HELMS ORDER TO WITHHOLD WATERGATE DATA REPORTED

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350001-8
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• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 8, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 2, 1975
• Content Type: NSPR

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CONFIDENTIAL
NEWS, VIEWS
and ISSUES
INTERNAL USE ONLY
This publication contains clippings from the
domestic and foreign press for YOUR
BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use
of selected items would rarely be advisable.
No. 4
18 February 1975
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
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GENERAL
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FA7ERN EUROPE
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WESTERN EUROPE
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NEAR EAST
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EAST ASIA
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LATIN AMERICA
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Destroy after backgrounder
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CONFIDENTIAL
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Ariproved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350001-8
NEW YORK TIMES
2 February 1975
?
elms Order to Withhold
atergate ata Reported
former Sub rdinate in C.I.A. Also Told
H use Panel That Justice Department
Was Denied Access to Key Witness
By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Special to The New Yet.% Times
WASHINGTON, Feb. 1 ?
Richard Helms, while Director
af Central Intelligence, ordered
a, high official of the agency to
withhold Watergate informa;
tion and deny Justice Depart-
ment access to a key witness in
the first six weeks after the
break-in on June 17, 1972, ac-
cording to previously unpub-
lished testimony.
The official, Howard, J. Os-
borne, who was director of se-
curity for the C.I.A. before he
retired in late 1973, told a
House Intelligence subcommit-
tee in May, 1973, that Mr.
Helms decided that a series of
letters sent to the agency by
James W. McCord Jr., a mem-
b-r ^f the te"na +11-t: broke into
Democratic party headquarters
at the . Watergate complex,
should not be forwarded to the
Justice Department
Hunt's Role
:.
Mr. Helms made his decision
at a time when the agency was
under subpoena from the Jus-
ace Department to forward "all
communications" 'related to
Watergate. '
The McCord letters, sent be-
tween July 29, 1972, and early
January, '1973, warned the
agency that officials of. the
Committee for the Re-Election
of the President were planning
to contend that the break-in
was a C.I.A. operation.
In one of the letters. Mr. Mc-
1 Cord said, "I have the evidence
of the involvement of [former
Attorney General John N.]
Mitchell and others sufficient
to convince a jury, the Congress
and the preis." I
Mr. Osborne also said that
Mr. Helms had instructed him
not to inquire into the agency's
involvement with E. Howard
Hunt Jr., another Watergate
participant..
Mr. Helms further directed,
MT. Osborne said, that the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation
not be permitted to' interview
1 Karl Wagner, a C.I.A:, employe,
who had knowledge that John
ID. Ehrlichman, then the chief,
White House adviser on domes--
tic affairs, had authorizedAlbrir
agency to establish a working.
relationship with Mr. Hunt hi
July, 1971.
"You forget about that," Mr.
Obsorne quoted Mr. Helms as
having told him in late June,
1972. "I will handle that. You
'take care of the rest of that."
At the time, Mr. Osborne had
been designated by Mr. Helms
as the official directly respon-
sible for coordinating and expe-
diting the C.I.A.'s communica-
tions with the F.B.I. about
Watergate.
Mr. Helms ?and other high-
level C.I.A. officials repeatedly
stressed in their public state-
ments that their actions regard-
ing Watergate were. not illegal,
but legitimate steps to protect
the agency frc.:In p3SSible ad-
verse publicity and to prevent
the leak of highly classified in-
formation about the agency's
operational procedures.
Mr. Osborne testified before
the House subcommittee? that
he had told Mr. Helms he felt
"very strongly" that the first
McCord letter should be turned
over to the F.B.I. However,
Lawrence Houston, the general
counsel to the C.I.A., testified
that he had advised Mr. Helms
that the agency had no legal
responsibility to do? so.
Ehrlichman Link
The three United States At-
torneys who originally prose-
cuted the case for the Justice
Department did not learn of the'
Ehrlichman link to the C.I.A.
for five months. They also were
not told of the McCord letters
to the C.I.A. until May, 1973.
The House subcommitee be-
gan hearings in the spring of
1973 shortly after, C.I.A. in-
volvement with the White
House "plumbers" became
known. The panel eventually
concluded that the agency had
been misued by the Nixon Ad-
ministration.
The testimony was declassi-
fied late last year, without
public announcement, by Rep-
resentative Lucien N. Nedzi of
Michigan, the subcommittee
chairman.
Mr. Helms told the Repre-
entatives that "everybody was
instructed to help with the
F.B.I. investigation in the agen-
cy, and every lead was checked
. . . All the records were gone
through and all the things were
etvetecibr Release 2.001i0
Mr. Helms was not airect y
asked about Mr. Osborne's alle-,
'iatIons, but William E. Colby:
then Mr. Helm's deputy and
now Director of Central Intel-
ligence, repeatedly told the sub-
committee that the agency's
failure to provide all known in-
formation to the F.B.I. was
based on its concern "that it
would somehow be' involved in
the Watergate case and there
was quite a lot of publicity and
public- information in the press
. . . I think the concern [was
about leaks to the press."
? Mr. Helms, who headed the
C.I.A: from 1966 to 1973 and is
now Ambassador to Iran, could
not be reached for comment. A
State Department aide said he
,was traveling and would not re-
turn to his post in Tehran, from
which he has been on leave, un-
til later this month.
, Widespread Pattern
Mr. Osborne's testimony
about the initial high-level
C.I.A. reaction to Watergate
was part of what a New York
Times inquiry has shown to be
a more widespread pattern of
C.I.A. noncooperation than pre-
viously known. The inquiry,
which included interviews with
former Federal investigators
- and an analysis of published
C.I.A. Watergate testimony and
documents, was begun shortly
after the published allegations
last December of C.I.A. domes-
!tic spying..
I No evidence was found link-
ing the C.I.A. to advance knowl-
edge of the Watergate break.
in but the testimony and doc-
ume.nts indicate that the Intel-
ligence agency followed the
course it did in part because of
a fear that some of its domestic
cover firms as well as its 1971
domestic activities on behalf of
the White House would be un-
covered.
The C.I.A. is currently facing
intensive investigations by
House and Senate committees
stemming from its admitted in-
volvement in "questionable"
domestic spying activities. In
addition, an eight-member com-
mission set up by President
Ford and headed by Vice Pres-
ident Rockefeller is in its sec-
ond month of hearings into
the domestic spying allegations.
Among the key new findings
of the inquiry were the follow-
ing:
9A number of high-level
C.I.A. officials, including Mr.
Helms and 'Mr. Colby, were in-
formed on June 19, 1972--two
days after the break-in ?that a
, transcript of an internal C.I.A.
Rape recording showed that Mr.
Ehrlichman had authorized the
iagency in 1971 to begin its sup-
'port activities on behalf of Mr.
Hunt, who was then a member
of the White House security
force known as the "plumbers,"
then investigating Dr. Daniel
Ellsberg. The transcript was
discussed at a C.I.A. meeting
that day.
9Mr. McCord had served as a
member of the C.I.A.'s counter-
intelligence branch since 1952
and was involved with prevent-
ing the penetration of the agen-
cy by agents from the Soviet
Union. Mr. McCord was work-
ing for the agency's office of'
security in 1967-68 when, ac-
iosoyehat-RDMiv't - i'Rc I 10
month, it trailtrate. agen
into . radical groups in the,
'Washington area -in? apparent
violation or the C.I.A. charter
barring it from domestic activi-
ties. At least four former,high-
level C.I.A. counter-intelligence
officials have resigned since the
first published allegations of
,C.I.A. domestic activities.
9None of the high- level C.I.A.
officials, including Mr. Colby,.
informed Federal authorities of
the repeated White House ef-
forts in June, 1972, to involve
them in the successful attempt
to limit the initial F.B.L Water-
gate inquiry. The officials also,
did' not immediately disclose,
that they had been asked to
provide bail funds for the ori-
ginal Watergate defendants. ,
,? 9None of the high-level C.I.A.'
; officials involved in the initial
,deliberations after Watergate
informed James R. Schlesinger,
who replaced Mr. Helms as Di-
rector of Central Intelligence in
'February, 1973, of the extent of
the agency's domestic activities
on behalf of the White House in
1971. Mr. Schlesinger learned
of Mr. Hunt's plumbers role
from a C.I.A. liaison officer in
early May, 1973.
Questions Left Open
The inquiry also left open
questions about the objectivity
and thoroughness of the initial
inquiry by the House Intel-
ligence subcommittee. In its re-
port on its hearings, published
Oct. 23, 1973, the subcommittee
did not note, for example, that
Mr.-Helms 'ordered Mr. Osborne.
not to turn over the McCord,
letters. ?
The C.I.A. also did not in-
form the Justice Department
that in July, 1972, it had re-
ceived confidential information
onthe Watergate break-in from'
Robert F. Bennett, the president'
of Robert 'R. Mullen and Com-
pany, a Washington-based pub-
lic relations firm that provided
"cover" for C.I.A. employes
-overseas and had hired Mr.
Hunt afte rhis retirement from
the agency in 1971.
According to a report pub-
lished last .year by Senator
Howard H. Baker Jr.,. Repub-
lican of Tennessee, the C.I.A.
paid half of Mr. Bennett's at-
torney fees stemming from his
grand jury appearance after the
Watergate break-in. .
, In a recept interview, Sey-
mour Glanzer, one of the ori-
ginal Watergate, prosecutors
who retired last year after serv-
ing 14 years with the Justice
Department, characterized the
C.I.A.'s post-Watergate actions
as the efforts "of an intel-
ligence agency serving some
alien Byzantine power rather
than one devoted to the best in-
terests of the people of this
country."
"Most of the facts may be,
known to the Government
now," Mr. Glanzer said, "but
the public isn't aware of what-
the C.I.A. has done. The whole
venture was one of keeping in-
formation from us.
"I frankly was amazed by the
conduct and the mentality I
found in the C.I.A. Anyone who
believes in candor must appear
to be naive to them. And
11-8nust have appeared
to be naive to them.
The most critical, C.I.A.
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'tire, Mr. Glanzer' iald,-was the"
agency's decision not to pm-
;Wee the six letters sent by Mr.
McCord after being served with
,a Justice Department subpoena
;compelling the agency to pro-
duce "all communications" re-
lating to Watergate.
"The McCord contacts would
have been vital," Mr. Glanzer
said, because Earl J. Silbert, the
principal United States Attor-
ney investigating Watergate,
"had selected McCord as the
'weak link?the only person
who had information and might
' lbe made willing to talk."
i "The letters were an indica-
tion that there was some way
of reaching the man," the for-
mer prosecutor said.
Mr. McCord, who? had earlier
rebuffed an attempt to begin
plea bargaining, repeatedly
warned the C.I.A. in the letters
that attempts would be made to
place the blame for Watergate
on the agency.
Upon learning in May, 1973
of the . McCord - letters, Mr.
Glanzer said, the prosecutors
told one high-level C.I.A. offi-
cial?not Mr. Helms?that he
was a potential . target of a
grand jury investigation. The
official resigne& within days,
Mr. Glanzer said.
1?
? Cox Takes Over
_ . .
At about the same time,
however, Mr. Silbert and Mr.
Glanzer were succeeded in the
Watergate investigation first by
Archibald Cox, - the Watergate
special. .prosecutor, and the
C.I.A. actions did not become a
public issue. .
In Mr. McCord's first letter
to the C.I.A., which was sent
to the office of Mr. Helms six
weeks after Watergate, Petit
O'Brien, an attorney for the
Nixon re-election committee,
was quoted as having said that
committee officials had initially
informed him that the break-in,
was a C.I.A. operation.
"He says he did not know
otherwise," Mr. McCord's letter
said, "until one of the defend-
ants told him the facts and he
says he blew up over it."
The letter said that there
would be an 'attempt to depict
the Watergate break-in as a
C.I.A. operation and suggested
that the Watergate 'prosecutors
Were leaking anti-agency mate-
,rial to the press. i .
Mr. McCord closed the letter
With the following statement,
which, given his extensive
knowledge of counterintel-
ligence operations, may have
led to varying interpretations;
inside the agency:
._ "The fact remains that I have
rved in Washington-, since 1942
,and know certain things about
the District of Columbia . from:
'first-hand knowledge, having
lived there in the past, that I
wanted you to be aware of." ,
The letter initially was dis-
missed as crank mail, Mr. Os-
borne told the House subcom-
mittee in May, 1973, but -.was.
subsequently identified through
Mr. McCord's handwriting. Mr.
Osborne then recounted the fol-
lowing events:
"I showed the letter to Mr.
Helms: I told him. that I felt
very strongly that the letter
should be turned over to the
Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion. Mr. Helms, after some re-
flection.; decided that he. would
like to*Ibave legal opinion eitt
the matter and summoned Mr.
Lawrence Houston, general
counsel of the agency, to his of-
fice and had him read the let-
ter.
'Legal Obligation'
"After he had finished read-
ing the letter, the ensuing dis-
cussion; to the best of my recol-
lection, centered about whether
the agency had any legal obli-
gation ta forward the letter to
the Justice Department or the
Federal. '. Bureau of Investiga-
tion. .
"Both' Mr. Helms and Mr.
Houston decided that there was
no such obligation, and I was
told to take no further action
on it. Mr. Helms instructed me
to restria knowledge of the ex-
istence of the letter to an abso-
lute minimum - number of
people."
Wherie'Mr. McCord's subse-
quent letters were received at
home by a C.I.A. employe in
late December, 1972, and early
January,, 1973, they were
brought to Mr. Osborne, Who,
as he told the subcommittee,
was authorized by Mr. Helms
Ito .file them. -
i The letters were turned over
to the Watergate prosecutors in
May, 1973, after Mr. Schlesin-
ger ordered all C.I.A. employes
to come forward with any.
!evidence or information in con-
nection with the White House
plumber S or other domestic
C.I.A. inyolvement.
Mr. Osborne acknowledged to
The committee that he had been
troubled by 'Mr. Helms's order
Inot to forward the McCord let-
Iters. .
l "We had been working very
Iclosely.with the F.B.I.," he tes-
tified. 'I, have always given
them everything. I have never
held anything from them.
,.
'He Was My Boss'
"At the time I don't think I
really agreed with it [the deci-
sion to withhold the letters].
But, you know, I worked for
Mr. Helms, he was my boss. I
would do the same thing with
Mr. Schlesinger."
A review of the published
testimony indicates that Mr.
Helms was never specifically'
asked about his request that
the McCord letters not be for-
warded.
Mr. Houston, however, was
questioned by the House sub-
committee about his counsel to
Mr. Helms after receipt of the.
initial McCord letter in August,
1972. lit defended his action by
noting that he had been in-
volved in many cases where
persons ' under indictment
threatened or hinted at a? C.I.A.
involvement.
In the case of the McCord
!letter,. he added, he considered
it to bp a similar warning or
ithreat that there "might be an
.actual attempt to involve he
agency in the defense of those
!arrested in the Watergate in-,
Icident." '
I Since-the C.I.A. had no prior
Involvement in the Watergate
break- in, Mr. Houston ex-
'elained; and .since any threat of
bluff was best countered, in his
opinion: by ignoring it, "I there-
fore advised the Director of
Central Intelligence that we
had no legal responsibility to
pass the letter on to any other
'authorities and that we would
iwork with the United States
Attorneys when the defense Be-
i ttutIlY,rnade a formal attempt to
Involve the agency at the trial.
The Director agreed."
Mr. Houston -subsequently
acknowledged under question-
ing, however, that when Mr.
Silbert and Mr. Glanzer re-
quested the C.I.A. to supply in-
formation in October in antici-
pation of a C.I.A. defense at the
Watergate trial, the agency still
withheld the letters.
Nedzi Interrogates
Then there was the following
'exhange with Representative
Nedzi.
NEDZI: Isn't this really'
suppressing evidence?
HOUSTON: No, sir, I did
not consider it evidence at
all.
NEDZI: 'ewes not evidence
. of agency involvement, but it
? was certainly information
that could very well have
been useful to the conduct of
a complete investigation, and
I think that the agency's obli-
gation goes beyond just de-
fending itself.
Mr. Osborne also testified
that he was ordered by Mr.
Helms not to inquire into Mr.
Hunt's links to domestic C.I.A.
activities in 1971. -1
After being assigned to find
out what possible, involvement,
if any, the C.I.A. had had in the
Watergate break-in?an assign-
ment he received ' from Mr.
Helms on the evening after the
break-in?Mr. Osborne recalled
being approached by a young
C.I.A. officer, Mr. Wagner.
Mr. Wagner had served in
.1971 as an aide to Gen. Robert
E. Cushman Jr., the C.I.A. Dep-
uty Director at the time and
the recipient of Mr. Ehrlich-
man's 'request for agency help
for Mr. Hunt.
Mr. Wagner learned at a staff
meeting that Mr. Osborne had
been assigned to the investiga-
tion, Mr. Osborne said, and
"called me and said he had
something he wanted to tell me
but he had to check with the
Director . first. The Director
called me on the telephone that
same day and said, "You forget
about that. I will handle that.
You take care of the rest of it.'
"I was specifically excluded'.'
from knowledge of the C.I.A.
involvement in the Ellsberg
burglary, "and I am delighted I
. was."
Mr. Colby told a Senate
Armed Services Committee
hearing in July, 1973, then con-
sidering his nomination to be
C.I:A. Director, that a tran-
script of a July 7, 1971, Hunt-
Cushman conversation ? in
which Mr. Ehrlichman's role
was mentioned?was discussed
at a high-lever agency meeting
on June 19. 1972.
Fact Not Relayed
However, Mr. Colby said,
when the C.I.A. formally in-
formed the F.B.I. three weeks'
later that it had supplied false
'documentation and other
materials to Mr. Hunt and 'G.
Gordon Liddy, another Water-
gate defendant, it did not relay
the fact that Mr. Ehrlichman
had been involved with Mr.
Hunt one year before Water-
gate.
Instead, the Senate testimony
showed, the C.I.A. said only
that the materials had been
supplied to Mr. Hunt in re-
sponse to a "duly authorized
?'extra-agency request." -
At one point during the Sen-
ate hearings, Mr. Colby told'
Senator Edward-M. Kennedy,
Democrat ' of Massachusetts,
that the information- was not
supplied because "it was not all
that important who male .the.
phone call from the White
House to General Cushman
'about this little one as.Istance
?for Mr. Hunt." V?
? Mr. Ehrlichman's name was
provided to the Justice Depart-
ment on Nov. 27, 1972, in re-i
sponse to a specific question;
from Mr. Silbert. In a later
memo about that meeting, Mr.
Colby wrote that he "had
danced around the room sever-
al times for 10 minutes tatty to
avoid becoming specific on
this."
Mr. Colby further disclosed
during the Senate hearings that
on June 28, 1972, ,Mr. Helms
has issued an order -requesting
that the F.B.I. not interview Mr.
Wagner and another C.I.A. offi-
cial who also knew of some
C.I.A. aid to Mr. Hunt in 1971.
At the time, Mr. Helms justi-
fied the order, according to the
Senate testimony, on the
ground that the F.B.L should'
"desist from expanding this in-
vestigation into other areas
which may, , eventually, run
afoul of our operations."
'A Lot of Leaks'
? In 'his July, 1973, tesliniony
before the Senate Watergate
committee, Mr. Helms referred
to that order, telling the Sena-
tors that "there was stet/big to
he a lot of leaks out of the
"F.B.I. for the first time on mat-
ters of this kind." Mr. Helms
later had this exchange with
David M. Dorsen, an assistant
chief counsel on the committee:
DORSEN: And to your
knowledge, was any relative
information withheld by the
C.I.A. to the F.B.I. and Jus-
'tice .Department, information
that you were aware of while
the events wereetaking place
in June, July or August of
1972?
HELMS: Sir, I do not be-
lieve so. Does the record
show that there was any-
thing of this kind? ?
DORSEN: No. I am not
suggesting that at all. I am
just asking for your knowl-
edge. I have no knowledge t
to the contrary.
HELMS: Well, I do not
either, but I just want to be ;
sure that my recollections
tracked with the facts.
In his earlier, testimony be-
fore the House subcommittee,
though,. Mr. Helms said he had
prevented the F.B.I. from in-
terviewing Mr. Wagner, whom
he did not mention by name,
'because he had not wanted in-
'formation about Mr. Hunt's
!involvement with Mullen and
Company, the public retations
firm, "from being spread all
'through, the Government, that
we had people under cover
ther
"ever, -no evidence- wasi
'However,'
presented in any other hearing
suggesting that Mr. Wagner, it
questioned by the F.B.', would
have discussed anything but
Mr. Hunt's reliance on the
C.I.A. in 1971 ;in connection
with his White _House plumbers
work.
