COLBY SAYS HE WOULD CURB C.I.A. IN U.S. AND ABROAD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77-00432R000100190001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 20, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 3, 1973
• Content Type: NSPR

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CONFIDENTIAL
NEWS, VIEWS
and ISSUES
INTERNAL USE ONLY
This publication contains clippings from the
domestic and foreign press for YOUR
BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use
of selected items would rarely be advisable.
No. 40
13 JULY 1973
Governmental Affairs ..... 1
General 000ac0000000000poo 33
CONFIDENTIAL
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ove nmen
NEW YORK TIMES
3 July 1973
Colby Says He Would Curb'
C.I.A. In U.S. and Abroad
,
? ,is that they get so big that they
lare no longer covert.
' The Laotian operation was
!undertaken under a provision of
the National Security Act of
i
j1947 authorizing the C.I.A., to
"perform such other functions
tend duties affecting national
rsecurity as the National Secu-
rity Council may direct.".
; 'President's Army' Denied)
1* Somewhat, reluctantly, Mr.
iColby provided a guarded in-
!sight into such operations by
?t
,explaining- that they were or-
!ciered by a special security
,council cominittee known as the
"40 committee" and presently
headed by Henry A. Kissinger,
the President's national security
adviser.
Mr. Colby took exception te
a Symington characterization
that under this proVision the
C.I.A. was being turned into
"the king's men, the President's
army. But he acknowledged
that such operations diverted
the agency from what he said
should be its "primary focus"
of foreign intelligence gather-
ing=
Mr. Colby was not asked di-
tectly whether he had person-
ally been involved in discus-
sions between the White House
and the agency on assistance
to Hunt or on ,covering up the
Watergate investigation. But
Indirectly the Watergate affair
came up as Mr. Colby was
asked whether he believed the
agency should engage in such
domestic activities as drawing
up "psychological profiles" of
American citizens or supplying
espionage equipment for do-
mestic investigations. '
Mt. Colby rook the position
that the agency had no business
in domestic intelligence activi-
ties, a principle that he said he
planned to "reinforce very vig-
orously." He also said he was
"quite prepared" to leave the
top job if ordered to do some-
thing he regarded as illegal.
? Mr. Colby's arrival as the
new, director is awaited 'with
some anticipation in the C.I.A.
ranks demoralized by the per-
sonnel reductions made by his
predecessor, James R. Schles-
inger, particularly in the opera-
tions divisions. But Mr. Colby,
said he intended to continue
the "personnel pruning" that ini
the past four months has re-i
duced the agency's strength byi
7 or 8 per cent.
Unless the rising personnel
costs are curbed, he explained,
the agency faces , on eventual
situation where it will have "all
personnel and no programs."
As in previous -Congressional
testimony, Mr. Colby denied
that the Phoneix program of
plitiollii ii1116atiaft in Rtitilll
vietnam, which he ?needed tor
three years, was an "assassina-
tion program." ,
. The purpose of the program,
he said, was to held South
Vietnam ferret out the leaders
,
By JOHN W. FINNEY
Soeolal to The new York Times
WASHINGTON, July 2 ?
William E. Colby said today that
as Director of Central Intel-
ligence he would insist that the
Central Intelligence Agency re-
frain from domestic investiga-
tions and curb its involvement
in secret wars overseas.
Testifying before the Senate
Armed Services Committee on
his nomination- to be the new
C.I.A. chief, Mr. Colby acknowl-
edged that the congressional
intent embodied In the 1947
law creating the agency .had
probably been violated when
the agency ,was directed in.
1964 to . support a secret war
in Laos. '
He also said that the agency
had made a mistake in provid-
ing equipment that was used
by E. Howard Hunt Jr., a
Watergate consPirator, in the
1971 burglary of the office of
Daniel. Ellsberg's phychiatrist.
Symington Convinced
Mr. Colby, who is the deputy
C.I.A. director for operations?
the agency's division for covert
operations?Was questioned for
nearly two hours in open ses-
sion by Senator Stuart Syming-
ton, the acting committee
chairman and the only Senator
present for the hearing in the
Senate Caucus Room, the scene
of the Watergate hearings.-
Never before has a nominee
for . C.I.A. director been so
'cross-examine in public on the
policies\ he believes his largely
'secret agency should follow.
The net result was that Mt,
Colby took several policy posi-
trons that reassured Senator
Symington, who announced at
the conclusion that he would
enthusiastically support the
nomination.
. As a member of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee,
Mr. Symington first exposedrthe
Way ,the C.I.A. was supporting
an irregular army of meo tribes-
men and Thai solders in Laos.
Mr, Colby gave the senator as-
kurances that it was "very un-
(likely" that the agency would
%get involved in such activities
)again. He explained that the
Nagency had been drawn into
iNlQfllti
Laos 'at the direction of the aauFitY Orianell
-cause it was supposed to be a
covert operation in which the
4United States could not be of-
t
aficially involved. The difficulty
.'"with, such operations, he said.
1
WASHINGTON POST
3 July 1973
" ? - "' 47-7"?.7"`""i7, '771 t*,
Colby Hedges AssOranee,
New CIA Head Vows'
h`,Watergates":
By Laurence Stern ,
:
Washington Post Stott WrIter
William E. Colby,!
'dent Nixon's Choice to head
the Central 'Intelligence
:Agency, gave Congress a
carefully' hedged assurance,
yesterday that he would"
:keep the agency out of do-
mastic affairs and Water-
gate-type involvements, ,
He appeared before the i
Senate ' Armed Services Corn.
'!mittee in open session ? a t
'rare if not unprecedented.
=occurrence for the operating?.
,head of the CIA?to testifY
his nomination. ?
Acting Committee Chait=!
..Man Stuart Symington:
Mo.) was the ? only memberi
am hand for what was billed,
an ? examination "in;
'depth" of the . CIA's opera'-:;
lions and policies.
?Colby breezed through 904
minutes of 'prevailingly
'friendly questioning by .;
;Symington. Colby's wife and,
Ithree children were on hand
or the ceremonial interro,.
He acknowledged. that the
LCA had erred in authoriz-
ing the preparation of a psy-
.chiatrie profile of Daniel':
, Ellsberg and in providing
cameras, tape recorders and
1"safe house" facilities to.
-Watergate conspirators E.
'Howard Hunt and G. pot. ?
'don Liddy. .f
But Colby said he could'
not rule out the future prep-,
!oration of psychiatric pro-
files on American citizens or,
-the providing of agency fa-
cilities and equipment to'
White, House' employees.
"t can envision a situation
in which it would, be appror
t
priate for the agency to help!
!ir White House official with-
;but its coming to public nol:'
,tice," said Colby.
'The underlying concern,
,,,expressed by Symington was,
/ ;the degree, to which Colby
I would sanction CIA activi-
ties directed against Ameri-
can citizens in area's of do-
mestic operation.
Colby, a clandestine ?Per.
ative for most of his 22
years in the CIA, reiterated
the claim made by formet
; director Richard M. Helms-
Allot the agency's activities
tj the tbintfititiist "apparatus"
otivetmg a P1'081'041 of Filhittovl
sion and guerrilla warfare. Of
the some 20,000 persons killed
in the process, he said, 87 per
cent were by military forces
and "only 12 per cent" by
South Vietnamese police forces,
,
4te not targeted against'
44inerican citizens.
? ;..4-}le told Symington,: howii
:diler, that there ..were soniet
iequiretnents' for- CIA opera.
.tiOns /within- the
:States: ? Maintaining itC
Ij?ley headquarters,.
iting and investigating
ryi own employees, main-'
taining contacts with "a::
lai?ge number of- AmeriCan?!
iirins? for overseas informa
don, and interviewing U.S.
Citizens for information theyl
*ay have on foreign opera.'
dons.
,The United States,:he also,
rioted, is A base for the col-:
leetion ? of foreign ?intelli-;
Once. It IS sometimes neces-!
sary, said Colby, for agents
"t:o appear not as CIA em-
Oloyees but as representa-
ttives of some other entity."
Under the agency's char-.
'titt, the 1947 National Seen*
Act,, it is 'stated that;
'the Agency shall have Mai
police, subpoena,' law-en,
Lot-cement powers or inter-'
, dal security functions" irV,.
the United States.
But the 1947 statute con-
tained a loophole which has,
Served as a chatter for speJ
idol foreign and domestic-,;
Operations. It says that the
agency shall "perform such ?
dther functions and ,'duties
Mated to intelligence af-
Octing the national security!
as' the National ?Securitifl
Council May from time tett
tone /direct." i;
4' Colby himself cited this'
language yesterday as thel
basis for the CIA's conduct
of the-war iri Laos, in which
the agency organized and'
:Managed a clandestine guer-i
title army of some 30,000 .
Moo tribesmen and also prrit'
=iided aerial support serv-3
ges.
70"The initiation of CIA ac-
ttirity in Laos was a Matter i
that did require the use of
hitelligente techniques .
It= was important that the:
U.S. not be officially in-' ?
Volved in the war," Colby:
eirplaindd to Symington.
?'? At this point Symington;
bridled, saying the agency's,
tole in Laos "has done noth,
tag to enhance ,the repute.;
flan of the CIA."
t,t1I4
agency was following na.
tional policy in Lads. With'
,the present thrust of policy,:
he said, the United States Is
'unlikely to become involved;
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WENING SUP and DAILY NEWS:
Washington, D. C., Tuesday, July 10, 1973
itt." such a liirge;scale .
destine role. '
"A covert 'operation can't
J4 a very big'one," Colby as-;
sized. "It stops being covert:
when it gets very big: The.
'Bay of Pigs is an example Of
that."
Colby invited Congress to4
amend the CIA's charter by
48dding the Word "foreign":
'before the word intelligence,4
.in the 1947 act to provide
further safeguard against in-
trusion in the domestic sec-,
ttor. :Such a change would
:not, however, cancel... the::
'agency's role in special op- ,
"erations decreed by the Na
tional Security Council.
Since the disclosure of ef-3
;forts, both successful and
unsuccessful, to involve the'
1CIA in Watergate-related af-
fairs, there have been wide-,
:spread depands on Capitol!
'Hill for a thorough review.,
:of the agency's operations....,
:Concern was focused most:
'urgently on .the question of
whether the CIA has been:A
, operating, contrary to its'.
.tharter, in domestic matters.
J.?as in the Ellsberg profilel
,case,
'.. If he we're ordered to
"Carry out what he consid-
ered . an improper activity
for the CIA, Colby assured'..*,
tSymington. he would quit. :
? : At the outset of the hear-
ihg was asked:, to com-
ment on a story that ap-
peared in The Observer of '
,London which charged that.
the CIA engineered the 1967
coup by the Greek junta.;
Colby repilied that the
,agency did not, "engineer":
the coup but that he could.
"not conclusively , answer
whether or not Greek Presi-
dent-designate George Papa-'
dopoulos was ever on the ?
CIA payroll. "We worked,
;With him from time to time
in his official capacity," said
Colby. .
' Sitting beside Colby
the hearing room ,was John;
'Maury, the CIA's congres-
:sional liaison matt, who was?
:the agency's Station chief in,
'Athens when the coup ? was'
staged. Maury was not asked'
i!for his. recollections. ?
;
olby.
By Oswald Johnston
. Star-News Writer
'SYltilINGTON: At any,
',time has Mr. Papadopoulosi
? been an agent for' the CIA?
COLBY: He has not been1
arr.agent.. He has been an;
'official for the Greek gov-
-ernment at various times,
nd in' those periods from:
time to time we worked with
hi:if in his official capacity. 4
The persistent and wide-
spread assumption bY many,
critics of American policy
, towards Greece that the
Central Intelligente Agency,
Wasinvolved in the military
COO 'there has been given,,
. Unexpected backing by one!
\bf the CIA's most experi-
enced career spies.
He is William E. -COlby,',
Pr?dent Nixon's nominee'
to head the CIA Colby de-.
?
flied during his Senate con-;
. firmation hearing last Week::
that the agency actually.'
engineered the 1967 coup;'
But his subsequent admis-
sion that the agency had
'!worked with" the leading
colonel in the military re-,
gime, George Papadopou-.
los, is being interpreted by,
knowledgeable observers 'at
the first formal admission',
by a U.S. official of the ex-
teriSive contacts the CIA
had delveloped with Papado-
poulos before, the coup took;
, place.
: During - his testimo
:ny, 'Colby promised to give
the .Senate Armed Services!
Committee further details in
executive session. Further,'
testimony has been sched2
tiled for today, at a closed
hearing in which it is under-
stood Colby will ,be asked
about the CIA budget and;
other unresolved questions,
involving the agency's au-
thority as well as the Greek
question.
??? 'During last week's hear-;
ing, Colby also promised to
discuss in secret the shad-'
oWy Forty ,Committee, the
high-level agency, chaired
:by Henry A. Kissinger.
