CHIEF OF C.I.A.'S LATIN OPERATIONS QUITS TO DEFEND AGENCY BEFORE THE PUBLIC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 51
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 21, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 10, 1975
• Content Type: NSPR

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NEWS, VIEWS
and ISSUES
INTERNAL USE ONLY
This publication contains clippings from the
domestic and foreign press for YOUR
BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use
of selected items would rarely be advisable.
No. 10 16 MAY 1975
GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS
GENERAL
WEST EUROPE
AFRICA
EAST ASIA
LATIN AMERICA 25X1A
1
28
30
31
32
50
Destroy after backgrounder has served
its purpose or within 60 days.
CONFIDENTIAL
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THE NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY, MAY 10, 1973:
Chief Of C.I.A.'sLatinOperationsguits1
To Defend Agency Before the Public'
By LINDA CFIARLTON
Spettal to The New York Times .
' 'WASHINGTON, May 9?For!
25 years David A. Phillips hasi
been, by trade, a spy, and,
although he might protest the
label?he would call himself
a clandestine employe of the
Central Intelligence Agency?
he does not apologize for the
occupation.
"There's no question in my
mind that I have spent the
ast quarte; of a century being
useful," he said in an interview.
134 there are questions in
many other minds, questions
raised by allegations that the
agency has conducted domestic
spying operations, proscribed
by its charter, questions that
have now spread to include
the C.I.A.'s permitted function
abroad.
- And so David Phillips, 52
years old, chief of Latin-Ameri-
can operations at the
for the last two years and
stat;on chief in several 'Latin-
Ameriaan countries before that,.
resigned yesterday -to start a'
self-assigned job as defender
of the agency. In his words,
he wants 'to explain the C.I.A.
and the intelligence establish-
ment. and the role that it has
in an American society."
Group Organized
To do this he has organized
the Association of Retired In-
telligence Officers, and says
about 160 of the 400 persons
he has sent letters to have
already . joined, paying a $10
fee. Its role, he said, is to
make speakers available, at no
cost beyond expenses, to any-
one who wants to listen.
Mr. Phillips who says his
income dropped from $36,000
to $16,000 at retirement, alrea-
dy has a couple of speeches
in New York City scheduled
for next week.
He seems likely to be a good
speaker, for even in an informal
interview over drinks he talked
in what sounded at first almost
like prepared statements, care-
ful in syntax, excellent in dic-
tion and inflection, the senten-
ces complete.
It turned out that he was
once an actor?"an incompe-
tent actor," he said firmly?be-
fore a stint as a World War
11 bombardier and, briefly, as
editor of an English-language
paper:in Chile called The South
Pacific Mail..
"It was there," he said, "that
I. was. first approached by !Alit-
I led States intelliaence to coop-
? ?
lerate." By 1956, he said, he
!was working fulltime for the
[agency?but posing- either As
a Foreign Service officer or
a businessman.
He, said he had chOsen Chile
as a place to work from. an
encyclopedia "because it said
you could ski in the Andes,
in the morning and swim ml
the Pacific in the afternoon.'
1This is possible, but it- is ar-
Icluous."
,--
He lived Chile .for more
than six and a half years, and
was running the agency's La-
tin-American operations at the
time that the' Marxist govern-
!merit of President Salvador Al-
lende Gossens was violently
overthrown?allegedly with the
active encouragement of the
agency. ?
Tomorrow Mr, Phillips plans
a news conference to talk about
what the C.I.A. actually did do
in Chile, he said, as opposed to
what it is rumored to have
done. He would say nothing
more until then, nothing be-
yond a- statement that "we
were indeed preserving some
sectors of Chilean society." He
would not explain.
But the "freedom to talk"
hbout it ds perhaps the basic
reason for his resignation, he
said. He says he wants to "help
dispel the myth" that "the
C.I.A. is composed of unprin-
cipled people interfering in the
private lives .of other people
around the world."
Mr. Phillips, who denied that
,he is receiving support other.
than moral from the agency or
any of his colleagues there, is
obviously not planning to. dis-
close anything that the agency
wants kept secret. Besides, he
said,. there are "good secrets,
bad secrets and nonsecrets."
There are also some entirely
persdnal and domestic reasons
for his decision to speak up
for the C.I.A., beyond his con-
viction that the agency is being
defamed and, perhaps, de-
stroyed, he said.
There was, he recalled, the
moment when he had to tell
one of his teen-age children?
he and his wife, both married
before, have seven children be-
tween them?that "father, after
all, had not been a foreign
service officer or a business-
man but an intelligence offi-
cer."
'But That's Dirty'
Tiis was the fifth time he
had done this, he said, and
in the past it had been a "plea-
sant experience." But, he said,
"the reaction this time was,
,'But that's dirty!' My reaction
to tiat was that it's just a
part of the current misconcep-
tion about C.I.A., period."
He said his decision to get
out of the agency to "defend
and explain" it, also was based
on a feeling that the agency
was tie ,victim of a "time lag."
"The activities that were
deemed necessary and indeed
were popular previously are
no longer so," he explained.
What sort of activities? "Such
as sustaining democratic insti-
tutions in Europe -in the post-
war era." He would not elabor-
ate, but gave another example:
such as "helping friends to
maintain themselves" during
the time in the nineteen-sixties.
when "Fidel Castro was spon-
soring the export 01,,- violent
revolution" in Latin America.
Again, no details.
Mr. Phillips believes that the
agency will be found "not guil-
ty of having established a pat-
tern which threatens the civil
liberties of Americans" when
the Congressional investiga-
tions of the C.I.A. are com-
pleted, and for that reason he
'believes that Congress is "the
absolute salvation . of the
C.I.A."' ? ?
Beyond that, there is another
question being asked in some
quarters these days: Should this
country have such an agency?
This is not a question for him
to answer, Mr. Phillips said.
But when he gave an answer:
"The world has been a tough
place from the beginning. I
,know, after spending my adult
life abroad, that it continues-
to be A tough place filled with?
dark alleys. Some of the na-
tion's work has had to be per-
formed in these byways."
What isi the nation's work,
then? "Aaah"?a sign of ack-
nowledgement. "An important
part of this nation's work is
to guarantee its survival." ? ?
So it is survival that makes
the C.I.A. necessary?- "Abso-
lutely." '
Are there some things a na-
tion should not do to survive?
"You are asking me a question
that others should answer.",
Earlier, after internal turmoil-
that was visible in his face,
Mr. Phillips had agreed to let
himself be quoted in acknow-
ledging, "The question of whe-
ther any -country needs. or.
should have an intelligence or-
ganization such as C.I.A. is
a valid subject for argument."
? ?
1
LOS ANGELES TIMES
11 May 1975
CIA Kept Out
Plot on Allen
Ex-Agent Says
BY RONALD J. OSTROW
Tones Staff Writer
WASHINGTON?The former Chief
'of Latin American operations for the.
CIA said Saturday. that , the agency,
breaking. its practice, twice instruct-
ed its agents to sever contacts with.
Chileans plottinab the overthrow of'
President Salvador Allende.
David A. P,billips, who retired Fri-
day from his CIA post to. organize a
defense of the embattled agency, said
the unusual step had been taken be-
cause CIA officials were convinced
that the United States would be ac-
ctised of helping overthrow the
world's first popularly elected Marx-
isVpresident.
The assertion by Phillips, 52, who is
formine, what he calls the Assn. of
-Retired Intelligence,Officers, is fresh
evidenbe in that continuing con-
troversy over what role the United
States may have played in Allende's
overthrow -and subsequent death .in
,1973.
,." Government officials have testified
? at .congressional hearings that the
: United States had reports that a coup
%vas planned but had no way of veri-
fying them. . . ?
Phillips told a press conference that
a major responsibility of CIA station
? chiefs' abroad was to advise the
American ambassador and Washing-
ton policymakers if an unexpected
change of government was imminent.
? "If any group achieved the clout
where they might actually carry out
assassination, CIA is derelict if they
do not have an agent in that group to
forewarn our country," Phillips said.
But in the Chilean case, he said, his
office sent two cables?one on May
:8, 1973. and the other 15 days later?
instructing CIA operatives to termin-
ate contacts with any coup plotters.
Phillips said that the agents had
protested after receiving the first ca-
ble that they could?not do their job if
they discontinued such involvement.
? Phillips recalled the second cable as
saying: "This one is a little different.
It looks like there is really going to
be a Coup, and we certainly, will be
accused, and consequently ,you are
not to be in touch with the coup plot-
ters . you are not to give them
any encouragement."
Asked whether, despite the break-
off with the plotters, the CIA had
known in advance Of the coup, Phil-
lips said, "indeed we did. We knew it
was 'going to take place about 30
times, in the 10,months before it took
place--because 'that's the way coups.
go."
? He added ? that "it is true that just
.before the coup we had information
that .indicated more 'strongly- than
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when it did?and it did." .
Phillips said, the CIA had not
'warned Allende because there was
no way of -being sure the coup would
- be carried out.
"If we were to go in Chile?or al:
post every other Latin country?
and tell the local government every
time we had heard information there
was about to be a coup. they would
stop talking to us in' about two
months." he said, "because they're
nearly always called off."
? Phillips aSserted that the CIA had
not supported or encouraged the ?
plotters arid said the overthrow of
.Allende "was ,a tragic event."
"It should never have happened,"
he .sairl. "Where you have your first
elected Marxist president anywhere
in the world, obviously the way that
? rnan should leave office is to be voted
out of office, and that's- the only way.
"We and the U.S. government
.would have much preferred. for the
coup not to have taken place so there.
could have been elections."
Phillips denied several times "that
CIA was responsible for the death of
Allende . CIA did not ? fund the
'strikes which led to the coup that de-
posed Mr. Allende nor did we encour-
age the plotters who planned and
conducted the coup.
o "Other activities we did undertake
in Chile. to. preserve its democratic
sectors until the 1976 elections could:,
be held. It was our estimate that.' g-
en the .absoltitrily disastrous
in the Chilean economy during .Mr.
Allende's presidency. he had little
chance to win those elections if the
?democratic sectors could hold out
WASHINGTON POST
11 May 1975
?
enies Agency Role in
that long."
. He did not elaborate on what steps
the CIA had taken, but U.S. officials
have acknowledged that SS millioi.
was channeled into Chile during the
Allende era to certain newspapers
.and non-Communist ? political parties.
-Officiais said the purpose- had been to.
bolster ? Democratic ? institutions in
Chilethat they 'contended were
threatened by Allende's rule.
If the CIA's information about the
coup had been assessed as solid, the
question of whether to advise AI-.
lencie "would have been a decision
readied at the highest levels of the
US: Government?much higher than;
the forum in which I sat." Phillips
- Phillips' choice of words was inter-
esting because Jack Kubisch. an:
? ?
assistant secretary of state, told a,
Senate foreigh relations subcommit-
tee in 1973 that officials at "the high-
est level" in Washington had decided
not to intervene in the Chilean tur-s-
moil,?although they had word of the.
coup -10 to 16 hours before it oc-
curred.
Spokesmen for ?the Department of
'State and for the White House later
denied that the _United States had
known about the coup in advance,
saying the information had been re-
garded as false:
.Phillips, commenting on Cuban
Premier Fidel Castro's recent denial
;of reports that he had Somehow been
,rolved in the assassination of Pres-
ident John F. Kennedy, said he
:agreed completely with Castro.
-"Based on all the information avail-
able to me. which is considerable,"
Phillips said. he is convinced Lee'
Harvey Oswald assassinated .Kenne-:,
nti-Alleude Coup
CIA Defend
,By Austin Scott
: Washington Post Staff Writer '
The man who ran Central
Intelligence Agency activities
in Chile during the overthrow
and death of President .Salva-
dor Allende said yesterday
that he sent out two cables or-
dering CIA agents to "cut off
contacts with people who are
planning coups" nearly five
months before Allende was
toppled. ? ?
David Atlee Phillips told a
news conference he did so be-
cause, as he noted in the first
cable lie sent on May 8, 1973:
"It, has begun to look as if
there is more and ? more,
chance for a coup. "
? Phillips .said some of the
agents wired back to ask bow,
Ay and "that he-did it alone."
Phillips said he had been stationed
in Mexico. City. watching the Cuban
Embassy, when Oswald went there
seeking permission to travel to Cuba:
"It is my conviction that the Cu-
bans in Mexico City rebuffed Lee
Harvey Oswald* and sent him on his
way." Phillips said. "They thought he
was some sort of kook." ?
'As for reports of CIA involvement
in plots to kill foreign leaders, Phil-
lips said he had no personal knowl-
_edge of such activity but added that,
"there must be something there.
There have been discussions." ?
After saying he had talked with
friends in the agency about 'any' CIA
" involvement, Phillips added. "There's,
no question that in those traumatic
times something took place .which
,might have been termed discussions.
Whether there were plans or not, I
,
'don't:know . . .
."Where there's so much smoke,
there must, be some fire," Phillips
said. "However in 25 years as an in-
telligence officer, I have learned that:
where there.. is smoke, there are
sometimes Small fires?and a great:
big smoke-making machine." .
? Over the last two year, during
-which Phillips has headed the CIA's
Latin American and Caribbean oper-
ations. there have been no agency
discussions or planning of 'assassina-
tions. he said. "and I am in a position
to know that is true." . ?
, Philripas asked for information
on any CIA operatiOns with which he
had disagreed, lie said he was saving.
such- discussion for. a series- of lee-.
.tures lie will begin Giving this week
for $500 to $750 each
r Ciies Chile Ca
if they severed such ties, they
were to carry out what Phil-
lips said was a major 'intelli-
gence task?giving the T.J.S.
government advance warning
of any major change in a for-
eign government. Phillips said
he replied in a May 23 cable:
"This one is a little differ-
ent, because it looks like there
will be a coup. You are not to
be in touch with the coup plot-
ters."
There were no CIA agents
in the groups that overthrew
Allende on Sept. 11, 1973, Phil-
lips said. Asked if the CIA had
advanced knowledge of the
coup, he said:
"We did. We knew it was go-
ing to take place about 30
'times before it did take
place." But despite the rumors
that. were sweeping Santiago
in the months before. the Al-
lende overthrow, as the time
for the successful. coup ap-
proached, Phillips said, ". .. It
is true that we had stronget
information than ever before
that it probably would have
taken place, and it did."
Asked if the CIA tried to
warn Allende, Phillips said,
"Now, we did not warn him,
we didn't prevent it, because
we had no way to be sure."
Until recently, Phillips was
the CIA's chief of Latin Amer,
lean operations, with 25 years
as a key spy behind him, most
of it in Latin America and the
Caribbean, including Cuba
and the Dominican.Republic.
2
?
les
Yesterday he called a newg
conference to launch the first
day of his newly chosen ca-
reer, that of ,a1 defender of
the CIA working outside the
agency. Phillips said he re-
signed from the CIA to form
an association of retired in-
telligence officers to try to
"put the current controversy
about CIA into reasonable
I perspective."
IAsked how people could be
!sure his new role is not just
,another CIA operation, Phil-
!lips said, "I sUppose the only
!people who are really going
:to know it's not an operation
;are my wife, those who know
IBill Colby [CIA Director
E. Colby] and those who
Iknow me intimately."
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Sunday. May 4,197$
THE WASHINGTON. POST
A Conimmunralie t
6
0
IMPS
HEN TOM ;BRADEN'S recent ar-
ticle, "CIA: Power and Arro-
,gance," appeared in Saturday Review,
;twits concerned about its basic line,
bit I was not roused to reply, as
have become somewhat inured to ad-
,Verse comment. Its reprinting in The,
'-Washington Post, however, suggests,
U1.0 through repetition it might ' ac-
'quire more cachet, to the extent that
rieel I must challenge its accuracy
?
and its -wisdom. ' ?
fn it, Mr. Braden talks of a CIA he
;Maly have known some 10 and 20 years
itgb? I have news for him. Things have,
'clanged. CIA is no longer a sacred '
establishment of insiders "different".
from outsiders in commitment and in
freedom from the rules that bind ordin-
ary men. It may have some of the re-
straints of American bureaucracy, and
its,personnel may live in Fairfax rath-
er than Georgetown, but I think 'we
have a stronger intelligence structure
today, rather than one whose "power
is gone," whose "arrogance has turned
to fear," and whiah "is divided and
torn."
Indeed, we now have a modern in-
telligence system. Its engineers and its
scientists produce marvels of technol-
ogy which deliver to our nation-Mfor-
motion about the world of which Mr.
Braden could not have dreamed in his
time. Its research and analysis staffs
stand for independent and objective
assessments, however much policy-
makers might wish more pleasing ones,
or whatever the reflection on depart-,
mental budgets and program propos-
als. Our clandestine operations are per-.'
haps less exhilarating but are more
productive than Mr. Braden's and my
parachuting days together: The unfet-
tered "power" which produced the
"arrogance" he recalls has been re-
placed by intensive supervision and
public as well as closed-door account-
ability. ?
Mr. Braden cites our box score in
the usual partial way, only the strikes,
not the hits. I note, for example, that
he omits his own contribution to pre-
venting Communist monopoly of the
cause of "peace" during the 1950s and
ye
1960s. Had they achieved this, our own
anti-war movement might have become
a vehicle for penetration comparable-
to .t.hat which produced the .Philbys
out of the anti,Faseist cause, in the
-1930s. His May, 1967, article in the
Saturday Evening Post praised this
:work ("I'm glad the CIA Is ?Immor-
,-al'"). I find it as strange to see him
now repudiating that praise as I
then questioned his violation of his ..
secrecy agreement by wrongfully re-
vealing the details of his operation
without authorization:
Most, serious is Mr. Braden's solu-
tion to the "ridiculous myths" that ex-
ist about CIA and intelligence. Instead-
of undertaking to reveal the untold.
story of modern intelligence in the
best journalistic tradition, he would
"shut it down" in abject retreat before
its critics. Indeed, this would in my
view lead precisely to James. Madif
son's injunction which he cited that "A
popular government without the
means to popular information is a
fark.e or a tragedy, perhaps both" in
the world in which we live.
ECAUSE our intelligence informa-
tion today is popular information.
Some of its sources and techniques
must. be kept secret if they are to en-
dure, but its substance is _made avail-
able in many and proper ways to our
"popular government." It is provided
to the executive branch and used in its
deliberations and its discussions with
the press. Our intelligence goes to a
number of our congressional commit-
tees and members on a regular basis,
where it is highly valued as a contri-
bution to their role in American
decision-making. And an increasing
number of our colleagues of the press
are finding that a visit to Langley can
expose them to independent, intelli-
gent and learned spokesmen on sub-
jects of interest to them, from nuclear
proliferation to economic trends with-
in the Soviet Union. If our government
,really should "shut it down," I do fear
the result could be "a farce or a trag-.
edy, perhaps both."
WASHINGTON POST
8 May 1975
Braden Replies to Colby
In his letter published in Outlook'
May 4, Director of Central Intel-
lig,encd Will,am Colby states that I
Mice violated a secrecy agreement.
His reference is to -a magazine ar-
ticle I wrote defending certain CIA
operations. Every one of these opera--
tions had been "blown"; that is, each ? Tom Braden. -
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Mr. Braden's solution of turning the,
overt intelligence function to the State
?Department flies in the face of the
proven desirability of separating from
that policy-oriented institution an in-
dependent intelligence collection and
assessment 'capability, a lesson learned
in China In the 1910s and in Vietnam
in the 1960s. I question even more seri-
ously his reflection on the fine job
the agency's paramilitary elements did
in Lioi with a handful of American
personnnel and. a miniscule budget
compared to some' other experiences.
"Paratroopers" like Mr: Braden and
me have been replaced by a new gen-
eration who understand that political-
will is' at the" base -of successful para-
military, work, arld'that parachutes and
even helicopters play only a support-
ing role in sucli situations.
. I note Mr. Braden's formula for fu-
ture clandestine work to be run "out
at some obscure toolshed." I have no
comment. on his name for the leader
of such,an effort, but I question wheth-
er such obscurity would not reestablish
the "Inside.outside syndrome. so essen-
tial to secrecy' . . making a mockery
of representative ,government," which
he wrongfully' ascribes to today's CIA.
May I suggest that a better solution
, is the serious review being undertaken
by the Vice President's Commission
and the Select Committees of the Con-
gress, to determine how outdated "ri-
diculous myths" about American intel-
ligence can be replaced by a better
understanding of the reality of mod-
ern intelligence and how it should fit
within our free society. In this process,
we will indeed replace the unaccount-
able power and the arrogance which
Mr. BracWn, seems to remember from
an earlier day by a new and American
concept of responsible intelligence.
And in the process, I believe that pub-
lic understanding of the importance
of our modern "means, to popular in-
formation" will be increased so that
we can strengthen them for the future
rather than dwell' only on the 'past.
W. E. COLBY
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
"-subject of expose, public debate and,.
newspaper comment.
If Mr. Colby 'is right in his assertion
that we now have a modern, responsi-
ble, accountable, objective and popular
intelligence service, it ought not to be
defended by a resort to the ad homi-
nem particularly when the ad hominem
is not true.
Tuesday, May 6, 1975
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The Washington Star
a
By Jeremiah O'Leary
Washington Star Staff Writer
The finality of Defense
Secretary James R. Schles-
inger's declaration that the
CIA has never resorted to
assassination could be con-
strued as reinforcing the
contention of administra-
tion sources that the agency
discussed and knew about
political murder plots but
never was involved in a suc-
cessful one.
Schlesinger made his
statement late yesterday
after testifying 'before the
Rockefeller commission
investigating illegal domes-
tic activities of the CIA,
He emerged from his
closed-door appearance
and, unlike some former
CIA officials, appeared al-
most eager to set the record
straight. He said, "Let me
make it very clear now that
assassination has not been
AlMaYSIS
SMIXIIMPEOWCSIMICIIMMON
user1 as a tool by -the CIA at
any time, and I don't think
that -a7:"es prospectively
any more than it does retro-
spectively.",
THE FORMER CIA
director was even more em-
phatic in denying CIA in-
volvement in the slaying of
President John F. Kennedy.
"The suggestion of any.
LOS ANGELES TIMES
8 May 1975
Colby Defends
Ned to Keep'.
'Family Secrets'
CIA involvement is prepos-
terous," Schlesinger said.
"It is psychologically and
intellectually impossible
that the CIA could in any
way be involved in the
tragic event."
He said any such sugges-
tions could only emanate
from sick imaginations. The
agency's whole role, he
said, has been to serve and
protect the United States
and its leaders.
Schlesinger refused to
comment directly on re-
ports of CIA involvement in
plots to assassinate foreign
leaders, but he said appro-
priate review bodies such
as the Rockefeller commis-
sion and the congressional
committees will want to re-
view those issues.
THE SUM of Schlesing-
er's declarations are
strongly supportive of state-
ments to The Star by White
House and CIA officials that
the agency knew of, and
even discussed, political
murder but never was in-
volved in a successful one.
This leaves open the
implication that the CIA
may have had direct in-
volvement in plots for politi-
BY PHILIP HAGER
- Times Staff Writer ?
SAN FRANCISCO?CIA Director
William E. Colby defended Wednes-
day the need to maintain "national
family secrets" but suggested his
agency's mission should be clarified
by new laws and guidelines.
- Speaking to more than 900 persons
at a Commonwealth Club luncheon
here, Colby declared:
"I fully- support procedures to en-
sure supervision, control and accoun-
tability with respect to our intel-
ligence. I only plead that these proce-
dures take into consideration the
unique and fragile character of our
sensitive intelligence operations."
Noting charges of illegal domestic
operations and other recent criticisms
of the CIA?and resulting govern-.
cal murder that did not suc-
ceed ? for example,
perhaps plots against Fidel
Castro, whose death was
certainly desired by many
Cubans. It is-even more
suggestive that the -CIA
knew of such plots but was
not directly involved.
Commission officials said
yesterday that the group,
appointed by President
Ford and headed by Vice
President Nels'on-A. Rocke-
feller, is nearing the end of
?the labors it began last
February. -The hearings ?
will be completed Monday,
and then the commission
will begin writing its report
and recommendations for
the President.
THE REPORT is to be
handed to Ford on June 4
and will be released public-
ly- soon after that. At that.
stage, the Senate Intelli?
gence Committee, headed
by Sen. Frank Church, D-
Idaho, will commence its
hearings into the activities
of all American intelligence,
agencies. Its House coun-
terpart is almost totally
dormant.
Also testifying yesterday
was Secretary of State_
mental investigations of the agency.'
?Colby asked that the ". . laws
and guidelines be clarified so that We
in the intelligence profession are giv-
en a clear expression of the mission.
theAmerican people and govern-
inent want us to undertake." _
"I ask also that necessary secrets of
intelligence be preserved in the inter-
est of our nation . . . We believe
these secrets need better laws and
especially we need to arrive at a con-
sensus that We Americans do have
some national family secrets which
must be kept.
"To make an open book of our in-
telligence sources is to invite steps?
many quite simple?to deny us infor-
mation vital to our nation's welfare
and safety."
The director stressed the unusual
nature of his appearance, .pointing
out that in many countries the chief
intelligence officer is not even
known, let along out ? making
speeches.
"Most of us grew up with the image
of intelligence drawn from Nathan.
Hale, Mata Hari, James Bond and
perhaps even Maxwell Smart. This
image is no longer valid today," he
said.
4
Henry A. Kissinger. He
denied having any knowl-
edge or involvement in ei-
ther -alleged CIA domestic
spying or foreign assassina-
tion plots.