Furthermore, 1-C.LA. docu-
ments published, last year by,
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`the Mouse Judiciary t
tee's impeachment inquiry
showed that information about.
the secret use of Mullen and'
Company was supple by the.
,C.I.A. to the F.B.I. on June 21,
1972, four days after the Wa-
tergate burglary.
Colby Testifies '
During testimony before the
House and Senate in 1973, Mr.
Colby, who had been placed by
Mr. Helms in oVer-all charge of
.,.he C.I.A.'s handling of the
Watergate inquiry shortly after
The break-in, made a number of
apparently contradictory state-
tieuts
During the House Intelligence
subcommittee -hearings in May,
1973, Mr. Colby was asked why
tne C.I.A. had not been more
responsive in providing infor-
mation to the F.B.I. He again
cited C.I.A. concern over pos-
sible press leaks and said the
.aganey had decided to "handle
AS much of the material that
was subject to misunderstand-
in an oral fashion rather
than in a written fashion."
Yet, Mr. Nedzi, in discussing
the meeting between the C.I.A.
and the Watergate prosecutors
in October, 1972, asked Mr.
Colby whether he thought the
iustice Department had been
made "completely aware of all
tthe facts that you had, is that
I right?"
Mr. Colby responded, _"yes,
WASHINGTON POST
2 February 1975
?ri
,1","PP iff).
they were totally informed!: "
Mr, Colby was then executive
director of the agency. ?
In subsequent testimony be-
fore the Senate Armed Services
Committee in July, 1973, Mr.
Colby said that he had known
of the White House attempts
the year before to get the C.I.A.
to provide bail funds for the
Watergate defendants, and
about other contacts, but had
not told the Justice Department
during the October meeting.
'Edge of Propriety' ,
Asked why, Mr. Colby said he
had not considered the White
House's contacts to be pocential
wrongdoing.
"Their requests were, it
seemed to me, on the edge of
propriety," he said, "and. the
C.I.A. responsibility was to
hold itself very specifically to
the facts and act within its
proper authority, and the C.I.A.
did that."
It was those actions, revolv-
ing around the efforts of Mr.
Ehrlichman and H. R. Halde-
man, then the White House
chief of staff, to get the C.I.A.
to attempt to 'halt theF.B.I. in-
quiry into Watergate, that led
to President Nixon's resignation
last August. A White House
tape recording showed that Mr.
Nixon had directed his aides to
attempt to involve the C.I.A. in
the,cover-up.
? While supporting the actions
taken by Mr. Helms in the
months after Watergate, Mr.
Colby also told the Senate
Armed Services Committee that
the basic decisions involving
C.I.A. policy had been made by
Mr. Helms. .
"The basid philosophy of
keeping the C.I.A. out of the
misunderstanding of being in-
volved and consequently han-
dling the material through the
top level of the F.B.I. and the
Justice Department [and not
through F.B.I. field agents and
United States Attorneys] was
a decision in which I shared,"
Mr. Colby testified. "It was ob-
viously Mr. Helm's decision
because he was in charge."
The fact that Mr. Schlesinger,
who is now Secretary of De-
fense, had not been briefed by
Mr. Helms and other high-level
C.I.A. officials about the extent
of the agency's involvement
with Mr. Hunt and the White
House plumbers was made ex-
plicit in a statement published
last July by the House Judiciary
Committee's impeachment in-
quiry.
Schlesinger Told
In the document, a C.I.A. of-
ficial who was serving in a liai-
son position at the White House
in May, 1973, recalled how he
apparently was the first to in-
form Mr. Schlesinger about the
C,I.A.'s involvement in the
-preparation of a psychological
profile on Dr. Ellsberg and
other matters.
. "He seemed surprised and
unaware of any such link," the
unidentified C.I.A. official said.
"I was sure that someone had
compiled the facts about- the
agency's involvement with
Hunt and the Watergate and
that it ' should be available
somewhere in the agency if he
had not already seen it.
"He seemed dismayed and
bewildered that something like
this could have happened and
that he did not know about it."
On May 9, 1973, a few days
after the discussion with the
C.I.A. liaison official. Mr. Schles-
inger issued his order calling
upon all C.I.A. employes to:pro
duce any evidence of domegtIQ
.ao
wrongdoing. -
It was this request, reVable
sources say, that not only led
to the discovery of the Mctord
letters and more ' Watergate
links, but also produced the,
evidence of other domestio.
activities?such as the infiltraz.-
tion of C.I.A. undercover agents
into dissident groups and the
accumulation of files on more
than 10,000 American citizens
who were opposed to the Viet-
nam war-4?that are being inves-
tigated by the Senate,_,:the
House and the Ford Adrninistra-e
r frFpnSwirmorts elms
_yr
By William Greider
;
Washirizton Post Staff Writer
For that .small circle- of influential
people, the ones who help shape Amer-,
lea's foreign policy and share national.
neerets, the intimate dinner party the
other night in honor of Richard Helms
was an especially tender moment.
"Touching and moving," said one,
who was there. , t
Assembled in the Chevy Chase.
house of. columnist Tem Braden and
'his wife Joan were some perennial
notables: ? .
Averell Harriman, ? the patrician
Igtatesman; Stuart Symington, the sena-
tor from Missouri; Robert S. McN-,
mare, who once ran the Pentagon and
now runs the World Bank; Henry A.
Kissinger, whom everybody knows.
'Even the outsiders were prominent'
ones: NBC's Barbara Walters and Isra-
el's Ambassador Simcha Dinitz, among ?
others. ?
They were gathered to cheer up an
old friend, a comrade wounded by re-
cent events, the former director of the
Central Intelligence Agency, who is
now confronted with embarrassing
questions about the secret agency's do-
mestic surveillance activites.
After the smoked salmon and crown
roast of lamb, the glasses of rich red ?
.wine were raised in his honor. Sym-
Ingtorr toasted the "splendid job" ?
which Helms had done in seven years
as America's intelligence chief. Hard-
;man seconded those sentiments.
But the high point was the brief and-
melodramatic speech of Robert Mc-
Namara, Deiense Secretary during the
,iong strpggle in 'Vietnam,, a man .who
shared with Helms the anguish of the
Johnson years.
McNamara wanted all in the room to
know: whatever Dick. Helms did,
'whether it was over the line or not, the
former Secretary of Defense supported
him fully. That moment of fraternity
moistened some eyes around the table.
'According to the etiquette of impor-
tant dinner parties, no one is supposed
to speak afterward of what was said
by whom, especially to the press. Yet,'
somehow, the- story of McNamara's
toast is circulating, confirming what
many already suspected?that Richard
-Helms has been shaken by the current:
CIA controversy and that the estabi
1ishcd circle is drawing the wagons up
.-Close in his defense.
That message was already whispe
leg around Washington, in part be-
'cause the Secretary of State was telling
'friends and associates on the dinner-
party circuit that he was dismayed by,
What has happened to Helms.
? "An honorable man," Kissinger says
solemnly, then he adds a word or two
or private rebuke for the present CIA Di-
ctor William E. Colby, who made the
public disclosures of CIA domestic
?
lapying, and even for Defense Secre-
,
lary 'James Schlesinger, who investi-
gated the subject when he held the
...CIA job briefly before Colby.
These are glimpses of the private'
and almost visceral political currents.
Which now surround the CIA contro-
yersy, a struggle as intangible as
smoke, yet with real significance for
the players. Helms is in foremost jeop-
Approved For FkgeNgb
tivities of debatable legality happened'
',during his tenure, but also for what he
said or didn't say about CIA activities
ivhile under oath before various con-
gressional committees.
On a political level, the situation is
Perilous for Colby too, wh,o now must
'answer the agency's critics More fully- -
at forthcoming hearings without to-
tally alienating the CIA's traditional
friends or his own troops within the
agency. In a secondary sense, the
Struggle threatens Kissinger and,
Schlesinger too, who now represent
the natural institutional rivalry be-
tween the Defense and State depart-
ments, who both played a direct hand,
in the CIA's past.
As one close partisan described it:,
"A fairly byzantine happening by some
fairly byzantine People." -
Helms' difficulties stem from his
bland .assurances, given regularly in
recent years to congressional inquiries,
that the CIA did not do such things as
?penetratirig domestic political organi-
?-zations or spying on radicals. Then, af-
ter the New York Times acdount of do-
mestic spying was published Dec. 22, . ,
-Colby eventually made a public recita-
tion on the subject, acknowledging'
what Helms seemed to have denied.
According to close friends, Helms is
se concerned about the arguable 11-
legality of any surveillance activities
which occurred under his direction or
even by his recorded statements deny-
ing that the CIA conducted domestic
spying. Those questions are loaded
with ambiguities, they point out, which
smilitpme:nosf4bry7_00ATAtittaidniefali1alii" difficult
fo pursue. ?
?
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350001-8
But Helms has been more worried
, about his testimony before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee on CIA
Involvement in Chile, back when he
was confirmed as ambassador to Iran
in 1973. Sen. Symington, a member of
that committee, asked Helms then:
"Did you try in the Central Intelli-
gence Agency to overthrow the govern-
ment of Chile?" ss,
"No, sir," said Helms. ?
"Did you have any money passed to
the opponents of Allende?" ?
"No, sir," said Helms.
"So," Symington asked. "the stories
you were involved in that war are
?
wrong?"
"Yes, sir," Helms answered. "I said,
to Sen. Fulbright many months ago
that if the agency had really gotten in
behind the other candidates and spent
a lot of money and so forth the elec-
tion
might have come out differently."
When Colby appeared in private last
spring before the House Armed Serv-
ices subcommittee on intelligence, he
told a ? different . story?that the CIA
had provided $11 million for "covert
action" in Chile Aimed at blocking Sal-
vador Allende's election in 1964 and
..1970, as well as "destablizing" the gov-
oernment in 1973 when a milirary coup
toppled the Allende government.
" Helms appeared again before the
Foreign Relations Committee two
weeks ago to explain the discrepancy.
.Now on his way back to Iran, he is con-
? Vinced, according to friends, that he
'satisfied the ,committee members that
no perjury had been committed. The
various issues/ however, must still be
explored by others. The circus now has,
three rings?select committees on In-
telligence in both the House and Sen-
ate, 'plus the presidential CIA commis-
sion.
? The difference between Helms and
'Colby is partly a question of personal
styles, but it is also the changed cli-
mate in post-Watergate Washington,
where both Congress and the press
pursue hints of scandal more zealously
than when when Helms was director
from 1966 to early 1973.
In broad outline, their careers seem
quite similar?t-lvy League educations,
veterans in World War II, lifetimes de-
voted to climbing the secret career lad-
der inside the "Company," as the CIA
? is sometimes culled among friends.
? But, though both served in
"Clandestine Services" and both held
the post of deputy director of opera-
tions, Helms and Colby came from dif-
ferenct sides Of the spy shop.
Helms was schooled in the;
"intelligence ' end," " Colby was a
"political actibn" man, two subspecies
with an inherited distrust of one an-
other. The intelligence folks collect
and analyze, while the "political opera-
tions" men run secret guerrilla wars
and "covert action" against foreign
governments. They tend to regard the
Intelligence types as ivory tower ten-
ants, removed from the real world;
while the intelligence people often
look on them as a bunch of wild men.
In any case, the personal relationship
between Colby and Helms over the
'years was correct and cordial, never
more than that, according to associ,
ates.
? When old colleagues describe Helms,
he emerges as a man of deeper Intel-
lect, more flexible, more cynical, quite
skilled at crossing the sliding sands of'
Washington's bureaucratic struggles.
Colby is more obvious, more straight.
ahead and even moralistic, according
? to friends and nonfriends. Helms is the
'urbanity of the Chevy Chase Country,
Club; Colby is the Boy Scouts in
Springfield, Va., where he lives.
"Dick is resentful," said one ex-offi-
cer. "He resents the change in per-
Iformance with regard to Congress, to
-the press, to'openness which he never
engaged except in the coziest way."
While Colby opts for on-the-record
Interviews with the news magazines,'
Helms' style was; more often, a
friendly off-the-record lunch at the old'
Occidental Restaurant. On Capitol
Hill, Helms left behind a reputation as
masterful at salving both hawks and
doves during the war in Vietnam, as
well as never revealing too much
About what the CIA was doing.
When the House subcommittee wa.s
.questioning him privately on Water-
gate in 1973, Helms displayed the
charm which won such praise. After a
lot of back-and-forth about what was
.legal or illegal for the CIA, Helms fi-
nally closed the subject with this ap-?
peal to personal faith: ?
"Gentlemen, don't you honestly be- ?
lieve, all of you, as I do, that you've
Igot to be honorable men to run any-
thing like this, particularly an intelli-'
gence operation?"
The notion that "honorable men"
'Could be trusted to run the CIA, with-
out much questioning from Congress,
was badly shaken in the Watergate epi-
sode, when it was disclosed that the
CIA under Helms alternately ivent'
along with and resisted various ques-
'tionable demands from the Nixon
White House. Rumors lingered and the
traditional secrecy of the agency'
helped them grow.
Helms, for instance, has been dogged
by stories that somehow a closer link
existed between him and E. Howard
Hunt, Jr. one of the Watergate bur-
glars, including the yarn that the CIA
? director prsonally lent Hunt $20,000 or -
$30,000. As it happens, Helms ex-
plained that in secret testimony at the
time:
"The guy was in very serious finan--
cial straits. In an organization like
, CIA, particularly in the clandesine
,side of it, anybody who gets in debt
constitutes a vulnerability. I mean for
a recruitment from the other side, if
nothing else. All drunks arc a threat.
,Drug people are a threat. Homosexuals
are a-threat. Anybody who has a really
'distinctive blackmail possibility.
? "So the logical thing to do was to
make available those institutions in
'the Central Intelligence Agency to.
help out employees who unintention-
ally get in some kind of financial diffi-
culty and one of the ways of doing this
Is something we call the Public Serv-
ice Aid Society, which contains a fund
4'
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350001-8
of monei?'idministered by some direc-
tors into which people give voluntarily
to build up a fund so that people in
jam can get this stuff without :paying
interest and so forth," ? ,
? The members of Congress also.
learned something qf the intrigues in-
volved in operating the agency, like'
the tape recording syStems in Helms's'
office and the "Frencii ROom". next
door where cenferences were held and
another in the deputy director's of-
.
fice. Helms had that one dismantled
when Gen. Vernon Walters, a 'Nixon
man, became deputy director because
"I thought at the time I didn't know
Gen. Walters 'very well. I wouldn't
have any control over it."
When Helms was, cleaning out his
files after 25 years in the agency, he
destroyed all of the non-Watergate
'tapes, including one conversation he
recorded with President Johnson.
"I do recall at one time having a
very active conversation with Presi-
dent Johnson about a whole lot of
things he wanted me to do about Viet-
nam," Hes told the sub committee,
"and my finally, in desperation, push-.
ing this button in order to get straight
what he was trying to tell me to do."
After Helms was abruptly fired by
President Nixon a month after the
1972 election, the popular assumption
was that his resistance to letting the
CIA take the rap for Watergate was a
special motive. It was also widely as-
sumer! that Henry Kissinger approved
the move or at _least acquiesced in it,
"particularly the subsectuent shake-up
of the agency which was carried ,out by
Schlesinger.
Helms professes not to know, what
the motives were for his abrupt dis-
missal. (His friends say he has never
blamed Kissinger). But he did tell the
Armed Services subcommittee this
much:
- "I was never on the team. I was left-'
over from President Johnson's admin-
istration and I had served in four
years in President Nixon's and I rather
gather they wanted their fellow dn the
job. I put the 'their' in quotes." ?
At this point, the.plot gets much too
byzantine to explain fully. Schlesinger,
an outsider, took charge of' the CIA
with expressed orders to "shake it up,"
'which he did. The personnel level was
trimmed sharply ("brutally," according
to some old hands), and, among other.
things, Schlesinger ordered a full au-
dit of the CIA's domestic activities.
That produced the documentation
which through no apparent fault of
his, eventually surfaced in public.
When Colby succeeded Schlesinger
in the, fall of 1973, he inherited the
new leaner look which Schlesinger
gave the agency, plus its new problems
of public relations. When Rep. Lucien
Nedzi, chairman of the House Intelli-
genee subcommittee, called Colby for
an examination on Chile, the new CIA
director told all. When it leaked Out
Helms was the embarrassed one.
Now, however, Colby is presiding
over a sharp division within his own
ranks, not to mention the hostile politi-
cians outside. As one associate put it:'
"A lot of people think he's gone too far
already. He's made a lot of concessions
which will be very hard to reverse,
later on. Worse, there's a great disillu-
sionment within the agency- They all
feel unappreciated and exposed." ,
On the other'hand, many see Colby:
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350001-8
is a-skillful CIA "political operator,".;
trying to navigate through the treach-
erous waters, to ameliorate the new
preAsures from Congress and the,
press, without sacrificing the agency's
essential powers.
"He is the essence of. a political op-.
crater who goes to a country overseas
and tries to find the levers of power
and hopes to influence them," said one
former colleague. "He's very much a
realist. He asks: who's running the
country? It's.not the President and the.
White House it's Congress and the
press. Well, how do you influence
them? You can't do it with the old
Cold War rhetoric or by telling the,
WASHINGTON POST
3 February 1975
forn B-Fa
imueriat
press ft has no business knoWilig about'
intelligence activities. So Colby is try-
ing to get a handle on these political,
?and social .realities. He's operating on
the same principle he would in Af-'
.ghanistan."
? Even Colby's admirers, however, can
envision an unhappy ending for the di-
,
rector if he misreads the pressures, if'
he tells so much to the inquiring mem-
bers of Congress on Capitol Hill that
his own bureaucratic strength is ex-
hausted downtown.
Among other questions, for instance,
?the investigators will pursue whether.
Kissinger, as Nixon's national security
.affairs adviser, had any part in order-
'
'Ing the CIA to siVon'reporters in 1971'
and 1972 because of national-security
leaks.
Schlesinger, as Defense Secretaty,
has been standing back from the fray
but his department, the Pentagon, has
an important stake in what Congress
winds up doing to the CIA and the
"intelligence community" generally.
In short, while the dinner-party chat-
ter enlivens the struggle, it is a defeni
sive game at this point. One former
.CIA official described the situation:
"Everyone, to use one of Helm's
phrases, is hunkering down and look-:
? lag out for himself."
2esidents and the CIA
I'm going to keep very quiet," said
Richard Helms, speaking of the inves-
tigation into the Central Intelligence
Agency. "But if it looks as though it's
all going to be my fault, I shall have a
great deal to say."
There is an implication here which
recalls another Helms remark, made
when he was summoned home from
Iran two summers ago to testify on the
subject of the wig and the camera lent
to Howard Hunt and on Richard
Nixon's attempt to use CIA as a foil
for halting the investigation into
Watergate.
"Who would have thought," Helms
said then, "that it might someday be
judged wrong to carry out the orders
of the President of the United States?"
? They hint?these two remarks?at the
Imperial presidency which- historian
Arthur M. Schlesinger has described.
They hint of Lyndon Johnson, large,.
powerful, domineering, thinking of
himself as law. They hint of Richard
Nixon, sly and stealthy, plotting how
to. retain beloved trappings of power.
Johnson, one can imagine, would order
the thing done without a thought as to
whether the thing was legal. Nixon, one
can imagine, had more consciousness
of evil, He would sneak the thing
through. The end was the same: The
end was corruption.
WASHINGTON POST
14 February 1975
Itockefetaer Capsanalis4on
' It is all very well to say that Richard
Helms should have risen to the
occasion: "Mr. President, I won't do
that. If you insist, Mr: President, my
only course is to resign."
? When authority gives an order it is
easy to find reasons why authority
may be right. More important, the
President is the Commander-in-Chief.
Does a soldier quit the field of battle
when the general orders a foolhardy.
attack? ?
Maybe the problems of the CIA are
battlefield related. Its leaders were
steeled in war and most of them were
steeled in a very special kind of war.
Most of them came out of OSS, as the
wartime secret intelligence agency was
called. This meant, first of all, that
they had volunteered to carry out very
unusual orders.
It also meant that they were unusual
people, given to taking great personal
risks, desirous of operating alone or in
the company of two or three others,
Impressed more than most soldiers can
be impressed with the absolute neces-
sity for secrecy and the almost certain
penalty which awaits the slightest
breach of it.
It meant one more thing which may
be important to the CIA story. The
OSS men, who became the CIA men,
thought of themselves as their country.'
Dropped alone in groups of two or
three onto unfamiliar and ertgmy-occu-
pied lands, they were, whetnr in Nor-
way or in Southern France, in Holland
or in Thailand, all that there was of '
America.