'through which the president,
',transmits authorization for;
? 011mdestine CIA operationS'
'abroad.
MUCH OF the relation-
.'hip. between the CIA and:,
ints
Coup Lin
lhe Greek colonels has.
leaked out in bits and!
.pieces in the years since the:
'coup.
-
'Papadopoulos, a former::
intelligence officer accord=!
Om to his official biography, ?
is known to have been a key
official in KYP, the Greek
intelligence bureau, Which;
'during the pre-coup period,
reportedly got direct subsi-
dies from CIA operatives in
Athens.
The question of 'direct"
cash ,payments to Papado-
pOulos also. was raised at-
', Colby's hearing by
'Sen. Stuart Symington, D-
, Mo., acting Armed Services'.
Committee chairman antl.,
the sole senator present at
the session.
Colby,'' who claimed to':
have "researched" the,
'question of any CIA-coup
connection after a widely
; publicized news report in
,the London Observer -re-
peating anew the charges of
CIA complicity with the col-,.
?Cnels, was unable to make a.
direct denial.
"I cannot answer that
'one, Mr. Chairman, for,?
sure," Colby admitted. "I
Just do not know. I do not,
believe we did 'personally.
I can say that we did not
pay him personally, I ant:.
sure."
? TAKEN with Colby'S.
,veiled admission of CIA
'contacts with Papadopouloa
? "from time to time ... in his,
Official capacity," that re-
Sponse is interpreted as tan,:
tamount to an open ac4
knowledgement of CIA sub-.
. sidies of the KYP. '
,
In' the .view of one knowl-
edgeable former CIA opera-
' tive who has kept close tabs
:on the agency, Colby's testi-'
mony on this point clearly'
, implies close and continuing:
,cooperation' between the
',CIA and Greek intelligence
'during the years before ,the
:coup.
: The testimony according=
ly gives further Weight to,
.the theory, never proved'
but firmly believed by many.
'responsible critics of U.S..
support of the Athens re-
gime, that Washington fully
:-expected ? and tacitly et'.
'couraged ?.a right-Wing',
royalist coup in the spring'
of 1967 to forestall the ex
-
',Meted electoral victory ofir
the' mildly leftist Center's
Union party of George Pa-'1
Oandreou.. ; 1_
According to this readings'
of the situation,the coup,
;was expected to have been;
carried out, with support of
'King Constantine, by the"
,Greek military establish-:
, ment.
The theory further holds;
that Papadopoulos, through';
his intelligence contacts,'
got. wind of the plan and'
staged a pe-emptive coup of, ?
his own with the backing of
anti-royalist extreme right-`,
:wing colleagues in the''
Greek armed forees.'
The little that is. 'known'.
about CIA 'operations -in
Athens before the coup sup-
ports this ,,thesis, and Col-
recent admissions sup-,
. port it further. .
THE CIA 'station chief ;in'
:Athens from 195 to the end ?
Of 1967 was Johri;,M. Maury,,
,now the agency S official in.
charge of congressional
? relations. In the recollection4:
of Amercians knowledge-
able in the workings of the;
U.S. Embassy in Athens at;
,the time, where Maury wasJ
listed as a' first secretary,
his main task was to keep
,up the cloS6 relations that,
existed between U.8. policy
and?The Royal palace.
The presence of AndreaS
,Papandreou, the premier's
Son, in the government as
the minister in charge Of
internal security affairs:
heightened U.S. displeasure,
, with the first left-leaning':
'government in Athens since
the early 1950s. The young-ti
!er Papandreou, who has;
since become a vociferous
lexponent of the theory that
the CIA engineered the 1967
coup, moved early on to cut s
off the direct CIA subsidy to,
the KYP. ? I
It is an open secret that
Washington firmly sided
with the King in his politi-i
cally debilitating struggle'
with the Papandreou gov-:
ernment a struggle that ear-
ly finally led to governmen-,
tal paralysis and set the'
stage for the coup.
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,
The New York Times Magazine-/.July 1, 1973
Dark side up
con
..????
By David Wise
A few weeks ago, a Norwegian who had served
? In the anti-Nazi underground ?saw a newspaper
. photograph and thought he recognized an Ameri-
.can O.S.S. officer he had worked with during the.
?
war and had known only as "No. 96." .
The photograph was that of William Egan Colby,
53, a career covert operator for the Central Intel-
ligence Agency, and chief of its supersecret Direc-';
torate of Operations, sometimes known as the
"Department of Dirty Tricks." As part of the high-
level game of musical chairs touched off by Water- ?
gate, President Nixon had just named Bill Colby',
to be head of the C.I.A.
And there is an interesting fact about Colby in'
the files at C.I.A. headquarters in Langley, Va. His
official C.I.A. biography relates that he served in
the 0.S.S. during World War H and contains this:
sentence: "Shortly before the end of the war in'
'1945, he led a team dropped in northern Norway
, to destroy' a rail line used for transporting German'
reinforcements." The Norwegian man who read.
about Colby's appointment and thought he recog-,
nized his picture got in touch through an intei--
mediary with an American woman who lives in.
Kensington, Md., and who is a close friend of the
:Colbys, particularly of Colby's wife, Barbara.'
Could the woman find out Whether Colby was his
old comrade in arms, No, 96?
"I tried to find out," the woman in 'Kensington.
told me. "And 'I'm still trying. Bill wouldn't say,,
and Barbara doesn't know, or at least she says she
doesn't knows"
; The story illustrates something about Colby that
Ishould not be entirely surprising 'in a man who
has spent. most of his adult life -as?well?a spy.
A State Department official who had worked with!
Colby in Vietnam put it this way: "He's soft-
spoken, with a casual style. He has a forthright
manner, but there's also a private Bill Colby. He's,"
a very private person." ?
. Indeed, there are really two Bill Colbys; -given
, his covert background there would almost have to
be. There is William Egan Colby, the quiet, young
; "Foreign Service officer" in the American Embassy ,
? in Stockholm and Rome in the nineteen-fifties, who ,
was simultaneously William Egan Colby of the ?
' C.I.A., an up-and-coming "black" (that is, secret) .
operator working in the C.I.A.'s Clandestine Serv-
ices under State Department cover. Later, there I
was Bill Colby in Saigon in 1959, listed in the::
official Biographic Register of the Department -of
State as a "political officer," and later.' as "first '
secretary" of the embassy. In fact, he became
Saigon station chief for "the Agency" during this;
period. Then, in 1962, he turned up at Langley as
, chief of the Far East Division of Q,17.A.'s covert side.':
There was Bill Colby back in Vietnam again in
' 1968, heading the "pacification" program, building;
; roads and schools and performing good works.'
There was also Bill Colby who supervised the
Phoenix program, designed to "neutralize" the Viet:
cong, which its crities have thilegati *COS a program:
; of systematic assassination, murder and totture-r-?
David Wise is the author- of "The Politics of
Lying: Government Deception, Secrecy, and Power.",
an accusation that Colby has vigorously ?denied,
, under oath. According to figures Colby provided
to a House subcommittee in 1971, however, the
Phoenix program killed 20,587 persons between
' 1968 and May, 1971. That's right: 20,587.
, Now there is Bill Colby in 1973, a devoted,
:family man, a good husband and father of four,
,children, a devout Roman Catholic who regularly
,attends mass at the Little Flower Roman Catholic-
:Church in Bethesda, Md., and who lives in an ,
:timSretentious white-brick house in Springfield, Md., '
,a Washington suburb that is not as fancy as, 'say,,
Chevy Chase. Bill Colby? -Why, he was neighbor-1
hood chairman of the Boy Scouts.
. ?
? "I
"Bill's always been involved in the Boy Scouts," .3
his wife said. Had be actually been One? "He was
:a Boy Scout in China when his father was assigned
,there as an Army officer."
It is a long way from the Boy Scouts to the
;C.I.A.'s Directorate of Operations, a euphemism
that encompasses "dirty tricks," although perhaps
:there 'are some similarities, too, if one is to judge
:by the activities and style of E. Howard Hunt Jr.,
the most famous recent graduate (if he did grad-
uate) of the C.I.A.'s covert division.
- As the agency's Deputy Director for Operations,
'Colby?when tapped by Nixon to be C.I.A. chief?
.was the man directly in charge of America's global
-espionage and dirty tricks. C.I.A. is a bivalve; one
dialf, the Directorate of Operations, collects informa-
tion and engages in secret political operations. These
are the spooks: The other half, the Directorate of
Intelligence, staffed by scholarly types, analyzes
'what comes in. Colby's counterpart there was Ed- '
t ward W. Proctor, an economist.
It is the operations directorate, the cloak-and-4
'dagger side, where COlby has spent his entire C.I.A.
:career, that on occasion overthrows governments,
bankrolls foreign political parties and guerrilla '
'movements, has subsidized foundations in the'
',United States, and, so it is rumored, has even':
engaged in the assassination of foreign political,,
deaders. It is covert political operations that have.
?gotten C.I.A. into hot water over the years, fromi
the Bay of Pigs to the "technical support" pro--i
tvided to the burglars of Daniel Ellsberg's psychia-,
trist. The Directorate of Operations is the foreign
'political-action and espionage arm of the United';
States Government; until this year, it was known'
ias the Directorate of Plans. Colby, of course, is not
;that "demmed elusive" Scarlet Pimpernel; he has,
;chiefly dealt with Vietnam during the past 15 years,
and as Deputy Director of Operations for only three','
`4months,' he can hardly be held accountable for
;everything that the Department of Dirty Tricks has'4
;been up to since 1948. The C.I.A. was created by ;
t Congress in 1947, but secret political action was
not approved by the National Security Council until,
'the following year. Since then, the operations di-
rectorate has, among other things:
o Air-dropped agents into Communist China In-,
In the early nineteen-fifties. Two . C.I.A. agents
;captured in 1952, Richard G. Fecteau and John
T. Downey, have now been released; Downey was ,
freed by Peking in March after more than 20 yearsi
iii GhineSe pribOn?:
o Overthrown the Government of Premier
'Mohammed Mossadegh of Iran in 1953, thereby
keeping the Shah on his throne. Not accidentally,
When Nixon replaced Richard Helms as C.I.A. di-
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rector in December, 1972, he sent him out as hi
Ambassador to Iran, one of the few countries in'
the world 'where a former CIA: chief could C0111'
fortably serve as ambassador.
? Toppled the Communist-dominated Govern-
ment of President Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala-.
1n1954.
? Attempted, unsuccessfully, to overthrow
President Sukarno in Indonesia in 1958 with
pilots and B-26 bombers. One of the C.I.A. pilots,',
Allan Lawrence Pope, was captured, imprisoned,!,
and later released through the intervention of:
Robert F. Kennedy.
? Flown high-altitude U-2 spy planes over the;
Soviet Union to photograph strategic missiles, an
operation that came to a crashing halt when
C.I.A. pilot Francis Gary Powers was shot down'
on May 1, 1960. A summit meeting in Paris be-
tween President Eisenhower and Soviet Premier ,
Nikita S. Khrushchev collapsed after the U-2 affair.
? Invaded Cuba at the Bay of Pigs In 1961 with '
a brigade of Cuban exiles in an attempt to over-
throw Fidel Castro. Nearly 300 Cubans and four
American pilots flying for the C.I.A. died and some '-
1,200 men were captured. It was the Kennedy Ad-
ministration's worst disaster.
? Set up ti" secret base at Camp Hale, 10,000',
feet high in the Rocky Mountains of Colorado, -,
1where Tibetans were trained to return home and '
fight against Communist China. The' operation, be-
gun in 1958, almost?surfaced in December, 1961,,
when armed troops protecting the C.I.A.'s Tibetans
roughed up some civilians at gunpoint. ,
? Advised and worked closely with the generals'
who staged a coup against President Ngo Dinh
Diem of South Vietnam in 1963. (While there is no
evidence that President Kennedy or the C.I.A. ex-;
pected Diem to be killed, on this point, Gen. Max-
well D. Taylor has declared: ". . . the execution of
a coup is not like organizing a tea party; it's a very
dangerous business. So I didn't think we had any,
right to be surprised when?when Diem and his
brother were murdered.")
at Spent tens of thousands of dollars?some re-
ports say. millions -- in Chile in 1964 to elect
Eduardo Frei, the Christian Democratic candidate'
over Marxist candidate Salvador Allende. Negoti-
jated with I.T.T., and made some unsuccessful ef-
forts to prevent Allende from becoming President
in 1970.
o Trained and supported a secret army in Laos
of at least 30,000 men?a figure acknowledged by
the C.I.A. in August, 1971?at a cost of more than
$300-million a year. -
? Subsidized the National Student Association,
the nation's largest student group, and many other
'business, labor, church, university and cultural
organizations through dozens of willing foundation,
conduits?a scandal that erupted in 1967.
