IMPEACHMENT DEMANDS AND MORE INVESTIGATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77-00432R000100270001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 20, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 28, 1973
• Content Type: NSPR

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CONFIDENTIAL
NEWS, VIEWS
and ISSUES
INTERNAL USE ONLY
This publication contains clippings from the
domestic and foreign press for YOUR
BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use
of selected items would rarely be advisable.
No. 48 2 NOVEMBER 1973
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
1
GENERAL
22
NEAR EAST
28
Destroy after b dkgrounder
has served its purpose or
within 60 days?
CONFIDENITAL
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WASHINGTON POST
28 October 1973
Impeachment Pemands and Morenvestigations
?
By Lawrence Meyer , ?.
Wit,thinittrin Post Staff Writer 1
( President Nixon's dramatic decisior0
'tr, finally turn over nine White House
?ta pc recordings and other materials-;
to Chief U.S. District Judge John ?J.
'Sirica ? \still leaves him facing three :
congressional resolutions for his im-
peachment and others calling for new ,
investigations of his conduct in office. i
"The president's belated action" on,
the tapes, the 29 cosponsors of one t
,I-louse impeachment resolution said in';
111 statement last week, "removes only
,one of the grounds on which we
!'Sought impeachment.
.
Although White House actions don.'
snerted with the Watergate affair are i
of impeachment, the congreSsional'i
the focus for much of the considera-'
land remaining ? prosecutorial investi-
gations extend far beyond Watergate
Lto include:
F, ? President Nixon's personal'.
ifinances.
? Receipt by President Nixon's close
ifriend, Charles G. (Bebe) Rebozo,'.of.
$100,000 in cash from an emissary of
;Howard He-hcs in 1969 and 1970.
G m '
? overnent actions atifecting ,
Rebozo's monopoly bank and a new
!?savings and loan association in Key.,
Biscayne.
? Campaign contributions ma 'e to,
J'resident Nixon by dairymen who re-,
ceived an increase in milk price sup-.
ports in a reversal of Administration
%policy.
? The settlement of the federal antV
?trust action against ITT.
'? ? President Nixon's short-lived de- '
'cision to implement a. domestic sur-,44
Irveillance plan that his advisers Me
!told him contained "clearly illegal";
.elements.
Y?. Involved in the ITT matter is a
-spledge of a $400,000 campaign contri-,
:bution by ITT to the Republican. Party,
;and the settlement of the Justice
De-
'partment's antitrust suit against the
'international conglomerate. '
,
A March 30, 1972 memo from the ",';
special Presidential counsel Charles'
W. Colson to then White House chief
of staff H. ?R. (Bob) Halde-
man warned that Senate.
, Judiciary Committee hear-
ings then in progress 'could,
produce revelations about
' the ITT case that "would
?
lay this case on the Presi-
Ident's doorstep." Such testi-,
mony was not given at those, ,
, hearings.
The Senate committee
staff also is investigating'
the two separate contri-,
butions of $50,000 each ,*
m'ade in 1969 and 1970 by an ,
emissary of billionaire re-
cluse Howard Huges to
Charles G. (Bebe) Rebozo,',
,Mr. Nixon's close friend. ?
According to Rebozo, he
.held the contributions in a..
ApproveaFor
safe deposit box for three Calif. with the aid of a loan ' "We have had such alitu-
years and then returned'
from industrialist R`pbert, ation, we have been 'ion-
'them to one of Hughes' law-
Abplanalp who later Ipur- fronted with it, we are dpal-
yers. Mr. Nixon said at his': chased, property back from' ing with it, and I will
press conference Friday ,Mr. Nixon With Rebozo as :I*4 say to you tonight that this,
'night that the money was in-' silent partner, and the' ex-. . nation?Republicans, Deina4
tended to be a contribution' penditure of neatly $10 ml!-.;
crats, Independents, 'all'i
for his 1972 campaign. ,lion in public funds to makel Americans?can have confi-,?
? RichardG Danner, an
improvements in, and dence in the fact that the'
,aging director of the , around i,Mr. ss Nixqn's homes' ? (Attorney) General, Elliot
Hughes-owned Sands Hotel; in San Clapente and Key., Richardson, and the special
Vegas, said in a Sept. 4 de-; and gambling casino in Las Biscayne: ' s' prosecutor that he wilf'ap-
.:
The mbSt :recent' revela- ,point in this case will have
position that the first ? $50,-s; ton concerning ekpendi,-., the total cooperation of ;the
'000 was intended for Mr.' tures .of public funds for Mr, ;executive branch-of thik-gov!
Nixon's 1968 presidentiati 'Nixon's retreats was, the re- ernment." ? ? ?
campaign?even though it port that almost $2.4' million, Less than six months4
was given after the fact--*' ?More than was spent by ? ,later, Elliot Richardson re,
sand that the second $50,000. , his three immediate prede-: 'signed as Attorney General'
was for the 1970 congres-'! cessors combined?has been. ,after stating his unwilling-'
sional campaigns. / spent on Camp David since!, .ness to comply with an or-1
A deposition by Robert .A. , :Mr. Nixon assumed office,: , der from President Nixon to!
Maheu, former manager of five years ago. Of this total; , :fire Special Watergate Pros-
Hughes' Nevada operations, t $150,000 was ? spent for a , ecutor Archibald Cox. Ac-
, gives no clear indication'of ; swimming pool next to the ; cording to Cox' statements
why the first $50,000 contri- 'presidential lodge in 1969. 'at a press conference earlier;
bution was made, but states,' The Senate -,select Water- in the day he was fired:,
that the second $50,000 pays.* gate committee la expected President Nixon had been;
ment was connected to ef- to inquire further into the' giving less than "total coop-,
forts by Hughes to persuade, ITT settlement when it re- eration" to the special pros4
? Mitchell, then attorney gen- sumes, its ,hearings next , secutor's investigation of the
eral, to overrule objections '
week:** * .? '? !Watergate affair.
'by the Justice Department's The t:sSenate*. -committee President Nixon's actions
'antitrust division to a pro- staff also ,, investigating,: ?concerning Cox and the
posed acquisition of another the relationship between tapes form the basis of an
hotel and gambling casino
contributions ' of"$427,500" :impeachment resolution In-
in Las Vegas. s
from three dairy coopera-? !troduced by Rep. Jerome
'
Although Maheu and Dan-
tives in 1971 and 1972 much 1Waldie ? (D-Calif.) and co-
'ner disagree about the pur-
of it to secret Nixon cam- isponsored by 29 other Demo-4
pose of the contributions,
paign committees, and ,the ;!crats. The resolution accuses,
their sworn statements also reversal of a decision by the :Mr. Nixon of obstructing the:,
conflict with President Nix-. Department of Agriculture :'adminigtration of justice by
'
on's explanation. 'not to increase its milk ,forcing the resignation of,'
IVIaheu also states in ' hisprice support levels. r Richardson, by firing Dep-
deposition that Rebozo "had Dairy co-op leaders said ,uty Attorney General Wil '
been chosen bk Mr. Nixon the President's decision rais- :Ham D. Ruckelshaus and by
as the person to whom the /116 the price 'Support level 'firing Cox, contrary to the!
money should be, delivered." fram 75 percent to 85 per President's promise to the,:
? Questions also have been cent of parity added from ?Senate, made, through Rich-i
raised about the Nikon ad-; $560 million to $700 million tardson, not to interfere with'?
ministration's decision to to dairy farmers income. ,',the 'special prosecutor's in-
refuse to grant a bank char-.1 A' document reeently un- (vestigation.
ter to Florida businessmen' earthed by the White }louse But the charges outlined
seeking to open a competi-.1 -in connection with civil, in the Waldie resolution,
tor to Rebozo's bank on KeT., gation shows that top White 'form only one potential ba-;
Biscayne. The administra-i; House aides and fund rais- sis for impeachment. In a:
tion twice overruled strong , ers originally expected $2 'statement by Waldie on Oct.i
recommendations 'from two million in contributions 23 he described Mr. Nixon's
federal bank examiners re- . from segments,of. the dairy actions as "a cover-up of a
!
'commending the competi- industry. cover,-up, an obstruction of
tive charter. ? . The most extensive public processes of justice aimed at
Just a month after 'the/ record to date, however,
Treasury Department's, concerns the Watergate af-j those guilty of obstructing?
.justice."
'PresidenV Nixon's own
' fair. President 'Nixon's own
comptroller of the currency ?
public statements acknowl-,'
'ruled that the rival group ?
,had shown only a "marginal. public statements as well as -edge that he took steps tti'.
banking need" in Key
the testimony of present ' confine the original Water-
cayne, the Federal Home s 'and former aides before the gate investigation so that It,
'Loan Board granted two d 'Senate select Watergate' would not reveal activities;
i-e
'rectors of Rebozo's bank as committee form a founda- of the special White House.
,
'charter for a new savings
tion for efforts to tie the investigations unit popu.s
and loan institution in Key.i
President to the Watergate larly known as "the plums.:
,
Biscayne. Rebozo will be the: hers."
cover-up.
landlord for the new institu- s "Many times in the his- It was the plumbers, a
:
tion.
tory of our country," Mr. group that included Water-
In addition, questions -Nixon said on May 9, , gate conspirators E. Howard
,' ;
have been raised concerning "administrations have failed Hunt Jr., G. Gordon Liddy,
Mr. Nixon's personal fi-4 ? to meet the test of investi- Bernard L. Barker and Euge-
nances, including a mop(); gating those charges that nio' R. Martinez, who were
tax savings he 'realized b' might, be embarrassing to responsible for the break-in
the donation of prepresiden-
the administration because at the offices of Daniel Ells-'
tial papers to the National ? s
they were made against: berg's psychiatrist in Sep-
Archives, the purchase of
high. officials in an adminis-; tember 1971. ?
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T.June 17, 1972 break-in at thel
, Watergate offices of the ,
Democratic National Com-
mitteet the FBI had discov-
ered that $114,000 in five':
Iseparate, checks had passed.
;through Barker's bank ac-
count from two sources,';
'Kenneth ?. Dahlberg, later
;-identified as a fund-raiser
:.?for President Nixon's re-
'election, campaign and from
Ogarrio, a Mexican
;lawyer. ?
What the FBI did not ;
know sotnetime
.%July, 1972, according to thei
'testimony 'of former acting ;
, FBI. Director L. Patrick'
Gray, wa:s that the money ;
belonged to the Committee
for the Re-election of the
;President
fs,' Within a matter of hours :
after the break-in, the Wash-
3tigton metropolitan, police;
;and the FBI had found evi-.1
i'dence connecting Hunt ? to
the Watergate operation.;,
Barker And Martinez were '
;Already in police custody. ??,.
. The arrest of Barker and ;
Martinez coupled with the"
jeads to Hunt provided at ?
least one possible motive for,
the White House cover-up ? :
concern that the Ellsberg
break-in, and the other activ-
ities' of the plumbers might
be exposed. ?
The Dahlberg check and ?
'the checks from Ogarrio
which have come to be
'known as the "Mexican:
money" -- provided a sec-
ond possible motive, for the;
cover-up since they were the ,
only documentary evidence;
'In the hands of law enforce-
ment authorities linking the ,
five 'men caught inside the ;
'Watergate with the Nixon
;re-election committee.
Had the Dahlberg and
Mexican checks been sup-'
.pressed in some way, a ma-
jor link to the re-election
'committee would have been"
eliminated. Testimony be-
?fore the Senate committee;
indicates that the white;
-House did, in fact, attempt:
'to suppress the Dahlberg:,
and Mexican checks.
Mr. Nixon, for his part,,
has given the following ac-
count in his' May 22 state-,i
ment of what he had done!
--; and why:
"Elements of the early:
post-Watergate reports led',
'me to suspect, incorrectly,
that the CIA had been in,'
some way involved. They,
also led Me to surmise, cor-
rectly, that since persons ;
originally recruited for co-
vert national security activi-
ties had participated in'
Watergate, an unrestricted
investigation of Watergate ?
. might lead to and expose
:those covert n'ational secu-.
,rity operations..
"I sought to prevent the;
exposure of these covert na-',
;tional security activities::
;while encouraging those:
,conducting the investigation
-to pursue their inquiry into
?the Watergate itself. I so in-',
!Structed my staff, the Afton'.
;ney General and the acting,
'director of the FBI.
"I also instructed Mr
Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlich-
man (presidential domestic
adviser John D. Elulichinan)3
to ensure that the FBI
;would not carry its investi-
gation into areas that mighti
m
'copromise these covert na.ii
'tional security activities, or
those of the CIA.",
? Former CIA ' Director.
Richard Helms testified that
he had informed acting FBI'
iDirector Gray on June 22
;"that the CIA had no in-
volvement in the break-in.
:No involvement whatever." ,
On June 23 both Helms;
and deputy CIA Director Lt.
Gen. Vernon A. Walters
were summoned to an after-;
noon meeting at the White
1, House where they met with
Haldeman and Ehrlichman.
Helms and 'Walters later tes-l!
"'tined in substantial agree.
ment that at the nieeting;
Haldeman did most of the
talking. Helms said he as-i
oured Haldeman that the;
I; CIA had nothing to do with ?',
,:the break-in. . ,!
'Nevertheless, according to"
;Helms and Walters, Halde-,,
man instructed Walters to?
, speak to Gray, "and indicate ,
;to him," Helms testified,t
?"that these:" operations?)
:these investigations of the 'I
-FBI might run into CIA op-;
;erations in Mexico and 'that i
it Was desirable that this not;
happen and that the investi-
gation, therefore, should be;
, either tapered off' or re-1
duced' or something, :butt,
;there was zio language say-
ing stopped, as far as I, re- I
The testimonies of Wal- ,
ters and Gray differ in de- ,
tail and emphasis over what.
happened in the following \
'days. What emerges clearly,';
:however, is an attempt by
!the White House, according
"to Gray's testimony, to stop:
the FBI from interviewing;
Ogarrio and Dahlberg on'.
the grounds that the CIA
had an "interest" in them. ;
i Walters and Helms, ac-
,cording to their testimony.:
, and Gray's, at no time ex-;
. pressed any "interest" in ei-
ther man, however, and by'
, July 6, Gray said, he had de-
cided to proceed with the in-
terviews. 4
The importance of the in-1
terviews was underlined by
, Gray ih his testimony when'
? pointed out that the
checks written by Ogarrio
and Dahlberg were "the,
Only money chain that we
? had right at that point in
time. Without it, the FBI
and the prosecution ,team
had nothing to connect the '
, Watergate burglars finan-
?cially with the re-election
' committee. ? ?
tl The other concern referrecf,
"to by President Nixon In
his May 22 statement as jus-
,,tification ,for limiting the;
Watergate investigation was!
that the activities of the,
!plumbers Might be exposed."
, President Nixon- said in:
Ms May 22.statement that in;
instructing White House!
;aide Egil M. (Bud) Krogh Jr.!
.on the duties to be pep:::
'formed by the plumbers, "I',
did not authorize and had;
,no knowledge of any illegal;
:means to be used."
;Nixon went on to Say, "AS: ?
'President, I must and do as-,?
sume responsibility for such;
!actions despite the fact that! ;
tI, at no time approved or , ?
had knowledge of them."
When Mr. Nixon did learn'
of the Ellsberg break-in, on'
March 17, 1973, according to'',
his statement on Aug. 15, he,i,
apparently did nothing to
disclose the incident to the
; judge in the Ellsberg
'In fact, when he learned;
'that the Justice Department
had found out about the:,
Ellsberg break-in, Mr. Nixon
by his own admission
at-
tempted to stop them from
?Investigating the incident. ,
, "I considered it my re-
sponsibility to see that thel
;Watergate investigation- did".
; not impinge adversely, upon:,
: the national security area,"
, Mr. Nixon said by way of ex-
, planation in his May 22,,
, statement.
; Mr. Nixon was informed /
'-by Attorney General Rich-
ard, G. Kleindienst on April
25 that, the trial judge in the '
Ellsberg trial, U.S.' District ?
Judge W. Matt Byrne Jr,,'
should be informed of the .
l'Ellsberg break-in.,
According to testimony ?
'before the Watergate coin-
nattee, Kleindienst and As-
sistant Attorney General':
4
l'erations in order to cover up
l,any hivolvement they or cer- ,
?tain others might have had';
hi Watergate." 4
. In addition to questions;
'that have been raised by the'
1. 'Los Angeles grand jury, the
' Watergate specialprosecul
; tor and by members of the,,
;Senate committee as, to,
,whether the Ellsberg break-i
'In was a legitimate national
security activity, the clues=
'tion must be confronted:
whether President Nixon.
;bears legal responsibility for;
,the allegedly illegal acts of':
his subordinates whether he;
; was ignorant of those acts?::
'as he claims?or not. ?
; Although the law is not"
;settled on the point, accord.,
Ang to legal experts, some',
constitutional lawyers sep'
precedent f o'r holding Mr.
',Nixon responsible and cul-,
"%pable for illegal activities;
engaged in by his, aides.
? One U.S. Supreme Court!
case cited in re Yamashita,1
involving the commandini
:general of Japanese forces
;in the Philippine Islands in;
;World War II who was',
'charged, tried and convicted'
?for war crimes ? committed:
:by his troops. Yamashita, as
the court pointed out in the ;
:majority opinion, was tried
,for his failure to take meas- ,
'tires to prevent violations of,
:the law of war. .
"The law of war," Abe_
, court ? said, "presupposes.,
that its violation is to be
,avoided through the control
.of ,the operations of war by
commanders who are to.,
some extent responsible for
'their subordinates." The ef-
fect of the court's opinion'
was to uphold the conviction':
of Yamashita, who was exe-;
-cuted.
1, In a dissenting opinion,!
? Justice Frank Murphy.;
warned of "dangerous impli-
cations of the procedure I
sanctioned today. No one in1
a position of command in an ,
army, from sergeant to gen-
eral, can escape those impli-1
,cations. Indeed, the fate, of:
some future President of
the United States and hisl
chiefs of staff and military
advisers may well have been;
sealed by this decision." .;
' The United States govern-
ment also has maintained in,
'litigation from time to time,
? that corporation heads are;
responsible for the acts of;
subordinates, whether the;
officers knew of the acts or;
not.
What Mr. Nixon might!
have done to prevent the ,
cover-up is not entirely;
clear from the public rec-
ord. Haldeman and Ehrlich-1
man testified that Mr. Nixon!
periodically asked about the:
status of the investigation:
and urged on several occa-
sions that the White House ?
issue statement setting forth
the full facts on the Water-
gate affair.
Invariably, according to,
Henry Petersen had agreed
that they would resign if:
? Mr. Nixon refused to allow&
them to report their find-
''ings on the Ellsberg break-
In to Byrne.
,The report was made and,
Byrne declared a mistrial,
! dim:Rasing the charges
; against Ellsberg and code- ,
fendant Anthony Russo. .
Mr. Nixon's assertion that,:,
;the Ellsberg break-in in-
volved a matter of national
security apparently was not ;
; shared by Kleindienst, Pet-'
ciersen, Byrne or the. Los An.
geles County grand jury'
that indicted ,Ehrlichman,
Krogh, Liddy and former
;White House aide David(
Young for their alleged par-
ticipation in the, incident.
? Despite his acknowledge-
1ment that he attempted to
restrain both the Watergate
investigation and the Ells-
' berg break-in inquiry, Mr.
' Nixon said, in his statement
of May 22, that it "appears',
that there were persons who
may have gone beyond my'
' directives, and sought to ex-
pand' on my efforts to pro-
it.ect the national security op- .4
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the testimony of Ha1deman7
and Ehrlichman,
'House counsel John Dean,
prevented full disclosure, ate 1.
, gide g thtit it would jeopard-,?
ize the rights of defendants.
to a fair trail.
Former Attorney General;
John N. Mitchell testified to,1
the Senate committee that
111.- Nixon asked him only
o e about the Watergate
affair, shortly after the
'break-in:
Gray 'testified that he
warned President Nixon on;
July 6, 1911,2, that some of his
aides Were trying to,
"mortally 'wound" him. Ac-'
; cording to Gray, Mr. Nixon.
? did not pursue the point.
According to Mr. Nixon's-
account, given at his Aug.
,22. 1973, press conference?
"whether the term used was
'mortally wounded' or not, I.
On not know. Some believe:
that it was. Some believe
that it wasn't. That is irrele-
vant. He could have said
that..
? "I told him to go forward,
with a full press on the in-:
vestigation, to which he has
so testified. It seemed to me
that with that kind of direce?
.tive to Mr. Gray that was
adequate for the purpose of
out the responsibili-
ties. As far as the individu-
als were concerned, I as-
sume that the individuals
that he was referring to in-.
volved ? this operation with,
the CIA."
According to White House
aide RiChard Moore, on May
8, 1973, Mr. Nixon told him,
in a conversation: " 'I have'
racked my brain, I, have
searched my mind. Were ;
there any clues I should
have seen that should have ,
tipped me off?' He said,
'Maybe there were ... I
'know how it is when you
have la lot on your mind,
,and I did,' but, he said, 'I
, still wonder.' "
According to Dean, Presi-,
dent Nixon had indicated,
.knowledge of the cover-up
, in conversations with Dean
dating from September,
1972. Dean's testimony im-
plicating Mr. Nixon has
been denied by Haldeman,
Ehrlichman and President
Nixon.
In the course of several
meetings between Feb. 27
and March 21, 1973, accord-
ing to Dean, he laid out the
cover-up for Mr. Nixon, giv-
ing the most detailed de-
scription in the meeting of:
March 21. Dean said his
briefing of Mr. Nixon in-
cluded allegations involving
Mitchell, Haldeman and;
Ehrlichman.
In his speech to the na-
tion on April 30, 1973, Mr.
Nixon said that on March ?
21, "I personally assumed
-the responsibility for coordi-
nating intensive new inquir-
.les into the matter and
"personally ordered those 7
'conducting, the investiga-
? lions to get all the facts and ;
to report them directly to
me, right here in this of-
Lice."
None of the persons in-
volved officially with thei
Watergate investigation?II
-Attorney General Klein-
dienst, Assistant ? Attorney.,
General Petersen or acting:
FBI Director Gray?re- ;
ceived any such intruetions'
from Mr. Nixon according to
their testimony before the
committee. Ehrlichman said
he was asked by Mr. Nixon
on March 29 to conduct an:
inquiry, but Ehrlichman ref-
used to eharacterize the in-,
terviews he had with half a
dozen persons as ,an
"investigation."
In his Aug. 22 press con-
ference, Mr. Nixon said he
was referring to in investi-
gation conducted by Dean?
which Dean denies conduct-
ing?to the investigation'
done by Ehrlichman, to Mr.'
Nixon's own interviews with.
Dean,. Mitchell, Haldeman
and Ehrlichman and to one
other incident. ?
"I also had a contact made
with the Attorney General
'himself," Mr. Nixon said,
"and . . told him?this was
*on the 27th of March?to re-
'port to me directly anything
that he found in this partic-
ular area . .,." Kleindienst's
,testimony did not reflect'
such a contact.
' On April 15, When nothing;
had yet been made public by
':Mr. Nixon about any investi-
gation, he met with- Klein-
dienst and Assistant Attor-:
ney General Petersen, who,.
'according to their ' testi-.
mony, informed Mr. Nixon
,,,of/ evidence the , Watergate
prosecutors had implicating
'Mitchell, Haldeman and
Ehrlichman among others.
;Petersen said he recom-
? mended that Haldeman and
Ehrlichman be discharged.
Mr. Nixon did not an-
nounce the resignations of
'Haldeman and Ehrlichman,
'however, for another two
weeks. In the interim, Mr.,
Nixon met twice with the
'lawyer, Jolm J. Wilson, re-
tamed by both men. Neither
Wilson nor Mr. Nixon has
disclosed what those meet-
ings involved.
, In his Aug. 22 press eon-
ferenc2, ;n response to a
, question,. Mr. Nixon denied
that he was coordinating
'anyslefense of himself with
that for Haldeman and Ehrl-
ichman.
Although Mr. Nixon asked
Haldeman to listen to tape
recordings of presidential
conversations?once before
'Haldeman resigned and;
!Once after he resigned in
July, 1973?Mr. Nixon has
declined to turn over five
tapes sought by the Senate
ApproveMilaiegedhdi it10107
NEW YORK TIMES
31 October 1973
House Panel Starts Inquiry
,
On bripeachtnent Question
,
, *E
Would have no standing in a
Approves Wade Subpoena Hpuse impeachment inquiry.
.
That view was expressed by
' Power for Chairman. ' Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., the
' historian, in a letter he sent
in Partisan Split ? last Friday to Mr. Rodino and
- 1 iother members of the Judiciary
, By JAMES M. NAUGHTON . Committee. The letter said, in
1
i sentat-to The New York Times part, that "Whatever merit" Mr.
WASHINGTON, Oct. 30?The Nixon's position might have in
House Judiciary Committee be; normal circumstances, "that
gan consideration of possible claim is automatically and
impeachment of President totally dissolved" when the
Nixon today with a partisan'
dispute over the grant of broad
subpoena power to its chair-
, man, Representative Peter W,
Rodino Jr., Democrat of New
?
? Jersey.
? In straight party-line votes,
' ;I to 17, the Democratic ma-
jority rejected 'two Republican
amendment S and then adopted
i resolution permitting Mr.
I Andino to issue subpoenas.
without the consent of the full
cammittee. ?
'? ' The dispute marred Demo-
cratic efforts to set a biparti-
san tone to the inquiry that
:will eventually culminate in a
committee decision whether to
urge the House of Representa-
? tives 'either to impeach the
..President or to drop the inves-
tigation. ?
Mr. Rodino pledged to use
'`the authority judicionsly and
the Republicans portrayed the
'issues as no more than a pro-
cedural "test vote" on whether
the inquiry into President
',Nixon's conduct would be hi-
:partisan. However, the decision
-:could ultimately have a signi-
ficant impact ,on the impeach-.
ment process.
Some member's of the com-
mittee , believe that Mr.
'Nixon's assertion of executive
privilege as the basis for deny-
ing White House tape record-
ings or documents to Govern-
ment and Senate investigators
seeking them in court.
In' refusing to turn over
the tapes to the committee,
Mr. Nixon made the follow-
ing statement: "The fact is
that the tapes would not fi-
nally settle the central is-
sues before your committee.
'Before their existence be-
came publicly known, I per-
sonally, listened to a number
of them. The tapes are en-
tirely consistent with what I
;know to be the truth and
what I have stated to be the
'truth. However, as in any
verbatim recording of infor- ?
mal conversations, they con-
tain comments that persons
with different perspectives'
and motivations would inevi-
President's 'continuance in of-
fice becomes the issue of im-
peachment proceedings.
Mr. Rodino sought this morn-
ing to assure the Republican
members of the committee that
"there will be no wholesale
issuing of subpoenas." He said
that on each subpoena he
would consult with the panel's
ranking Republican, Represen-
tative Edward Hutchinson. of
Michigan. ?
Partisan Maneuvering
But the subpoena issue soon
became the focal point of less-
than-subtle maneuvers by both
sides.
Representative Tom Rails-
back, Republican of Illinois,
warned that bipartisanship
would be an essential ingredi-
ent in the impeachment inquiry
and said that the Democratic
majority could "demonstrate its
good faith" by amending the
resolution to permit Mr. Hutch-
inson to share in the authority
to issue subpoenas.
"This is a kind of test vote,"
said another Republican, David
W. Dennis of Indiana. "If we
really mean it, here's the place
to begin bipartisanship."
The resolution also gave Mr.
Rodino authority to issue sub-:
poenas in the committee's
forthcoming hearings on Presi,
dent Nixon's nomination of
Representtaive Gerald R. Ford,
the House minority leader, to
be Vice President.
Noting pleas from Republi-
cans for quick action on the
nomination, Mr. Rodino said
pointedly that confirmation of
the Michigan Republican could
be facilitated by a .iding com-
plicated subpoena procedures.
Move to Halt Debate
After 40 minutes of disput-
ing, Representative Jack Brooks,
Democrat of Texas, demanded
a vote on whether to "give the
Republicans a veto on sub-
poenas."
Republican members noisily
objected to shutting off the de-
bate, amid loud groans among
the Democrats and shouts of
"regular order," a parliamentary
call for adherence to the com-
mittee rules.
Mr. Rodino permitted th&
argument to continue after Mr.
Dennis asked, "It is the desire
of the majority to begin this
inquiry by cutting off free de-
bate?"
Some 20 minutes later, for
11145P7451011IMO 1(antiemeirtirgte iv Lawrence
?gin, Republican of Maryland,
Approved
For Release 2001/08/07
lobjected that "we seem to have
ja steamroller rolling here" and
Representative James R. Mann,
,Democrat of South Carolina,
'suggested drily that Mr. Rodino
was being prevented from "dis-
playing his bipartisanship," the
committee voted on the Rails-
back amendment.
- ? : 'Real Bipartisanship?"
, One after another, the 21
Democrats voted, no and the
17 Republicans voted yes. '
: "Real bipartisanship?" Repre-
sentative Barbara' C. Jordan,
Democrat of Texas, observed in
a stage whisper:
' Undaunted, Representative
Robert McClory, Republcian of
Illinois, offered an amendment
that would have authorized Mr.
Hutchinson to issue subpoenas
in addition to, rather than in
concert with, Mr. Rodino. '
The chairman said that he
would "respect" and republican
4requests for subpoenas. Mr. Mc-
Clory said that his amendment
would merely "spell out precise-
ly what the chairman said."
And Representative George E.
Danielson,' Democrat of Calif-,
fornia, protested that the com-
mittee could not "operate with
two chairman."
. A roll-call vote on the amend-
ment failed, by the same parti-
san split, 21 to 17. The resolu-
tion itself finally passed on a
third roll-call division along
party lines.
Thus began the second formal
inquiry in the nation's history,
and the first in 105 years, into
the possible impeachment of a
President.
Mr. Rodino told the com-
mittee that he would not con-
duct a "witch hunt" and that
he-would not hold the nomina-
tion of Mr. Ford "hostage," as
some House Democrats have
urged, until the impeachment
inquiry was completed.
' The committee chairman
gave no indication when hear-
ings might begin on either the
Ford nomination or the 13 im-
peachment resolutions submit-
ted to the panel so far. He re-
ferred, however, to a "high
level of intensity and urgency"
surrounding the impeachment
movement and said that he did
not believe "this crisis in au-
thority can be permitted to
continue for a long duration."
1In the Senate, one Demo-
cratic member took the floor
today to suggest that Mr. ?
Nixon resolve the issue by re-
signing.
"He must leave office for ?
the common good," Senator
John V. Tunney of California'.
declared. "The people do not,
believe him, and he has shamed
them."
"Our country simply cannot:
sustain three mor years of such
distrust, despair and disillusion-
ment," he went on. "The mysti-
,Pal bond that unites the gov-
erned with the governor has
been severed. In the name of
common decency, Mr. Nixon
should put his nation ahead of,
himself and step aside so that
the process of national renewal
and revitalization an begin." ,
: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100270001-7
Why
We Are
Shaken
By Anthony Lewis
? WASHINGTON, Oct. 28?In answer-
ing the first questidn at his press con-
ference Friday, President Nixon
brought up the case of Aaron Burr as
a precedent to support his continued
withholding of Presidential papers. He
said:
"You remember the famous case in-
volving Thomas Jefferson where Chief
Justice Marshall, then sitting as a trial
jtidge, subpoenaed a letter which Jef-
ferson had written which Marshall
thought or 'felt was necessary evi-
dence in the trial of Aaron Burr. Jef-
ferson refused to do so, but it did not
result in a suit. What happened was,
of course, a compromise in which a
,summary of the contents of the letter
which was relevant to the trial was
produced by Jefferson. . . ."
The historical facts are as follows:
The letter at issue was not from Jef-
ferson but to him, from Gen. James
Wilkinson. Jefferson did not refuse to
cooperate in the matter; indeed he of-
fered to be examined under oath in
Washington. And he did not produce a
mere "summary'! of the letter. He
gave the entire original letter to the
U.S. Attorney, George Hay, who of-
fered it to the court for copying and
use of "those parts which had relation
to the cause."
In short; Mr. Nixon's account was
a farrago of untruths. It may seem a
'minor matter in a press conference
-that also saw him falsely imply that
Elliot Richardson had "approved" his
' course of action on the tapes. But the
President's misuse of the Burr case is
interesting precisely because it was so
. unnecessary, so minor, so gratuitous.
? Why did he introduce such an his-
torical episode into his discussion and
? then so gravely distort it? Did he con-'
sciously intend to deceive his audi-
ence? Or is there in him some uncon-
scious process that reshapes the truth
to his ends?
Those questions are not put down
tto suggest that there can be sure an-
swers. What is disturbing is that the
'public cannot be sure. Even on so
small a matter we cannot trust the
President of the United/States.
? Trust is fundamental to the func-
tioning of a free government. Those
ABROAD AT HOME
. YORK TIME4
? 29 OCT 1973.'
who yvrote the American Constitution,
understood that, and therefore tried to
make sure that faith in our system of
democracy would survive mistaken
leadership. To that end they created
institutions?in shorthand, government
of. laws. not .men. ? ;....
.. ?
I
That Richard Nikon has made it im-
- possible for the country to trust in
him is not %tlicy? worst he has done as
President. TheOliore grievous harm has
been to damaief trust in our institu-
tions. Consideit;seine examples.
The, police are a particularly sensi-
tive barometer of trust in any society.
The most respected American police
institution ha' been the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation. In 1970 Presi-
dent Nixon sought to involve the
F.B.I. in a program of illegal wire-
tapping, surveillance and burglaries.,
After protests from J. ,Edgar Hoover,
the program was allegedly canceled,
but the White House plumbers carried
out some of the illegal activities,
Americans' confidence that Federal'
law-enforcement institutions Will re-
spect the law has certainly been
damaged.
The Central Intelligence Agency is'
another sensitive institution. The evi-
dence indicates that Mr. Nixon's top
assistants, almost certainly on the
orders of the President, sought to in- ?
volve the C.I.A. in the cover-up of
Watergate.
. Our military institutions suffered a
painful loss of public confidence as a
'result of Mr. Nixon's secret bombing
of Cambodia. It is not surprising that
people should be shaken if our power-
ful forces can be used in secret, with-
out the consent or even the advice of
Congress, and with military men join-
ing in a conspiracy to deceive Congress
and the public by false reports.
- It hardly needs to be said that the
courts have been abused by this Presi-
dent, or that Congress has suffered
as an institution from the attitude of.
open contempt displayed. toward it by
this White House.
Finally, one must mention a sordid
episode in which Mr. Nixon did not
hesitate to sod the institution of the
Presidency itself?by innuendo di-
rected at a dead President. At a press
conference on Sept. 16, 1971, he said
the United States had got into Viet-
nam "through overthrowing Diem and
the complicity in the murder of Diem.",
We have no evidence of any such
complicity. Mr. Nixon's remark came
shortly after his White House con-
sultant, E. Howard Hunt, tried to forge,
some?a "cable" made to look as if
it had come from the Kennedy 'Ad-
ministration.
These assaults on our instit; ',ions
and on our trust have left the country
in a state of nervous exhaustion. Be-
fore we can recover, we shall have.
more to endure. Investigating a Presi-
dent, and judging him, will require us
to face hard questions of law and
policy and politics. But there is no
other way.