And while they may well have been
on the run, hunted and ,harried from
one hiding place to another, they took
more pride than most soldiers learned
to take in the fact of what they were.,
h warea A Trl ante 'T'h 4; I, th
death pill in their pockets were all
they had.
Is it not possible that men who have
learned to do everything in secrecy,
who are accustomed to strange assign-
ments and who think of themselves as
embodying their country are pecu-
liarly susceptible to imperialistic -
Presidents? Have they not in fact
trained themselves to behave as a
power elite?
"For 28 years," Richard. Helms re-
marked the other day, "I had the idea
certain that I was serving my coun-
try." That's a proud thing to be able to
say. What a shock it must be to such a
man to be told that from time to time
during those 26 years he was wrong.
0 1975. La AIII10110 num .
9 CIA Pariei Lawyers :Named
Nine staff lawyers were ap-
pointed by Vice President
Rockefeller yesterday to serve
the presidential commission
Investigating the Central In-
telligence Agency.
They will serve under David'
W. Belin, a Des Moines, Iowa,
lawyer who is executive direc-
tor. The nine lawyers include
two who have served as clerks
to Supreme Court juStices and
one who is active in the Amer-
ican Civil Liberties Union.
The four senior counsel:
Harold Baker, 45. private at-
torney from Champaign, 111.;1
Ernest Gellhorn, 39, a law pro-
' Lessor at the University of
t Virginia; Robert 13. Olsen, 48,
a private attorney and ACLU
board member from Kansas
City, and William W. Schwar-
zer, 49, a San Francisco trial
lawyer who Is a World War II
military intelligence veteran.
The four counsel:
Marvin L. Gray Jr., 29, 55.
sistant U.S. attorney in Seat-
tie, Wash., and former law I to Justice Thurgood Marshall. a
clerk to the late Justice John
M. Harlan; George A. Man-
fredi. 31, private attorney in
Los Angeles; James N. Roethe,
33, private attorney from San
i Francisco, and James B. Weld-
32, partner in the Newt
York law firm of Rogers .3:
Wells. '
Named as special counsel
was Ronald J. Greene, 32, an
attorney with the Washingtoi,y
firm of Wilmer, Cutler and;
Pickering and a former cleric'
NEW YORK TIMES
3 February 1975
:,CORRECTION
The New. York Times,
through an editing error, in-
correctly reported yesterday
that the Central Intelligence
Agency was under a Justice
Department subpoena in early
August, 1972, when Richard
Helms, then Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence, ordered the
agency to .withhold ? informa-
tion. The subpoena, ordering
the C.I.A. to produce all
Watergate communications,
was not. in effect at the time.
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Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350001-8
INF, WASHINGTON POST' *Itilar:Teki,19/S
T a es i C
A Files:
By Harry Rositzko
lositzke, who retired' from the CIA in 1970 after 27 years with the agency and Its predecessor, initiated
Its liaison-withthe FBI on Soviet espionage matters. He is author of "The U.S.S.R Today" and "Left On!"
THE HALF-DOZEN inquiries into
the charges of "domestic spy-
ing" by the, Central Intelligence
Agency. lace a challenging task on ,a
confusing 'terrain.
From a wide range of legitimate
, counterintelligence activities involv-
ing American citizens, the investi-
gators will have to sift out those
cases in which the CIA violated its '
charter, by using secret ? agents.
, against Americans within the United
States. ?
- The legitimate operations cover a,
broad array of activities in which
Americans voluntarily or otherwise
fall within the purview of the CIA,
.with their names properly entering,
.its
Countless private citizens, for ex-
ample, have been "cleared" by the.
CIA before they are asked to partici-
pate in secret .,or covert operations.-"
Thousands ,of Americans have helped
establish such CIA-sponsored organi-
zations as the Committee for.a Free
Europe, .to set up founptions for
channeling funds to covert opera."e
tions, and to create the proprietary
companies that supply logistic sup-
port for CIA para military operations.
Hundreds of others have helped
CIA make contacts with resident for-
eigners who are of interest for fu-
Jure intelligence use abroad, or in
building ?up new identities . and get-
ting jobs for. Soviet and other de-
fectors being iresettled in this coun-
try. In each case, the FBI and other?
federal files must be checked, and
in some cases a security investigation
is carried, out as well, before an
American citizen is cleared for con-
tact.
Any violations of CIA authority in
this security-investigative , area can..;
be examined by the committees on a:
case-by-case basis?an unauthorized
telephone inqrcept or microphone,
installation, a surveillance conducted
to investigate a reported plot against,
the CIA director, the use of inform-,
ants to report on the plans of Wash;
ington demonstrators.
FBI-CIA Cooperation -
THE TERRAIN is far more con-
fused 'in the 'area of secret do-
mestic activities of the CIA's Opera-
tions Directorate, especially- the Do-
mestic Operations Division know the;?
Foreign Resources Division) and the
,Counterintelligence Staff. The Do-
mestic Division has been carrying out
intelligence operations against for-
eigners in the United States since the
early 1960s.' The Counterintelligence
Staff has, since 1946, exercised over-
all responsibility for gIA's world-
wide counterintelligence program.
Both have worked closely with FBI.
Internal security, the responsibil-
ity solely of the FBI, doesnot in-
volve the domestic scene alone. Any
country's internal security service
must have the cooperation of its for-
eign intelligence service to do its
work effectively. This cooperation is
not always easy, but for those famil-
iar with conflicts between the do-
mestic and foreign, services in Eng-
land, France or Germany, the differ-,
ences betwen the CIA and the 'FBI
are relatively modest. In any case,
they have had only minor repercus-
sions on the working level.
It is in this area of domestic coun-
terintelligence that the committees
will find it most difficult to estab-
lish normal and proper patterns,' of -
FBI-CIA cooperation, an essential
first step toward detecting what is
improper or illegal.
The patterns are clearest in the
most specific form of counterintelli-
gence ? counterespionage. Heie the
targets are persistent and easily iden-
tified: the actions of any hostile in-
telligence service directed against the
American interest.
- For 30 years the CIA and FBI
have worked closely against the So-
viet and East European intelligence
services, especially the KGB, ex-
changing information about Soviet in-
telligence officers and providing each
other with leads to suspect agents. In
the past 15 years the volume of hos-
Hie espionage operations has climbed
perceptibly. During the 1960s, KGB
officers were making more than 200
attempts a year to recruit Americans
.stationed abroad. In the late 1960s
more than 300 KGB officers were sta-
tioned in New York City.
The demarcation line between re-
sponsibilities of the two agencies has
always been clear in the minds of
CIA operations officers. The investi-
gation of suspect Americans or for,
eigners is the exclusive province of
the FBI within the physical confines
of the United States, of the CIA
abroad. From the operator's point of
view, there are no "gray -zones" in
this area.
CIA-FBI cooperation in counter-
espionage matters is mostly a. one-
way street, for the -great majority of
Soviet, East European and Cuban es-
pionage operations-against the United
'States are mounted overseas. From
Its own sources abroad, from its
liaisons with friendly security serv-
ices, from Americans recruited
abroad by a hostile service, the CIA
has supplied more leads ,for the FBI
to fellow up in the United States
than conversely.
In most cases these do net involve
American citizenship. For example:
? CIA/Vienna 'reports from an
agent-source the dispatch of a Soviet
"'illegal," (a staff officer .under
vete Cover) to the United States. The
FBI takes over his surveillance at
the port of entry.
?/CIA/Parii forwards information
on a Soviet espionage net in New
York City from a Russian who has
walked in to the Paris embassy. The
FI conducts the investigation' that'
leads to the arest of Col. Abel.
Othes cases initiated by CIA in-
volve the return of a U.S. citizen
from his overseas post:
? An American technician in Italy
has been recruited by a KGB officer
for the purpose of getting computer
data from his home, office. The fol-
low-up in Italy is CIA's job; on his
return i3O his headquarters, it is the
FBI's job.
? An embassy file clerk in Tokyo
is approached by a young KGB offi-
cer and 'accepts his proposition' un-
der the direction of the CIA station.
When she is about to return to Wash-
ington, the FII is informed, and it
.
can request that the operation be
terminated overseas or elect to take
over the handling of the "double"
In Washington.
A "Chance" Meeting
COOPERATION. between the two
A.A agencies on counterespionage
targets within the United States has
been oven closer when the.CIA can,
contribute a means of access to a
&Met or East European intelligence
officer stationed in New York ? or
Washington. In elect, the operation
becomes joint.
A senior East European intelli-
gence ,officer in New York, the rest.
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. _
.dent in charge, Is 'found to have been.
'the deputy of a defector who has
itarted a new life in Latin America.
The defector is brought to the United
States by CIA and telephones the
resident's wife, with whom he had
an affair in the old days. He is most
cordially received, and has several.
night-club metings with the couple
during which he proposes that the
resident cooperate with the Ameri-
cans. The meetings are closely ob- -
*served by both CIA and FBI officers.
' Another joint operation involved
an American citizen whom the CIA
was preparing for a Latin American
assignment A file-search reveals that
at one time he knew fairly well a
secret KGB courier who is making a ?
three-day stop in New York City. The
American is brought from Pittsburgh
and a "chance" meeting with the
courier is arranged at an airline ter-
minal, with both FBI and CIA offi-
cers in attendance.
These and similar counterespion-
age operations against foreigners of-
fer a simple paradigm for countering
telligence operations against Ameri-
can citizens, the immediate issue be-,
fore the inquiries. The basic operat-
ing rule is the same: Dealing with
American dissidents, militants, or ter-
rorists within the United States is thei
FBI's job; supporting FBI operations
abroad is CIA's job.
.Here again FBI-CIA cooperation
Is mostly a one-way street, but now
running in the other direction. Since
the targets are Americans on the do-
Imestic scene, the main flow of leads
_is from the FBI to CIA for overseas
action. Only occasionally does a CIA
operation abroad come up with a lead
for FBI action at home.
Over the years the FBI has made'
:countless requests for overseas ac-
tion on American Communist leaders
traveling abroad to determine whom
they. visited, what instructions they
received in Paris or Prague, what
funds they ,might bring back. Other
FBI' targets have been reported on
by CIA during their attendance at
peace rallies or other Soviet front
meetings in Europe.
In the 1960s these requests mount-
ed and broadened in scope as the
New Left, on and off campus, began
to create turmoil on the American
scene.
. Thus, a leading anti-war militant
m,akes a trip to Paris, apparently to
visit the North Vietnamese delega-
tion. Whom does he meet? What do
they talk about? Any other contacts?
A Black-Panther on the run flees
.to Algiers. Does he plan to return?
With whom is he in touch? Any con-
tacts with the Seviet or Cuban em-
basses?
A student activist in Chicago flies
to Bonn to make contact with the
leader of a revolutionary German
,student group. Why?
These requests can be multiplied
by the hundred. They are often easy
to satisfy with the help of friendly
foreign security services that have as
great an interest as the FPI in run-
ning down the internatioal contacts
of their militants and revolutionary
groups. Sometimes the answers can
be obtained from CIA agents whom
the local station has inserted in the
wide-ranging Soviet and other Com-
munist establishments to monitor
their non-diplomatic activities.
Terrorists and Smugglers
DURING THE SIXTIES some CIA
stations in Europe also began
to pay more attention to such non-
Communist organizations of the New
Left as the "proletarian" socialist
parties and the Trotzkyists, Moaists
and Castroites, which sprang up in
great profusion. Many were concen-
trated on university campuses, and
CIA agents within, them were able?
to answer questions on their outside
connections, including those with par-
allel orgaizations in the U.S. move-
ment.
The names of any Americans that
cams up in these operations were
given the amount of investigative at-
tention they deserved?by the CIA
while they are overseas, by the FBI
when (and if) they came home.
It is perhaps also worth noting
that this same clean-cut division of
labor applies to the handling of coun-
terintelligence operations against in-
ternational terrorists and drug-smug-
glers, with the leads coming 'mostly
from the CIA to the FBI:
? A CIA agent in a Latin Ameri-
can terrorist group learns of plans
for attacking an American embassy
(action CIA) or sending a team to
New York City (action FBI).
? A CIA penetration of a heroin
ring in Istanbul comes up with the
name of an American connection. If
the connection is in the United States,
the action goes to the FBI and Drug
Enforcement Administration.
, It is against this pattern of normal
practice that the inquiries can best
assess individual cases in which the
CIA (or the FBI) may have over-
stepped its authority. Such cases are
likely to fall into that narrow area in
which CIA officers carry out opera-
tions within the United States that
are normally handled by the FBI.
In a typical case, a CIA officer in
Europe develops over a two-year pe-
!trod i close relationship with one of
his agents, a Communist organizer. In
the European maritime unions. The
'organizer is sent for six months to "
Baltimore to work with the local
maritime unions, and, the FBI is in-
formed. After a working-level dis-
cusion, the FBI agrees that the CIA
officer continue to handle him be-
cause of their close relationship. His
reporting goes to the FBI, and the
FBI asks the CIA officer for any
information it wants from his contact
with the organizer.
Another type of ease comes even
closer to the .thin line between CIA
?
and FBI jurisdiction. In this situa-
tion, an American student is being '
prepared for an assignment to France,
where he will attempt to report on
Soviet and North Vietnamese contacts
with the New Left. CIA helps him
develop a cover for his role as a stu-
dent activist by having him associate
with radical groups on an American
campus. With his bona fides as a
"radical" established, he will be more
readily accepted by student activists
on a French campus.
In cases of this sort CIA's domestic
actions are directly connected with
its foreign counterintelligence re-
sponsibilties. Whether they fall into
a white, gray or black area will be
a subtle question for the inquiries
to detennine. ?
GroundLevel*-Questions
THE INVESTIGATORS have., a-
three-fold task: to establish
facts, judge their legality or illegal-
ity, and recommend executive or leg-
islative remedies if they are needed.
The operational facts come first. The
issue of "domestic spying" ,is sur-
rounded by so much confusion and
suspicion that the inquiries will do
the nation little good unless they
come up with the facts that will set-
tle questions in the public mind.' If
tivil liberties were violated, whose,
how and when? If the CIA or thefl
FBI overstepped its charter bounds,
who did what where? If someone
broke the law, who did what? -
Answers to these ground-level ques-
tions may be of more importance to
the citizen than recommendations
for remedial legislation, tighter over-
sight, or broad injunctions to the
President to ride closer herd on his
secret agencies.
? It is ,only by coming up with hard
facts that the presidential and con-
gressional inquests can gain public
respect and allay public suspicion of
their -own and the CIA's competence
and integrity.
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NATIONAL REVIEW
31 JAN 1975
CIA in Wonderland
In the beginning God created Terra, and set her spinning
through space and time. More recenttly a mixed crew of
demigods has launched a substitute planet, Media, of
their own devising. Like those multiple- space-time con-
tinuums in science fiction, Media and Terra intersect at
various nodes, but elsewhere their realities, in spite of
superficial similarities, have little in common: cf. the
standard Media rerun of the Vietnam reality?as pre-
sented, say, in nightly TV broadcasts?or the two ver-
sions of a school busing dispute.
The current CIA flap appears to us as a Media
_
epi-
"Mv god! I was followed all the wa-7. to the office."
sode with only the flimsiest attachments to Terran real-
ity. In appropriate demigod mode, the New York Times,
burning to get even with the Washington Post and Los
Angeles Times for their Watergate triumphs, created this
new CIA turmoil out of next to nothing, and in 'a trice
it reverberated throughout all Mediadom. Never was
there a more numerous crop of.anonymous sources and
anonymous victims. In Media, no less than 10,000 inno-;
cents have been practically shoved into the furnace by
CIA storm troops. (In Terra, meanwhile, not one single
citizen has complained of personal harm or damage from
their vile machinations.) In New York magazine, Media-
nite Tad Szulc poured out 6,000 horror-struck words
about what "might" be in "the White House tapes and
documents," what the Pentagon may have ordered some:
time or other, what "one possibility" is according to
what "some knowledgeable State Pepartment officials"'
say, what "is widely known in Washington," and about
"the extraordinary combination of, coverup of the
CIA's domestic 'activity. . with 'esoteric intrigues within
the Agency itself" that, "if this theory is correct, we may
be facing."
Interestingly enough, in Szulc's own Medieepic there
are two brief intrusions from the Terran continuum:..
"The dividing line between the Agency's foreign ancl.do-`
mestic counterintelligence work ; . . is completely
blurred, particularly since J. Edgar Hoover, the FBI's
late director, suspended all counterespionage scoopera-
: tion with the CIA in 1969.... That which CIA officials'
speaking privately have conceded to be the `grey area'
of _operations is the surveillance of American citizens
stispected of contacts with foreign intelligence. Although
the 1947 National Security Act, which created the CIA,
specifically forbids domestic police functions by the
Agincy, it is argued that such activity is simply an ex-
tension of foreign counterintelligence." On the basis of
which quotations a sober Terran might conclude: even
granted the CIA exceeded its mandate, this would seem
to be at least as plausibly attributable to differing inter-
pretations of the laws and regulations, and to practical
necessities, as to the criminal desire of protofascist plot-
ters.
? President Ford seems to have estimated this. fume and
fuss at its true value. His Blue Ribbon Commission con-
sists, for the most part, of solid an4..rOsonably well in-
formed types who know what goes on and are able to
distinguish real events in Terra from pseudo-events in
Media. We may hope and expect that they will gradu-
ally anesthetize the frothing patient that the 'President
assigned to their clinic.
We should note, however, that, once it was raised,
many persons here and elsewhere joined this 'hue and
cry against the CIA, not to sell newspapers or TV pro-
grams. nor to correct abuses dangerous to liberty, but
destroy CIA and to make it impossible for the U.S. to
maintain any sort of effective counterintelligence and
counterespionage function. Ex-agent Philip Agee, the
creep whose book, Inside the Company: CIA Diary, has
just been published in Britain, is one of those who do not
disguise their objectives. He has named hundreds of CIA--
agents, collaborators, and cover organizations he says he
came to know about on a Latin American assignment,
and he states he has done so with the deliberate purpose
? of blowing their identities and wrecking CIA operations.
And this is often the effect of the exposures or alleged
exposures (which can be equally damaging) now being
made daily by those who insist they have only the patri-
otic aim of protecting the citizens of the U.S. from police
state practices.
You cannot have a confidential agency unless it oper-
ates confidentially. Before tossing aside the possibility, it
would be well to reflect on some of the things we as
persons and as a nation confront at the moment: global
and rapidly growing clandestine terrorist organizations;
nuclear weapons on land, on and under the sea, and in
the air, all immune to direct inspections; international
revolutionary and subversive organizations pledged to
the destruction of our nation and our society:---to narne
a few not likely to be exorcised by Media editorials.
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?
TIME
10 Fl.,13 1975
THE PRES1DENCY/HUGH MET one man said, that Johnson aides
thought they were not fit for the-Pres-
L LI and Domestic Spying ident to see. They were sent back to the
bureau.
Shortly after Johnson took office, the.,
transcript and tapes of Martin Luther King's bedroom activ-
ities were spirited to him. He read the accounts, which an aide
described as being "like an erotic book." He listened to the
tapes that even had the noises of the bedsprings.
?
When a Johnson assistant oncedefended King's antiwar ac-
tivities, L.B.J. exploded: "Goddammit, if only you could hear
what that hypocritical preacher does sexually." The aide tried
to joke. "Sounds good, Mr. President," he said. A huge grin ap-
peared momentarily on Johnson's face, but he quickly caught
it and returned to his threatening self.
An aide remembers being with Johnson and Hoover when
Hoover was reporting on important people linked to the gam-
bling world. Johnson was fascinated, but hesitant. How did
Hoover know these things? he asked. Because of wiretaps, Hoo-
ver told the President. Then Hoover would drop a tidbit or
two. Johnson was all ears, but he would protest, "All right, all
right," as if he wanted Hoover to stop. Hoover did not stop.
He kept on talking, and L.B.J. kept on listening. Johnson
was hooked and Hoover knew it.
Yet for all of this, Johnson
sometimes denounced bugging as
if it were original sin. "The worst
thing in our society would be to
not be able to pick up a phone
for fearof it being tapped," he told
one of his men. "I don't want any
wiretapping," he said when he
was designing the Safe Streets Act.
However, Senator John McClel-
lan talked him into including a
provision for wiretapping. The
Congress then provided more au-
thority than agreed open, so
son ordered ordered the Justice Depart-
ment not to use that power.
