a possible cover-up and the
reasons for it, than if we had
seen it." he continued. "I mean;
I don't know where the impos-
ter notion would have led us?
perhaps nowhere, like a lot of
other leads. But the point is we
didn't know about it. And why
not?"
At the State Department, a
spokesman said there would
be no comment because all for-
mer officials who might have
knowledge of the Oswald file
had died or retired.
Mr. Slawson said in an inter-
view that the investigation
should be reopened also "be-
cease the interposition of an
imposter, if that happened, is apartment's Soviet desk. The
political act." other, dated March 31, 1961,
And after all. this [the as- I :was sent from one section of
sassinationl was not just anothi the Passport Office to another.
er murder," he said. "It was, by I Concern on Passport
definition, a political murder." The latter memo indicated
Two other commission staff 'concern that a revalidated pass-
members shared with Mr. Slaw- 'port to be issued to Oswald in
son the responsibility for !preparation for his return to
checking out rumors. Neither the United States in June, 1962,
recalled specifically having not be mailed to him through
the Soviet postal system but be
delivered to him "only on a per-
sonal basis" at the Embassy in
Moscow. Officials there could
berg, who wrote the gossip- then be satisfied that they were
puncturing "Speculations and dealing with the real Oswald.
The Warren Commission sub-
sequently developed that in Ju-
ly, 1961, Oswald's passport was
handed hack to Inc man who
Moscow Embassy officials were
satisfied was the same Oswald
- 'they had first met in 1959,
when he angrily announced his
intention to renounce his ci-
intention to renounce his citi-
zenship, The Stat,. Department
had ruled by then that he had
superior at the commission, and
who, was nominated last month
by President Ford to be Secre-
tary of Transportation, was
asked . during an interview
whethet he bad seen the;
memos.
"It's been 10 years," he said,,
"and I don't remember one way'
or the other."
. He recalled, however, that his
duties "required me to see ev-
erything that Oswald had done
as a defector to the Soviet;
Union."
Mr. Hoover's memo was
dated June 3, 1960. Its contents
suggest that the F.B.I. director
raised the possibility of an im-
poster because of. certain facts
the memo recounts. ?
It cited a Foreign Service dis-
patch concerning Oswald's dec-
laration in Moscow on Oct. 31,
1959, that he would renounce
his citizenship and noted that
he had surrendered his pass-
port-
It also cited a report of an
F.B.I. agent in Dallas of May
12, 1960, which said that Os-
wald's mother, Marguerite C.
Oswald, "stated subject had
taken his birth certificate with
him when he left home."
The agent's report indicated
that Mrs. Oswald was appre-
neesive about Lee Son'S safety
because she had written him
three letters and they had all
been returned to her unde-
livered.
Mr. Hoover concluded: "Since
there is a possibility that an im-
poster is using Oswald's birth
certificate, any current infor-
mation the Department of State
may have concerning subject
will be appreciated."
Two internal State Depart-
ment memos transmitted Mr.
Hoover's warning. One, dated
June 10, 1960, went to the de-
seen the memos, but they tend-
ed to discount any thought of a
renewed investigation.
One of them, Dr. Alfred Gold-
Rumors" section of the com-
mission's report; said in an in-
terview:
"I don't have any recollection
of having seen that [Hoover)
memorandum. As a matter of
fact; J am fairly certain I didn't.
"While I think we might have
done more had we seen it?we
might have engaged in more re-
search, we might have looked
for more, wemi ght have asked
for more from the State Depart- not actually given up Ins cite-
mem and the F.B.I.?in terms
of the outcome, I don't believe zenship.
None of these documents?
it would have made any differ-1 -not the Hoover memo or either
ence." of the State Department memos
Willia.m T. Coleman Jr., who ?was in the department's Os-
was Mr Slawson's immediate v.,ald file as it was given to the
Warren Commission in 1964,
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7a.Ccording to Mr. Slawson.-'
- After the commission pub-
lished its report, thousands of
pages of unpublished conimis-
sion records were declassified
by the State Department and
,placed on public file in the Na-
tional Archives.
Among them J. G. Harris, a
45-year-old New Yorker who
has spent nearly. a decade in
Kennedy assassination re-
search, found the Hoover and
State Department memos.
How the memos came to be
missing from the State Depart-
ment's Oswald file given to the
commission but included in the
same file the Archives remains
unclear.
Mr. Slawson, citing recent
tdisclosures about domestic ac-
tivities of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency, said:
"It conceivably 'could have
been something -related to the
C.I.A. I can only speculate now,
but a general C.I.A. effort to
take out anything that reflected
on them may have covered this
up." Mr. Slawson added that
he had been "impressed at the
time with the intelligence and
'honesty of the C.I.A. people I
dealt with."
? A C.I.A. spokesman deny-
ing that the agency had ever
had any connection with Os-
wald, said the agency had 'no
record of ever having seen the
Hoover memo and had not ere;
gaged in a cover-up.
A former State Department
official who, was familiar with
the Oswald file supgp:sted that
Mr. Hoover himself might have
ordered his memo removed
from the file before it was sent
to the commission, to avoid em-
barrassing the bureau.
The former official, Rich-
ard A. Frank, now a lawyer
here with the Center for Law'
and Social Policy, said in an in-
terview that as the depart-
ment's assistant legal adviser in
1963-64 he had been unaware
of the Hoover memo, although
he had a major responsibility
for assembling the Oswald rec-
ords to be sent to the commis-
ion.
I He Said it seemed possible
!that the memo "was so unsup-
portable by anything the F.B.I.
had on Oswald that, when the
Oswald file suddenly became
the object of a most intensive
search and review, Mr. Hoov-
er and his friends in the secur-
ity operation at State simply
made it disappear." -
A former senior F.B.I. official
who worked on the assassina-
tion inquiry said in an inter-
view that he could net recall
such a mernce_as.part. of the
case file.
At the C.I.A. a spokesman
said there would be no com-
ment on Mr. Slawson's sugges-
tion of ,a cover-up. The State
Department had no comment
either.
Abram Chayes, the depart-
ment's legal adviser in 1964,
who assured the commission
in testiniony then that "very
aggressive efforts" had been
a made to collect and transmit
the full Oswald file, was inter-
viewed by telephone in Mos-
cow, where he was attending a
legal conference.
He said lie had no memory ef
any imposter memo in the State
Department files.
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THE WALL STREET JoURNAL .
'Wednesday, 'Feb; 19, 19
As of Today, Getttmg
Federal Documents
Will Be a Lot Easier
To the Bureaucracy's Dismay,
New Rules Make It .Harder
To Keep Information Secret
e By ARI,EN J. Law;
Staff Reporter. of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
WASHINGTON?Uncle Sam will be bear-
ing from Clarence Ditlow today:
Mr. Ditlow, one of Ralph Nader's troop-
ers, pestered the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration .in 1973 for copies of
its correspondence with Detroit, on auto-
safety defects: Invoking the Freedom of In-
formation Act, Mr. Ditlow took the bureau-
crats to court. He lost.
Now Congress has changed that law, .and.
the changes -become effective today, So Mr.?
Ditlow is renewing his request for-the docu-
ments, and he expects to. Win this time.
Gradually and grudgingly, the govern-
ment is opening up. Watergate gave secrecy
a bad name. Congress keeps thinking of new
ways to compel the Executive Branch to op-
erate more openly. On- Capitol Hill itself,
more committees are writing laws in rooms.
open to.lobbyists, the press and the visiting
high-school class from Hoboken. The Senate
later this year probably will allow its floor
sessions to be televised, possibly putting
Senators in competition- with afternoon soap
operas.
The broadening of the 1956 Freedom of
Information Act is part of the trend. Con-
gress wants the public to have access to
more kinds of documents currently locked
in government files.
Among the possible beneficiaries is Wil-
liam Taylor, director of the Center for Na-
tional Policy Review at Catholic University
here. He has been trying to see reports? on
the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare's enforcement of desegregation in
Northern schools, but he has also been los-
ing in court. Now he is. asking a federal
judge here to reverse the decision in light of
the amended law.
Courtroom tactics aside, Mr. Taylor
hopes that the bureaucracy will show more
enthusiasm for complying with the informa-
tion law. "We're all going to be interested in
seeing whether there's going to be a change
in the spirit of administering it" he says.
Bureaucratic Resistance
? The history of the Original 1966 law shows
that the open-government spirit was want-
ing in many agencies. "The bureaucracy
did not want his law," writes Harold Re-
lyea, a Library of Congress analyst, in a
current article. He says this resistance has
resulted in "excessive processing fees, re-
sponse delays and pleas of ignorance when
petitioned for documents in terms other
than an exact title."
Tho law laid down the general rule that
documents are to be made public unless
,they are covered by any of nine specific ex-
:erriptions, such as defense secrets, medical
?files, trade secrets, internal policy memos.
anti -investigatoty rec'ords. To the surprise
of the law's sponsors, it hasn't been used
imuch by the press. But public-interest law
firms and trade associations have invoked it
repeatedly. A frustrated official at the Jus-
tice Department hotly threatened to use it
against felloW bureaucrats to get a copy of
;the FBI phone book. Some document-seek-
ing members of Congress have taken the
government to court, mostly without suc-
cess.
tSeveral ink court cases and the' tiniku-1
cracy's stalling tactics prompted Congress!
last year to tighten up. The coverage of two!
of the exemptions was? narrowed, agencies.,
Were given deadlines to respond to requests,
excessive copying fees were banned, and fu-
ture winners of court cases were authorized
to have lawyers' fees paid by the govern-
ment_President Ford vetoed the bill at the
alarmed behest of the whole Executive
Branch, but the veto was overridden.
The Clock Watchers . .
With these provisions becoming effective
today, officialdom is looking to its defenses.
The new law gives an egency 10 working
days. to make its first response to a free-
dom-of-information request, and some offi-
cials are preparing to fight for every min-.
ute. They have decreed that the clock
doesn't start running until the letter reaches
the right desk; time spent lost in the mail
room doesn't count. To play the game, ap-
plicants are asked to write "freedom-of-in-
formation request" on the outside envelope.
In a memo of advioe to other agencies, the
,Justice Department has warned that "an ef-
ficient system or date stamping for incom-
ing matter is essential." _
Many agencies 'expect a surge of re-
quests starting today because of the two
substantive changes that Congress made: in .
the law. Courts had ruled that the exemp7
tion for investigatory files covered such
things as Mr. Ditlow's auto-safety docu-
ments and Mr. Taylor's HEW reports.
Congress sought to restrict this protection to.
actual cons:and-robbers categories of inves-
tigations, and even some of these may be-
come narrowly available if there isn't any
invasion of personal privacy.
Hence, the FBI is getting ready to, show
an individual. what's in his own the, after
screening out anything that would identify
an informant. An applicant will be asked to?
go to great lengths to prove his identity, in-
cluding possible submission to fingerprint-
ing.,
Other investigatory records -that are
likely to be requested under the new law in-
clude data from President Kennedy's au-
topsy and the Justice Department's file on
the Kent State investigations.