"Since I have been in
Washington, the National
Security Council or the NSC
staff, Or the assistant to the
president for national se-
curity affairs (Kissinger's
other title) did not concern
themselves with domestic
intelligence; nor were they
informed about domestic
intelligence," Kissinger de-
clared.
'Asked about allegations
of CIA assassination plots,
Kissinger said none of those
allegations pertain to the
period of his service in
Washington from 1968 until
the present.
ANOTHER WITNESS
yesterday, former CIA
Director John A. McCene
(1961-1965) said, "During
my term of office; there was
no, absolutely no assassina-
tion plot against Castro or
any other foreign leader.
McCone said such plots
were not consistent with the
moral values of the United
States or the CIA,
He rioted that collecting intel-
ligence now far more often involves
a scholarly, intellectual process rath-
er than clandestine, operations an4
that this process . was greatly en-
hanced by- technological advances.
"This now allows us to see, hear
and sometimes even touch informa-
tion previously totally inaccessible .
and in quantities hitherto totally un-
manageable," he said.
CIA information now is often pro-.
----e
vided to congressmen, ambassadork
scholars and the press?in unclassi-
fied, background sessions?in arida
tion to its traditional recipients, such
as generals and admirals, he said.
Colby acknowledged that the agerie
cy had made some "missteps" in its
27-year history but added that action
had been taken to "correct them and.
prevent their recurrence."
As for the current investigations of
secret., political or paramilitary CIA
operations in recent years,. Colby as-,
sertee: . _ .
'1 am confident it will be demon-,
strated that any such activities. in
past years were conducted under le-
gal authority then existing, reflecting
the political climate of those times,,
and were carried according to prop-.
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erly constituted procedures.
"I must point out that this changed
world seems to .be changing again.
Our country may again need the ca-
-pability to provide -some quiet in-
.fluence or assistance to friends
abroad without engaging the formal
_diplomatic or military might of the.
U.S."
In answering questions from the:
audience, Colby said that -in the last-
five years, "between 400 and 500".
Americans overseas had been ap=
proached to serve as agents for,
foreign powers.
WASHINGTON STAR
13 May 1975
an A
hn May
IratIzAh
The CEA
John D. Marks worked as an intelli-
gence analyst for the State
department before writing, with Victor
Marchetti, "The CIA and the Cult of
Intelligence" ? publication of which
the CIA attempted to stop in court.
Marks, now director of the CIA research
.project being conducted by the Center
for National Security Studies bus work-
ed to get Congress to investigate intelli-
gence agencies. He was interviewed by
Washington Staff Writer Allan Frank.
, Question: In what areas of ordi-
nary life has the CIA been involved
that you think will surprise or shock
the American people if evidence
comes out during the hearings about
such activities?
Marks: The CIA has been heavily
involved in church activities, reli-
gious activities. They've infiltrated
the church and used the church or
church groups as funding
mechanisms. They solicit informa-
tion from missionaries, try to hire
missionaries. Things of that sort will
shock a lot of people. They also had a
contributory pension plan and the in-
vestment programs were regularly
run through the CIA's bank of com-
puters at Langley, which are some of
the most advanced computers in the
world. This is a profit-making plan
for private employes and government
computers are not supposed to be
,used for that sort of thing. I think
that will shock people. We also know
that the CIA has made use of private
investigating firms in this country to
do some of its domestic operations.
Again, I think this may shock the
American people.
Q: Have you read any stories late-
ly about the CIA that surprised you?
A: It's hard to be surprised by any-
thing now, but I guess I have to say I
was surprised when I found out that
the CIA had gone to the Mafia to take
an assassination contract out on
Fidel Castro. I always thought that
Maria. Maybe that's naive, but that
surprised me.
Q: Do you believe the stories that
the CIA went to the Mafia? Or the
stories about Howard Hughes' con-
nection with the Soviet submarine
and the CIA?
A: Yes, I believe them. I've con-
firmed them through my own
sources. I knew that U.S. intelligence
was doing an awful lot of underseas
research and other kinds of activi-
ties, but I didn't know that they had
gone in specifically after a Soviet
submarine. I do know in a general
way that the CIA has been very ac-
tively working with all kinds of
American businesses and that they
have working agreements with quite
a few American companies, so this
kind of thing with Hughes didn't sur-
prise me. For example, one former
CIA guy with 20 years in the agency
told me about how, in one -Latin-
American country the CIA had a deal
with Pan American Airlines where
the CIA was given access to all the
baggage and mail that went through
on Pan American planes. To facili-
tate the CIA's access, Pan Am even
supplied the CIA's men with Pan Am
overalls, which would give them a
better excuse to be rummaging
around in the baggage compartments
of Pan Am's planes. This kind of ar-
rangement has existed all over the
world with AmericiCii business.
_
Q: Do you feel that U.S. intelli-
gence efforts in that kin-' of operation
will be hampered, particularly with ?
regard to Pan Am, now that the Ira-
nians are about to buy a major por-
tion of Pan Am?
? A: No, in this ease because the Ira-
nian government has very closely
cooperated with, and was put in by,,
the CIA. Iranian intelligence cooper-
ates very closely with the CIA. I
think some of the exposures that
have come out recently of American
business contacts and cooperation
may have smile effect because I think
foreign countries now are going to be
putting much more pressure on
American businesses operating in
'their countries not to be espionage
operations. And (CIA director) Wil-
barn Colby himself told the press last
year that over 200 businessmen, or
so-called businessmen overseas,
were really CIA operatives. Now, the
press didn't report that it was Wil-
liam Colby ? it was a "high U.S. offi-
cial," but I can tell you it was Colby.
Q: But what will the exposures
really mean?
A: Exposures are going to limit.
this kind of close cooperation be-
tween American businesses and the
CIA because the primary business of
American business should -not be
espionage. The companies are going
to see that they are not going to be
able to get away, with this kind- of
close c000peration without anybody
knowing it and they are going to have
to be responsible for their acts. If
.they want to own up to the fact that
they're cooperating with the CIA,
that's fine. But I have a feeling ?
and some of the CIA supporters
our government didn't GreppratediEor Vigraesee-2difft011108rkcENOIRDPis7W0
going to back off some of its close
cooperation with the CIA because it
doesn't want to get nationalized or
have its public interest tarnished. I
know for a fact that ITT (Internation-
al Telephone and Telegraph), Pan
Am and W.R. Grace Shipping Co.
have all provided cover for the CIA
overseas in the past. I don't think
that's consistent with their proper
roles. _
Q: How do you know that for a
? fact? -
A: I've _talked to CIA people who
have told me. I've said-it publicly in
speeches and no one has challenged
me. -
Q: Will it hurt American busi-
nesses not to be connected with the
CIA?
A: It may in some areas. American
business cooperation with the CIA
has been a two-way street. These
businesses have done favors for the
CIA and the CIA in return, either for-
mally or informally, has passed
information ? economic intelligence
to the American businesses which
has been very helpful to them. One
longtime 'CIA operative ?in South
America told me that while he had no
official directive to help out Ameri-
can businessmen 'overseas; he would
pass on information that was helpful.
Information, for instance, on which
companies were about to be
nationalized, which companies were
in trouble with the local government.
I behevecthis goes on on a broader
scale.
Q: Do you then agree with Me.
Cal by' analysis that if the CIA is
limited overseas, it will hurt the
United States' economic position in
the world? -
A: No. I think it would be a much
healthier situation if American busi-
ness concentrated on being a good
corporate citizen overseas and didn't
make itself an extension of American
intelligence operations. And I should
emphasize that it's not all American
business that is doing this.
Q:, What to you is the most impor-
tant lead the congressional investi-
gating committees could pursue? For
instande, do you have any proof that
_ the CIA ever assassinated anybody?
A: Do I have any .prof? I don't
have any proof I could go into a court
of law with. I know from my own
sources and from things that have
come out in major magazines and
newspapers that the CIA has certain-
ly been involved in assassination
.plots. With the Trujillo assassination
in the Dominican Republic, for in-
stance, the CIA sent guns into the,
group that did do the actual assassi-
nation. Now it has never been proved
whether those particular guns were
used to shoot Trujillo, but the CIA
seems to have been involved. Jeremi-
ah O'Leary of the Washington Star
wrote that story.
Q: Do you believe, as some people
do, that the CIA will be irreparably
harmed by all these disclosures?
A: Let's say that I hope the CIA is
irreparably harmed by the disclo-
sures on assassinatons, the disclo-
sures on domestic survellianc.. In
432R10004601.3608024se activities are
irreparably harmed, that the U.S
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government just cuts theln out. I
think that would be very useful. I
don't think the legitimate parts of the
CIA will be irreparably harmed. The
intelligence analysts are not being
called on the carpet at this point. It is
not they who have done those improp-
er things. They are the people who
should be encouraged and whose
functions should be strengthened.
? Q: Do you feel there is anything
inherently evil about the CIA?
A: I feel a lot of their activities in
the past have been wrong, and ille-
gal. And some of those activities,
such as the surveillance of Ameri-
cans in this county, are clearly
gal. These kinds of activities present
a danger to our own democratic insti-
ton-ions. What we need is a return to
?resident Truman's original intent in
setting up the CIA, and that was to
have an agency to coordinate intelli-
gence and enake the best possible evi-
dence of what was happening in the
world, etich has nothing to do with
?-?he dirty tricks of the CIA. I think we
snould strengthen the good part of
the CIA, the intelligence estimating
nellet of the CIA, and we should elimi-
nate the clandestine services, which
have caused the country a good deal
e
q: Some CM officers argue that to
be effective in intelligence, you have
to be able to break into embassies to
steal current codes.
A: I'm sure you can slightly in-
crea^e your effectiveness by break-
ing knto embassies and stealing
codes; hut I don't think that is any
justificaton for breaking the law.
Q: How do you answer the
criticism that other intelligence
agencies operate this way, and we're
tying our own hands if the CIA is not
allowed to operate in whatever fash-
zon it deems necessary? ?
_ ?
A: The Soviet Union's intelligence
-system operates a vast string of con-
centration camps.- The Gulag Ar-,
chipelago documented that. I don't
think we need to emulate the Soviets
bY setting up concentration camps.
There are certain weapons the
United States could use, such as
bacteriological warfare, which we
don't use because we feel
they are below our minimi-
um standards of decency of
what we want to do in the
world. I would maintain
that the CIA's dirty tricks
are also below our minimal
standard of decency, and ,to
be true to our ideals, we
shouldn't be using these ?
things. We don't have to
emulate the ways of tyran-
nical governments in order
? to protect our own society.
Q: When has decency be- -
come a factor. in intelli-
gence operations?
A: Never. It is not
something that is factored
into what the CIA people do.
What is important to the
CIA is what works. There is
virtually no criminal activi-
ty known to man that the
CIA hasn't used at one time
or another in the further-
ance of its clandestine
goals. That kind of moral-
ity, or lack of morality, is
something we don't need in
officers of the United States
government. That kind of
morality is what brought
down the Nixon administra-
tion. That kind of morality
is what brought us Water-
gate, in fact, with a cast of
characters partly supplied
by the CIA. It seems to me
we should be eliminating
that kind of morality from
our government, not prais-
ing it, not saying it's neces-
sary.
Q: Do you feel that the
CIA has any legitimate
operational functions inside
this country? For instance,
Mr. Colby says that the CIA
may have to spy on people
at the United Nations?
A: No, absolutely not.
Q: Do you feel that is le-
gitimate?
' A: The law says that the
CIA will have no domestic
police or internal security
functions.. If there has to be
spying at the U.N., why
don't they use the FBI?
Why does the CIA insist on
breaking the law? I don't
think our own government
should be breaking our.
laws.
Q: The scuttlebutt is that
the CIA does not get along
with the FBI. Is that true?
A: The CIA officers have
little or no confidence in the
FBI and vice versa. I don't
think the solution to that
problem is government
agencies to break the law.
If there is a problem with
NEW YORK TIMES
3 May 1975
A.C.L.U. Critical on Intelligence Panel
the FBI and their domestic
surveillance or domestic
counterespionage, let's im-
prove the FBI. Move some
of the geniuses from the
CIA to the FBI so that it can
be done legally. I'll give you
a hypothetical example of
this domestic security busi-
ness. If a Russian spy is dis-
covered in Washington, the
first impulse of the FBI is to
arrest him. The first im-
pulse of the CIA is to
manipulate him, and that is
the basic difference be-
tween the two
organizations. The CIA is
always looking for that
clever way to turn things to
their own advantage,
whereas the FBI, certainly
in the eyes of the CIA, tend
to be gumshoes more con-
cerned with internal securi-
ty and things of that sort,
which I think is perfectly
proper. I'm Just giving you
an idea of the perception of
the mentalities of the two
agencies. I wasn't using it
as an example of anything
proper or improper.
Q: Do you agree . with
with Mr. Colby when he
says 'Well, we could publish
all our -budget figures for
one year but if we did it for
three or four years, the op-
position would be able to
establish a trend and figure
out how much we're spend-
ina, and what we. 're doing.
? .
I don't agree with
that reasoning. When -you
publish a budget figure like
that of the CIA's, like $700
million, and then when you
increase it to $800 million,
then the Russians will know
we have increased our intel-
ligence operations slightly.
I don't see where that gives
them any access to knowl-
edge of our secrets. I think
the KGB knows a great deal
more about U.S. intelli-
gence operations than ei-
ther the American public or
the American Congress
does. And a lot of that
secrecy is aimed not so
much at the Russians or the
so-rnlled enemies as at the
people here in this country,
Just to give you my favorite
example, the CIA for 10 or
12 years fought a secret war
in Laos. That war was no
secret to the people in Laos
? the enemy ? because
they were being shot. They
knew *there were Americans
involved. They knew who
was shooting them and who
was bombing them. It was a
secret from the Congress
and the American people. I
don't think there is any rea-
son to have that kind of
5eCrecy.
Q: Have any of the
stories that have come out
dealt with matters that
have been deleted from
your book under the court
Order obtained by the CIA?
not Sure I can say
and remain within terms of
the injunction. Now, you
have quite a few reporters
looking into what the intelli-
gence agencies were doing
so it's natural that some of
these stories are coming
out. I'm sure people would
be shocked by some of the
things in the book, but I
-don't think there was any
justification to censor our
book. But because we are
under court order, I can't
really talk about it. We
have at least a half- dozen
front page stories in that
book remaining under cen-
sorship.
By JOHN CREWDSON
Special to The New YJni Times
WASHINGTON, May 2?The
American Civil Liberties Union
called today upon Representa-
tive Lucien N. Nedzi to affirm'
.his intention to investigate the
activities of American intelli-,
gence-gathering organizations!
or to reign the chairmanship'
of a House select committee'
set up for that purpose.
In a letter to the Michigan;
tor, and Char:es Morgan Jr.,
who heads its national office
here, asserted that Mr. ,Nedzi's
"failure to staff the committee
raises grave doubts as to the
ability "of the House of Repre-
sentatives to oversee and in-
vestigate the Central Intelli-
gence Agency."
A Senate select committee,
set up three weeks earlier for
the same purpose, has long
since retained officials and
staff investigators and is inter-
Democrat and House 'Speakerlviewing, prospective witnesses
Carl Albert, two A.C.L.U. offi-ifor the public hearings it plans
cials pointed out that 71 days to begin in June.
had passed since the House es- Mr. Nedzi, who also heads a
tablished the panel that Mr. separate House subcommittee
Nedzi heads and that no chief that acts, as a "watchdog" for
counsel, staff director or staff ithe C.I.A., has reportedly been
had been appointed. !unable to obtain a consensus
The officials, Aryeh Neiedamong the Democratic and Re-
the ACLU's executive direc-I publican members of his panel
on a candidate for staff di-
rector.
? Mr. Nedzi, who has not
spoken with the press since he
was named to the chairman-
ship, is nonetheless known to
believe that the director's post
must be filled before the staff-
selection process can begin.
In their letter, Mr. Neier and
Mr. Morgan asked that Mr.
Nedzi advise them "and the
public generally, of the plans,
if any, you have to aggres-
sively undertake the duties of
yOur chairmanship. .
"If you have no such plans
or decline to reveal them," the
letter concluded, "we suggest
you resign your chairmanship
to allow the appointment of a
House member willing .to in-
vestigate the C.I.A."
6
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WASHINGTON POST
14 May 1975
7i CIA-Fs
"By George Lardner Jr
iTiashington PGs t Staff Writer ;
A prominent critic of the
Central Intelligence Agency
charged yesterday that the
CIA is trying to "subvert"
the new freedom-of-informa-
tion law by setting heavy
fees for unearthing request-
ed records.
Former White House aide
Morton* Halperin, who de-
manded the records under the
new law nearly three months
ago, said the CIA is now in-
sisting that it will cost
"thousands of dollars" simply
to find the documents.
Halperin said he was baffled!
by the CIA's stance because.
he assumed that most of the
docufnents had already been
found in connection with the
disclosures the CIA- has al-
ready made about its domestic
spying activities.
, In a letter to Halperin this
? week, however, the CIA billed
,him $964 in "chargeable search
NEW YORK TIMES
14 May 1975
iNew Law Is Dislodging C.I.A.'s
costs" and said it would cost
$640 a week for the agency to
I keep looking from now on.
Now affiliated with the non-
profit Center for National Se-
curity Studies, Halperin filed
hi g freedom-of-information re-
quest in February, asking for
44 categories of records sug-
gested by' the public congres-
sional testimony of CIA Direc-
tor William E. Colby.
In addition, Halperin said,
Colby and the CIA made
other, still-secret disclosures
in reports to President Ford
and the Rockefeller Commis-
sion and in response to re-
'quests from the Senate com-
mittee on intelligence opera-
tions headed by Frank Church
(D-Idaho).
' "What on earth did they
look at [as the basis] for the
* Colby report [to Pr esi den t!
F o r d]?" Halperin demanded.i
"Why haven't they found this:
material? Either they're try-
ing to subvert the Freedom of
--Information Act with big fees
r Reif/eosin
for documents they've already
located or they haven't sear-
ched their files."
Aside from the discomfiture
posed for the CIA by the new
legislation, Halperin said he
suspected the agency has yet
to check all the files that
might bear on illegal or im-
proper domestic spying opera-
tions. ?
CIA Director Colby, -in dis-
closing what he described as a
few "missteps" by the CIA
over the past 27 years, told the
House and Senate Appropria-
tions committees that the
agency had recruited or in-
serted "about a _dozen individ-
uals into American dissident
circles ..." Halperin asked for
"all files" pertaining to the ac-
tivities of these 12 individuals.
? He said he has yet to get
more than a few scattered
CIA directives and memos in
response to his requests, along
with a 39-page report compiled
in 1968 about worldwide stu-
dent protests entitled
"Restless Youth."
By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK '
Special to The New York Tipes
WASHINGTON, May ]3?Ap-
plications under the Freedom I
of Information 'Act are slowly!
beginning to dislodge docu-
ments, from the Central
genceAgency, and tidbits from'
the agency's secret files are;
floating zit over Washington.
Among the individuals and
groups that have obtained for-
merly secret documents is
Morton Halperin, a former -de'
to Secretary of State Kissin7er
who is now with the Center for;
National Security Studies.
Mr. Halperin has obtained!
the C.I.A.'s side of the original'
agreement on responsibilities
between' the CiliAi and Federal
Bureau of Investigation. The
C.I.A.. obtained the right to
keep contact in? the United
States with "individuals and
groups of foreign nationali-
ties." This was supposedly to
permit the C.I.A. to ,recruit
agents from among various
e,migro groups.living within the
'United States: ?
Lawyers for the Political
Rights Defense Fund have ob-
*tained part of a C.I.A. dossier
on the Socialist Workers par-
ty's Presidential candidate,
Peter ,Camejo.
Cables Surrendered
The C.I.A. surrendered sev-
eral heavily edited cables in
which it instructed its offices
in- Bogota, Colombia a..d
Buenos Aires to keep track of
Mr. Camejo while he was
abroad. It also submitted sev-
eral documents apparently:
a Hi
, Halperin had asked for al
waiver of all search fees un-
der a provision of the Free-
dom of Information Act allow-
ing this when release of the
information would benefit the
general public. The CIA de-
nied the request.
Halperin said he is appeal-
ing that decision and will seek
a review of the CIA's esti-
mated fees for finding,the doc-
uments.
.Meanwhile, Halperin said he
has asked the CIA to stop all
document searches and to con-
centrate on reviewing those al-
ready found. In a reply to the
agency dated yesterday, he
emphasized that the Senate-
House; conference - report on
the new Freedom' of Informa-
tion Act stated that "fees
should not be used for the
purpose of discouraging re.
quests for information or as
obstacles to disclosure of re-
quested information."
said that the hnreau aver-
aged 113 F.O.I. requests a day
?
in April, and that, though the
:flow had tapered off somewhat,
'view that Mr. Camejo had over
Havana Radio while he was in
Cuba. _?..?
Most significant in,
Mr.
Camejo's 'case .was ?that the
agency said it had 81 other
.documents that it did not have
to release under provisions of
the law. .
John Marks. co-author of a'
book on the C.I.A. and a former
State Department officer, has
;obtained a secret study pre-:
loared by the C.I.A. in Sentem-
ber, 1968, called "Restless
Youth." . ? . .
It is an erudite, if conserva-
tive, view of youthful militancy
and radicalism around .the
world. There is no question of
impropriety in the ? acency's
preparing such a document, and
it has offered study 'papers
throughout Government oni
other subjects. -
, The' paper contained an un-
to-date analysis of Students'
I for a. Democratic Society and
[antiwar activities that sugj
I gested that it had its own,
sources of information.
? It offered the conclusion that
"the Communists can take little
comfort from any of this, even
though Moscow and its allies
.may exact fleeting advantage
from the disruption sowed by'
the dissidents."
"In 'the long run, they, will.
have to cope with young people
who are alienated by the more
oppressive, features of Soviet*
life," it said.
Richard Helms, former Direc-
tor of the C.I.A., and other
Government officials have said.
that the C.I.A. began to gather
intelligence on domestic dis-
might be financed by. Soviet- :it still had- 101 employes as-
intelligence agencies. -, ?signed to processing the .appli-
? The Socialist Workers .parly, ? -cations.
The C.I.A. has a 50-man com-
plement processing the -
re-
quests, and received 1,600 since
Jan. 1. Each request must be)
searched through the records,
the material read and a deci-
sion then made on whether
the agency must release the
document under the law.
Under the amendment to the
act, any citizen may apply to
a Government agency to dis-
cover .whether it has prepared
il:dg a job that Carrollton Press, ?
"a dossier or file,on him. Within
Inc., which has several other
certain ranges of time or na-
library services, is now offering -"ti onal security, the agency
must surrender the file. If it
does not,, or withholds portions
I file. If it
does not, or withholds portions
lof the file,. the citizen may
appeal and ultimately get a
;court hearing.
was kept under surveillance
by the F.B.I. for three decades.,
It is not clear from the C.I.A.
material released last week
whether it was privy to the
F..BI.'s files on Mr. Camejo.
An amendment to the Free-
dom of Information Act that!
went into effect in February.
has vastly increased the nurn-'
ber of documents that are being,
:declassified. Keeping track of:
Ie material has become so
a service that obtains,_ cata-
logues and examines do-
cuments released under various
a9ects of the law.
Both the C.I.A. and the F.B.I.
have felt the full burden of
the new law. An F.B.I. spokes-
WASHINGTON STAR
1 MAY 1975
Glomar to Be Taxed
LOS ANGELES ? The Los Angeles county assessor
says he'll slap a tax assessment of more than $1 million
on the secret salvage ship Glomar Explorer which, as ,
purported property of the federal government, has '
been tax exempt.
Assessor Philip Watson said yesterday he believes
the 618-foot ship ? used to raise part of a sunken Sovi-
et submarine off Hawaii last year ? is the legal prop-
erty of Howard Hughes' Summa Corp. and at an as-
sessed value of $40 million should be taxable in the
amount of $1.24 million.
Watson said there is about $250 million worth of so-
phisticated electronics equipment on the ship but
suspects most of it is owned by the Central Intelligence
Agency and is therefore tax exempt. ?
'based on newspaper clippings,
and a transcript of an Anter- sidents because of concern by
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WASHMGTON POST
13 May 1975
R.ockefaler ana
Ends CM Pmbe .
By George
?
Washington Po
The Rockefeller commission
Completed its investigation of
the Central Intelligence Agen.
,cy's domestic activities yester-
day except for the finishing
!touches required for a report
-to President Ford.
The commission's vice chair-
pan, C. Douglas Dillon, told
reporters that "we didn't dig
up anything" surprising be.1
yond the allegations and dis-
closures already made public
in the press.
The inquiry ranged from a
covert CIA program of inter-
cepting first-class mail to re-
ports of CIA involvement in '
assassination schemes against
foreign leaders such as Cuban
Premier Fidel Castro.
Headed by Vice President
Rockefeller, the commission
heard 48 witnesses at closed,
once-a-week hearings that
started Jan. 13. Its staff took
'depositions from scores of oth-
Lardner jr.
St Staff Writer
mony that the agency engage :
in Surveillance of American,
journalists and political dise
senters, opened first-class mail,
over .a 20-year period between
the United States and Commu-
nist countries, planted inform-
ers inside domestic protest
groups, assembled files on
more than 10,000 Americans,
and kept counterintelligence
flies on at least four members
of Congress.
Dillon said he would not
characterize what the CIA did
as "massive" domestic spying.
"The allegation is that the
agency was devoting a large
part of its time on domestic
--areas when it was supposed to
be operating abroad," he said.
"I don't think this was the
case."
