MORE INTELLIGENCE CHANGES CONSIDERED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77-00432R000100240001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 15, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 4, 1973
• Content Type: NSPR

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CONFIDENTIAL
This publication contains clippings from the
domestic and foreign press for YOUR
BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use
of selected items would rarely be advisable.
INTERNAL USE ONLY
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
EASTERN EUROPE
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
CONRDENT~AL
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WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS
Washington, D. C., Thursday, October 4, 1973
By Oswald Johnston
Star-News Staff Writer
In another phase of the
administration's drastic'
shake-up of the intelligence'
establishment, Secretary of
State Henry A. Kissinger is.
giving serious thought to'
abolishing the State Depart-'
ment's small but influential
Bureau of Intelligence and
Research.
Kissinger revealed this
intention last month; during,
a closed-door confirmation
hearing before the Senate:
Foreign Relations Commit-;
tee. According to informed
intelligence sources, Kissin-:
ger has already begun to
bypass his in-house intelli=
gence bureau and has been
giving the CIA assignments
that the bureau normally
would handle.
Kissinger's disclosure of
his dissatisfaction with the
intelligence bureau, known'
in the department as INR,
came during a hearing Sept.
17 'that otherwise concen ''
trated on his role in initiat-'
ing wiretaps on 13 govern=
ment officials, including
Kissinger aides, and four
newsmen.
THE TRANSCRIPT, a
:declassified version oft
which was made available
today, shows Kissinger.
musing out loud on whether
1NR should be' abolished
outright or merged with
existing geographical bu-
reaus in the State Depart-
ment.
"From what I. have seen
of the intelligence product.
,of the State Department,*,
the present function is not;,
satisfactory, , Kissinger.,
told the senators.
The : new secretary of;
State is widely believed to,
have held a' similar. opinion
of the national intelligence
estimates which had been'
prepared under a 23-year-
old system by the Board of
National Estimates, an elite
group within the CIA.
Early last summer, in one
of his first official decisions,
newly installed CIA Direc-
tor William E. Colby or-
dered the abolition of the 10-'
.man board, and, according'
.to reliable reports, forced-
its director, John W., Hu-
izenga, into retirement.
THE CHIEF of the 33S-'
man INR bureau at State"
Ray S. Cline, is a veteran of
the Board of National Esti-
mates. He could not be
reached for comment on
Kissinger's remarks in the
transcript.
Other sources in the intel
ligence community noted,'
however, that abolition of
the bureau, if it takes place,
would mark another breach
in the wall between intelli-,
NEW YORK TIMES
~!.. 29 September 1973'
Kissinger Gives Aides Pep Talk;
'Tells Them to Be `Best in' Town"
By . DAVID BINDER
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Sept. 28' -
Secretary of State Kissinger
gave a pep talk to about 1,000
State Department employes this
noon, telling them he wanted
their work "to be the best in
town."
'Speaking in a 'faint drizzle
in the , department's large
courtyard, he said the United
States was no longer in a posi-
tion to "overwhelm every prob-
lem with resources" or "sub-
stitute resources for thought."
"We no longer have over-
whelming margins of safety and
we no longer have overwhelm-
ing margins of resources, -and
therefore we have to be good
"
and we have to be thoughtful,"
he said.
Mr. Kissinger said that it was
not enough merely to
on foreign policy issue
that he expected "a clear-cut
statement of choices" from the
various bureaus. For a start
he called fora report "by the
end of next week" from every
regional bureau on problems
facing the United States in the
coming year.
His air, he' said is "to try to
restore, the State. Department
to its traditional role of advis-
rig the President on foreign
policy, to achieve preeminence."
"With this attitude we can?
do great things together with'
gence analysts and the op-
carry out policies which are.
'Supposedly based on*;
"clean" and unbiased esti
mates. ,
,.,.In other sections of tran
script. of the closed hearings
on. Kissinger's nomination,
these points emerged:'
? A confidential FBI report
.on the 1969-71 wiretapping,
'which has not been revealed'
in full even to the commit
-tee, shows that Kissinger.
.and the current White.
House chief-of-staff, Alex
ander M. Haig, then an,
'Army colonel on Kissin-
ger's National Security
Council staff, personally-
1, requested three specific'
targets for the taps. But,
Atty. Gen. Elliot L. Rich-
ardson, who also testified in
the closed session, insisted
that this overstated Kissin-,
ger's role. He emphasizes'
that Kissinger did not "orig-'
inate" the taps. Kissinger-
himself insisted that the
idea originated with then-!
FBI Director J. Edgar Hoo-'
ver and former Atty. Gen.
John N. Mitchell and that
the taps. were ordered in
stalled by President Nixon.
At Kissinger's request, 49
'consecutive pages dealing;
with the wiretap issue were-
'deleted from the transcript.: -
.10 A top-level White House,
crisis team, the so-called'
Washington Special. Actioni
Group, was convened as,
soon as news of last month's.
coup in Chile was received
here. But according to Kiss;
singer, the group decided to
avoid any appearance what-
soever of U.S. involvement
and passed the word so
forcefully that "everyone
was afraid even to express
sorrow" at the death of Chi-
lean Presiden Salvadore;
,Allende, reportedly a sui-
cide the day of the coup,:
This oversight was correct=!
ed the next day, but not beef
fore it brought the adminis-t
tration a worldwide bad)
press. WSAG decisions;
Kissinger stressed, are per-'
sonally approved by the,
President. .