At one point Johnson became
so angry at Hoover and the bu-
reau that he ordered his Secret
Service detail chief, Rufus Young-
blood, to go oyer to Justice and
take ever the FBI. Youngblood went there, wandered around
for a few days, but the order was never formalized. Two of John-
son's closest friends warned L.B.J. that Hoover was disregard-
ing the civil liberties of many people. It was then that Johnson
gave his pungent summation of why he kept Hoover: -I would
rather have him inside the tent pissing out than outside the
tent pissing in."
None of the Johnson men remembers any written orders
to the FBI or the CIA on all this dirty linen. The material just
came in, and Johnson seemed to understand. But then there
came a day when that changed, at leastwith the FBI. After John-
son had announced that he would not seek re-election in 1968,
he learned from an intelligence report that Anna Chennault,
widow of famed World War II Flying Tiger General Claire
Chennault and a money raiser for the 1968 Nixon campaign.
had got in touch with the Saigon government. It was suspect-
ed, at the least, that she was urging them not to cooperate with
Johnson in his last days, but wait for Nixon to be elected. The
belief in the White House then was that a high Republican trav-
eling with Vice 'Piesidential Candidate Spiro Agnew had got
to Mme. Chennault to urge her to carry the message to Saigon.
When Johnson demanded ' to know who the contact on the
Agnew plane might have been, the FBI's proven ability to de-
tect such sources suddenly and mysteriously faltered. As one
of Johnson's most trusted Men put it last week, "The power
had passed." Indeed it had. Another conspirator was about to
enter the White House, and the FBI was getting ready for him.
As the mists of a decade of White House conspiracy are
rolled back, there is a better view of Lyndon Johnson. The
new trails Of CIA and FBI domestic spying, however uncertain
as yet, lead back to his Oval Office and that towering figure of
contradictions. Those ravaged patrons of Richard Nixon are
quick to suggest that L.B.J. was as bad as or worse than the dis-
graced 37th President. But that has not yet been proved.
What seems more likely is that there was an unusual com-
bination of people and events in the mid-1960s. There was
J. Edgar Hoover, the aging head of the FBI, who kept in his pri-
vate safe the hottest files on important people and dribbled the
information out to Presidents when it served his power-hungry
purpose. Hoover knew his man; Johnson had a voracious ap-
petite for gossip. Then there was Cartha (Deke) Deloach, Hoo-
ver's deputy, who felt that he might be named Hoover's re-
placement under Johnson. Deloach became a courier to the
White House of the juicy gleanings from the FBI.
And then there was Johnson, schooled in the tangles of
Texas politics, tutored by Master Plotter Franklin Roosevelt,
tempered in the Senate's school of
the deal, and ultimately a man
who believed that there were no
accidents in politics, only conspir-
acies. He armored himself with in-
timate knowledge of those he be-
lieved conspired against him,
which was almost everybody. "I
don't trust anybody but Lady
Bird," he once said, "and some-
-times I'm not sure about her."
He never accepted the find-
ings of the Warren Commission
and believed always that John
Kennedy's assassination was a
conspiracy by Communists in re-
taliation for a reported effort by
Kennedy. to have Fidel Castro
killed. He believed that the race
riots in the ghettos and the peace
marches in the streets were being
paid for by the Red Chinese. "I
know there is Chinese Communist money there," he kept tell-
ing his aides. ?
L.B.J. was convinced that BobbyKennedy had bugged him
all during the time that he was Vice President. He frequently
called the CIA "Murder Incorporated" because he believed that
the CIA had gone ahead and killed South Vietnam's President
Ngo Dinh Diem against Kennedy's wishes. He had a further no-
tion that the CIA was somehow linked with the Mafia.
?
He read and reported !.yith relish the findings of the Trea-
sury in the biggest tax cases. He bragged once that he knew
within minutes what Senator William Fulbright, then chair-
man of the Foreign Relations Committee, had said at lunch at
the Soviet embassy or what Soviet contacts had told other mem-
bers of Congress at cocktail parties. He insisted that the So-
viets were building Viet Nam oppositiOn in Congress and the
press. Fle,slapped his thigh with delight when he got a report
from the FBI about a prominent Republican Senator who fre-
quented a select Chicago bordello and had some kinky sexual
preferences, all of which were reported in detail. The infor-
mation came from a madam who was an FBI informer.
As the 1968 Democratic Convention approached, the FBI
'sent Johnson almost daily reports on the people and events of
that unsettled time. One Johnson aide remembers that there
.was information about the activities of Congressmen and Sen-
ators. The FBI reports were often included in the President's
night reading, and sometimes they were such "garbage," as
AP
HOOVER & JOHNSON AT THE WHITE HOUSE IN 1967
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rt
By Harry Kelly
Chicago Tribinge Press Service
CHICAGO TRIBUNE
2 FEB 1975
? WA.SIIINGTONL.The nanie,? :On ? th'n
door of the second floor is Intertel.. It is
a name of intrigue, mystery, and con-
troversY. - ? .
? It inspired suspicion in the heart of
White House spy 'Jack Caulfield. He
contended Intertel was a Democratic
espionage operatibn with ? an. "old boy's
network" in all the agencies of the Nix-?
on administration; ' -'T? ? e ? ;
Intertel, as a blue-ribbon private se?
-
curity firm, ? has been involved with all ?
the 'headline ? 'mites: Howard Hughes,
I. T. T., Las Vegas, Caribbean gambling,
the, United ? States Drug Enforcement
Administration,. and the Mafia.
NOW IT IS under .the eyes of two ,
Senate investigating committees with ?
former Nixon assistant Charles Colson
telling two senators in an out-of-prison ?
Interview that he believes Intertel has .
been a Central Intelligence Agency 'Cove.
? -?"That's bull," says Intertel President
Robert Peloquin, onetime Navy intelli-
gence officereNaticaial Security Agency
aide and Justice Department official in,.
the Kennedy and Johnson administra-
tions. ?
: Colson 'reportedly contended in his
talk with Senders,. Lowell Weicker 111.,
Conn.), .and Howard Baker [Re Tenn.)
that he once had been warned in the
White House that "you can't tell where
the Hughes Corporation begins and the
CIA ? leaves off." Hughes has been a
Major Intertel client. ? ? ? ,
INTERTEL IS? housed. on the second
floor of an office building a short walk
from the White House. The building has
become a little, aeedy. with age and its ,
first :.floor has been disemboweled by ?.
subway construction. ? ? ? ? ?-?
? Its : appearance, only adds to the
shadowy charisma of Intertel, less well
known aseInternntional Intelligence inc.
It is to Private eyes what the Federal.
Bureau' of 'Investigation , is .. to Sane.
Spade..
TIME
10 FEB 1975
? 'Intertel was -organized after Richard
Nixon entered the White House as 'a
management consulting firm _specializ-
ing in security .arid.background investi-
gations: -; ? . .
.:ITS ROSTER of enipIdyes includes a -
farmer supervisor of the FBI's internal
security investigations, the deputy di-
reetor of 'security for the State Depart-
.mat; chief Of the National Security,
Agency's special projects section, a su-
pervisor. of 'intelligence' activities. for
the FBI, chief Of the former .Bureau of
Narcotics and. Dangerous Drugs' interne
gence division, and chief of. the Internal,
Revenue Service's intelligence division.
Intertel's director of intelligence is,
'Edward M. Mullin, formerly of the nare
?Cbties.bureau, the FBI, AND CIA.
. .
? ; Intertel has been caught in a corner
4. the tangled.web of Watergate.
? ??-? COLSON,' WHO FOR' months has.
been trying ? to lay Watergate' at the'
door of the CIA, was brought from de-
?tention to the Alexandria courthouse to
t'qk to -Weieker? en;1 ??
:.Iii addition to claiming that the CIA'
used or owned Intertel, Colson report-:
edly contended that when Nixon once
,demanded he investigate the possibility.
Of CIA involvement in Watergate, lie:
was warned off by J. Fred,13uzliardt, a
former Defense Department .! counsel
and White House lawyer. . ?
'Sources quoted-Colson as saying Buz-
hardt told him some CIA and Hughes
operations had intermingled and he
should stay away for fear of involving
"some important Republicans."
? THE SOURCE'S acknowledge the like-
lihood that the CIA used as a cover in
overseas operations the Hughes Corpo-
ration which also manufactured techni-
cal or scientific equipment for the intel-
ligence agency., ? .
As another background link, a hood- ?
lum testified that ex-FBI agent Robert
Leapin' Johnson lizards .
Re CIA "Revelations and Resigna-
tions" [Jan. 131: Wow! For security rea-
sons, in '62 during the Kennedy Admin-
istration a Domestic Operations Divi-
sion (DOD) was set up in the CIA! Holy
Democrat! And?wiretaps in the '60s!
Leapin' Johnson lizards! Not only Wa-
tergates, but also Demogates!
Will Bartlett
Daver-Foxcroft, Me.
? The information on citizens in the
CIA and FBI dossiers [Feb. 31 gives these
agencies power over Americans. At the
same time, the secrecy,with which these
agencies operate denies citizens infor-
mation, and therefore_power, over them.
ie
Mallen, who- managed Hughes' hotel
and casino operations in Las Vegas
,Nev., tried to hire him 'to assassinate
Cuban Premier Fidel Castro, saying he
was acting for the CIA..,..:
. Some Intertel people think the reason
Colson thinks?or says lie thinks?inter-
tel is . a CIA front is that Hughes hired.
another firm which was a CIA cover. .
HUGHES EMPLOYED as a pUblie
relations firm in Washington the 'Mul-
len Co., which had close linv-s with the.
CIA. It. afforded cover for CIA opera-:,
tions, employed fanner' CIA agent and-
White /louse -,"plumber" E. Howard.
Hunt, and its president, Robert .Ben-
nett, reported his ?knowledge of Hunt's
activities to a CIA case officer soon
:after the Watergate break-in, well be--
fore Hunt's involvement became public.'
,
As further fuel for the. Senate investi-
gation of the CIA, according to sources,
classified CIA documents that Baker
tied in compiling .an early report on
the agency's links to the ? Watergate r.
Scandal make several references to In-
.3,.._,..3 ? _The sources declined to disclose.
what is: said in the still-classified.docu.
Meats. ? ?
-.?..Reportedly there- is ."no solid evi-
dence" in the material?wbich Baker
hopes the CIA will _ultimately declassify
Intertel was used by the CIA. ?
"?-? INTERTEL-- ? OFFICIALS Peloquin'
and General Counsel Torn McKeon
deny it categorically. .
"We are not Owned .by and never in
.the existence 'of the organization been...
employed by the CIA," Peloquin said.
? . IN THE BACKGROUND is the theory
of Senate Watergate investigators, is-
sued in a staff reyeirt, that the Water-
gate break-in may have been an attempt
to :discover whether Democratic Nation-e
al . Committee. .(hairman . Lawrence
O'Brien hadeeny damaging &cements -
linking Hughes and Nixon....0'Erien 'had
also been on the Hughes payroll.
In the case of the cm, even its budget is
secret. The Constitution's requirement
that "a legal statement and account of
the receipts and expenditures of all pub-
lic money shall be published from time
to time" has simply been disregarded.
We need two reforms. We need an
end to all political dossier building by
the FBI, the CIA and all other govern-
ment agencies. We also need full infor-
mation on what our agencies of govern-
ment are doing.
A government with information
about us that denies us information
about it turns the very idea of a democ-
racy upside down.
Aryeh Neier. Executive Director
American Civil Liberties Union
'10 New York City
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WASHINGTON POST
3 February 1975
Chilean Cites
'71 Kissinger
Assurances
? By Lewis H. Diuguid .?
Washington Post Staff Writer
Former Ambassador Or-
lando Letelier charged last
week that Henry A. Kissinger
aJok the 'initiative to assure
him personally in late 1971 of
nonintervention by the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency in
Chile, although the public rec-
rd now clearly indicates in-
aolvement by the agency.
Letelier, ambassador here
or the government of Presi- ,
azat Salvador Allende, was
imprisoned for a year by the
atlitary junta that seized
power in September, 1973. He
is now a lecturer at American
University.
Kissinger's initiative in ' De-
'ember, 1971, followed allega-
tions of a CIA role in the first
"najor anti-Allende demonstra-
tion in Santiago, the Women's
march of the empty pots. ?
"Kissinger asked me to as-
sure President Allende that
there was not a single person
!iivolved either directly or in-
aiireett, ," Letelier said.
Letelier first made the alle-
gation in. a televiaion inter-
view, saying the assurance of
aionintervention was made by
a high official. Asked to con-
firm that the official was Kis-
;Anger, Letelier did so.
?
The meeting took place fol-
lowing a dinner at the home of
columnist Joseph Alsop. Lete-
.3ier said he was told Kissinger
would come with a special
:message for him. "He drew me ?
aside to say that there were
no CIA people involved in any
internal Chilean problem,"
said the former ambassador.
A spokesman for the State
Department said Kissinger "had
0. recollection of any conversa-
tion" such as Letelier describes,
and does not recall meeting
him at the Alsop residence.
Alsop does remember the din-
ner but he said he did not re-
member Kissinger coming.
When the 1971 women's po-
test against food shortages
took place, pro-Allende news-
papers in Chile and elsewhere
noted the similarity of the
demonstration to those b y
women in Brazil, allegedly
-dvith CIA backing, prior to the
1964 coup ousting a left-wing
government in that country.
Letelier said he believed
Kissinger's assurances, passed
them to Allende and used
them as a basis for counseling
restraint in later instances
when his government sus-
pected U.S. involvement in
Chilean affairs. - ?
Kissinger at that time was
the presidential adviser on na-
tional security affairs. In
other encounters, Kissinger in-
dicated personal respea foi:
Allende and said he was con-
sidering a visit to Chile, ac-
cording to Letelier.
'However, according to Rep.:
Michael J. Harrington (D-
Mass.), CIA Director William
E. Colby testified' before a
1-louse ' subcommittee 'last,
April that the Forty Commit- !
tee of the National Security "
Council authorized $5 million :
for anti-Allende efforts follow-
ing the election of the Marxist i
in late 1970. .
The government has not
specified what form that activ-
ity took, beyond a press con-
ference statement by Presis.
dent Ford last Septemberindia
eating that the money went to
support opposition parties and
newspapers.
. State Department authori
ties privately contend the CIA
efforts were aimed at .keeping
an oppressed opposition alive,
not at bringing down the Al- -
lende government. They deny]
that any aid went to. strikes on
demonstrators such ? as the i
women.
Letelier said that in retro--
spect he sees evidence of as
wide U.S. role, an "infernal..i
'machine" of outside interven-
tion that he contends was deci-
sive in Allende's fall. . a
Letelier also said he. be-
lieves that the CIA was re.;
sponsible for the May, 1972,',
break--hi at. the Chiienn. em-
bassy. No arrests were ever
made i?n the break-in, which:
came a month before the in
truders were caught at the.
Watergate. He, noted that:
Chile was then' in critical ne-
gotiations with the Interne-
' tional Telephone and Tele-
graph Corp. on nationalization
of its properties.
Two months earlier, colum-
nist Jack Anderson had pub-
lished documents revealing
ITT efforts to engage the CIA
.in efforts to prevent Allende's
ascension to the presidency.
Letelier said the only item of
importance stolen from the em-
bassy was his mailing list, but
he said other rifled documents
undoubtedly were photograph-
ed.
- By mid-1973, Letelier indi-
cated that Chile had further
indications of CIA involve-
ment. He cited 'statements by
'an American saying he was a
former CIA agent who sought
a Chilean passport in return
for revelations ofainti-Allende
activi ties.
Letelier said that he could
not recall the man's name,
but that Chile assisted him in,
reaching Sweden after taking 1
his testimony in Santiago. 1
An American pilot later I
called the embassy offering to
sell information on flight of
. arms to rightist Chilean gnu;
. rillas; Letelier said. The offer
was turned down but the gen-,
era data conformed with the
government's own findings of i
I
alleged CIA activities, he
added..
BALTIMORE SUN
4 February 1975
lAn emotional Kissinger ?
blasts Post on lying storS7
? Washington Ell
reau of The Sun
"to say that there were no CIA
people involved in any internal
Chilean problem."
William E. Colby, director of -
the Central Intelligence
Agency, testified to a congres-
sional committee last spring
that the Forrty Committee,
which oversees American intel-
ligence activities, authorized
the expenditure of $5 million
for activities against the Al-
lende government. Mr. Kissin-
ger is chairman of the commit-
tee.
Mr. Kissinger said yesterday
that since the Post carried
his denial well into the body of
the story, readers would be
eft with the impression that
he had lied.
Washington?Henry A. Kis-
singer, his voice strained from
emotion, yesterday attacked
the Washington Post for its
handling of a charge that he
once lied to the former Chilean
ambassador to Washington.
The Post, said in its Mon-
day editions that the ambassa-
dor, Orlando Letelier, said that
Mr. Kissinger had falsely told
him in 1971 that the Central
Intelligence Agency had abso-
lutely no involvement in Chi-
lean politics.
Mr. Letelier was at the time
representing the government of
Salvador Allende. He said that
Mr. Kissinger took him aside
at a dinner party given by
Joseph Alsop, the columnist,
BALTIMORE SUN
11 February 1975
? ? CIA Prescience:
Domestic spying may not be the only way in
which the CIA has viewed its mandate a bit too
broadly. A recent CIA move to ,initiate a privately-
,' conducted soidy of mass transit,..cat vh in Europe
would seem to be an example, especially since the
Department of Transportation probably long since
has gathered the information and would give it to
the CIA free of charge. But the concern motivating
the study makes sense. In a letter outlining the stud-
'y, the CIA says that economic, ecgldgical and other
_ concerns may "drastically alter future ground and -
? air transport requirements," and that most new
mass-transit technology is being developed abroad.
? ,U.S. industry, the letter says, may be facing danger-
ous competitive threats if it doesn't catch up. Na
CIA investigation is needed to tell the nation that
,rail and mass transit technology here has been,
largely moribund while the Europeans and Japanese
? have been forging ahead with super high-speed
trains, magnetic levitation and tracked. hovercraft.
But in displaying its interest, the intelligence agenCy
is displaying prescience of a kind American industry
still seems to lack.
During ? that period the
Forty Committee chaired by
Kissinger authorized $2.5 mil-
lion more for Chile, some of it
to influence an important elec-
tion, according to the Harring-
ton account of Colby's testi-
mony,
Despite the evidence cited
by Letelier, Chile made no
formal accusation against the
United States. Letelier left
?Vashington to become foreign
minister and then defense
minister. By August, 1973, ,he
said, the government ? had
taken Up a new- round of talks
aimed at settling. differences
with the. United States. .
Left-wing Socialists advised
Allende against negotiating
with 'a country they believed
was seeking to 'overthrow his.
government, but Letelier said
Allende went ahead, in part as
a concession to the armed
forces which sought concilia-
tion.
The talks in August prod-
uced--no public results and the
coup came Sept. 11.. .
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? WASHINGTON POST '
3 February 1975 _.
Meg Greenfield
"
Everything has its usefulness, in.
eluding, I suspect, the muscle-bound
and accident-prone inefficiencies of
mut' federal government. Consider only
the saving incompetence of the Water-
* gate crowd. Frustrated in 'their -at-
4empts to !get the great engine of gov-..
eminent to do the dirty work for them,
in the end. they foundered on their
own weakness for bureaucratic compli-
cation and excess: too many records,
too many participants, too much organ-
izational structure, too much junk.
These thoughts are prompted by the
current 4ontroversy in Washington
over the ,dossier-making and/or file-
-keeping issue. iSsue. You do not, I think,
have to resolve the still-open questions
concerning- the latest charges against
the FBI and the CIA to accept one
'general proposition. It is?as any small
? businessman or student-loan applicant
or war protester can tell you?that
' government at all levels has long since
crossed the 'boundary between legiti-
mate and illegitimate intelligence
,gathering and file making 'on Ameri-
;-ean citizens. For the CIA and the? FI
are far frdm being unique among Fed-
.eral agencies in having investigators in
the field or in amassing vast amounts
'rig material of questionable relevance
'and propriety in their files. And that 'is
where the saving sprawl and ineptness
of government come in. For it may be
accounted one of the blessings of our
. time. that for all its snoopery and stor-
age capacity, the government does not
,necessarily know what it knows?or,
even 'how to find out.
I offer in evidence a personal remi-
,niscence from the Kennedy years. The
episode, -set off by an angry letter
'from -Bertrand Russell to The Nest-
:York Times, has always struck me as
'being both illuminating -and oddly re-
assuring. Lord Russell, feeling more
scourgelike than informative, in effect
'had only this to say: .it was a sad com;
inentary on America's pretensions to?
democracy. that, for all our talk of
freedom, the government had locked
up poor Don Martin for expressing his
:dissent and now was refusing to let
him out of prison?for shame.