As we proceed, we should remember
above all that we are trying to heal
wounded institutions. That means that
the whole process of investigation,
impeachment and, hopefully, political
accommodation must be carried for-
ward with a deep concern for institu-
tional regularity. We must answer
disrespect for institutions with respect,
lawlessness with Jaw.
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Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100700014
'E NEW YORK TIMES;T:thIRS1411, dovEMBER'1;.1,97.3:
hite House Says 2 of Tapes Promised Sirica Were
..The Talks Were Those
President Had With
Mitchell and Dean
By WARREN WEAVER Jr.-
apedal to The New York Timm ?
!, WASHINGTON, Oct. 31 ?
Two White House conversations
that were believed to contain,
'evidence critically important to
:the Watergate criminal investi-
gation were never recorded at
President Nixon's special,
counsel said in court today.
? J. Fred Buzhardt Jr., the
I :White House lawyer, told Fed-
eral District Judge John J.,
Sirica at a special hearing that
Mr ::!ixon would be unable to
deliver tape recordings of the
'two conversations to 'the judge
for his inspection, as the court
.had ordered, because they did,
,not exist.?
_ In one, instance, the presi-:
dent's counsel said, Mr. Nixon's
telephone had not been "hooked
into" the system designed to
,record for history his impor-
tant conversations. In the ether,
a tape recorder in the Presi-
dent's hideaway in the Exeeu-
' tive' Office Building had mal-
functioned.
Two Conversations Cited
Government prosecutors had
ought recordings believed to'
.have been made ora telephone
conversation between President'
;Nixon arid his campaign .man-
!'ager, John N. Mitchell, on June
'20, 1972, three days after the;
_Watergate burglary, and 'of
...meeting between the President:
land John W. Dean 3d, theri?his
counsel, on /Ora 15, 1973;
? Because of testimony by Mr..;
Mitchell and Mr. Dean before
the Senate Watergate commit-;.:
tee,.. investigators believed that
the two conversations would"
shed light on the President's'
possible involvement in ,the
cover-up of the break-in it the,
headquarters of the Democratic
National Committee at the Wa-
tergate hotel complex.
Today, for the first time in t
public, President Nixon's law-
yer said that tapes of the tiro,
conversations had never existed
during the 'entire legal con-
trbversy.
President. Nixon had refused
to leliver nine tapes, believed
to ,.nclude 'these two, sought'
by Xrchib6d Cox, then the spe-
cial. Watergate prosecutor, on'
three separate pccasions?,
When they .were subpoenaed
by the court, when Judge Shim
Ordered him to surrender the.
and 'when the United States
Court of Appeals upheld Judge
Sirica's order.
Then, a week ago, the Presi-
dent reversed his position and:
announced that the would coin-
ply with the court orders and
submit the nine tapes for
judicial screening. .
Tonight, when asked why
no announcement of the non- ?
existence of the tapes had been,
made previously, Gerald L.
Warren, the White House dep-
uty press secretary, said that
no effort had been made to
find the recordings until' last
weekend. ,
Mr. Warren said. that' Mr.
Buzhardt 'had. discovered that
the two conversations were not
in the tapes when he ordered
a search for them over the
weekend.
Mr. Warren said that when
Mr. Buzhardt was told the
tapes did not exist, he asked
experts in the Technical Sec-
urity Division of the Secret
Service to find out why.
Mr. Buzhardt'S statement ap-
peared to 'conflict with testi-
mony given to Senate Water-
gate committee investigators
NEW YORK TIMES
24 October 1973
PLUMBERS' INQUIRT
'URGED BY ELLSBERG
SAN FRANCISCO, Oct. 23
Dr. Daniel Ellsberg has
called for an investigation into
the possibility that the White
House "plumbers" engineered
the shooting of Gov. George Ci
Wallace of Alabama.
Dr. Ellsberg said that Some
of the "plumbers" including E.
Howard Hunt Jr. Were: "pro-
fessional managers of assasSi;.
nation" arid they believed that
Mr. Wallace's tiot running for
in closed session by Stepheq
B. Bull, a special assistant% td
the President, in August.
Mr. Bull reportedly said that
President Nixon had ordered
,the April 15 tape of his coq-
versation with Mr. Dean flowh
to his home at San Clemente,
Calif., on June 27, but that no
courier flight from Washington
could be arranged.
as an alternative, the Senate
investigators were told, Mr.
Bull was instructed to make
arrangements with the Secret
Service to have Mr. Buzhardt
listen to the tape and then brief
tMr. Nixon on its contents by
?telephone. Whther those in-
structions were ever carried out
could not be determined.
Judge Sirica first learned of
,the nonexistence 'of the two
tapes in a closed meeting yes-
terday morning with Mr. Buz-
hardt and representatives of
the Watergate Special Prosecu-
tion Force, the group that Mr.
Cox _formerly headed. ? '
The judge then summoned
,both sides to an open court
? hearing this afternoon. He said
there "the facts and circum-
'stances" of the new White
House statement "should be
made a matter of public rec-
ord."?
, After an opening statement;
Mr. Buzhardt began calling wit-
,nesses for sworn testimony on
the White House recording sys-
tem, how it functioned and
occasionally did not. The first
witness, Raymond C. Zumwalt,
a White House Secret Service
agent, was cross-examined by
Richard Ben-Veniste, assistant
special prosecutor of the Spe-
cial Prosecuting Force. ;
At 4:30 P.M., Judge Sirlca re-
.cessed the hearing until tomor-,
,row morning and ordered Mr.
Buzhardt to bring with him a
log 'showing who had. had
ac-
cess to all the White House tape
recordings and on what days
they - had withdrawn specific
tapes from the file. ,
, Judge Sirica gave no hint of
what action he might take when
both sides had completed sub-
mitting evidence on the matter.
President in 1972 was "cincial
to their success."
'Dr. Ellsberg said that he was
calling for a re-examination of
the shooting "knowing now
what the President Nixon' teani
was prepared to do to help his
election.'
The 'former employe of the
?
Rand Corporation, adquitted 4 F---
eliarges, arising 'out: of his
ease of the Pentagon pane)
discussed Mr. Wallace's atta
in an interview witIrthe mag
4ne Rolling Stone tial:the nos
stands today
ot Made,
v,
of 'the- missing tapes. Legally, - 1
they are under his jurisdiction
?if they exist?since they are
among.the material that he has
specifically ordered the White
House to submit to him.
Under the Court of Apphals
decision, President NixOn. 'May,
delete national security material
from the tapes, subject to later
challenge by the Waterghte
prosecutors, and the'judge rill
,decide what -,..;rtions of tthe
,coversations should be pasSo- d
along to the grand jury as As-
sible criminal evidence
? 1'
Mr. Cox, who was testifying
today before the Senate Judici-
ary Committee on the circum-
stances of his dismissal as spe-
cial prosecutor, said that he
had been given a hint of to-
day's White House disclosure a
few days before his dismissal.
.. Mr. Cox said that an Assist-
ant United States Attorney in
New York, otherwise unidenti-
fied, had told him that Mr. Buz-
hardt, when questioned about
the availability of other White
House tapes, had said, "We
sometimes had mechanical
problems:"
I Mr. Zumwalt, the White
House Secret Service agent,
testified that there were two
tape recorders in the Presi-
ident's suite in the Executive'
jOffice Building, just west of
the White Hoilse nbey were
used on alternate days, with
an automatic control activating
the idle machine about mid-,
night every night.
"I assume it failed to switch;
the machines" the night be-)
fare the Sunday meeting be-'
tween the President and Mr..
Dean, Mr. Zumwalt said. "Evi-,
dently, tkle contacts did not
workr..
"
Mr. Warren rren said tonight that
the call to Mr. Mitchell on June
20 was made by Mr. Nixon on,
a phone in the West Hall of the;
White House that was not con-
.rtected with the recording sYs.-
,tem: The tapes operated only
on calls from the Oval Office,
the Lincoln Room on the sec-
ond floor and the executive
Office :Building hideway.
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NEW YORK TIMES Approved For RefialliS209114111161D7 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00030270001-7
31 October 1973 29 October 1973
?
?
ic
Szra to Consider
Isaue of Privilege
Before Tape Audit
By WARREN WEAVER Jr.
spcti:a to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Oct. 30?The
first official steps toward mov-
ing the Watergate tape record-
ings out of the White House
vaults toward the grand jury
were taken in Federal District
Court today, and it looked like
a long, Vow journey.
Judge iohn J. Sirica met for
an hour and a half in his cham-
bers this morning with, repre-
sentatives of the White House
and the special Watergate
prosecution force to work out
procedures for his examination
of the nine White House tapes
that President Nixon agreed to
surrender a week ago.
When the closed conference
'Was over, the judge issued a
brief statement that failed to
clarify the question of what ac-
cess assistants of the dismissed
special prosecutor, Archibald
Cox, would have to the hitherto
secret records as part of the
judicial screening process.
Judge Sirica said that before
he listened to. the tapes , he
would "hear argument in 'closed
session on the various claims of
privilege" made by the Presi-
dent to keep portions of the
recorded conversations from go-
ing to the Watergate grand
'jury.
This clearly implied that
'lawyers for the special prose-
cution forces would be entitled
to contest before the judge the
President's contention that
some parts of the tapes should
remain secret because they
involved national security or
official Presidential activity
that merited confidential status
in the public interest.
? Analysis 'Soon'
But whether these lawyers
would base their arguments on
'any analysis of the tapes
drafted by the White House,
excerpts from the conversa-
tions made by the White House
or the full text of the record-
:ings Judge Sirica did not say.
Representatives of the judge,
the President and the special
'Prosecution force declined to
',provide any explanation of the
judge's statement.
"All parties agreed," said the
statement, "that the White
::House will prepare as, soon as
possible an analysis of materi-
als which will be transmitted
to the court, together with the
tapes and documents them-
'selves."
;. Participating in the confer-
ence with the judge were J.
Fred Buzhardt, special counsel
to the President, and Philip La-
covara and Henry S. Ruth,
counsel and deputy prosecutor
of the special Watergate prose-
cution force.
"Before the, court examines
ravdrit. Hints Watergate
Is Threat to PreA:clent
MOSCOW, Oct. 28 (UPI)
The official Communist
Party newspaper Pravda.
gave its readers their first
inkling that the Watergate
affair has raised questions
, of President Nixon's contin-
?uing in office today.
In reporting on Mr. Nix-.
on's news; conference in
Washington Friday, Pravda:
wrote that a new Watergate,
?prosecutor would be ap-
? pointed and added: "Nixon'
said he would continue to'
; fulfill his presidential
'duties."
Soviet newspapers have
not reported demands by
; members of Congress, labor
leaders and others that'
President Nixon be im-
peached or resign.
Pravda also hinted for the !
first time that the U.S. alert ?
; of its armed forces last
;week had been caused by
some alleged Soviet action.
The disclosure in the!
strictly controlled Soviet
? press followed a govern-!
?Tient statement yesterday
Which called the U.S. expla-',
nation for the alert
the materials," Judge Siriba
continued, "it will hear argu-
ment in a closed session on the
!various claims of privilege. The
court will thereafter examine
the tapes and written material
and make individual decisions
on each claim of privilege; how-
ever, all these rulings will be
handed down at one time, when
the court's examination is com-
pleted."
-
? The judge added that no
schedule had been adopted for,
submission"-of the tapes and'
the closed hearings held on' por-
tions that President Nixon'
wants to keep from the grand.
jury. The timing will probably
be determined at another meet-
ting on Friday.
The tapes were the? subject;
of a fierce legal battle between,
Mr. Cox and the President, with
the dismissed special prosecutor'
arguing that they were essen-
tial to his investigation of the
Watergate burglary and cover-'
up. Mr. Nixon insisted that he
had an absolute right to keep
such White House records pri-
vate.
Ever since the District
Court's first attempt to resolve
She politically charged disput,
Ih-e decisions have been cloud-
ed with uncertainty. Judge Si-
rica ruled that the President
must surrender the tapes to
him for a screening of privi-
leged material, but he declined
to say what he would regard
as privileged.
The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Co-,
lumbia affirmed Judge Sirica's
'ruling with some modifications;
specifying that Mr. Nixon could
"absurd." But the official
Tass statement did not 'Say.
what the explanation was,' ,
Pravda, however, did not
link the U.S. alert to a
Soviet action in reporting
Mr. Nixon's press confer-
, ence remarks. Instead, it
, made reference to an earlier,
news conference by U.S. De-
fense Secretary - Ames!:
Schlesinger.
, The United States said it ?
acted because of indications !
? that the Soviets might sent !,
, troops to the Middle East.
The Soviet statement stop..!
ped short of an outright de-
nial of such plans. ,
Pravda said that Mr.
Nixon tried to justify the
U.S. alert by making refer-
ence to some "Information"
that allegedly precondi-
tioned it but that he did not
, disclose the source of the in-
formation.
After denouncing the
'alert as harmful toi interna-
tional relaxation of tensions,
Pravda added: "It is also in-
dicative that Defense Secre-
tary Schlesinger, who held a*
press conference before
Nixon. had to admit that he'
refuse to hand over parts of
the tapes that related to "na-
tional defense or foreign rela-
tions," but said that the special
prosecutor could "inspect the
claim and showing" and chal-
lenge its validity in a closed
hearing before the judge. ?
The appellate court also
ruled that the special prosecu-
tor could call for a private
hearing on other claims of
privilege made by the Presi-
dent but never revealed what
the evidentiary basis for such
challenges would be.
In fact, the court hinted that
the prosecutor could only have
access to the tapes and docu-
ments themselves "for the
limited purpose of aiding the
court in determining the rele-
vance of the material to the
grand jury's investigations."
Other White House tape re-
cordings are being sought by
two former Nixon Cabinet offi-
cers, John? N. Mitchell and
Maurice H. Stans, as part of
their defense against charges
of conspiracy and obstruction
of justice that they face in New
York as part of the prosecution
of Robert L. Vesco, indicted for
illegal campaign contributions.
The White House 'has not
said whether' it would make
these tapes available volun-
tarily.
:had no 'information about!
,'any actions of the Soviet,'
Union which could give ma..
;
eons for anxiety."
? Schlesinger in fact said!
that all of the Soviet On- t
ion's paratroopers had been '
placed on alert but that no!
Soviet personnel had as:tof ,
Soviet personnel had as hf
' that time shown up in tpe
Middle East.
(Pravda ? also accused
China of opposing the estab-
lishment of peace in llte!
middle east, Agence France-
Presse reported from Mos-
' cow. Pravda termed China's
' statements in the U.N. Sem-.
rity Council and its refusal
to participate in the voting,
"provocative maneuvers.")
? Chi denounced "the at-'
tempts of the United States
and the Soviet Union to im-
pose on the Arab peoples a
situation of neither war nor
peace."
He described the cease-
fire agreement as "a further
betrayal of the Arab peoples'
by the soviet Union."
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Apriroved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100270001-7
WASHINGTON POST
2 November 1973
? Jaworski
Chosen as
Prosecutor
BY Carroll Kilpatrick
Wanhington Post Staff Writer
President Nixon yester-
day picked Sen. .William.,
B, Saxbe (R-Ohio) to be
Attorney General and ap-
proved the appointment '1
of Leon Jaworski, a Texas .;
Democrat, to be Water- .!
gate special prosecutor.
? On Capitol Hill there was
; praise for both selections,
but Democrats said that
. they would continue to push
.. for a court-appointed special
. prosecutor.
? The President personally
announced the selection of
Saxbe to succeed Elliot L. ;
Richardson. Acting AttorneY,.:
? General Robert H. Bork an-
nounced the appointment of ,
Jaworski to succeed Archi-
bald Cox, whom the Presi-i.)
dent fired Oct. 20.
Bork said Mr. Nixon, "has-m,
5 given his personal? asser-.;.
? ance" that he will not exer-
, cise his right to fire Jawor-
with?ut 'obtaining the
r consensus of the majority
Iand minority leaders of the.:
?,
-House and Senate and the ,
chairmen and ranking mem- 4
hers of the House and Sen.
t ale judiciary COMMitteeS. "
' In both appointments, the
President sacrificed some of
his authority, first by nomi-.
mating to the Cabinet an in.
;dependent-minded senator ..
who has never been his fa..,-
.vorite and second in agree-
,-ing not to exercise his con--; ?
, stitutional right to dismiss a ;
.;,member of the executive
branch without first, obtain-
jog agreement from congres-
, Worth) leaders. .
Mr. Nixon met early. ye's-;
terday with Republican core;
I, ?
gresslonal leaders 0 -.give
them the news and then?,
the house in Ohio and twies
,Saxbe and Bork to announce'
the state's attorney general,
'his choice of Saxbe. Bork;
'followed with the announce-; for 25 years.
"Not only is he eminently,
'ment abeut Jaworski.
. qualified," the President'
Saxbe, who is subject to.
added, "but he is an individ-=
Senate confirmation, would added,
who wants to take this'
'normally be confirmed, as a
position and who will do ev-,
'member of the Senate in
. ? erything that he possibly'
'good standing, without diffi?
-
can 0 serve the nation as
lenity. ? can
first lawyer in the na-.
..;; But because ot the crisis non."
.,over the dismissal of Cox ...Recalling that Saxbe had ?
? announced he would not
.and the resignations of
seek re-election next Year:
'Richardson and Deputy At-
but would return to his law
Aorney General William --D.
practice, the President said
'Ruckelshaus, senators are he' was giving him the op-
pected to cross-examine portunity to practice law as
'
,'head of the largest law'
'Saxbe closely on Jaworski's
, , firm in America, the Depart-
independence. ,
Tent of Justice."
? .- In Houston, Jaworski told: -After making the brief an- '
,:a mews conference that he . tiouncement, Mr. Nixon' left i
?accepted appointment only the roorn. Also speaking
after being satisfied that he , hriefly, Saxbe said he hoped
.would be entirely free to that Bork would remain in
17...*!!*There are no restraints," said he would continue to
, the Department, and Bork';
-he said, "I am not prohib- serve as solicitor general. '
-ited from taking any action "I am anxious to under.;
J - might feel 'should be
take this job," Saxbe said. "I
taken." ;have no reluctance and
? "have no doubts that I can
He said he was confident
handle it. I know it is going'
that when members of Con- to be difficult; but it is go-
-gress "examine the terms of
ing to be one that I am fa-
my acceptance" they will
'"find the comfort and 'vas-.
miller with and one that I ,
'am happy to tackle."
-surances I found." "I do understand and corn-
On Capitol Hill, as Demo- prehend the difficult times
rrats said that they wanted that I feel that our country
a special prosecutor entirely is in, a crisis of leadership,".,
independent of the Presi- ,
dent, it was not immediately ? Saxbe said. "I believe that I
,can help solve this problem.
clear how much opposition
to the selections would de: "I think everyone in this
country wants to get back to
? velop or how much' the ?
tapes controversy would. af- routine affairs and the very
fect confirmation. . difficult things that we have-
- "We've relied before on to settle both nationally and.
the promises of the Presi- internationally."
dent, and Congress has been 'Bork said that Jaworski
burned," Sen..Aadlai E. Stev-, will have the same charter
? enson III (D-III.) said. -. ,Cox did with the additional
,IHowever, Senate Minority commitment the President
Leader Hugh Scott (R-Pa.) made regarding his power to;
' praised both appointments, dismiss him.
and Sen. John G. Tower (R; Jaworski has been prom-
Tex.) predicted that Jawor- ised "the full cooperation of?
ski's selection "should fore- the executive branch in the
stall any action that Con- pursuit of his investigation,"
gress might take to create Bork said. "Should he disa-
an independent prosecutor gree with a decision of th
by legislation of dubious:
..ronstitutionality."
' Mr. Nixon called Saxbe
"eminently ?qualified" and
said he had known the, ? .7
, walked into the White ." LOhioan, ho waaNeaker 10.Ci
House', ? press roOnApiSitthied For Rwelease z ima/u-t : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001t0270001-7
administration with regard
? to the release of presiden-
. tial documents, there will be ',..
' no restrictions placed on his
1 : freedom of action."
Bork said that the deci-
sion, to name Jaworski "is
?ene I made personally."
i Saxbe participated "in the
. closing stages of the selec- ?
lion process and concuiTed
in the result," Bork said.
? "The selection also has the:
approval of President ?
'Nixon." .
Bork Said that as one who.
has "committed his honor ?
,and professional reputation
to achieving justice in thi .
-case, I am totally satisfied.
with the process of selec !
'tion, with the terms of the .
new charter, and most espe, ;
daily with the man who 1 i
(going to be taking on thes -;
;new duties." 1
:. Jaworski is a man
:complete independence and,
tintegrity," Bork said. ,
In answer to a question , ?
Bork said he had told Jawor-:
ski that he believed the staff
assembled by former prose-:
cutor Cox "is ?indispensable
'
to the rapid investigation
?and . prosecution of these.
cases, and Mr. Jaworski ?
fully agrees." ,
Expressing confidence there
would be no confrontation be-:
. tween the President and Jaw=
.orski, Bork . said " the Pi-e$
7dent told me he wanted full'
investigation, he wanted full
,prosecution." I.
"I believe that is what he
wants,' Bork added. 'I think
the President fully under"
stands that with Mr. Jaworr
ski that is what he is going
to get, and I don't think any..
body wants any further core;
frontations."
A question was raised last
night whether Saxbe can'
qualify for appointment to
the Cabinet since he was a
member of Congress when
the salary of Cabinet offii
cers was increased.
Article I, Section 7,-of the:
Constitution says that no
member of Congress may be
, appointed "to any civil of-'
?fice ... which shall have
. been created, or the etnelu;.
ments whereof shall have
been increased" during his
time in Congress.
A spokesman for Saxbe
said "we are aware of the
constitutional provision. We
believe there is precedent'
for a senator to be nomin-
ated and serve and We do
, not believe that this will be
,a bar."
Bork said last night that
he believes remedial leg,isla--
tion can eliminate the prob-
lem and that such legisla-,
tion will be proposed with
.the nomination.
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29 October 1973
U.S. intelligence arm?weakened?
By Benjamin Welles ?
'Special to
The 'Christian Science Monitor
?
Washington
? Nixon-administration budget cuts ?
In the United States intelligence corn.:
? muniti over the past three years have,
, seriously weakened the nation's in- ,
4 telligence arm, sources here believe.
During the recent Arab-Israeli
fighting, or instance, the, U.S. In-
telligence; Board ? the composite ;
group representing all six ? in-
telligence-connecting agencies ? .)
-could deploy only one spy satellite
? which made two brief photographic
. passes over the fighting area. ??
By contrast the Soviet Union, ac-
cording to trustworthy sources, had,
? six satellites constantly circling the
globe and passing repeatedly over the
Middle East. presumably most, if not'
all, the photographic intelligence col- ,
lected, was furnished to? Moscow's
Arab collaborators.
United States spy satellites with:
cameras sharp enough to distinguish
an officer's insignia of rank from 130
miles in the air cost $35 million, apart
;from costly launching equipment at
? Vandenberg and other U.S. Air Force ;
bases. There is a tendency to hoard,
these expensive devices; not to risk
Ahem prematurely.
, "The Pentagon, which controls
?'them, is always trying to keep every-;,
thing back in case there's a World'
War III," said one veteran expert;'
"It's the old story of the.hest being the;
enemy of the good. We ought to use
intelligence techniques now ? not
wait for a later crisis."
? Secretary of State Henry A. Kis-
singer told a press conference on Oct.
12, at the height of the fighting, that
. there are always two aspects to
intelligence.
'One is a determination of the .
facts; the other is the interpretation,
; 'of these facts," he said.
1 Dr. Kissinger conceded that both
Israel's highly touted intelligence ser-
; vice and' the U.S. intelligence, with
; ?
which it collaborates closely, failed to
plumb Arab intentions. In the week
prior to hostilities, he said, the Israeli
and U.S. services agreed in response
to three separate questions from his
office that there was virtually no
chance of an Arab attack.
1 That the attack plan was tightly
held is evident: It is now thought thati
at most 12 Arab leaders in Egypt,
Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia knew
of the coming invasion. Probably
,those in Jordan and Saudi Arabia
knew only of the plan, not the date or'i
? time. Moreover, Western intelligence
sources now suspect that, while the
Israelies may have been dangerously
overconfident that the Arabs would
not dare attack, the Arab command-
ers of the Egyptian and Syrian forces
themselves may have thought they
were only conducting routine maneu-*
'vers ? until fresh orders reached;
, them at the last moment.
Yet a warning of suspicious Egyp-
tian and Syrian troop concentrations ,
was sent through, if not by, Jordan via ;
a third country to Washington. The
,Pentagon ran the tip through its '
computers, and still coneluded that no,
attack was imminent.
There is firm evidence that imme- ?
diately prior to the war one Arab
country near Israel virtually went off
the air, a warning that any profes-
sional intelligence service would in-
stantly heed, many believe. Just
before the Battle of the Bulge in
December, 1944, for instance, Hitler's
*attacking force abandoned radio corn- ;
munication that could be monitored
for the slower but foolproof use of land
lines and human couriers.
Examination urged
In short, It is being said, the grave
misreading of various signals by both
the Israeli and U.S. intelligence com-
munities requires, and should pro-
voke, a thoroughgoing examination.
The role of the U.S.S.R., for in-
stance, not only in furnishing and
teaching Arab armies to use complex
modern weapons but also in the
techniques of strategic deception, is
increasingly evident, it is being said.
The Soviet Union appears to have
been uttering reassuring, but decep-
tive, noises in diplomatic chanceries
? around the world prior to the attack.
"We were collecting tips' min-
? imizing any likelihood of war from
many capitals," said one analyst.
"The Soviets were swamping us with
, disinformation, and the few, in-,
? dicators that pointed
buried in tire Mass."
Dr. Kisainger in his press confer-
ence drew 'attention to the "tendency
of most intelligence services ? and
indeed of :most senior officials and
, some newspapermen ? to fit facts
into existing preconceptions." In
other worcis, he was admitting, the
Soviet-Arab deception plan appears
now to have gulled both the Israeli
and American intelligence services ?
and brought Israel perilously near to
having to sue for peace five days after
the Arabs struck on Yom Kippur,
Oct. 6.
Vital decision
Only the U.S. decision of Oct. 13 to
rearm Israel allowed it to use its
remaining planes, tanks, am-
munition, and fuel swiftly and fully ?
with crushing effect against the Arab
forces. Intelligence analysts here are
? certain that Moscow was deeply en-
gaged in the Arab venture from start
to finish ? however much Secretary
Kissinger might choose to play down,
Moscow's role to keep "detente"
alive.
The highly touted Nixon "reorgani-
zation" of the U.S. intelligence com-
munity appears to critics, in short, to
have brought forth a mouse; a con-
fused and myopic mouse.
In the interests of "economy" the.
Nixon budgeteers have slashed $400
million from Central Intelligence pro-
'grams since 1970: cutting the commu-
nity's yearly spending from $3.6 bil-
lion to $3.2 billion. Inflation, esti-
mated now at about 12 percent per
year; is thought to have pared an-
other 25 percent so far from the
intelligence community's available
funds. Spy satellite and electronic
intelligence both have been heavily
cutback.
- Moreover, Mr. Nixon's rapid-fire,
personnel shifts with three directors
of Central Intelligence ? Richard M.
Helms, James R. Schlesinger, and
William Colby ? in six months have
Impaired the nation's intelligence'
farm. The CIA's tangential in-
volvement in the Watergate scandal,
moreover, has improved neither its
morale nor its image.
to war got
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? BALTIMORE SUN
23 October 1973
Nick Thimmesch
New Chief Getting CIA Back on Its Feet After a Serie':s
? -Langley, Va.
Like a middle-aged gent
forced to suddenly run, ?the
' Cent rat Intelligence Agency
? is catching its breath these
? days following: .a 'series of
disquieting experiences. -
Since 'it- was 'established in.
1947, the CIA'. has always
been able to blunt congres-
sional -criticism, :shield 'its.
staff and budget figures, win
, . loyal support from presi-:
dents, and otherwise work in
relative secrecy. The very,
nature of this organization,
m kes powerful people cu-
rious, and then resentful
when .they ,can't find out
hat is going on.
But in recent months, its
role in the Laotian war, the
had luck the agency fell into
? in the Watergate affair,
hefty manpower? cuts, and.
, the departure of two directors
' within six months, left the'
, CIA gasping. , ? ?
Its new director, 'William'
!. Egan Colby:. 52, an 'old pro'
. who describes his job' as;
, "hiring out," has been a set-'
tling influence since he took
over, last month. His prede-,
cessor, James R. Schlesin-,
ger, in the few months he',
? was in office, severed about
1,000 people from a payroll
? estimated at 18,000, and indi-
cated changes ,.designed 'to '
please Henry,A. Kissinger,
the Secretary o State: '
Dr. Kissinger 'and otherS'in
the administration :have not
been satisfied will:Ube-Jae- ?
fulness of information provi-
ded by the CIA, particularly
'that coming out of the agen-
cy's top study unit, the Of-
lice of National Estimates.
That body is about to be'
abolished, and some critics'
claim this means the CIA'
will consequently be less
objective in its evaluations'
for the White 'House and
State Department..
- The CIA also seems to.
have pulled back from clan-;
'destine operations which,:
while forming only a small:
'part of its overall activity,
; brought the agency an aura
of intrigue and adventure,
and also fierce criticism.
The CIA's role in toppling,
governments - has always
been exaggerated, but even
'in its current "hold-down'!,
phase, officials have not dis,,
missed the possibility of such,
activities in the future.
The 'CIA's basic work 'is'
)just what its title denotes?
an
information collecting.
agency, but one unsurpassed;
in the world. Its staff tends,
more to academic than spy-
master types. Indeed, about',
21 per cent hold advanced
degrees, and fully one-third'
come from the social scl-
ences. Increasingly, CIM
staffers concern themselves'
-with economic questions be-
cause the power-game in the
, world today moves toward
'that area. .
; The CIA also collects such!
WASHINGTON STAR
13 OCT 1973
seeming trivia as depths of.
'harbors, the conditions of
caves, and biographical in-
formation about officialdom ,
of every nation in the world.
The biographies include tid,
hits about a leader's health,--
weaknesses and inclinations.
?stuff any gossip columnist
Would drool over. .
The U.S., like all major
'nations, had an intelligence
collecting service through its
history, but it was not until
the intelligence disaster ac-
companying Pearl Harbor 'S
'that we realized the need for,
s central information collect-
'jog agency. There are eight'
' major intelligence-gathering'
'.units in the U.S. government,'
but the CIA and the Federal!
Bureau of Investigation have;
to be considered the key
ones. Of the estimated $4
billion to $5 billion spent by,
the government on intelli-
gence, the CIA receives about
,$500 million.
-I The CIA, because it is su-
persecret, is credited or,
blamed for all manner of
events. When Mr. Colby tes-,
tified in Senate confirmation
'hearings, he had to deny that
, the CIA engineered the 1967
coup in Greece, ousted Cam-
bodian Prince Norodom Si-
hanouk, made a private deal
with Cambodian Prime Min-'
ister Lon Nol, and conducted
the Phoenix program in Viet-
nam as one of assassination..
,Denials' aside, what is im-
portant is that many Amen-
rain Picked for Post
' Richard D. Drain, a ca-
reer government official,
has been elected adminis-
trator of the Protestant
Episcopal Cathedral Foun-'
dation, it was announced by
the Very Rev. Francis B.
Sayre Jr., dean of the Wash-
ington Cathedral.
Drain will serve the foun-
dation as &whole, including
St.,Alban's School, The Na-
tional Cathedral School for
Girls, Beauvoir School and
the College of Preachers.
.
.A 'native of Washington
and a graduate of St. Al-
ban's, Drain served in the
Army from 1942 to 1946. He
received his LLB in 1948
from Yale and his LLM in
'1949 from George Washing-
" ton University. He prac-
ticed law with the Washing-
ton firm of Drain and Weav-
er from 1948 to 1951, then
left to join the CIA.
- During his 22-year career
with the government, he
served in the Executive Of-
fice of the President and as
special assistant to Secre-
tary of State John Foster
Dulles.
After working with the
State Department in Athens
and Nairobi, Drain rejoined
the Army and was assigned
to the pacification program
in Vietnam from 1968 to
1970.
Drain is married and has
two sons. He lives at 5120
Bal tan Road, Sumner? Md.
of Stumbl
cans and certainly the ma- "1
jority of young people be-
lieve the CIA is responsible
. for these acts, and more.
! The CIA has few opportuni-
ties or forums to make deni-
al's,,and is vulnerable on this.
score. One consequence ,is
, that the CIA:has a difficult"
time signing on the "cream".
'of. college graduates. 'Yet
some' rather . prominent.
names once worked in the
i CIA, or were involved in its
!projects-'--Yale's University's,
i Rev. William Sloan Coffin is
one, and feminist Gloria Stet.'
:nem is another. ? ,
All major nations and:
many minor ones have their:
!CIA's. The Russians have
their KGB and GRU. France
has its Service for Documen-,
tation and Cotinter-Espio-;
nage. The British will' not,
admit to anything, but M-6 is;
their CIA, and its director,
:Maurice' Oldfield, had to'..
leave his post' recently after*
his name_ was- publicly re-.:
vealed. ?
Perhaps 'one _sign of the,
, times concerning the CIA is ;-
the one put up this summer
:on the highway leadii to its
,huge central building' here.
The sign, which directs traf-
fic, is the first CIA sign ever
?
seen in these parts, though.
,thousands of people drive to
?work at the CIA each day. ?
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WASIIIINGTON P
cftitproved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100270001-7
31 pctober 1973
CIA Seen
Du ed in
Scandal
Hill Unit Cites
Adnilnistration
Contradictions
? ,
By Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writer
The first congressional'
:report on the Watergatet
scandal yesterday cited
n'major' contradictions in
'statements by President.
Nixon and his top aides,
,in efforts to draw a
na-
.tional security cover over
the affair.
, In completing its 12-week,
'Investigation, the House
'Armed Services Subcommit-.
tee on Intelligence conclud-
ed that the Central Intelli-.
gence Agency had been
duped by top White House
;officials seeking to stall an
FBI investigation of the.
.Watergate break-in.
The report, at one point,
? strongly suggested that
,President Nixon publicly,
misrepresented his purpose
in phoning former FBI act-?
Ing Director L. Patrick Gray
III on July' 6, 1972?a cru-
? cial day in the Watergate in-
.vestigation.
' The President's call came
half an hour after Gray
telephoned Mr. Nixon's cam-
paign manager, Clark Mac-
Gregor, to express his con-
(cern over White House pres-
sures to suspend FBI inquir-
ies into the Watergate case's"
,Mexican connection. At
Issue were funds processed
through a Mexico City bank
linking members of the
Watergate break-in team to
the Nixon re-election corn-
mittee.
In the President's account,
'of the phone call, delivered
.in a statement last May 22,
? Mr. Nixon said he tele-'
phoned Gray "to congratu-
late him on? the successful
handling of the hijacking of
a Pacific-Southwest Airlines
plane' the previous day. Dim-
ing the conversation Mr.'
. Gray discussed with me the
progress of the Watergate
Investigation .. .10
, But the subcommittee re-
port cited testimony by for;
mer White House 'domestic
counsel John D. Ehrlichman
that'the President's call was,
prompted by "MacGregor's
,,conveying a request from
' Gray to the President."
