AN INTERVIEW WITH SENATOR PROXMIRE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 8, 2001
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 29, 1974
• Content Type: TRANS

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CONFIDENTIAL
INTERNAL USE ONLY
This publication contains clippings from the
domestic and foreign press for YOUR
BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use
of selected items would rarely be advisable.
CONFIDENTIAL
20 January 1975
Destroy after backgrounder
has served its purpose or
within 60 days.
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GOVERN'4ENTAL AFFAIRS
GENERAL
WESTERN EUROPE
NEAR EAST
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EAST ASIA
LATIN AMERICA
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RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.
4435 WISCONSIN AVE. N.W.. WASHINGTON. D. C. 20016. 244.3540
PROGRAM Issues & Answers
December 29, 1974 1:30 PM
STATION
ABC Network
Washington, D.C.
AN INTERVIEW WITH SENATOR PROXMIRE
BOB CLARK: Senator William Proxmire, Democrat
of Wisconsin, here are the issues: Will charges of widespread
domestic spying destroy the CIA? How can Congress tighten
its control over intelligence operations? Will Congress
vote an anti-recession tax cut?
ANNOUNCER,: Senator William Proxmire, who has
demanded an investigation into alleged domestic spying by
the CIA and has called for the resignation of former CIA
Director Richard Helms, Ambassador to Iran, will be interviewed
by ABC News Capitol Hill correspondent Bob Clark and ABC
news correspondent Bill Gill.
BILL GILL: Senator, in this week of charges against
the Central Intelligence Agency on alleged domestic spying
you have had a research staff at work. Now most of the char
have been from unknown or unnamed sources in news reports. gas
Have you been able to determine exactly what the Central
Intelligence Agency may have been guilty or not guilty of?
SENATOR WILLIAM PROXMIRE: Well, I think I can
say on the basis of the information I have, and I think it's
very good information, very reliable people that I've found
to be reliable in the past, that the stories and the allegations
in the New York Times about the 10,000 -- the file of 10,000
names of people who had been under investigation by the CIA,
,about the surveillance -- surveillances, I should say --
about the breaking-and-entering, and about wiretaps, that
those are accurate and correct. 1 think I can confirm that
on the basis of the information that I've had, and I think,
as I say, that's good information.
GILL: Well, the latest report is the Central
Intelligence Agency was shadowing or putting under surveillance
Congressman Claude Popper, Supreme Court Justice William
0. Douglas, some other of the highest-ranking American officials.
Can you confirm that?
quite a
bit, especially the Douglas surveillance. So
information on that. don't have
GILL: Well, suppose you evaluate that kind of
action by the Central Intelligence Agency.
for a moment that they might have investigated, s tsunde
surveillance these two PPtunder
particular people, Claude Pepper
a congress m alp &v leor4&le d 2balWaMB8, : GIlI1-f~DR7 @04r,9BAOC 1~0 r99.03-6
 holding office; William Douglas, aSupreme Court'Justice..
Is this part of the CIA's province? .
this is exactly what your question implies at the end, this
is not part of the CIA's responsibility or their legal.right..-
Th_ CIA is responsible for foreign intelligence-gathering,
primarily, and-they have absolutely no right to engage in
this kind of surveillance, and not only with respect to United
States senators, but any American citizen in this country.
It's Wrong.
And I think I should be very careful in saying,
that I do think that internal security is.an essential function.
I t has to be performed. t?te don't live in a Sunday .school
world. The Russians undoubtedly have their agents in this
country and they should be under the closest kind of surveillance,
but that should be done by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
And it's most important that the CIA, which is a secret agency--
we d-on't even know its budget. It has hundreds of millions
of dollars, tans'of thousands of people working for it --
that if this agency begins to engage in this kind of thing
without.the controls the'FBI has, without court orders. for
mail cover, for example, and wiretapping, then we're in a
very dangerous position.. And I think that distinction has
to be made.
CLARK: Senator, as you know, we don't even know
the 'budget of the CIA ' and ;,then you eny "'1.ie_ " you the
J ?, J- _I J 11Y , 4V_ 111-"11 the
U.S. Congress. There are a few members of the House and
Senate who form subcommittees on the Armed Services Committees
and the Appropriations Committee who theoretically oversee
the CIA budget. But...-
SENATOR PROX!-;IRE: Im glad.you.said theoretically..
.1 mean it's pretty theoretical. They don't...
CLARK: That's sort of the heart-of the question.-.
I know these rarely meet and they're dominated by two or
three senior rnembers.*- But what do you do about it? How
does Congress tighten its control over the CIA so it knows
.:hat it's doing and what it's spending?
SENATOR PROXIUI RE : Well, .number one -- . I think:
there are a number of things we should do. Number one, we
should clear up this so-called gray area that you have.
We should make it absolutely clear by law that the CIA cannot
engage, must not engage in any kind of domestic police activity
at all, any kind of domestic activity. I got that kind of
an amendment through the Senate and Senator Stennis cosponsored
it with me, the Proxmire-Stennis Amendment. It was unfortunately
dropped in the House, but I think we can get that adopted
in the coming year, thanks very largely to the story in the
New York Times, the series of stories and exposes in the
New York Times. So I think that's number one. But that's
just the.beginning.
'I think, in addition to that, we must act to establish
an independent special prosecutor' with subpoena powers who
will prosecute every illegal action by CIA agents, past or
present.
CLARK: Now are you talking about a special prosecutor
under the Justice Department or under Congress, as a creature
of Congress?
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SENATOR PROXMIRE: No. What's outrageous about
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00350003-6
SENATOR PROXMIRE: Well, I think it ought to be
a creature of Congress. I think it ought to be created by
us. I think it would be workina with the Justice: Department,
but I think it ought to be independent, and I stress the
independence. I think we have a framework for that, of course,
in the Watergate situation, where we had both Cox ' and Jaworski
in this position, where there was a Justice Department responsibility,
but where it was clear that the independent special prosecutor
could not be fired without informing the Congress about it
and giving the Congress an opportunity to act. It must be
independent of the Executive because this is where the problem
has developed.
CLARK: Well, would you have this special prosecutor
conduct the investigation that almost everybody agrees is
now needed of the CIA?
SENATOR PROXMIRE: Well, I think that's part of
it. I think he should conduct the investigation of illegal
activities, but I think that's only part of what has to be
done. And in addition to that, I'd like to see the establishment
of a joint committee that has the exclusive job and the sole
job of investigating this whole operation and what's been
done in the past.
You see, we've had these flurries of saying "Let's
control the CIA" again and again. We had it when the Bay
of Pigs thing happened. We had it with the U-2 fiasco.
W;- had it with the secret war in Laos conducted by the CIA.
And nothing happens. People complain about it for a few
days or a few weeks,' and it goes away.
So I think we should take action to make sure
that -you have that kind of a committee established with the
responsibility, a limited responsibility, but a specific
responsibility, in this case.
Then in addition, I think it would be desirable
to have an oversight committee that would be permanently
assigned to oversee the CIA, because as you implied before,
there just isn't the kind of congressional control of the
CIA that we must have.
GILL:. Wel I , Senator.. .
SENATOR PROXMIRE: In addition to that, one other
thing. I introduced legislation and got substantial support
in the Senate, although it didn't pass, that would provide
for an overall budget of the CIA so that we know how much
money is being spent. And we have the word of both Schlesinger
and ' Col by, the former directors, that this would not have
a serious effect in compromising the security of the CIA.
GILL:-.- dust so that we -- for clarity, up until
this past week the central criticism of the Central Intelligence
Agency over recent times has been covert activity in foreign
countries a la Chile, the Bay of Pigs, the Laos war, with
a great sentiment being expressed by some that even this
should be absolutely prohibited. But now we're concentrating
on a new area and that particular phase of the CIA operation
seems to have faded away for the moment.
SENATOR PROXIMIRE: No. Bill, these are very,
very closely related. I think the covert activity should
be stopped, the so-called -- the paramilitary activity, the
murder,.the kidnaping, or that kind of thing to destabilize,
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overthrow governments. It's wrong. It's counterproductive.
It failed with the Gay of Pigs. It failed in the Chilean
situation. It's failed over and over a-gain. It's succeeded
sometimes, but even where it succeeds, I think it erodes.
our...
[Confusion of voices]
SEF;ATOR PROXiiIRE: ...throughout the world.
GILL: '.:ell, didn't it succeed in such places
as Turkey, Greece, Iran...
SENATOR PROXNIRE: It succeeded in some places,
that's correct. But even where it succeeded, it's something
teat leaves such a bad flavor and taste and attitude toward
this country that I think it's wrong. We have no right to
play God.
The reason it's related, however, is because if we're
going to have people with that kind of experience, that kind
of knowledge, that kind of ability engaging in subverting
foreign countries, then we're asking for it here in this
country. I think one of the most serious threats we have
to our free system is subversion from trained subversive
,agents who've been trained to do the job abroad and then
transfer that ability here.
1 think the Watergate experience is one that should
remind us of this.
GILL: What I'm asking you pointedly is can you
briefly give me your concept of what Central Intelligence
should be? ..
SENATOR PROXMIRE: Yes. Briefly, what the Central
Intelligence Agency should be doing is gathering intelligence,
gathering information, gathering it in every way they know..
And, of course, the technological advances we've. had in recent
years, where we have satellites that can be a hundred miles
above the earth, can photograph something literally inches
in size, has given us the most reliable kind of objective
information about what's going on in foreign countries.
And I think that that kind of intelligence-gathering and
any other kind of foreign intelligence-gathering is right,
useful, desirable; we have to have it.
But the paramilitary action abroad that Congress
knows nothing about is, I think, vicious, wrong and unjustifiable,
and we ought to stop it.
CLARK: Senator, let me play devil's advocate
here for a moment, and I know the position you're taking
is essentially that of Chairman Fulbright as he leaves the
Foreign Relations Committee, that the CIA should confine
itself only to gathering intelligence. But the rebuttal
that is made to that is that we live in a dangerous and sometimes
a dirty world where it takes a dirty tricks operation to
remain competitive with the intelligence operations that
are manned by the iron Curtain countries. How do you answer
that?
SENATOR PRUUII RE : Well, I'd answer that by saying
that this is -- we've always lived in a dirty world in which
tough and mean, cruel people operated this way. That's the
way the world has been. There's nothing new about that. I
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got along without the CIA operation for most of our history,
th_ great majority of our history.
When President Truman discovered that this covert
kind of operation was going on, he expressed real shock. He
was concerned about it. He thought it was wrong.
And I don't think that there's -- it's ever been shown
that his is necessary. or that this kind of activity has at any
time been really useful in the long run for the interests of.
our country. I think we can protect ourselves with our defense
establishment. I think we can protect ourselves by getting
information about what's going on, which is what the CIA should
do. And we do not need to engage in that kind of activity abroad.
I don't think it works for us; I don't think it works for other.
countries trying to operate in this country.
CLARK: I want to get a little clearer on your views
as-to--what sort of an investigation should be mounted into the
CIA. Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State Kissinger, who is
.also the chief. wheel of the private oversight operation within
the Administration of the CIA, the.so-called Committee of 40 --
but he reportedly favors an investigation by a panel -- a blue-
ribbon panel, so-called, of private citizens. What would you
think of that idea?
SENATOR PROXMI RE : Well, now we've had an investigation
by the CIA itself of itself, and I think we have to discount
that, although I have great respect for i?lr. Colby, who I think
s doing a good job, on the basis of everything 1 've seen, as
Mr. Schlesinger did. He's a good man. But I think that the
CIA to investigate itself obviously isn.t it.
Now-if you have a panel -- we have a panel, 'a board',
an intelligence board whose job it is to brief the President
on ,what's going on in the intelligence community, .and it just
hasn't worked. We wouldn't have situation that has just.been
exposed by the New York Times.
What. I'm concerned about is that if the President appoints
a panel, with Mr. Ki ssi nger's advice -- and Mr. Kissinger, as
you say, is partly responsible for the CIA -- that it's likely
to be a whitewash. I just wouldn't have faith that they would
do the job.
I think, in addition to that, you should have what
I have suggested, which is a vigorous independent special prosecutor
with the job of going after what's wrong and illegal. and. taking.
action, and a congress ioiial -committee with its specific responsibility
for acting here.
I wouldn't have any objection-to that, but I don't
think it'.ll do much.
finding.
CLARK: Senator, you are going...
SENATOR PROXMIRE: I wouldn't have any faith in their
CLARK: In the new 94th Congress you're going to move
on to a new job as Chairman of the Banking Committee. We want
to ask you a number of questions about that....
GILL: Senator, before we go on to your new duties
as Ch airmaApprrovtOFoBftle*1 2Q1JICWCBtt A,-FW%7-Q 2~RMOYIWBA6that
5
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you mentioned is rather intriguing,' I think, and I'd-like to
ask you this: If you were to have a special group of oversight
action created in the Congress, could the CIA, under your premise,
then come to that organization for sanction of its dirty trick
operations, its paramilitary operations, if it felt that it's
absolutely essential to the country? Would there be any mechanism
at all that they could get the permission or the consent or
the agreement of that legislative body to go ahead with such
a paramilitary operation? Or are you speaking of making it
absolutely prohibited?
SENATOR PROXMIRE: Well, I'm saying I'd like to
h
l
get
t
e
egislation adopted prohibiting that kind of activity.
As I say, I don't think it's worked.
But obviously, at any time the President of
the
United
States or the CIA or anyone else wants to come before
the
Congress
and ask for permission to do this, they could get the
law
changed
to permit them to do it,.and I think that that should
be
the
requirement.
GILL: But then it would have to go before the entire
Congress and be laid out on the table, and then there is no
secrecy to it. Aren't you really getting to the point now where
you're in danger of just totally emasculating the CIA in some
foreseeable future when something such as [unintelligible] is
absolutely necessary?
SENATOR PROXMIRE: No. I don't think -- this is the
way free societies perish. I think by getting into activities
t- Z ~ th they 4.rc+ devour
~~~~i ~.~~ are so J VYI on l~, 1.he -..ea.-.s are so wrong, 4.14J ~MJ .. u~.? your ends. I think what we have to do is recognize that this
country survived very well for 170 years without any CIA. We
also have to look at what the covert activities have told us
for the last 20 years or so since we've been engaged in them.
What is the result? It's been counterproductive. It.has not
given us a single instance which, it seems to me, Americans
can be proud of in advancing our position.
Sure, we have gotten a little more friendly governments
in one place and another, but we're playing God when we do that.
How can we possibly justify removing a government that's been
elected, or, for that matter, any other government?
I think that this covert activity is wrong. and it's
really a more likely threat to the free institutions than the
invasion of a foreign power.
And I just want to make one more thing clear: I feel
very strongly about internal security. I think we do live in
a tough world, but I.think that the FBI has the professionalism,
the competence, the track record and they can protect this country
WASHINGTON POST
10 January 1975
eportedldT Asked ,r'~s to S
.
r month linked the CIA to' P1 u-;
.The Central Intelligence
,Agency recently asked Ameri-
can firms to engage in.indus-
trial espionage on civilian
transportation systems in Brit-
ain, ' Canada, France, West
Germany;. Japan and the
Soviet Union, it was asserted
.yesterday.
Sen. Richard S. Schweiker
(R-Pa.) charged that research
egntract proposals sent by, the
tions." ~ project said "the emphasis i tion why this information isn't
The CIA document outlin- will be placed on the identifi-
ing the proposed study said i cation of specific foreign de.
said "the U.S. may be faced velopm ents in transportation
with competitive threats, inltechnology that could provide
both the U.S. and interna. the most serious economic
tional market, evolving from competition for the United
rapid technological advances States."
in other countries." Schweiker said in his state-
A copy of the CIA's seven- ment "I do not question our
rage document requesting government's interest in for.
. . r
being openly obtained by the
Departments of Commerce or
Transportation instead of sec-
retly procured by the CIA.
"This latest discovery adds
new weight to the charges t
that the CIA has exceeded its
charter and established an in-
visible government of its
own," Schweiker said.
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NEW YORK
20 Jan. 1975.
By Tad Szulc
"... Nixon tapes would speak for themselves. The C.I.A. will tell
the blue-ribbon panel. as much, or as little, as it chooses ... 55
i
'President Ford no sooner said that
he wished to know and tell the whole
truth about the illegal domestic opera.
tions of the Central Intelligence Agency
than he placed this investigation in
the hands of an eight-man blue-ribbon
commission whose immediate problem
may tie in its own unreality. Its chair-
man, Vice-President Nelson Rocke-
feller, and several of its most knowl-
edgeable members have long, intimate,
and protective ties with the U.S. in-
telligence community, which could con-
ceivably lead them to see the C.I.A.'s
controversial doings in a relatively
charitable light.
The crucial question to be answered
by the commission is this: who knew
about the C.I.A.'s portion of what John
Mitchell characterized as the Nixon
While Housc "horrors"? Was it n ?~,?L
1\(ll-
ard Nixon himself, orchestrating a com-
prehensive plan to push the United
States toward a police state? Was it for-
mer C.I.A. Director Richard Helms?
Was it General Robert Cushman Jr., a
close associate of Richard Nixon's and,
at the time, the agency's deputy direc-
tor? Or was it Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger, the man who, in effect, runs
the entire U.S. intelligence community?
Charity may not be the most necessary
attribute for a group whose mission
includes determining whether sufficient
safeguards surround the C.I.A.
In any event, this commission can
hardly do its work adequately unless,
along with the Watergate special prose-
cutor, it gains access to the treasure
trove of Richard Nixon's materials held
back by the Ford White House because
of Nixon's own legal challenges.
Federal investigators are convinced
that among the 900 reels of tapes (add-
ing up to some 5,400 listening hours)
and 42 million documents in the White
House complex there is ample evidence
to verify how and why the former
president and his associates went about
misusing and abusing the American
intelligence community for their own
political ends-at the expense of the
civil rights of American citizens.
The C.I.A. and military intelligence
have been snooping around the United
States for a long time, but there has
been nothing quite like the carryings-
on under Nixon. These activities far
transcend in importance recently re-
ported "massive" C.I.A. spying on
antiwar militants., if it really occurred.
They included direct domestic police
functions in support of local police
forces, White House-directed surveil-
Approved
lance of selected individuals for politi-
cal reasons, considerable cooperation
with the "plumbers," and the manage-
ment of a $200-million-a-year top-secret
C.I.A. corporate empire.
The existence of this vast internation-
al corporate empire has a new rele-
vance, presumably of interest to the
Rockefeller commission. Present for-
eign aid legislation prohibits the fund-
ing of covert C.I.A. operations abroad
unless the president certifies to Con-
gress their need for U.S. national se-
curity. The availability of funds in
C.I.A.-owned and profit-making busi-
nesses could circumvent the intent of
Congress.
Net:' York Magazine has learned
details of these and other hidden in-
telligence operations through recent
research and wide-ranging interviews
throughout the United States intelli-
gence community. A presidential com-
mission seriously interested in getting
to the bottom of things surely could
do much more. Curiously, though, the
contents of . the Nixon cache, which
would be the most vital aspect of its
investigations, were referred to by
neither Ford nor any other senior ad-
ministration official in the course of an-
nouncing formation of the commission.
The commission's present plan is to in-
terview C.I.A. Director William Colby
as its first witness, then move on to
Kissinger and others. The Nixon tapes
would speak for themselves. The C.I.A.
will tell as much, or as little, as it
chooses to the blue-ribbon investigators,
a potentially sympathetic group. The
chairman, Rockefeller, served on the
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board,
theoretically a supervisory group for
U.S. intelligence-gathering activities.
from 1969 to 1974. Its membership
includes such old friends of the C.I.A.
as former Treasury Secretary C. Doug-
las Dillon, former California Governor
Ronald Reagan, and former Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General
Lyman Lemnitzer. As J.C.S. chairman,
General Lemnitzer was on the White
House's "303 Committee"-now known
as the "40 Committee"-which super-
vises the most secret United States for-
eign covert intelligence operations.
The A.F.L: C.I.O., whose secretary-
treasurer. Lane Kirkland, is on the pan-
el,. provided in the sixties an umbrella
for C.I.A. activities in Latin America
by setting up the American Institute for
Free Labor Development. Kirkland is
to his tapes and documents constitute
a legal cover-up. It is aimed at.voiding
an agreement signed last November
between the Ford White House and
the special prosecutor to make the
pertinent files available for the prepa-
ration of additional Watergate. indict-
ments.
Inasmuch as one of Nixon's suits
challenges the constitutionality of a
recent congressional act which ratifies,
in effect, the Ford-special prosecutor
agreement, the case may go all the
way to the Supreme Court, indefinitely
delaying all the investigations. The
blue-ribbon commission must report by
April 4 (even though it is unlikely that
litigation over Nixon's materials will
be resolved by then).
The White House tapes and docu-
ments are also believed to contain
juicy material that would document
other areas of Nixon abuses - most
notably concerning illegal wiretaps,
violations of the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice's statutes on the secrecy of tax
returns, and other startling attempts to
subvert the functions of government
departments for the former president's
political advantage.
If the tapes are obtained, the spe-
cial prosecutor hopes later this year to
come up with new indictments against,
among others, those who during
Nixon's reign installed what are be-
lieved to have been illegal national se-
curity wiretaps against administration
officials and Washington newsmen.
Federal Bureau of Investigation agents,
Justice Department Internal Security
Division officials, Washington police
officers, or even C.I.A. operatives may
have done the work. Should the wire-
tap case go to trial, the special prose-
cutor is certain to call as witnesses
Kissinger and his former deputy, Gen-
eral Alexander M. Haig Jr., who is now
commander-in-chief of NATO forces.
Both have already acknowledged rec-
ommending the names of those to be
wiretapped.
The Nixon tapes might also explain
why the Nixon administration late in
1972 created a mysterious military in-
telligence office known as Defense
Investigative Service (D.I.S.) located
in the Forrestal Building in downtown
Washington. The D.I.S., reportedly
staffed by a number of ex-C.I.A. agents
from domestic intelligence units, re-
ports directly to the Office of the Secre-
tarv of Defense, significantly by-passing
also a member of Rockefeller's earlier the Defense Intelligence Agency.
commission on "critical choices." Inquirers at the Pentaron about the
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tralizes security clearance for defense
contractors. But there is doubt that
this is its- only function. Until his re-
tirement late in 1974, the D.I.S. was
headed by Air Force Brigadier Gen.
oral Joseph Cappucci. formerly chief.
of the air force's Office of Special in-
ves6eatio.n. Insiders say that clearing
defense contractors would hardly be a
task given a senior military intelligence
officer. Political intelligence within the
air force was a responsibility of the
Office of Special Investigations.
Officials familiar with the situation
suggest that new disclosures from the
Nixon materials may create acute em-
barrassment for Henry Kissinger. Inas-
much as the C.I.A. reports to the
president of the United States through
the mechanism of the National Security
Council, headed by Kissinger since
1969, and since he is chairman of the
N.S.C.'s "40 Committee," concerned
with the most secret intelligence opera-
tions abroad, it is a valid question how
much he might have known about the
agency's secret operations.
Privately, many officials further
argue that Kissinger probably had to
be aware. of the C.I.A.'s domestic
activities. For example, the dividing
line between the agency's foreign and
domestic counterintelligence work-
the tracking' of foreign intelligence
operatives-is completely blurred,. par-
ticularly since J. Edgar Hoover, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation's late
director, suspended all counterespio-
nage cooperation with the C.I.A. in
1969. If indeed other C.I.A. units aside
from the Counterintelligence Staff be-
longing to the office of the Deputy Di-
tectoryof Operations (D.D.O.). also
known as the Clandestine Services, be-
came engaged in purely domestic
operations between 1969 and 1972, it
would have been an affront to Kis-
singer to keep him in the dark. It must
be remembered that from the moment
he moved into the White House. in
1969. Kissinger insisted on maintaining
full control of the C.T.A. to the point
where successive C.I.A. directors had
no direct private access to Nixon: the
present director, William E. Colby,
usually sees President Ford . in Kis-
sinaer's presence.
After Ford requested a report from
Colby on the C.I.A.'s illegal activities
following publication in The New York
Tulles on December 22 of the `-`massive
spying" charges. it was Kissinger, as
the head of the N.S.C. mechanism, who
was instructed to transmit Colby's re-
sponse to the .president. In this sense,
then, Kissinger is part and parcel of
the whole intelligence controversy. As
of now, sods his friend and benefactor,
Vice-President Rockefeller.
There are also some reasons to sus-
pect that the whole affair is immensely
more complex and sensitive than the
simple possibility that the Counter-
intelligence Staff ran private spying
operations against the antiwar move-
ment. There have been a number of
unexplained moves both by the C.I.A.
and the White House suggestive of a
no-holds-barred power struggle within
the intelligence community, possibly
involving Kissinger himself. Ford's de-
cision to "get to the bottom" of the
present C.I.A. affair-an abrupt de-
parture from past White House prac-
tice in C.I.A. matters-is an element in
the mystery.
One possibility, insiders say, is that
the need was perceived at the. highest
levels of the government to hide the
real C.I.A. enterprises during the
Watergate. era-such as undertaking
direct police functions and dirty work
for the Nixon-White House. Because
bits of information were beginning to
surface, these insiders say, it was judged
less damaging to go along with the
limited charge of "massive spying"
against the antiwar movement.
A related possibility is that the "mas-
sive, spying" disclosures last month
were the result of deliberate C.I.A.
leaks. Their objective: to help eliminate
James Angleton, the head of the Coun-
terintelligence Staff, one of the C.I.A.'s
most powerful and independent senior
officials and long a thorn in Colby's
and Kissinger's sides.
Angleton and his Counterintelligence
group were initially singled out as cul-
prits in the spying scandal despite the
high probability, as it now appears,
that an entirely separate C.I.A. branch,
the Domestic Operations Division. con-
ducted domestic operations.
Published reports early this .;.glide
indicated that both Colby and Kis-
singer resented Angleton's personal
control of all intelligence liaison with
Israel. Unlike all other cases involving
foreign intelligence, the C.I.A.'s rela-
tions with Israel were handled by
Counterintelligence rather than a geo-
graphic division of Clandestine Services.
Some knowledgeable State. Depart-
ment officials say that Kissinger felt
that Angleton's operations interfered
with his Middle East diplomacy.
Counterintelligence was apparently the
only area in the C.I.A. that resisted
Kissinger's sway. In addition, Angleton
was known to hold a low opinion of
the detente engineered and negotiated
by Kissinger with the Soviet Union.
.. Angleton himself told. newsmen that
Colby had asked him to resign in the
wake of the domestic spying charges
(although he was to remain with the
agency as "a consultant" while the
Counterintelligence Staff is being re-
organized and a new chief named).
Three of Angleton's deputies were also
asked to resign. But New York Maga-
zine has learned that Colby actually
moved to fire him two or three days
.before The Times published its report
on domestic spying naming Angleton
as the man responsible.
I f this theory is correct, we may be
facing an extraordinary combination of
a cover-up of the C.I.A.'s domestic
activities on Nixon's behalf with
esoteric intrigues within the agency
itself-indeed, within the entire Ameri-
can intelligence community-a combi-
nation. that cannot help but affect the
conduct of American foreign policy.
The very structure of the agency's
"Clandestine Services," the secretive
Directorate of Operations (see table on
page 33), helps explain how such thing
.are possible.
So that perfect security and secrec
may be assured, the agency frequentl
insists on the right hand's not knowing
what the left hand does-the princi-
ple of "compartmentalization." In all
D.D.O. operations, knowledge is con-
fined to those with "the need to know"
-.and it can't even be ruled out that
in some cases the C,I.A. director him-
self may have looked the other vcay
on the theory, as a C.I.A: veteran put
it, that "what you don't know don't
hurt you."
During the Nixon period-until his
removal early in 1973-the C.I.A.
director was Richard Helms, a lifelong
clandestine operator. His deputy direc-
tor of Central Intelligence (D.D.C.i.)
was Lieutenant General Robert Cush-
man Jr., once Nixon's military assistant
and now commandant of the marine
corps. Helms and Cushman were sup-
ported by four C.I.A. deputy directors,
one of whom was the deputy director
for plans (recently the title was changed
to deputy director of operations).
This post was held until early 1973,
by Thomas Karamessines. He and his
deputy. Cord Meyer Jr., were in charge
of all clandestine operations. The direc-
torate was divided into four main
branches reporting directly to Kara-
messines. (A fifth branch, the Science
and Technology Office, was subse
quently added.)
For specific operational purposes;
however. Karamessines also ran two
parallel groups of divisions, one foreign
and one domestic. These were hier-
archically separated from the special
staffs such as Counterintelligence or
Covert Action. Six regional divisions
supported by subregional and country
desks formed the geographic group
and worked with the special staffs on
specific overseas operations.
On the domestic side, the directorate
had-and still has-four divisions. In
varying degrees, they were all involved
in Nixon-era secret domestic operations.
The little-known Domestic Opera-
tions Division (D.O.D.) and the mys-
teriously named "Division D" (now
renamed "D Staff") carried out the
bulk of domestic activities, ranging
from wholly legitimate ones to some
that were quite shady. They were
': zistically aided, as the rest of the
C.I.A. is, by the specialized Technical
Services Division' (T.S.D,) and Rec-
;-ds Integration Division (R.I.D.).
The Domestic Operations Division is
:-t charge of a network of C.I.A. offices
:acated in at least fifteen American
::ties. Some of these offices are overt
and even listed- in local telephone
Directories (under "Central Intelligence
Agency"). The' division's so-called
offices, for example, concentrate
on debriefing American travelers re-
-:lrning home from trips to countries
:n which the C.I.A. has a special inter
- est. Inasmuch as the Counterintelligence
Staff worries about foreign agents, such
as Soviet K.G.B. operatives, entering
the United States, it may. occasionally
request the D.O.D. to lend a hand in
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6 _
tracking them. Such interceptions were
once made by the F.B.I., but when Hoo-
ver gave up his counterespionage func-
tions, this follow-up was made by C.I.A.
Counterintelligence or the D.O.D.
That which C.I.A. officials speaking
privately have conceded to be the
"gray area" of operations is the sur-
veillance of American citizens sus-
pected of contacts with foreign intelli-
gence. Although the 1947 National
Security Act, which created the C.I.A.,
specifically forbids domestic police
functions by the agency, it is argued
that such activity is simply an exten-
sion of foreign counterintelligence.
It is widely known in Washington
intelligence circles that the C.I.A., and
especially Counterintelligence, sus-
pected a number of dissident and radi-
cal American groups of ties with
Communist intelligence services-and
not only in the antiwar movement con-
text. The Black Panthers, for example,
were under close C.I.A. surveillance
based on the suspicion-never proved
-;hat many of its members traveled
to Algeria and Moscow for ideological
indoctrination and then to North Korea
for sabotage and guerrilla training.