? Kissinger'defended the'
decision-making procedures.;
devised for Nixon adminisr'
tration foreign policy as;
"much more systematic.
than those of President,
Johnson." But he promised
soon to bring the State Der,
partment into policy mak-,
ing in a major way by rein.,
vigorating its policy plan-;
.ping staff and thoroughly
shaking up the higher eche-<
.Ions. "Some rather drastic,
moves will be made to bring:
'younger men into key posi-.
'tions more rapidly," Kissin
ger told the committee.
The one reorganization he.;
discussed in detail, howev. '
er, concerned the` INR and'
its probable abolition. '
. 0A
land. mystery of the universe.-
The Secretary got a chuckle
when he said the courtyard
,gathe ing was "the closest thing
to a Nuremberg party rally that
could be organized" and an-
other when he suggested that
it might be the first and last
time most of ' the employes
would ever see him.
Trip to Europe Planned
WASHINGTON, 'Sept. 28
(Reuters)-Secretary of State
Kissinger is expected to begin
a visit to Europe in about two;
asm," he said, drawing ap-1
plause.
As Mr. Kissinger spoke he
faced a tall metal sculpture of
a superhuman figure balancing
two planets. The sculpture, by derick. Ma s VieR e f i o f s @dfifyo
The department spokesman,'
Robert McCloskey, said Mr..
Kissinger would meet the Brit-i
ish Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec
Douglas-Home, and also hopes
to talk with the West German
Foreign Minister, Walter Scheel,
and the French Foreign Minis-
'ter, Michel Jobert.
There have been reports,
denied by Mr. Kissinger, that
President 'Nixon is considering
canceling his plans for a tour
of European capitals this year.
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HOUSTON POST
17 SEPT 1973
D
By DONALD R. MORRIS
Post News Analyst
During the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee hearings
to confirm Dr. Kissinger as
Secretary of State, several of
the senators touched on the
Central Intelligence Agency.
in doing so, they inadvertently
brought out several points. of
the utmost importance, which
- somewhat unfortunately
for the public - were not.
picked up.
The first point during Sena-
tor Symington's questioning
came out not as a query but
as a forcible statement, to
which Dr. Kissinger indicated
.a whole-hearted agreement.
Symington, after mentioning
in passing that he had been
on the CIA sub-committee a
'matter of 15 years, said that
in all that time, with a single
exception, the agency esti-
mates had been far more ob-
jective than the military.ones,
and that they had always
proven accurate. He for one
would sooner see the agency
abolished than to have its es-
timative function subordi-
nated to political influence. In
reply, Kissinger admitted the
tendency of any intelligence
estimate to deliver what the
customer wanted, but In-
dicated the tendency was
hard to control in military es-
timates. The agency, he felt,
was free of It, and he empha-
sized the pains to which he
had gone not to exert pres-
sure for specific estimates.
In subsequent questioning,
Kissinger outlined the struc-
ture and functions of the
"Forty Committee," which is
almost unknown to the media
and the public. Not because
its existence is hidden, but
because on the few occasions
the name has been men-
tioned, its significance failed
to register.
The Forty Committee,
which one way or another has
been in existence since 1947,
consists of the deputy secre-
taries of State and Defense,
the Director of Central In-
telligence, a representative of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff --
NEW REPUBLIC
8 Sept. 1973
'Conversations in ie Court
Reorganization of Intelligence
"C.I.A. to Undergo, Major 'Overhaul"
The New York Times, August 21, 1973
Lord Kissinger:
I've brought Sir William Colby by,
To tell us how our spies deploy, what word
They send by secret ways, and finally how
To use the stuff.
King Richard:
The latter, yes, my Lords,
For in my need to know what's happening
Beyond the realm each'day,
'I cannot spend forever browsing through
The stacks of yellow foolscap just to find
That wine from France is up in price,
That peasants wear no shoes in Greece,
That Chinese chopsticks take some time
and in recent years Chairman
Kissinger. It considers all
proposals for covert action
abroad -- from management
of paramilitary operations in
Laos to the clandestine inter-
vention in the internal affairs
of another country -- and
passes its recommendations
directly to the President.
It is, in short, the precise
mechanism of control for all
our covert action abroad, and
those who feel we should con-
trol' such action more closely,
modify it or simply abolish it
would make far more prog-
ress were they to devote their
attention to the Forty Com-
mittee rather than to the
agency itself. Hounding the
agency on that score is akin
to hectoring patrolmen on the
beat about the distribution of
the beats, instead of going to
the police commissioner.
The exact nature of the
problem was splendidly illus-
trated moments later by Sen-
ator McGovern, who tried to
get Kissinger to agree that
the agency should do much
,less covert action - should,
in fact, eliminate it entirely.
McGovern. specified police,
training, assassinations and
interventions in foreign do-
mestic politics. '
' Kissinger in reply refused
to agree that assassinatiorjs
h a d ever !' n approved,
agreed that police training
was only justified under spe-
cial circumstances, and then
startled McGovern by stating
it would be "highly clan-
gerous" to abolish the other
functions, which would best
be discussed in closed ses-
sion.
Throughout his reply, Kissin-
ger did not tall( about what
"the agency" did or didn't
do, but about what the "com-
mittee" did. The significance
.of that usage, which was
quite unconscious, seems to
have escaped Senator McGov-
ern, as it has been escaping
-far too many people for far
too long.