Ehrlichman acknowledged
%under questioning by sub-1
committee Chairman Lucien'
N. Nedzi (D-Mich.) that the'
President's public account'
of the conversation did not:1
, square with the version Mr.
'Nixon gave him. ' '
The significance of the;
.conversation is that it sig-;
naled the refusal of Gray:,
'and CIA Deputy Director'
Gen. Vernon A. Walters to"
go along any further with
'strong pressures by the::
President's then-counsel,
John W. Dean III, to delay"
investigation'of the Mexican '
-fund connection.
: These, pressures
origi-
nated, according to the testi--
mony, , with instructions
from the President to his
;former chief of staff, H.. R.
(Bob) Haldeman, to get as-
surances that the FBI inves-
tigation of Watergate would'
not expose covert CIA oper-
ations or activities ,of the
White House "plumbers."
Between June 22, 1972,..
;and Gray's final declaration;
to the President in the Julyi
6 conversation that "people
'on your staff are trying to
mortally wound you by us-,
ing , the FBI and CIA,"
,Haldeman, Ehrlichman and'
;Dean interceded'in' efforts,
tto stall the FBI itivrstiga-
Aim), according to the testk
mony in the case.
After Gray made clear to'
the President that neither
he, on behalf of the FBI, nor
Walters, on behalf of the.
CIA, could go along withi
the delay, Mr. Nixpn said:,
,"Pat, you continue to con-.
, duct your thorough and ag,-;;
'gressive investigation." Thisl
was Gray's testimony.
: The subcommittee noted 1
'that as early as June 22?i
the day the President etc-1
pressed concern over p_ossi-)
ble FBI exposure of covert;
CIA activities?former CIA
Director Richard M. Helmal
assured Gray, there was no'
such danger. Helms reiter-1
ated his conclusion the foli
lowing day at a White
House meeting with Waliii
lers, Haldernan and' Ehrlich.1
man.
Yet Haldeman instructed;
Walters on June 23 to go tol'?
Gray immediately and tell!
:him that the Watergate
vestigation might breach na-
tional security by exposing,
covert CIA activities. The,
effect of this and an ensuing
series of contacts between
,Dean and Walters delayed
.for-'more than two weeks the.
FBI investigation of the
most concrete tie-in at that
'point in the case between
the Watergate break-in and
the Nixon re-election corn-
' mittee.
The subcommittee critk,
cized Walters for failing to
tell Gray on June 23 that
the' White House concert)
over exposing CIA opera-'
;tions by pursuing the Water-,
'gate trail was unfounded.
"It remains a good ques-
tion why General Walters'
failed to assure Mr. Gray of;
the lack of. CIA conflict in
the Mexice matter immedi-;
,the
after it was so deter-,
mined on.June 23, 1972," the,
-report observed.
Walters testified that he
;assumed Dean would pass,
?'the word to Gray "that'
,there was absolutely ria?cIii,
f problem:"
' The subeorninittec
4houent differently. "To beli`
charitable," the report con.;
i'eluded, "the best- that?can be
said for, that explanation' is..
:that it ia rather strange.
; . "Qeneral Walters, by
mwn admission, was eon.,-
!cerned that Dean' was at.?
:tempting to blame CIA for;
:.Watergate, and in that1
frame of reference, one'
`could hardly expect Dean to':
be the vehicle for informing.'
;Mr. Gray that 'there was no t
;ZJA-Mexican connection." ?
The subcommittee bared a'
'major conflict in the testi-1
triony of Gray and Walters. ;
Walters said he told Gray
on June 23 that he had been:
"directed" by top White'
House officials to warrii
Gray 'that 'the FBI investigk;
;tion in Mexico would 1e0P2
ardize covert CIA opera-
tions there; that in view of'
.the first five Watergate ar4;
rests it would "be tetter to'
taper the matter off there." !
' Gray denied that Walters
'mentioned senior White;
House officials as the source ,
lof this concern.' ?
, ? "Mr, Gray was vehement
.in his statement that Wal.)
;ters did not mention 'senior!
tpeople at the White Housei
The important aspect of thatl
10
,testimony is that Mr. Gray',
!said he thought Walters was 1
speaking for the CIA," the ?
subcommittee said, ?
In his -testimony to the
4,, subcommittee, the former 1
director expressed his
,own sense of helpless puzz-,i
;lement.
r "With I both Helms aruL
Malters present (at the June;
23 White House meeting),
;they acquiesce in this move;
4o send Walters over to give ;
me a message they, both
,know to be false. At least I
,
? Helms does, because
talked to him on 6-22-73 and,
'he said no CIA Involve-
ment."
.: The subcommittee did not,
,puruse the question of whyi
Gray needed the assurance
of the No. 2 man in the CIA..
when, by his own testimony,3
he had already received'
it from the man in charge of
the agency, Helms.
t, As a result of the week,
of executive session testi.'
'mony by CIA officials, for-
.mer White House aides and,
hWatergate defendents, the
;subcommittee proposed,
three legislative recommen-;
dations intended to tighten,
loopholes in the CIA's statu-
tory charter. They would:
? Require the President to
'approve any 'violations of
',the prohibition in the Na-,
;tianal Security Act against
domestic operations by the 1
CIA..
? Tighten phraseology in
:the act that might otherwise!
'permit' the agency to in- i
ttrude Into the domestic seeil
'tot'., ,
? Prohibit fs lings bee:
tween former LILA ernployl
;earl and th0 agency "beyond'.
IpUrely ' routine administral
,tive matters."
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WASHINGTON POST
2 Nlovember .1973
'7
Tried
To Curb F II
? On it reak-In 7!
By Laurence Stern
l?ashicogton Post Staff Writer
r Former CIA. 2 Director ?'
Richard M. Helms ordered
his deputy, 11 days after the ?
Watergate break-in, to re-.
-quest th the FBI confine
its investigation "to person-
alities already arrested or
under suspicion."
' The June 28, 1972, memo:
to Gen. Vernon A. Walters
. also urged that the FBI be
requested to "desist from ;
ex.,,anding this investigation J,
into other areas which may,?:0
' evcut &tally, run afoul of our? \
ope ra tions."
The Helms memorandum
appears to be in sharp con-.:
Mct with testimony by the
former CIA director to five
congressional committees .'
and federal prosecutors in, ,
vestigating the June 17,
1972, break-in and subse-
quent cover-up conspiracy.
It emerged, in part, in the I
? recently released transcript:4
? of a Senate Armed Services ?).
Committee execittive session .;
dealing with the confirma-
tion of William E. Colby as
CIA director..
The thrust of testimony
both by Helms and Walters, ;
'
as well as other principals
?
? in the case, has been that '
despite heavy White House
pressure' the CIA steadfastly '*!
denied that FBI inquiries .;
into Watergate matters':
would expose. CIA activities.
-? President %Nixon, by his
own admission and the testi- `.
' mony of top White House
aides, initially raised this
; concern when the FBI was
on the verge of investigat-
ing the channeling of funds'
through Mexico which estab-
lished a link between the 1
eak-in team and. the Nixon ?
-election committee. 6
Colby, in a series of writ-
. t n responses to Sen. Sam,
NAnin (D-Ga.), said that,
Itelm.i' memo to Walters,i
las "consistent with' 'our
ncern that investigations
Might reveal CIA actiyAties.!
ahd our belief that they
were unnecessary since CIA,
had 'no involvement with.
tile Watergate incident.",. .
This was precisely the'
concern voiced by top White:
douse officials, during the
4irly days of the Watergate
lttvestigation, in urging that
F131 investigation of the
Watergate "Mexican connec-
tion" be suspended.
? ?
(l'he White. House : reit;
'mires directed at lielmif
Walters and acting FBI Di:
rgctor L. Patrick Gray III,,
luid the effect of delaying
the Mexican investigation
frlom June 22 to July 10,"
when the first FBI inter-,
?vi ws were conducted in',
exicor City.
?
CIA officials declined to
.1
d?rulge the full memo or;
comment on the apparent;
contradiction between :the
ea:rlier public testimony by;
CIA officials and the asser-
tions in the Helms memo tol
VV'r% lters.
,
lby, in his written re..
stiOnses to Nunn's questions,'
sad, that the gist of the
mg.tho on -CIA relationships:
w#n the FBI in Watergate.
matters was first stated liY%
Heints at a morning staff
meting of the CIA on June
19,--two days after the
brpak-in. ?
:The memo was first a1
lulled to, although without
spbcific identification, by
foilner Watergate Special
PiloAecutor Archibald Cox in,
hi rappearance Monday be-
fo'-e'? the Senate Judiciary
Committee. Cox said he had
received a memorandum by'
a "major 'witness',' in the
W'atergate scandal that was
at' odds with .other testimony,
bg that witness. Hearse
N ws Sefvice reporter. Pat=
ri k J. Sloyan revealed the
witness to be Helms in a
'dis-
p4tch Tuesday. ,.
Rep. Lucien' N. Nedzi. (D*'
MIch.), chairman of a Hansel
Atmed Services intelligencei
subcommittee, acknowl-,,
edged that he obtained a.
coy of the full HelmtWal-
tets memo in connectionc
'wtth his 12-week investiga-,'
tidni of CIA involvement in-
Wajergate. Nedzi .insisted,!
hOwever, that the requested,
cditailment of FBI activities!
wit's: limited to a few CIA op.!
eratives whose covers Helms:
feared might be blown byl
Fllirinquiries in Mexico.
edzi declined, however,1
'teiclivulge the full contents,
otthe memo. So did staff of-!
filials of the Senate Arrnecr
? ?
Serl;ices Committee.
subcommittee is
sited a report Tuesday'?
charging that the CIA had:
Nen duped by tori White.
Hpuse aides into becoming
implicated in the Watergate
case.
?
tThe Senate Watergate '
chmmittee had the Helms
' aim? in its files, but did
Ot publicly question the
'former CIA director or any.
other witness about its con-
tents. .
. Sen. Lowell P. Welcker Jr.
(R-Conn.) asked Helms on
Aug. 2 at a session of the.
Watergate committee.
whether he had ever told
Gray that there might be:
,,some form of CIA involve-.
"I don't recall ever dis:
cussing with Gray," Helms'
, testified, "this question of
jts (the,FBI's) uncovering%
, other CI operations."
Nevertheless Helms did:
:phone Gray on June 28, ac-
:cording to Nedzi's report,
and asked that the FBI "not
interview" .two CIA active
:agents, Carl Wagner and;
John Coswell.
, Colby told Nunn that a
check of the FBI's Water;
, gate leads in Mexico "did
:not involve any current CIA,
assets or activities. Having.
satisfied ourselves that there
!!ivas no CIA involvement in'
?the Watergate incident, we
,were Concerned that a possi-
ble broadening of the inves.',
tigation which would reveal'
CIA foreign activities hay-
Jng no bearing on the
!Watergate incident would
',take place."
The FBI leads were fo-
cused specifically on Nixon
re-election funds which
'were- "laundered's through a
,Mexico City bank from
'Texas contributors to the
safe of the President's 1972,
're-election fund , raiser,
'Maurce H. Stens; The
)money ? ? was ultitnately
'traced 'to the was,'
of con-
victed Watergate conspira:
,tor Bernard Barker.' '\
Ihthe course' of the ex' ec.-
utive hearings Colby also ac-
knowledged that he sought,
unsuccessfully;' to conceal
from former Watergate
prosecutor Earl Silbert at
(
an interview on Nov. 27,7
1972, that it was White
House domestic affairs ad.'
.viser John D. Ehrlichman
who requested CIA assist-
/ once for Howard Hunt Jr. lh
July, . 1971, in connection'
with .the break-in of the of- ?
flees of Daniel Ellsberg's
psychiatrist.
'. In a "memorandum for
'the record" on the interview,
with Silbert, Colby said he.
,"danced around the room se-
veral times for .10 minutes
to try'to avoid becoming.
:specific On this, finally nam-'
Ing the White House, and .
was then -pinned by Silbert'
with a demand for the,
name,... at which point the:
name of the individual was
'given."
;; ? ? The ? name. was Ehrlich.;
ittan'. :Colby recited his ef-
fortt 'to withhold Ehrlich-
urine in a White
House meeting on Dec. 15,
1972, 'with ,Erhlichman and
then, White House counsel
-John W. Dean III 'in the
'presence of Helms. ? ".!
? This was some. six months
after Helms an Walters re!..
:alized, according to their.
subsequent ,testimony, that,
Ehrlichman and Dean, were!
trying' to implicate the CIA:
in the Watergate case.
? Colby said he had hoped
to ,withhold Ehrlichman's,
name, from federal prosecu-
tor, Silbert because "there':
was a ?reluctance to drop
,
somewhat ? ? . inflammatory,
,nametinto the kind of at-.
mosphere, that was around
;us glint time.".
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?,
'1C4lopf Sues Over C.I.A.' Cerisbnrig of Book 1.
,pie: The brief goes on to ',examination 30 'days in ad- trice with the publication
vance of any publication. cease, and that the secrecy-
In compliance with the, agreements signed by Mr. .'
I order, Mr. Marchetti and Mr: .Marchetti and Mr. Marks be '?
; Marks submitted to the C.I.A. declared "null and void." ?(
on Aug. 27, 1973, a typewrit- , In related actions, the suit'
Iten manuscript consisting of asks that Mr. Colby and Sec-:
517 pages. On Sept. 26, the ? retary of State Kissinger pro-
C.I.A.'s acting general coun-: !vide, with in 15 days, all data :1
sel delivered to the authors' . and documents relating to the :
;lawyers a 19-page document ;decision to censor the 225 s;
,specifying, 339 deletions? 'portions of the book, the e-'s
? amounting to between 15 and , 'curity classifications of each,
'.20 per cent of the book, and , item censored ,the manner in 6
;asserted that the manuscript .which the dicision to censor.tl
'could not be released without was made and the names and'
the deletions of classified in- , addresses of all those in-
s (formation. ,volved in the dicision. '5
The censored version of , "An Incredible Thing", .
,the manuscript was submit-
?
? , By GEORGE GENT
In what their lawyers'
called '1 the second Pentagon
papers case, the authors and
' publisher of a forthcoming
bodlc about the Central Intel-'
ligenee Agency filed suit in
Federal Court yesterday to'
enjoins the Government from
deleting roughly 10 per cent'
of the book's material and to
halt all interference with its
,publication.
; The suit was filed on be-
',half of Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.,,'
, publisher', of the book, which
has the Working title of "The
C.I.A.? and the Cult of Intel-.
ligence," and the co-authors,
Victor L. Marchetti, a former
? executive assistant to the
deputy director, 'and:
'John D. Marks, a former
State Department employe.?
A previous court ruling on
;the case in March had led to
a C.I.A. review of the unsub-,
1,mitted manuscript.
Named as defendants in
new action were William
Colby, director of the C.I.A.,'
and Secretary of State Kis-
,singer, whose department em-:
ployed Mr. Marks.
'? This is only the second,:
time in the country's history,
?the first was in the Penta-:
gon papers suit?that legal
action has been brought.
against the Federal 'Govern-,
ment to overturn an Injunc-
tion against publication of'
material the Government!
'wants to keep classified.
Prior Restraints Cited
The Government's action,.
the brief says, violates the
Constitution's First and Fifth
Amendments by prohibiting
,the plaintiffs from delivering
an uncensored version of the?
manuscript to the publisher;
a "forbidden prior restraint
upon freedom of the press,"
in that publication of the,
censored material would not.
"surely result in direct, int:
'mediate and irreparable in-,
Jury to the nation or its peo-!
WASHINGTON POST
31 October 1973
say, therefore, that the pur-
'ported secrecy agreements1
signed by both Mr. Marchetti;
and Mr. Marks were uncon-
stitutional prior restraints on'
the freedoms of speech and
the press.
Floyd Abrams, who was;
one of the lawyers repre-..
senting The New York Times;
?
in the Pentagon papers cases
'and who now represents]
Knopf, said previous court)
rulings on the case in ques-'
' tion had been concerned'
with Mr. Marchetti and his.
alleged obligations under the
'secrecy provision he signed.
when he joined the C.I.A. in.
;1955. ?
"What is new herd is that
!Knopf has entered the case,
;under the freedom of'thee
;press statutes," Mr. Abrams,
;said.
' The brief , notes that on
March 29, 1972, Knopf and:
,Mr. Marchetti entered into a',
contract that stipulated that
?Mr. Marchetti would writes
and Knopf publish a book'
about the policies and prac-
tices of the C.I.A. that would'
provide the American people
,with "vital and timely" infor-
mation about the secret,
Agency. Subsequently, Mr.,,
Marchetti and Mr.'Marks?
agreed that they would write'
,the book jointly. '
' Last March, a permanent'
injunction was issued in Fed-
eral Court in Alexandria, Va.,
forbidding Mr. Marchetti's
,"further breaching" the terms
, and conditions of the C.I.A.'s
s secrecy agreement, which he
;signed on joining the agency
in 1955, and from disclosing
any classified information re-
lating to intelligence activ-?
ities, sources and methods
..that had not previously been!
placed in the public domain,
by prior disclosure by the
Government. The court fur-
ther ruled that all, material:
relating to ?the agency be
submitted to the C.I.A., for
Ex-C ffiefal Sues
To Stop Censorship
By Stephen Isaacs
Washington .POst Stall Writcr
NEW YORK, Oct,. 30?For-
mer Central Intelligence
Agency official Victor L. Mar-
chetti, his co-author and his
publisher sued today to try to
enjoin the government's cen-
soring Marchetti's book, which
criticizes the CIA.
Nanded as defendants in the
suit, filed in federal court
here, are CIA' Director Wil-
liam Colby and Secretary of
State Henry A. Kissinger.
Lawyers for Marchetti insist
that the censorship of sections'
lof his book?about a 10th of it'
,? constitutes prior restraint
and is unconstitutional.
Marchetti was joined ih the
suit by co-author John D.
Marks, a former State Depart-
ment employee, and by Alfred
A. Knopf, Inc.
Before Marchetti wrote the
book, the CIA sought and won
an injunction' against him
from U.S. Judge Albert V.
Bryan Jr. in Alexandria. That
injunction was upheld by the,
Fourth Circuit Conn of Ap-
peals in September, 1972.
Last December, tile Su-
!
ted to Knopf on that sanie
Robert Bernstein, president' '
;
date by the authors. The
of Knopf, said at a news icon-
publisher has not yet seen ference in his office that' "it
an uncensored
,,? was an incredible thing to re-:
t copy.
; ceive from the Government a,
, Subsequently meetings by ,
Mr. Marchetti and his law4 censored manuscript with the
:
sers with C.I.A. officials'
deleted portions actually cut,
out of the book with scis-
brought out the information sors." (The Knopf suit alleges ,
.that some of the material ' that all of the deleted mate-
been acquired by Mr. Mar- '--
'censored by the agency had rial had been placed in public
?
4ietti after his employment do"main.)I am seriously thinking of
;with the C.I.A. or was al- ? publishing the book with all
ready in the public domain. ?
the deleted material appear-;
C.I.A. Restores Portion ' ing as white spaces," he said.?
The C.I.A. agreed and, on , ? Mr. Marchetti, who was
-Ocvt. 15, the agency released Present at the conference
114 of the original 339 dele- ,with Mr. Marks, said the suit
tions for publication, leaving ' sought to uncover just what;
still censored 225 portions, .the agenc considers classified'
or roughly 10 per cent of the material. "Much of it is silly,"!
manuscript. he said yesterday. "One of'
. By their act of censorship," the items originally deleted
the suit alleges, "defendants and then restored had to do
;have substantially impaired with a training installation in s
and invaded the right of Virginia called The Farm." S
plaintiffs to publish the book Mr. Marchetti and Mr;"
'The C.I.A. and the Cult of :Marks are represented in the;
Intelligence,' and have de- suit by Melvin L. Wulf and s
priv,ed the public of the right 'John H. F. Shattuck of the,
to receive vital information American Civil Liberties
regarding the conduct of the :Union Foundation.
Government."A spokesman for the C.I.A.
, In seeking redress, the suit said late yesterday that there s
would be no comment 'at this'
asks that the 225 deletions !
be restored, that the authors" time because the case was
be permitted to submit, and
'before the courts. A Statel
Knopf to publish and sell, the" ,Department spokesman said,'
,uncensored manuscript, that:: "We know nothing about the
'all Governmental interfer-?;, ?suit herel"
P,reme Court refused to review
the appeals judgment.
At issue is whether Mar-
chetti and Marks retained
rights to freedom of speech
when they signed secrecy
agreements upon joining their
government agencies.
Melvin L. Wulf of the Amer-
ican Civil Liberties Union,
representing Marchetti and
Marks, said that "This is only
the second case?the Pentagon
Papers being the first?where
the government of the United
States, in its whole 200-year
history, has gone to court Pr
sought to enjoin by way of
prior restraint the publication
of material concerning govern-
ment practices.",
Virulf warned that if the
CIA's censorship is upheld,
the practice of requiring se-
crecy oaths could spread
through the government and
shut off information about
government affairs. '
The suit asks that the prior.
res!raint be enjoined, that the
seerecv agreements be de-
cla?-ei! void, and that the gov.-
ernment be kept from inter-
ferring with publication and
. sale of the book, tentatively ti-
tied "The CIA and the ?Cult of
antelligence,"
?
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THE NEW REPUBLIC (D .0 . )
OCTOBER 6, 1973
Banned in McLean
Victor Marchetti was a high-level clerk and analyst at
the CIA until 1969, when he quit because he had be-
comeA "disenchanted" with the spy business. At the,
peak of his career he Was an executive aide to Admiral:
Rufus Taylor, deputy director of the agency. Marchetti
quit ,after. doing 14 years of CIA paper work because,
he felt his employers had become "too large, too ineffi-'
:cient, too tribal, too dangerously manipulated by the'
military. One of the things that bothered me," he
said, 'was the fact that we continued to perpetuate the
cold War' we were over-concerned with what they?;
called 'maintaining stability in the third world,' an-,
Other way of saying supporting our dictators and ret!
actionary friends. Also, to be frank, age was a factors`
My boy scouts were coming back with long hair and;
beards and saying they didn't want to go to Vietnam.'
It was a time of personal reevaluation: At the time all lr
thought was, just get out, the hell with it." He thought
he would write some spy novels, make -some money:
and "get established in the writing game." Eventually:
he planned to write "the kind of fiction I wanted to,
write in high school."
Marchetti was disappointed when the critics panned
'his first book, a novel called The Rope Dancer, ?aboui
espionage. "They completely. misunderstood it," he?,
complains. But he discovered that reporters were in-
terested in him as news copy. He gave interviews, de-
livered some lectures and began work 'on a nonfiction:
, analysis of all that he felt was wrong with ps intelli-
gence. He drew up an outline, found a co-author (John
Marks, a former foreign service officer) and signed a:
?contract with Knopf to write what was tentatively
called The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence. Then the'
CIA's lawyers moved in. Since April 1972 Marchettii
? has been prohibited by court injunctiin from showing ;
, his manuscript to anyone outside the CIA without its
' prior approval.
With the help of the American Civil Liberties Union
Marchetti appealed his case to the Supreme Court,'1
whh denied him a hearing. Marchetti now remains
bound by the lower court injunction, which he calls
1,"an outrageous document, written by that juridical;
; master, Clement' Haynsworth." It applies to fictioni
and nonfiction, and apparently it binds him for life.:.
'Under threat of contempt charges Marchetti and Marks
sent their book to the CIA last month for approval.;
,They were told that 100 pages of the 530 they sub-:l
.mitted were unacceptable and would have to be cut..;
The CIA argued that if Published in its present form,
'the book would compromise national security anclovio-;:
.late the CIA's right sto protect its "sources and meth!.,
,ods." Marehetti, on the other hand, said he put noth-
ing in the book that hadn't already been exposed and
that the only names he included were those of high,
officials ("who are in a'sense public") and foreign';
:heads of state.
,
Legally the case is interesting because it is not being
-; argued as a violation of the espionage statutes, but as:
.a civil dispute. The CIA: won its injunction against
Marchetti on a principle of business law. Many big
corporations require new employees to sign a contract
; promising not ,to give away or exploit company secret
?: when they leave the company, a practice that is gener-
ously supported by legal precedent. When Marchetti
joined the CIA he pledged not to "divulge, publish or
, reveal either by word, conduct or by any other means
any classified information, intelligence or knowledge
. . . unless authorized specifically in writing in each
case by the Director of Central Intelligence." So when
Marchetti ' signed his book contract the. CIA went
straight to court citing his oath and business law prec-;
nedents. It won an injunction against breach of contract;
, Marchetti and the ACLU describe their case as a c(Tt-
stitutional issue, art unprecedented attempt by he
government to censor a book before it has been pub-
lished. They warn that other government workers may
find themselves bound by similar injunctions. Mar-
chetti points out that on August 25 the FBI announced
that all employees would be bound by a new secrecy
code:enforced through contract pledges like the one
he signed at the CIA. When a reporter asked for a legal
justification of the new policy, the FBI spokesman cited
the Marchetti case.
Marchetti believes the CIA has taken him to court to
harass the book out of existence. He says- "The CIA
doesn't want the book published. And if we go ahead
and publish anyway they want to punish the author to
set an example for lots of other guys who are sitting
around in the Washington suburbs thinking about
what has happened and wanting to comment." Mar-
chetti's only legal recourse now is to challenge each
CIA objection individually and try to reinstate the 100
censored pages a word at a time.
Since it is not possible to read the Marchetti manu-
script we cannot say whether his suspicions about the
agency are justified or not. One former CIA official
who has seen parts of the book believes that Marchetti
simply used bad judgment, that he might have pub-
lished his book by now if only he had not used the
names of current CIA employees and projects. Mar-
chetti says his book doesn't expose current operaticians;
the CIA says it does and as of now the agency haslhe
upperhand.
1.3
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NEWS,
12 September 1973 24 September 1973
(Cheer For -CM?
Along with the scabies, psoriasis,
blight and sundry popular
.?'eauses1 of an adulatory era, let's
? hoist 4 cheer for the CIA, probably
the 'roost maligned for the least
i reason of any U.S. governmental.
activity.
! The Central Intelligence Agency
has done a superb job in its basic
. mission. Begun after World War
?II, when it became apparent the
.United'' States would have to as-
sume some unaccustomed world re-
sponsibilities formerly borne large-
ly by the British, the agency had
:10 be built virtually from scratch.
There were a few operatives'.
! around frbin Wild Bill Donovan's
cops-and-robbers wartime Office of
Strategic Services, but that was not
' much of a base for an intelligence
' operation that would have to go up
: against the well entrenched, sophis-
ticated Soviet apparatus.
?t The CIA borrowed a good bit
from the British, but it soon began
to operate on its own and to de-
? velop a reliable brand of intelli-
gence. It gave U.S. officials an ob-
jective data base on which to make
decisions.
Remember that this was being
accomplished by penetration of
closed societies, principally Russia
and China. There are reasons to
believe that the CIA was caught
short by the speed with which' the
Soviet Union developed its first
atomic bomb?but few other major
; developments escaped the agency.
Through the years, it maintained
, an objectivity of reporting that
maddened the salesmen of particu-
lar causes in Washington and
earned it some distinguished en-
emies. The agency never was popu-
lar with the State Department, for
; obvious reasons, or with the in-
telligence divisions of the various
! armed services, but it performed
, well.
?
? Its failures were highly publi-
cized, especially in ?Ile operational
branch that probably never should
have been incorporated within the.
intelligence-gathering agency. That
, is. the "dirty-tricks" department,
which brought on the Bay-of-Pigs
: fiasco and has been blamed for just
about everything evil that has hap-
: pencd in the world?from droughts
to assassinations.
Even the dirty-tricks branCh
had some spectacular successes
against its even less principled ad-
versaries in ? such places as Iran,
Guatemala, et al, but its successes
could never be advertised and it
was tagged with failures on ven-
tures it did not even involve itself
In.
On the intelligence-gathering
side, the CIA was helped enor-
mously by technology. First the
II-2, which was an important suc-
cess, despite President Eisenhow-
Ex-aide fights to restore
deletions in book on CIA
By Thomas Oliphant
Globe Washington Bureau '
WASHINGTON ? A farmer se-
nior Central Intelligence Agency of-
? ficial will' be going back to Federal
court shortly to try to win the right
to publish the full version of a book
about his 15 years with the agency.
The CIA, meanwhile, has told the
former official, Victor Marchetti,
that moit than 100 of the 500-odd
manuscript pages he has completed
are objectionable, and it will seek to
prevent their publication.
At issue is whether the govern-
ment's defense and foreign policy
?agencies can control the writing and
speaking activities ? of former em-
ployees. Marchetti ? resigned four
years ago.
? The CIA claims it has binding
powers over Marchetti on the
? grounds that as an official, including
a stretch as the executive assistant to
its deputy director, he signed a stan-
dard form agreeing not to publish
anything not approved by the CIA.
. . Marchetti claims the form vio-
lates his First Amendment right to
free speech.
Sri far, the CIA is winning the
battle. Late last winter, the Supreme
Court declined to review a lower
Federal court order that enjoined
Marchetti from publishing the book
without first submitting his manu-
script to the agency for review.
Marchetti submitted his manu-
script, and last week was informed
in a general way of the deletions the
CIA warns to make.
? His New York lawyer, Mel Wolfe,
said he was told that more than 100
pages of the manuscript are objec-
tionable to the agency's general
:counsel, Gen. John Warner.
er's blunder in acknowledging it?
a violation of the first law of intel-
ligence collection. To do so only
embarrasses your opponents. '
The perfection of electronic
snooping brought about the. Nation-
al Security Agency, an operation
much larger than the 'CIA, but an
invaluable source of information.
Satellite reconnaissance, now that
It has been developed and, refined,
provides an accurate and compre-
hensive check on weapons deploy-
ments all over the world.
How well has the CIA done at
-classic, cloak-and-dagger spying?
For obvious reasons, few people
know. There are some indications
? . Wolfe said he will reeeive the
manuscript back this week, but as-
? sumes, he will not be able to discuss
publicly the nature of the deletions.
? A CIA official confirmed that the
manuscript has been submitted and
, is being returned, but insisted 'that
the deletions are not final and that
"there is room for give and take on
this."
14
Marchetti, however, said the
agency wants to keep him from pub-
lishing "anything in the way of sup-
portive detail."
He said the book's principal focus
is his contention that the !lime has
come to reform the CIA and bring it
under the control not just of the
President and the congressional Senn-
ities, but also of the public."
Marchetti said he is convinced
that the detail he offers to support
his contention would in no way en-
danger any person's life, or the na-
tional security.
"I'm also trying to encourage
others who've been on the inside to'
do this," he said, "and there are a lot
of them. You'll never hear about
them, though, if we don't win this
case, which is why I'll fight as hard
as I can all the way."
The injunction applies only as
long as the merits of the actual case
are being tried. It also limits the
CIA's jurisdiction over Marchetti to
classified information.
One aspect of that order is the
extent to which a Federal court will ?
, be able to apply it without getting
into discussions in the open of spe-
cific facts or events the CIA is seek-
ing to keep secret.
This suggests that the govern-
ment may seek to have a free speech
case heard in secret, as was the case
during portions of the Pentagon Pa-
pers controversy two years ago.
it has been moderately successful.
That job is infinitely tougher when
you are dealing with closed-society .
police states than with open ones
. such as ours.
1
Now the Nixon administration:!according to the pro-administratiog
Washington Star-News, is revamp-
ing the CIA to eliminate the Boards
of Estimates and the National In-
telligence Estimates. These cur-
rently are our highest balance
sheets of digested intelligence.
, If so, the White House is making
another tragic mistake, of a piece
with some of the others that have
risen lately to plague it. The beef
against the CIA apparently boils
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WASHIkTON POST
8 October 1973
ook World
Secrets
,,ehind the Stamp
THE ANDERSON PAPERS. By Jack Anderson with
'George Clifford
(Random Rouse. 275 pp. S6.95)
? Anderson ? because both he
wReuie ed by?
and Pearson have done
Julius Duscha ? much over the years to
? keep government honest,
The reviewer, a former. but .the 'pressures on the
Washington Post reporter, is Washington Merry - Go ?
director of .the Washington Round column are tremen-
Journalism Center.
. ? dous. Published seven days a,.
Jack Anderson, the all-. :week, it promises a scandal al
American reporter, has writ- 'day, and not even Anderson
ten a disappointing book. The: rand his handful of aides can
jacket has a large red "Secret" Wine up with that, many.
stamp on it along with the Often the column is wrong,'
legend, "From the files of and sometimes a snippet of
America's most famous in- information is hoked up be-)
vestigative reporter," but in-' clause yet another deadline, igi
side there is only a rather flat: fast approaching. In addition)
rehash of Anderson's ITT, to the 'column, Anderson alsoi
FBI and Bangladesh escap-. 'turns out television broad:,
edes.as, well as an apologia, casts and lectures around thei
for his disgraceful role in country. ?
the Eagleton affair. These'same pressures apply)
There is too much preach: to all of journalism, of coursei,
ing. in the book, too. Like his but they are particularly,viru-1
predecessor Drew Pearson, lent " among columnists who
Anderson has a disturbing, must produce on schedule'
often cloying messianic streak ?something that at least sounds,.
which surfaces much more new.
often in his public speaking '? The largest part of bolt
than in his column. Ander- is given over to a retelling of;
son is a Mormon and Pear- the . ITT affair, the famous',
son was a Quaker and both.. ?Dita; Beard memo and the al-N
of them have wanted the'l 'legations that the Justice Dc-
world to know that they are partment settled an antitrust'
eager to save it. suit against the ITT in ex-,,
In trying to explain away,/ change for a $400,060 contri-;
bution from the corporation
for example, his unsubstan-
.,
tiated report that Sen. to help pay for the Repub
limn -National Convention
Thomas Eagleton (D-Mo.).
when it was originally'
had been cited for front' scheduled to be held in'
:six to 11 traffic violations San Diege. The conven-
ranging "from drunken titan was Moved to Miami
and reckless driving Beach after Anderson's revela-
to speeding," An
writes: "It was not the first lions, which, more important-
,,
y, have led now to a then.
:mistake I have made. Being sough investigation of ITT by
an optimist, I hope it will be. special Justice Departinents.
the last. I have recounted it Prosecutor Archibald Cox.
;here in the hope that some The role played by Ander-_,..
;'who 'are down on the press ? son and -his aide Brit Hume I
? will see how much effort and '1
anguish it takes to produce a in this .case was investiga-
flop, and find in this failure tive journalism at its best.
riot a confirmation of their From ITT Anderson moves
o
general distrust, but rather a n to his belabored account of
the Eagleten affair and then
,better understanding of the
to a retelling of the arrest by
.news' business and, hopefully,
new faith that a free press, thg?..FBI of his associate Les'
..
'in' its' stumbling way, is the
;,Whitten on charges of,,
best safeguard for ultimate "receiving and possessing
truth." !stolen property." The
property, in question con
Only a man like Anderson,
with unbounded faith in him-
stituted records taken from'
self 'and the goodness of his :the Bureau ..of Indian Af-
works could find that kind of ,fairs when the building was.
comf6rt in what was a reek- ;looted during the Indiansit-in
less error that not only dam- lost fall. Whitten and the two'
aged him but hurt all of Jour- andians arrested with him'
Minim in the process. ,said, that they were return-)
I, don't like to bad-mouth .ing the documents to the'
Approved For Release 2001/08/07
NEW YORK TIMES
31 October 1973
NIXON'S 8TH VETO
OF YEAR UPHELD
By RICHARD L. MADDEN
spectat to The New York Tlinei
. WASHINGTON, Oct. 30 ?