. ? Provided Watergate star E. Howard Hunt Jr.
with his famous red wig (invariably described in
the press as "ill-fitting"), his miniature Tessina
camera in a tobacco pouch, his false credentials
and "a speech alteration device," which, according
to 'those who have seen it, resembles a set of
dentures. The equipment was
provided by the Technical,
Services Division of the
C.I.A., and the C.I.A. 'claims it
had no idea that Hunt would
use it to burglarize the office
of Ellsberg's psychiatrist.
This listing of, accomplish.
meats is necessarily ineorn,
plete, both for reasons of
space and because the direc-
torate's work is not always
well-publicized. The Director-
4
ate of . Operations does -not
covet publicity, except about
- feats like the Berlin Tunnel,
which enabled the C.I.A. to
' Wiretap conversations in 1955
,between Moscow and the .
headquarters in East Germany
,of the Russian Army and the
K.G.B., the Soviet secret in-
telligence organization.
But the list. could also in-
clude C.I.A. operations in Al-
bania, Singapore, the Congo, ,
--Vietnam,. Egypt and ?several.'
other places. The C.I.A.'s
black operators helped* to
spirit Svetlana Alliluyeva out
of India, and, according to for-
mer agent Patrick J. McGar-
vey, they stole the Soviet
sputnik for three hours while
it was on a world tour, dis-
mantled it, photographed it
and put it back together, with-
out the Russians finding out.
The operations directorate
is no small-beer enterprise; It
has its own air force in Indo-
china, known as Air America;
it -had its own navy during
the Bay of Pigs (five ships
leased from the Garcia Line
Corporation in Manhattan); it
has had its own radio sta- ,
tions (Radio Free Europe and
Radio Swan, to mention two
of the better-known ones),
and it does a bit of honk
publishing on the side. For
example. the publishing iirm
of Frederick A. Praeger said
.i.n._1967 it had published "15
or 16 books" at the sugges-
tion of the C.I.A.
Under James R. Schlesinger,
who succeeded Helms as C.I.A.
head (and under Helms as
well), word was put out in
Washington that the C.I.A.
was trimming down its covert
political operations. The hu-
man spy is being replaced by
reconnaissance satellites, elec-
tronic intercepts and technol-
ogy. Black operations are no
longer very important, or so
it is said. As a result, Nixon's
designation of Colby to a post
requiring Senate confirmation
raises the question of whether
a career clandestine operator
is the-: appropriate choice to
head the CIA. at 'a time when
?so it is claimed?covert po-
litical 'action is becoming a
less significant tool of Ameri-
can foreign policy. The Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence
wears two hats_ He is
director of the C.I.A. (at
$42,500 a year) but he, is
also chairman of the board
and coordinator of all United
States intelligence agencies,.
including the Pentagon's
powerful Defense Intelligenea
Agency, the F.B.I. and the
ultrasecret National Security
Agency, which eavesdrops on
i worldwide' communications
and makes' and breaks codes.
:.The purpose of this vast intel-
ligence "community". is to:
, provide the President with the
'information and assessments:-
* he needs to make -foreign-
policy decisions. The Director
of Central. Intelligence basi-
cally serves as a manager and
analyst. One of his most im-
portant functions is to inter- :
pret intelligence to estimate
the course of future events.
These are responsibilities that
do not necessarily require t
skill in clandestine political
operations.
Ann:ner question might be
asked about whether Col-
by, who has himself fig-
? gured at least peripherally in
the Watergate investigations,
is the proper man to head the
C.I.A. at a time when the
C.I:A. itself?and particularly
Its covert side?has been en-j
snared in various aspects of
Watergate. The C.I.A.'s en-
tanglements are complex' and
'varied, but they include the
fact that both Howard Hunt
and James W. McCord Jr.
worked for the C.I.A. for more
than 20 years; that the Cubans
caught inside Democratic Na-
tional Committee offices in
the Watergate building also
have ties to C.I.A.; that Frank
Sturgis, one of those arrested
in the Watergate, had C.I.A.
credentials that had belonged
to Hunt in the name of "Ed-
ward V. Hamilton"; that the
C.I.A. provided the disguises
and equipment used in the '
burglary of Dan Ellsberg's
doctor's office; that the C.I.A.
prepared a "psychiatric pro-
file" of Ellsberg?Snd, finally,
the disputed accounts of how.
the White House sought to ?
list the C.I.A. in the Watergate
cover-up.
-Colby's name first cropped
up, virtually unnoticed, in the
Watergate investigation on
May 15 when Senator Stuart
Symington issued a long state-
ment about various conversa-
lions among the C.I.A.'s Dep-
uty Director, Lieut. Gen. Ver-
non A. Walters, Helms, H. R.
Haldeman, John Ehrlichman
and Patrick Gray. Walters has
claimed the White House
wanted him to block the F.B.I.
investigation.of the Watergate
burglary and of the campaign*
funds laundered in Mexico, on
, the grounds that the investi-
gation would 'compromise
C.I.A. operations in Mexico.
Symington summarized Walt-,ers's testimony on this point
SigraiREIten piic ?4i4
had testified that in Febru-
ary, 1973, John Dean called
C.I.A. Director James Schles-'
inger and asked whether the
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'C.I.A. could retrieve' a "pack-: to get it to Silbert, who had
age" of documents from the asked for it in the. first place.
F.B.I. The documents spelled Moreover, Cushman said he
out, in embarrassing detail, sent the memo to Ehrlichman
an
the espionage espionage equipment given
to Hunt and used in the Ells-
berg break-in in 1971. "He
[Walters] testified that he,
Mr. Colby and Dr. Schlesinger
discussed the matter and
agreed there was no way, this
could be done," Symington
declared. Colby, in other
words, by this account, sat in
on a top-level C.I.A. meeting
at which it was considered
whether the agency's duties
might extend to snatching
back a package of incriminat-
ing documents from the F.B.I.,
.at the behest of the White
,House. Walters testified that
the C.I.A. would not play. ?
'That seemed to be a rela-
tively marginal involvement
of Bill Colby, but two weeks
later, a little disagreement
developed between Gen. Rob-
ert E. Cushman Jr., former
Deputy Director of the C.I.A.,'
and John Ehrlichman, con-
cerning just who had asked
the C.I.A. to provide Howard
Hunt with that wig and cam-
era before the Ellsberg bur-
glary.
In a sworn affidavit exe-
cuted on May 11, General
Cushman, who left the C.I.A.
at the end of 1971 to become
Marine Corps Commandant,
said that "about July 7, 1971,
Mr. John Ehrlichman of the
White House called me and
stated that Howard Hunt . . .
Would come to see me and
request assistance which Mr.
Ehrlichman requested that I
give." But on May 30, Ehr- 'agreed to write another memo,'
lichman said he could rernem- which he did, omitting Ehta
ber making no such telephone , ' lichman's, name.
call to Cushman. He did not, Perhaps the most' trouble.'
Ehrlichman said, have even some, recurring problem in.
"the faintest recollection" of Bill Colby's long career, how-
?
placing the call. ever, is the Phoenix program,
General Cushman, who which keeps rising, -Phoenix-
served for four years as Vice like, to haunt him. If there
President Richard M. Nixon's are two Bill Colbys, it is also
national security aide, then true that there were two pac-
held a press conference on
May 31 -to announce that
minutes of a high-level C.I.A.
meeting on July 8, 1971,
showed that he had specifi-
cally named Ehrlichman as.
having called on Hunt's behalf
the day before. In December,
19'72, Cushman explained,
says, "so 1 started looking
around for the ablest Ameri-
can 1 could find to replace
me." As a special assistant to
Johnson in the White House,
at the suggestion of
cial of the C.I.A. Konter had been impressed
-Cushman's office said it had 'with Colby during their frea
ipuent eontaets In 1966, when
a .tape recording of the press .
1-Colby was ; the C.I.A.'s top
conference, but parts were
not clear, and they could !covert official in Washington
provide only an unofficial jot the Fer test, -
transcript. But this transcript ! Op trip back from Saigon
includes the following ques- In NoVemhei, 1967, }tomer re-
Along and answers: !la ed,
kept asking me,
. Q. And the C.I.A. suggested' l'What do you Want? What do
to you that you first submit' 11 you need?' said I wanted a
that memo to Mr. Ehrlichman? deputy ih algon. 'Who do
A. I, think yes, but I don't ;you want?' jdimson asked. I
know why. You'll have to ask- said, 'Mr. Oresident? II have
them [unintelligible].'. . ,liny eye owl0 fellow named
Q. Did you at any time: 1Bill Colby." ?
communicate directly with ' As Koiner tells it, Johnson
?the prosecutor? picked up the telephone and
A. I don't think I've ever ?eelled Walt W. Rostow, his,
talked to the prosecutor, no.. ' assistant for national security:
Q. So you submitted the 1 "Call Helms," be barked at
paper work for the prosecutor. Rostow, "and get some guy
through Mr. Ehrlichman? minted Colby for Korner."
A. I think I did. . . . Korner adds: "The next
Q. Who in the agency sug-E thing I heard was Dick Helms
blowing a ,fuse. Helms was
gested that you submit the
memo to Mr. Ehrlichman? really p off. I don't
A. Mr. Colby, as I recall. blame him. The first he had
Q. Bill Colby? heard about it was Rostow
, A. Yes. 'Calling for the President. But
Cushman said Ehrlichman Dick 'calmed down later."
asked him to tear up the Until he Was suddenly
amemo because he, Ehrlichman,' tapped for Vietnam, Colby, it
did not recall making the was whispered in the cloak-
phone call about .Hunt. Since, rooms of Langley, was slated
his own memory was hazy, for the hottest clandestine
Cushman said (he had appara field job of all?station chief
ently not yet discovered the in MoscOvv. In the operations
minutes of the July 8 meet-' directorate, that post 15 the
ing) he and Ehrlichman agreed major leagues; a C.I.A. agent
that it would.. "not be very putting his head in the bear's
fair" to name Ehrlichman in mouth, as it were, operating
the memo. Cushman said he in the very midst of the Com-
mittee for State Security, the
Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Be-
zopasnosti,1 the K.G.B.l Colby
must linve thought he; WIta
. going, because his kids bought,
him a fur hat.
it was of little use in Sai-
gon. Colby had broken an.
ankle ice-skating on the canal'
that runs along the Potomac;
but by March, 1968, after the,
Tet offensive, he was in Sai-
gon as Komer's deputy in
CORDS, the over-all pacificaL
tion program for South Viet-
nam. In November of that
year, Colby took over the top
I job; !Comer was dispatched as'
ambassador to Turkey.
ification programs in Vietnam.
The very word "pacification,"
of course, has rather ominous,
Orwellian overtones. It is part
of the loathsome jargon of
the Vietnam war?a war that
did violence to the English
language, as well as to human.
beings. Phoenix flapped into
Earl J. Silbert, the Watergate Colby's life through the win-
prosecutor, asked if he would 410.W of "pacification."
be kind enough to write a ' The 'link to both programs
memo describing just how was Robert W. Korner, a for-,
Howard 'Hunt had come to met C.I.A. man (from the In
his attention. In the memo, thlligence side) whom Lyndon,
Cushman fingered Ehrlichman.- Johnson sent to Vietnam in
:Here things get a little fuzzy,' May, 1967, to head up the
but caahman said at his pros pacification effort. Kamer is
conference that he 'sent the , voluble Colby .booster.
"
memo to John Elirlichmon, I caught a rare tropical
disease in Vietnam," Konier
which seemed an odd route!
; One ef Colby's former dep-.
lu ties in the pacification pro-
.
, gram said ? gagging only
slightly over the phrase?that.
It was designed "to win the
hearts and minds of the peo-
ple." The task was, of course,
enormously complicated by
'the fact that American planes
and treeing were simultane-
ously tieetrayit13 tImtaittittf4.
But, said the aide, "we had a
:road program, a village int-
provement program, health
programs, agriculture ? we
brought in new strains of
rice." Perhaps significantly,
however, Colby,. as head of ,
CORDS, reported to the Mill.'
tory, to Gen. Creighton
,Abrams, not to Ambasseclor
Ellsworth , Bunker.
Phoenix, the other face. ofe
pacification, was also Oder
Colby. It had begun inl; its
earlier stages as a C.I.A.-'op-
eration, and it was a feint
United States-South Viet4m-
ese program designed to iden-
tify and then "neutralize"/,the
Vietcong "infrastructure."IThe
enemy was "neutralized" by
, being killed; jailed, or "ral-
lied," a word that meant per-
suaded to defect. During
Colby's period with the pacifi-
cation program, 28,978 per-
sons were captured or jailed,
17,717, "rallied" and 20,587
killed, according to the fig-
tires Colby provided .in 1971
' to the House Foreign Opera-
tions and Government Infor-
mation Subcommittee, headed
by Rep. William S. Moorhead.