It is a point that should reg-
ister, however, and that soon,
for as long as it doesn't regis-
ter all rational talk about our
role in covert action abroad
is at cross-purposes and
counterproductive.
To master.
Sir William Colby:
The very thing you've set your heart
Is my heart's chosen course. We winnow
Day and night by river bank to blow the chaff
From royal view, deliver whole the kernel of
The honest truth.
Lord Kissinger:
Well spoke, brave. Will, we've had enough
Of those surveys which place six warts
On the left hand, and half a dozen on the right.
Cleave to the center true!
Sir William Colby:
As all work of mortal toil, .
One imperfection's raised its head.
King Richard:
And what, pray tell, is that?
Sir William Colby:
No news today.
Robert J. Myers
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HOUSTON POST
19 Sept. 1973
iiy I)ON.1Ll) R. MORRIS
Post News Analyst
Probably no field Qf public
affairs suffers as much from
slicer niisinfot-malion as in-
telligenc-o activities, and. this
is especially true of the re-
porting function - which is
responsible for about 80 per-
cent of. all intelligence activi-
ty but which generates almost
none of the publicity.
Everyone knows that the
function of intelligence is to
inform command - those re-
sponsible for devising and ex-
ecuting policy. And when pol-
icy goes wrong, the first cry
from those who were execu-
ting it is "Bad intelligence!"
From the Chinese crossing of
the Yalu in the Korean liar
to the disaster at the Bay of
Pigs, "wrong" intelligence
has been used to lever re-
sponsible leaders off the hook.
-"Intelligence" is practically
C) never wrong. It is, however,
almost invariably incomplete.
To begin with, intclligcnce
agencies do not collect infor-
mation gratuitously. They
only collect in response to'
''requirements" which are
"levied" by the "customer."
In short, ask the right ques-
tions and you will get the best
answer possible (which will in
110 case be complete). Ask no
questions, or the wrong ones,
(or discard or fail to read the
answers you do get), and
in- %%-ill be of little ser-
vice to you.
Intelligence, moreover, can-
not tell you what will happen,
it can at best tell you what
happened, and the job of de-
ciding what that means in
terms of what will happen to-
morrow is the customer's, not
the collection agency's. The
collection agency will not
even evaluate the material as
"true" or "false" - this too
is the customer's job. What
the collection agency will do
is evaluate the chances that
the source of the report is
passing on accurately the in.
..
formation he claims he re-
ceived, and it will also pro-
v i d e an estimate of the
? source's track record for
credibility. But what you
make of all that is up to you.
Collection agencies, there-
fore, will not engage in "es-
timative" functions - that is
your responsibility as a cus-
tontcr. The ha tie of their exis-
tence is a customer who
doesn't understand this (a
depressing percentage don't)
and who then points to the re-
porting as an excuse for his
fallible judgment.
There is an exception. The
Office of National Estimates
is housed in and chaired by
the CIA, although the if) or 13
people (assisted by a score of
staff members) who compose
it include representatives
from all intelligence agencies.
They have unlimited access
to all intelligence sources,
and perhaps 50 times a year
they are called on to produce
a "National Intelligence Esti-
mate." usually in answer to a
requirement from the NSC or
TIMES, 1aneas City
8 September 1973
Buffeted C[!-~ L oks Bad" Mi.-I'd
The Central Intelligence Agency has been un-
der tough con?r'essional scrutiny this summer
because of its involvement, clearly unsought in
the Watergate affair. The impression from testi-
mony before. two congressional committees is
that CIA officials did not respond enthusiastical-
ly to White House contacts concerning a cover-
up anti did not want to have their organization
involved in any way.
But it was, although not in terms of specific
wron' rloin- rriaLe't to Watergate. Probably the
most r)an;aginr information brought out about
the C'A was that it unwittingly provided techni-
cal aid for the burglary of the office of Dr. Dan-
iel Ellsherg's psychiatrist. Apparently the worst
that the CIA can be charged with is unquestion-
ing compliance with a request by a high admin-
istration official i ithout insisting on full inform-
ation.
Now the CIA has a new director, William E.
Colby. who is a professional in the field with 30
years of experience as'an intelligence specialist.
Except. for a period when he directed pacifica-
tion programs. in South Vietnam, Colby and his
activities have not 'r.ren in the news, Undoubted-
ly he would prefer that both he and his agency
receive little public notice in the future.
Ideally that is how it should be for this sf-
the White House. Some are
-standing requirements, others
c r a s Ii ones levied on an
hour's notice. Any customer
can have a gut feeling the
ONE estimate is wrong, bul,iit
takes a brave (or a brash)
statesman to ignore ONE esti-
mates. JFK was notorious for
it.
ONE estimates. even with
qualifications, are riot in.
fallible, but they are the clo.-
est facsimile of a cry;.tal ball
the country is ever liable to
get. They reflect he distilled
results of the work of hun-
dreds of sources (each pro[cs-
siona)ly evaluated) ? and of
h u in d r e d s of profccsion.-Jl
analysts. :lost basic Aincri-
can foreign i:olic?y rr s on,
these es11;:.,tcs. ~~i;ich I why
p o l i c N. is greyer rcvcrr cd
abruptly when tine Out, re-
place the At most such a
strange effects the lac)ics of
policy, rarely if ever the
strategy.