The new law overturns a Stipreme Court
ruling that forbade federal judges to inspect
classified documents in testing whether they
are covered by the execption for defense
secrets. Now, ?a judge will have authority to
order the secrecy stamp removed from all
or part of a document if he decides that the
classification was improper.
That is expected to attract requests to
see CIA Director William Colby's recent re-
port to the President of his agency's domes-
tic spying activities. Morton Halperin, a for-
mer National Security Council staffer, plans
to invoke the new law to obtain previously
unpublished chapters of the Pentagon Pa-
pers As well as official U.S. forecasts of
Soviet strategic-weapons strength.
"To some extent, the national, mood has
changed," says Mr. Halperin, who now
works for the Center for National Security
Studies here. "There's a general feeling in
Congress, in courts and among the public
that a lot of things stamped secret aren't
really classified."
Philip and Sue Long, a Bellevue, Wash.,
couple who successfully used the old law to
obtain tax-auditeguidelines from the Internal
Revenue Service, think that the new .defini-
tion of investigatory' files could force the
IRS to give up more material, Mrs. Long
says it Would be useful for taxpayers dicker-
ing with the IRS over disputed sums to see
how similar cases were settled, but these
records have been classed as investigatory
files. She thinks that the new definition
might open them up "but it depenos On how
the courts go."
The new rule allowing fudges to order,
'the government to pay' lawyers' fees of site:3'
?cessful seekers for documents will "dramat-
ically" increase the number of court chal-
lenges, predicts Mark Lynch, another Nader
associate. Mr. Lynch observes that so far
the number of lawyers specializing in free-
dOrnsof-information cases has been rela-
tively small and that they have generally
drawn 'a careful bead on government se-
crecy abuses. With more lawyers moving
Into the field, he expects "we're probably
going to have , some pretty harebrained
cases."
The Advisory. Committees ?
Congress also .has' been trying to require
more openness in the work of the 1,118 advi-
sory committees of outside specialists that
give policy coaching to federal agencies.
Pressed by Democratic Sen. Lee Metcalf of
Montana, Congress in 1972. sought to require
!advisory committees to publicize their
:meetings in advance and to open them to
the public. The law says a meeting can be
closed only if the subject matter discussed
falls into one of those nine exemptions to the
Freedom of Information Act.
The Derense Department promptly
closed the doors on meetings of its advisory
? committee on women in the armed forces,
contending that the talk would deal with the
same subjects covered in internal polity
memos. A federal judge ruled that this
wasn't ,a valid reason, complaining sharply
that "the penchant for unjustified govern-
ment secrecy repeatedly evidenced in cases
under the Freedom of Information Act
seems to be present here."
Despite this and similar court rulings,
critics of the 'advisory committees say there
Is still too much secrecy and not enough ad-
vance notice of the meetings. Chester War-
ner, a self-described,, "open-government
nut," last year was the official monitor of
advisory-committee practices in the White
'House Office of Management and Budget. A
check of committee meetings in December
showed that about 45% were closed, he re-
ports. After a, dispute with OMB higher-4s
about the makeup of an Interior Depart-
ment advisory committee on oil, Mr. War-
ner quit last month.
Congress Opens Up
These congressional open-government
laws ironically don't apply to Congress it-
self; the Freedom of Information Act
couldn't be legally invoked to get an early
committee draft of a bill, for example. Rut
the point is increasingly moot because mere
bill-drafting sessions of congressional com-
mittees are being held with open doors.
Pending in the Senate Roles Committee
is a proposal backed by influential members,
of both parties allowing floor sessions of the
full Senate to .be televised. Cameras of any
kind currently are taboo in that chamber.
The TV cameras would be run by the Sox-
ate, but commercial networks would be al-
lowed to tap into the Capitol's closed-circuit
System.
The motive primarily is a political reac-
tion to the low public esteem in which Core
gress is held. Republican Sen. J. Glenn
Beall of Maryland says he hopes that
increased familiarity with the processes of,
government will boost confidence in con-
gress while making Senators more account-
able to their constituents."
Florida's Senators especially make a Ug
point of demanding "government in the mu-
shine," Democrat Lawton Chiles is the lead-
ing crusader for open committee mecums,
while his freshman colleague, Richard
Stone, goes even further. Sen. Stone refwes
to attend the still-secret caucuses of Senate
Democrats, and, In the ultimate symbol of
!open government, he has taken his office
!door off its hinges.
24
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'Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360007-1
NEW YORK TimEs
Fts 1975 ,
The New Rules
n Freedom
f Informatiq
By MARTIN ARNOLD
. Next week, on the 19th, over the objections of President
? Ford, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, the Pentagon, the State Deliartrnent and,
in fact, probably over the objections of almost every rank-?.
iag,member of the Federal bureaucracy, 17 amendments to.
the Freedom of Information Act go into effect.
.. -
The results could be important, particularly for journalists*;
who under the old act usually did not press their legitimate .
demands for Government information simply 'because the -
process took so much time.
The Reporters Committee for Freedom, of the Press in !
Washington estimates that there were only a half a dozen
or so major press attempts to get information through the
provisions of the old act. It -was put to perhaps its most !
spectacular use by N.B.C.-T.V.'s Carl Stern. He broke the !
story of the Federal Bureau of Investigation counterintelli-
zehce goup that infiltrated the New- Left. It took the per- ,
SIstent Mr. Stern 20 months of litigation.
Under the prodding of consumer groups, such as Ralph!
Nader's, and of the media, the original Freedom of -Infor-
mation Act was passed in 1966 and signed by President
Johnson. Then, as now, it was opposed by nearly every de- I
pertinent and agency in the Federal Government, but most
particularly by those involved in criminal investigations_ and
in gathering foreign and domestic intelligence.
The 1966 act permitted private persons to file complaints
in Federal District Courts to 'force Government agencies'
to produce information they were withholding. Exempt from
the act were medical reports, an agency's internal rules
and regulations, confidential trade secrets, and foreign'
policy and national defense information that had been
classified secret by Presidential Executive Order.
That bill simply didn't work. The process was not only
lengthy but so costly that unless a citizen was wealthy or
had the 'financial aid of an interested group,- he? could go
broke trying to get information out of the bureaucracy.
Finally, the law put the burden on the citizen and his
surrogate, the reporter. The effect was that of an implicit
rejection of the philosophical point that the government
is, after all, us, not them, end-the information-.belongs to
us .not them. Why should people have to struggle so hard
LOS ANGELES TIMES
15 February 1975
CA
Fonda
en ail,
wyer Says
BY KENNETH REICH
Times Political Writar
An attorney for actress Jane Fonda said Friday he has
-been informed by the U.S. Justice Department that the
Central Intelligence Agency is now ready to admit in a
paper to be filed in U.S. District Court here that It opened.
.mail arriving for Miss Fonda from abroad.
-- Leonard Weinglass, the attorney, said he had been told
.by Ed Christianbury, a Justice Department attorney in
-Washington, that the CIA would drop its denial, made in a
court filing six months ago, that it had involved itself in
investigating Miss Fonda.
"This is the first time in a legal proceeding that the CIA"
.has admitted taking action .against an individual in the
States,* Weinglass declared.
Approved For Release 2O1/08/08:
to get information? The question was brought home to
many through the Watergate disclosures and the more
_recent.disclosures of apparently illegal spring on citizens
by the Central Intelligence Agency.
Ironically, the act also effectively restricted not only the-
rights of the people, but those of the legislative branch.
Senator Howard Baker Jr, the Tennessee Republican, has
said recently that he 'and hil colleagues on the Watergate
.Committee were Unable to get the C.I.A. to declassify its
Mies on persons Who had knowledge _about Watergate..
Few claim thad the new amendments will lead to more'
disclosures :with ithe impact- of Watergate. But the ' new
amendments, designed to make it easier, quicker and less_
costly to get Government information, are in 'a sense a
product of the atmosphere of Watergate. They passed Con-
gress overwhelmingly, and were vetoed by President Ford
on Oct. 17, ,1974e About a month later, Congress _overrode
the Vresident's veto; again overwhelmingly.
? .The exemptions in the original act still stand. But one of'
the amendments- gives ,a. Federal. judge the authority to
review in private :classified foreign policy and' national
_defense information,, at the behest of a petitioner, to de-
termine whether it should, in fact, be classified.
Another key amendment sets a strict timetable for 'the
Government's response to a request for information. In
general, an agency have no more than 10 days to
make the information available or to deny it, with 20
additional working days to decide on appeals. ? -
. That amendment wbs objected to by the President, as-was
a third that awarcV court costs- to an individual who
successfully brings sUit to force the disclosure of informa-
tion or documents. There is even -a_for.ea of punishment.for
officials who withhold _them. *e..? - ? -? ? .
. The punishment ;clause could be the' one that really
'speeds up the .flowl of information from the Government
to the people. A ',successful litigant can get the Civil
Service Commission ...to sus7end 'wifiaout- pay for 60 days
a bureaucrat who arbitrarily withheld information.
Based on past e?pPrienrP, no nne? really expects the
Government to live easily with the new amendments. But
under the new act information will be more accessible' to
the public even if it takes a .year or so of constant law
suits to get the bureaucracy to- begin to cooperate.
Still, among the press, the- feeling is that in the new
_amendments Congress did a good job of balancing one of
the inner tensions of a democratic society: the people's right
to know vs. the Government's need to protect legitimate
secrets. Surely, most Federal judges will be just as sensitive
to national security, and probably just as sophisticated in
deciding those issues, as are the;.Cabinet officers and their
Undersecretaries who control the many thousands of Navy
ensigns and Air Force lieutenants who have the authority _
to stamp documents classified,. and the many more
thousands of Government- clerks who now casually turn
down citizens' requests for information.
.Martin Arnold is a New York Times reporter who -Special
? izes in press affairs.
7 It's rather curious that they first make a flat denial and
then, after the Rockefeller Commission makes a few inter-
views, the government comes in and withdraws the deni-
al"
= The Rockefeller Commission is investigating allegations,
'of illegal domestic activites by the CIA.
Attempts to reach Christianbury for comment were un-
availing.
'
availine% A woman identifying herself as his secretary in-
? -dicatedhe declined to return calls.
Miss Fonda has a suit pending in U.S.-Dist. Judge Mal-
colm M. Lucas' court here asking the courts to enjoin a va-
riety of czovernment iig.Pocio,, from engaging in surveil-
lance of her activities and asking for monetary damages
exceeding S2 million.
The act res.,. long active in the antiwar movement. re-
mains poliicoll.v invoi%-ed in a number of dissident causes.
Weinglass said Miss Fonda's original complaint, filed in
1973, had named the director of the CIA. The CIA, along
with other government agencies, subsequently admitted
keeping files on her, but it denied it had actually initiated
the collection of any information.