Earlier, in February, 1970,
Colby had tried to explain
Phoenix to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. Chair-
man J. W. Fulbright asked
whether captured Vietcong
, were "executed," prompting
the following exchange:
Ma. COLBY: Well, let me say
? they are not legally executed,
no ...Now, I would not want
to say here 'that none has
ever actually been executed,
but ... the Government's pol-
icy and its directives are that
these people when captured
are placed In detention cen-
ters....
SENATOR CASE: This is not
properly then defined in fact
aa a counterterror operation?
MR. COLBY: No, it is not,
Senator.
SENATOR CASE: You swear
to that by everything holy.
You have already taken your
oath?
MR. COLBY: 1 have taken
my oath.
A bit later, Colby told the
Senators: ". . . I would not
?
..want to testify that nobody
was killed wrongly or exe-
cuted in this kind of a pro-
gram. I think it has probably
happened, unfortunately."
The following year, in testi-
fyihg to, the Moorhead sub-
committee, Colby said that
"the Phoenix program is not
a program of assassination:"
The Vietcong, he said, were
killed as members of military
units, "or while fighting off
arrest," although there had
been' "atime tliiikibW
ittainaast.
But one witness, K. Parton
Osborn, a former military-
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intelligence agent, told the
subcommittee that suspects
caught by Phoenix were inter-
rogated in airborne helicop-
ters. Some prisoners, he .said,
were pushed out, to persuade
the more important suspects'
to talk. He said he had been
on two such flights and saw
two prisoners killed by being
thrown out the door. Interro-
gations in Vietnam, the wit-
ness testified, also included
"the use of electronic gear
such as sealed telephones
attached to the genitals of
both the women's vagina and
the men's testicles, and [the
interrogators] wind the mech-
anism and create an electrical
charge and shock them into
submission."
Osborn also described other
interrogations, which he said
he had personally witnessed:
"The use of the insertion of
the 6-inch dowel into the
canal of one of my detainees;
'ears and the tapping through
,the brain until he died." The
'witness also said a U.S. Army
captain shot and killed a Chi-
nese woman who had been
:working as Osborn's inter-
:-preter. According to Osborn's
:testimony, the officer said
?"that the woman was only a
'slope' anyway., and it doesn't
matter."
Osborn declined to name
any individuals who had been
involved in these alleged epi-
sodes. The Pentagon investi--.
,gated his charges and sub-
mitted a classified report to
the Moorhead subcommittee
discounting the testimony.
"Staff members of the House
panel were astonished to find
that the document said Pen-
tagon investigators could find
no records of a - Chinese
woman killed during the time
period Osborn described. "Do
you really think," a staff
member asked one of the
Pentagon officials, "that an
American Army officer who
shot a civilian under these
circumstances would report
t it?"
A central point of contro-
versy over Phoenix is whether
Vietcong were killed during
capture, as Colby has sworn,
or during subsequent torture
and interrogation. Robert Ko-
.mer says that "90 per cent of
the Vietcong infrastructure
Were killed in fire fights by
'the South Vietnamese mili-
tary, in normal combat opera-
tions. Ten per cent were killed
.by police and the P.R.U.
[Provincial Reconnaissance
Units]." How many were
killed under interrogation? "I
would say relatively few. It
must have been way under
the 10 per cent figure," Ko-
..
'iner replied.' "The number:
killed by torture would be
? very, very little."
A second point in dispute.
' is whether suspected mem-
bers' of the Vietcong were'
'killed resisting arrest, as
'Colby testified, .or whether
substantial numbers were
;simply shot on the spot,
as soon as they' were found,
as Osborn has charged. In
, a recent interview, Osborn'
called Phoenix "an indiscrimi-?
nate murder program."
Certainly there is evidence
t, that Phoenix claimed some
'innocent victims. During Col-
by's testimony to the House
subcommittee, Representative
Ogden R. Reid of New York
asked whether persons cap-
' tured had the right to counsel.
No, said Colby, they did not.
Then it was a "kangaroo
trial"? Colby replied that
the interrogation procedure
"probably meets the techni-
calities of international law
but it certainly does not meet,
our concepts of due process."
Then this exchange occurred:
MR. REID: My question is:
Are you certain that we know
a member of the VCI [Viet-
cong infrastructure] from a
loyal member of the South
Vietnam citizenry?
AMBASSADOR COLBY: No, Mr..
Congressman, I am not.
Congressman Reid observed
that "...there is the possi-
bility that someone will be
capttfred, sentenced or killed
who has been improperly
placed on a list." Colby did
not disagree; he said he would
like to see the legal pro-
cedures improved because "I
do not think they meet the
standards I would like to see
applied to Americans today."
Some months ago, Osborn
and a few other former intel-
ligence agents formed the
Committee for Action/Re-
search on the Intelligence
Community. CARIC opposed
Colby's designation as C.I.A.
chief, calling his rise within
the intelligence agency "no-
thing more than rewards for
his having been the C.I.A.'s
apologist for Phoenix to Con-
gress." In language consid-
erably less polite than that
used by members of the
Moorhead committee, CARIC's
statement added: "Mr. Colby's
?professional qualifications as
a mass murderer are not in
question here; 'his appoint-
ment to a powerful Govern-
ment position is."
While charges of torture in
the Phoenix protieum rennln
unproved, a directive issued
in May, 1970, to Phoenix per-
sonnel indicates that Phoenix
was not for the, squeamish.
6
The directive, signed by Mar
Gen. W. G. Dolvin, empha-4-
sized the "desirability, of ob-
taining these target individ-'
uals' alive" and contained the
peculiar phraseology that:
American personnel were.
"specifically unauthorized to
'engage . in assaSsinations."
However, the directive said,
"if an individual finds the
'police-type activities of the
Phoenix program repugnant
,to him, on his application, he
can be reassigned from the
program...." (Italics added.)
Two Bill Colbys and two
pacification programs. Not
one of Colby's friends or
neighbors, or even his critics
on the Hill, would, in their
wildest imagination, conceive
of Bill Colby attaching electric
Wires to a man's genitals and
personally turning the crank.
"Not Bill Colby. . . . He's a
Princeton man!" ?
But at the House hear-
ings, Congressman Paul N.
McCloskey Jr. kept ask-
ing niggling, Nuremberg-type
questions. "flow far up in the
command structure does the
intelligence - collection proce-
dure?how far up in the com-
mand structure is the torture,.
the brutality, the assassina-
tions fully known to those in
command and in charge of
completing t,te mission? Does
it go up the captains, the
,majors, t c colonels, the gen-
erals, the Ambassador?"
'These are very . difficult
questions, and by mid-1971,
Colby no longer had to deal.
with them in Vietnam. He
came back to Washington, in
part, friends say, to be with
his seriously - ill daughter,
Catherine, who died this April
at the age of 23. Colby was
named Executive Director of
the C.I.A. by Dick Helms,
early in 1972, and became
head of the operations direc-
torate under Schlesinger a
year later.
"Bill behaves in a calcu-
latingly colorless manner,'
one covert operator who
worked with him for years
said. "It's the way he chooses
to deal with the world."
One former agent, Patrick
McGarvey, ruefully concedes
that he experienced firsthand
just how unobtrusive Colby
can be. McGarvey was work-
ing in the Saigon station.
"This guy walks in. An inno-
cent-looking little man with
glasses. Mr. Peepers. He asked
us what we do. 'Christ,' I
said, 'we spend eight hours a
tlytriyinti that nut,'
IIe sat down and we talked
about an hour and a half. I
really vent my spleen. I
hitched about all the Mickey
Mouse detail. Then he sayi,',
'By the way, my names Bill ,
Colby." At the time, 1964,,
Colby was chief of the CII.A.'S.;
Far East division, and' there,
were, McGarvey said, 'quite
a few reverberations." (tater,'
McGarvey quit the agency
and wrote a book, "C.I.A.::
The Myth and the Madness,"`
which he submitted for, clear.:
ance and which the 4gency,-
after some deletions-it per.
mitted to be published;)
Most officials whaa have,
known Colby, not only fin the:
C.I.A., give him very high:
marks as a person, and for',
his professional abilities.;
Some, however, criticize him
as an inflexible cold warrior,i,
frozen in attitudes learned in,
more than two decades as a
spook. By all accounts, he.
was a true believer in Ameri-
can policy in Vietnam. (Al-
though not in every detail;
associates who served with
him in the ,C.I.A.'s "black"
Far East division in the early
nineteen-sixties say that he,
opposed. the coup against
Diem and considered it a mis-
take.) One former covert
agent complained that Colby
was "an adequate technician
but not in a ciass with Allen
Dulles and Bedell Smith. The
agent added that C.I.A. per-
.sonnel were fairly dancing
with delight when Schlesinger
left, "but I wonder if Bill
Colby is getting in over his''
head."
Other associates strongly
defend Colby. as a persuasive,
articulate bureaucrat who in-
spires personal loyalty in his
subordinates. Although a
graduate of Princeton and
Columbia Law School, Colby,
unlike many of the Old Bdys
who have traditionally domi-
* nated the higher echelons of
the C.I.A., does not come from
a wealthy, upper-class back-
ground. He is not, as they say,
."St. Grottlesex"?he did not
attend one of the prestigious
Eastern prep schools. Rather,,:
he went to high school in
Burlington, Vt.
His wife, the former Bata.
bara Heinzen, is a short, out-
going brunette who shares
her husband's Catholic faith.
Very unassuming, no airs, but
a well-educated, sophisticated
woman. Their oldest son,
John, 26, is married, has.
worked for Henry Kissinger
on the staff of the National
Security Council and, is a
classmate at Princeton of
Edward Finch , Cox, was a
groomsman at Tricia Nixon's
aarana ration eraltilnet th7lz
The Colbys have three other
children, Carl, 22, Paul, 17.
and Christine, 13.
Colby is the third chief of
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'Dirty Tricks" VS be named.
head of the C.I.A. ? the two
others being Allen Dulles and
Helms. Dulles was put in
charge of spying and coverte
action in 1951. He was suc-
ceeded by the late Frank G.;
Wisner, a tall, Mississippi-
born, dedicated cold-war op-
erator who ran the coup in
Guatemala. Wisner was fol-
lowed by Richard M. Bissell,
one of the fathers of the U-2,
program and chief planner of
the Bay of Pigs invasion.
Beached after that, Bissell
was succeeded by Helms. '
After President Johnson
named Helms C.I.A. director ?
,in 1966; Desmond FitzGerald
, took over the plans direc-
'tora'te' He died in 1967 and
was succeeded by the "black-
est" and least-known of the
operations directors, Thomas'
Hercules Karamessines, a New.
'Yorker and Columbia grad-,
uate who served in the OSS..
and worked for the C.I.A. in
Athens, Vienna and Rome
under embassy cover. "Tom
K.," ?as he is known among
the operators, was retired last
March in the Schlesinger
'shakeout, along with several
other big-name spooks, like ,
Bronson Tweedy and Archi-
bald B. Roosevelt Jr., both'
former London station chiefs.
'Very prestigious station, Lon-
don, and Cord Meyer Jr. has
been selected for the post.'
That's fine, of course, for
Cord Meyer, but not so fine
for some of the old Gro-
tonians with the? reversible .
names who have been put out
to pasture while Bill Colby
:made it to the top. Which,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
9 July 1973
CIA's superspy
William E. Colby looks and
acts like bespectacled, mild;
mannered Clark Kent. But don't
let him into a phone booth#:
because he comes out superspy.
- If President Nixon had in mind
for his new head of the CIA a
man who works in the shadows,
he has him. He's the classic
undercover man, the profes- ?
sional's professional, notes
Monitor correspondent Jack
Waugh.
For 20 years Mr. Colby has
been what the spy trade calls a
"black" operator, a "spook," a
cloak-and-dagger man, an es-
pionage agent, a master of the
dirty-tricks department.
So clandestine a man is he in
theory and practice that not
,nauch ? is even known about his
boyhood. He is said to have been
a Boy Scout and the son of an
Army career officer, to have
'attended high school in Bur-
lington, Vt., and to have gone on
to Princeton and graduated from
,the Columbia Law School. . ,
'bill Colby?
? But the question is unfair.'
.Perhaps there has been, all
these years, only one Bill
Colby and two United States
,Governments. One that pub- '
licly adheres to the highest
moral 'principles in the con-'
duct of its, foreign affairs, and'
another that uses dirty tricks -
and Bill Colbys to fight what
Dean Rusk once called a
"back-alley" war. ?