This is a major rcmron for
1he fact that our course in
Vietnam continued through an
In-Out-Out-In succession.
lent arm of the government, The CIA hat. had
intelligence successes since it was founded in
19,17 but it is always better that these not be
heralded. The CIA's failures do become known,
as in the case of the Bay of Pigs blunder. Amer-
icans need to understand, too, that the CIA will
often he blamed unfairly for developments that
were not of its making. Tinhorn dictators
around the globe have a habit of accusing the
CIA when things go awry in a particular coun-
try regardless of what really occurred.
Contrary to several hooks that. have sold well,
the CIA is not an invisible government that acts
'without reference to national policy. Its function
is mostly the gathering 2nd analysis of mili-
tarv and political information. Cloak-and-dagger
work is very much the lesser part. of its opera-
the CIA notoriety if something goes wrong
o
can cause it to be denounced when it is inno
cent. Thus the CIA has had its troubles and
probably will have more. But the disclosures oft
the past few months have reaffirmed that 'they
CIA must keep its nose entirely out of domestic
matters and stick to foreign intelligence. No
large objective of the new CIA director can be
more important than that.
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RADIO TV REPORTS. INC.
4438 WISCONSIN AVE. N.W., WASHINGTON, M.C. 20018. 244-3540
PROGRAM Jack Anderson Report STATION 'WAVA Radio
September 19., 1973 '5:05 P11
Washington, D.C.
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS
JACK ANDERSON: 11111 the Central Intelligence Agency
continue to provide reliable estimates? I'll have an exclusive
rpnnrt Fr v. .._
in en s to choose
a dozen experts from the different divisions of the CIA. They'll
be known as national intelligence officers. Kissinger, meanwhile,
has told the CIA that he wants his. intelligence straight., without
any ideological slant. He also wants to see the minority views.
.,
-Well, my CIA sources claim this is exactly what the
Board of Estimates was sending to the White House. The elimination
of the board, they say, is a signal that the White House really
wants estimates which always support the President's policy.
ominated by doves. My own White House sources
say Kissinger got so upset that he refused to read the estimates
from the CIA.
Now the new CIA chief, William Colby, is preparing to
abolish the Board of Estimates. In its place he t
Nixon !and his foreign ' Henry s ave angered President
policy adviser HKissinger. They complained
that the board was d
e
V "%,U gency. re declared
I afterward that he wanted'tosplinter the CIA in a thousand pieces
! and scatter it to the winds. When he cooled down he called in
I. White House adviser Clark Clifford who had d.rafted the legislation
establishing the CIA. As Clifford remembers it, Kennedy said,
"I made some bad decisions on the Bay of Pigs. I made these bad
decisions because I had bad information."
Well, Kennedy appointed Clifford to head a civilian
advisory board which recommended a great many reforms. To make
sure the President. got good information, a Board of Estimates
was established. However its estimat h
ANDERSON: The late President Kennedy blamed the Bay
of Pigs blunder on the Central Inte114
A
IVASHI""TO.T, STAR
.2 6 .SEP 1973
Ben Smith, 74;
Fors en Acts
CIA Retiree
served with the Office of
Strategic Services, a prede-
cessor of the CIA, in London
.and China. He was awarded
the Bronze Star and the
Medal of Freedom.
Mr. Smith was. born in
Waxachie, Tex. He was a
member of the Players Club
of New York.
He leaves his wife, the
former Roxana Stahl; a
son, Patrick J., of New
York; a' daughter, Mrs.
S. Stewart of Washing.
to
n, a brother, a sister and
five grandchildren.
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AIR FORCE TIMES
19 Sept 1973
Eaker's View
u, 5 fl f
By LT. GEN. IRA C. EAKER (USAF, Ret.)
A HEADLINE in the Washington Star-News August 19 read. "Elitel
CIA Unit to Be Abolished." On August 21, a New York Times
headline staled, "CIA to Undergo Major Overhaul."
The articles under these headlines expressed concern over a
proposed plan to eliminate the Office of National Estimates, a
prestigious branch of the CIA organization charged with preparing;
th
N
ti
e
a
onal intelligence Estimates.
Obviously, sound defense planning must be based upon accurate
estimates of the capabilities ,and intentions of all other major
powers. whether prospective enemies or allies.
The Office of National Estimates has led a deeply troubled
existence for many years. Its critics accused it of imperfect forecasts
of Soviet intentions; of being dovish about Kremlin motives: and of
failing consistently to anticipate Russian advances in science
WASHINGTCK STAR
21 September 1973
SECURITY THREAT FEARED
0`1A Mfantp t
H
By Oswald Johnston upon joining the agency in,
9-m?Nenssmuw,mr 1955 that he would ngver
Victor L. Marchetti, the publish anything about',CIA
one-time CIA agent who lost activities without prior
a court fight a year ago to clearance. ? 11
write about his former em- The 530-page typescript
ployers without their ap-' went to the agency Aug. 27,
proval, is facing a new and reviewers there have
problem. shared it with State Depart-.
After a three-week study ment officials seeking to
'of a S30-page manuscript on impose their own censor.
'the activities of the agency, ship of the book.