However, Weinglass, said, Christianhury telephoned him
this week to say that the CIA denial was in error.
"Christianbury acknowledged that they had opened mail -
coming in to Jane Fonda from overseas," Weinglass said.
"That would have been in violation of the law."
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WASHINGTON POST
8 February 1975
Rbbert Karen
Fighting the Tide of Torture
In the winter of 1945 in northern R-
aly, the Gestapo ? picked up a young
Italian resistance worker and tortured
.her for 45 days. Convinced that giving
them information of any kind would
make her immediately dispensable, she
never talked and in the end was made
to type her own death sentence. How-
ever, on the day she was to be execu-
ted, two men in Gestapo uniforms took
her away for some "final questioning."
,Inexplicably, they left her at a hospital
and in two years she was fully re-
covered.
Today, almost 30 years later, Ginetta
?Sagan has become one -of the major or-
ganizers for Amnesty International, the
London-based group that."adopts" and
fights for the release of political pris-
oners.the world over. Founded in 1961
Mr. Karen, former press secretary
to New York City Councilman ?Carter .
Burden, is now a free-lance. writer.
This article is adapted from a piece'
which appeared originally in The
Nation.
?
by a British lawyer, Peter Beneson,
Amnesty has 38,000 members in 32
countries and claims responsibility for
the release of more than 10,000 politi-
cal prisoners.
Sagan became involved with Amnes-
ty International 1967, when the Greek
junta took power; it was the first time
since the war that repression and tor-
ture again touched her life. "I had a
lot of friends who were in jail because
so many of them had studied in France
when I was there. My former professor
there had just met Christos Sartze-
takis, who is the judge portrayed in
the movie Z. They were sending me
file after file of prisoners and horrible,
horrible stories, of torture. I remem-
ber one in particular. the dean of a
university who was 80 years old and
given the falanga?tying a person to a
table and beating the soles of the feet
until they are ..swollen. So painful,
dreadfully painful."
In 1971.Sagan prevailed upon Melina
Mercouri and . Joan Baez ?to come to
Berkeley for a concert to benefit the
Grcek relief fund. A crowd of 10,000
attended and Sagan has since proved
that direct action to salvage individual
lives can generate the kind of personal
commitment that seemed to haye
faded with the anti-war ,rnoyement.- In
the three years since, that first;.Berk-
eley concert, Amnesty's West Coast
membership (concentrated in Califor-
nia and Texas) has. shot up from 52 to.
almost 52,000.
Today the San Francisco office at
3618 Sacramento Street has four full-
time staff members, including Sagan
and Kit Bricca, formerly with the
Farm Workers. The region now
counts for about half of Amnesty's 100
U.S. groups, and the leadership under-
standably believes that similar organiz-
ing elsewhere in the country would
produce comparable results, _Recently
LAmnesty hired Joel Carlson, a South
African civil ? rights: lawyer- 'who was
forced to leave his country in 1971,
to be-full-time national coordinator, an
investment which it hopes will lead to
the creation of regional offices in Chi-
cago, Denver, Atlanta and some place
in Texas.
? All this activity for human rights.
would be a cause for celebration were
it not for the historical events which.
?have helped to' generate it. In the
short time since, Ginetta Sagan began
organizing for Amnesty, there has
been a marked increase in political re-
pression and a severe upswing in the
use Of torture. In the last few, months,
Amnesty papers on Chile and North
Korea and a worldwide survey called.
"Report on Torture" have revealed.
that not only is freedom of speech and
association endangered by state ?JUL=
but torture, remarkably similar tto the
kind the Gestapo practiced in Italy
and throughout occupied Europe,
Seems to be spreading in epidemic pro-
portions across the continents.
"When talking with the victims of
torture today, I have a sense of deja
vu," says Sagan. "The same thing?in-
terrogation, beating, fear, insult, deg-
radation. They really want to destroy
you as a human being, to reduce you
to the level of a groveling animal."
The data Amnesty has-gathered over
the past 10 years on the detention poli-
cies of some 62 nations indicate that
torture is a perennial form of political
oppression.
It would be impossible to enumerate
all the, methods now in use. Old stand-
bys from near drowning and suffoca-
tien to pulling out the fingernails are
still prominent. But "Report on Tor-
ture" also enumerates modern develop-
ments. The omnipresent electric shock
Is probably the key contribution of ad-
vanced technology. Psychological and
manipulative techniques, such as sen-
sory deprivation, isolation, exhaustion,
degradation and threats (of permanent
injury, disease, economic retaliation,
'or harm to one's family) are more
widely and sometimes more cleverly
applied. Sagan relates that in Brazil
and the Soviet Union the secret police
have been known to torture people
while showing slides of members of
their families, creating an association
.of family with pain. ? '
Perhaps . the most , important new
weapons aVailable to modern torture
are the scores of drugs which terrify
and melt the will of their victims.
None of these drugs can force anyone
to reveal what he has the courage to
withhold; most, if the victim surviVes,
'will have no lasting physiological ef-
fects, though the emotional damage is
frequently severe and permanent; and
virtually all have some legitimate med-
:
g
?al use.. But the fears of the victim,
the threatening' atmosphere and the
extremely unpleasant physical sensa-
tions make these medicines a potent
form of terrer. ?
While a sadist is the most likely can-
didate for a career in interrogation, re-
cent clinical tests seem to demonstrate
that many peonle, normally indisposed'
to cruelty, will nonetheless administer
pain if told to do so by someone in au-
thority. That is a crucial point when
one considers the scores of doctors and
nurses?some of whom are presumably
not sadists?who, in the ultimate per-
version of their professional roles,
show up at secret police villas to act as
consultants and practitioners of the
black mechanics of interrogation.
-"Torture could not take place without
the cooperation of physicians," says
Sagan. "It is the doctor who examines
.the prisoner before interrogation, it is
the doctor who says, how far they ca:n
go, it is the doctor who treats the vic-
tim of torture and who remains si-
lent."
It must be understood that torture is
a very inefficient means of gathering
Information and for the most part is'
not used for that purpose. That fact is
reflected in the black humor of South
Vietnamese interrogators, who have
been heard to- say, "If they're not
guilty, torture them until they are!"
'Torture is a weapon, widely perceived
as a proper response to domestic or
colonial insurrection, and sometimes
openly advocated by counter-insur-
gency strategists. All told, according
to the Arimesty report, at least 31-.1 na-
tions use torture as an administrative
routine and have given free rein to
men and women who achieve personal
gratification from the destruction of
other human beings. These torture
states share information, educate tor-
ture trainees from less developed po-
lice states, and have even produced
films on the subject (one found in the
secret police headquarters in Portugal
was made in part to instruct prison
-doctors).
Unfortunately, many victims of tor-
ture, including Sagan, have been un-
willing to discuss their ordeals. Tor-
ture victims are often deeply ashamed
of what has been done to them and
what they have been made to do. Many
have lasting and often disastrous emo-
tional disorders.
"I wasn't able to talk about it for
many years because of the humiliation
and the degradation that they forced
on me," says Sagan. "That is why I
feel strongly that the Amnesty project
of help to care for the victims of tor-
ture and to rehabilitate them psycho-
logically is an urgent- and crucial one.
I wouldn't want anyone to go through
years without being able to share, to
talk, and to be -assured that we are hu-
Man beings still. It is hard for any psr-
son to think himself still human after
they strap you to a table, after they-?n-
suit you, and after they force on you
these unspeakable, unspeakable, un-
speakable, unspeakable actions."
Sex, degradation and power form a
special weaveln the torturer's mental-
ity. An obsession -with excrement and
urine and forcing prisoners to smear
themselves is common. So is rape and
'demeaning sexual positions.
What Amnesty offers the politica
prisoner and the victim of torture is
the promise that his case will not be
forgotten. Its basic organizational unit,
the "group," is responsible for three
_
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Prisoners of conscience?one from the
Eastern bloc, one from the West, and
one .from a nonaligned nation. This
careful policy of neutrality has been a
key to Amnesty's suctess, and with po-
litical oppression so widespread, the
meticulous nonpartisanship is unfortu-
nately easy to maintain.
- Letters on behalf of adopted prison-
ers are sent to the United Nations and
other international bodies, to the
press, and to the responsible govern-
ment, Amnesty International sends ob-
servers to trials of those accused of po-
litical crimes and, when possible, visits
prisons and interviews prisoners and
ex-prisoners.
Its success is a testament to -the
power of public opinion. And yet,
within and without the responsible
state, public opinion iS a difficult
weapon to mobilize. "I can understand
the fear," says Sagan. "Anything that
threatens the status quo or the fragil-
ity of our day-to-day existence is better
ptished back into the unconscious. It is
much more comfortable to go on with
our daily lives without worrying about
the man in Czechoslovakia who has
been picked up, who has lost his -job,
'who is being held some place incom-
municado. But the only way to break
the power of the secret police is if
enough people speak up."'
Can it happen here? Amnesty does
have 30 prisoners of conscience in the
United States, most of them members
of ethnic minorities who were caught
in situations where racial and/or polit-
ical prejudice was evident in the ar-
rest, conviction or sentencing. It has
also described numerous instances of
police and prison brutality. But regard-
ing torture, it has concluded: "It would
be incorrect to suggest that there is an
administrative practice of torture by
.the law-enforcement. authorities -of the
United States within their own domes-
tic jurisdiction."
Still, there is reason to be concerned
about the U:S. position. As a major
supplier of funds and hardware for
'foreign military and secret police, the
country bears a responsibility, for how
these resources are used. Our govern-
ment has never officially condemned
the practice of torture in Brazil, al-
though there is no disputing its preva-
lence, and there is a persistent suspi-
cion, bluntly portrayed in the movie
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
18 February 1975
Weatherman links -
traced to Cuba, Hanoi
Washington
Leaders of the militant Weatherman
group were trained in Cuba and in
North Vietnam in guerrilla warfare
tactics, including use of sophisticated
military weapons, according to
congressional testimony released here.
" The allegation of a connection
between the radical organization and
the Cubans and North Vietnamese was
made in a report released by the
Senate internal-security subcommittee
which interivewed a former member of
the Weatherman underground.
The witness, Larry Grathwohl, a
onetime informer for the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, also told the
panel that one member of the
Weatherman group, Naomi Jaffe, had
told him that in addition to Cuba she
had been in North Vietnam, where she
had been trained to use an anti-aircraft
gun.
Mr. Grathwohl said the the
Weatherman leaders told him that the
Cubans and the Vietnamese were more
concerned with propaganda and
keeping the radical movement alive in
the United States than with actively
promoting a revolution.
"State' of Siege," that the United.
States provides the training for many
-of Latin America's novice interroga-
tors. To bring the issue even closer to
home there have been widespread re-
ports, abundantly documented by the
confessions of repentant GIs, of direct
involvement of American troops in the
torture of Vietnamese.