The commission was origi-
nally scheduled to report to
the President in March. but it
was granted an extension af-
ter Mr. Ford asked it to ex-,
! plore any violations of domes-
tic law arising out of the
CIA's alleged involvement in
eeseesheat;ne eNlets. againse
Castro and others.
Dillon said yesterday he has
"no knowledge" that President
Kennedy was kilted in retalia-
tion for CIA plotting against
Castro, as one persistent ru-
mor has it.
But he was more reserved
about the commission's in-
quiry into assassination plots
against foreign leaders. With:
out characterizing the find-
ings, he said the investigationt
of these allegations _involved
"largely .Castro" although
others conCerned the late Ra-
fael Trujillo of the Dominican
Republic. .
The commission ? also
checked into claims by activist
Dick Gregery and associates
that a photograph of several
shabbily dressed men picked
up in Dallas shortly after the
November, 1963, assassination
of President Kennedy showed
two persons resembling
Watergate burglars E. Howard
Hunt and Frank Sturgis, both
fOrmer CIA operatives. ? ' ?
-, The FBI, which loOked into
the same claims last year and
found no substance to them,
dispatched a photographic ex-
pert to Dallas recently tore-
view its. findings and appar-
ently came up with the same
results.
Hunt and Sturgis have de'
flied beine in Dallas the day
the President was killed.
The final two witnesses be-
fore the commission yesterday
were retired Navy Adm.
George B. Anderson, chairman
of the PreSident's Foreign In-
ers.
?
' The -eight-member panel
will now embark on an accel-
erated round of private ses-
sions to edit a draft report for
Mr. Ford that already covers
at least 600' pages. Spokesmen
said staff lawyers and investi-
gators are still doing some
wrap-up work and several sec-
tions of the draft report re-
main incomplete.
Dillon, however, said he felt
that "with one or two major
exceptions, everything that
was done was rather periph-
eral and was connected in one
way or another to the legiti-
mate work of the agency." He
did not spell out what he
would regard as the "major
exceptions" to that conclusion.
The deadline for the report
io Mr. Ford is June 6. It is be-
ing written with the expecta-
tion that it will be made pub-
lic, but the President will
make the final decision after.
he has reviewed it.
Commission spokesmen
:were unclear about how de-
tailed the report would be in
'recounting various episodes,
-although one said "certainly
the names of top officials will
be used."
The transcripts of testimony
taken by the commission and
its staff Will be kept secret, he
added.
? President Ford created the
commission on Jani 5 to hives-
tieate chaff:es that the CI-A
spied on Americans in the
United States in violation of
its charter.
?CIA Director William E..
Colby subsequently acknowle
Rdged in 'congressional testi,,
NEW YORK TIMES
8 May 1975
Ass ssin ti n Denials of C.I.A.
Termed 'incomplete' by Church
By NICHALOS M. HORROCK -
? Special to The New York Time
WASHINGTON, May 7?Sen-
ator Frank Church. said today
that he had information in his
possession indicating that the
published denials of any com-
plicity of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency in assassination
plots were "incomplete."
Mr. Church, 'Idaho Democrat
who is chairman of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelli-
gence, cited statements in the
press by a Tormer Director of
Central Intelligence, Richard
Helms, and the current director,
William E. Colby, and others.
He pledged that his committee
would look into? the matters
"very thoroughly" and would
later decide whether to make
its findings public.
Under questioning by report-
ers, after meeting with Vice
President Rockefeller, Mr.
Church also said that the evi-
dence his committee was seek-
ing from such diverse agencies
as the Defense Intelligence
Agency, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the C.I.A.,
was being "funneled" through
the White House and that this
was delaying the Senate coin.:
? mittee inquiry.
Mr. Church and, the commit-'
tee vice chairman, Senator
John G. Tower, Republican of
Texas, met briefly with ? Mr.
Rockefeller today to make a
formal request for all the tran-
scripts. evidence and "raw
data" that the Rockefeller
Commission has gathered on
the C.I.A..
Mr. Church said that the
Vice President had told him
that since the commission had
been created and appointed by
President Ford it was up to the
President to decide whether
Congressional investigating
committees could have the ma-
terial. Mr. Rockefeller, Mr.
Church sadi, had no objection
to the material going to the
Senate committee. ? -
' No White House Denial
Both Mr: Church and Mr.
Tower said that no White
House official had yet flatly re-
fused to provide any piece of
evidence sought by the com-
mittee and that there had been
no objection yet to turning over
the material to the Rockefeller!
Commission.
It was during this question!
period that Mr. Church re-,'
sponded to a query of whetherd
after reviewing the evidence'
he now had, he could "en-1
dorse" statements by Mr. Helms
and Mr. Colby that said there,
had been no planning of assas-I
sinations within the C.I.A.
Mr. Church said that 'based
upon information in my posses-
sion, those statements that ap-
peared in the press by Mr.
Colby and Mr. Helms and oth-
ers have been correct but not
complete."
Presumably, Mr. Church was
referring to recent statements
by several senior former C.I.A.
officials, including Mr. Helms,
that there was never an
"authorized" plot to assassinate
a foreign leader or C.I.A. in-
volvement. in several assassina-
tions over the last two decades.
But Mr. Church refused to ex-
pand on his first answer to the
question.
Church Lacks Evidence
Under . questioning, Senator
Tower said he had "meevidence
to convince me" that any of-
the statements were "incorrect"
but he did riot contradict Mr.
Church's statement.
The entire matter of whether
the C.I.A. has been involved
in assassination plots of for-
eign leaders or actually com-
mitted assassinations has
swirled through the city for
nearly two months with little
lard data to clear the air.
On. another matter Mr.
Church ',said that his commit-
tee 'felt that evidence from in-
dividual government agencies'
should not have to be reviewed
by the White House before it
was turned over. -"We think a
good deal of this material could
be delivered directly but the
White House takes a different
view. So far we have been un-
able to cut that particular
knot."
Mr. Church said that this
funnel system was delaying the
Senate committee's inquiry. He
said that in the interests of
erepediting thd investigation,
the committee had agreed to-
tell the White House which
pieces of evidence it, thought
were most important and which
should be delivered first.
telligence Advisory Board, and
chief U. S. Postal Inspector
William J. Cotter, who told of
his repeated and finally suc-
cessful efforts to get the CIA
to abandon its illegal mail-in-
terception program. ?
SUNDAY TELEGRAPH., London
4 March 1975
C.I.A. 6 tried to
kill Philby
By Our Staff Correspondent
in Washington
The Central Intelligence
Agency planned to eesassinate
Kim Philby in 1963 in Beirut,
according to -Jack Anderson, the
:syndi cat ed col um nist.
At that time, he wrote yester-
day "The C.I.A. was 100 per
cent. certain that Phan/ was a
Russian spy. Fed up with British
dilly-dallying, the CIA. decided
to murder him. But as the
.' torpedoes ' closed in the elusive
Philby skipped off to the
Soviets."
8
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WASHINGTON STAR
7 May 1975
Mail Op ed
431 Mlles
On avrants
, United Press International
The chief U.S. Postal
Service inspector has testi-
fied that there have been
431 cases during the past
two years in which an indi-
vidual's mail was opened
after issuance of a search
warrant. ---
William J. Cotter also
indicated yesterday that the
CIA may have been involv-
ed in mail openings beyond
the 431 authorized by court
orders, but he refused to
comment publicly on the
number.
Appearing before a House
subcommittee on postal fa-
cilities and mail, Cotter
gave further information on
CIA mail opening activities
to lawmakers in executive
session.
When committee mem-
bers asked Cotter about
how extensive past CIA
mail opening practices had
been, he replied, ".I would
feel much freer to dis-
cuss this if we , were in
executive session." He re-
fused to publicly reveal any
details of the CIA mail
openings, including what
criteria is used in allowing
the agency to engage in
such activities.
During the public part of
the hearing, Cotter review-
ed current practices on
mail openings and mail
covers as well as a CIA "20-
year project" during which
mail to and from the Soviet
Union was opened.
Cotter, a former CIA
agent, said a mail cover in-
volves recording informa-
tion from the outside of the
envelope, but not actual
opening of letters. A cover
may be instituted to assist
in locating a fugitive, to ob-
tain evidence on the
commission or attempted
commission of a crime and
to "protect the nationaPse-
curity," he said.
? At present there are 353
mail covers in place around
the country, but during a
year there might be 1,000
covers, be said. Cover au-
thority is issued for a 30-day
period, but can be renewed.
Only the chief postal in-
srPctor can authorize na-
tional security category
covers, Cotter said, and 95
percent of those requests
comelrom the FBI.
NEW YORK TIMES
4 May 1975
ssassinaticn Is a
That JustWon't
By DANIEL SCHORR
WASINGTON?Four months, ago, -topic "A" in
investigations of The Central Intelligence Agency
was "domestic surveillance." Now it is "assassina-
tions," foreign and/or domestic, plotted and/or
committed: The subject has become a preoccupation
of the Presidential commission headed by Vice Presi-
dent Rockefeller despite its primary mandate, an
inquiry into allegations that the C.I.A. paid consider-
able attention, improperly and perhaps illegally; to
the activities of thousands of Americans.
The shift in attention is a development that Presi-
dent Ford had hoped to avoid, but unwittinglyhelped
to bring about. Meeting with the President on Jan. 3
for a confidential briefing after filing a written
report responding to Seymour Hersh's revelations in
The New York Times about domestic surveillance
C.I.A. Director William Colby described other matters
potentially much more troublesome if exposed.
Whethet by deliberate design or not, a course was
followed that would keep the skeletons safely locked
in the closet. The surveillance issue, where little
more damage was expected, would be addressed by
appointment of a Presidential commission, but it
would work within guidelines carefully framed and
its members. would be carefully chosen to avoid.
more perilous areas.
Unfortunately for the success of that approach,
lite candid President talked about his concern to,
subordinates, and even at a luncheon with executives'
?of The New York Times. To illustrate his worries
about an uninhibited inquiry he mentioned "assassi-
natj:pns" without being specific about what he had
in mind. .
Though The Times executives respected Mr. Ford's
confidence, word eventually leaked, and the Presi-
dent's worry was reported by CBS News on Feb. 28.
Senator Stuart Symington, because he shared re-
sponsibility for overseeing C.I.A.' activities immedi-
ately called Mr: Colby to ask if the C.I.A. had killed
anybody, and quoted the director's initial response as
"not in this country." Asked if anyone had been killed
anywhere, Mr. Colby replied negatively, Mr. Syming-
ton said, but,added the matter was'complicated."
President Ford inferentially confirmed an "assassi-
nation" problem at his March 7 .news conference,
saying, in reply to a question on assassinations, that
he had received "a full report from Mr. Colby on the
operations that have been alluded to in the news,
media in the last week on so, really involving such
actions that might have taken place beginning back
in the 1960's." _
?
The issue, once publicly raised, had to be dealt
with. It was tossed to the Rockefeller Commission,
whose staff had become interested on its own.
The Vice President was left to explain the new
concern. The best he could do was, "We see the
possibility of a situation which we didn't antici-
pate." Part of the "situation" was the revival of
public interest in revisionist theories about the
assassination of President John F. Kennedy. The staff
conducted dozens of interviews and made an exten-
sive review of documents, including the Kennedy
autopsy report.
Richard Bissell, who had retired as the C.I.A.'s'
Deputy Director for Plans (clandestine operations)
in 1962, before domestic surveillance had starteu,
was asked what he knew about the unnatural deaths
of foreign personalities, such as Patrice Lumumba of
the Congo and ,Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Re-
public. Mr. Bissell disclaimed direct C.I.A. involve-
ment?What became apparent was that the standard
pattern of covert activity was to support opposition
groups, and hope they would do what the C.I.A.
wanted done.
. An exception was Fidel Castro: The commission
staff 'found evidence that the C.I.A. was more di-
rectly involved?at times in concert with American
underworld figures?in a series of attempts on Mr.
Castro's life that started before the abortive Bay of
Pigs invasion and continued as late as 1963. Mr.
Bissell had been succeeded in 1962 is deputy di-
rector of plans by Richard Helms.
-- ? Mr. 'Helms was recalled from his post as Ambassa-
dor to Iran for a third round of testimony?two
arduous days with the staff, almost four hours before
the full commission. He was described by commis-
sion sources as .a "not very helpful" witness, with
frequent lapses? of memory. He emerged, agitated,
to tell newsmen, "I don't know of any foreign,leader
that was ever assassinated by the C.I.A." But he
would not be drawn into discussion of indirect in-
volvement or abortive conspiracies.
The Castro issue took on a special significance for
the commission staff. David Belin, the staff director,
had been chosen by President Ford, with whom he
served on the Warren Commission to investigate the
Kennedy assassination. They agreed, as Mr. Ford
expressed it'on April 4, that there was no doubt
that Lee Harvey Oswald was the sole assassin, hut
there could be a "problem" about the conclusion
that there was no evidence of a conspiracy. Mr. Ford
meant that -any indications of others influencing Os-
wald Could technically be taken as evidence that he
was part of a conspiratorial undertaking.
The Castro Factor
The "problem" can never be resolved because Os-
wald is dead, and only he could describe his motives
with ?certainty. The Warren Commission had re-
ported his activity in the Fair Play for Cuba Com-
mittee and his visit to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico
City, but the commission conceded Oswald's Cuba
connection was murky. The commission knew noth-
ing about the plots on Castro's life.
, President Lyndon Johnson learned about them ac-
cidentally, when'J. Edgar Hoover made a bureacrat's
complaint. He told Mr. Johnson that F.B.I. agents
had trapped a major underworld figure,' only to find
that the criminal was working for the C.I.A. in one
of .its attempts on Premier Castro's life. Presumably,
that information led to speculation by Mr. Johnson,
recently disclosed, that Oswald may have been "in-
fluenced or directed" by the Castro Government to
murder Mr. Kennedy in retaliation. The,C.I.A. designs
on Mr. Castro occurred only months before Mr. Ken-
nedy was killed. What Mr. Johnson considered a
possible connection was also obvious to the Rocke-
feller Commission. -
The commission's report is scheduled to be given
to Mr. Ford by June 6 and is expected to be made
public shortly thereafter. Its main subject will be
domestic surveillance, but the matter of assassina-
tions cannot now be avoided: Mr. Ford's original
wishes notwithstanding. He and everyone else will
then find out whether the public is reassured or
horrified about some of the things the Central Intelli-
gence Agency has contemplated or done, here and
abroad.
Daniel Schorr is a Washington correspondent for
C.B.S. News. .
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LOS ANGELES TIMES
11 May 1975
"
Kennedy
Conspiracy
Ise tunte
.? BY W. DAVID SLAWSON "
and RICHARD M. MOSK
? There v'ere always those who be-
lieved there was a conspiracy. to as-
sassinate President Kennedy, and
many of these persons brushed aside
the report of the Warren Commis-
sion, which found no evidence to sup-
-port the conspiracy theory and con-
cluded that Lee Harvey Oswald act-
ed alone. ?
Recently .talk of plots to assassin-
ate Joreign leaders, and investiga-
tions into what role, if any, the
David Slawstm is a professor of law
at USC, Richard Mosk is a Los An-
geles attorney. Roth were attorneys on,
the staff of the Warren Commission.
American CIA ma Y have had in such
plots, has revived speculation over
the Kennedy assassination. .
The conspiracy theory persists
partly because some persons find it
difficult to beliirve that such a
momentous act could be done so ca-
priciously. and by such .an insignifi;
cant, hapless man as Lee Harvey Os-'
?
.'Few persons not familiar with the
Warren Report realize the large
number of chance occurrences under-
lying the assassination. It is very un-
likely that Oswald would ever have
killed Kennedy had the President not
gone to Dallas when he -did and
? passed the building in which Oswald
was working. At the time Oswald
.took his job, there was no way of
,knowing that the presidential parade
'route would go right by the building
in which he worked, or that there
would be a presidential parade at all
'in the foreseeable future in Dallas.
The night before the assassination,
Oswald hitched a ride with a friend
out to a suburb to see his wife, Mari-
na, from whom he was then separat-
ed. He begged her to come back and
.live with him. He offered to rent an
'apartment in Dallas for the two of
them the next day: She refused. The
next morning Oswald left his wed...-
ding ring and almost all his money
bn the dresser, and departed with the
Isame friend for work, with the rifle
dismantled and concealed in a pack-
:!age. Kennedy might be alive today
had Marina relented.
*
Allegations concerning CIA activi-
ties in the late 1950s and the release
have created added doubts, ?because
The CIA assisted the commission in its
investigation. However, the CIA was,
Only one such outside source of assis-
tance, and it was not the most impor-
tant one. (The most important was'
the FBI.) Moreover, the commission
double-checked and cross-checked all
Fig,rtificant information among a va-
riety of sources?governmental and
private.
The principal reason for the criti?
cisms and conspiracy theories,
however, is the breadth of the War-
en Report. The published materials'
comprise 27 volumes. The National
Archives contain additional material,
'which has for the most part been
made public. Critics of the report, by
selective and inaccurate citations,
have turned this vast amount of ?
material against the commission.
The commission took testimony
from over 300 people. Thousands
more were interviewed or gave affi-
davits. The FBI alone conducted ap- ?
proximately 25,000 interviews. As is
true with even the simplest accident
ease, some people's reactions, memo-
ries, observations and actions were
imperfect.
For example, critics have claimed -
that. one of the doctors who worked
to save the President's life said the
wound on the President's throat was
an entry wound, which if true .would
prove that there was a second gun-
man since Oswald was behind the.
President.
What these critics fail to disclose is
that the doctor, at a raucous news
conference right after the President
died, said that it was possible that a .
bullet had entered the throat. PP la-
ter testified that at the time he made
the remark, he had not seen ? the
wounds on the back of the President.
Although the throat wound could not
thereafter be definitely analyzed, be-
cause of a tracheotomy which this
doctor, among others, had performed,
other doctors later said the wound
probably was an exit wound.
The commission, on the basis of this .
and other expert testimony, fiber
analysis of the clothes, the location of '
bullets and other evidence concluded
that the hole in the. throat Was an
exit wound, which would demon-
strate that the bullet came from the
rear where Oswald was located.
, Quite apart from eyewitnesses,' the
evidence supporting Oswald's guilt is
overwhelming. Ballistics evidence de-
monstrated that Oswald's rifle was
the murder weapon; Oswald's prints
were on the rifle; handwriting analye,
,sis of-order forms and pictures of Os-
'weld with the rifle demonstrated that
the rifle was his; the rifle was found
.in the building where Oswald worked
,and where Oswald was seen shortly
'before the shooting; his prints were
located in the part of the room where
:the rifle and spent cartridges were
'found and from which witnesses saw-
the rifle Protruding at the time of the
\assassination; X ,ray's, photngraphs
.and the autopsy show that the bullet
came from the area where Oswald
was located; after the shooting, Os-
wald promptly left: the prod-uses and
resisted apprehension by killing a po-
liceman. Finally, he lied about a
? number of facts during his interroga-
tion.
Thus, the claims that the rifle was
inaccurate, that the shot was diffi-
10
cult, that Oswald was a poor shot and
that stress analysis tests of Oswald's
voice allegedly show him to have
been telling the truth when he de-
nied his guilt are all unpersuasive in
light of so much uncontroverted
evidence. These claims, even in isola-
tion, are misleading: Oswald was a
former Marine and hunter. He prac-
ticed with the rifle when he was a ci-
vilian. Tests showed that his rifle
was sufficiently accurate. The shot
was not particularly difficult. It was
from a stable, prepared position at a
target moving 11 m.p.h.. almost
straight away at a range of 177 to
266 feet. The rifle had a telescopic
sight. The voice stress analysis has
not achieved general acceptance as a
reliable lie detector test.
Most critical commentaries focus on
suggestions that there had to be at
least two gunmen.
-One of the oldest. claims is that Os-
wald could not have fired three shots
in the time he had and have two of
them hit the President. The commis-
sion utilized the film of the event by.
Abraham Zapruder to determine_ that
the interval between the two hits
was between 4.8 and 5.6 seconds (the
exact time is not determinablesince
the first shot hit the President while
a road sign was between him and.
Zapruder's camera).
Some have said that 4.8 to 5.6 sec:
onds is too short a time for three
shc s to? be fired and two of them to
hit. But the' time interval isbetween
two shots?the two that- hit?not.
three. The commission found the
evidence iheonclusive as to whether,
of the 'three shots fired, it was the
first, 'second or third that missed.
Since the time' interval is that be-
tween the two shots which hit, Os-
wald had all the time he needed to
fire the first shot. A period of 4.8 to
5.6 seconds is ample time for aiming
and firing one shot?the second one,
that hit..
. The evidence concerning the
wounds conclusively dispels the idea
of shots from the front, another part
.of the .e,onspiracy theory. The
wounds bah slanted downward from
_Xennedy's back. This is clear beyond
doubt from the autopsy and from. the'
photographs and X rays of the body.
,The photographs and X raYs are still,
not open to public view, because of'.
Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis' wishes;
but to doubt the evidence of the
wounds is to label as liars the doctors
who examined the body,' the pictures
and the X rays for the commission..
.The inward pointing of the threads of
the back of Kennedy's clothing and
the outward pointing of the threads.
in the front of his clothing demon-
strate that the bullet which first hit_
him entered from the rear and exited
from the front. Since the car was in a
low underpass, a bullet from any di-
rection would have to have been
going downward, and would have. hit
?the car after leaving Kennedy. All
the bullet damage to the car was in
front of Kennedy, which is consistent
with a bullet entering from the rear.
? A great deal of publicity has been
given recently to the claim-that Ken-
nedy must have been hit from the,
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front because the Zapruder film
shows his head jerking back.
? ? In fact, the head jerks back not
when the bullet hits it but slightly la-
ter. Actually, at the time of the hit,
the President's head appears to move
slightly ? forward and the sprayed
flesh ago moves forward. The jerk,
therefore, cannot have been a
momentum reaction. It must have
been a neural or muscular reaction
caused by either bullet or by a reac-,
tion to some other stimulus.? ,
Many critices have pointed to a:
-rough sketch of the location of the
neck wound and to the location of,
the bullet hole in the President's shirt
and suit jacket .as proving that the
rear wound was lower on the Pres-
ident's body than the wound in front.
From this it follows, supposedly, that
some other gunman must have been
firing in a downward direction from
the front.
But the best evidence of the.
wound's location are the autopsy rec-
ords and the photos and X-rays of
'the ,body itself. These unambiguously
show the rear wounds higher than
The: Wound at the front. The rough
sketch was just that: rough. The
-holes in the shirt and jacket seem to
,indicate a low wound on the body
only because the clothing, when pho-
? tographed, was laid flat and because;
presumably, when the President was
sitting in the car his clothing was
'slightly bunched up his back.
Critics have . criticized the "single-
' bullet theory," which is the commis-
'don's Conclusion that the first-bullet
passed through the President and
?also hit, and eventually came to a
stop in, Gov. Connally. Why anyone
should think it unlikely that a rifle
.bullet should go through one man
and hit another, when the men were
sitting close together, escapes us.
Of course, it was difficult for the
:commission to reconstruct exactly
what the path through both men
-was, but a reconstruction proved pos.:
sible, and the conclusion that it was a
single bullet which hit both men ?
-makes, by far: the most sense in- the
-context of all the other evidence.' No
-bullet was left inside the President;
the nature of the President's wound
shows that the bullet that made it
was hardly slowed down and so must
have been stopped by something else,
,but there was no appreciable damage
BALTIMORE SUN
4 May 1975
Cult of the Secret Agent
to 'the car in front of the President;
the films show Connally to have been
hit at or near the same time as the
President; the nature of Connally's
wounds show that he, too, was hit
from the rear.
The fact that the recovered bullet
that apparently went through both
Kennedy and Connally was not
greatly distorted itself actually sup-
ports the single-bullet theory. In or-
der that a bullet be recovered with-.
out being greatly distorted, it must.
be brought to a slow and gentle stop.
By going through two men, and by
tumbling end over end through 'flesh
and muscle and by glancing off, rath-
er than penetrating, large bones, the
bullet was brought to a slow and*
gentle stop and so Was able to
emerge in a relatively unscathed con-
dition.
? The photographs supposedly show-
.
ing shadowy outlines of gunmen in
the bushes or trees actually show
this only to someone with a wild ima-
gination. What they really show are
only shadows such as can be seen on
almost any photograph taken from a
distance of trees or shrubbery.
There has been spectilation recent-
ly that various people masqueraded
before the -assassination as Oswald
and, thus, there must have been a
conspiracy. ? -
?Just as thousands of people claim to
-have seen Patty Hearst in various
places at the same time, many people_
reported seeing Oswald. The Oswald.
"identifications" were even more
doubtful because many of them alle-
gedly took place months and years.
before
before the assassination. If there was'
a conspiracy, what possible purpose
would have been served by sending
fake "Oswalds" around the country?
The recent surge in speculation
about purported CIA or PBI connec-
tions with, or coverup of, the assas-
sination is not a result of any newly
, discovered link between those agen-
cies and the assassination. It is a re-
sult of the revelations of alleged un-.
savory practices in other matters by
these agencies.
In October, 1963, the CIA's Mexican'
department sent a message and a
photograph to the FBI saying, in ef-
fect, that the man in the photograph
was thought to be Lee Harvey Os-
wald. The photograph was not of Os-,
'wald, but it was .not until shortly af-.
' The man who 'touched off the greatest political
scandal in our entire national existence?the former
CIA officer, ex-White House consultant and onnvicted
Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt?has by now
dwindled to a relatively secondary figure in the
drama... . . The conspiratorial dream world Hunt
lived in was clearly built on his identification with We
romanticized and idealized image of the secret agent,
one of the most characteristic projections of Twen-
tieth-Century mass culture.