"President Nixon won his eighth
consecutive veto battle of the
year with Congress today as
,the Seneate failed to override
his veto of a bill authorizing
?;funds for the United States
'Information Agency.
. 'The vote was 54 to 42, or 10
_votes short of the two-thirds
required to override.
Despite Mr. Nixon's wealt.,
'.government, and a grand
jury refused to bring an
Indictment in the case.
In an intriguing footnote to'
?this episode, Anderson writes:,
,"Because one of my report-
ers had been arrested on the
'Streets by the FBI, I stepped',
:out 'from behind my type-1
'writer for , the first time:i
'ince taking Over the col- I
limn and helped to line ;.
up, the Senate oppositionj
to Patrick Gray." Gray's nomi-
nation to be FBI director wag
withdrawn , by President
Nixon because of his in- ,
,volvement in the Watergate
scandal.
The book ends with a- recon-;,
'struction of the accounts that:
-Anderson published, verbatim:
'from government memos, of;
the frantic meetings held at:
;the White House and the..
State and Defense Depart.'
ments during the 1971 In=!'
dia-Pakistan war which led' to
the birth of Bangladesh as an
independent state. These were'
the memos that showed
'Nixon privately order-
ing United States policy
,to "tilt" toward Pakistan while,
administration spokesmen, in
eluding now-Secretary of
? State Henry Kissinger, were"
publicly proclaiming Amer-
ican neutrality in the Conflict.,
'These remain fascinating',
glimpses into the way gov-
ernment sometime operates.;
? What I missed most. of all
'in Anderson's book is his fail-
ure to go much beyond'
what .I had already read in,
'his' columns over the last cou-
ple of years. One expects
from a book bearing a "Se-
cret" stamp some genuine'
-revelations as to how Ander-
son operates, and they are,
missing except in the case of,
-the Eagleton chapters' ,
Anderson does titillate their
reader,by mentioning that he
:secretly met his Source for;
;the India-Pakistan documents
in, a discount drugstore a cou-'
'ple of blocks from the White
;House, and now every time
:go in the Dart Drug at 18th
and Eye Streets NW, which'
I. have patronized for Years, I ?
look surreptitiously,' of
-Course, for, Anderson. I
haven't seen hirri?yet. Am'
, -
';ened position in the aftermath
the Watergate scandal and;
the dismissal of the special'
,.prpsdcutor, the vote indicted'
.nci discernible ? change in thel
'Pettern of the legislative battles.,
4
Provision Drew Veto
7 Mr. Nixon vetoed the 'bill last
'Tuesday because it contained
4 : provision requiring , the
rthiS.I.A. to turn over any confi-
dential information Congress
? demanded.
He said that the Justice De-'
partment had advised him that
.,the provision was "an uncon-
stitutional attempt on the part
of Congress to undermine the
president's constitutional re-
sponsibility to withhold the
? disclosure of information when,
ilin his judgment, such disclosure
'would be contrary to the public
;Tinterest."
:b The President also hag indi-
ecated that he would veto bills
pending in Congress that
would authorize funds for fdr-
pign aid. Both contain similar
-provisions requiring Federal
:agencies to make available in-
formation demanded by Con-
.;gress or face a cut-off of their
/operating funds.
The provisionoriginated be-
;fore the recent controversy over
whether the President should
make available the Watergate
tape recordings to the courts
and was an outgrowth of com-
plaints by some Democrats in
Congress that the' Administra-
tion had not been accommodat-
ing enough in providing infor-
mation to Congress about for-
eign policy matters.
In the brief debate before the
vote, Senator J. W. Fulbright.
Democrat of 'Arkansas and
chairman of the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, said that Con-
gressional committees had been
"completely thwarted" by Fed-
eral agencies in supplying what
he ,said he was information
'needed by Congress, particular-
ly on foreign policy, develop-
merits.
But Senator William V,..Roth
'Jr., Republican of Delaware,
said that such previsions cut-
ting off funds if agencies didn't
heed Congressional demands for
tinforination were "overreaching
Tand onnecessary." ;
He said: it would put "un-
'reasonable demands" on the
agencies, such as the
and 'could open the way for
'Congressional cominittees to
-demand ? confidential informa-
tion on agency employes.
, Twice this year the Senate
has voted to override Nixon
vetoes, but the House then sus-
tains them.
? However, Today's vote was
; well short of the two-thirds
needed to override. The Senate
'originally passed the measure
"by a vote of 62 to 20 on Oct. 10.
Voting to override the veto
were 47 Democrats and 7 Re-
publicans, while 35 Republi-
cans and 7 Democrats voting
against overriding.
With the veto sustained, the
Senate and House will now
, have 'to draft a new bill
'authorizing funds 'for ? the
U.S.I.A. The vetoed bill would
have authorized $216.7-million
TSfor the agency in the current
'fiscal year. ?
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7 October 1973 7 October 1973
lio's watching , its over, over there
,
The Berlin Ending. By E.
Howard Hunt. 310 pages.
Putnam's. $6.95.
the watchers?
The V.S. Intelligence Com-
miteity: Foreign Policy
anili Domestic Activities.
By iLyman B. Kirkpatrick,
Jr. 203 pages. Hill & Wang.
$7.95. .
This is a very sensible lit-
tie handbook by an author
who knows his subject as do
few writing thereon today.
? Author of "The Real CIA"
(1958) and now a professor
of political science at Brown
University, Mr. Kirkpatrick
can look back on almost a
? quarter century of intelli-
gence activity, culminating
in his post as executive
director-comptroller of the
Central Intelligence Agency..
In what he terms "neither a
defense nor a whitewash but
an evaluation of the U.S.
effort as I see it," he begins
his study with an explanation
of what the so-called 'intelli-
gence community" centered
in Washington is, analyzing
the functions of its various,
components. He then
sketches the controls built
into and around this commu-
nity to forestall gigantism or
cancer, and singles out "the
one with the sharpest cutting
edge" as the Office of Man-
agement and Budget. He de-
fends the secrecy pledge re-
quired of employees, thinks
the case of Victor Marchetti
"may well become a land-
mark ... for legal action
, against intelligence person-
nel," and delves at some
length into one of those rare
episodes where international
espionage briefly surfaced.
This was the 1964 slander
suit staged before Judge
Roszel C. Thomson in Dis-
trict Court in Baltimore in-
volving two Estonian nation- I
.als.
Government ' operations
overseas and at home each
receive a chapter, as does
the subject of political sup-
port for, or criticism of, an
administration's conduct in
those fields. The author is
solidly in favor of House and
Senate "watchdog" commit-
?.i
tees overseeing intelligence
activities, or at least their
drift, but argues 'also that
the professional community
must appropriately withstand
too much such access. If this
situation were to predomi-
nate, "there would lie no
intelligence community and.
no security or secrecy in
government."
Mr. Kirkpatrick's style is
matter-of-fact, at times bor-
dering on colorlessness. His,;
index is skimpy, and he of-,
fers only two illustrations: ,
charts of a sample electron-
, ics-communications system'
and of the Defense Intelli-
gence Agency (within the-.
armed forces). There is very
little on espionage. The bibli-
ography is almost ruthlessly
selective. Offsetting such de-
ficiencies is the author's'
masterly overview of a com-
plex governmental structure,
with the narrative occasion-
ally enlivened by personal '
reminiscence. He recalls, for,
example, the photograph a'
grateful President Kennedy
sent across the river to Lan-
gley inscribed, "To the CIA'
?with esteem."
Mr. Kirkpatrick finds "the
modern American tragedy",
to be that "many citizens
have lost their confidence in
the truthfulness of ,their gov-
,ernment officials." Such citi-
zens, he is convinced, are
wrong. "How good is the
U.S. intelligence community?
Obviously, it. is neither om-.
niscient nor ubiquitous, nor
could it be. There are gaps
in knowledge in vital sub-
jects. But based on what was
missing in 1947, compared to,
what is missing today, the;
record is good."
Civil-libertarian types may
be expected to pounce upon
this volume with little grunts:
of slavering anticipation. But
to at least one reviewer it
stands as an admirably com-
pressed, wisely instructive
monograph for the restricted',
audience it patently ad-
dresses.
' CURTIS CARROLL DAVIS
Mr. Davis is a, veteran of
both tl-e OSS and the CIA.
down to the fact the CIA does not
always tell Mr. Nixon what 'he
wants to hear. Killing the slave
who brings the bad news is an an-
cient remedy, but it doesn't work
?at least not for more than a brief
interlude of fans/:...........woor
?
The picture Howard Hunt
, (one of the Watergate Seven)
draws of international agents
and the worlds they occupy
'strikes one as strangely ego-
centric, without much
e connection to ideal or coun-
try. Hunt himself was in the
CIA for 20 years and report-
edly, missed the CIA way of
life when he joined a Wash-
ington public relations firm.'
' If a comparison can be fairly
'drawn between Hunt and the
main character in his new
book, Neal Thorpe, what he
missed was not service to his
country but rather excite-
ment, danger, and a feeling
of personal power.
So realizes Thorpe, speed-
ing along in his car, after
becoming involved hi uncov-
ering a Soviet plot designed
to place an agent as Secre-
tary General of the U.N. The
' zest has come back into his
life since he picked up a
young woman at National
Airport and 'drove her into
Washington during a taxi
strike. Concern for her
, plight, and a desire for ex-
citement give Thorpe reason
, for leaving his dull job as
architect and returning to
the CIA.
The story ends
The novel jumps from per-
501) to person and location to
location as the cast con-
verges toward Berlin, where,
as the title says, the story
'ends. The ending brings,dis-
illusionment to Thorpe.
Minor players on both sides
of the game have been liqui-
dated but the prime target is
still at large, untouchable.
Thorpe himself, because of
his involvement, is charged?
with a murder he did not
,commit in the States and has
no idea when, if ever, he can
safely return. He doubts that ,
ithe CIA, on whose fringes he
has been working, will help
him much.
Somehow though, the bitter
ending is not effective. In a
novel such as John Le ,
Carre's "The Spy Who Came
in from the Cold," the main
characters become real and
sympathetic by virtue of
their weaknesses, idiosyncra-
sies, and distrust of power.
When a cold organization
crushes such people, the
reader is naturally appalled.
But when the characters are
as slick, self-assured, and
fashionable as Thorpe and ?
his girl,'it is difficult to feel
much for their predicament.
The impersonality of Hunt's
style creates too much dis-
tance to involve the reader's
compassion.
The agent as hero can be a
dangerous image in reality.
Literature reflects reality
and sometimes influences it
no matter how fantastic spy
stories may seem. There is
undeniably a desire in man
to test his energy in the '
universe of his concern. Such
testing is the subject of
much literature.
At the book's end, Thorpe
is indignant when faced with
the fact that the machinery
is more important than one
cog. The reader is likely to
feel similarly indignant un-
less he realizes that thee
are few, if any, individuals
to whom one would entrust
the responsibility for making
decisions of national or inter-
national scope.
DALE MATTHEWS
MICAGQ TRIButas
80 OCT 1973
?
Hunt back in prison
? after taking stand
DAN-BURY, Conn., Oct. 29
CAP] ? Convicted Watergate
burglar E. Howard Hunt is
back in the federal prison here,
after a sojourn in Maryland in
the custody of U. S. marshals.
Hunt was in Maryland to testi-
fy before the Watergate grand
jury and the. congressional
committee investigating the
1972 break-in of Democratic
natioqat.beadquarters.
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Ariproved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100270001L7
NEWSWEEK
8 Oct. 1973
THE SPY WHO
TOOK THE FALL
pr:son-wan and faltering, he seemed
anything but the superspy-eum-
noveist whose Bondian career had
crashed in the debacle of Watergate.
Faci!; the Ervin committee, E. How-
wanl Hunt was a.burnt-out case?and
as a tall guy in the Watergate scandal
who has served long months in jail
while higher-ups went free, he in-
spired considerable sympathy in the
Senate 'Caucus Room and in living
rooms across the nation. But the dark
glasses he sometimes wore in the
gime of the TV lights were fitting: in
the end, he remained an enigma.
With two of his children, Lisa, 22,
and St.. John, 19, sitting behind him,
Bun!, 54, recounted a Job-like ordeal.
"I find myself confined under a
sentence which may keep me in pris-
on (or the rest of my life," he told the
senators. "I have been incarcerated for
six months. For a time I was in solitary
' confinement. I have been physically
attacked and robbed in jail. I have
! suffered a stroke. I have been ...
manacled and chained, ? hand and
foot. I am isolated from my four
motherless children. The funds,. pro-
vided me ... have long been ex-
hausted ... Beyond all this, I am
crushed by the failure of my govern-
ment to protect me and my family as
in the past it has always done for its
clandestine agents."
Naive: But for all its pathos, Hunt's
testimony suggested to some skeptical
associates that the 21-year veteran
of the Central Intelligence Agency..
Was simply wearing a new disguise.
"One thing Howard is not is politically
naive," a friend of Hunt told NEWS-
' WEEK. "He had to know' that this was
the same kind of thing he had been
doing in other countries for years. He
had to know the risks were greater.
? Ile was playing for higher stakes, .al-
so. He wanted deputy director of the
CIA, or something like that." One
:acquaintance suspects Hunt has held
back hush money from his Cuban
codefendants, who now feel as be-
trayed by their leader as he does by
the men who directed him.
Some of Hunt's stories of prison life,
knowledgeable sources say, are a bit
embellished. When his children vis-
ited him in Danbury Federal prison,
? St. John said, "It was really nice. Al-
most like. a boarding school." Hunt
did have a fight with another inmate
during a stay in the D.C. jail, but his
attorneys tend to play down his ac-
count of his medical problems;
To be sure, the fifteen months since
Watergate have cost Hunt' dearly.
Soon after the break-in, hunt was ,
fired from both his White House and
his public-relations jobs. His wife died
in a plane crash last December, on a
financial mission for the W.atergate
cover-up. In fighting his 35-year provi-
sional jail sentence, Hunt is piling up
legal fees of $1,500 a day?an expense
that .the reissue of seventeen of his
47 spy novels will do little to mitigate.
No less painful for Hurl is the_liulotie
Approvea ror
NATIONAL REVIEW
12 October 1973
Howard Hunt: Justice Outraged
? A man caught breaking into Tiffany's at midnight and
stuffing his sack with valuables might receive about six
months in prison, if he wife a first offender and other-
wise had a good record. i
For his role in the Watergate break-in, E. Howard
Hunt was sentenced to 35 years by Judge John Sirica.,
Other defendants also received long sentences, with the
'exception of James McCord, whose sentencing was de-
ferred on the assumption that he would talk: In Hunt's
case, ne mitigating circumstances of previous record,
character, or motivation ,affected the sentence. In. factl
Hunt had had a long and honorable record of service
to his country as an OSS and CIA operative. ,
Since his imprisonment, Hunt has been shuttled from
one. cell to another, and from one hearing to ,another,
? usually in manacles. His health has declined. In his:Jirst
appearance before the Ervin committee, he revealed that
he had suffered a stroke since his imprisonment. His
accommodations in prison have not prevented his being
physically attacked and robbed by other inmates. In '
addition, his wife died in a Chicago plane crash carrying
Watergate money. Numerous and often redundant court
actions and hearings have exhausted Hunt's financial
resources. His children have been effectively orphaned.
The extraordinary sentences imposed by Judge.Sirica
were an attempt, and widely recognized as such, to get
the defendants to "sing." But Judge Sirica had no way.
of knowing what further information they possess, if
any.
Hunt's 35-year sentence would appear, prima facie,
to be unconstitutional. In the first place, it violated the
Eighth Amendment prohibition against "cruel and un-
usual punishments," a prohibition the relevance of which
is strengthened by the accompanying language regarding
"excessive bail" and "excessive lines." In the second
place, it at least indirectly violated the Fifth Amend-
ment, which was designed to eliminate the use of torture
to extract incriminating information from a witness or
a defendant.
In recent years, rivers of ink have been spilled about
real and alleged abuses of justice: how Soledad Brother
George Jackson received such a long prison, term for a
mere armed robbery; how the 13errigans were martyred
by their months at Danl2ury; how felons at Attica have.
been abused; and how Black Panthers in New -York
have been persecuted by an unfeeling Jude e Murtagh.
We are waiting to hear from Toni Wicr, Murray
Kempton, and Kingman Brewster about the case of E..
Howard Hunt and the Cubans.
ridicule that has greeted his esca-
pades as a spy. The reportedly "ill-
fitting red wig" that Hunt wore to his
meeting with Dita Beard has become
a national joke, and former CIA di-
rector Richard Helms has called him
"a bit of a romantic" with a tendency
"to get alittle carried away."
But if last week's appearance be-
fore the committee was an act, it was
among the best in limit's career. "I
am sorry that I did not have the wis-
dom to withdraw [from the NVatergate
operation)," he said. "At the same
time, I cannot escape feeling that the
country I have served for my entire
life and which directed me to carry
out the Watergate entry is punishing
me for doing the very things it trained
and directed me to do."
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wk$HINGToN stftwiramd For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100270001-7
Washington, D. C., Sunday, October 7, 1973
By Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
In our political system the president en-
joys ? or suffers ? enormous advantages
of leadership. His is an extremely difficult
role to share, and to a considerable extent
the advantages interact with the problems,
one upon the other, to cripple the political
system.
' His pril*ipal advantage is that the gen-
? eral publib ? even the best-informed pub-
lic ? views the world beyond our borders
as confusing and dangerous.
, To the extent that the average citizen is
confused, he tends to place his trust in the;
? president and in the experts. The feeling of
danger ? reduced and diffuse today but
still very much present ? brings with it a,
strong sense of the necessity for teamwork'
under a united leadership. And so the pres-,
ident operates from a protected position
behind the high wall of the public's desire,
to delegate trust to one man.
Unfortunately, presidents are inclined to
think this blind trust in their wisdom is
wholly justified. Having almost sole access
to the full range of classified information
and expert opinion, presidents are tempted
to think that the opinions of congressmen,
academics, journalists and the ,public at
large are, almost unavoidably, inadequate-
ly informed. The subtle insights of special-;
ists or classified pieces of information are
,often accorded a totally undeserved atten-
tion and importance in comparison to more
widely shared insights and knowledge.
' ALL THIS REDUCES the politically
healthy feeling of being constrained by the
disagreement of many of one's peers. But
that might not be particularly serious if
the president and the executive branch
were bias-free, and single-minded in their
desire to produce results representing the ,
long-run preferences of the American pub-
? lic. Unfortunately, neither of these condi-
tions is likely to prove true.
For there are biases built into the posi-
tion of the president ? and the advice he
receives that are likely to lead to depar-
tures from the needs of the country as per-
ceived by others.
' For one thing, the very factors which
reduce the value of the opinion of others on
tactical questions have a way of spreading
to questions of basic values. There is a'
tendency to assume that such fundamen-
tals as the amount of dollar cost the public
, will bear to reduce nuclear risks, or the
loss of lives that we will bear to avoid a
particularly offensive weapon, are techni-
cal decisions for experts ? although these
decisions plainly involve only value judg-
ments, not specialized knowledge, once the
choices are fairly laid out.
,The problem is further complicated by
the fact that presidents in recent years
have' become increasingly enamored of
their role on the stage of world affairs and
are likely to resist a more limited role even
if the public were to assign it to them. .
All of these pressures make a relatively
retiring presidential role less likely what-
ever the public interest.
OVER THE YEARS, THEN, we have
moved further and further away from the
basic premises of our democratic political
system to put important decisions on for-
eign policy in the hands of the president
and, in effect, to charge him with its suc-
cessful administration. Our almost total
reliance on the president's leadership and
accountability; the felt need to fight insur-
gency with counterinsurgency, often se-
cretly; our unwillingness to test foreign
policy initiatives in the ways in which we
test domestic policy proposals ? through
debate and discussion; the appeal of "na-
tional security" as sufficient justification
for a vague and extensive foreign policy;
and, most of all, the fear of the president
that his political popularity, his place in
history and his capacity to lead all depend
on not having another China, or Cuba, or
other major loss to communism ? all these
considerations tempt a president to go it
alone in the hope that the policy will suc-
ceed.
The temptation to let the end justify the
means is clearly present, even if the
means requires dissembling or misleading
the Congress and the American people.
Such Conduct can, in the environment of..
the recent past, be rationalized as neces-
sary to maintain that secrecy on which
?success depends. And, after all, it is un-
likely that the president's honesty and
good faith will be brought effectively into
question if the policy is successful.
The Bay of Pigs debacle of 1961 is an il-
lustrative example. The significant aspect
of this incident is the fact that President
Kennedy's mea cu/pa related to the failure
of the mission, and the later investigation
%'into how the president could be so misin-
formed. He felt no need to apologize for
undertaking so extensive a covert activity
'on presidential authority alone.
? Was the Bay of Pigs different in kind or
quality from the secret bombing of Cambo-
dia (and falsification of records) at Presi-
dent Nixon's direction? However justified
by necessity, secrecy destroys our demo-
cratic process when it also deceives the
American public on important and contro-
versial matters.
The war in Vietnam has raised still deep.;
er questions. Between 1961 and 1964 our
operations in Vietnam through "military
advisers" were, at most, partially covert.
The fact of their number was known, and
'their roles only modestly concealed.
As the operation grew and the possibility
of more massive intervention became
clearer ? and, I am convinced, well before
he had made up his own mind how far he
would intervene ? President Johnson did
go to the Congress for authority in the
form of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. The
form, at least, was observed, though un-
happily in part as a political response to
Senator Goldwater's position in the 1964
campaign.
YET I CANNOT, IN RETROSPECT,
square the Vietnam War with my concept
of democratic government. What Presi.
dent Johnson did not do, when he had
made up his mind in 1965, was to lay out
fairly and frankly for Congress and the
American people the choices facing us, the
risks we were taking, and the possible
EE
consequences of our intervention. His fail-
ure to do so led in the end directly to 'at-
tacks upon his credibility and to a serious
erosion of the trust and confidence of the
public in the president. And, of course, as
? the war unfolded, lack of candor was corn-'
pounded by miscalculations that I am sure
far outweighed conscious deceit.
Mr. Johnson did not want the war, felt he
could not let Vietnam go without overt mil-
itary assistance, and was genuinely con-
cerned about its potential for expansion..
Once committed, he saw no retreat without
too great a loss of prestige both at home
and abroad.
In 1965 I have no doubt the public and the
Congress would have overwhelmingly ac-
cepted and supported our intervention in
Vietnam, and that any alternative
(harsher or softer) course, as I am sure
President Johnson knew, would have badly
divided the country. There was in 1965 no
'basic contrary view; virtually no one of
any political weight was avowedly pre- '
pared to accept the, collapse of the non-;
communist government in South Vietnam.
In these circumstances it would have
been difficult for Mr. Johnson to have vol-
unteered all the risks potentially involved,'.
to have prepared' the American people for:
the worst. His primary political interest
was the Great Society ? not Vietnam ?
and his political compromise was to down-
'play Vietnam in the hope that guns and
butter were both possible. In retrospect he
should have encouraged a Great Debate;
had he known his worst fears would be re-:
alized, he undoubtedly would have. Yet the
harsh fact is he did not, and that he did not
importantly narrowed his future options.
- Then, as the war dragged on, and as
opposition to it became increasingly vocal,,
the administration's motivation subtly'.
changed. Information withheld, promul-
gated half-truths, propagandizing the good
news -- all of which were to a degree mis-
'leading ? were now justified by the neces-
sity to minimize the degree of opposition so
that peace could be more rapidly achieved.
And so the credibility gap widened. ,
Mr. Nixon ? prior to Watergate ? re-
couped some credibility for the presiden-
cy. He did not, however, do so by frank-
ness and candor. His technique was to
reduce the levels of U.S. troops and casual-'
ties; to seek to focus attention on other
matters by his China initiative; and to con-
tinue to dissemble and to restrain discus-
sion on Vietnam. His excessive views of
presidential power, his seeming disdain for
congressional views, and his -moving the
center of decisions and operations from the
State Department to the White House all
have tended to reduce public discussion
and, consequently, public opposition. And
to a completely unprecedented degree he
has conducted his foreign policy secretly.
In his administration, neither the Congress
nor the public hn uun informod Obout
foreign affairs except at a level of high
generality, and even then without the
opportunity for discussion. Indeed, not
even the bureaucracy has been consulted
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or informed.
WHAT MUST BE DONE TODAY to put
our foreign policy on a viable basis is, .
first, -to promote discussion sufficient to!
establish the domestic consensus neces-
sary to inin acceptance for, and support "
of, our f:lreign initiatives. We stand as a
badly divided nation and we face some
very tough problems. Second, we must re-
store confidence in the integrity of the.
presidency. The Congress and the People,
, need in believe what the administration,
says. Both of these objectives mean dra-
matic changes in the style of the presiden-
cy in foreign affairs.
I would propose the following changes:
?
0 The president must indicate that he
needs and wants the support and participa-
tion of Congress and the public in formu-
lating his foreign policy. He must welcome '
public discussion and criticism of his pro-
posals. Clearly, he must do the proposing,
' he must provide the leadership. But he and
his principal assistants must be far more
willing than in the recent past to lay out.
candiIy the problems, tile choices, the
recor ;mended actions. ;
To involve the Congress in this fashion'
is, despite congressional protestations to
the contrary, as much a problem for the
Congress as for the president. The un--
? pleasant fact is that most members of
:Congress find little political profit with
their constituents in foreign affairs and in
. accepting the compromises necessarily
involved. The role of critic after the. fact is
often more politically rewarding than that
.of a constructive participant. It is easy for
,opposition ? especially in the Congress
'to center around short-term considerations
rather than long-term policies, to make
appeals to national pride, to criticize al-
most any negotiation.
The record of Congress on many foreign
policy issues, usually in the form of
amendments to foreign aid bills, is far,?
from a distinguished one; and the tempta-
? tion of the executive to interpret away
crippling amendments to its foreign policy
has served to create still another tear in ,
the fabric of constitutional government.
Secrecy in foreign affairs is not, there- ,
. fore, a one-way street born of presidential,:
'ambition for power.
Nor is a compromise approach ? secret
consultations with relevant congressional
committees and leaderships ? much of an
answer.
No, today there can be no substitute for
'a general rule of openness with the Con-
gress. Congress must become truly in-
!volved in decisions and programs for so-
tion, and it must be told what the problems
are, what the apparent options for action
,are, and why the executive has come for-
ward with particular proposals. If, in the
process, nations abroad come to know
,somewhat more about the way an adminis-
tration's mind is working, I think the price
if it is that ?eminently worthpaying.
-0 It follows that the principal makth's of
foreign policy decisions must be exposed to
Congress. the press and the
0 We should abandon publicly all covert
operations designed to influence political
results in foreign countries. Specifically,
.there should be no secret subsidies of pa
lice or counterinsurgency forces, no efforts'
? to influence elections, no secret monetary
subsidies of groups sympathetic to the
United States, whether governmental,'
nongovernmental or revolutionary. We,
should confine our covert activities overzi
,seas to the gathering of intelligence infor-
mation. ?
? I come to this condusitin with some,re-,
luctance, because in a few instances such
activities have been legitimate and useful..'
But I believe the impossibility of control-:
ling secret activities ? and the public's'
.apprehension about them ? outweigh the
losses which will be sustained. Much of
this activity was phased out under Kennel-.
dy and Johnson, and I think the rest can
go. _
'
?
0 We must minimize the role of, secret in.
formation in foreign policy. ?
Prior efforts to revise the classification
and declassification system have not
;worked, primarily because in no instance,
has major surgery been tried. Classifiers:
have mixed the desire to keep information
confidential and "closely held" for what-
ever reason, good or bad, with information
actually affecting the "national defense."
To do this is a perversion of the law.
What exactly would be covered by a
(revised) classification system, limited to'
matters affecting the national defense?
Examples would be CIA and DIA intelli-
gence material on foreign military capabil-
ities, troop dispositions, missile place-4
ments, and weapons development; and,
defense and AEC information on our own,
weapons systems, future technological
developments, current strength and dispon;
sition, mobilization estimates, and military
plans to the extent such information is not
already in the public domain. Even such a
drastic cutback as this will result in smile
overclassification. But it should be more:
workable than the present morass.
I do not propose that all other infor1112?;
tion be made public or even generally,
available. I simply suggest that it not be
classified as "national defense" informa-,
tion, carrying such exotic labels as "Top
Secret" or "Cosmic Top Secret" or the
like. I have no problem with limiting distri-
,bution within the bureaucracy of informs- ,
tion which is politically "sensitive," or
,with general rules concerning the confi-
dentiality of discussions with foreign diplo-
mats, ambassadorial or other bureaucratic '
,recommendations as to policy, or personal;
Or investigative records. (In the case of '
diplomatic exchanges, such common-sense
rules long antedate the postwar expansion
,of classification.) Frankly, I think we can
, rely on the good sense of bureaucrats to .
,keep confidential what should be confiden-
tial most of the time, without employing,
bloated concepts of national security to do
so. ?
* Classification will not stop leaks any-
how. What minimizes these is loyalty to
superiors, based not so much on agree-
ment with policy as on respect for their
fairness, integrity and openness to recom-
mendations and ideas. Apart of the new
style of operation must be far greater
openness within the executive branch it-
self.
? IN THE PRESENT WORLD SITUA-
TION, far greater congressional and pub-
lic involvement in formulating our foreign
policy, seems to me not only right but near-.
ly inevitable. There are two reasons for
this:
' First, problems of trade, investillent,
resources, development and interna tion
monetary stability promise to take in-
cressing importance in the future. 411 of
these bl ? legislatis,
lutionsf and therefore extensive conkres-
? sional participation and action. All iill
involve a continuity in policy over relative-
ly long periods of time and thus need ad:?
;lie understanding and support. ?;?,1;
Second, as communism has bei,otrie less ?
;monolithic, as China has emerged as 'a
competing ideological center, as the Soviet
?
Union bas become less stridently revolii-1
',tionary and more concerned with China ,
and with its own domestic progress, and as ;
Europe and Japan have become centers
for wealth and power, security consi ra-
tions in the United States' foreign ?*cy,
? have become less consuming and less glob.'
al. ?
' The shift to a more open style in foreign
policy will not be without its difficulties. .
One?is the extent to which openness may in
,fact reduce options or be perceived as ?
doing so. I accept the fact that it some-
times does. But I also think the extent of ,
that reduction is exaggerated, often for
improper purposes. I accept, too, that
there are circumstances where the presi-
dent'or the secretary cannot be totally
candid without affecting the situation he is
discussing. I think the press and public
understand this. They know, for example,
that 'high government officials cannot pub-
licly discuss corruption of high South Viet- ,
namese officials, or that high-level expres- ?
sions of doubt about the viability of a for-
eign government may bring it down. But.
these inhibitions ,are not serious ones, be.
cause the underlying facts ? if they are
important to understanding policy ? can .
be made available to the public in other,
'ways.
THE MOST SERIOUS PROBLEM of a',
more open foreign policy lies in congres-
sional response. In Congress controversy,
'can lead to delay, to inaction, to unworka-;
? ble compromise, to missed opportunities.
'Minorities can obstruct; special interests,
can sometimes manipulate policy more,
easily on the Hill than in the executive ,
branch. The accident of committee leader.;
ship and membership can skew policy
,away from the national interest to more:
;parochial concerns. No one should be san-
guine about these risks. The danger of get-
ting hopelessly bogged down in a congres. '
sional quagmire is clear and present.
Nonetheless, I am prepared to take some
'losses in our foreign affairs if by doing so
we can restore the fundamentals of repre-
sentative democracy to our foreign policy.
As Watergate demonstrates, democracy is
too fragile to be divided into foreign and ,
domestic affairs. We cannot give the presi-
dent a free hand in the one without eroding
the whole of the governmental system that
all policy seeks to preserve.
-
Nicholas Dea Katzenbach was attar:ley
general and later undersecretary of State ?
during the Johnson administration. He now
is general counsel of IBM. This article is .
excerpted,? by permission, from Foreign
Affairs, published by the Council on For-
eign Relations.
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22 Ociober 1973
McG9prge Bundy?
oward
-
an Open Foreign Polic
: There ' are many theories of the
American presidency, and the style of
the White House changes with every
change el administration. But there is
'one element in the styles of the last 10
years which, if I am right, will be
..profoundly out of place in the next 25
' years?the apparent belief that there is
an indisp4,nsable need for secrecy and
loneliness in the conduct of our major.
? international affairs.
. This attitude is seldom supported,
: by reasoned argument, and its validity
can be questioned even with respect
to such interesting special cases as
diplomacy toward China, the Soviet,
lUnion and Vietnam. An important
, element in the agenda of the nation
could he a careful review of the real.
' importance or lack Of importance of ?
the attitudes toward secrecy which de-
veloped in the generation marked by
the opening of the nuclear age and the
fears of the cold war, and which have
reached their extreme point, in argu-
ments offered by President Nixon in',
defense of his plumbers. My own
: strongly held belief is that such a
study would demonstrate the number
'of matters which need to remain secret
over anything but a short 'space of
time is exceedingly small, and that
the balance of national advantage,
both at home and abroad, rests with
a presumption in favor of openness.
. Because the subject is one with
which for a time I was closely en-
gaged, and because its history is 'fre-
quently cited as evidence of everween-,
ing strength in the presidency, let me
here suggest that my'argument may be'
most plainly demonstrated by the his-
tory of our deeply troubling engage-
'ment in the Vietnam war., There are*
. many lessons in it, and the mode of
learning, at least so far, has more
often been hot debate than cool reflec-,
tion, but my own conviction is that the
history of the war in Vietnam, prop-
, erly understood, will testify not to,
the dangers of excessive presidential,
power but to ' the perils of secretibe-
ness?which is something very differ-
ent. Seen as a matter of simple power,
I think the story of Vietnam will tell.
more about the weakness and internal,'
division of our government?including'
its presidency?than about any usurpa-
tion of excessive power by anybody. I
know from direct experience that be-
tween 1961 ? and 1966 the dominant
emotional reaction of the White House
to the Vietnam problem was frustra-'
tion-and while a great part of that
sentiment derived from the intractable
behavior of both friend and foe in
Southeast Asia, a great deal more was
the 'product of division, uncertainty,
and a sense of limited ability to control
!.men and events within the Executiye
Branch itself. I believe history will
conclude that none of our last three
Presidents has felt fully confident of
his capacity to command and control
his own subordinates in relation to
.Vietnam, and that no matter what
polite may have been preferable at
any atacto,furthor , in, faster out, or
.something in between?that policy
would have been better managed if
command and control in the Executive
Branch had been stronger. There are
particularly , significant questions, I
think, about the relation between
Presidents and military men, but
? there are lessons to be learned else-,
where as well. In this capital case, as.
in general, I believe evidence will
' show that the truly' fundamental error.
has been to suppose that isolation,
"secrecy and surprise are the precondi-,
tions of strength. I think all those in-'
volved, and especially the last two
Presidents, would have gained in ef-
fectiveness by a more open and con-
' fident approach, first to the rest of the!
Executive Branch, second to the Con-
gress, and third to the country.