With Colby designated di-
rector of the CIA. and mov-
ing out of the operations
directorate, 'the secret show
must go on. Along the intelli-
gence grapevine the word is
out that Colby's choice for
the new Deputy Director of
Operations would be William
Nelson, who, until recently
was director of the C.I.A.'s
Far East division, the job
He Is a very private person in a:
very private line of work. It is
said that during World War H in
the OSS he was known as Agent
96. But not even that is certain.
He won his big reputation in'
the CIA in Vietnam where he
headed Operation Phoenix, a
project that Is still touchy. It'
kept cropping up even as he was
,undergoing confirmation hear-
ings here last week. Phoenix was
part of a, pacification program
but It was designed to neutralize
' the National Liberation Front.
And while Mr. Colby was tending
It, 28,978 front members were
captured, 17,717 were "rallied"
(persuaded to defect), and 20,587
'were killed.
He comes to the pinnacle of his
life's work after having been the
CIA executive director and,
since last March, head of its
Operations Directorate (a eu-
phemism for the "department of
dirty tricks"), a department
known to have once stolen a
Soviet Sputnik while it was on a
world tour, dismantled it, photo- '
graphed it, and put it back'
together without the Russians
ever finding out.
It was an act worthy of Clark,,
Kent..
(
Colby' used to have. When ,
Colby was named chief of'
the operations directorate, he
moved Nelson up to be his.
deputy. Like Colby, Nelsqn is
a career clandestine operator..
He is said to be of medium:
'height, , with light brown'
hair, and wears horn-riniined
glasses. There is a William E.
Nelson listed in the State iDe-'
:partment's Biographic Regis-
ter. He is 52, Columbia
Harvard, and, it says, was a
researcher for "Dept of
Army," then a political ;offi-
?cer in Tokyo in 1950, and
turned up in. "Dept of Navy?
on Taiwan from 1959 to 1965.
It also says he has been back
at the State Department since
1968. But for some reason he
isn't listed anywhere' in the . ?
department's - phone book. El
NEW YORK TIMES
4 July 1973
Applications r .Ipbs in' C.!. A.
Have Dect7ined Since Scandal
WASHINGTON, July 3 (UPI)
? The Central Intelligence
Agency has received fewer ap7
plications for employment since
the Watergate scandals erupted,
but the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation and the Secret Serv-
ice report no change in the
rate of application.
A spokesman for the C.I.A.
said yesterday that there had
been a slight "but clearly, dis-
cernible" decline in the num-
ber of formal applications for
employment received by that
agency in the last few months.
He said, however, that it was
too early to tell whether it re,
flected a disenchantment 'oil
the part of ,young Americans
with government intelligence
operations because of the Wa-
tergate case or simply reflected
hanging employing conditions
In some parts of the country.
Both the C.I.A: and the F.13.I,
have been implicated in the
Watergate scandals. The F.B.I.
has been accused of having
failed to investigate thoroughly
the events surrounding the
break-in and bugging of the
Democratic National Headquar-
ters in the Watergate building
complex on June 17, 1972.
Upheaval at Bureau
The FBI has suffered an in-
ternal upheaval since the death
last year of J. Edgar Hoover,
it first director, and efforts to
find an acceptable replacement
for him.
L. Patrick Gray 3d resigned
as the bureau's acting director
In April when his Involvement
with the Watergate cover-up
was disclosed.,
The C.I.A. has been accused
of aiding a Watergate conspira-
tor in a burglary at the office
,of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg's psychi-
atrist in Los Angeles.
' "We haven't noticed any de-
cline in employment at the
F.B.I.," a spokeranan NM. "Of
the 8,709 04oritt4 '?,4fe einplo,9
thoril15 an averafso turnovef
of 300 agents a .year- There
have always been about 30 a.
plications for every agent's
slot and there still are."
A spokesman for the Secret
Service, which authorized costly
improvements in President Nix-
on's homes. said, "there is no
reason to think the Watergate
has hurt our enrollment." He
said that turnover among the
agents hired to guard the Presi-
dent and other top Federal offi-
cials was minimal.
"We 'maintain a continual
waiting list of more than 100
prospective agents every year,"
the spokesman said. The Secret
Service has 1,227 agents based
in 62 field offices around the
country with a total employ-
ment of 2,800, including cleri-
cal and administrative staffs:
A C.I.A. spokesman said that
formal applications' in the past
had been subject to regional
employment conditions. Whethl,
er this is the case in the pres-
ent decline, which began in
March, he said, has not been
subjected to statistical studies
that would allow firm conclu-
sions.
The C.I:A. spokesman said
that, in general, recruiters for
he agency had found for sev-
eral years that college students
were being drawn into the inner
cities to work. 1The F.B.I. Also
said that it had had some' re-
cruitment problems among coh
lege students who were drawn
to private business because of
larger salary prospects.
The F.B.I. spokesman said
"the glamour aspect" aided re-
cruiting in all security opera-
tions.
"The lure of becoming an In-
ternational spy or an F.B.I.
agent, involved in cops ami
robbers," he said, "always in a
bigger come-on than the peLsi-
Witty of ftilfillhel n rlerlest or
adminIstroilVti Ttir.vo re
1 'WM olfavioAl i Ito 1)14-
reatt.
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WASHINGTON POST
29 June 1973
"7
Hunt I ni estittle8
l es to .?
About robe
Of Kel iedy
? By Susanna McBee
Washington Post Staff Writer ,
Convicted ? Watergate con-
1
..spirator E. Howard Hunt
told a House subcommit-
tee yesterday that he used;
;Central Intelligence Agency.
'equipment to conduct an In-
terview probing the private
'life of Sen. Edward M. Ken-,
enedy (D-Mais.).
Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi (D-
Mich.), chairman of the.
;House Armed Services Sub-
'committee, which listened to
Hunt for more than nine
hours, expressed shock -at
"the CIA involvement in a.
."domestic operation of a
clearly political nature, a
hatchet job."
The National Security Act
of 1947, which created the.
CIA, was designed to keep
, it from conducting domestie
, operations.
Hunt's interview with Clif-
ton DeMotte, a General Serv-
. ices Administration employ-
.ee in Rhode Island, during
the summer of 1971 was re-
vealed by The Washington
: Post last February.
But Hunt's testimony yea-
terday disclosed for the first
time that he used CIA
equipment td disguise him-
self and establish 'a false
identity as "Edward War-
ren to ask DeMotte if he
knew any scandalous mate-
rial about the Massachusetts
Democrat. .
DeMotte, 41, was public
relations director of the
Yachtsman Motor Inn in
Hyannisport in 1960, wlidn
the late John F. Kennedy
used the hotel as a head-
quarters for his presidential ;
campaign. -
Nedzi said Hunt told the
subcommittee that the in..
formation he received from
DeMotte "wasn't anything' ,a
Worthwhile" In February, ;
DeMotte told The Washing- f
ton Post that Hunt wanted
him to "do work on Chappa-
quiddick," but that he re- '
fused.
Necizl quoted Hunt as say-
ng an tinkle titi fed person 0
outside the admieistration
had suggested that he see h
DeMotte and that former
White Ifouse special counsel' ,s
,Charles 1Y. Colson author-!,
ized him to conduct the in- t,
terview in Providence, R.I. 0
Yesterday's development, 0
brought to four the number ,w
of incidents where CIA'- c
equipmeht Wati
'Used by the "plumbers," a: rn
White House team set up in k
1971, supposedly to stop se-
curity leaks. 't
The ' others were the N
tWatergate'break-in In Nine.
1972; the September, 1971,,
leirglary of the office of
,Daniel Ellaberg's psychia-
trists; . and Hunt's inter-
view in the spring of 1972,
with Dita S. Beard, the In-
ternational Telephone and
'Telegraph Corp. lobbyist ac
? cused of writing a memo t
linking ITT with a plan to
,Underwrite part of last'
year's Republican National ,
Convention. ?
Hunt, a membr
e' bf ? the
plumbers" team, has been:
'accused of burglarizing the
.13everly Hills office of the
psychiatrist, De. Lewis
Fielding. Partly because of
.the disclosure of that break-
in, ' the government's Pehta-
gon ? Papers ease against
, Ellsberg was thrown out of.
court.
. In the closed hearing,'
Nedzi said,, Hunt described
how, as a White House secu-
rity consultant hired by Col-
son, he came to the CIA in
July, 1971, and received
such equipment as disguises
phony papers to establish a
new identity, a tape recorder
, and a camera.
? Gen. Robert H. Cushman,
now the Marine commandant
and then the deputy direc-
tor of the CIA, has told sev-
eral congressional commit-
tees that CIA assistance to
Hunt stopped ,in late Au-
gust, 1971. Nedzi said the
equipment was finally re-,
covered after the Watergate
arrests.
Cushman said that he ap-
proved CIA aid for Hunt af-
ter receiving a phone call
July 7, 1971, from then
While House aide John D.
Ehrilichman. However, Ehr-
nehmen has testified that he
doesn't have any recolice- ?
tion of calling Cushman that ;
day.
Nerizi 'said Hunt's testi-
mony contradicts neither ae-k
count. He quoted Hubt' as
saying he got a call from the,
CIA setting up a meeting
for him with Cushman. d -
Hunt also told the House'
investigators that he has re-
eived $156,000 from anony-
mous sources for attorney
ees plus additional money
for "support" Hunt said he
eceived $75,000 of the
money after talking this
March with Paul O'Brien, an
attorney foe President Nix-
n's re-election committee.
"To this day Hunt claims ,
C doesn't know where the
noney came from," ? Neidi
aid.' Hunt also denied that:
t was a payoff or "hush
money." Nedzi said that $10,-
00 cash found on the body
f linnt's wife, Dorothy,
ho was killed in a plane ,
rash last Deceiriber, was
fin of the "support"
oney,
Most of the money Was
unneled through' Hunt'n
orney, William 0. Bittmano
ezdi said. Hillman has tes-
NEW YORK T IMES
29 JUNE 1973
CIA. AID TO HUNT
IN RAIDS HINTED,
By MARJORIE HUNTER
? Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, June 28t- ,
E. Howard Hunt Jr., a convict-
ed Watergate conspirator, was,;
quoted today as saying he had ,
used disguises and other equip,
ment supplied him by the-Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency for-
projects other than breaking
into the office of Dr. Daniel
Ellsberg's former psychiatrist,
Hunt's testimony came clUr-
ing day-long questioning by a
House Armed Services subcom-
mittee investigating C.I.A. In-
volvement in the Watergate,
affair., It was his first appear-
ance before any of the Senate
and House cbmmittees investi-
gating the Watergate scandal.
While the session was closed,
some of the highlights of his
testimony were discussed later
by Representative Lucien' N.
Nedzi, Democrat -of Michigan,
who is chairman of the sub-
committee.
Mr. Nedzi quoted Mr. Hunt
as saying that he had used
some of the equipment?a wig,
identification papers, and other
items?obtained from the C.I.A. '
in the summer of 1971 for sev4
eral projects in addition to the
break-in of the Cali'fornia psy-
chiatrist's office.
Asked if thr:,e activities were
illegal, Mr. Nedzi replied:
"They were to my mind."
However, he declined to gay,
what the activities were.
It had been disclosed pre-
viously ? during grand jury
questioning and court proce-
dures?that Hunt had partici-
pated in 'breaking into the psy-
chiatrist's office in September,
1971, was the first indication
of C.I.A. equipment beingdused.
by Hunt in other break-ins.
Hunt was involved in
'tified that the money was
delivered to his home after
he received mysterious calls
from a?"Mr. Rivers."
The congressman said.
Hunt specifically denied
? charges made by former
*White House counsel John
W. Dean III that Hunt had
demanded money in return,
for silence on the Watergate
scandal.
? Hunt also denied that he
asked for or received any ai-
surance of 'executive clem-
ency.
y Nedzi, whose subcommit-
'tee Will quiz Colson today,
,said Hunt repeated his
charge that Colson told him
to fake two State Depart,
ment cables linking the-
Kennedy administration
with the assassination of,
Sfititti Vietuani PNsitittit
Ngo Dinh Diem in Septern-
her, 1963. The phony cables
were passed to a reporter,
for Life magazine, but were
not published. Colson has
denied the allegation.
8
,
White House project investigitr
ing Dr. Ellsberg's connection
with the disclosure of the ;se- ,
oret Pentagon papers describing
United States involvement;, in,
Southeast Asia.
Top C.I.A. officials -had dis-
closed earlier that the agency-
had given Hunt various emit/al
ment and disguises to conduct'
what Hunt told them wasya
"one-time interview" on a sec-,
urity matter. , '
Mr. Nedzy said that Hunt's :
testimony seemed' to indicate
that Charles W. Colson, a cor-:
mer White House aide, might
have been involved in some of
the activities described by Hunt
today.
Mr.' Colson has maintained
that he was not involved in
the Watergate 'events.
Mr. Nedzi said that Hunt 4tid
the subcommittee that he had
been hired for the White House,
job by Mr. Colson and that he-
had dealt "very closely" with'
him with respect to the varioua
projects the so-called "plumb=
ers" were involved in."