This glamorous figure has served as the herb of
countless films, plays, comic strips, pulp-magazine
stories and novels. ... James Bond. the steel-thewed
sexual athlete, jet-set name dropper, and bureaucra-
tized killer invented by the late Ian 'Fleming is prob.
Approved For Release 2001/08/08:
ter the assassination that this fact,
was established. These events have
led to the speculation that either the
man in the photograph was a CIA
agent masquerading as Oswald or ?
that Oswald was a CIA agent.
This happened because the CIA had
several secret sources of information
operating in Mexico and,- as is fre-
quently the case in this kind of work,
the central headquarters had difficul-
ty in putting the bits of information
from the different sources together
properly. One source reported that a
-than calling himself Oswald had visit-
ed the Soviet Embassy in Mexico
City. Another source obtained a pho-
tograph of a man who probably visit-
ed the same embassy about the same
time. No source was able to get a
photograph of Oswald in Mexico City,
and no source was able to obtain the
.name of the man in the photograph
who visited the Embassy. Someone in
the CIA who was responsible for put-
ting bits of information together
guessed, mistakenly it turned out,
that the two men were the same.
?
?
With all. of 'this confusion, the time
has come for_ everything on the as-
sassination in the National'Archives
to be made available to the public,
Unless its disclosure can be shown to
be definitely detrimental to the2fti-
*tional security.
We do not believe that a reopening:
of. the 'inquiry, in the sense of estab=
..L.shitig a new commission to carry on
its own investigation or to hear ar-
gument from private investigators,
would :serve: any -useful purpose,
'
,The legitimate interest of the
American people in knowing as sure-,
ly as possible that they have found
out the whole truth can be served;
we think, by the creation of special.:
'limited new investigations if and.
when a need for one of them arises..
Currently, for example, the news me-r
dia has ? reported that the White
House Commission on the CIA is in-.
vestigating the allegation that the
CIA may not have fully 'disclosed all
relevant, information to. the Warren.
Commission in an effort to cover.up
-its own involvement with an assasi'
sination attempt on Castro. 'Such air
issue should be investigated and, apt
?parently it is.
ably the most tardotis of these synthetic modern
heroes.... Fictional depictions of the secret agent as
hero are validated by an almost equally' abundant
flow of nonfictional accounts.
. In all secret service literature, fiction and nonfic-
tion alike, there is an ambiguous and extremely corn-
plex relationship between myth and reality Such a
relationship exists, indeed, within the covert organi-
zations themselves. . The writer of spy thrillers or,
romanticized secret service history and the real-life
covert operator are dialectical partners. The former,
by glamorizing the secret agent, creates an archetype .
?: upon which the latter tends to model his professional
behavior, and he in turn authenticates the writer's
fantasy.
?
' ?Edmond Taylor in
Horizon magazine
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REVIEW
3 April 1975
Th YIA mad, Lamm 17112? 771ac. Not, Osumi
Bernard Fensterwald and
George O'Toole
Six weeks before the assassination of
President Kennedy on November 22,
1963, the Central Intelligence Agency
sent the following teletype message to
the Federal Bureau of Investigation
and the Departments of State and the
Navy:
Subject: Lee Henry OSWALD
1. On 1 October 1963 a reliable
and sensitive source in Mexico
reported that an American male,
who identified himself as Lee
OSWALD, contacted the Soviet
Embassy in Mexico City inquiring
whether the Embassy had received
any news concerning a telegram
which had been. sent to Washing-
ton. The American Was described
aS' approximately 35 years old,
? with an .athletic build, about six
feet tall, with a receding hairline.
2. It is believed that OSWALD
may be identical to Lee Henry
OSWALD, born on 18 October
1939 in New Orleans, Louisiana. A
-former U.S. Marine who defected-
to the Soviet Union in October
? 1959 and later made arrangement
through the -United States Ern-
' bassy in Moscow to return to the
United States with his Russian-.-,
born wife, Marina Nikolaevna
Pusakova, and their child.
3. The information in paragraph
one is being disseminated to your
: representatives in Mexico City.
Any further' information received
? on this .subject will be furnished
you. This information is being
made available to the Immigration
and Nattralization Service.'
Was the Lee Henry Oswald of the
CIA message Lee Harvey Oswald? Yes,
according to Richard Helms; then chief
of the Agency's Clandestine Services.
In a March 1964 memorandum to J.
Lee Rankin, general counsel to the
Warren Commission, Helms explained
that "OSWALD'S middle name was
erroneously given as lienrY' in the
subject line and in paragraph two of
the dissemination.... The maiden sur-
name of Mrs. OSWALD was mistakenly
listed as `PUSAKOVA.'
But *Lee Harvey Oswald was not
"approximately 35 years old, with an
athletic build"; he was twenty-three
years-'old and slender.3 Apparently the
'Warren Commission Document 631,
Ile National Archives, Washington,
DC.
?2Ibid. Her correct maiden name was
Prusakova.
.3Report of the President's Cominission
on the Assassination of President Ken-
nedy (US Government Printing Office,
1964), p. 144. (Hereafter, Report.)
CIA was concerned about the dis-
crepancy, for on October 23 it sent
the following message to the Depart-
ment of the Navy:
Subject: Lee Henry OSWALD
Reference is made to CIA Out
Teletype No. ?74673 [the earlier
? message], dated 10 October 1963,
- regarding 'possible presence of sub-
ject in Mexico City. It is requested
that you forward to this office as
soon as possible two copies of the
most recent photograph you have
of subject. We will forward them
to our representative in Mexico,
who will attempt to determine if
the Lee OSWALD in Mexico -City
and subject are the same individ-
tia1.4
Since Oswald had served in the
Marine Corps, which comes under the
administration of the Navy, his person-
nel records would have included his
photograph.
W.hat the Agency did not say in this
cable ,is that it had in its possession a
photograph of the. man who- .had
apparently "identified himself" as Os-
wald. The man in the CIA photo was
not Lee Harvey Oswald; he was, just as
the Agency's "reliable and sensitive
source" had described him, approxi-
mately thirty-five years- old, with an
athletic build and a receding hairline.
According to a memorandum by
Helms, the CIA never received the
Navy's- pictures of Oswald 'and only
concluded after the assassination that
two different people were involved.5
Meanwhile, the photograph was deliv-
ered to the FBI on November 22,
1963,6
One can -only guess at, the confusion
caused by the picture. The FBI needed
no Navy photograph to establish that
'the mystery man was not Oswald-Lee
Harvey Oswald was sitting handcuffed
in a third-floor office of the Dallas
police headquarters. The next day
Special Agent Bardwell D. Odum was
dispatched with the photograph to the
motel where Oswald's wife and mother
were hidden. He showed the picture to
Mrs.Marguerite Oswald, mother of the
accused assassin. Mrs. Oswald looked at
the .photo and told Odum she didn't
recognize the man.7 The following
day, however, shortly after her son was
murdered in the basement of Dallas
City Hall, Mrs. Oswald erroneously
identified the mystery man. She told
4Commission Document 631, op cit.
5Ibid.
6Hearings Before the President's Com-
mission on the Assassination of Presi-
dent Kennedy (US Government Print-
ing Office, 1964), Vol. 11, p. 469
(hereafter, Hearings).
p. 468.
?
the press the FBI had shown her a
picture of Jack Ruby the night before._
Mrs. Oswald's mistake was under-
standable-the mystery man bore a
superficial resemblance to Jack Ruby,
.and in her .recollection of a brief
glance at the photograph, two faces
became one. But the misidentification
made it necessary for the Warren
'Commission to refer, however oblique-
ly to the affair of the mystery man.
In _the twenty-six volumes of published
testimony and evidence supplementary
.to the Warren Report, the Commission
printed the picture that was shown to
Mrs.' Oswald.8 The Warren Report
contains a very' brief account of the
incident. .
According to the Report, the CIA
had provided the FBI with a photo- ?
graph of "a man who, it was thought
at the time, might have been associated
with?Oswald."9 The Report quoted an
affidavit by Richard- Helms that "the
original photograph had -been taken by
the CIA outside of the United States
sometime between July I,. 1963 and
November 22, 1963."I?
The Commission's explanation is
both inaccurate and misleading. The
? implication that the CIA thought the
mystery man was "associated with
Oswald" 'Only masks the. true situation.
On the basis. of its own evidence, the
Agency mist have concluded either
that the .mystery man was imperson-
? ating? Oswald or that an unlikely chain
of errors had accidentally linked both
the man in the photograph and, the
man who "contacted" the Soviet Em-
bassy to Lee Harvey Oswald.
- The truth was further obscured by
the Report's reference to the Helms
affidavit, which described the circum-
stances in which the mystery man was
photographed only in the most vague
and general terms. The affidavit was
dated August 7, 1964.1' However, the
Commision never mentioned in its
Report or in its twenty-six supplementa-
ry volumes that it had 'obtained an
earlier affidavit from Helms on July 22,
1964 in which he was much more
specific.' 2 "The original photograph,"
Helms testified, "was taken in Mexico
City on October '4, 1963."I3 (This
earlier Helms affidavit was released in
1967 through the efforts of Paul Hoch,
a private researcher.). -
There is no available record that
Richard Helms ever told the Warren
Commission exactly where in Mexico
City the- 'mystery man was photo-
graphed, . but the circumstances in
which the photograph was given to the
8Ibid., Odom Exhibit 1.
.,9Rep.ort, p. 364.
?Ibid., pp. 364-365.
''Hearings, Vol. 11, p. 469:
"Commission Document 1287, The
National Archives, Washington, DC.
13 Ibid.
1
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Commission offer a- very plausible
suggestion. The CIA required the FBI
to sr,op out the background in the
photo before handing it over to the
Commission." The obvious conclusion
is that the photograph was taken by a
hidden surveillance camera, and the
CIA- wished to avoid disclosing its
location. Accbrding, to knowledgeable
former employees of the CIA, the
Soviet and Cuban - embassies, among
others in Mexico City, were under
-constant photographic surveillance at
the-time. It seems likely then that the
man who, according to the CIA:.
"identified himself as Lee Oswald" was
photographed leaving the Mexico City
embassy of the Soviet -Union or of:
some other communist country.
The first public hint that the mys-
tery man may have been impersonating
Oswald came in .1966, with the publi-
cation of Edward Jay Epstein's In-
quest, a scholarly study of the Warren
Commission.' s Epstein interviewed
one of the Commission's legal staff
who recalled the incident. He said he
had asked Raymond G. Rocca, the '
Agency's liaison with the Commis-
,-
sion,? about the photograph. The law-
yer later received word from the Agency*
that the mystery man was thought to be
Oswald at the time the photograph was
given to the FBI. Why, he asked, did
the Agency mistake someone so dis-
similar in appearance for Lee Harvey
Oswald? The CIA said they would
check further and call him back. The
lawyer told Epstein that they never
called him back and the Warren Report,
contains no -explanation of the Agen-
cy's mistake.' 7 ?
.. Another piece of the puzzle fell into:
place early in 1971, when the National
Archives released a previously classified
memorandum about the mystery man
from Richard Helms to the Commis-
sion's general counsel, J. Lee Rank!
in.18 Dated March 24, ? 1964, the,.
memo informed Rankin:
On 22 and 23 November, im-
mediately following the assassi-
nation of President Kennedy, three
cabled reports were received from-
- [deleted] in Mexico City relative
to photographs of an unidentified
man who visited the Cuban and
Soviet Embassies in that city dur-
ing October and November
14Hearings, Vol, 11, 'p. 469.
.1 5 Edward Jay Epstein, Inquest:. The
Warren Commission and the Evablish-'
ment of Truth (Viking, 1966).
'6
Mr. Rocca; deputy chief of the
.CIA's Counterintelligence Staff, was
one of the four senior Agency officials
.who resigned last December in the
wake of The New York Times's revela--
tions of illegal domestic operations by
the CIA's Clandestine Services.
I 7 Epstein, Inquest, p. 94.
Commission DocumlinrWed
National Archives, Washi gion, DC.
' 1963....19
On the basis of these cables, Helms
went on to' say, the CIA had sent
several reports to the Secret Service.
Attached to the Helms memorandum
were paraphrases of these reports.2?
Two dealt with the mystery man:
Message to the Protective Re-
search Staff, The Secret Service,
delivered by hand on 23 Novem-
ber 1963, at 1030 hours. -
, Through sources available to -it,
the CIA [deleted] had come into
possession of a photograph of an
unidentified person thought to
have visited the Cuban Embassy in
mid-October. This individual, it
was believed at the time, might be
identical with Lee Harvey. OS-
,
WA LD.2 I
and,.
Message to the Protective Re-
search Staff, The Secret Service,
delivered by hand on 23 Novem-,
ber 1963, at 1030 hours. ,
CIA Headquarters was informed
[deleted] on 23 November that
several photographs of a person
known to frequent the " Soviet
Embassy in Mexico City, and who
might be identical with Lee Har-
vey OSWALD, had been forwarded
to Washington by the hand of a
United States official returning to
this country.2 2
Helms's covering memorandum af-
'firmed that "the subject of the photo:
graphs mentioned in these reports is
not Lee Harvey OSWALD."23
Several photographs, then, of a
-mysterious stranger who kept being
confused with Lee Harvey Oswald, and
who had visited both the Soviet and
Cuban embassies. Was' it the same
mystery man whose picture had been
shown to Mrs. Oswald? Or was it yet
? another Oswald Doppelganger?
Firm evidence of the existence of
additional photographs of the unidenti-
fied man mentioned in the Warren
-Report .was turned up by Robert
Smith, a private researcher. In 1972
Smith, then research director for the
Commission to Investigate Assassina-
tions, was poring over some recently
declassified Warren Commission docu-
ments when he found reference to the
mystery photo and two other vieWS of
the same person." Smith calla his
discovery to the attention of one of
the authors, Bernard Fensteiwald, who
1 9 Ibid.
2?Ibid.
21Ibid.
221bid.
2 4 Commission Document 566, The
Release i AID 110M11,: CIAAPEI7 TAW 2
13
instituted a 'suit under the Freedom of
Information Act for release of the two
plctures. The government yielded and
turned over the photographs to Fen-
sterwald and *Smith. They are pub-
lished here for the first time.
The two new views of the mystery
man were taken at a different time
'from the first. picture. In the first
picture, the one published in the
?Warren ,Commission volumes, he, is
?wearing a long-sleeved dark shirt and
appears empty-handed; in the two new
photos he is wearing a short-sleeved
white shirt and is Carrying some kind.
of bag or pouch., The new photos also
show him holding a small, passport-
sized booklet and what appears to be a
Wallet. As in the first photograph, the
backgrounds of the two new, photos
have been cropped out. Whoever he
was, he managed to be photographed,
'apparently by ''the CIA's hidden sur-
veillance cameras,' on at least two
separate occasions. And neither of the
, new photographs reveals- any _tesem-
blance between the mystery man and
Lee Harvey Oswald.
The Warren Commission concluded
that Oswald had been in Mexico in late
September and early October 1963.'
Records of Mexican Customs and Im-
migration, bus lines, and a Mexico City
hotel ,indicate that Oswald ,entered
Mexico. At Nuevo Laredo on the US
border on September 26, traveled by
bus to Mexico City, arriving there the
next morning, and returned to the
United States on October 3.25 Passen-,
Ors- on the bus to Mexico City
remembered Oswald, but there is al-
most no eyewitness testimony to sup-
port the 'Commission's reconstruction
of Oswald's movements after he arrived
in that city.26 The Commission's find-
ing that Oswald made repeated visits to
both the Soviet and Cuban embassies
rests heavily upon the affidavit of one
witness, ?a Mexican woman who
worked at the Cuban Embassy."
Silvia' Tirado de Duran was secretary
to the Cuban Consul in Mexico City.
In a sworn statement28 she gave to the
2s Report, p. 299. -
26Ibid., pp. 733-736.
"Ibid., p. 734. Two other witnesses
told the FBI" they saw Ostvald at the
Cuban Embassy. A Mexican private
detective who had visited the embassy
on October 1, 1963; identified Oswald
from newspaper photographs as some-
one he had seen leaving the embassy
on that date in the company of a
Cuban. The detective was shown other
photos of Oswald and failed to iden-
tify him, and the FBI seems to have
concluded that he was mistaken (Com-
mission Doculnent 566). The Warren
_Report does not 'offer, the detective's
'testimony as 'evidence of Osv,ald's visit.
Another witness who claimed to have
seen Oswald at the Cuban Embassy
retracted his testimony after failing to
pass a polygraph examination (Report,
R006940260007-6 ?
28Commission Document 776a, The
National Archives, Washington, DC.
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twrs.0tvub Dant .3,1975
deputy director of- Mexican Federal
Security on November 23, 1963, she!
said that Oswald had visited the Cuban
Embassy in late September to apply
for a visa to visit Cuba during a
planned trip to the Soviet Union. Mrs.
Duran recalled a heated exchange be-
tween Oswald and the Consul when
the Cuban official told him his request
could not be granted immediately. She
remembered making a "semiofficial"
phone- call to the Soviet Embassy to
try to speed? up action on Oswald's
application. She identified the Lee
Harvey Oswald who visited the Cuban
Embassy as the accused assassin whose
photograph appeared in the Mexican
newspapers on November 23.29
Apparently the Warren Commission
staff did not interview Silvia Duran,
but instead relied solely on her affi-
davit. Whether any attempt to talk to
her was made is not recorded in any
available document. However, accord-
ing to the Commission filesea Mexican
'newspaper reporter tried to interview
her in April 1964, Her husband would
not permit the man to speak with her,
saying "she had suffered. a nervous
breakdown following her interrogation
by the? Mexican authorities and had
been? prohibited by her .physician
from discussing the ' Oswald matter
further."30 If this report is correct,
the interrogation of Silvia Duran may
have, been a more, emotional interview
than one would. conclude from the
report forwarded by the Mexican po-
lice. The report gives the impression
that the police were routinely collect-
ing information about Oswald's Mexi-
can trip for the -American authorities.
One question that arises is whether
Duran's statement was given volun-
tarily, and, if not, whether her identi-
fication of Oswald as the visitor to the
embassy is valid.
The Warren Commission may have
omitted a _full exploration of this
question because it had collateral evi-
dence of Oswald's visit to the Cuban
Embassy. There were, for example,
Oswald's application for a Cuban visa,
bearing his photograph and signa-
ture,3I and a letter reportedly written
by Oswald to the Soviet Embassy in
Washington, referring to his Visit to the
Cuban Embassy.32 The address book
found among Oswald's possessions,
moreover, contained Duran's name and
telephone number. But the only cred-
ible 'eyewitness testimony that Oswald
in fact visited the embassy is the
statement of Silvia Duran.
When viewed in the light of the,
recently disclosed evidence suggesting
that someone might have visited the
embassy impersonating Oswald, the
Conimission's failure to settle com-
pletely the question of the three.
29Ibid., p. '5.
30Commission Document .963, The
National Archives, Washington, DC, p.
16.
3lHearings, Commission Exhibit 2564. 14
321bid., Commission Exhibit 15.
Approved For Release 2001/08/08
misidentified photos seems extraor-
dinary. It is probable that the CIA did
in fact supply an explanation of the
photographs that was enough to satisfy
the Commission at the time. If so, that
explanation remains a part of the
classified Warren Commission docu-
ments not available to. the public.
Raymond Rocca (who,- until his
recent resignation, was the Agency's
action officer for all post-Warren Re-
port inquiries about the matter) told
one of the authors that the CIA could
not identify the mystery man. If this is
so, we may wonder how the Agency_
could have -offered a satisfactory ex-
planation of the incident to the Coin-
mission. Until additional documents
bearing on this matter are declassified,
the conclusion that Oswald really visit-.
,ed the Cuban Embassy must remain in.
some doubt. But even if he did, the
question whether someone was never-
theless trying to impersonate him re-
mains a crucial one.
If someone posing as Oswald visited.
the Soviet and Cuban embassies in the
early autumn of 1963, what implica-
tions might be drawn from this dis-
covery? One obvious interpretation is
that someone sought to counterfeit -a
fresh connection between the man who
was soon to become the accused
presidential assassin and the govern-
ments of those two communist coun-
tries. But it, is not necessary to
speculate further. If someone were'-
trying to impersonate Oswald eight
weeks -before the assassination, the
Warren Commission's theory of a lone
assassin, unconnected with any con-
spiracy, is seriously undermined and
the case should be reopened.
There could be, of course, an
innocent explanation of; how the CIA
came to misidentify the mystery man
as Lee Harvey Oswald: Oswald may
actually have visited the. Cuban and
Soviet embassies. If this were the case,
then somewhere in the CIA's files
there should be' photographs of the
real Lee Harvey Oswald departing from
the Soviet and. Cuban embassies in
Mexico City. If those photographs
exist, their publication would help to
settle the question. If they don't, the
CIA should now explain-why not. In
either case, it should also disclose what
it knows about the man it wrongly
identified as Oswald on two separate
occasions. It should explain why it
believes that this man was not imper- ?
ionating Oswald. All these matters
should be clarified both by the CIA
itself and by the congressional com-
mittees that are about to investigate its.
activities. 0 ?
CIA
Who killed
Kennedy?
Washington, DC
Currents of doubt about the findings
of the Warren commission on the
assassination of President . Kennedy
at Dallas in 1963 have never quite
ceased to swirl. The films of the event
are open to different interpretations.
'A disparate group of self-appointed
examiners has chewed over, in books,
articles and pamphlets, the forensic
evidence, which in any event is in-
,complete. Some possible, if fanciful,
leads to the former associations of the
presumed assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald,
were not followed up. The important
question is whether Oswald was the
sole assassin acting of his own motion,
as the Warren commission concluded,
or whether he had controllers or
associates. If it were shown that he
was not acting on his own, then the
question might arise whether any con-
nection existed between the killing of
President Kennedy and some other
notable American assassinations of the
period.
The most recent hypothesis is that
the president may have been killed in
retaliation for attempts on the life of
Mr Fidel Castro, and this ,has arisen
in connection with the recently cir-
culating suggestions that the Central
Ir:elligence Agency had something
to do with plans for, or discussions about,
the assassination of various foreign
rulers, Mr Castro -among them. Step
.by steP the, Rockefeller commission,
apiSointed by President Ford in January
to look into allegations of domestic
spying by the Central Intelligence
Agency, has found itself casting its
net wider. This week it recalled for
prolonged questioning two witnesses
previously heard: Mr William Colby,
the present director of the CIA, and
Mr.Richard Helms, the former director,
now ambassador in Iran. Mr Helms
had already been questioned at length
by the fommittee staff on, two days
last week:
- ? After his appearance before the coin-
- mission Mr Helms denied, once again
that, so far as he knew, the CIA had
ever assassinated any 'foreign leader.
Unfortunately he showed signs of being
overwrought, calling one reporter who
questioned him (Mr Daniel Schorr,
who first aired, the allegations about
foreign assassinations by the CIA on
Columbia Broadcasting System) "killer
Schorr" and obscene names.
On,-the following day, there was Mr
Schorr on the CBS news questioning
a retired air force officer formerly in
the Office of Special Operations at the
Defence Department, Colonel Fleycher
Prouty, one of whose duties was liaison
with the CIA. Colonel Prouty wrote a
book about his experiences, "The
Secret Team". Watching his television
set on Monday, he became incensed at
seeing Mr Schorr abused by Mr Helms,
and volunteered his recollection that
there was indeed a plot to kill Mr Castro
in 1959 or 1960, and that in the course
of his duties he had helped to supply
the CIA with a specially equipped small
CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360002-6
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001.00360002-6
WASHINGTON POST
11 MAY 1975
elE
Soy' iet Security Vetoed His Return in '63
By Daniel Schorr
Soeetal to The Washlowton Post
- On Feb. 4, 1964, ten weeks
after President Kennedy's
assassination, U. CpL Yuri
Ivanovich Nosenko of the
KGB (Soviet state security)
defected to the United
States. in Geneva. He said,
among other things, that he
had handled the file on Lee
?Harvey Oswald since the ex-
Marine's arrival in Moscow
In 1959." ?
? Brought to :the United
States by the Central Intel-
ligence Agenc y, Nosenko
was..turned over to the FBI:
on 'Feb. 26, 1964, for ;ev-
eral days of interrogation
-about Oswald, who the War-
ren _Consmission said acted .
alone.- in assassinating- Ken-
nedy in. Dallas on.-Nov.
-1963. The ' in terrogationssre-
'port--Tart _of the Warren
?:Commission's seer et fite,,_
but never, ? cited in testi-
mony or-in conelusions?has
been- declassified.. This ac-
dountis taken from,Nosen,
Nosenko painted a pie-ture
of Soviet Isecurity officers:
So :leery .of ? Oswald, who...,
they --considered- ,mentally-;
unstable n d-- possibfr.tt!
-i,tleeper' American -agent,
that they ;tried to get him
Out of the Country and veto-
ed his return when he ap-
plied in Mexicci City in ?Sep-
ternber, 1963.
? The security officer said
that an inspection of the
Soviets' file after the Dal-
las murder started a Krem-
lin flap that reached as high
as Premier Nikita S. Ithrusli- I
chev when a notation was I
found indicating that a KGB !
officer in Minsk, in violation',
of instructions, might have !
tried to recruit Oswald be-
fore his return to the United
States. .
According to Nosenko, it ;
was with relief that it was I
-finally concluded that the :
entry was a self-serving lie !
by a bureaucrat, who was ig-
norant of the implications.