So I think it is usually a mistake to
suppose that secrecy gives strength to
foreign policy. In most cases, I believe?
the strong presidency and an open
style are not enemies, but friends. I,
believe this to be true in at least six,
major areas that are of critical im-'
portance. These are, in no particular'
order, the Executive Branch, the Con-
gress, the press, the general public,.
the interested public, and foreign gov-
ernments. Without 'attempting a de-,
tailed analysis of these different sec-
tors and their meaning to the presi-
dency, let me suggest some general
arguments for openness.
The central requirements for an ,
effective relation with each 'of these
great forces is that there should be a
sense of effective, two-way communica-
tion based on trust. The shape of that,
trust will vary from one sector to an-'
other. In none of the six cases can we
exclude the element of principled dis-
agreement, and in none, alas, can a
President neglect the !possibility of be-
trayal. But the right objective, in each
case,' must be the establishment, and
the zealous maintenance, of a process
of communication that' is , mutually
reinforcing.
, The President and the press, to take'
' a relatively simple but lively example,,
are natural adversaries every ,day, on
the shallow plane of short-lived secrets.
They 'can also be deeply opposed to
each other on major issues of policy,
'though the press will rarely be mono-,
lithic on any large question. But the
President who ,perceives the press as
intrinsically his enemy is a President
who has condemned himself to an iso-,
lation that limits the strength of his
office.
But the two most immediate areas
'of concern for the advocates of open-
ness are the relations between the
presidency and the Executive Branch,
and the relations between the Execu-
tive Branch and the Congress. These'
relations, in any administration, are.
sensitive and complicated. Representa-
tive government, in Theodore Lowi's'
words, is "the most complex and deli-
cate type of political organization that
has yet been 'seen in world history,"
and in the American case the problem
Is compounded by our constitutional
and institutional commitment to the
-separation of powers. The difficulties
there are legion,, and nowhere more
troubling than in foreign affairs. It is
extremely easy for Presidents, sena-
tors and foreign policy professionals
(whether in the State Department, the
Pentagon or the Treasury) to give up
on the complexity and difficulty of
those relations, and to try to "go it'
alone." But that does not work?not in
the long run. ' ? , ?
It is particularly unwise, I think, for,
the presidency to give up on the Execu- ,
tive Branch, and that happens to be,
one that has been most conspicuous ,
in recent years. Seen from the White
House, the bureaucracy can be a most
'irritating institution, and there are
interesting Special reasons why it may
be even more irritating to Republican.
'than to Democratic Presidents. But to .
,surrender to this irritation is at least
as self-defeating, and mutually shriv-
eling, as to accept a relation of distant
,and hostile mistrust with the press.,
The right way to deal with the bu-
reaucracy, at least in the field of-
'foreign affairs, is to get close to it, and
to build persistently and sympatheti-
:cally on its own almost instinctive
desire to turn toward the sunlight of
presidential leadership.
. It would be pleasant if we could
say that a new policy of openness
*.weuld resolve all our difficulties. But
to see how much trouble remains we ,
, have only to look at the problem which ,
currently faces our government in the
Mideast. Here for the fourth time
since 1948 there is open warfare, and
the difficult and delicate effort to con-
tain the struggle and to achieve a
cease-fire is one in which the Presi-
dent and his principal advisers cannot
be expected to disclose all that they
are doing and saying, both in the Mid- '
east and outside it. Moreover, the sit-
uation itself, as it evolves from one '
day to the next, will be of critical im-
portance in shaping the next move of ,
, every government. So far, at least, it
'appears that this evolution may be.
'both slower and more costly for all
than was the case in the, six-day war
of 1967. But as one of those who was'
at work in the White House during
that last occasion, I know 'how inescap-
ably both battlefield news and private
diplomatic communications are a nee-,
essary part of the conduct of policy at
such a time. Thus both the sensitivity:
of what is said and done and the speed
with which the situation changes do
combine to enforce upon the President
a special responsibility.
Yet precisely because it, is so im-
portant and so dangerous, this situa-
tion does emphasize again the require-
ment that our basic' policy here as
elsewhere runs grave risks of failure
if it does not rest upon informed and
general public 'support. And so we
must ask the deeper question whether
the President's conduct of affairs in
the present crisis can be said to rest
upon .such an agreed national senti-
ment.
The question is not an easy one. It
is not hard to frame an American view
of the Mideast that will commahd.
broad support if we use phrases that
are broad enough to encompass our
hopes and thin enough to leave our'
real obligations undefined. Thus we
are for peace, and we believe in the
independence and security of all the
peoples in the Mideast. We favor jus-
tice or refugees and secure boundar-
ies, and the President Is tibis to writo
in each of his annual report a of our,
concern for friendship with all, and
.our responsible support for a nego-
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ApProved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100270001-7
'bated settlement. this much is easy.
,But behind the generalities there are
much harder questions. The most im-3
'portant and the most sensitive of these -
turns on the degree to which the ,
.United States has become an indis-
.pensahte force in assuring the survival
, of Israel. This has never, so far, be- '
,come a question of direct American ?
military engagement, and no American
government has ever had to decide '
ex:'icI;;,- what it would do or not do to
,prevent. the destruction of that extraor-
dinarily gallant and determined coun-
try. But at the lesser level of provid-
ing essential military supplies, usually
by direct sale but sometimes on more
favorable terms, the United States gov-
ernment, through five administrations,'
, has made military equipment available ?
? in such quantities and at such times
,:as were necessary, in our own view, to
preserve the military balance in the
area.
r. The most candid expressions , of this
r policy have been those of the present,
administration, which has repeatedly
announced its determination to do '.
? what is necessary to maintain that
? military balance. But what we now
have to face is that any action by us'
.;?to maintain balance, in the current:
situation, may have graver cense-
- quenceS than ever before. The danger.
'has more to do with forces in the Mid-
east itself than with any threat of
HOUSTON POST
25 Sept ? 1973
great-power confrontation, simply be-
cause there are powerful forces?
including those of geography?which
limit the hazard of such confrontation.
&But the forces at work within the Mid- ?
east itself are now such that they may
.confront this country with extremely
grave choices, and I do not believe
that our government has yet offered
the kind of open leadership, on this
subject, which would lay the necessary
basis for effective future policy. It is
one thing to talk about "military bal-
ance" in reports which are read only
by specialists, and it is another to en-
list the American people in the accept--
ance of the possible consequences of
perseverance in this policy.
It is possible, of course, that events
will not force our government to very
,hard choices in this field, and I repeat
that it is understandable from the
diplomatic standpoint that the govern-
?
ment should prefer to play its difficult
hand quietly. In 1967 the Johnson ad-
ministration said as little as possible
in public while the fighting lasted, and:
nothing at all about the military bal-
*ance. Even then, however, the reper-
cussions from our association with Is- ?
rael were severe, if temporary. I think
It will be more serious this time, and ,
I think our public is less prepared, if
only because the Six-Day War came at.
the end of a prolonged international
crisis 'which had aroused both atten-
tion and sympathies throughout the
country.
So I think /there is a rapidly growing
:need for ,a Omprehensive and authori-
,tative exposition of our policy toward
the Mideast, and that cryptic press
conferenpes and back-channel conver-
sations With journalists will no longer,
,clo the j ... My point is not ... thati
I know dust what should be said, or .
:just wh 1. My point is rather that'
quite a lot needs to be said, to us and ?
to the world, and that no policy which
requires public support can be sus-
tained without such exposition ... For
all too many years we have lacked the
kind of open leadership, at the top,
4.for. which I plead. In the last eight
!months we have seen dismaying rev-
elations of mistrust and suspiciousness
at the highest levels. And even when-
, there have been great achievements,,
.as in our new relations with China and
'Russia, and in our effective self-ektri-
cation from Vietnam, the accompanY-
ing explanations have often fallen
:short of candor. It is time for Ml of ?
us, in or out of office, in or Out of
politics, in or &it of any party?to ap-
peal to what is still our government'
:to accept the charge of moving our
'great affairs into the open once again.
It will not be easy, but it is the one
,sure path to a renewal of strength not
only for the nation but for the Presi-
dent himself.
n enc6 findo'a.- ha
seret phrise 00
?
By DONALD It. 5IORR15
Post Nows Analyst
The classified document leak is a staple of
journalism these days, and after lengthy de-
liberation have decided to release an ex-
ample that once came into my possession.
Although the Agency it came from is not
identified, the document is marked "Office of
Training." An accompanying note explains
that it is for the use of intcaligence officers
'stationed abroad who are charged with main-
taining official liaison with the local intelli-
gence service. The document consists of a
glossary of phrases, and the author claims it
is only necessary to have them translated into
the local language for the liaison officer, to be
equipped to handle about 90 per cent of the
problems that arise:
1. Good morning, Colonel, flow are you? I
am fine.
2. A cigarette, perhaps? No, please take the
whole pack. I have more.
3. Yes, thank you. I will try one of yours.
4. No, no. I am quite all right. It is merely
a bronchial condition of long standing. Please
pass the water carafe.
? 5. llo ho. That is extremely funny. ?
6. Have you heard the one about the Irish-
man and the Zen Buddhist?
7. Now, as to business. My organization has
had second thoughts about what I told you
yesterday.
?
. 8. Perhaps you had better disregard what.'
told you yesterday. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIAIRDP77-00432R00010027000177
9. For the love of heaven, disregard what I
told you yesterday.
10. What did I tell you yesterday?
11. Have you perhaps located the request I
passed you last November marked "Urgent"?
12. We have a slight problem. The chief of
your police has confiscated the driver's per-
mit of our ambassador's wife.
13. Have you seen this morning's news-
paper? They have again misspelled the name
()Cour principal agent.
14. My headquarters feels there is distinct
merit in your operational proposal. As soon as
the man you have recommended is released
from jail, we will consider funding him.
15. My superiors would also like a wee bit
more information about the operational utili-
zation of the Lincoln Continental you are re-
questing.
16. The polygraph of my aunt is broken.
17: Would you- ask- your surveillance team
not to wear uniforms and to refrain from
whistle signals? It is beginning 'to attract at-
tention.
18. It could not have been our surveillance
team, we do not maintain a surveillance team
in your country.
19. Last night? That was no agent, that was
my wife.
20. Nonsense. He was merely adjusting the
license plate because it rattled.
21. Would you please return this tape record-
?
..er to the chief of your counterintelligence ser-':
vice? He apparently left it by accident under
my sofa during dinner last night. No, I do not
.remember seeing a reel in it.
22. If you want additional Minoxes, please
ask me for them. Do not write letters to Mr.
Colby. ?
23. Perhaps we could hold these meetings in
my apartment instead of your office in the fu-
ture. Yes, I know it is convenient, but I keep.,
meeting the PRAVDA representative in the
elevator.
24. I assure you the manager of the 'Greater
East Asia Coprosperity Coconut Company has
no connection with my organization..
25. Yes, I know he was in the Political Sec-
tion of our Embassy until last month. The fact
that he was then listed to my telephone exten-
sion was merely an error on the part of ? the
printer.
26. I was just wondering, among the papers
I gave you yesterday, was there one marked
"Local Penetration Agents"? *
27: I have been transferred to Upper Volta
and must leave this afternoon. Yes, it is rath-
er sudden.
28. Well, in a way you might call it a pro-,
motion. I will be the only man there, which"
makes me Chief.
29. Permit me to introduce my replacement.
No, it is not a new style. He is wearing Ber-
muda shorts only because he did not have
time to change before leaving Washington.
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NEW YORK TIMES
24 October 1973
Scarcity Alters
By NICHOLAS GAGE
A sharp' decline in heroin-,,
imports from Europe? over!
t'the last two' years has drama-
tically changed the methods
used to obtain and distribute
the drug in the New York ,
market.
The shortage is ' not so
acute as to cause a panic in
,the addict community, but
:-Federal and local law en-
forcement officials as well'
as independent sources report
,the following shifts in dea1e0
'patterns. .
qChinese - American drug
dealers have been trying to
,fill thevacuum created bythe't
'current shortage by import-
Ang heroin from Asia, but,
they have not made major'
headway yet because they do,
,not have the necessary dis-.
tribution network. Lawmen
believe, however, that in time
,Chinese - American dealers'
could become one of, the,
'major sources of illegal hero-,
'in in the city.
91For the first time in his-
.tory, major black drug deal:'
,ers are able to buy heroin
?directly from overseas sup-
'pliers without going through:;
'the usual organized crime
'contacts.
1 qThe current shortage has
"forced many wholesalers
:who once sold only heroin to
:offer cocaine and other- hard
!drugs as well.
? , qThe heroin now imported
from Europe generally is half
,as pure as it has been tradi?
tionally and what is sold on
=the street is one-third as'
_pure. ?
One reason the flow of
heroin from Europe has de-
'dined is that such key coun-
Jries as France have begun
Ito fight the heroin traffic
vigorously ? motivated, in
part, because they have be-
gun to develop addict prob-.
lems of their own.
. During the last 18 months"
the. French police uncovered.
seven heroin laboratories and
, seized about 2,500 pounds of
heroin. In the previous five.
;years, they uncovered only
-one: laboratory and seized
less than 1,000 pounds. ,
Coupled with the push
'overseas, a new cooperative
(effort by the police and
,Federal agents here has re-
sulted in hundreds of indict,'
ments and the sentencing of
major heroin dealers to long
'prison terms.'
Eighty-six persons were
arrested in raids last April,
'for instance, and 46 others
were ' indicted earlier this
:month, including Carmine
.Tramtuiti, the reputed boss,
'of one of New York's five
Mafia families.
The law-enforcement pres--
, sure here and abroad ,has'
made the traditional import-
ers of heroin?who tend to'
be members of , organized'
crime?cut down on their ac-
tivities.
, Their caution comes not
. only from fear of arrest, but,
from econqmic considera-
tions. Whenever they con-
tract for a shipment from
Europe they have to put up
',half the purchase price in
advance, and if shipments
are seized at any point along
+, the way,. the money is lost.'i
. In' the face of the cautiont
being shown by organized
.crime importaers, \ore ag-1
'gressive 'independentsdealers,
including blacks, have gone.
directly to suppliers overseas
and made purchases on their'
own, often paying higher;
'Prices to gain entry.
"It was in late 1971 that
we first heard that some,
,black dealers had started,
buying directly from Euro-
?pean suppliers,' said Deputy
Inspector Robert Howe, exe-
cutive 'officer of the Policei
Department's intelligence
.vision. ? ? -
One such dealer, he said,
was Frank Matthews, 291
years old, who jumped bail I
of $325,000 last summer,
,while- awaiting trial on Fed-;
eral charges of selling drugs:
and of income tax evasion)
The heroin both black and,
White importers haVe, been:
buying in Europe laltly has
been only half as pure as in
the past because pressure on,
European processors has kept,
them from producing as Much,'
'heroin as before.
"The heroin shipments:
'we've been intercepting frOmi
,Europe have tested out at'
around 45 per cent pure corn-
'pared'to 85 to 90 per' cent
a few years ago," said John
Fallon, acting deputy director
of the Drug Enforcement Ad-
? ministration's regional office
here.
Once imported, the heroin'
is "whacked"?cut?as much
as 10 times at various dis-
tributing levels and by the
gime it is sold on the street
it is sometimes as low as 2
per cent pure, he added. Tra-,
ditionally, such heroin tested
at 5 to 6 per cent.
[ "The decline in the purity.
? of heroin has been so great
that some adicts have invol-
bntarily detoxified themselves
because they've been buying'
increasingly weaker stuff,"
said Andrew J. Maloney, head
of the New York Federal.
'strike force on drugs.
2 Seeking New'Sources"
Addicts have been switch-
ing to other drugs in high
numbers because of the short-
age or have tried to find new'
sources of heroin beyond
their usual suplpiers. In that
search some have turned to
r?
e Patterns
Chinese-American heroin deal--
ers.
, For many years Chinese-.
American dealers have been.
cirri-porting heroin from South-,I
'east Asia for their own
,limited market, which was,
'made tip almost entirely. of
Orientals. Generally, they,
:were ignored by the law-en-
forcement community be-.
cause they were not consid-
'ered a major force in heroin'
traffic.
When it became apparent
that the shortage in heroin
from Europe was going to
last, some Chinese-American
dealers saw an oportunity to
fill the vacuum and get richer,
In the process.
Taking advantage of the,
ropportunity, however, provedi
to be more difficult than they;
',had anticipated. While they
:could smuggle into the coun-
-try large quantities of heroin!
from Southeast Asia, using i
such devices as hollowed
statuettes, they had little
,experience in distributing the.
.drug outside their commun-
ity.
At first, they started
,ing heroin to anyone who
approaeled them with enough
money. But some of the buy-
ers turned out to be under-
cover policemen or Federal,
)narcotics agents, and seve-
ral Chinese-American dealers
were indicted on drug charges."
Since those indictments,'
:Chinese - American dealers
;have been more cautious.
;"We heard of one dealer who
;brought in 18 pounds and
held it for seven months be7';
fore making any effort' to,
;move it," said Jerry N. Jen-
;son, acting regional director
lof the Drug Enforcement Ad-
ministration offices here. :
Slowly, however,' Chinese.''
American dealers with access,:
' to large quantities of heroin
are trying to make contact
I.with organized crime whole-,
isalers in_short supply of the
drug. . ?
'If, they can work out a
'teal alliance, the Chinese.
73.?
I could wind up being a major
suplier of heroin to the New
York market," said Deputy
Chief John G. Schawaroch?
head of the Police Depart-
ment's narcotics division here.'
Such an alliance, if it
comes, will take some time,
lawmen believe. Organized
crime members are afraid
that Chinese dealers do not.
have the experience to func-.
tion in the high-risk generali
'heroin market.
One Chinese-American deal-
er, Cheung Lam, was caught,
,by Federal agents after, he'
bought 18.7 pounds of heroin
from a seaman and paid for
.it with a personal check.
The heroin Chinese-Ameri-
can dealers sell is different
from European heroin. Most
of it come in brown granules
, rather than white powder.
Known as brown rock heroin;'
)it .is about 50 per cent pure.
"It looks like the granules
;in a jar of Ovaltine," said,
? James Beckner, a supervisor,
in the, Far Eastern division of,
the Drug Enforcement Ad-
ministration's regional office
here. . ?
He said it is made that
way because Oriental addicts.
k like to smoke heroin rather
l; than inject it, and they prefer
it in granule form.
' There is another variety of
' Southeast Asian heroin that;
:conies in white powder. like
European heroin and is close:
, to 100 per cent pure. But it
. is fluffier than the European-
.' variety. A one-kilogram pack-
age of it would be more than,
twice the size?of one kilo of
, European heroin.
; Little of the white South,'
, east Asian heroin reaches',
America now, narcotics:
? agents said, but more of it
will be imported as Chinese-,
American dealers expand'
, their distribution outlets.
When selling heroin, Chi-
nese-American dealers use a,
double standard; the agents
said. They have 'one set of,
prices for Orientals and an
other?higher?set for every-
one else.
NEW YORK TIMES
21 October 1973
14 Tons of Bananas Used ?
To Hide Cocaine Shipment
1' BALTIMORE (UPI)--Custone;,
;officers had to remove 14 ton,:
of bananas from their carton:;'
to' get at almost 70 pounds of
pure cocaine hidden in false
bottoms.
The shipment had arrived
from Ecuador on a Colombian
freighter.
A truck driver who came to
pick up the bananas was ar-
rested.
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' Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100270001-Z
WASHINGTON rgsT
21.1 OCT 1973
Ed 7 9S Pli..ht o
s, ars
Grelon vivs\
? .?
? By Kenneth J. Freed
? Associated Press
?? 'July 17 was to have been
'a banner day for William
Hayes pi Babylon, N.Y. It
was his 7: release day after?
serving three years in a
Turkish jail for possession of
five pounds of hashish.
; But instead of walking into
freedom Hayes stayed in the
Istanbul jail- because a local
court-decided a mistake had
been tnade: :
The error was that Hayes .
bad been wrongfully tried
for possession. The court ?
said he should have been.
charged With smuggling. The .
?resulting trial ended in a,:
? new sentence of 30 years. .?
According to Turkish law,:
the young New Yorker can-
not appeal, and his lawyer
? says the' only hope is for . a
..commutatien that would-low- ?
: In July, 1969. 61 Americans
.were arrested in foreign :
countries on various charges t
relating to drugs and mari-
juana.
The figure more than dou-
bled, to 144, in ;Fitly, 1970.
? At that point the State De-
partment began a public re-
lations campaign to warn
citizens touring, other cOun-
tries that drug involvement '
could bring serious legal con-
:sequences.
This effort was low key at
; the beginning and it didn't
pay off. The arrest records
? continued to climb.
. In July, 1971, 172 Ameri-
cans: were arrested? on drug
..charges: and the figure went
up to 189 in July, 1972. Last
July 261 Americans were
picked up in foreign coun-
tries on drug-related charges.
' The constant rise in arrests
?
bright with it an increased
:State Department effort to
warn Americans. In addition
:to the pamphlets circulated
:at the outset', the depart-
ment began producing radio
? and television programs in
.1971. ?
Officials. appeared on
broadcast interview pro-
grams and letters were sent
to magazines thought to be
:read by the so-called youth
'culture, including "Playboy."
". The success of this slick
public relations campaign
.appears to be marginal at
-best.' ?
.? The only sign of improve..
-.mem; has been a drop in the
? number of U.S. citizens ac-
; 'Wally in jail at the end of
:July, compared with the
?
? same time last year.
? As of July 31, 910 Ameri-
cans . were in foreign jails:
.for drug offenses. Last year
:at the same time 946 Ameri-
cans were behind bars on
. similar charges. ?
Barbara Watson, assistant
secretary of state for secu-
'ray . and consular. affairs,
? said the reduction "hope-
f?lly indicates our -message
, is getting through."
There
: There are.. some other fig-
- ures that may back Up her
, hope. Per example, in 1972
Americans were arrested on
? drug charges at a, monthly
average of 159:Through July
; .this year, the monthly aver=
;lap was 144. . ? ,
:et' Hayes; time to 5 to 10
? years. .
?. The severity of Hayes' sit-
uation is not entirely typical
of the problems faced by
, Americans picked up on
:,drug and marijuana charges
In foreign countries.
But it underlines a pro-
lem State Department offi-
Cials say too many young
Americans don't c o nip r e
hend?other nations are not
'lenient in drug cases and be-
Ing a U.S. citizen generally
:won't get someone out of a
-jam.
In fact, it may have the
.-opposite effect. At least
:there is an indication of that
.-in the Hayes case.
" His lawyer in Istanbul said
:Hayes might be :the victim
of a backlash against U.S.
.-demands for abolition of
Turkey's formerly legal OPi?
-urn poppy crops.
: Even if not always as a ?
?backlash, many foreign gov-
,:ernments have tiel,...thened '
-drug laws and stepped up en-
?''jorcement; and that has sent
:-more and more Americans,
:particularly young ones, to
-jail overseas.
The sigeificant increase in
-Americans in trouble over-
seas on drug charges is re-
? -fleeted in the arrest figures
,:for the month of. July, the
-height of the tourist season
;
for young U.S. citizens, start-
with 1969.
2
But the officials are far iafter some friends were
from 'certain that these fig' found with hashish. He had
uses are valid indicatious of him but he admitted
- ? none on
sa permanent improvement In
smoking hashish in the past.
the situation.
Once an American is ar-
They point out that the
1973 figures do :mit include rested, he more often than .
August or September, both not is thrown into a jail that
months during which large makes a U.S. prison appear .
numbers of Americans tour to be a resort by
comparison.
abroad.
There also is a distinct An example cited in Mex-
l- ico involved a 'young girl ?
likelihood that fewer Amer
charged with ? trafficking be- ;
cans traveled overseas this
year'because of the lessened causefound
marijuanainher hou ssee.esd She
werewase
%
value pf the dollar.
' Afiother statistical in.
di..: jpaiitlaeicif oi nr . tah ob rvoi ko ieenn tdloywi nns lai lel es....
cation that the State.Depart- . With all the Pamphlets
ment's effort to warn Ameri- ? ,?
speeches, news stories and
cans may not .be paying off slick TV spots, State Depart.
is seen in the percentage of : ment officials are bewildered ?
drug offenses involved in the ? by. the apparent lack of at-
total number of foreign ar- tention paid by Americans.
rests involving Americans. ?
. One source chalked it up .
Last year 64 per cent of to the age of those arrested;
the U.S. citizens arrested in At least 85 percent of the
i
foreign countries were n- Americans arrested overseas '
volved in drug cases. This. in drug cases are under 25. :
year the figure - ts 75 per The official says most pee.
Lent. , .-?: .- . ? ? ;pie this age are more willing
, What: the State Depart- to listen to a faulty grape-
ment. is trying to impress on ivine telling of easy drug sit- ;
travelers is simple: it is easy euations:than dour warnings ?
to get, in trouble for drug ?
involvement, ? p n i shment., from the establishment.
7
can be harsh and there i According to Miss Watson,:
. s
little the U.S. government
can do to help.
To ?, get' this message
across, the TV spots often
show interviews with Ameri-
cans still in jail who de-
scribe, often in nearly piti-
ful tones, the helplessness
of their situation.
Some examples from State
Department files and reports
nearly all the Americans in ;
trouble for .drugs abroad
have been to college, a, large
'majority have been overseas
more than once and most
come from middle to upper
middle class families. ?
One. State Department of-
ficial said once it is learned
why such a group would dis-
regard the obvious dangers
involved in drug use over-
by Associated Press bureaus: seas, then perhaps something.
overseas: .
.? can be done.
A 23-year-old American ,
recently was arrested while
attempting to smuggle two
kilos of hashish out of a
country in the Middle East.
He could be sentenced to life
in prison.
? ? fin Denmark,. one Amer--
can is serving a six-year
term for possession of LSD,
another . was sentenced .to
four years for selling a mor- ?
phine base, a 'third was given ?
a 3i-year term for attempt-
ing to smuggle 27 kilos of
hashish.
? A' young American was .
held ,for 56 clays in..Spain
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BALTIMORE SUS Approved For Release 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100270001-7
28 October 1973
Narcotics 'industry' is headache for Peru,
? Lima, Peru (Reuter)?Deep
in the jungle-clad Andes of
South America, police are
, waging a prolonged war to
snuff out the multi-million-dol-
lar "Peruvian connection."
International drug rings have
chosen the vastness of the Pe-
ruvian Andes as the starting
point fog a clandestine drug i
trade aimed at the United
States and Europe.
NetworZ of well-equipped
laboratori produce huge
quantities of cocaine, opium,
marijuana and hallucinatory
pills, according to the Narcotic
Investigation Division of the-
Peruvian police.
? The drugs are smuggled
across Peru's, northern borders
with . Colombia and Ecuador
? and from there to Panama for
distribution to Western nations,
police say.
? But in the past two years,
Peruvian police have seized
104 tons of drugs worth $30
million across the counter, and
estimated at 10 times as valua-
rri
ble on the international blacki
market
About 50 local drug-running
gangs have been smashed, with
the arrest of 2,000 suspects
including "chemists," financial
backers, distributors and cour-
iers, police add.
Detectives in the mountain
province of Huanuco, 250 miles
north of Lima, recently sailed
for 24 hours down the 'rushing
waters of the Huallaga River
?one of the headwaters of the
Amazon?to reach remote hide-
outs of cocaine smugglers.
In the isolated localities of
Monte Moena and Puerto Viejo
they discovered the headquar-'
ters of a province-wide net-
work of cocaine laboratories.
It was the biggest single drug.
producing chain smashed so
far.
In the subsequent raids, po-
lice reported finding 661
pounds of cocaine worth $21 mil-
lion on the black market.
'.Another coup was the Smash-
ing of an 'international band of
LONDON TIMES
28 September 1973
e
los
01
en Tria
s its s
more than 100 members led by
a Cuban named Jose Antonion
Gomez, who is now awaiting
trial. ,
Another 440 pounds of co-
caine--almost ready for trans-
port to the Ecuadorean fron-
tier town of Huaquillas?was
seized when police broke up 20
gangs in the Andean provinces
of Junin and Huaricavelica just
north and east of the capital,
Quito.
But police believe the "Peru-
.vian connection" is still well-
organized and flourishing.
? Its production centers and
clandestine routes are difficult,
to detect amid the sheer, jun- '
gle-clad mountains of central
Peru, which tower far higher
than the European Alps.
One highly organized produc-
tion center in a tiny, impover-
ished village in Jauja prov-
ince, about 160 miles northeast
of Lima, showed the difficul-
ties the police are fating.
Apart from the drug "labo-
The Chinese Nationalist govern-: in kind to that of a Mafia " god;
father" in that those ignoring
ment in Taiwan is involved in ,.it did so at their peril, was
. the opium traffic in the" Golden
; Triangle" where Burma, Laos. ,normally effective. What Lo
could not do was. to prevent.
, and Thailand overlap, and has Intelligence Bureau men from
increased its clandestine opera- , getting killed in clashes with;
tions in Burma during this year.:.
'
I write this in some sorrow, since' ,Burmese forces, as happened-
the regime of the Chinese
.from time to time. But he could,
,And did provide facilities of
People's Republic is not among various kinds for the Intelli-;
my favourite politics, and 1, ,gence Bureau, so that their
greatly admire the extraordinary ' 'clandestine operations ? could'
achievements of Chiang Kai-
shek's administration in Taiwan. ' 'continue. ,
? But I do not believe that the. .,At times, these deaths "in
' facts in these two articles can be . action" have seriously affected
.
'
successfully challenged, and 1, Taiwan's operations, but a well,.organized machine always'
doubt whether, in the long run,-
,
such activities can possibly be brought,the Intelligence Bureau
,
in the best interests of Taipeh, ' tip to strength: replacement&were sent to Burma from the
especially at a time when more ?Bureau's base in northern Thai-.
and more of the governments land; and the base in turn got
thar once recognised it are trans- . replacements direct from
lering their diplomatic links to- ':Taipeh.
Peking.
For years it has been common -,* Until a press briefing in June
; \ : by Colonel Tin 00, Director of
.knowledge that the remnants of Burma's Defence Services
the Kuomintang (Nationalist) Intelligence?which I believe to,
'the Chinese civil 'war are
volved in the drugs trade. Less'
:force stranded in Burma after -be well founded?the relation.; ,
in- 'ship between the Kuomintang
?'remnants in Burma and the
familiaris the role of the
Nationalist Intelligence Bureau 'Nationalist Government in
Taiwan were never other than
of Taiwan's Ministry of National, Murky. Now the murk is dis-
Defence. It is now known that ?
-the Intelligence Bureau worked 15ersing.
'closely with Lo using-han, the: According to Colonel Tin, the
biggest heroin tycoon of the Intelligence Bureau has
d
'Golden Triangle, who was cap- deployed some 1,400 agents and
lured in July by the Thai Special troops in the north-eastern and.
.Narcotics Organization, after an. eastern regions of Burma. The
?American tip-off. . Bureau, he said, was based in'
Huai Mo, just over the Burmese ?
Lo, in fact, protected Intelli, border in Thailand. About 400 :
ience Bureau personnel by
,claiming they were his of Taiwan's agents are operating
' own at Hsop Wo where, -until
. men. Since his word was law recently, they were commanded
:over much of the Golden Tri-? by Major-General Ma Chun-kuo.
!angle, this protection. similar
But Gen.Ma is reported to
24
ratoily" were steel silos that
eould be hidden at a moment's
notice in huge specially pre-
pared' ditches, ? or quickly
Iransported by road, police
4 Police are hammering home
their spectacular successes
' against the drug traders over
Ole past year.
Captured drugs are publicly
'burned before thousands of
;witnesses. One suspected
drug-runner termed the proce-
dure a "sacrilegious act" as
he watched the drugs blazing
iafter his capture.
Drug bonfires, on which nar-
cotics worth $300 million and
the equipment used in their
manufacture have been
burned, are often supervised
-by Peru's interior minister,
Gen. Pedro Richter Prada.
? Police squads stand by in
case of trouble, and in each
case' a Public notary makes an
official record of the proceed-
ings.
have been transferred to the
Intelligence Bureau's mainland
operations department at Huai
Mo. From there, he reports dir-
ectly to a Taipeh official
stationed in Bangkok. In charge.
of the mainland operations
department is Major-General
Chu Chi-liang, but the overall
direction comes from Taipeh,
where the Intelligence Bureau
headquarters is run by the Dir-
ector, Lieutenant-General Yeh
Hsiang-chih.
According to documents pub-
lished recently in the Burmese;
press, the Intelligence Bureauil
is deeply involved in the most
sensational coup of the captured
opium king, Lo Hsing-han?the,
kidnapping on April 16 of two
Soviet medical men, Dr Boris
Pianitsky and Stanislav Vinog-
radov, a medical technician.
The documents included photo-,
copies of a letter dated October.
1969, on the official stationery-
of Taiwan's Chinese National;
Liberation Organization,j ap-
pointing a man ailed that year
on charges of opium running,.
black marketeering, robbery,
murder and other crimes, as
counsellor to the Fourth Execu-
tive Committee of the Federa-.
tion of Overseas Chinese Asso-.
ciations.
? The kidnapped Soviet medical
men had been working at a hos-
pital at Taunggyi. The kidnap-,
pers had threatened to kill their,
hostages if the Burmese gow
ernment gave any publicity to
the incident. Both the govern-
ment and the Soviet embassy in
Rangoon decided to stay silent.'
It was the kidnappers -them-
selves who leaked the news to a,
Bangkok paper, perhaps in an
attempt to discredit the Bur-
mese government.
The background to the kid-
nappings is an eloquent com-
mentary on the perennial pro-
blem of insurgency that has
plagued Burma since independ-
'ence in 1948, and indeed wa
not unknown before that und
the more realistic label
dacoity (or banditry).
' In April, Burma's strong ma
General Ne Win, abolished th
self-defence forces he ha
authorized 10 years earli
.when the regular ariny was
deeply engaged with insurgen
in central Burma that it coul
not also protect the north-ea
and east. During the decad
many of these local forces ha
degenerated into private armi
deeply involved in the opiu
traffic, gun-running, black ma
keteering and other illeg
activities. After the April ba
some of the groups turned
their weapons and their me
bers were allowed to join t
?Burmese army.
Others, however, had be
deeply infiltrated by Intel
gence Bureau agents whose go
had brought them control. R
fusing to turn in their weapo
they went into open rebelli
against Rangoon. The Bure
is also said to control t
remnants of the former Ku
mintang Third and Fifth armi
based in Thailand under t
respective commands of Gene
Li Wen-huan and General Tu
Shi-wen.
Both were involved in t
opium trade, and both acted
mediators when that tra
looked like being disrupted
February this year when
of the private groups start
fighting each other. One w
Li Hsing-han's private army
Kokang ; the other was the
Maw group (named after a d
ti-let) under Chang Shu-chu
? The Kuonmintang mediat
did their job well, for the
groups settled their different
refused to turn their arms ov
to the Burmese army, a
agreed to resume the opt
trade under the protection
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'the mediators?and of the
Nationalist Intelligence Bureau.,
It was the Loi Maw group
.that kidnapped the two Rus-.
sians, and Lo ? Hsing-han subse:
'gently tonk them with him into
the mountains before a Burmese.
-army ar!.ack on May 30 drove)
Lo acres,: the border and into'
the hands of the Thai authori-
ties. ?