. "The plumbers were members.
of the team set up to investi-
gate various leaks on securitY
matters, including the Pentagons
papers.
Asked who had opened the' ,
door to the C.I.A. for Hunt, Me.
Nedzi said: "He did mention'
he had spoken with Mr; Colson
with. respect to possible C.I.A. '
assistance. It was not clear as,-
to how Mr. Colson would hare-
dle it. It was left at that.' .*
Mr. Colson told a Senate pa-
nel, last week that he had men-
tioned to John D. Ehrlichman,
a top White House aide at the.
time, that Hunt was anxious,
to establish "liaison" with the-
agency to interview Col. Lucien
Conein ,a former agency opera-
tive in Southeast Asia.
Mr. Colson insisted, however,'
that he did not tall the C.I.A. ,
on behalf of Hunt.
Asked if Mr. Colson knew.'
what Hunt, wanted the disguise'
and equipment for, Mr. Nedzi,
replied: "Yes." He would not
elaborate. .
Mr. Nedzi also quoted Hunt*
as reaffirming an earlier state,'
ment that he had been ordered'.
by Mr. Colson to fabricate ca-
bles designed to show that the:
Jonh F. Kennedy Administra-
tion was deeply involved in,
overthrowing the Diem regime",i
in South Vietnam in 1963.
Mr. Colson has denied issuing'
such an order hut has said that;
Hunt may have misunderstood;
something that he told him.
Mr. Nedzi said that Hunt, in`,
his testimony today, gave a
third version of how he gained
access to the C.I.A. that sum-
mer.
Gen. Robert Cushman, for..:
-
mer deputy director of the
C.I.A. and now commandant of,
the Marine Corps, told Congres-
sional panels last, month that'.'
Mr. Ehrlichman had called him
when he was with the agencyt
and asked It to cooperate with
Hunt, who had just been liked
its a White House SettlriW
Mr.
"pert.Ehrlichman later denied
he had called General Cushman
and further denied any involve-.
ment in gaining agency access
for Hunt.
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NEW YORK TIMES
30 JUNE 1973
C lson Confirms ackin
6 b
enies Knowi
(11
e'in
n(D'd
Tr,,r JuL,',.0 wry
?
-7, 7 2
fs-.
numc
CO LAO Aid,
st, ?
,He Also Disputes Data
Ey Ehrlichman and Dean
?
By MARJORIE HUNTER
SInd?I to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, June 29 ? month-old deposition in a su t
'Charles W. Colson, a formef bY the Democratic National
,White House aide, confirmed 'to- Committee was released upon
day that he had authorized E. being filed in Federal court.
Howard Hunt Jr. to investigate - Both in his subcommittee
testimony and in his deposi-
tion, Mr. Colson indicated that
John D. Ehrlichman, President
Nixon's former adviser on do-
mestic matters, arranged for
Hunt to obtain access to C.I.A.
equipment in the summer of
1971.
This disputes Mr. Ehrlich-
man's denial that he had
asked the C.I.A. to assist Hunt
and confirms testimony of Gen,
Robert A. Cushman, then the
Deputy Director of Central In-
telligence, Mr. Ehrlichman had
called and asked him to give
Hunt whatever assistance he
needed.
Mr. Colson conceded that he
, had told Mr. Ehrlichman that
Hunt wanted to establish liai-
son with the C.I.A. to investi-
gate a security matter.
The witness testified that
Mr. Ehrlichman told him, some
days later, that he had called
General Cushman and arranged
for agency assistance to Hunt,
Mr. Colson also disputed an-
other former White House col-
league, John W. Dean 3d, who
was ousted as counsel to the
President on April 30.
Mr. Dean. suggested to the
Senate Watergate committee
this week that Mr. Colson had
been involved in a number of
"dirty tricks" and participated
In the Watergate cover-up,
Commenting on lists of White
House "enemies" and "political
opponents" that Mr. Dean said
had been prepared by Mr. Col-
son's office, Mr. Colson said
they were merely guidance for
invitations to White House so-
cial affairs and appointments
to 'boards and commissions.,
Mr. Colson denied that ?ei-
ther he o this former assistant-,
the late George Bell, had writ-
ten what he called the "de-
famatory remarks" beside 20,
of the names on the "enemy
list."
"It's /tot my language, it's
:not Bell's language," he said.
"T-resent it, and I hope Dean
Will tell the truth."
He said he did not know who
had written the comments about
the "20 enemies."
Mr. Colson also disputed a
suggestion by Mr. Dean that he
IColson] had sought 'executive
Colson smiled and replied: clemency for Hunt.
'It's an easy name to soon
"I never talked to the Pres!.
Only five letters," Acutally, his tdent about executive elem.
name has six letters.
ency," Mr. Colson said.
While he was testifying, his Mr. Colson furthef ? denied
activities of Senator Edward M.
Kennedy during the summer of
1971.
But Mr. Colson denied that
he had been aware that Hunt
had sought and used Centtal
Intelligence Agency disguises
and other equipment for use in
the project.
Thus, his story conflicts in
one 'major respect to that of
Hunt, who said yesterday that
Mr. Colson had authorized him
? to interview a "Clifton De-
motte" about possible scandal-
ous information ' on Senator
Kennedy and that Mr. Colson
? .had known beforehand that he
? intended to use C.I.A. equip-
ment in carrying out the as-
signment.
Mr. Colson gave an account
of his role in the Kennedy
investigation as he emerged
after five hours of questioning
. by a House Armed Services
subcommittee investigating
C.I.A. involvement in the
Watergate burglary. ? '
Something One Does
He dismissed the Kennedy
matter as merely the kind of
thing one does in the world of
politics.
"When someone comes to
you and offers information on
? a prospective opponent and you
turn him down, either you are
naive or you don't stay in
politics very long," he said.
At that time, Senator Ken-
nedy was considered high on
the list of. those who might
? capture the Democratic Presi-
dential nomination a year later.
Hunt teold the subcommittee
yesterday that, with Mr. Col-
son's blessing, he had inter-
viewed Mr. Demotte, a former
resident of Hyannis Port, Mass.,
site of the . Kennedy family
compound, but found the in-
formation useless and dropped
? the matter.
Sources within the closed
subcommittee session today de-
scribed Mr. Colson's perform-
ance as virtually flawless, with
no apparent holes in his re-
peated denials of any involve-
ment in the Watergate affair.
Later, asked why his name
"crops up so often" in Water-
gate accounts given by former
White 'House colleagues Mr
that he had ordered Hunt to
fake cables designed to impli-
,cate President Kennedy in the
assassination of President Ngo
?Dinh Diem of South Vietnam in
1963, or that he had ordered
Hunt to check out the Milwau-
kee apartment of Arthur Bremer
after the near-fatal shooting of
?Crov. George C. Wallace of Ala-
bama last year.
Hunt has said that Mr. Col-
son ordered him to fake the
cables and ordered him to check
the Bremer apartment.
Mr. Colson also denied' a
charge made yesterday by Sen-
ator Lowell P. Weicker Jr.,
Republican of Connecticut, a
member of the Watergate com-
mittee, that Mr. Colson had
tried to plant articles with
newsmen that Senator Weicker
was guilty of campaign irregu-
larities and that he was think-
ing of switching parties. -
Mr. Colson's deposition be-
fore the Democratic party's
lawyers was recorded May 28.
With a few exceptions, the ma-
jor points in his account have
since been made public in
newspaper interviews.
- The Kennedy inquiry, he
said, ,was Hunt's idea. He said
that in July, 1971, one of
Hunt's public relationt associ-
ates got a telephone call from
"someone in Massachusetts"
with unpublished information'
about' the" drowning of Mary'
Jo Kopechne in Senator Kert-j
necly's automobile' on Chappa-
quiddick Island in August,
1969. N
"Mr. Hunt asked me if I
would like to have' him try to
get that information and I said,
,'Certainly,'" Mr, Colson testi-
fied.
Mr. Colson also acknowl-
edged authorizing another
Hunt errand, the trip to Den-
ver in a red-wig disguise to
interview Mrs. Dita Beard, Lob-
byist for the International Tele-
phone and Telegraph Corpora-
tion, about her 'purported
memorandum linking an I.T.T.
donation to the Republicans to
Government help in a corpora-
tion case. But Mr. Colson said
that that trip, too, had been
initiated by Hunt.
Mr. Golsen said that the
White House paid Hunt's ex-
penses for the trip to New Eng-
and on the eKnnedy investiga-
tion. He said he did not know
who paid for the Denver trip.
Mr. Colson's deposition in-
cluded denials that he knew of
the Watergate bugging plans in
advance. For the. first time,
however, Mr. Colson said that
within a week aftr the Water-
gate break-in, John W. Mitchell,
the former Attorney General
and Nixon campaign manager,
told him that his friend Hunt
was implicated in the bugging
raid ."up po his ears."
Approved For Relcasc 2004108107 :-CIA-RDP77-00432R0001001.900.01-8 .
WASHINGTON STAR
29 June 1973
By Fred Barnes
Star?News Staff Writer
E. Howard Hunt has dis-
lased that he used a dis-
ise provided by the Cen-
ral Intelligence Agency ..
tiring a White House inves-
igation of Sen. Edward M.
ennedy's auto accident at '
happaquiddick Island.
Hunt . said he wore the
isguise, and billed himself
s "Edward Warren" when,?
n August 1971, he ques-'
ioned a man who was sup.
posed to have information
about the accident that
vould be extremely damag-
ing to Kennedy.
The probe of the 1969 acci-
dent, ,in which Mary Jo
Kopechne drowned, was.
authorized by White House
counsel Charles Colson',
Hunt said.
The disclosure by Hunt,
convicted Watergate con-
spirator, came yesterday
during nearly nine hours of
testimony before a closed-
door hearing of the House
Armed Services subcommit-
tee. , ?
COLSON testifies today
before the subcommittee,
which is looking into the
extent of CIA involvement
in the Watergate break-in
and other deomstic? activi-
ties. By law, the agency is
barred from domestic in-
volvement.
Rep. Lucien Ncdzi, I)-
Mich., the chairman of the
subcommittee, gave an out-
line of Hunt's testimony.?.
Besides the Chappaquiddick
inquiry, Nedzi said, Hunt
testified that he:
? Received more than
$170,000 in cash from undis-'
dosed sources to cover his
legal fees and other expen-
ses after he was convicted
in connection with the Wa-
tergate affair and sen-
tenced to 35 years in jail.
O Used the CIA disguise
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100190001-6
'-during an interview hi the:
'spring of 1972 with Dita
Beard, a lobbyist for Inter-,
national Telephone & Tele-
graph who allegedly wrote,
a memo spelling out
skin between the corpora-
tion and the Nixon adminis-
tration.
0 Utilized the disguise and
'other equipment from the
CIA during the burglary in
.September 1971 of the office
of Daniel Ellsberg's psychi-
atrist and the break-in in
June 1972 at the Watergate
headquarters of the Demo-
cratic National Committee.
'0 Denied that he had ever
sought executive clemency
from President Nixon or
that he was ever offered
any sort of pardon by the
White House.
It was Colson, Hunt said,
who promised to help clear
the way for him to gain ac-
cess to the CIA headquar-
ters at Langley, Va.
Colson was fully aware
that Hunt was seeking a
CIA disguise to conduct the
probe of the Chappaquid4
dick incident, Hunt said..
Colson has given a different
account to a Seoate subcom-
mittee, saying that he
thought Hunt wanted only to
question a CIA operative
about security leaks.
Once he obtained the dis-
guise and other equipment,
Hunt said he arranged to
Interview a man named
Dernott who was supposed
to have information about a
party attended by Kennedy!
before the fatal auto acci-
dent-But the information
turned out to be worthless,:,
Hunt said.
The probe of the Kennedy
accident was the second.
ordered by the Nixon ad-
ministration, which includ-
ed Kennedy on its list of
"enemies" that was made.
public this week. ?
' THE FIRST investigation'
11,
'? I was conducted by the FBI ,
on White House orders,
sources said, . and it re-
vealed only that Miss Ko-,
pechne had once been
bilked out of several
hundred dollars by a young
man.
Nedzi said that there is no.
evidence that CIA officials
knew Hunt's intentions. In-
stead, agency officials have
testified that they were
merely fulfilling a request
? from the White House when
. they provided the disguise,
!Nedzi said.
But the congressman Said.
that the fact that the dis-
guise and other material,
.was "obtained from the CIA
for a clearly domestic oper-
ation is troublesome."
Hunt asserted in his testi-
mony that his boss in the.
Plumbers, Egil Krogh, or-
dered the burglary of the.
? office of Ellsberg's psychia-
trist in Los Angeles. Krogh,
has conceded that he issued
such an order.