Don Martin? Evidently Meng with a
posse of other reporters, I rang the ap-
propriate 'Assistant to the Attorney
General and asked who Don Martin
was and what the Department of Jus-
tice had done to him. "God, don't we
wish we knew," came the reply, fol-
lowed by assurances from the harassed'
aide who was working on it that I
would be placed prominently on the
"call-back", 'list of . journalists wha
wanted to Ictur.v.
Tine passed, and so did my faith in
my prominence on the list. So I did
the obvious, reasonable thing?which
is somehow outside government's
' grasp. Figuring it sounded like some-
* thing the American Civil Liberties Un-
ion would know about, I called a law-
yer there and was told at once that
Don Martin was a youth who had been
jailed for his part in a "row-out" pro-
test against Our nuclear-submarine fa-
' cility in Groton, Conn. I was referred
to young Mr., Martin's attorney who,
after a helpful chat, in turn put me on
to the federal judge in the case. The
judge discussed the public aspects of
the case and then suggested that I
seek Justice-Department permission to
speak to a person he named over there
who was familiar with the status of ef-
forts to secure.the youth's release.
, No one who works in Washington
will be surprised at the greeting I re-
ceived from the (now frantic) Justice
? 'Department aide -whom I .called to-
'
The writer is deputy editor of the
'editorial page. This column orgio
natty appeared in Newsweek.
seek that permission several 'hours af-
ter our original exchange. "Look," he
blurted into the phone, "we're working
on it, and we will call you back. We
are 90 per cent certain it's something
that came out of the civil-rights dem-
onstrations in Albany, Ga., but we'
want to nail it down."
One cheer, then, for government's
inefficiency as keeper arid producer of
the files. Even when it ought to know,
it often doesn't. Still, one cheer is
plenty. For this built-in bureaucratic
maladroitness has its limits as a virtue
?and also its potential as a vice. It's
not just that fancy computer retrieval
systems now threaten to make the util-
ization of government files much eas-
ier. The fact is that bureaucratic in-
competence and point-missing have
also managed to stuff government's
files with irrelevant, damaging and
false information concerning thou-
sands of citizens.
The late Francis E. Walter, who was
chairman of the House Un-American
Activities Committee during the time
of some of its worst excesses, once told;
me that his own name had turned up
on one of the committee's dragnet lists
of potential subversives, owing to a
cOntribution he had made to a Spanish
' 12
Civil War refugee program: Re found.
this fact inexpressAly funny. But as.-
one who has ever tried to straightna
out "a ease of mistaken identity with a
credit bureau or who has followed the
nightmare experiences of those pubbe
and private figures who have sought te
expunge from the record half-hiddesr
libels that have plagued their careens
will know that these things are any-
thing but funny. The Fibber MeGeet
closet of government-acquired WW1-
mation on the personal lives of citizens
may be?happily?a model of disorder-
'and inaccessibility, but from time to
time someone is going to open tin-
- door.
The recently enacted federal iirivary
statute attempts to diminish some at
these dangers. But since it is limited ha
scope, and leaves enforcement of new
curbs on government agencies largely--
to the agencies themselves, I think its
effect is bound to 'be modest. For we
can take it as the nearest thing Ire
have to an immutable law that instils.:
tions involved in intelligence gather,:
lug and record keeping can almost at--
ways think of a reason to pursue their
-inquiries, and almost never of a makes
to close or destroy the files. It is inter-
esting to note, in this connection, that
-even as members of Congress express
their outrage' over the: FBI's pryhg
into their private lives, there has been
_ no congressional groundswell to dis-
mantle ,the notorious files (on other'd
of the House Un-American Activities_
Committee, which was allowed to am-
ble along, pursuing its inquiries an(
making its official notations until just
a few weeks ago.
,
The-sad fact is that there is hardly
an agency or branch of government or
political group or faction that has not
somehow contributed to the condition
in which we now find ourselves, in
- eluding, I would add, those of us whit
have urged an enlarged governmental
role in people's affairs over the pad
few decades?without thinking abotdi
this predictable result. Now we are
well beyond the point where inquiriei
into the possible malefaction of certain
government employees or passage cit
modest statutes can have much effeet.
For we have to decide not just how we
wish to control this intelligence-gather-
ing mania in the future but what we
wish to do with the mountain of exist
ing government files that clearly ex-
ceed-the hounds of any decent national.
purpose or need. On the theory that
we can't count on Washington's in-
competence forever, I am for a bon
fire.
_ .
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NEW YORK TIMES
5 February '1975
COLBY WITHHOLDS'
DATA ON POLICE AID
Asserts Programs of Local
.Agencies Would Suffer
? From C.I.A. Disclosure
By DAVID BURNHAM
Special to The New York Times
'WASHINGTON, Feb' 4?Wil-
liam E. Colby, tWe Director of
Central Intelligence, has re-
fused to identify police depart-
ments he says his agency assis-
ted'untit two years ago because
"such publication could hamper
current police programs." .
t Mr. Colby, in a letter to Re-
!presentative Edward I. Koch,
Democrat-Liberal of Manhat-
tan, said, "Confidentaility of re-
lationships is generally a prere-
quisite to good intelligence. If
we are forced to violate the
trust? and confidence under
which these relatios relation-
ships were established, our re-
putation and effectiveness as a
serious intelligence agency will
be seriously impared."
The Central' ? Intelligence
Agency is currently facing in-
vestigations of allegedly illegal
involvement in domestic intel-
ligence activities by committees
of the House and 'Senate and a
panel established by President
Ford.
Mr. Koch first inquired about
the C.I.A.'s relationships with
police departments two years
ago following publication ? in
The New York Times of reports
that high ranking officials in
the New York Police Depart-
ment had undergone training at
the agency's headquarters in
Langley, Va.
? For Dozen Departments
As a result of Mr. Koch's in-
quiry, the House Government
Operations Committee initiated
a limited investigation that re,
suited in the C.I.A.'s admission
that it had provided assistance
and training to "a dozen city
and county police depart-
ments."
The agency, though it insisted
that the contacts with the po-
lice departments did not violate
its charter, announced, in a let-
ter to the House committee dat-
ed Jan. 29, 1973, the termina-
tion of all such activities.
About this time, the identities
of several additional police de-
partments that had been
trained or otherwise assisted by
ithe C.I.A, became known. Be-
sides New Yak, they included
the departments in Washing-
ton, Boston, Fairfax County,
Va., and Montgomery County,
Md.
It was a letter from Mr. Ko-
chon Jan. 9 ,of this year about
the identity of the remaining",
seven departments the agency,
had assisted that prompted Mr.
Colby to refuse to-name them.
After making his request, Mr.
Koch said, "With the recent
press reports concerning the
extensive activities of the
C.I.A.,. I would think that the
Approve
BALTIMORE NEWS AMERICAN
2 FEB 1975
. ;
7,16,14iiiR1A7ViVE MEANS
Colson & the CIA Probe-
During two Gig prison conversations,
Charles Colson has given Sen. Lowell
Weicker, R-Conn., a. vivid account of White
House-influenced covert activities conduct-
ed by the Central Intelligence Agency dur-
ing the Nixon administration.
The senator plans to volunteer the sub-
stance of those conversations to the new
Senate committee to investigate CIA opera-
tions of the President's commission to
probe the agency's alleged domestic sur-
veillance activities, which is chai
Vice President Nelson Rockefeller.
When Colson was a ruthless and power-
ful White House assistant pulling the strings
of some Nixon team "dirty tricks,"Weicker
would have nothing to do with him. Their
distaste was mutual. But now that Colson is
behind bars, convicted. of obstructing jus-
tice, Weicker has been to visit him twice..
?
?
?
Furthermore, Weicker has indicated to
associates that he is convinced Colson is a.
different man, capable of being a credible
witness in areas of his personal knowledge.
lithe investigating bodies also believe that,
either or both may ask Colson to testify.
? After Colson pleaded guilty to one count
of obstructing justice in return for the Jus-
tice Department dropping all ocher charges
pending against him, it-was.widely expect-
ed that he would provide significant infor-'
?mation about the Watergate crimes. While
a member of the inner Nixon crowd, howev-
er, Colson apparently operated somewhat
independently of the others. If he knew of
any bombshells implicating the president,
he never dropped them.
Colson- has not been fully Interrogated
under oath in public, however, about his
knowledge of specific CIA* operations. Ac-
cording to sources close to Weicker, Colson
has now made several allegations about.
-CIA domestic activities, at least one of
which purportedly implicates Secretary of .
State Henry Kissinger.
In the White House, Colson apparently
dealt with CIA personnel occasionally.'
Howard Hunt Jr.,-a former CIA agent who
is one of the convicted Watergate burglars,'
!information I am requestint,
!could not possibly be consi-
dered classified."
According to the C.I.A. and
the New York Police Depart-
ment, 14 New York policemen,
including former First Deputy
Police Commissioner William
H. I. Smith,. received training in
the computerized handling of
intelligence information during
September, 1972.
The training for the other de-
partments reportedly included.
the detection of wiretaps and
other secret recording devices,
the techniques of secret surveil-
lance and methods for finding
xplosive charges. ?
The C.I.A. said it did not ber
lieve the "training activities
violated either the letter or
spirit of the 1947 law establish-
ing the agency, which said it
"shall have no police, subpoena,
law enforcement or internal se-
curity functions" in the United
eates. ? .
For Release 2001/08/08:
? .. ?
operated from an office inside the 'White
House listed as under Colson's general su-
pervision. John Dean accused Colson of or-
dering Hunt to forge a State Department
cable linking the assessinanation of South
Vietnamese. President Ngo Diah Diem In
1963 with the late President Kennedy, but
Colson denied the charge.
??When the grim Spector of prison began
to loom over him. Colson 'dramatically be-
came a religious convert. Despite the fact
he went off to jail clutching two Bibl?.nol.-
all those who usedeo know him are satisfied
that he has sincerely reformed. But Weick-
er appears to believe that new and tnereno-
ble impulses now motivate Colson to tell the
truth.
It is interesting that it should be Weick-
er who has become Colson's contact with
-the outside world. Weicker was the most
outspoken Republican on the Senate Water-
gate Committee, the first to denounce the
Nixon crowd and the first to call for the res-
ignations of H.R. (Bob) Haldeman and John
Ehrlichnian. He accused the Nixon .Atire;qn-
istration of hurting the Republican Pa-
and "dragging politics into the gutter" and
urged the internal Revenue Service to et-
examine Nixon's tax deduction for his vice
presidential papers, all back at a time when
other GOP politicians were gingerly pussy-
footing around the problem in hopes that it
would vanish into thin air.
He has done his own investigation i from
time to time and independently disded
the other day that a former CIA agent had
viewed assassination equipment displayed
by a Virginia firm which wished to sell it to
the government. ?
He did not, however, seek a spot ea the
new Senate committee probing the CIA.. "I
don't want to be known just as an investiga-
tor," he told associates. .But colleges
point out that Senate Minority Leader Hugh
Scott, who made the selections, was not
pleased by Weicker's Watergate perfse-m-
ance and views him:as an untrustworthy
: maverick.
. It doesn't matter. Weicker runs his own
show anyway. .
NEW YORK TIMES
4 February 1975
ROCKEFELLER SEES I
LONGER C.I.A. INQUIRY
- ?
WASHINGTON, Feb. 3 (AP)?*
Vice President Rockefeller said
today that his commission's in-
vestigation of alleged domestic
spying by the Central Intelli-
gence Agency might require
more than the three-month
period set by President Ford.
? Speaking to reporters at the
end of the commission's fourth
weekly meeting, Mr. Rockefeller
said "we'll do our best" to
complete the inquiry by April,
but added that "we may have
,to ask for additional time."
I The panel heard further testi-
Imony from Richard Ober, who
once reportedly headed a coun-1
terintelligence group, which the
C.I.A. director, William E.
Colby, has conceded knt files1
on 10,000 American etizens.!
Mr. Rockefeller descried Mr.i
Ober as the "former chief of the
special operations group of i
C.I.A.," but refused to discuss!
Mr. Ober's testimony.
Mr. Ober, now on the staff
of the National Security Coun-
cil, again declined to make anyi
comment to reporters. It was
his second appearance befor&
the Rockefeller commission. I
Earlier, the commission heard
from Lyman B. Kirkpatrick Jr.?
formerly No. 3 man at the
agency and now a profsor oft
political science at Brown Uni-
versity.? - t
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77714;,3;lay,Feb. 1975 *A7k-Ii&dfog-1,6f1
t From
- By Lawrence Meyer ??
Wastithgton Post Staff Writer
James W. McCord's letters
to the ? Central Intelligence
Agency written :lafter the
-Watergate break-in Were with-
-held from the Watergate pros-
ecutors on orders - from CIA
'Director Richard M. -Helms,
according to sworn testimony.
Helms ordered thel letters
held by the CIA, despite the
strong recommendation of
CIA security director Howard
J. Osborn- that they should be
'turned over to the FBI, after!
the, agency's general counsel
told Helms that the CIA had
.no legal obligation to give
them to the FBI, according to
testimony before a House sub-
committee. ?
; The letters, Written between
the Watergate break-in and
the start of ,the first Water-
gate trial, could have had a
"significant effect" on the in-
vestigation, according to act-
ing U.S. Attorney Earl J. Sil-
bert, the chief, prosecutor in
the first Watergate trial. ,
The CIAis failure to turn
-Watergate conspirator Mc-
Cord's letters over to the in-
vestigators was called "a sup-
pression of evidence" by Rep:
Lucien Nedzi, chairman of the
House Armed Services Sub-
committee on Intelligence.dur-
ing closed hearings in May,
1973. Testimony from those
hearings was ,recently; made
public- ? ? '4
'''Helms ordered McCord's six
letters to be held. by the CIA
after the agency's general
.counsel, Lawrence Houston,
told Helms "that we had no le-
gal responsiblity *to pass the.
letter on. to any Other author-.
ites" according to Houston's
testimony.
Houston testified that in his
experience as general counsel
to the CIA since 1947 criminal
defendants had attempted to
construct a defense by involv-
ing the CIA, In many cases,
;Houston said, this attempt was
'a bluff.and the ? bluff collapsed
when the CIA waited out the
situation: - ? -
Where the defense was actu-
ally presented, Houston 'said,'
the CIA countered it by pre-
senting documentation or wit-
nesses to refute the claim.- 1
Houston did not, however
persuade Nedzi during his tes-
timony that the CIA' had acted
properly in withholding the
letters from the 'FBI, the pros-
ecutors and ,the ,Justice
le o eifers
I, Inquiry Told
partment.
; In a session that at tithes be-
'came heated, Houston admit-
ted that part of his motivation
'was to keep the CIA from be,:
ing linked' publicly to the
Watergate affair.
: Osborn, during his testi-
mony orf`- May 24, 1973, reL.
counted how a letter signed
only "Jim" in an envelope ad-
dressed to Helms with no re-
turn address had Come to his
desk about Aug. 1, 1972?some
six weeks after the Watergate
break-in;At first dismissing it
as "crank' mail," Osborn said
he then recognized the signa-
ture as that Of McCord, who
had worked for Osborn at the
CIA. . ,
,
Osborn testified that he
showed the letter to Helms
and said-" that he was
"reasonably sure" it was from
McCord: "I told him that I felt
very strongly that the letter
should be turned over to the
Federal- Bureau of Investiga-
tion."
Helms, Osborn said, decided
to get Houston's legal advice
on the matter.
"I participated, I stayed in
and remained in that conver-
satiou when Mr. Houston and
Mr. Helms 'discussed the legal'
aspects of 'it," -Osborn, testi-
fied. "At the time, I don't
think I really. agreed with it;;
but, you, k-nowi r wo'rked for.
Mr. Helms, 'he Was my boss," ,
- In one letter;: dated Dec. 29, .
1972, and addressed to one of
McCord's former CIA col-
leagues, McCord asserted: "I
have the evidence of the in-
i
I volvemeet. of (former Attor-
,ney General John N.) Mitchell ,
and others,' sufficient to con-
vince a jury, the Congress and
; the Press." ;
When Houston argued that
the CIA had no legal reSponsiL
bility to turn the letters over
to the FBI or prosecutors,
Nedzi told' him that he agreed
"that you had no direct legal
responsibility ,at that time to
do this," but that "the reason-
able thing to have done would
have been to immediately noti-
fy the FBI that such a le,tter
was from a,defendant....
Houston :said that it was
"very obvious from the news-
papers that any information,
that went to the prosecutor''
office was appearing in the pa-
pers very shortly after ,that . .
.And since, the last thing we"
wanted to .: do was interject
ourselves into the case and
stir tip -newspaper stories
and rumors that we had been
'involved, I ,felt that I wantedl
to deal with this matter with
the Departinent of Justice and
I the prosecuting attorney when
kthe issue 4rose as it .subst,
quently did . .."
The issue arose when Sil-
bert told the CIA he was con-
cerned that a defendant might
bring the CIA into the case
and asked Houston's deputy,
John Warner. a series of ques-
tions about the CIA.
The answers to Silbert's
questions, contained in what
Houston described as an
"elaborate report." , went not
to Silbert but to his superiors
at the Justice Department.
Houston then did not mention
McCord's letters, he testified,
because "I honestly didn't
think of it."
At another point, Houston
'asserted that the letters were
,"not pertinent to the FBI's in-
terest." ?
?
"Why wouldn't you let the'
FBI make that determina-
tion?" Nedzi asked Houston..
Houston also attempted to.
justify his recommendation by
explaining, "I was not askedi
;to give it (McCord's letter), ai
Was asked whether we had to!
give it, and in my opinion I'
said, 'No,'"
"Your opinion: in my jude
ment," Armed Services Com-)
mittee chief counsel Frank M.
Slatinshek told Houston, "wag
Very, very poor."
Nedzi told Houston that he
understood the desire to "keep
the agency's skirts clean," but
he added, "under these cir-
cumstances,. the desires seemJ
' 14
40.?
'Ito be somewhat excessive be
cause I do think that in effect'
there has been a suppression
'of evidence." ? ? , ,
Osborn:also, told the subcoit-
mittee the while investigating
the aMtacts of-the Watergate
conspirators with the cm,. he
had .been 'told .byHelms to
"forget about" a matter inVolv-..
lag .the loan by the CIA..of,
wig, tape recorder' other
materials to Watergate conspi-
rator g: Howard /brat Jr. Os-
born said Helms told him, "'I
will handle that. You take care
.of the rest' of it.'" ?-?
Helms', sworn testimosnifhe
'fore the, Senate Select Water-1
gate committee appears to con-
flict with the testimony given
riby Osborn and Houston. Helms'
was, asked on Aug. 2, 1973 by.
Assistant chief counsel David.
Dorsen if "any relative infor-
mation (Avis) withheld by the,
CIA to the FBI and Justice De-
partment, information that you,
were aware of while the events.
Were taking place in June, July,
or August of 1972."
"Sir, I do not believe so,"-
Helms' replied, "Does the rec-
ord show that there was any.;
thing of this kind?"
Dorsen replied that he hadi
no evidence to the contrary.1
"Well," Helms said, "I do not,
either, but I just want to be,
sure that my recollection,
tracked with the facts." 4
NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
it FEB 1975
"ABC . News ClOseup," .which
plans to present a TV report next
May on the Central Intelligence
Agency, said yesterday that it
had received permission .to take
its cameras inside the agency's
headquarters in Langley, Va. The
program, however, does not ex-
pect to reveal any secret in-
formation. ?
Av Westin, a vice president of
ABC- Nevis and director of TV
documentaries, said:
"The C en t r a I Intelligence
Agency has broken a precedent
by, agreeing to our request to
admit cameras for an extensive
look at the agency. We will have
access to examine and film spe-
cific elements in the intelligence
gathering operations."
William Colby, CIA director,
and other agency officials and
employes will be interviewed on.
the docnnentary, Westin* said..
"Our purpbse is to develop an'
objective, balanced report on the.
CIA covering its functions, its
policies anti itemethods oropera-
tion."
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?
-I2HINGTON POST
'2 I4-lebraury 1975
Appioved For Release 2001/08/0Nrs-',-RDP77-00432R000100350001-8
'
y Wirliarn creider
? cArtt:z.v-r is a nwin.bev of the national staff of The -Washington Post.
- .
-nettndals, as they be-
? knowzi one by one, reed 'like' a.
-..??.?Igh.`-cirmSt of "1984."7- '
Army was uptight about Oleo
? coffeehouse outside Ft. Hood,
r'? ?'tc'Olee Strut was put 'under sax-
by Military intelligence agents.