The very personal quality of caring
which Amnesty offers is evident in the
title of a new quarterly magazine,
Matchbox, which is being published by
the West Coast office. The name de-
rives from an incident during Sagan's
imprisonment by the Gestapo. A few
nights after she had been, forced to
watch a comrade tortured to death,
one of her jailers began cursing her
and then kicked open the door to her
cell and threw ,in a loaf of bread. "I
was hungry, I wanted .to eat, but at the
same time the thought crossed my
mind that perhaps it was poisoned. But
when I picked it up and started eating,
I chewed on something hard. It was a
little matchbox. There were matches
inside and a piece of paper saying:
`Coraggio. Lavoricimo per te.' Take
courage, we are working for you,":
? .
27
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New Statesman 14 February 1975
Dev Murarka
light of
41119UMW
171460TIONOMMINWASOMIZI
ussia's ip issidents
e fragmentation and destruction of a
mall world is never an ennobling sight.
hen this happens due to avoidable mis-
es, it is all the more tragic. That this
as been happening to the world of Soviet
*ssidence has been obvious for the past
ouple of years. Now the process is accele-
ting and the last fortnight has revealed,
s never before, the serious plight and
gony in which the Soviet dissidents now
d themselves. The situation is leading to
elf-questioning and doubts about the whole
pproach to dissidence which came to be
dopted during the past decade. More
ignificantly, some .of the dissidents them-
Ives are now questioning the motives of
noisy claque of dissidentologists who have
perated in their name abroad and who
ear no small responsibility for their
estniction:
The centr.1 issue before dissidents now
whether they continue to believe and
-ork on the basis that reforms and change
an be thrust down the throats of the
oviet leaders by the American Congress
d Administration and Western press pro-
aganda, or whether they themselves have
do something as well beside issuing
atements to the Western press at the drop
I a hat. The American Trade Bill episode
only the latest in a chain of experiences
hich have convinced many of them that
^ from bringing deliverance, the Western
kage has brought them ruin.
It may indeed prove to be the most im-
rtant of all fall-outs from the rejection
the Trade Bill, with its emigration
ause, by the Soviet authorities. Surpris-
gly, this aspect of the tangled story of
e Trade Bill seems to have received the
ast attention. The pundits have been far
o busy agonising about whether the
erican monopolies would be able to
ake huge profits out of trade with the
viet Union or not. Is it not amazing,
me to think of it, that the original pur-
se of the Jackson amendment has been
thoroughly lost sight of that only its
ended beneficiaries, now its victims, the
sidents, remember it at all?
That it has become a serious problem
the dissidents was made clear in a
urageous statement by the dissident
torian Roy Medvedev, who roundly de-
unced the antics of Senator Henry
kson. His acid critique of Jackson called
n the American public to judge the
tives of their politicians and decide to
at degree the dramatic fate of the Soviet
s really disturbed Senator Jackson and
what extent he made use of the tragedy
tens of thousands of Jews in the Soviet
ion to aid his personal career and his
btful political speculations'. He accused
[phone]=1118aC=POZLICEMNSXMICIEWIMMilli
the Senator of being motivated by a desire
to impose humiliating conditions upon the
Soviet regime, thus ruining a compromise
which had .been made possible over a long
period and with much difficulty.
The essence of Medvedev's argument is
that any advance in political reforms in the
Soviet Union can only come through a
dialogue with the Soviet authorities and
not through external pressure, which only
backfires in the end and halts any mean-
ingful breakthroughs. At the core is
Medvedev's belief that the Soviet leaders
and bureaucracy are not a monolithic bloc
impervious to progress and standing firm
against change. In his view, they are
approachable and susceptible to persuasion
in the matter of changes. Medvedev himself
recognises that it is an extremely slow
process and the changes may come too
slowly for some. But, he seems to ask, is
there any viable alternative to it? Besides,
in his view, there are different sections of
the leadership and the bureaucracy which
can provide an internal pressure group
against the no-changers. But to put visible,
overwhelming outside pressure closes all
ranks and makes change much more diffi-
cult. Whether the thesis is entirely correct
or not, and many dissidents disagree with
it now and have disagreed with it in the
past, the significant fact is that more dis-
sidents and sympathisers are now listening
to Medvedev's ideas and some are even ad-
mitting that he has proved to be right.
Medvedev's thesis is not a new one.
Nearly two years ago, he warned of the
harm done to the dissident cause by its
connections with the Western press and
some of its backers abroad. At the time,
he refrained from. questioning the motives
of such supporters. But his frontal attack
on Jackson's motives is intended to have a
wider implication since it is not only Jack-
son who has waxed eloquent and fat on
the Jewish and dissident theme. Dissident-
?logy, in fact, has become a well-established
minor and self-supporting industry in the
West, with little relevance or benefit to the
dissident cause, as distinct from individual
dissidents. Medvedev himself will be the
last one to deny that publicity abroad has
some merit.
However, he also feels strongly that its
merit is increasingly outweighed by the dis-
advantages it brings, the worst being the
discredit it brings to the dissident cause in
the eyes of the Soviet common people, who
are often unable to distinguish between
such publicity and collaboration with
foreign enemies. This is the crucial dis-
sident dilemma now. How can the dissidents
hope to make changes if they have no
support or credibility with the public at
2.8
home? Some of them now. go even farther
and ask themselves: what have we really
done to rally support, leave aside deserving
it? Indeed, it is becoming .a new source of
strong resentment for many of them that
some of their potential leaders have been
destroyed through being turned into sacred
cows by the Western dissidentologists. To
be sure, they are very profitable cows for
the dissidentologists themselves, but it
brings no profit to the dissidents here and
much pain and humiliation. It is also
resented that through their extensive con-
trol and influence over the publicity media
the dissidentologists prevent any balanced
picture of the problems of dissidence being
presented, those attempting to do so being
silenced by ridicule, abuse, slander, and
other means. Thus a gross misrepresenta-
tion of the dissident reality is taking place,
in which some established figures are pro-
claimed heroes, others are made out to be
fools, knaves or non-existent because the
armchair revolutionaries in Washington,
Paris or London know the dissidents' prob-
lems better than the dissidents themselves.
It is significant, too, that this time only
a feeble rejoinder to Medvedev's statement
has come from Dr Andrei Sakharov, the
other distinguished dissident still in Moscow.
Two years ago Medvedev had warned that
to involve the American Administration in
legislation about emigration or other in-
ternal Soviet issues, as Dr Sakharov and his
associates were urging, would prove to he
disastrous. Indeed, Mr Sakharov even
called upon' the American senator to make
these conditions tougher. Now even Dr
Sakharov has avoided any praise for
Senator Jackson and merely declared that
the Congress and the US President should
continue on their path of 'principled
politics'.
Many dissidents are also coming rotmd
to think that the whole emphasis put on
emigration in recent years is fundamentally
wrong. Ultimately, emigration is a denial
of and escape from dissidence, not its
affirmation.
A well-known dissident, mathematician
and professor, Igor Shaferevich, who is a
contributor to a Solzhenitsyn'anthology
of dissident writings, has implied that such
emigration on the part of dissidents was a
sign of weakness, their inability to with-
stand pressure and suffering. Naturally,
such a charge is resented and it has brought
a stinging reply from Yuli Daniel, still here,
and a close friend of Andrei Sinyavsky, the
literary critic, who has emigrated to Paris
Daniel argued that those writers and artists
who have left for the West 'can work for
the future and in the future their 'ors
will come back to the fatherland'. This
may be so, but in the eyes of many dis-
sidents remaining behind the emigrants arc
becoming irrelevant to their struggle none
the less.
Such dissensions, tearing the fabric or
dissidence 'apart, arc, unfortunately, likely
to grow even more' as the movement
weakens and falls apart. There is no sign
of any new source of vitality yet. If at
dissidents do survive, it would be only
through self-renewal and a more realistic
reappraisal of their means as well as goals.
Such change will not be painless and im-
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mediate results will be practically invisible.
But unless it can be done the dissidents,
instead of the state, will wither away.
Equally, somehow they . will have to dis-
card the croSs of dissidentologists which is
proving fatally heavy for the health of
dissidence to bear.
Moscow
CHRIST IAN SCIENCE MONITOR
21 February 1975
Jilie Fon a
s eaks frankly
in Nilo=
By Dev Murarka
Special to
? The Christian Science Monitor
Moscow
Jane Fonda, the political activist
actress, is in the Soviet Union making
a film. And those who have been
following her career are watching to
see how she will react to her stay
here.
Miss Fonda is taking part in the
first Soviet-American co-production
of a film based on the classic tale by
Maurice Maeterlinck "The Blue
Bird." She plays the princess of night.
Most encounters between radical
chics and life as it is in the Soviet
Union have been mutually bruising
because free-wheeling radicalism
makes the Soviets uncomfortable.
They are bewildered by non-con-
formist behavior amidst them, though
It is admired from a distance.
For the time being, however, Miss
Fonda's views, as she explained them
In on interview published Feb. 19 in
the Literaturnaya Gazeta, fit in with
the Soviet perceptions on such mat-
ters.
Her interview was given to Soviet
script writer ?Alexei Kapler , who
adapted the story for the film. (Mr.
Kapler is remembered by many as
the man who was sent to a prison
camp as a British spy because Sta-
_ lin's daughter Svetlana fell in love
with him. Svetlana now lives in the
United States.) '
The political undertone of the inter-
view was apparent. "I'm not easily
scared," Miss Fonda retorted in re-
'
sponse to a question about strong
feelings aroused in certain American
circles because of her activities
against the Vietnam war.
As usual Miss Fonda was elegantly
caustic in her comments upon most
subjects, ranging from Hollywood to
new-wave films., She spared no one,
Newsweek, March 3, 1975
THE RUSSIANS ARE COMING
though she took the opportunity to
express her thanks "for the assis-
tance Which the Soviet people are
sending to Vietnam." However, she
bluntly pointed out -- underlining the
political motives behind the fuss
being made about her here ? that "in
the Soviet Union people know more
about me as a fighter against the
Vietnam war than as a film actress." ?
She went on to say that of all- her
films she liked only "Klute" anti
"They Shoot 'Horses, Don't They?"
which is the one film of Miss Fonda
.well known in the U.S.S.R. "Klute"
could never pass the official prudery
of the censors which stifles the arts
here, particularly the stage and the
.screen,.
? But the Welcome being given to
? Miss Fonda is more out of political
admiration for her than anything else.
This is evident from the comments by
Mr. Kepler which precede the Inter-
view in which she is described as a
'"well-known American actress and
political personality." ?
' The title of the interview. tti ."..Tane
? Fonda ? anthstar."