CIA lawyers have decided This is because a coau-
technology, weapons and capabilities. '
There was also a widely held suspicion of bias. Some "Eastern
Establishment" members of the Office of National Estimates
apparently have long regarded themselves as the protectors, if not
the initiators, of "detente." By watering down predictions of the
Soviet threat they evidently hoped to reduce U.S. defense budgets
and thus decrease Russian fears of U.S. military might. Their effort
resulted in Russian numerical superiority of ICBMs. It also led to
the agreement, in the first round of SALT, which now virtually
assures Soviet scientific and military supremacy within a few years.
THIS OFFICE allowed ideological fervor to color its findings. It
became a captive of State Department "doves," articulate civilian
bureaucrats and self-styled intellectuals who tended to see the
world through rose tinted glasses. Throughout, their true motives
were obscured in volumes of rhetoric. The National Intelligence
Estimates they produced often exceeded 100 pages. Finally, the ?
'parity preconditions' to detente were achieves. The price was
America's loss of her technical and strategic edge.
The National Security Council evidently found the intelligence
estimates prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency of the
Department of Defense much more reliable than CIA's effort
Increasingly, the national leadership has based its strategic
decisions on intelligence provided by DIA and the National Security
Council, disregarding CIA estimates.
Dr. James It. Schlesinger, in his brief service as director of CIA,
tried to remedy all this. It was he who decreed the disbanding of the
Office of National Estimates. With his transfer to Defense, the
revolution at CIA has lost its chief architect. The old bureaucracy
remains essentially intact and one now wonders what will replace
the Office of National Estimates.
THE ARCHITECTS of intelli
ence
f
t
...:~~
rrn.,. ti ., i
th
g
o
u
ur
e
n
that nearly 100 pages must thor who joined Marchetti?
be., deleted in the name of earlier this year, John D...
national security. Marks, a former Foreign
Marchetti, who was hop- service officer, has been
ing to publish his book in under similar pressure from'
time for the Christmas buy- the State Department to,
ing season, is now consider- submit the manuscript for'
contest the CIA's' censor- State Department law
ship. yers until recently denied
knowing that the book'
AMERICAN Civil Liber- Marks was working on was
ties Union lawyer Melvin L. already under court order;
Wulf, who has represented to be submitted to the CIA;
Marchetti since the begin- for clearance.
ning of his struggle to pub-
lish his memories, yester- LAST JULY, the State;
day disputed the CIA's con- Department legal office,
tention'that its demands are formally requested that;
merely a matter of negotia- Marks submit the manu-i
lion. script for review.
"We're going to negotiate Marks,, Marchetti and
in court, to said, g Wulf, concluding that in this
adding case the, State Department;
that an earlier offer to dis- and the CIA were parts of
cuss the manuscript with the same government, de-
CIA lawyers last. month has cided to ignore that request. -
been rejected. The State Department qui
Marchetti's earlier strug- etly acceded by making its
gle to publish without CIA own arrangement to look at
fundamental issues of surviva . War, peace and-the grey areas ' to the Supreme Court where The authors are still not
between involve a high order of uncertainty and risk assessment. 'his plea was rejected last sure what parts of the book
William E. Colby, nominated to?succeed Dr. Schlesinger as head of December. the CIA wants to' censor.?T
CIA, is able and experienced in the intelligence field, having been General Counsel John War
with CIA since its founding and with its predecessor. organization, AS A RESULT, Marchetti ncr has promised to provide
the OSS of World War 11. was under court order' to that information to Wulf
But we shall have to wait to see whether Dr. Colby can meet the :fulfill the pledge he signed next week.
challenge. Whether, in an age of increasing centralization and
bureaucratization of power, he can reform . CIA's' defective
?-estimating.proccss.
Copyright 1973 General Fealuee Corp.
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 CIA-RDP77-00432R000100240001-0
NEW YOU TI:,lES
2 0 SEP. 1973
can1Ib
or
n
The Katzenbabh Paper
By Anthony Lewis '
BOSTON, Sept. 19-The United States
should abandon all covert operations
in foreign countries except the gather-
ing of intelligence. That proposal is
made by Nicholas dell. Katzenbach,
the former Attorney ? General and
Under Secretary of State, In an article
,:.just published in Foreign Affairs.
"there 'should be no secret subsidies
of police or counter-insurgency forces,
no efforts to influence elections, no
secret monetary subsidies...."
The Katzenbach paper is a remark.
able one apart from that striking
recommendation. It comes from a man
whom the left has criticized -as too
establishment-oriented but who in fact
combines a highly original mind with
careful and wise judgment.
What makes this article important
is that it relates American foreign
policy to the crisis of confidence in
government, taking a large historical
view. Katzenbach rejects the revi-
sionist proposition that policy in the
postwar years was built on bad
motives. But he also rejects the notion,
expressed wishfully by Henry Kissin-
ger, that foreign policy can be sepa-
rated from the domestic sickness of
Watergate.
Since the war, he says, the making
''of foreign policy has become more
and more secretive and concentrated.
Katzenbach traces a number of the
influences: the postwar atmosphere of
crisis in opposing conspiratorial Com-
munism, the growth of the military.
role, the tendency of The public wnen
it feels' endangered by the outside
world to put its trust in the President.
"Unfortunately," Katzenbach notes
dryly, "Presidents are inclined to think
this blind trust in their wisdom is
wholly justified." He adds the shrewd
point that Presidents also became
captives of - public anti-Communist
passion, so that they dared not "lose"
any foreign territory. and resorted to
Presidential action unauthorized by
the normal processes of law.
