THE PRESIDENT'S STRATEGY FOR SURVIVAL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 28, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 22, 1974
• Content Type: NSPR

/77f
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432*R0001003200024
TIME, MARCH 25, 1974
P
s
Richard Nixon is rapidly running
out of options in his struggle to survive
Watergate. Last week he exercised a
fresh one. Pushing his Special Counsel
James St. Clair out front in a political
as well as a legal role, Nixon embarked
on a drive to save himself by appealing
directly to the public and assailing the
tactics of the House Judiciary Commit-
tee, which is investigating his conduct
in office. It was much too early to as-
sess public reaction, but the impact on
the House of Representatives was im-
mediate. The tactic backfired, and im-
peachment sentiment rose.
As both the President and St. Clair,
a shrewd and highly successful Boston
trial lawyer, moved boldly into the pub-
lic arena, the outlines of the three-
pronged White House offensive were
sharply etched. The strategy seeks to:
1) Goad the House Judiciary Com-
mittee into hastily subpoenaing presi-
dential tapes and documents and bas-
ing its enure impeachment case on a
contempt of Congress citation against
Nixon for 6bstructing the impeachment
inquiry if, as he has so far, he refuses to
yield the evidence. Nixon apparently be-
lieves that such a charge would be too
thin to enlist broad public support and
that even if impeached by the House
on that charge. he could muster the 34
votes necessary in a Senate trial to re-
tain his office.
2) Delay any broader impeachment
moNe by stalling in the delivery of re-
quested evidence, continuing to raise
legal technicalities, and resorting to
time-consurning court action. Delay
could erode public imerest in the whole
sordid scandal. Stalling could also push
the crucial impeachment vote closer to
the November elections?thus making
it more risky for any incumbent Con-
gressman--and perhaps even cause the
problem to be carried over into the next
session of Congress.
3) Solidify the President's hard-core
support and play on the more general
public fear of forcibly removing any
President from office. This is being done
through a public relations campaign de-
signed to highlight the President's
achievements in office and the sanctity
of the presidency itself. At the same time
the effort seeks to obfuscate and obscure
Nixon's own Watergate role and por-
tray impeachment as a partisan move-
ment spearheaded by political enemies.
At a minimum, the aim is to build
enough pressure on normally friendly
Senators to prevent conviction on any
House-approved impeachment charge.
Most of this strategy was probably
devised by Nixon himself, but it has both
come together and reached its peak
since St. Clair became his chief legal
strategist early in January. Not only is
Nixon being scrutinized by the Judicia-
ry Committee but, more important, he
is on trial in the court of public opinion.
At long last he has a lawyer who?un-
like his previous counsel?is a seasoned
courtroom attorney. Moreover, St.
Clair's Washington experience (see box
page 12) goes back to the classic Army-
McCarthy hearings of 1954, when he
was an assistant to Joseph N. Welch,
C'OT
the Army's counsel. A poised and suave
performer, he has brought an aura of ag-
gressive confidence to Nixon's defense
campaign. "Jim has been a bonanza for
us," observes Alexander Haig, Nixon's
overworked chief of staff. Haig describes
St. Clair as a man who has "consider-
able acumen" in the highly charged and
shifting political atmosphere of Water-
gate. "He intuitively understands the
needs of the President."
Last week the President carried his
public relations drive both North and
South. In Nashville, he helped open the
$15 million home of the Grand Ole
Opry. As 4,400 country music fans ap-
plauded, Nixon said that their kind of
music "radiates the love of this nation
--patriotism." He flubbed an attempt at
spinning a Yo-Yo given him by Coun-
try Music Star Roy Acuff and played
God Bless America and Happy Birthday
on the piano to honor his wife Pat, just
back from South America, on her 62nd
birthday. In a relaxed evening, there was
no talk of his Watergate agony.
The President- was garrulous and
high-spirited the day before on a visit
to Chicago, where he made his first pub-
lic appearance outside Washington or
the South since July, 1973. He easily
handled soft questions from a largely
friendly gathering of some 2,000 mem-
bers and guests of the Executives' Club
of Chicago. He implied that he will not
comply with the Judiciary Committee's
request for White House tapes and doc-
uments beyond'. those already turned
over to Special Prosecutor Leon Jawor-
ski. With much exaggeration, Nixon
complained that the committee wanted
"all of the tapes of every presidential
conversation?a fishing license or a
complete right to go through all of the
presidential files." He said that "it isn't
the question that the President has
something to hide." But to let anyone
"just come in and paw through the doc-
uments," he contended, would destroy
"the principle of confidentiality" be-
tween a President and his advisers.
Nixon was even more forceful in
vowing once again that he would not re-
sign. "Resignation is an easy cop-out,"
he declared, adopting his frequent rhe-
torical device of posing an artificially
easy-or-tough choice. "But resignation
of this President on charges of which
he is not guilty simply because he hap-
pened to be low in the polls would for-
ever change our form of government. It
would lead to weak and unstable pres-
idencies in the future, and I will not be
a party to the destruction of the pres-
idency of the United States."
Third Version. Only when he dis-
cussed a detail of his own Watergate role
did Nixon's confidence seem to ebb. His
voice grew tremulous as he described his
increasingly crucial conversation with
John Dean, his former counsel, on
March 21, 1973. In a statement last Aug.
15, Nixon said Dean had told him that
secret payments had been made to the
original Watergate defendants only to
meet their legal costs. On March 6 of
this year, however, Nixon said flatly in
a press conference that Dean had told
him on March 21 that the cash was
meant to buy the silence of the lowly bur-
glars?which Nixon admitted was a
criminal act. After a week of silence on
the topic, Nixon made an attempt to
bridge that direct conflict and it was a
lame one. Dean, he said, had just "al-
leged" that the money was used to keep
the men quiet. This third Nixon ver-
sion of Ole conversation was meant to
clear him of any charge that he had
known of a crime and done nothing
about it.
The main question of the impeach-
ment inquiry, of course, is whether
Nixon not only knew of such acts but
participated in them as part of a con-
spiracy to conceal the origins of the June
17, 1972 wiretapping and burglary of
Democratic national headquarters. An
event that could illuminate that fateful
matter?and possibly blunt the entire -
Nixon counterattack?was scheduled to
take place this week in the Washington
courtroom of Federal Judge John J. Si-
rica. He was to rule that a Watergate
grand jury report and a briefcase full of
evidence relating to Nixon's own role
in that conspiracy will be given to the
House Judiciary Committee, headed by
New Jersey Democrat Peter Rodino.
Factual Findings. The grand jury
package, given to Judge Sirica on March
1, when the jurors also indicted seven
of Nixon's former official and political
associates in the cover-up conspiracy,
does not draw conclusions as to wheth-
er Nixon acted illegally. But a summa-
ry of the evidence in the briefcase lists
a series of factual findings by the grand
jury that do implicate Nixon in the
wrongdoing of his aides. Any such trans-
mission of the evidence to the House by
Sirica is .likely to be appealed. John J.
Wilson, the attorney representing two
of the indicted conspirators, H.R. Hal-
deman and John Ehrlichman, has
vowed to appeal.
The delicate way in which the White
House has been handling the grand jury
report shows the deft touch of St. Clair.
He surprised many Washington,lawyers
by raising no objection at all to the idea
of Sirica's sending the report to the Ro-
dino committee when the judge held an
extraordinary hearing on the question
on March 6. To oppose this move would
make it appear that the President feared
a revealing of the contents of the brief-
case. But St. Clair well knew that Wil-
son, whose clients' interests in many re-
spects dovetail with those of Nixon,
would fight to squelch the grand jury's
findings. Wilson promptly raised objec-
tions on the grounds that 1) the grand
jury had no power to make such a re-
port, and 2) the documents were likely
to mention Haldeman and Ehrlichman,
and any public disclosure could preju-
dice their chances for a fair trial.
While Wilson carries on the legal
battle over the grand jury report, the
President and his staff are expected to
continue their public psychological war-
fare against Watergate. That attack last
week was well orchestrated. First. Ken
Clawson, the White House director of
communications, leaked to reporters a
Feb. 25 letter from John Doar, chief
counsel for the Rodino committee, to St.
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RI1P77-00432R000100320002-0
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0
Clair. It showed that Doar was seeking
not only six additional Nixon tapes, as
generally believed?even by members of
the committee?but also tapes covering
six periods of time, from February to
April 1973. Presidential Press Secretary
Ronald Ziegler said that this involved
42 tapes. The White House disclosure
made the Doar request look excessive,
though it by no means supported St.
Clair's claim that the committee seemed
to want "hundreds of thousands of doc-
uments and thousands of hours of re-
corded conversations."
The main aim of those White House
revelations, however, seemed to be to
try to drive a wedge between the Ro-
din() committee's members and its staff,
including Doar and the Republican
counsel Albert Jenner. In an effort to
prevent news leaks?as urgently de-
manded by the White House?Doar and
Jenner had been keeping only the com-
mittee leaders, Rodino and ranking Re-
publican Edward Hutchinson, posted on
all details of their dealings with St. Clair.
Clawson charged that Doar had tried
to "hoodwink" the committee by keep-
ing from the other members the extent
of his request.
Press Secretary Ziegler also assailed
the Doar request. "The mere fact of an
impeachment inquiry does not give Con-
gress the right to back up a truck and
haul off White House files," he told
newsmen. Moreover, Ziegler said that
for Nixon to comply with another Doar
request?that the committee staff be giv-
en access to the White House files of
such former Nixon aides as Haldeman,
Ehrlichman, Dean and Charles Colson
?would be "constitutionally irrespon-
sible." Presidential Counsellor Bryce
Harlow later protested to reporters that
the Rodino committee members were
acting like "children who are asking for
another helping before they have eaten
what's on their plate."
The surprise in the White House
campaign was St. Clair's sudden emer-
gence in public and his accessibility to
reporters. Until recently, he had been
operating mainly in private. He had bar-
gained skillfully and sternly with Spe-
cial Prosecutor Jaworski over which
White House tapes and documents the
grand jury could be given. St. Clair had
spoken out publicly on only a few oc-
casions. On Feb. 4 he attacked the cred-
ibility of John Dean and criticized Ja-
worski for publicly defending Dean's
veracity. As a result, Jaworski privately
scolded St. Clair for "unprofessional
conduct," and their cordial but correct
relationship cooled.
Legal Views. In his major court-
room appearance in Nixon's behalf,
St. Clair on Jan. 16 tried to shake the tes-
timony of a panel of court-appointed
acoustics and recording experts in a
hearing before Sirica. The panel claimed
that an l8-minute erasure in one key
Nixon tape in all likelihood had been de-
liberate rather than accidental. Though
St. Clair, with his assured courtroom
manner, was far more effective than
such predecessors as the docile Fred Bu-
zhardt and the ill-at-ease Leonard Gar-
ment, he made little headway against
the experts. Sirica found St. Clair's ques-
tions repetitive and tedious and finally
cut him off.
In last week's flurry of activity, St.
Clair expressed highly controversial le-
gal views in two television interviews
and several talks with reporters. He said
that because Nixon was the nation's
"chief law enforcement officer," he had
not committed any crime in failing to re-
port the hush-money payments. This
was an effort to account for the fact that
Nixon, by his own explanation early this
month, had not reported Dean's hush-
money confession (made at the March
21, 1973 meeting) to any law-enforce-
ment agency or court.
St. Clair also said that the charge in
the indictment that a payment of hush
money had been made on March 21 was
doubtful. His reason: "sworn testimony"
at the Senate Watergate hearings includ-
ed no similar charge. He further con-
tended that Dean could no longer be
used as a credible prosecution witness
because a tape showed that a conver-
sation with Nixon that Dean thought
took place on March 13, 1973, actually
occurred on March 21.
More broadly, St. Clair argued that
the Rodino committee must determine
just what kinds of presidential acts it
considers impeachable before it seeks
more evidence. He also claimed that he
was not actually engaged in defending
Richard Nixon, but in representing "the
office of the presidency."
None of those statements could
withstand sharp legal scrutiny. Their
shrewd purpose, however, seemed to be
multiple-edged. They served to chal-
lenge and fuzz up the indictment's strong
implication that, at the least, Nixon had
learned from Dean on March 21 of the
illegal payoffs to defendants and had
failed to cut them off. St. Clair's remarks
sought to set the Rodino committee
members off on a potentially divisive
squabble over defining impeachable acts
?a point on which St. Clair knows the
Congressmen hold sharp differences.
St. Clair was trying to strengthen Nix-
on's oft-repeated claim that the institu-
tion of his office, rather than his per-
sonal fate, was the overriding issue in
the impeachment controversy.
The new White House offensive was
backfiring in its attempt to trigger pre-
cipitate and self-defeating action by the
Judiciary Committee to impeach the
President solely on grounds of contempt
of Congress. Committee members were
angry?not at each other or at their staff
?but at what they considered the ob-
viousness of the Nixon-St. Clair tactics.
While they respect St. Clair's legal sav-
vy, they think that he has ventured into
essentially political maneuverings. At
that game, they assume, they are far
more adept and experienced than he.
Cooling Hotheads. A few of the
more volatile members of the committee
almost jumped at St. Clair's bait. Such
liberal Democrats as Father Robert Dri-
nan of Massachusetts, California's Je-
rome Waldie and Michigan's John Con-
yers Jr. wanted immediately to issue
subpoenas for every bit of evidence that
Doar was seeking. But Chairman Ro-
dino called a caucus of the committee's
Democrats and urged the hotheads to
cool off. There would be plenty of time
to issue subpoenas, he argued, once the
White House intention to cut off all fur-
ther evidence was totally clear. Mean-
while, the committee staff was awaiting
a chance to examine all of the material
that St. Clair and Nixon had promised,
including the 19 tapes and more than
700 documents given to the special pros-
ecutor's office.
The White House attack seemed to
unify the committee?against the Pres-
ident. "It is not the White House's job
to tell the committee how to discharge
its constitutional function," declared
Maryland Republican Lawrence J. Ho-
gan, until now one of Nixon's strong de-
fenders on the committee. "The Pres-
ident's lawyer was off base when he
stated the committee should first define
an impeachable offense?there is no set
definition. Each member will have to
subjectively determine this in his own
mind." Hogan contended that Nixon
was getting "bum advice" and was in
danger of losing those on the commit-
tee "who are trying to keep an, open
mind on impeachment." The release of
the Doar letter to St. Clair, protested
Texas Democrat Jack Brooks, was "an
affront to the comity between the White
House and the Congress." But he urged
his colleagues on the committee not to
let "the White House hucksterism de-
tract from the decency and forbearance.
of the committee. It is clear that the
White House is not going to cooperate.'
Rebutting St. Clair's demand that
the committee state its charges against
Nixon before it seeks more evidence,
Republican Edward Hutchinson ar-
gued: "There are no charges. We hope
we will find none. We are simply mak-
ing an inquiry." Added Hutchinson:
"What we 'have asked for is very rea-
sonable and very relevant." The com-
mittee request, he explained, was aimed
primarily at clarifying the "suspicion
about the President's action in the so-
called Watergate cover-up."
Contempt Citation. The commit-
tee strategy is to continue to move war-
ily, maneuvering to avoid any court bat-
tles. Not only are such battle i time
consuming, but the committee is con-
vinced that no court has any jurisdic-
tion over any part of the impeachment
inquiry and process. Impeachment is
sanctioned by the Constitution as solely
a congressional activity. The committee
leaders expect to give St. Clair perhaps
two more weeks in which to respond
conclusively to its request for evidence.
If he fails to do so, the request will be re-
newed. If Nixon and St. Clair still re-
fuse to comply, only then will the com-
mittee issue a subpoena for the material.
Meanwhile, the committee's inves-
tigation will continue. First, all of the ev-
idence given to Jaworski by the White
House will be examined. Then the com-
mittee intends to study the package of
evidence from the Watergate grand jury.
If St. Clair and Nixon decide to resist
the subpoena, the committee will prob-
ably seek a contempt citation against the
President. The citation would become
one of several?or perhaps many
?points in an impeachment charge. "I
would make it the last article of im-
peachment, not the first," declares a
Republican member of the Judiciary
Committee.
Reports TIME'S veteran congressio-
nal correspondent, Neil MacNeil: "St.
Clair's strategy is offending the House's
sense of itself?an extremely dangerous
business for Nixon. He is losing South-
ern Democrats and conservative Repub-
licans by the dozens right now." And
this is even before any of the potential
impeachment evidence has been ana-
lyzed by the Rodino committee.
Always Smile. Despite St. Clair's
problems, many legal scholars give him
high marks so far for making the best
,2
,Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0,
of what they see as a very difficult case.
Under St. Clair, observes Harvard Law
Professor Alan Dershowitz, "the quality
of legal representation has gone way
up." St. Clair is following a predictable
pattern of impeachment defense, says
Law Professor Arval Morris of the Uni-
versity of Washington. "The first thing
is to narrow the concept of the impeach-
able offense?that rules out a whole lot
of evidence." The University of Chica-
go's Philip Kurland views St. Clair's de-
fense strategy as "to give only what he
is forced to give and to delay as long as
he can."
Richard Donahue, a leading trial
lawyer in Massachusetts, offers a more
invidious assessment. He considers St.
Clair's tactics much the same kind of de-
fense that one would put up for "a drunk-
en driver. If you have a guilty client,
you make 'em prove everything every
inch of the way, attack everyone in the
room?the judge, the court officers, the
witnesses?but you always smile." Har-
vard's Dershowitz says that it is diffi-
cult to rate St. Clair's overall effective-
ness without knowing the culpability of
his .client. "If Nixon is innocent, has
nothing to hide, then St. Clair is doing
a terrible job because he is making it ap-
pear as though Nixon has something to
hide. If he is guilty, then St. Clair is do-
ing a great job."
A strategy of delay, however, is a dis-
service to the nation, argues Law Pro-
fessor John Flynn of the University of
Utah. He objects to St. Clair's "defend-
ing this case on a petty criminal basis
?raising every technical objection pos-
sible. This is a form of legal
brinkmanship. He may be winning the
legal battle but losing the more impor-
tant battle of public confidence in the
President." The University of Chicago's
Harry Kalven Jr. agrees: "Delay has
consequences for the whole country. It
seems seriously inappropriate." It is also,
of course, the opposite of what Nixon is
arguing for: "I want a prompt and just
resolution of this matter."
Many of St. Clair's recent statements
on more specific Watergate issues are se-
verely criticized by legal experts and
other persons who have detailed knowl-
edge of the various investigations of the
scandal. Generally stated, these asser-
tions by St. Clair include:
A President can be impeached only
for crimes of a very serious nature com-
mitted in his governmental capacity.
As a practical?but not legal?mat-
ter, a serious criminal act by a Presi-
dent may have to be shown to enlist the
two-thirds Senate vote for conviction
and removal from office. Despite the
views of Nixon and St. Clair, however,
almost no reputable scholar contends
that the "high crimes and misdemean-
ors" cited in the Constitution as bases
for impeachment were meant to be tak-
en in the modern sense of those words.
Chicago's Kurland says that any
"breach of trust of high office" falls with-
in the meaning intended by the consti-
tutional framers. This was shown by one
of the framers of the impeachment pro-
vision, James Wilson. who said that
what he had in mind was misbehavior,
or what he called "malversation." James
Madison added that impeachment was
a protection against the "negligence or
perfidy of the Chief Magistrate."
The President can claim Executive
privilege in withholding requested evi-
dence from the House Committee.
Disputing that, the University of
Washington's Morris echoes the prevail-
ing view among constitutional scholars:
"In constitutional law, there really isn't
any sort of Executive privilege that the
President can raise against the House."
The impeachment procedure was set up
to cover a unique situation in which the
separation of powers among the branch-
es of Government can be broached by
the Congress to determine whether
an impeachable offense has occurred.
Four U.S. Presidents?Andrew Jackson,
James Polk, James Buchanan and Ulys-
ses S. Grant?have declared that they
would have no right to withhold any-
thing from an impeachment proceeding.
The House Judiciary Committee
must determine what an impeachable of-
fense is belbre it seeks the evidence.
There is no legal requirement to do
so. It is precisely because the Consti-
tution is vague on what is impeachable
that the committee wants to determine
whether there has been wrongdoing be-
fore deciding whether what it finds is im-
peachable. Certainly, the multiple in-
dictments and guilty pleas on criminal
charges by 26 Nixon agents so far are
reason enough to prompt a broad and
deep inquiry into the President's con-
duct in office. To carry out that inquiry
properly the committee needs all the ev-
idence it can get about the President's
conduct in the Watergate and related
political-espionage and payoff scandals.
Because the President is the chief
law-enforcement official in the nation, he
did not have a legal obligation to report
his knowledge of the hush-money pay-
ments?a crime?to anyone else. He must
only see to it that the judicial process was
initiated.
"The President is not engaged in the
law-enforcement business," contends
Chicago's Kurland. "It is a title that St.
Clair has created for the situation."
Adds Hofstra University Law Dean
Monroe Freedman: "The contention is
cute, but technically it's absurd." For a
President merely to tell himself that a
crime has been committed is not enough,
many scholars point out. People in the
White House are "no different from any
other citizens" when they learn of a
crime, says Attorney General William
Saxbe, who has a greater right than the
President to consider himself the top
law-enforcement official. Far from ini-
tiating judicial action in the Watergate
cover-up, moreover. Nixon sought to
block full disclosure. He withheld tapes
and other evidence from investigators,
fought vainly in the courts to keep this
material away from the grand jury, and
fired Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox
when he persisted in seeking it.
St. Clair is not representing the Pres-
ident. He is representing the institution
of the presidency.
"This is at best superficial and at
worst misleading," declares Norman
Dorsen, law professor at New York Uni-
versity. "It is not the presidency that is
being investigated and that is denying
Congress information. It is Mr. Nixon
who is under investigation, who is not
cooperating. It is not some abstraction
that is advising St. Clair on the case. It
is Richard Nixon." No one is counsel
for the office of the presidency, asserts
Kurland. "There is no such job. This is
just rhetoric."
St. Clair seemed to concede as much
last week when he told TIME Correspon-
dent Dean Fischer: "My client happens
to be the President of the United States.
In this sense, he's a unique client. There
are certain decisions that only he can
make. These decisions relate to the con-
fidentiality of presidential communica-
tions and Executive privilege. I can't
make those decisions for him. They're
his and his alone."
Such a decision by Nixon was made
when the President ruled that he would
not give Jaworski any more White
House evidence, including 27 tapes that
the special prosecutor is still seeking.
St. Clair has not heard those recordings.
That puts him in a weak position in hav-
ing rejected Jaworski's request on
grounds that the contents of the record-
ings did not justify violating the Pres-
ident's right to protect their confiden-
tiality. St. Clair has apparently not
heard the 42 tapes sought by the Ro-
din() staff either.
For an experienced trial lawyer,
St. Clair has made some specific com-
ments on aspects of the Watergate
cover-up case that appear odd. Par-
ticularly baffling was his claim that
John Dean would no longer be a wit-
ness in Special Prosecutor Jaworski's
conspiracy case against Nixon's former
aides. Both Nixon and St. Clair were
heavily depending on the claim that
Dean had been discredited because he
testified before the Senate Watergate
committee that he had talked to Nixon
about the hush-money payments on
March 13, while a tape of the conver-
sation shows that it occurred on March
21. Dean, who had testified without ac-
cess to his White House files, later told
investigators that he had been wrong by
one week. Nixon in Chicago seemed to
be grasping at a straw in citing that one-
week error as significant. Dean will be
a major trial witness.
St. Clair also tried to undermine a
key claim in the grand jury's conspir-
acy indictment: that $75,000 in hush
money had been paid on March 21,
1973, to William Bittman, the attorney
for E. Howard Hunt, a Watergate wire-
tapper. Hunt had been demanding
money from the White House, threat-
ening to disclose some of his seamy work
as a member of Nixon's squad of secret
plumber investigators. The payment was
alleged by the grand jury to have been
made just a few hours after Dean and
Haldeman had met with Nixon on that
day. St. Clair pointed out, however, that
a large chart used in the Senate Wa-
tergate hearings had listed no such pay-
ment on March 21. That was hardly a
conclusive refutation.
Hush Money. Testimony at the
Senate hearings was imprecise as to the
time of this payment. But St. Clair had
to be aware that the grand jury had
strong evidence of the date before citing
it as a culminating act in the chain of
criminal conspiracy. Last week the
Washington Post reported that Freder-
ick LaRue, a former official of Nixon's
re-election committee who has pleaded
guilty to conspiracy to obstruct justice,
had recalled handling the payment after
dinner on March 21. The date was ver-
ified by the travel records of one of La-
Rue's out-of-town friends, who attended
the dinner. Investigators have the credit-
card records of his hotel and travel ex-
penses. That is minimal documentation:
the prosecutor has other evidence too.
The payment date challenges Nix-
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-ROP77-00432R000100320002-0
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0
on's repeated claim that. during the cel-
ebrated March 21 meeting with Dean
and Haldeman in his office, he flatly re-
jected the idea of paying any hush
money. The grand jury, which heard the
tape of the meeting, cited Haldeman for
perjury because of his testimony at the ?
Senate hearings that Nixon had said
such payments were wrong. This grand
jury action suggested that Nixon must
have been lying in his public claims that
he told his aides the payments were
wrong. If a payment was made after the
talk, the President either did not dis-
courage the payment of hush money, or
he was misunderstood by his aides, or
he was disobeyed.
Nixon conceded in a press confer-
ence two weeks ago that other persons
who heard the tape might "reach dif-
ferent interpretations. But I know what
I meant, and I know also what I did. I
meant that the whole transaction was
wrong, the transaction for the purpose
of keeping this whole matter covered
up." Nixon said that he told Dean, "It
is wrong, that's for sure"?and that the
remark was meant to apply to both
the promise of Executive clemency and
the payment of hush money to any
defendant.
The President has refused to release
the tape or a transcript of the conver-
sation, but TIME has learned its gist.
Four important words spoken by the
President come through clearly: "It
would be wrong." But these words are
spoken only within the context of a dis-
cussion about promising clemency. The
subject of paying money to keep the bur-
glars quiet comes once before the clem-
ency discussion and two times after it.
On none of those three occasions does
Nixon say or suggest that such payments
would be wrong.