' On Hollywood Miss Fonda said: "At
present in Hollywood It. is' becoming/
Increasingly difficult to make films in
which it would be possible -to convey
something important. "
Expressink her philosophy of films,'
Miss Fonda explained to the Soviet
readers that a work of art should not
be meant only for film critics and
intellectuals. She went on to -claim
that "the country where very inter->.
eating films are being made' al
present is Cuba."'" 7
Ideology sits heavily on the soviet
arts:though it is done in the name Of
Marxism. Miss' Fonda ' has yet to
realize perhaps that -while Manciiit
'critiques of bourgeois art are Mural=
.nating, Marxist practices in the arts
? are with few exceptions boring. t?:?
These few exceptions are found
mostly in the category of dissident or
near dissident art, which is only
reluctantly given recognition, as was
the case with :the film "Rublev.!
Directed by Andrei Tarkovsky, the
film about Russia's most famous icon
artist received international acclaim
at the 1.989 Cannes Film Festival.' ?
A swarm of young Soviet diplomats has invaded Capi-
tol Hill recently, but the well-schooled and intellectual
Russians are making no effort to gather information. In-
stead they are working to build friendly ties with young
Congressional staff members, those who can be expected
to stay and move up into key committee posts. American
,intelligence chiefs are expressing concern about the de-
velopment, mainly because of the fact that Soviet dip-
lomatic personnel often double as members of Russian
intelligence.
29
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ATLANTIC MONTHLY
FEBRUARY 1975
AMERICA'S MEDITERRANEAN BUNGLE
Cyprus, like Israel, Czechoslova-
kia, and Laos, is one of those small
spots on the map whose global im-
portance far exceeds their size. Thus
the ouster last July of Archbishop
Makarios, the president of the is-
land state, was an incident of inter-
national significance. The coup
d'etat, staged by surrogates of the
military regime that then ruled
Greece, touched off a complex crisis
whose repercussions are bound to
ripple beyond' the Mediterranean
for some time to come. Not long
ago, when 1 suggested to an Ameri-
can official that the United States
may have been scarred by the crisis,
he replied: "The wounds have to heal
before we are scarred."
The coup triggered a traumatic
sequence of events. Turkey, which
had long sought to control Cyprus,
used the fall of Makarios as a pre-
text to invade the island, thereby
upsetting the fragile balance be-
tween its Greek and Turkish com-
munities and heightening the pros-
pect of chronic religious and ethnic
tensions similar to those that plague
Ulster. Although Greece and Tur-
key narrowly averted a direct con-
flict, the episode exacerbated tradi-
tional animosities between them
which are likely to explode over
other issues., such as their rival
claims to Aegean oil deposits. Dis-
mayed by the U.S. role in the af-
fair, the civilian Greek government
that supplanted the junta withdrew
from the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization, leaving a gap in the al-
liance's southern defenses, where the
Soviet Union has been strength-
ening its forces.
Moreover, the hostility against the
United States that has surfaced in
both Greece and Turkey makes it
unlikely that either country will co-
operate in ,American efforts to sup-
ply Israel if another war erupts in
the Middle East. In Washington,
meanwhile, congressional dis-
pleasure with Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger's handling of the
situation has diluted his authority
on Capitol Hill and revealed the ex-
tent to which he and President Ford
differ in their attitudes toward the
legislature on foreign policy matters.
Kissinger holds a large measure
of responsibility for the crisis. He
deliberately chose to disregard
warnings that the Greek dictator-
ship was plotting to topple Ma-
karios, and, rejecting the advice of
State Department and Pentagon
specialists, he did nothing to min-
imize the impact. of the coup after it
had occurred. There is no doubt
that he was preoccupied at the time
by the impeachment proceedings
then building up against President
Nixon. But his refusal to bring pres-
sure to bear on the Greek generals
was mainly motivated by his reluc-
tance to ruffle them and, in the pro-
cess, court the risk of jeopardizing
U.S. and NATO military installa-
tions in Greece. In that respect his
conduct was consistent with the pol-
icy pursued by the United States in
the area since the end of World
War II.
Washington's approach to the re-
gion through the years had essen-
tially been founded on an estimate
of Greece's. strategic value in the
struggle against communism and in
the quest for equilibrium in the
Middle East. The primary American
objective in Greece was the preser-
vation of U.S. and NATO bases
and other facilities there?even if
this meant backing autocratic, un-
popular, and inept Greek regimes.
During the 1950s, therefore, Ameri-
can diplomatic, military, and intelli-
gence representatives in Greece sup-
ported right-wing Greek political
figures who promised to maintain
the status quo. Presidents Johnson
and Nixon carried forth the same?
line by aiding the egregious dicta-
torship that ran the country from
1967 until last summer. Ironically,
however, this policy contributed de-
cisively to the very instability it was
supposed to prevent.
The American tendency to sup-
port Greek conservatives goes back
to the days of the Communist rebel-
lion, when security was a key con-
sideration. The United States should
logically have encouraged the devel-
opment of democratic institutions
after the insurgency waned in the
late 1940s, but American strategists
were turned in the ?opposite direc-
tion by two events: the Communist
take-over of Czechoslovakia, and
the outbreak of the Korean War.
Washington hastily pushed Greece
into NATO, and, along with this
determination to incorporate Greece
into the U.S. orbit, the United
States also moved to ensure that the
30
Greek government would respond
to American dictates. In other
words, the realities of Greek politi-
cal life were subordinated to
broader American imperatives in
the Cold War.
The American who set the pattern
for this approach was John Peuri-
foy, the U.S. ambassador in Athens
during the early 1950s. A dynamic
diplomat, dedicated to the notion
that American intervention in
Greece's internal affairs was salu-
tary, Peurifoy behaved more like a
viceroy than an emissary. Seeking a
solid Greek personage to manage
the government, he persuaded Mar-
shal Alexander Papagos to form a
political party. With Central Intelli-
gence Agency operatives acting as
his intermediaries, he encouraged
numbers of Greek politicians to join
the -.?,w movement, in several in-
stances offering them rewards to do
so. When Papagos failed to make
much headway, Peurifoy bluntly
threatened to curb U.S. aid unless
Greece's electoral procedures were
changed from a proportional to a
plurality system. In the 1952 elec-
tion, Papagos' party managed to
gain control of Parliament even
though it won fewer than half of
the votes that were cast throughout
the country.
Obsessed with keeping Greece on
an anti-Communist track, American
officials supervised their Greek
counterparts or indirectly influenced
their activities. An American eco-
nomic expert attended meetings of
the Greek Cabinet, and U.S. mili-
tary advisers were attached to
Greek army units, most of whose
commanders had been trained in
the United States. The CIA was
particularly close to the Greek es-
tablishment. Its agents, many of
whom were of Greek origin and
spoke the language fluently, created
special bonds with the Greek lead-
ers. And Queen Frederika was fond
of Allen Dulles, then the CIA direc-
tor, so the agency carried unusual
weight in the palace. It also. exer-
cised extraordinary ?authority
through the Greek Central Intelli-
gence Service (K.Y.P.), which it had
organized and continued to subsi-
dize. At one point during the 1950s,
a former CIA man recalled, the
agency was financing all but two of
Athens' sixteen newspapers.
It would be unfair to assume that
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most Greeks, at least during that
period, resented American patron-
age. But, as they saw it, this link
imposed upon the United States the
obligation to further Greek inter-
ests; they would later feel disap-
pointed, and even betrayed, when
Washington abandoned them to a
dictatorship or rejected their posi-
tion on the sensitive Cyprus issue.
By the early 1960s, the Greek po-
litical scene was fragmenting as new
forces, mirroring changes in the eco-
nomic and social landscape, began
to emerge. Prime Minister Con-
stantine Caramanlis, who had gov-
erned for eight years and was re-
sponsible for much of the economic
progress, finally clashed with the
royal family and voluntarily exiled
himself to Paris. Elections in 1964
swept in George Papandreou and
his brilliant, erratic son, Andreas, a
former American citizen who had
taught economics at the University
of California. The liberal Pa-
pandreous, who were enormously
popular in the new climate, soon
became the focal point of Greek
and U.S. intrigues.
The Kennedy Administration,
which believed that reform was the
best defense against communism,
? tried to tilt toward the Papandreous.
But President Kennedy's ambassa-
dor in Athens could not control the
CIA and military advisers in his
mission, and they continued to sup-
port their own prot?s. A bitter
dispute arose, for example, when
? Andreas Papandreou attempted to
break the tight liaison between the
CIA and the K.Y.P. He was after-
ward accused of plotting to take
over the government, and although
there was no hard evidence against
him, King Constantine and his con-
servative sympathizers, helped by
the CIA and American military
men, used the allegations for politi-
cal purposes. They spread rumors
against Andreas, and by paying pol-
iticians to quit his father's party,
managed to bring down the Pa-
pandreou Cabinet. But nobody else
could form a durable government.
The king considered setting up a
? right-wing regime under his own
aegis, but was warned that the
United States would not tolerate an
unconstitutional bid for power. So
new elections were scheduled for
May, 1967. They never took place.
As the elections drew near, the
CIA learned that the king and a
group of generals were planning a
coup d'etat to forestall the Pa-
pandreous, who seemed certain to
win. Anxious to "save democracy,"
the CIA station in Athens proposed
that the elections be rigged to favor
the conservatives and thereby re-
move the pretext for the coup. But
the suggestion aroused little enthusi-
asm, either in the U.S. mission or in
Washington. The American military
advisers in Greece welcomed the
rise to power of their Greek col-
leagues. The U.S. ambassador, Phil-
lips Talbot, opposed the scheme on
principle, and he was supported by
Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who
feared that it might backfire. Thus
the American representatives in
Athens waited for the coup, while
Talbot, in a series of audiences with
the king, expressed the hope that it
would be gentle.
To everyone's surprise, however,
the king and his generals were pre-
empted by an obscure colonel,
George Papadopoulos. Talbot ca-
bled Washington, decrying "the
rape of Greek democracy," and
pleaded for a denunciation of the
coup by the State Department. But
Rusk ruled against it, instead is-
suing a watery statement voicing
hope that the junta "will make ev-
ery effort to reestablish democratic
institutions." His judgment was ap-
plauded by the Pentagon, which ar-
gued that Papadopoulos might close
U.S. and NATO bases if put under
pressure. As a gesture to Congress,
the Johnson Administration stopped
sending tanks, aircraft, and other
heavy equipment to Papadopoulos,
but continued to give him rifles,
ammunition, jeeps, spare parts, and
the other materiel he needed to
maintain internal security. Washing-
ton hoped that the king might
somehow restore democracy. But
that dream evaporated in Decem-
ber, 1967, when the king failed in
an abortive countercoup and went
into exile.
After that, the Johnson Adminis-
tration began to fantasize that Pa-
padopoulos would- return to consti-
tutional government, and by way of
placating him, resumed shipments
of heavy arms to Greece. But the
junta continued to rule with a firm
? hand. Oddly enough, in light of his
later attitude, President Nixon ini-
tially adopted a tougher stance
toward Papadopoulos. He reimposed
the ban on deliveries of heavy mili-
tary materiel, left the post of am-
bassador to Athens vacant, and en-
couraged his aides to criticize the
dictatorship. In July, 1969, for ex-
ample, Secretary of Defense Melvin
Laird vowed that the partial freeze
on military aid "will be continued
until progress is made toward more
democratic procedures in that. coun-
try."