But Hunt said he under-
stood that for mer Attorney
General John N. Mitchell, ?
Nixon campaign official Jeb
' Stuart Magruder and de-
posed White House counsel
John W. Dean III all
aprpoved the break-in.
During his tenure on the
White House team, Hunt
Said he was assigned to as-
sess the abilities of Donald
? Segretti, who has since been
accused of being a political
saboteur for the Republican
party.
HUNT CONCLUDED that
!Segretti was a shallow indi-
vidual who was prone to
propose. "College-type
? pranks" that would not be
useful to the GOP.
After he pleaded guilty
and was convicted in the
Watergate burglary, Hunt .
said he requested money
from Paul O'Brien, an at-
torney far the Committee
fon,the Re-Election of the ,
3.0
l President.
Hunt claimed he needed
money for his lawyer's fee'.
,-and for the support of his,
al;family. But he insisted he?
'never demanded any sd-
called 1- rh money to re;,
,main Si at about the in-
volveme of others in the
Watergate scandal. ?
Some time after he =del,
his plea for funds, Hunt?
said, his attorney began to ,
receive phone calls from
unknown persons. At one'
point, a caller identified
himself as "Mr. Rivers,"
,Hunt said.
Finally, a caller cleared
-the way for the delivery of
:funds to the home of Hunt'sl
'attorney, William 0. Bitt-,
, man, Hunt testified.
HUNT SAID $156,000 was
received which he used to
pay his attorney and at.
least another $15,000 was
received for his family.
, Hunt said he assumed
that the funds were provid-
ed in responss to his request
to the Nixon re-election
committee. ,
? Nedzi said that after Hunt'
was jailed, Hunt's wife con-
tinued to receive funds. She
lwas carrying $10,000 in cash
when she was killed in a ,
Chicago plane crash last
December.
Hunt denied that his wife
had ever told James Mc-
Cord, another convicted
Watergate conspirator, that
the Nixon administration
was attempting to foist the
,blame for the Watergate'
break-in on the CIA ? as.'"
?McCord has claimed.
Nedzi said his subcomrnie-
tee has heard conflicting :
testimony from about a daz-
?en witnesses that it has in-
terrogated so far. He said'
that none of the witnesses
'has implicated President
Nixon in any illegal activi-
ties.
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YORK TIMES
29 JUN 1973
x-Presidential Counsel Tials of White,
.
House s Concern ?ver Demonstrations
Conversation with Walters
Q. This is another very
lengthy question: Mr. Dean,
you have testified concerning
your conversations on three
' different occasions with Gen.
! Vernon Walters, the deputy
! director of the C.I.A., begin-
ning on the 26th of June.
General Walters prepared a
; memorandum for the record
of each of these conversations
: with you.
In General Walter's memo-
randum record for your meet-
ing with him on 26 June, you
are reported to have asked
General Walters whether
. there was not. sonic way that
? the Central Intelligence Agen-
cy could pay hail for the
? Watergate defendants and if
the men went to prison, could
C.I.A. find some way to pay? .
their salaries while they were
in jail out of covert action i
? ?funds.
! In your testimony, you
made no mention of asking ?
General Walters whether the
C.I.A. could pay the Water-
gate defendants bail or sal-
aries while they were in pris-
on. Was this an intended
, omission on your part in the
interest of saving them or do
.you deny that you made
? these specifict f
General Walters?
? A. I recall I did make those? ;
requests and as I say, the .
ornissioin was not intention-
al. I have nevery really read ? ?
in full General Walter's de- ,
, positions. So the answer is
, that, in fact, I recall that,
. that was discussed. . .1
! Q. Mr. Dean, I believe you
testified that on March 26,
while you were at Camp
- :David, you called Mr. Ma- -
'.rotilis, the attorney for Mr.
, Liddy, and asked for a state-
ment by Mr. Liddy that you
had no prior knowledge of
the Watergate break-in. Is ,
that correct? A. That is cor-
rect, and I have so testified. ;
Q. Now, at whose instances ,
? did you contact the C.I.A.;
? that is, General Walters? A.
After discussing this with Mr. ;
Ehrlichman, he thought that
I should explore the possible
use of the C.I.A. with regard I
to assisting in supporting in ;
dealing with the individuals
who had been involved in the
incident.
Q. So the C.I.A., an effort
was made to involve the
C.I.A. also the F.B.I., Mr.
Gray, destroyed some docu-
ments which came from Mr.
Hunt's safe, did he not? A.
That is correct.
Q. Now, I call your atten-
tion to what I designate as .
; Document Number 3 and ask ?
if you will read this docu-
ment to the committee.
A. This is a memorandum .
for Mr. Huston, subject, Do-
mestic Intelligence Review: .
I might add here it is from
Mr. Haldeman to Mr. Huston ?
?"The recommendations you ,
have proposed as a result of ;
the review have been ap-
? proved by the President. He ,
does not, however, want to l
follow the procedure you ? ?
have outlined' on Page 4 of ; ?
your memorandum regarding
implementation.
"Ile would prefer that the
thing simply be put into mo-
tion on the basis of this ap-
proval. The formal official' ,
memorandum should, . of ?
I'course, be prepared than 1fect, was a propose) to set
'to carry it out. . representatives from the
"I realize this Is contrary F.B.I., C.I.A., N.S.A., D.I.A.,
, to your feeling as to the best and the counter-intelligence
:?way to get Sis done. I feel units of the Army, the Navy,
! very strongly that this pro- and the Air Force to furnish
cedure won't work and you information about the activi-
had better let me know and ties of all of these agencies
we will take another stab at to the White House?
it. Otherwise let's go ahead." A. I believe that is correct.
Q. Now, that letter can Q. Now, as a lawyer, you
only be construed as a state- are aware of the fact that !
meat on the part of Mr. H. the Section 403(d) of Title
.R. Haldeman to Mr. Tom 50 of the U.S. Code provides
: Charles Huston, the aide in mat the C.I.A. "shall have
, charge of domestic intern- no police, subpoena, law en-
, gence, to the effect that the forcement powers, or internal
? .President of the U. S. had security functions."
approved his recommenda- . A. Yes, I was entirely
lions about removing the aware. of that.
. limitations on surreptitious;
Statute on C.I.A.
or rather, on electronic sur-
veillance and penetration, Q. Yet, despite the fact
that the statute forbade the
C.I.A. exercising any internal
security functions, here was
a coordination of activities
of the C.I.A. in the domestic
:intelligence field, was there
not? And notwithstanding the
fact that the statute gave
them no internal security
functions, they were called
upon to evaluate domestic
intelligence-gathering by
other agencies?
? A. That is correct.
the prior knowledge of Mr. ? Q. Did you ever receive
.Mitchell? ; any instruction from anybody
A. I do not know that for to the effect that the Presi-.
a fact, no. sir. When I talked
to Mr. Mitchell about .it, it ;dent had rescinded. these
i plans recommended by Mr.
had reached the stage that Huston?i
they wanted to do something.' A. Not To the contrary, as
Mr. Mitchell and I talked this document indicates, on ?
about it and we decided that k Sept. 18, I was asked to see
; the best thing to do was to what I could do to get the
first step started on the
create the I.E.C.
Q. Now, the I.E.C., ef- . document.
_ . .
!should be the device by which up a group representing or
surreptitious entry or bur- ?
? glary, the use of mail cover-
? age, and of sources of infor- ?
!Illation on the campuses and
the military undercover
agents for the purposes of
I gathering information upon
the objectives of that.
A. That is correct, Mr.
Chairman.
Q. Now, do you know that
this plan was put into effect
--was, rather, approved for
use by the President without
WASHINGTON POST
29 JUN 1973
Slitideitiy, the. Su
By Ken Ringle
? w.shingtoa Nat Staff Writer
For more than a decade,
the George 'Washington
Memorial Parkway exit
south of Turkey Run has
been variously tabled
"Bureau of Public Roads,"
"Federal Highway Adminis-
tration," or "Fairbanks
; Highway Research Station:N
This week parkway work-
men finally put up signs
showing where. it really
leads?to the mam mol
; headquarters of the Central
? Intelligence AgFney in
Langley, V.
? Parkway superintendent
. .
er-Secret CIA Goes Pu
David A. Ritehie?said the 're
quest for the new sigi
"came down some months
' back from CIA." A spokes
man at CIA said the ig,n
was ordered by James Rs
Schlesinger when he took
over CIA for four months
early this year. ,
"He came in here and said
?..'Where's the sign?' and
there wasn't one so we gOt
one." the spokesman said.
He said the sign was part of
'a general policy of increased
openness that Schlesinger or-
dered at the nation's spy
agency, where switchboard
operators now answer calls
? . with "CIA" instead of just
repeating the phone num-
ber.
Parkway superintendent
, Richey said the lack of a
./ sign at CIA was "sort of a
joke going ? back over the
years. People know very
well the highway station is
not the principal agency
down that road." For years,
roadmaps have identified
the location'of the CIA.
Ritchey said he never
knew of anyone getting lost
trying to find ,CI., and that
. a greater problem was keep-
ing sightseers and tourists
out.
71?
The CIA spokesman said
people in quest of. the
agency get lost all the time.
"We get cab drivers who
never find us," he said.
"They wind up circling
around and around like
some sort of Flying Dutch-
man on the Beltway."
Did Schlesinger ever get
lost trying to find CIA?
"I don't think so," said the
agency spokesman. "That's a
piquant thought. but I don't
think that guy gets lost do-
ing anything."
After four months as head
of CIA. Schlesinger moved
UI) last May to Seeretary of
Defense.
--,:-GIA-RDP77---00432-R0001-00-190001-6
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100190001-6
LOS AIWELES -TIMES
.25 JUN 1573
^
aTeirga e
:4,0
i?
? CiSp
May 3elift1 Lid
'31402J
D?mcSpyfr
?,.
BY rtUDY ABRAMSON
Times Star!
WASHINATON ? A competent
chicken thief would not have made
the Mistake. Retaping the lock on a
door after a night watchman had
discovered and untaped 11.?that he
longed in ati Abbott and Costello
movie. ?
Indeed, some said the Watergate'
burglary must have been a counter-
Inte'lligence 'plot by the Democrats
designed to end in. arrests and em-
:barrassment for the Republicans.
But the truth was that well-bank-
rolled operatives with a generation
of experience in intelligence had
nIde a blunder that would expot:e
not only an elaborate 'scheme of
campaign espionage but ad ? hoc
domestic spying as well.
As the layers have been peeled off
the Watergate coven! j) over recent'
. months, there have been other
spying cliares that would have
caused top-drawer scandals in .their
own right in times past.
? Testimony from principals, leaks
from investigating committees and
newspaper reports show domestic
snooping has eone on uninterrupted
at least since 1967, when the Lyndon
B. Johnson -Administration put the
Army to work conducting surveil-
lance of U.S. civilians.
. The scattered stones turned. over?
by the Watergate imbroglio have re-
vealed enough io cause- some aca.-
demics .to call for renovation of the;
country's legitimate intel-
ligence institutions and to
. move civil libertarians to
renewed opposition to alt.
domestic intelligencei
functions. ? t
? A special Senate corn-,
mittee, seeking to estab-.
lish responsibility f o
Watergate and the cover-
up, has not yet dealt with
these questions:
?Was the 1970 intel-
,ligence plan that was ap-
proved by, President. Nix-
on, then disapproved five
days later, . actually put
.into effect as designed?
The scheme ? acknowl-
edged to be politically ex-
plosive and partly illegal
'by one of its chief or-
' chitects?called for break-
ing and entering to get in-
gence in
monitoring- overseas tele-
phone calls by U.S. citi-
! zens and stepped-up inter-
! cent Inn 'of mail ? addrcssed
1
to il,
ome.itic intelligence
tareette ?
, The plan %vas withdrawn
bcau!.c of objections hy
ins againzt Chilean
?
WrIlef
i;far itonver, who op-
parentiv was concerned
that a %.Vhite How-Is-direct-
ed intelligence operation
would undermine his au-
to:welly at the FBI.
?Was the plan devised
as a way of continuing the
Army's surveillance pro-
gram, ?which had been
forced-to an end by public
disclosure and congres-
sional pressure?
?Did the "plumbers,"
the White House group or-
ganized to slop "leaks" of
sensitive information tr!
the news media. fit. into
the overall plan? . ?
Reports that have come
to light in the course of
t h c Watergate inquiry
raise the possibility that
much of the 1970 domestie?
spying plan may have
gone ahead:
?Defense attorneys and
one defendant in the Seat
-
tie 7 ease reported break- ?
ins...in which, they said,
documents and egal pa-
pers were taken before,
during and after..the
, (en-dun% 1970?,..trial.,. The
defendants were 'accused
i of conspiracy to destroy
!federal property and of ri-
oting in an anikvar
protest.