Among the tapes most eagerly
sought by both Prosecutor Jaworski and
the Rodino committee staff are those of
conversations between Nixon and his
top aides from about ten days before to
ten days after this March 21 conversa-
tion. The investigators wonder whether
there was any more talk of the illegal
hush payments in this period. Nixon has
refused to yield any of these tapes to ei-
ther of the investigating bodies.
Two Supporters. An additional
problem for the President is that any
White House attempt to stonewall the
Rodino committee by denying access to
any further evidence runs the risk of
alienating two of Nixon's most helpful
supporters: Vice President Gerald Ford
and Republican Senate Leader Hugh
Scott. Ford seems to be opening a great-
er distance between himself and the
President. He still backs the White
House view that Rodino is off on a "fish-
ing expedition" for evidence and ought
to specify "a bill of particulars" against
Nixon before seeking the supporting
documents. But Ford irked Nixon's staff
by declaring publicly that Rodino is ful-
ly entitled to see the grand jury's spe-
cial report and evidence. He also said
that he was "concerned" about Nixon's
failure to report the illegal payment ofsi-
lence money to Watergate defendants
as soon as Dean told him about it. "I
think I would have," Ford said.
Scott is getting nervous because he
went out on a limb to assail Dean's cred-
ibility on the basis of tape transcripts
and summaries shown to him by Nix-
on. The failure of the White House to
make the same information public dis-
turbs Scott. His associates worry that he
may have been misled by the one-week
discrepancy in Dean's testimony about
hush money, perhaps having seen a
transcript in which no such discussion
appeared. As for giving the Rodino com-
mittee what it wants, Scott, too, is op-
posed to "fishing expeditions," but he
TIME MARCH25 1974
s:A Shocke
66 ?
,
Another big bombshell is about to
go off under the President. The Con-
gressional Joint Committee on Internal
Revenue Taxation, which Nixon asked
to look into two questionable tax entries
that he had made on his returns for 1969
and 1970, is expected to release its pre-
liminary report late this week or next
week. Says one senior Senator on the
committee: "It will be a shocker."
Congressman Wilbur Mills; the in-
fluential and powerful chairman of the
House Ways and Means Committee,
added: "If Watergate brought pressure
on Nixon to resign, our report will bring
about a great deal more pressure. I don't
believe that he will be able to withstand
it." A congressional staff member said
that Nixon may well wind up owing
more than $500,000 in taxes and pen-
alties. For the years 1970 and 1971 he
paid less than $2,000 on a combined in-
come of $526,000.
?
The tax committee will not draw any
conclusions on whether Nixon may have
been guilty of fraud in filing his returns.
It will leave any such determination up
to the Judiciary Committee and Inter-
nal Revenue Service, which is belatedly
rechecking Nixon's returns. The report
by the joint committee will merely in-
dicate those deductions that it considers
should not have been allowed and will
_ _-
CONGRESSMAN WILBUR MILLS
cite other taxes that it judges the Pres-
ident owes. (Though the committee's
findings are not binding, the President
has promised to accept their ruling and
pay accordingly.) It would be wrong to
allege fraud, Mills explained, "because
half the members of the committee are
Senators, and they may have to serve
as a jury on impeachment." In other
words. Senators should not accuse Nix-
on if they also may have to stand in judg-
ment of him later.
The committee is expected to con-
does not believe that the committee is
on one. Noting White House objections
to anyone backing a truck up to the
White House for files, Scott suggests:
"How about a station wagon?"
As the President's difficulties con-
tinue to accumulate, his public appear-
ances look increasingly like an effort to
go over the heads of the aroused im-
peachers in the House and directly to
the public. His vows to "fight like hell"
and "not walk away from this job"
may win some wavering doubters to his
side. But his position is steadily grow-
ing weaker.
If the President is innocent in the
cover-up acts of his aides, he could eas-
ily gain adherents by turning over the
27 tapes that Jaworski wants and the
42 that the House Judiciary Committee
is seeking. That would dispel many sus-
picions, and it would certainly not "de-
stroy" the presidency. Since he has given
up 19 tapes and 700 documents already,
why would turning over more tapes
break the back of this most visible of
U.S. institutions? If he is not innocent
the current collision course with the
Congress may be the only viable one
for him.
Gentler Approach. Perhaps per-
ceiving new dangers in a showdown with
the impeachment committee, St. Clair
seemed to soften his earlier stand. "We
are not seeking a confrontation," he told
TIME. "It would not be good for the Pres-
ident or the country. I think John Doar
and I both believe that adjustments can
be made to avoid it. I don't think the
committee intends to have a fishing ex-
pedition." If this view seemed more con-
ciliatory than those expressed by his
unique client last week, perhaps the gen-
tler approach is merely a shrewd tactic.
Or maybe Lawyer James St. Clair de-
serves a more attentive audience within
the confines of the Oval Office.
elude that Nixon owes some $300,000
in back taxes for having taken a deduc-
tion of $482,000 for the gift of his vice-
presidential papers?a transaction that
he has conceded may not have been
completed before a law banning such de-
ductions went into effect. While Nixon
will not be accused of fraud because a
deed and other papers completing the
transaction apparently were backdated
to get them within the deadline, the
committee may put blame on those who
prepared the returns. That could apply
pressure on Nixon's lawyers to explain
the transactions more fully in order to
avoid criminal charges themselves.
a
Also certain to be cited as another
Nixon tax error was his failure to re-
port a $142.000 profit on the sale of his
Manhattan apartment in 1969 and to
pay a capital gains tax on it. Nixon had
asked the committee to examine both
this sale and the deduction for his pa-
pers. The probers have gone beyond
these matters and apparently have dis-
covered other Nixon tax errors. Insists
Mills: "People can better understand a
failure to pay taxes than they can un-
derstand Watergate. Overdeductions,
failure to state income?this will be a re-
port to the American people. And they
can draw their own conclusions." The
conclusions may be particularly bitter
because the report will be released just
at the time when Americans are paying
their own income taxes.
4
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0
THE WASHINGTONIAN
March 1974
GuessWho'sTrying to be H
?
enry Sup-Toy?
Wh
's Who and What's Happening in the Spy BLsiriess
?A Long Look Behind the Ciz,ssiiied Curtain
-By Tad Szuic
,ne day it is the controversy ever the
sani Central intelligence Agency's role in
Watergate. Another day it is a piece of inept
C/A skulduggery in a remote province in
.Thailand. Then it is the grudging admission
that quite a few American newsmen have
been operating as CIA .informants abroad.
Or ?he discovery that the agency has been
secretly training Tibetan guerrillas in Col-
orado, and Cambodian and Ugandan irregu-
lars at hidden camos in Greece while bank-
rollin.7 colonels on the ruling Greek junta
and financing (amous European statesmen
and contriving to overthrow the Libyan re-
gime.
? The CIA; it would seem, just cannot stay
out of the headlines, which is a commentary
con the agency itself and on the contradictions
in our society. Though it obviously is one of
the mot-.sberetive agencies in the United
States government, the CIA probably re-
ceives more publicity than any Washington
bureaucracy except for the NN'hite House.
Most of this publicity is negative, sometimes
indignant, often' sensationalist, and fre-
quently lopsided. The CIA's track record in
the?? years of its operations largely accounts
for this lavish yet unwanted coverage?it's
done everything from stealing the text of
Khrushchev's secret Kremlin speech de-
nouncing Stalin and theilay of Pigs, to over-
throwing foreign regimes, to running the
Laos "Clandestine Army," and possibly out-
fitting the AVatergate 'Plumbers"?but it is
our endless fascination with espionage and
cloak-and-dagger stories that makes readers
unfailingly receptive to stories and books
about the Cl:.
, On a more serious level, however, our
interest underlines the important point that a
secret agency cannot function in .utter se-
crecy in what still is a reasonably open soci-
ety.- The CIA is the subject of continued
public scrutiny and debate?even if the
scrutiny is superficial and the debate seldom
well informed, and even if it is true that the
agency has been allowed to run wild and
uncontrolled. There is a growing view
--reinforced by the Watergate affair?i hat
the CIA should be made more accountable to
proper Congressional committees as is, for
example, the Atomic Energy Commission,
whose work also is secret. Yct there is no
other nation where key intelligence officials
arc as easily identifiable as in the United'
States and where the head of intelligence is
Approved
publicly and extensively questioned by the Henry Kissinger. What is aviisue now is the
legislature?never mind how thoroughly' effectiveness of our intelligence machinery
?as William Egan Colby, the new CIA Di . and the question of whether it is helped or
y
rector, was last year. And it is not all that hurt b Kissinger's decision to be the de
hard for investig.nive reporters to track facto chief intelligence officer of the United
down some CIA actions, much to the States in addition m serving as Secretary of
; State and :he President's principal foreign
agency's annoyance. In Britain, the Official
Secrets Act would make this impossible. In Policy advisor.
,
France, the top-secret Service .du Territoire First, however let's briefly look at the
would prevent it. So would Israel's Shin Bet,, United States intelligence establishment.
with the assistance of official censorship. In ?
Communist countries, exposure of the In theory, the intelligence community is
`i un
curity services is. unthinkable., ified body presided over by the
Unsatisfactory as it is to those appalled by United States Intelligence Board (USIB),
the CIA%, excesses, the exposure that does which is directly responsible to the National
-
exist in our democratic society clearly is a Security Council at the White House and
plus. Last year's discovery of the abortive consequently to the President. The USII3 is
1970 Mite House plan for domestic intel- headed by the Director of the CIA, who also
ligence (Tom I /Liston, its author, praised the acts as Director of Central Intelligence and,
CIA for its cooperative spirit in engineering again in theory, as chief Of the intelligence
it) underscored the importance of such expo- community. William Colby replaced
sure. So did disclosures of the CIA-run Op- Richard I (elms in this twin. post last Sep-
eration Phoenix in' Vietnam set up for mur- tetnber (there was a five-month interregnum
dering suspected Viet Cong agents. We are during which James M. Schlesinger man-
highly sensitized to the role of intejligence aged to shale up the community quite con-
agencies here and abroad. But mi strange is sideerably before moving on to be Secretary
our morality that we usually tend to accept of Defense), but there are no indications so
the national security need for building better ? far that Colby carries much more weight
and better nuclear arsenals but flinch indig- with the Nixon-Kissinger White I louse than
nandy at the notion of American involve- did I Mills. Ichns. now Ambassador to
ment in global intelligence operations. Iran, was in deep disfavor With Kissinger.
This is where the contradictions of our The White I louse tends to regard Colby as
an: efficient intelligence bureaucrat and ad-
society mine in. I lowever, the reality is that
ministrator (despite his long career as a chin-
classical
foreign policy depends not only on
classical .pol it ical and economic diplomacy, destine operator) who meets Kissinger's spe- ;
but also on military deterrents and the cial requirements. So it is hard to think of
availability of solid intelligence. To abolish Colby as the real chief of the intelligence
our intelligence services would be tan- community in the sense that Allen Dulles
tamount to unilateral nuclear disarmament, was when he was CIA director from 1953 to
something not seriously proposed here. We 1961. There seem to be no giants nowadays
must live with the reality that the CIA and in the spying business. It has been touched ,
its sister agencies will go on exist ing; "so will by the age of mediocrity too.
The other agencies forming the USIII are
the Soviet KGB's external operations.
Having Said all these things, I should add ' the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA),
po
that despite all the publicity about the CIA sup sedly the spokesman for the Pentagon,'
b
and company, the function of intelligence in hut not always in tune with the intelligence
experts of the Office of the Secretary of Dc-
thethe modern age is not always understood by
fcnsc or the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Na-
public or, for, that matter, by our top
t
Na-
policymakers. In fact, the entire Americanional Security Agency (NSA), specializing
intelligence apparatus?not just the CIA?is
I in highly sophisticated electronic and icaltech-
undergoing a major institutional crisis. This nolg intelligence gathering; the State
crisis results in fairly equal parts from the Departments smallish but excellent Bureau
profound politic' and technological changes of Intelligence and Research (INR), mainly
affecting the world in the 1970S (perhaps not concerned with analyzing political and
fully comprehended by the intelligence peo-
economic intelligence; the Atomic Energy
C
plc themselves) and from the style of foreign ommission (AEC), which has its own
policy as conducted by Richard Nixon and
intelligence-processing capability in the nu-
? ? clear field; the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDFS7-00432R000100320002-0
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0
tion, contributing counterespionage func-
tions; and the Treasury Department, a fairly
recent addition, which is'involved in intel-
ligence operations against narcotics traffic
.and which also runs the Secret Service.
Below the USIB, but connected with the
:major intelligence agencies, are such
specialized organizations as the National Re-
connaissance Office (NRO), the most secret
of them all. NRO's existence has been one of
the intelligence comniunity's best kept se-
crets. Its mission is to coordinate the so-
called "overhead" reconnaissance conducted
by Samos spy-in-the-sky satellites and
high-flying planes like the SR-71, the suc-
cessor to the famous U-2. The Air Force
runs NRO with special funds?some esti-
mates are that NRO spends $1.5 billion an-
nually, about a ? fifth of the total United
; States intelligence budget?and it is believed
that the Under Secretary of the Air Force, I
currently . James W. Plummer, is . its im-1
; mediate boss. Overhead reconnaissance is
absolutely essential for the monitoring of I
; military deployments by potential adver-
saries The Samos satellite, for example, is
the so-called "means of national verification"
for the 1972 Soviet-American nuclear con-
trol agreements. It insures that the Russians ,
? arc not cheating on the antiballistic missile
(ABM) limitations or exceeding the number
of land- or submarine-based missiles under
the temporary accord on offensive strategic
; weapons. The Samos, with its high-
!precision photography, keeps 1N'ashington
I posted on every new missile site and type of
weapon deployed by the Soviet Union.
;Thanks to the Samos we know that the
: Soviets are busily building their strength.
And the Russians, of course. have their own
version of the Samos to keep us honest.
NRO experts work closely with the huge
National Security Agency (believed. to em-
ploy more than 20,000 civilian and military
specialists), both in actual overhead recon-
naissance and in the parallel task ot telemet-
ric monitoring of Soviet advances in the de-
. vclonment of Multiple independently ;
;
Targeted Reentry Vehicle (M IRV)
t4warlicads. (These are multiple warheads,
usually three, carried by indis:idual ballistic
missiles. Each can be guided separately to its
assigned and very precise target.). Develop-
ing MIR \' was a major American nuclear
. breakthrough, and for the last five years
enormous effort has gone. into monitoring
Soviet tests to determine whether the Rus-
sians have it too. The American defense
posture and disarmament negotiating stance
depend on this knowledge. The intelligence
community believes that the Soviet Union
"NUR Ved" last year, but ? is uncertain just
how precise the Soviet targeting system is.
This information isthe raw strategic intel-
ligence that NRO and NSA feed to the CIA
and the DIA?and ultimately. to the USIB
and the White House?for evaluation and
interpretation. NS.A.also provides the intel-
ligence community with a fantastic wealth of
electronic intelligence?ELI NT in the pro-
fessional jargon?in addition to. data on
Soviet or Chinese military deployments and
developments. NSA listening posts around
the world eavesdrop on practically all the
non-American (not only Communist) mili-
tar)' radio, microwave, telex, and telephone
traffic. They intercept conversations among
Soviet N110 pilots; routine communications
either in clear language or in code (one of
NSA's crucial functions is code-breaking as
well as code-making) involving Warsaw Pact
military units, Chinese, North Vietnamese,
North Korean, and other Communist de-
tachments; and iust about everything of po-
tential interest to the United States that can
be overheard or copied. This work is done
from secret land bases ranging from Ethiopia
and the Indian-Himalayas to Turkey and the
Aleutian islands an well as from ELINT
ships (the Pueblo, captured by North Korea,
was one) andtLINT aircraft flying all over
the world. NSA-equipped and manned air-
craft directed secret ground penetrating op-
erations in Laos arid Cambodia, anti pre-,
sumably do so now in other critical areas
Middle East is probably one. It my
one day be NSA's function to interrupt the
worldwide United States military com-
munications network with a message pre-
ceded by the code word CRITIC (which
automatically gives it absolute priority over
all other traffic) to alert the White House, the
North American Defense Command in Col-
orado, and the Strategic Air Command in
Omaha that enemy missiles or bombers' have
been launched?or arc about to be?against
the United States. The extra few seconds
such a warning would provide before, say, a
Soviet first strike would allow the United
States to respond with a second strike from
? Minuteman missiles in North Dakota,
! Polaris and Poseidon nuclear submarines
cruising under the oceans, and SAC 13-52
' bombers on permanent airborne alert.
But since a nuclear holocaust is not gener-
ally anticipated, the value of strategic intel-
ligence relates to the construction of our de-
fense. and. diplomatic policies'. And this is
where the intelligence community's Current
internal crisis appears in its most acute form.
To be meaningful, strategic and tactleal in-
telligence must be properly evaluated and
interpreted. The National Security' Agency
and. the National Reconnaissance Office
produce and supply the raw intelligence for
the CIA, D1:\, and INR. But the CIA, DIA
(and the individual military.intelligence Ser-
vices), and 1NR also collect and produce in-
telligence they obtain through non-
electronic means. Each agency plays a dual
role and. each has its own analyses, opinions,
and biases. Each tries to influence policy,
often for .self-serving reasons. The CIA, for
example, is barred by statute from formulat-
ing policies, but the CI; N obviously holds
policy views and subtly, if not always suc-
cessfully, tries to influence national
decision-making processes. During the latter
! part of the Vietnam war, for example, the
agency continually warned against military
over optimism and against underestimating
North Vietnamese and Viet Cong power:
The CIA urged realism in "Vietnamization"
policies. On the other hand, it miscalculated
the advantages of getting rid of Prince Noro-
dom Sihanouk in Cambodia because it
? minimized the potential of the rebel Khmer
Rouge guerrillas. The Administration ac-
cepted the CIA's Cambodia opinions with
results that are less than felicitous. As will be
seen,. the CIA also had views on strategic
negotiations that differed from those of other
? members of the intelligence community. It
played an important role in helping to un-
dermine the Socialist regime in Chile?this
included strong policy views in faitir of
doing so?in addition to carrying out 1Vhite
House instructions in this area. In other
words, the CIA never simply cranked out
intelligen.ce without adding policy views.
The DIA, whose generals and admirals
are concerned with the fortunes of the mili-
tary profession, often seems to have a vested
interest in "worst case" interpretations of
intelligence .data. Put simply, military
analysts tend to suspect the worst concern-
ing the potential enemy's intentiOns because
that justifies requests for bigger budgets and
appropriations for new weapons systems.
Politically, "worst case" conclusions may
bring trade-offs. In 1969, for instance, the
Pentagon's insistence that the Russians had
"MIR Ved" (the CIA accurately concluded
that they' hadn't yet) inrceci Nixon and Kis-
singer to "buy it off": They promised ap-
propriations for new weapons systems so
that the military establishment .would sup-
port the SALT I negotiations with the Rus-
sians. And so on.
Traditionally, the general idea always has
been that the intelligence community,
with all its various resources, would pre-
sent the President with agreed estimates on
everything from Soviet nuclear advances to
Hanoi's intentions :n Vietnam, Laos, or
Cambodia; the likelihood of a Soviet-
Chinese war; the chances of a new Middle
Eastern conflict; the survival power of. the
Socialist regime in Chile; and many other
:situations of concern to the United States.
When the CIA truly was Washington's
pre-eminent intelligence organ, its Office of
National Estimates prepared the so-called
National Intelligence Estimates (Ni Es) on
behalf of the entire intelligence community,
although other agencies. dissenting views
? were duly noted. By and large, however, the
? NI Es were fairly sacrosanct. .
But in June 1973, when Kissinger as the
President's chief of staff for foreign affairs,
the Office of Nationa: Estimates was
abolished. John W. Huixenga, the Chief of
National Estimates, was forced into prema-
? ture retirement by Schlesinger. The changes
? 'awe based on reorganization plans for the
intelligence community that Schlesinger,
? then head of the Office of Budget and Man-
agement, prepared.for the White House in
November 1971. The new estimating iys-
tem turned out to be more responsive to the
special needs of the Nixon-Kissingr White
I-louse, and this is veiry much part of what is
happening to 111e intelligence community.
' instead of a permanent estimates body.
! Colby, acting as Director of Central intelli-
gence, set up a corps of so-called National
intelligence Officers drawn from the CIA
and other agencies to work on specific intel-
ligence projects. This staff has the logistic
support of the whole intelligence commu-
nity. itis headed by George Carver; desig-
nated as Chief National Intelligence Officer,
who operates direitly under Colby with
three deputies and approximately 30 Na-
tional intelligence Officers, although this
figtire probably will increase as the corps
. develops. Carver is a CA veteran and a
I Victtiam expert. He first caught Kissinger's
eye because he represented the CIA on the
Vietnam Task Force, an interagency group,
and occasionally on the National Security
Council. In practice, Colby and Carver as-
'sign a specific project?it could he Arab at-
titudes on oil or the likeIood of a North
Vietnamese offensiw: in 1974?to a National
Intelligence Officer, who nulls together all
6
? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0-
c necessary intelligence resources to pro-
cc a report submitted to Colby and then to
e National Security Council, which means
ear). Kissinger wearing the hat of Special
residential Assistant and/or chairman of
le top-secret "40 Committee" in the NSC
tructure. This means. that different senior
stimators. work on various projects rather
han having thc Office of National Estimates
pproving all the reports as it did in the past.'
issinger and his staff have direct-access to
he National Intelligence Officers when ?
vork is in progress, so Kissinger can better
ontrol the process of intelligence.
This is the most important structural anti
)Etical change to allvet the intelligence
.oiniunnity since Helms was shipped to Iran '
.arly in 1973. Schlesinger's short reign at the
CIA Langley headquarters produced some
superficial changes: The staff was cut by
nearly ten percent; scores of old-line
.'romantics" in the .Clandestine Services
were retired (E. Howard Hunt was retired
by..?Helms in 1970); the agency was rein.-
Ofized along more modern and efficient
lines; and the imPortance of electronic intel-
ligence was emphasized by bringing Pen-
tagon "overhead" reconnaissance experts to ;
Schlesinger's seventh-floor executive suite at
Langley.
But the really significant change in the
intelligence community's structure came
with Kissinger's decision to atomize it and
therefore britig it under his own tight con-
trol. Kissinger wanted to break the fre-
quently artificial ,:onsensus of estimates and
encourage a direct flow of intelligence from
the various agencies to his own office in the
1Vhite 1-louse s,here he and his National
Security Council staff made the final esti-
mates and evaluations.
This naturally led to a major contro-:
versy?an academic one, since Kissinger had
the last word?between Kissinger and the
traditionalists in the intelligence commu-
nity. In brief, the opposing positions were
these: Kissinger believed that the agreed na-
tional estimates were the *lowest common
denominator reached by agencies that often
disagreed on interpretation of data-4?in his
own words, he had to fight his way through
"Talmudic" documents to find their real
meaning; the traditionalists' view was that
Kissinger was disrupting an orderly intelli-
gence procedure in favor of his own biases, ,
that he wanted interpretations to fit his pre-
conceived policy opinions. Intelligence
community veterans complain that Kis-
singer and his people now use the intelli-
gence product capriciously and unprofes-
sionally. They resent what they consider hifi
"sloppy" handling of intelligence and his
practice of eliminating top intelligence peo-
?ple front the decision-making process. They
say that under the new system, the intelli-
gence comniunity, including Central Intelli-
gence I3irector Colby, has no idea what hap--
pens to the intelligence product, gueli as the
National Intelligence officers' contribution,
once it is fed int(; the White I !Ouse machin-,
'cry.
Even in Dick I !elms' day, old-timers say,
the Director of Central Intelligence .rarely
had a chance to defend his views at the White
I louse because National Security Council
meetings were increasingly infrequent and
' there was no other forum where he could
? 'speak. out. In his latter 'years .1 !elms had
virtually no direct access to Nixon, while
Kissinger made no bones about his low opin:
? ion of the CIA boss. Colby, as far as it is
known, is not faring much better with the
White House. For example, when Kissinger
and Schlesinger ordered the worldwide
United. States military alert during last
October's Nlideast crisis, Colby was not con-
sulted beforehand. He simply was sum-
moned after the decision was made and in-
formed of it. .
CIA ? officials also think that Kissinger
often ignores agency views and estimaies in
favor of opinions more to his pragmatic lik-
ing. This, they say, is what happens when
? CIA and military intelligence differ consid- .
erably. The. 1969 MIRV controversy sea:
the first instance of it. Later the White
. 1-louse. Minimized CIA warninga that the
Viet Cong was much .stronger in Vietnam
?than the US Command in Saigon claimed
and that pacification was far from successful.
Kissingei-, CIA people say, ne-er requested
the agency's opinion on the soundness of the
DIA plan to snatch American war prisont.r.:
from the. Sontay camp in North Vietnam
(the camp was enrt. t..y when the raiders
landed). No questions, they say, were put to
the intelligence community when the Ad-
ministration decided on the Cambodian in-
vasion in 1970 (the military insisted they
knew where to find the elusive COSVS;
command of the Vie.v Cong inside Cam-1
bodia; it has not been located to this No I
questions were put to the intelligence com-
munity when the ?Vilite iouse decided to
support the South Vietnamese thrust into
Laos in 1971 to sever the I 1u Chi Minh Trail
(du; operation failed). CIA people wonder'
why Kissinger never ordered the imelligence
community to prepare studies on all these,
plans before deciding to carry them out.
Colby, a lifetime clandestine operator (he'
fought behind enemy lines in France and
Norway as a young OSS officer in World
War II, then made a CIA career in Vietnam
as station chief and later as chief he pacifi-
cation program with ambassadorial rank),
still chairs the USW as Diactor of Central
Intelligence?US III now is mainly con-
cerned with evaluating Soviet military and
political strength. But Colby's power has
been considerably eroded in comparison
with that held by his CIA predecessors.
Individual intelligence agencies now are
increasingly in rivalry with one another (the
difference is that in the past natural rivalries
were discouraged by the White House; now
they seem to be encouraged) for the attention
of Henry Kissinger and thus the President.