Similar suspicions surrounded young
'Americans who had visited Cuba.
The C.I.A. increased this surveil-
lance under Nixon even though the
National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders, formed by former President
Jc nson. had concluded that there was
no foreign subversive conspiracy be-
hind racial riots. The C.I.A. had worked
closely with the commission. Cord Mey-
er. the Clandestine Services' deputy
chief, was the agency's liaison official.
But 'although it engaged in financing
such. groups as the National Student
Association for intelligence operations
abroad, and publishing houses, maga-
zines. and news agencies for foreign
propaganda in pre-Nixon days, former
Director RichardHelms -and the C.I.A.
,drew a line at "targeting" Americans at
home. Nor would the C.I.A. busy itself
abroad on essentially domestic matters.
In the 1960's, for example, Helms per-
sorally refused a request from the In-
ternal Revenue to establish surveillance
in South America on a tax evader, an
American citizen, who had skipped
overseas owing hundreds of thousands
of dollars in back taxes.
Under Nixon, however, the climate
changed totally. In December, 1970,
Helms fitted- the C.I.A. into the secret
Intelligence Evaluation Committee at
the White House. The unit grew out of
the secret domestic intelligence plan
drafted for Nixon by his aide Tom
H:sion six months earlier. Under enor-
mcus White House pressure, the C.I.A.
bc_an to become involved in domestic
activities, often in clear violation of its
o'.vn. statute. For example:
1. Police functions. During the 1969-
1972 period of massive antiwar demon-
strations. particularly in Washington,
t'- C.I.A., responding. to White House
r_,;uests. trained and advised local
police departments in the arts of in-
?e''.igence and communications. The
C.I.A.' Domestic Operations Division,
Technical Services Division, the
Approved
Records integration Division, and the.
"D Start" were all involved. The "D
S: fr" was in charge of communica-
as and intelligence collection for
.al police forces. This presumably
in-luded direct surveillance of Amer-
ans, but as an ancillary rather than
p acipal function. The R.I.D. helped
with computer read-outs from files
kept by the C.I.A.'s Counterintelli-
gence, the F.B.I. (which did work on
domestic riot control), and the military
intelligence services. The Technical
Services provided highly sophisticated
equipment, such as devices showing
whether a person had held metal-a
gun-in his or her hand hours earlier.
The C.I.A. doesn't actually deny its
training and equipment support for the
Metropolitan Police Department in
Washington. The C.I.A. claims, per-
haps lamely, that it had acted in the
belief that it was meeting the require-
ments of the 1968 Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act.
There is no question but that this
C.I.A. police function, also carried out in
New York and Chicago, specifically vio-
lated the National Security Act. C.I.A.
training of U.S. police forces ended early
in 1973, after a New York Times article
alluded, in general terms, to such assis-
tance.
2. Plumbers. The record of Water-
gate investigations shows that acting on
a telephone call from John Ehrlichman,
then Nixon's chief of the Domestic
Council, the C.I.A. provided one of the
plumbers, Howard Hunt, with disguise
equipment on a "one-time basis." This
was authorized by General Cushman,
then the C.I.A.'s deputy director, and
the material was provided by the Tech-
nical Services Division.
But private investigations suggest that
in addition to the help obtained from
the C.I.A. headquarters on this par-
ticular occasion, the plumbers were
equipped for other missions by the
agency's clandestine offices in Miami
and outside San Francisco. The so-called
"green light" group in the C.I.A.'s lvii-
ami office reportedly provided Hunt
with some of the equipment for the
June, 1972, Watergate break-in. The
C.I.A. office in Burlingame, near San
Francisco, apparently did likewise in
connection with the plumbers' break-in,
in 1971, into Daniel Ellsberg's psychia-
trist's offices. In 1973, when investi-
gations uncovered the agency's role in
equipping Hunt, a senior officer of the
Technical Services Division, Howard
Osborne, was quietly fired from the
C.I.A.
In Las Vegas, Nevada, where the
plumbers had planned an operation
against newspaper publisher Hank
Grcenspun, the C.I.A. maintains one
of its largest domestic clandestine of-
fices, run by the D.O.D. It remains un-
clear why Las Vegas, hardly an espio-
nage center, rates a big C.I.A. station.
3. The corporate empire. This is one
of the C.I.A.'s most sensitive secrets. The
network of C.I.A.-owned companies
was created in 1950, at the height of
the Cold War, to. provide fireproof cov-
ers for overseas operations. In the
1960's, it was used to disguise the fi-
nancing of such enterprises as the Bay
of Pigs invasion of Cuba, the use of
'anti-Castro Cuban pilots and B-26's in
the Congo, the "secret army" of Meo
tribesmen in Laos, and a variety of
other covert activities. Under Nixon,
funds for domestic operations, includ-
ing some plumber-type operations, were
channeled through the C.I.A.'s "pro-
prietary" or front corporations. The
most famous, though not necessarily the
most important, of. them was the Rob-
ert R. Mullen & Co. in Washington,
where Hunt was "employed" after leav-
ing the C.I.A.
The holding company for the C.I.A.'s
corporate empire is the Pacific Corpo-
ration located in Washington. Pacific,
whose subsidiaries are said to employ
some 20,000 people worldwide, was
incorporated in Dover, Delaware, on
.July 10, 1950, by the Prentice Hall
Corporation (no kin to the publishing
firm of that name), an incorporating
agent for hundreds of firms that enjoy
Delaware's tax advantages. A C.I.A.
official familiar with the Pacific Corpo-
ration explained that in this and every
other case where a C.I.A. company is in-
corporated in a state capital, the local
secretary of state is informed of the
true nature of the enterprise to avoid
tax or any other inquiries. Thus Dela-
ware's secretary of state refuses to dis-
close the names of Pacific's directors at
the time of the incorporation.
The Pacific Corporation owns such
operational C.I.A. companies as Air
America, Inc., whose planes supported
all the agency operations in Indochina;
C.A.T. (Civil Air Transport) Co., Ltd.,
a Taiwan-based airline often used by
the C.I.A.; Air Asia Co., Ltd.. special-
izing in aircraft maintenance; the Pa-
cific Engineering Company; and the
Thai Pacific Services Co., Ltd.
The Pacific Corporation and these
five other companies have headquar-
ters in a third-floor suite at 1725
K Street, Northwest, in Washington.
Oddly, all six are listed in the build-
ing directory and in the Washington
telephone book. But to a casual visitor
to the K Street building lobby, all these
names are wholly meaningless, as are
those of nine officials listed under Suite
309. Curiously, however, the name of
based on the suspicion-never proved
-that many of its members traveled
to Algeria and Moscow for ideological
indoctrination and then to North Korea
for sabotage and guerrilla training.
Similar suspicions surrounded young
Americans who had visited Cuba.
The C.I.A. increased this surveil-
lance under Nixon even though the
National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders, formed by former President
Johnson, had concluded that there was
no foreign subversive conspiracy be-
hind racial riots. The C.I.A. had worked
.closely with the commission. Cord Mey-
er, the Clandestine Services' deputy
chief, was the agency's liaison official.
But although it engaged in financing
such groups as the National Student
Association for intelligence operations
abroad, and publishing houses, maga-
zines, and news agencies for foreign
propaganda in pre-Nixon days, former
Director Richard Helms and the C.I.A.
CIA-FbP77-00432R000100350003-6
 A rgvedAFor Release 2001/0?/0? : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6
drew a V- at "t
er
p
~
g i
e
i
g mericans at agency s can estine offices in Miami
home. Nor would the C.I.A. busy itself and outside San Francisco. The so-called
abroad on essentially domestic matters. "green light" group in the C.I.A.'s Mi-
In the 1960's, for example, Helms per- ami office reportedly provided Hunt
sonally refused a request from the In- with some of the equipment for the
ternal Revenue to establish surveillance June. 1972, Watergate break-in. The
in South America on a tax evader, an C.I.A. office in Burlingame, near San
American citizen, who had skipped Francisco, apparently did likewise in
overseas owing hundreds of thousands connection with the plumbers' break-in,
of dollars in back taxes. in 1971, into Daniel Ellsberg's psychia-
Under Nixon, however, the climate trist's offices. In 1973, when investi-
changed totally. In December, 1970, gations uncovered the agency's role in
Helms fitted the C.I.A. into the secret equipping Hunt, a senior officer of the
Intelligence Evaluation Committee at Technical Services Division, Howard
the White House. The unit grew out of Osborne, was quietly fired from the
the secret domestic intelligence plan C.I.A.
drafted for Nixon by his aide Tom In Las Vegas, Nevada, where the
Huston six months earlier. Under enor- plumbers had planned an operation
mous White House pressure, the C.I.A. against newspaper publisher Hank
began to become involved in domestic Greenspun, the C.I.A. maintains one
activities, often in clear violation of its of its. largest domestic clandestine of-
own statute. For example: fices, run by.the' D.O.D. It remains un-
1. Police funclions. During the 1969- clear why Las Vegas, hardly an espio-
1972 period of massive antiwar demon- nacre center, rates a big C.I.A. station.
'
strations,
particularly in Washington,
the C.I,A., responding to White House
requests, trained and advised local
police departments in the arts of in-
telligence and communications. The
C.I.A.'s Domestic Operations Division,
the Technical Services Division, the
Records Integration Division, and the
"D Staff". were all involved. The "D
Staff" was in charge of communica-
tions and intelligence collection -.for
local police forces. This presumably
included- direct surveillance of Amer-
icans, but as an ancillary rather than
principal function. The R.I.D. helped
out with computer read-outs from files
kept by the C.I.A.'s Counterintelli-
gence, the F.B.I. (which did work on
domestic riot control), and the military
intelligence services. The Technical
Services provided highly sophisticated
equipment, such as devices showing
whether a person had held metal-a
gun-in his or her hand hours earlier.
The C.I.A. doesn't actually deny its
training and equipment support for the
Metropolitan Police Department in
Washington. The C.I.A. claims, per-
haps lamely, that it had acted in the
belief that it was meeting the require-
ments of the 1968 Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act.
There is no question but that this
C.I.A. police function, also carried out in
New York and Chicago, specifically vio-
lated the National Security Act. C.I.A.
training of U.S. police forces ended early
in 1973, after a New York Times article
alluded, in general terms, to such assis-
tance.
2. Plumbers. The record of Water-
gate investigations shows that acting on
a telephone call from John Ehrlichman,
then Nixon's chief of the Domestic
Council, the C.I.A. provided one of the
plumbers, Howard Hunt, with disguise
equipment on a "one-time basis." This
was authorized by General Cushman,
then the C.I.A.'s deputy director, and
the material was provided by the Tech-
nical Services Division.
But private investigations suggest that
in addition to the help obtained from
the C.I.A. headquarters on this par-
ticular occasion, the plumbers were
equipped for other missions by the
3. The corporate empire. This is one
of the C.I.A.'s most sensitive secrets. The
network of C.I.A.-owned companies
was created in 1950, at the height of
the Cold War, to provide fireproof cov-
ers for overseas operations. In the
1960's, it was used to disguise the fi-
nancing of such enterprises as the Bay
of Pigs invasion of Cuba, the use of
anti-Castro Cuban pilots and B-26's in
the Congo, the "secret army" of Meo
tribesmen in Laos, and a variety of
other covert activities. Under Nixo^.
funds for domestic operations, includ-
ing some plumber-type operations, were
channeled through the C.I.A.'s "pro-
prietary" or front corporations. The
most famous, though not necessarily the
most important, of them was the Rob-
ert R. Mullen & Co. in Washington,
where Hunt was "employed" after leav-
ing the C.I.A.
The holding company for the C.I.A.'s
corporate empire is the Pacific Corpo-
ration located in Washington. Pacific,
whose subsidiaries are said to employ.
some 20,000 people worldwide, was
incorporated in Dover, Delaware, on
July 10, 1950, by the Prentice Hall
Corporation (no kin to the publishing
firm of that name), an incorporating
agent for hundreds of firms that enjoy
Delaware's tax advantages. A C.I.A.
official familiar with the Pacific Corpo-
ration explained that in this and every
other case where a C.I.A. company is in-
corporated in a state capital, the local
secretary of state is informed of the
true nature of the enterprise to avoid
tax or any other inquiries. Thus Dela-
ware's secretary of state refuses to dis-
close the names of Pacific's directors at
the time of the incorporation.
The Pacific Corporation owns such
operational C.I.A. companies as Air
America, Inc., whose planes supported
all the agency operations in Indochina;
C.A.T. (Civil Air Transport) Co., Ltd.,
a Taiwan-based airline often used by
the C.I.A.; Air Asia Co., Ltd., special.
izing in aircraft maintenance; the Pa-
cific Engineering Company; and - the
Thai Pacific Services Co., Ltd.
The Pacific Corporation and these
five other companies have headquar-
ters in a third-floor suite at 1725
K Street, Northwest, in Washington.
Oddly, all six are listed. in the build-
ing directory and in the Washington
telephone book. But to a casual visitor
to the K Street building lobby, all these
names are wholly meaningless, as are
those of nine officials listed under Suite
309. Curiously, however, the name of
Hugh L. Grundy, who is president of
the Pacific. Corporation, . Air America,
and Air Asia, is not listed anywhere.
C.I.A. insiders say that the Pacific
Corporation may own dozens of other
companies elsewhere in the United
States and abroad. It may-be impossi-
ble to unravel all the corporate ramifi-
cations of the Pacific firm without a de-
tailed inspection of the C.I.A.'s books,
something a determined presidential
-commission could do.
It is known that the Pacific Corpo-
ration had about S200 million in "sales"
in 1972. This fact emerged when the
Price Commission, engaged in classify-
ing companies by their size for report-
ing purposes, came upon the Pacific
Corporation's tax returns.
Tax returns? Of course. Because the
corporation serves as a C.I.A. cover. it
as to behave like all other companies.
Thus it pays taxes. The C.I.A. real-
zed. however, that the Pacific Cor-
poration's cover was in jeopardy if the
Price Commission applied to it 'the rule
that all companies with sales in excess
X50 million annually must report their
Accordingly, the Pacific Cor-
poration sent a letter to the Price Com-
:7ission advising it that its domestic
s::les were below S50 million-that the
balance was in foreign operations.
All American citizens living continu-
ously for eighteen months abroad, ex-
cept for government employees, have
a S20,000 exemption from their taxable
income. To maintain their cover, the
employees of the Pacific Corporation
and its subsidiaries theoretically enjoy
this advantage. But because they are in
fact government employees, they must
pay the tax differential to the C.I.A.,
which, in turn, refunds it to the Internal
Revenue under a secret arrangement.
The final irony is that the Pacific Cor-
poration actually makes a profit on its
different operations: the problem is
how to feed it back, discreetly, to the
U.S. Treasury. The empire also finances
secret overseas operations. To disguise
the movement of a large volume of dol-
lars-as was the case in Vietnam and
in the preparations for the overthrow
of the Chilean regime in 1973-friendly
American banks and currency houses
discreetly handle this flow of funds.
Other activities emanating from the
C.I.A.'s Domestic Operations Division
have included the use of Cuban exiles.
many of them former or present agency
employees. to picker the diplomatic
missions in the United States and else-
where of foreign countries dealing with
the Castro regime. In this instance, the
C.I.A. was both carrying out its private
foreign policy toward Cuba and ille-
gally engaging in domestic operations.
Break-ins into foreign embassies and
United Nations missions are justified on
counterintelligence grounds. (On one oc-
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00l100350003-6
. Hign;, ccmpa"-
mentai,z'O. -tn r'ar-
?^`3t'o' paSSeO 3.Ouna cn;y On a
reed :a-know Casa. tha C.LA.'s
~ireLtorate of Opera'ions also
.n,wr1 as Canaesstine Services,
^.33 a'.T.s that OOn't ^ecessartly
Know w;at ,tier arms are
doing. Cc^-rass dcesn t
k:tOw a. Some of
the 3-ms e%a'.
REGIONAL
AND
COUNTRY
DESKS
aes aOt appear c.
DIRECTOR G;: CENTRAL i?,TELLIG'ENCE tD.C.t.)
-W!i_L, \f,r E. COLBY-
EP!.;71 C' -CTOR OF
CENTn.a_ INTELL;GENCE (D.D.C.i.)
-LIEUTENANT GENIER AL VERNON WALTE'HS-
DEPUTY DI'-R=CT Cr?. OF O?ERATIONS (0.0.0.)
(Also called ~ndastine Services)
-WILLIAM NELSON-
FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE
STAFF (F.l.)
SOVIET
BI:.OC
CIV.
(5.3.)
REGIONAL
AND
COUNTRY
CE S
NEAR
EAST
DiV.
(N.E.)
COVERT
ACTION
STAFF (C.A.)
AFRICA
DIV.
(A.F.)
REGIONAL
AND
COUNTRY
DESKS
.REGIONAL
AND
COUNTRY
DESKS
FAR
EAST
DIV.
(F.-E.)
REGIONAL
AND
COUNTRY
DESKS
REGIONAL
AND
COUNTRY
DESKS
may have been dealing directly with
senior C.I.A. officials friendly to it and
willing to twist the statute to please
the president. But at this point in time,
as they say. the C.I.A. looks very much
like a public agency of awesome power
that is now beyond effective public con-
trol. And there is reason to wonder
whether the Rockefeller commission
ma-, be up to the lob of checking it and
providing the safeguards promised by
President Ford.
casion C.I.A. raiders found S300.000 in
purloined stock certificates instead of
diplomatic codes in the safe of a Latin
American diplomat in New York; they
left the certificates in the safe and fled.)
The same explanation applies to one or
two break-ins into the homes of C.I.A.
officials suspected of leaks or other ties
with foreign intelligence services.
As we have seen. one hand at the
C.I.A. often doesn't know what the
other does. This surely applied during
the Nixon period,when the White House
WALL STREET JOURNAL
13 JAN 1975
TECHNICAL
SERVICES
Div.
(T.S.D.)
RECORDS
INTEGRATION
DIV.
(R.t.D.)
DOMEESTIC
OPE TIONS
00..
OFFICE
NEW YORK TIMES
5 JANUARY 1975
SCIENTOLOGY CHURCH
GIVES EDICT TO C.I.A.1
'WASHINGTON,' Jan 4 (UPI)
---The- controversial Church of
Scientology said today that it
had delivered to the Ceneral
Intelligence Agency a court
order forbidding the agency to
'destroy any files it has on the
church.
The temporary restraining
order was signed in December.
.by a Federal judge in Hawaii
after the church was found to
'be..on the Internal Revenue
service's list of 99 organizations
considered "enemies" by Presi-
dent Nivxon's administration.
,The court order prohibits any
"government agency from de-
stroying files on Church of
.Scientology organizations in
:the United States.
"Although we will be serv-
j irig each agency covered by the
court order,"' a church spokes-
man said, "we have servied the
C.I.A. first. They are presently
under heavy fire for domestic
intelligence activities and we
want to make sure they don't
destroy incriminating evidence
:relting to their activities against
our church or parishioners."
The spokesman said the
church or parishioners."
. The spokesman said the
church had been a target' of
'.:'C.I.A. misinformation and spy-
ing tactics similar to . those.
American citizens."
World-Wide
CIA INVESTIGATIONS by five groups
will get under way this week.
The Rockefeller commission appointed
by President Ford will convene today to
;look into press charges that the intelligence
agency has repeatedly violated its 1947
'charter ban on domestic oeprations. The
panel is expected to question CIA Director
,William Colby, ex-director Richard Helms
and Secretaries Kissinger and Schlesinger.
A Des Moines lawyer, David.Belin, is to be
named executive director of the eight=mem-
ber commission.
If there appears to be doubt whether
certain, activities are barred by the CIA
charter, Beiin told the Des Moines
Sunday Register, "that doubt will be re-
solved against the agency."
Four congressional committees plan CIA
hearings soon after the 94th Congress opens
tomorrow. Sen. Robert Byrd of West Vir-
iginia,.the assistant Democratic leader, sug-
gested on ABC's "Issues and Answers" that
a single joint committee be formed. He'ex-
pressed a fear that vital CIA operations
could be exposed through "one-unmanshin"
Itpdf tvL e_,2Q01/08/08.: C1A-RDP7?-00432R000100350003-6
COUNTER-
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STAFG (C.I.)
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INTELLIGENCE
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WESTERN
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 CIA-RDP77-00432R000101350003-6
BALTIMORE SUN
6 January 1975
Vice President Rockefeller chairman of a new 'corn-
mission to investigate allegations that the Central
Intelligence Agency illegally spied on American citi-
zens within the United States.
Mr. Ford also disclosed the names of seven other.
-men who will serve on the commission, established.
.Washington-President Ford yesterday named
Ica tn
Uku fll.:
velkstmati
By ALBERT SEHLSTEDT, AR.
Washington Bureau of The Sun
Saturday by the President, to
'determine whether the CIA
violated its charter with opera-
tions inside this country.
The commissioners, as a
group, have backgrounds in
'business, the military, labor,
academe and government.
Among them is Ronald Reagan,
the retiring Governor of Cali
fnrni, vrhn k o~4nninln,4r, 4 4n,
1 have an interest in running for,
the. presidency in 1976.
e J. Lane Kirkland, secre-1
tary-treasurer of the AFL-CIO;
since 1969 and a graduate of
the, Georgetown University
School of Foreign Service.
Mr. Nessen was asked if
General Lemnitzer might have
had dealings with the CIA in.
his military work, and replied;
"Not in a sense that would
L.-.-- L:_ 1_ _.- AL-
Iicul1} VJ. ilia rVlc Vii Luc 4'Vlll-
mission."
The press secretary; also was
Ron Nessen, the White House reminded of the friendship be-
press secretary, said each of tween Vice President Rockefel-'
the commissioners was con- ler and Henry A. Kissinger,
tacted personally by President- the Secretary of State, who has
Ford, who wanted "respected dealt with the intelligence
public citizens without any community as head of the Na-
NEW YORK TIMES
6 JANUARY 1975
8 on the President's Panel
Span ide`Pange of Belief
=Members Include Former Government
Aides, Retired General, Gov. Reagan,
Educator and Labor Official
By PETER KIHSS
The eight members Of ,& com-
mtssion named yesterday by
-President Ford to investigate
,alleged domestic activities by
.,the Central Intelligence Agency
include redoubtable spokesmen
for cold war policies as well as,
-crusaders for civil liberties.
Perhaps . the least-known
member is Edgar F. Shannon
Jr., 56 years old, who retired
as president of the University
of Virginia last year after 15
years to resume teaching 19th-,
century English literature.
Under Professor Shannon's)
lyeadership, the all-male, all
white institution admited wo-
men and blacks. Professor
Shannon quoted Thomas Jeffer-
son at his inaugural: "If a na-
tion expects to be ignorant
and free in a state of civiliza-
tion, it expects what never was
and never will be_"
Erwin N. Griswold, 70,. was
a member of the United States
Civil Rights Commission from
1961 to 1967 and Solicitor Gen-
eral of the United States from
.796T to 1972.
As dean of the Harvard Law
School from 1950 to 1967; he
affiliation with the CIA." tional Security Council. )from Congress, Mr. Nessen!
Other members of the com- . Mr. Nessen? was asked if that tsaid.
mission, ordered by the Presi- friendship might present a po- The press secretary said the
dent to make a final report on tential conflict in the commis- list of commissioners was
its. inquiry by April 4, are: sion's investigation. "The Pres- drawn up by President Ford.
? John T. Connor, the chair- ident didn't think so," Mr. His original list was slightly
man and chief executive offi- Nessen replied. I longer than the one announced
cer of the Allied Chemical Cor-, [A spokesman for Mr. Rock e- lyesterdav, but Mr. Nassen did
poration, who was secretary of feller, who was at his West-1 (not disclose who was elimi-
commerce in the administra- (chester (N.Y.) estate yester-I I nated or who might have de-
tion of Lyndon B. Johnson and, day, said the Vice President dined to serve.
counsel to the Office of Naval! was "talent hunting" on the: , President Ford's executivel
Research from 1945 to 1947. ( telephone for people to serve on order of Saturday directed
? C. Douglas Dillon, the !the commission's staff, accord: ' I each department and agency
1chairman of the executive com- ing to the Associated Press.] !of the government to give the
~mittee of Dillon, Read & Co., a The principal job was finding commission any information
New w York investment firm, who a person to be executive direc- or assistance necessary to
was secretary of the treasury
from tor of the commission, a post carry on its investigation.
1961 to 1965, and before
that held two high posts in the that Mr. Ford's executive The commission, in turn
,
State Department. order of Saturday said will be will give to the attorney gener-
a Erwin N. Griswold, now designated by the President. al any evidence "which may
t Harvard Law School and ' a ' Ro-kefeller. der.
The commission was estab
member of the United States! fVr. Nessen, asked about the
lished by the President follow-
Civil Rights Commission. ?n., Pt and size of the commis- ling published reports over the
? Lyman L. Lemnitzer, thet sion's staff, had no ready fig. past two 'weeks. that the CIA
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff from 1960 to 1962, and ` ~1 -s? The eight commission: carried out burglaries during
m .-Nmhers each will receive al 1 the 1960's and early 1970's, and
supreme allied commander in. ,,~.,vltard's fee of $138.50 ai that it spied or kept files on as
Europe from 1962 to 1969, wheni day on days worked. many as 10,000 Americans, par-
he retired. Money to for the investt-I titularly persons o
? Edgar F. Shannon, y pay pled to Vie
dent of the University o f Vir- I ?ation could come from either Vietnam war,
y a White House contingency fn addition to the presiden-
ginia until his retirement last' uad or from a supplemental tial inquiry now under wa at
year and a former member of y'
i appropriation that President least four committees of Con-
the Harvard Universit
facult
However, t:we re;-omnlenda- . I relate to offenses under the
formerly solicitor general of ; 't'on for the jo', o' executive I srawtes or the United States,"
the United States, dean of the ( lire:'tor will come from Mr, , according to the executive or-
y
y
.Ford would have to requesti greys are expected to conduct
probes of their own. 12
opposed the late Senator
Joseph R. McCarthy's attack
on the use of the Fifth Amend-
merit against self-incrimination
by persons refusing to nswer
questions about alleged" Com-
munist ties.
.. If we. take these rights for
granted," Dean Griswold said,
"if we accept them as a matter
of course, we may simply frit-
ter them away and end by los-
ing them, and possibly we de-
serve to lose them." -
Vice President Rockefeller,
64, commission chairman,
activitiesd as at a least-some e of the
11-member President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board as
late as last year under Presi-
dent Nixon.
As special assistant to Presi-
dent Eisenhower in 1955, Mr.
Rockefeller set up top-secret
seminars at the Marine Corps
School in Quantico, Via., Ito de-
vise cold war tactics and' stra-
tegy. One of there led to the
"open skies" proposal to allow
unarmed Soviet and American
planes to fly over each other's
territory to check on military,
preparations and disarmament.i
. '68 Rockefeller Rival i
Ronald Reagan, 63, who steps'
down today as Governor of
California after serving since
1967, was a rival with Mr
.,
Rockefeller for the Repubican
Presidential nomination in 1968,
won by Mr. Richard M. Nixon.
Both Mr. Rockefeller and Mr.
Reagan have been mentioned
as possible candidates for the
'76 nomination.
Mr. Reagan has been a favor-
ite of the Republican party's
conservative wing. He was
president of the Screen Actors
Guild from 1947 to 1952 and
again in 1959. He headed a
'successful 1959 strike over tele-
vision residual pay for actors,
and fought to eliminate Com-
munist influence in movie in-
dustry. unions.
C. Douglas Dillon, 65, is;
chairman of the executive com
mittee of Dillon, Read & Com-I
pany, investment bankers. He'
was Under Secretary of State
.in the Eisenhower Administra-
tion from 1958 to 1961, and
served as President Kennedy's
Secretary of the Treasury from
1961 to 1965.
As Acting Secretary. of State,
Mr. Dillon let his press officers
,put out a report in 1960 that a
C.I.A. U-2 spy plane over the
Soviet Union was on weather
reconnaissance.
He took part as a Kennedy
!Cabinet member in planning in
11962 in the crisis over Soviet
i The C.I.A. and the Cult of
Intelligence," by Victor Mar-
chetti and John D. Marks,
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6
which. was published last year
said Mr. Dillon presided over
off-the-record meetings at the
Council on Foreign Relations in
1968 when former intelligence
professionals and others dis-
cussed the C.I.A. role in foreign
.policy and apparently C.I.A. re-
lations with private institutions.
Oldest Commissioner
Gen. Lyman L. , Lemnitzetr,
aldest commissioner at 75, was
a high-ranking commander and
staff officer in World War II
and the Korean war, chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
from 1960 to 1962 and then
then supreme commander of
North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation forces until he retired in
1969.
He presided over' the Joint
Chiefs when they were briefed
in 1961 on ill-fated C.I.A. plans
for an invasion by exiles'seek-i
ing to overthrow Fidel Castro
in Cuba and when the chiefs
agreed there was a chance of
success.
. John T. Connor, 60, is chair-
man of the board of the Allied
Chemical Corporation and was
Secretary of Commerce from
1965 to 1967. As president of
Merck & Company, pharmaceu-
tical manufacturers, he had
earlier helped collect millions
of dollars of drugs to ransom
the Bay of Pigs prisoners from
Cuba.
non, the Virginia educator,I
weie among vigorous. public
opponents of the invasion of
Cambodia and both, urged ai
quick end to the Indochina war.!
The youngest commissioner,;
Lane Kirkland, 52, has, been
secretary-treasurer of theI
American Federation of Labor
and Congress 'of Industrial Or-
ganizations since 1969, and a
member of its staff since 1948.1
Mr. Kirkland, operating
quietly and behind the scenes,
served eight years as executive
assistant to George Meany, the'
labor organization's president.
NEW YORK TIMES
7 Jan. 1975
EX-C.1.A. AIDE CITES
JOHNSON AND NIXON
PARIS, ' Jan. 6 (Reuters)-
Victor Marchetti, a former of-
ficial of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, said in an in;
terview today that Presidents
Johnson and Nixon had pressed
the agency into domestic spy-
ing activities.
In an interview with the
weekly magazine, Le Point, Mr.
Marchetti said, "I saw very
well how the agency, pushed
by the White House and espe-
cially Lyndon Johnson, began
to mount its operations in the
United States, even spying on
such organizations as, the civil
rights' movement.
"Nixon carried on In the
same way and there 'was noth-
ing astonishing in the fact that
a growing number of young
officials like myself should be-
come indignant at these prac-
tices." Mr. Marchetti resigned
from he agency in 1969 and
later wrote a ' book on its ac-
tivities.
WASHINGTON POST
.6 January 1975
q,. land Evans and Robert Novak
The Tragedy
The crisis of the Central-Intelligence
Agerjcy' that may wreck its effective-
ness with tragic consequences for the
nation can -be traced back to a secret,
politically inspired command from a
troubled President Lyndon B. Johnson
in 1968.