Brian Crozier':
NEW YORK TIMES
23 Octtober 1973
$500,090 BAIL SET
FOR DRUG SUSPECT
, An Uruguyan national, de-
"scribed as the top supplier of
cocaine in the United States,
was arraigned yesterday in
Federal Court in Manhattan
and bald in $500,000 bail. '
As' istant United States Ati-t,
torney Walter Phillips asked for
bail, of $2.5-million for Adolfo
? Sobocki Tobais, alleging the de-
fendant was: the "largest single
supplier of cocaine into this
country."
Mr. Sobocki, 50, years old,
"owned a hotel in Avica, Chile
and lived in Santiago with his
wife and five children. He was
expelld from Chile Saturday
and was taken in custody by
United States authorities and
:and flown to New York Sunday
sfrom Montevideo,. Uruguay.
Mr. Sobocki had been a fugi-
tive since March, when he was
'named in an 11-count 'narcotics
'indictment with Vincent Rizzo,
41', of Manhattan ,a ' reputed
' Mafia ,figure, William 'Benja-
min, a Philadelphia business-
man, and Luis Ortero, an Uru-
' guyan. The Government said
Mr. Sobock, who was born in
'Poland, supplied an average Of
more. than 200 pounds of co-
caine a month to New York
outlets.
At his arraignment before
Judge Edward Weinfeld, Mr:
,Soboki indicated he intended
to plead guilty "to some of the
charges,', Judge Weinfeld en-
tered a plea of not guilty until
the defendant aquired an at-
torney. ?
Rizzo was convicted on con-
' spiracy charges last spring and
sentenced to 15 years in pri-
son. Benjamin was convicted,
and sentenced to seven years'
and Otero got a five-year sen-
? tnce.
LONDON TIMES
10 October 1973
- -
Taiwan and the golden triangle1 ? part two
at w for the tirni
to Tisin-han's arrest by the
Thais is a real loss both for the
Kuomintang drug-runners and
for Taiwan's Intelligence Bur-
eau, to the extent that it bene-
fits from the opium trade. The
? "opium king" had been allotted
an important role in the media-
tion agreement negotiated by
the Kuomintang Generals Li
and Tuan last spring with the
blessing of the Intelligence
ureau. Indeed, at a meeting on
May 24 in the Loi Se area, he
was chosen as the leader of a
new "Shan Land United
Army ", composed of a dispar-
ate collection of insurgent
groups, including the defiant
self-defence forces of Kokang,
?Wa and Loi Maw (who had re-
fused to turn over their arms
to the Burmese army), part of
the Shan State Independence
Army, the Kuomintang and
members of the Intelligence
Bureau.
When last heard of, at the
time of Lo's capture, the kid-
napped Russians were reverted
to be alive and well. However,
a death threat hangs over their
! heads if the Burmese authori-
' ties refuse to release the for-
mer leader of the Loi Maw self-
defence force, Chang Chi-fu,
jailed in 1969 on opium traf-
ficking, robbery, murder and
other charges.
. It is strongly doubted. how-
ever, whether Lo and his
followers were particularly in-
terested in securing Chang's
release, which would merely em-
barrass them since a new leader-
ship has dug itself in during his
years in custody. Of greater
interest to the Kuomintang, and
especially to the nationalist
government in Taiwan, is the
possibility of inflicting yet an-
other humiliation on the Bur-
mese government.
It is this aspect of Taiwan's
operations in Burma that is
bound, at this late date, to be
questioned by those?often
known as the "friends of Free
China "?win have at heart the
? best interests of those Chinese
who, for one reason or another,
have remained outside the con-
trol of Peking's totalitarian rule.
Ejected from Yunnan pro-
IIIMMOOM
-vince at the end of 1949 by Mae
Tse-tung's "People's Liberation
Army ", the Kuomintang forces
turned down a Burmese ulti-
matum in June, 1950, to leave
Burma or surrender their
weapons. Burmese army opera-
tions forced the Chinese to re-
treat through the mountains to
Mong Hsat, in the Shan Stat4 of
Burma.
They levied an opium tax on
the highland villages, foreing
output to climb. Ever since,
they have collected the raw
opium, sent it by mule caravan
to Thailand and sold it to Thai
dealers for money, supplies and
weapons. It was not long before
90 per cent of Burma's opium ex-
ports passed through Kuomin-
tang hands.
In March, 1953, the Burmese
army repulsed a Kuomintang
offensive, and referred the
matter to the United Nations.
Reluctantly, Taipeh bowed, or
rather half-bowed, before UN
censure, and shipped some
troops out at the end of 1953.
There was a further shipment?
disproportionately composed of
the old, the infirm and the
female?after the Burmese army
had seized the Kuomintang base
in March, 1954. But 6,000 of the
Chinese troops remained, and
simply transferred their opium
trade to a new base. at Mon-Pa
Liao.
This heavily fortified com-
plex fell into Burmese hands in
early 1961 and some months
later about 4,200 Kuomintang
troops were shipped out to
Taiwan. The national govern-
ment has never accepted respon-
sibility of those who stayed be-
hind, or admitted, even to this
day, that the Intelligence
Bureau works closely with them.
In fact, with Bureau men and
local recruits, the Kuomintang
could still muster between 2,000
amid 3,000 armed men. The 1961
operations had driven them into
Laos, but from there they moved
to Thailand and set up two bases
near, the Burma border, from
where they resumed their opium
deals.
It is fair
just what
to ask at this stage
Chiang Kai-shek's
AlleMannalaniaMat2E2211,.
?
g, ,
,
Government hopes to get O'llt of
its clandestine involvement in
Thailand and Burma.
Whatever the realism ' of
earlier hopes to "return to the
mainland ", any chances thakthe
Kuomintang remnants cOuld
play a part in an invasion of
communist territory has tom
lost all credibility. The Kuomin-
tang chieftains from times to
time justify their opium-running
on the ground that theyeed
weapons to attack the Chi ese
communists, but nobod , is
fooled. If their motivation kvere
political, they could try helping
the Burmese to wipe out the
Peking-controlled White Flag
insurgents, instead of diverting
Burmese firepower on to their
own insurgents.
And what of the nationalist
Intelligence Bureau? Even in
1973, it may still have a case for
espionage against communist
China; and possibly even for
, sabotage of communist installa-
tions. But are the possible ad-
vantages worth the involvement
in the opium racket, in kidnap-
ping and in the violation of
Burmese territory at a time of
shrinking international friend-
ships ?
In all this, Thailand's role is a
curious one. In 1959, the Thai
government banned its indige-
nous opium growing and trade,
but continued to wink at Kuo-
mintang activities. The Thai;
government is divided on the !
issue. The so-called " buffer "
school, conscious of Thai affiniel
ties ' with the Shans and mis-
trustful of the Burmese. regard,
the Shan and other dissidents,
together with the Kuomintang
and Intelligence Bureau, as a
buffer between Thailand and the
Burmese and Chinese commu-
nists to the north.
Latterly, however, a strong
" anti-buffer " school has gained
ground. The anti-buffer school
sees Thailand's security increas-
ingly in good relations with
China and Burma, which are
hardly thinkable so long as Kuo-
mintang and Taiwan people
operate from Thai territory.
In May, the Thais ordered the
nationalist Intelligence Bureau
to close down a secret radio
(station in Mae Chan, in Chiang
1 Rai province near the Burma
border. And on July 1, the
deputy Prime Minister, Field-
!Marshal Praphat Charusathien,
ordered the Mainland Opera-
tions Department at Huai Mo to
close down. The ball, now. is
;firmly in 'Taipeh's court.
Brian Crozier
Times Newspapers Ltd, 1973.
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The New York Times Book Review
September 30, 1973
The Intellectual
, By JOHN LEONARD
In some parts of the world, the rela-
tionship between politics and intellectu-
als is taken more seriously than most
intellectuals would prefer; it can be a
terminal case.
As I write, there is no word on the fate
of Pablo Neruda, who is said to have
been in Chile at the time of the junta
take-over ,and the suicide of Allende.
The Nobel Prize-winning Neruda has
been conaderably more than his coun-
? try's Ambassador to France; he has been
a remarkably skillful propagandist for
Allende's Marxist government among in-
tellectuals everywhere?a sort of Andr?
Malraux in reverse?and there is ample
reason to 'believe that he is high on the
enemies' list' of the generals. So far,
the generals have shown little regard for
the niceties of due process; gunning down
a poet could appeal to their Hispanic
sense of fateful symmetry (Garcia Lorca,
remember, in Spain, I936?); a petition
from PEN might not be enough to save him.
Nor is there any word on the prospects
for Jorge Luis Borges now that Peron
has resumed control in Argentina. Borges
suffered before under Peron, but sur-
vived. Can he a second time? Already,
the Book Review has run a "Guest Word"
(Sept. 9) urging the Swedish Academy
to make sure that Borges receives this
year's Nobel Prize for Literature, as an
insurance policy against his being liqui-
dated. It worked for Pasternak, didn't
it? And Solzhenitsyn?
' Consider Solzhenitsyn's breathtaking
highwire act: He proposes, in the Aften-
posten of Oslo, Norway, and on the Op-
Ed page of The Times, that dissident
Soviet physicist Andrei Sakharov be
given the Nobel Prize for Peace, for
"opposing the persistent violence of the
state against individuals." (The Prize,
again: Is it a bullet-proof vest?) Solz-
henitsyn proposes this while he himself
is not allowed to move to Moscow; white
Sakharov is under virtual house arrest;
while Daniel is in prison; while Medvedev
is in exile; while Yakir and Krasin "con-
fess" to being "paid agents of Western
subversive organizations"?as likely as
Jadques Barzun's confessing he master-
minded Watergate?and are sentenced to
prison and exile; while Pravda attacks
Westerners supporting this "tiny bunch
of intellectuals" and praises David Rocke-
feller for saying we shouldn't let internal
as Faust
Or ,Quixote
The
Last Word
differences within the Soviet Union in-
terfere with a new trade agreement.
(Chase Manhattan will move to Moscow,
even if Solzhenitsyn can't.)
Moreover, in making the case for Sak-
harov, Solzhenitsyn has some unpleasant
things to say about Palestinian terrorists,
the massacre of Hue, the governments
of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and
China, and Ramsey Clark! That is mak-
ing oneself a nuisance on a grand scale,
like Sakharov writing to the United
States Congress in opposition to a trade
pact that isn't tied to democratic im-
provements in Russia: The courage of
these- men makes the rest Of us look
like parsley.
The Book Review is not the appropri-
ate section of this newspaper to editorial-
ize on trade agreements or on candidates
for the Nobel Prize for Peace. And if the
Swedish Academy had the slightest inter-
est in our opinions on literature, Nabo-
kov, Malraux, Borges and Gunter Grass
would already be Nobel laureates?for
their books rather than their derring-do.
But this may be the appropriate sec-
tion of The newspaper tO say something
about the reactions of American intel-
lectuals to the bad news from abroad.
Oh, petitions of protest are signed with
a flourish?the fastest wrists in the
West?but in the salons there is also a
muttering, a hum. Solzhenitsyn, Sak-
harov, Neruda are they net cinema-
scopic embodiments of our secret dream
of ourselves, the intellectual as [flier-
mensch? To be Faust instead of Quixote:
the sexiness of it makes one sigh. An envy
is apparent. Solzhenitsyn and Neruda are
considered dangerous by their govern-
ments because they are taken seriously
by their readers, whereas?hum, hum?
we are allowed to get away with any-
thing because no one takes us seriously;
we are puppies whose heroic snarls are
irrelevant.to trade agreements; powerless.
? In fact, intellectuals in this country
26
have an'enormous amount of powei, o
the banal sort that decides how othe
musalive. The trouble is, too often tliei
constitnency is not their readers; it seem
to be whoever will pick up the tab.; I'
not referring to the intellectual as p
cultural jack-in-the-box; that's y4ter
day's sports pages. But the intellettua
as lot-and-cold running warrior, Worl
poliFeman, cost-benefits Geronimo, kelp
? det!rmine our foreign policy.
The intellectual as communard in th
"think tank" group - grope compete
with.' the "intelligence" agent to pre
scribe the "options" of our leaders. Th
"hardnosed" intellectual ? what would
Freud make of "hard nosed"??use
Vietnam or the inner city as a ,da
board. The jet-setting intellectual, th
social scientist with a Pentagon credit
card, shuttling from classroom to war
room with his canonical variations and
his counterinsurgency scenarios, has re-
ceived from Washington an exclusive
fried-chicken franchise in ideas, so long
as those ideas serve whoever happens to
be in charge in Washington. And the
intellectual as "meritocrat" proclaims
that the luck of his genes and the luck
of his environment entitle him to all the
blessings that flow from a grateful man-
agerial class, with no questions Asked by
the plebes. (Thus, in discussions of
"equal opportunity," "keeping up, the
standards" is a euphemism for "I'm all
right, Jack." We need a few monographs
on the intellectual as arriviste)
In other words, our intellectuals are
in a situation the reverse of Solzhenitsyn,
et al. Whereas a Sakharov or a Neruda
exists in an adversary relationship with
his government, too many of our intel-
lectuals are downright cuddly?"repres-
sive tolerance," hell; cohabitation is more
like it, with accountability to no one but
whoever signs the bottom line. They ar
traded, or trade themselves, around, fro
bureaucracy to bureaucracy, like profes.:
sional athletes?I'll play for anybody?.
moralizing and complaining all the while
the vulgar public doesn't understand me
They are probably lucky the public
doesn't understand them. The adversa
zeal, unto tiresomeness, of a Chomsky
the humorless gnawing of a Nader; th
iconoclasm of a Paul Goodman;tjhe ser
endipities and excesses of a Mailer?al
are preferable, and exceptional, to th
careerist Muzak to be heard in the salons
Solzhenitsyn's contempt hits home. la
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THE GUARDIAN, MANCHESTER
10 October 1973
Turkey s poppies an
Religion may once have been the opium of
the masses, but what the Turkish masses want is
the real thing. It now-seems certain that any.
Government likely to emerge from Sunday's ?
general election will cancel the ban on the grow-
ing of opium poppies; TheTnited States per-
? suadeci Turkey to accept the ban' in return ?for...-
$35 millions. But that 'W.a'S01O'years-ago, before'
the Turkish politicians got down among the.pOppy-',
roots. Mr Suleyman Dernitersf:justice Party, which -
:may well head the n'e*t.' Government, has,
promised to allow farmers to grow poppies again,
though under state. ,control.,,: The Social
Democrats have promised simply: to abolish the ,
ban. The left-wing Cumhuriyet says .that
$35 millions are not enOugk.to compensate the
pOppy-farmers, and .that,'ff ,the,-United- States:
wants t6 avoid tralfickingjtr.'should buy all the
product from Turkey." And then, presumably,
burn it. ? '
. The US Government 'has been:.
much, impressed. Americani,.,OffiOals,de: not take,:.,;
the treats of the Turkish parties serionsly.Ihe4',
say that the ban on Turkish poppy-growing ha
been very helpful to the Administration's anti-
narcotics drive. The Americans, along.With all
others who are fighting drugs, 'must', obviously .
want to ,see the ban remain. It is easy enough to
criticise the Turks who have, after all, shown little.;
mercy to Timothy 'Davey, yet . are not above
NEW YOtfl:I31 TIMES
eCIri
ATITS
DEFEND BOMBER
Cite Frustration Over- War
at Hearing in Madison
? , By WILLIAM E. FARRELL .
; Special to The New 'York Times
' MADISON, Wis., Oct. 24?
Three leading opponents of the
Vietnam war today defended
Karleton Lewis Armstrong, who
?bombed the University of Wis-
consin's Army Mathematics Re-
search Center in 1970 as, a
protest against the war. A
physics researcher was killed
in the bombing.
The three antiwar activists,
the Rev. Philip F. Berrigan, Dr.
Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony J.
'Russo Jr., all asserted that
Armstrong, a 27-year-old native
of Madison and a former Boy
Scout turned radical, had been
driven to a desperate" act by
? his frustration over the escala-
tion of the war and alleged war
research conducted by the
Army Mathematics Center.
Armstrong and his defense
lawyers contend that the death
of Robert Fassnacht, a 33-year-
'old physicist and 'father of
three children, was "acci-',
dental," and that ,Armstrong
was unaware that he was ',in
the building when the explosion
took place on Aug. 24, 1970,
some time after 3 A.M.
Today was the eighth day in
a mitigation hearing on Arm-'
strong's character before Dane
County Circuit Judge William
. C. 'Sachtjen. Armstrong has
pleaded guilty to reduced state'
charges of second degree.
murder and arson resulting
,from the bombing. He has also
'pleaded guilty to several
Federal charges.
? Sentencing Next Week ?
The hearing is expected to
last through the week, and
summation and sentencing are
tentatively set for a week from
Thursday. '
The former University of
Wisconsin student faces 70
years' imprisonment on the
Federal charges and 95 on-the
state charges. Defense lawyers
have bargained with prosecu-
tors, asking that the maximum
penalty for Federal and state
charges not exceed 25 years,
with both sentences to run con-
currently.
However, the plea agreement
is not binding on the judges.
Father Berrien, a longtime
peace activist, Old Mr, Ells-
berg. and Mr. Russo were
among the 35 witnesses who
have appeared to urge leniency
for Armstrong. Dr. Ellsberg has
said he, made the Pengaton
papers available to the press.
Other witnesses told about the
killing of Vietnamese civilians.,
by American soldiers. Some
pohtics
benefiting from the opium trade themselves.'Only
last year a Turkish senator,. was stopped by the
French Customs at Nice irOa car whose upholst-
ery was stuffed with heroin instead of hair. (He
said he was going to Lyon, :to buy his daughtey
a wedding dress.) ?
On the other hand' the Turkish farmers can
complain with a tertain artionnt of justice that
they are being asked to make financial sacrifices:
in order to . solve the :Western. world's drug
'problem. The 100,000 Turkish poppy-farmers say
that they s,tand to lose afore than ten times the
amount they' Will receive in compensation. Nor
do they see Why the Americans should pick ori
Turkish ,poppy-farmers and let the Iranian ones;
corner the market. It is true, also, that the;
developed nations' attitude towards opium has
sometimes been less than , noble: It .Was Lord!
Melbourne, after., all, ,:Who. made war on China!
.sbecauSe the .Chinese refused to alio* the import
:of opium': from; British .India. . . ?
, T,he' fiirkish farmers ought not to. have
suffer:* because the developed nations have!
now resolved more firmly than ever to stamp outs
the narcotics trade. But the. trade trade haS to be!
stopped.. If $35 millions is not fair .compensation':
for the Turkish farmers; then they ought to be!
offered 'more. The money would not beDanegeld.
It would be a justIfied expense,in the war, against
narcotics:
scholars testified that the con:
duct 'of the war had been il-
legal.
Because of illness, Dr. Ells-
berg was represented here to-
day on a tape recording made
yesterday in New York and
broivIht to the?courtroom by
William M. Kunstler, who is
one of Armstrong's attorneys.
Asserting that he did not
know 'Armstrong personally, Dr.
Ellsberg said that he would
like to live in a society which
punsihed all" who used explo-
sives.
"But that's not the society we
live in,"s he said, adding that
the Nixon Administration and
others had bombed Vietnam
with impunity "without regard
to domestic or international
law."
To move toward a "just so-
ciety," Dr. Ellsberg said, "the
place to start is not by punish-
ing the action of Karl Arm-
strong."
"One must recognize this
prosecution is highly selective
m terms of violation of the
'law," he said.
Armstrong should not serve
in jail any longer than should
Robert S. McNamara, McGeorge
'Bundy, Henry. A. Kissinger or
others involved in the conduct'
of the war, Dr. Ellsberg said.
'A Courageous Thing'
Mr.' Russo told reporters at
a news briefing that Arm-
strong's act was "a very cour-
ageous thing, though perhaps
misguided."
In his testimony, Mr.,. Russo'
said that after one trip 'back
to 'the United States from Viet-
nam in 1968, when he was
employed by the Rand Corpora-
tion, a "think tank" with gov-
ernment research contracts, "I!.
brought a grenade back." 1
"I was angry, very angry,"
he said over the continuing es-
calation of the war. "I walked'
down the halls of Rand to the
computer room and wanted to
toss it in there. I thought I had
to do this for mankind." He
said that he finally thought bet-,
ter of it and threw the grenade
off a pier at Santa Monica
Calif. ,
Father Berrigan and Arm-
strong embraced in the court-
room, and the gray-haired
Jesuit said that as early as
1967 he felt that "people were
going to have to break the
law" to awaken a "somnolent"
public to what was happening
in Indochina.
Petitions, discussions - with
politicians, demonstrations of
this war," he said "There have
been ? bombings, and people
have died," he said, referring
to protests in the United States.
?0.3ad happenings like that
have to be balanced off against
the official crimes that deci-
mated' one-half of Vietnam,
and those crimes will never be
tried."
"Robert Fassnacht's death is
mourned," the priest said, but
"I believe very profoundly that
it was accidental and has to
be balanced by the calculated
deaths of millions."
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WASHINGTON POST
27 October 1973
L.S. Scores Mideast, Role of NA
Alliance Rift Unprecedented
By Michael Getler and Dan Morgan
Washington Pest Staff Writers
ing rights at the joint base:
in the Azores.
,But -the most serious con-:
? cern involves the.. implica-"
tions of. the West German.
"foreign ministry statement
on Thursday proclaiming,
':German "neutrality" in the
Arab-Israeli war and de-:
manding that the U.S. stop.
sending American military
equipment based in West
Germany to Israel.
e "We maintain our fotces
in Germany. because it pro-
vides us with enhanced"!
, readiness," Schlesinger said,
, yesterday. ?
"The reactions of the for-
eign ministry of Germany.
raised some . questions about,
whether they view readiness?
in the; same way that we:
view readiness and conse-
quently we will have to re-
flect on that matter,"
? -Privately, high-ranking.
. In his televised press con- . U.S. officials said they
ference last night, President ,understood ? the European
'Nixon also made clear that dependence on Middle East-
lie believed U.S. efforts to ern oil. But they said they
arrange a settlement of the regarded NATO country ac-'
Middle East crisis had been tions that had the effect of
in the interest of the: Euro., restricting': U.S. freedomf
with respect "to America&
national interests- as: a more'
important issue, and a very
serious one.' .4
The United States main-
tains thousands of tanks and
other arms .in West ? Ger-
many, and senior Defense
'officials said the question'
was whether the new war
had revealed a major 'neon.:
.sistency, in how the United
States and? other NATO
,members interpret readi-
ness and the stationing of
U.S. forces in Europe.'
"Can those stocks'
(meaning U.S. tanks) be
use only for Germany and'
d
NATO? If they're not a(mila-,
ble to us" for other U.S. in-
terests, one Pentagon offi-
cial said, "then maybe we'll
,have to, keep some of them;
;someplace else."
' Some. NATO members.
t Furthermore, Greece and 'claim the diversion of U.S.
Turkey?along 'with all but tanks and other , weapons:
,one or two NATO countries during the crisis weakens.-
-denied the United States NATO, but the Russians re-
use of their air fields or air portedly took large numbers
space to aide in the resup- of similar weapons from
, ply of Israel. "We didn't ex- their East European arse,'
,pect much," said one offi- nals for the Arab. resupply
Cial, "but they didn't have to effort:
Olt over from.the first little Schlesinger, in general,'
hint of preliStire." reflected disappointteent
Only Portugal overtly pro- over the allies' performance,
?vided U.S. planes with land- stating that the Pentagon
? ? 28
The Pentagon and the
State Department yesterday
both levejled unprecedented
'criticism at several U.S. al-
Ilies in Western Europe for
,having "separated them-
selves publicly from us"-
during the still-simmering
Middle East crisis.
The strongest words came
:from State Department
spokesman Robert J. Mc-)
'Closkey.
But Secretary of Defense
,??James R. Schlesinger, at a
Pentagon news conference,
.also warned that the actions
of several NATO govern-
.
.ments?particularly West
Germany's Foreign Ministry.
?were causing the Defense
Department to "reflect on"
previously established no-
tions about the military
ance.
peans.
' "Europe, which gets 80?
. per cent of its oil, would
have frozen to death this
winter if there hadn't been
a settlement," he said.
While sharp debate has
frequently flared openly be-
tween the U.S. and its
NATO allies on economic
matters, there has rarely, if
ever, been public U.S. criti-
cism directed at the allies'
over military policy since
NATO was founded 25 years
'ago.
Senior U.S. Defense offi- ?
?eials are miffed over what'
they view as the ease with,
which Russian transport
planes loaded with arms
flew over Greece and Tun.
' key, both NATO members,
'Without much protest from
-those countries.
would investigate "all as-
, pects of the respons'yeness
of various countries n this'
crisis
' crisis and will take them
into consideration in the Lu-
Schlesinger is scheduled;
;to go to a NATO meeting,
early next month at the Ha-
gue and was considering vis-
iting West Germany on the
same trip. Now, aides say,
he is considering dropping
?the German visit.
Berndt von Staden, the
:West German ambassador-in
1Washington, met with Secre-
tary. of State Henry A. Kis-
singer yesterday afternoon
for 45 minutes for a
, general review of questions,.
ctneerning the NATO alli-
ance." The two sides said,
that the meeting, which Am-
bassador von St,aden had re-
quested on Monday, was
."friendly and useful."
State Department spokes-
man McCloskey, more out-
spoken than Schlesinger,
said, "We were struck by a
number of our allies going
to some lengths to in effect
separate publicly from us."
McCloskey said that U. S.
support for Israel was moti-
vated by a desire to estab-
lish a durable peace in the
Middle East. He said this
was as much in the interest
'of Germany and the Euro-
pean allies as of the United
States.
, "We were and have ben
In a very critical period, a '
period which affected in
many ways all of us and our:
allies in West Europe," he)
said.
He then added that Euro-
pean policies "raise ques-
tions as to how that action
on their part can be squared
with what the Europeans
have often referred to as in-
divisibility on questions of ?
security."
In light of the fact that
the crisis posed the threat
of a potential confrontation
With the Soviet Union, Mc-
Closkey said, "We would
have appreciated a little
?
more unified support." ?
Senior Pentagon officials
echo this view, claiming that
if Israel is "pushed into the
sea".. it could only happen
with massive Soviet support
for the Arabs and that then
, "it would be Russia with its
hand on the tap" of Middle
East oil "and NATO won't
be any better off that way."
: An immediate concern to
officials in the Nixon admin-
istration is the effect that
the German position could
_
Allies
have on congressional'
moves to bring home some
of the 229,000 troops sta..
tioned in Germany.
An effort led by Sen.
? Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) to';
cut drastically the number
of troops abroad was par; '
tially forestalled this year?. r
hut only after frantic ma- ,
neuvering by administration
supporters.
Some Pentagon officials'
said yesterday that the Ger- '
man position could lead con,
gressional opponents of
unl-
lateral American cuts to
'change their thinking, since
many of these lawmakers
;strongly support Israel.
The new note of acrimony
, in the .Atlantic relationship"
comes at a time when U.S.!
and European negotiators
are trying to draw up a dec-
laration of principles about
the future of NATO.
The purpose of this is to.
redefine and update the
broad rationale for the At-
lantic alliance. With the end,
of the post-war era in Eu-,
rope, some have detected
rising nationalism and anti-
Americanism in certain seg-
.
-ments of European society..
In part, the aim of the lead-
ers on both sides of the At-
lantic is to counter this
tendency and -provide new
cohesion to the alliance.
Some efforts were made
in Bonn yesterday to tone
down the dispute. A govern-
ment spokesman, Armin
iGruenewald, described
Bonn's attempts to halt the ;
resupply from its territory
as only a "political request."
However, questions re-
mained about the scope of
the operation originating
from Germany?and also-
about the extent of consulta-
tion.
German officials here said ?
privately yesterday that the
loading of Israeli ships in
the German port of Bremer-
haven from installations un-
sjer U.S. control apparently,'
took place in a "hidden"
way.
John Goshko, correspond-
ent of The Washington Post
in Bonn, quoted sources in
the German capital as say-.
ing that American Ambassa-
dor Marin Hillenbrandt ap-
parently was himself una-
ware that the ships were be- '
ing loaded in Bremerhaven.
i At his press briefing in
:Bonn yesterday, Gruene-
'wild said that Chancellor
Willy Brandt's government
has no power to dictate
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'what the United States does*
wit it its military materiel'
stockpiled in ? West Ger;
anany.
Nevertheless, others said
the episode had raised fun-
(,lainental, questions about
the role,: and function of,
man officials in Wash-
! `ington .said privately that
.the American forces in Eu-
.rope are "for NATO pur-
poses--not for the Middle
East or Latin America. They
are there, as a credible de-
terrent against Soviet ag..,
? gression in Central Europe."
l,. In any event, Europeans
and Americans yesterday
'both expressed concern that.
the flare-up could further ,
strain the alliance at a time,
,when confidence in-
i?leadership because of the'
;domestic problems is 'at a
low ebb.
Some Europeans also ar-
' gued that the United States.
;was only free to act as it did
'because only 12 per cent of
Its oil supplies originate in
North Africa and the Middle
East?compared with 80 per '
'cent of the European sup.;
NEW YORK TIMES
31 October 1973
BALTIMORE SUN
30 October 1973
More .Frays in the Alliance
? ? ? .
There is a danger that one of the main sufferers' , pursuing a six*ear-old blatantly anti Israel poliCy,i
of the Middle East war will be the NATO alliance,, simply denied that it was possible that , Libyan'
? where trust already shaken over the past two 'Mirage fighters bought from France were
years deteriorated greatly in recent weeks and against Israel, When Israelis said they saw them.
. days. If so, the lesson likely to be taken by Krem- European goirernments were knuckling under'
lin leaders reflecting on their costly, adventurism: not to the Soviet Union, but to the Arab oil poteR1
with Syria and Egypt will be that they are still on tates. And not, without good reason. The Unite
' to a good thing. It is time for Washington and the States if it has to can do without Persian Gulf oir
other NATO capitals, accepting, their different in- Europe depends utterly on it. The Europeans haye
terests in the Middle East, to perceive' the danger' Other reasons for, as Mr. McCloskey put it, "goi#g
as a Soviet diplomatic objective and to insure that to some lengths to in effect separate publicly frop
it is not realized. us." One is a long memory, especially in Paris, of'
The danger erupted Friday in an Americgn:I Washington's pulling the rug out from the unwise
verlial assault on the allies. James R. Schlesinger, Anglo-French attempt to invade Egypt in concert
the Secretary of Defense, and Robert J. McCloskey, with Israel in 1956. Another is the false Washington
the chief spokesman of the State Department, assumption that it has or deserves a blank check
' criticized the Europeans in general and West Ger- on European support for any foreign policy re- ,
' many by name and raised 'questions that, in the gardless of whether `Europeans are consulted.'
language of diplomatic understatement, were hinted Added to this now is a 4arge fear that Europe is
threats to bring American troops home from Eu- imperiled by American alerts of nuclear forces on '
rope. European soil, combined with a notion that Mr.
Messrs. McCloskey and Schlesinger. had reason' Nixon acted for domestic reasons.
enough to be annoyed. The Germans had stopped ? What is needed now is not recrimination but ;
:American tanks stockpiled in Germany Iran be- cooperation. If American and European interests?
ing shipped the best way to Israel. Turkey and diverged during the war, for reasons of which 1
! Greece reportedly allowed Soviet arms shipments ,' Europe has no cause to be proud, the interests
to Egypt to use their air space, but not American have coalesced now. All NATO members have a
'Ishipments to Israel: Britain's claim to an even- powerful national interest in the attainment of a!
handed arms supply policy was a cover for ban- permanent Middle East peace. Continued rancor
ning the paid-for supply of spare parts to tanks between the United States and its' NATO partners,'
which Britain had willingly sold Israel rwlnle mi- over the Mideast will not only serve the hawks in
tiating helicopter training for Egyptian pilots and the Kremlin leadership, but ill service the pros-
the sale of tanks to other Arab states. France, pects for peace between Israelis and Arabs.
What 'Year of Eurl ope'?
What the United States had envisioned as the Year,
of Europe, a period of imaginative updating and refur-
bishing of the NATO Alliance, capped with a new!
AtlantiC Charter, has become instead the year in which'
Washington's relationship with its European partners
has struck an all-time low.
? The Administration's unprecedented decision last,.
week to trumpet its resentment against the allies for
not, lining up solidly behind United States actions .in
the Middle East?not once but thrice in a day, the last
,shaft 'delivered by President Nixon himself?understand- s'
ably provoked anger and bewilderment in nearly every."
NATO capital in Europe. The climate was not' improved
by Secretary of State Kissinger's alleged remark. to visit-
ing European parliamentarians this week that during the
"two-week Middle East crisis the Europeans "acted as'
; though the Alliance didn't exist."
. Most NATO members had made clear in advance, ;
privately or publicly, either that they did not share
Washington's assessment of. the crisis or that they
? could not afford to take a stance that might have the ,
result of cutting off the flow of Arab oil which, as Mr. .J
'Nixon pointed out, is far more vital to Western Europe !
? than to the United States.
? Apart from any desire to remain officially neutral
t between Israel and the Arab state, howcver, the allied'
; governments felt strongly that once again they were
being asked to support an American policy on which.
they had not been consulted. These feelings were
itacerbated when Washington did not hotify them in
Approved
; advance of its Worldwide security alert,' obviously of
concern to every, country allied with the United States
? and especially those in which American military bases
, are situated.
04 * ,*
'President Nixon was right about Western Europe's,
tremendous stake in a Middle East cease-fire: State'
Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey stated the'.
obvious in saying that maintenance of the r'litary
balance._ and establishment of a durable peace in the
? Middle East "is just as much in the vital interest of .
West Germany and the other NATO allies as it is in ;
our interest." The relevant point, however, remains the:
:right of the European allies to be consulted about
policies crucial to their survival.
Washington's failure to consult, despite. countless '
promises to do so, and its decision not to give its 'allies
advance warning of a military alert that inevitably
affected their interests, fits a dismally familiar patterfl.
for this Administration. Mr. Nixon and Secretary Xis-
singer can speak eloquently about the indispensablei
American-European connection; but their actions, particu-
larly in crisis, do not match their words. ? ?
Some allied governments did .go to unnecessary
lengths to "separate themselves publicly" from the
United States?one of Mr. McCloskey's complaints.
West Germany might at least have made through'
diplomatic channels; rather than by public pronounce-.
ment, its demand that the United States,, halt arms
shipments to Israel from German . territory.. But no:
constructive *purpcise was served by the peevish public!,
criticisms of allied behaViOr i'1'Ofl &il AdminiStiVitin!
whose policy in crisis had been carried Out In disregard
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?f the le zf 86442W616CP2tkit 6;1 r7.
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Thursday, Nov. I, 1973 THE WASHINGTON POST
,? ?
Uri tic ism rt gs A !wry
ess Imes From E ro
f By Dan Morgan and
i Michael Getter
, Washiniton Post Staff Writers !
1 ? American displeasure
' 'with the neutral Middle
'East polidies of its closest al:,
lies prov ' ed a number of.
i angry European responses
, yesterday, as the dispute
. ? showed, signs of spreading,
. Into other areas affecting
;Atlantic relationships: ' !
. In Paris, French President'
Georges Pompidou proposed
? 'a summit meeting of the
nine Common Market coun-
tries to seek a joint Euro-
pean policy on the Middle:
East. .!
Pompidou noted that.