To put it simply, Kissinger, who distrusts all
bureaucracies including the intelligence
community, devised a series of sophisticited
moves to weaken the intelligence -apparatus
so that he could become the chief interpreter
and arbiter of the intelligence product
emanating from each agency.
Kiisinger continues to control the Na-
tional Security Council?he retains his post
of White House Special- Assistant far Na-
tional Security Affairs despite his new post
as Secretary of State?and this preserves his
control of the evaluation of intelligence. This
is probably the most powerful function in
the formulation of foreign policy, which can
be evolved only on the basis of evaluated
knowledge. That is what intelligence is all
about. The Secretary of State has no such
statutory j)ower; traditionally he is a con-
sumer of intelligence. During Nixon's first
term William P. Rogers simply relied on his ;
own intelligence and Research Bureau?and
there are regrets ot the State Department
that he did not study that first-rate .product
sufficiently?but Kissinger, wearing his
many hats, is both chief producer and chief
consumer of the to:al intelligence available to
the United States government. His CIA de-
tractors call hint the "syper case officer" in
the intelligence community.
f.(issinger also has a handle on major
intelligence decisions through his
chairmanship of the "40 Committee" in the
National Security Council. This is princi-
a policy body?the intelligence
community, the Defense, State,. and Justice
departments are represented on it?that
mai-Ts broad decisions in the field of intelli-
gence and instructs the appropriate agencies
? tt, carry them out through their own means.
;ts nrucu. is derived from the number of the
I969 NSC memorandum that Set it up in its
tnescnt form. Earlier, the Committee was
!,nown as "5412," a memorandum number
dating bacic to zhe Eisenhower Administra-
tion., and tithing the Kennedy and Johnson
, administrations as "303," this being the
room number in the Executive Office Build-
ing where the group met. Britain has a simi-
, lar body known as the "20 Committee," but
its name is a product of British whimsicality.
Since the British group was called by insid-
ers the "double-cross committee, its chiefs
-translated the Roman numerals "NX" into
the designation "20" for their outfit.
The "40 Committee". decisions Must be
personally approved by the President. Its
agenda and the frequency of its meetings arc
secret, but it is assumed that all large-scale
operations (as distinct from ongoing stand-
aid activities) are reviewed there. This was
the case, it is said, with the CIA's clandestine
arnly in ;..aos and with Operation Phoenix in
):ietnam. But it also is known that between
19; 0 and 1973 the ".10 Committee" has con-
emu] itself on a number of occasions with
the Chilean situation before and after the
election of Salvador Allende, the late presi- ?
den:, as well as with such recondite matters
as whether the Norwegian government
would grant concessions to American oil
firms. In the case of. Norway, US
policymakers felt that normal diplomatic
pressures were inadequate and that intelli-
gence resources were required. It is not clear
just how the CIA went about this assign-
ment. Likewise, the CIA's role in an abortive
attempt to overthrow the Libyan regime
some time in 1971 has nbt been fully
explained?in fact, the whole operation re-
mains an official sect et. However, responsi-
ble sources claim the CIA was instructed to
eliminate the radical government of Colonel
Quadaffi when he threatened to nationalize
U S oil companies. Given the scope of
United States interests, there is no limit
to the situations the "40 Committee" may,
be drawn into.
Odd as it may sound, the "40 Committee"
under Kissinger early realized that Soviet
; leaders should have a better understanding;
of the United States. The function of the,
American intelligence community is, by def-
inition, to ferret out knowledge about the
Soviet Union, but sophisticated thinkers
* here concluded that awesome policy errors
in the Kremlin can be avoided if the Russians
knew more about American attitudes and
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-ROP77-00432R000100320002-0
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0
potential reactions It would be an exaggera-
tion to suggest that the CIA is engaged in
educating the KGB (although a peculiar rap-
-port between them exists in certain fields
such as security at the time of Nixon's Mos-
cow visit and Brezhnev's Washington trip), ,
but the intelligence community clearly was
'delighted some years ago when the Soviet
Academy of Sciences organized its "USA"
institute under Gyorgi Arbatote a specialist
on American affairs. The assumption.here is
Ithat the new institute is performing a Politi-
;cal intelligence functinn in conjunction with ,
the KGB and the Soviet Foreign Ministry..
Speaking of the KGB, which is the CIA's
: principal opponent in intelligence wars, the
, private assessment here is that the So6et
service has been improving over the years, .
particularly with the advent of a new genera-
tin of analysts and estimators. Americans
think, however, that the Russians are far
behind us ? in electronic intelligence even
though they, too, have equipment like over-
head satellites.
Experts say that the KGB's internal de-
fenses are strong. It is doubtful that the Cl:
ever really penetrated it, although there was
the case at:4one] Oleg Pcnkovsky, a senior
KGB officer who -allegedly served British
and American intelligence for years as a
double agent. Despite claims here,. it re-
mains aenclear what precisely Penkovsky
really did for the West. Because it is both a
domestic security service (in the FBI sense)
and an international intelligence agency like
the CIA, the KGB obviously is hard to pene-
trate. CIA Director Colby made this point
indirectly when he told a Congressional
committee in executive session late last year
that he was spending much of his time trying
to penetrate the Soviet Communist party.
? It is presumed to be among the "40 Corn-.
mince" functions to supervise secret intelli-
gence agreements with friendly countries.
Such agreements exist teith Britain, Canada,
? Australia, South Africa, and Israel, among.
? -others. The CIA and the British MI-6 occa-
sionally exchange agents when it is conven-
ient for one service to work under the cover
of the other, but the principal aim of the
agreements is the exchange of intelligence. A
secret British-American intelligence group
thus functions at the British Embassy in.
Washington. There are extremely close tics
with Canada; recent' published reports said
that Canadianintelligence personnel worked
hand in hand with the here and in Ot-
tawa. Finally, there is an intelligence ex-
change agreement within the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, but this is a more lim-
ited arrangement because of what the CIA
sees as the dangers of leaks to the Soviets.
Despite budget and personnel cuts, in-
ternal divisions, rivalries, and -frustra-
tions, the United States intelligence com-
munity is a formidable empire. It is believed
to employ around 100,000 people in all the
agencies (not counting the FBI) and its an-
nual budget is somewhere between S6 billion
and $7 billion, the bulk of the money going
to the expensive technological operations in
the National Security Agency and the Na-
tional Reconnaissance Office. Although the -
CIA is overseen by special Congressional
appropriations subcommittees, its budget-
ing, like that of the NSA, DIA, and NRO,
does not appear on the books. Instead, the
Office of Budget and Management hides it in
appropriations for other government agen-
cies. Sometimes agencies like the Agency for
-
International Development spend their own
funds on the CIA's behalf, a5 was done in
Laos and Vietnam, to be paid back later.
. The intelligence community, especially
the CIA, also works through innumerable
fronts, often supposed businesses, and
channels funds for political operations
through labor end cultural groups. At the
peak of the Vietnam war the CIA owned at
least two airlines?Air America Inc. (still
operating) .and Southern Air Transport.
(being sold). It also had contracts with sev-
eral bona fide US carriers. Southern Air
Transport carried out a- number of secret
operations in the Caribbean in recent years.
The Cl: still charters Southeast Air Trans-
port planes to such agencies as AID to bring
Latin American students and professionals
to the US for conferences and other meet inge
sponsored by the US government. In 1964 a
special company was set up in Miami to
recruit Cuban pilots, veterans of the Bay of
Pigsefor secret operations in the Congo. In
earlier years the CIA ? subsidized the Na-
tional Students' Association, Radio Free
Europe and Radio Liberty, the Congress for
Cultural Freedom; and a series of related
magazines here and in Western. Europe. Al-
though the CIA is barred by law from
operating in the Urfited States (except at' its
Virginia headquarters), the agency still
maintains covert of in Miami, New
'York, New Orleans, San Francisco, and
Charleston, South Carolina. CIA officials
say these offices support foreign operations
and, among other functions, help to debrief
interesting travelers returning from abroad.
But in the course of Watergate investigations
it developed that Langley headquarters as
well as the CIA offices in Miami and San
Francisco provided logistic support for the
White House "Plumbers." One employee,
in fact, still was on the CIA payroll when he
was arrested at the Watergate office building
in lune 1972. ?
Basically, the CIA is divided into two
main departments: operations and analysis.
There are experts in Washington who hold '
the CIA analysis branch in extremely high
. esteem, but tend to ? be skeptical of the
operators. The two departments are often at
odds politically: the operators often dismiss
the estimators as "eggheads" -while the
analysts think of the operators as a wild
bunch. This situation is changing as more
and more old-timers, mostly OSS veterans,
retire, a new generation of agents and
analysts enters the CIA ranks, and the needs
of intelligence, especially in electronic intel-
ligence, change along with the rest of the
world. But there also are stresses inside the
clandestine services. "Action" officers?the
"black" operators and paramilitary special-
ists?--are more gung-ho than what the CIA?
.calls covert political operatives, and this,
too, leads to internal disagreements.
Top specialists in their fields still are hired
from the outside?the CIA has experts on
everything from West African culture to
Filipino tribal myths and the effects of the
Humboldt Current on fisheries in the
Pacific?bo the basic recruitment is mainly
from colleges and universities. The decision
whether a recruit should be assigned to oper-
ations or analysis is usually made during an.
initial stage at the CIA's "basic training"
school on Glebe Road in Virginia. Recruitsi
selected for operations are assigned to a!
tough course at a special school known as
'The 7amne near tlearktown,
Preeneteng analyeas reeet be sent back to uni-
versiiiee for nostgraduate studies in various
,
Traditionally, the CIA has been run by
men from the clandestine services. The most
notable Cl: director with this background
was Alien Dulles, probably the best intelli-
gence cperatar the OSS had in Eurtme dur-
ing the war. Richard Helms ran the clandes-
tine services before rising to the director-
ship. William Colby served briefly as deputy
director for plans (the "dirty trick's" division)
after his return from Vietnam and before
being named Director iasr year. As CIA Di-
rector and Director of. Centrai intelligence,
Colby, a 54-year-old Self-effacing but tough
man, is backstopped by LieutenandGeneral
Vernon (Dick) Walter's, the Deputy Direc-
tor of intelligence. Walters, an extraordi-
nary linguist, spent much of his Army career
as a military or defense attache overseas, but
he is not considered an expert on either
analysis or clandestine operations. It was
Walters's lot, however, to be drawn into the
Watergate cover-up controversy when the
White I louse tried to get the Cr.\ to take the
blame for the "Plumbers" and pay their
salaries after they went to prison.
Schlesinger and Colby reorganized the
CIA structure to a Considerable extent. The
old Plans Department (DDP) was renamed
Directorate for Operations (DDO), absorb-
ing the scientific and technical divisions. It is
headed by William Nelson, a clandestine
services veteran from he Far East, who took.
Colby's former job. Colby, not being a pro-
fessional estimator, has kept on Richard
Lehmann, a highly respected official, as
Deputy Director for Current Intelligence
(DM). Lehmann works with George Carver
in the new National tmelligence Officers'
system. Major General Daniel 0. Graham,
brought from the Pentagon by Schlesinger,
is in charge of "overhead" intelligence, his
speciality. He works directly with Colby,
but he feels strongly that military intelli-
gence at the Pentagon should become more
sophisticated so that it would not lose influ-
ence to the civilian agencies.
CIA officials say that the new electronic
intelligence systems have cut down the
agency's clandestine work through agents.
After all, enormous resources are earmarked
for worldwide eavesdropping and celestial
reconnaissance. But, they hasten to add, the
CIA has not lost its capabilities in this field.
It retains its paramilitary organization.
Many agents arc involved in the new
government-wide operations against the
traffic in narcotics and against international
terrorists. The agency, in fact, seeks to pro-
ject an image of concentration in these areas.
More recently, the CIA was 'asked by the
new Federal -Energy Office to monitor the
movements of oil tankers throughout the
world to determine shipping patterns during
the -energy crisis. Deeply involved in the
corporate affairs of the oil industry, the CIA
is believed to be the only government agency
to have been able to compile a list of joint
ventures in the petroleum industry. This is a
top-seeret document beth frOm the view-
point of the CA and the nil industry.
eithere ts ne nuestien, (titian, that the CIA
remains deeply involved in covert political
action everywhere in the world. The latest
example of such activities concerned the
CIA. agent in northeastern Thailand who
faked a letter to the Bangkok government
8
.Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0.
from a guerrilla, leader proposing negotia-
tions. -Iles was a classical example of the
"disinformation" technique, intended to
embarrass the guerrilla leader with his fol-
lowers and thus weaken the subs ersive
movement. But the. new Thai government
took a dim view of the CIA's involvement in
domestic politics and a scandal developed,
especially because the American Ambas-
sador, Robert Kintner, has a CIA back-
ground himself. Intelligence specialists here
think, the lintel-writing agent exceeded his
authority?and did a sloppy job to boot-
and this episode already has resulted in the
recall of 13. I Iugh Tovar, the chivf of the big
Cl. station in Thailand, and has compli-
cated our diplomatic relations with the
Thais.
The Thailand incident also served fo
undersct,re the extent to which the CIA op-
erates abroad in conjunct ion with local se-
curity services. In exchange for intelligence
or whatever special las ors it desires from
local police or counterinsurgency forces
(often for reasons having malting to do With,
the interests of the host country), the CIA
may provide them with training or special
equipment. Thailand, where the United
States has vast interests and where there is a
local instil gene y problem, is a case in point.
But it also has been argued that this system
has resulted in iLdirect CIA stipF.tut for
police forces in rohtiCaily reyessive gov-
ernments front Latin America to Asia and
Africa. Last year, respk,--iding to Gin..;re,-
sional pressures, ti'.e CIA promised lc end its
secret programs Of actually training foreign
police forces.
r. made the point earlier that there are
i! no giants in the United States intelligence
community. This may be partly due to
Henry Kissinger's forceful personality?he
evershadows other figures in the intelligence
establishment. And the recent quick turn-
oyer in top intelligence jobs has lelf the
community in flux and u.ncertaintv, aggra-
vated by the Kissinger-imposed strictures on
hs modus operandi.
At the CIA, for example, William Colby
still is new in his job and judgments are being
reserved as to his efficiency and the value Of
his innovations. The main concern in the
CIA is that he assert his independence to-
ward the White House, particularly in the
area of estimates. Thus far his public image
has not been bad. Ile is available to testify
before Congressional committees much
more frequently than I lelms did?late last
year he appeared before two separate sub-
committees to discuss the CIA's involve-
ment (or, as he claims, non-involveme...1) in
the Chilean situation. lie has testified on
?Vatergate as often as he was called.
In the State Department, the new man in
charge of intelligence is William I lyland, a
former CIA official, a distinguished expert
on Soviet affairs, and a Kissinger protege.
He worked for Kissinger in the planning
section of the National Security Council
staff. But he has been .in his new post only
since last December.
The Defense Intelligence Agency, a
5,000-man operation; is headed by Vice
Admiral Vincent P..dePoi,-;, an austere man
who has held his joh since early 1973. The
National Security Agency has a new Direc-
tor in Air Force Lieutenant General Lewis
Alien who was brought to the C/A from the
DIA last year by Dr. Schlesinger, then ap-
pointed to head the NS:A.1Jc is another top
specialist in "overhead" intelligence. Both
dePoix and Allen are career military intelli-
gence officers with highly technical back-
grounds. They are Pole known outside the
professional intelligence community. Few
Washingtonians recognize Admiral &Nix
or General Allen on the rare occasions when
either comes to lunch downtown.
It is prOhahlV too cr1V to assess whether
Kissinger's domination of the American in-
ielligence operation is good for the country.
But there are thoughtful intelligence
specialists who have serious rei.ervations
about it. Exyerienced intelligence people see
a danger in the :Ana! role Kissinger is deter-
mined to play: He [nay be tempted to inter- ?
prct intelligehee data to tit his policy con-
cepts. They think he did so last year when he
apparently ignored CIA and IN R Warnings
that the Egyptians and the Syrians were ac-
tively planning an attack on Israel because of
his conviction that the So% ieti wimid not
abet an operation that would entlan:?,,T the
dkenze they had worked out with hint.,
This, CIA people think, was a classic exam-
ple of how a statesman can become the intel-
lectual prisoner of his outu ideas,
Finally, there is the notion that to be Use-
ful, intelligence must be totally detached
from the policy-making process. This con-
cept of intelligence independence was a cor-
nerstone .of the legislation that created the
CIA in 1947. Yet Kissinger seems deter-
mined to weld together the functions of intel-
ligence and policy formulation, perhaps dis-
regarding the profound difference between
capabilities and intent of hostile parties. to
WASHINGTON POST
18 March 1974
ir CI
differentiate between them is, after all, the
principal function of sophisticated intelli-
gence. Kissinger's technique, possibly a
plausible one under the existing system of
government in Washington, is simply to
throw specific hard questions at the intelli-
gence people, receive the answers, and then
make his own judgments.
The question, therefore, is whether;
American intelligence is more effective than
before--in die most professional sense of the
word. Allowing for the fact that it may still
be premature to render hard judgments?
the intelligence community, after all, is in i
flux?there seems to be growing evidence ?
that the present period is bound tube transi-
tional because it does not satisfy the emerg-
ing policy needs.
The intelligence community itself feels
shackled by the ?Vhite I louse in the intellec-
tual dimension of its work. Being a bureauc-
racy, it cannot function as efficiently as it
should when it believes (rightly or wrongly)
that fundamental concepts of the use of intel-
ligence are being violated at the to of the
Administration. This is something that
Henry' Kissinger, whatever hat he may be
wearing, is bound to discover sooner or later.
-Ellis is not to say', of course, that every
bureaucracy should not be shaken up period-
ically. The perpetuation of old habits leads
to sloppiness and opposition to new ideas.
Quite possibly, the real change will come
when the new generation of intelligence
specialists replaces the "old spies" who still
think in terms .of 1Vorld War II, the OSS,
and the Cold War. Be that as it may, enor-
mous care must be exercised to prevent the
intelligence product from being misused
politically, as often appears to be the case at
this juncture, to satisfy grandiose policy.!
concepts politically useful to the White
House or the new -State Department under
Kissinger. The tendency still is too strong to
shoot the bearer of ill tidings?carefully con-
structed policies are not challenged by cold
r;vidence. Soviet cheating on the di:tente, a
sacred Nixon achievement, must not be.ig-
nored te prevent the daente from collaps-
ing, Thic?is the principal example. There
may be others. The object, then, is to make
professional intelligence a respected servant of
policy. And a final word: '1he surest way to
demoralize the intelligence corinnunity is to
try to involve it, as the Nixon Administra-
tion tried to do, in such nefarious doings as
Watergate and its cover-ups. 0
r"."T d)Ci'-' ?
Z11
43
Anent the currant lw?itbiting
among the Executive and the CIA and
the Defense Establishment about inter-
necine spying, the following excerpt
from Margaret Truman's book about
her dad, page 332, iG both human and
enlightening;
"Dad was even able to joke about se-
rious things. One of his proudest ac-
complishments as President was the
creation of the Central Intelligence
Agency. Before it 't7as Cstabliched, in-
telligence was gathered by a half
dozen agencies, and very little of it
reached the President. One day he
sent the following memorandum to Ad-
miral Leahy and 7.ief.r Admiral Sidney
W. Souers, the ?Ir. CIA chief:
'To My Brethren and Fellow Dog-
house r Arens: By virtue of the au-
thority :tc-I in me as Top Dog I re-
quire ce. chn-ge that Front Admiral
William D. Leahy and Rear Admiral
Sidney W. Souers, receive and accept
the vestments and appurtenances of
their respective positions, namely as
personal snooper end as director of
centralized snooping. ... I charge that
each of you not only seek to better our
foreign relations through more inten-
sive snooping hut also keep ma in-
formed constantly of the movements
and actions of the other, for without
such coordination there can be no or-
der and no aura of mutual trust.'
H.S.T."
NORMAN 0. TIESTENS,
.yae,;.,. United Gtz.tc.3 Tint Court.
WafiilLgten.
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-IpP77-00432R000100320002-0
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE Ele11:1-OR
19 March 1974
/-
" , /,' \ ' ' ' ' ' , -r-?'1
Tens.:Ce.7--'"elteselneriond
Staff correspondent cf
The ati:i3tial Science Monitor ?
7SE:7-g leo I's, 7e nil n'.1161
Few essiane have much that is ",,'"C3C:
to say about the U.S. Central in-
telligenceAgisny.
The e.entes :inspected of all sorts of
nefar:ous schemes, and the schemes
are not always believed to be directed
against cur:sr/n:11113N.
ai-iersceny had its, troubles
etrn a 'dozens letter sent 13y a CIA
ageat to the Thai Fresno Minister. The
agent's action was. considered by
me.riy Thais, to be an essample of
'clatant interference in Thailand's
internal affairs.
But one of Thailand's highest offi-
cials caps thhat despite tin: intedent
? teli.lch the United States febsists was
uneentherinc-cl ? tee CIA is rieeded in
WASHINGTON POST
15 Mar ch 1g 74
Thailand and is of help to the Inesn
Governeeenie
l'ejcesftes'e
"The T.:Tilted Stones Teas facen7e.es to
ehtsin intelligence which nee den't
have," said Deteety Tsintisten:
Sultich Xinoreseel.e.ernin in en enter-
view with this eepo:eter,
"esncl ?Linie is some intel'igence.
[01-nail-ed., by the CL 1 I which Ls' useful
? to us," he ss26.
"This is sceeciaely tile when it
ecesses tc wese s happening in Ls es,
Cambodia, one,. Vietnam." the Then;
official cad.
"Sornetimes e.e.ople otrerstep their
intellignesee-gathentsg role," he said,
refee.rf rig to tile Poses lette
"Fent it is 'elks ehee tongue read the
teeth. Sometime:: the teeth lite, the
tongue . but it is rot inte.ntionai."
0 .
I
The March Fyne .and Novak col-
umn, "VW:es of Asniskica Speechless
on t.C.,eng .e.seninelaltn" is a gross
distortion aZ .che recore7. of VOA's
covenage of T.,1:e. Leezhenitsyn, his
buok, and th is dciii moyement in
the Soviet Usien.
VOA ha: covered :Misr and factu-
ally the de.velepine, a!;-.' Mr. Solehen-
itsyn and the peblic;tion ef "Gulag
Archipelago," es it ',tar, cove-see: other
aspects of the r'.,!..sif.a?qt nosveetent.
Since the boo'n tee.: istenised on De-
cember e7;, .nee sene Wee. Solzhen-
i4:synie in. 'e Peen reposted al-
roost l.seerly in Insesian laneu-
age neweesets, and :nese: tlian l8f.." re-
ports and features on fins Eub;; zet. have
been Lroadeast, in othee nolitinai pro-
granuning ? 337 times, coenting re.-
pests through March G. These figures
do not include net: items.
Seeking to refleze a balanced pro-
jection .of American and world seen-
tion to events in the Soviet Union,
VOA has given substantial coverage
to the views of responsible American
and other Western observers, includ-
ing comments by the President, the
Secretary of State, and members of
Congress and to editorials Ls 711700r
U.S. newspapers and stetcments by
pnblic figures elsewhere in the world.
In these broadcast:; there have been
accounts of "Gulag Archipelago" as
it has been described by reviewers in
Ueited States and other countries.
titles of some of these progranes
give an indication of their content:
"Sol.zheniteya Denounces Lies of So-
viet Sy:sten," "Solzhenitsyn Biogra-
phy,' "Nets 'York Times on -Solzhenit-
syn," "Solzhenitsyn on. Soviet Law,'
"Erpidsicn of Snlzhenitsyn. -eeseld
Press," "Geleg 3cPr.; the
and so forth.
VCA': thorongh eznoztine e.n.e.-
hessitsse.. arid "'.-2:r.7.3:.; esreineelene''
has been criticized on a core:inning
basis by Soviet officials.
LISLte's approach is enactIy Ves;
sane new :se it was bcfeee the Seviat
1-.Treen ceased :sem:nil-1g he Sept
'tvialcut ou-z
out exolsnation. Ileading iscre nneoee
as the authors of the articls. uotoi.
wculd be far net:ides the nosmalentseen
of Voice of Aeterica nrogremming.
Since 13U, ihc lick: ne.ennesieee
operated under a set 3Y. Verne enes7e.:,,e
principles. VOA': goal is to asses. ee
"a consistently reliable- and at.'eler.,;ea-
tive ecteece of news," tc neeeese S'ee
balanced and nompreherisive pro:ince:
lion of signiflcent Aneerican theuee.:::
and institutions," and "es an eife-e.
radio, VO,n will preseeit the pretielet
of the, United States clearly anel.
,
fcctively." ,
Henze, the comment: se. 'fienises:
Evans and leovalL that it le "shiseeeen'tt
. . that 79A is being styli:cited :eters
no-holds-barred rif.:713 pOlkj
the U.S,"
:Landing of the ne.renteaj af th!:.1 ? Nir,0:-
oi
On the other hand, ::?eedio :ref:?iceen
consistent with its oven. stein ?iced: if
broadcasting the tent of ehs
the pe.aple of the Soviet 7eniennetaClele
Liberty, while also fundee ilss
government, dee: noir sers,e fein,
official voices,
,? -,--1077:A lit\..Y
?
?
, (pdallo adOT222
1-2 ? 0
Washington.
^ ;
- - '
77seesieennee....t ecnnees in iSarigkok
en:ed. ''Ceet Cese?.:: ens's: -17.7i.i2 rCeMtly
abese e5e, 07e reente see:es:id:ago in
? s.'iss.e{:. an: been
"serns est...an-len" tetest rili:073 3r.
eeducetee seesteenti.y :elates
meetly tG elethockt
..,21 Lr :a. CTLP.,
? F'!";,_";!-4.017.e.C7, ines'elan.e. Inners 'esseen,
nnee stesne et the s sentc eels: need ';e:
stipply teecnn ferfeenan C.0:7
? 1/3y El T....aOtf07.A1 Ceeveennseee,
Tee reduct1071 :10,E1 V277.
r.fio,e7eig down of instaletaeions at a
nue-re:el-at unereereeicd etes.ses in Thai-
lass , Inca:cc:Leg eo oemee source:.