Johnson's order to CIA stemmed
from his political fear of anti-Vietnam
dissidents, eroding his presidency and
endangering his Vietnam policy. He
wanted CIA to establish a link be-
tween the Soviet KGB or other Com-
munist intelligence apparatus and vio-
lent .anti-war activity in the United
States., No link was established, but
the CIA's legal counterintelligence op-
erations fatally overlapped into the
forbidden area of internal security.
Now, that this overlap has been re-
vealed, the CIA's ability to fulfill vi-
tally necessary functions in a still dan-
gerous world is deeply compromised.
"There never was real substance to
Johnson's fear of a link to foreign
agents," an American intelligence ex-
pert told us, "and the CIA bitterly re-
sented his order." While pursuing
LBJ's command diligently until the
anti-war movement died out,, CIA
never once established "conclusive evi-
dence" of. foreign control over any
American student dissidents. .
But in his zealous pursuit of the elu-
sive link, CIA's Counter-Intelligence
Counter-Espionage chief, the . super-
conspiratorial James Angleton, went to
extremes. Known American anti-war
agitators, including the notorious
Weathermen, were placed under sur-
veillance during contacts with leftist
student leaders in Europe and then
kept under CIA surveillance when
they returned to the. United States.
This suveillance, including bugging
clandestine anti-war meetings, created
a huge file of names which was stored
routinely in secret CIA vaults in Lang-
ley, Va.
Much of this stemmed from FBI Di-
rector J. Edgar Hoover's bitter feud
with CIA, choking communications be-
tween the two agencies. CIA special-
ists say there was often "no bureau-
craic way" to turn domestic surveil-
lance over to the FBI once an anti-war
activist returned to the United States.
Instead, Angleton's counterintelli-
gence agents continued the job started
abroad.
A full briefing on the "worst case"
examples of this highly illegal CIA ac-
tivity was given more than a year ago
to congressional watchdogs by William
Colby, then newly appointed CIA di-
New York Times
1!1 Jan. 1975
Pravda Says C.I.A. Spurs
Activities in Middle East
MOSCOW, Jan. 13 (UPI) -
The Communist party news-
paper Pravda said today that
the Central Intelligence Agency
was increasing its activities in
the Middle East.
The article was the latest in
of the CIA
rector. Since these abuses had occur-
red years before, no public airing was..
demanded.
The reason: A full-fledged CIA scan-
dal in the midst of Watergate (which
itself tainted the agency) would se-
verely damage the CIA and most par-
ticularly its counter-intelligence opera
tions. . ,
Now, that damage to CIA's credibil-
ity and efficiency in the wake of The
New York Times expose is in full
bloom, ironically abetted by the ouster
-of Angleton and the sympathy resign-
ations of his high command: Ray
Rocca, William Hood and N. Scott'
Miler.
Angleton's suspicious conspiratorial
nature had brought him into high-level
disfavor long ago. Yet, that aspect of
his personalty was essential to his in.
valuable connections with such foreign
intelligence agencies as the West Ger-
man BFW, the British MI-5, the French
Deuxieme Bureau - and, most inti-
mately, the Israeli Intelligence Serv-
ice.
Angleton's single most valuable post-
war heist- the first Western copy of
Khrushchev's historic 1956 attack on
Stalinism at the 20th Soviet Party Con-
gress-resulted directly from his se-
cret contacts with Communist and Is-
raeli agents.
Such brilliant exploits tend tq. be
shrugged off today as relics of another
world. But intelligence experts here
say dismantling the top echelons of
Angleton's, operations alone will prove
priceless to the Soviet, KGB and im-
mensely costly to the United States.
That, however, is but the first cost of
CIA's tragic errors of the late 1960s.
CIA's scandal, following a blackened
eye from its Chilean operations, now
threatens to close off not only foreign
intelligence sources but routine infor-
m;ition from traveling American citi-
zens-invaluable the past 20 years.
In addition, morale at CIA today is
at quicksand levels with recruitment
endangered. Worst of all, CIA's credi-
bility as a tight ship - vital to every
aspect of its work - has been griev-
ously undermined.
The first results of this will show up
early in the new Congress. Efforts that
have failed in the past to cut down
CIA may now succeed. To a generation
that never knew the cold war, that will
be welcome. In truth, it.may cost this
country dearly in the grim world of
1975.
a new press campaign against
the agency.
Pravda said an American es-
pionage network had recently
been exposed in Southern Ye-
men, a group acting on instruc-
tions from American intelli-
gence had been arrested in
Iraq and an anti-Government
conspiracy inspired by the
C.I.A. had beon uncovered in
iAfghanistaii.
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 WASHINGTON POST
6 January 1975
CIA and Cult Technology
- Bulk of Intelligence Gathered by Equipment
'tftseli' with bureaucracy, anc
together they ride
k'roughshod over reason' and
logic. The result is a mad-
dening, -s e I f - perpetuating
-chaos which has distorted
the entire intelligence proc-
ess to the point that technoi-
By George C. Wilson nuclear bomb (they do) and phones clamped on their ess has.: become the goal ogy
Washincton Post Start Writer i are their nuclear-capable heads listen hour after hour, rather than the means to a
The five-story yellow building with the Jericho missiles targeted on talkiforeign fighters pilots goal . Our almost limit-,
shrouded- windows at 1st and M streetsEgypt's Aswan Dam (they talking ground command- less ability to collect infor-
SE-just down the hill from the Capitol- 'ogee were) so Cairo and the ers. ination has prompted only a
Nile valley could be flooded- Both the successes and few-to question the utility of
llig
f the C
t
l I
t
h
ra
ence
en
n
e
ere much o
is w
Agency's super-secret and super-valuable if all seemed lost? failures of,technical intelli-' :the information that is col-
work goes on. ? Is Russia mobilizing for. gcnce have been spectacu- lected...
Technocrats in the spy business. note War (a constant question)?, lar. The U-2 was both.-,It, "The results are frighten-
with pride that most of the windows are. ? Is Russia building a brought back the hard infor ing - , . As the programs ex-
cemented over - to foil any enemy agent new missile system or just thaVon on Soviet missile pand, they defy rational
who might try to record conversations improving the old one. progress-although Sen. management. And we have
inside by focusing a laser beam on win- (photographs showed the John F, Kennedy (D-Mass.) international incidents re-
latter)? How many intercon- kept charging "missile gap suiting from collection pro-
vibratvowpanes to detect and make an the tinental ballistic missiles even as U-2s were bringing grams designed to provide
l visitor would m the akand bombers do the Soviets. back contrary evidence in information that will allow
To the ine voices
casual yellow edifice have? flights from 1956 until 1960. the United States govern-
of secrecy is "Building 213". For some . 0 Could U.S. Green- Be- .. And it was a failure in. the meat means to avoid such
reason, the -public is not supposed to sense that its intrusion info incidents. Intellige nce today
know what the Soviets' counterpart rets rescue American prison- Soviet airspace f o in almost? the u 1 t j m a t e
agency, the KGB knows-Building 213 is the ers from the Sontay prison prompted
CIA's National Photographic Interpreta- camp outside Hanoi? Premier Khrushchev to can- irony .. .
tion center, known to insiders as N-Pic. N-Pic, in answer to that, eel the 1960 summit confer- One man who had' a lot to
t ence with President Eisen-. ado with making technology
i
an
N -Pic is just one arm of the mechanical last question, made a g
montage of' the Son bower. ' ~. so imperious within the CIA
Son-
giant the United States has built to spy photo. Even . without failures, specifically and intelii=
on the rest of the. world. This giant also, fay camp and proudly. technical intelligence has its genes. community generally
has eyes in space, ears all over the globe, showed it, off to CIA train-. Said one former is Richard Bissell, the for-
each operation that costs billions of dollars ees to demonstrate what the limitations. head of the CIA's U-2
each year - dollars that are only mini- agency could do inside the high "What ranking ing CIA Idoesn' executive; is t prmer ogram wf the from of f
mally accountable to anybody outside the intelligence factory on Al. technology
CIA. Street. do,.won't do, and can't do is - cial grace because of his
tell you what peoplb are role as operational director
It is this mechanical giant - not the The Pentagon, in : turn
James Bonds of the CIA who meet for- , ~_t rr_n;e's montage to thinking and what . their of the Ray of Pi ;s invasion
eign agents at bars at midnight -, which build a replica of Sontag at plans are. We can't read of Cuba by Cuban exiles
gathers the most valuable information for Eglin Air Force Base in Flo-1 minds with technology, but in 1961.
the United States. . rida so the Green Berets that's our business-reading Bissell, now an executive
"Technology has revolutionized the in- could rehearse the POW res- minds. The -whole purpose at Pratt and Whitney Air-
telligence business, there's no question- cue. The Sontay replica was, of espionage is to find out craft in Hartford, Conn., in
about it," CIA Director William E. Colby taken down during the day what people are thinking an interview traced the birth
has said. so Soviet satellites would. and doing." of the U-2 and how its sue-
"If I had to rate everything we did on, not see it and tip off Hanoi He could have added that cess blazed the way across
een-
ortiori such systems, ther tech-like
an A through Z value scale," said a CIA's -testimony to this era of the the clearest m the eal sky y for
executive who quit the agency a few' open ' skies where super satellite not tell photograph States t s the l toll and systems,
months ago, "I would give A through U powers keep track of, each
to technical intelligence" - gathering' other through camera eyes what weapon the Soviet Un Back in 1954, Bissell re .
information by satellite, plane, ship, sub-. in space. ion, or China is working on called, lames R. Killian Jr.
marine and eavesdropping radio outposts. ' N-Pie's effort proved in under the laboratory roof. was asked by President Ei-
Next in terms of productivity, he listed, vain, however, because Ha-- But neither the failures- senhower to head a commit-
reading foreign publications and analyz-. not had moved American like the U-2 incident, Lib- tee which would recommend
ing them in a systematic way. Last, the- prisoners out of Sontay by erty attack and Pueblo cap- ways to preclude another
CIA alumnus named covert operations: the time the raid was ture-nor the built-in limita. Pearl Harbor-type surprise
like buying information from foreign, launched on Nov. 24, 1970. tions have kept the intelli- attack on the United States.
agents. Thus, it can be said that gence community's technical "The intelligence panel of
"On a scale of 100," said another former the' N-Pic arm of the intelli- giant in bounds, according that committee," Bissell
CIA officer in an interview,, "I would give gence giant stretches all the to its critics. said, "became convinced
at least 70 per cent to technical intelii- way from M Street to the Wrote former CIA officer that we needed an over-
In his flight capability. They also
cold void of outer space,
Garvey
M
lit
k J
i
t
.
c
.
ers-
r
Pa
c
gence; 25 per cent to reading open
ture and assessing information obtained where both American and book, "C.I.A.-The Myth came on the U-2 design as
through diplomatic contact. No more than Soviet cameras look down and the Madness'-": it had been submitted" to
5 per cent to all the covert stuff." through portholes of space- g the Air Force in 1953 or
The counterintelligence operations' craft whipping around the "In intelligence, the rever- 1954 by Clarence L. (Kelly)
Johnson. of Lockheed.
which lave provoked the current contro- earth once every 90 minutes. once accorded technology, is,
versy-with allegations that the CIA has' Other parts of the me." ..open to serious questioning "In the autumn of 1954,"
chanical giant require per- - The vaguest hint that Bissell said, "the members
producing put Americans anything under at su all for the rveillance country," sonnet inside-such is the something new will afford of that intelligence panel - he said. "It's just looking up each other's surface electronic intelii- an, opportunity to open an-
and d with them the whole
sleeves-personnel management in the gence (FLINT) ships that other peephole into a paten- Killian surprise attack com-
whole creepy, backroom world." took over from the ill-fated fiat enemy's domain mittee - endorsed a pro
He added. "It's time to drop all this U.S.S. Liberty and U.S. prompts the loosing of intel- posal that a high altitude re-
Mickey Mouse." Pueblo; the American sub- ligence money and the ap- connaissance aircraft config:
In the bland looking yellow building, N- marines which remain close proval.of `feasibility tests'- ured exclusively and ex-
Pic has processed film from high-flying spy to foreign shores, recording which invariably lead to pressly for reconnaissance
It lh levelo ment tests' b d tl c Pell '
e c '-
i
satellites. These satellite
and other reconnaissance
pictures, analyzed by photo
interpreters, have helped
answer such questions as
these asked by anxious Pres-
idents and other top govern
ment officials:
? Do the Israelis have the
y
be built ass on
messages and radar signals; iu
the U-2 reconnaissance' and finally implementation Johnson concept - and that
plane Francis Gary Powers of a new collection program. it be built with maximum
flew over the Soviet Union . "Critics of these efforts security and maximum
and its higher-flying succes- are few," McGarvey added, speed." ,
sor, the SR-71; community, "for few wish to confront 'rlie concept was to put
tions intelligence (COMINT). 'the national security' arc gu- glider-like wings on a jet
outposts around the world ment flaunted by supporters aircraft so it could fly in the
tubers specialists with ear of intelligence ... In intelii? thin air of high altitude, out
genee.technology has allied
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of the range of anti-aircraft
guns and rockets. Also, the
theory was that the new spy
plane would be safe from
other interceptor fighters
because their engines could
not push them to the 14-mile
altitude of the U-2.
Put in direct charge of the
U-2 project Bissell in the
spring of 1955 placed an or-
der with Lockheed for 20
U2s at a total cost of $21
million.
The U-2 contract may
have been the last time a.
military plane was built for
less than the agreed upon
amount. Bissell said "there
-was a $3 million underrun."
Today, each reconnaissance
plane and satellite - like
the Big Bird satellite lofted
into space this year by the
giant Titan IIIAD rocket-
costs more than the whole
$18 million paid for the first
20 U-2s, minus engines.
With the U-2 on the way
CIA photo-interpreters, I ke
the one in Building 213,.
studied photographs of the
Soviet SA-2 G u i d e l i n e
rocket that Russian gunners
would shoot at the U-2 if
their radar detected it. The
missile's fins, the specialists
concluded, were too small to
guide it accurately in the
thin air where the Z;2
'Wei-lid f!y.
"This was one of those
things they call a calculated
risk," said Bissell in discuss-
ing the conclusions about
the threat of the SA-2 to the
U-2. -
. The CIA's U-2 started fly-
ing over Russia in Jurle,
1956, Bissell said, and en-
joyed success until May 1,
1960, when one of those sup-
posedly inaccurate SA-2,
rockets shot Powers out of
the sky and into a diplo-;
matic uproar.
Looking back over the
whole U-2 program and ac
knowledging its value in set-
tling the missile gap ques-I
tion, Bissell said "the great-:
est value" for the country
was the "proof you could
learn as much as you could
by looking down from
above.
"It whetted the appetite
of this government and in-
creased its willingness to de
_`'velop systems of this sort of
intelligence collection," Bis-
sell said.'
,,,Given this appetite, the
Soviets' Sputnik I, launched.
on Oct.. 4, 1957. looked ap-
?caling' as another way to
look down on the other
country.
Aerial intelligence-collec-
tion in the two decades
since the U-2's birth quickly
advanced to the SR-71 and
an entire family of satellites
ranging from the compara-
tively simple Samos to the
sophisticated Big Bird which
can take pictures and do
various other things-like
intercept communications.
The technological explo-
sion also advanced to intelli-
gence-collecting from ships, .
submarines and land listen-
ing posts. The CIA, National
Security Agency (NSA) De-
fense Intelligence Agency
(DIA), Army, Navy, Air
Force. and the military-in-
dustrial-scientific academic
complex have become en-
,meshed in the American in-
itelligence collection effort
ver the last 20 years.
The citizens commission
:'resident Ford has named
to investigate the CIA is
' bartered to focus on the
bartered
domestic activities,
dot the overlaps in the
American intelligence com-?
nnunity as a whole. But Con-
press is expected to look
,into the duplication between
CIA, Defense Intelligence
:Agency and the National Se-
eurity Agency. NSA is the
sprawling intelligence com-
cglex headquartered at Fort
Meade, Md., which is be-
lieved to have a worldwide
payroll of 100,000 people,
one big reason the total. bill
for American intelligence
agencies is estimated at
around $15 billion, not coun-
ting the missiles and ships
and other support the Pen
tagon furnishes.
The intertwining charge
congressional and other crit-
ics, is inefficient, costly, and
sometimes fatal. The over-
lapping showed up embar-
rassingly for the intelli-
gence community when
NSA's warning against send.
ing the Pueblo out on a mis-.
sion off North Korea in 1968?
got lost in the DIA maze in
the Pentagon.
Also, the post-mortems on
the Pueblo spy mission
failed to show that the trip
was necessary from an elec
tronic intelligence stand-
point-bitter news for the
Navy crew imprisoned and
tortured.in North Korea for
11 months and the family of
the sailor who was killed
during the ship's capture off
Wonsan in January, 1963.
The late Sen. Allen J El.
lender (D-La.), while chair-
man of the Senate Appropri
ations Committee, told a re-
.porter that the amount of
money the intelligence com-
munity spends for informa-
tion nobody has time to
process or read is "a na-
tional scandal."
The next few months will
tell whether Congress, dur.
ing its reapprisal of the
CIA, will attempt to rein ins
the technical giant.
In the meantime, It will
he business as usual at
places like N-Pic within the
CIA's far-flung complex.
"Honest, Sir," said the po-
liceman at the gate of N-Pic.
"I don't know what that
place is other than Building
213." By contrast, two
women behind the gate said,
"Yes it is," when asked if
the place was indeed N-Pic.
WASHINGTON STAR
03 January 1975
By Mark Hosenball
special to the Star-Ne-.
LONDON-A disillusion-
ed ex-CIA agent, in a book
he has made clear in recent
interviews is deliberately
intended to hurt his former
employers, has bared a host
of agency activities in-Latin
America, where he served
in the early 1960s..
"The conflict with my
residual loyalty to the CIA is
far outweighed by the peo.
ple who have been killed or
tortured as a direct result of
CIA operations," .says.
Philip Agee.
"Exposure of CIA meth-
ods could help the American
people understand how we
got into Vietnam and how
other Vietnams are germi-
nating whereverthe CIA is
at work," says Agee, whose
"Inside the Company-CIA
Diary"was published here
this week. ?
Agee claims the CIA had
him followed after it was
discovered he planned such
a book and that, at one
point, he discovered a bug-
ged typewriter had been
planted on him. Attempts by
him and his British publish-
ers to have the book pub-
lished in New York failed,
but in late October, Straight
Arrow, the book division of
Rolling Stone, bought the
American rights and re-
lease in the United States is
planned in May.
AFTER JOINING the
CIA in 1957, Agee was post-
ed to "stations" in Quito,
Montevideo and Mexico
City, where he served eight
years as a full-fledged,
apparently dedicated ca- t
reer spy.
But he said he became
disillusioned with such
things as CIA support of the
Brazilian military junta and
U.S. militajy intervention in
the Dominican Republic,
and in 1969 he abruptly left
the agency.
Since then, he has pro-
fessed himself a revolution-
ary Socialist. He spent four
years in libraries preparing
his day-by-day account of
life as an "operations
officer."
He has sprinkled the
It doesn't take the skill of
James Bond to get inside
the lobby of Ni-Pic, note the
CIA employees on coffee
break in the cafeteria and
read the Christmas greeting
of "peace, peace, peace" and
"joy, joy, joy" on the wall
behind the guard.
pages with what seems to be'
every name he could recall,
including some of men still
chiefs of station in various
capitals. His aim, he said in
an interview, "is tot
neutralize these people com-
pletely.-
GEORGE MEANY,
president of the AFL-CIO,
and the late Joseph Beirne,
who headed the Communi-
cations Workers of Ameri-
ca, are accused by Agee of
having been "effective, wit-
ting collaboraters" in
promoting CIA interests
within international labor
circles.
He says the CIA arranged
"-with Beirne" for conver-
sion of a CWA school at
Front Royal, Va., for the use
of the American Institute
for Free Labor Develop-
.ment, which he said was
organized in 1962-with
Meany and Beirne on its
board of directors-to
"organize anti-Communist
trade unions in Latin
America."
Three Mexican presidents
-Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, Adol-
fo Lopez Mateos and Luis
Echeverria Alvarez-are
among those Agee says col-
laborated closely. with the
CIA. All were close friends
of the station chief in Mexi-
co City, he says, and in re-
turn for such favors 'as,
being led daily CIA intelli-
gence reports and having a
secret communications net-
work set up for their use,
authorities were coopera-
tive when the CIA needed to.
tap phones or check traveltt~
ers-in some cases to the
point of being provided
photos of every traveler to a,
given point. -
IN URUGUAY, after
bugging the headquarters
of the Communist party in
Montevideo,, the CIA bug-
ged the Egyptian Embas-
sy's code room-by using
the ceiling of the U.S. AID
office on the floor below in
the same building. Agee
said this also brought in
messages from Egypt's
embassies in London and
Moscow, which were on the
same cable circuit.
He claims he participated
in CIA activities which help-'
ed cause Uruguay and
Ecuador to break diplomat-
ic relations with Cuba, and
,says he came across CIA
dealings with American
bank officials to get Chilean
currency to Uruguay so it
could be sent back into Chile
to help opponents of the late
Salvador Allende.
His first assignment in
Mexico City, Agee wrote,
was to spot potential CIA
agents among the competi-
tors at the 19GS Olympics-
foreign and American,
coaches and officials.
"WE'VE BEEN IN every
Olympics since the Soviets
appeared in Helsinki in
1952." he wrote. ;
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fE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, JANUARY 14, 1975
BOok byEx= C: I. A.Ma n
Links La tins to5pying..
By RICHARD EDER
Special to The New York Times -
LONDON, Jan. 13-A for- term "collaborator" appears
mer employe of the Central to indicate a more voluntary
Intelligence Agency has pub- imparting of information or,
lished what he describes as a assistance than in an agent's
detailed, almost day-by-day case. Presumably, the "col-
account of his work and that laborator" dealt with the
of his colleagues in three C.I.A. as the most appro-
Latin-American countries. priate representative of the
The author, Philip Agee, United States Government for
who has been interviewed a particular purpose, not be-
widely before publication, cause he was under the
served successively in Ecua- agency's control.
dor, Uruguay and Mexico In his index, Mr. Agee re-
from 1960 to 1968. He then fers to George Meany, head
resigned and, after going of the A.F.L.-C.I.O., as an
briefly into business in Mex- "agent collaborator." Ques-
ico City, began a series of tioned about this today, Mr.
trips to France, Cuba and. Agee said that he was re-
Britain, seeking research ma- ferring to the close coopera-
terials terials and a publisher. tion between Mn Meany's
He found both in London. "organization. and the intelli-
At the beginning of this gence agency, and that per
month, Penguin Books pub- haps simply "collaborator"
"Inside the Company: C.I.A.
Diary." Straight Arrow Press,
a San Francisco house linked.
to Rolling Stone magazine, is
planning to bring it out in
the United States this spring.
No contract has yet been
signed, however.
The book, in the form of a
diary, describes the author's,
disillusion, both with C.I.A.
methods in particular and
more largely with United
States policy around the
world. The writer, originally
a conservative Catholic, has
become a revolutionary so-
cialist.
Mr. Agee says that his
book is intended as a contri-
bution to the cause of world
revolution. He sees in the
C.I.A. an agency designed to
frustrate revolution and pro-
tect capitalism. The book
contains a list of nearly 250
persons he identifies as
C.I.A. officers, local agents,
informers and collaborators.
Inside Political Parties
Besides revealing the names
of dozens of members of the
agency staff, most of whom
operated from United States
embassies in Quito, Montevi-
deo and Mexico City, the
book identifies local busi-
nessmen, labor and student
leaders and politicians as
C.I.A. agents.
In Ecuador, for example,
Mr. Agee says that the agen-
cy had men in leading posi-
tions in several of the major
political parties -- including
the Communist party - and
controlled virtually the en-
tire top leadership of one
group, the Popular Revolu-
tionary Liberal party.
Mr. Agee lists as collabo-
rators such figures as two
former Presidents of Mexico'
-Gustavo Diaz Ordaz and
Adolfo Ldpez Mateos-and
the current president, Luis
Echeverria Alvarez. in Mr.
Echeverria's case, according
? to Dir. Agee, the relationship
existed only while he was
Minister of the Interior.
..In Mr. Agee 's u?age, the.,
propriate term.
Tributes by Ex-Colleague
A considerable if grudging
tribute to the book was paid
by Miles Copeland, formerly
a high-ranking C.I.A. man,
himself. In a review published:
in The Spectator, Mr. Cope-
lanA assailed Mr. Aoee_. for. in
effect, betraying all his for-;
mer associates: But, hel
added:
"The book is interesting as.
an authentic account of how
an ordinary American or Brit-
ish 'case officer' operates."Mr. Copeland went on to say:
"All of it just as his pub-
lisher claims, is presented
with 'deadly accurac ee sent
In the years Mr. Agee spent
working in Latin America,
the' main objective of C.I.A.
stations around the hemi-
sphere was to counteract the ?
effects of Cuban influence.
He tells of his own awk-
ward attempt to recruit the
leader of an EJcouad Maria.
Castroite group, e
Roura. When Mr. Roura was.
freed from jail and expelled.
Mr. Agee arranged to sit next
to him on the plane. C.I.A.
stations, writes, made it a-
point to get the close coop-
eration of local airline execu-
tives.
The plane was virtually
empty, however, and Mr.
Agee felt it would be too ob-,
vious to sit right next to his
quarry. So he sat several..
rows away, trying miserably:
to think up an excuse to
strike'up a conversation.
"I felt more and more
glued to my seat." he writes.
"I was going into a freeze and
beginning to think up ex-
cuses, like bad security, to
offer later for not having
talked to Roura. But some-
bow I had to break the ice,
and I finally 'stood up and'
began walking back to
Roura's seat, in mild shock as
when walking into a cold
sea"
Mr. Agee did manage to
get talking, and thought that
."we seemed to be develop-
ing,'a little empathy." How-.
Cover of book by former American spy, published by.
Penguin in London. A San Francisco publishing house:
may bring it out in the U.S. this spring.
ever, Mr. Roura refused to
take up the suggested con-
tacts, and later Mr. Agee
learned that the. Ecuadorean
had complained about his
C.I.A. seat-mate and threat-
?ened to kill him if he ever
saw him again.
Most of the work was'
duller, however. A lot of
time was spent reading mail
between Ecuador or Uruguay ?
and Cuba. Local postal of-
ficials were a priority target
for C.I.A. recruitment.
Another target was local
builders. When a Czecho-
'slovak or Soviet delegation
was due to take up resi-
dence, C.I.A. teams would
arrange with the builders
to install microhpones before
they arrived. Managers of
hotels and apartment houses
were enlisted.
On Tape, a Tryst
Mr. Agee writes about
bugging an apartment in
Montevideo that was to be
used by an Argentine woman
arriving on behalf of a far-
left group. It turned out that
a main purpose of the visit
was to meet her lover, and
the tapes duly took it in. ,
He writes of making a reg-
ular visit to high Uruguayan
police authorities, with whom
the C.I.A. was cooperating
to put down revolutionary
groups. Mr. Agee and his col-
leagues had turned over
names of suspects to Col.
Ventura Rodriguez, the chief.
Upon a second visit, he
wrote:
"As Rodriguez read the re-
port, I began to hear a
strange low sound which; as:
it gradually became louder,'
I recognized as the moan of
a human voice. I thought it
might be a street vender.
trying to sell . something,
until Rodriguez told Ra-
mirez"-another police of-
ficer-"to turn up the radio.'
The moaning grew in inten
sity, turning into screams.
Mr. `Agee was horrified at
what his work had led to. "I
don't know what to do about
these police anyway," he
writes. "They're so crude and
ineffectual. Hearing that
voice, whoever it was, made
me feel terrified and help=
less. All. I wanted to do was
to get av ay."
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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
7 January 1975 THE ECONOMIST JANUARY 11, 1975
h. E) we, j% I A panes '''" Secret agent
INSIDE THE COMPANY: CIA Diary
,The naming of a public commis-
By Philip Agee. -
sion to investigate charges of do- Penguin. 640 pages. 95p.
mestic spying by. the CIA is, a Few people would raise an eyebrow if
welcome step. President Ford has they read, in some' anonymous revo-
swiftly served notice that he does lutionary newspaper, that President
.not want to cover up any abuses of Echeverria of Mexico, President Lopez
power or "dirty tricks" by an Michelson of Colombia and President
executive agency that by its na- Figueres of Costa Rica were CIA agents
ture has not always been subject or collaborators. The allegation would
to the closest scrutiny. have scarcely more effect if it appeared
That said, however, some mis- ' in one of those handy guides to "Who's
givings might be voiced about the Who in the CIA" that are printed from
composition of the panel, which time to time in East Berlin. But, crop-
as a wide professional but less ping up in a 600-page book by a man
l
varied ideological spectrum. Such who served with the CIA stations in
Ecuador, .Uruguay ad Mexico between
members as Ronald Reagan, Gen. 1960 and 1969, it is guaranteed to make
Lyman Lemnitzer and Douglas everyone who suspected that agency's
Dillon, while men of proven abil- skulduggery is behind most things that
ity and stature, nonetheless are of happen in Latin America leap to his
conservative bent and generally feet and cry, "I told you so."
committed to past U.S. policies. Mr Agee may not make his fortune
Some might be concerned, too, with a book well timed to cash in on the
about Vice-President Rockefel- post-Watergate appetite for revelations
1er's close personal ties with on the CIA (now domestically under
Henry Kissinger, who heads the heavy fire in the United States, see
page 43); but he has certainly made
high-level intelligence panel, the some prominent people's faces red, and
40 Committee. Nor will it go unto- not just in Langley, Virginia. His book
ticed that there are no women in comes as a godsend to the anti-American
the group. ' left throughout Latin America: it names
This is not to suggest that the names, it catalogues the wide range of
eight appointed Individuals should infiltration and "destabilisation" tech-
.,, t~,a 1 k , the !`TA it
not be on the panel. But a larger - i:iue3 e?"i--~~ ~- > , -- and politically mere divergent eludes that inter-American security,
-make-up might have served the as defined by successive governments
purpose better. in Washington, is merely "the security
In any event, it is important that . of the capitalist class in the US"-and
Congress also press forward with the picture must be authentic because
it is by a man once on the inside.
an investigation of the CIA. Or must it? There is little reason to
The formation of a joint House- doubt Mr Agee's account of the routine
Senate committee, as proposed by operations of the stations to which he
Senators Baker and Weicker, was assigned. The basic modus operandi
makes sense. It would eliminate is confirmed by other people's revela-
the duplication of effort that would tions (and notably those of the former
result if a plethora of congres-. Bolivian minister of the interior, Antonio
sional committees pursued their Arguedas). The priorities prescribed
own investigations. for the 'CIA in the 1960s were much
Such a congressional committee the same throughout the. continent: to
neutralise (and, if possible, secure the
should have a broader mandate expulsion of) the communist embassies;
than the President's panel, which to support counter-insurgency; to pene-
regrettably is limited to looking trate all major political groupings; and
Into the domestic spying allega- to identify and undermine those in
tions. As we ha?e stated before, it government suspected of anti-American
is time for a thorough study of the ' leanings. In pursuit of these ends, the
CIA with a view to an overall CIA colonised local intelligence services
restatement of its mandate and and frequently succeeded in creating a
functions. Congress should probe, flow of information on left-wing groups,
for instance, whether the subver- and much else, that was far superior
sion of foreign governments Is an to anything the local head of state could
acceptable CIA activity. hope to gain from. other sources. Mr
Agee quotes many cases, for example,
It would also be well for Con- where, through agents in immigration
gress to keep watch on the inquiry departments, post offices and airports,
of the Ford commission..By per- the CIA had first crack at intercepting
forming a watchdog role, it can "interesting" foreign correspondence.
help assure that there will be the His picture of the daily grind of a CIA
station in Latin America is often reveal-
ing, particularly on the scope of black
propaganda operations designed to
discredit or divide the left, on the
emphasis placed on funding and manipu-
lating trade unions, and on counter-
intelligence operations against the
Cubans-in which Mr Agee became a
specialist. Mr Agee suggests that the
CIA helped to topple the left-leaning
President Arosemena ' in Ecuador in
1963, but then that president hardly
needed anybody's help to fall over.