But late in 1969, as tensions in
the Middle East appeared to in-
tensify, Nixon reassessed his policy
toward Greece. He named one of
his favorite diplomats, Henry Tasca,
ambassador to Athens, and that
move signaled a major shift in the
U.S. line. Not long after arriving at
his post, Tasca eliminated members
of his staff considered inimical to
the military regime, and he directed
his subordinates to portray the junta
favorably in dispatches to Washing-
ton. Visits by prominent Americans
to Greece were to become a con-
scious ploy filled with deep signifi-
cance. Despite his earlier avowal
that he would not lift the military
aid embargo before the rebirth of
democracy, Laird appeared in
Athens following the full resump-
tion of arms shipments in Septem-
ber, 1970; his arrival coincided with
a U.S. pronouncement that "the
trend toward constitutional order is
established"_ in Greece. And when
Vice President Agnew traveled to
Greece to see his family's village, it
appeared that his trip was designed
to assert U.S. backing for the junta.
By the summer of 1973, Tasca's
illusory confidence in Papadopoulos
had faded. In July, on the eve of a
rigged referendum contrived to con-
firm the dictatorship, he warned Pa-
padopoulos that U.S. public opinion
demanded a free election. In No-
vember, when the regime collapsed,
he urged Washington to bring back
fon-- er Prime Minister Caramanlis.
But Nixon personally ordered him
to stick by General Demetrios Joan-
nides, the military police chief who
had taken over the government, and
Kissinger reportedly advised him
against "interference" in Greece's
internal affairs. Tasca obeyed, even
though it was clear by early 1974
that Ioannides was doomed because
of his own incompetence, and that
his downfall would rebound against
the United States. Among others,
Democratic Representative Donald
Fraser of Minnesota foresaw this on
a trip to Athens in January. "The
present government cannot long en-
dure," he wrote. "Marked by inex-
perience, its members appear with-
out requisite talents for extricating
the country from its political and
economic chaos. . . . Damage ?has
already occurred to American inter-
ests in Greece and more will occur
before the present situation ends."
The inevitable upheaval was to be
initiated by the Cyprus problem.
The tiny island of Cyprus, which
had gained independence from Brit-
ain in 1960, presented one of those
perennial dilemmas that age
statesmen prematurely. Had it been
located elsewhere, its 520,000 Greek
Cypriots and 120,000 Turkish Cyp-
riots might have learned to coexist
or integrate. But situated as it is, it
became a source of conflict between
Greece and Turkey, both of which
felt compelled to protect their re-
spective ethnic groups. Makarios,
who more or less held the island to-
gether, pleased neither the Greek
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junta nor the Turkish government.
The Turks disliked him because
they suspected, with good reason,
that his long-range aim was to wipe
out the Turkish Cypriot community
by gradually excluding it from the
island's economic development. The
&seek generals detested him be-
cause, by stalling for time, he in-
tended to postpone forever their
cherished dream of aligning Cyprus
with Greece in enosis, or union.
Washington also distrusted him, for
he had traveled to Moscow and Pe-
king, and he tolerated the large but
rather mild Cypriot Communist
party. It was feared that he might
Drze day allow the Soviet Union to
build bases on the island. Some
State Department and Pentagon ele-
ments, apparently forgetting that he
permitted the iCIA to operate moni-
toring stations on Cyprus, called
him the "Castro of the Mediterra-
nean."
But America's principal objective
in regard to Cyprus was to prevent
it from poisoning relations between
Greece and .Turkey, both members
of NATO. American attempts to
fulfill that goal, however, merely
strained U.S. ties with its two allies.
For example, an idea for partition
conceived by Dean Acheson was
viewed by Greece as a tricky device
to give a part of the island to Tur-
key. Similarly, President Johnson in-
furiated the Turks when, by threat-
ening to cut off their aid, he
blocked their plans to invade Cy-
prus. Consequently, Kissinger
sought to stay out of the problem.
During a brief visit to Nicosia in
the spring of 1974, he facetiously re-
marked to local reporters that, de-
spite his diplomatic triumphs in
Vietnam and the Middle East, he
would never .get caught in the Cy-
prus tangle, But if he had been
reading CIA reports from Athens,
as he presumably was, Kissinger
must have known that a Cyprus
crisis was brewing and the United
States mighebe drawn into it.
Papadopoulos had tried at least
four times to oust Makarios, and
loannides was determined to suc-
ceed where his predecessor had
failed. Soon after seizing power, he
set up a branch of his junta in Cy-
prus under the Cypriot National
Guard commander, General George
Denizis, and it coordinated activities
. with a Greek army contingent as-
signed to the island. Ioapnides ? also
recruited the fanatical remnants of
the National Organization of Cyp-
riot Combatants, now known as
EOKA-B, which had originally been
created by the guerrilla chief
George Grivas to fight the British.
The assault against Makarios was
timed for late April, but loannides
delayed it because a dispute had
flared up between Greece and Tur-.
key over oil exploration rights in
the Aegean Sea. By mid-spring, de-
tails of the plot were reaching
Washington from the U.S. mission
in Athens, and the first authoritative
information on it emerged in late
June, when loannides communi-
cated the plan to a CIA contact in
an apparent effort to sound out U.S.
reaction.
The State Department immedi-
ately instructed Tasca to tell loan-
nides that the United States strongly
opposed the coup. The envoy de-
clined to deliver the message per-
sonally, on the grounds that, as he
later said, "it was not the ambassa-
dor's job to make diplomatic de-
marches to a cop." But he assured
Washington that loannides had re-
ceived the word. The State Depart-
ment was unconvinced, however.
Another message went out to Tasca,
and the same reply came back. Still
Washington doubted that Tasca,
who had covered up for the junta in
?the past, was doing his job. At that
stage, it seems to me, Kissinger
might have dispatched a special em-
issary to Athens to discourage loan-
nides more forcefully. Not only did
he do nothing, but some weeks later
he denied having had advance
knowledge of the coup, saying that
infoimation on the affair "was not
exactly lying on the street."
Makarios, who had watched the
conspiracy against himself build up,
now calculated that he might dis-
courage loannides by making the
plot public. On July 2, he wrote to
Phaedon Gizikis, the figurehead
president of Greece, complaining of
the plot and demanding that the
junta's agents on Cyprus be recalled
to Greece. He published the letter a
few days later, along with a plan of
the coup. But his tactic misfired. On
July 6, loannides ordered his aides
to prepare for action and sent Gen-
eral Michael Georgitsis to Cyprus to
assume command of the operation.
At the same time, the government-
controlled Athens press announced?
that the junta would discuss the Cy-
prus question over the following
weekend. But that report was a
smoke screen, contrived to create
the impression that the coup was
still in the blueprint stage. On July
15, while the conference was sup-
posedly taking place, units on Cy-
prus loyal to loannides attacked the
presidential palace in Nicosia. Ma-
karios miraculously escaped to a
British air base on the island, and
was flown to London. In his place, '
loannides installed Nicos Sampson,
a notorious thug known to have
killed several British soldiers and
Turkish Cypriots.
In Washington, State Department
and Pentagon experts urged Kissin-
ger to denounce the appointment of
Sampson and issue a statement, like
32
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that put out by the British, asserting
that the United States still recog-
nized Makarios. The experts con-
tended, among their other argu-
ments, that the elevation of
Sampson would be interpreted by
the Turks to signify a virtual take-
over of Cyprus by the Greek junta,
and would prompt Turkey to invade
the island. But Kissinger rebuffed
their counsel, partly because he con-
sidered Makarios to be "politically
dead," and partly because he feared
that the alienation of loannides
might jeopardize U.S. and NATO
bases in Greece. Accordingly, a
State Department spokesman dealt
with the situation in an evenhanded
manner. As the experts had pre-
dicted, the Turks were alarmed.
"Pray for me"
Bulent Ecevit, then head of the
Turkish government, is hardly a bel-
ligerent figure. On the contrary, he
is a quiet, earnest intellectual who
has translated T. S. Eliot and Ezra
Pound; his dream is to transform
Turkey into a sort of Scandinavian-
like social democracy. But the na-
tionalistic Turkish army, which had
been humiliated by the Cyprus issue
in the past, hovered in the wings of
his government last summer. Fur-
thermore, Ecevit is enough of a na-
tionalist himself to have been
aroused by the Greek junta's thrust
on the island. So, within a day after
Makarios fell, he ordered the Turk-
ish forces to mobilize for an in-
vasion of Cyprus. To give diplo-
macy a chance, however, Ecevit flew
to London to consult with the Brit-
ish, who, along with Greece and
Turkey, had guaranteed the inde-
pendence of Cyprus in 1960. He
presented the British foreign secre-
tary, James Callaghan, with four
proposals: that Sampson be re-
moved; that the Greek soldiers in-
volved in the coup be sent home;
that Cyprus be given a new federal
system respectful of Turkish Cypriot
rights; and that negotiations to es-
tablish such a system begin immedi-
ately.
In the meantime, Kissinger had
sent Under Secretary of State Jo-
seph Sisco out to calm the crisis.
Sisco heard Ecevit's proposals in
London. He promised to take them
to the Greek junta in Athens and to
deliver an answer to Ecevit later in
the week. But in Athens, all that
Sisco could obtain was arr offer by
Ioannides to replace rather than re-
move the Greek troops on Cyprus.
When he carried this response to
Ankara on the afternoon of July 19,
Ecevit predictably rejected ,it. Sisco
then went back to Athens to per-
suade the Greeks to do better. They
refused, and he returned to Ankara
that night to plead with Ecevit for
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more time. Kissinger also had a
dozen telephone conversations with
Ecevit, but to no avail. The Turks
would not be deterred unless
Greece made concessions, and the
Greek junta, which considered the
Turkish threat a bluff, believed that
Kissinger could stop Turkey just as
Lyndon Johnson had. Tasca, desper-
ate to prevent the Turkish invasion,
appealed to the Pentagon to deploy
the Sixth Fleet in the area. Kissin-
ger intercepted the message and
shot back a cable calling the idea
"hysterical." Thus the Turks landed
on Cyprus on July 20, and their
performance was appalling. They
sank one of their own ships,
dropped their paratroopers off tar-
get, and made little progress ad-
vancing from their beachhead.
In Athens the next day, Ioannides
announced that he would counter-
attack along the mainland Turkish
border, but his commanders, aware
of the odds against them, claimed to
be unprepared. By now Sisco was
back in Greece, trying to arrange a
cease-fire in Cyprus. But Idannides
had disappeared, and Sisco dealt
with Peter Arapalcis, the Navy chief,
who agreed to halt hostilities on
July 22. The morning after, Presi-
dent Gizikis called in the senior
commanders and a group of promi-
nent politicians from rival parties.