Western Europe had been
left out of the American and
Soviet moves even though
its vital interests had been'
at stake. '
In Washington, high-level
:European-American c o nsul-;
tations on trade policy and:
future tariff reductions enc14
ed with both sides admitting'
that they 'were far from any
, agreement.
'? At the same time, Euro;
Team who spoke with Secre-'
tary of State Henry A. Kis-,
singer ..-earlier, in the week.
' said he was "very angry"
'about a wide range of Allan-
1tic matters, .not all of them.
? directly connected with the
' Middle East. ? -
One of the few bright
signs in the otherwise dis-
sension-ridden at mo sphere
1 I was a cautious resolution
1 1 drafted here yesterday by.
' American congressmen and..
European members of par-,
liament. It calls for the two,
'sides to avoid trying to out-1
bid each other in the scram-;
? ble for oil supplies which
?have suddenly been re-
stricted by Arab countries.
Par less harmonious, ac-
cording to European
sources, were talks held this,:
week between Sir Christo-
pher Soames and top admin- ;
'istration economic officials.? I
Soames, representing, the!
Common Market countries,? ,
met with Treasury Secre-
tary George P. Shultz, Un- '
der Secretary of State Wil-
liam Casey und the special'
White House representative
for trade negotiations, Wil-
liam D. Eberle.
"After Sir Christopher's_
talks here there is broken
'china all over town," said
one European. He said that'
.Soames had refused to ac-'
cept extremely tough admin..'
istration criticism of Euro-
pean trade policy and had:
"given back what he got."
U.S. officials are angry
over the refusal of Euro-
pean members of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tarrif
and Trade, meeting in Ge;
neva last week, to set up
working groups pending pas-
'sage of a U.S. trade bill that:,
would give the administra-
tion authority to negotiate.
ariff/cuts.
But the Europeans are
equally angry over signs
that the U.S. trade bill may,
not be passed until March-1
1
,t
and could conceivably be ve-
toed by President Nixon if.
;Congress- succeeds in insert-
ing restrictions on trade
;with the Soviet Union.
In talks with European
legislators this week, U.S.-
'officials reportedly blamed'
1"Zionists, isolationists and
'labor unions" for stalling
; the trade bill by demanding
''restrictions on Soviet trade.
At a meeting with report-
. ers yesterday, Soames said:
that he 'had noticed "no,
signs of strain," but added,,
that there is "no sweet har-
mony." He said, however,
, that this was "not such as to;
cast doubt on the good in-
tentions of either partner." I
The Europeans and Amer-
icans are trying to draft a
"joint declaration of eco- ?
nomic principles. European
' sources said this week that
Kissinger had blamed the
Europeans for stalling on
this.
A visiting member of par-
1
? liament said, "He is very an-
gry that the whole thing is
? hung up because the French
' and the British can't agree
on the word 'partnership' as
it ,refers to the United
States."
He said Kissinger was
'also angry that Britain re-
fused to submit a proposal
for a Middle East cease-fire
in the U.N. Security 'Coun-
cil, "even though he knew
-very well that the British
thought it was too early for
such an initiative."
BALTIMORE SUN
30 October 1973
U.S. loses points in Europe over troop alert
By PHILIP POTTER
? London Bureau of The Sun
London?Henry A. Kissin-
ger's answer to a news confer-
ence question last week
whether the Soviet Union had
taken advantage of U.S.
do-
mestic problems by threaten-
',ing a unilateral troop move-
' ment in the Middle* East has
had a big impact here,
"One cannot have a crisis of
authority In a society for a
period of months without pay-
ing a price somewhere along
the line," the U.S. Secretary of
State replied. -
It is an irony that the U.S.
military alert in response to
the_threat may have dissuaded
,?, ,c ? t?,,, .
the Russians and cost them
points in Arab lands, but
gained the Russians some
points in Europe.
It long has been an aim of
the Kremlin to see wedges
driven between the United
States and Its European allies
in the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization and the military
alert that caught Europe by
surprise did open a gap.
, ? The NATO.alliance has been
30
These developments came.
amid' indications that a 'dif-
ference of Opinion is devel-'
-oping within the Nixon ad--
rnirlistration over the way it:
has; directed criticism at:
.U.S. NATO allies for their,
'failure to, line up behind.
'tilts country in the Middle.
'EOst crisis.
: 'Last Friday, the Presi-
dent, Secretary of Defense,
;and the' State Department
all joined in leveling unpre--
cendented criticism at the
'Europeans for their role.
However, some Senior U.S.
officials say the Pentagon
would prefer that the State'
,Department tone down its,
strong public chastisement
,of the EuroPenans in favor
of more quiet discussio"R.
. It is the Pentagon- tnac
must deal with, the allies
most directly on military
matters, and the Defense ?
Department's top official?.
Defense Secretary James R.
Schlesinger?will have to ,
confront the Europeans face,
to face next week at a previ-
ously scheduled NATO
meeting at the Hague.
Though Pentagon officials
have criticized! the Europe-
ans, much broader criticism
has come from the State De-
partment. Yesterday, a State
Department spokesman dc-,
nied published reports that
Kissinger had gone so far as
to express "disgust!' on Cap-
itol Hill over the NATO
countries' neutral stance in
the Middle East crisis.
thrown into some disarray as
the allies took differing pos-
tures on the Israeli-Arab con-
flict.
As the Sunday Times put it
in an editorial, "The crisis of
the presidency is a crisis for
the world. . . . A disaster
'which must mortally alarm all
who are in any' way engaged
with American power."
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NEW YORK TIMES NEW YORK TIMES
31 October 1973 30 October 1973
War Signals Misjudged, ,
THE WHITE HOUSE
Officials Concede NOW URGES DELAY
ON RUSSIAN TRADE
By JOHN W. FINNEY
special to The New York Time
wsH1NGTON, Oct. 30?,
.Unitc(1 States officials said to-
day that - despite several sus=
'picious signals, neither the
, United States nor Israel seri-
ously believed at. the ? start of
October that the Arab countries
were about to attack. This view
; began to change, they went on,
1* when Soviet commercial air-
liners were diverted, some in
,midflight, to evacuate Soviet
dependents from Egypt and
Syria three days before the out
break of the war.
' Such was the prevailing be-
lief that the Arabs would not
attack? that even the diversion
',of the Soviet Ilyushin 18 trans-
'ports was misinterpreted in
come United States intelligence
circles, the officials added.
, The iminediate reaction of
tome intelligence officials was
that the Soviet Union had re-
Ceived information that Israel
was about to, embark on some
Military operation. And lor
eight hours after the outbreak
of the fourth Middle East war
Oct. 6, sizable segments of the
United States intelligence com-
munity continued to believe that
Israel had launched the attack,
not the Arabs.
The warning set off by the
emergency Soviet evacuation
beginning Oct. 3 was described
today by officials as they disd
lcussed the deficiencies that' de-E
'velopcd in American and Israeli
assessments of Arab intentions.
-That an intelligence gap de-
veloped is now generally ac-
knowledged within the Govern-
ment, which is going through
a re-examination, with inter-
agency squabbles, of the intel-
ligence machinery's operatiOn
before and during the war.
It is generally agreed, among
lUnited States officials, that the
machinery performed well in
;accumulating facts about Arab
'military development and capa-
bilities. Where it failed was in
judging the facts in terms of
Arab intentions.
, Signs Were 'Misread
? Officials now believe there
were several signs, going back
nearly two years, that Egypt
and Syria were preparing for
an attack. But almost right up
to the outbreak of the war,
officials said, these signs were
all misread if not ignored, large-
ly because of the prevailing Is-
raeli and American view that
the Arab countries, after their
'humiliating defeat in the 1967
War, would not dare initiate a
nevi. war.
,Ati 'brig as a year and a 'half'
ago, Israel had obtained de-
tailed, photographs, of new
roads leading to key -crossing
points on the western bank of.
the Suez Canal. The pictures
also showed that bridge-hbild-
ing equipment supplied by the
Soviet Union had., been 'stored
near' each of the potential
crossing points.
Constructed near revetments
were large , regimental head-
quarters camps, complete with
radar, tanks and 'ammunition
stocks, ('but manned by few
persons. '
? It is now ,obvious, officials
'say, that the Egyptians had
prepared for' a large-scale as-
sault across the canal and had
only to move troops in to carry
out the operation. E
But when ,the Israeli photo-
graphs werd showed at the
time to American analysts, the
Israeli and American assess-
ment was that a large-scale
crossing was challenging be-
yond the Egyptian Army's cap-
abilities.
As a result, Israel, whose
whole military strategy is
based on seizing and maintain-
ing the initiative against the
numerically superior Arab
forces, was taken by surprise
by the Egyptian offensive
across the. Suez in the early
morning hours of Oct.6.
Another sign that was largely
ignored was the construction
in the last year and before of
a forward line of Soviet sur-
face-to-air anti aircraft misif
sues near. both the Egyptian
and Syrian 1967 cease-fire lineal
with Israel. ' '
It now seems apparent that'
the Russians convinced the
'Egyptian and Syrian militaryi
leaders that if they wanted .to!
launch a: large-scale ground at,'
tack, it should be carried out
Under an umbrella of Missiles.
Largely because of the Amer-
ican experience in countering
a SAM defense that was less
sophisticated and not so dense,?
the implications of the Egyp-
tian and Syrian missile net-
works fended to be dismissed.
This misjudgment proved costly
for Israel, which suffered
heavy aircraft losses in elim-
inating the SAM defenses on
the,Syrian front and the SAM
system on the western bank of
the canal' deterred Israel from
using her air, power to elim-
inate the Egyptian beachhead
on the eastern bank.
In the weeks immediately be-
fore the war, United States and
Israeli intelligence received re-
ports of troop concentrations in
Syria and :the mobilization of
?some Envptlan reserves, In ad-
kiwi, lora word reliable rot
By LESLIE H. GELB
Special to The New York Vales
WASHINGTON, Oct. 29?The
-chief White House advisor on
international economic policy
said today that Congress should'
temporarily shelve legislation
on trade benefits for the So-
viet. Union while Middle East
negotiations were under Way.
Testifying before the Senate
,Banking subcommittee, the ad-
visor, Peter M. Flanigan, said it
, would be inappropriate for
Congress to deal with the issue
of improving the Soviet Union's
trade position in this country
through a grant of so-called
? most - favored - nation status
when Soviet cooperation was
needed to settle the Arab-Israeli
conflict.
Mr. Flanigan, who is exec-
' utive director of the President's
Council on International Eco-
nomic Policy, denied that this
,was either an attempt to gain
leverage against the Soviet
Union on the Middle East or
a reversal of President Nixon's
,ports that North Korean pilots
Were flying planes in Egypt.
Signs Again Dismissed
I Once again the signs were
'dismissed on he grounds that
the Egyptians 'were engaged in
,annual fall maneuvers, officials
:said.
, In remarks that seemed eriti-
Cal of the intelligence commu-
My's performance, Secretary of
State Kissinger said in a news
?conference Oct. 12 that three
times in the week immediately
preceding the outbreak of war
United States and Israeli intel-
ligence agencies had been asked
for assessments. They had come
back with the conclusion, he
said, that "hostilities were un-
likely to the point of there be-
ing no chance of it." .
To Mr. Kissinger, this illus-
trated "the gravest danger of
intelligence assessments"---try-
ing "to fit the facts into exist-
ing preconceptions and to make
them consistent with what is
anticipated." This is a judgment
now widely shared in the intel-
ligence community.
United States officials now
believe that the Israeli Govern-
ment knew 24 hours in ad-
vance that an Arab attack was
imminent but - decided not to
launch a pre-emptive attack for
fear of alienating the United
States and other Western
nations.
A wide belief in the intelli-
gence community now is that!
the general Arab plan for wuir
w/111 W Med t the caft3fe
me uRekliOnal
goal of normalizing cOmm0-
cial relations.
I In a telephone interview Mr.
Flanigan said that the Adr+
istration wanted to avoid Ia
possible vote in the House Of
Representatives , denying most-
' favored-natiom? creatment
credits to the Soviet Union.
added that since the Adminif-
, tration's strategy was "to 10
the trade bill move towa41
-passage," it was now recom-
mending that Title IV of th
'bill be dropped.
. That segment, as drafted lit
the Administration, would
grant most-favored-nation sta-
tus to Communist nations,
guaranteeing that tariffs on
their exports, to the ,United
States are no higher than tar-
:iffs on the same goods from
:,,any other country,
The bill was set for action
i;,last week, but the House lead-
ership, at the request of the
Administration, deferred floor
:debate until the fighting in the
Middle East had ended.
According to a number of
:House sources, the Administra-
lion had little alternative' at
'This point. The House Ways and
Means Committee, contrary to
Administration wishes, had al-
'ready redrafted Title IV to
make the granting of trade ben-
!. f-
ce its contingent on free emigra-
tion of Soviet Jews and other
Icitizens.
With 289 co-sponsors, the
House, according to the same
sources, was about to add an
amendment that would also
make the granting of Export-
Import Bank credits to the So-
viet Union contingent on free
Jewish emigration. That amend-
ment was proposed by Repre-
sentative\ Charles A. Vanik,
Democrat of Ohio.
In this form, combining tariff
'and credit issues, the legislation
would be identical to an amend-
ment proposed in the Senate
,by Senator Henry M. Jackson,
Democrat of Washington, which
has 77 co-sponsors.
The Jackson-Vanik strategy,.
Congressional sources say, is
to bring the trade bill to a vote
with Title IV written to their.
specifications. According to the
sources, Soviet behavior in the
Middle East crisis makes it all
the more imperative to tie eco-
nomic concessions to require-
ments for changes in Soviet
society and government.
The White House strategy,
as indicated by Mr. Flanigan's
testimony, is to avoid a Con-
gressional vote in which de-
tente, as a White House source
.put it, would be "clobbered."
' The Nixon Administration
had lobbied hard on most-fa-
'yored-nation status for the So;
Viet Union: yiikorday it
reportedly Open IR nninifitiie
Is7 81417 and WO; mea4R.
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..1.70NDON TIMES
23 October 1973
,Bitter taste '
t..-,..,
ilip aris ?
cilf big power
diplomacy.
Frtm Charles Hargrove
Paris, Oct 22 ,
: The resolution voted by the,
,
' Security Council on the Middle
- East has this to be said for it, in
: the 'French Government's view:
: it atknowledges the necessary
link between a ceasefire and the
opening of negotiations for a'
: peace settlement. France has
insisted on the link since the :
; outbreak of the conflict.
.t This modest satisfaction can-
not conceal the bitter realization
in Paris that western' Europe in
' general, and France in particu-
lar, have had no part in ending
: . the conflict. It has provided
;another sobering example of the
collusion of the two super-
powers, and of their ability to
, decide on questions of war and
'peace untrammelled and un-
aided.
The four-power mediation in'
the Middle East to which France
.has always clung could only
work when the United States and
, Russia had decided to agree. '
1 The newspaper Le Figaro
I says today: "events are con-
tradicting cruelly those who
'persist in believing that the old
European powers can still play
a decisive role in world affairs:
the contradiction is the more
cruel because what is involved is
the Middle East, that is to say
a region where Britain and
France long had privileged
interests ". ,
This view is shared by M Jean-
Jacques Servan-Sehreiber, the
president of the-Radical Socialist
Party, who says bluntly in this
week's issue of L'Express: "The
absence of Europe from the
Middle East conflict is a tragedy
?and a scandal."
\? Paris has some grounds for
believing that it can play a more
.glorious role in the negotiations
than it did in the:war: There are'
reports that the Arab countries
are not willing to leave their fate
to Russia and the United States
and that they want a return of
ithe European presence
32
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
30 October 1973
The essential alliance
It is perhaps understandable keep out of it loud and clear before
that during the week of a Mideast the United States began to inter- ?
crisis piled on top of a culminating vene on ',ibehalf of Israel. The ;
point in the domestic political America41 action was an act of
? crisis over Watergate some offi- . separation from the neutral posi-1
cials in Washington got their pri- tion take g up by the Western!
orities mixed up. But now that the allies. '
? cease-fire in the Mideast is in The fact of separation became ?
_force it is time for Washington to public only over the arms ship-
remember that the bedrock on ments forn a German seaport. )
which the security of the United The British and French, for ex-,
States rests is its alliance with the ample, were spared an act of operi
-countries of Western Europe. ' separation. They were not pub- ,
t. That alliance has been care- licly asked to permit American ,
lessly and dangerously dam- planes flying arms to Israel to be
:aged by Washington during the allowed to refuel at British or :
'Mideast affair. Seldom since French airfields. The permission
-the alliahce was formed has it if requested would have been re-
-been brought into so much ques- fused. The only Western ally will- ,
lion in the European capitals. The ing to allow arms to Israel through
repair of the alliance should be the its territory was Portugal.
.first task of American statecraft. The brusqueness 'in the Amer- ?
: London, Paris, Bonn, and the ican treatment of its allies is all
'other Western capitals are shaken. the more remarkable in .view of
by the fact that they were not even what happened in a previous
informed of the reason for the
sudden military alert of last Middle East crisis. In 1956 Britain
Thursday, let alone consulted and France sided with Israel in an
attack on Egypt. The United
States intervened as a neutral. It
applied oil sanctions to Britain for
doing precisely what the United
States was doing this time. It
seems gratuitous in this case to
complain in public of the allies
doing now what Washington was
doing ?'much more vigorously ?
in 1956.
If the United States wants an
alliance with Western Europe it ,
must treat its alliance with re- '
spect and consideration.
The unforgivable mistake in an
alliance is to try to commit an ally
without the knowledge or consent
of the ally. The United States '
? would not for an instant allow its
seaports to be used in a manner
which violated the foreign policies,
of the United States. The alliance
simply cannot be held together if
the allies are to be treated as they
were last week.
It is to be remembered that the
detente with Russia is an achieve-
ment made possible by the bed-
rock of the alliances with Western
Europe and Japan and the new
understanding with China. The
United States has a powerful, a
respectable, and a respected posi-
tion in the world because it is the
center of a group of allies and
friends. It is this position at the
center which makes it worthwhile
for Moscow to enter into &detente
with the United States.
Let the grouping fall apart, and
Moscow would no longer need the
detente, or need to be respectful of
the United States.
'before it was declared or
' even advised that it was happen-
ing. In the case of 'the Cuban
missile crisis top American diplo-
mats were flown to all European,
capitals with photographs of the
, Soviet missiles in Cuba ? before
;the White House demanded re-
moval of the missiles.
In the Case of the Mideast crisis
no one even telephoned the Prime
Minister of Great Britain, the
President of France, or the Chan-
cellor of the West German Repub-
, Iic.
Carelessness Was particularly
marked in the case of the loading
of American weapons into Israeli
ships in Bremerhaven without
even advising, let alone asking the
? consent of, the West German Gov-
ernment. This was done after Ger-
'many had declared its neutrality
in the Arab-Israeli war. Sending
-American weapons from a Ger-
man seaport to a belligerent com-
promised German. neutrality.
Bonn, on learning of what, was
happening, publicly ordered an
immediate stop to the loadings.
To any diplomat it was incred-
ible that, two top officials of the
American Government, the Secre-
? tary of Defense and the official
spokesman-for the Department of
State, publicly scolded the Ger-
mans for "going to home lengths
to separate themselves from us."
? Who separated themselves from
? whom?
The Western Europeans de-
clared their neutrality in the war
and made their determination to
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LONDON TIMES
29October 1973
CRISIS MISMANAGEMENT IN NATO
No one comes with much credit
out of the present wrangle be-
tween the United States and her
' European allies. We must hope
that the ? real strength of the
Atlantic Alliance has not ? been
damaged, but the impression of
fiagility which it has given to the
rest of the world will not be easy
t?correct.
1 On the substance of the dispute.
b4th Americans and Europeans
have valid arguments. The Ameri-
cans quite naturally feel that, if
Europe looks to them to ensure,
he own defence and expects
thein to make considerable sacri-
fices for it, the least she could
do is to be cooperative in an
emergency when they are trying
. to defend someone else: in this
instance, Israel. The Europeans
feel that Nato is a mutual self-
. help organization to which each
partner makes his contribution.
If one partner chooses to incur
other obligations in another part
of the world, those obligations.
are not, automatically shared by
\ all the rest. Each ally remains:
sovereign in the general conduct
of his foreign policy. His interests
in another part of the world are
not necessarily identical with,
those .of the United States ; still
less so is his perception of how
those interests can best be served.
? In this instance European gov-
ernments may or may not feel ,
that President Nixon was right to?
believe that it was in America's
interest to help Israel maintain
her hold on occupied Arab terri-
tories, but with virtual unanimity
they reached the view that it was
not in their own interests to do so;
and therefore !did not feel that
this was a legitimate use ,of Nato
".` facilities in their countries. Some
of them were irritated, moreover,
, by America's failure to consult
- them, especially, before ordering
- the worldwide alert on Thursday
morning. ?
The sources of resentment on
.. both sides are therefore under-
standable. What is inexcusable
? is that both should have expressed
'!their resentment publicly, or at
least? in such a way that it was
bound to become public. The first
;. -offender was the West German
Foreign Ministry, which on Thurs.
-'day put out a public. statement
.. announcing that it had protested
? about American arms supplies
, being shipped to Israel from West
, German territory. The Germans
, apparently felt obliged to make
!. this public because earlier private
!, objections to the Americans had
! been ignored. Even so, this pub-
lic airing of an inter-allied dispute
' on a day of acute international
tension. Was tactless to say the
least.
It was also a little tactless of
Sir Alec Douglas?HOme to say, on
the same day, that there was " no
? evidence" that the Soviet Union
was "seriously considering"
moving troops into the Middle
? East. He- meant, of course, that
there was no evidence available
. to him?and he may have wished
to hint that he felt the Americans
ought to have made that evidence
? available to him. But he would
? have been a better ally if he had
r? made it clearer that he was not
! In a position to know, and that
? ' the United Stales Administration
was certainly',:better, ?informed
,? than he Was. ?. 1
,,The same criticism, 'applies ? to
, ? ; 1/1',.,:,t ' j
BALTIMORE SUN
25 October 1973
ar straining
U.S.-Eur e ties
By PHILIP POTTER.
London Burea t of The Sun
This, it is feared by some
American officials, could be
used in Congress by those who
have been agitating for with-
drawal of some American
forces from Europe.
Now the possibility looms
that the U.S. will get little help
from its European partners,
should the cutback in oil pro-
duction by the Arab oil-produc-
ing states and the embargoes
seme of them have placed on
shipments to the U.S. produce
a need for pooling of the sup-
plies available to the Western
powers.
Yesterday, it was indicated
that Britain may join Italy,
Belgium, The Netherlands,
London?The Middle East cri-
sis, it is becoming apparent
here, could bring new fissures
in the relationship between the
United States and its European
allies that would replace the
"constructive dialogue" that
Was proclaimed only recently
as having succeeded a period,
, of trans-Atlantic "guerrilla
warfare."
Washington officialdom, it is
known, was not too happy that '
the British not only applied an
embargo on arms to the com-
batants?that many Britons
complain was weighted against
littifil=but denied the use of
British bases to American mil-
itary planes carrying arms to
Israel.
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those participants in the Nato
Council Meeting on Friday, who
allowed their! view that there
was no gocid reason for the
Americans tp .'have gone so far
as a full alert" to be leaked to
the press. As Lord Kennet pointed
out in The Times on Saturday,
these peoplecould not have had
access to the information on
which the American decision was
based.
But the American reaction to
these criticisms was equally ill-
considered. By allowing both
Mr Schlesinger and the State
Department to make public
attacks on the attitude of allied
governments, and then going on
to endorse those attacks in his
own press conference the same
night, Mr Nixon widened the rift
in the alliance when he should
have been doing his best to heal
?it. Moreover, the criticism as he
himself phrased it was wrong in
substance as well as in form. He
said: " Our European friends
-haven't been as cooperative as
they might have .been in attempt- ,
-ing to help us work out the.
Middle East settlement."
In fact European powers (or
at least Britain) had been
trying desperately to play a
role in the peace-making pro-
cess but had succeeded only in
getting in the way because they
were not really wanted or needed.
What they had been uncoopera-
tive about was helping Israel to
prosecute the war. Whether the ?
President was right in thinking
that this was a necessary pre-
condition for working out a
settlement is a matter of opinion,
and one on which his allies can I
legitimately differ.
Austria, Sweden, Spain and
Luxembourg in imposing con-
trols and special conditions on
the export of oil to the U.S.
Peter Walker, secretary for
trade and industry in the Cabi-
net of Prime Minister Edward
Heath, told the House of Com-
mons that the government
could not permit uncontrolled
exports.
Therefore, he said, it would
be prepared to control the ex-
port of oil and oil products
other than to the European
Economic Community. Under,
Common Market rules, petro-
leums-export restrictions are
not permitted by one member
country against another. But
against third countries, the
members can do what they -
like.
The United States, which'
came to the aid of Europe in'
the 1956-1957 oil crisis following
the second Arab-Israeli war,
during which France and Brit-
ain joined Israel in frustratedi
efforts to gain control of the!
Suez Canal, would obviously
dislike a European rejection of'
pooling now when the Arabs
are directing their oil weaponl
at the U.S.
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WASHINGTON STAR
25 October 1973
/Ms
? By Leslie H. Gelb
New York Times News Serrvice
'The United States was forced to set up a special
system tp rush supplies to the Israelis because t
some of its North Atlantic Treaty Organization al-
'lies, along with Spain, balked at any cooperation,' `.
' accordink to diplomatic sources.
The sources said that the refusal was based on a
? fear that the Arab countries would cut off Europe's
oil supplies.
The reiupply effort, from bases in the United.
? States, involved aircraft carriers and Air Force
? tanker planes, military officials disclosed.
? The Navy, and Air Force had to adopt this.
roundabout system, the diplomats said, because ?
with the exception of Portugal arid, to some extent,,
West Germany ? some key Western European
countries along the supply route made it clear that
aircraft bound for Israel could neither land on nor
fly over their territory.
A MAIN REASON cited by Washington over
? the years for American military aid to Greece and
i Turkey has been to make it possible to use bases on'
their territory in Middle East crises. Air Force con-
tingency plans, according to knowledgable
sources, have looked to at least tacit Greek govern- !
ment cooperation in an Arab-Israeli conflict.
The Turkish Foreign Ministry announced Oct. 11
that American military installations "are for the
' security and defense of the North Atlantic Treaty
area and have been set up solely for defense cooper-
, ative purposes of Turkey." Nevertheless, a number
of American officials report, Soviet resupply air;
craft heading for Egypt and Syria have flown over
TurkeY.
The Greek government also ruled out any role in
the supply flow to Israel.
i UNDER A NAVY plan for the urgent supply of A4
,.Skyhawks ? described by informed congressional ?
NEW YORK TIMES'
30 October 1973
EUROPEANS IRKED
BY U.S. COMPLAINT
By ALVIN SHUSTER
specie to The New York Thee
? LONDON, Oct. 29?European
'officials are expressing surprise
and irritation over Washing-
ton's criticism of their lack of
support in the Middle East war,
,but they remain uncertain
about just how to respond.
The official inclination in
several capitals today was to
try to play down the possibility
of repercussions from the harsh
words from Washington. Presi-
dent Nixon and other officials,
. reflecting their resentment over
the way most allies detached
themselves from the American
airlift of supplies to Israel,
complained on Friday that
Burppe should have been more
helpful to the United States in
the war.
For their part, some Euro-
pean officials said privately to-
d?ififffibership in the
North Atlantto Went), Orgoli
zatian did not mean blind sup-
port for every American policy.
The questions debated today
Included whether bad feelings
Mift
r !sr
and government sources?the planes were flown
from the East Coast to Israel, with stopoffs in the
Azores, and the carriers John F. Kennedy and
Franklin D. Roosevelt for refueling by tanker air-
craft. The planes were also refueled midair in the
eastern Mediterranean.
, Twenty to 30 Skyhawks were ferried to Israel, and
30 to SO were sent on Navy transport ships.
The Skyhawks and the Phantoms retained their
U.S. markings until they landed in Israel where Is-
raeli markings were applied. The American pilots
returned home on transport planes ?
a ANOTHER RESUPPLY issue that remains some-'t
what clouded concerns West Germany. Government
officials concede that in the first days of the Arab-
Israeli fighting, Air Force cargo planes flew from
the American base at Ramstein, carrying small
, arms and munitions. Aviation Week, an authorita-
tive source on such matters, says that these aircraft,
, flew over. Austria, Yugoslavia and Greece, all pro-'
hibited territory. Officials here deny this but will not'
suggest other possible routes.
? The diplomatic effort became quite complicated,
according to the diplomatic sources, with Washing-
'ton and other NATO capitals jockeying to avoid
open confrontation. At first, Washington, it was
said, simply decided not to raise the question of
landing and flight rights, hoping its allies would look
the other way.
However, the governments of Greece, Turkey,
Spain and Italy publicly forbade their territory to
American aircraft, other governments, including
that of Britain, made their positions clear pirvately.
The sources asserted that the U.S. representative.
at NATO, Donald Rumsfeld, was asked to win sup-
port for American policy in the Middle East but was
unable to do so. The oil issue apparently outweighed
unity
would slow the pace of the
emerging declarations sought
by Washington as the frame-
work for revitalizing trans-
Atlantic relations. Some offi-
cials said privately that the
task would go on but would be
somewhat complicated by the
change in atmosphere.
"Thei whole thing is bound to
have some effect on the spirit
of the discussions now under
way," said one diplomat in
Brussels. "But the impact on
the substance remains to be
seen,"
The new strains in the alli-
ance come at a particularly
sensitive time in what Wash-
ington had hoped would be the
"Year of Europe." Apart from
the declarations now under dis-
cussion, the North Atlantic
Treaty allies open negotiations
with the Soviet Union tomor-
row in Vienna on reducing
forces in Central Europe.
s Officials here and elsewhere
stressed today, however, that
the differences over the Middle
East war would not disturb
NATO's agreed position in deal-
ing with Moscow on force cuts.
But there is some concern that
America's unhappiness over Eu.
rope's stand on the Middle East
ebuld spur demands in Wash-
ington fora unilateral reduction
In American forces in Europe.,
As usual, the private corn-,
ments today about Washing-
ton's, reaction more accurately
reflected the mood than the
sparse official pronouncements.
For the most part, the official
effort was aimed at toning
down suggestions of a serious
rift between the NATO allies.
. One bitter private remark
came from a NATO diplomat in
Brussels. "The United States is
firing off salvos in all direc-
tions which are ill-timed and
ill-conceived," he said. "Ameri-
cans don't even consult and
then complain we don't share
their views."
British officials were among
those who argued that there
were no serious differences
with the United States although
Lord Carrington, the Minister
of Defense, did agree that
"Europe's interests were rather
different from the interests of
the United States."
In criticizing the European
stand, American officials com-
plained that most allies, with
the notable exception of Por-
tugal, divorced themselves from
the American policy of support
of Israel in the interests of
preserving Europe's flow of oil
from the Arab states. Washing-
ton is particularly unhappy
that many of America's NATO
allies made clear their opposi-
tion to allowing American
planes bound for Israel either
to fly over or land on Wit
territories,
In turn, European officials
complain about the lack of con-
34
sultation provided by the United
States, not only on Middle East
policy in general, but also on
the worldwide alert proclaimed
last Thursday. Word of the
alert was passed officially to
Europe and td NATO headquar-
ters in Brussels only well aftet
the orders had gone out.
The European unease over
alliance differences was re-
flected today in editorials, with
the French Newspaper Le
Monde comparing the state-
Ments in Washington to school
principals' giving bad marks for
conduct to their European
pupils. It noted that the Ameri-
can comments apparently dealt
a fatal blow to the Year of
Europe and said that Europeans
were unhappy about the breezy
offhandedness of the United
States in deciding to solve the
Middle East crisis with "the
sole consent of the Kremlin."
The controversy, meanwhile,
is expected to figure this week
in talks between Walter Stoes-
sel, the assistant Secretary of
State for European Affairs, and
European officials, Mr. Stoessel,
who arrived in Bonn today and
is due here later in the week,
Is trying to work out agreed
language for a document set-
ting forth guidelines on eeo;
Donk ahd politidal relittloki
IttitWOOti the tiiii@ filOMPerai Pr
the European Economic Com.
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munity and the United States.
The other key document, the
military half of the "Atlantic
Charter" tailed for by Secretary
or State 1{issinger last April, is
being drafted in Brussels for
e,:cntual signature by all 15
.members'f of NATO.
NEW YORK TIMES
1 November 1973
[RATE RALLYING
WEAN MIES
By VAN ROBERTSON
Special to The New York Times
PARIS, Oct. 31 France,
smarting from what she sees as
total Soviet-American disregard
of Europe in the Middle East
crisis, took the lead today in
? trying to restore Europe's
world influence by tightening
Common Market ties.
President Pompidou called
for a meeting of the leaders of
the nine Common Market na-
tions before the end of 1973
to "compare and harmonize"
their attitudes toward the Mid-
dle East and other political
issues.
' The proposal was expressed
in letters sent to the heads of
governments of Britain, West
Germany, Italy, the Nether-
lands, Denmark, Belgium, Lux-
:embourg and Ireland..
Mr. Pompidou also urged
regular meetings from now on
at the highest level to coordi-
nate Common Market political ,
positions, stabilize its? mem-
bers' currencies and fight in-
flation.
The French President told
the Cabinet at its weekly ses-
sion _today that the Middle
East cease-fire, "planned and
put into effect without thk
participation of Europe in any.
form," was a "dangerous".
way to operate. ,
Experience, has shown, he
said, that private understand-
ings between the United States
and the Soviet Union can ei-
ther help d?nte or, lead to a
general confrontation. ?
He declared that such agree-
ments worked against Europe's
direct historical, 'geographic
and economic links to the Mid-
dle East.
Mr. Pompidou' said that Eu-
rope, while reaffirming its loy-
alty to its alliances and cooper-
ation with the East. should "put
to the proof and the test the
? strength of its structure and its
ability to contribute to the set-
tlement of 'world problems."
. He said that at the meeting
he proposed the Common Mar-
ket partners should set down
and harmonize their political
attitudes and establish , proce-
dures for getting together
quickly in times of crisis to
define a common European
positions.
? The French leader also urged
the Common . Market finance
ministers to meet soon to work
Out "indispensable measures':
for insuring the stability of
their currencies and shielding
awn against inflation.
fie further asked that the eco-
nOttliCS ministers of the nine
WASHINGTON POST
26 October 1973
estern Euro e Ke
le ,ast Crisis
mg u
oves
, By Dan Morgan
Washington Post Start Writer
, Western Europe's by-
stander role in the 20-year-
old Middle East crisis?una-
ble to influence events yet
deeply affected by theml?be-
, came even more evident yes-
terday in the unfolding su-
,perpower diplomacy.
According to U.S. sources,
the American actions in re-
' sponse to possible Soviet
"unilateral" moves were
first conveyed to the Euro-
peans in Brussels yesterday.
The implication was that the United States immedi-
there was no :advance con- ? ately stop reinforcing Israel
sultation or warning. from American military
The sources said that the ? bases in Germany.
United States was in touch The foreign ministry in Kissinger r egarding Eu."
Bonn yesterday that West
Germany and other NATO
troops did not join U.S.
forces in their alert.
Diplomatic and other ob-
servers took the view yester-
day that the independent
U.S. action could only,
deepen the tensions betweert
the United States and Eu-
rope flowing from their
sharply divergent interests
and policies in the Middle
East crisis.