The first two-thirds of Mr Agee's
book are so stuffed with pedestrian
detail and so barren of personal com-
ment or political analysis that one tends
to swallow them whole-although the
style is a constant reminder that this is
not a diary at all, but a reconstructed
chronicle. But in the last part of the
book, the tone alters. Mr Agee starts
forgetting names as he gets closer to the
present day; he devotes only a brusque
10 pages to a 15-month posting in Mexico
City, compared with 210 pages for a
three-year posting in Quito; and he starts
complaining about the morality of
operations.
His conversion to his new (and now,
confessedly marxist) position is not
adequately explained. On page 408,
he uses a stolen key to start dipping
into the secret correspondence in his
boss's safe. A dozen pages later, he is
worried about the ethics of the invasion
of the Dominican republic. He then
starts quoting United Nations statistics
on the distribution of wealth in Latin
America (collected by the UN, it should
be noted, in 1970, after Mr Agee left
the CIA). But his final decision to leave
the Agency seems to have been related
more to marital problems than to a
political awakening.
He admits to two visits to Cuba-in
May 1971 and May 1972-where one
is surprised to find a man who spent
most of his career service spying on
Cuban embassies being received warmly
and helped with "research materials".
His disenchantment with his former
employers now seems to have turned
into a crusade; at a press conference
in London last October, Mr Agee was
already updating his book, issuing a
list of 37 alleged current agents of the
Mexico City station.
Mr Agee's book is inescapable read-
ing for those interested in recent Latin
American history and the way intelli-
gence services operate.- But one must
be careful to read between the lines as
well. The author is remarkably good at
unveiling CIA operations and contacts
(including many that one might have
thought that a junior officer would have
been kept in the dark about) without
giving much away about what the
Cubans or the Russians were doing.
As his book makes clear, he was in
a position to know all about black
propaganda.
fullest accounting possible of the 'dignity." The charges made are needed to protect the nation's
CIA's past domestic conduct. sweeping in nature but so far little security. Warning of such a possi.
Meanwhile, it is to be hoped that substantive detail has emerged to bility former Attorney General
support them.
Nicholas Katzenbach comments,
form the newly created panel will per- "I think the agency and, its task with thoroughness as M One thing the current wave of assume still is the Most objective Rocke with re and forller stated, enthusiasm for delving into the analyzer of intelligence that there
due g the "Nksic CIA must not do - and that is to
concepts of freed and um i is on the Washin o scene and it'
rove orr 11aAeuse
~1 t9~~1~e1 043$1 Qk~$Q ~jQg preserved."
of an Institution that is greatly
 4 J gWVor Release 2003/O%> ryCC1A?RDP77-00432R000100350003-6
Secret police?
Washington, DC
The fog of suspicion that swirled around
the Central Intelligence Agency during
the period of President Nixon's decline
and fall has thickened to a point at which
a- formal investigation, conducted on a
grand scale and independently of the
administration in office, looks like the
only way to dispel it. Put crudely, the
suspicion is that the agency has assumed
some of the character of an American
secret police. This charge is more dan-
gerous to the agency than any amount
of exposure on the usual lines-bungling
at the Bay of Pigs, provoking the Rus-
sians with U-2 flights, or meddling in
the politics of Chile or Guatemala. Those
were merely reproaches of bad judgment.
A system of domestic espionage, which
Js what the CIA is now accused of having
conducted, would be a flagrant breach
of the act of Congress by virtue of which
the CIA exists.
The National Security Act of 19471
provides that the CIA "shall have no
police, subpoena or law enforcement
powers or internal security functions".
Those functions belong to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation; the powers of
the CIA start at the water's edge. An
ambiguous area does, however, exist in
which foreign agents or foreign money
may be fostering conspiracy, espionage
and sahntaoe on American soli Pres!-
dent Nixon and his men were inclined
to use external security as a pretext for
harassing and spying on domestic "ene-
mies", and the atmosphere of the late
1960s, when anti-war protest was ve-
hement and radical, lent itself to such
.evasions of the spirit of the law. What
has to be established is whether, and how
systematically, the CIA joined in this
constitutionally dangerous game.
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
7 JAN 1975
Meanwhile
..
the KGB prowls
in Far East
By Daniel Southerland
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
Hong Kong
The Far Eastern Economic Re-
view, in a cover story on Soviet secret
agents in Asia, has concluded that
Russian espionage activity in this
area is "expanding steadily."
But the weekly maga.;ine's corre.
spondents throughout Asia also found'
that the Russians are more often than
not crude and inefficient In their
efforts to pry secrets from Asian
sources.
This is partly because governments
are alerted, it said, but also because
the bureaucratic structure of the
KGB, the Soviet equivalent of the
.American CIA, has proven "ex-
osop,'s?es
vels
probe
CAf !or
BY Elizabeth Pond exactly the United States from which
Staff correspondent of ? come accusations against the Soviet
The Christian Science Monitor 'Union and other socialist countries of
'absence of democracy;' 'persecution
MOscOVV of diss, etc for the U.S., the
Pravda's turgid prose Is enlivened authors a of r such s concoctions, of
these days by a first-rate spy serial: course, think that the American
the CIA scandal, society is the summit of democracy.
The contrast could not be greater "However, the revelations of the
with Soviet noncoverage of the unfold- persecutions of dissidents in the U.S.
Ing Watergate scandal from 1972 are appearing one after another .. it
through the resignation of President turns out that this organization [the
Nixon in 1974. The difference could CIA), whose task was only a 'noble
arise from the welcome chance to activity' of foreign espionage, did not
cudgel the U.S. Central Intelligence hesitate to undertake real surveil-
Agency. or to attempt to show readers lance and compiling folders on dozens.
that the. Soviet Union is not the only of thousands of persons in the U.S.
country that hounds its dissidents. "Now It turns out ... that already
Or the difference could stem from since the middle of the 1950's a
the degree of involvement In the continuous program of espionage has
scandal of the American President been conducted with weapons of mi-
with whom the Kremlin wants to crophones, eavesdropping . on tele-
continue doing business. phone conversations, and other elec-
When Mr. Nixon was implicated in tronic devices..
Watergate, Moscow . protected him "Thus the highly praised bourgeois
and tacitly justified its own willing- democracy in practice turns out to be
ness to deal with him. With President a system of total.. surveillance and
Ford not implicated in the present spying."
affair, Moscow does not have to shield Despite any possible backfire on its
him. own system, however, the Soviet
Still, the subject is a ticklish one in press has been carrying fairly full
-'?':cSC' because of the inirror image sUi ii-varies of developments in the
It casts on the Soviet secret police and CIA scandal. '
intelligence agency, the KGB. West-
ern specialists say the KGB main. ? Initially, Pravda and Izvestia spoke
tains exhaustive surveillance files on of CIA spying on "progressive and
Soviet citizens. democratic" elements - a term re-
One of the leading Western experts
served for those supporting policies
nn tha TT C e n g
Robert Conquest, estimates that 20 More
million
Sovi
t
.
e
citizens died In Stalin's
secret-police purges and forced coI-
?lectivization.'
And Soviet secret police inter-
rogation, torture, and forced labor
camps have been vividly described
for Western readers in Alexander I.
Solzhenitsyn's "The Gulag Archi-
pelago."-(Soviet citizens must either
read an illegal manuscript of the
novel or listen to the Western radio
broadcasts of the book beamed to the
-Soviet Union. )
Soviet commentators are aware of
the* comparison. Pravda's weekly in-
ternational review of Jan. 5 made a
point to ridicule the comparison.
Tomas Kolesnichenko wrote: "It is
pointed out
that "the CIA filing
system was started not only on repre.
sentatives of democratic forces of the
country." Senators, congressmen,
and a Supreme Court' justice were
also spied on, the papers reported.
The resignation of four top CIA
officials because of their excessive
use of police power - an unheard of
possibility here - has also been
carried in the Soviet press.
And on Jan. 6 Pravda reported that
President Ford has ordered an in-
vestigation of the "illegal actions of
the CIA, which ... practiced large-
scale secret spying on thousands of
Americans, thereby flouting their
civil rights and freedoms.
pensive and ineffectual."
The Soviet cloak-and-dagger men
keep a "sharp watch" on American
activities in Asia, the Hong Kong-
based magazine said.
But some time ago the Russians'
main target became the Chinese
rather than the Americans.
18
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WASHINGTON POST
5 January 1975
'6y William Grelder Ind Thomas O'Toole
Washington Post Staff Writers .
Inside the supersecret agency of gov-
ernment, it is known as the Bluebird,
and, in some ways, the CIA is as obvi-
ous as that little blue bus which putts
around Washington, dropping its bu-
reaucrats at their unmarked office
buildings.
One ex-official, who rode the bus
and played the CIA's secret games, re-
marked dryly: "There is much less dif-
ference between the agency and the
Department of Agriculture than peo-,
pie would have you believe."
On its way downtown, the Bluebird
winds through the high-rise offices of
'Rosslyn, past the CIA's Foreign Broad-
cast cast Information Service, which cranks
out translated digests of overseas radio
news. The same building houses the
old Domestic Contact' Service, which
picks up tidbits from thousands of-
Americans who travel abroad. Only
now it is called the "Foreign Re-
sources" branch, because "domestic"
has become a scare word within the
CIA.
Around the corner on Lynn Street,
the Bluebird stops at the unmarked
home of the Office of Basic and Geo
graphic Intelligence, the shop which
turns our encyclopedic "national intel-
ligence surveys," everything you ever
wanted to know about the other guy.
Another building houses the recruiting
office for ordinary out-front employ=
ees. Farther out Wilson Boulevard is
"Blue U.," a big blue office building
owned by former congressman Joel
Broyhill, where CIA technicians are
trained.
In the city itself, the bus swings up
23d Street and lets off passengers at
the training building tucked behind
the Navy Medical Center, where they
used to give new recruits the series of
lie-detector tests to measure their met-
tle.
CIA posts are scattered all over the
capital, though not on the Bluebird
route - the so-called safe houses used
for clandestine contacts and secure
storage of enemy defectors, the field
office on Pennsylvania _Avenue a few
blocks from the White House, the
blank-faced yellow factory on M Street
Southeast where agency analysts scru-
tinize high-altitude photos of Russia
and China and the Middle East, count-
ing up the rockets.
When the Bluebird Tolls home to
Langley, Va., and the seven-story mar-
ble fortress, shrouded by suburban for-
est, it is at the headquarters of the
mystery. When the building was
opened in 1961, agency officials put a
sign out front, "Central Intelligence
Agency," like any other government
bureaucracy. One of the Kennedys told
them to take it down - inappropriate
for a bunch of spies.
The road signs are, back in place
now, but the mystique lingers on. Na-
we -W V-1 Arm I
m
than Hale, a bronzed Yalie who was
America's first martyred spy, stands
brooding in the courtyard, his statue
erected by another Ivy League spy, the,
present director, William E. Colby,
Princeton class of '41.
"Moses sent a man from, each tribe.
to spy out the land of Canaan," Direc-
tor Colby solemnly explains the tradi-
tion to interviewing reporters.
"Nations have the right for their self.
protection and self-interest to do
things abroad in a different fashion
from the way they want to run their
country at home. Intelligence has been
collected in that way for, thousands of
years."
i It is the same speech the director
makes to new recruits, the Career
Trainees, who also get instruction in
breaking and entering; telephone tap-
ping, steaming open other people's
mail, disrupting public meetings, foul-
ing up automobiles and sabotaging
printing presses.
. Inside the gray and vacant lobby at
headquarters, the CIA added a poign-
ant touch several months ago-31 stars
engraved on the marble wall for the
anonymous agency officers killed in
action over the past generation.
Their stories are still secret, where
they died and how, even their names
are officially unacknowledged. -
.Outside the agency, a social mysti-
que surrounds it, too. From the start, it
has been run by men of breeding, Ivy
League alumni who live in the smart
homes of Georgetown and McLean,
men who mix the coolness of their
class status with the bravery of bucca-
neers. A former FBI agent, once`
explained: "We had the Fordham boys,
they had the Yalies."
On the lobby wall, opposite the 31
stars, the agency has posted its creed,
of intelligence, taken from a non spy,
St. John: "And ye shall know the truth
and the truth shall make you free,"
Can the CIA be truthful about itself
and still survive as a secret intelli-
gence agency-? That is its dilemma
right now, as Congress and the public
clamor for a fuller accounting of what
this agency has clone in the world and
within the borders' of the United
States.
For 27 years, the CIA has prospered
in secrecy, 'shrouded by tales of der-
ring-,do, protected by official evasions.
Now it must come in from the cold, at
least enough to quiet the criticism.
The "truth," as it unfolds in congres-
sional inquiries and other investiga-
tions, might de-mythologize the place
for its own good. Or, if the staunchest
critics prevail, it might leave the CIA
a mere shadow of its former shadow.
Some men who served within, who
are still loyal to the agency, believe
this process may be good therapy for
the CIA and for the republic. For in-
stance, listen to the "magic wand" the-
ory held by one man who served in
key CIA posts in Europe and Asia:
"The problem faced by the agency
ever since it was formed is the idea
that covert activity strikes many
Americans in high places as the an-
swer 'to everything - like a magic
wand - as the solution to problems
which aren't solved by the methods we
are used to using.
"Thus, if you have a country that
doesn't like our economic system, that
doesn't want our aid, that doesn't talk
to our leaders, that thinks it can get
more from the Soviet Union, their you
turn to the CIA. Ahah, the magic
wand. I think that attitude has ac-,
counted for much of what has hap-
pened. The problem is the magie-wand
doesn't always work."
Others from the intelligence commu-
nity are fearful that this period pf
probing may compromise the future ef-
fectiveness of the CIA, an arm of gov-
ernment which they consider vital, es-
pecially to an open democracy. in a
world of closed adversaries.
"The country has a lot to learn
about how it wants to live with the.
CIA," said one ex-official. "And' the
.CIA has a lot to learn about how it
ought to serve the country." '
The idea that something "inagic"'
lurked behind the marble fortress has
sustained Washington cocktail gossip
for a generation, fed by incredible sto-
ries filled with danger and wit-and
often success.
There was the caper in Monte Carlo,
ielite ember, W ILU1n the CIA rigged up a
urinal in the casino to collect a sample
from King Farouk because somebody
in Washington was interested in his
health.
And then there was the Bhuddist
demonstration in Saigon, when the po'
litical action branch sent South Viet-
namese into the crowd with egg-size'
bombs of itching powder.
Or the time in Moscow, when a CIA
operation named "Gamma Gupy" inter
cepted the radio-telephone chitchat
from the limousines of top Soviet offi-
cials, picking up masculine gossip
about a masseuse named Olga, plus
valuable insights into the Russian lead-
ers' temperament.
Some of the stories ended uphappily.
During the Korean War, the agency
trained Taiwanese and parachuted
them into mainland China where they
broadcast out information on troop
movements. A lot of them disappeared
without a signal. Some made their way
to the Manchurian foothills, where
they were scooped up in baskets by a
low-flying C-47 with a hook.-On. one
such flight in 1952, the Chinese were
waiting. They shot down the plane,
executed the spy, and two Americans,
Jack Downey at)d Richard Fecteau,
spent nearly two decades in a Chinese
prison.
Back . in 1963, when the CIA was
helping to change governments in
South Vietnam, things took their nat.:-
ral course and the agency's new clients
rhurdered the agency's old client, Ngo
Dinh Diem.
In Laos, the CIA ran a secret war
for 10 years, fought by its own "Armce
Clandestine," with as many as 35.000
recruits from the native populace. The
agency congratulates itself for the
cost-effectiveness of this operation and
the small number of U.S. casualties-
though the secret war virutally deka-
mated a generation of 1leo tribesmen.
To grasp the full range of CIA ac-
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tivity, however, consider this-sample of
countries where the agency has played.
an effective role in a change of.
government: Iran, Guatemala, Soma-:
lia, Brazil, Ecuador, Chile, South Viet-
nam, Laos, the Congo, Indonesia; ac-;
cording to the testimony of ex-officers,
scholarly studies and the acknowt-
edged history of the agency.
Does the CIA kidnap people? Does it
torture? Does it assassinate? No, no,-
no, the Old Hands insist. "Our world is;
full, of assassins," one retired officer.
maintains, "who never killed any-
body." Another high CIA official, how-
ever, was less reassuring on, assassina-
tions.
'fl don't want to make a flat state-
ment that we never did such'a thing,"
he explained. "There were some things-
that were a little close to the edge." -
Years ago, such artful disclaimers
from the agency were swallowed with-
out much question. Now, because'of a
combination of factors, a new skepti-
cism has developed. The CIA's
chummy connections with the Water-
gate burglars, its denials, followed by
belated admissions, upset even the
agency's defenders on Capitol Hill..
Further, the fresh disclosure of CIA
involvement in toppling a foreign gov
ernment-this. time in Chile-renewed
old arguments over its "covert action'.'
abroad.
Then, more recently, a report by The
New York Times that some of the
agency's overseas espionage techni-
ques were being used at home against:
American citizens produced additional
shock waves.
N^ dozen-s of ^ , ,lntio - are pend
ing in Congress fora grand inquiry of
some sort, or even a new oversight
committee to exercise greater control.
Some critics want to outlaw the agen-
cy's "dirty tricks" altogether and rer
strict it solely to intelligence-gather-
ing, a task which is done more and
more by electronic marvels in the sky .
rather than human spies.
One of the doubters is Rep. Lucien
Nedzi, chairman of the House Armed
Services Subcommittee on Intelli-
gence, which expects to draft legisla-
tion redefining the CIA's charter and
perhaps narrowing the range of
"covert operations."
"A larger number. of purists will say,
?.
and perhaps rightly so, that we got no'
business getting involved in such
activities, "Nedzi explained. "But my
view of a Congress as a whole is that
there is a lingering feeling that the
world isn't so neat and tidy that we
can afford to tie our hands in this -
way."
Nedzi describes himself leaning to-
ward the "purist" camp. "I'm inclined
to think we ought to stay out of covert
operations," he said. "I want to empha-
size I'm not persuaded 100 per cent. At
this point, I have such serious doubts
that you can maintain secrecy, so, . if
you going to be involved somewhere,
do it openly and support it publicly."
The congressional debate gets a bit
confused, however, because only a
handful on Capitol Hill really know
what they are talking about (and most
of them won't talk at all). In 1949, Con-
gress "freed" the agency from regular
appropriations processes. It; activities
and spending are reviewed in private
by. a few inenlbers from House and
Senate committees on Armed Services,
Appropriations and, more recently,
Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs.
The rest of Congress is kept in the
dark. So are most people inside the
CIA. - . .
CIA is now an agency with about 15,-`
000 regular employees, a figure shrunk
by inflation and budget holddowns,
just like other federal agencies. About'
4,800 of those people work in'
"clandestine services," the secret spies
here and abroad, but the agency hires
thousands of foreign "agents" to,
gather information too.
The CIA spends about $750 million a
year (not counting the very expensive
satellites and spy planes operated for
it by the Pentagon), which makes it
more costly than the National Science
Foundation, but less expensive than.
the State Department.
The CIA won't verify that budget
figure, but when former agency offi-
cial Victor Marchetti published it .in
his book, "The CIA and the Cult of In-
telligence," the agency tried unsuccess-
fully to censor it.
Langley operates or supports a bi-
zarre collection of enterprises. It has
bankrolled two radio stations-Radio
Free Europe and Radio Liberty-plus
several news services to distribute
propaganda. It owned several airlines
-Air America, Air Asia. and Southern-
Air Transport. It whipped together its
own air force of B-26s for war in the
Congo. It has some 200 agents under
"cover" overseas as executives of,
American businesses. It has, by the
last estimate, several dozen journalists
on its payroll abroad. Its West Point is
"The Farm," codename ISOLATION,'
at Camp Peary, Va.,. but it has also
trained --`oreign mercenaries in Saipan
and Okinawa and at the International,
Polley Academy in Wnghinotnrl.
In' the 196Cs; the agency penetrated
.scores of domestic institutions, mainly
with its money, by financing overseas'
activities by labor unions (Retail
Clerks, . Communication Workers,
Newspaper Guild, to name a few), and
private organizations like the National
Student Association and the National.
Education Association and dozens of
tax-exempt foundations.. It now avows
that those days are over.-though for
some, like international labor organi-
zations, the. government has replaced-
secret CIA funding with "overt"
money.
The CIA was born with the National
Security Act of 1947, the same year as
the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall
Plan. Quartered at first in old Tempo
buildings along the Tidal Basin, it
flourished with the Cold War, picking
up the FBI's responsibility for overseas
surveillance but foreswearing any in-
volvement in domestic spying, a re-
striction on which the ate J. Edgar
Six months ago, the Senate debated
over whether to make the CIA present
its budget figures in public, but de-
cided against it. The agency's view is.
that if you divulge the budget one year
you will have to do it again the follow-
in, - thus signaling too much in-
formation to the opposition.
"If you have a very important tech-
nical system which can be countered
fairly easily," said Director Colby, "in
Washington today, you're going to let-
as few people know about it as possible.
Why? Because somebody will make a
mention of it, just to show how impor-
tant he is, sometimes. Or the 'reporter
will pick it up and he'll run it and
somebody will turn a switch and we
will no longer get the benefit of it.'
That has happened. So you hold it as
narrowly as you can."
But the penchant for secrecy even
leaves people within the agency uncer-
According to one reliable source, thei 'story. The CIA is organized so the'left
,hand won't tell the right hand what :
it's doing, not to mention ordinary con-
gressmen. When the "covert opera-
tions" people were organizing the Bay
,of Pigs invasion in 1961, they did not
tell the agency's own deputy director:
of intelligence, Robert Amory, who
might have figured out that the whole,
trip would be a bummer.
When the "covert" people wanted to,
check out a Chinese espionage pros.,
pect with the agency's established
contact man in Hong Kong, they didn't,
send one name. They sent half a dozen
.-so that no one in between would:
know with whom they. were doing,
business.,
Even communications between CIA
people is garbled in a heavy language
of cryptonyms. Nobody ever uses the
right name for anything or anybody..
The U.S.A. is ODYOKE, according to
ex-spy Philip. Agee's account. ODACID
is the State Department. ODEARL is
'Defense. KUBARK is CIA. They have
a RED series to cover anti-Soviet
operations-REDWOOD, REDSOX and
REDSKIN (which means legal travel-
ers into Russia). `
The CIA is especially proud of its
. claiim that its ranks have never been
penetrated from the outside, an accom-
plishment of the agency's counterintel-
ligence section, the one now under fire'
for Rs alleged domestic ' activities.
"They are the real paranoids of the
agency," said one former officer. "They
don't trust anybody."
If the CIA does not tell the straight
story inside, how can anyone outside
-be sure they are getting the truth?
That question was given more sub-
stance late last year with the release
of testimony by the late CIA Director
Allen Dulles before the Warren Com-
mission in 1964. Dulles assured the. in-
vestigators that, as CIA chief, he
might well lie to them or anyone else,
except the President 'himself, to pro-
tect the identity of a CIA agent.
When former CIA Director James
Schlesinger was trying to figure out
the CIA's connection with Watergate,
he assured the congressional oversight
committees that the agency was not fit
contact with the burglary team's wire-
man, James McCord. Months later, Mc-
Cord's periodic letters to the agency
;turned up. , -
"He said, 'I'm so damn mad. I just
learned about this,'" recalled Rep.
Nedzi. "After going into the matter, it
became clear that someone way down
the line- had these letters tucked
away."
The CIA is also effective in keeping
'secrets from its diplomatic counterpart
-the State Department. Yet, the CIA
uses diplomatic cover for most of its
overseas officers. They show up on the
regular embassy, rosters, usually with
bland titles which conceal their real
influence. "Informers want to talk to
diplomats," one agency veteran ex-
plained. "They don't want to talk to
Coca-Cola salesmen."
The Russians, of course, use the
same system. In a way, it protects both
sides, because, as one CIA alumnus ex-
plained, governments don't arrest dip-
lomats. The worst that will happen to
any operative from KGB, the Soviet
spy apparatus, or the CIA is exposure
and expulsion.
In terms of quantity, the business of
"runnin;,, agents" in foreign countries
is a minor part of the CIA's game,
producing a small fraction of the total
;intelligence. In terms of quality, there
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are strong differences'amdng CIA melt"
themselves over whether it is worth
much.
For the old Bands, who grew up with.
the agency, it is the heart of the busi-
ness. "It's the only part of the job that
counts," one of them said nostalgically.
For others, especially among the
younger officers, it is an elaborate
game of "Mickey Mouse" that pumps
out lots of reports, mostly. worthless to'
American policy decisions.
"Meeting people in bars at midnight'
-that gets old fast," said one young
ex-officer. "The first time it's fun, but,
it gets old. When you get done, you,
have to go back through the bureauc.
racy. Write a report, file an expense-'
chit."
The traditionalists argue, that spy'
`satellites are good for counting missile,'
silos, but they do not help with read-'
ing minds. "The people tell you about
political dynamics," a high official ex-.
plained. "It's terribly important to
know what's ,going on within a closed
society, comparative 'political forces,
strengths of the military group, party.
apparatus, the government, the youth
movement. You're not going to get
that out of a machine."
The skeptics don't think the CIA is
so hot at getting those kind of insights
either, especially from China and the..?
1 Soviet Union. '
"The bulk of the overseas jobs are.
anachronistic game-playing," said one.
of the disillusioned. "Running agents
- that's a crock. Its minutia. It's re-
cruiting low-level and middle-level pol-
iti.Cians and paying diem for reports. A
Mot of times, the report turns flout to be
something the agent copied out of ai
newspaper."
It also can be expensive. One retired
officer said a busy station like West
Germany could spend as much as $3
million a year, taking care of defectors
and supporting local politicians, even
ones who are temporarily out of office.
"So he won't go broke," the officer ex-
plained.
One CIA official, who prizes the sys-
tem of agent information, explained,
why it can be costly:
"Sometimes to run a good case in
volve's quite a few people on our side.,
Because if you're going to meet thel
fellow, you have to have somebody,
watching you to see who else may be
watching you and then watching him
because somebody else may be watch-
ing him, so somebody has to be watch-
ing him to see who may be watching
him when we make the meeting."
If that sounds like dialogue from
TV's Maxwell Smart, the business of
CIA penetration is no joke to foreign
governments. "Inside the Company,"
an ex-officer's book scheduled for pub-
lication in England this month, pro-
vides an exhaustive portrait of how it
is done: the tedium and scope and risk
of American spies trying to pry their
way into another country's politics.
.Philip Agee, a CIA man for 12 years,
'has set down the most minute details
of his service in Ecuador, Argentina,
and Mexico, naming names and caus-
ling a considerable reshuffle of CIA
personnel in Latin America.
A lot of energy was expended In try-
ing to tap into Communist bloc embas-
sies or to compromise their employees.
In Mexico City, he recounts, the agent
'LICOWL-1 ran a tiny grocery across;
from the Soviet embassy and reported
Iiiteriireted 'to include some domesic"
operations.
The CIA has offices in at least 15
American cities, according to one for-
mer employee, where as many as 500
.people. interview. scientists, business=
,men and college professors either
bound for Eastern Europe or just re-'
turning. The agency asks them to look
out for mundane intelligence like the
crop reports or esoteric technical gos-
sip like the status of new technology-'
Among ex-officers, it is widely be-
lieved that the agency's counter intelli-.
gence has on occasion "bugged" its
own employees to check their security.
The spectre of widespread electronic
eavesdropping in the drawing rooms of
Georgetown is not so widely believed.
The agency's pursuit of "foreign" in-
telligence has also led to some state-
side burglaries, according to one for-
mer officer, who said the CIA had brio
ken into embassies in New York and
Washington, mainly to photograph for
eign codebooks. .
Director Colby - insists that the
agency does not have any "gray areas"'
in its charter which allow it to break
U.S. laws. But then he muses aloud
over the question of a burglary of the'
Japanese embassy, say, two days be-
fore Pearl Harbor. Would the CIA be
justified in doing it?
"That's a close case," the director
said, "a very close case." I
One limitation to CIA activity within
the United States has been its natural
bureaucratic rivalry with the FBI,
When Hoover was alive, he persist-
ently protected his own turf and blew:
'his stack in 1970 over a minor episode
when an FBI man passed to the CIA
the whereabouts of a college president
on his way to Eastern Europe. Hoover
demanded the name of his own agent
and the CIA refused. The FBI director
retaliated by cutting off "all liaisgn
with Langley.
"There were a lot of people is, gov-
ernment," said an ex-CIA official,
!-'who were asking God at the time to.
take Mr. Hoover from us:" ,
The Watergate scandal suggested
that, contrary to tradition, the CIA'
could be persuaded to help out with
domestic spying aimed at American
citizens. It began with a telephone call
from White House aide John D. EhrI-
iclfman to CIA Deputy Director Robert
Cushman, suggesting the agency give
"carte blanche" to E. Howard Hunt Jr.,,
the former agency officer working for
the White House "plumbers." When
Hunt called on him, Cushman taped
the conversation and turned over ex-
otic paraphernalia-a wig, a mous-.
tache, a fake identification card, a
speech-altering device, a camera con-
cealed in a tobacco pouch.