1:/yr Co?/1.6?N;1,1"/ t11.1/ bnel ?2CITAPII tfl
bring Caramanlis back. "Pray for
me," Caramanlis said to? reporters as
he departed from Paris.
The cease-fire on Cyprus had not
ended the crisis, however. In re-
sponse to U.S. and British appeals,
the Turks and Greeks met in Ge-
neva on August 8 to open negotia-
tions on the status of the island.
The Turks, perceiving the Greeks to
be weak, were really not in a bar-
gaining mood. In the first place,
they were clinging to a precarious
position on the ground on Cyprus,
and they realized that they could
not gain at the conference table
what they had not won on the bat-
tlefield. Secondly, they feared a set-
tlement that might prevent them
from launching a fresh military
drive. Their apprehensions were fur-
ther fueled by the fact that the Brit-
ish had reinforced their bases on
the island with a battalion of Gur-
khas and a squadron of Phantom
jets. Therefore, when the Greeks
asked for a thirty-six-hour adjourn-
ment of the conference to study
their proposals for a federal system
in Cyprus, the Turks spurned the
request, and instead began a new
military offensive that gave their
forces nearly half the island. Be-
yond exhorting them to show flexi-
bility, the United States did nothing
to stop the Turks. Now it was Tur-
key's turn to threaten to withdraw
from NATO if American pressure
were applied, and Kissinger
evidently submitted to the tactic.
Congress, which had been too
busy during the summer with the
impeachment inquiry to react to the
Turkish actions, went off like a time
bomb in September. Arguing that
the Turks had violated the law by
using American military aid beyond
their own frontiers, Thomas Eagle-
ton in the Senate, and congressmen
of Greek origin such as John Bra-
demas of Indiana and Paul Sar-
banes of Maryland, pushed to stop
U.S. assistance to Turkey. Kissinger
unwittingly helped their case by
telling congressional groups that
"national security" took precedence ?
over the law. President Ford vetoed
two bills designed to penalize the
Turks, and Kissinger, who had
learned about relations with Capitol
Hill under Nixon, reportedly urged
him to veto a third. But Ford ac-
cepted a compromise that, by giving
the Turks until early December to
accede to a Cyprus settlement, ac-
tually constituted a victory for Con-
gress. It also represented a setback
for Kissinger, and it indicated,
along with other signs, that he may
face increasingly hard times with a
new legislature eager to make itself
heard in the field of foreign affairs.
During this legislative episode, a
Greek lobby appeared, which ex-
pects to mobilize a significant nuni-
ber among the estimated two mil-
lion Americans of Greek origin to
exert pressure on Congress.
By the end of the year, there
seemed to be little cause for opti-
mism about the future of the east-
ern Mediterranean and the impact
of the events of last summer on
other parts of the world.
? Cyprus, with a third of its pop-
ulation rendered homeless by the
Turkish invasion, had become a hu-
man shambles and appeared to be
degenerating into a cauldron of
communal strife.
? Ancient hatreds had been re-
THE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER
11 February 1975
Fascists
? plotting
takeover'
Lisbon, FebrUary /0
Southern farmworkers have
. accused Portugal's large lan-
downers of plotting a Fascist
coup, according to a document
. published by the Communist
Party today. The document, a
re.port.prepared at a mass meet-
ing of Southern farmworkers
yesterday, called for the
confiscation of all lands and
goods belonging to those who
carried out social and economic
sabotage.
kindled between Greece and Tur-
key, and neither could any longer
be regarded as a dependable U.S.,
ally, especially in the event of an-
other Middle East war.
? Fresh strains had been put on
the Western alliance, and this would
benefit the Russians, who have been
seeking since the days of The czars
to extend their influence into the re-
gion.
? Secretary of State Kissinger's
credibility, which is vital to his role
as an international diplomatic magi-
cian, has been shaken as a result of
his own miscalculations.
In A World Restored, originally
written as his Harvard doctoral dis-
sertation, Kissinger described the
challenge that confronted Metter-
nich and Castlereagh in 1821, when
the Greeks suffered atrocious repri-
sals after revolting against their
Turkish overlords. European liberals.
of the period were shocked, and
Czar Alexander of Russia planned
action against Turkey. But Metter-
nich and Castlereagh opposed inter-
vention that might jeopardize Euro-
pean stability, insisting, as Kissinger
put it, that "human considerations
were subordinate to maintaining
`the consecrated structure' of Eu.:
rope." Greek lives were thus sacri-
fice,: for the sake of a larger order.
But that policy crumbled with the
death of Castlereagh. Greece, with
British and Russian support, gained
its independence soon afterward.
Although history repeats itself im-
precisely, ICissinger's conduct during
the summer's Mediterranean crisis
strikingly resembles the behavior of
Metternich and Castlereagh more
than a century ago. Concentrating
as he did on the "big picture," he
overlooked the fact that the whole
is the sum of its parts, and that a
tiny island like Cyprus can unhinge
a larger power balance. He may
also have learned that a strategy
predicated mainly on the quest for
security is, in the end, insecure.
?STANLEY KARNow
the elaboration of revolutionary
laws for the punishment of
saboteurs and said all large
,holdings whose value had
increased at the cost of the
people's money should be
expropriated.
" The great landowners ?
discomforted by April 25 (last
year's coup) ? are deeply
'involved in the preparation of
a coup. to make the 'country
return ' to a Fascist-type
.regime," the -document said.:
? " The, economic ? sabotage
carried out by big farmers
since April 25 has a generalised.
character, which presUpposes
the existence of an, authentic
unified plan by the great lan-
downers. ''
?The farinwi;rkers said that-
unless urgent and energetic
measures were taken, .1975*
would be. a year of hunger
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WASHINGTON STAR
18 February 1975
THE fianra Te anekle* Ano
Concerning the develop,
ments in Portugal, a- few
observations:
' The Communists in Portugal
are organized, the non-
Communists are not. Power
generally flows into the hands
of the organized, as distin-
guished from the disorganized,
party. ' Alvaro Cunha', the
leader of the Portuguese
Communists, spent nearly 20
years in Prague. He had
advantages then he did not
have during his exile in
Zurich. Cunhal was well look-
-ad after by his hosts, and he
spent his time creating an
organization against the day,
when a successor dictatorship'
to Salazar's should fall.
WHEN APRIL came, Cun-
hal was there, ready to plot
the subjugation of the Por-
tuguese people. That is the
proper term for it, as the polls
show that the Portuguese are
not an exception to the rule
that the human species will
not elect a Communist dicta-
torship if given a choice. The
question isn't: Will the
Communists win in Portugal
at the general election sched-
-
NEW YORK TIMES
, 23 February 1975
NOVEL ON RED COUP
SiiRRING ITALIANS
?Readers Amused by Caustic
? Portrayals of Politicians
In Anonymous Book
By PAUL HOFMANN
Special to The Neer York Times
ROME, Feb. 22?A political
novel that cannot yet be bought
'in any bookstore has already
become a political and literary
sensation here because of its
:theme?a Communist take-over
in Italy with support from Mos-
cow, Washington and the Vati-
can?and because of the myste-
ry surrounding its author,
. "Anonymous."
The title of this book of fic-
tion, which uses actual political
figures as characters, is ."Ber-
linguer and the Professor." The
first of the title characters is
Enrico Berlinguer, the noble-
uled for April 12? The question,
is: Will there be a fair general
election? The Communists will
not Abide by a fair election,
any more than Lenin did. Like
him, they will simply dissolve
the general assembly ?in this
case the rump parliament set
up by the military ? and pro-
ceed with communization.
? . What should we do about it?
Anything? My guess is that
the CIA is too intimidated
these days to do anything.
How can it do something to
help the Portuguese ,resist en-
slavement by the Communists,
when to do so would involve
the risk of antagonizing
America's new isolationists?
JAMES BURNHAM, collat-
ing the reports of informed,
Journals and commentators in
Europe, writes that Moscow is
sending sums in excess of $10
million per month to Portugal.
And why indeed not? At that
rate even over a period of one
year you are spending less
than A single submarine costs
you. But the tactical and
strategic value to the Soviet
Union of Portugal is worth per-
haps 1,000 submarines.
man from Sardinia who is chief
of the Italian Communist party,
"The professor" is former Pre-
mier Amintore Fanfani, leader
of the Christian Democratic
party.
In the novel no fewer than 27
leading Christian Democrats
die in savage infighting among
their party's factions before the
Communists consolidate their
power. ?
Guessing the Author
Rizzoli, the Milan publishing
house, has announced that
"Berlinguer and the Professor"
will be on sale in a week. But
sets of galley proofs and ad-
vance copies of the 135-page
novel have been circulating for
weeks, and Italians who have
read the book are chuckling
over the sarcastic portrayals of
some of the nation's best-
known figures and are trying to
guess who wrote the book.
, The politician who has been
suggested most often as the au-
thor is former Premier Giulio
Andreotti. Mr. Andreotti, who is
Budget Minister in the present
Government, is the author of
works on 19th-century and
20th-century history and has a
caustic wit that is not typical of
Italian politicians. He also
'3-
-azores, o?
? It is a pity that, during the
SALT talks when Henry Kis-
singer and 'Leonid Brezhnev
Were balancing off permissible
inventories of missiles and
submarines and what not, we
did not think to include coun-
tries. It would have been inter-
esting tO see what would have
happened if we had insisted
that the Soviet Union would
have to limit itself to its cur-
rent quota of slave-satellites.
But one supposes that that
would have busted up the
negotiations.
As to the future, what are
we going to do if? the
Communists take power,
which appears likelier than
not at this moment? They
would, of course, instantly
withdraw Portugal from
NATO, and boot the United'
States out-of the Azores.
Should We accept Cunhal's.
orders, and abandon our bases
in the Azores? Portugal was
admitted into NATO in the '40s
not because the European
NATO powers loved Salazar,
and certainly not as a reward
for Portugal's neutrality dur-
ing the ?.war. Portugal was
heads a -Christian Democratic
faction opposed to Mr. Fanfani,
Mr. Andreotti has publicly
denied authorship of the book,
which promises to become a
best seller.
Killed by a 'Cardinal'
In the fictitious events that
lead to a Communist take-over,
Mr. Andreotti is pictured as
seeking refuge in the Vatican,
but he is killed by a false car-
dinal whose hand he "naively'
kisses.
Another former Premier,
Emilio Colombo, is cast as an
exile who is shot down by a
hired assassin in Brussels. The
present Premier, Aldo Moro, is
depicted as escaping the mas-
sacre of feuding Christian Dem-
ocrats with no more than a
facial scar from a knifing.
Mayhem ends when Mr. Ber-
linguer and Mr. Panfani reach
a deal in which the Commu-
nist becomes chief of a new au-
thoritarian regime and the
Christian Democrat is pro-1
claimed nominal president butt
retires to a convent. A "Pope'
John XXIV" blesses both lead-
ers.