The Bay of Pigs is an example.
Katzenbach notes that when that
invasion of Cuba failed, President
Kennedy took public blame only for
the failure, not for the attempt: "He
felt no need to apologize for under-
taking so extensive a covert 'activity
on Presidential authority alone."
Then came Vietnam. President John-
son followed the form of law by ask-
ing Congress for authority in the Ton-
kin Gulf Resolution. But there was no
real candor; and as Congressional and
public dissent. made things
increasing- ly difficult, secretiveness and decep-
tion increased.
That history suggests that the ex-
cesses of the Nixon years-the Water-
gate crimes, the secret bombing of Cam-
' bodia-had roots in the past. Secrecy
had increasingly become, Katzenbach
argues, a way "to avoid the difficulties
inherent in our political system and
hopefully to present the public with
triumphant faits accomplis."
ABROAD
AT HOME
p m
eig
poky. can e
parochial, obstructive, . uninterested.
But he rejects even reliance on select
committees and private consultation.
Today, he says, "there can be no sub-
stitute for a general rule of openness
with the Congress." There must also
be "far greater openness within the
executive branch itself," he says.
Katzenbach calls most strongly for
reducing the whole role of secret in-
formation in foreign policy. The system
of classifying documents has not
worked 4nd should be drastically cut
back, he argues; "bloated concepts of ?
national security" should be dropped.
-And then he urges the abandonment
of covert operations abrq,?d, saying
that their usefulness is outweighed by
the fears they arouse and the impossi-
bility of. controlling them. '
"However difficult and complex our
foreign policy. may be," he concludes,
"there is no license to free it from
the mandates of the Constitution or
the constraints of public views, inter-
ests and wants."
It is difficult to summarize all this
in a newspaper column. The attempt ..
seemed worthwhile because the Kat-
Then what had happened gradually
as a convenience "was converted into
constitutional principle by Mr. Nixon."
To an unprecedented degree the Nixon
Administration excluded the public,
Congress and even official Govern-
ment channels from foreign policy
consultation or information. Katzen-
bach concludes:
"Even without Watergate, personal
diplomacy, conducted in secret, with-
out public understanding or solid. In-
stitutional foundation within the gov-
ernment, should be insufficient basis
for a viable foreign policy. And if,. , as
I believe, Watergate has destroyed
confidence in the President's cred-
ibility, much more is now needed."'
. The remedies that Katzenbach sug-
gests all are designed to restore con- '
fidence in American policy and policy-
making. Their common theme is.
greater openness to discussion and
criticism.
Congress is naturally one part of
the problem. Katzenbach has no illu-
sion that it can easily be made a par-
zenbach paper provides an ---ssential
framework for the rethinking that
Henry Kissinger-and all of us-must
now do about the means and ends of
American foreign policy.
The Washington Post/Potomac/September 23, 1973
I When we last tuned in on Victor Mar-
chetti,. ex-spook of the CIA, he was glad
he'd quit, glad he'd written the novel
about the guy who quit the CIA after giv-
ing terrible secrets to the Commies, and
hopeful that the courts would rule he
doesn't have to show everything he writes.
.about intelligence to the CIA,_ before he
publishes it.
The Supreme Court didn't come
through. Marchetti has to show his new
book to the blue-pencil squad in Langley-
and the agency is terribly concerned with,
its public image these days, with all this.
Watergate business, you understand.
"A lot of ex-spooks have contacted me.
They, want me to write novels with their.-
experience and my name behind them. I've
got some good things going. I'm not so
glad I quit when I look at the checkbook,.
and my wife had to go back to work, and I
expect a lot of court action over this new
book'..
--:-Henry Allen
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100240001-0
The New York Times Book Review
September 30, 1973
Hunt on the C. I. A.
Give Us
This Day'.
By E. Howard Hunt Jr.
365 pp. New Rochelle, N.Y.:
Arlington House. $7.95.
E. Howard Hunt Jr., of recent Wa-
tergate notoriety, has written a fas- '
cinating, highly personal and, at
times, rather eloquent defense of
himself and of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency during the resounding
burgle of the Bay of Pigs in April,
1961. It goes without saying that
Hunt continues to justify the at-
tempted. overthrow of Fidel. Castro's
Government by the Kennedy Admin-
istration with an invading Cuban ref-
ugee brigade. Hunt's contempt is re-
served, instead, for those who have
"always cringed from American ex-
ercise of power in our national self-
interest." In the wake of the far
more monumental American fiasco in
Vietnam, Hunt's basic assumptions
will no longer win wide support.
Nevertheless his case is worth
considering. Contrary to his disclaim-
er that the book contains no clas-
? sified material of value to Castro,
there is actually a great. deal of
fresh informatics on the Bay of Pigs,
if, sometimes, between 'the lines of
this account by a very active part-
ticipant, the liaison man between the
C.I.A. and the Cuban refugees. In-
deed Hunt's involvement in the Cu-
ban project went back to the days
of its prototype, Operation El Diablo,
the misleadingly easy removal of the
Leftist Arbenz Government in Guate-
mala by the C.I.A. in 1954. There is
new light on such controversial fig-
ures as Frank 'Drecher-Frank Drol- '
ler, according to Arthur Schlesinger
who was officially titled headquarters
chief- of action, Cuba Project, and
who, under the code name of Ben-
der, now emerges as too socialist a
Central European refugee in Hunt's
,view to be effective at restoring the
old regime in Cuba. In any event the'
Kennedy Administration from the
,President down, at least to the level
of Kennedy's personal- friend, Dick
Bissell, the C.I.A. operations chief for
the Bay of Pigs, proposed to re-
place Castro with a bona-fide lib-
eral leader such as Manuel Ray rath-
er than a conservative who might
be contaminated in liberal Cuban and
American eyes by previous associa-
tion with Batista.