Hunt and his friends did a couple of
burglaries for the White House before
they were caught. Meanwhile, the CIA
helped out again with a psychological
profile on Daniel Ellsberg, the antiwar
critic who surfaced the Pentagon Pa-
pers. '
When the scandal broke, the agency
successfully deflected White House
suggestions that the CIA was somehow
responsible. Still, the episode left trou-
bling questions. It was learned, for in-
stance, that McCord was reporting to
a CIA "case officer," a relationship
which implies that McCord was doing
domestic work for the agency.
How much does anyone in Congress
that Silnikov, the embassy's adminis-. but a loophole provision also directs know about this sort of thing? Are sen-
tration officer, was ripe for entice-' it to protect national securit sources ators briefed on embassy break-'-"s?
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-lQP17-00432R000JLQD3&MG3-mow that the U. S. I.ox-
tnent, ' r : - --. . . zli ky
"The station decided to recruit a
young Mexican girl as bait'," Agee re-
ported. "An appropriate girl was ob-
tained through BESABAR, an agent
who is normally targeted against Pol-?
ish intelligence officers .... By loiter-,
ing at LICOWL-l's, store, the girl at-'
tracted Silnikov's attention and a hot.
necking session in a back room at the'
store led to several serious afternoon
sessions at the girl's apartment nearby-,-
obtained especially for this operation.
Silnikov's virility is, astonishing both
the girl and the station, which is re-
cording and photographing the ses-
sions with the knowledge of the girl.. .
Eventually it will be decided whether'
to try blackmail against Silnikov or to:
provoke disruption by sending tapes',
and photos to the embassy if the black"
-mail is refused."
In Ecuador, the CIA was .plugged'
.into the police, politicians, the post of-
fice, the airports, the government, la-
bor and student groups.
Here, for example, is Agee's recital
of the agents recruited there in the,
early 1960s: .?
ECSIGIL, two independent o p e r a-'
tives within the Ecuadorean Commu-
nist Party, each with his own "cut,
out," another agent who served as go-
between so they would not have to
meet directly with CIA people.
ECFONE, another Communist Party
agent, sending five or six reports a
week. RCOLIVE, an agent inside the'
'Revolutionary Union of Ecuadorean
Youth. ECCENTRIC. a doctor friendly.
with the president. ECAMOROUS
chief of intelligence in the National'
Police. ECJACK, an army intelligence'
officer who wanted to resign from his
own country's ineffective service and.,
join the CIA.full-time.
ECSTASY, a postal worker in Quit0
who set aside mail pouches from Cuba,
,Russia and China for his brother, who
delivered them to the U.S. embassy for,
inspection. ECOTTER, an airport em-
ployee who passed on passenger lists.
ECTOSOME, an Oldsmobile : dealer
who reported on his Czech friends.
ECOXBOW, a retired colonel and vice
president of the Senate, getting $700 a
month plus a luxury 'hotel room for
fun and games because his access was
so good.
AMBLOOD, an agent trained to pen-
etrate Cuba where he was later caught
and confessed to an assassination plot
aimed at Fidel Castro.
The list goes on and on-a newspa-'
-per columnist, political candidates, a.
cabinet member, student leaders, even
a socialist in the Chamber of Deputies. -
But, as Agee laboriously recounts
how the CIA used these people, it be-
comes clear that passive intelligence-
gathering was only a small part of the
game. There was constant agitation
against the government's recognition
of Cuba, against the leadership of do'
mestic organizations, against any Ecua-
dorean forces which the CIA station
chief perceived as hostile to American
interests. In agency terms, the action
succeeded. Two governments fell in
quick succession, thanks partly to the
clandestine agitation, and were suc-
ceeded finally by a military regime.
The controversy over foreign activi-
ties has been matched in the last two
years by unanswered questions about
'what the CIA is doing inside the
gathering foreign intelligence abroad,
 Approved For Releag 0aHJ21/n Q1Stg ng ~1pR sYt1r ~p7 oA2R~A ope
estimate '*a q~ q$~akvlafibns. If any=
7ernirieiif aecording Approved
i
s the President. The NSC
spending at least $11 million in the. Relations members too. Marchetti tells one does, it
early 1960s to change governments in in his. book about the time in 1966 issues; lots of directives about the
-Ecuador? According to the CIA, it when the Senate appropriations sub CIA's noncontroversial bureaucratic
faithfully reports all of ,its ."covert ac= committee was prepared to ask tough functions, he said, but the sticky, clan--
tivities" to the select few entitled to. questions about technological costs: destine stuff never gets written down.
know, but even the agency admits that The agency bedazzled them with a dis- The ;Foreign Intelligence Advisory
it does not volunteer any grisly details play of James Bond gadgets -a cam Board,: consisting of nine prominent
-, if nobody asks the right questions. era in a tobacco pouch, a transmitter citizens, many closely attached to the
Director Colby explains: "If you look- concealed in false teeth and so forth 'defense establishment, is likewise got
back over 25 years, you see degrees some of the same equipment which the. -regarded as a serious 'check. One
CIA later provided to the White House highly regarded CIA alumnus said:.
? and variations of Congress's supervi-. ..
Sion, so that I think that some of the burglary team. Those guys are almost-without excep
senators can properly say they didn't- On the House-side, Rep. Nedzi said : tion more hawkish than the guys in
.hear of some thins. In some cases, he has been briefed regularly about- the agency. The tone of those guys is:-
their chairman heard, about them. In CIA activities ever since he became 'If there's anything wrong, blow 'em
0
others, the material was perhaps cav-, chairman of the oversight subcomniit up.
Bred "in our annual appropriations tee two years ago, and that nothing on If Congress does opt for new over-.
briefings in which the matter was con- A he scale of the Chile. intervention has sight machinery, it will still face the
ered in general terms and then de- occurred in that time.. How does he dilemma of how to operate a secret
scribed to the degree requested." know for sure? agency in an open democracy. "All of
"The answer is that I don't," Nedzi -the clamor," said Nedzi, "is based on
When Congress turns fo its debate said. "I'm not going to vouch for what the premise that somehow, if Congress
on CIA oversight, it will have to face they're telling me. But I want to em-, had known about all these things' they
one nettlesome reality: in a lot of?situ- phaiize that' l have no reason to be-: wouldn't have happened. To me, that
ations, Congress did not want to know. lieve that they're lying to me, at least doesn't follow at all ...
If a spooky operation succeeded, fine. at the ton levels." "There's a very difficult problem
Sen. John Stennis '(D-Miss.) who for more than a year about the CIA in its pure form yet. hat is the moral
chairs the Senate's joint oversight domestic spying which caused -the cur; obligation of a congressional overseer
committee; once expressed his own rent flap. He was briefed on it by, if some information comes to him,
ambivalence: "You 'have to make up Colby and kept it to himself..Nedzi which indicates a direction in which.he
your mind that you are going to have was assured, he said, that the question, doesn't feel the agency or the country
an intelligence agency and protect it able had been discontinued. "It . was 'should be going? Does he have the.
,as such and shut your eyes some and historical," he said. - right to blow the cover off the proj-
take what is coming." If congressional oversight 'has been ect? Does he have a duty to. blow the
The Stennis committee rarely meets, tweak, some experts think the same is 'cover? If your answer is yes, is it rea-
though the senator has pledged more true of the executive branch. One for. sonable to have a secret agency in the
vigorous supervision in the wake of mer official.said the National Security hands of so many masters?" Watergate. The new foreign aid bill re. Council, despite the popular mythol:
'ogy,.about it, exercizes, very, little corl-
WASHINGTON STAR
10 January 1975
olhy Assures
s Envoys
?
U
Cooperative
By Jeremiah O'Leary
Star-News Staff Writer
In an unprecedented appearance before all U.S.
ambassadors to Latin American nations here this
week, CIA Director William Colby gave assurances
.that he would instruct agency station chiefs around the,.
Western Hemisphere to make the fullest disclosure to
the envoys of information and appraisals generated by,
the CIA. .
Colby attended the final session of a three-day
closed-door meeting of the ambassadors at the State'
Department on Wednesday, it was learned. He assured
William D. Rogers, assistant secretary of state for
inter-American affairs, and the ambassadors that the'
CIA is "running no operations" in Latin America.
today.
Under questioning by several of the ambassadors,
Colby acknowledged that not all CIA station chiefs -
nominally under control of their ambassador - fully
shared information acquired by the agency or the esti
mates and policy recommendations sent to CIA head-
quarters.
THE STATION chiefs, who are "light cover" on
embassy-staff lists, have separate and secure channels
of communication with their Langley, Va., headquar-,
tiers, and there has peen no prior requirement for CIN
officials abroad to fully inform the ambassadors about
the information they send to Washington.
Colby said the wiser station chiefs do make it a, prac-
tice to keep the ambassadors informed generally of .
what.they learn and what they report.
- Several ambassadors asked Colby if he would issue
instructions to make this information-sharing manda-
tory and the CIA director said he would do so. How-
ever, Colby said that obviously the CIA stationiefs',
would not reveal the names of their secret sources in,
Latin America even to the ambassadors.
The Star-News was told that ambassador to Chile'.
David Popper said that even after a year in Santiago
he had not been able to discover exactly what role the _
CIA played in the September 1973 revolution or events
preceding it. Several 'members of Congress have com
plained that Colby's secret testimony before the Senate
Arms Services Committee on CIA's'Chilean operations
is still so closely held that other members of Congress,
have not been allowed to see it.
BUT COLBY assured the ambassadors that the CIA
was not involved in the successful uprising of the Chi-
lean armed forces which overthrew the Marxist-domi
nated regime of the late Salvador Allende. He also said
the CIA did nothing to precipitate the truckers' strike
that paralyzed Chile for two months shortly before the
revolt.
There has been no public. disclosure of exactly how
the CIA spent an estimated $8 million that was ap-
proved by the White House "40 Committee," headed by
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, for expenditure in
Chile in the period before the Allende's overthrow.
There has been, however, public testimony of CIA
collusion with the International Telephone and Te-
legraph Co. in an attempt to' influence the political'
turn of events in Chile at the time of Allende's election
in 1970.
Approved For Release'2b01r0/`':? C~=Ir1fi=il'043'2`R00'01fl035a003-6
If it failed, then everyone could holler. On the other hand, Nedzi has known 'here that fortunately I haven't come to
 'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R090100350003-6
L 5 ANGELES TIMES
12 January 1975
i ith its'authority in investigating the legiti-
macy of the complaints it received. Cases of
questionable or clear illegality would be for-
warded to the judiciary committee or to the
.attorney general and given publicity within
-the bounds of proper security.
One can only speculate on whether such an
ombudsman would have served a useful pur-
hPor 20 years the exposure of secret CIA
operations has automatically elicited public
,outcries for "a thorough investigation" and'
cmore congressional oversight" These expo-.
sures have, until recently, focused on CIA's
covert ? operations abroad in such fields as
technical intelligence collection (the U2 over-
Retired after 23 years in Central Intelligence
Agency operations, Harry Rositzke is the au-
i'hor of 'U.S.S.R. Today."
'flight program), paramilitary operations
.against Guatemala and Cuba, political action
operations in Iran and Chile, and the use of
private American organizations and dummy
foundations to support a propaganda program
against the Soviet Union abroad.
Now the CIA joins three other elements of
the executive branch accused of carrying out
improper or illegal counter-intelligence ac
tivities inside the United States during the
?ixon Administration. First, the White House
-itself witii its plumbers' squad and the aborted
Huston plan, in which a former White House
a.de suggested widespread :intelligence-
gathering, including breaking and entering:
Second, the. Pentagon with its compilation of
dossiers on American civilians. Third, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation with its coun-
ter-intelligence programs directed against
radical groups involving not only inv'estiga-
lions but the provocation and -harassment of
individuals and organizations. -
The CIA case in this lineup is unique in two.
respects. First, its charter specifically prohi-
bits the agency from carrying out internal se-
curity operations within the United States, a
function falling within the exclusive province'
of -the FBI. Second, the CIA has for some
time, long before Watergate, been loosely and
vaguely suspected of importing it's 'dirty'
tucks" from abroad, of becoming a domestic'
Testapo.' ,
The facts of CIA's "domestic operations" and
on whose authority they were carried out,
will be made clear by the President's blue-rib,-
bon panel and by the investigations already.
promised by Congress. Together these should=
provide the public with the facts-but, as
.usual, after the fact. .
The principal limitation of Congressional,
oversight, however earnest or competent, is
simply this: it serves only to detect or expose
what has already happened. For 20 years,
Congress has been able only to hold postmor-
tems: after LL Powers' U2 was shot down, of-:
ter Castro wiped out the invaders at the Bay;
of Pigs, after the secret army in Laos had ex=
fisted for years, after covert support of anti-
Allende elements in Chile had stopped.
Placing historical facts on the record serves
some worthy purpose, not the least of which
Is to warn the executive branch to observe
-greater caution in the future, but it cannot ef-
fectively control improper or illegal actions in -
the present.
The main issue is: how can illegal internal
-security activities by the CIA or other arm of
the executive branch be detected or pre-
vented in the future?
ivuga iormer uLA Director Richard Helms
It can't be adequately done by Congress be-' have referred the White House request for a
cause of the very nature of intelligence-gath profile on Daniel Ellsberg to an ombudsman?
ering organizations. Their files are highly' Might former FBI Director Patrick Gray have
classified and closely guarded, their employes revealed to him his conviction that the Pres-
are trained in secrecy and highly disciplined ident was being misled by his subordinates?
and they are in the habit of dealing only on at Might White House Counsel John Dean have
"need to know" basis. Congressional oversight gone to an ombdusman weeks
h
or mont
s be-
committees,, faced with this mixture of built- fore he found good reason to talk to the
in secrec
and inte
l b
'
y
rna
ureaucratic control; grand jury?
-
are simply, inadequate to the job of controll- More important, perhaps, are thefracitizenm s
ing executive branch security organizations. whose rights are violated. Whether the
Another problem with Congressional over- right 'or the left, black or white, radical or
sight involves national security. In any public militant, the targets of domestic counter-intel-
inquiry into a secret operation there is inevi- ligence have the greatest right to be heard.
tably a fallout of information that is not es- When they discover that they are being
sential to the inquiry and which should be tailed, bugged. or denounced without legiti-
kept secret in the national interest. To expose mate cause they should have a place to lodge
such secrets in the search for illegality or im-. their complaints. Now they have nowhere to
propriety is to give comfort to those hostile to go but the,courts, a slow and expensive pro-
us and to . feed anti-American propaganda cess. Would they go to a man in Washington
around the world. ' they could trust? I think many would.
If oversight is not the solution to detecting
violations of our civil rights at home, what is? America's investigative journalists have
one answer would be to employ against those contributed a gi-eat deal to the exposure of of-
who abuse or misuse their legal authority one ficial corruption, but they are at a serious dis-
of their own favorite counter-intelligence advantage when itcomes to obtaining unvar-
techniques-the encouragement of infor nished facts on counter intelligence. WV'hat is
mints. needed in the present case is the whole story-
What might serve that purpose is to have a factual and objective, as only an ombudsman
federal ombudsman in Washington, a man of or permanent commission could provide it.
impeccable credentials with a small staff of An open society cannot be closed by a
two or three investigators who would invite handful of plumbers, but it is healthier-with=
any federal employe to get in touch with him out them. There is no foolproof way in a
in complete confidence to register complaints democratic country to keep it free from exec,o
about the improper investigations of Ameri- utive excess unless citizens participate-be
can citizens. Such -an ombudsman, or per- they federal employes or suspected "radicals"
manent commission, would properly come un- The least we can do is give them the tele-
'der the. Senate, Judiciary Committee and act phone number of. an honest and powerful
watchman. _
WASHINGTON POST
15 January 1975
Press Reports on CIA Hit
States.
I the incidents that may have
Schlesinger, who served as occurred during the CIA's
CIA director for six months1 more than 20-year history.
early in 1973 before taking Schlesinger said misdemea.
over as head of the Defense I nor is a legal term that should
Department, declined to pro- be avoided until it is deter-
vide any details on CIA do. mined by the President's blue
mestic activities that may+ ribbon investigative panel if
have been questionable over any illegalities did in fact take
the years, but he commented, I place.
"I think. that in relation to his. All bureaucracies have a
torical standards, that there tendency to stray across the
were' not activities in such line," he said.
e
Central Intelligence Agency
had files on 10,000 American
Secretary of Defense James I number or so surprising as to
R. Schlesinger yesterday de- be a source of national tur-
scribed as "overblown" press moil."
accounts alleging that the Speaking at a Pentagon!
press conference, Schlesinger
sought to retract the term
"misdemeanor" that he us
d
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RIM77-00432R000100350003-6
 NEW yORc TI proved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6
12 JANUARY 1975._
relaxed attitude toward such
S Furor Over C violation's here than there is in
rUa;. ? ?I. s the United States Mr.; Ehmise
told Die Zeit in an interview
.Is a Puzzle to Europe Mast October that he thbug t
? the service would be justified)
in keeping files on a German)
,By CRAIG R. WHITNEY
BONN, San. 11-The contro-
versy over charges of'domestic'
spying in the United States by
the Central Intelligence Agency
has aroused considerable inter-
est in West Germany, where
similar activities came to light.
last October.
But in Bonn, as in Paris,'
Rome, and London, occasional
disclosures of questionable ac
-tivities of security agencies
have few lasting effects, and
the intensity of public reaction
in the United States always
surprises Europeans. "You
.don't have a country over
there, you have a huge church,
a diplomat here remarked.-`_-
Italians take it for granted
that if they have \any social oz,
political. standing at all, their
telephones will be tapped by
one secret agency or another.;
Thousands of prominent Italians
were discovered listed in the
files of Rome's military intel-
ligence service in a scandal six
years alp
In Paris, the police were
caught last year installing bugs
in the office of a satirical
weekly, Le Canard Enchaine.
In Britain, which is in a war-
time-like condition because of
Irish Republican Army bomb-
ings in Northern Ireland and
England, the public expects
M.l.5; the- security service, and
M.I.6, the secret. intelligence
service, to be discreet in their
handling of domestic and for-
eign?spying.
The Spy in Brandt's Office . `
Cases of abuse seldom come
to light in the British press
because of the Officials Secrets
Act, which makes disclosures
like those made in The New
York Times in recent weeks
almost impossible.
The West Germany weekly
journal of' opinion, Die Zeit,1
pointed out a similarity be-
tween the Times reports that
the C.I.A. had illegally investi-
gated about 10,000 Americans
from the nineteen-sixties until
last year, and disclosures that
were made last year about the
West German Federal Intel-
ligence Service.
These were made in October,
during an investigation of the
security services' botching of!
the case of Gunter Guillaume,
the East German agent who
worked in Chancellor Willy
Brandt's office until last April
and contributed to Mr. Brandt's
resignation the next month.
The former chief of the
Brandt Chancellery, Horst
Ehmke. said in parliamentary
hearings that he had discovered I
in 1970 that the. intelligence)
service had illegally kept files
on 52 German politicians, rang-,
ing from the Opposition leaderi
Franz Josef Strauss to the man
behind the Brandt "Eastern
Policies," Egon Bahr.
According to Die Zeit, "the
causes of the violations are
identical. Here, as there"-in
the United States-"the secret
service justified itself and
created its own laws outside
the laws of the commonwealth.
Here, as there, existed the
dangers Thomas Jefferson once
said threatened every . free
state: That uncontrolled power
can easily become, all-embrac-
ing power."
Report Due Next Month
Mr. Ehmke's disclosures pro-
voked a few newspaper articles,
but whatever spying, had gone
on was four years in the past.
He told the parliamentary-com-
mission that some of the files
no longer existed-he had or.-
dered them.. destroyed-.- Mr.
Ehmke : said' he believed the
files were kept by Christian
Democrats in the secret serve-
ice' who; hoped to use them to
embarras the new Social. Dem-
ocratic Government. in power
since 1969'.
'
The parliamentary commit-
tee's continuing examination of
the Guillaume case is expected'
to produce a report some time:
,next month that may result in
suggestions for a reform of the
entire intelligence system.
It has been made clear in
(public testimony that Mr. Guil-
laume rose to his position as
Chancellor Brandt's assistant
for party affair; even though
strongly incriminating evidence
against him had been in the
Government files for nearly 20
years. The various bits ' and
pieces were never put together
for the authorities, who ap-
proved a top-secret security
clearance for him in 1970. The
responsibility for the failure'
s still a matter of dispute.
The German Bundesnach-
richtendienst, or Federal Intelli-
gence Service, was built up
after World, War II by Gen.
Reinhard Gehlen, the intelli-
gence genius of Hitler's Wehr-
macht. At firs,, ha worked!
'directly under American occu-
pation authorities, and after
'West Germany b?ec.me. inde-
pendent lie cooperated closely
with the American services.
Like the C.I.A., which was
created in 1947, the German
agency was limited to foreign.
intelligence. A second agency,.]
the Federal Office for the Pro-i
tection of the Constitution, was:
created for domestic security.
Keeping of files on German pol,1
iticians, therefore, was clearly:
a violation of the Federal In
telligence Service's charter, as,
!C.I.A.'s monitoring of American,
civilians would be a charter vi-i
olation in the United States.
There is, essentially, a more)
politician if he was making'
contacts with. foreigners here-t
just , the thing that critics of
the American service say is it
legal in the United States.
Germany is perhaps a special
case, because of the division
into capitalist and Communist
states, and as Gunter Guillaume;
oroved, it is comparatively easy!
for an East German agent to
pass himself off as a loyal!
West German citizen, The linen
between "domestic" and "for-1
eign"? intelligence in West Ger-]
many., therefore are easily
blurred.
The C.I.A. is known to con-
sider the German intelligence
services so .riddled with East
German agents that the Ameri-
cans do not share real "top
secrets" 'with it. Estimates of
the number of Communist spies
of various; sorts in West Ger-
many. run. as high as 10,000.
WASHINGTON POST
17 January 1975
Refill Na'
I)li,eei?r 0.1
CIA. Panel
united Press International , . }
President Ford 'yesterday
appointed, David W. Belin,
who was counsel to the War-
ren Commission, which inves-
tigated John F. Kennedy's as-
sassination, to be executives di
rector of the . eight-member
commission investigating
charges of illegal domestic
spying by the CIA.
.Belin, 46. has been a senior
partner with a law firm in Des
Moines since 1966 and is said
to be a long-time acquaintance
of Mr. Ford.
In his work for the CIA in-
vestigating panel, which Mr.
Ford created Jan. 4 under di-
rection' ' of Vice' President
iiockefeller, Belin will draw
536.000 a year. The c ommis-
sion is supposed to finish its
mission within three months.
Rockefeller appointed S o l
Neil Corbin as his special
counsel serving as his liaison
with the commission. Corbin
also served as c o u n s e l to
Rockefeller when Ire was gov-
ernor of New York from 1962
until 1965.
Belin was counsel to the
Warren Commission in 1961:.
The' White House said he has,
concentrated in his private
law' practice on corporation
work and court cases, includ
ing constitutional issues. .
In Franc,'a cool sense off
"raison d'etat" often ' justifies
.:espionage . activities, which
most conservative Frenchmen
assume are conducted as a mat-,
ter of course. When the late
!Soviet, leader Nikita Khrush-
chev, visited France in the
early nineteen-sixties hundreds,
perhaps thousands of people
were either detained or shipped
to Corsica for the duration of
his stay, as security risks. ?
Last year it was learned that
many different French authori-'
ties have the right to order
wiretaps and that government
ministers had taps put on their
mistresses' phones as well as
on those of their political rivals.
After President Valery Gis-
card d'Estaing' was elected in
May, he promised an end to
such wiretapping and said the
files would be destroyed. Some
files were burned, but it is
generally conceded in Paris that
(domestic spying still goes on-
The Italian Parliament passed
legislation outlawing telephone
tapping last year. But recently,
an allegedly illegal monitoring
center was discovered on the
outskirts of Rome, indicating
that the practice is probably
continuing on a large scale.
WASHINGTON POST.
.9 January 1975
A', Y. Times, Time
Asked for CIA Data.'
From News Dispatches
Rep., Lucien Nedzi (D-'
Mich.), chairman of a CIA'.
"oversight . subcommittee, .
'-'yesterday asked the edi-'
tors of The New.-York--
Times and Time magazine
to' suggest witnesses for a:
House inquiry into alleged
CIA domestic spying.
, Both publications in the'
last two . weeks . have car-
ried extensive dispatches
claiming the CIA had
breached its charter by
carrying out surveillance
of American radicals and.'
dissenters within the
United States..
The New York Times
.:turned 'down the request.'
On grounds that it was
.given information 'for its
'stories on a confidential
basis.
A spokesman for Time
-magazine said in a state-
rnent' "This was obtained
from confidential sources?
and for that reason we '
cannot comply with the re-
.
quest."
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003~0Q03-6
BALTIMORE SUN
12 January 1975
By PAUL W.'BLACKSTOCK.
Columbia, S.C.
It is a truism that "intelligence is the
first line of national defense," since im-
portant foreign policy and military deci
sions affecting the national security are
based, at least in theory, on the best in-
formation available. The collection,
evaluation and dissemination to policy-
makers of such information is the pri-
agents who collect information abroad
using clandestine techniques. The task of
counterintelligence or counterespionage
is to block such efforts. When police
agencies, such as the FBI, take over
these functions they are called security
police. In the 'U.S.S.R. counterintellig-
ence is carried out by the proper divi-
'sions of the GRU (Chief Intelligence Di-
rectorate of the General Staff) and the
civilian KGB (Committee for State Se-
curity of the Council of Ministers). The
KGB is thus a combined national intel-
ligence and security police organization.
However, surveillance of political dissi-
dents is widespread in the U.S.S.R., not
only on military installations but
throughout the entire state and society.
The amount or degree of such domes-
tic spying is a basic criterion in distin-
guishing police states from open socie-.
ties. Indeed, any such surveillance is
rightly regarded as a threat to demo-
cratic freedoms. The authors of the Con-
stitution and Bill of Rights cherished,
such freedoms so highly that they delib-
erately imposed restraints on the power
of the President and the Congress even
in,matters affecting national security.
The Constitution and Bill of Rights
were meant to protect the privacy of the
individual in his personal life and to
guarantee his freedom from political
surveillance by government agencies.
Under the Fourth Amendment, the
mary function of the intelligence com- sanctity of the home is guaranteed
munitv. , against illegal search or seizure by the
Unfortunately_ the Central Inteilig. police-and by police there is no ques
ence Agency has had a bad press for tion that the intent was to include all po-.
years as a result of such covert opera- lice agencies, including what later be-
tions as the Bay of Pigs fiasco and past came our national security police, the
military interventions abroad which FBI.
have little, if anything, to do with the Senator Ervin's investigation re-:
primary function of intelligence. Recent
revelations that the CIA has been en-
gaged in political surveillance (domestic
spying) on so-called subversive elements
which it regarded as a threat to domes=
tic or internal security have distracted
public attention from the essential and
proper functions of the agency and tend
to give intelligence in general a bad
name.
Back in 1970 Army intelligence also
came under a cloud when the Senate
subcommittee on constitutional rights
under Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (D.,
N.C.) investigated military counterintel-
vealed that at one time various military
counterintelligence units kept political
card index files on 25 million American'
citizens and extensive dossiers on many
thousands of others. Similar charges
have been made that the CIA has kept
ligence agencies which had expanded turbances and urban riots of 1967. Ghet-
their normal function of protecting mil- ton were burned and buildings bombed.
Lary installations to include political sur- Military forces were called upon to res-
'veillance of suspected civilian "subver- tore order in the emergency situations
sives." The Ervin investigation brought thus created, a perfectly legitimate
a halt to these extra-legal activities, but function of the armed forces. After all,
excellent as it was, its report left unan- George Washington himself called upon
swered such fundamental questions as: the militia of several states to put. down
What are the legitimate functions of the Whisky Rebellion of 1794 and per.
:counterintelligence and security police. sonally led the forces.
agencies in a democratic state and so- These were military operations and
ciety? How do they differ from similar their commanders felt that they were
agencies in totalitarian or police states? simply doing what they regarded as an
What are the constitutional safeguards essential task at the time-collecting
against their illegitimate expansion? the information needed for emergency
All national intelligence agencies operations, The job was done with char-
have one or more subdivisions that re- acteristic zeal amounting at times to
cruit and manage networks of espionage military "overkill," since in an atmos.
phere charged with political and social
Dr. Blackstock is a professor of interna- tensions, one man's liberal became an-
tional relations at the University of other man's subversive. The situation
South Carolina, and an intelligence and would have been ludicrous had it not
psychological warfare research special-
ist. menacing.
He served in Army intelligence dur-
m
ees
ave
ing World War If, and has written nu- A basic principle is at stake here the entire Defense Department to over.
merous books and articles relating to which cannot be too strongly empha- see, a subject with political appeal
the intelligence field.proved For size d Release 0
: 01Y6 /o :eelik-gt@"i- O R000100350003-6
p
some 10,000 civilians under surveill-
ance. Such situations would have been
considered "unthinkable" by the authors
of the Constitution.
The justification offered for thisio-
lation of constitutional rights by the De-
fense Department was that it needed
files on "politically subversive ele-
ments" during the widespread civil dis-
police- agencies of a democratic state ex
pand the definition of "subversive" to in-
clude anyone who opposes government
policy, the intelligence base of these"
agencies becomes identical with that of
police-state dictatorships. When this
happens, the constitutional framework,
of the democratic state has in fact been
eroded, regardless of whether or not
such erosion is tacitly accepted by the
public, as was the case in. Nazi Ger-
many.
The threat to the Constitutional order
is far more serious when, under a man-
tle of secrecy, the counterintelligence
components of a national intelligence
agency assume internal security police
functions, thus following the Soviet mod-
el. This is true whatever "presidential
mandate" of legal pretext may be in-
voked either secretly at the time or later
by way of attempted justification.
According to Lyman Kirkpatrick, a
former Inspector General and Executive
Director of CIA writing in The U.S. In-
telligence Community: "By law, the CIA.
has no police or subpoena powers nor.
does it engage in any internal security
activities-other than those affecting its
own personnel or operations." In connec-
tion with the Watergate affair former
CIA Director Richard Helms has repeat-
edly affirmed this principle, and has de-
nied that under his directorship the CIA
engaged in any extra-legal political sur-
veillance of alleged subversives.
Serious charges have been made that
counterinteiii enee or `"special opera-
tions" divisions of the CIA carried out
widespread domestic spying during the
late 1960's and early 1970's. The subst-
ance of these charges has been publicly
admitted by the former head of Counter-
intelligence of CIA. The full story of how
the agency got mixed up in political sur-
veillance in clear violation of its charter
and the constitutional principles in-
volved must await investigation, which
should be immediate, thorough and free
of whitewash.