'other things; wai busy
to penetrate the Black-Student Union
7:--ennsylvania Military College, a- quiet
pus ?In Chester, Pa.-
.IRSN:rit scanning the tax return.; of
Cumrnirigi- Engine Foundation; looking
'7' violations because that' tax-exempt foun-
? some money to black..activists
I'Ve*-Left-theoreticians. ' ;
`Tric.f.',LA., :which is supposed to -gather'. In-
.: on foreign pewers;" instead was-
.?;_,Ing columnist Jack- Anderson-and :his
L
.'"hose disjointed fragments are riow.begin-
???yrg ta forin a more coherent picture: over
c-3..kast eight years, the- American govern-
?..22-4 devoted 'enormous energy to a secret
tY..----Spying on American citizens. It
done with videotape cameras and elec-
'uric..bugs, with _undercover agents and
informers, with fancy. computers and
Th the tacit consent or even encourage-
? el tWO Presidents from both political
As usual, Sam' Ervin, the --retired senator
in'_North Carolina, said
Unfortunately, in the heat of political cri-
L, government And the men that wield its
owerhe-Come 'ffighterned by opinions they,
Usliike. Their reaction it'vto combat tin*
'ctvS by any power they have at hand --ex-
':the power of -better ideas and better
. ?!!.. ?
, Feat Reflex . ?
,;-70W?DID 'IT.happen?" What As
...12.,,Vp_rerit _its happening- again? If the
.aeOngressional cemmittees on
?-nee seriously confront the complex his-'
...:xyrA:of -these episodes, they will find that
-
he "in- iiit-"hriportant ' questions are :still
?
rgely?i unanswered. . ?
she :issues of legality .;Which surround
overnment surveillance are -at best unset-,
and,-even now, civil libertarians argue
at there is no firm legal barrier to prevent
imila.e.cOntroversies if the nation finds, it-
{ elf in a future period of domestic turmoil.
What :is' the long-term danger? It may,
qound ielodramatie to'invoke the image of
George Orwelps "1984." And yet, if society,
:ails , on-nigh political Spying or to build
tr4n-g, ,Oeventives into theApproiexleFor Reiettsie12601opaioer. orpe-Rtionglio48.21/2oo ? i 00360001-8
enough to envision the eventual acceptance
' of these practices as legitimate' activities,
? not jtist in times of social stress, but always.
That path would .surely lead to a. Society.
quite 'different from the Ainerican ?ideal,-A
? place where unerthixiox 'ideas and free 'ex-
pression -are permanently inhibited by the,
gavernment's computer memery; :
It is still not'. entirely clear -what deal;
sions - Produced Jthis' exploion 'of surveil-
epee and dirty tricks :There are at least two
'competing theories.- One, which Might be
Called -the -theory' of "spontaneous. combut::
suggests' that these Various' branches
of government; Watching the tame frighten-
'ing:eventi; reacted individuallY but in simi-
1,,a-ys thonkr in11q thai the
'CIA bethe'FBI weren't acting irresponsibli'
on"theli own passion but were following
.orders from aboVe."---
; Although the factual evidence
tied; at least this znuels is clear': .that these
activities grew ,out of Coramon.'reflexes of
lear,...that:the rgular inhibitions of decent
Men Or traditional legal restrainti which are
supposed to prevent such abuses of power
proved inadequate, not just in the pu: or
thelustice Department:or the 'FBI, but in
the White House. Cities were burning, Radi-
als were, indeed, 'planting bombs-in public
buildings. The citizens'? protest movement
against the war in V.Ietnam--.--whicir seemed
so impotent in terms ilef.chAn.O.ng govern-
ment policy?was mOst .iffeetiv, e .in frighten-
,
ing the 'men who Made that poliek. :
.? 'Looking back, the- circumstantial eVidenei,
,
,does .suggest that all. of these activities were
.interielated, at least tO.- some; degree. In a:
;.ibiase, that it Mitigating testiino-nY for 'the
'individual agencies. If oneconcludes that all
nf these bureaucradies 'were responding- to
rthe same alarm bells, then it is more diffi-
'cult to portraY the. CIA., or`..the'. FBI -
secret police force .that has run -amok' in a
democratic societY. ' *.
Two Periods of Reactioni:,:': ?1:
THE SIMPLIFIED higtory. of events runs
"
like this
were twe; distinct periods of 'fear
'when the federal government mobilized to
gather intelligence on society's -tiotiblernak-
.? ers, whether they were anti-war demonstra-
tors or black activists in, America's central
Cities: .
The first was in late-1967; after a tuinultu-
ous:summer of -nrban riots, 'when the Justice'
:Department'under Attorney General Ram:
. .
tion! and Pruirlant Johnson's 1711,1to House
expressed to vaxions departnientt---from the
CIA-tO the Pentagon?the 'need ,fOr better
intelligence on' the domestic discord.- :'?
A lot of things started in those months: In.
the ?Iiring of 1968,- for instance,:the'FBI or-
d ered offices ghetto
Informants," at least one for each of the ha
'reati'S 8,99Q Agents, It alsolannched its now
Infamous". COINTELPRO. Operation; 'aimed
at ditrtipting New Left groupt. It broadened
its regular surveillance,: ineruding wiretap
and paid infiltrators, on;both black and' anti-
war groups;
The Army p
, in that same eriod, issned .an
"Intelligence collection plan"?distributed
to OO 'federal offices?which authorized
on' the premise that';riots were
:6used .by "militant "agitator'! -Aird.".rabble;
? .
rousing meetings ; and .,fiery ? agitation
Speechet 'of extremist civil rights .groupl."
Military intelligence, was equally interested
In' monitoring "subversive": efforts like the,
'Underground ? newspapers . and GI coffee-
houses which Were fostering "resistance tr.;
the Army" .
The CIA, as the public recently learned,
also participated in its own limited way: The
Intelligence agency ; "Inserted'.'. 10 ' agents
inside dissident' gronpi in .the :Washington
area, on the pretext' that it wei.. proteeting
CIA building against assault, ;
? , . . ? .
The tocend time a crisis within the gov-
ernment ?which is better known probably
because it was well exposed during the
Watergate scandal?came in the summer. of:
,1970 *4eA:a. yoting White , House aide named
Tom. Huston wrOte' his famous.
*ma calling on. all agencies; from : Justice
te:the CIA to the Pentagon'S,Ilational Sear:
rity Agency,' to sign hp for. a broad and ex-.
plicitly illegal campaign of surveillance.'All
but J. Edgar Hoover, of the:FBI were will-.
'
ing, : ; ? ?
CIA,..by its own. account, became. ac-
tiv'e planting' a dozen or, so agents in-
'side ."dissident circles," allegedly to .search
for foreign ? connections: The Internal Ree
nue Service, meantime, had initiated in the.
.tummer , of 1969 'its ,own, "special services
staff," collecting names of dissen-
ters andinvestigating their taxes. 'And the.
;FBI was. sending its agents onto college
Campuses,' with orders to start files on every
lack Student Onion in the nation.
, , . . ?
? `?!?
?
? -
TN, BOTH PERIODS, the- record is stud-
? ded with' tantalizing leads,c.' essentially
.unresolved, ? which* suggest' that'. these veil-
..
out programs . were ,more
closely- 'coordhi-
,ated than Anyone has' !quite ? admitted:. roar:
? When 'Ramsey , Clark issued his first
_ marching order "for.' the . IDIU, he noted:
rlon are free to, consult. with' the FBI and
her 'Iritelligenee. 'agencies the governs
?.ment .to draW., on their .eXperience_in' mein-
;taining u.nitt, to;.: explore the:poSsibil:
Jties:?of obtaining "infermatien .?yedo?41ot
.now.receiVe''. ? A
? ? Clark's 'assistant 'attorney' general fcii:
rights,lohn Doar,,stiggested trading 'in
'formation With the povertyprOgram's agen-
Cies, the Internal?Revenue Service, the Nar:
'Collet Bureau; the Post'Offiee, and the Alco-
hol, Tax and Tobacco unit of Treasury.
sey Clark formed its Inter-Divisional Infor- ? ? Tle'.ArrnY't variant intelligence collie-
Tantalizing Leads
? ?
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oirs Sliareii their information With justice :Pentagon, for instance, insisted 'later that
t regular basis and, indeed, got freqttnefit they were misled by Army intelligence peo-
leiquests for ? data.;...After, ?Armr: photogre pie who blandly asserted that the bulk of
pheis, posing as "Midwestiricleo," took films the intelligence information was collected
?,f the demonstrators at 1863 Democratid -by the FBI and merely passed on-for Army
'eibpyention'? in Chicago,. Deputy ? Attorney', :analysis. There are a lot of internal docu-
;7fetieral.Warren Christopher :asked for cop- :ments which seem to corroborate that claim.
? ? '?. L On the other hand, Under Secretary of
9 An 'Army "collection plan".issued': in: Defense Paul Nitze approved 100 new slots
pm listed the. CIA tinorik the cooperatf for Army intelligence in 1968 (trimming the
agencies Wich would Provide information: ' .Army request from 167). What were all
6 The IRS, when it launched its super-se ,'those jobs supposed to be for? And in early
,cret program aimed at radicals, started with ' 1969 Army General Counsel Robert E. Jor-
dan tried to persuade the Nixon administra-
..tion to adopt a new inter-agency policy re-
stricting the military role and shifting the
main responsibility for spying to the Justice
,Department (the effort failed). Why make
'that policy fight if no one grasped what was
'going on? ' ?
. Who knew about the Army spying? In the
7 names and quickly grew to a file with 11,-
458 names. About 55 per cent came from the
FBI, but IRS also ."coordinated" with the
Defense Department and sought Secret
Service files. The IRS targets included those
on both the left and the right?local chap-
ters of moderate civil rights organizations, a
Black Muslim temple, a Jewish organization,
abor unions, a law students' association,' .summer of 1969, after the change of adminis-
bree universities, even a branch of the Re- trations, the new under secretary of the
pelican Party. ',Army got a phone call from Fred Vinson,
0 When the CIA got Into the business, it, !former assistant attorney general in Ramsey
In turn, the CIA traded its own data
'Clark's Justice Department. Vinson, accord-
received names from Justice's IDIU and_the
ing to an Army memorandum, "had indi-
with metropolitan police departments all na.
'cated that he was concerned about the
'
ver the country, most of whom have their Army's role in domestic intelligence activi-
own "red squads" tot look after political dis-
ties and that he understood the Army had
enters. t 'two separate computerized intelligence set-
"Atups.'" How did a Justice Department offi-
various times; many of these agencies
cial know what Pentagon officials claimed
-;iere called together to "coordinate," though .
officials of each insigted later that they were ? not to know?
In short, while investigations have not yet
aot. familiar with the particulars of what z pinned down the precise relationships be-
mer Attorney General Clark has denied
others were doing. Thus, for example, for- '
tween these various surveillance activities,
.
:mowing about the Army spying, though his it is clear that the traditional jurisdictional
"wn IDIU got data from it, or even knowing
lines between agencies became almost mean-
Wgless. The "files" are interwoven. They fed
about the FBI's COINTELPRO, though it
Vas in his own department.
? upon each other. The computer tapes tray-
Victor Marchetti, formerly a high offi-? eled freely around town, from Pennsylvania
a
-Avenue to Langley to an IRS computer in
al at CIA, recalled recently that in 1967 'Rockville. .
resident Johnson was pushing the intelli-
Undoing the damage which those files can
fence community to pursue the anti-war
novement more actively and that Director
. Inflict on individual reputations, careers,
z
;tichard Helms resisted much of the pres-
credit ratings or whatever is nOt so
cure. "Helms came in one day [to a daily
easy. The Army, for instance, issued what it
,
CIA meeting] and said the military would regards as very tough regulations in early
Andle -most of the 'action and the FBI
1971, halting general surveillance and re-
?quiring all intelligence units to "clean" their
would help out," Marchetti related. 'In the
CIA, you get the feeling this was a put-off '`files, to reduce the holdings drastically and
to re-verify periodically any information
which is still there.
? Two years later, however, when Pentagon
inspection teams went out, they found some
..curious items. '
At Travis Air Force Base, the intelligence
'office still held data such as an "estimate of
Enemy Situations," including reports on sev-
? eral local dissident groups "which were tar-
' geted against Travis AFB and which were
- thought to pose a real or potential threat to
the base." Another California air base still
'had a list of "enemy forces" covering leftist
groups dating back to the Abraham Lincoln
Brigade of the Spanish civil war.
At the Presidio Army headquarters in San
Francisco, the files still contained a listing
'of local personalities whom the local mili-
ztary intelligence officers regarded 'as worth
watching?Communists, socialists and others.
? At Fort Dix, N.J., the inspectors found
-lists of organizations and people dating back
to 1964. In Hawaii, military intelligence was
!still keeping tabs on "Liberated Barracks," a
'CI underground newspaper which the files
proclaimed was "targeted against the mili-
tary" and, therefore, subject to surveillance
-under the new rules.
?
= In Washington, the Pentagon announces
-.'periodically that it has discovered yet an-
,:tory, the cover story. I learned subse-
quently the agency was training local police
'forces in this country. If you were going
into domestic intelligence work, it would
make sense to train the police and maybe
cnetrate them." ?
During the Nixon years, Huston assem-
bled all of the agencies at the same table.
The Nixon administration claimed that the
o-called Huston Plan was never imple-
mented, but the same organizations?the
FBI, the CIA, NSA, the Defense Intelligence
Agency, the Secret, Service and the White
House?met weekly' for two years after-
wards under the Intelligence Evaluation
Committee, a group launched by Robert
Mardian when he Was ?assistant attorney
general for internal security. In 1972, after
the Army had pulled back from its massive
spying, it still lent a hand to Mardian's IEC,
ncluding three counter-intelligence analysts
ent to help out at the national political' con-
enlions.
?
he "Deniability" Principle
HO REALLY KNEW what was going
on? The bureaucratic principle of
'deniability" seems to have permeated the
government, and it is hard to reach precise
onclusions. The civilian managers at the
other file system or-computer bank that was
supposed to be purged in 1971. Just a few
weeks ago, they found, a microfilm lib\rary
on civilians at the Forrestal fInilaing.
'In bureaucratic language, when a file is
"purged," it does not necessarily mean that
it has been "destr,oyed." Sometimes the ma-
terial is simply stored elsewhere in a "non-
active" status: The CIA, for that matter, has
been "eliminating" names from its own
counterintelligence files on 10,000 Ameri;
cans, but that does not really settle things.
So far, about, 1,000 names have been re-
moved from the active index, but Director
William E. Colby noted that these "could
be reconstituted should this be required."
Except for official good intentions, there
is ? not muCh, to ? prevent any of these
agencies from 'again launching a general
surveillance of citizens they regard as
"dangerous" to the national survival. The
CIA, for instance, has acknowledged halting
some activities of dubious propriety, but it
has not conceded that ;any of them?from
burglary to opening private mail?was illegal.
Attorney General .William Saxbe condem-
ned the FBI's COINTELPRO as a deplorable
, use of government power?but FBI Director
Clarence Kelley refused to do so.
The Army's tougher regulations require
approval for covert operations at high levels
in the civilian management, but the rules
still permit, something called "Aggressive
Counterintelligence Programs," as well as
"clandestine" operations defined as
"illegal," if Pentagon officials decide the
"threat" is serious enough.
The fact is that, despite strong opinions
on the impropriety of these activities, the
questions of their legality have not been set-
tled by Congress or the courts. One test of
sincerity for the various intelligence agen-
cies will be whether they support legislation
making political surveillance by them an ex-
plicit offense. Last year, when Sen. Ervin
proposed such a limitation for the military,
the Pentagon helped block the bill. In the
meantime, a long list of cases is working its
way through the courts, intended to define
the citizens protection against an overly cu-
rious government.
Is it legal for any government agency, for
instance, to commit a burglary?entering
private premises without a warrant?even to
ensure that an employee. is not leaking na-
tional secrets? The Fourth Amendment. says
not, and there is no law which authoritizes
such tactics. The CIA might claim some
vague authority inherent in its charter
responsibilities?"the protection of intelli-
gence sources and methods"?but John Ehrl-
ichman lost in court when he invoked a sim-
ilar "national security" argument as the de-
fense for the Ellsberg burglary.
Breaking-and-entering, however, is proba-
bly the clearest of the issues. Opening pri-
vate mail, for instance, is widely regarded as
forbidden without a search warrant, but one
government official says there is a national
-seeurity exception which might cover the
CIA's extended "mail cover" programs.
Conflicting .Commands
wHAT ABOUT political spying general-
ly, or keeping files on citizens who
have not been charged with any crime,
much less convicted of one?
The question, even when applied to the
CIA, is more complicated than it seems. It is
true that the National Security Act of 1947
prohibits the CIA from any "internal secu-
rity" functions, but the charter also author-
izes the agency not only to protect
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?
'intelligence sources and methods" but to
-perform "such other functions"- which the
National Security Council assigns it. Thus,
the CIA charter has one restrictive com-
mand telling the agency to stay out of do-
mestic surveillance?and two loopholes
which might be used to justify just about
anything in the name of "national-security."
The question of what those words mean
haS been litigated only once, apparently, and
the. CIA won. According to Thomas B. Ross
cp:. the Chicago Sun-Times, co-author of "The
Taivisible Government," a federal judge held
in a 1966 civil libel suit involving a CIA
agent that the agency does have authority to
collect its foreign intelligence inside the
United States.
"The fact that the immediate intelligence
auurce is located in the United States does
::.!.ot make it an 'internal security function'
over which the CIA has no authority," Judge
Roszel C. Thomsen declared. "The court con-
cludes that activities by the CIA to protect
.it foreign intelligence sources located in
tie United States are within the power
granted by Congress to the CIA."
When Sen. Ervin's subcommittee investi-
gated Army spying, Ervin concluded: "There
Is no question that military surveillance of
civilian political activity is illegal, at least in
The sense that it was not authorized by law.",
But William Rehnquist, who was then
assistant attorney general, argued that the
President's constitutional responsibility to
see "that the laws be faithfully executed"
gives the executive branch not just authority
to prosecute crimes, but also to prevent
.them. Under that inherent power, he argued,
surveillance aimed at preventing violence
ur civil disturbances was legitimate.
Rehnquist, as it happened, got another
chalice to express his views on the same
matter after he became a Supreme Court
justice. Over the protest of ACLU lawyers,
be cast the deciding vote in Tatum v. Laird,
ruling against a challenge to Army spying
evhich contended that the mere act of mili-
tary surveillance "chilled" the First Amend-
anent right of free political expression of
Arlo Tatum, an anti-war activist who was
"targeted" by military intelligence.
the Supreme Court held that a citizen
could not sue the government for spying un-
less he can prove -that the surveillance dam-
aged him in some tangible way. Now the
American Civil Liberties Union lawyers are
moving forward with new case's intended to
show just that. Among the plaintiffs are
Americans living in Germany who were un-
der Army surveillance in 1972 as members
of the Berlin Democratic Club and who had
their security clearances held up as a result.
"The Army files," says ACLU lawyer John
Shattuck. "all state that these people were
doing things that might pose a threat to the
military. What these people were doing was
campaigning for George McGovern."
Showing "Probable Cause' .
DESPITE THE SETBACK of the Tatum
case, Shattuck is generally optimistic
about the series of lawsuits now aimed at
limiting the government's discretion in sur-
veillance, including the one against Secre-
tary of State Henry Kissinger for the, 17
"national security" wiretaps authorized- by
the Nixon administration in 1969 and an-
other to be filed soon against the CIA's
counter-intelligence files.
"We're trying to have the courts set stand-
ards that would prohibit the CIA, the FBI
and the Army from having a free hand to do
whatever they want to do," Shattuck says.
"They are operating essentially without au-
thority in all of these areas. The only thing
they can point to is the kind of generalized
authority."
Meanwhile, the ACLU is pushing Con-
gress to draw the toughest standards of all.
A variety of reform proposals has been in-
troduced, ranging from flat prohibition of
political spying to strict procedural systems
requiring a court warrant for any .sur-
veillance of private citizens by any agency.
Shattuck wants to have both.
? Thus, if a government agency perceives a
possible crime or even a potential crime, it
would have to demonstrate "probable cause"
before a federal judge to secure a warrant.
"If the executive branch is so paranoid that
It believes the courts are a security risk,
then we're really in bid shape in this coun-
try," Shattuck says.
The Busing Case
INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES in .the past
it have successfully resisted any legislation
in that direction, partly on the practical
ground that the FBI, for example, might
have to take every investigation before a
judge to prove that it's criminal, not politi-
cal. '
LOS ANGELES TIMES
9 February 1975
. ?
Beyond that, the distinctions between,
criminal and political sometimes become
highly debatable. In the 1960s, for example,
the FBI penetrated and disrupted the Ku.