Nosenko's offer to testify !
in secret before the Warren :
Commission was declined. ,
John McCune, then director ?
of the CIA, told this re-
porter that his counterintel-
_ .
ligence officers suspected
Nosenko-might be a plant to
exonerate the Soviets . of
conspiracy. . ? . ?
When McCone appeared.
before the Warren Commis-
sion with his deputy, Rich?;[.
ard Helms, in June, 1964,
they said that there was "no
evidence" of a Soviet con-
spiracy in Kennedy's assassi-
nation. But they did not say
they might have evidence to
the contrary. ? .
r! Rep.. Gerald R. Ford, a
member of the Warren Corn-
mission, asked, "Is the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency
continuing any investigation
into this area?"
McCene replied, "No, be-
cause at the-present time-we
have-- no- infornsatiernsin- cur
files that have-- not elc,*
haustiveir investigated and
disposed of to our. satisfack?
'don." ? -
Today; McCone say's that
Nosenko's bona fides "sub-
-sequently were proven
And that "it is today the pos-
ition of the:CU.:that the-in-9
formation-: -given- by:, No-J,
-senko was correct." Withir
the agency; it is understood,,!
that is still a subject of din:
: Whether--? . e. port
-
port would have affected'
the conclusions of the War-
ren Commission is hard to
judge. Some former staff
members said the conclu-
sion that there was "no evi-
dence" of a conspiracy
might have been more
strongly worded..
Not only did Nosenko
deny any Soviet conspiracy,
but he said he knew of "no ,
Cuban involvement in the
assassination."
The account contained in
three interrogations of No-
senko by the FBI can be
summarized as follows:
As deputy chief of a KGB
counterintelligence section
dealing with American and
British tourists, Nosenko re-
ceived a report from an In-
tourist guide. after Oswald's
arrival in Moscow, saying ,
Oswald wanted to stay per-
manently and become a So.!
viet citizen.
Deciding that Oswald
"of no interest to the KGB"
and "somewhat abnormal,"
Nosenko had the Intourist
guide advise Oswald that he
would have to- leave when
his tourist visa. expired.
After slashing his wrist in
2 Moscow hotel, Oswald was
taken to a hospital, where
aircraft to land the assassins, two Cuban
exiles, in Cuba. They failed, and were
captured. Denials and counter-denials
abound, but the CIA investigation is
making a new inquiry into the death of
President Kennedy more likely.
?
Approved For Release 2001/0810% : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360002-6
an evaluation of "mental in-
stability" was made. Despite
_
Oswald's threat to try sui-
cide again if he had to leave
the, country, the KGB ad-
vised his expulsion, but later
learned that some other au-
thority?the foreign minis-
try or the Red Cross?per-
mitted him to stay in the So-
viet Union and-sent him to
Minsk. ?
- The KGB's file en Oswald
,vras- transferred- to- Minsk
with a cover letter contain-
ing instructions that the
if.G11 there- "take -no action_
concerning Oswald except to'
'passively' observe-his activi,
ties to make sure he was not
a United States intelligence
,agent temporarily dormant:- ,
- -The-next- time- Sosenkot
heard o f Oswald was in Sep-
tember, 1963, when Oswald
applied for a re-entry visa at
the Soviet embassy in Men-
ico City. An ekthange of me-
mos between the foreign in-
telligence and domestic in-
telligence directorates of
the KGB resulted in a deci-
sion that Oswald "not be
granted permission to re-
turn to the Soviet Union."
Two hours after Kenne-
dy's assassination, Nosenko
was called into a KGB office
and asked about Oswald. He
telephoned Minsk for a sum-
mary of Oswald's file. The
summary contained a .nota-
tion that the KGB in Mipsk
had tried to "influence Os-
wald in the right direction."
That Stirred further inves-
tigation, and the entire file
was flown to Moscow by mil-
itary plane. Vladimir Semi-
chastny, chairman of the
KGB, was obliged to report
to the party central commit-
tee and to Khrushchev.
". The Investigation con-
cluded that the KGB "had
no personal contact with Os-
wald and had not attempted
to utilize him in any man-
ner." The entry about trying
to "influence Oswald" was
attributed to the KGB in
Minsk, "unaware of the in-
ternational significance of
Oswald's activities . . . re-
porting their endeavors to
influence Oswald as a self-
serving effort to impress the
KGB center."
Nosenko said "the Oswald
affair was a source of great
concern for KGB headquar-
ters, where a large Staff was
assembleciand records were ?
reviewed "to make: certain
that the KGB had not uti-
lized. Oswald as.= agent"..':-.7--
Schorrz-is -a- CBS liretes.:,
: :eorrespondent."---
NEWSWEEK
12 May 1975 '
, CIA Controversy
I agree- wholeheartedly with A.J. Lang-
guth when he says "Abolish the CIA!" (MY
' TURN, April 7). We should dismiss this
secretive elitist cult of agents and adminis-
trators for all the reasons put forward by
Langguth, and as a matter of retribution on
behalf of the contribution the CIA has
made to the countless thousands of war
dead in Southeast Asia, for the victimized
peoples of other Third World countries, for
those oppressed or tor:lured or even mur-
dered as a result of CIA interference, for
the people 'of our own country whose
constitutional liberties lie trampled under
secretive CIA "expedience" and on behalf
of all the untold victims of -other CIA
"horror stories" still to be uncovered.
iLM BLICKENSTAFF
Concord, Calif.
? . ?
^ The CIA has done more good for the U.S. -
than Mr. Langguth's narrow-minded arti-
cle has done for NEWSWEEK. As long as we
'face Communists, who want world domin-
_ ation, let us not abolish any agencies for
preserving freedom for Americans.
PAUL KANTOR
Fairport Harbor, Ohio
? Let's abolish A.J. Langguth--at least
from the pages of NEWS WEEK!,.
HURLEY M. MULKEY
Durham, N.C.
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360002-6
THE NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, MAY II, is
C.I.A. Covert ActivitiesAbroadShieldedby
The following article, was
.written by John M. Crewdson
based on reporting by him and
Nicholas M. liorroch.
' spc?ctet to The Neve York Times
1 'C.I.A. operative and convicted
Watergate burglar, that he him-
self is a former C.I.A. agent:
Mr. Fodor declined comment,
however, on Mr. Hunt's asser-
tion that Fodor's had provided
operating covers for American
intelligence agents abroad. ?
Officials of the Sumrna Cor:.
pOration, Mr. Hughes's umbrella
organization, has said privately
that the reclusive billionaire
received no remuneration for
allowing the C.I.A. to place his
imprimateur on the Hughes
Glomar Explorer, the salvage
ship that, disguised as a deep-
sea mining vessel, raised part
of. a Soviet submarine from the.
floor of the Pacific last sum-
mer.
There are, nevertheless, indi-
cations that Mr. Hughes ? may
have reaped some long-term
rewards for his operation, and
many of the other companies
that have entered into com-
mercial cover arrangements, ac-
cording to the intelligence
source, have 'received various
forms of compensation in re-
turn. The source said that some
had formed the C.I.A. to "pay
through the teeth" for the use
of their names.
Maintaining 'Cover'
? The source gave this descrip-
tion of how the arrangement
works:
To maintain their "cover,"
the C.I.A. operatives working
under such agreements must
spend e certainport lot' of their
time on legitimate business ac-
tivities. In most instances, these
activities produce income that
is shared by the C.I.A. and the
covering company. _
The operative's salary is paid
by the C.I.A., which also under-
writes the expenses incurred if
an overseas "business" office
must be enlarged or opened to
accommodate the agency's pur-
poses. The company then bene-
fits by gaining a ? corporate
presence in an area where it
otherwise would have none.
, On some occasions, the
source went on, companies hav-
ing commercial cover agree-
ments with the C.I.A. have at-
tempted to take advantage of
their' special relationships by
approaching the agency to seek
some official favor from the
Government. But he said that,
to his knowledge, they had in-
variably been turned away.
The corporations involved in
these relationships may belie-
fit in yet another, way.. Al-
though most agents operating
under commercial cover allot
the minimum time possible to
corporate matters, the reverse
is sometimes true.
Some clandestine agents; an-
other intelligence source has
said, have given the C.I.A. "a
pain in the neck" and company
sales an, unexpected lift by
spending "only 10 minutes a
day" gathering intelligence and
devoting the remainder of their
time to business dealings.
Other agents have proved to
be such talented businessmen
that they reportedly have even-
tually been hired away from
their intelligence positions as
full-time executives by the
companies that provided theiri
WASHINGTON, May 10?The
Central Intelligence AgenCy's
use of the Howard R. Hughes
organization to disguise its re-
covery of a sunken Soviet sub-
marine is but the most recent
example of a long-standing
practice in which dozens, per-
haps scores, of American com-
panies have lent their names
and reputations?usually for a
price?to shield covert C.I.A.
According to one intelligence,
source thoroughly familiar with
the practice, these relationships
between the C.I.A. and Ameri-
can-based multinational corpo-
rations, known as "commerciial
cover agreements," have re-
sulted in the placing of career
C.I.A. officers in- the overseas
offices of legitimate companies
that range from some of the
laregst in the world to others
unknown to the general public.
The source named more than
20 American companies that he
said had entered into such
agreements with the C.I.A. over
the last 15 years.
The, list, which reads like a:
"Who's Who" of business and
finance, includes such diverse
fields as petroleum, rubber]
produete, heavy manufacturing,;
;banking, consumer productsi
land services, travel, advertis-I
'ing, publishing, public relationsl
and the import-export trade.
- A C.I.A. official said that the
agency would remain silent on
the details of its cover ar-
rangements with American
businesses, but other officials
have previously conceded that
operatives posed as journalists
and businessmen while work-
ing abroad.
Spokesmen for most of the
corporations identified by the
intelligence source said, after
checking, that they had been
unable to find any evidence of
a relationship between their
organizations and the C.I.A.:
Some of the companies de-
clined to comment, and others
said that they had been asked
by the C.I.A. to enter into such.
relationships but had rebuffed
the agency..
There have been recent pub-',
lished assertions, however,.
that Fodor's Travel ,Guides,
Inc., has, provided operating
cover for intelligence agents
abroad, and an article in the
Feb. 3, 1975, issue" of Advertis-
ing Age suggested that the J.
Walter Thompson Company,
the nation's largest advertising
'agency, had performed a simi-
lar function for the C.I.A.
Assertion Denied
The Thompson organization
has 'denied.the assertion,. but a
spokesman did confirm that two
individuals named by the source
as C.I.A. agents who had op-
erated under Thompson cover
were employed at one time in
the company's offices in Paris
and Tokyo.
Eugene Fodor, the head of
the Travel Publishing Company,
has denied allegations by E.
Howard Hunt Jr., the retired
Major U.S. Cornpanie,s
covers.
Although there are no pub-
lished estimates of how many
C.I.A. agents are working under
commercial cover, the number.
is believed to be around 200, ?
according to the intelligence
source. Similarly, no' one out-
side the C.I.A., and few within,
know precisely how many com-
mercial cover arrangements are
in force at any one time, the
source said. . .
Nor is the existence of such
arrangements broadly -known
within the participating corpo-
rations, the source said, where,
typically, only one or two top
executives are made "witting"
?the C.I.A. 'Term for one who
is knowledgeable?of the cover
operator's true affiliation. ?
For this reason, smaller com-
panies, or large ones with small
overseas offices, are reportedly
!preferred by the C.I.A. For such
!relationships. Since virtually all
:the agent's business colleagues
!are left unwitting, the source
said, it is far easier for! hhirn
,to carry out his intelligence
'work if- he is not ? required to
maintain the- appearance of a
corporate executive in front of
a large number of genuine
businessmen.
Corporations that are wholly
owned by a Single individdal;
closely held,- or headed by a
dominant and aggressive chief
executive officer are likewise
more attractive to the, agency,
the source said, although
several with broad Public
ownership allgedly have been
used for cover purposes as
well.
Not surprisingly, Mr. Hughes"s
various entities reportedly have,
proved particularly useful tol
the C.I.A.. as "front" organiza-
tions. The intelligence sourced
who said that the agency had
emplOyed Mr. Hughes for Other!
covers before he became in-
volved in the submarine salvage
!project, recalled that members
of the C.I.A.'s central cover''
staff, which oversees such ar-
rangements, "always. referred
to him as 'the stockholder.":
? Mr. Hughes, whose Summa
Corporation is wholly owned
by him, was "ideal for certain
projects," the source said, "be-,
cause once he comes down ?nd'
says, 'do a certain thing,' you
do it."
The source recalled one in-
!stance in which the C.I.A.
needed to arrange quickly for
an agent to attend an interna-
tional air exposition in Paris at
which the Soviet Union's
TU-144 Supersonic transport
was scheduled to perform.
The Hughes organization,
the source said, Was able on
*short notice to slip a C.I.A.
agent onto the show grounds
disguised as an employe of the
Hughes Aircraft Corporation,
which reportedly has under-
taken a number of highly sen-
sitive projects for the-agency
in past years.
A spokesman for the Summa
Corporation said that he had
"no knowledge of that inci-
dent",
16
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360002-6
The tax problem generated,
by C.I.A. agents who lead dou-
ble lives as businessmen, the
; source said, are handled by a
secret "tax committee" within
the agency that works closely
with the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice. '
Two Returns Filed
Each year, he said; the' 200
or so businessmen-spies file
two Federal income-tax returns
? and "overt" return that lists
the salary ostensibly paid by
,the covering company, and a!
"covert" return that shows the
true Government salary.
The "covert" return, he said,i
although inspected by thet
I.R.S., never finds its way out-
'side theC.I.A.'s modernistic!
marble headquarters building;
across the Potomac River fromt
Washington.
There are about 6,000 em-
ployes of the C.I.A.'s Divisioni
of Crandestine Services, the!
"cloak and dagger" branch of
the agency that sends intel-
ligence operatives abroad un-1
der a Variety of covers. Theset
include "official" covers, in
which the agent is passed off as
an economic or political offi-
cer attached to an American
Embassy 'or foreign aid mission.
; It is, however, the clandes-
tine services'. "deep cover"%
agents, like the bogus business-
men, who are the elite of thei
'C.I.A.; the source said They
are the nearest thing in the!
American intelligence commu-
nity to the secret agent, he;
said, the men who work most,
often with such paraphernalia;
as physical disguises, tale pass-1
ports and disappearing inks. ?
, They are; in most cases,
i,highly individualistic and_Le-i
: sourceful types, he said, whce
prefer to work overseas and oni
their own, frequently in dan-J
gerous circumstances, rather ati
C.I.A. headquarters or in Amer-
ican Embassies.
Since their extended absencesi
from Washington deny most of:
them the contacts necessary;
for promotion within the
C.I.A., they are generally menl
with little :ambition for ad-
vancement, the source contin-
ued. Their only tangible re-
ward is a 10 per cent salary
bonus awarded annually for
working under dangerous con-
ditions, he said..
The nature of their work de:
nies them both security and
genuine friendships. If a deep--
cover agent should be exposed:
and captured, the source said,i
he cannot depend on the.
C.I.A. to secure his return, and;
the agency, in fact, may be
forced to deny knowledge ofl
him.
Moreover, while he is
,
place," or on assignment underl
cover, -the source said, thei
agent continually presents at
fabricated identity to his us.-
sociat es and acquaintances.1
fending off the ones who at-;
tetept to come too close. Eve&
other deep-cover agents with)
whom he may work off and on
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 :
for years years are likely to know
him only 'by his "funny," or
cover, name.
The- deep-cover agent's true
vocation, the source said, is
carefully hidden at the-outset
of his caereer from most of his
colleagues in other branches of
the : C.I.A. One, such former
agent described how, near the
end, of- his espionage training
at Camp Peary, a C.I.A. facility
in southeast Virginia, he and
a handful of classmates were
taken aside and asked about
their interest in deep-cover
work.
Those who aegreed to join
that branch of the agency, he
said, then became the principal
actors in an attempt to con-
Vince their fellow trainees, by
their casual comments, that
they had become disillusioned
With the C.I.A.
1 Their efforts, the source said,
accompanied 1.)3T asides from
their professors that cast doubt
on their potential for espionage
work, culminated in their "res-
ignations" from the six-month
training program.
Fellow trainees who had un-
successfully urged such friends
to stay on perhaps then re-
ceived letters or telephone.
calls from a departed colleague
reporting that he had' taken a
'job as an overseas executivr*.
Sales representative for a
known corporation, the sciu.,r0
Said. Regrets were exchanged,
and there were promises .10.
keep in touch, he
deep-cover agent
place."
:The' -agentworking uncliV,A.
commercial cover abroad has
the: primary responsibility .;,to
create and reinforce his second
Identity, the source said. He A-
portedly .receives periodic help.
from the C.I.A., but is left
largely to rely on his own re-
sources, in .convincing business
associaes and others that !lie
is what he is not.
In supporting a .deep-cover
identity, an operative sofile
times finds it necessary to vt:o-
late Federal laws. ' One ag,it
who reportedly posed as a busi-
nessman in Western Europe,
for example, accepted the lead-
ership of an organization of ,Re-
publican party members living
abroad.. .'. . The
The man's -political 4rk
may have helped allay &as-
picion about his .true identity,
'according to the source. -Bet
it, also amounted to a vinla-
tion of the Hatch Act, which
prohibits Federal emplciYes
from taking part in partisan,
political activity. ?
WASHINGTON POST
111- May 1975
? Radio Free Europe and
Radio Liberty, two Ameri-
can-financed stations that
broadcast to F astern Europe
and the Soviet Union, will
reduce their staffs by about
300 persons this year, man-
agement spokesmen in mu-
nich said.
17 Approved
WASHINGTON STAB
1 MAY 1975
GARRY WILLS
AWord for Warren Commission
It is time to say a word for the Warren
Commission. Even those who believe
that Oswald was the sole assassin of
President Kennedy are beginning to
grant that the Warren Commission did a
bad job. They say we should "reopen
the case," if for no other reason, just to
resolve doubts caused by sloppy detec-
tive work. But most doubts are caused
by two classes of men ? those who have
not really read what the Warren
Commission said and those whose
doubts would not be resolved by the Sec-.
ond Coming (which they would treat as
a CIA plot).
The attacks on the Warren Commis-
sion come from three main directions: .
1. Some think the commission was
part of the plot itself. These people are
at least consistent. If one could mobilize
all the resources most conspiratorial
theories demand, then controlling the
commission should have been no prob-
lem .at all. But this, like most such
theories, proves too much. If one can
"control" a chief justice, a future presi-
dent, a bunch of prominent lawyers on
the make, an attorney general who hap-:
pens to be the assassinated man's broth-
er, then one controls everything, and
there is no longer any need to hide ?
i.e., to be a conspiracy. .
2. Others think the CIA and/or the
FBI bamboozled the commission ?
which is a rather touching exercise in
credulity. Even if those agencies were
efficient, they would have to tread care-
fully where so many other factions and
rival interests were at play ? and
where the results were going to be pub-
lished in 26 volumes. But, of course, the
record of both the FBI and the CIA is
enough to make any criticism of the
commission look like praise. lithe con-
spiracy depended on the FBI and the
NEW YORK
12 May
C.I.A. SAID TO EASE
BUSINESS SPY ROLE
Agency Reported, Reducing
Companies That It Uses
WASHINGTON, May 11 --
The Central Intelligence Agency
is cutting back on the size and
number of companies that it
owns and has used in past clan-
destine activities, but it appears
to retain the power to revive
them if needed, Newsweek ma-
gazine said today.
The agency's Washington-
based Pacific Corporation, with
11,200 employes in 1970?com-
pared with 16,500 in the agency
itself?is down to little more
than 1,100, the magazine said.
Other companies are being
sold, Newsweek said, some pos-
sibly in the manner that the
Fewatvic6 iarh
CIA, then Howard Hunt's whole career
tells us what would have happened to it.
3. Others, by far the most numerous,
think the commission just fumbled the
job outof haste, incompetence or uncon-
scious prejudices. Most of the evidence
for this is the citing of "leads" that the
commission did not track down. In fact,
._ many of these were tracked down, or
.were patently false leads from the start.
A fair example is Mark Lane's use of
testimony by Nancy Perrin Rich. He de-
voted a whole chapter. of this book to
this woman's bizarre tale. He neglected
to tell the readers that the same woman
appeared two other times, in two differ-
.ent, places, to volunteer evidence to the
commission. The investigators listened
politely, though she told three totally
different stories. At one of these appear-
ances, deliberately omitted from Lane's
chapter, she took .(and flunked) a poly-
graph test. .
Ovid Demaris and I, back in thes'60s,
took Lane's advice and followed up this
woman's testimony. We found that she
was an unstable woman, had been in
and out of psychiatric care and police
stations, that she loved to "testify"
about all her famous friends in mob
trials and other celebrated crimes. We
also found that Lane knew all this, that
he told the woman's husband he would
not be able to make anything of her
testimony. But he made an entire ten-
dentious Chapter out of one third of that
testimony.
Here is a simple rule of thumb for
dealing with conspiratorialists: If they
question the integrity of the Warren
Commission yet quote Mark Lane with
approval, they are 'intellectually very
ill-equipped or intellectually dishonest.
sold at a "bargain rate" to the}
man
man who operated it for the
agency for a decade..
The agency operates and
maintains a number of contin-
gency funds in connection with
the compaies it owns, includ-
ing a $26-million insurance
fund, the magazine said. Much
of that money is reportedly in-
vested in stocks and securities
ckosen by C.I.A. economists in
'Langley, Va., partly on the bas-
is of classified information not
available to ordinary investors.
In addition, the magazine
said, an "old-boy" network of,
former C.I.A. agents, officials
and cooperative private busi-
nessmen was found to include
connections with 16 banks and
investmeat houses, including
New York's Manufacturers
Hanover Bank and the Chemi-
cal Bank.
Connections also lead to two
dozed :major '.;.;,rporations,
Newsweek said, ;including
I.T. &T., United Aircraft and
W. R. Grace & Co., as well as
some prestigious law firms, in-
cluding Boston's Hale & Dorr,
A-Ft?IR7M04332R000.1003600
NEW YORK TIMES
6 May 1975
Chief of U.S.I.A. Opposes';
Abolition of His Agency
WASHINGTON, May 5 (AP)
? James Keogh, director of the
United States Information
Agency, said today that he op-
posed the recommendation of a
panel that the agency be
abolished and its *functions re-
organized.
The 21-member panel had
proposed that the advodacy of
United States foreign policy be
transfered to the State Depart-
ment, that a new cultural af-
fairs agency be established for
long-range portrayal of Ameri-
can society overseas, and that
t.2..te Voice of America be placed
under an independent five-mem-
ber board of directors.
? ?Our informaticn and cultar-
al programs should be coordi-
nated with U.S. policy, and th
agency which runs them should
have close and cooperative re
9,4941s with the White Hous
'the Department of State,'
Mr. Keogh told the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee.
_
NEWSWEEK
19 MAY 1975
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_
tbegan as a blend of patriotism and old
Li school spirit. Back in 1961, an Arling-
? tons Va., lawyer named L. Lee Bean was
contacted by a former- classmate at the
University of Virginia. The old chum had
an intriguing proposition: would Bean
.help the U.S. Governmentset up several
companies to *do special. work ,in the
interest of national security?
With the approval of his partners, Bean
agreed. Next he was directed to a promi-
nent Boston lawyer, Paul Hellmuth at
-the firm of Hale and Dorm, who provided
the actual instructions on incorporation
and operation. In short order, Bean's firm
was a rnailing address for two newly
minted concerns: Anderson Security
.Consultants and Zenith Technical En-
terprises. Anderson provided security
services for various other U.S. firms
(destroying classified documents, inves-
tigating employees) while-Zenith, head-
quartered in a deserted blimp base on
the campus of the University of Miami,
conducted a variety of anti-Castro propa-
ganda and paramilitary operations. What
both companies had in common?be-
sides Bean?was that they were wholly
owned domestic subsidiaries of the U.S.
Central Intelligence Agency.
.Bean's case is just one example of how
the CIA over the years built a
multimillion-dollar commercial empire
of diverse and deftly disguised "propri-
etary" companies?owned by the agency ?
itself?to help carry out and cover up
many of its most clandestine operations.
In recent years, as embarrassing public-
ity about the proprietaries has spread
and scientific intelligence techniques
have 'become More effective, there has
been a drastic cutback in the proprietary
network; significantly, NEWSWEEK has
learned that the CIA's biggest single
company, the Washington-based Pacific
Corp., has trimmed 90 per cent outs staff
.since 1970. But given the CIA's power
and proclivities, there is no reason why
the network couldn't expand again if it
seemed useful. And in any case, the
proprietaries are a fertile field for the
multiple investigations of the agency's
activities now gaining momentum on
Capitol Hill.
DESCENDANTS OF TIGERS
In their heyday, the agency's proprie-
taries helped bomb villages in the Con-
go, fly mercenaries and supplies into
Laos and train Tibetan guerrillas for.
sneak attacks on China. They also pub-
lished books, broadcast propaganda and
provided "cover" for CIA agents in their
own news agencies and free-wheeling
public-relations firms in the U.S. and
around the world. Even with the current
cutbacks, a hard core of proprietaries
remains?including, NEWSWEEK has
learned, a small news service in Europe,
a cornPany supplying technical services
in the Middle East, and Fairways Corp.,
a small Washington airline. And agency
veterans suggest that the phasing out is a
sign that the CIA is shifting to tectics that
avoid the long-term costs of large pro-
prietaries. One example of the new style
may be the recently revealed sub-raising
'efforts by the mystery ship Glomar Ex-
plorer?operated for the CIA by Howard
Hughes. ?
z
n
? b
The history of CIA proprietaries goes
back almost as far as the agency's original
division into intelligence-gathering and
"special operations" branches. It was in
the summer of 1948 that National Securi-
ty Council Order 10/2 created an Office
of Policy Coordination to conduct small
and "plausibly deniable" spying, sub-
version and secret propaganda activities.