On: c.1C.C2 so E.:foe-nee was 17.7tieVe61
to or Sckol Naltorn inenetnesestein
The third, eritenz the CIA antieo-, oiIiie:atnone "zs'et.t letteeneses
nehe iet':er; eeeensting to be irons
the Ceneseenesteled gent Move-
ment, proposed te tree '.'-2-2;22. Govern-
ment that it negotie.es with the in.sur-
gents. The fa."sa letter was aperarently
meant either to encourage reelections
front the ineu.rgent nanits or to im-
press Thai officials with the sericu.s-
no es in the illS0..gert ltreat.
Beet in either case; when its origin:
weee sesefeed by s Thai press:the
leLi.nes succeeded :Deny lx esevoising
,Cseeteetsegr' th
ren_e fe.:ires letter was 'Leaned to its
nenden because e, eenee'. assistant to ?
the Cie., agent ..;stiese,:enie.7 cent. the
leteze 'ee; registeree mate thus reveal-
ing the agar:::::-
The egonc, Wil0Ee name was never
disc:need, was cesfeneed to leave Thai-
land by U.S. Ambassador William
Kinteee almost ienmedistely ef'...er the
irich'entu'c:
-a for 21:117.11Z:1" later declared
that the eznfiesse ef the letter had not
been atienniatted by the U.S. :embassy
sin Cia-. aCtiCee woutd, be taken
against the ZIA agent. He assured
Thei ofeicials that there would never
he 2. cul-fance of an Incifent
The incident triggered 2. protest
dersionststs'flo:i. by several thousand
sendeerte Lx C eat es?. ells U.S.
.2 en esteGy hi ZEJ.).:/_Ya.71,37-;,.
?...`ejen
tst
77%-'
aeutus ?
ZURICH, isiases. ti. ? The
iesternationsi ?rose .enstitute.
today described as "appalling"
a aces re-port ihet more than
aurnaiists 77 ore :se tie'
esyrcli of the Centrze.,
2F Agency..
'.1eLsectoi- Ern.st
Lie report, published in the
72'ashington Star-News, 5r:di-
estect that sonic journa:Ists
ssould betray their professica
ees servins as the ears and
en2e
cc
L
. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002:0
'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0
BALTWORE Sljn
MAR 1974
14,0
T-1 ?
_Yi:1 s'F :1'1- Or
,!,...?/.11
,L .PC1.11
4-1 .1&?
?.? nefled Press Internal.fur,n1
'
Thr, Central Intelligence!
Agency fired convicted water-
gate Burglar Bernard L.
Barker in the mid-1960s be-
cause he was involved with
"gambling and criminal Cie.!
merits," according to former
CIA director Richard Helms.
. Barker is the man - ?vho
worked for E. Howard Hunt '
Jr. during the Bay of Pigs in-
vsaion of Cuba.. In the spring,
of 1971 he recruited, at Hunt's ?
request, the burglary team :
that brolee into the Los Ange-
les office of Daniel Ellsberg's.
psychiatrist and subsequently;
was caught in the 1972 Water-
gate break-in.
' Barker and five others were
indicted Thursday for alleg-
edly conspiring to violate the
civil rights of Dr. Lewis Field-
ing, Ellshe.rg's psychiatrist, fie
has served a year in ail after
pleading guilty in the June,
1972, break-in of Democratic
National Cominittite headquar-
ters at the Watergate compiex.
Helms' testimony, given to.
the Senate Foreign Relations.
Committee behind closed
doors on Feb. 7, 1970, was
made public yesterday. The
hearings were held on the.
nomination of Helms to be
Ambassador to Iran. ?
Barker's attorney, Daniel F.
Schultz, promptly denied
II elms' description of why
Barker was terminated by the
CIA.
? ' "Mr. Helms' testimony is in-.
consistent with official infor-
mation we have' received from
the CIA. It is categorkfally de-
nied by Mr. Barker and is sim-
ply not true.." Schultz said..
Helms' statement on Batter
appeared to conflict with
-Barker's account of his rela-
tions with the CIA given in
sworn testimony before the
Senate Watergate committee
May 24. 1973, 3':2 months after
Ilelms testified at the Foreign
Relations Committee.
Helms told the commit;
about Barker:
-During the Bay of Pigs he
was one of the Cuban deri,..a-
tiN es who was involved in that
opc.i ation and it is my recol-
lection that all lines with him
on the part of the agency were
eliminated some time in the
middle 'ties.
Barker, testifying to the
Watergate committee, said lit'
left the CIA immediately after
the end of the Bay of Pigs op-
eration in April. 1961: and had
no further connection with it
until Hunt approached him 10
years later. to set up the bur-
glary team.
CIA spokesnn,n said it
would be ':difficult" to find
out exactly when Barker left
the agency or the circum-
stances.
Helm5 Tells of fi::ing
Top U.S. 3tis? hi7ssotettl
en
Richard Helms, former di-
rector of the. Central
genee Agency, has told sena-
tors he had a policy of going
right to the tpp of Ai-aerie-1n
business firing in trying to e et
their cooperai.ion in gathering!
intelligence o-,erseas.
Helms now is ambassador to
Iran. During ' a ? closed-door
hearing on his ambassadorial
nomination, before the Senate
Foreign Relations Commitee
in February. .1973, lIcilros?said
the CIA aid not press busi-
nessmen or others to pass on
potentially useful information
they may have obtained while
visiting the Soviet Union or
other countries.
"There is no payment of
money. There is no 'effort to
twist anyone's arm. We simply
are giving them an opportu-
nity at. patriotic Americans to
say %chat they know about
this."
Answering, questions about
contacts with American busi-
ness firms abroad under CIA:s
Domestic Contact Service, he
said: "It has been my own
feeling that one should start
with the chief executive offi-
cer normally because it is not
fair to these companies to met,
up a relationship with some-;
body down the lino that the
chief executive officer does'
not know about or a', least has.
not indicated that this other.
man is your point of contact."
? An estimated 290 persons
are operating as int?Iligence
agents under the...tuise of busi-
? nessmen, according to recent
:American press reports quot-
ing an unnamed American of,
ficial who apparently is famil-,
liar with the inner workings of
;the CIA.
BALTIMORE SUN
19 March 1974
PT ?A ? ?
2a0-13
CII 11..RA ertheizect
-
n77,31 ensecrets
Washington tili?Goveinment
attorneys argued yelterday
that the authors of a book
critical of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency have ariced a
strained, inoperative" con-
cept of how national f..Z.'2fetS
are classified.
? They made the contention in
final arguments on the case of
"The CIA: The Cult of Intelli-
gence." after which Judge Al-
bert V. Bryan, Jr., in United
States District Court in nearby-'
Alexandria, Va., took it under
advisement.. He. did not indi-
cate when he will rule. ,
Attorneys for the authors,
Victor L. Marchetti and Seen
D. Marks*, argued that 'I:7e Jus-
tice Department had ?Feilc.,d to
prove that mates -i \el:lick the
CIA has ordered deleted from
the manuscript was actually
classified secret.
Floyd Abrams, representing
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., the pub-
lisher, said that at the trial
"we needed the man who clas-
sified it, or some documentary
evidence that it was classi-
fied" to jestify its deletion. ;
1..112 4lepety assistant attor-
ney general, Ire-in Gcldbloom,
replied tha':, Me. Abranis had
adopted "a strained, inopera-
tive coecept" of how the clas-
sification procedure works. It
is ret ressi'ele, Me. Goldbloom I
said, in feed questions into al
computer and get hack data on
who eless;Iicd re-:ter-Jai, or
hen.
At the 21.2-clay trial, :nest of
it behind closed doors, four
CIA deedty directors testified
taf the deletions ordered
tahen fm the manuscript.
preece-.,y labeled secret,
and remain classified.
He said L':cir testimony,
based on review of the menu-
sc, ipt last - September,
amounted to an updating of the
classification. That is, he said,
their testimony was that the
material ?hould still be
stamped secret or top secret.
Melvin L. Wulf of the Ameri-
can.- Civil ? Liberties Union,
which -is representing the au-
thors, said the case has impor-
tant First Amendment implica-
tions, pesing the queStion,
"Are .the people going to be
informed about-an important
agency which lie said operates
both overseas and dorriesti..
cally? -
"The American people have
been deprived, I think by de-
sign, of a greet deal- of infor-
mation about the CIA ... of
activities around the globe un-
dertaken in their nadie," he
said.
Mr. Wulf said it is Mr. Mar-
chetti's stated purpose "to re-
form the agency and not blow
it out of the water."
Mr. Marchetti, a. former CIA
employee for 14 years, was
enjoined by Judge Bryan 23
months ago from publishing
any CIA secrets, without sub-
Miffing the manuscript to the
agency for review. Mr. Marks,
a former State Department
employee, has agreed to be.
bound by the same terms.
Knopf plans to publish the
book within a few months
?with blank spaces for the 162
deletions unless the CIA posi-
tion is overturned by the
courts. The deletions range
from single words to entire
pages of the manuscript.
C.; CC V.:
V.,',1111.-gton 0. C., Sureav, March 17. 1974
rr, , .
L-31: ETYdr About
7,Fad r3aelcer
Assecistal Press
The Central Intelligence
Agency today said a had
apologized on behalf of its
former director, Richard
Helms, fOr his testimony
stating that Watergate fig-
ure Bernard Barker was
fired because of involve-
ment in gambling and ether
criminal associationk-, -.?
CIA officials said Barker,
onvicted, for-. the ? 1972.
break-in of the Democratic
National Committee head-
quarters, had actually left
the agency in good stand-
ing.
Helms, currently U.S.
ambassador to Iran, told
the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee on Feb. 7
that Barker had been dis-
missed in the middle 1959's
when "we found out he was
involved in certain gam-
bling and criminal ele-
ments."
The testimony was not
released until last Monday.
After its publication,
Barker complained to the
CIA. Agency officials said a
check of the records showed
lhat Helms was in error and
after being informed of this
the ambassador asked that
Barker be extended an apol-
ogy.
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-F4P77-00432R000100320002-0
Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0
THE
16 MariLl'..
FOR, ST".:K
James, an aeros a c
engineer. ageti; 3.3.
twilight v..erl,-.;
gical spying. He
informant 017; t,:c-e?;;
technology as v.ell Ls Lit
and Whitney it-httrcf:t
propuian
who tra.,,ci!...?a
scientific ,:rinferences fn
places as Atli,..?ns,
Belgiade, Venice, 7.7,1
There Jsmes
with St;ciet
then covertly r...ner-ttc hi:
CIA cantat:t hat he
learned. His v
letters a conmendatiun tacit
the air forc?s, thmn his
employers, an," tiroto ..he CIA
as well.
.iart3es rm..: Ias ec..-i-i;!
from the coiti, at tha mice
both his job and his dna? :ffile
as a CIA tri.i.rrmart.
has given Cr,rigressrtn,
force invastirrata.rs, the .F3J.,
and CIA an-d
story of cloal.:--:a
harrassment b7 an a.f-isn.r.
military intelligence ;:gcncy
? the air fe?-r;e's cC77? t
shnology City;turi.
ATter
James affatr, repel-tea;
29-page sworn sfiltzine;)t pe.!S
exhibits to ths at
lions, Senator
called on Wednt:stlay
for the abolition t.-1 the
;foreign ttichn;oler,y,
The agede:i's misiion is to
,stihrie intelligence an
partiedlarly
.2,rt?f,taronnan. Felt
trietIy
Li: ftiaCt! aP.:11nia
ii' as aaart 1.1a. its `.?1%
.:r-
Thre base in
the
' Tniy
etnoiti;ors of :;:rns
arter into conlracis
fi-rts in orc."-:-,1to
anif ;teelthi 7O:
,tta?h ?ihay
intelligence aperatif.-hn cii
pro-
Yid? rnio,ce et ;pain:fly."
e is iy.tc;
irs th2
CiJ a'.r.tivatc cor7.irnrs
ci-rt;ad. Torre have he. ;.
es's reocd-ts, LI
b?tte'l high ornd,ils, inat
the Cf.d. utts smnt?
abi;ci..td operati,-g ar 2ot
nit: c cart.
er
?
indostric.; "
not t.,a put into a of
i'ercen complia.nee v
arnasts from ?
faii0,11,icence uci't 'au
1C.:;S j? rrac
husincES."
TIT alsti eite
o7". "inteitigence
- c':'lnL case to :'.oft.nce con-
trctor3 *which proriclesan
unfair gempetitive a,.1-.?aninge
to 'he :?ooperalitte company."
Seerett?rv
11. iai1e:i;sear tolc",
duiing a lhating'nst
that he world innl- imp the
L7:1T)CkI TIMES
5 ch 1974
From Fred Emery
Washington, March 5
With the return of a Lahour
government, the Central Intelli.
pence A?zency will be witlichirT
Se,?irl missile testin2,, the
Chinese anti-confuzius cam-
paign, and ei...?cr the Middle
East. It may also be interested
in Britain and other West Euro-
pean but as low priori-
ties, and in the normal course
of lioiness. rhey arc not :it&
?garde& as -banana republics.
Tbis is imitited here with
quiet force by and nor-
mally inaccessii:,ie sources.
They admit that they could he
expected to say little else;
that the CIA is unfortunate
above all intelligence seri-ices
in being expected to read Ltir
people's mail and then talk
about it.
None-the-less these sources.
with a slight ft own. deride The
Times for first carrying und
then failing to 'follow up its
January IS story that ao to Jr.)
extra CIA men had been
drafted to Britain To watch o'er
Indust! hal uprest. They arc not
amused that Ore Am.,rican Lon.
pai?I
;the
air 7t-zte
to his
further,
,ne othc?.? 71f:',17e;
hoc]
to i'ne
c._
IUT;tst.. OtiS
liar I;T--;.
s_ticc. CZ;
v,-.1.?.n.y p:a ?
Slit 1?J,..,?:4,.15u 5::
P.7.77%t arift
,a II ;C. 'or; c?-7.
CT! to 71_10111.'a71. 110
5iLC L77. ' ? L 17:70'7.,
..-7 -'71C 717
?1-,7ji* ,-71:7111c
Y;;;I:r.. iiD,_ihint?-?
mac it,
it tiler
3 ? ? tic i?,?',:es
t:
zinc; d'
!1,13
. ,d t an. ? ;
nyr,
; .
?.'h ? s;n:Ls.
Jr1 175 1..-a=
10'S 7;t.:??th-Lr
aim ...r:,- .10011 :.ere
tiaa'aiit
t_
7_ ? : 17112S rt'1%tk71::..
111-n,-2:c 01;-1%; 1.7
. ?.
hussy dental has ?.akan isisrt
ettilidrination of the ornal
story.
While unwilling to 2E1 on to
thc record, they dismiss such
reportin:.; as "siily" but -,vr;,?ly
accept iz as part of :he CIA
inirden. hit Richard Helms,
former CIAdirct.tor, had a
cartoon tin his r.:Fict atlt of it
t-oit.ittio erupting rith te cap-
'on "The CI.% did ir ".
Iwo specific points arc rotitle
in rebutting The Times story.
Firstly. President Nixon is
mere interested in averting
nuclear n.ar than in heariii:
latest details of insinst-r:r1
unrest n coif ry---:C
alone Britain. 5..ccondiy, fur
asscr:s;ng the sitrAtion
Britain the CIA has its cat;, a:
hid: at headquatets in Larietc,
Virginia?in I31 diffca-'ia
academic specialities, it is
v.rondly. The CI simuly does
not rkteil ao -eine hi at or 47.; of
its p,ople to co,ifirm ,?:hat it
oun already get from iiritish
smirees.
It is adnintc.i. lOOVO. .:i131
r.ritoin is ;7- ,
place, for -sen7._reriecs
;IV if.nterna-
.i.-_:,," ...a. ? ?
.e.olz
int it 74;1' :11" ciing
`?.C1
C: )7k:1 a;iti?its. -1.?.rres
,77':1* so.::olt
t.r s 1'f F C.11. Ta?I'C'era-
;. t .'71
....lit_ The
7.;t:
'
corn-
? .? ala
7 stir-
r.1:;re
o.116. nIt
,0 7c to the
hook.
'.r.eit to the
I.
the
? director
,osep,h
,?finf amct that
? _. 7t7photo-
-.":" ore-
. ; 'But
.-itcriiev,'s con-
, chuot z"iri: not
'flu'b act of
,
is ida
???-? ?
? been
i3- 7co, "or his
e was
c,
. corn-
:1:0 o ;iLl t.. CO to lie
;1;71
fo: ,-?nierican
liased round
hergf ore 0-12 inference is rhat
TI;c: Times sourer.' jumbled all
t:tese vi.i-iters. into ail; ,i2Li-kisi
io
.Anw.11,?-? CIA 1731.i.
in LuncIciii. it was
not 7i1-- ) `iv
uiIS
i ii
;,111 C7-.C.70.7.17,C Of
inform,T,tion ittid always 1,e,ri
ntrtintaii-?:d.
said, in an
t-inierency "Linif.;:d. ?
75C7'e seen as
ihrn some chi-act ,
a Ii r.?-? 'oc undertaken.
"int cu. penetration ;
h: ?-..on..ct_11:::6 from a ;
"?thi,-d t_1111.1--v". he itlisted,
air-ova the way it Ivas
doito ..-ilsewh.t.re. but 'lie Itnevc of
oczao.1 it had a been
ir. Pu To.
r-t r-tile-',.??ed talk
teocn? aiccUe' "-'as then
he a riti'.itirdi s.,uni. by the
n-ics. and the Ct.',
slti..?.v .-1.1V 1,7;77 ..2.ined 10.
3.7
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0.
.77,r?
rT6`13
:--
Sen. Howard H. Plzer Jr. (11-
Tcari.), the Senilte
matinee %dol, ;Ina :n iin
behind the icenes atoint-
tled .:-White :7 aide
Cherie:, Col7o1.7. jc?Lt ef-
fort to .2lir!ate the Centeal.ln-
telli!-:?,:- ?: A.:,?gc:muy i7
C! ?
CAron exercLatii
hie fidi AmetiLline- rights at
the Ceaato 11-?&-zinz:-: :L2 has col-
abm?ated cyi etly tBaker's
top et,.en!inia..e L.-le, Fred
Thq,:?on, in t'f erate at-
pt ha 1.7ater-
3,h.e bheto th?-?C..
f..".?olsftn 17.a -i in touch
with the
CIA anq,le. ?.r.tE 26
picion Vliet the 2.:
alaneuver may 13::"..
House ploy to dive: ? at-
teon from L.
onre c! ti :Le': hotly
served.
THE WASHINGTON POST Tuesday. March 19, 1974
('.(1Qe.etf
deny that I Ainea.A.,:aticen
is. ;? diA?oraier,ary action. They
Lay he is hard at t.voi;.: cc de-
tailir.d report, which y
'All he a "hustbshell."
IT.i.om hints .va Lavr. gottcyl (*:
,s,if.n6C*3inr,..!:e:1;
I:; (1 7:iir cic.N;erip-
inn o; ,.!.oat
;7oi r L. dallieti
?viI.:1 the ih ttho CIA really
Vit;thenert the celebrated
breLloin at Derrkocratic head-
4u:r1.er.3 for ic"?-?-?:,Tr er7.! ^,e.?
'qurity' ree:.:ot;?; 7mZi C::?T=.; pulled
strings to hush it up. But ha !taLt
never seemed to be able to get
hia theory to jell.
What lin tlly persuaded him
+vc.s our sources say,
"as t' acir-:ytCAoa
.1.4a. 9 th;tt tarep: of CIA can ,or-
sations v.'ere destroyed durl'all,
the 7Tater5ate.
Leader
Me hcfield (D-Mont.) hes apecifi-
ally requested that they be pre-
r
? At Da::er-'s in;tiseten,. fer-;
me:: CIA chief Herns,
now ambassador to Iran, was;
hauled befs:0 the coramittne a
week ago under the most secret)
conditions.
In addition to Bakerand
Thompson, the session was also
attended b;:., Chai:-.:.'an Sam Jf.j
Ervin Jr. (D-N.C.), cousel Sam!
Dash and a few trusted aides.i
ALo present, surprhingly, waa
Sen. Stuart Symingt.cn (D,77.e.)t
who heads the Senatc.'s
hush CIA oversight subcommit-
tee. ?
For four hours, the chain-1
:cinching Helms was t:xilled
:al.,;-)ut the CIA's put in the
:W,itergate events. We ilrwo
lesencri that the carrot %rm.
scrirts sho-.v that EtPael.; que];:-
lions ,acre aimed at tmenvering
a hidden CIA involvement.
: Baker seemed convinced, for
'example, that Helms personally
:ordered the tapes deetoyed.
Oor .-.,c.nras say that
1,1:CCM:GAN STAT 2 NEW; (EAST LANSING, MICHIGAN)
117B 1971:
. _
" 11 ?
'
By AM dGSTRA
State New Staff Writer
Tt.venty to 30 people questioned,
heckled and laughed at a Centra
Intelligence Agency branch chief on
campus Tuesday.
Lhilip A. True, held of the East Asia
Drench of the CIA Office of Basic and
Geographic Intelligeme, was invited by
the MSU Geography Dept. Colloquium
Committee to speak o: applied geographic
research in the CIA.
The protesters, representing the Young
Socialist Alliance and the Southern
African Liberation Conmittee, packed the
back of a small roam in the Natural
Science Building and spilled into the hall.
Approximately 25 other people attending
seemed to be nonprotsters.
Before True was L-troduced, Barbara
Riemer, asst. profemr of psychology,
stated the protesters' position that the
CIA has no right to speak at MSU because
of its active supprcssion of democratic
freedoms.
An older geography major who could
not get into the roon said: "It's unfair,
that these protesters ;_liould create a stir
and take seats away fr:m those who want
to hear. They should make their point at
the beginning and then leave."
A single page statenent handed out by
the protesters at the dmr, claimed:
?The CIA is atterrpting to suppress
publication of the book "Politics of
Heroin in Southeast Asia" by Alfred
McCoy, which Eocuments CIA
11( 2 I 17 1 rit7"
f (--))
participation in heroin traffic.
OThe CIA?is in court to stop a former
agent from publh,hing his memoirs.
(-The MSU Vietnam Project from 1955
to 1961 was used as a front for the CIA,
violating the Geneva convention.
The handout also claimed that the CIA
"subverts the basic human rights of life
and liberty and democratic self -
determination," citing "well documented
involvement" in Cambodia, Laos, Chile,
Brazil, Guatemala, Iran and Greece. True
remained calm, ignoring heckling and
giggling throughout his 25 - .minute
description of what CIA geographers and
cartographers do.
When True finished, Bill Buckler,
Geography Dept. graduate assistant, said:
"On behalf of those here, I thank you for
your talk and apologize for the
disruptions." .
? Asked about geographical research
behind the bombing of the Red River
dikes in North Vietnam, True said no
information on that had been requested
from his department as far as he knew.
After failing to respond to several long,
complex questions from protesters, True
was asked if he was under orders not to
answer. ??
"If I don't know, I can't answer," True
said. "The questions seemed more like
statements to me."
At the end, True thanked the group for
an interesting and stimulating hour, and
raid he would be willing to come back to
MSU anytime. Several persons shouted,
"Please don't!"
Approved For Release
":;ier't3 !U)5-
. a. did not ihcemirt.te
the CIA
Once the houring It-aa' Over,
Pp7;7r a71t1 Tiomp5an ?vent to
wor1/4on tlie revert. It probat.:7y
will be ubmitted to Symi7 -;-
trn's Subeenr 1.k.ittce for Seear:.1y
if,teview.
jlakor,
c:eted t ilentand tlnit all CIA
d.cetiments In the Watergate
case be declasAfirl He lass
claimed privately that tha...1 Da-
rns will bolster his case. Oth-
rs who have had access to the
documents insist they may raise
more questions than they an-
swer.
Footnote: Baker cruld net be
reached. Colsin, Thompson and!
Dash refused te provide any de-
tails about the CIA invest17,a-
tion. Thompson, however, acid:
"Hopefully, the entire pic..7)..re
will be made public. At that
time, people can make teir
own judgments."
YEN YORK TIMES
10 ,March .197/4
LY r..bkSe
1\1 11 ainy
Fr f Or; ff r? ?
r\AA \,? Cdri
The American businessman active
in trade and investment matters in
such politically sensitive listening
posts as Hong Kong and Vienna may
be?"Shhh!"?an American spy.
That's not. exactly news to, the na-
tives, ? who have developed a sharp
. eye for the American?or, for that
matter, English, Russian or any other
?espionage agent, but it's unusual for
the spy industry's home office to let
out statistics on this aspect of its
work; as an unnamed official in Wash-
ington did recently.
Unbending with New York Times
reporter David Binder and requesting,
naturally, that his name not be used
and his department not be identified,
the official dropped these tidbits:
There are more than 200 American
Intelligence agents stationed abroad
posing as businessmen. Some are full-
time operatives, and the business con-
cerns that proviod their "cover" re- '
ceive payments from the United States
Government to help defray business
overhead. Others are part-timers.
Some are "a pain in the neck": They
spend. "10 minutes a day" on intelli-
gence and the rest of the time making
money. But some, both part-time and
2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77a10432R136078'8320002clErd very valuable.
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0
NEW YORK
11 March 1974
iCt
27i,y
When La.A.ritans
ping calls through ;LA.--
markets: rot an et -them are
aware that they are naw C.;i71-
patIng fcv .ittlell of the fent,.
ti,ey bry v./1th pacple in ,M,T)::?:,
Western the !Loviet Uv
ion., China a.r,f, most e.7. the- xes':
of the 71:11; they are.
LgricultlIa ar.f.
ez.l.";erts
over
a major rn a?r.e.
sharp, inc.:e.aze4.;
in recent yearn 'raj:, 'Ise.21 The,
s::..dde.;a and vas'.. 2;1
agficulturai axpoat..; 'Lanza tie!
United States.
In the fiscal yea' anrIrij
June 30, 1972, the totni value of I
American agriculture:. Emportsi
was 59-billion. :or ilia year end-
ing 'thin June 50, the 3ororn-4.
ment is es'iln.ating total.
cu/tural saloa; anrcr.:'; ;',;20-1
billion, 2% theta
"We had a heilish
crease ir quantity:, of!
it was in prica,? k. rn.raj
0. Stepharin, deput,".
sales manager' in the Depart-1
rnent of Agricritura'a.
agriculture service.-`1?.?,:f....yhe 501
per cent of this vraEi
;Sr!!in
That 'n'hen!
a lot of ec.ie are
the existing 1cductn. a S'
ternational :set.