Klux Klan without much complaint from lib-
erals.
The anti-busing controversy in South Bos-
ton right now offers a better example of the
'dilemma. Nick Flannery, director of the
Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights, wrote
to the Justice Department last month, corn-
-plaining that the FBI was* not aggressive
enough in its surveillance of an anti-busing
organization which he feared would stim4-
late violence. '
"At the very minimum," Flannery wrote.
"the bureau should have developed infor-
mants in ROAR [for Restore Our Alienated
Rights] and its agents should be at South
Boston High and elsewhere, depending on
their intelligence data to act upon violations
of law, as they are committed, 'rather than
'investigating after the fact on the basis of
complaints."
Yet that is precisely the sort of rationale
which led the Army and the FBI and others
to spy on anti-war organizations and black
groups in the tate 1960s?the fear of violent
protest. They were "political" ,organizations.
So is ROAR. The Justice Department is
caught in the middle again.
But the close cases are not the heart of
the controversy. So much of the surveillance
activities of recent years have been So mas-
sive and aimless in scope that the connec-
tion with possible criminal charges is tenu-
ous or non-existent. Sen. Ervin's admonition
to tne internal Revenue Service might just
at well apply to the other agencies. "The
purpose of the IRS," Ervin' warned, "is to
enforce the tax laws, not to enforce Political
orthodoxy."
In a way, the remedy for legitimate law
enforcement interests?as opposed to aim-
less desires for political surveillance-7-
might be just what the ACLU has pro-
posed: a clear definition of the purposes
for which a government ageney can spy olt
someone. If that agency cannot convinnt
a third party, such as a federal judge, that
it-has in mind a legitimate investigation of
crime, then it Ought to keep hands off.
Obviously, this would inhibit the investiga-
tors and, no doubt, it would reduce the
amount of .surveillance undertaken. That is
precisely what's needed.
U.S. ENV Y IN PERU SAYS
CIA A NO HAND IN. RIOTS
LIMA, Peru (UPI)?U.S. Ambassa-
dor Robert W. Dean Saturday issued
'a* statement denying allegations in
Peruvian newspapers that agents of.
the Central Intelligence Agency had
helped instigate violent riots in Lima.
As the representative of the
'government of the United States in
1Peru,.I state categorically that neith-
er the CIA nor any other agency of
the US. government has been in-
volved in any way. in these lamenta-
ble events,' Dean said in a commu-
nique distributed to all Peruvian
'news media."
Twenty Peruvian military judges
Saturday began hearing the cases
:against 1,300 persons arrested for .
Ap I ilaW120 011000/08
-stemming from riots earlier this week
that were touched -off by the-army's
repression of a police strike.
Embassy officials said that Dean's
statement was partially motivated by
concern for the safety of the Ameri-
can community in Lima because of
attacks on the embassy during the 'ri-
oting.
"When you have 47 windows
smashed,' an embassy Jeep burnt up,
a bullet fired at the embassy and at
least two attempts to put the torch to.
r the embassy and send it up in flames,
you begin to grow concerned about
anti-American feeling and want to do
what little you can to modify it," a
U.S. diplomat said.
? Military justice prevails under the '
tiZt1A0 WRO04324R010141101350Q 1-8
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NEU YORK TIMES
Li February 1975
FOP EX-C.I.A. AIDES
HEARD BY INQUIRY
? .
By LINDA 'CHARLTON ?
? SPect21 terhe New York Time.)
WASHINGTON, Feb. 10?
i'ames Arigleton, the former
:thief of counterintelligence for
the Central :Intelligence 'Agen-
iy, was the principal witness
enday at the fifth weekly meet-
ng" of the Presidential commis-
Alan investigating alleged ille-
%al dinnestic activity by the
7
Mr. Angleton, who refused to
somment before and after the
.losed meeting, testified from
ilbout - 2 P.M. until 4:45 P.M.
qarlier, the panel heard from
:rice Mm. William F. .Raborn
air., who testified for more than
6.in hour. .
Admiral Raborn, who headed
lie agency from April, 1965, to
tine, 1966, was asked by repor-
tiers' if the C.I.A. had underta-
r,.
.ien any illegal. domestic activi-
aes during his tenure. ' ?
? "Not to -my knowledge," he
Z.-. In response to another gilds-
Jon, 'the. said that he believed
he investigation ? would be
,;useful" to the C.I.A. rather
fhan damaging. ,
? His -appearance was viewed
,Is more or less routine, since
lie panel has heard testimony
rom all part directors of the
gency. ?
Mr. , Angleton, however, is
Jawed as a key witness' in the
ttivestigation. He resigned in
"iecember, after 31 years with
,he agency. This followed the
*st news articles about the
,gency's domestic activities,
.rhich are prohibited by its
barter. ! ?K.
Six Members Present
? Only six of the eight members
1 the panel, which is headed
y Vice Pregident Rockefeller,
',ere present for today's meet-
C. Du glas Dillon, former
-ecretary of the Treasury, was
43sent for the second week in a
aw, and Ronald Reagan, the
armer California Governor,
iissed his fourth consecutive
"ieeting:
peaking schedule has permit-
e=c1 him to attend just part of
he first commission meeting,
ffered to. resign. Mr. Rockefel- ?
-rx dissuaded hiln, however,
pd transcripts ot the testimo-
y are being sent to a military
)stallation near Los Angeles,
there they can be kept in se-
re files, for Mr. Reagan's con-
lenience in reading them. Mr.
pagan is expected to be at
text Monday's meeting, as he
till be in Washington over the
feekend for a conference..
-;In a related development to-
sy, Senator William Proxmire,
emocrat of Wisconsin, an-
ounced that he planned to in-
ioduce tomorrow a bill author-
ing the General Accounting
thee to audit the expenditures
I the .C.Iak. and other
THE WASHINGTON POST-
hief of St
David
By William
Washington Post 8
W. Belin, the Iowa
lawyer who is chief of staff
for the presidential commis-
Mon investigating the CIA,
describes himself as "a phil-
osophical 'independent con-
servative" With polite em-
phasis on the "independent."
People familiar with Be:
lin's career as a Des Moines
lawyer and a Republican
Party strategist, plus his
wide-ranging intellectual in-
terests, predict that his -tem-
porary tenure in Washing-
ton will confirm the point.
Belin will not yet discuss
the investigative atrategY of
the commission's staff,
which is still being assesn:
bled, but he has set this
goals i
"The No. 1 requirement
to have an independent staff
of high caPability and integ-
rity." - ?
Belin himself has a streak
of independence in his past.
A Republican party loyal-
ist, he campaigned for the
Nixon-Agnew ticket in 1968
..?but declined to do so in
1972, when the GOP victory
was overwhelming.
On the touchstone issue of
U.S. involvement in Viet-
nam, Belin was a "dove"
long before that became a
popular fiolitical position,
indeed, even before Presi-
dent Johnson's Democratic
administration entered the
war.
?
On legal issues, he calls
himself a., "strict construc-
tionist," but he played a role
in winning.a Supreme Court
decision in 1967 that ex-
tended the constitutional
right of competent legal rep-
resentation for the poor. Be-
rime agencies' in the 'Federal
overnment
"The C.I.A.," Mr. Proxmire
tid in a Speech prepared for
ie. Senate, ;'and other intelli-
snce agencies have protected
temselves from Congressional
!view by not allowing audits
!. their programs."
Greider
taff Writer
lin also took a strong hand
in the legal fight for reap-
portionment of Iowa's state
legislature.
As a lawyer, he has con-
centrated on corpor at io n
work but 'his clients also,
include two Democratic con-
gressmen from Iowa?Ed-'
ward Mezvinsky of Iowa .
City and Berkley Bedell of
Spirit Lake.
Among other things, the
46-year-old lawyer helned-.
Bedell, a wealthy fishing;
tackle manufacturer, organ-
ize a private foundation.
called the Research Founda--
ton for a Better America, it',
has given money to such
varied projects as a self-help
housing program run by
C,hicago blacks zinti
Quaker bail-bond release
project in Des Moines.
Belin's service as one of
14 staff lawyers on the War-
ren Commission investiga-
tion of the John F. Kennedy
assassination is what led to
his appointment for the cur-
rent inquiry. He got to know
Gerald Ford, who was a
member of the Warren Com-
mission, and is the author of
"November 22, 1963: You
Are the Jury," a book that
examines the assassination
evidence and rebuts ,critics
of the Warren Commission
report, though it also takes-
issue with some of the com-
mission's own decisions.
Last month o Belin was of-
fered a job in the Ford ad-
ministration. He turned it
down, but the White House
returned -with a request to
take on the staff assignment
with the commission chaired
by Vice President Rockefel,
ler. He and Rockefeller are
not old friends, but Beth
did provide political advice
for Rockefeller's presiden-
tial campaigns in 1964 and
1968. "
The commission, now a
month old,- is still getting se)
curity clearances for its:
staff, expected to be seven
to 10 people, Belin said he
took special care in select-
ing lawyers of substantial
experience. ?
18
"We have to have a Mirk"
"concern," he said, "a con-I
cern for the protection of ef-
fective intelligence gather-
ing and for the individual.
rights of Americans and I
:expect every member of the
"staff to share those con-
cerns"
The commission originally
was given a deadline of
April 1 but Rockefeller has.
hinted that the inquiry may
need more time. Belin isn't
concerned about time: he in-
formed his law firm back in
Des Moines - Herrick, Lang;
don, Belin, Harris, Langdon
and Helmick - not to expect:
him back before July I.
Belin, Phi Beta Kappa at
the University of Michigan
and an honors graduate of
the Michigan law school,
started out to be a concert.
violinist. He was born in
Washington, D.C., and grew
up in Sioux City, Iowa. Af-
ter two years in the Army,
including service in Japan
as a violinist, he turned to
'business and law.
Belin's view of the current
controyersy is - shaped in
part by his close familiarity
with the Kennedy assassina-
tion, his strong positions on-
Vietnam and his subsequent_
concern about Watergate. v
"I look back on Nov. 2,
1963, as a tremendous psy-
..chological turning point,"
Bolin said.,, "During the
early '60s, there was a vi-
brant feeling in the country,
a feeling of hope. about the
government and the people.
Then with the assassination,
followed. by Vietnam, fol-
lowed by Watergate, you
have so many people w ho
say, 'a plague on both your
parties.' There's a great
skepticism, a great cynicism
that people have about gov-'
ernment. I don't."
The CIA investigation, Be-
lin hopes, will "make some'
small contribution to the
restoration of credibility in
.? government."
On Vietnam, Belin said he-
and his wife, the former
Constance Newman from
Grand Rapids, Mich., were
"doves" dating from the
1950s when she wrote a re-
Search paper at Michigan on
the impossibility of main-
taining French colonialism
in Indochina.
"I was very, very anti-Lyn-
don Johnson and his ap-
proach there," Belli]. said. In
1968, he campaigned enthu--
-
siastically for Richard Nixon
and served as chairman of
the Iowa Lawyers for.
Nixon. But when they asked,
him to take a comparable
position in the 1972 cam-
paign, Blein declined.
"There were many Nixon'
policies that were very
sound, the rapproachement
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4with' hiiia, for instance,"'
Belin said. "I felt the domes-
tic policy they were follow.
ing was wrong, particularly
the approach of Agnew
attacking young people."
Belin is writing a second.
book, this one about the Re-
?
publican Party and whether,
it has a future.
"One of my arguments,"
he said, "is that the Republi-
can Party, 'which is ? so,
closely identified with busi-
ness, does not take a very
.business-like approach in
the marketplace of voters.,
We all knew that young vot-'
ers were going to be impor-
tant, yet Vice President
new attacked them. When:
the kids were raising cane'
about the war in Vietnam, a
very legitimate concern, and
,Agnew attacked them, Mr.
Agnew and I parted com-
pany."
Belin voted for Nixon in
:1972 but became "very con-
cerned" .afterwards as the
Watergate scandal devel-
oped, partly because one of
hit pet interests is openness
in government. Belin's work
on the Warren Commission:
staff taught him how diffi-
cult it sometimes is to get
information from govern.:
meat agencies and he hopes
that lesson will serve him in .
the CIA inquiry.
"When Belin was an
-
pointed, his hometown news-,
paper, the Des Monies Reg-
jster, sent him off to Wash-
ington with this high praise:
"He is a man of integrity
and we believe he will insist
on freedom to dig out the
facts. If he finds he cannot'
get the facts from CIA, we
believe he will so report to
.the public. If the commis-1
-sion does not agree with his.
findings, he also will make
that evident to the public."
All that Belin will say on
that question is that he is "a
philosophical independent
conservative." -
WASHINGTON STAR
8 February 1975
g(Le
WASHINGTON STAR
13 February 1975
Charles Bartlett:
P kli t t
The CIA is being poked at like a turtle
on the beach. And it will be nice to get it
back where it belongs, swimming
under water.
The turtle-baiters are presently bent
on establishing that the intelligence
agency and its former director, Richard
Helms, were more responsive than any-
one admits to the presidential paranoia
which caused Lyndon Johnson and
Richard Nixon to push their investiga-
tive talent into gray areas.
On a story like this, the press moves
in like a ship's crew hitting shore on
Saturday night. When they spot a joint,
they barge in, break up the furniture,
rough up the customers and move on.
When the joint turns out to be an institu-
tion wrapped in mystery, the binge be-
comes a crusade. And at the end of the
escapade, those who are left to survey
the shambles wonder how it all began.
Perspective gets lost in the excite-
ment. So it is important to make two
points about Helms. He was plainly
fired by Nixon as director of CIA, a job
he dearly loved, because he failed to
cooperate in obscuring the Watergate'
crimes. Nixon dumped him as soon as
the election was over and tried to cover
the deed by having two loyalists, John
'Scali and Charles Colson, spread the
word that Henry Kissinger, absent in
Paris, wanted Helms out. The truth was
that Kissinger had argued hard for
Helms'a retention. He is said now-to be
deeply angry at the present CIA direc-
tor, William Colby, for seeking purity
by making it easier for the wreckers to
move in on Helms,
REGARDING HELMS' lack of candor
with the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, it should be remembered that' in-
the days of bitter divisions over Viet-
nam, it was not safe for any executive
official to entrust volatile information to
the full committee's care. This disarray
caused the Senate to make a formal
decision against including the Fulbright
committee in the congressional review
of CIA affairs.
Senators are still asking themselves
lovried
The - nation's ranking
arms control official is Con-
cerned that U.S. intelli-
gence agencies might not
beable to do their jobs in
the future if zeal to expose.
improprieties of the past'
damages their effective-
ness,
Fred C. Ikle, director. of
the Arms Control, and
Disarmament Agency;)s'aia-
in a speech in Cleveland
yesterday that the CIA can--
not perform its role in arms
control verification unless
the law permits it to do flux
e Turtle
how 'much a politician can afford td"
know about the nation's spies. One as-
pect of the problem was well put by Sen.
Clifford Case, R.-N.J., when he said re-
cently, "I have been very skeptical of
an oversight committee because I can't
see what good a committee does if it.
can't tell what it knows."
Similarly if Helms had conveyed to
the enators all the ugly facts of cash
payments to anti-Communist elements
in Chile, those preoccupied with their
public images would have faced an awk-
_ -ward choice. They could keep quiet and
share responsibility for the exercise or
they could explode and stir an?interna-
tional ruckus. The CIA can only be
objectively and comfortably monitored
by politicians who are not liberals run-
ning for president.
THE HARD fact is that members of'
Congress have not given the CIA enough
constructive attention to inhibit presi-
dents from misusing its agents. Thus
the overdrawn allegation of a "massive,
illegal domestic intelligence operation"
arose from the agency's penetration of
the anti-war groups in the Vietnam era.
If these penetrations exceeded the
limits of the national security act, it was-
because President Johnson kept push-
ing. Helms to probe. Helms's status at
the White House was not helped by his
necessity to keep reporting that he.
could find no alien elements.
There is a role for Congress and a
-need to establish some new rules. But it
is hard to see how Congress will solve
any problems by poking at the turtle
about controversies that arose from the
old rules.
IF CONGRESS and the press manage
to break up the joint, the winners will be
the Soviets. Another consequence will
be the loss of civilian control over intel-
ligence estimates of Soviet military
strength.
So those who want tight limits on de-
fense budgets will be big losers if the
turtle doesn't make it back into the sea.
veDI CA Pro e,
necessary "detective
work."
Arms control would come
to a dead end if the CIA is
hamstrung by ongoing
investigations, he said. "We
cannot have arms control
without good intelligence
-capabilities," Ikle declared.,
"Verifiable arms limita-
lions, such as agreed to in
SALT, give us and our
Adversaries a firmer basis
on which to predict what
forces each side will de-
ploy," Ikle said. "Unfortu-
nately, the means of yeti-,
fication used for strategic'
arms limitation cannot
necessarily serve to verify
other types of arms control
agreements."
He said the Soviet Union
does not make public
enough information on its
military budget so that'
other nations can make esti-
mates about Russian mili-
tary procurement pro-
grams. As an example, he
said, the 1974 Soviet defense
budget was announced by
Moscow as 18 billion rubles,
while the U.S. estimates it
was about 60 billion rubles.
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WASHINGTONIAN
l'EBRITARY 1975
JAMES ANGLETON: The Spy Forced in from the Cold
-r".--araneanneeaneasarai One summer evening several telligence agencies.
a-a---aaaar -a: years ago, five men stone( cast- "It was a disgrace," said a knowledgeable intelligence sotirce.
"Nixon found out about it on taking office but he didn't dare tangle
with Hoover. who was popular in the country and on the Hill. Be-
sides. Nixon was more uptight about anti-war militants and rioters
in the cities than about foreign spies."
Angleton, the eye of the current storm, is a most unlikely spy-
catcher. Six feet tall, stooped, his thick, grizzled hair parted almost
in the middle, he gazes out through his bifocals with the courtly,
faintly quizzical charm of a New England professor. He dresses
conservatively. His voice is quiet, meticulous, but assumes a faint
rasp when he's angry.
His character is one of sharp contrasts. Children and animals
seem to instinctively love him, but by profession he had to be sus-
picious of the adult world around him. He was obsessed with the
KGB and with preventing any penetration of the CIA by a "mole"
?the spy who works his way into an intelligence agency, as de-
scribed so vividly by John le Carre in the best-selling novel,
Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy.
He has lunch nearly every day at La Ni?se in Georgetown, pre-
ferring fish, particularly fresh flounder, accompanied by n bottle of
French wine. Once as a practical joke, someone at the restaurant
put a microphone in the flowers on his table. Angleton almost im-
mediately noticed it, looked at his companion with a finger to his
lips, and removed the vase.
For years he has moved in an aura of discreet mystery, an enig-
matic character even to his CIA colleagues, though his staff swear
by him. His wife Cecilie, grown son, and two daughters long have
been accustomed to his frequent, unexplained absences. He claims
that for years they thought he worked "somewhere high in the Post
Office."
As .befits one in his curious trade he often works when others
sleep. Not infrequently he will drop in on a friend at ten at night.
-sitting until two AM, chain-smoking, sipping bourbon and water,
now and then rubbing a hand over his forehead and eyes, chatting
tirelessly, his mind fully alert. He is discretion personified, turning
:t"aY awkward questions with an elliptical answer. E.-en at two am
he sometimes will phone an intelligence contact and, in murmured
tones, announce his impending arrival.
for weeks he will disappenr, then arrive at the home of friends,
bearing a magnificent cattleya orchid raised in his own greenhouse
a suburban Virginia. or a bit of semi-precious stone he has been
l':;Ii?hing. or an intricate trout fly he has made.
Now 57, Angleton got into the spy-catching business by accident.
His father, a wealthy executive who ran National Cash Register
operations in Italy, joined the OSS during World War 11 and rec-
ommended his son. Young Angleton, with a Yale degree and two
years at the Harvard Business School. had just enlisted. He was in-
terviewed, recruited, and after special counter-espionage training in
England was sent to Italy in 1943, where he rose to the rank of
major in charge of counter-espionage.
It was in Italy after the war that he first met the Jewish under-
ground leaders who then were helping fellow Jews escape Europe
for British-ruled Palestine. Their friendship flourished. For the
past 20 years Angleton has been the CIA official with whom suc-
cessive Israeli leaders have preferred to deal. Given the current
Middle East situation, these contacts have given him immense re-
sponsibility?and also have caused je'alousies within the US gov-
ernment, Some observers feel Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
and CIA Director Colby have decided to gather liaison with Israeli
intelligence into their own hands.