That office quickly attached itself to the
recently created Central Intelligence
Agency, where it was known officially as
the Plans Division and unofficially as the
"Department of Dirty Tricks."
Over the next two years, the agency
took increasing control of an unusual Far
East airline?Civil Air Transport?
which had been formed by seasoned
veterans of Air Force Gen. Claire Chen-
naules daredevil Flying Tigers. CAT's
risky missions to harass mainland Com-
munists were financed at first by the
Chinese Nationalists, then by the Ameri-
can Airdale Corp. Airdale soon meta-
morphosed?in the corporate records of
Delaware?into the Pacific Corp., subse-
quently revealed as a linchpin of CIA
proprietaries.
Soon other proprietaries came under
the umbrella of Pacific Corp., including a
number of ostensibly independent firms
whose role as CIA covers was later
blown by a series of journal istic exposes
and books such as former agent Philip
Agee's "CIA Diary" and "The CIA and
the Cult of Intelligence" by John Marks
and CIA alumnus Victor Marchetti.
Among the first proprietaries:
so Air America, which grew from CAT'S
Asian operations, became a major airline
with 165 planes and about 5,000 employ-
ees. Its CIA missions included parachut-
ing Meo tribesmen as guerrillas into
Laos, dropping rice to refugees in the
Vietnamese highlands, carrying payrolls
for CIA mercenaries and transporting
prisoners for the Saigon government. In
the course of all this, the airline has also
been accused of playing a role in the
massive Southeast Asian narcotics trade.
But most of its activities are open com-
mercial contracts to transport U.S. serv-
icemeri and, government personnel; it
even Played a major part in the recent
evacuation of Saigon. The airline"former-
ly ran a large maintenance base at Udorn,
Thailand, providing the airfield with
weather and communications systems,
tactical air control and even fire-
protection services.
to Air Asia Co., Ltd.' based on Taiwan,
until recently ran the largest aircraft
maintenance-and-repair facility in
southeast Asia. Operated as an Air Amer-
ica subsidiary with nearly 6,000 workers
and pilots at its peak payroll, Air Asia
serviced craft not only for Air America
but for the U.S. military as well. Accord-
ing to one former intelligence officer, it
could actually build entire aircraft from
prototypes (to the sputtering dismay of
some U.S. manufacturera)e -
a Pacific Engineering Co., an operating
division of Air America, provided super-
vising engineers for local work teams
assigned to build airstrips for Vietnam
and the- "secret war" in Laos. Hugh L.
Grundy, the division's president, says
these were mainly "up-country, moun-
taintop strip. . . in primitive areas." _
Outside the Pacific Corp. framework,
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dness'
the CIA set 'up dozens of other propri-
etary companies around the world_
These ranged from tiny one- or two-man
offices ("singletons" and "doubletons,"
in agency parlance) to larger operations
such as Anderson Security, Zenith Tech-
nical Enterprises and the major interna-
tional broadcasting stations Radio Lib-
erty and Radio Free Europe.
Originally created to provide logistical
support for CIA undercover operations,
many of the proprietaries themselves
soon became involved in intelligence
gathering and moved on to more active
operations. A CIA-owned print shop in
Latin America, for example, might first
have been set-up merely to provide cover
for a CIA agent in the area. But it would
soon seek to gain influence with a local
political party or labor group by printing
their propaganda, providing jobs for
movement leaders or offering office
space for political meetings. "When the
agency was deeply involved in political
activities, proprietaries made a lot of
sense," says one former CIA employee.
"To have a handle on a foreign labor
union was important." .
As with lawyer Bean, many prominent
Americans were recruited to give the
proprietaries credibility. "Anybody who
looked closely would know that most of
the people actually running the company
were having a hard time meeting their
own mortgages," says one close observer
of the erneecs The big names were
signer; up to suggest solid sources of
private capital- When the CIA acquired
the Miami-based Southern Air Transport
in the early 1960s, it apparently persuad-
ed former U.S. budget director Percival
Brundage, a consultant to the prestigious
Price, Waterhouse ik Company, and for-
mer Assistant Defense Secretary Perkins
McGuire, a board member in various
corporations, to hold most of the airline's
stock in name only.
In practice, the proprietaries were
used as needed to cover CIA operations.
A fleet of twelve to fifteen B-26 bombers
from the Korean War, for example,
passed back and forth among the agency
and it, companies in the course of being
used in the Indonesian war, the Conga
rebellion, the Bay. of Pigs invasion and
Vietnam. Sometimes the planes required
no cover at all, but at other times they
were flown by pilots working for suck
CIA proprietaries as the Double-Chek
Corp. and Caramar?die Caribbean Aero
Marine Corp. Between assignments, the
planes were frequently ferried back to
the U.S. by Air America pilots and then
stored by Intermountain Aviation, an-
other proprietary that has recently been
spun off to a private buyer.
The operations of the proprietaries
have raised larger questions about the
CIA's barely glimpsed finances. At best
estimates, the agency receives about
$750 million from Congress each year; it
also has large amounts of cash available
on short notice for covert projects ($3
million was channeled to anti-Allende
forces in Chile from 1970 to 1973) and
sizable sums were set aside in contin-
gency funds for the insurance and fringe-
benefit needs of its proprietaries, pan
ticularly the airlines. The insurance
funds totaled more than $26 million be
1971, NEWSWEEK has learned. Rather
than collect dust, says one former CIA
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100380002-6
employee, much of that money was
reinvested in choice stocks and securi-
ties chosen by economists in CIA head-
quarters at Langley, Va.?partly on the
basis of classified information not avail-
able to ordinary investors.
A COVER IS BLOWN
. A clandestine service with independ-
ent income? The potential for mischief is
clear, and Wisconsin Sen. William Prox-
mire recently introduced legislation that
would require stricter audits? of CIA
investments and other finances. "Do
profits go into the CIA budget?" Prox-
mire asked. "Does the director of the
CIA have a special 'Director's Fund'
which can be used without justification
to any other person?" The CIA, for its
part, has declined to answer a series of
similar questions from NEWSWEEK, re-
plying to a written request: "Please
excuse us from answering ... We are in
full compliance with the law."
Most CIA proprietaries, of course,
have been too small to make much profit
on their own; indeed, agency policy is
generally to avoid doing too well in the
world of private enterprise. But the
charade still requires two or three sets of
records to keep track of private and
government funds, as well as complicat-
ed intercessions with other arms of gov-
ernment such as the Federal Aviation
Agency and the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice. One temptation is to slip several
agents into the same proprietary, but
while that might save on bookkeeping, it
makes all the agents vulnerable if the
cover of any one of them is blown.
This was the undoing of the
Washington-based Robert R. Mullen &
Co., a public-relations firm which, while
not owned by the CIA, had agreed in
? provide slots for several of its overseas
operatives. When the CIA learned that a
forthcoming book would disclose that
Mullen had provided cover for an agent
in Mexico City, Mullen fronts in Am-
sterdam and Singapore had to be
closed?and the cover man in Singapore
disappeared. Mullen itself expired of
embarrassment in 1974, though its for-
mer president, Robert R. Bennett, is still
in the PR trade.
The policy of not doing too well in
business also takes a psychic toll. -You
look like a horse's ass," one former agent
now complains to friends. "Even your
kids think you're a loser." Some opera-
tives even begin straining to super-
charge their little firms, often at the
expense of their cloak-and-daggering.
"They'd start trying to make the god-
damn airline run better," grumbles an
agency veteran. "That's not the
purpose of the drill. Pretty soon
they'd become more businessman
than an intelligence officer."
DROPOUTS AND OLD BOYS
A few agents actually quit "the
company"?as the CIA is known?
to join real companies for which
their work in the proprietaries had
provided on-the-job training. Oth-
er agents are not quite so well
prepared, however. In fact, NEWS-
WEEK reporters fca nd.surprisingly
widespread complaints that CIA
case officers and contract workers
whose commercial covers were
blown often found themselves ab-
ruptly dropped by the agency?
and unable to parlay their past
experience into straight-world
jobs. "Say you're working _for the X-
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : t9A-RDP77-00432R000100360002-6
Corp. or some such, and you make
a mistake or someone else does and
you are out on your ear," explains
one veteran of commercial-cover
assignments. "When you try to find
another job they ask, 'What does X-
Corp. do?' Well, you stutter
around?a Man 40 or 45 is sup-
posed to have a reputation for
something, but there's not much
for them to go on. You can't say, ?I
worked for the CIA"."
More and more agents may be
experiencing such hardships as the CIA
trims back its proprietary program. The
Pacific Corp., for example, has shrunk
from 11,200 employees in 1970 (com-
pared with 16,500 for the CIA itself) to
little more than 1,100 today. Other firms
have been sold off or shut down., But one
former CIA employee suggests that the
agency may be trying to sell the proprie-
taries "in such a way that they might be
recalled someday"?and such suspi-
cions have been bolstered by some re-
cent transactions. Southern Air Trans-
port, a$5 million operation at its peak,
was sold not long ago?at a bargain rate?
to the man who managed it for the CIA
for more than a decade. The sale of Air
Asia to E-Systems, Inc., puts the firm in
the hands of a company whose board of
directors includes retired Adm. William
F. Raborn, a former CIA director.
The same sort of "old boy" network of
former CIA agents, officials and cooper-
ative businessmen has grown to include
influential corporate leaders, lawyers
and foundation executives. : Through
them, NEwSwEEK has traced connec-
tions of one sort or another with at least
six een banks and investment houses
(Manufacturers Hanover, Chemical
Bank, Fiduciary Trust), several major
law firms (including Boston's Hale and
Dorr and the equally prestigious Ropes
& Gray), more than two dozen large
corporations (ITT, United Aircraft, E-
Systems, W.R. Grace & Co.) and several
dozen associations and foundations, in-
cluding the highly respected Council on
Foreign Relations.
Evidence that the old boys do errands
for the CIA is intriguing but largely
circumstantial. Boston lawyer Hellmuth,
who concedes that he helped set up
Anderson Security as a CLA proprietary,
is also head of two charitable organiza-
tions (the Independence Foundation
and the J. Frederick Brown Foundation)
which, he admits, have been used to ?
channel CIA funds. Former CIA director
Reborn is a consultant to Aerojet-
General Corp., while another former
boss of the agency, John NIcCone, serves
as a board member of ITT, Standard Oil
of California, Pacific Mutual Life Insur-
ance Co., United California Bank and
Western Bancorporation.
Whether through the nehvork or not,
multinational companies have often
done favors for the CIA. The agency
said last year it had 200 agents abroad
posing as corporate employees. For
years, NEWavaEpc learned, some com-
panies have served as conduits for CIA
-funds, including money Used as bribes
and campaign contributions to foreign
officials. * . ?
Were the favors repaid? When a con-
duit company had its taxes audited, says
a former U.S. official, the internal Rev-
enue Service would sometimes "get a
call from the CIA . saying, 'Get your
people off their backs'." A former agency
case officer recalled one company with
investments in pre-Castro Cuba that was
"extremely appreciative" of information
that then CIA director Allen Dulles
? ? provided just before the. revolution. "It
saved them a lot of money," said the
former case officer. And John McCone,
the record shows, was, quite willing to.
trade on his old agency connec-
tions in behalf of ITT when he
offered the CIA $1 million to help
. prevent the election of Marxist
President Salvador Allende in
? Chile?where nrr had holdings
worth nearly $150 million.
? THE NEW LOOK
Such corporate connections are
harder to make these days; after the
? recent publicity, many companies
are refusing to provide cover slots
? for CIA agents. "In fact," says a
Congressional investigator, "you
can almost hear them bouncing on
the steps after they've been thrown
out." But he adds, "I dciubt they're
getting totally out. Don't forget, the
best cover is for everyone to be-
lieve that they can't get any cover."
Thus there is still pressure in Con-
?- gresS for a law that would prohibit
what Idaho Sen." Frank Church
c.allsthis incestuous relationship
between government and private
corporations."
Are the CIA's proprietaries a
dying breed? There are those who
think that authority for almost all of
the CIA's covert operations should
be shifted to the Defense Depart-
ment, leaving the CIA to concen-
trate on its original mission: the
collection of intelligence. Others
believe the reformers may be content
with better Congressional control and
review of the agency's current activities;
one step in that direction is the new
legislation that requires the Administra-
tion to brief both the House and Senate
Foreign Relations Committees on CIA
cover operations overseas.
But as long as there is a CIA, it will
surely resist the idea of forswearing any
tactics at the risk of letting other coun-
tries gain advantage. The idea that there
are "rigid rules- in the intelligence
business is nonsense, says a veteran of
the U.S. intelligence establishment. f I
don't need a man in a white suit poking
around somewhere today. I won't put
him there. But I'm not saying I won't put
him there tomorrow.'
M. ALPE RN with ANTHONY MARRO. EVERT MARX
and HENRY McGEE in Washington
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360002-6
PUBLISHER'S WEMY
5 MAY 1975
THE WEEK
Editor:
Daisy Maryles
SVLGie To Pub ish Agee's
Ex se E Th
cEA
"INSIDE THE COMPANY: CIA
Diary," one of the "hottest" book prop-
erties in recent years, has finally been
signed by an American publisher, Stone-
bill Publishing Company who, unlike
many large corporate firms, decided to
grab the "hot potato" instead of passing
it on. In this expose of the CIA, former
agent Philip Agee describes in complete
detail his 12 years (1957-1969) with "The
Company" in Ecuador, Uruguay, Mex-
"leo and Washington. According to pub-
kised reports, his book names every CIA
officer and agent whom he encountered
and describes every operation that he
took part in. The book gives an account
of the author's disillusion, both with CIA
methods and United States foreign pol-
icy. Among the figures listed as CIA col-
laborators by Agee are the current presi-
dent of Mexico and his two predecessors,
a former vice-president of Ecuador, rank-
ing Communist Party members and
scores of politicians, high military and
police officials.
Agee, who wanted to avoid the prob-
lems encountered by fellow agents like
Marchetti, decided to publish his book
outside the country. Penguin released the
book in London on January 2 and it ,be-
came an instant best seller. In mid-1974
when Penguin offered the U.S. publica-
tions rights to the Agee book to Ameri-
can houses, the advance offers were re-
puted to be high. There was a report that
one major publisher offered $250,000.
However, when Penguin made it clear
that they would not honor the warranty
clause in any contract signed with an
'American publisher, publishers began to
back down. With the CIA-Knopf action
on Marchetti's "Cult of Intelligence" go-
ing from court to higher court and in-
volving huge legal costs on the part of the
publisher, interest quickly waned.
Except for the United States, the book
has been available, since early January,
in all English-speaking countries, includ-
ing Canada. "Inside the Company"
has been widely and favorably reviewed
in the English and Canadian press. There
was even one review in an American
paper?the Washington Post on Febru-
ary 23. The Post departed from its usual
practice of reviewing only books avail-
able to the US. because of "the unusual
interest the book has generated and be-
cause df the relevance to the current
investigation of the aims and methods of
the CIA." Among other comments, the.
review said that "Agee has provided the
most complete description yet of what
the CIA does abroad. In entry after
numbing entry, U.S. foreign policy is
pictured as a web of deceit, hypocrisy
and corruption."
The book was available for a -few
days in a few bookstores in Washington,
D.C. (Discount and Sydney Kramer
Book Store) and in New York (Classics
Book Store). Copies sold out almost im-
mediately., However, since then U.S.
Customs officials have interceded and all
copies (a few at the stores, the rest at the
docks) have been seized.
About six months ago, for a $12,000
advance, Straight Arrow Books had an
oral agreement with Penguin to publish
the Agee book. The West Coast pub-
lisher dealt first with Penguin, then with
the author and finally with the Scott
Meredith Agency. A conflict over what
rights were agreed on arose. Straight Ar-
row claimed that it had bought both
hardcover and mass market rights from
Penguin; the English publisher denied
this. Straight Arrow, aware that the
Meredith agency was offering the book
to other publishers, stated that it was not
interested in the hardcover rights without
the paperback rights. But in the interim
the book was listed in the Straight Arrow
catalogue as the lead spring title. Simon
and Schuster, the firm's distributor, was
taking orders for it. Charles Williams,
PHILIP AGEE
r-71
20
S&S sales manager, said that 15,000
orders have been logged in for the hook.
The Meredith agency, according to
Jack Scovill, who handled the deal, of-
fered the book to about 25 American
publishing houses including the majot
paperback firms. The best offer came
from Warner Publishing Company for
$60,000. That deal also fell through when
Warner's insurance company refused to
cover the risks involved. Scott Meredith
came back to Straight Arrow,- this time
with an agreement that also included pa-
perback rights. However, the firm at that
point was curtailing operations and hon-
oring only contracts already signed.
Scovill told PW that "he was aston-
ished that publishers were running so
scared of the CIA." This sentiment was
echoed by Melvin Wulf, legal director of
the American Civil Liberties Union, who
told PW that he had made it clear in pub-
lishing circles that the ACLU was willing
to represent them if there were any at-
tempt on the part of the government to
suppress the publication of the book.
However, it was not until April 22
when Stonehill's president, Jeffrey Stein-
berg, signed an agreement to publish the
book in the United States that the picture
changed. Steinberg, who was a founder
with his father of Chelsea House,
launched his Stonehilt firm in 1971 and
recently successfully published (good re-
views, strong hardcover sales and a sub-
stantial paperback reprint sale) Sigmund
Freud's "Cocaine Papers." Steinberg is
very excited about his newest book which
will have "heavy national publicity." He
told PW that the first printing of 25,000
will be off the presses and shipped to
bookstores in mid-June. A second print-
ing will be available a few weeks later.
Stonehill's distributor, George Braziller,
will be handling book orders. Arrange-
ments are, being made with S&S for
. their order's.
The ACLU has promised to represent
Stonehill "in the event that the U.S.
seeks in any way to interfere with publi-
cation of the book." Steinberg's counsel
is Greenbaum, Wolff & Ernst.
Priced at S9.95, "Inside the Company"
will be serialized prior to publication in
both Rolling Stone and the Washington
Post. Agee will be interviewed in the
August Playboy: articles by and about
him are scheduled to appear in the com-
ing months in Esquire, Oui, the Wash-
ington Post, Village Voice and others.
For the time being. Stonehill has no
plans to sell paperback rights. "We will
wait until we have a better legal back-
ground and can offer the paperback pub-
lisher some protection," Steinberg said.
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? BALTIMORE SUN
13 May 1975
By ISAAC REHERT
Now that the Rockefeller Commis-
sion investigating the activities of the
Central Intelligence Agency is taking
another look at some aspects of the Ken-
nedy assassination, Henry Wegrocki
feels vindicated.
He has been saying for months that
the Warren Commission was wrong, that
the time is ripe now for an official rein-
vestigatiobof that murder. ?
? ? Henry is only 18, a senior at McDon-
ogh School ? he concedes he is no old
and practiced hand at accomplished
sleuthing. But the facts, he insists, speak
for themselves; it is not a question of the
youth or age of the person pointing the
finger.
? Henry 'believes that in the light of
-present-day events, the conclusion of the
Warren Commission would never stand
up against the facts. He thinks that the
commission's report was molded in part
by the political climate of the day.
But that climate has changed, Henry
says. and a new look will expose the sin-
gle-assassin, no-conspiracy interpreta-
tion of that crime as untenable.
Henry has been taking such a new
look. During the past 16 months, he has
read dozens of books on the subject, vis-
ited the National Archives in Washing-
tOT) where the evidence is kept and stud-
ied the Warren Report.
The nature of the wounds that were
inflicted, the films showing the actions
of President Kennedy and former Texas
Gov. John Connally in the open limou-
sine, Governor Connally's own eye-wit-
ness testimony, the recovered bullets
and the rifle, which is. supposed to have
been the only weapon used ? all this ev-
idence does not point, Henry believes, to
a solitary and emotionally distraught
'Lee Harvey Oswald planning and doing
the deed all alone. ?
Henry beleves there had to be more
than one sharpshooter. Someone else had
to be firing from another spot besides
the top floor of the Texas Book Deposito-
ry where Oswald had been.
There was a conspiracy, Henry be-
lieves, and adding what we know today
to the information the Warren Commis-
sion had then suggests a conspiracy in-
volving officials in the government.
Henry thinks that the Warren Com-
mission eliminated the possibility of
conspiracy because at the time there
U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
12 MAY 1975
e young
9
think
researci,er
seemed to be no motive for one and it
was unthinkable then that high Ameri-
can officials might be involved in such a
thing.
But, he says, we are a lot better in-
formed today, a lot wiser about some of
the sinister capabilities of men in high
office. Since the Warren Report, we
have lived through My Lai, the Agnew
resignation, Watergate and now the
most recent revelations about some of
the muddy activities of the CIA.
Today, Henry believes, the nation.
would be more ready to face the truth
about what happened in Dallas.
Henry began his study in November,
1973, after watching a television pro-
gram on the 10th anniversary of the as-
sassination. He borrowed his father's car
and drove to the Archives in Washington
to study the evidence.
First of all, he decided, it couldn't
have happened as the Warren Commis-
sion explained it. The commission said
that three shots were fired, all of them
by Lee Harvey Oswald, hitting the Ken-
nedy car from above and behind.
One if the bullets is supposed to hive
passed through Kennedy's shoulder and
then to have struck Governor Connally.
A second missed, the third hit Kennedy
in the head. \ ?
Impossible, says Henry Wegrocki. He
has looked at the bullet; it is hardly at
all deformed. He has looked at the rifle,
an Italian Mannlicher-Carcano bolt-ac-
tion weapon of 1940 vintage. No one
could possibly fire the thing as fast as
the actual shots rang out that day.
Re looked at the films. While Presi-
dent Kennedy was being hit the first
time, Governor Connally was still sitting
in comfort. His own testimony was that
there was an interval between the mo-
ment he heard the first shot ring out and
when he himself was hit.
And the shot that struck the Presi-
dent's head could not have come from
the rear, for parts of the flying debris
struck police officers on motorcycles be-
hind. It had to come from up front.
So Oswald could not have been the
only person doing the shooting. There
was more than one assassin, Henry be-
lieves; there was a group, and the brains
behind the group, in his opinion, was the
CIA.
The CIA had a motive, for President
Kennedy had enpreereed disapproval of
the worst of their cloak-and-dagger ac-
""1
12:7i72 ',./inisparse
tivities. It would suit them for him to be
out of the way.
And there is evidence, too, that Lee
Harvey Oswald himself had links to the
CIA. ?
It was the CIA that had mastermind-
ed the invasion of the Bay of Pigs and a
short time later, President Kennedy is
known to have demurred from a pro-
posed CIA plot to assassinate Fidel Cas-
tro.
Nevertheless, in spite of this disapa
proval, a CIA-backed team was pcitecl
.up in Havana intent on just such an zest
of political murder. This is whet the
Rockefeller Commission recently has
been concerned about.
As for Oswald, Henry's research
raised a lot of unanswered questions that
suggest he may have ? worked for the
CIA. ?
- When in Russia in the early 1960's,
was he spying on the Soviet development
of a U-2 spy plane?
As an insignificant Marine private at
Atsugi Air Force Base in Japan, he was
given a high security clearance. Why?
And the Dallas police maintained
that Oswald had a CIA number, 110669.
Is there any verification?
' Unfortunately, unless there is a
change in policy, the American public
cannot find out until the year 2038, for
many documents relating to the assassi-
nation have been consigned unopened in-
to the National Archives for 75 years.
Lyndon Johnson believed there might
have been a conspiracy ? perhaps by
the CIA, perhaps by Castro, in retalia-
tion for the attempts made on his life.
And Senator Richard Russell of Georgia,
who was a member of the Warren Com-
mission, dissented from its final explan-
ation.
But back in 1964, Henry -believes,
agencies such as the CIA were too sacra-
sanCt even for the Warren Commission
to take on.
That is all changed now. No agency of
government is beyond suspicion today.
? Henry believes that the time is ripe
to reopen the matter of the assassination
and when the Rockefeller Commission's
report is delivered next month, he hopes
it will spark public demand for a. new
and more thorough investigation.
? Henry will lecture on his own private
studies at McDonogh's Cultural Fair Fri-
day.
The CIA is having trouble getting
Secretary Kissinger to rcad ks assess-
ments of world trouble spots, particu-
. lady those dealing with Asia and the
? Middle East. The CIA complaints that
he prefers to rely on information pro-
tiOroirectamPlatlefirtiepall0108108. : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360002-6
vided bA
21
analysts. ?
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LEBANON DAILY NEWS
15 APRIL 1975
By TED GRESS
? Euecutive Editor, ,
Lebanon Daily New? o
First of Three
Nathan Hale, one of our
earliest national heroes, was
an fritelligmce agent. Probably
our first.
Remoolier him? He was a
U.S. Army officer who
ellsguisal himself as a Dutch
schoolmatter and sought
intelligence in forma tioa-
behind the British line on
Long island in 1776.
He was captured and ban
Before h e iitel he made a state
meat that nearly every school
Child has heard in history
dam. It was: "I regret that I
have but ane life to give for my
country."
He was an early practitioner
of a service which ultimately
would become the Central In-
telligence Agency. (CIA).
' The agency has come a long
way in trainirg of American
intelligence officers and agents
since the time Nathae reale re
sceivet a one-day briefing and
was told to put his reports in
his shoe.
The depth of today's training
would amaze you. I'll touch on
-it "later. In another article I
will give you a full report on a
private interview I had in
Washington with William E.