Discussions acres,:
t.tipresetit?tf7a..a.
;foe':mdv
s.ensu,s .C1E.`k:
Z.-'5179E.IV:C-11
tural trade. Is :act
Most Liner:I.:a:in
v?,Ith the
350 millioa
tha late cuma-,ez cf.' 1272.
marked the.
end of tha
JnLte Si' tat.
C,allily-SIZi.;
t;?,-
;
,
Cr.f,
in
',-?yer-.1-ncreasiug. 'Cr"
sc;Ti.).-;:oa'tiO allipeacc
Soucta.','
YC e,: jEa5:1 ',3utz .sna:
ire:aping fare convin,:c-;; :that '',"1-1e
.inoa: a", 'lel,-re. IL L'
_
!can
,. leases a
=_ Cr CTIMS
ships,,
,ac;:s., and
nec.. ,and. fish-
.. :773
r_nc; c,s n. '33
. :and r.
dn serva
111.1i1C
Lcund Lcrri1e.' 'Jan
? 11.11]Oil,
.ri_UCErTIS,"
_ "r in conri-_,.i:ny
0. CA
t
to get gran/ f.on
as to deicit
7 '..:11C21.:
; , ? ? -?
!,,72.St ? 30"' a.'?
sp:-nt 'aii Ly
icns tt:
"71d :7-'3- 41- -?
.
;C1I1I IaXEII 1740.; i:host. .
CY:P. thEt is
iTC,CCT;
,...5?2.r,
a_.?,. LT-11:?-?-cha Anr.a Kansas City
the: is to take grain
; it is in surplus and then
l'a.,s1.,..buto it when it is no
sr.rplus. nut's the
business."
*,?/.:.1. with
:rd
horn-
ti:.cr.
"-
c::
?
,$)!
tire don en;:dc
inE-ati;,'n? ? 7.c
:1;:z?t:,:-.; .ah ;-' ?
an ,
,
if
1,tha. ;:srica at a I,. in -a,
city; atino, acle,:- considerably,'
ta v.:no 2.7oensa a..feeding
naultrii in!
thit ccalni.ly and event:la:1y to
tho to consum-
e:7r. Likewise, a. ..leveloptag tin
lire for more meat al...):ead. may
."!eac.i to a ciras?tic Ltrz,E.:-..-; in
e:;:ports of Americaar earn and
. grains,
thez pl.;ces As making the cost
of' ozef and pork much :iigher
yr LilO Uratei States.
;J. ?17-Lot?ric. :. L
Yhc atiang,'; was :put-r.".:d by
:auml-t.r at things, such on
tha easing of restriction': ci-;
T:ae with Ca,nmunist coon-
,in ?.-nany ?part9
ucar :.:".tch of
ker ni-nteion in *.T.:..rf.rls;
?::.a.ri; ago, 7.-IsinT
chavusid soy wLva: rat
:?-out;
cro-3 friiu1 as n: Asia axi,
.':vo7'a1)aSiritio ova-:
ira 7rist sin Oar, hi'
yrid asnait;
But it ? &bon:: s'ai
t, :
c3unti7: that it
many j a;:rprine.
Little eublic antics 1.??,-an
:to the. s'r,iftlig
rho. .'.nirrican 3al:afa
saatigarifig
the ZE.2;,:itrI.Eat of iigricu1turZ1
ho :le",7 the reco:d esresolinofl
',-;-,sat. The be.17.ers 7c.i.;ght thel
of s'ome sort
cansrng crini...rels? in oIrect, an
arryougc; on ne aeies, lest the
Stat.:', nu,
cf
nr.
? . . .
u
a 'bia,
' 'Sat
aria a, ..",y )71
mailstry ...-uat
are La trade in
market the"
ni ?
g pries tar proaidai.a,
:those that ars raiaaa. grea'a
:surplus hares. C.07
:wheat, tn:.: tInter Statt;.:
sumac only about a
its annual cycn there ova non7u,
obviouz; :71ziftts it
mg the people' zat
time of rising prices Snot :Lin;
,must bid against the ren at
v,oild fey
itry Dav:s.
.cern.--y is yyit'g so a.
hut lie er.tia.ua'....H:??
'lmbrace.. L1.17; ?11"..m.%
Arre:ici.;; tora,?linz:ra are
going
(.ThrLi:, 7.nc,? ir ?
.s :
as cr.5
net tie
`nareila: Cl
Sa.LndeTs.
?aransova.,::
via es.:
L01-.1/7 C/11
divisivn, are faa.i?r, -
new world
It's :he: :;i?sina,,.
ho oic'z.
torn ar??ir, for zIt'ne::
an. "Since
,Ti cur biggest cus-
bner. ilTncle Sam, but
do much ;If that any
? vernon that the world:
? stocis.s tatrit, but in-i
-.73a:tad t'cri ta-u United. States
not ant o:i wheat.
: "Ws really ben e s-7-,ocic to
'aI Mi.?. Saunders said. "Mel
TAti 1: have been with Cargill a.
nicrnbaralt yzars and nobody
antis, any attention to our busi-
ness. ATot-?',: we've been on radio
;.77, :''.e.ievislors and people corn-
slain to st 'narties,
'You're 'the gut who sold all
that v,rheat to the 71ussians.'"
'That .RuFsiar, grain deal is
rnost reisu_r_derstood thing,'
7.-.d itt. Wii.Cdents, ``Ir..1.t it was
7u=;c mers than any-
,
ng. Neboeiy $3redictoC. the
Imocic T.uirarouild."
'? %.youlf.-?
interject-d,
"but -.;e thought it `,701.116 cv
1.0bCr..; rcta.d ,11e
17..Lra-
trfs thags, so
? - tFike
2.rant?
sales 1,13
sells grain (it
reore "L;.
sa
14
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0.
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
20 March 1974
Aid t
rEVOr
ed
By'dem W. well
The refusal in January of the Howe
of Representatives to .authorize
United States participation in the
World F-2einins "soft loan" program ?
the International Development Asso-
ciation (IDA) ? was taken by many
in Washington as one: more indication
that America...es would no longer sup-
port any form of foreign aid.
The vote also was seen as further
evidence that the mood of the public
was becoming increasingly isolation-
ist. Now that the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee is about to open
hearings on U.S. participarnon in IDA,
it may be well to take a look at what
Americans do think about the devel-
oping countries.
No one doubts that the mood in
Washingten is unfavorable to foreign
aid, or indeed to any inejoe Jnarlcsn
role in :lel ping to solve that Rob eri: S.
Maraneera celle the problems of
"a.bsolute poverty."
? The annual passage of foreign-aid
bills has some to resemble the "Perils
of Pauline"; the legislation is con-
stantly in peril and saved from immi-
nent destruction only by the most
incredible of feats.
But does Washington reflect the
mood of the public in this case, or as
in so many other cases, is Congress
only an imperfect mirror of what the
public actually thinks? The latter
may well be the case.
Support for development is one
issue on which the perceptions of the
policymaker seem to be very differ-
ent from the feelings of the American
people.
Americans sympathetic
A recent survey published by the
Overseas Development Council asked
a cross section of Americans about
attitudes on global development, U.S.
LONDON TIMES
14 March 1974
7 7- 0
A 77 r-ri: (717
? '
The omniscient as well as omni-
present image projected of Dr
Henry Kissinger is beginning to
look exaggerated even for such
an efficient and hard-working
Secretary of State. Not that it is
entirely his fault. Much of the
world, east as well as west,
hankers for Superman. The role
was thrust upon him, although
presumably he did not have to
be persuaded.
But the image is beginning to
crack a bit, and not because the
war, for the ending of whieb
was awarded the Nobel 7cace
Appr vpiliPtill?R&Vage'20134/68708af
'
CIA
rls'a-
foreign aid end teada policies, and a
range of other Issues concerning
world poverty and development. The
results indicated that the public has
not become Leolationist.
Rather .A.mesleana do have a basic
sympathy for the problems of the poor
abroad despite the fact that meat are
unaware of the true anendons of
world poverty and etroneonely be-
lieve that this country is spending far
more in terms of relative wealth then
other rich countries.
Americans consider world hunger
and poverty a very serious problem.
While they give higher priority to
domestic poverty programs, they do
not see- the solution of domestic and
internatioeal problems as conflicting.
Interce tingly enough, the cold war
no longer provides any part of the
rationale for development assistance;
the basic reason for the concern of
Americans with the poor abroad is
moral and humanitarian.
More than 68 pe.: cent. of the public
supports the pri: providing
assistance to the p :-..e coeetries; even
when faced with nudgetapy choices,
nearly 1 of every 2 Americans favors
maintaining' or increasing the alloca-
tion for foreign economic assistance.
Nevertheless, Americans remain to
some degree skeptical about official
U.S. aid, feeling that too often in the
past, assistance has been wasted, tied
up in red tape, or siphoned off by
corrupt officials in recipient coun-
tries.
This sympathetic attitude is re-
flected clearly in support for private
programs. Voluntary contributions to
private aid programs have increased
60 percent over the past decade, the
same period in which official U.S. aid
has been declining.
Why this discrepancy between pub-
lie opinion and public policy? First,
no channel to. mobilize this sympathy
now exists. In the. 1950's and early
1950's, public support was mobilized
by a partnership of the executive
branch (which saw aid as an impor-
tant tool in the cold war) and key
members of Congress and private
organizations who supported the pro-
gram for a variety of reasons.
Real neees disregarded
Today the support of the executive
branch is lukewarm. Many sympa-
thetic congressmen and private lead-
ers consider current American po-
licies irreleaant to :-.?-cc3s of
the poor countries and are,
paying moreattention to domestic
needs.
Second, Congress has its own per-
spective and, in the absence of any
strong public pressure one way or the
other, gives low priority to issues
concerning the poor countries. The
result is that both the executive and
the legislative branches generally
disregard the needs of the developing
world.
The survey shows Americans pre-
fer programs aimed not at gaining
short-term political advantage but at
alleviating such basic human prob-
lems as' hunger and malnutrition,
disease, illiteracy.
These, of 'course, are precisely the
kinds of programs that IDA was
designed to support. Therefore, when
Congress again considers the issue of
U.S. participation, it should under-
stand that this is one case where
wise public policy coincides with the
wishes of the American people.
John W. Sewell is vice-president of
the Overseas,Development Council, a
nonprofit organization concerned
with the relations of the developed
nations to the "third world."
(r-4
fercity. Rather is because nf
animosity towards Western
Europe.
His statement that the
United States had its biggest
problem in dealing with its
friends and not its enemies was
odd. His warning that in any
competition with Europe
Americans "are going to win
because we have infinitely
more resources" had a note of
truculence impossible to under-
stand.
It was not the first outburst.
His displeasure was no less
P -1n, con t nue s with p?3,1,c markedlast year during the
sons that later not bear
did
, cle.e. examination: One must
assume that this animosity is a
factor in European-American
? relations, and therefore worthy
I of analysis by one of the
American think tanks such as
RAND or the Hudson Institute:
? Since this is unlikely, I shall
have a go.
First, the cause of his dis-
pleasure. Clearly the perform-
ance of the European Commu-
nity has been disappointing.
, manly because of France. The
ether member nations are well
disposed towards the United
States, as Dr Kissinger must
CWROY:771-108411S2RIMOVtin
0
(
':.
Ldr?
they are as powerless as is the
United States to do anything
about France, but his condem-
nation embraces the entire .
Community.
In the Middle East, the :
United States was an active
participant. Europe was not,
and can hardly be blamed for
looking first to its own inter-
ests. For European countries
Arab oil was vital. For the
United States the embargo has
proved to have been only an
inconvenience.
Europe could not afford to
wait for Dr -Kissinger's atten-
tion, and had he not been
preoccupied with other conse-
quences of the war he could not
. have done anything about oil.
1 The Arabs had the pov?er to
20002-0
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0
nirn nil the te?es. the
et.-nti;lo to recogne real-
ity.
At the time the
Statc.,-; is-
Ar...th oil, end
y?qui-ed to asse,..trieg7,i 1:1?.;-;
ceee Euror, e,
. Brita;n, would
the Community C..asen te
stand firm widi TrXi3si:Iger.
Neverthelr.F,s. 7.t.t,erit, was rc-
pre.ss,ted at the Wr.shiT7,ton
col3forenc.. :and. With 117"-
tion of 1:7-.-anc:?., ivrtetl to
cooperate..
This is necessarily a shart
review, but pact from the
French attic.ide fr.,:ac is little
cause for Dr in-
temperate lenynnt,e. Sc; 1...,:hat
are the possible c-telanations
fer his behavioer P
It could be jet log or L;e'l_eal
tiredness. A irtr,r, who is cie.tr:Y
not in ,guorl phys;:ol 7hape can
hardly ire; tnuch and
esp;:ct to ri.:so:Irld -,?;,-:;1 to tile.
admittedly tirecorto -arJbleins
of alliance. politirs.
Like John Fosttr Delics
.before ?him, Dr ilZi;i?inr,4..- 71.t.s
more or less divorc:d ? _'"
from the State 7::_rx:trite.n. its
bureaucracy can be tirtr.nln,-..
but it is .m..tr.,-,2t."
class ce-:d
JAPAN TIMES
15 March 1974
-- -7/
/
WAINGTON ?- The
Goverirnefit ? which is poying
Turkey Il5 million c; her. the
.growing of opiu ro ries
has been quietly urging India to
increase its opium production.
T h a re- son: The Turkish
opium ban, v.hich drug officials
.say has helped rcluce the flow
of heroin into this country, also
has caused seribus shortages of
opium ref...der:1 ior medical uses,
such as the production of mor-
phine and codeine.
"In case you haven'
said one Coverornant cificial,
"There's now a worldwide
opium shortage."
Two Adrninistratice officials
confirmed Teet.ntly that the
U.S. has ap2roaohed r Liia, the
world's largest producer of le-
gal opium, through "normal
diplomatic charnels" 7o an at-
tempt to head-off an opium
shortage. Both said that this
was not. as much of a con-
tradiction of its Torkish policy
as it might appear.
. They said that Ttehey, atere
the U.S. Is amdor_s he beep the,
opium ban in elite, rad been
the source of to CO per cent
of the illegal herci,1 bat fount;
its way iCtI the U.S. :Little, :if
.any, Indien ,epium e1er r>.:22.0;etI
this crlintiz;:- thrti-JrhIke
market. t"aey
be
bctiar tc:
than ta;-?e 01 015t. of his irc
t en+. r:Lite7f,e.
Th:so o, ranrot he
One 'star only to .cecall
in circurnstarce?.3
.r !ulcsth,.-eatoned tcrope
-vith. I vinssv: rcappralr.?,) and
01,o v?it r?,"eV..,Ssistaiice fcr the
Dam. P.o'c the reznitma-
spzeiy 'tics .in Br Kiisin-
ger. s preocci7liz.sian with de-
tente. Thi; is tw.derrnodabIe to
some crrta.ot. Th-2 world, east
and wo3t. .2)?ould he r,r3teful,
but ha ha-3 10,:-.A:07110 intiC11.S;VeVe
to es the New
Yorker gently pointed oat when
discussing ei.:palsion_ of
AlundeCo17.iochitsyn krorn
Russia.
The maLavine observed that
hr Solzheritsyn'.3 presence in
the 1.%"est nro-'..airiti the moral
uni'v of the: L-trti- end that Dr
it,lissinral's career nroclaitue.d
the a..opro3cl,in7, poiLical and
cit; of the
ti1C' Seen:tory
C^ .!7;2r1 bent:1 the ;-11.1.,::sian triter
he tri: cvosiv::- action. "1.V.? do
not '!.t.i?se-o.3 enough 3-.:htnn. the
smic;i7c, cireurn,tence.s
dev,i-_,:r-dire of 7kfr
?Pat
mach limo lii tl-?;-.t
-
::.oncern ?e
that nothing rausl he axia.
interfere. .11: have the Impression
that this especially ap;.7lies. to
Europe. The C.orornunity
Neto are .e?...mectod not to get in
'.ay .31,3. to .%:-.:t,l,t,ate
urTugst.'4:731-ytly
? Dr Ytisshieze eNtiticts toe,'
much. Europa is ....7ot a coi:ec-
tion of alicrt states, and Frence
has been id-evoked i:ito further
lz.aropet.ri
countries bce mroathing
offer. P.ftct Brancles
achieved more than
25 -years of .`tnerica.t> diplo-
macy diU. Is also merle tbe
wider detente poliry passible
for Y.:r.f.:ircirr.er.
lie wift,:iti era c:cest tots. cc
believes tha.: since the Ti
NIVorlcl. War 7Surog.-een go'vero-
rnen'il: have "very been
fully lep,ititnate". t is an osid
belief. They may ',lave 'ner:n
waelt, hut they
c.rliy elected.
D.- 1:issiiigor rest kr:n-y tiret
in:IL-Re:1,-1 :zit
rarest -runirient NirP.t1 bane
a
the first '11::::er3:.:t2 in-
vcrti7,otn.t? lt:st
o.trumn. Jr the ert3.? ?
e.ny agreroen'.:
ncreos'e 1-c 'uctio,n
;317
o.'
obtain metlicinui opium from
India., rather th20 3:,EV2 opium
growing resume in Turkey.
A 1972 I..t..port, by President
Nixon's Cabinet Committee on
Internatioral :';',Tarcotics. Control
showed 14-Idia was the w.wici's
largest producer of leFtei opium,
with an estimated total prodrc-
tion of f".fl tr,eric tons in :i071,
compared s.,?ith ,-tscimated.15,C
metric tor,s pro "2eed in Tur-
lc.ey.
-
The rei.ott, warit on to note
thst while the of Itercin
isv ATheriC:ail. rdciicts had
come ?krom Turkish opium 'flat
had :been refined an French he-
rein "most -:yoduc-
;;?on in s',1-1e 11-rj;.ia.1
. . is cer'sumed ir t ,ge.Geral
rgYcn where it Is produced."
One ai the so.7..,:-.2z-is saitl StaL
2:?apartraLrt c""ii7Ials
tacted the
past $i\ ....71ent..nS and
u.,-.ged that opium producticn be
htcreased is meet..m!4tical
needs.
The second source, hovievt:r,
tibdicated that there hai lleert
mere on out'
-
7:cr
L-1.!_-rEass, '
he said. think shad- irIfsic:h-c,,
that ite-a would be a market
for anyciiirtz they taaa76. Tiro-
citice, but stressed thet.
wouldn't v.tant ary incre.at.o 17.
there was a dt-n.ssr of if
maci-
di-terierl bite the illicit
.?
Indian
...csponse bes been,
era
y 3 T2G-
nor? nic
z7,.;tr.a at be ";`?zy :r1
not cuitirm. te
''Tsose ctit J:st !:an lc
bad taken
spo:zes-man sakTi.
are not hi abe riciLtz un this at
the ei-nbooFy:'
A acK1-7:-.37.-aaa.-_a:Lezo,
a.ttornelf tea a z-.2ze::?-.
linT, also said
Department !Ye.
increase
been tinr,n
o ?.,,ary
10 ?
the
"
re: may
''.:Ortr...17.71 go
e aware
7rnist also knew th
tmlilte l'.1.asr.o..v and Pekin
gsvernmen
d;otrunotic
tern t
to say
Tel: Co ri.o men': 0.1
at r:cCstttg er an
'flashino,t-t: is acer to
17.1ez-n
tie'7.T3.1!;i.e ren at;
F.F.
arn.-Iiirtv,- 7a achie-tc :5Lor
ret..,st te cc:1 T
ar^ -3. ear to
tut to
neat 77."On
,ogint hy
Yo;,?: 171:,7ie.c. yertex
when it chai.zi ised r;
diff.rercct
tweet- he jolted trtcx
a*:
Itiaz:ket .-__Iit;;t to
'27:ace rl-r teci in a ver
brawl... . Or.771
ba
event :right tilat tis
r.2atitre lie lat:o:ons
it-nz?ry' ?Trotri
'flr.).1 17:72, .1P-I-VP:7%
acct.:rang to fticialsat
Dreg Enrorcarnalril.;:...tlin
.I,atration ? bed ext almost, 3
;net:later.opsa.--:;t. They say
ann j;."'; least partly respt
sible ltr,ro.fA L'-aorta
1;E:" haltanje a,d.sts along
aES cowl.
'222:e baA "ZICL' elan
ir-pnaWan: tii'e: aria tine
atrug linac'. TI LeftTyitljacdli
noa:Ao2o7v as a
Tz.T.L.ra, aq6
platatthe fama-,-? ; of ?
Lif'.17:7,3 -7.7!::T:LT;C.77.
'I cs-hate 62:1
caner
.:;?!Ft. a LOSS
an- ac -
. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003200024
The Administration sources
said the U.S. is hoping to per-
suade India and other poppy-
growing nations to convert to a
"poppy straw" method of culti-
vation. This could result in"
more Morphine for medical
uses, with less risk of its being
diverted into the illicit market.
The traditional method is to
obtain opium gum by slicing
into a poppy bulb with a sharp
knife and allowing the gum to
ooze out and dry. The gum is
then scraped off the bulb and
refined into morphine base.
In the "poppy straw" method,
however, no opium gum is col-
lected: The poppy plants are al-
lowed to mature instead, and
then are cut like hay and car-
ted off in bales to a processing
plant, where rao.Thine ? not
opium ? is extracted from the
stalks.
The Administration bz..ileves
that this piocessing method
could he more tightly control-
led. The problem, the sources
say, is that India and most oth-.
er poppy-growing countries do
riat yet have the technology to
do it economically, and, in the
short run, could. increase pro-
duction only by growing more
poppies and harvesting gum in
the traditional way.
Another problem for the Ad-
ministration is that the. new
Turkish Government recently
told U.S. Ambassador William,
Macomber that it wads to re-
open discussions on the 1971
U.S.-Turkey agreement that led
to the opium ban. Some Gov-
ernment sources believe the
Turks may want to revoke the
ban now, or at least want more
money from the U.S. to keep it
in effect.
NEW YORK TIMES
18 March 1974
itj1N PRESSED
OUR ?ME CURB
U.S. Seeks Continued Ban
on Poppy Cultivation
Special to The New York Time&
WASHINGTON, March 17?
United States officials say they
hope to persuade Turkey to
continue her 32-month-old ban
on the cultivation of the opium
poppy, but the feeling in Wash-
ington is that Ankara's decision
will probably be based on
internal Turkish political pres-
sures.
Last week the Turkish Am-
bassador here, Mehli Esenhel,
met with State Department of-
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
12 March 1974
Turke
and the opium poppy
The United States has good rea-
son to be concerned over the new.
Turkish government's intention to
lift ? the ban on cultivating the
opium poppy.
The ban was imposed in 1971
under strong U.S. pressure. Be-
fore then American narcotics
agents estimated that 83 percent
of the raw heroin reaching the
U.S. had its origin in Turkey. In
the past two years, however, there
has been a significant decline in
the amount of heroin smuggled
into the U.S. ?
Under the 1971 agreement the
U.S. undertook to. compensate
Turkish farmers for the loss of
their opium crop to ,the
tune of
35.7 million. The financial aid
was intended to help the farmers
convert to other crops, end also to
encourage regional development.
But the farmers complain that
this aid has not reached them.
Some 1CO,C30 farming families
in four provinces are involved.
Previously their opium was theo-
retically . sold to the government
for export for medicinal purposes.
finials to discuss his country's
desire to resume cultivation of
the opium poppy, from which
heroin is derived. A State De-
partment official reported that
the Ambassador had given as-
surances that do decision had
been mad yet and that even if
the ban were lifted, no plant-
ings would be undertaken be-
fore the fall season.
That means the poppy crop
would not be harvested until
June, 1975.
United States officials here
indicated that they would be
trying hard to convince Turkey
to continue the ban. And two
New York Congressmen, Rep-
resentatives Lester L. Wolff of
Nassau and Charles B. Rangel
of Manhattan, arrived in An-
kara on Thursday to press the
United States position.
$35-Million in Aid
Turkey ordered the ban on
But in fact the growers 'made
major cales to drug traffickers..
The two parties which make up
Turkey's new ruling coalition ?
the Republican People's Party.
c.nd the National Salvation Party
? Tom.ised in last October's elec-
tions to lift the ban on opium.
growing. Most Turks do not see
why their farmers should bear
sacrifices because ? of the drug
problem in another country, the
more co since there is no drug
addiction in Turkey itself, and
Turkish laws are vei7 severe on
drug smugglers. ?
If Turkey goes ahead and autho-
rizes the -planting of the opium
poppy again this spi ing, the U.S.
must make the best of this un-
fortunate decision, and p2ess for
enforcement of strict security
measured with the goal of ensur-
ing that the entire crop is handed
over to. the government and none
hidden away for the sale to traf-
fickers. But admittedly it is not
easy for the Turkish autliorltica to
keep a tight check on all that goes
on in the remote Ana.tollan hills
where the poppy growers live.
poppy growing in July, 1971,
in exchange for S35-millica in
United States aid. Th: aid was
to compensate the Turkish
Government for legitimate ex-
port losses and to develop pro-
grams to replace the income
lost by the farmers.
But elections in Turkey last
October resulted in a new Gov-
ernment that pledged to end
the ban. The ban had been un-
popular with the farmers be-
cause of their economic loses
and among others for national-
istic reasons. Moreover, parts
of the poppy provided the
farmer with oil for cooking and
feed for livestock.
A State Department official
said that he did not know what
the United States would do if
Turkey resumed cultivation. Al-
though other measures are be-
ing considered to block traf-
ficking in opium, he said, it it
's grown in Turkey some if it is
eound to reach the black mar-
get.
Half of Aid Unpaid
The official added that other
nations, including Britain, Can-
ada, West Germany, France,
Sweden, and Iran, were also
,trying to persuade Turkey to
continue the ban.
He said that he did not :mow
what would happen to fre un-
paid balance of the $35-raillicn
in American aid if opium grow-
ing resumes. Only $15 milliCn
has been paid to Turkey .;:o far.