Unexpectedly, that hitherto curi-
ously opaque figure, Lieut. Gen. .
Charles Caboll, Deputy Director of
the C.I.A. in 1954, is portrayed as
the true villain of Hunt's piece. For
whatever reason, Cabell delayed a
Trumbull Higgins is a' military his-
torian at John Jay College, City Uni-
versity of New York.
WASHINGTON POST
2 1 SEP 1973 .
CIA Seeking to Eliminate
100 Pages of Upcoming Book
By Laurence Stern. Warner is negotiating the; straining order in U.S. District
weshlnatou Post $te[t Writer !terms of. publication with Court in Alexandria in April,
The Central intelligence i??ulf, but said 'that details 1972, to prohibit Marchetti:
Agency' is seeking to expunge!could not be disclosed. "There from circulating an outline of
1100 pages of a 530-page ' book !definitely are security prob- the book to publishers.
profiling the agency's opera-
tions in the United States and
!abroad, attorneys for the au-
thors said yesterday.
The book, "The CIA and the
Cult of Intelligence," was writ-
ten by former CIA analyst
Victor Marchetti and John
lems," the CIA spokesman A trial was held in camera,
said. and attorneys for the a"thors
Marchetti insisted yesterday invoked the defense employed
that "there is nothing in this in the Pentagon Papers case:
book that would jeopardize that censorship could be justi-
the national security of my
country. There is nothing in
the book that would jeopard-
ize the lives of any agents,
anent intelligence officer and sink any ships or give away
U.S. Senate aide. It is to. be any codes."
,published by Knopf. Among the subjects with
Melvin Wulf, chief Ameri-iwhich the book deals are tl:e
can Civil Liberties Union at-
torney on the case, said he
was informed by a CIA offi-
cial yesterday that the agency
-acting under a court injunc-
tion-would seek to eliminate
hearly a fifth of the manu-
script.
Wulf identified the CIA offi-
cial as John Warner, the agen-
cy's general counsel.
A spokesman for the agency
acknowledged yesterday that
CIA's role in the 1970 Chilean
election, the disbursement of
CIA funds to a number of
world leaders, alleged misuse
of the CIA director's contin-
gency funds and internal U.S.
operations of the CIA.
This is the first time, ac-
cording to lawyers in the case,
that a government agency has
exercised prior restraint. over
a book under a court order.
The CIA obtained a re-
planned second air strike upon Cas-
tro's still surviving air force long
enough for the Administration to
cancel it outright, to the consterna-
tion of its C.I.A. controllers. Unhap-
pily for this standard charge against
President Kennedy, there is no evi-
dence that any number of additional
air strikes would have enabled the
1,400-man refugee brigade to have
conquered Castro's almost 200,000
'Soviet-equipped militia, should this
militia have fought for Castro.
Hunt is on surer .ground when he
says that the C.I.A. never planned
to rely upon the leak-prone under-
ground in Cuba. Hunt's basic ,conclu-
sion, Kennedy apologists notwith-
standing, namely that landing of the
small brigade without following it up
with open and massive American
intervention made no sense, seems
to this critic irrefutable. As Hunt
put it: "The [offshore American] task
force, in addition to'the [aircraft
carrier] Boxer, comprised Marine
'landing forces and logistic trainees.
If the armada was not charged with
ensuring victory, why else. had it
been assembled?"
Hunt's somewhat contradictory re-,
marks leave us rather uncertain re-
garding the controversial role of the
distinguished United States Ambas-
sador to the United Nations, Adlai
Stevenson. Whether the idealistic Ste-
venson actually suspected the Ad-
? ministration's covert sponsorship of
the bombing of Cuba before his pur-
portedly innocent do H 'ls at the
fied only if it could be shown
that there might be immediate
and irrevocable injury to the
United States.
The court held with the
CIA's argument that it could
enforce the oath of secrecy
that was a condition to Mar-
chetti's employment by the
agency, a decision that was ap-
pealed.
The federal appellate court
found that the agency had a
right to delete classified mate-
rial from the book after a re-
view prior to submission of
the manuscript to its pub-
lisher. The Supreme Court de-
clined to take jurisdiction of
the matter.
United Nations of American involve-
ment in the invasion is still open to
speculation. But Stevenson's probably
decisive influence in ' cutting back
more air strikes against Castro is
not sufficiently emphasized by Hunt.
Fundamentally, Hunt's job was to
cajole the confusing kaleidoscope of
the Cuban refugees, whom he liked
for the most part, into some sort
of coherent and usable front to con-.
ceal the American sponsorship of the
Bay of Pigs operation. Here Hunt
is replete with information.