Colby, CIA director.
It lasted nearly an hour.
Colby was frank in discussing
problems facing the agency.
He also told me what he
thought about his future.
First I'd like to tell you about
'some of the problems con-
fronting-the CIA. They really
started when the New York
Times came out in December
? of 1974 with charges that the
CIA directly violated its
charter and conducted massive
illegal domestic intelligence
operations during the Nixon
administration against the
. anti-war movement and other
dissident groups in the United
States.
There have been almost
Continuous assaults on it ever
since; mostly by the leftist-
liberal news media. The New
York Times leads the way; the
others follow.
Letitre cite a few einiinpie-s-:-
Dick Cavett, well known
talk-show host, was the roaster.
of 'ceremonies on a big TV
special featuring Barbra
Streisand
? One of his "witticisms" was:
"I knowa way to speed upmad
delivery and that is to give
set
eels (-se rrea
-Iiiesonlit'e
speed-reading lessons to the
CIA."
Mt By (Cartoon
Another was an editorial
cartoon sent out by
McNaught's, one of the major
newspaper syndicates in the,
country. Based in New York it
is a highly respected or:
ganization.
The earthen shows an office
dour on whish is lettered:
"Central ? Intelligence
Agency." in the corner of the
glass panel in small letters is
"The Godfathers.".
The implication, of course,
links the CIA with the maf ia.
In fairness to McNaughts it
should be mentioned that the
following week it distributed a
cartoon showing a man from
the CIA in boxing trunks. He is
wearing a boxing glove on one
hand. The other is tied behind
his back. He is blindfolded and
his feet shackled.
His opponent is wearing big
brass knackle and a mask on
which b the emblem of the
Soviet Union.
The referee is telling the CIA
man: "And you fight fair. No
icks."
An article in New York
magazine (not The New
Yorker) was written by Aaron
Latham. It deals with James J.
Angelton, who was let go by the
CIA. It is based largely on
supposition.
It discussed the fact that
"maybe" it was Kissinger who
initiated the action which led
to Angelton's firing.
It is loaded with statimenta
Me "The CIA gave the
impression"?' "Now it looks as
though " and "it is likely." I
? Fiction Approach
The same magazine followed I
in a later issue with an article!
by the same author. Only this;
time, believe it or not, it is a'
'fictionalized account of CIA
operations.
Aaron Latham claims this is
the only way he can deal with
the story. Treating it as fiction
certainly give him a wide
latitude in dealing with facts.
It's a rather obvious bit of
character assassination.
Readers, unless they are
aware dee-hat actually is going
on, will be inclined to believe it
all despite Latham's
disclaimer.
Seldom does a week go by
that the CIA is not the subject
to an a ttack.
It may be a cartoon such as
appeared in the respected Na-
tional Observer, which showed
a cutaway section of a
mailbox. Inside a man labeled
CIA is reading letters.
A woman is approaching
with a handful of letters. Her
briefcase indicates 6e is
Congressman Bella Abrug.
She's the lady who is carrying
on a feud with the intelligence ?
agency for opening her maiL
Or it may be a TV episode of
"Cannon" which was aired
March 12. In it a murder.
suspect was identified as hi-Ong I
with the CIA: -Later it was
revealed that the suspect, a
rather easty fellow, didn't
week for CIA but the damage
already had been done.
The CIA also comes tinder
assault in a recent issue of the
Saturday Review by a former
Cf A executive, Tom Braden.
The ex-official is unhappy with
the organization and charges it
with :laving an excess of
power. He would do away with
it completely.
Recalls Rumors
However, he recounts the
myths about the agency that
have collected through the
greari-and labels them as false.:
Such as the rumors that the
CIA killed John Kennedy; that
it shot George Wallace; that it
was responsible for an airplane
crash and that it pulled off a
big gold heist.
These he admits were not
true.
The rumors continue to grow
as is to be expected when an
organization operates under
the veil of secrecy as it must.
Now let's talk about the
articles and derogatory
reference which often appear
in Parade magazine, a Sunday
supplement with a circulation
of over a million.
Among these were a long
article and also a question and
answer interview with Philip
Agee, former agent who left
the service, and now has
written a book about it.
The book was published
recently in England, where the
author cannot be stopped from
publishing CIA secrets'. He.
names names. He lists his
former CIA associates so as to
"neutralize" them, according
to Parade.
The magazine reports that
Agee, when asked if be didn't
feel any obligatioe to protect
other CIA men in the field,
? replied: "Why should I be
delicate with them? These
people are promoting fascism
around the wrx1d."
Agee now lives in Cornwall,
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en
icias
England, with a , Brazilian
beauty he says was tortured in
her own country by the secret
police. He has since become an
ardent socialist, Parade
reports.
"Why did Agee turn against
the CIA? One reason was that
he cculdn't tolerate the brutal
tortures which the various
Latin American police practice
on their political enemies. The
thought that he was in part
responsible for such cruelty
turned him off his work."
Now let's look at the other
side of the coin. This in-
? formation was taken from my
long interview with Colby.
I asked the director about the
Agee case. Here is what he
said:
- "Agee left theCountry and
wrote the bock -abroad.
Because he was out of the
country he was not 'subject to
the kind of injunction which we
did get against another former
agent to force him to abide by
his secrecy agreement.
"This a eement says that
secrets that he learned here he
leaves here. We have enforced
thee because revealing names
and things like that could be
most harmful.
"Mr. Agee went abroad
where we couldn't posshly get
an injunction and he has
published a bock using every
name he can possibly
remember. The book which
_
was published in England has
been spread around but it has
not been published here."
17. There are. amusing . .
amusing may not be the right
word . . . overtones to the
? situation as Colby explains:
"When Agee left here, he
; wrote a letter in which he said
he thought this was a great
institution and he appreciated
all we had done for him to help
him with his problems.
"He said he had the highest
opinion of the importance and
the security needs of the
agency and then he went and
did that."
"What do you think
happened?" I esked.
Thank.s Corn man is t s
"I think he got into bad
circles," Colby replied. "He
makes a point in his book of
thanking the Communist Party
of Cuba for its help in his
research. I think you can judge
from that what has happened
to him."
The director went en to
explain he has asked for
certain legislation that would
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give firmer control over the
disclose of official, secre in-
formation.
He pointed out this is
jeopardizing the lives of agents
. and jeopardizing millions of
dollars worth of technical
machinery which the other
side can turn eft' if it knows it is
there.
"We have laws that make a
crime," he said, "of the
unauthorized exposure of your
income and income tax by
Internal Revenue Service or
your census returns by Census
Bureau workers or of certain
? statistics by an agricultural de-
partment employe."
41 can't see .why we?Caift
have criminal penalties fordis-
closure of an agent's name ora
secret of this nature. I do
believe that it has to meet the
demands of the First
Aratedinent. I believe in- the
First Amendment. (The First
Amendment is the one which
guarantee Freedom of the
Press.k -
"So this restriction could-
only apply to us who asturre-
the chligatica to keep a secret:.
It ? should not apply to is:
journalist who may pick upi!
idarmation:.? -.7 j
Takes Secrecy Oath-t:
When a man joins, the
,Cent.'.11 Intelligente Agency be
takes' an oath of secrecy. He
knows what he is doing. This is
part of the price of joining one
of the most important insti-
tutions in our government..
Nathan Hale didn't have to
Lake such, a pledge but the
intelligence service has cornea i
long way since then. It has ;
grown and expanded. It, is.
Important that it be nourished
and supported so this nation
can survive ?
NEW YORK TIMES
4 May 1975
'EXPOSE OF C.I.A. WINS
THE HILLMAN AWARD
Seymour M. Hersh of the
New York Times, who uncov-
;ered Central Intelligence
,Agency surveillance in the
United States, was among six
recipients of Sidney Hillman
Foundation awards yesterday
at the Commodore Hotel.
Other winners were CBS for
."The Autobiography of Miss
Jane Pittman"; Noel Mostert
for his book, "Supership"; The
Boston Globe for its coverage
of Boston school integration;
Richard Barnet and Ronald
Muller for ther book "Global
Reach,"- and a special award to
WNET/Channel 13 television
,.*for "outstanding program-
)ining." The award consists oft
$750 and a scroll.
Mr. Hersh, a Washington-
based correspondent for The
a
NEW YORK TIMES
8 May 1975
On U.S. Intelligence
? By Hanson W. Baldwin
ROXBURY, Conn. ? There is not
much doubt that the K.G.B., the Soviet
secret police, is gloating in Moscow. .
In the last few months, exaggerated,
inaccurate or irresponsible press ac-
counts and self-serving politicians
have greatly damaged United States
intelligence organizations.
Some? crippling restrictions already
imposed are now being followed by
extensive and numerous investiga-
tions into every facet of intelligence
? and counterintelligence, which may re-
sult in new and dangerous exposure of
organizations, methods and personnel.
One of the most damaging and ir-
responsible leaks in United States
? intelligence history?the widely pub-
lished accounts of the salvaging of the
sunken Soviet' submarine?already has
occurred, with the media, in the name
of freedom damaging the defense of
freedom.
? Nor is it encouraging that The New
York Times allowed the columnist Jack
. Anderson to trigger its own actions.
The consequent publication by The
Times and ' all other media of a
fantastic technological feat and _ an-
intelligence coup still incomplete could
cause immense potential damage. One
need only recall the broken codes of
World War II, and, in?recent history,'
...the nasty surprises new Soviet weap-
ons provided in Vietnam and in the
1973 Arab-Israeli war.
The current investigations, therefore
7?unless they are to be of great aid
and comfort to those who 'would
destroy the systemof political freedom
that makes such investigations possi-
? ble?must concentrate on the con-
structive, not the destructive; on the
future, not past.
They must avoid, at all costs, any
more public exposure of secret intel-
ligence methods, technology or person-
No intelligence organization, even
in a democracy, can be a completely
'open. book if it is to be worth its cost.
But there are some key questions
that require _reassessment.
Are there, for instance, too many
semi-independent intelligence agencies,
each vying for power? Or . does each
have its important specialized role
and does each act as check-rein on
the others?
Should the director of Central Intel-
ligence be given more power?to
knock heads together, to merge, to
allocate tasks? Or would this continue
and expand an already dangerous
centralization of power?
Intelligence and counterintelligence
are tw:ns. What, particularly, should
in the week for the same series
easing C.I.A. activity.
Murray H Finley, president
of the 340,00-member Amalga-
mated Clothing Workers Un-
ion, which set up the Sidney
Times, was named winner of
F
the George Polk a warAppeintd I Rebleiligrakneffftl:
Cl
be the relationships between the
Central Intelligence Agency and Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation, and who
should do what in counterespionage
and countersubversion? ?
It is easy to dismiss the Communist
and radical and ,terrorist threats as
bogeymen; yet the capability of Puerto
Rican 'nationalists and radical Weather.'
men to bomb public places repeatedly
without detection and the ability of
so well-known a figure as Patty Hearst
to remain hidden, in an American un- .
derground speaks badly, indeed for
present and recent attempts of our
intelligence services to combat espio-
nage, subversion or "even simple
anarchy.
How does one define the thin line
between freedom and license, security
-and repression, the "right to know"
and irresponsibility? The political ex-
tremists and fanatics, in pursuit of
revolution, believe that the ends
literally-justify any means. ?
United States intelligence agencies
can never embrace such a concept,
without ultimately aiding the hidden
enemy, The adoption of such a policy
?the ends justifying any' means?
would subvert our own institutions.
Yet there is a nagging problem here;
a threat -exists and it cannot be met'
by mouthing shibboleths. ?
How should authority over our intel:. `-
ligence servi6es' at the top level .be
exercised? intelligence is a tool of
government; as such it can be turned
by those who control it to- good or,
evil purposes.. Who should be the
guardians of the good, who the
monitors? The more people that get
into the act the less secrecy. Congress
Is noted for its blabbermouth pro-
clivities i if there is to be ,any secret
intelligence it is clear that only a
handful of Congressmen, picked for
ability, judgment and discretion and
devotion to the common good, can be
kept fully informed.
Intelligence?facts,- secrets, our own
and the opposition's?means today and
for the future, security?the difference
between the life and death of a nation.
Granted the need, how then do you
keep intelligence apolitical, freed from
the ambivalent pressures of domestic
politics, in a milieu such as Washing-
ton, which is highly partisan?
And, ultimately, the larger question
?the unresolved residue of Watergate
?
?how do you curb executive power
i
without crippling t, and how do you -
operate a democratic government, or
for that matter, any government,
without secrecy?
Hanson W. Baldwin, now retired, was
military affairs editor of The New
York Times.
Praised Mr. Hersh for his
1 , . .
"skill at finding wrongdoing"
in military and law-enforce-
ment agencies at a time when
these sectors "seem to be
growing almost beyond the
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LEBANON DAILY NEWS
17 APRIL 1975
a
By TEDGRESS
Eiterethe Editor
laetaoon Daily News
z: (Second of Theee)
What kind of a man is William
E. Colby. head of the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA)?
deHis name is in the headlines a
great deal as the spotlight-of a
Congressional tnvestigation
plays upon the once
:completely secret agency, an
'agency responsible for
scanting and evaluating
:intelligence information from
!around the World.,
ee The information plays a vital
Tart in- shaping the foreign
:policies of this country. It.
enables us to know what'
:friendly- and not-so-friendly
JSriliS are thinking and
:doing and planning for the fu-
It's not.an easy task and its
niroblernS are now compounded
,by a vicious attack from the
leftist-liberal conundnity. I've
.dealt with that subject in detail
in a previous article.
e Now I want to turn to a
tloseup look at Colby. His plc-
-tire has appeared in numerous ;
publications. It shows a i
serious-faced middle-aged man
'wearing light-colored glasses.
When you.walk into his office
you find a man wearing a I
conservative grey suit, white I
shirt with button-down collate
'and a blue and gold striped tie. I.
He could easily pass for a
banker.
Not Bea Man
Colby is not a big man. later
I learned he is five feet eight
inches tall anti weighs 160
pounds.
His hair, well tinged with '
Trey, is start,' to recede;
itghtly. His voile is 'soft but
'erige His handehake firm but
:friendly.
He acknowledees Angus
MacClean Tle.:errner's
'explanation about my aanig the
:.ape recorder fee tie! inter- ?
Thuermer :s thr number
.1.1'wo man in the agency::
d I set the recorder on-a table
next to his chairbut beitedts up.
tf he microphone arid le:aids it in,
this hand througheut lite inter-
t:?niew.
< First I asked him about his
,personal background.
Briefly; here it is. He was
Urn in St. Paul, Minn., in 1920
And spent his early years on
various army posts, including a
Ihree-year stay in Tienstin,
chinadHis father was an army
officer.
He became a Boy Scout when
[le lived in .China and later
avhen his own family was grow-
ing. up, -he was active as a
couter. He graduated from
Princeton University in 1941,
!roined the army and served in
tun:9e with 'the Office of
trategic Services.
IAfter the war he got his law,
egree from ,Columbia Law;
chool and became a member
,gaf the New York State and U.S..
Supreme Court bars. .;
After that were a SUCCESsion
icif governmental posts includ-
ing diplomatic service in
Yietnam. He was deputy direc-
jor of operations for the CIA
When he was named, director
jest year.
Colby lives 'at Bethesda,
'eehich is only a hop, skip and
5'timp from his office.
'
Starts Early
His typical day starts at 6:30
vith exercises, including
talisthenics and jogging., He's
at his desk at eight and gets an
update on. what is going on in
the agency.
Then a briefing from senior
staff members at 9 o'clock.
After that it is 'anything. It
might be a meeting downtown.
or testimony on the Hill or
visits at his office with "some
of our people."
? "I'm on the telephone a lot ,"'
he said. "There are always
meetings to attend: meetings;
of intelligence experts on
? various subjects such as Viet-
nam or the Middle East or!
whatever.
? "Usually, I go home about ?
seven. I take some work home
but not too much. I've avoided
the social circuit fairly suc-
cessfully. I don't waste much
time on that."
The director said he leads a
normal family life. "I guess
you could say we are an
average middle-class Ameri-
can family."
The Colbys live next to a
Catholic clairch where they are
? regular attendants. Two sons
have left home; one is a lawyer
, and the other is in college. A
son and a daughter remain at
hnmp
About once a month he visits
Los Angeles, Chicago or New
York speaking about the
Central Intelligence- Agency.
Monday of last week he ad-
dressed the Associated Press
meeting in New Orleans. .
He takes a trip overseas
about every six months to
-"keep in touch with things:"
I -atked what is the specific.
role of the CIA: ea ?
"Its wholes tpurpose'-". he
.replied. "is to get in place.
all the information and then
subject it to some expert
opnion and analysis."
He's very proud of the
quality of the people working
for the agency. 24 I'm not going to quit. I serve of
dF RI se 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360002-6
"We have more people with.
doctor's and master's degrees
and Ph.D's on anything from
agricultural economics to
nuclear* programs than you
find in most universities.
"They have access to all the
fanciest forms of information
collected through photography
and electronics and from all
normal kinds of regular report-
ing and radio broadcasts.
Information also that has beeni
collected by agents byi
clandestine means in somei
'.;imited situations. .
"If anyone likes to do pure:
;enearch this is the best place!
in the world. to dielta The rawi
material is fantastic. The free-.
dom to make a decision un-
affected by policy is here. And:
it is on an important subject".
He said it is important thatl
the people have confidence in;
the agency which he points out
is important to this country's1
future.
"Do you-have trouble get-
ting recruits for the agency?" I:
asked.
"We have no trouble getting
them," he replied. "We eat
good people but don't recruit
like we used to because We
have gone down in Strength in
the last five years."
Budgetary limitations and
inflation have taken their toll.
It's been rather amusing,
though, that since all the re-
cent unfavorable publicity
about the CIA, the number of
applicants has increased.
Normally they used to get
about 600 every two weeks. The.
first two weeks in January.
Which ;was just after the New'
York Times started scream-
ing its head off about the
agency, there were 1,700 re-
; quests for jobs. ?
Colby is pleased with the
type of people. applying for
positions.
They have tremendous
academic- records from some
of the best schools in the
country. They have good work'
experience and are very alive.
"They are psychologically
mature, intelligent people.
They're great. Of course, we
don't' hire them all by any I
means, but that's a fine group:
to be able to select from.
-What about yourself?" I!
inquired. "Have you ever been!
tempted to quit this rat race,'
particularly since all' this
trouble has developed?"
"No I haven't. We are deal-
ing with something important.
It's important to the country.
It's important to the
intelligence profession.
"I've spent more than 30
years in this profession and
course at the pleasure of the e?-?
President and am at his-.
disposal totally. And I'll stay.;
as long as I think I'm useful." ?
We turned then to what I re-
guarded as -one of the most
important questions of the I
interview: "Do you see any!
conflict between the peoples
tight to know and the need for,
secrecy in operating an agency;
such as theCIA?"
"This is one of the most diffie
cult things in a way in Opel-?
ating an intelligence agency in;
our free society," he replied..
-"We are Americans. We like.
our free society. We believe in.
it. And yet if we are going to,
protect it we have to have
some intelligence work.
Protect Ourselves
"In. this country we are:
sitting 30 minutes away from a
nuclear missile aimed at us. If.
we live in this kind of a world
we obviously must have pro-
tection and we must not only be
able to protect ourselves but
we have to be able to negotiate
about that :kind of a problem,
and that T'ind of a threat and be,
- able to reduce it.
"And that, I think, is wtiat.
intelligence-can do. So I think.
we have to define rather'
sharply those things which are
good secrets and need to be
kept secret and keep them
secret and those which are
"bad" secrets and which do not
.deserve to be kept secret. In.
other words they are non.,
secrets and don't deserve to be'
kept secrets." .
??? ? ? ? ? ?
He pointed out that formerly'
there was nor sign on the head-
quarters building.
"This is an awfully big build-
ting and everybody knows-.
.Where it is. All the -aircraft
pilots used to point it out as
they flew down the river, bed
fore they had Watergate to
point out. ?
"As a result we were a non-
secret. It's wrong to be
obscure about things like that.
But there are things that-need
to be kept secret and I think.
that now we have procedures .
to clearly delineate which are
secret and which aren't.
"If there is supervision by
Congress and the executive
.branch, we can accept this.
And the American people-will
accept it.
"Americans today have ac-
cepted that grand jury pro-
ceedings have to be kept
secret. They accept that the
Pentagon's plans are secret
and also accepted the idea that
Congress has to have execu-
tive sessions,
"They understand similarly,
with respect to intelligence arxi
I think they'll accept the need
' Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360002-6
for some secrets."
My next question was: Do
you flinch at the . word
"spying" instead of "intelli-
gence?"
"Well, I think in the old days
it was synonymous, but today
it he replied. "Intelli-
gence a much bigger word.
Intelligence involves the
technical collection of
information involving
analytical work that I referred
to, and to research;. all that
LEBANON DAILY NEWS
21 APRIL 1975
CI
sort of thing.
"Spying and intelligence are
not the same. We still have
agents. We still collect
material in the old fashioned
way but we only do it when we
have societies that are other-
wise closed. . . .
"A Russian attache can walk
downtown in Washington and
get a lot of information by buy-
ing a magazine for a dollar. We
have to spend millions of
dollars and take enormous
risks to obtain comparable
? informs tion." ?
- He pointed out that spying is
only a small portion of the
entire intelligence operation.
"We then discussed the per-
sonal rewards of intelligence
wort. '
? ; 'you do your work iti4e is
real satisfaction in it,' he
explained. "When they come
into intelligence work we tell
our people they can't expect to
get public recognitiaa. It's not
Illte the military or the
diplomatic service or polities.
"The satisfaction you get in
intelligence is the satisfaction
of doing something important
an.d doing it .wel I. ? ?
important to yoar
country, to the safety and to
the ? welfare of ? this grmt
nation. And it is a great nation.
There is no question about that..
"If you understand that when
you come in and if you stick:
.with that understanding that's
the reward."
By TED GRESS
Executive Editor,
Lebanon Daily News
(Last of Three)
The Central . Intelligence
Agency (CIA) now under Con-
greisional investigation is
making some changes of its ?
own to. keep in step with the
?times.
William E. Colby, CIA
director., made this statement ,
-during an interview recently in
his ;headquarters at Langley,
Va." 1
? "The United States set up an
intelligence system right after
World War Two," he said,
"which reflected the opionion
? of that time about intelli-
gence. Intelligence was some-
' thing to be put under the table
? and never talked 'about and
never looked at.
? "That's not good enough
today. So we are relooking at
the philosophical approach
toward intelligence. What we
are-saying is that now we have:
to have a view of intelligence:.
? responsibility.
? "We must have some secretsi
but We also ? have to be i
reassured as to what its real
? function is.
Philosophy Outdated
"We are in the process of re-:
evaluation: We are setting up ?
?
the: structure here and under- ?
standing, a philosophy if you:
will. of intelligence in our free
society which I think will go on;
fort? to 20 years. Then I think
it Will be relooked again."
Colby pointed out the.
original philosophy is nearly 4
years old and o-tdated.
"-I think the changes being.
? made will bring us up to date
and that peony will be'
satisfied: that afterthey take a
look at our intelligence .struc-
ture they will find it a good
structure; that it does a good
job and an important job."
said earlier at a hearing that
there have been mistakes
made in the past,
."There . have . been some ?
transgressions in the past," he
said, ."but today I'm pretty .
sure we are clear. We've taken
considerable steps around here
to make sure that we stay.right
within our charter. People
here want to do the right thing.
"If we have Jone anything
wrong in the past, they have
been very few things, very in-
frequent things. They, were
done in' the belief at that time
that they were somehow justi-
fied.
. 'It's hard to apply the stand-
ards of one time, to the 'situa-
tions of another time. I'm sure
that someone will come along
in 1990 and be critical of what I
did. Maybe they'd say I didn't
do! enough or maybe that I did
too much. I'm sure they will be
critical because they will have
a ; different perspective . or
viewpoint."
= Being Corrected
He said he is leaning over
backward to make certain that
everything is being done
correctly by the agency teday.
The intelligence machine, he
said, will either be "corrected
or adjusted" to make sure it
doesn't make any mistakes in
the future. "Then public confi-
dence will be re-established
and we can go back to work,"
he added. .
Some of the internal adjust-
ments being made include the
use of a system whereby any-
one in the organization, can
speak up if he thinks the
director is wrong.
This is a. remarkable thing in
a. governmental operation
where the lower echelon
seldom can reach the top with
their views.
And we encourage this,"
Colby said.
Colby also makes a point
He also repeated whpVeCivECit Reieftenirapati /08C08
25 with a half-dozen junior CIA!
employes in order 'to get a:
feel about what they are doing
and thinking and are con-
cerned about."
Encourages Differences
A difference .of opinion is not
only permitted but en-
couraged. -This- -particularly
applies to evaluation of intelli-
gence material.
Out. of this will come deci-
sions which may govern future
-actions of this country in
dealing with critical situations
in other parts of the i,vorld.
I referred to charges the CIA'
opened private mail . in this
country. .I ??asked if this was
true..
? 'Yes, unfortunately' it is,"
he replied. "I've testified to
that. We thought -we were
doing the right thing. I don't
think it was-the right thing and
we've stopped it." -
'It was mail going to a corn-'
munist ? country. We picked it
out tO learn who was communi-
cating with whom and with
'what organization back in that.
?country. . Sometimes we were'
looking for the kinds of censor-
ship that might Le used..;i me
reason we did this Itia.A.,cause
we would have an ..gent who
might be sent to that country
and have to write back to us.