Not only the vital, legitimate function
of intelligence as the first line of nation-
al defense is at stake, but also the foun-
dations of our democratic state and opens
society. As Watergate has demonstrated
these may be undermined from within
by political zealots who are capable of
rationalizing almost any crime in terms.
of. their own paranoid perceptions of
"national security."
The congressional committees can,
demand action and usually get results if
they want to be tough. But it should be
remembered that these bodies are ex-
actly what their chairmen want them to
be. The constant refrain that nobody in
Congress knows the amount of the CIA
budget or where it is buried in the over-
all budget is simply not true (unless the
subcommittees have not bothered to ex-
amine the budget). The congressional
subcommittees on CIA (one each in Ap-
propriations and Armed Services in the
House and Senate) not only can know all
of the details of the CIA (and the intel-
ligence community) budget, but all of
the activities and operations.
. One question that must be answered
is: How much time do the committees
wish to devote to CIA and intelligence?
The Armed Services Com
itt
h
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-bases, contracts, jobs, . constituents.,' names would. be 'publicized they would; -on a confidential basis to* raise ob_
Appropriations must pass on the federal never work fbr the United States. tions with the President before ' the;
budget of which intelligence is less than m broad throne tha rnrr,,ittana rrnrcf mounting-of an onoratonn thev daamad+
6 pel cum'.
There appears to be little merit to ad-
ding another committee just to oversee.
intelligence activities with each senator.
and congressman already sitting on one
or two standing committees as well as
special committees. Nor would there,
seem to be any use in establishing a
`Joint Committee on Intelligence if the-
Armed Services and Appropriations
Committees continued to exercise juris-
diction over the intelligence agencies.
This would only add to the competition
and rivalry between committees. A
Joint Committee would be advisable on-
ly with exclusive jurisdiction and mem-
bers and staff with time available to do
the job. .
Another question is: To what degree t
should the Committees examine the de-
tails of intelligence operations? It is not
easy to persuade foreign nationals (and
they are the only ones who are clandes-'
tine agents) to engage in highly danger-
ous work in which their lives may be at
stake. If such people believed their:
be told enough about the work of the in
telligence community so they may re--
sponsibly assure the American people.
that the system is working properly. The:
Congressional Committees never shouldi
be misinformed or uninformed.
More specifically, in the areas of es-
pionage, counterespionage and covert
political operations the committees
should know what is going on and wheref
but should not ask for details of operav'
tions or identity of agents. In counteres~?
pionage, the never-ending struggle-tar
protect our own secrets, the oversee%?s
should be told in general which agency. r
carrying out the operations in. the Unitea
States. .
In the area of covert political opera.;,
tions, the. suggestion made by.Preside'tif
Ford that the "40 Committee", his body,
for reviewing in advance proposals:ipr
such activities, advise the congressional
committees of contemplated -acBblt''
seems to make good sense. This would
give the congressmen. an . opportunity'
LOS ANGELES TIMES
14 January 1975
unwise. However, if such information.
were to become a vehicle for political'
opponents of the President's foreign pot-
icy to attack it, the partnership would`
. ,
end.
One thing should be obvious: The ii1V'
ingness of the President to allow frank
'discussion of intelligence operations'
with congressional committees in execu
.tive session will be in direct proportion'
to the responsible handling of that infor=
mation by legislators. Neither branch= of.'
the government is in a good position to!
"cast stones" on the subject of leakage
of classified information. Nor can we ex.'
pect leaks to be eliminated by anything
except responsible performance in both,
branches of government. But foreign in
telligence assets are too perishable- id
irretrievable to be destroyed in the pur-
suit of partisan politics. Most important"
at this moment in our history is for?the'
Congress to assure itself and the Amen:
can people that the intelligence and-se
curity .genies are working properly.
THOSE IN THE KNOW ARE `CbNCERNED` NOT' HYSTIERICAU
-i 11c; '1 VY 111 .111 V U,%_5 L1d UII k%J dear LEW till.
BY J. F. terHORST take action or be open to accusations of ig-
WASHINGTON-Advance communication poring the problem, Marsh said.
between the White House and Capitol Hill Nedzi advised Marsh that Congress could
indicates strongly that neither Congress nor not delay, either-and for the same reasons.
the Administration intends to let investiga- Indeed, the White House learned, Nedzi in-
tions of alleged CIA domestic spying turn tends to begin his CIA hearings within two
into a publicity-generating vendetta that weeks, and-hopes to conduct them with full
i could permanently cripple the agency's vital- press coverage. CIA chief William Colby al-
intelligence-gathering mission. ready has been alerted to have himself and
other agency witnesses ready to testify by
Several days before President Ford an- then. _
nounced the Rockefeller commission to check' . Marsh got essentially the same response
into charges of CIA spying on American po- from Sen. John C. Stennis (D-Miss.), who
litical dissidents, a key telephone conveysa- heads the Senate Armed Services Committee,
tion occurred between presidential counselor and from other Democratic and Republican
John 0. Marsh, a former Virginia Democratic leaders of the two chambers who do not in-
congressman. and Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi (D- tend to delay their congressional inquiries
Mich.), chairman of the armed services sub- until the Rockefeller commission completes
,committee. its 90-day CIA investigation.
Those in the White House and on Capitol
Will wh k th b
w
t
o
no
a su s
ance of the allega-
Marsh advised Nedzi of the President's in-
tention to appoint a special inquiry board, of them, "concerned but not alarmed orf hyone
s-
and solicited Nedzi's opinion, because his sub- terical."
CIA violated its charter against domestic sur
veillance or whether it merely extended it
legitimate foreign intelligence gathering int
the home front in an effort to see whethe
there were links between American citizen
and some hostile powers abroad.
There were widespread suspicions withi
the top echelons of government back in th
1960s and early 1970s that foreign mone
was bankrolling some of the antigovernmer
activities within the United States.
If the presidential panel named by M
Ford and the congressional hearing acco
push anything, they should at least answe
the persistent implication that antipathy an
rivalry between the late FBI Director J. E
gar Hoover and the heads of CIA were th
cause of the problem. The FBI supposedl
conducts domestic surveillance, but repor
are that Hoover would not take on cases r
ferred to the FBI by the CIA.
Practically speaking, it probably wouldn
if h
b
,e "ee
nveuzl, for example, was apprised of some
eing
unit charged with monitoring the nation's in- alleged CIA spying on domestic antiwar cretly investigated by the FBI or the Cl!
telligence apparatus. groups more than a year ago, during his but it makes a lot of diffference.nowada~'
Nedzi advised Marsh that it might be wiser closed-door probe into CIA involvement in when the CIA is rather widely suspected i,
for Mr. Ford to delay the naming of his spe- ? the Watergate coverup. He did not make it young persons and older conspiratorial typ
cial group until House and Senate investiga- public then because he was convinced that it of running a secret, sinister supergovernrne
tions into the CIA had been completed. was not'directly related to the Watergate within the United States.
Marsh replied that the public outcry and scandals. In fact, some of the alleged CIA Responsible lawmakers that the CIA and public official
the nature of the charges made it impossible spying activities dated back to the Kennedy are confident that the Cinvestigations wi
for Mr. Ford to abstain from ordering a probe and Johnson presidencies, he was informed. disprove these suspicions to a majority .
Americans, even though a fanatic fringe Brie
of the agency. The President would have to The gut issue in all of this is whether the . "whitewash.".'
143
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6 .
LOS ANGELES TIMES
12 January 1975
'ATCH OGS WENT TO SLEEP
BY DAVID WISE
-Profound ironies underlie the current de-
bate in Washington over charges that the
Central Intelligence Agency violated the law
and turned loose its spies, spooks, wire tap-
pers and "entry" men on American citizens in-
side the United States..
Those who have urged greater control over
the CIA and warned of the dangers of secret
shower in a democracy have been repeatedly
assured that the CIA always operates under
tight presidential supervision. The official.
David Wise is the coauthor of "The Int-S,ible
Government," a critical study of the CIA.
claim is that no covert operations are under-
taken abroad without the approval of a high-
level White House committee and that Con-
gress' and an outside civilian review board
serve' as vigilant watchdogs, barking in the
alight at the slightest sound of an illicit clan-
destine footstep.
Unless there were considerable substance to-
he allegations of CIA domestic spying, Pres-:,
ident Ford would hardly have found it neces-
sary to appoint an eight-man commission,
headed by Vice President Rockefeller, to con-
duct an inquiry. If the CIA indeed were under
.Iidht nrocirlantiol rnnfrri 11(ir T.'nrra ..m,9.i
have needed a report from CIA Director Wil-
liam E. Colby and a commission to investigate
CIA domestic spying-he, would already have
known all about it.
President Ford, however, is a relatively re-
cent occupant of the White House, and per-
haps he was unaware of CIA domestic spying.
Reportedly these domestic activities were sus-
, ended around the time Watergate broke
open in 1973. Perhaps Colby neglected to
brief the new President on what had been
going on. But in that case, what about Secre-
tary of State Henry Kissinger?
For five years, Kissinger served as Richard
Y\Yixon's national security adviser and chief of
me staff of the National Security Council,:
;titles he has retained as secretary of state.
'.Under the law, the CIA is directly supervised.
'uy the NSC. Yet 24 hours after the CIA story`
idn't. Know,
broke, a spokesman for Kissinger said, "The
secretary' has never seen any survey of
American citizens by the CIA and he doesn't.
know if any such surveys exist."
If Kissinger, the man with direct responsi-
bility over' the CIA since 1969, really knew.
nothing of CIA domestic spying, there is yet
another paradox in the case of Nelson Rocke-
feller. The man chosen by President Ford to
investigate the CIA has been a member since
1968 of the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board. For years, starting with the
late Allen Dulles, CIA directors have claimed
that this board of civilians has access to
whatever it wants to know about the CIA. If
so, Rockefeller would already possess full
knowledge of any CIA domestic spooking-he
would not need an eight-man commission . to
ascertain the facts.
As for Congress, if the four subcommittees
responsible for watching over the CIA were
..being properly informed; there would be no'_
need for the various new Congressional'
probes now under consideration.
On the face of it, then, the current' con-
troversy has raised grave new doubts about
the familiar claim that the CIA operates un-
der strict control by the executive branch and
Congress.
But, as' the Watergate scandal demonstrat-
ed, there is another side to the coin. While
there are great dangers to a democracy when
a secret intelligence agency operates out of .
control, there are equally great dangers.when
a President and his men exercise improper
control and misuse power against political en-
emies or dissidents: The central importance of
Watergate was this abuse of power and the
misuse of government agencies-particularly
law enforcement and intelligence agencies, in-
cluding the CIA and the FBI-against indivi-
duals. .
Richard Helms was director of the CIA from
1966 to 1973, a period when much of the al-
leged domestic spying took place. In a 1971
speech, he said: "We do not target on Ameri-
can citizens" Yet the Senate Watergate hear-
ings and the House Judiciary Committee's im-
. peachment evidence indicated that the CIA
idn't 1t9
while Helms was director twice violated the
law confining the agency to overseas opera-
tions.
Helms agreed to outfit Nixon's plumbers.
with a wig, a camera,' a voice alteration de-
vice and other spy equipment, and Helms per-
sonally approved the preparation by the CL
of a psychological profile on Daniel EilsberOn June 28. 1972, Helms obligingly wrote a
memo asking the FBI to "confine themselves,
to the personalities already arrested' an?
avoid expanding the Watergate investigatic
into "other areas, which may well eventuall
run afoul of our operations."
The CIA cooperated for a time with Nixon'-s
attempt to use the intelligence agency eb
block the FBI probe of the Watergate burg-
ry despite the official denials. It is also verb.
possible that the CIA followed presidential
White House orders in carrying out domnst:
spy operations.
The problem of controlling the CIA i&
therefore, a dual one: To make certain tha-11
the agency operates under strict supervision
of the. executive branch and of Congress, but
by the same token to be sure that it is no
misused by, a President or his advisers. and
turned into an illegal secret police.
It is possible. that. a much-needed general
reform of the CIA will emerge from the cur-
rent investigations. As a first step Congre~ s
should outlaw all covert operations by the
CIA overseas and confine the agency to gash-.
ering and evaluating intelligence-the mis-
sion which Congress thought it had assigned
to the CIA when it created the agency
1947. Second, Congress should specifically
prohibit any CIA domestic operations and pre-
cisely define that term. The legislation shoul+f
include strict safeguards against presidential:
.misuse of the agency.
Third, 'Congress should ' establish a' joir:t
committee to ride herd on the CIA, scrappin
the existing informal, shadow subcommittee:.
In the words of Sen. Stuart Symington (IL
Mo.) a member of the Senate Armed Service.
.Subcommittee on CIA: "There is no ?cder ,
agency in- our government whose activiti .
receive less scrutiny and control than th
CIA"
WALL ST=, JOURNAL
3 JAN 1975
CIA FIIItM NT graves-and not just be-
cause of durnestic-spring char.-;es.
-The agency emphasizes scientific snoop-
ing by satellite or electronic eavesdropping;
director Colby deemphasizes "dirty tricks."
The trend to detente angers CIA veterans)
whose careers advanced when the Commu-
nists clearly were the enemy. Today's rela-I
tive openness about CIA work contributes to'
a general sag in morale.
Chances are stronger than ever for con-'
gressionat restraints on the aency. Corning-
0
urely find a par-
Capitol Hill inquiries will surely,
tial basis for reports of illegal actions in the
past. Some forbidden domestic spying evi-
dently took place under former Director
Helms, with Vietnam-war protesters the
main targets.
Colby Will surrire as 'CI.' chic/ 'for
now. But a respected outsider may be
brought, in later on to restore the agcn-
cy's_ reputation. 27
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ificialdom'
 17 January Aoved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6
Baker Reports"-CL"
. Compiled ~o ss ers on o Former
Senate. Aide and a Private
New Fork Investigator
t'$ NICHO
LA
y
a M. HORROCK. April, 1972, that they might be
Special to The New York Times the subjects of a sophisticated
WASHINGTON, Jan. 16-1 electronic surveillance Not.
Senator Howard H. Baker Jr. Mr. Fen'sterwald said he had
a!aid today that his investiga- no "independent" knowledge-
;taon into any Central Intel- that the C.I.A. had a dossier on
ligence Agency involvement in him or that it had ever investi-
:Watergate had - disclosed that gated him, but he speculated
the agency had compiled dos- that he might have come under
siers on a former Senate aide
r agency scrutiny when he was
land a New York private investi- working for Senator Long's in-
gator. vestigation of wiretapping and
In a telephone interview 'at bugging in the mid-1960's.
s home in Huntsville, Tenn., "We were getting into C.I.A.
Senator Baker, a Republican, wiretapping, pushing the -Free-
said that his investigation had i dom of Information Act and in
M
ound that the agency hd d
aos-
siers on Bernard Fensterwald,?a
Washington, D.C., lawyer and
iformer aide to the late Senator
Edward V. Long, Democrat of
!Missouri, and on Arthur James
Woolston-Smith, an officer of a
New York City investigation
and industrial security consult-
ing concern.
"These were but two of the
numerous indications our inves-
tigation turned up that the
C.I.A. has engaged in wide-
spread domestic activity," Mr.
Baker said'
A spokesman for the C.I.A.
declined to comment on the
Senator's allegation.
A report on the agency's
domestic activities released
yesterday by. William e.. Colby,
Director of Central Intelligence,
acknowledged that the agency
had kept files on several mem-
bers of Congress and numerous
dossiers on American citizens
collected both by domestic spy-
ing operations and through f
agency employment checks. t
Senator Baker said that his
inquiry into C.I.A. activities,
brought to an abrupt close by
the demise last year of the Sen-
ate Watergate committee, of
which he was vice chairman,
had uncovered five areas that
he believes require further in-
vestigation by a bipartisan se-
lect Congressional committee
or some form of permanent in-
telligence oversight committee.
Mr. Baker said that he was
"unabashed" in his desire to be
part of a Congressional com-
mittee to investigate the agen-
cy. He added that though "I
feel it may sound immodest, I
think I'm one of the best quali-
fied men in the Senate to delve
into C.I.A. because I was one of
the first to hear the 'animal
crashing about in the forest."'
? Senator Long's Activities
The Senator was referring to
his suspicion in 1972 that there
might be illegal intelligence and
espionage activity going on in
had found indications that the T-..
;C.I.A. might have tapes of tele-1
phone and room conversations)
throughout its headquarters in!
Langley, . Va. He pointed out,,
for instance, .that a tape of a
conversation 'between Marine
Gen. Robert E' ? Cushman Jr.,.
then deputy director. of'. the
C.I.A., and E. Howard Hunt Jr.,
to do electronic surveillance,
Mr' Baker reported. The refer-i
rals were made by the chief of
the agency's external employ-
ment assistance. branch, which
aids former employes.
"I think we must establish
whether these referrals -were
authorized by the director and,
who was convicted for his role if not, who decided this was an
in the Watergate burglary had appropriate job referral for the,
not been destroyed. The agen?. agency to make," Mr. Baker
cy, he said, also "appeared to said.
have- a taping capability from . One former Senate investiga
the main switchboard." - . . .. tor said that the external assis-
vestigating a U.S. Government! - Mr. Baker said that,, in"addi- tance operation was "virtuall
y
plot to assassinate Fidel Castro' tion to the tapes, the .I.A. had the switch plate of an old-bo ,
and any one of these things reported that several dos-j network -for former C.I.A.1
could have attracted their at- uments had been destroyed. J agents." The discovery of. the'
tention, Mr. Fensterwald said. , A second area to investigate,
Last month, Time magazine re-! Mr. Baker said, is -the domestic
ported that the C.I.A. had creat- role of Eugenio R. Martinez, a
ed a dossier on Senator Long Watergate burglar. The C.I.A.
during the same period. acknowledged that at the time
The report on domestic acti- of the Watergate burglary, Mr.
vity released by Mr. Colby, cur- Martinez was receiving a $100
rent director of the C.I.A., ack a-month retainer as an -opera-
nowledged that the agency had tive in Miami. Mr. Baker said
-voluminous files on American ! that .in addition to reporting on
specialized dossiers. on antiwar'
activists first revealed by The
New York Times on Dec. 22.
Though a file on Mr. Wool=
ston-Smith may ha,e ended up
in C.I.A. data vaults. as -a,
_- a'-.' al ? 1, ,.d
telligenceG work, the fact that
there was a dossier on Mr. Fen-
sterwald struck Senator Baker
tion. "We had no indication
from the - C.I.A. that Mr. Fen-
sterwald had been involved in
any foreign intelligence," he
Mr. Baker, discussing, the
need for further -investiation,
said that one of the five pro=
posed subjects was the de-
struction of tapes and doc-
uments.
On Jan. 24, 1970, Richard
Helms, then director of the
C.I.A., ordered the- destruction
of tapes of his personal office
and telephone conversations
dating back over several years.
The tapes included conversa-
tions with President Nixon and
other Administration leaders,
according to Mr. Baker's
Watergate report. ?
The destruction was carried
out despite a request from the
Senate majority leader, Mike
Mansfield, Democrat of Monta-
na, that the C.I.A. retain all
evidence pertinent- to the
Watergate investigation. Mr.
Helms later testified that the
tapes had contained no Water-
gate material. "We ought to
have'further testimony-on this
Both Mr. Fenstetwald and Mr. from the custodian of the
Woolston-Smith said that 'they tapes," Mr. Baker said.
had no knowledge that the . Mr. Baker said that the vol-
C.I.A. had maintained dossiers, ume of material destroyed was
on them. "I don't doubt it and I so great that "it took them sev-
don't care," said Mr. Woolston- eral days to scissor the tapes
Smith, a New Zealander whoi and burn them.:
.said his coincern had done in-
telligence work for the United
States Navy. Mr. Woolston-
Smith, an officer of Science Se-
curity Associates, Inc., said he
.had warned the Democrats in
"I don't charge Mr. Helms
with any wrongdoing," he said.
"I'm only sorry the Congress
has been deprived of the oppor-
tunity to review the material."
I He said that his investigation
Hunt referrals fed the suspicion`
that many C.I.A. men continue'
to work- for the agency long af-
ter appearcng to resign or re--
tiring. Mr, Hunt-testified that,
he 'retired'.; once in the mid
1960's as. a cover story for
spying assignment in Spain.
The Hiring of Agents
tinez was assigned to learn) (would irwolve covert domestic)
about possible demonstrations, Iagents. Mr. Baker said that "fart
by Cuban-Americans at the, more must be learned? about`
Miami political conventions. the C.I.A.'s hiring of secret
(investigators asked the C.I.A.!
,? about 'this -apparently complete-1
ly. domestic assignment, presu
g
mably forbidden by the Nation-I in Washington on a $250-a-
,al Security Act of 1947, they! 'month retainer. Lee Pennington
were told that the agency was! Jr. was the C.I.A. operative sent
-responding to. a request from ;to the home of James W. Me
'the Secret. Service which had) Card Jr.', convicted Watergate
the responsibility for candidate burglar, two days after the
safety. Mr. Baker said there break in -and the man who
was no clear reason why the) assisted, in the destruction of
Secret Service should have papers that might have linked
asked the C.I.A.;. for such Mr. McCord to the C.I.A.
domestic intelligence. Mr. Pennington died of a
Support for Hunt heart attack last year, but not
befor
te
if
i
e
st
y
ng that he had
Moreover, Mr. Baker said, .
when he attempted to interview been retained by the agency to
Mr. Martinez's case officer dur- gather information in Washing-
ing the crucial period in 1971 ton. Mr. Baker said he had,
and early 1972, he was first found indications that there
told the officer was "on African were "other Lee Penningtons."
f
i"
sa
ar
and then was later told.
he was unavailable because he
was serving in Indo-China. Mr.
Baker said the agency had also
withheld numerous documents
concerning Mr' Martinez's acti-
vities.
The third area proposed for
investigation is the support fort
Mr. Hunt. Mr. Baker's investi.j
gation disclosed that, in addi-
tion to providing Mr. Hunt with
disguises, false documents and
hidden cameras, the C.I.A. had
referred Mr. Hunt to former
agency personnel who might be
willing to become involved in
espionage operations.
Upon Mr. Hunt's request he
was given the name and loca-
tion of a "lock picker" and men
agents in the United States. It
was his investigation that first
of a domestic agent operatin
Finally Mr. Baker would in-
vestigate fronts and proprietary
companies.
The Baker investigation un-
covered indications that the
C.I.A. had retained and possibly
fully supported private investi-
gation agencies in the United
States that could conduct
domestic surveillance opera-
tions under the guise of private
investigations.
Mr. Baker said this evidence
coupled with his findings on
the operations of the now-dc-
ifunct Robert Mullen Company
Irequired that Congress "learn a
,great
great deal more about the
A.'s investment in private
industry, and its use of -private
firms for cover operations."
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LONDON TIMES
16 December 1971i-
Muted voice
Is the Voice of America going
soft on . Communism ? The
thrust of a Time magazine
article last week was that Henry
Kissinger's detente policies have
muted America's official over-
seas broadcasts, particularly
those in 16 Soviet and East
European languages.
Provocative stories are sup-
posedly being avoided. Read-
ings in Russian of Solzhenitsyn's
Gulag Archipelago were vetoed.
VOA correspondents abroad
complain they are being sup.
pressed when they try report-
ing internal dissidence, accord-
ing to the article.
ington. Some staff on news and
current affairs see nothing to
complain about if the "Voice"
is at last losing its ideological
stigma, -
They claim, perhaps extra-
vagantly, that for plain news
they have long been on a par
with BBC overseas services. The
propaganda tag of cold war vin-
tage has long irked them, as
being a deterrent to listeners.
If the. United States Informa.
tion Agency director, James
Keogh, has put a stop to the
aggressive anti-Soviet commen-
taries which his predecessor,
Frank Shakespeare, urged on
them, they are not grumbling.
The grumbles which Time re-
ported may come from emigres
in the East bloc services, who
feel they are losing their anti-
communist crusade.
Whale policy lines come from
the State. Department, through
USIA, working news staff claim
they are not excessively inhibit-
ing to ingenuity. When Keogh,
for example, gave a directive
that unnamed source Watergate
stories attacking the Nixon Ad-
ministration were not to be
used, the news reports simply
quoted the White House spokes-
men denying the offending
stories, which were then told at
length.
Officially, the VOA will not
admit that the voice of ideo-
logy has been muted. Officials
assert that it has not been
there for some time. Yet Ruth
Walter, VOA spokeswoman,
said: "When our Government's
foreign policy changes, we have
to change, too."
Time had one damaging
quote. It said that Pavel Lit-
vinov, an exile speaking to
Soviet Service VOA - staff,
declared: "The quality of your
broadcasts to my country has
declined 500 per cent in the
last few years." And the staff
applauded.
Miss Walter says he never
said it. The tape of the talk has
neither that quote nor the
applause, she insists, although
Litvinov did accuse VOA of
having less to say about internal
events in Eastern Europe. She
points out that the CIA's Radio
Liberty in Germany, now openly
financed by Congress, is speci-
fically there for a propaganda
purpose. VOA people seem
happy to be called soft if it
makes ,them a harder news
organization. ..
It has had interesting reper-
cussions at VOA headquarters,
Fred Emery reports from Wash.
NEW YORK TIMES
17 January 1975
Soviet Trade Fiasco`
.- C bL -. a... ..
Frv.rn 1-, vivid TT 'o . rCpuu.a:l.,7-.
nivi
aLSULL v1 talc t a- a-
emigration compromise negotiated by Secretary Kissinger
i with Moscow and Senate leaders, the country should
learn some important lessons.
The first .is that a' superpower cannot be pushed
around by a Senator, even a superpower's senator.
Senator Jackson's amendment to the trade bill undoubt-
edly helped Mr. Kissinger obtain, by quiet diplomacy,
a. huge increase in Jewish emigration to about 35,000
in 1973. But by dragging out the issue for two years.
and insisting on public "assurances" from Moscow=-
against the State Department's strong advise-Mr..
Jackson overplayed his hand and, as President Ford
has noted helped to achieve results. quite t11e opposite
from those he intended.
The second lesson is that the Congressional role in
overseeing the Administration's foreign policy is that
of advice and consent, not taking negotiations into
Senatorial hands or tieing the hands of the officially
designated negotiators. The Stevenson amendment limit-
ing Export-Import Bank credits to the Soviet Union to
the insignificant sum of $300 million over four years
undoubtedly grew out of the atmosphere of "victory
over Moscow" that Senator Jackson created, but it
carried the error a disastrous last step.
'Instead of . permitting the President to relax the
restrictions when convinced that Soviet-American rela=
tions and the future of d?tente would benefit, the final
version of the amendment adopted by the Senate re-
quired further Congressional , approval for each credit
i.
Increase over the ceiling. This. clearly was the straw
that. broke the Soviet camel's back.
The third lesson is that detente is still too fragile a
thing to carry the kind of load some Americans seek
to put on it. It has been evident since 1971 that the
(basic transaction in the new Soviet-American relation-
ship has been a Soviet offer of detente to obtain Western
:technology and credits and an American offer of trade
and credits to obtain detente. All elements of detente, .
including strategic arms control, the, Middle East, Viet-
`nam, and progress in human rights, such as Jewish emi-
gration, are unavoidably linked to trade and credits. One
is not politically possible without the other.
But the linkage must be flexible, rather than rigid,
and the quid pro quo in trade and credits must be
there in sizable amount. The Senate repudiated the
Kissinger compromise when it passed the Stevenson
amendment. The tragedy is that Moscow could not wait
for the Ford Administration, in the current session of
Congress, to try to reverse it.
The fourth lesson is that the Stevenson amendment
must be quickly reversed because it not only shackles
the Administration's efforts on the emigration issue but
son all negotiations to assure a. peaceful world.
Trade can continue to expand despite the failure of
the trade pact. The Soviet Union's hard currency earn-
ings abroad have been increased by the rise in oil, gas
.and mineral prices, and Moscow. is in less need of
,credits for short- and even medium-term purposes. But
some long-term projects, each of which would have to
be weighed on its merits, will be unable to go forward'
,until long-term credit facilities are created.
Emigration undoubtedly will continue to be linked to
trade and detente, as from the beginning. The Soviet
Union demonstrated a refusal to be pressured by re-
ducing emigration to 20,000 last year and it continues
to drop. A turn-around will depend on the whole state
of Soviet-American relations..
A dangerous period has opened. Far more than trade
and emigration is involved. In the Mideast peace nego-'
;tiations, the Soviet view has never been identical with
that of the United States, except on the determination
to avoid a nuclear confrontation. If the prospects for
detente continue to dwindle, the chances for a moderate
Soviet policy in the Mideast may dwindle with it.
There is less danger of a breakdown in arms control
.negotiations. Here both countries have identical interests.
But in other fields, such as mutual force reductions in
.Europe and efforts to resume peace negotiations in Viet-
nam, as well as the Middle East, hope for a more peaceful
%world will ride on the Administration's new efforts to
revise Congressional trade, and credit restrictions.
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NEW YORK TIMES
12 JANUARY 1975
:
PARIS SPECULATES mand of from the the North Ath Aanti
mend tlantic
Treaty Organization and her
g~ expulsion of all United States.
ON U. S. ~j~!PIES military units.
Criticism by Communist
Officials on both sides said
that this represented no change
Desert-Warfare Exercises -in French policy toward NATO
or military cooperation with
and Kissinger 's Remarks the United States. Nonetheless;
Stir Questions on Oil the exercises were not generally
known and the aisciosure
brought a sharp attack on the
By FLORA LEWIS Government from the Commu-
SpCiat to The New York Ti- nist leader, Georges Marchais.
!dip ?. mat dent Valery Giscard d'Estaing's has compounded the problem of
s
s inger the gunboat diplomat failure to denounce Secrete communications, making'it har-
Peaaceceeded Priza e w winninnerer? the Nobel of State Kissinger's public] Secretary: der for many officials and diPlo-
P" the an-
'nouncer on a French television statement that United States 1 mats as well as newsmen to ob-
-newscast asked this week. ' military intervention in the) tain needed information.
He was commenting Tuesday Middle East was "not ruled A number of French and West
night on a news film clip show out' meant that Paris had given German diplomats are com-
ing a, landing exercise on a tacit approval to American plaining-as American diplo-
Mediterranean beach involving. policy. mats have complained through
-1,000 marines attached to the' The Communist leader said out the Kissinger years-that
United States Sixth Fleet. The' more than tacit approval was they are being kept in the dark
implication appeared to be that involved in the French Govern- by their own Governments.
land in ment's willingness to permit The recent NATO meeting in
the marines were practicing to (
United States exercises at Can- Brussels and the European sum-
Arab oil-producing;
'countries. juers, "in geographical condi. mit conference in ? Paris were
However, the program's di- tions like those to be found in cited by some officials as ex-
rector, Michel Texier, said sub- the Middle East." amples of the problem.
rector, y that it was simply "It is veritable collusion, Secretary of State Kissinger
intended to show "part the deliberate," he added. said at a news conference at
intended show
openly the Officials said there'was a 10- the end of the meeting of conti
rec- ognized by the plans of day- marine exercise at Can- foreign ministers of the North,
-State 'so as to be prepared for juers, a relatively new base,.in
January, 1974. The marines
.all eventualities." L- ., __ L__ ,______,_..