Hunt winds up his account with a
fairly well substantiated interpreta-
tion of the Kennedy Administration's
attempt to blame the failure of
the Cuban operation on the C.I.A. To
be sure, as Hunt suggests, the Pen-
tagon shared some of th e blame, but
Hunt appears to be almost entirely
unaware of how Kennedy had gutted
Eisenhower's National Security Coun-
cil shortly after taking office, let
alone how this institutional failure
affected the operation. In short, Hunt
could have made a more damaging.
attack upon his enemies among the'
Kennedy liberals had he concentrated
more upon the higher-level Washing-,
ton scene. But his job and his personal .
commitment was to the Cuban refu-
gees in Miami and elsewhere and
his bias and bitterness reflect their,
rather than the American, interest.
As a consequence, like so many oth-
ers disappointed by the Bay of Pigs,
Hunt does not understand that in
military operations waged against a
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WASHINGTON POST'
25 September' 1973
By Lawrence Meyer and Peter A. Jay
Washington Post Staff Writers
t Convicted Watergate conspirator E.
Howard Hunt Jr. told former special
counsel to the President Charles W. Col-';
are really responsible for the Watergate
break-in," according to a transcript of a
.November, 1972, telephone conversation.
The transcript was released by the
Senate select Watergate committee as it,'
resumed its hearings yesterday.
In the conversation, which was recorded
s by Colson, Hunt was repeatedly admon1'
ished by Colson not to tell him any `spe
cific details about the break-in and bug
ging of the Democratic National Commit-
tee's Watergate headquarters.
"It's just that the less specifics I know';'
Colson told Hunt, "the better off I am,
we are, you are."
Hunt told the committee yesterday that,
he was unaware that Colson was. record-
ing the conversation, the transcript of
which the committee obtained from Col-;
son by general subpoena. "I might say.
that I feel, in retrospect I was set up on
this one," Hunt told the committee.
Colson has consistently denied any prior
knowledge of the Watergate break-in or,
involvement in the subsequent cover-up.
The thrust of the conversation between'
Hunt and Colson,. which Hunt said took:
place on Nov. 24; wars Hunt's complaint
that he was having difficulty getting funds
for legal fees and family subsistence that
'he had been promised would be paid to
him and the other six Watergate defend-
ants.
At the time of the conversation, the
'seven Watergate defendants were prepar-
ing for.their January, 1973, trial. Hunt
testified that after his wife,s death in a
December, 1972, plane crash, he decided
to plead guilty in the case.
For the first time publicly, hunt yester-'
day told how he became involved in both'
the Watergate affair and the break-in at
the offices of Daniel Ellsberg's psychia-
trist.
Hunt, who appeared pale, thin and phys-
ically weak, told the committee that at the
time he became involved in the Watergate
break-in, "I considered my participation
as a duty to my country." Hunt admitted
receiving funds to cover his legal fees and.
majority of the population of a coun-
try, no mere improvement in tech
nique works very well. Blaming the.
techniques employed in Cuba, as in
Southeast Asia, thus evades the
point: Was the operation or war it-
self justified in the first place? With
'respect to Cuba, at least, like Ken-
edy before him, Nixon eventually'
decided that it was not.
family 'subsistence after his indictment
and conviction but insisted that "I made'
-
no threats" In order to receive the money:
Although Hunt was testifying under a.
'grant of limited Immunity from prosecu
tion extended by the committee, he is also.
under an admonition from Chief U.S. Dis.
trict Judge John J. Sirica to cooperate'
fully with any official investigative body:
that calls upon him for testimony.
Sirica last March sentenced Hunt provi-'`
sionally to 35 years in jail and a $40,000
fine for his admitted role in the Water-'
gate affair. At the time of sentencing,
Sirica made it clear that he would weigh.
the degree of Hunt's cooperation before:
giving Hunt a final sentence.
Hunt last week filed a motion with Si-
rica asking him to set aside Hunt's guilty.
plea and to dismiss I all charges against:"
'him because, among pother reasons, Hunt
thought that top White House officials
had approved the Watergate
burglary.
Although Hunt was speak-
ing for the first time public-
:ly yesterday about "the events
,which have befallen me" as
he put it,' much of what he,
told the committee has al-
ready been reported as a re-
suit of the several appear-
ances he has made before
other committees in closed,
session and through the re-
lease of his grand jury testi-
mony. -
Hunt, and his attorney,
Sidney S. Sachs, both re-
ferred to the burden that has
been placed on Hunt under
the provisions of the condi-
tional sentence imposed by
Sirica.
"Since b e i n g sentenced,"
Hunt said, "I have been ques-
tioned under oath on more
than 25 occasions, often for
many hours. I have answered
thousands of questions by in-
n u m e r a b l e investigators,,
.prosecutors, grand jurors and
staff members of this com-
mittee.
"I am informed that such
intensive and repeated inter-
rogation is a most extraordi-
nary procedure and of dubi-
ous legality. Even so," Hunt
said, "urged by the court to
cooperate fully, I have not
contested the procedure. In
fact, I have answered all
questions, even those which
involved confidential com-
munications between my at-
torneys and myself."
testimony yesterday con
cerned his dealings with his
former lawyer, William 0.
Bittman. Hunt received $156,000d nit
In legal
fees from Hunt. Bittman
.Withdrew as Hunt's counsel
In August after he became a
subject of scrutiny.
Hunt, 54, a CIA agent for
,.21 years before his retire.
ment In 1970x, also cata-
logued for the committee
the troubles that have beset
him since his sentencing,
which he said may keep him
imprisoned for the rest of
his life. "I have been inca