The idea clearly behind the
farcical fiction .is that contin-
34
admitted because, on further
consideration, the generals
gave out the word: We must
have the western coastline of
the Iberian Peninsula; and,
above all, we must have the
Azores.
? ARE WE prepared, in the
event of a coup in Portugal
(which is what, in effect, it
would be), to dissolve NATO,
or to accept it as a military eu-
nuch? Or would we simply
say, as we did when France
fell, that we do not recognize
the legitimacy of the regime?
That, indeed, the full powers
of NATO are legitimately sum-
moned to resist the coloniza-
tion of one of their members
by the superpower which
NATO was sworn to protect
Europe against?
It would not be tactful to say
it in so many words, but I
should think Kissinger could
find a suitably elliptical for-
mulation for saying: "Your
may get away with staging a
coup in Lisbon, boys, but if
you think the Azores go with
it, come on to Washington and
talk it over with our
admirals."
tied disunity among Christian
'Democrats, Italy's largest par-
dy, would inevitably bring the
'.Communists to power. ,
? Communists Seek Power
e The Communist party, Italy's
'second largest party, has for
Tears offered to become an ally
:of the Christian Democrats in
governing the nation.
, Whoever wrote "Berlinguer
:and the Professor" is surely a
member of the Italian establish-
'anent, probably a Christian
TDemocrat and no friend of Mr.
'Fanfani.
The volume is so replete with
:"in" jokes and detail familiar
only in Italian politics that one
:can hardly imagine translations
into other languages.
? In one scene, the ? Italian
'Government, still controlled by
,the Christian Democrats, is en-
tertaining the visiting President
'of the United States in Rome.
,But the Communists are alrea-
dy so strong that they can dic-
',tate what the guest is to be
-served at a state banquet?
'spaghetti and sausages. The
;narne of the American Pres-
ident just before the fictional
:1980 coup in Italy is Henry ,
'Kissinger.
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:CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR.
25 February 1975
By Razia Ismail
Special to
? The Christian Science Monitor
New Delhi
Whether or not spring comes to
? America and India in its normal
annual season, relations between the
two nations seem in for another cold
spell.
Washington's decision to resume
arms supplies to Pakistan has in one
stroke frozen New Delhi's attitude
toward both the United States and
Pakistan into one of stiff formality,
which will take time and effort to
thaw out again.
New - Delhi's reaction to Pakistan
Premier Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's arms-
se-eking visit to America was adverse
from the outset. The move was seen
as contradictory to the amicable tone
of the 1972 Simla agreement signed by
Mr. Bhutto and Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi to normalize ties weakened by
decades of periodic war and suspi-
cion. '
New Delhi's adverse reaction to
initial 'reports that President Ford
might lift the arms embargo was seen
by some as an irrational flap over an
imagined threat. But threat or not,
India deeply opposes a revival of the
doctrine that arms supply should be
the basis for a "balance" in the
subcontinent.
Reports now reaching here cite the
plea by Undersecretary of State Jo-
seph J. Sisco that new .weapons to
Pakistan are necessary to counter-
balance India's nuclear test of last
year.
This is taken to indicate that the
U.S. does not really believe that India
will limit its nuclear energy to peace-
ful purposes. Secretary of State
Henry A. Kissinger had succeeded in
leaving a different impression when
he visited New Delhi a few months
ago?and.said, "We take seriously
India's affirmation that it has no
intention to develop nuclear weap-
ons."
Although.Washington's latest move
is unwelcome, this does not mean it
was unexpected. A clear hint came
last week when Indian Foreign Min-
ister Y. B. Chavan had told Parlia-
ment he might have to defer plans to
visit Washington for the India-U.S.
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
25 February 1975
Why arm Pakistan?
Washington's decision to lift its
10-year arms embargo against
Pakistan undoubtedly was a diffi-
cult one. It takes little imagina-
tion to perceive the danger inher-
ent in an unrestrained arms build-
up on the Indian subcontinent,- a
region bristling with animosities
and conflicts.
On the face of it it is utter folly to
fuel these conflicts by pouring in
more and more weaponry. Indeed,
the worldwide trend of escalating
arms sales presents dangers that
ought to be reckoned with at every
point.
But there are no simple solu-
tions to the complex problem of
security, and the lifting of the ban
on United States arms to Pakistan
must be seen within the large
context of what is happening next
door in India and all around the
Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean.
India has a massive, sophisticated
military arsenal built up by the
Soviet Union. Even now a high-
powered Russian mission, in-
cluding Defense Minister Andrei
Grechko, is in New Delhi talking
arms supply.
In recent months, too, India has
moved vigorously to enhance its
dominant political and strategic
position. It has consolidated its
hold in Sikkim and, most recently,
In Kashmir. And, despite its reas-
surances, it has exploded a nu-
clear device that leaves no doubt it
now has the capability of building
an atomic bomb.
None of this is to suggest that
India has aggressive intentions or
designs on its neighbors. But,
from his vantage point in Islama-
bad, it is understandable why
President Bhutto is jittery. In the
wake of the breakup of Pakistan
his foremost concern has been
Joint Commission talks scheduled
early in March.
Informed sources also say, how-
ever, that New Delhi had hoped the
arms supply issue might be discussed
In Washington by Dr. Kissinger and
Mr. Chavan before any decision was
taken.
The fact that the U.S. would not
delay. its decision for a few weeks
until after the-.scheduled
talks, or until after the arrival in New
Delhi of new American Ambassador
William B. Saxbe, is seen as a clear
Indication of where U.S. priorities lie.
Meanwhile, Soviet Defense Min-
ister Andrei A. Grechko landed here
Monday for talks with Indian leaders.
His visit was planned as a goodwill
trip two months ago, but now assumes
added significance.
35 The informal comment in govern-
keep his truncated country to-
gether and to build a viable, inde-
pendent state. His problems are
compounded by separatist strife
in Pakistan's North-West Frontier
Province and Baluchistan, which
he suspects is being fueled by the
Russians, among others.
It is hence to provide Pakistan
with ample weaponry for its secu-
rity and self-defense that Wash-
ington has reversed course. It, too,
views a strong, independent Paid-
stan as essential to keeping the
crucial oil flowing through the
Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea.
There should be no question that
the supply of arms to Pakistan
must be carefully limited. The
State Department promises that
military sales will be weighed so
as not to intensify an arms race in
South Asia and that it will not try
to change the strategic balance in
the region.
All this said, however, it would
appear that the change in U.S.
arms policy has been most crudely
handled. To have the new Amer-
ican envoy to India sitting in
Bangkok making odd statements
while an announcement about the
embargo was imminent seems a
strange way to conduct diplo-
macy.
It would have been more sen-
sible and tactful to let William
Saxbe present his credentials in
New Delhi and personally explain
the impending U.S. decision to
Indian leaders. Then an announce-
ment in Washington could have
followed.
In any event, it is now to be
hoped that Mr. Saxbe is in a
position to assure New Delhi that
the lifting of the arms embargo
will not be detrimental to its
interests in the region or to U.S7
to Indian relations.
ment circles here is that Moscow has
always been "very friendly and un-
derstanding" about India's defense
needs. The steady flow of Chinese
arms to Pakistan as well as the new
U.S. arms decision will doubtless
figure in Mr. Grechko's talks agenda.
Greater Soviet support for India's
growing defense production capabil-
ity may be one outcome of .the series
? of-:events. But this should not surprise.
anyone in Washington. . .
The tragicomic, tailpiece to tho
whole episode is Ambassador Saxbe's
failure to arrive in New Delhi on
schedule. The American Embassy
here first said he was ill in Bangkok,
but Mr. Saxbe himself scuttled that
excuse by claiming perfect health. He
will hardly be able to make that claim
about India-American relations, at
least for some time.
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LOS ANGELES TIMES
23 February 1975
Should U.S.'
.Resupply
'Ethiopia?
BY DIAL TORGERSON
ASMARA, Ethiopia?In an Asmara
hospital, a doctor pointed out the ci-
vilian patients who had lost arms and
legs to the high-powered bullets fired
by the Ethiopian army.
'Why," he asked, "must the Ameri-
-cans keep supplying bullets to an
? Times correspondent Dial Torgerson
wrote this article after returning to
? his base in Nairobi from a recent trip
to Asmara.
army which does this sort of thing?" ?
The US. government provided the
guns and the ammunition with which
perhaps 20,000 government troops
have been attempting to put down
Eritrea's fight for independence. ??
Now, after more than three weeks -
of fighting, the Ethiopians admit they
need resupplying. A State Depart- ?
ment official says the U.S. govern-
ment "is continuing to study" Ethio-
pia's request for an airlift of ammuni-
tion.
Washington has a lot of factors to .
study. Among them:
?The Addis Ababa government
has used massacre as a technique of
'subjugation. Last summer, the army
killed 126 civilians at the village of,
Urn Hajar. On Feb. 2, approximately
100 were machine gunned to death
against a church wall at Woki Deba,
and 700 escaping political prisoners
were reported killed by paratroopers-
Feb.15 near Asmara. ?
?Military strategists believe that
the Ethiopian army is fighting a war.
it cannot win?against guerrillas:
well supplied with Communist-bloc'
arms, backed by the overwhelming
support of the civilian populace, and
in their own mountainous territory
where roads can be easily cut by
small-unit attacks.
?The Eritrean liberation move-
ment has an undeni.abiy valid caliAe: .
The autonomy of the:coastal territo-
ry was unilaterally cancelled by
Ethiopia when the Addis Ababa
government annexed Eritrea as its
14th province in 1962.
?The Ethiopian government, has
proclaimed itself socialist and is ex-
ploring diplomatic links to the Chi-'
nese and the Eastern-bloc nations of
Europe. Many persons say that the
. ./
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'military junta which rules the coun-:,
try, the Provisional Military Adminis-
trative Council, is edging closer
the Communist philosophy every
- ? ???
If the United States resupplies the
Addis .Ababa forces, then, it will be.
aiding a ruthless, left-leaning Military.
junta with dubious chances of milita- -
fry spccess... .
. On the- other 'hand, the United'
States, has a stake. in Eritrea. ,The
00-mile strip of Red Sea' coastline is
:among the most strategic areas of the
world. It represents a ? longtime US.
.investment. Among the reasons why:
f-. f?If Eritrea wins its independence,
-,:the balance of power along the Red
:Sea will shift heavily .to the. Arab
ewOrld. The Eritrean liberation groups-
ire dominated by Moslems ancl.step-.
? plied by Arab countries. .
?-7.1f Eritrea shakes loose from Ad-
- dis Ababa, only the tiny French en-
"chive Called the Territory of, the
Afars and Issas?and its port, Djibou-
ti.--ewill remain open to the West.
'And there will then be strong Arab
pressure ta forte the 'French out of
Djibouti's' e? ?
.