The official also noted that
reports last week erroneously
stated that Turkey had already
decided to resume opium grow-
ing. Be said that the Turkish
Government had only begun to
permit production of seeds :or
;.ossible future Use.
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-111:2P77-00432R000100320002-0
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0
NEW YORK TIMES
10 March 1974
-
By iViartthall 7). Shnlman
The United States is approaching a
choice in the next few weeks about
whether economic relations with the
Soviet Unicn should be developed or
discouraged. The forthcoming Senate
debate on the Trade Reform Act, with
its proposed amendment to prohibit
credits and normal tariff- status to the
Soviet Union unless that country per-
mits free emigration, will have an im-
portane 'effect on the future course of
Soviet-American relations.
Unfortunately, the ilebate has be-
come polarized between equally un-
realistic extremes. On one side is a
strange alliance between conservatives
who have ccrisiftently opposed a re-
duction c: tensions in Soviet-American
relations, and liberals who are react-
ing to the collapse of their too-high
.expectations for friendly relations with
a liberalized Soviet regime.
On the other are enthusiasts from
the business community who are fas-
cinated by vast new opportunities in
Eastern Europe, and who see trade
as the universal solvent of interna-
tional conflicts.
The .choice appears to be .between
morality with continued high tension
and detente with trade.
It is not surprising that the course
of recovery from 25 years of the cold
war should be full of zigzags, particu-
larly when the -biarhugs and cham-
pagne toasts between President Nixon
and Leonid I. Brezhnev have been
overciramatized as the symbols of a
new "structure .of 'peace." BUT we
should understand, if we must use
the word "dntente" (and it is probably
inevitable, for there is no other head-
line-sized word to describe the present
mixture of competition and restraint)
that detente. is .a process that may, at
best, develop from stage one, 'where
we are now, throegh the decades to
stages two, three, and beyond.
Stage one, or limited d?nte, means
neither lees nor more than the partial
codification of the terms of competi-
tion. It does not yet mean that the
rivalry is over, that the two societies
have common goals or values, or that
we approve of each other.
The main business of stage one is
to reduce the danger of nuclear war,
by darnpng down the military compe-
P'747-4, 17.
4
,
I
titien and by encouraging eosteatents
In the continuing competition between
the two countries. We should not for-
gee that unless this objective is real-
ized all other objectives lose their
meaning.
The development of economic rela-
tions with the Soviet Union Is an
important secondary aspect of the lim-
ited d?nte. Among the most impor-
tant Soviet motivations for seeking to
reduce...tension is the strong desire for
trade, technology and investment from
abroad.
Clearly we should neither slam the
door on the trade agreement nego-
tiated in 1972 (as we would do by
paesing the restrictive amendment as
it is now worded) nor open the door
w'rle to a sudden expansion of trade
an -1 investment with unrestricted Gov-
esnment-sponsored credits.
A more sensible response at this
early stage of our emergence from the
cold ?war would be a modest and con-
trolled development of economic rela-
tions, largely in consumer goods and
machinery, with the prospect of
gradual increase over a fifteen- or
twenty-year period involving an in-'
, creasing mix of advanced technology
and. investinent ? in resource-develop-
ment.
This would serve to offer a con-
tinuing incentive to the Soviet leaders
to accept the constraints cf a
tension policy, but could be regulated
to insure ;that our resources are not
used to strengthen Soviet military
capabilities and that :the political Com-
petition is conducted with restraint.
? This would require that the Admin-
istration have the will and the means
for coordinating and controlling credits
and the transfer of technology on the
basis of a national policy, and that
the matter should not be determined
by the separate actions of individual
ccenpanica on the basis of the profita-
bility of theca transactions to them.
Our policy should be determined not
by arguments about profits, job:, bal-
ance of payments or the loss of trade
to other. countries, nor by illusions
that trade will democratize the Soviet
Union, but by the hardheaded aware-
ness that economic motivation can
provide a continuing incentive to con-
strain the terms of competition, and
that it is in our interest to do so.
ena
F
Vriat a:-.ctst:.%r., :Lights. cding
the Jewish err!.rati.on? That beLtoviet
system of political control to na:. able
to coexist with freedom of isequiro 'end
with intellectual and artistic creativity
should come as no surprise, nce the
present convulsive tightenina, ors-con-
trols by the hardliners and the Soviet
police apparatus, who fear the effects
of prolonged low tension. .
But there are also many :C.11',OLE tor
change in the Soviet Union, noi: only
among the handful of artiada.L:
courageous dissidents, but by 1:C177,:.15
in a spectrum of pcsitions within the
system who are seeking to rid
selves of of atavistic methods and cum-
bersome bureaucracy.
The condition favorable to the ivo-
lution they seek is a prolonged neriod
of reduced tension, with the co-:a:pa-
thetic attention and support of world
public opinion.
Public* pressures In this al?::-..tion
combined with private diplomacy can
be mord effective than f. cr.in L7:2-
mantis upon the Soviet leacierg.,57 by
our Government, whether o'er sesem
tive or the legislative branch. -
The restrictive trade ainendment has
the character of an ultimatum deniand-
? log .unrealizable conditions, which Ill
inevitably generate forces of resis'ance
in the Soviet political leadership and
will be counterproductive.
If therefore the Senate situation is
such that the restrictive amendment
is inevitable, that measure should at
least be cast in less uncompromising
language deigned to encourage the
objective of easing arbitrary discrimi-
nation and harassment of those who
wish to emigrate, and should put
clis-
cretonar authority in the han:Is of
the ?resident to administer the provi-
sion with some flexibility.
The present alternative leads ?to-
ward a return to the tensions of the
cold war, which would not only in-
crease the danger of war but -mould
preserve the basis for controlled mo-
bilization in the Soviet Union and
diminish the prospect for that enolu-
tion that we and many pe.opie in the
Soviet Union ardently desire.
Marshall D. Shulman is .d1c ii.Cte-
venson Professor of Interruatiencei
ia-
tiona and director cl thp, .7?1:77?.91
Institute at Columbia T.InivercE.':;
18
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0
,
'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0.
BALTIMORE SUN
20 March 1974
?qPS for
.3rnssets.
A year ago the European Eco-
nomic Community had just been
enlarged and had einbarked on an
ambitious journey toward full in-
tegration. A musical and artistic
"fanfare for Europe" -,ea's provid-
ing the cultural accompaniment
For 'he city's new task.
A year later the European
fire- m hs turned into a night-
m^re o uncer'ain'y and inde-
els'on and a funeral dirge would
nn re appropriate background
music.
The intervening period has been
marked by acrimonious bicker-
ing; missed deadlines, external
pressures and deteriorating eco-
nomic and political conditions in
most of the EEC member coun-
tries. All this has paralyzed the
Community's already sluggish de-
cision-making process and caused
many to doubt whether the enter-
prise can survive. Whereas many
dedicated Europeans in the past
had been saying that there could
be no going back in the construc-
tion of Europe, the top Eurocrat
recently observed that "there is
nothing preordained about Eu-
rope; there is no point of no re-
turn." And some of the recently
arrived British civil servants are
beginning to cast about for other
jobs.
0 ?
This time disappointed Euro-
peans cannot engage in a con-
venient binge of "frog bashing"
and blame French obstructionism
as usual. This time there is a lot
of blame to go around.
France did deal the Commu-
nity goal of economic and mone-
tary union a crippling blow by
withdrawing from the EEC com-
mon currency float. And it has
long stymied numerous other
Community decisions ranging
from formulation of an energy
pohey to stecngthening the Euro-
pean Perliarnent. But then there
NEW YORK TIMES
18 March 1974
A
p---.
......_
r? " ,,, ,e,...4"..?"-'1,
.!..L.Iti.i.k
It
By DAVID FOUQUET
was also the obstinacy of Ger-
many in rejecting a large re-
gional development fund for
the Community's underdeveloped
areas.
Bonn, which in the past
had been characterized as "very
generous" in funding EEC pro-
grams, has expressed a weari-
ness at "playing the paymaster."
This led to a clash with the Brit-
ish Heath government, which des-
perately needed a large regional
pork-barrel program to bail it out
economically and politically.
Since it couldn't obtain the fund-
ing . it, sought for the regional
program, Britain blocked deci-
sions in other areas.
? ? ?
As a result, the Community has
come to a virtual standstill in re-
cent months. Even commitments
solemnly made by the European
heads of state in a December
summit meeting in Copenhagen
.have been largely ignored. If this
weren't enough, the Community
now faces the uncertainty of a
new British government, led by
a party that vowed to renegotiate
the terms of British entry into
the Coiranunity. Knowledgeable
officials in Brussels forecast that
the British situation will further
paralyze the Community for at
least a year, while the new re-
gime sorts out its policy, while
the Community concentrates on
this problem and probably until
new British elections are held.
Internal preoccupations aren't
the only thing endangering the
Europeans. Just as important are
the nature of the Community's re-
lations with its former supporter
and mentor across the Atlantic.
"The Year of Europe," which
was supposed to resolve problems
between Europe and the United
States actually created more. In-
stead of merely having to deal
with economic and commercial
controversies, the two are now
confronted with more serious
?
AtlanticAsperity
President Nixon's outburst in Chicago against.the Euro-
pean allies makes it clear that serious difficulties have
again overtaken Secretary of State Kissinger's year-long
flickering effort to reinvigorate the Atlantic Alliance and
establish a "special relationship" with the nine-nation
Common Market. The vehemence with which Mr: Nixon
wielded his bludgeon was apparently designed, to pave
the way for yesterday's disclosure that he has decided
to defer his projected April visit to those allies in Europe.
Concealed behind all the rhetoric, there is one ember-,
rassing 'fact. Mr. Nixon has been trying futilely for
7.7r7;
v.41,
questions of security and political
trust.
Henry Kissinger, who .has dis-
played, such finesse in dealing
with opponents and explosive sit-
uations, has shown only spotty
results in patching up relations
with Europe. His call for a Year
of Europe and a new Atlantic
Charter was judged to have been
ill-prepared and badly-timed from
this side of the ocean. The situae
tion was aggravated even further
during the Middle "P'ast war and
the ensuing energy disruption.
His convening of the Washing- -
ton energy conference served to
isolate France in stubborn oppo-
sition while gaining the support
of the rest of the European Com-
munity. However, it had a cata-
strophic impact on Community
tempers and relations. French
Foreign Minister Michel Johert
was moved to attack his Euro-.
peen colleagues to the point that
one Eurocrat in Brussels observed
that "his attacks were so wound-
ing that I don't see how they can
work together in the future."
? ? . ?
There are even-those in Brus-
sels who feel that Mr. Kissinger,
having glimpsed that a united Eu-
rope could no longer be controlled
by jthe United States, has decided
to limit its development to a com-
mercial group.
Belgian Jean Rey, a former
European commission president
who has never been accused of
being anti-American, recently ob-
served "Henry Kissinger doesn't
like the Europeans, that's a fact.
Unlike many American leaders,
he doesn't understand the Com-
munity. He has never displayed
interest or sympathy in it and he
considers it like a foreign body
in the Atlantic Alliance. Only the
Alliance interests him and, at the
heart of this, the American lead-
ership." Many non-French Euro-
peans, no less than Latin Ameri-
cans at the recent hemispheric
meeting, are suspicions of U.S.
hegemony. -
This Ins been the French thesis
which, taghtly or wrongly, s being
looked at more closely as a re-
sult of Mr. Kissinger's recent
tirade against the European fail-
ure to consult before deciding to
seek a conference between Euro-
pean and Arab countries. The
fact is that German Foreign Min-
ister Walter Scheel discussed the
matter with Kissinger before it
was decided. This has led some
Europeans here to wonder
whether in Mr. Kissinger's vo-
cabulary "consultation" is not
synonymous with "U.S. veto."
? e
If Mr. Kissinger feels at Herr
Scheel's consulting style was in-
? adequate, he may be in for fur-
ther disappointment in the latter
? half of 1974, 'when Franca and
Michel Jobert take over the ro-
tating presidency of the EEC.
It :is no wonder that with so
? many internal and external con-
troversies and pressures bet-
'thig, the. -Cominunity, its grave-
diggers are becoming legion. The
only thing certain at the mennent
,only
that ?its, Custonis union .and
other economic proarems are
still functioning and will continue
to exist Precariously. However,
so many promises have been
? broken ? concerning greeter erne
? nomic and political unity that no
e one would want to predict a re-
sounding success for the future.
- Despite all the uncertainty, at
"least one Community official isn't
panicking. "Just remember," be
remarked retently, "in the 1,330's,
more than one-hiuldred years
after the end of the Congrese of
Vienna, -there were still bureau-
crats attending to the clean-
ing up." - . .
, ? ?
Mr. Fouquet is a No-lance
joanalist Iivg n 3rtwel,2.
a year to obtain an invitation from the European Ece-
nomic Community (E.E.C.) to meet formally with its
nine chiefs of government in Brussels during his Euro-
pean tour. The idea, originally suggested by West German
Chancellor Brandt, has been blocked by France.
It is agreed that there would be a summit-level meeting
of the .fifteen-member NATO Council. Its purpose would
be to sign a declaration of common purpose in defense.
But there is no agreement on who will attend the signing.
of a second joint declaration covering political and eco-
nomic cooperation between the United States and the
Common Market; which has just been redrafted by the
Europeans. The :Tenure of the meeting to conclude this
document is the primary cause of delay in scheduling
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-MP77-00432R000100320002-0
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0
President Nixon's trip, rather than such differences over
the text as the American desire and French eefusal to
speak of 'partnership."
The United States wants Mr. Nixon to meet with the
nine E.E.C. chiefs of government even if, as France insists,
the document is signed on behalf of the Common Market
Council by its President, a post that will be occupied by
Chancellor Brandt until the end of June. But President
Pompidou has refused to agree even to an informal
dinner meeting with the Nine, lest a precedent be set
for an institutional link with the United States. He wants
a single spokesman to represent the Common Market in
consultation with the United States. Otherwise, as he
sees it, nine relative dwarfs would be meeting with the
American dominant giant.
*
The American view is that improved procedures for
European - American consultation are essential if joint
policies are to be achieved for solving mutual problems.
At present, Mr. Kissinger has charged, the E.E.C. countries
are precluded from consulting with the United States
until a common policy is shaped, after which "Europe
appoints a spokesman who is empowered to inform us
of the decisions taken but has no authority to negotiate."
It was this issue that prompted Mr. Kissinger's ran-
carcass protest early this month against the decision of
the E.E.C. countries to meet separately with the Arabs.
NEW YORK TIMES
16 March 1974
United States
By C. L. Sulzberger
PARIS?The petulance now featur-
ing United States relationships with
France is ridiculous and unnecessary.
From certain remarks attributed to
Henry Kissinger one must conclude he
should never be indiscreet in private,
which he now inferentially acknowl-
edges. It is one thing to use the calcu-
lated public leak for policy purposes
but it is quite another to blow off
steam and have it surface in a cloud
of embarrassment
Mr. Kissinger was quoted in a pro-
American London paper Feb. 10 as
having told a small group that Euro-
peans are "craven," "contemptible,"
"pernicious" and acting like "jackals,"
to say nothing of appraising Saudi
Arabia's King Faisal as a "religious
fanatic," which neither helped pros-
pects of trans-Atlantic amity nor facili-
tated -easement of the anti-U.S. oil
embargo.
On March 6, the normally pro-
American Paris Figaro reported the
Secretary of State as saying the
United States knew better how to
choose enemies than friends and it
was easier to treat with the former
than the latter. These alleged opinions,
added to those publicly enunciated,
raised hackles;
One result is that recent U.S. policy
has proved counterproductive.. The
Washington petroleum consumers
meeting, at Which France was the
odd-man-nut, was swiftly superseded
by a :uropean Community policy that
excluded America. And French Foreign
Minister Michel Jobert, who admires
.Mr. Kissinger's person More than his-
-current views, has recently taken to
zabbirn mustard into U.S. irritations.
it is even reported that Washington
has began re-examining policy toward
.-V,:taally, few majct cecis!orls are taken hy the E.E.C.
withoet lengthy argument in public view among the nine
governments. The United States has only itself to blame
if it fails to lobby effectively for its interests.
France's eight Common Market partners did wisely-
agree in Washington in February to act jointly with the
United States on the critical oil problem, despite Paris's
refusal to participate. Under 'those circumstances they
could not risk further divisions in the E.E.C. by flatly
rejecting the Arab contacts Paris proposed. Moreover,
respondieg to President Nixon's letter this month pro-
testing "rival activity" in the Middle East, Chancellor
Brandt made it clear?as representative-of the Nine?
that he would move slowly, in consultation with Wash-
ington, and would seek to provide "flanking support"
for American-political and oil efforts in the Middle East.
These reassurances make incomprehensible President
Nixon's Chicago accusations of "hostility" 'and "confron-
tation" on the part of the Nine. His criticism of the new
draft of the projected joint declaration?and his refusal
to set a date for his European trip until agreement on
its terms is reached?can be defended as efforts to
assure a summit meeting with the Common Market, with
or without France. But his warning that substantial
numbers of American troops might be withdrawn from
Europe unless the E.E.C. comes to heel on political and
economic issues, can only be self-defeating.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
France, which I take to be nonsense
since things are certainly in no more
critical state between the two coun-
tries than frequently in the past and
It would be folly to heat up the situa-
tion.
Mr. Kissinger has for years been,
pro-French and a considerable ad-
mirer of Gaullism, the philosophy
represented today by President Pom-
pidou and Mr. Jobert. Indeed, Mr.
Kissinger?then a Democrat?had been
brought into the Kennedy Administra-
tion early as an adviser on nuclear
strategy and European matters.
He was often used as a secret mes-
senger between President Kennedy and
Chancellor Adenauer, an ardent Gaul-
list and Francophile, and once was
dispatched by the former "to find out
what's gone wrong with our German
policy." Mr. Kissinger replied: "That
will be easier if you'll tell me one
small thing: What is our German
policy?"
The present Secretary of State
broke with Mr. Kenneciwy over France,
especially on the question of de Gaulle's
so-called force de frappe. He argued
there was absolutely no escaping the
existence of a French national atomic
force. Subsequently, he became a Re-
publican policy expert, first for Nelson
Rockefeller, then Mr. Nixon.
Now, one might ask, just what is
our French policy as applied by the
man who seemed an early U.S. Gaul-
list and in the name of that avowed
admirer of the General and friend of
Pompidou, Richard Nixon? The answer
is, things will pre:ably einrasee deals
and our policy is already see'aing to
anetth'-'-n Joe ,nza
\
calm the situation, not exacerbate it.
Mr. Kissinger certainly knows that
foreign policy for one country means
internal policy for another. Thus Mr.
Nixon has been accused of reeking
political coups abroad to strengthen
his sagging situation at home. Like-
wise, with Mr. Pompidou in Soviet
Russia this week, it was reaseaehle
to expect his journey to be preceded
by a dash of French nationalism at
American expense.
Now that the French President is
home one can anticipate a switchback,
even if he isn't going to change his
mind on dealing with the energy cri-
sis, a subject viewed differently in
fuel-poor France than in fuel-rich
America. But the old French-American
friendships retains plenty of vitality.
In 1965 de Gaulle received Hubert
Humphrey and told me afterward:
"You know, in our conversation, Vice
-President Humphrey and I were in
agreement on this point?our coun-
tries, the United States and France,
have often been in disagreement over
the lest two centuries. Certainly we
were not in agreement over Mexico
one hundred years ago.
"And from 1914 to 1917 the United
States had relations with Germany,
while we were at war. After the Ver-
sailles Treaty, the United Statesfailed
to join in the League of Nations and
opposed reparations for France. In
1940 the United States was not ready
to go to war to protect France and
England.
"We have often been in disagree-
ment and Humphrey sfnared my view
that it doesn't matter, Despite our dif-
ferences, our two nations have always
remained friends, naturally and seen-
taneonaly.' izzc., E?%. this
should not cnntinins."
20
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0-
WASHINGTON POST
19 March 1974
Joseph Kraft
7oreign Policy Showdown'
'Why did President Nixon take a
gratuitoue shot at the European allies .
in his Chicago appearance last week?
And why, for the previous 10 days, did
Henry Kissinger knock the allies in
staterneuts to newsmen, senators and
even coeg?essional wives?
The answer is that the President
and the Secretary of State are provok-
ing a showdown in order to force the
allies, once and for all, on to the road
of Atlantic partnership with this coun-
try. In the bargain, the allies would be
put on the defensive and therefore
unable to upset ongoing negotiations
In the Mideast and with the Soviet
Union. Which is very rice, except that
the bold move is apt to backfire with
adverse consequences both abroad and
in the United States.
Behind. all this is the slow, unsteady
progress toward political unity which
Europe has been making following the
entry of Britain into the Common
Market last year. The French have
been using the process to build a
Gaullist Europe?divorced from the
United States. They have insisted on
policy stands hostile to American in-
tereets in the Mideast, and on a pro-
cedure which forbids consultation
with Washington until decisions are
taken.
Most of the other European coun-
tries, and especially West Germany,
want to stick close to the United
States. So while going along with
France on procedural questions, they
have tried to cooperate with _ the
United States on practical restters. In
fact, during the past year there has
been a rare degree of Inemony be-
tween Washington and the European
allies on such substantive busineee as
trade, exchange rates and defcuse.
Practical cooperation on speelae
problems has not been good enough
for the President and the Secretary of
State. A year ago, in a speech which
spoke of the Year of Europe, Dr, Kis-
singer called for an Atlantic dialogue
to foster agreement at the highest
levels on a joint statement of betie
principles.
As predicted here and elsewhere,
the dialogue resulted only in a highly
generalized statement. Moreover Dr.
Kissinger was furious when the Euro-
peans, last fall, prepared a draft state-
ment and presented it to the United
States without previous consultation,
as an accomplished fact.
The consultation issue erupted again
as a result of Dr. Kissinger's efforts
to organize cooperation with the allies
on the energy question. At the Wash-
ington energy conference last month,
he did prevail on eight of the Euro-
pean countries to agree to work jointly
with the United States in dealing with
problems growing out of the energy
crisis. France, which opposed any co-
operation, was left isolated.
But the French made a slight come-
back by prevailing upon the other
European countries, on March 4, to
agree to a forthcoming meeting with
Arab leadersajfrom which the United
States would be excluded, Once again,
moreover, Dr. Kissinger felt that he-
was presented with a decision by the
Europeans without serious advance
consultation.
Immediately thereafter, Dr. Kis-
singer began loosing against the Euro-
peans what the Economist of London
called "Henry's Thunderbolts." The
Preaident .then piled it on in Cilka4.0
THE NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, MARCH 10, 1974
_ -
by indicating this country would with-
draw troops from Eurepe if tie ares
did not cooperate more in political
and economic issues.
Both men have a point. The habit of
non-consultation is bad. Unless checked
soon, it could harden over the years
so that eventually the United States
and Europe would drift apart on all
major issues.
Moreover, the occasion is not neces-
sarily bad for a showdown. The French
are uncomfortable in their isolation?
hence the relatively conciliatory
speech over the weekend by Foreign
Minister Michel Jobert. The socialist
governments in Germany and Britain
are defensive about relations with the
United States, and under strong in-
ternal pressure to appease Washing-
ton. If nothing else, tough talk now
will prevent the Europeans from op-
posing the negotiations Dr. Kissinger
now has under way in the Mideast
and with the Soviet Union.
At bottom, however, I think the
President and Dr. Kissinger are play-
ing with fire. Advance consultation is
not all that important?and they know
it better than anybody. No present gov-
ernment, not excluding the Nixon gov-
ernment, is strong enough to make
binding commitments about the future
of Atlantic partnership.
By forcing a conflict now, practical
cooperation on specific issues is made
more difficult. Worst of all, by raising
the troop question, Mr. Nixon is only
playing into the hands of those in this
country who want to withdraw troops
as a first step in an over-all thinning
of relations with Europe.
c test nblet Errt,,-prices.
,--?
A Postage S tairip Rrexes 7 es i"..., G
_
said "Aha!" a re:I political commitment.
The threat, whether real 12ut it is not popular only
?
A Communist Executed ill or imagined, of "radicals"
Amen-
infiltrating the Government among Germans. An Ameri-
1919 Is Commemorated through the Social Democrats can lawyer at the anti-estab-
is a subject of constant dis- lishment Lawyers Military
*cussion here, and to many - Defense Committee in Heidel-
it seemed to become real berg put a Rosa Luxemburg
again when 30 million of the stamp on a letter to a United
C 40-pfennig commemorative! States Army colonel the
stamps were printed
other day and said, "We do
rinted late last
"We've never had a stamp it on purpose?it ought to
so many people refuse to make them mad." The coin-
take at the counter," said the mittee helps defend soldiers
in mainly political cases here.
Postmaster General, Horst
2,000 Protest Letters
Ehmke. "But we've printed
Mr. Elunke has received
them, and we'll sell them."
about 2,000 protest letters,
A press spokesman for his tters,
i
ministry said, however, that . r which themes such as
the 30 million stamps, nor- Bonn now takes orders
from the Kremlin" seem to
mally enough to last for six
predominate. He countered
with one of Rosa Luxem-
burg's own quotations:
"Freedom means the free-
dom to disagree."
Rosa Luxemburg was sum-
marily executed on Jan. 15,
1919, after the failure of the
Communist uprising in Ber-
lin. Before she founded the
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 :AIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0
By CRAIG R. WHITNEY
Sp2TIal to The New Yc..."1: Timex
BONN, March 8?Rosa
Luxemburg, the "Red Rosa"
who was executed in Berlin
55 years ago for her revolu-
tionary activities, is raising
political tempers in Germany
again through that most con-
servative of institutions, the
Post Office.
Since Jan. 15, she has
been commemorated on the
German equivalent of the 10-
cent stamp.
Although the basic color
of the stamp is orange, not
red, and Rosa Luxemburg is
portrayed in black. many
Germans who think.Chancel-
lor Willy Brandt's Social
Democratic party is crypto-
Communist anyway took one
look when it came out and
months, would probably be
sold out in five.
One reason may be that ?
buying a Rosa Luxemburg
stamp is a way for those
Germans?especially younger
ones?who have leftist-liberal
political views to show them,
without necessarily =line
Spartacist Union with Kael
Liebknecht in 1917. she be-
longed to the left wing cf
the Social Democratic party.
Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0
THE WASITINGTOti POST
Friday, March 8,194
Ar
LS.
reTs, fiaez
ea.}in ? _elk e taeo
0
/ne
(Ala
By Lewis M. Simons
NEW DELHI, March 7?
With Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger expected to visit
New Delhi in the next i'ew
weeks, the government of In-
dia is struggling to hold the
lid on an anti-American tem-
pest. brewing in a teapot.
The flap, breught up by left-
ist members of Parliament,
concerns U.S. plans to de-
velop its air and naval support
facilities on the tiny Indian
Ocean atoll of Diego Garcia.
. Prime Minister Indira Gan-
dhi and her government are
anxiously trying to let the
United States know in ad-
vance of Kissinger's trip that
while they are opposed to a
major power buildup in the
Indian Ocean, they are not
overly upset with the Penta-
gon's plans for Diego Garcia.
The government fears that
if the pot boils over before
Kissinger arrives, hoped-for
discussions on strengthening
Indo-American trade and
economic cooperation ? and
possibly resuming some form
of U.S. aid?will suffer.
But Communist and other
left-wing legislators are refug-
ing to play along. Today and
yesterday they forced Foreign
Minister Swaran Singh to de-
clare before Parliament that
India was as resolutely as ever
against a major U.S. presence
in the Indian Ocean.
The opposition members
were using a remark made
on Monday- by U.S.. Ambassa-
dor Daniel Patrick Moynihan
to prass their point. During a
meeting, with Indian journal-
ists in the southern city of Ma-
dras, Moynihan reportedly
said that U.S. interests in Di-
ego Garcia were "more impor-
tant" than those of India.,
which has no "fuundamental
concern" in the island, located
1.201) miles south of the In-
dian coast.
Most New Delhi ilewspapers
ran the story on their front
pages. Moynihan was deeply'
? ng.ered. claiming that he and ,
the newsmen had agreed that ;
the remarks were not to be st-1
tribeted to him.
Communist parlirereeteri-i,
Approved For
ans jumped on the reports and
one even demanded that MoY-
niban be declared persona non
grata and ejected from India.
Swaran Singh prevented
that but reiterated that the
U.S. plan to spend S29 million
on expanding the Diego Gar-
cia facility was contrary to In-
dia's aim of making the Indian
Ocean a "zone of peace."
Singh's statements reflect
India's dilemma. As a prime
mover in the nonaligned
movement and the major
power in south Asia, it must
argue against a U.S.-S o vl e t
arms race in the region. But
the Indians must also temper
their public protestations with
private assurances to the
United States at a time when
relations between the two are
gradually improving.
Senior Indian government
officials make the point pri-
vately that they are prepared
to live with an increased num-
ber of U.S. Navy ships, ,subma-
rines and aircraft moving in
and out of Diego Garcia.
"We're not anti-anybody on
this," a ranking government
source said, "and we want the
United States to know that.
But India, and all the coun-
tries on the Indian Ocean for
that mattet, are committed to
making it a zone of peace."
U.S. observers say Indian of-
ficials are restrained because
they realize that turning Di-
ego Garcia into an important
staging base cannot be con-
strued as aiding Pakistan?eIn-
(ha's constant and overriding
defense worry.
"Our hands-off policy on
arms for Pakistan Is finally
sinking in," one American ob-
server said. "It's beginning to
look like the Indians finally
believe we mean what we
say."
Diplomatic reaction to the
expansion plans for Diego
Garcia has been low key. U.S.
and British diplomats were
not even summoned to the
Foreign Ministry, a standard
procedure when a government
wants to register a com-
plaint. Britain. which owns the
5,700-acre, coral island, re-
cently agreed to allow the
United States to expand its fa-
cilities there.
Some observers believe that
lithe Kissinger visit, which is
expected sometime before the
middle of April, produces lit-
tle or nothing concrete, India
may shift its stand and launch
a full-scale diplomatic attack
on the United States.
But the Indians do not ap-
pear to expect Kissinger to ar-
rive with a sack of goodies.
The mere fact that he is com-
ing for the first time since talk-
ing office and will spend a
couple of dzys talking to Mrs.
Gendhi and others is consice
ered important.
BALTIMORE SUN
18 March 1974
21?,?7NT
t ' ?
1v 1?
9 L A.A.
71- 36
?1-711 orff
PRAN SAMA3WAL
New Delhi Bureau of The Sun
New Delhi ? Ambassador
Daniel Patrick Moynihan and
the World Bank president,
Robert S. McNamara, are
under attack in India despite
their efforts to help overcome
the country's worst economic
crisis.
Both are being criticized in
Parliament for their candid,
but private, comments.
Mr. Moynihan was criticized
for his background interview
with newspaper reporters, in
which he said that the Indian
Ocean base being built by the
United States on the British-
held island of Diego Garcia
was more important to U.S.
interests than to India's. He
also commented, "Why call it
the Indian Ocean? One may as
well call it Madagascar Sea."
The pro-Moscow Communists
party criticized Mr. Moyni-
han's observation, condemned
him and his government's
"sinister moves" in the Indian
Ocean and called for his expul-
sion.
?
Given special attention
All the recent efforts by the
American Ambassador to re-
pair Indo-U.S. relations, in-
crease bilateral trade and eco-
nomic co-operation and the
writing off of India's debt in
rupees was of little conse-
quence when it came to attack-
ing him on the Indian Ocean
base.
In the last six years, since
Mr. NcNarnara became the
chief of the World Bank, he
has singled out India for spe- doing enough.
a
cial attention, pumping
funds to help the country.
Two-thirds of all the soft
lending of the International
Development Agency, an asso-
ciate of the World Bank, was
given to India.
When President Nixon cut
off all economic assistance to
India in 1971 because of the
Indo-Pakistan war, Mr. Mc-
Namara continued assistance
to India, despite the fact that
the U.S. is the major contribu
tor to the World Bank.
The crime of Mr. Mc
Namara, according to pro-Mc-
cow Communists and others?
including members of the rul-
ing Congress party, is leakag
of the World Bank report e
the Indian economy in Wash
ington which has some ver3
gloomy predictions about th
country's future and question
the Indian economic assess
mcnts.
The "leak." according to th
critics, was deliberate and ha
"sinister motives" of runnin
down India. the World Ban
acting on behalf of Amercia
imperialism, was trying t
pressure India to give up a
efforts at becoming self-r
liant, critics charged yesterda
in Parliament. -
The atiack Li on U.S. m
tives. Leftists fear that th
resumption of American ai
would hurt Soviet influen
here. The rightists, on t
other hand, are complainin
that the United States ic e
Release
22
2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77
?
-00432R000100320002-0
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0-
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
8 March 1974
3y Deeilel Getetreerlaned
Staff correspondent of
The Chrietisee Science Monitor
Faeara oaTe, Cele:Jaffa
. .
The Urdtee i';':e.tea has managed to
get Cambedien Army officers to
reale eignif co reductetcns in the
number of "phantom" soldiers on
their payrolls, but the practice of
collecting money for nonexistent sol-
dieTS is far from eaded.
In Jaeuray of last year, the Cam-
bcclin n command claimed an Army
.:strength of 3C:3,C:73 men. But everyone
:knew that the Lemy di net have this
many stile:lees anti telficers were
pcalreting the pay cif a large number
of ghost, or phantcm, aeldiers.
The 1Jnitze2 Stetee eaf-eteed in r:72p-
pszt.teatyrell aeore than 21.I0,050
m:a, and the. flare 7:a .3 cubsequently
set at about 2ZO,C3.3. At the name time,
a new CSIltiaIN:id payroll system was
ntisiuced. Zventeally this system is
to be computerized.
/et aa.72n1 faln; Zni
`ft.?,.e oaigitre of the phantom-soldier
WASHINGTON POST
13 March 1974
as-
0 04
paya:fs go bach to the 'beginning of the
war in Cambodia. *
When the war erupted nearly four
years ago, the Army consisted of only
about 30,030 men. It had to expand
rapidly, and battalion cornmenCers
were authorized to recreit for??:a.a.ir
own units.
As a result, a decentralized and .
corruption-ridden system of paying
the troops emerged, wIth battalion,
brigade end divieicn cominaaders
mahinsteable profits. Reports of the
s..ite talon caeated a stir in the 'U.S.
Congress, and at one point a Cam-
bodian Cabinet official candidly ad-
mitted that there might be as many as
1C0.000 phantom troops.
Under the new system, pay com-
mittees rent out from the central level
have taken over the function of paying
the troops. Theoretically, this ought to
eliminate the phantom problem.
Salaes row'
But as one high-renhing Cambodian
Army ? officer explained to tete re-
porter, the average officer ca anal get
by cn his effete.! caLuy.
r 7
i" C E: .7.C.777
S
A e
yr, 7 ea a-a ea
L' -IT AO )4 ?1
_
By Elizabeth Becker
saasiai so The Washington Post
KAMPOT, Cambodia?Dur-
ing the dark hours of ; dawn
the Cambodian insurgents
were lobbing mortars around
the government's command
post at Kampot. Inside. U.S.
Maj. Lawrence W. Ondecker
was showing the Cambodian
officers how to mount a coun-
terattack.
"I want you to respond very
quickly he said. -If even one
mortar falls in your zone, you
mast answer back with fire
immediately."
Whlie the American major
was poring over maps with
the Cambodian staff afficers,'
the Cambodian aeneaal offi-
cially in command of the post
coastal town about 30 miles
south of Phnom Penh is cait-
ical, and Maj. Ondecker was
flown down Sunday. "He was
loaned to us from the 3d In-
fantry Brigade," Lt. Col.
Choey Yeun said. "He is at-
tached to the 3d and nor-
mally works in the field with
? tham, but he is needed here.
?I am surprised that you did
not know him."
In the past month rebel
troops have moved within one
;to four miles of Kampot, cap-
turing the city's main water
supply and the country's only
'cement iactory. They regular-
ly shell the town with 75-mm.
.racoillesa rifles and 81-mm.
mortars.
I Although government intel-
ligence officers warned of an
!
' was wrialng in his diary, alone impending offensive as early
; as January, the Kampot garri-
; in an adjoining bunker. son made no defense prepara-
IThe U.S. embassy in Phnom! tions. Orr the past week the
Penh has repeatedly denied Cambodian high command
reports that Americans are sent r'inforcements?and they
serving as military advisers in sent Maj. Ondecker.
' the field. Congress has passed "Protect this area in:medi-
a law that prohibits the U.S. ately," Maj. Ondecker said
mission here from direct in while the 51 rounds were fall-
volvement in the conduct Gf lag in and around the city
the war. l'flonday morning. "Good, per-
But the
sttuatitm in this feet," he said as a Cambodian
int
'S a
the ,
,
. .
This ciicer said that he allots 20
phantoms to each of his battalion
commanders. This allows the battal-
ion commander enough extra money
? about 140,G00 riels, or about .$230 a
month to pay his expenees, eend his
children to school, and rent a house
for his family in Phnem Penh.
The officer said that he thought this
was "reasonable" compensation for-
men who are expected to fight a long
war on low salaries.
What about complaints?
But what if the paymansteas ob-
jected to this, the officer was asked.
"There are ways of threatening
them," he replied. -
The officer said that the problem
was to prevent those who were profit-
ing from the phantom system from
being too greedy. He achnowlefged
that sharp reductions had bean made
In the total number of phantoms but
said that the problem could never be
entirely eliminated.
infleea pointed on the map af
tnr accepting the American's
propcsal.
The day before rebel gun-
ners shot down one of the two
helicopter gunships stationed
hara. and the second one was
recalled to Phnom Penh. Maj.
Ondecker arranged with the
U.S. embassy on the morning
of the attack that additional
gunships would be sent to;
Kampot to support the infan-
try.
A member of the U.S. milia
lary attache's staff in Phnoml
Penh, Ondecker, is in Kampot;
officially to gather informa- '
tion Chuck Bernard, known as'
Monsieur Jacques. is the other
U.S. representative in town.'
Ile has approximately the
same official duties as On.
decker except that his area is!
civilian matters.
"Monsieur Jacques works
with me," said Ker Sophay,
ln;??
di-
it has never been con:CI-mad..
In Kampot, hcwever, it is dila
ficult to hide. Ondecker was in:
and out of the command post,
openly recommending miEi.rc'
manuevers. Somethres he are-
faced his proposals with "I
suggest and the general also
suggests that you immediately ;
fire in this direction."
The Cambodians were ob-
viously pleased with the
American's help. "Maj. On-
decker was very good with the
3d Brigade; he will be good ;
with us," said CoL Choey
Yeun.
Changes were made quickly'
after Ondecker's arrivaL An-
other infantry brigade was '
Called in to bolster the 2,030-
man government garrison, and
the top command was re- ,
placed within 24 hours. The
city's defense perimeter was
stabilized for the first time
threnthout the siege.
Villagers are still leaving
rector of political warfare,. the town ? the population has I
"He writes propaganda tracts! ;dropped from 50,000 to less
with me. We have published; , than 20,000 in a month.
and distributed 6,003 Pon-I !Though all private shops are
phlets in the three weeks he I i closed, and mortars still land
has teen here." ! !within the city, the city's
While junior Cambodian nf- small open-air market re-
ficaar sr:. Ameaizaas advise in ? opened Sunday with some
the field around P111113131 Penh, fruit and flab offered .`:c: sale.
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RRE77-00432R000100320002-0
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0
WASHINGTON POST
14 March 1974
Law -3%-.us t.7r1-ci1vc
.
9 7:).70,7 'American personnel in Cam-
'7
/ s'.rl are limited by law
? 7
4.4"." 'to'20-0 men.
Reuter
The State Department said
yesterday it has asked the U.S.
_embassy in Phnom Penh for a
full report on a Washington
Post dispatch that said an
American military adViSt: was
working in the field with Cam-
bodian combat trocps.
The Washington Post identi-
fied the officer as Maj. Law-
rence Onciecker, and said he
was advising Cambodian offi-
cers in the government, com-
mand post at Kampot, a
coastal town 80 miles south of
Phnom Penh.
Congress has passed a law
banning direct U.S. military
'involvement in Indochina, and
the newspaper report prompt-
ed an aegry Senate demand
WASHINGTON POST
15 March 1974
sit
iU,42SCI
000 .,Lqua
rrt ,
0
for an investigation.
The State Department noted
that military perearinel are re-
quired 'ey law to maintain
'close liaison with Khmer offi-
cials to ensure safe delivery of i
U.S. military equipment.
"However, I do acknowledge
that (delivery personnel) are
not assigned as advisers and
they are not supposed to func-
tion in a combat advisory
role," department spokesman
John King said.
The Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee made prelim-
inary inquiries during a nomi-
nation hearing for the ambas-
, sador-designate to Cambodia,
i John G. Dean, a career For-
eign Service officer.
But a bipartisan groan of
nearly two dozen senators fcr-
renuested aaArined
Rzuter
A U.S.. military attache in
Carahactia has 'denied acting
illeeally as a combat adviser
tc Cambodian government
troops, the State Department
said yesterday, but :congrese
sional demands for an investi-
gation of his activity increased
State Department spokes-
man George Vest said the U.S.
embassy in Phnom Penh had
termed "unjustified" a Wash-
ington Post story that said
Maj. Lawrence Ondecker had
advised government troops at
Kampot, Cambodia, in viola-
tion of U.S. laws barring mili-
tary advisers from Indochina.
Vest said: "The embassy has
.assured us that the U.S. mili-
tary personnel in Cambodia
are fully instructed as to the
legal restrictions on their!
activities and are complying
with these restrictions and
that the allegations in the
story are not justified."
Vest did not respond to
questions about exactly what
was being disputed, saying
only that the embassy reply
is the official response.
Vest did not say the article,
by Elizabeth Becker, a cor-
respondent for both the Post
and Newsweek Magazine, was
inaccurate.
Post Foreign Editor Lee
Lescaze said the newr.116per,
stands by the story.
Serelees Cemanteee eavesaine-
tion, declarina, in a etatemert
that "covert and illegal war
cannot be tolerated by the
Congress." ?
Dean, until recently deputy
chief of mission at the Ameri-
can embassy in Laos, told the
Foreign Relations Committee
that the State Department had
asked the U.S. embassy in
Phnom Penh for clarification
of the report.
However, he defended main-
taining Foreign Service and
military officers in the field,
saying they were "the eyes
and ears" of the embassy in
determining how American
aid was being used.
The committee approved
!Dean's appointment as ambas-
sador but not before he prom-
ised to provide a list of the
There was angry reaction
on Capitol Hill to the story
and 41 senators have co-spon-
sored a resolution by Sen.
Alan Cranston (D-Calif.) de-
manding an investigation of
Ondecker's reported activity.
? Becker quoted Ondecker as
telling Cambodian officers
under mortar attack at Kam-.
pot: "I want you to respond
very quickly. If even one mor-
tar falls in your zone, you
must answer back with fire
immediately."
The telegram from the em-
bassy in Phnoin Penh said
Becker had a "rudimentary"
speaking knowledge of French
and may have misunderstood
Ondecker's conversations with
Cambodian officers.
"I made no suggestions nor
in any way gave instructions ,
or advice to the Khmer." the
telegram quoted Ondecker as
saying.
Sen. Frank Church (D-
Idaho) the co-author of I.he
1071 Cooper-Church amend-
ment barring U.S. advisers ,
from Indochina, disclosed that
he had sent a letter to Secre-
tary of State_ Henry Kissin-
ger.
If The Washington Post
story is correct, the letter
said, "this is a direct Viola- ,
tion of the laws of the land."
Church said he had remind-
ed Kissinger of his pledge to '
the Senate last September
that the department would.
not seek to circumvent legal
obstacles to the U.S. military
presence in Indochina:
Church also called on Sec-
retary of Defense .Tames
Schlesinger 'to account fully
and openly for this apparent
violation as soon as nossiale."
NEW YORK TIMES
20 March 1974
(Thlker:707,
E,'1 L
Sen. Alan ?:2eansian
Cel:f.), a leadet ,:f last year's I
congressional campaign to etecil
U.S. military involvement in!
Cambodia, said it apparently;
was not enough for Congress;
to pass laws.
"Apparently we underrated
the administration's cunning
and determination to go its
own way regardless of the law
.... We must constantly moni-
tor the implementation (of the
law) and .me must police and
publicize emery violation," be:
said in a Senate speech.
Sen. ;nib-. Stennis (D-Miss.),1
chairmen the Armed Sere-
ices Comm.- lee, said the panel
would consider the request for.
investigation.
rain
The news from Southeast Asia is beginning to have
a morbidly familiar ring. In an engagement Monday
Vietnamese forces suffered their heaviest casualties
since the signing, of cease-fire fourteen months ago.
In fierce fighting on the same day Cambodiat insurgents
captured a major city twenty miles from Phnom Penh,
In Washington the Defense Department is asking
Congress for urgent new military aid to South Vietnam,
and the American Ambassador in Saigon is warning that
the "people of the world" will be exposed to "enormous
dangers" if the United States fails to provide whole-
hearted support for President Nguyen Van Thieu. Those
who dare to question the continuing United States
military effort, says Ambassador Graham Martin, are
only succumbing to the insidious influence of Com-
munist North Vietnam.
There is scarcely a pretense any more that the
Vietnam truce agreement has brought respite from war.
Pentagon witnesses told a Congressional committee this
week that, unless a quick $474 million is sent off to
Saigon, President Thieu's military operations would
have to be sharply curtailed next month. And for the
coming year, the Administration seeks $2.4 billion fa:
Vietnam aid, plus another $463 million to support
American military forces based in Southeast Asia. In
the first year of so-called peace, the United States
expense for weapons' and ammunition in Vietnam anas
only 25 per cent below the level for corresponding
programs in the heavy war year of 1972. .
Neither North nor South Vietnam has shown any
interest in implementing the elaborate and patently
unwieldy political provisions of the Paris accords. 1
this comes as no surprise, what is ominous is the
unstated assumption that the United States is com-
mitted to 'keeping the war going, on President Thiee'e
terms. Having successfully barred direct combat involve-
ment in Southeast Asia-, the Congress is eettitle: new
to be wry of continued drift into war by prcene.
24
. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0.
NEW YORK TIMES
9 March 1974
E.47nvoy in Saigon Charges
zzies ArCiele Was Inaccz2r
Special to Ma N
-WASHINGTON, March 8?
Graham A. Martin, the United
States Ambassador in South
Vietnam, has complained to
the State Department that an
article in New York Times on
continued American involve-
ment in Vietnam "contains nu-
merous inaccuracies and half-
truths."
In a lengthy cablegram -made
avrilable to The Times in
Washington, Mr. Martin took
strong issue with a survey
article that was written by
DiT.vici K. Shipler of The Times
Saigon bureau and published
on Feb. 25. .
Me: Shipler wrote, in sum-
mary, that American in:Litary
aid to .the Saigon Government
"continues to set the course
of the war more than a year
after the signing of the Paris,
peace agreements and the;
final withdrawal. of i....merican
tr.ops." ?
WASHINGTON POST
14 March 1974
m Vv.:tn./n.3
-"Whether the United States
is breaking the letter of the
agreements could probably be
argued either way," Mr. Ship-
ler wrote. "But certainly the
aid ? directly supports South
Vietnamese violatleins and so
breaks the spirit of the ac-
cords:"
? Hanoi Campaign Seen
In a preface to a paragraph-
by-paragraph , rebuttal of Mr.
Shifler's article, Ambassador
Martin said that Hanoi was
planning an all-out campaign to
persuade Congress to cut aid
to ?Saigon and that efforts!
would be made "to bring influ-
ence to bear on selective sus-
ceptible but inflvential elements1
of American communications
media:"
.A's an example of his objec-
tions, Mr. Martin noted that
Mr. -Sl,ipler had referred to
S' igon's violations of the cee.,SE-
fire accotd.
"This is a classic," Mr. Mar-
tin' said. "Shipler categorically,
postulates 'South Vietnamese
violations' without presenting a
shred._of evidence, and alleges
American military aid 'directly
supports' such violations which
thereby 'breaks the spirit, of
tie accords.'"
"It is quite true that to Hanoi
ne spirit of the accords' was
that the Americans would de-
liver South Vietnam bound
hand and foot into their hands,"
ithe Ambassador said. "Fortu-
nately, only a handful of
lAmericans would agree with
;that interpretation of the
i'spirit of the accords."
; Mr. Martin acknowledged in
'his cabicgram that he and Maj.
'Gen. John E. Murray, the em-
bassy's defense attache, had re-
fused to meet with Mr. Shinier
;while he was preparing his
;article because "to do so would
'permit their own reputations
for integrity to be used as a
pIarCal-sr; for promoting a cam-
'i7 hose Ambassador?
7N GRAHAM A. MARTIN, President Thieu of South
Vietnam has a warm friend and a forceful and highly
relL zed advocate?a fine amhaesador, you might say. In-
deed, Mr Martfefe recent attack on a New York Times
report on American aid to Saigon?an 18-page attach
which Mr. Martin asked the State Department to make
public?could hardly have pleased President Thieu more.
It mirrored precisely Mr. Thieu's own view that the fount
of all criticism of his rule is Hanoi.
The catch is that Graham Martin is not the ambassador
of South Vietnam to Washington. He is the American
ambassador to Saigon. This would seem to be an elemen-
tary distinction but Mr. Martha, in his blin?dered devotion
to President Thieu, has evidently lost sight of it. We
have his devotion (and his low boiling point) to thank
for the fact that he has come out from behind the wall
of discretion, behind which professional diplomats ordi-
narily work, in order to challenge a reporter for the
Times.
It is, first, outrageous that Mr. Martin should preface
his challenge with the suggestion that press and con-
gressional criticism of South Vietnam is being orches-
trated by Hanoi The charge is false-.-and mischievous.
That an American career envoy in the year 1974, should
be sniping in a cheap political way at the motives of
Vietnam policy critics is a sad commentary on how little
the old cold-war-oriented hands have learned from our
Indochina experience. Moreover, it is an old and un-
worthy ploy for an official to disdain to talk with a re-
porter on grounds that the reporter is "biased," and
then denounce him for alleged errors. In short, Mr. Mar-
tin is paying a heavy price for Mr.. Tlaieu's affection.
Secondly, Mr. :`,72entin's critique is a throwback to the
bad old claye cf eze-sided, self-seantesa over-simplified
Approved For Release 2001/08/08
paign to grossly deceive the
American Congress and the
;American people."
I "In summary, Mr. Martin;
'said, "the Shinier article was;
obviously not written to in-
form New York Times readers
but to give a slanted impres-,
sion that the United States and
South Vietnam are grossly vio-
lating the cease-fire agree-
ment."
"It deliberately omits or
;treats skeptically the flagrant
Communist violations of the
;Paris accords, all of which have
;been pointed out repeatedly to
IShinier and The New York
!Times Saigon Bureau by United
!States and 'South Vietn.amese
officials."
Mr. Martin invited Secretary
of State Kissinger or Secretary
of Defense James R. Schlesinger
to release his cablegram to the;
Columbia School of Journalism;
to expose "propaganda under'
the guise of 'investigative re-I
porting' ratl.er than a respen-
ible journalistic effort."
reporting on Vietnam and, as ouch, is althcgather out ail
line with the more nuanced requirements of a policy
that no longer needs to depend for its effectiveness on
misleading the American people. We had thought, or
hoped, the objective now was to help move the Vietnam-
ese parties toward a real settlement. By the evidence of
Mr. Martin, however, the policy is to supply President
Thieu the resources and encouragement to let him side-
step the Paris accords and to keep pressing the war. For
it is obvious that Mr. Thieu, seeing Mr. Martin's uncriti-
cal devotion to him, can have little incentive to heed
whatever cautions the U.S. Government may simultane-
ously offer. We apparently have here a classic case
study of how an ambassador loses influence with the
government to which he is accredited.
As to the specifics of the aid program as discussed by
the Times and Mr. Martin, we believe, as we have pre-
viously said, that Congress should itself go deeply into
the whole program. The Times article charged that
American military aid "continues to set the course of
the war"; various American violations of the Geneva
accords were alleged. Denying these allegations, Am-
bassador Martin responded that the course of the war is
set by "the continuous and continuing Communist build-
up" and by Saigon's response to "actual military attacks
mounted by the other side." These are, we submit, dif-
ferences of perception which the Congress ought to try
to clarify before it votes further aid for South Vietnam.