West Germany yesterday
offered a fresh example of
this when it demanded that
i"individual views" had been ,
expressed in NATO forums ,
, that "they wouldn't be 'in'
the position they are on oil
if the U.S. had not engaged
, in the re-supply of Israel."
When asked if France was.i
one of the countries, he re-:
plied, "certainement."
Since the start of the cr1-1
sic on Oct. 6 there have.
,been at least four major,!
Meetings of the NATO coun-
cil at which the Middle East
has been discussed.
U.S. sources in Washing-
ton said that the Ameriean
position at these meetings 1.
.was "tough." These sources
described the attitude of
Secretary of State Henry A.
with members of the North Bonn charged that weapons rope's oil worries as uncom- '
'Atlantic Treaty Organiza- deliveries originating from promising. ? .
tion's standing council some- , German :territory violated "He made clear that the ?ii
time after a U.S. National the "strict neutrality" policy : U.S. was going to re-supply .1
Security Council meeting' 'of the government. Israel in order to maintain I
broke up at 3 a.m. in Wash- There have been uncon- the military balance in the "I
ington. firmed reports of German,' Middle East, and that was i
The military alert ordered ' acquiescence in the re-sup- that," one source said., ? ,
by the United States sP? 'ply operations for days. Dip- At the same time, the ?:
parently did not extend to - lomatic sources here said United States was reported
the forces of the West Euro- 'this announcement there- ? to , be disappointed that
pean countries, most of' fore .appeared to ' be in- Greece and Turkey, two ,
,which have been' trying as -,tended mainly to protect countries which receive mil-
best they can to disassociate Bonn against possible Arab itary assistance, had stayed
:themselves from American: retaliation. ? neutral and had refused to
i'
support of Israel and, in re-. Fear that the Arab coun- allow the use of their facili- I
'cent days, from the U.S. mil: ? tries (which supply roughly' ties in the airlift. T h e
itary re-supply of that coun-
80 per cent of Western Eu- United States maintains its.,
t.try. .
rope's oil) would impose to- own air bases in Greece In ,
. .
' A West German defense tai embargoes has been the Turkey, these bases are run !
' ministry spokesman said: in 'primary factor, in the neu- jointly with the local gov-
ernment.
The lifting of the complex '
series of restrictions on pro- ?
. trebly of Europeans.
Of all the NATO coun-
tries, only Portugal offered
the United States landing duction and export of oil im-
facilities for its re-supply posed by the Arabs in the ;
operations. Last week, Sen. last seven days could reduce
, Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) some of the immediate Eu-
announced that Italy, ropean-U.S. strains which
France, Spain and Britain have emerged in the present
0, had all ,refused to cooperate crisis.
in the re-supply effort. ? However, American offi-
Jackson said the Portu- cials say that obvious diver- .
r ? guese government, o n e of gence between European
. the two dictatorships in and U.S. interests in the en-
NATO, gave permission for sis will affect the atmos-
U.S. military aircraft en phere for months.
-route to Israel from the East The United States and the
Coast to refuel in the Azores. Europeans 'are now seeking ?
Azores. to work out declarations :
The State Department de- of common principles about
nied last week that the the future of NATO.
United States had either According to U.S. ()M.
, asked for or been- refused cials, European govern-
landing rights or military ments were angered by a re-
overflight permission by the cent proposal in Congress +
governments named by Jack- by Senator Jackson and Sen. '$
. son. However, U.S. officials Sam Nunn (D-Ga.). It would ,
? said that there had been make U.S. troop levels in
"disappointing response" to Europe contingent on Euro- `7,
the re-supply efforts by the pean readiness to offset '
Europeans. The implication fully the balance of pay-
was that some major govern- ments drain on the United
ments made clear from the ,States caused by the station-
start that they would stay ing of ,US. troops abroad. ?
neutral. More than $1 billion in
''"Nobody could deny that U.S. balance of payments ,
some Europeans were irri- costs resulting from troops
nations draw up a plan to fight Italians.. tated," one official source are still not covered by the
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inflation, 'which, he said, would
be aggravated throughout Eur-
ope by, the rise in oil prices.
Mr.,Pompidou reaffirmed
France's readiness to assist "as
best we can, under the author-
ity of the United Nations Secu-
rity Council, in establishing , a
just and lasting peace guaran-
teeing the security of all states"
in the Middle East.
His cal 'few quick, positive
action by the Common Market
chiefs of government came aft-
er United States criticism of
its European allies for lack of
support during the Middle East
war. '
Until the war broke out, the
Common Market countries
were deeply divided' in their
attitudes toward Israel. Israel's
stichest friends appeared to
be the Netherlands and West
Germany, with France the most
pro-Arab. Others, such as Italy,
claimed neutrality.
Because of the Arab oil, boy-
cott, a shift seems to have
taken place aligning the, nine
governments, irrespective .,of
public opinion, at home, on a
line somewhere between that
of the French and that of the
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SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, London
28 Pctober 1973
y LAURENCE MARTIN
.A MILITARY tutor's report on
the Arabs this weekend
would have to? read "much
improved but must try harder."
What the Arabs have or have
not done, however, they have
achieved with Soviet arms?
Scviet dvice, Soviet training.
and under the real if remote,
shadow of direct Soviet inter-
vention that. caused such a flurry7
last week. Thus, as we write a.
half-term report on the Arabs,
we must also reassess Soviet'
? policy in the Middle East.
It is the great good fortune:
of the Soviet Union that Arab
failures are not incompatible with
Soviet successes. The existence of
Israel has always compelled the
' United States to play the balance,
of power game upside down in the'
Middle East. The Americans are
compelled to side with the smaller
legions.
True, the smaller legions have
been infinitely tougher, and more
skilled militarily than the Arabs.
But the Arabs sit on most of the
region's natural resources and.
have title to, if not always the
free use of, the Suez Canal, the
area's single most important
strategic prize. Moreover, as the,
present war shows, the Israeli lead
in sophistication must inevitably be
a wasting asset, so that gradually
numbers will tell.
In the long run this erosion of
Israel's advantage favours the
Soviet Union, but the Soviets also
profit from the disparity of scale
in a more immediate way. The
Arabs have a spongy impervious-
ness to disaster that enables the
Russians to view the setbacks of
their allies with an equanimity
Americans cannot afford towards
the much more delicately poised
existence of Israel. Thus, with
reasonable luck, the Russians can
profit from either outcome of the
present war.
The Arabs may, contrary to
present probabilities, emerge with
sufficient military credit to salve
their pride, and sufficient bargain-
ing power to enable the Super-
powers to compel Israel to dis-
gorge some of the territories won
in 1967. In that case Russia has
helped enough to earn some Arab
gratitude and the United States
has certainly done enough for
Israel to attract even greater Arab
hatred than before.
If, on the other hand, the Arabs
feel humiliated and incur 'further
losses, they may upbraid the Soviet
Union for neglect, but they will
survive and they will continue to
need Russian help.
Indeed7 though there can be no
real substitute for a Super-power,
the slim chance of offering the
Arabs. some alternatives, is the
most plausible?argument for the
/ Western European efforts to
, remain aloof that have so annoyed
the Nixon administration.
Soviet policy is not without its
risks. The credence accorded
,rumours of Russian troop move-
ments on Thursday rests on the
' belief that there are limits beyond
7-which the Soviet Union could not
let Israeli adventures go. It is, how-
ever, unlikely that we were really
near the brink of war, for Soviet
policy in the Middle East is based
? on calculations of diplomatic
advantage.
The American position is very
different, for American dedication
to Israel has a domestic and emo-
? tional basis which goes beyond
. national self-interest. Thus Soviet
policy involves the danger that
unexpected Arab successes could
. certainly compel direct American
; intervention. So far, Arab incom-
petence has paradoxically permit-
ted the Soviet Union to avoid this
'ultimate danger, and has enabled
her to use Israel as a catalyst for
' extending Russian influence into
:the Moslem world. .
e As recently as 1956, when Sir
:Anthony Eden launched the ill-
fated Anglo-French Suez operation
to prevent a revolutionary
? Egyptian Government and a new
'Soviet policy of arms supply from
delivering the Arab world and the
'Canal into Soviet hands, the pros-
fpect seemed a disaster justifying
desperate counter-measures.
There could scarcely be more
.striking evidence of. changed pers-
pective than the widespread
chorus of delight with which many
British commentators last week,
,when faced with the idea that
Russia might contribute the Red
rArmy to a peace-keeping force on
the Canal, greeted it as a triumph
for d?nte. A realist like Dr.
,Kissinger was quick to scotch any
such idea, but its very conception
was dramatic testimony to Soviet
success in winning acceptance as a
, legitimate pillar of the military
balance in an area where, 20 years
ago, they had scarcely a finger-
hold.
The military instruments of
this achievement have been the
Soviet naval presence both in the
Mediterranean and the Indian
'Ocean, the lavish programmes of
military aid and training, and, at
peak of the effort, the stationing
'of a Soviet air defence force of
some 20,000 men in the United
Arab Republic. Not only did
Soviet maritime aircraft fly recon-
naissance missions from Egyptian
.bases, but Soviet pilots briefly
engaged and took casualties from
Israeli Phantoms over Cairo;
possibly a unique instance of
Soviet armed forces being commit-
36
ited to overseas combat.
One motive for all this military
deployment was undoubtedly to.
'outflank N.A.T.O. to the south and
,to provide a strategic defence for
Russia in an area which is second
only to Eastern Europe in long-
established Russian strategic con-
cern. This concern doubtless per-
sists in the Soviet rationale for
- their policy, even though changes
in military technology and in the'
European political situation are:
sharply reducing the likelihood of
general war and the strategic sig-
nificance of the Mediterranean if'
it should come.
The other, and increasingly1
.obvious, role of Soviet southern
deployments is in a carefully
orchestrated blend of military,
-political and economic policies
intended to increase Soviet, and
:decrease Western, influence
throughout the Middle East and.
South Asia.
? It is important not to exag-
gerate or misconceive the military.
component in this strategy. It is
by no means always the dominant,
element, and, even within the
military component, the provision
of supplies and training is
prob-
'ably more important than the
direct presence of Soviet forces.
But if the military component
is only part of the mix, it is an.
inevitable one. The areas at stake.
are so turbulent and contain so:
many conflicts which the indige-
nous nations will militarise and not
infrequently convert into active
hostilities?witness the Middle
East now and the Indo-Pakistan
'conflict of recent memory?that '
any outside power that seeks influ- '
ence must be prepared to contri-
bute to the military balance in
one way or another. That is why
recently revived hopes of strictly
.curbing and balancing military
supplies will have little, if any,
.success.
What, then, will the military
arm of Soviet policy in the Middle
East and South Asia do next? As
we have seen, there are signs that
the Russians have mixed feelings
about the wisdom of a conspicuous'
direct military presence, and the
present Middle Eastern war has
brought to the surface what may
be a rather sharp debate in.
Moscowabout the relationship.
between a global d?nte and a'
forward military policy in local
theatres.
It seems inevitable, however,.
that military forces and supplies
will, continue to be a prominent
instrument of Soviet policy. One
reason is that military leaders can
argue very plausibly that across
the board?in strategic parity,
European arms control negotia-
tions, Vietnam, India and the
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Middle East?the Soviet Union has
enjoyed a remarkable political
return for its military investments:
'What the rewards may be
future:not only in the Middle East.
but elsewhere too, will depend
very ,much on Western policy.:
Perhaps the most salutary result
the West could derive from the
current Middle Eastern crisis
would be for a great many people
ho should have known better'
to learn the real meaning of.
"d?nte." Dr. Kissinger himself
may have been guilty of occa-
sional euphoric phraseology, but
he has repeatedly pointed out that.
detente! is not a substitute for they
balance .of power but a particular
form of :it.
When, in his Thursday PreSs,
conference, he said that the
United States was not in " con-.
frontation " with the Soviet Union,
in the Middle East, he meant that;
there was in fact such a clear con-
frontation that it had every chance
of being contained. If it is to:
survive, d?nte means not the,
absence of acute local crises, but,
on the contrary, a painstaking,
care to take up and meet every.
challenge in areas which the Westt
does not intend to concede to the'
Communist powers.
The rather hysterical outburst
against his European allies,
delivered by the American Secre-
tary of Defence on Friday shows'
that there are some special ques-
tions about the future of the Wes-
tern alliance for Europeans to:
ponder this weekend. Though they:
may welcome the firmness shown,
by the United States in the Middle;
East, they must ask themselves
how much was due to the special.,
status of Israel in American,
opinion at a time when the Presi-,
dent is under peculiar domestic
'pressures.
More important, perhaps, in the
light of American displeasure,
:Europeans should not fail to notice
that even Israel has to show inde-
pendence and take risks to prevent
her vital interests being sacrificed
to the element of Super-power'
collusion which is as much a part
of d?nte as the residual element
of Soviet-American conflict on
lesser issues.
Israel can do this only because
of her own capabilities and resolu-
tion. Europeans should remember
, this when tempted by the idea that
!detente entitles them to neglect,
their own moral and material de-
fences. This weeks opening of the
.force reduction negotiations in.
Vienna would be a good time toi
?
'''?"I`he author is Professor of War
Studies at King's College, Univer-
;,,aity of London.
,
THE GUARDIAN, MANCHESTER
24 October 1973'
? '
seeks
ssu
\
By HULA PICK
While Russia is still with-
holding diplomatic recognition
, from the EEC, its diplomats are
quietly urging the Nine to take
a common, pro-Arab stand on a
, Middle East settlement.
During the last few days the
Soviet Ambassador to Britain
has made repeated calls on the
Foreign Secretary to discuss
the Middle East. One reason for
' this interest appears to be a
Soviet belief that Britain's
policy on the issue is on the
, right lines and that she should
'be encouraged to propagate it
among her partners in the Corn-
' munity.
Although the Russians no
? doubt recognise that there are
considerable divisions among
the EEC countries in their
'Middle East policies, they
, appear to welcome Britain's
. attempts to have the Com-
munity act together in seeking
to resolve the crisis There is,
in this Soviet view, an implicit
, acceptance not merely that the
, Community is here to stay, but
that it is also developing into a
, political power that counts on
, the international stage.
. Neither Russia nor any other
member of the 35 countries
taking part in the European
security conference in Geneva
made any attempt yesterday to
. stop Israel from addressing
them. All delegations were pre-
sent, and silent, as Israel's
, Ambassador to Swizterland, Mr
Levavi, delivered a low-key
speech .urging a peaceful settle-
ment and "normal negotiations
between Israel and her neigh-
bours" to break the deadlock.
In a memo to the conference
Israel stressed its close links
with Europe and insisted
that security was indivisible.
NEW YORK TIMES
19 October 1973
Red Cross Pressing Israel '-
On Step to Protect Civilians
Special to The New York Times
GENEVA. Oct. 18?Israel ii
being pressed to ,answer an ap-
peal by the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross urging
her to observe new stringent
rules of warfare designed to
civilians in the Midest.
? A committee spokesman said
today that anew call had gone
out to Israel because she waS
the only one of the tour, prin.
'In an unmistakable allusion
' to Palestine terrorists, Israel..
called on the ? conference.;
to draw up procedures for pre-',
venting hijackings and the
holding of hostages.
It was argued that to grant
help' or asylum to terrorists
would constftute a grave threat
to the security of all nat?kus.
including Europe. ?
Israel came to the Security ?
conference as part of an agree-
ment that was struck to allow -
Mediterranean countries to put :?
forward their views on the rela-
tionships between their own
security and European security. f:
Algeria and Tunisia had been
represented in Geneva during
the first week of the Middle'.
East fighting.
. *But there had been some con-
-cern that Israel's appearance
might provoke heated debates
between the conference:
members and there had been,
corridor moves last week to
suspend the conference tem-:'
porarily. Britain, as well as the
US and other senior members
of the conference, were, how- ,
'ever, determined to continue
business as usual in Geneva
and would not even ack-
nowledge moves for adjourn-,
inent.
The US-Soviet ceasefire reso-
lution in the UN Security Coun-
cil removed the doubts of those
who feared that detente was
endangered and that the
Geneva talks might develop
into an empty charade. As a
result, Israel was able yester-
day to express "the hopes that
the bloodshed and hostility .
which have tormented the ;
Middle East for so many years '
will be replaced by an era of,
peace and cooperation."
cipal belligerents in the Middle
East war had not replied to the
first appeal.
Syria and Iraq have agreed
to apply the new draft rules.
Egypt has, too?but only on
the condition that Israel, also
agree, according to the spokes-
Drafted under Red Cross aus-
pices, the proposed 'rules would
outlaw all attacks aimed at
1'terrorizing civilian populations.
Also on such objectives as pub-
.1ic transport service not banned
'would be attacks primarily in-
volved in war efforts.
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28 Oitober 1973
onn Silent on
its
Bypiohn M. Goshko
Washington Post Foreign Service
BONN; Oct. 27?Chancellor
,Willy Biandt's government de-
clined. qomment today on
Washington's critic:sm of
,West Germany and other
NATO countries that have
'"separated themselves pub-
. licly" from U.S. efforis to sup-
ply Isarei with arms.
"For the time being, the fed-
H oral government has nq inten-
tion of saying anything on
this," Bonn spokesmen said
.when asked for comment.
? , At separate press confer- ,
enees yesterday, President
? Nixon, Defense Secretary,
James R. Schlesinger and
State Department spokesman
Robert J. McCloskey all Or-
pressed annoyance at the atti-
tude of Washington's NATO.
partners toward the Middle
;East situation. "
In large part, their anger,
was prompted by Bonn's ac-.
'tion Thursday in protesting!
sharply against the delivery of
U.S. arms to Israel from West
German territory. The foreign
ministry called the arms ship-
ment a violation of Bonn's ef-
forts to remain neutral in the
Middle East conflict and
called on the United States to
, halt such shipments.
Since then, however, the
;Brandt government has at-'
;'tempted to back away some-
'. what from the sharp tone ot
'the foreign ministry state-
ment.
Officials here noted only
' that Bonn's ambassador' in
Washington. Berndt Von Sta-
den, met last night with Secre-
Iary of State Henry A. Kis-
singer to discuss "NATO ques-
tions." As a result, they said
ti"each side now understand
bettor the position of the
t? other."
. it was obvious, however,
v
that the Bonn government will
blot be able to maintain this
pow profile much beyond the
weekend. News of Washingt
,ton's reaction reached here*
f,too late to be published in
fliost of this morning's news-
papers. That, Plus the fact
that Brandt' left today for a.
vacation in France, shoulct!
i give the government a breath-
Ag spell until Monday.
By then, however, the Ger-
;Irian press and the opposition
'Christian Democrats are ex-
pected to be besieging the gov-
ernment for explanations. As
,a result, Bonn might find
i'Itself in the position of either
having to back down or risk
the possibility of severe trio-
,tion in its relations with Wash-
ington.
? In this respect, particular
,concern is certain to be ex-
'pressed here about Schlesing-
rer's comment that the West
lterman protest may force the
United States to review the
?iii,jith of its military and di-
,plomatic commitment to West
'West Germany.
r!. Underlying the dispute has
vbeen the ,effort of Brandt and,
rFereignMinister Walter
Scheel to .overcome' West Ger-
m'any's past reputation for'
partiality to Israel and to
prove Bonn's relations With'
the Arab world. This is
prompted in turn by two
factors: West Germany, de-
Pendence for most of its oil
supplies on the Arab cowl-
ries, and the German \ desire,
to avoid a new outbreak of:
Arab terrorism such as ? last'
fear's murder of Israeli ath-.1
letes at the Munich Olympics. ? '
Bonn's attempt to pursue a'
;Policy, of "strict neutrality'',
when 'the .new Middle East'
fwar began immediately came
tinto collision with the fact
/that the United States 'was
tirawing on military equip-
inent stockpiled in West Ger-
imany to replace Israeli battle
!losses. . ?
t. Privately, the West Ger,'
!mans imply that they tried to
'turn a blind -eye to the resup-
ply operation but that this was
;eventually made impossible by
,iAmerican lack of candor and.
idiscretion and by Washing:.
tc,ton's failure to understand the;
:difficulty of Bonn's position.
"According to authoritative
sources, the Germans were in:
',formed by U.S. Ambassador'
Martin J. Hillenbrand on
Tuesday that the shipments
were being ended. But imme-
diately after the Germans re-
layed this information to the:
Egyptian government, it be-
,came known that two Israeli'
,freighters had been loaded
with tanks and arms at the
'North Sea port of Bremerha-'
'yen.
The sources say that the',
sharp tone of the resulting'
public German protest was
prompted in part by a desire
to protect Bonn agianst Egyp-
tian anger, and in part by a
feeling that the foreign minis-
try had been duped by the
Americans.
Subsequently, the
add; the Germans became con-
vinced that Hillenbrand had
not misled them intentionally
and that there had been.some
k'nd .of misunderstanding.
This led the government to
'conclude that its initial pro-
test had been to strong, and it-
began the backpedaling opera-
tion set in motion yesterday. ,
Now, however, the questionl
is whether the .move came too'
sources
le t la
late to avoid charges of a ,
,threatened split with West , ;.?
Germany's m ost important
'ally.' A sample of what the:'
,Brandt government can ex-
pect was supplied today by. '
:Karl Carstens, parliamentary
:leader 'of the Christian Demo;
,crats.
In a newspaper interview to
:be published tomorrow, Car-
stens charged that the Brandt,
government's policy had failed
to serve "the cause of peace."
Instead Carstens added, Bonn
had erred badly by publicly
criticizing Washington instead
of recognizing the U.S. effort
to "restor& thebalance of
forces in the Middle East." ,
U.S. Criticism Stirs
Europea n Rejoinders .
U.S. criticism of its Euro-
pean allies in NATO for alleg-
edly letting the United States
down during the Middle East,
war has brought some sharp
reactions ? ?
BALTIMORE BUN
26 October 1973.
; Greek Foreign Minister
Christian Xanthopoulos-Pala-
mas complained in Athens
'that Mediterranean nations di-
;rectly affected by: the war
were "ignored" during the cri-
sis. The Greek Embassy in
Washington. denied as com-
pletely unfounded U.S. reports
that Soviet airplanes used
Greek airspace in flying mili-
tary supplies to the Middle
East. ? .
? An , Italian 'government
, spokesman said in Rome that
'Italy's membership in NATO
did not obligate it to assist
Washington's Middle East poll.
icy. ,
Widespread anger was re-
ported in Europe at the U.S.'
failure to' consult its allies be-
fore ordering a nuclear alert
affecting bases in Europe.
British newspapers said the
,alert had shattered British 11.-?
lusions about the, alliance. The
London Hedy Mail said that
"Europe must now stand on,
;Its own feet."'
ntam r:osses.
Soy' iet nAccoais
Ry 'PHILIP POTTER
' London Bureau of Th,
London?TheBritish govern-
of the U.S. alert being report-
edly in response to a unilatera
Ment insisted yesterday diet' Soviet troop movement:
although it had no .confirma- "There is no evidence that the
tion of, Soviet Mideast in,ten- Soviet Union is seriously con-
tions, it did press in Moscow sidering this. They are just
for word of what Russian aims reports which the House must
were. This was in response to note."
the United States military alert If the U.S. does come for-
to counter any Soviet dispatch ward with proof, as Henry A.
,of troops to the .Mideast. Kissinger put it, that high
Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the American officials were "not
foreign secretary, responded in playingivith the lives of Amer.
the House of Commons to a ican people," it can be said
? suggestion from Eric Heifer, a with authority that high British
left-wing Labor party member, government sources would re-
that the alleged threat of uni-
' lateral Soviet action was
"mythical" and the American
alert of its forces around the
world had "more to do with
President Nixon's internal dif-
ficulties than with the situation
in the Middle East," by say-
ing, "This may be mythical. I
hope it is, but we shall know
more in time,"
At another point Sir Alec
said he was "uncertain" titi 16
the "actual state" of the
',American alert. Sir Alec said
?Bss
gard any Soviet provocation of
the alert as having been a
"monumental blunder" on
Moscow's part. .
AS to possible Soviet inten-
tions, it was said the plan
might have been to send Soviet;
troops to Cairo to be bar-
racked there, or, alternatively,
that it considered the Egyptian
forces on the Sual4 frefit in
etleh ,"torriblo" plight as to
warrant-iidesperate" action.
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THE GUARDIAN, MANCHESTER
26 October 1973
iddle East peace too, big
a job for small Powers
. Dr Strangelove's world was with us yester- '
day. An international crisis and an internal crisis
eoincided in the United States, with American
nuclear forces on a precautionary alert through-
out the world. The gert may have been ordered
because of the Soviet military and diplomatic
measures in the Middle East or because the
President consciously or unconsciously wanted .
to divert attention from his, blunders at
home. The sacking of Professor Cox and the
. resignation of Mr Elliot Richardson have torn-
:away the loyally of many of his remaining sup-
porters. The President is under extreme strain,
both because his own future, in the White House
is at stake and because his country's relations
with the Soviet Union are also at stake. The strain
and the evidence that he has recently reversed
wane of his own critical decisions call into question
the balance of his judgment, Never since the
Cuban missie crisis in 1962 have the President's
secitty and sound judgment ,been of: more
kx,ortance to the world. Once , again, both the
PaWella have played with the most
4=gily
.111Theiber the Soviet Union meant to move
into the Middle East remains unclear. It
.now undertaken not to do so and has sup-
the non-aligned countries' resolution for
zr4,' international ceasefire contingent to which
Tx'e a the big Powers will contribute. At the
iting of the week the Russians offered in the
Smnetity Council to contribute to a US-USSR
peottekeeping force in the Middle East. The
United States at that time and since/ then has
refused. It was an ill-advised decisiett and one
that may yet have to be reversed' If the warring
parties are to be kept separate.
With the collapse of the first ceasefire and
with. General Daya,n's surrounding of the Egyp-
tian Third Army, President Sadat is in great
',peril. Even if Dayan does not intend it, his tanks
eould- be on the outskirts of Cairo also within a
few hours. And if the Egyptian Third Army either
surrenders or starves, PresidAnt Sadat's political
' position will have been destroyed. In his tele-.
phone talks with Moscow he may have appealed
for physical support. To do so must be pro-
foundly against his, own 'instincts, because he
threw out 'his Soviet advisers only last year. Once
they returned and 'returned not as advisers, but
?
as a coherent fighting force?they would not soon
he removed a second time. But Sad,at's position
is desperate, and Washington could have believed
that Moscow was about to respond. The
'Soviet "'readiness measures" mentioned by Dr /
Kissinger may have come at the same time.
. To order an alert, to warn Israel, and to
reply vigorously to Moscow would be the obvious
? reaction in Washington. The warning to Israel
might well be inseone terms. By his activity
before. and during the so-called "ceasefire,"
,,General Dayan gravely overrreached himself. Of,
. course, Israel has every reason for punitive action.
, having been caught by the Yom Kippur surprise
attack and. having,. suffered extremely: painful
casualties. But Mrs Meir, General Dayan, and
their colleagues need to ask themselves, whether
they want peace, either now or ever. They also
need to ask themselves what their future relation-':
ship with Washington will be. By causing a new?
Soviet-US' eonfrontation they have added to'
Washington's embarrassments. Even. if Mr Nixon
is not unhappy that the Middle East diverts:
Attention from Watergate, he doe.s not want' to:
jeopardise his achievements in improving East-1
West relations. Above all, he does not want to
be drawn into war. Dr Kissinger's warning .yester
day?that there is a limit to American toleration:
of Soviet action?indicates the imminent danger..!
The United Nations has nee voted,
for a peacekeeping force drawn from UN:
members other, than the US, USSR, China, France,
and the UK. Dr Kissinger says that it is "
ceivable " that the Americans and Russians should'
place on the ground in Sinai and the Golan.
Heights forces strong enough to repel the Arabs
or Israelis. He is right to talk of a peacekeeping'
force in 'terms -of having to be strong enough to'
fight. But if for political reasons it is " inconLiv-:
able" to Washington that US and Soviet forces of
that strength should be placed there, is it con-,
ceivable .that anyone else can raise them ? No :;
it is not. Countries like Nigeria and Yugoslavia
could find strong contingents, but they could not
be welded into a coherent force quickly enough;
If anyone is to do the job-,--and it is in everY,
way a thoroughly unwelcome prospect -- the-
Americans and Russians will have to do it: Each,:
after all, has powerful influence over its client:,
If the Russians tell the 'Egyptians and Syrians
that' they. ,will allow no attack, then there will be
no attack. ,The 'Americans are .as well 'able to
deliver the same message to the Israelis: Even.
from Israel's standpoint, it is better ,to have an;
agreed American force on the Negev frontier,'
with a demilitarised zone in Sinai, than to have
'the Russians on the canal ready to wage war.'
For everyone's sake a limited Soviet-American:
presence is the lesser evil?and an infinitely'
lesser evil than an outright Soviet-American'
conflict.
Mr Nixon may enjoy the immediate reprieve
from a further Watergate inquisition. In the end,'
he will 'have to face it. He has been a unique
blend of the conscientious, the unscrupulous, the
competent, and the totally unlovable. His, dedica-
tion to his job was never in doubt, yet he had
no qualms about how be secured it. He has been
maudlin to the point of nausea on television, yet:
he has presided over the most fruitful period in'
American foreign policy since the war. Truman,
the unknown haberdasher, surprised the world;
by his instinctive mastery of America's problems,)
domestic and foreign; Nixon, the known trick- ,
ster, pulled America out of Vietnam, made peace.
with China, and brought the two super Powers'
into a flew relationship. With only one exception
he has surrounded 'himself with the worst type:
of adviser; the exception is Henry Kissinger who
in h b
is earlier days was among America's foremostr
hawks and did not 'stop short of advocating a,
pre-emptive nuclear strike. Whatever other
qualities historians find in . Nixon's bizarre
tenancy, of the White House, there will be a
quarry a? irony for them to mine.
? -
? .
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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
' 30 October 1973
eyio `-'sees less' }a'
/
Mrs. Baudarana culls supporters
in 1964, her government was toppled ,
by soine `of her own Freem Party
? member* 'defecting to the" UNP-led
siy fears coup attempt by aA
oppositiv; and in the summer of 1971,
, .1 ?fly Ear.dley Suresh - ' competence to solve any Sf the press-
Special to ? ?? Ing problems which have snowballed
? The Christian Science Monitor ? into dangerous proportions. Things
have reached the point Where eco-
nomic crisis and famine threaten to
blow tlie lid in the coming months, if
.
not weeks, unless the Coalition gov-
ernment can obtain immediate cash ?
and fOod aid for Sri Lanka from
friendly countries.
H 1 . .
Colombo. Sri Lanka
, 'Shock waves from the Chilean mili-
tary coup are still being felt in little,
Sri Lanka (Ceylon), half a world
? away.
Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike's left- .
1st Coalition government has grown
increasingly concerned about its own
safety from machinations of the U.S.
Central Intelligence Agency, which.it
believes is activating anti-govern-
ment forces and engineering parlia-
mentary defections to topple the gov-
ernment from within.
There i concern that the conserva-
tive pro-West United National Party
(UNP), the leading political opposi-1
bon, may be aiding and abetting such
, a conspiracy.
Crack3 have already appeared in
,the governing Coalition monolith with
the-recent expulsion of the ultra-left,
Moscow-influenced Communist
Party, one of its partners. The Corn-.
munists have been attacking the
Coalition for heaping unbearable bur-
dens on the people by increasing the
price of essential consumer items, *
and denigrating it for its tardiness in
nationalizing major foreign and Cey-
lonese-owned industries and tea plan-
tations which are the Island's main
money-spinners. '
Communists expelled
"It is no longer possible to regard
you as members of the United Front," ,
wrote Prime Minister Bandaranaike
in a letter to the Communist Party.
The expulsion may not endanger
the government's stability imme-
diately, since \it has an enormous
parliamentary majority, but unat-
tached political sources here do not
discount that this may be the begin-
ning of more defections which Mrs.
Bandaranaike may find hard to stem.
Partly this threat lies in the unrelia-
bility of Coalition parliamentary
backbenchers who are' of several
minds about their membership in the
government to begin with.
And partly it's because the govern-
ment's popularity has .been ebbing
away rapidly due to, its In-'
Coalition loosely knit
Unlike its UNP opponent, the Coal!-
, tion is not a closely knit organization
backed by large resources. It is
rather a medley of several forces
? ranging from Rightists, Socialists, '
Trotskyists, Communists (Moscow
, and Peking supporters) and ultra-left,
each trying to pull the government in
Its own direction.
For several years, these factions
had fought each other bitterly till they
came together under Mrs. Band-
aranaike's charismatic leadership to
attain the power which had eluded
? them so long.
, Since the Communist Party's exit,
. Mrs. Bandaranaike and her ministers
have been keeping the Chilean coup in
public focus and warning the people to
be on the guard against attempts by'
"rightists and foreign forces" to over-
/ throw the government with the help of
, "those within it."
In a statement on the Chilean coup,
Mrs. Bandaranaike said:
"Events in that country are more
proof that the real danger for de-
mocracy comes from vested interests
and their political leadership. They
always cover up their hostility to
progressive social change and pick on
economic difficulties which have been
created by their economic system and
their anti-social behavior to justify
unconstitutional opposition to legally
elected governments."
She called upon the people to draw
the cornet lessons from the events in
Chile.
With Mrs. Bandaranaike a concern
about assassinations, military coups
and party defections is no mere
obsession. Her husband, who rose to
power in 1956 as prime minister, was
assassinated in September, 1959; in
January, 1962, she faced an abortive
military coup led by higli-ranking
police, military and civilian bfficials;
barely nftie months after her advent ,
to powergwith a sweeping majority,
she faced; a Maoist-style rebellion by
, over 17,000 ultra-left youths, which
? was quickly put down, thanks to
timely foreign assistance.
In all this, it was alleged that the
American CIA, the United National
, Party, local and foreign vested inter-
ests had engineered and financed
subversive elements. The UNP de-
nied this charge. However, all those
involved in the attempted military
coup later obtained top appointments
in the private sector and in the State
Corporation, while the UNP was in
? power between 1965 and 1970. ,
Though there now appears to be no
danger of a military coup ? because
? the armed services have been purged
of UNP elements and replaced by
Coalition loyalists and kinsmen of
Mrs. Bandaranaike ? the govern-
ment evidently still fears more defec-
tions to the opposition and the recur-
rence of a rebellion by youths which
could weaken and topple it.
4
40
Youth ardently wooed
Youths are now being wooed by the
UNP, which has promised them ev-
erything under the sun.
? ? . Many of those arrested during/ the
? 1971 insurrection have been freed
after an intensive rehabilitation pro-
gram or released ? after triar on
suspended sentences ranging from
? one to six years, but it is hard to say
whether they will keep away from
? trouble.
Several' hard-core insurgents are
still at large, and they are believed to
be behind the sporadic incidents of
terrorism which are still being re-
' ported. Youth unrest is, rampant
? throughout the island due to lack of
employment opportunities. In the
? hands of government's opponents
they could soon become a destructive
? force to cause a political upheaval.
? Cashing in heavily on the Coali-
tion's failure to keep all its election
? promises and on the simmering dis-
? content .within its ranks, the UNE' is ?
currently conducting an island-wide
campaign to force its immediate
? resignation to enable the people to
choose a new government. '
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