Angleton's critics accuse him of having built a virtually unassail-
able empire-within-an-empire. There is some truth to this. As steward
of the nation's innermost secrets?even the White House tends to
leave counter-espionage to career professionals?Angleton has had
great authority with all US security agencies. Another charge often
heard is that he is a man steeped in hostility to the Communist
world, a man who sees spies under every bed.
Ile makes no secret in his quiet, professional way that he regards
d?nte as a risliy gamble and the Sino-Soviet split of 1960 as a
masterly hoax. "There are installations in China that wouldn't be
there," says, "if there were a real split." Since 1959, he insists,
the KGB and 26 other Communist intelligence services quietly have
coordinated their operations and now pool all intelligence about the
US and its NATO allies. Of all US leaders, he believes, Defense
Secretary James R. Schlesinger is the only one who truly perceives
the growing Soviet military threat.
"In five more years if we go this way." Angleton says, "a crunch
will come and the US will have to back down."
But those who challenge Kissinger's dream of d?nte nowadays
risk thunderbolts from on high, and Angleton's career, together
with those of his deputies, has wound to a close. The key question
now is the transition: Who guards the portals while the guard is
-changing? One who surely will want to know is Juni Andropov,
.head of the KGB. In the covert war Angleton has lost?not to An-
al! FBI liaison?not only with the CIA but with all other US in- dropov but to a Washington weary of the Cold War.
20 --BENJAM.1N WELLIES
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-
atz-1-1%---1-vbka'
'
ia..e.?-traaasa
naaaaaas ? ."-aa-aa-'
-
re,e_
c.k172.:;4414 -
-kit,"?&-:-.?-
lag for trout in a secluded Mid-
western rivbr. Four were Amer-
-1 leans; all practiced anglers. The
,fifth was a Russian, obviously
.1 an amateur. His line kept snag-
ging on boughs, yet he enjoyed
) himself hugely, standing rubber-
booted in the swirling water and
nipping vodka from a flask.
The host was James Angleton,
who recently- resigned after 31
years as chief of counter-espi-
onage for the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. The Russian was
a high official of the KGB (So-
viet secret service), who had
defected to the US. The others
were CIA.
In such' tranquil spots Angle-
ton a keen student of human
? T
tr,
.!?
psychology, often has reaped his richest rewards. Defectors are fear-
if of pursuit and assassination, torn by conflicting loyalties. Angle-
ton, a soft-spoken yet firm man, Spends months helping them un-
wind, winning their confidence?and eventually extracting valuable
information. It was through defectors that he uncovered such top-
grade British KGB spies as Kim Philby and George Blake.
"Jim's forte is patience," said a veteran colleague. "I've seen him
in a river at dusk, the rain coming down, casting slowly hour after
hour, trying different flies until the trout strikes. He outwits and
outwaits them?as he does with spies."
A few weeks ago Angleton and his three top deputies?represent-
ing among them 120 years of combined counter-espionage experi-
ence?were forced out following New York Times charges that the
CIA had staged "massive" and "illegal" intelligence operations
against American anti-war dissidents during the early Nixon years.
More than 10,000 files on Americans were Compiled. the paper
claimed. Angleton's counter-espionage branch was singled out as
the culprit.
Angleton has steadfastly denied that his relatively small staff had
any reason?let alone the manpower?for the time-consuming, on-
erous task of running surveillance on Americans inside qhe US. Un-
der the law, be has told friends, only the FBI .has the authority and
the resources for such work. "He could have cared less about the
kids protesting the Vietnam war," one CIA watcher said.
However the CIA, in accordance with its statutory responsibili-
ties, did keep an eye abroad on dissident groups, such as the Black
panthers, who were tracked from Algiers to Moscow to North
Korea, where they took demolitions training before filtering back
Fnto the US and going underground. Such Americans were reported
to the FBI, Angleton has insisted.
As to the charge of compiling 10,000 files, CIA colleagues have
pointed out that the agency has automatic access to all FBI files?
more than 100 million?and would have voluminous files on all
Americans who have ever had contacts abroad with enemy or
friendly intelligence services.
The identification of Angleton's unit in the original New York
Times story of December 22 had the earmarks of authoritative
guidance from highly placed sources within the CIA. Since then,
however, the Times appears to have shifted the focus of its charges
to another CIA unit?the Domestic Operations Division?with
which Angleton and the counter-espionage staff have no connection.
There are grounds for believing that Angleton's dismissal caps
18 months of growing tension between him and new CIA director
William E. Colby. Colby's CIA career has been spent primarily in
covert labor activities and in the Far East. He has told his staff
that he must devote 95 percent of his time to briefing the White
House, Congress. and the pews media. He is said to have little time
for or interest in the complexities of counter-es6ionaee.
Congress, in creating the CIA in 1947. specifically barred it from
"police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers 4or internal-security
functions." These were reserved for the FBI. But at the same time,
with characteristic imprecision, Congress ordered the CIA to "pro-
tect" intelligence sources and methods and to perform at the Na-
tional Security Council's request additional services of "common
concern" and "such other functions and duties" as the NSC might
require. The gray areas here are obvious.
Since spies and other subversives are travelling increasingly in
and out of the US, the system works only when CIA-FBI liaison is
good. For 20 years Angleton worked closely With his friend Sam
Papich, the FBI liaison officer. But in 1969- the late J. Edgar
Hoover, incensed that President Lyndon B. Johnson had failed to
defend him from charges by Senator Edward V. Long of Missouri
that the FBI was tapping his phone, preempturily ended virtually
? -
APproved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350001=8
NEW YORK TIMES
10 February 1975
HELMS SAID NIXON
'SOUGHT CHILE COUP
Testimony on the Overthrow
of Allende Contradicted
? offigials' Statements
? ? , -
,-
. By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Special ,to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Feb. 9?
'Richard Helms, the former Di-
Tactor of Central Intelligence,
old a Senate committee in
testimony released today that
there was "no doubt" in 1970
that the Nixon Administration
wanted to have President Sal-
vador Allende Gossens of Chile
overthrown.
? In the days following Dr.
Allende's election in Septem-
ber, 1970, Mr. Helms told the
Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee in a closed hearing Jan.
22, the overthrow of Dr. Al-
lende, a Marxist, "became a
thing that they were interested
in having done."
. 'Incidents' Not Needed
. Mr. Helms's. flat assertion
about the Nixon Administra-
tion's intentions toward the
regime of Dr. Allende, who was
overthrown in a bloody coup
d'etat in September, 1973, con-
tradicts sworn testimony and
public statements by many
former officials of the State
Department and other Govern-
ment agencies who had insisted
. :that the United States scrupu-
lously adhered to a policy of
aonintevention toward Chile.
Dr. Allende failed to gain a
majority of the popular vote in
the Sept. 4, 1970, election and,
under the Chilean Constitution,
his plurality had to be ratified
by the Congress on Oct. 24. It
was during this seven-week
period, Mr. Helms testified,
that the Nixon Administration
sought to find ways to over-
throw Mr. Allende.
"The Alla.nde Government,"
said Mr. Helms, "was not even
in at the time the probe was
made just to see if there were
any forces there to oppose Al-
lende's advent as president. It
'was very quickly established
there were not, and therefore,
no further effort was made
along those lines, to the best
of my knowledge, at least I
know of none."
; In a telephone interview, Ed-
ward M. Korry, who served as
Ambassador to Chile from 1967
until 1971, recalled that the
.C.I.A. was asked in late Sep-.
tember, 1970, "to find out if
there was any real resistance
to Allende."
"We weren't talking about
extremist groups." he said, "but
sizeable forces in the political
? WASHINGTON MONTHLY
FEBRUARY 1975 ?
The Heirs of Walter Lippmann -
One of the real problems of the business of being a columnist is the slim factual basis
on which most columns are written. Tom Braden, who has not been immune to this
difficulty, recently demonstrated, however, how interesting -a column can be when the
. columnist really has a story to tell, in this case about James Angleton:
Back in the late '40s he was the ideal choice for the counter-espionage work to which
the late Frank Wisner assigned him. Painstaking, suspicious, quick to note deviations
from the norm, he had the kind of mind one associates with the classic detective.
In addition, as those of us who were with him in CIA may recall, he had a capacity
for empire-building. From the end of World War II until last week, he built his power
within the agency to the point where he was virtually untouchable. ?
Successive directors, newly come to the pinnacle, were fascinated at their first
encounter with this bespectacled, scholarly looking figure with the stooped shoulders,
who walked cat-like into- the office, and, when the door was closed, introduced himself
with' some startling and calculated revelation.
"I think you'll be interested in this," he would begin with a chuckle, and then
proceed to tell his new boss exactly what his new boss's hostess had said about him after
the new boss had departed her house on the previous evening.
Or he would show the new boss a copy of a private letter written by some employee
or agent on the subject of the new boss. It was heady stuff, acquired by such means as
the rest of us may imagine, but which only Angleton knew. A fly fisherman by hobby,
he often referred to his knowledge of the personal and private as the result "of a little
fishing." ?
With one director of CIA, himself a fly fisherman, Angleton established such rapport
that the two talked of secret matters in terms of fly tying: "I caught it on a little brown
bug with lona antenna." Many people in CIA feared Angleton as much as successive
directors held him in awe....
But at some point in his long service, Jim Angleton's sharp and studious mind
became confused by Jim Angleton's ideology. As the external world chaneed, as it
became clear that Khrushchev's policies would not be those of Stalin, that the United
States had won the cold war, that rumors of -a Sino-Soviet split were true, Angleton
found it difficult to straighten out in his own mind the agency's confused purpose.
Ideology told him the cold war must go on, that the Chinese and Russians were
faking their feud, that the comings and goings of Aeroflot representatives to new
nations revealed a Soviet intent on aggression in those nations, that those who had sold
Mr. Nixon on detente were dupes and possibly knaves. He believed his ideology and
shaped facts to fit it and his power became dangerous.
He is not the last of the ideologists to leave the agency but his departure will help
CIA t straighten out its purpose: It is, after all a service, not a weapon in the cold war.
While one wishes that Braden had told us about Angleton several years ago. this is
still genuinely fascinating material, much more interesting that the predictable
pontificating that Braden and his fellow columnists usually turn out. One reason they
have so little interesting information to give us is that they simply don't have time to dig
it up. There's time for a luncheon conversation, a few phone calls and then the day's
700 words must be ground out. Too often there's no fresh research at all; the columnists
rely on their memories, which unfortunately are often faulty.
Thus Gary Wills in one recent week wasted his readers' time with an attack on John
Kennedy for having failed to offer to remove our Turkish missiles during the Cuban
missile crisis?in fact, Robert Kennedy told Dobrynin we would remove both our
Turkish and Italian missiles--and an attack on Harry Truman for having starred the
imperial presidency in April 1948 with the "non-political" campaign train. In fact many
presidents had used p-and trains before, and Roosevelt, in September 1940, had used
the nonpolitical campaign train.
Mr. Helms, who is now Am-
bassador to Iran, was sum-
moned to testify before the
Foreign Relations Committee
because of seeming discrepan-
cies in his testimony at hear-
ings on his confirmation in 1973
over both the extent of the in-:
volvement of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency in Chile and in
domestic activities inside the
United States.
The former C.I.A. director
conceded that he had erred in
withholding information about
the extent of the agency's co-
vert operations against the
Allende regime.
"I think I made one mistake
in the testimony," Mr. Helms
told Senator Clifford P. Case of
New Jersey, the ranking Re-
publican committee member.
"Maybe it is a serious mistake,
but I should have probably
asked either to go off the rec-
ord or to have asked to discuss
this matter in some other
forum, because you will recall
at that thne [February, 1973],
Allende's government was in
area." ? power trt Chile and we did not
Approved For Release 2001/08 0
need any more diplomatic' in-
cidents.'
During his two-hour appear-
ance before the committee, Mr.
Helms was pressed to explain
his previous testimony only by
Senators Case and Frank
Church, Democrat of Idaho,
who is chairman of the new
Senate Select Committee on In-
telligence. _
During his confirmation hear-
ing, the former C.I.A. chief de-
nied that the agency had sought
to overthrow the Allende re-
gime, or had passed any funds
:to Dr. Allende's opponents. At
ione point in this hearing, Mr.
!Helms volunteered the follow-
ing statement: "If the agency
had really gotten in behind the
other candidates and spent a
lot of money and so forth, the.
election might have come out
differently."
He testified In a similar vein
during hearings later in 1973
before Senator Church's Sub-
committee on Multinational
Corporations, which was hives-.
ligating the links between the
19rnito?4121b168100350001-8
. .
phone -and Telegraph- Corpora--
tion and the Nixon Administra-
tion's policy toward Chile.
William E. Colby, who be-
came Director of Central In-
telligence in mid-1973, told a
House committee last April,
however, that the Nixon Ad-
ministration had authorized
more than $8-million for clan-
destine activities in Chile be-
tween 1970 and 1973 in in ef-
fort to make it impossible for
Allende to govern.
Mr. Colby said that $1-mil-
lion had been authorized for
covert use in August, 1973, but
that only $50,000 was spent
before Dr. Allende's overthrow
and death a month later.
Mr. Helms defended his ear-
lier testimony by telling the
Foreign Relations Committee
that the 'money authorized for
Chile "went into civic action
groups, supporting newspapers,
radios and so forth . . . 1 cad
not realize that [it] went into
political parties. I did not think
, that it had, at least it was my
;understanding at the time.., If
[somebody had said something
[else, ,I am prepared to stand
. _ _
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350001-8
rcorrectde." 2
During more than two hours
of unworn testimony, the
!former C.I.A. chief also sug-
gested that the Senators had
erred in not asking him more
pointed questions in 1973.
Last Sept. 19. The New York
'Times quoted intelligence
Sources as saying that C.I.A.
funds were secretly funneled
to striking labor unions and
trade groups for more than 18
months before Dr. Allende's
overthrow. Mr. Helm's was not
asked about that in his most
recent testimony, nor Was he
pressed to provide- an account-
ing of the $5 million that was
authorized for so-called "de-
stabilization efforts" againit
Dr. Allende in 1971, 1972 and
1973. More than half of that
money, The Times quoted its
sources as saying, was used to
provide strike benefits and
other means of support for anti
Allende strikers and workers.
? After telling the Senators
about. the C.I.A.'s unsuccessful
efforts in late 1970 to find sup-,
port' for the overthrow of Mr..
Allende, M. Helms added, "I
cannot ,understand how anyone
could Interpret [the CIA's ef-
forts in Chile] as an attempt to
overthrow the Government or
believe that they stood a chance
Of doing so. So that is what I
meant when I answer [the]
question [by saying]. there was
really no effort made to over-
throw. the Government of
He also cautioned -the oom-
Mittee bout the words used to
describe CIA. plans. "They
'sound exotic, tough, all the
rest," he said. "I think when
you get the entire story laid
out in Chile between 1970- and
1973 you are going to regard
that as a pretty pitiful affair.
I meal in terms of actually ac-
complishing anything."
? During his testimony, Mr.
Helms was not asked in any de-
tail about the recent allegations
of C.I.A. involVement in- do-
mestic spying activities.
?
WASHINGTON POST
8 February 1975
CI Wins
By john P. MacKenzie -
Washington Post Staff Wri ,er ,
The 'Central Intelligence
Agency yesterday won back
the right?at least temporarily
?to suppress classified infor-.
mation in a book about the -
CIA's covert activities.
-? Reversing a lower court, the
Fourth U.S. Circuit Court of,
'Appeals -ruled that former in-
telligence officers Victor L.'
Marchetti and John D. Marks
failed to prove that 168 dele-
tions from their book, "The
CIA the.. Cult of Intelligence,"
were improperly excised.
The burden had been placed
On the government last April
in a . decision by U.S. District
Iteversial on Book
sages were "classifiable" and
not that they had been prop-
erly classified.
But the court ?of appeals
said the National Security
Council and an interagency
committee established by pres-
idential order, "far more than
any judge, have the back-.
ground for making classifica-
tion and declassification deci-.
sions."
For this reason, the court
held that the burden of proof
established by Judge Bryan
"was far too stringent." It or-
dered the case retried under
new ground rules.
Melvin L. Wulf, the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union law-
yer who represents the au-
thors, said he will seek Su-
Court Judge Albert V. 'Bryan preme Court review. A peti-'
Jr. in Alexandria. tion -by_ the book's publisher,
Bryan',' who heard closed- Alfred A. -Knopf, Inc., ap-
courtroom testimony from for-. Ipeared equally certain.
mer CIA Director William B. - ?
. One issue the high court !
Colby and his four top depu.1 will be asked to decide is '
ties, disapproved all but 15 of ! !whether the Fourth. Circuit
the agency's deletions. He said' ' I
I correctly applied the . newly
the government had shown
!amended federal Freedom. of,,
only that the disputed pas.
BALTIMORE NEWS AMERICAN
31- JAN 1;75 - ?
Eiveirt `et r 'kr ANT ii-Net- 7 tf /771
t7 ? .M II v_itt.p
I Information Act. Under- the?'
law the government must
I convince 'a federal judge dui_
i particular information
properly classified and thet
judge has clear authority
make his own secret examinaq
tion and evaluation of tisk
documents.
Chief Judge Clement Pi
Haynsworth Jr., writing foci
the circuit court, said the law
should be applied to the CILA?
case but on the understanC
ing that there was "a pse4
sumption of regularity ?
performance by public off?-i
cials" who have the job se
keeping government secretz.
Haynsworth. joined by
Judges Harrison 'L. Winter:
and J. Braxton Craven In,,
said the government "was re:
quired to show no more that
that each deletion item (Bs
closed information which was
required to be classified is
any degree and which was
contained in a document bear-
ing a classification stamp."
Soviet Spies in the U.S.
;
.Our battered Central Intelligence Agen- Soviet espionage calls this "re-
cy is convinced that, behind the scenes, the grooming." Sakharovsky's agents are first
Soviet spy activity in the United States has sent abroad for about a year to familiarize
now reached an all-time high. themselves with the target country. Then.
We are the only country the Kremlin they are brought home and trained another
.really fears and the CIA knows that, with- seven or eight years ?as long as that ? be-
out question, the U.S.A. is the Soviet's main fore being returned, say, to the United
target. To our CIA the proof ? even me- State, _
chanically ? is self-evident. The American
section of the KGB in Moscow is over-
whelmingly the largest section in the entire
apparatus.
KGB chief Uri Vladimirovich Adropov,
60, was Soviet Ambassador to Hungary dur-
ing the Kremlin's reconquest of Hungary in
1956. Andropov became KGB chief in 1967, a,
year after Richard M. Helms was appointed
head of the CIA. Then in 1973 Soviet Com-
munist. party First Secretary Leonid I.
Brezhnev elevated Andropov to the ruling
17-member Politburo, the first KGB chief to
be so elevated since Lavrenti P. Beria.
The CIA }mows Andropov has organized
the 'KGB into 15 directorates. Lieut. Gen,
Aleksandr M. Sakharovsky commands the
1st directorate. It employs at least 10,000 se-
cret agents abroad.
The CIA finds that Sakharovsky relies
heavily on the "sleeper" method and that
most "Sleepers" are trained in an immense
old 15th century czarist chateau at Barkov,
40 kilometers from Moscow, on the Vereyka
River.
For example, the Soviet's Konon Molody
("Gbrdon Lonsdale") spy ring planted in
the British Admiralty consumed 12 years in
its "sleeper" status before starting espio-
? The made-over men are "regroomed "
into U.S. citizens, equipped with false pass-
ports and other false documents: false birth
certificates, driver's license, etc., in as-
tounding variety.
?
Their "Rezident," operating here from
a "Rezidentura," directs them into our gov-,
ernment; the armed forces, atomic plants,
scientific centers, the news media, defense
or communications industries or what not.
On the side, the KGB pays its placed
agents (always cash) as little as $-420 a
month. Moreover, it frequently fools them
by saying the apparatus will put huge bonus
payments for them in a Moscow bank. Then
the KBB liquidates the agent for knowing
too much.
In its inside parlance this is called
"implemented interrogation" and the favor.
ite point of puncture is the back of the neck.
The 13th Directorate has a special noto-
riety within the CIA and other Western in-
telligence services. James Bond's fictional
SMERSH does, in fact, exist, although the
true official title inside the KGB is the
Chatany Otdel group.
The killer squad is under Nikolai Kora.
noideals worldwide,
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ApProved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100350001-8 .
NATION
8 if IS 1975
RECRUITING HISTORIANS
trzz CIA RN THE f303 A A
RONALD RADOSH
illiam E. Colby's policy of building a more open CIA
was evident at the annual conference of the American
Historical Association, held at the Conrad Hilton Hotel in
Chicago from December 27 to 30. At just the time when
sobs are very hard to find in the universities, the CIA
made its first public appearance before the AHA by