The newscast, which, has vpora`e "ere, by themselves,
although facilities 'at the base
provoked some renewed' con- and its firing ranges are
cern here about United States manned by the French.
intentions in the Middle. East, Other exercises have taken
followed by, several days the' place at the ' Foreign' Legion
publication of Secretary of base at Lovo-Santo in Corsica,
State Kissinger's remarks sug- where United States marines
gesting that force might be and French legionnaires join
used to solve the oil problem in
in assault landing. practice. The
a case "where there is some last such exercise was in Octo-
actual strangulation of to beg, 1974, and lasted four days.
industrial world." "The marines show the
Ready for the Desert legionnaires new tactics and
Until Mr. Kissinger's remarks techniques for amphibious
about the possibility of inter- operations, and the . French
vention, the widespread specu- show us the latest in com-
lation in Europe about possible mando tactics," according to
American military action against Comdr. Gene Wentz, spokesman
Arab oil fields was based main- for the United States Naval
ly on television films of Ameri- Command in Europe at. its Lon-
can troops practicing for desert don headquarters.
warfare in the western part 'of The French television clip on
the- United States.. the Sardinia exercise was an
The French film; made about extract from a 20-minute seg-
two weeks ago, showed Ameri- ment about the Sixth Fleet
can marines from the Sixth shown Thursday night as part
Fleet landing on the Italian is-, of an hour-long current events
land of Sardinia. However, the review. It included an inter-
speaker said that they planned{ view with the fleet's com-
further training exercises in mander, Vice Adm. Frederick
France. Turner, who described his mis-
Military sources here said the ? sion as maintaining and safe-
exercises would be held at Can- - guarding United States . inter-
juers, a French tank and artil- ests in the Mediterranean.
lery base near Toulon. While At one point, the French in.
the exact dates were not offi-` terviewer sought to learn from
cially made public, the ships) a marine officer whether he
bringing the contingent, about
200 marines were due at'Saint-
Raphael yesterday. and were to
leave on Jan. 20, the, officials
said.
It was learned on inquiry
from.French and United States
military sources that, small
units of marines have been
training on French soil for some
years, despite France's with-
to die for oil wells" and elic-
ited the reply "Yes," suggest-
ing that the motivation for a
military operation existed.
But when pressed, the offi
cer, identified only as Captain
Germain, said that in the pres-
ent situation he did not "think
an intervention would be nec-
e.,sary."
NEW YORK TIMES
23 December 1974
SUMMIT PARLEYS -
HAMPER ENVOYS
Are Said to Curb the'Flow of
Information to Diplomats
By FLORA LEWIS.
Spedal to The New York Times
PARIS, Dec. '22-The growing
trend -for direct personal con-
.press spakesmenr _ - -~
Apparently, Mr. Kissinger
understood "discretion" to
mean a refusal to tell the press
what was said. The delegatiae
of the Netherlands, which has aE
Policy- of generally. open infor-i
mation, interpreted it to me=,
giving a. fair summary of tile}
,speeches since there had been'
nothing-' particularly sensitise;
Or embarrassing that seemed to
warrant concealment.-
According to NATO sourcces~ !
Mr. Kissinger was furious. Tlse1
United - States spokesman
Robert Anderson, held a brief-
ing in which he said that re-
ports of'.Mr. Kissinger's speech
based . on. the Dutch briefing
were "inaccurate." But he ae`
fused to-,;say anything more or
to give an American version of.
what had been said.' ' I
Information Tightened
The Secretary's anger led,
most delegations to tighten on the ~>information they dis-
closed for fear that full reportsi
might endanger future allied:(
exchanges, press officers said.
I
Thus, briefings were held by
spokesmen who had to get their
information second-hand be-
cause they had not- been al-
lowed into the restricted sew
on Dec. 12 and 13 that it was were restricted to newsmem-t
"the !
best NATO JCSsIIJrl.l 114Ve of the nation providing time
attended." report. Later, the reporters ex-
"The new format of restricted changed hat theth adilear accept sessions makes for a better dia-i tion at one more remove from
logue and less formal state-; the source.
ments," he said. "`I recognize itj The difficulties. at the F
also makes , for ..more erratic'
briefings; since not all delega-I roPcan summit meeting in Paris
tions interpret the -restrictions
in a similar manner, and we
will have that straightened out
by the next meeting."
An Angry Dispute,
information policy during the
session. -
Mr. Kissinger had proposed
"restricted -sessions" with all
two weeks ago had a similar(
effect of making information
hard -to obtain. Mr. Giscard.f
d'Estaing had insisted that only
Government heads and foreign
ministers be admitted to the
session-so -as to encourage easy
exchanges.
The governmental press
spokesmen were willing to pre
vide information, but the tight)
schedule of the conference en t
abled them to see their top de-i
excluded and the usual press Ii legates only for two or three
briefing sessions - afterward j minutes after each session.
limited 'to statements of "dis-II They had to obtain what news;
cretion."- The ministers agreed I they could get on the run arid!
to have only two aides present,I1 were unable to answer many-(
WASHINGTON POST
12 January 1975
Russell Tribunal
BRUSSELS-The second
'session of the Bertrand Rus-
sell tribunal's "trial" of four
Latin American countries
for violations of human
rights opened here.
Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and
Bolivia were found guilty of
"crimes against humanity"
at the first session of the
"trial" last March in Rome.
The second session is to ana-
lyze the countries' social
and economic systems.
00432I4O0o100358003-6
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Tuesday, io z. 7, I975 THE WASHINGTON POST
By John M. Goshko
Washington Post Foreign Service
BONN, Jan. 6-The threat
of a new Arab-Israeli war-
and its potential conse-
quences for West Germany
Jews. or, Democratic leader, is report.
? Defying the Americans edly the Cabinet's strongest
PV-V Luc consideration should be its
Arabs, who provide roughly security relationship with
70 per cent of West Ger. the Uni't d St t
for Helmut Schmdt s gov-
ernment.
. The possibility that fight-
ing might break out again in
the Middle East, bringing in
its wake a new oil embargo,
is a topic of considerable
concern in all West Euro-
pean capitals. Even more
than the others, Bonn has
,special reasons for anxiety
about the situation.
Tremendous quantities of
American arms and military
equipment are stockpiled in-
West Germany. in the event
of a new Middle East war,
any U.S. attempt to resupply
Israel would almost cer-
tainly involve drawing upon
these stocks and transport-
ing them from air bases and
ports within Germany.
about which path they
would choose in the event of
war. Despite a growing
surge of speculation in the
German press, the Schmidt
government has alternately
refused to say anything, is-
suing terse restatements of
its neutrality, or talked
cryptically around the sub-
ject.
-
In an interview published
in this week's edition of the
I newsmagazine, Der Spiegel,
Schmidt said, "I know of no
pressure" from the United
States to make air bases and
port facilities available for
supplying Israel.
He added that Bonn
would not react to such
pressure. Beyond that, he
said only, "Since I don't re-
gard myself as chancellor of
a world power, I will, not
philosophize publicly about
[that] question. That'would
be fatally dangerous."
But such a move would
run directly counter to West
Germany's policy of, "strict
neutrality" in the MiddleEast. That was made quite';
clear during the 1973 Octo-
ber war, when U.S. ship
ments from Germany to Is-
rael embroiled Washington
and Bonn in one of the most !
acrimonious disputes of
their long postwar alliance.
The Middle East cease-fire
enabled the two govern.
ments to paper over their .
differences before they esca-
lated to the crisis stage. But
German officials are keenly
.aware that a new war would
put their neutrality policy
under agonizing strains.
Bonn probably would not
be able to avoid getting
caught in the cross-fire' Its
dilemma would be a choice
between equally unappeal-?,
ing options:'
? Going along, at least
passively, with the United
States, the ultimate guaran-
tor of West Germany's cecu-
rjty, and with Israel, whfse
very existence is the direct
result of Nazi Germany's at-
tempt to exterminate the,
however, about how much
backing Genscher has for
this position in his own
party.
The Cabinet's foremost
exponent of not offendinz
the Arabs is Economics Min-
ister. Hans Friderichs, also a
Free Democrat and a man
who is believed to harbor
ambitions about supplanting
Genscher as party leader.
Starting under former
Chancellor. Willy Brandt
an~ I as mild and non-provocative as
sues that the Secretary had ;
marks
articularl
thos
i
t
h
p
y
e
n
er-
t
ey could be adtill b h
,n seon.
preted as critical of European been referring to the past, arid1 est. 1-le could not honestl
have
n
t t
y
o
governments,
o governments but to in- said, the aide observed, that
dividuals, according to a Paris the United States would in no
Those comments appeared ink dispatch' to The, New York
_an interview with Mr..Kjssin-, Times. The. sam. explanation it ciary mr ficctioones ta countenance mil-
n.
32
eac
on to Mr. Kissinger
s (would rush to the rescue of they
remarks, said the Secretar
Arabs
d
h
y
an
t
at the Amei(
,rcan considered his comments t
b
public would not tolerate a newt
war. 1
Those who talked about in
tervention did so privately or:
anonymously. Former Senator.
J. W. Fulbright, who retired
last week as chairman of the
Senate Foreign. Relations Com=
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mittee, said he had heard in-
tervention discussed at dinner
tables and in Capitol cloak-
rooms.
A major oil executive labeled
the discussion `loose talk.'
Frank Ikard, president of the
American Petroleum Institute,
speaking before Mr. Kissinger's
interview appeared,' said: "You
hear it more in. the form of a
question than anything else.
I haven't heard it from any-
body at the policy level, . any-
body who can makea decision
on it."
Like many others Mr. Ikard;
termed intervention `unthink-I
able.'
Representative John Brademas l
of Indiana, deputy chief whips
of the Democratic majority in
the House of Representatives,,
described Secretary Kissinger's.
remarks as unwarranted and
unwise. Senator Hugh Scott of
Pennsylvania, the Senate Re-
publican leader, said, on the
other hand, that the Secretary
was entirely right. .
If the United States was in.
dire economic straits, Mr. Scott;
said on ABC television's "Issues
and Answers," "I can't imagine
this country not doing what-
ever it needed to do, either
economic or military, to permit
itself to survive, and we
wouldn't be worth a damn as.
a nation if we didn't."
Actually, the question of us-
a. ~
of the minds of policy makers
since the beginning of the Arab
oil embargo against the West
in 1973. President Ford men-
tioned it obliquely in his speech
to, the World Energy Confer-
ece in Detroit on Sept. 23.
"Throughout history," he
said, "nations have gone to war
over natural advantages such
as water or food, or convenient
passage on land or sea."
"But," he added in the very
next sentence, "in the nuclear
age, when any local' conflict
may escalate to a global ca-
tastrophe, war brings unaccept-
able risks for all mankind."
Weighed and Rejected
The President's energy ad-
visers reportedly considered a
.military option in their discus-
sions at Camp David, Md., last
Dec. 14 and 15, but the White
House said, their recommenda-
tions did not include it. '
. So far the most extensive
and closely reasoned public ex-
amination of the military option
has come from John Hopkins
University professor of interna-
tional relations, Robert W.
Tucker, whose analysis was
printed in the January issue of
Commentary, published by the
American Jewish Committee.
Remarking on the "astonish-
ing" absence of any meaningful
threat of force in the crisis,
Professor Tucker examined the
technical feasibility of military
intervention. He concluded that
it would depend on whetner
there was a relatively restricted
area containing enough oil to
provide reasonable assurance
that, if war effectively con-
trolled, it could break the car-
tel of - the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries.
"The one area that would ap-
pear to satisfy these require-
ments," Professor Tucker
wrote, "extends from Kuwait
down along the coastal region
of Saudi Arabia to Qatar." It,
supplies 40 per cent of present
OPEC production and contains
40 per cent of world reserves.*
"Since it has no substantial
centers of population and is
without trees," the article
added, "its effective control
does not bear even remote
comparison with the experience
,of Vietnam."
The Public and the Allies
The American public, Pro-
fessor Tucker said, would
assuredly oppose another Viet-
nam, but might support inter-
vention if it promised success
at a modest cost. The United
States would have to act unilat-
erally, he suggested, but its al-
lies could later be won over by
"even-handed" distribution of
the oil. As for the. Russians,
he said they ."still lack the
naval forces needed for effec-
tive interposition in the Persian
Gulf."
Against. Professor Tucker's
sanguine view must be put
other opinions. Secretary Kis-
singer, himself told- Business
Week that miiit;~ry action on
oil prices would be "a very
dangerous course."
"We should have learned
from Vietnam that it is easier
to get into a war than to get
out of it," he said, adding that
it would be reckless to take
military action without consid-
ering what the Soviet 'Union
might do.
Conspicuously silent amid
this speculation has been the
Defense Department. While it
may have. contingency plans,
the Secretary of Defense, James
R. Schlesinger, has pointedly,
avoided menttioning any pos-
sibility of military intervention.
Given the risks, why is the
military option tempting? Main-
ly because political and eco-
nomic measures . .offer no
immediate promise of. stopping
the financial hemorrhage caused
by the quadrupling of oil prices
and the threat of another em-
bargo in case Israel and the
Arab states go to war again.
'The Low-Cost Option'
One of the experts at the
Camp David conference is said
to have passed around a note
saying-facetiously or not,
"Let's try the low-cost option-
war." This alludes to Govern-
ment analysts' calculation that
at the present rate the oil-ex-
porting countries will have ac-
cumulated monetary surpluses
by 1985 totaling $1.2-trillion-
about six times the present
monetary reserves of the entire
world.
Even among' those who fear
war there are some who have
said privately that it does no
harm to let the Arabs know
that they are running risks too,
for it may make them more
amenable to persuasion.
Approved For Rase 2001/08/08 :
NEW YORK TIMES
12 JANUARY 1975
ARABS QUESTION f peaceful way," he was quoted
as having said recently.
KISSINGER'S ROLE 1 The reaction has a bearing
~on the attitude of the Arab oil
producers, which are actively
By JUAN de ONIS
Special to The New York Times
BEIRUT, Jan. 11-Arabs are
beginning to question Secretary
of State Kissinger's role as a
peacemaker in the Middle Eaat,
following his statement on
preparing for discussions in
Algeria this month on a pro-
ducer-consumer conference.
The United States has sought
prior coordination among the
consuming countries before they
meet with the producers.
In an evident reference to
and Japan, which depend heav
ily on imported oil, Mr. Kissin-i
ger said in his interview that
the consumers had to achieve)
"financial solidarity so that]
individual countries are not so
obsessed by,their sense of im-
portance that they are prepared
to negotiate on the producers'
terms."
To the arab oil? experts who'
have studied the statement, this
smells of a "confrontation pol-
icy," as one Kuwaiti adviser
said.
hTe oil producers have also
noted the United States refusal
to support the proposal of the
European Economic Community
for an expanded borrowing and
leanding facility under the In-
. ternational Monetary fund to
channel surplus oil 'funds to in-
dustrial countries with payment
difficulties. .
This is regarded as another
exampie of American uai'gaiii-
ing tactics that set little store
by cooperation on reaching
agreement with oil producers
on a system of long-term lend-
ing of surplus funds that would
protect the value of petro dol-
lars.
Without such an agreement,
big producers, such as Saudi
Arabia, that earn far more than
they can currently spend do-
mestically, have little incentive
to maintain even present levels
of output.
But if there is a production
reduction, for lack of economic
incentive, prices would tend to~
rise. The question being raised
here is whether this would)
move the oil problem toward!
the status of "gravest emergen-,
cy" that Mr. Kissinger has said'
would make military action a
possibility.
use of. military force against
oil-producing countries. They
are. wondering what heh really
had in mind in his comments in
a recent interview with Busi-
ness Week. .
Mr. Kissinger appeared to
rule out military action just to
bring down oil prices as "a very
dangerous course,." but he sug-
gested that it was another mat-
ter if "there is some actual
strangulation of the industral-
ized world" through a new em-
bargo or an outbreak of war
between Israel and the Arab
states.
Al Ahram, a Cairo newspaper,
that often reflects official think-
ing, said editorially that his
comments did not indicate that
the United States was thinking
clearly about the relationship
between oil and a political set-
tlement in the Middle East.
"The policy of recourse to
force against the oil-producing
countries ignores the funda-
mental fact that the use of oil
as a weapon is a direct result
of United States support of
Israel," the newspaper said. "If
the U.S. is concerned about the
.continued flow of Arab oil sup-
plies, it need only deal with the
cause of the problem without
having to move its forces and
occupy the oil fields in the Mid-
dle East."
A Kuwaiti Reaction
Abdel-Rahman al-Atigi, Ku-!
wait's Minister of Finance and
Oil, said military action was
"incomprehensible" from the
standpoint of oil problems,
"What can be gained by force
can also be had in a cheaper
way, and at lower prices, in a
NEW YORK TIMES
5 JANUARY 1975
.Endearing Indira
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi for years has been
famous for biting the hands that feed India. But in her
latest lecture' to the world's advanced nations, she out-
does herself.
Mrs. Gandhi last week called it "a new form of arro.
gance" for countries that have provided India with mil-
lions of tons of grain in the past to be concerned in the
present world food shortage with The soaring demands
of governments that have not been able to reach neces-
sary levels of food production or adequately to curb
population growth, or both.
The irony is that much of India's present problem
stems from the high prices of the oil cartel, which Mrs.
Gandhi hypocritically refrains from attacking, knowing
that her friends there would be likely to cut off such
aid as they are granting. The West, in contrast, has
suffered Mrs. Gandhi's own form of arrogance for years,
but undoubted) wil i t'n 4 ~jj out of human
Cs Qpy7f7P~to iW ff TWs most impor-
tant democratic experiment.
 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6
5 January 1975
by ANDREW WILSON objectives are to a degree
T1RF (1RSP.RVF.R has ob- . try's naval facilities.as havi central auesng centradicuestian on thatAmeer r the
ica's
ar
Ftainea the Iull tCXC Vi uic yvu uic - ??-? e"'vu" C ~~we wvuuwouva,
controversial secret docu- ence which cannot be dupli- regimes =the range of of their current racial and
ment on United States cated elsewhere in Africa. : options is limited.. On one colonial policies, and through'
foreign policy objectives in It also refers to a US. missile hand, it says, the US cannot more substantial economic
uthern Africa known as tracking - station ' (since endorse the racial policies of assistance to the black States
closed) and to US finance of a
So : the white. regimes; on. the, help to draw the two groups
National Security Study British installation In Swazi- other, ` our interests do not to-ether and exert some influ=.
Memorandum 39. land ` which helps us monitor justify the consideration of. ence on both for peaceful
Parts of it have been nuclear atmospheric explo- US military intervention in change.
quoted in the US Press, but slons.' the area,' including involve- NSSM 39 goes on : `We
the whole goes much further Another installation of meat in the enforcement of
explaining the Nixon Ad? major importance' is a NASA sanctions. would maintain public opposi-
in ministration's `tilt' towards station for cracking. un- The document outlines tion to racial repression but
the Vorster and Smith manned spacecraft. . a number of policy options. - relax political isolation and.
regimes, America's concern ` We (also) have an atomic Option One-'Closer asso- economic restrictions on the
for continued British use of energy agreement with South ciation with the white white States. We would begin
the Simonstown base, and its Africa under the Atoms for by modest indications of this
interest in Mr Callaghan's Peace programme; this. is, regimes' is based on the pre- , relaxation, broadening the
current efforts to secure a important in influencing mise that, whatever America scope of our relations and
does, it can have no signifi? contacts gradually and to.
constitutional settlement in South Africa to continue its _ cant effect on the region, and some degree in response to
Rhodesia. policy of doing nothing in the that it should simply try to tangible-albeit small and
Evidence that the tilt' marketing. of its large produc- protect its economic and gradual-moderation of white
continues under President tion of uranium oxide which strategic interests in the policies. Without openly
Ford came just before Christ- would have the effect of in- white States. taking a position undermin-
mas with the sacking by Dr creasing the number of nut . Option Two-described as ing the UK and-the United
Kissinger, the, Secretary of Tear weapons powers. `broader association with Nations on Rhodesia, we
State, of Mr Donald Easum, NSSM 39 says there is a both black and white States would be more flexible in our
his chief adviser oil African basic consensus in the US in an effort to .encourage attitude toward the Smith
I afairc anird an advocate of a Government that US inter- m :deratia n and rcd't:cc tc n- regime.' "?
more active anti-apartheid ests in Southern, Africa are sion -is based on the pre- According to the memor
policy. It was followed last not vital security matters, and raise that the blacks cannot andum the US would have to
week by a report that the US. that most black nations.. gain political rights through ex p rebuffs from both
will provide South Africa would tend to judge con- violence. p
with enriched uranium for its spicuous US co-operation Option Three - limited Whites and blacks in attempt-
first big nuclear power plant. with the white regimes as association with the white ing to develop an atmosphere
`NSSM 39' was prepared condoning their racial poll- States and continuing associa- conducive to change in white
by a group of experts from cies.But it also admits to a tion with the blacks--is based attitudes through persuasion
the State and Defence Depart- basic intellectual disagree- on the premise that a posture and erosion. To encourage
ments and the Central Intelli- . ment' within the Administra- on the racial question accept- this change in white attitudes,
gence Agency.. It was de- tion on such vital questions able to the blacks need not the US would have to
livered to Mr Nixon in 1969 as the inevitability of vio- entail giving up all material show willingness to accept
under the direction of Dr lence. - interests in the white States* political arrangements short
Kissinger, at that time the ' On Rhodesia, the memoran- Option Four - dissociation of guaranteed progress to-
'President's foreign policy dum says that the sanctions. from the white regimes and ward majority rule, ? pro-
devised by 'the British were closer relations with the vided that they assure
advise. memorandum begins 'a compromise between force, blacks-is based on the pre- broadened political participa-
by listing America's `import- which they were unwilling to mise that America cannot in- tion in some form by the
ant, but not vital' interests contemplate largely because fluence the Whites for con- whole population.'
in the region-about #400 of domestic reasons, and structive change; that increas- In a move to forestall critic=
million worth of investments, doing nothing, which would ing violence is therefore ism arising foam the possible
a highly profitable trade , have jeopardised their rela- , likely; and that ` by cutting leaking of NSSM 39, the State
balance, and substantial tions with the black. African '.our ties with the white Department. stated in a fact
States'-and that the US regimes we can protect our sheet last year that the US
political and military inter- co-operated for the same stand on the racial issue in had adopted a policy
errs. In addition, it says, the reasons. It deplores an black Africa . and inter- of `communication' in its
US has an indirect interest . overestimate' of the effec- nationally.' dealings. With South Africa.
in the key role which South tiveness of the programme. -?. Option Five - dissociation This, it said, meant the main-
Africa ' plays in the UK NSSM 39 lists the broad ob. from both sides-is based on tenance of formal, if not
balance of payments. 'UK jectives of US policy towards the premise that confronta- cordial, relations, with South
investment in South Africa is Southern Africa as follows: tion will grow worse despite Africa, while. making clear
currently estimated at $3,000 0 To improve the US stand- "any outside efforts.--and that America's ' abhorrence of
million (#1,250 million), and ing in black Africa and inter- the US should simply lower South Africa's racial policies.
the British have made it clear nationally on the racial issue. its profile in the area. It said ` America would con-
they will take no action which 0 To minimise the likeli- The crucial option turns tinue to support 'fully the
would jeopardise their econo- hood of escalation of violence out to have been the second UN embargo on arms to South
mic interests.' in the area and the risk of US one, for it was this that was Africa, and would not en-
The memorandum says the involvement. recommended by Dr Kissin- courage investment there.
US has an important interest O To minimise the oppor- ger and which, State Depart- But this has not allayed
in the orderly marketing of tunities for the USSR and meat sources now admit, was fears in the UN and in sec-
South Africa's gold produc- China to exploit the racial' adopted by President Nixon. tiions of the British Labour
tion which is important to the issue in the region for propa In the relevant passage the movement that the US, hay-
successful operation of the ganda advantage and to gain
memorandum states : The ing modified its former strict
two-tier gold price system. political influence with black whites are here to stay and policy on South Africa, is now
- On defence it is even more Governments and liberation ' the only way that constructive pressing, in NATO, for an ex-
emphatic; `Southern Africa movements. change can come about is tension of the North Atlantic
is geographically' important 0 To encourage moderation through them. ' There is no', alliance's responsibilities 'to
for the US and its allies, of the current rigid racial and.; hope for the blacks to gain the Southern Hemisphere.
particularly with the closing colonial policies of the white the political rights they seek This fear is given impetus by
of the Suer. Canal and the in- regimes. through violence, which will a passage in the memorandum
creased Soviet activity in the 0 To protect economic, scien- only lead to chaos and in- which describes South ASri-
Ind.ian Ocean.' title and strategic interests creased opportunities for the can port facilities as being
After mentioning overflight and opportunities in the Communists of `long-term strategic nn-
and landing facilities in South region, including the orderly 'We can, by selective portance to the US and its
Africa it describes the coup- marketuig of South Africa's relaxation of our stance to. allies in view of increasing
34
ward the white regimes, Soviet activity in the Indian
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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
24 December 1974
Portugal's oil-rich separatist hotbed
By Dev Murarka
Special to
The Christian Science Monitor
1 Moscow
Soviet experts on Portuguese Africa
are charging repeatedly that the
Central Intelligence Agency and the
Gulf Oil Corporation of America are.
active in backing separatist move-
ments in Angola, particularly its oil-
bearing part, Cabinda.
The Portuguese colony of Angola is
rich in minerals and oil. But it also
has a comparatively large population
of white settlers, 600,000 out of a total
of nearly 6 million. This makes the
decolonization a complex one.
Fighting erupts
Last month Cabinda was shaken by
fighting between the Popular Move-
ment for the Liberation of Angola
(MPLA), the leading political party
there, and the Cabinda Enclave Lib-
eration Frnnt (FT.EC.1, IFLEC
claimed it wanted to secede from
Angola and form a separate state.
Cabinda is so rich in oil that this
year the revenue from sales is esti-
mated to be $400 million or more. The
argument used by FLEC, with tribal
overtones, is that if the oil wealth was
used only by the local tribe and not
shared with the rest of Angola, Cabin-
da'would become another Kuwait.,
One of the Soviet experts on Portu-
guese Africa who has often traveled
behind the guerrilla lines there, S.
Kulik, charges in No. 50 of the Soviet .
magazine New Times: "The U.S.-
operated Gulf Oil Corporation, which
exploits Cabinda's oil fields, suspi-
ciously hastened to back this idea [of
secession] and gave FLEC financial
assistance."
Troops regain control
For the time being, it is reported,
the MPLA and Portuguese troops
operating jointly, have subdued the
FLEC followers and regained control
of Cabinda town. The dismissal of
many local officials and several
senior commanders of the Portuguese
garrison in Cabinda followed, for
condoning FLEC activities.
The problem in Angola, however, is
not confined to the dispute between
the MPLA and theFLEC alone. There
are numerous splinter groups claim-
ing a share in the succession to
Portuguese rule. Some of them are
tied to the white settlers. But the most
important,.the Angolan National Lib-
eration Front (FNLA), is based
mostly in the north, on Angola's
borders with Zaire, and is supported
by the Zaire government. It is led by
Holden Roberto.
'Soviet blame U.S.
But the Soviet version puts more of
the blame for Angola's problems on
the United States.
In an earlier New Times article
(No. 46), Oleg Ignatyev claimed that
"judging by numerous statements of
its former leaders, [FLEC] had been
r;,;:uay pu V.7lU1(CU by thG U1111C11
States, which also supplied weapons
for Roberto's units.
"In response to this American con-
cern for the national liberation move-
ment, the FNLA played the part of a
cordon hindering the MPLA's oper-
ations in the northern - the richest
and most densely populated - parts
of Angola."
Mr. Ignatyev's account goes on:
"Of late the Maoists have joined in
this dirty game. Holden Roberto was
invited to Peking.
Instructors from Peking
"The fascist regime in Portugal had
already been overthrown when 112
Chinese instructors arrived in one of
Roberto's military camps.
"Whom are they going to instruct,
and in what? After all, the democratic
authorities of Portugal have pro-
claimed their firm intention to carry
decolonization through to the end, and
facts show that their words are not at
variance with their deeds.
"It looks very much as if the plans
of the CIA and its backers, the
h i 'Al lyold'v--
ul"Ires
monopolies, which have enormous
capital investments in Angola, coin-
cide with the plans of Peking aimed at
strengthening. the FNLA as a counter-
weight to the MPLA."
From this account it seems obvious
that the Soviets are fully backing the
MPLA, with which they have had
good relations and to which they have
supplied arms in the past.
Moscow would be loath to see a pro-
Western or pro-Chinese group come to
power in Angola, and evidently it will
exercise some pressure in Lisbon
perhaps through the Portuguese Com-
munist Party, to see to it that the
MPLA is given due weight in what-
ever settlement is evolved.
But more than that, it would appear
that a new concern is bothering
Moscow - collusion between China
and the United States to keep the
Soviet influence out of Africa.
It is no secret to anyone familiar
with developments in Portuguese Af-
rica that Pelting has been trying hard
to undercut Soviet influence upon the
guerrilla movements there.
And in the opinion of Soviet experts,
Washington would prefer a Chinese
presence there rather than Soviet
influence because in addition to keep-
ing Moscow out, the Chinese may not
have any other interest which would
clash with Washington's interests.
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Rowland Evans and Robert Novak-
he New VietnamT Crisis
The Ford administration decided
-Tuesday to seek desperately needed
tins from a hostile Congress for be-
leaguered South Vietnam based on
this secret warning from Ambassador
Graham Martin in Saigon: If weapons
continue to be rationed at the present
parsimonious rate for another three
-months, the result will be catastrophic.
Thus, policymakers meeting at, the
S"tate Department decided on an all-
-otitt effort for an immediate $300 mil-
'lign in arms. Most critically needed to
stem the dangerous though still local=
ized Communist offensive is ammuni
tion, particularly for Saigon's ample
'supply of big guns. These guns are
now starved for shells to fire. Also in
critical short supply is aviation fuel,
Well has partially grounded Saigon's
st Al air force.
These shortages of both ammunition
and aviation fuel contributed to Ha-
-poi's conquest of Phuoc Binh City, a
)t Saigon, in the Communists' most
glittering military victory since the
1972 offensive. The latest triumph
flowed cirectly from anti-Saigon ani-
mus in Congress; other military disas-
tth s could follow.
t:: Seeking ni`litar,. aid fcr Sa'c' n a
?f9 :midab e first challenge for Presi-
tlent Fo 'n fac ng the new Congress,
overwhelmingly libera,, and Demo-
crat-c..The difficu.ty w,-,s .inpzreW 'o
,the. ein?r ency session Tuesday of Mr.