The administration is asking for $1.45 billion in military
aid in fiscal 1975?up from the $829 million approved in
? 1974. Whatever total it finally approves, the Congress
should be convinced that the money is being given in an
amount and in a way designed to ntieforce the Paris ac-
cords, act to nr....i.'ermine them.
CIAIIDP77-00432R000100320002-0
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0
NEW YORK TIMES
18 March 1974
27?.011r,:Sdy Cm plains to Kissingerl
731 Envoy in Saigon,
'elements of Arnerira r_cmmuni-
'cations media Ln-i. part:calar.y,
WASHINGTON, March 17
(Reuters)?Senator Edward M.
Kennedy has told Secretary of
State Kissinger that a cable-
gram from the United States
Ambassador in South Vietnam
has raised' the "worst kind of
innuendo" about Congressional
criticisms of American policy in
Indochina.
Mr. Kennedy made his March
13 letter public today as he and
other members of Congress
critical of the continued United
States involvement in Indochina
stepped up the campaign to cut
off military aid to South Viet-
nam. The 1Vlassachusetts Dern-
THE ECONOMIST MARCH 9. 1974
carat asked Mr. Kissinger to ex-
plain exactly what the United
States was doing in Indochina
with its continued military and
economic aid to South Vietnam,
Cainbodia and Laos.
Mr. Kennedy's letter criti-
cized a March 6 cablegram sent
to the State Department by
Graham A. Martin, the Ambas-
sador to Saigon. The cablegram,
which was published in part in
the press earlier this month,
said that Hanoi W'as trying to
use "the remnants of the Amens
can 'peace movement' to bring
influence to bear on selective
susceptible, but influential,1
on susceptible Congressional
, staffers."
"For him to suggest a tie,"
iMr. Kennedy wrote, "between
alleged decisions in Hanoi and
the views of members of Con-
gress and their staffs about the
course of American pnlicy to-
ward South Vietnam and In-
dochina is the worst kind of
innuendo and regrettably ig-
nores the many legitimate
questions and concerns of the
,Congress and the American
'people over our commitments
Ito the governments of Indo-
china and over the continuing
level of our involvement in the
political and military noniron-
Thisu's hoping for oil, too
Saigon
It needs three things to go President
Thieu's way if he is to pull the South
Vietnamese economy round. One is
that the North Vietnamese do not launch
an attack. The second is that America
continues with its current rate of aid.
The third is that commodity prices level
off. In these conditions the country
might get through 1974 with a payments
gap of ?85m (or more than its own
reserves), an inflation of 30-50 per
cent, and a 10 per cent drop in real living
standards. So even on the most optimistic
assumptions South Vietnam's economic
outlook is bleak.
The war years, plus the huge sums
spent by the Americans, pumped the
economy up like a balloon. They also
warped it in a way that is only now
really being felt. At the height of the
American presence in the mid-1960s,
the money spent by the half million GIs
and others amounted to ?170m??210m
annually. It created a range of service
industries and jobs for staff on canteens
and bases, prostitutes, bar girls, un-
official wives and so on. Out of a 19m
population. 250,000 were employed
directly by the Americans, and the
South Vietnamese government amassed
$400m (?170m) in foreign exchange
reserves. With the American withdrawal
these services have evaporated. The
government's own reserves have run
down to less than ?40m. And the war
and the lure of easy money have swollen
the town populations. They are now 40
per cent of the total; yet South Vietnam
has very few industries. So there is mass
unemployment. Unofficial spending
by the remaining 7,000 or so Americans
will probably total only ?35m this year.
And on top of the withdrawal South
Vietnam has been savaged by the rise
in world commodity prices.
Imports last year amounted to ?300m.
This year they will double in cost,
principally because of oil and fertilisers.
For obvious reasons there are no oil
refineries in the country. So, with some
allowance for growth. the cost of im-
ported petrol alone would soar from
?35m to ?85m. For the same reason
there are no fertiliser plants either. But
in most of the Mekong delta farmers
have gone over to miracle rice as part
of the much-trumpeted green revolution,
and miracle rice needs lots of fertiliser.
Fertiliser imports have therefore been
eating up one-eighth of the country's
import bill. Now fertiliser prices have
doubled in six months. Besides the
foreign exchange bill, farmers themselves
have been badly hit. Some have been
cutting back crop plantings. This could
threaten South Vietnam's hopes of
becoming self-sufficient in rice this year
and even exporting 50,000 tons. Another
-;.etions of the area."
A sizable port?ni. of Mr.!
Graham's cablegma contained,
criticism of an article written'
from Saigon by David K. Shin-
ier of The New York Times.,
That article, which was printed;
on Feb. 25, reported on United1
States military aid to the Sai-
gon Government.
-
This said, the article said,1
"continues to set the course of t
the war fore than a year after
the signing of the Paris peace
agreements and the final with-
drawal of American troops."
Mr. Martin, in his cablegram,
submitted a paragraph-by-par-
agraph rebuttal of ahe article,
which he said contained
"numerous inaccuracies and
half truths."
offensive by the North Vietnamese,
of course, would be even more damaging.
Exports have been rising?to ?10m in
1972, ?26m in 1973 and maybe ?43m
this year?but not enough to dent the
import bill significantly. The yawning
trade gap would not matter if the Ameri-
cans were prepared to foot the bill. But
in the past three years American econo-
mic aid has remained constant in dollar
terms. In real terms this means a fall of
30 per cent this year alone. Last year the
rate of inflation was 65 per cent. Yet the
wages of important groups like the army
and the civil service rose only 20 per cent.
This year South Vietnam is expected
to get between ?140m and ?160m of the
?190m that Congress has allowed Presi-
dent Nixon for Indochina reconstruction
aid. In addition something between
?64m and ?110m should be available in
PL 480 commodity aid. Even adding
?43m which might spill over from mili-
tary aid, as well as loans from Japan and
France, this still leaves a nasty pay-
ments gap. There is virtually no money
available for development.
Against this there is the country's
main hope for the future?oil. The oil-
men are well ahead with their pro-
grammes. Prospects are good and
off-shore drilling could start in the second
half of this year. Eventually the dis-
covery of oil could get South Vietnam
off the hook completely, but even the
oil search itself will improve confidence.
In the meantime, all Saigon can do is
keep its fingers crossed that world com-
modity prices do not rise too rapidly.
But as a good half of the budget goes
on defence, until President Thieu can
demobolise some of his army of lm?
he will have an inflationary situation on
his hands?and disaffection too as belts
are tightened.
26
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0.
BALTIMORE SUN
8_ March 1974
In Latin Armrica
?The
Santiago.
There is some argument over
whether the corpse of Latin
Areerican,Christian Democracy is
interred in Caracas, Venezuela,
or here in the New Chile. A few
souls still believe that the "hope
of the future," as Christian De-
mocracy was called in Latin
America only a decade ago, is
still alive. If it is, it is not kicking.
In Venezuela last December 9,
the presidential candidate for the
ruling Christian Democratic party,
Lorenzo Fernandez, was soundly
trounced by Carlos Andres Perez,
of Accion Democratica. in an in-
terview two days before the elec-
tion, Mr. Perez made two pre-
dictions: that he a ould win the
presidency, and that Christian
Democracy "was through as a
force in Venezuela and Latin
America."
? ? ?
He won, and it looks like it is.
Christian Democracy ene erged
in Europe as a democratic com-
promise between the conflicting
tetalitarianisms of coinmunism
and fascism. Those forces have
Cashed as frequently, though not
as Fiercely, in Latin America. In
1947 the trumpet was blown for
Christian Democracy in Uruguay.
It was heard in Brazil, Argentina,
Venezuela, Peru, Bolivia, Colom-
bia, Chile, end it even reached
as far as Mexico.
Even in Paraguay, ever
squashed under the heel of Gen.
Alfredo Stroessner, hope flickered
and a nucleus of Christian Demo-
crats took form. Less successful
and viable aristian Democratic
parties in some countries took
heart in the success of their co-
religlonaries in others.
Thus, Christian Democracy was
probably one of the most positive
forces ever to thrive in Latin
America. It beidged the disparate
cultures of the various countries
/47
of Chrir-b1-77
IL)-; Fcy
By RICHARD O'MARA
as no other force did, except
perhaps Catholicism. But then, it
was a political faith that sort of
grew out of the spiritual one.
Christian Democracy was most
successful in Venezuela and Chile,
where it won the govermnents. In
Venezuela, Rafael Caldera won
the presidency in 1933. He will
keep it until March when he must
turn it over to Mr. Perez,
Eduardo Frei won the presi-
dency of Chile in 1954, and as the
first of his kind to reach the top
be set the torch burning its bright-
est. Mr. Frei a as a sincere re-
former, intelligent, honest and
determined to carry out policies
aimed at distributing the wealth
of Chile more equitably. In much
he succeeded, and in much he
failed. And in doing what he did
he stimulated- the appetites of
many dispossessed Chileans for
more.
Thus, we had Salvador Allende,
the coup d'etat of last September
11, and now Gen. Agnosto Pino-
chet. There are those who fear
that General Pinochet and the
extremists of the right who have
his ear, will push the pendulum
all the way back to pre-Frei days.
It might be said that Christian
Democracy got tired in 'Vene-
zuela, got cautious in Chile and
got crushed everywhere else.
? . .
It was not clear to most politi-
cal experts that the Christian
Democratic party of Venezuela,
COPEL had ceased to be a party
of the people by the end of Mr.
Caldera's term. In his earlier
years Mr. Caldera had populist
pretensions. The astounding de-
feat of his hand-picked candidate
and would-be successor, Mr. Fer-
nandez, taught the experts a les-
son, that COPEI had become lit-
tle more than a smooth, slick
machine, a 7sarty that seemed to
have lost its heart.
It is said that in the ? months
preceding the overthrow and
death of Socialist President Salva-
dor Allende. Eduardo Frei had
become a gOlpista, that is some-
one agitating for a coup. That
has not been proved, but it was
clear that prior to the coup Mr.
Frei had aligned himself with the
right wing of the Christian Demo-
cratic party, which had come to
control it mainly through the per-
son of Patricio Aylwin, the party's
president.
? ? ?
Mr. Aylwin's last significant po-
litical act was to refuse to even
talk with President Allende and
the Union Popular government's
representatives. . Some believe
that . wes the strategy that iso-
lated the Allende government and
made the coup a certainty. Mr.
Frei, it is believed, concurred
with that policy, and in doing so
one can see how far he bad trav-
eled since he stood out as Chris-
tian Democracy's shining apostle.
Mr. Frei, Mr. Aylwin Pod Mr.
Caldera are veterans of Chris-
tian Democracy's struggle to suc-
ceed in Latin Arherica. They have
been personally successful, but in
their success they have brought
about a decline in the fortunes
of the movement, or at least sep-
arated it from its miler ideals.
In other countries than Chile and
Venezuela, Christian Democracy.
was smashed from the outside:
smothered in Argentina and
crushed in Brazil. in Bolivia, the
party leader, Benjamin Miguel, is
In prison.
Despite its general decline,
.Christian Democracy is not with-
out outstanding figures. Among
these are Radomiro Tomic, of
Chile, and Andre Franco Montoro,
of Brazil.
'Mr. Tomic was the Christian
Democratic candidate for presi-
dent against Salvador Allende in
1970; he lost and because he lost
his esteem ebbed within the party
and control passed to Mr. Ayl-
win. Now, because of Mr. Ayl-
win's complicity in the coup?
indirect, to .be sure?Mr. Tomic
has ken rehabilitated in .the
eyes of many Christian Demo-
crats.
It is significant, and indicative
of the breadth and vision of the
two men, that Mr. Aylwin blamed
Dr. Allende exclusively for what
befell him. Mr. Tomic spread the
blame around, described the coup
as a result of the failure of all
to make democracy work.
Obviously, Chile is not a com-
fortable place for Mr. Tomic
these. days, and for that reason
he is sojourning in Texas. Brazil
is also not a comfortable place
for Mr. Montoro.
0 0 9 .
Mr. Montero is a Christian
Democrat in Brazil. He is also
a senator, which does not mean
intich since the congre.zs there is
only a collection of puppets con-
trolled by the military govern-
ment. Still, Mr. Montoro manages
to be about as. an effective critic
of the military dictatorship as
anyonee'Ogidelae; while living in
that cotinti ?
Trisfa0410' Athayde is one of
BraziliS':ecatiOst astute political
conniterators. Recently, writing
in Journal do Brasil, he asked
Ilim?elfPne of those rhetorical
questions for which the writer
professes to have no answer. The
question was, is "Christian De-
mocracy in a comatose state or
a changing state?"
No one can be sure, but one
thing is certain: if it is changing
it is changing into something not
as exciting as it once W,11),
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIANDP77---00432R000100320002-0
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0
WASHINGTON PCST
11 March 1974
1-7,-L-aV7ger C?f;11.3 Find NeW Cs-17'7a
0
ein /7-7
` See/ saahei eav
By Terri Shaw
Washington Post Staff Writer
Disturbed by reports of con-
tinuing political repression in
Chile, many of the American
groups that sparked the move-
ment against the Vietnam war
have begen to work together
again to oppose the military
'! junta that overthrew Chilean
'Preeident Saleador Allende.
For Veresle. I masers, young
radicals, chairch groups con-
cerne-d about social justice
and some trade unions have
directed their attention , to
Chile where the, right-wing .
junt'a has done away with!
most.dernocratic institutions.
nSeveral of those organiza-
tions have sent delegations to
1Chile to investigate reports of
the torture of political prison-.
ers and other violations of hu-
!man rights. Others have been
lobbying in Washington to
!gain help for refugees from
the new government and to
j urge a cutoff of U.S. aid to
Chile.
The existence of this new
coalition became apparent at a
;conference on Chile held re-
cently on Capitol Hill under
the sponsorship of several leg-
islators.
The conference, financed by
; the Fend for New Priorities
;for Arrierica, was intended to
be a 5"eyeim for all points of
view about the Lew Chilean
eovernment and its re'saticn-
,F en te the United Steles.
Hon. ever, all U.S. eo,....sna-
rneet officials who had beerd
invited to attend declined, and.
Chilean Ambassador Walter,
Heitmann canceled out at the
lasttraornent.
Several people involved in
organizing the meeting said
they had made a special effort
to convince State Department
officials to attend, but were
told that the conference would
be "biased against the Chilean
junta.' ?
"By not participating they
left the conference even more
unbalanced," one congres-
sional source said. The admin-
istration's failure to partici-
pate "was seen by many peo-
ple on the Mil as a slap by the
Executive Branch at Congress
trying to deal with a foreign
policy issue," he added.
William Meyers, president
of the Fund for New Priorities
which has sponsored about 20
similar meetings on other top-
ics, said it was the first time
the administration had boycot-
ted one.
About 300 listerners, many
of them young, packed a large I
hearing room in the .New Sen- !
ate Office Building to hear
grim_ reports of torture, bun- .
ger and repression from re-
cent visitors to Chile, aca-
demic specialists on Latin
America and Chilean exiles.
Meyer warned the partisan au-
dience several times against
loudly demonstrating its oppo-
sition to the new Chilean gov-
ernment.
Paul Si:, nel, a professor
of eclitteel :cis nce at Frineic-
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
15 March 1974
-..;17Yc(airl'n r
?.?, ?
inmea Nelson 0c:sod:sell
Latin America correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
Santiago, Calle
Chile has long been the most politi-
cized nation in the southern hemi-
sphere. In fact, politics used to be a
way of life here.
But this is now a thing of the past.
Six months after the overthrow of
Salvador Allende Gossens' Marxist
government, Chile's military leaders
have, in effect, declared themselves
the one political force of consequence
in the nation.
They expect ? and will brook ? no
competition.
Normal political activity is vir-
tually in suspension. Not only have
the Marxist parties been proscribed,
but the non-Marxist parties, including
those that supported the military
takeover, have also been put into a
form of limbo.
Hard news for Frei
L.
:ton UnivEr!:.:ty rEn'iriJ ea the edeninistratiee has re-
the eirereenee set an 'eSihieseez
of church groups, independent
!public se." tsrest groups and uni-
versities" ageinnt the Chilean
junta.
"It really has been a na-
tional movement," he added,
pointing out that when U.S.
Marines invaded the .Domin-
can Republic in 1935 "theta
was hardly a Murmur from
the American people."
Laurence Rims, of the New
School for Social Research in
New York City, predicted that
American corporations who in-
vested in Chile under the
junta "will be tirelessly publi-
cized" and perhaps face the
same kind of demonstrations j
as those mounted against com-
panies 'manufacturing napalm
during the Vietnam war.
One of the ? Major goals of j
opponents of the junta is a
suspension of foreign assist- I
ance to the new Chilean gov-
ernment.
An ally in this effort and;
one of the sponsors of the con-
ference is Sen. Eziward
Kennedy (D-Mass.).
Sen. Kennedy said that sev-
eral international investiga-
tions "and the innumerable
personal 'accounts that have
been submitted to my office
disclose the grossest violation
of hurnan rights" in Chile:
Kennedy said that Ceseito
provision in the new f.nrzigit
aid law saying that Chile
; should get no mare rid unti
ihuman rights are protected
ig.77?Cec,a,
s
quested nese military aid for
the junta and is backing new
loans for Chile in the Interna-
tional develcpment banks.
Donald Anderson, assistant
vice president for Latin Amer-
ica for First National City
Bank of New York, and one of
the few at the meeting who
was not critical of the junta,
pointed out that Chile sill
need large ens:sits from the in- I
ternational leading eggeeciez-
to get its economy moving
again.
An indication of the wide-
spread concern about viola-
tions of human rights in Chile
came in a statement issued atee
ter the Capitol Hill conference !
by a group of intellectuals, in-
cluding Roger Baldwin of the
International League for the ,
Rights of Man, and historian
Arthur Schee:ginger Jr.
The statement criticized the
Allende government for
"creating the situation which.
led to the military action. of;
Sept. ll." But it also called ces
the junta "to move quickly to
restore democratic rights and ?
institutions."
The signers of the state-
ment, identified as members
of the Inter-American ea ecia-
tion for Democracy E.Ild Free-
OM, urged the L.
gsrerss-
meat to provide aid -.Z.3 the
junta; but also "to use its gry:r.T
offices in all legitimate
to urge on the junk, ?Lae. ur-
gent need to rests,: e fuectice-
ing democratic preceeses."
This is particularly galling to the
Christian Democrats, and most espe-
cially to their world-renowned leader,
Eduardo Frei Montalva, whose Re-
formist Party has for a decade been
Chile's largest single political force.
They had expected to play a major
role in the military government that
seized power in the wake of Dr.
Allende's overthrow and thus to be in
on the ground floor for an eventual
return to traditional political patterns
In what they hoped would be the not-
too-distant future.
But they have been sadly dis-
appointed. Individual Christian
Democrats are serving in the govern-
ment, but the party itself has been
shunted aside and warned not to
become active. .
La Prensa closed down
The Christian Democrats, angry
over the situation several weeks ago
28
. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0
sent a letter to the military junta
headed by Army Gen, Augusto
Pinchet Ugarte expressing their dis-
pleasure ? an action, it is understood
here, that incensed the military com-
manders.
In the wake of that incident, the
Christian Democrats closed down La
Prensa, the newspaper that had be-
come the party's mouthpiece in San-
tiago, indicating that conditions here
did not permit the paper to operate in
freedom. La Prensa was known to be
having financial difficulties, but it
would probably have been kept alive
if it were not for the military-imposed
press censorship that has cut San-
tiago's 13 dallies down to 5.
The military, for its part, in evolv-
ing its own political philosophy, is
clearly more and more in dis-
agreement with the Christian
Democrats, hlarnire them fcr much
of the difficulty now facing this
'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0.
nation.
A document prepared under mili-
tary guidance and published in the
Santiago newspaper El Mercurio on
the c re of the six-month anniversary
of the Allende ouster outlines military
thinking on the question.
Arguing that "the long period of
decadence" which Chile has under-
gone can be blamed on party politics
and sectarian governments "whose
aims were . . . to increase their elec-
toral base . . . and not in the common
good," the document specifically sin-
gles out the Christian Democrats,
lumping them together with the
Marxist parties that supported Dr.
Allende.
'International' ties cited
It even goes so far as to say that
Christian Democratic philosophy is of
foreign origin. "Marxism and Chris-
tian democracy ? were 'inter-
national' in many and important
aspects," it states.
In working out a new concept of
government, the document indicates
the military is interested in some-
thing "not influenced by the concepts
and attitudes that have brought us to
decadence and disintegration."
There is no doubt that the military
includes the Christian Democrats in
this along with the Communists, So-
cialists, and other leftist parties that
worked with Dr. Allende.
In effect, what the military is
saying, according to a source close to
the junta, is simply this: The political
ideas supported by more than two
thirds of the Chilean electorate in
recent elections are to be discarded.
T-eiid long recogniz ed
There never was any doubt that this
was to be the fate of Dr. Allende's own
Socialist Party and its close collabo-
rator, the Communist Party, which
together represented a good third of
the electorate.
But now it is clear that this includes
also the Christian Democrats, whose
political base is another third of the
national electorate.
This is bound to leave a major
political vacuum ? but such concerns
do not seem to worry the military.
The military leaders are convinced
of the rightness of their cause and
they indicate they have the patience
and muscle to sit out any opposition
that the policy encounters. Moreover,
the military displays a determination
to take the program to the people and
win them over.
Whether such an effort will be
successful remains to be seen_ But the
military certainly is not going' to allow
any organized political qpposidon in
the effort.
29
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100320002-0
NEW YORK TIMES
10 March 1974
1
tl()RJ Standard
By Tom Wicker .
Two items from The New York
Times:
March 8, 8, 1974: "Secretary of State
Kissinger told a Senate committee to-
day that he would recommend a veto
of the Nixon Administration's own
trade bill if Congress refused to grant
trade concessions to the Soviet Union
because of its restrictions on the free
emigration of Jews and others."
Feb. 28, 1974: "[A high United States
official] pointed out that the Central
Intelligence Agency had rejected an
offer by the International Telephone
and Telegraph Corporation of $1 mil-
lion in September, 1970, to be spent
in Chile to defeat the Socialist candi-
date for the presidency, Salvador Al-
lende Gossens., The offer was made
to Richard M. Helms, who was then
the Director of Central Intelligence,
03111128?10111?1011%.? .-4,160.11.1.M131:68=9.11111
- IN THE -NATION
"The Chilean
siozy is . . .
in sad contiast
to Mr. Kissinger's
positipn
on Soviet
emigration
policies."
by the agency's former director, John
A. McCone, who had become an I.T.T.
board member."
There is no particular connection
between these two items?except that
there is now an intensive effort in
Congress to deny most-fav,ored-nation
trading status to the*Soviet Union if
it continues to restrict the emigration
-of Jews; and that there was in 1970,
and throughout his presidency, an in-
tense effort by I.T.T. and others to
prevent or destroy Mr. Allende's Gov-
ernment in Chile. But the Nixon Ad-
ministration that Mr. Kissinger repre-
sented throughout the period did not
threaten or disapprove the latter ef-
fort; quite the contrary.
The C.I.A. did turn down the I.T.T.
money (although nothing seems to
have been done about the scandalous
attempt by a former-C.I.A. director to
bribe the agency, with private money,
to undertake interference in the inter-
nal politics of another country). But
the Nixon Administration restricted
that Government's ability to get for-
eign credit and cut off foreign aid to
it, continuing only to supply arms and
training to the Chilean military.
Thus, it was troops trained by' the
United States and armed with Amer-
ican weapons who overthrew the Al-
lende Government last fall end?as
?
now seems certain?murdened Mr: Al-
lende.
There are numerous evidences .that
the officers who ordered the bloody
coup and the later execution of What
appears to have been thousands of
Chileans were encouraged in their
planning by American supporters,
both official and unofficial. Nor did
the Nixon' Administration and its em-
bassy officials in Santiago distinguish
themselves in saving the lives of ref-
ugees, including some Americans._
. The Chilean story is only gradually
coming to light, but what is known is
in sad contrast to Mr. Kissinger's po-
sition on Soviet emigration policies.
He said he regards detente as of such
overriding importance that the United
States must not endanger it by trying
to influence- internal Soviet polities.
On the other hand, in pursuit of
what it conceived to be the national
interest, the Nixon Administration-ap-
pears to have been a considerable in-
'fluence in the opposition to, and over-
throw of, the Allende Government.'
Before that, of course, various Amer-
ican Governments had had a hand in
numerous interventions (for example,
the overthrow of Guatemala's elected
left-wing Government in the nineteen-
fifties). ? -
This reflects a double standard if
ever there was one. It is a double
standard' in the sense that Amerian
interests (as perceived by the Admin-
istration in power) may require inter-
vention in one country's internal af-
fairs but forbid it in another. It is an
even more deplorable double standard
in that it seems to permit interven-
tion for certain selfish political or eco-
nomic purposes but not for the pur-
pose of upholding human rights.:
This is not necessarily to argue that
Mr. Kissinger is altogether wrong on
the Soviet emigration question; There
is in fact much to support his position.
Anyway, to take a stand for human
rights. in the Soviet Union might seem
a bit ludicrous, since the Administra-
tion has such strong ties to Greece,
the Chilean junta, Spain, Portugal,
Smith Vietnam, South Korea, the-Phil-
ippines and other strong-arm govern-
ments.
The members of Congress who are
demanding Soviet concessions on emi-
gration, morever, have their own dou-
ble standard: they are not so vocal
about Chilean refugees, of whom only
a handful have been admitted to this
country, or about human rights iii the
numerous other repressive gorern-
ments to which they annually, vote
military and other forms of aid. The
Jewish emigration question, after all,
is of interest to Many of them only for
obvious domestic political reasons.
Under the auspices of the Fund for
New Priorities, some of the same mem-
bers of Congress did take part the
other day in public hearings on the
situ_aticn in Chile. That would be an
excellent place for them to show a
more general concern for human rights
?as well as for the established Amer-
ican double standard tat--.-ard these
rights.