"We wanted to protect our
agents and warn them so they,
would not get caught. That Sort
of technical inspection wasn t
to study the Substance of the
mail but nevertheless it was
not. proper and we shouldn't
have done it."
One of the charges made in
the investigations was that. CIA
was exceeding the limits of its
charter which desigh?Fted it to
handle worldwide in-i-Iligence
whereas the Federal Bureau of
Investigation handlei - the
intelligence within. the ',Jilted
States.
The charge was made that
the CIA was involved in anti-
:
e
iserligthelOgial
been a lot of exaggeration
about. the CIA operating some;
domestic police function. This
is not true.
"itlIe made a few mistakes
such as, some of our people
were in contact with anti-war
dissidents. These were made
so that our people could get
credentials with which they
could work abroad.
Some people tried to say we
were working against Aineri-
cans. This was not true. This
was not the purpose. of this
activity.' but unfortunately. it
Was said to be a terrible thing.
. "This bothered the morale of
our people, they felt this was
unfair. Some of them got out Of
the . service. Some felt that it
we ever did anything improper
we should reveal everything
and wear a hair shirt and so
forth.
Different Views
"There are different views in
the agency and this pulls and
-.tugs a little. It's a natural
''reaction of both sides. It is my
job. to try and keep them both
together and not let them go off
at 180 degrees apart."
Then he turned to a sensitive
subject, that of keeping
.. secrets.
- -"I must confess that we are
having a great deal of concern
about our ability .to keep
secrets. Not so much .secrets
as much as the impressions we
are giving to some people
abroad. Some of our friends
abroad are worried that their
names will come out. ?
"Some foreign governments
that are working quietly and
secretly with us couldn't do it
publicly. They are concerned
and wondering if we can keep
our secrets. Some of our
people. some of our agents
abroad, have resigned. They
Say they can't take a chance
anymore.
Some governments have
13036,Geinet great concern about
whether they should give us
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360002-6
LEBANON DAILY NEWS
17 APRIL 1975
their sensitive materials if we
can't protect them. I think. we
can. I think that the Cengres-
sional investigations that will
take place shortly will be a
responsible inquiry.
."Both senators and
eongressmen have given us
every indication that they are
going about this seriously and
responsibly.. They are going to
get-answers but if I have a good
reason to keep a name secret I
believe they will be convinced
of the need for such secrecy."
? Earlier in the interview he
pointed out that since the CIA
has been in the limelight any
reference to the agency
immediately took a news story
from an inside page and moved
it out to the top of the front
page.
The CIA is required by law
not ? to confirm or deny
published reports, whether
true or false, favorable or un-
favorable to the agency or its
personnel.
CIA does not publicly discuss
its organization, its budget .or
its ? ? personnel.' Nor does it
discuss its methods of opera-
tion or its sources of informa-
tion. ?
It can't by the terms of its
charter. It's a secret organi-
zat;nn that is committed to
protectine this country from
ioteign influences.
. . Get Blamed.
As
. As a result, the CIA often
? gets the blame for things it has.
had no hand in. ?
U.S. Sen. Stuart Symington,
Missouri. did a great deal of
the cross-examination . of
witnesses when Colby
anneared before a Senate com-
mittee to be confirmed as
director of the agency a year
and a?half ago.
At one point in the testi-
mony Symington said that
other government agencies
have the- tendency to -dump
any ill-fated operation on the
CIA because they can't defend
themselves."
He cited one ineinent whet
an enemy agent wee killed an
the CIA was blamed
Symington said he knew for .
. fact - that. the CIA ? hal
"recommended urgently" tha
the agent no be killed. .
,- "I -know about .this case. ix
cause I investigated it per
sonally," the senatoi said.
Yet the Central Intelligene
Agency was blamed. .
The CIA is accountabl
directly to the President.
What have some of ou
leaders felt about the agency?
Harry Truman once sent a!
message to the CIA in which he,
said: **The Central Intelli-!
gce Agency is a necessity to
the President of the United
States. From one who knows."
President Eisenhower added
some thoughts of his own when
they laid the cornerstone for
Ted Gvess
Plogeo From A .Nensinan's Note book
WOULD YOU care to join
me on my journey to Central
Intelligence Agency head-
quarters located in a densely
eitioded
area at Langley, Va.,
eight miles from the heart of
.
As you approach the area
Tram the direction of McLean,
Va., you s?-.!e a sign ahead. Yit is
en'een CM white and says: "CIA-
Turn Here." The road sweeps
in a big arch to the left and
leads to a high wire en dtzure.
There's a gap in the fence
which is set a large guard-
house. It is manned by
courteous verde who ask you'
name.
They quickly elm& iist end
find my name on it. ?!.',That
happens when your name is not
on the list is simple: You don't
get in.
Maybe you'd like to know
hem I got my nerne on the list.
I had been corresponding.
with Angus MacClean
Ibuermer, assistant director.
Then we exchanged telephone
calls. He first doubted that I
would be able to interview
Colby who has a full schedule.
So I was pleasantly surprised
when I got a call that the Colby
interview was on. -
The guard gave me a- three-
hour pass which I placed in the
car window, then head into
the giant compound.
? THE MAIN BUEI,DING.
quickly came into view. It is
seven storiee high with two
the headquarters at Langley,
Va.. when he said:
No leek could be more
importate. In the work of the
intelligence, heroes are
undecorated and unsung; often
even among their . own
`fraternity. Their inspiration is
rooted in patriotism ? their
reward can be little except
their conviction that they are
perf aeming a unique and
bdispertsable service for their
country, and the knowledge
that America needs and
appreciates their efforts. if:
assure you this is true."
Several presidents have
repeated the phrase:. "the CIA ,
successes will never be I
published and their failures
will always be publicized."
There are' many unanswered
questions about the agency: ?
Among them, what happened
in Chile in the overthrow of the
government. What about -Abe
Soviet submarine which sank
in the Pacific and was raised to
the surface under a CIA con-
tract Toth the Howard Hughes
firm? _
There are many things which i
the public would like to !mow
hasenieet levels. It has over a
million square feet of office
space. Up to now this was
classified information.
The number of employes and
the amount of the payroll still
is classified.
The building is surrounded
Ly trees, flowere. 'and
shrubbery. There is a gassy
area out back which is us in
the summer by employes who
sit on rustic batach.es to eat
d A seldom-used helicopter
pad is locates neat' the
?
. The parking esea in front of
beilding is !Towne ze lbe
QZPAvangle.." Ritr,V, now is is a
Picture of quiet charm as a
mireber? of tulip trees are in
bloom.
Was greeted by a leneacinets
guard when I pulled up in front
of the building.
He noticed my press sign on
the car and gave me a warm
welcome. -"We want to take
good care of the press" he
assured me.
? He was as good as his word,
for .he parked me in .the
number one spot.
I climbed out, tacked my
dispatch case and tape
recorder under my arm. Then I
reached for my camera. -
"Sorry," he said, "you can't
take the camera into head-
quarters."
"Well," 1 replied, "I'll just.
leave in on the front seat."
WASHINGTON POST
10 May 1975
-adj (r_71,_T(0;
V
?
"Oh no, that's not good.
Someone might steal it"
I looked at him and then the
high wire enclosure around the
campus, as it 'is called. Later!
was to learn that during the
gas shortage gasoline had been
stolen ? from cars parked on
campus.
The guard was doubtful
about my tape recorder but
remarked as I turned away,
"They will probably take it
from you when you get inside."
They did, too, but when I met
Thuermee he got it hack for
Enz. He still wasn't sure that
the director would permit me
to use it during the interviews.
However, it turned out all right.
and there was no further
que ion about it.
Word had been sent upstairs
and a well-built young man
came down to meet us. He was
quiet and courteous. He had to
use a key to open the door to
the elevator which took us to
the seventh floor.
Here we waited in a small
room adjoining Colby's office.
Finally came the word that he
could see us and we strode into
his office.
It was a long room flanked on
one side almost entirely bytall
windows which looked out over
the Potomac River.
And So we settled down for
nearly an hour of conversation
about the Central Intelligence
Agency.
jio o-
1lLiRi.
Fred Griffin, 58;? a former
senioi- executive with the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, died
of a stroke Thursday at Subur-
ban Hospital in Bethesda. He
lived at 8901 Kensington
Pkwy.. Chevy Chase.
A native of Grapevine, Tex.,
Mr. Griffin attended schools
there, and later graduated in
1936 from Texas Tech Univer-
sity in Lubbock. with -a liberal
arts degree.
He taught English at the
university and later served as
its director of public relations.
iI During World War II, Mr.
but never wW because of the ?
terms cc/ its charter which ,
seals its lips. What will happen
after the Congressional investi-
gation. only time will tell.
Colby in a recent interview
acknowledged he is aware of
the presence of foreign spies in
VV ILtir/Tt (L9ff
, Griffin worked for the Army
! as a eryptanalyst. in that Ca-
pacity he worked on breaking
the Japanese code.
After the war he came to
Washington as a staff assist-
ant to a Texas congressman.
In 1946, he joined the War De-
partment as a security expert.
He joined the CIA in 1952 and
; remained there until his retire-
! ment. Mr. Griffin is survived by
his wife, Lorna, of the home;
and three childen, Lorna Lilly,
! of Stoneville, N.C.; Bryan of the
I home; and Melanie, of Wash-
ington.
this country. He said "it's
accepted that we au i engage in
that clandestine gathering of
! Nobody gets
emotional about it. It's been
going on since Moses sent a
man from each tribe to spy on
the Laud of Canaan".
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? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360002-6
JAPAN TIMES
30 April 1975
FREE LA BOUR WORLD, Brussels
March 1975
UNION
BOOKSHELF
Philip AGEE
Inside the Company, a CIA Diary
Penguin Books, 1975.
This is a badly written and surpris-
ingly boring book: One wonders how
many of those- who buy it because the
publisher's hullaballoo has whetted
their appetite will manage to read it
from cover to cover. This reviewer, at
any rate, found the task impossible.
But perhaps it was one of the author's
Jntentions- to show bow dull and. dreary,
:the- CM agent's. life- is., in describion-.
'at great length the way the CIA organ-
isation is built up and functions, Agee
lists countless names and abbreviations
which no reader could possibly take
In, let alone remember. ? all this
obviously with the intention of proving
the authenticity of his story. We are
supposed to think that the author Gould
not have made up so many details:
hence .he must be a genuine agent.
Actually, of course, this does not prove
anything. But supposing that Agee
really did work. for the CIA in Latin
America and actively participated in
many shady activities (to use no stron-
ger term), he has done a very poor job
In writing this book. He coisld not only
have entertained a public which loves
to read about bugging, spying, secret
inks and codes, but he might have
done some useful service in exposing
the CIA machinations in that continent.
However, he completely destroys his
own credibility by drawing all kinds of
reckless conclusions and referring to
things of which he has no first hand
experience or reliable information. In
fact, the only startling thing in the
book is the effrontery with which the
author denounces persons and organis-
ations as CIA agents without the slight-
est concrete evidence. In many cases,
his allegations are not merely unfound-
ed, but can quite easily be proved to
be untrue. But unless somebody takes
the trouble to establish the facts in a
court action, this rubbish will no doubt
find enough gullible readers and will
be used by others for their own political
purposes. G.F.
Governinent
'in the Open
By Max Lerner
GAINESVILLE, Fla. How open dare government be?
How closed must it be? These were the- questions put at a'
.University of Florida conference on openness .in govern-.
ment, which used Florida's "sunshine law" as its kickoff'
.point. It was the first. time. ,I have pitsted to. explore my
thinking on the difficult limits of secrecy and openness,.
the right to know and the* right of privacy. The two-day ,
:exchange of views with a number of legislators, private
and public lobbyists, can professors and public officials ,
help all of us to reach some conclusionS.
One is that it 'is healthy to let more sunshine into the'.
dark places of governmental secrecy by opening as much
as possible of the decision-making process to the public.:
Although it is as old as Ponce de Leon's _early quest for:
the fountain of youth, Florida is " ? along with California
? also one of the fastestzgrowing states, and in that Sense'
one of youngest 'and -most rootless. When a whole culture
is unrooted and wholly fluid, public officials are tempted
.to be on the make. Covertness becomes their weapon, and,
the "sunshine law" takes it away from. them.
It is a vaguely drawn; embracing law. that leaves much
to the courts to interpret. The trend has been to apply it
to informal as well as formal meetings' of governmental
boards and committees, and to preliminary, ones as well
as to those at which decisions are announced. ? . ?
; If other states and the federal government adopted the
'Florida law, we .would' get a double flow between the gov-
ernment and the people. One would be outward to the
'public that of letting the people know wha is happen-
ing. The other would be inward into the government
that of letting various interest groups 'and people's lobbies
c.ompete 'with the private k lobbyistS who sd often have ar.
inside, track into legislative committees and regulatory agen-',
cies ?
, This would create an equalizing situation between the:
two sets of groups. By making 'government more acces-?
sible to the . people it might heal some of the current feel-;
ing of helplessness, especially of the young who see
tics as a rigged game. '
If -this were all, would throw my hat in the air and cheer
for total sunshine. But it isn't all. There are two major
problems with the idea of total openness in government.
.One is that there will always be areas where secrecy is.
indispensable. The present hearings on the CIA oper-
ations, both by the Rockefeller commission and the Sen-
ate subcommittee, have to be held in closed session. This.
is also true' of much of diplomacy. President Woodrow
Wilson's idea of "open covenants, openly arrived at," was`
a - dead pigeon even before he came' up with it. Consider,
what chance there would be .for a Middle East peace if all
negotiations had to be carried on in the open. The best we
can hope for is open covenants, .arrived 'at, openly possible:
and secretly if necessary.
, There are processes of government ? in 'mediating la-
bor disputes as well as in diplomacy ? where the crux of
it lies in a compromise between publicly held positions..
There is also a second area where the deliberative pro-.
cess cannot be' a public one without paralyzing whatever,
creativeness government can still have, in an era where'
many of the governmental processes are nonthitiking ones.
, The arguments in a case before the U.S. Supreme Court
are held in the open, but the discussion of the case by the
judges is held in closed session. Similarly the convention
which framed the U.S. Constitution had to be a closed one,.
although we are now in James Madison's debt because he
kept, notes about its deliberations.
For the rest, there is still room for far more. sunshine'
!in government than we have yet achieved. Yet I must add
the .kind of warning that Theodore Loewi ..has sounded in'
his strong book, "The End of Liberalism". ? about the ?
fallacy of mu belief that whatever gives more scope to'
pressure groups , makes government better.' A government'
-of pressure groups may become a competition of group
selfishness and rivalpes, and more access to committees
and commissions may only . make their struggle. more
ApproveceFor Release 200178M8 : CIA-FggRU-0243?Mg100360002-6
t , eles Times
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360002-6
TIME, MAY 5, 1S75
SOVIEV Ol
Ali the Shi
? Around the world last week, ships
of the Soviet navy were under full steam.
Off the Azores, NATO spotter planes re-
ported one of the 10,000-ton Kara-class
two-year-old missile cruisers that West-
ern naval experts rate among the world's
best modern warships. In the Mediter-
ranean, where the US. Sixth Fleet cus-
tomarily roams while Soviet vessels lie
in Syrian and North African ports?ex-
cept for a few "tattletale" scouts dog-
ging American carriers?the roles were
reversed. The Soviet fleet was out in
force and the Sixth Fleet was doing the
tattling. Other Soviet task forces were
sighted in the Pacific Ocean, in the Sea
of Japan and off the Philippines.
The global flurry of activity was no
accident. At least 200 surface ships and
100 submarines, along with land-based
aircraft, were involved in a massive na- .
val exercise, the first such worldwide
maneuvers that the Soviet navy has run
in five years. The Soviets dubbed the ma-
neuvers "Spring"; the West called them
"Okean 1975," a reference to the Ok-
ean (Russian for ocean) maneuvers that
the Soviets held in 1970. The new ex-
ereise was apparently scheduled for the
same length of time as the last one
? ?about three weeks.
Varied Aims. Far from screening
the maneuvers, the Soviet navy took
pains to advertise its muscle flexing. It
passed routine naval orders over regu-
larly monitored radio channels. Okea n's
essential message was a now familiar
one: under Soviet Admiral Sergei Gorsh-
kov, the Soviet navy is no longer a coast-
al force but an impressive blue-water
global fleet. Said one U.S. officer last
week as he busily monitored the Soviet
fleet at sea: "What they've done in just
ten years is absolutely fantastic. From
almost nothing, they've built up a first-
rate navy, and it's an imposing threat."
What interested Western observers
more than the disposition of the ships
was the basic aims of Okean 1975. They
appeared to be varied. Judging from
groupings of Soviet merchant and hy-
drographic ships off the Azores and
Japan, convoy maneuvers were in-
volved. But whether Russian warships
were practicing convoy escort or pos-
tulating the convoys as U.S. fleets?or
U.S. tanker convoys?would await the
same sort of computer analysis that the
Pentagon carried out in connection with
the first Okean. Even without comput-
ers, however, it was obvious that the So-
viets had also practiced air reconnais-
sance and antisubmarine warfare, using
not only ships but land-based aircraft,
including the intercontinental-range nu-
clear bomber "Backfire," and TU-95
"Bears" flying out from Cuba and
Guinea.
Most significant for a global fleet,
Okean 1975 tested "command and con-
28
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360002-6
Pacifii'Ocean
AUSTRALIA ?
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CANADA: ' ;
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Az-ores
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SOUTH
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AFRICA
trol" communications networks employ-
ing satellites and satellite relay. Using
a mixture of very high and very low fre-
quencies and linking even submerged
submarines, the Russian navy apparent-
ly achieved near-instant communica-
tions. That would be a considerable asset
in Gorshkov's "first salvo" concept, in
which scattered Soviet fleets are sup-
posed to undertake simultaneous attacks
within a 90-second period.
As in all such maneuvers, East or
West, Okean 1975 had another aim as
lag the exercise was "Seagull," observed
it aboard a warship in the Barents Sea,
along with Soviet Defense Minister An-
drei Grechko. They obviously meant to
impress the Politburo as well as the West
with the capability arid reach of Soviet
forces. One fallout from the first Okean
exercise, for instance, was the decision
to upgrade the Soviet carrier forces.
Their third and most sophisticated car-
rier, the 35,000-ton Kiev, is now outfit-
ting in the Black Sea port of Nikolayev
and will undergo sea trials this summer.
well. Gorshkov, whose code name TJLc.' ijW kwK TIMES, MONDAY, APRIL"28.,
1975
"Vast Soviet Nay
.1 Exercise Raises
Urgent i JV
?
?
ore than 220 of the Soviet
Navy's most powerful surface
ships and perhaps half that
many submarines reached home
ports at the weekend after the
largest and most extensive air
and sea exercise the Soviet
Union has ever stag.:(1,
Defense Department analysts,
studying preliminary reports
from American and other un-
invited observers, say that Ex-
ercise Okean (Ocean) 1975?
which for the first time em-
ployed, convoys of merchant-
men in an exercise?raised
questions whose answers could
be ? f the greatest significance .
to the United States and its
allies in the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization.
Woes this foreshadow the
future use of Soviet sea power
to escort a merchant fleet or
an expeditionary force en route
to a crisis area?
c,Or do the convoys reflect
; greater emphasis in Sovict
naval planning on the destruc-
tion in war of allied ,nilitarv
'convoys loaded with troops and
. . . ..
., supplies for Etiropt- and of
merchantmen carrying oil and
other vital materials to North
America and Europe?
tiWas this a demonstration
1 as much for the benefit of the
Soviet Governmept as for the
.West of what the new navy
can do, a signal that the navy
can no nonger be consiceren
. 'merely na extension of the
army but a force capable o
implementing Russian policy at
great distances?
Secretary of the Navy S.
William Middendorf 2d reported
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360002-6
?in a speech to the Navy League
that the Russians used the ex-
ercise to evaluate command
;and control of naval forces
worldwide, ocean surveillance,
anticarrier, antisubmarine nad
anticonvoy warfare operations
and weapons and electronic
systems. ?
! "In my view," he said, "this
iSoviet naval exercise clearly
demonstrates the fact that the
'Soviet Navy, ia capable of
operating effectively in all the
oceans of the world."
Intensive analysis of Okean
1975 is expected to provide fur-
ther details on the modern
Soviet Navy. Enough is known
now, defense analysts said, to
depict the dimensions of the
exercise and its chief tactical
themes.
Soviet squadrons exercised
from the Sea of Japan to the
Caribbean and from Norway's
North Cape to the Azores Is-
lands. A task force by two
missile-armed cruisers conduct
%d what were believed to be
antiearrier operations in the
.Tyrrhenian Sea area of the
Mediterranean. There were four
naval task groups in the West-
ern Pacific and a heavy con-
centration of, submarines and
surface ships drawn from the
northern, Baltic and Black Sea
fleets, in the North Atlantic.
? The Soviet naval air force
participated on a scale well be-
yond its role in the last global
exercise five 'years ago. 11-38
reconnaissance aircraft flew,
over the North Pacific and the
North Atlantic. Other 11-38's,
based near Berbera in Somalia,
worked with the Indian Ocean
squadron. Tu-95's from Cien-
fuegos in Cuba cooperated with
surface ships and submarines
In the Caribbean and other
Tu-95's exercised off the coast
of . Africa, presumably from
-bases in Guinea.
In the Indian Ocean exercise,
squadrons of Tu-95's flew from
bases in Soviet Central Asia
over Iran to the Arabian Sea.
? Tankers a Factor
The emphasis on the exercise
in this area, where surface
strength was higher than usual,
indicates to analysts that the
Soviet Union is as unaware as
the West of the importance of
the tanker traffic originating
In the Persian Gulf.
The important role played by
the air force, analysts believe,
symbolizes the attention given
,to _aritisubmarine warfare )11
,,Okean 19754
The anti-submarine warfare
phase was followed by what
appeared to be simulated anti-,
'carrier attacks by surface ships ?
and by a large number of TU-16
strike aircraft based in Eastern
jEurope and the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union has com-
pleted one 40,000-ton aircraft
I carrier and is authoritatively
reported to be building a sec-
ond. But neither the completed
'carrier, the Kiev, nor the two
!helicopter carriers, the Moskva
and Leningrad, were sighted in
the maneuvers.
New Role for Navy
If they were employed, they
may have ,been assigned to the
extensive Black Sea fleet ma-
neuvers about which relatively
little is known.
The presence of merchant
ship convoys in the North At-
lantic and east of Japan puz-
zled Defense Department ana-
lysts. ? Were the ? convoys sup-
posed to be American or So-
WASHINGTON POST
15 May 1975
roadcasfing to Closed Societies
viet? The attacks on the con-
voys by ships and aircraft
might argue that they were
considered American and that
the exercise was intended to
perfect operations against al.
lied maritime communications.
Some analysts point out that
Soviet naval literature, espe-,
,dally the writings of the Com-
mander in Chief, Adm. S. G.
Gorshkov, recently has stressed
the role the navy can play in
carrying out Soviet overseas,
policy. Such a role could in-
volve the movement of 'ground
Iforces in a convoy. ? ? -
I "If .the use of convoys Sig-
'nifies changes either way," one
analyst said, "it encourages the
view that, Admiral Gorslikov
has made his point that the
navy can deal with 'military-
politico matters."
He added that there= is "a
need to rethink our ideas on
the uses of the Soviet Navy,
there's clearly been a change."
Despite the attention paid' to
antisubmarine operations; espe-
cially in the North Atlantic,
analysts do not? believe 'that
Soviet technology in this. field
has reached the point , where
Russian antisubmarine forces
can be considered a "significant
threat" to American submarines
;armed with ballistic missiles.
! - Analysts also reported great-
er emphasis on the quality of
new Soviet surface ships that
are being commissioned hi the
growing fleet.
Mr. Middendorf noted 'the
"disturbing fact" that the So-
Viet Navy today "has twice the
number of major surface, eem-
batants and submarines as the
United States Navy." ." "
There are more to come, the
analysts noted. The', Soviet
Union, one reported, new has
more ways for shipbuilding in
one shipyard near Severomorsk
in the Kola Peninsula than exist
in the whole of the United
States. ? .1' -
ADIO4 FREE EUROPE, broadcasting to East Europe;
It and Radio Liberty, broadcasting to the Soviet Union,
have successfully weathered a difficult transition from
CIA sponsorship to open operation under a public hoard,
and-from cold-war programming to a more careful and
' responsible programming consistent with the changing
international scene. Not being the official' voices of
America, these stations have the independence to offer
their large and attentive audiences unvarnished news?
especially news of those domestic developments which
the local governments customarily censor. The purpose
of the stations is simply to satisfy a continued longing,
in the closed societies to which they broadcast, for honest
Communication and facts.
Americans could, of course, join with the local Com-
munist governments in a partnership to suppress the
local news. But this would serve no useful or legitimate
political purpose -and and it would be a crude violation
,?
of our own values. There is no contradiction between the ,
existence of detente and the broadcasting of news. On
the contrary, the real contradiction is between the exist-
ence of detente and the suppression of news, which is '
what the Communist authorities try to do by jamming,
Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe. Americans have
exactlY the same right to broadcast to the Russians that
they have to broadcast to us. No one has to listen who
doesn't so choose.
In the last year, and at specific congressional bidding,
substantial changes have been made in the organization
and operation of the two stations in order to make them
more efficient and economical. By informed conSensus,
they are now better fit than ever to perform their essen-
-Hal service of communication. It remains only for the
Congress, as it weighs their budget requests in the cur-
rent cycle,,to provide the small additional sums necessary
to let them do their job.,'
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29
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360002-6 _
BALTIMORE SUN
12 May 1975
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