VV,-,d's top officials, includinSecre-
tary of State Henry- Kissinger, CIA Di-
rector William Colby and Deputy De-
fense Secretary William Clements.
Their decision, concurred in by the
President: Mr. Ford himself will take
the leading role in persuading Con-
gress.
They were left no choice by Martin's
stringent warning that shortages of
ammunition and fuel were trapping
Saigon's forces in a series . of predicta.
ble? and ugly defeats against the ene-
my's lavishly-equipped tank brigades.
Martin's message was terse: High
battlefield casualties to South Viet-
namese troops defending strongpoints,
including district capitals in the high-
lands, were causing severe' morale
problems. A large percentage of those
casualties, he reported, are directly
due to limitations imposed on the fir-
ing of weapons to conserve dwindling
stocks of ammunition. The stocks have
been dwindling because of the Penta-
gon's allocation of scarce supplies in
compliance with- restricted congres-
sional funding. .
The first crack at Congress will seek
an. immediate $300 million appropria-,
tion to finance conventional ammuni-
tion and. fuel from the Pentagon's do-
mestic stocks, both of which are in
-plentiful supply. The last Congress ac-
tually authorized $1. billion for miti-
'tary aid, to Saigon 'but only appropri-
ated $700 million; so. the $300 million
sought needs clearance for floor action
only by the House and Senate appro-
priations committees, - traditionally
more riendly. toward South Vietnam
'hall the dovish Foreign Affairs and
2oreign Relations Committees.
Despite that slender advantage, Mr.
Ford's aides have no illusions about
the congressional quagmire they are
entering with this week's decision to
reopen the inflammatory congressional
debate over Vietnam. Sen. John
Stennis of Mississippi; chairman of the
Armed Services Committee, has
agreed to help. But other senior Demo-
crats have. not yet been contacted for
help in an uphill battle in each house.
To line up other leaders of both par-
ties; President Ford is planning the
usual high-level talks in the White
House next week.
At first glance, the prospects for get-
ting the 94th Congress_ to help South
Vietnam help itself seem grim. The
freshman liberal Democrats have
emerged from an atmosphere of shame
and anger over the American role in
Vietnam. They have come to Washing-
ton to battle recession and inflation.
not meddle in the blood feuds of Indo-
china.
But. Ford administration officials by
no means feel helpless. The case to be
made for this first installment of emer-
gency aid, on its face, is that Saigon
has displayed surprising resilience and
military skill. Government troops have
been holding their own against North
Vietnamese regulars supplied by Mos-
cow and Peking with tanks, heavy ar-
tillery and other st phisticated arms
moved south from Hanoi since the
cease-fire-in contravention of the
1973 Paris agreement..
If Saigon is given -the means to use
its guns and planes, these officials in-
sist, South Vietnam will not be over-
run. In three months without help, a
final countdown will start with its
tragic climax quite predictable. That is
the choice President Ford is putting
before the 94th Congress.
LONDON TIMES
2 January 1975
Richard Harris concludes his survey of East Asia
The first point to be made
about Vietnam is to affirm that
it is part of the civilization of
East Asia and not part of
South-east Asia, an area that
lacks any real identity. Ruled by
China for a thousand years, tri-
butary to China for another
thousand, Vietnam's Confucian
society did not disappear under
the pressure of French colonial
encroachment. The period was
too short ; the resistance to
French rule too strong. In Viet-
nam the French met with more
violent hostility to their colonial
rule than did any other colonial
power in any other part of Asia.
But having accorded Vietnam
a similar resistance to Western
civilization and the enclosure
within its own world common to
other East Asian. countries, it
WTISly
I T I . ~!~ MI an t
becomes necessary to enter
qualifications: French rule can-
not be disregarded : it left its
deposit of outside culture and
offered Vietnam all inter-
national foothold.
Then there is the difference
between north and south, unlike
Korea. The northern part of
the country is the historical
base of the Vietnamese people,
the part that China ruled in the
first millennium, the part that
kept its tics with China most
closely in the second. But Viet-
namese expansion southwards
led to partition in the 16th cen-
tury. Not until the mid-18th
36
WASHINGTON POST
9 January 1975
far
A O
are
Duties
century was the Mekong Delta
peopled and brought under con-
trol, nor was Vietnam, fully uni-
fied again until French aid
helped the Emperor Gia Long
into power in 1802.
Thus the north is the discip-
lined, hierarchical, authori-
tarian Confucian state in, the
full East Asian sense, -where
government is seen as the apex
and fulfilment of society and
where Vietnamese pau?iotisttl is
most developed. French rule
scurcely had time to make a.
dent in these traditions : it
served only to create a.. new
nationalism.
By contrast the south with it
ethnic and religious divisions i!
anarchic, much less disciplined
its Confucian society diluted
Given to spurious religions an {
tvarlordisnl (and often the tw
combined) it was disrupted eve
more by 90 years of Frenc
rule, 'its upper class seduce
into a subservience to th
French from which the
profited and into a French col
ture that absorbed many o
them to the point of expatria
tiou.
The strong solid north and tb
weak friable south offered
formidable contrast long befor
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W 1975, Fleld'Entenprlses, Inc.
 `Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350003-6 .
the Indochinese Communist similar division after the
Party was founded and Ho Chi Japanese surrender only trans-
Minh captured the leadership fated into cold war terms a
of Vietnamese nationalism in division that had existed long
1945 with the wartime league before. It is not easy to dis-
known as Vietminh. To the tinguish the anti-northernism of
leaders of that political alliance the south from the anti-corn-
the government they formed in ntunism which President Thieu
Hanoi in August, 1945, remains drills into his cadres with the
the only true representative of same fervour as the party line
Vietnamese nationalism whether is injected among the cadres of
it was making the claim against the north.
i
h
F
h
i
h
renc
or, s
t
e
nce, aga
nst t
e
Americans. In its view in the
forties, the fifties, the sixties,
the seventies and in any fore-
seeable decade- the unity of
Vietnam depends on the recog-
nition of the rights of the gov-
ernment in Hanoi as the start-
ing point. They are the
guardians of tradition, the ex-
ponents of a doctrine, the up-
holders of true independence.
For the only East Asian
country once under western
colonial rule the independence
matters more than elsewhere, or
rather it must be more demon-
strable. By the same token, the i
obvious dependence on the
Americans of every government
in Saigon since Diem in 1.954
is an unchallengeable justifica-
tion for the task of unification
to which North Vietnam has set
itself.
Against this there is the case I
to be made for the south. The F
historical division of the country
has left a southern conscious-
ness. The southerners would
prefer to be ruled by,
southerners (though even in the
last 20 years of . .. rf^- the
power in Saigon has been held
more often by men of the north
or the centre than of the south).
Unlike Korea which was
inopportunely divided by the
cut on western power and There remain obstacles tl
because they regard the West any speedy unification of Vie:-
as a.hinterla.nd a.=,Bust thejcom- nam by the political elision
muiii
t
h
b
h S
h
s
nort
,
ot
out
Korea
ar:d South Vietnam will remain
politically weak: l ;- -h countr
y
has a small v'Oca! (:i)r,J:aiiOn to
its repressive government and
being open to inspection by
western journalists such an
opposition will be able to make
itself heard. Moreover both
Perhaps the distinction i countries have been the scene
scarcely matters. In a world of of bitterly fought wars osten-
new nation states, most of sibly in support of "freedom"
which were modernized and gal- 0V " d0 r"^:...... " or some such
vanized into nationalism by Western political concept.
western rule, a united Vietnam
regaining its full independence
is as much a goal for the Viet-
narnese for reasons of East
Asian particularism as it is for
reasons of anti-colonial nation-
alism. And if one asks how the
unification can come about
there is only one possible
answer ; indeed, there could
have been only one possible
answer. That the unifying force
happens to be communist
meanis-as it did in China
-that only the communists
offered all those ingredients of
nationalism, independence and
doctrine that marks the East
Asian renewal of the twentieth
century. Only the north upholds
all the East Asian values.
As with Korea one cannot
forecast the immediate future
in Vietnam. In both countries
American policy is still impor-
tant. The belief in American
power rather than the appeal
of any ruler holds the south
together in both. On top of that
comes the authoritarian discip-
line that President Park and
President Thieu both hold to.
But because they are depend-
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
6 .January 1975
U rte elm
n n a s n
Were the wars fought in-
vain ? Of course the pleas of
the opposition-however small,
urban-based and ineffective-
will win support ; theirs is the
voice of the liberal democrat
against the police repression of
the authoritarian ruler who
goes on in the old East Asian .
way. From time to time there
is an outburst of struggle and
the deeds of the repressive
government are seen to be
animated by none of the ideals
that the "free world" deems
proper. Western sympathy
builds up for the churchmen
and journalists, the students
and intellectuals in Seoul and
in Saigon who suffer for their
ideals of freedom. Since these
are the slender shoots of a
genuine discovery of political
freedom through contact with
the West, western sympathy for
the governments in the two
capitals will constantly be
ia~.bu~ ?
communism will seem more and I
more empty. They can
- ute rams agreements-Wtlic1i =
President Thieu shows no si'zns
of fulfilliint;-or by anotlr r
offensive conducted h"" th'e
troops the north has in the
south. One is !Hanoi's apprecia-
tion of the American temrer
and the likelihood of further
air intervention. Another is the
often acknowledged need ii
Hanoi for economic recovery as
a priority to any action over the
south. Nor will-the Chinese he
very generous in aid for a
government whose military tac-
tics in the Ter offensive of 196!
and the 1972 offensive will not
have earned them praise in
Peking.
But not least it should I:e
said that the southern co .-
monist People's Revolutionara-
Government and its Vietcong
force is not likely to recover
the popular backing that it
enjoyed in the early sixties.
Its standards were never as high
and have fallen far short of
the qualities that enablezi
China's communist guerrillas to
penetrate so deeply into the
rural consciousness in China iie
the 1940s. -
Ideally, of course. both Korea
and Vietnam shouid be unified
by mutual patience and for-
bearance, arriving at the~r own
East Asian consensus over doe-
trine and disciulir.e. But once
launched as they have been i=-r
i
tne cold war atmosphere neinc4ar
side finds it easy to step clear
of it.
industrialize and export success- Previous articles in this series
fully as in South Korea, but, were published on December
they will remain politically, 2, 13, 16, 17, 27.
unstable. i ? Times Newspapers Ltd, 1975
of grass-roots support. '
"We do have some differences
among party members over procedural
~~CT 0 I matters," said Mr. Kim, acknowledging 'A I
WASHINGTON POST
7 January 1975
2 Rightists
Offer to loin
Korea's main opposition political party, are an unitea on the issue of con-
says he has gotten used to being under stitutional revision." ~~~t k
In an interview, Mr. Kim said he Agence b'rance-Presse
constant surveillance by government
thought President Park was exagger- STOCKHOLM, Jan. 6
agents. ating the possibility of an attack from Prince Norodom Sihanouk has
The opposition politician has been Communist North Korea in order to us- said that several officials of
held for questioning by the Korean J us- .Cambodian government,
Central Intelligence Agency three times tify his continuing hold on power and including ex-Premier Sirikl
over the past 12 years. It's all part of suppression- of the opposition. Matak and Chief, of Staff
South Korea's very rough brand of pol- "North Korea alone doesn't have the Sosthenes Fernandez, have
itics. capacity to attack South Korea," he ? offered to join his Cambodia
Mr. Kim was among those who en- said. "North Korea must have either . United Front.
gaged in demonstrations against Park Russian or Chinese help to attack, and Matak and Fernandez are
Chung Hee after Mr. Park, then an that is not something they are willing to members of a four-man advi-
Army general, took power in a military give now, because they want detente sort' group which advises
coup in 1961. As floor leader of the with the United States." President; Lon Nol.
New Democratic Party, Mr. Kim later A few years ago, Mr. Kim discovered Sihanouk was interviewed
opposed Mr. Park's attempts to pro- how dangerous South Korean politics for Swedish television in
can be when someone hurled a con- Peking. where he heads a
long his stay in power. government in-exile which
A handsome man whose modishly tamer of sulphuric acid into his car. Mr. b
Kim, who escaped harm, was never is trying to - oust -Lon Nol.
long hair is now graying, Mr. Kim took able to determine with absolute cer- Matak and Fernandez havq
over as the opposition leader about tainty who threw the acid. But he de- sent secret messages to himk
four months ago. Since then, he has clared that he is "90 percent certain" through friends. Sihanouk;
stressed one constant theme: There government agent. - said, adding that they hadl
must be a revision of the existing Con- that it was a "not yet received the permis-.1
stitution to allow for the direct election "The worst thing about tieing in my sion of their masters, the
of South Korea's president. position is the constant surveillance by Americans ... who constitute
Some of Mr. Kim's own party mem- government agents," he said. "But af- an obstacle to a peaceful so-
bers are critical of the opposition ter a while you get used to it - the tele- lution in Cambodia."
leader's tactics. They say he lacks sub phone tapping and the people follow- Sihanouk s aid he -planned,
ing your car - and you get so you - to expand his
tlety and political realism. The New government to
Democratic Party has long been badly don't agonize over it." include "several representa-I
hampered by factio al splits a la Daniel Southerland tives of the right but exciud- i
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NEW YORK TIMES
12 JANUARY 1975
KISSINGER KEEPS'
L4IIN AID UPIJUN
Goes Counter to Advisers
in Extending Military
Equipnient Grants
By LESLIE If. GELB
Special to The New York Time,
WASHINGTON, Jan. I1-Sec.
almost Kissinunger has
rejected State
recommendation of his senior
advisers to terminate next year
the long-standing program of
outright gifts of military equip-
p
g
a
w
uld
ment to Latin America, a num- provide an opportunity to- un=;
bet of Administration officials) derline a new relationship with4
have disclosed. Latin America. _
According to these officials, The group's position was
the reason for the Kissinger' that stopping the military
decision was philosophical, not handouts would help to under-
financial. It goes to root issues cut accusations about Latin
that divide the Secretary from, Governments being simply
his c,%vn experts on how to deal; Washington's clients.
with Congress and the proper; Last month in the 'Declara-
evle of military aid in furei ll.
Policy. s 1 iiutl vi iiyacucilv," a lumber
The recommendation to ter-; p edgedtlnthmA
selve'sn to nations
limit
minate the military grants toj arms expenditures and not to
.Latin America was made to Mr.' acquire offensive weapons.
Kissinger last November by Car-: The question of decisions
lyle E. Maw, Under Secretary) about the aid program. arose
of State for Security Assistance.; last October during the course
It was fully supported, the of-; of review of the new budget
ficials said, by the Latin Ameri-' within the Ford Administration.
can bureau of the State De-: The new budget is to be sub.
partment, all of the United mitted in February.
States ambassadors in Latin,' The only dissent from the
America, the National Security majority view came from the
Council staff, and the Office of Pentagon, which argued that
Management and Budget. I the aid program was important
It was opposed only by the; in. -maintaining close relations
Pentagon. which proposed cut-' with the Latin American mill.
ting off the program in. Central' tar,'.
America by 1979 and in South' The recommendations were
America by 1981,` the officials: cabled to ,14r. Kissinger in No-,
said. vember while he was traveling]
Mr.: Kissinger chose the Pen- in the Middle East, and he
tagon"option without any ex- cabled back adopting the Pen
planation of his decision, it tagon stance.
was confirmed. This was the third year in a
The secretary's action, an as- row, the officials revealed, that
sociate explained in an inter-: Mr. Kissinger overruled similar
view, was based on his convic-, recommendations on the pro-
tion that he needs to retain gram. Neither this new recom-
every possible carrot and stick rnendation nor previous ones
in his diplomatic arsenal.' would eliminate cash or credit
The amount of the grant mili- military sales or military train.
tary aid program to Latin hig programs..
America is trivial this year- The nine Latin American na-
about $10-million to be distrib tions that receive grant military
uted among nine countries. aid are Bolivia, the Dominican
"But Henry never knows," - Republic, Fl Salvador, Guate-
another official said, "when a mala, Honduras, Nicaragua,
million here and there might Panama, .Paraguay and Uru-
come in handy." And, he con- quay.
WASHINGTON POST
29 December 19714.
' Diplomat's Chile Role Cited
U.S. 1Vominee Stirs.
By Joseph Novitski
Special to The Washington post
storm of protest here has
greeted the nomination of
Harry W. Shlaudeman, a ca-
reer diplomat, to be U.S. am.
bassador to Venezuela. He
served in the Dominican Re-
public after American troops
landed there in 1965 and later
was in Chile just before the
overthrow of the Allende gov-
. ernment. -
parties that opposed Allende%
attempt to bring socialism to
Chile.
[Rep. Michael Harrington
(D-Mass.) complained that an
the same date Shlauden~n
testified that . the U n it ed.
States had no role in the Chi,
lean coup, Harrington was re-
viewing secret testimony by
CIA director William Colby,
who said the agency had set
Despite the Protests, the
Venezuelan government has
agreed to the. nomination.
Leaders of President Carlos
Andres Perez's party told re-
porters yeaterday, in an at-
tempt to moderate criticism,
?l~~t +ha ann,4will ha+ aan two
governments was more impor-
tant than the personality or
reputation of an ambassador.
Since President Salvador Al-
lende's socialist-led govern-
ment was deposed in Chile's
military coup last year, the
Latin American left in many
countries has firmly identified
Shlaudeman with reported
American intervention against
Allende.
Criticism of. the Shlaudeman
appointment began on the
Venezuelan left three days
ago, but has since spread to
all of the country's important
political parties, including the
governing Democratic , Action
Party, at the rank and file
level. -
Shlaudeman, now serving as
-deputy assistant secretary of
state for inter-American af.
fairs in Washington, must still
be confirmed by the Senate
before 'replacing Ambassador
Robert McClintock here. At
one of his last appearances be.
fore a congressional commit-
tee in June, Shlaudeman de-
nied any U.S. connections with
the coup in Chile.
aside $11 million for anti-.I
ende activities in Chile.] _
Shlaudeman was deputy
chief of mission, the second-
ranking office, in the U. S. eke-
bassy in Santiago from June
1969, 16 months before .l
lende's election; until a few
months before the coup in
September 1973.
Previously, Shlaudeman had
served as political officer in
the U. S? embassy in Santo
Domingo from 1962 to 19w.
He returned after Marines
were landed in the Dominican
Republic by the Johnson ads
niinistration in 1965, and acted
as part of the diplomatic team
that negotiated the wiW-
drawal of American troops um
der Ambassador Ellsworth
Bunker.
Men who watched Shlaude-
man at work in the Dominican
Republic said he seemed tohe
a hard -headed professional
diplomat..He was respected by
Chilean diplomats under Pres
ident Eduardo Frei, Allende=a
predecessor.
After Allende's election,
some members of his coalition
of Marxist parties said they
preferred dealing with
Shlaudeman rather than Am.
bassador Edward Korry, al-}
though they felt that Shlaude-
man was not sympathetic to tt
their political ai
ms Shiauiie
. Five months later. President) man has since been accused of
Ford said that the U. S. gov- being an agent of the CIA b1
. ~nment had supported Chi- left-wing Latin American par.
-lean newspapers and political ties.
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tinued, "it is a matter of prin-
ciple with Henry not to give in
to Congressional pressures to
tie his hands." .
In recent years, Congressional
committees' have stepped - up
pressures to end grant military
aid worldwide and to Latin
America in Particular.
PU 2nd add . AID
Mr. Maw and his supporters;
another official explained.
"
wanted tott i f
ge ounront of
Congressional criticism, for a
change,.., dampen some ;of the
Congressional hostility, ` and
end the program without be.
ing forced to do so."
This group also argued, the,
official said, that the amduntf
of aid, is now so small that it
does not provide Washington
with any leverage anyway,
Rather the group mentioned.
that ending the
ro
r
m
o
:
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BALTIMORE SUN
7 January 1975
James J. Kilpatrick
ro"Arab To ' jos Must Not Get ? Panama. Canal
Washington. - Under the treaty of 1903 are directly or indirectly at-
An ominous story appeared the United States acquired tributable to the canal.
a cod le of week
h
headed "U.S.-Panama Accord
Seen in Early 1975." This was
Marlese Simons's lead:
"A U.S. concession to
surrender jurisdiction over
the Panama Canal Zone at the
end of five years has led to
confident predictions by an
authoritative source that a
new U.S.-Panama canal
treaty would be ready for
signature next year."
Let us sound the alarm
bells and summon such able
warriors as Representative
Daniel J. Flood (D., Pa.) and
Senator Jesse Helms (R.,
INC.). For the past 20 years,
Mr. Flood has been raising
Catonian cries in the House;
ll
included a
power and au-
thority the United States
would possess "if it were
sovereign." By direct pur-
chase from private owners,
the United States also ac-
quired title, in fee, to certain
lands now involved. -
In 1914, after a tremen-
dous and costly feat of engi-
neering, we opened the Pan-
ama Canal to the shipping of
the world. For 60 years the
canal was operated without
an increase in tolls. About 70
per cent of the tonnage
through the canal in recent
years has originated in, or
been destined for, the United
States. Apart from its com-
seized power in October, 1968.
He is pro-Arab and pro-
Communist. Before any sur-
approved, we should ask our- ama has been made, a line has
selves how in the name of to be drawn: No more. And
common sense the - United sorry about that.
States could benefit from The. treaty of 1903 is not
Panamanian control. The engraved in stone. It has been
prospect is for nationaliza- twice amended-in 1936 and
tion; the prospect is for Gen- 1955. It is entirely possible
eral Torrijos to do in Panama that further amendments can
what the late Gamal Abdei be agreed to, relinquishing
Nasser did in Suez. unneeded land for Panamani.
Now, it is understandable an development, further
that Panama chafes under the increasing payments to P
continued U.S. presence. Sena- ama, and providing for some
tor Alan Cranston (D:, Calif.), Panamanian participation in
who favors a new treaty, has administration of the canal.
askad hnna A.f.e..;..., - -.....-u ninist
the
Senate h d valuu, the canal has feel if the British still held j smack of abject surrender
leader
the
had immeasurable s
prevent
of vital
p as apt- -perpetual rights along the They smack of appeasement. Flood p pwY
a . gaa
rights and p pro ert in the
: value also. ly called r. j gu lar veinof Erie Canal. Doubtless the They smack of the same
ighal Zone. This "concession present situation is indeed a cockeyed judgment that gave Caij to surrender" cannot possibly hemisphere." "source of confict,".and after us the wheat deal with the SO.
surrender" s roved. y Panama has benefited i n ye ;;s ^f
... tcinnitt%;nt uc-
pp also. More than 40 per cent of gotiations, Ambassador a victory vict union for . That
detente. was One called more a
We ought to understand Panama's foreign exchange Large Ellsworth Bu t
e
nker
what is at stake in these ne- earnings, according to a State doubtless is correct in saying such victory and we are done
gotiations, both as to the canal Department paper last year, ' the Panamanians are "imng for. 5'
past and as to the canal fu- and nearly one-third of Pan- tient." pa-
ture.- . , ama's gross national product But there comes a time
CHR]STIAN SCIENCE MONITOR.
30 December 197)+
uba: a mixe report
Cuba under Fidel Castro has yet
to become the economic success
claimed for it by some of the most
ardent supporters of the island's
Marxist government. But, at the
same time, it is far from the
failure seen by- many Cuban exiles
living in the United States and by
others who vigorously oppose the
Castro government.
. This is the report that a Monitor
correspondent brings from Ha-
vana following a recent visit to
assess Cuban developments 16
years after Dr. Castro came to
power. While Cuba's economy Is
still propped up by massive Soviet
aid and now given a strong assist
by high sugar prices, there is
evidence that Cubans have solved
some of the problems of in-
efficiency and mismanagement
which nettled them in the, early
p ago m t
e rights "in perpetuity" over a What of the-future? Pan-*
Washington Post under , a 10-mile-wide zone of Panama- ama is under the iron rule of
Panama City dateline. It was nian tart;+n>K, mi _:..i.~. 1 _ .
years of the Castro revolution.
Moreover, Dr. Castro and his
close advisers appear more re-
laxed than at any time in recent-
years. With the economy working
more smoothly, they are allowing
a limited, although controlled,
amount of democracy - provin-
cial council elections aimed at
decentralizing the bureaucracy
now centered in Havana.
On a hemisphere level, Dr. Cas-
tro is winning new respectability.
Diplomatic ties with Latin-Amer-
ican nations are growing. There is
also evidence that the Cuban
leader would not oppose some. sort
of relationship with Washington -
but it would have to be based on an
end to the decade-old economic
blockade. That should not be too
hard a step for Washington to
take. After all, the blockade never
brought Dr. Castro to his knees.
Although it made his economic
situation difficult, it also allowed
him to whip up a sharp anti-United
States campaign on the Island.
Today, the blockade appears to be
an anachronism in U.S. foreign
policy that does more harm to the
U.S. than to Cuba.
This past week. it brought a
sharp denunciation from Canada.
The Issue involves a subsidiary of
a U.S. company which has been
forced to cancel the sale of desks
and chairs to Cuba because Wash-
ington warned the parent com-
pany that the sale would violate
U.S. law and the company could be
penalized. It can be hoped that the
new year brings not only a rever-
sal of policy in the Canadian case,
but also a broad change in U.S.
policy toward Cuba.
when great powers must
behave as great powers. Not
evey source of conflict can be
removed. Some conflicts must
be endured; they must. be
lived with. Not every wounded
sensitivity can be soothed.
39
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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
27 December 197+
US. and Canada duel over
By James Nelson Goodsell
di
b
idi
C
l
ti
f
Latin America correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
Washington and Ottawa are on a
collision course over trade with Cuba.
The issue at stake - whether
Canadian 'subsidiaries of U.S. com-
panies may sell their wares to Cuba -
goes to the heart of Canadian nation-
alism. It also raises the broad issue of
whether Washington has any right to
dictate policies in such.cases.
For years, the 'United 'States has
insisted that the foreign subsidiaries
are merely an extension of their
United States parent and therefore
subject to U.S. law. Hence, because of
the U.S. embargo on trade with Cuba,
the subsidiaries cannot sell to Cuba.
Resistance started
Washington's stand has been a sore
point not only with Canadians but also
with Latin Americans and others.
But few foreign subsidiaries have
tried to buck the order - until early
this year.
Both Argentine subsidiaries of
United States automakers and the
ana
an
ocomo
ve su
s
ary o
a
U.S. firm entered into big deals with
the government of Cuban Prime Min-
ister Fidel Castro. For various rea-
sons, Washington was forced to ac-
cept fait accomplis in these cases.
But now a new case is up for
scrutiny and ruffling Canadian feath-
ers.
It involves a relatively small sale of
$500,000 worth of office furniture to
Cuba by a Toronto-based subsidiary
of Litton Industries of Beverly Hills,
Calif.
Halt ordered
The U.S. parent company ordered
the Canadian firm to halt the deal -
after learning that the U.S. trading-
with-the-enemy act might well be
applied against the transaction, a step
that would. hold Litton executives
responsible if the deal were con-
summated.
Canadian Trade Minister Alistair
Gillespie called Washington's role in
the affair "intolerable interference"-
and accused Litton of "corporate
colonialism."
The exact nature of Washington's
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE` MONITOR
2 January 1975
Chile rebuts torture charges.
By James Nelson Goodsell
Latin America correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor
Smarting from mounting accusations of prisoner torture, Chile's
military leaders have gone on the offensive.
Denying many of the allegations, they have put in doubt some of the
specifics of the charges by accusing organizations like Amnesty
International of being loose with their facts.
Fernando Duran, Chile's ambassador to France, said this week in an
interview in Paris that three of the places where the London-based
Amnesty International claimed torture had taken place were unlikely
locations for such activities.
One of the places where Amnesty International charged torture was
committed is a public building open at all hours to anyone, Mr. Duran
said. Another is a private office building. A third simply does not exist,
he said.
Mr. Duran did not specifically deny all torture charges, but his
interview in Le Monde was aimed, according to Chilean officials, at
scotching the heavy flow of torture charges now being aired,
That flow was boosted in mid-December with the release of an
Organization of American States (OAS) study charging the Chilean
military with "extremely serious violations of human rights"
Including the extensive torture of political prisoners.
Many of those said to have been
tortured were supporters of the gov-
ernment of Salvador Allende Gossens
which . the military deposed in a
violent coup in September, 1973.
The OAS charges were contained In
a 175-page document prepared by the
Inter-American Commission on Hu-
man Rights on the basis of a 12-day
tour of Chile last summer by a five-
nation investigating team.
Attached to the OAS document was
a lengthy rebuttal from the Chileans,
contending that the report contains
"Important and grave deficiencies
Cu
a trade
role in the affair is not clear. The
State Department says that "no
agency of the U.S. Government has
blocked the sale," but it Is understood
that the Treasury Department was
contacted on an Informal basis by
Litton people.
Mr. Gillespie said in a press confer-
ence in Ottawa that his government.
would formally protest the issue in a
note to Washington before the year is
out - and that he was hoping to
clarify just how it happened that .the
deal was canceled by Cole Division of
Litton Business Equipment, Ltd.
What could happen
The directors of Cole are all U.S.
citizens and residents and therefore,
subject to fines and jail terms of up to
10 years if the Canadian firm went
ahead with the sale and if Washington
were to prosecute.
Earlier when a Montreal-based rail-
way-equipment firm, a subsidiary of
Studebaker-Worthington, Inc., of Har-
rison, N.J., signed a $15.2 million
contract for locomotives, the deal
went through because all of the
subsidiary's directors were Cana-
dian, and therefore outside U.S. law.
and "manifest errors."
' But this rebuttal did not specifically
contest charges of individual torture.
Use of shocks alleged
The OAS investigators, headed by
Robert F. Woodward, a former
United States ambassador to Chile,
did not Identify alleged victims by
name, using ' numbers instead, but
they were specific on the charges -
claiming the military had used elec-
trical shocks, threats against close
relatives, sexual violence, and beat-
ings.
Amnesty International's charges
are similar, covering some of the
same ground, although the two re-
ports spring from separate in-
vestigations.
For its part, the Chilean Govern-
ment has manifestly denied the exten-
sive use of torture, claiming that
while there have been occasional
lapses in Chile's traditional concern
for rights, the basic thrust of Chile's
policy remains one of protecting hu-
man rights.
But it is obvious that Gen. Augusto
Pinochet Ugarte and his fellow mili-
tary commanders in Santiago are
worried about the charges which have
led, at least in part, to Mexico's late
November decision to break relations
with Chile and to the numerous
attacks on Chile in the United States
Congress and the threat of military
aid prohibitions in. foreign-aid mea-
sures on Capitol Hill.
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