?An attorney for the
Vietnam Veterans Against
the War has given an affi-
davit saying that her pa-
pers were searched and
.
tint documents relating to
oi7c of her clients were sto-
len in a 1972 burglary.
ublished reports ,
quoted assertions that Ad-
minktration intelligence
operatives had planned a
break-in at, the Breokings
Institution, a Washington
"think tank" where Mor-
ton H. Halperin, a former
National SecuritY Council
Employe, worked. lialper-
in, it has been disclosed,
was one of the persons
whose telephone had been
tapped during investiga-
tions of the Pentagon Pa-
pers case.
?Dan Rather, CPS
,White "House reporter, re-
ported his home was bur- -
glarized ancl his files rifled
in 'April, InTel, when he
was etworing President
Nixon in Florida.
?At least three break-
offi.
s in the 1. niterl States
in. 1971 and 1972 hive
been .reporte.d:, in none of
the .Cases were valuahles
taken, but pdpers were ap-
parently rifled.
, ?.Robert Strauss, chair-
. man of I cic Demecratie
Committee,
his home in Ilnuston
broltim into clecie:; the
Demeuratic national coo-
?ventlon last year. Extxn
sive jewelry and furs were
ileft behind, he said, bu.
.his files were disturbed
At the time of the burgla
ry, Strauss was treasure
'of the. committee.
--There nave been re
ports that E. Ilcmvar.
Hunt Jr., a member of ttl
, 'plumbers" and one of th
convicted Watergate cot-
spirators, slid he was
tiered to Milwaukee 1)
:search the apartment
Arthur Brenmer?in lb
hope of finding left-win;
materials there ? shorn',
after Bremner shot Al;-?
bama Gov. C-;orge C, \Val ,
? lace. Accordilg to the re
ports, Hunt did not rinks
the trip.
?A plan Was said to
have been nude to burgla-
rize the :1par:inept of Las
Vegas newspiper Editor
Hank Green!pun repor-
tedly in the hope of ob-
taining matercils &wag-
ing to Sen. Ldnund S.
Muskie, at the time a con-
tender for the Democratic
Presidential nomhation.
There is little evidence
that' other aspect) of the
plan might have hien car-
ried out, althoug-t Tom
Charles Huston, th! White
Ilott;::a security aide who
helped foribulate i'., com-
mented in secret mthlos
that CIA Director Richard
Helms was enthus.astie
about R. He mentoned
also that the heads d the
National Security Alency
and the Defense
ligence Agency wen !inset
by 1100VP7'44 oppoSitiCAL
t, Solute
. !
..,.W 4 let1gHt Snvc3tigT,tiort
_It set f, Oro .other congres't:
'Oc#11:11 VOiriftte.4;;:. rith
"!.t.e.$now.41bilty. tor inanitot;
lrig the Alii*e ,Conlact4;
f',...4t1 hearingk:/2.4:e;.-;:..;::'',,*;CV,
;So 't'zitt oily' two tOrnilit,
;ston:t. ,:}ii.htitii.'?'',ebfliei.'34.911;0
??:',thictii.ci4,,:ki-.,: oinling,:.(a eS.4.'?
t) n e'r;s4 0,1'mi .CI,v from
0 0 v, e.1.!Onntitt, :i,z.iit),thttif
ottridit % ti.., 4a it1,1,;.i.10 A
ll' ? ' 'tt 1 0 ' '-f .1."'''''1.';''
4, i I .. , a . t 1,4,., )e.,,
of li;e5:ident tat p Ma
.Johh 1N1 Liirlichnuitt'. WI,
1:notOng)?` helped Jtunt
'.prepare':11e..; the burglary-,
of thinflill'`?Ali4lierg's :psy;?,..
h 1.a t i',I.i.',,s ; offitte.f but;
backed out. 'wht,o 4.itr:.0A4lo
'.....!)6,-"illi:1116::"eP'A:ti.arelltil5tiS:eCl.7t'.6:.c3
eoon,erate:.;.it. ,stopplug an
.P.111.'itiv'eqatiort of f esiMt.
j-stil!..:Ut.. ftind.i.6ent : throughi;
:Is *,.tleXlett Cir bank, before!?,
being thanrtled hack into
?the United Sites,. :..-,;:..? -.1,::;
' -4,Ndne Of he.: InVesitgli4,
'lions to (or bye gone into';
:the tittiationit the White
trouse. itliert ,legitimate
? national., ticeuity rititters;,
huej illegal kimophig mitt::
hav4 bccornebltangied....
' i'Tor instance,, the ''pliirr
hers" r,rotip .;.:,-- I tiint, C.
.6ordom Liddy, Egli Nrogh;
.1r. and .1.3i7fd Young. A"
Nationit 1 '.:ACIII'ity Council
(daft MeMber?W5iS'.orga4'
nized hi 1971 in the .'n*ke.:1,
tn? the puhteatiOn of the
? Pentakon Pamrs.., ? : .. ' '`,,,
' Deelitssifiestiost Official
..
, 'tine next lining; Young;
liecirne the White llotise!
Matt ? officer. tinning' a
povcrornentmide effort to.
tbelassify settet paper&.
lt this positico, lie had ttc,.;,
tess to tenslive .goverri!.:'
tient t,edrets at the same;
line be was connected'
.Wt4 the 'phinberS," the,
.t:rget of poltiCal espion-..,
... .
?me charges, ., ? ' : '4
Nrogh, the head i'pluin?;:
be'," who mortd oil to be.,
Cone ;undersecretary ..of..
trin;pOrtatiOn, htis since.
i'eipried :from the govern-
mint, tetceptin.; repoifi.l.'i
billy for the 1,',Psberg pg.3.,,:,
chhttist burr,,ta.-y. ? ,,.
ung quintli left, the'.,./.
gOTrnment.the same ciat
;the Preicient: cdmounceck,
.,the reiiignations of pres73
idettlit advisers' . 11: ? 11,./z
j11allenian aria 1,Thrlich;:,
1,marand the tiring of pres-:.:.;
ldettial :counsel John Wil,.
1' calif'', And Liddy and
were conyteted of
I st.,! V.Itorsositl liefiolmil
''
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?
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WASHINGTON POST
3 Q JUN 1973
.Colson
To -Leak Secret Cab
rity" grounds, Paul ? 11,-. in approval at the re-elee- !
Weiss, attorney for the Dem- tion committee. ?
Colson said he cut Liddy
? off, saying, "This was not
I my area of responsibility"
sand called deputy campaign
? chief. Jeb Stuart. Magruder.
He said he told Magruder,
"I don't even know what'
their plan is" and that "1
haven't even listened to .
them." ,
He said he told Magruder,
By John Hanrahan
?
? Washinaton Post Staff Writer.
_Former White House aide
Charles W. Colson balked at
answering some questions
on the grounds of "national
security" but then acknowl-
edged that he had ordered
E. Howard Hunt Jr. to per-
mit a news reporter to read
a. number of classified State
Department cables, accord-
ing to Colson's sworn depos-
, ition,made public yesterday.
? Colson, as he has done
previously, denied that he
had ever given Hunt any in-
structions to fabricate a ca-?
ble linking the late Presi-
dent John F. Kennedy to the
assassination of South Viet-
namese President Ngo Dinh
Diem in 1963.
Hunt, who pleaded' guilty
in -January to charges rela-
ted to the, Watergate break-
An and bugging, previously
gave -a sworn .statement in
? May to be Daniel Ellsberg
! trial in which' he said he had
shOwri the phony cable to
Colson and; that- Colson had
' liked it. ?
But Colson, in is sworn ,
' deposition given May 28. ?
said he was "not sure that I
ever saw the text of that ca-
. hie:" ?
Colson said that Hunt, in
late 1971, had been working
with Time-Life reporter Wil-
liam Lambert "who was in-
terested in writing a story
about the entire history of
the Diem coup."
. . . I learned at some
point during the time that.
Mr. Hunt was working with
the reporter that there was
one purported cable which
was not authentic,. at which
point I attempted to discour-
age both Mr. Hunt and the ?
reporter involved from pur-
suing the story any further."
; Colson's deposition was .
given in connection with
civil suits that arose after
,the Watergate arrests of last
June.
Early in the deposition,
Colson declined to answer :
questions regarding the bur-
glary of the office of Ells- '
berg's psychiatrist, which in-
volved -Hunt and fellow
Watergate conspirator G.
Gordon Liddy: Colson's law-
yer, David Shapiro, said his
client could not answer tin- '
HI the "national security"
aspects of the'break-in were '
1 clarified.
Picking up on Colson's re- .
. luctance to answer some
questions on "national secu- '
ocratic National Committee, ?
pressed Colson as to why he
then was showing classified'
documents to Lambert.
Colson acknowledged that
. Lambert did not have a se-
curity clearance needed to
see classified material. He
said he had ,told Hunt. "that
he could ? not give him
(Lambert) anything ? but let
him read through the docu, ? der, "I don't know whether
ments." what they have got is any
"Regardless of whether good or not . . . but for
they were classified or not God's sake?listen , to them
classified?" Weiss asked. ? or give them a hearing -or,
"Did you put any specifica- let them tell you what theY'
tion on that?" are doing:"--- ?
Colson replied: "Noi" ? Colson said Magritder
Weiss asked Colson 'about responded: "Yes, I know
reports that Hunt had about it and I'm arranging.
showed Colson the fabri- that." -
cated cable at one point and In testimony-to the Water-
That Colson had allegedly gate Senate select commit;
,said "that isn't good- tee On thoi Watergate this
enough" or "can it ,be month, Magruder said Col-
better?" Colson said this son-- had prodded hint -to
had not happened. approve ? the "Liddy plan"
"My recollection," Colson but that Colson had Made
said, "is that Mr. Hunt no mention of what the plan
showed mesa series of cables involved. Magruder has ac-
and told me . . . that Mr. , knowledged sitting in on ?
Lambert did not believe sessions where the bugging ?
that these were adequate for was discussed, and periur.
his own purposes, that this ing himself afterward as
didn't tell enough of the
Story. recall telling Mr. IV Of the Watergate cover--
Hunt. to go back and keep
Colson, until March, was
digging or keep working on
special counsel to the Presi-
it and sec what else he. dent. His name has ariscn
could find and see what else
he could come up with, to frequently -in the Watergate
? ? case and he has ' emerged
see if he could come uP with in recent weeks Its the chief
something better,"
, public defender of President
Once he became ' aware
that one of the cables was : (Mr.
Position that he
phony, Colson said, he did Nixon) knew nothing
not- discuss the matter with eith" of Pia" to hug the
Water-ate or of the cover-
Hunt but rather endeavored ? -
!to steer Mr. Lambert away uP.
from the story altoeether. ?v.$
' But Colson, in the deposi- ?
tion, again denied?as he
Colson had Previously has done on numerous oc- :
given a deposition in con- casions?that he knew any-
nection with the civil suits ? thing about the bugging
last Aug. 30. In the first de- !Plans or was involved in .
the subsequent cover-up. .
position, Colson was asked ,
w o other depositions
to describe any meetings he
arising from the civil suits
may have had with Hunt be-
i/also were rmade public yes-
fore the June 17, 1972 i let-day. These came from
Watergate arrests. He did Judith Hoback, former sec-
retary at the Finance Corn--
not at that time,. mention a
mittee to lie-elect the Presi
meeting he had with 1-hint
-- and John D. Loftonand Liddy, which he de- ,
Jr., editor of .the "Monday"
scribed in his deposition
made public yesterday.
? publication for the Itepub-
'
Colson said the brief
meeting occurred in his of-,
fice in late January or early
February of 1972, He said
Hunt said Liddy, the attor-
ney for the Nixon campaign
committee, "had developed
a plan for security and intel-
ligence" for which they
were .having difficulty gain-
lican National. Committee. :
In his June 19 .deposition,
Lofton said he had acci-
dentally seen the ."Ge.ni-
stone" file which contained 4
wiretapped information ob-
tained from the first break-
in and bugging of the Demo-':
crate National Committee
headquarters in the Water-
gate in May, 1972.
, Lofton said he had seen
, the file, probably in early
June, 1972, in Magruder's
office, but that he did not
know what it was at the:
time.
' Magruder, Lofton said i,
stated he "had some inter-
, esting information about
Larry O'Brien," then the
Democratic national chair-
man.- ?
Lofton said Magruder then
s gave him some of the- infer- ,
mation orally, but "what the
information was, I don't ex-
actly remember."
Two days after the Water-
gate arrests, Lofton said he
? called Magruder and said to
jam "Well, there gees Gem-
stone" or "There goes your
Gemstone." Magruder then
, warned him never to "use
that wind again."
? In .Tanuary of this year,
Lofton said Magruder
brought up the subject again
and told, Lofton: "You did
not see anything." Lefton
-said he- angrily told Marilyn-
der that he certainly had
seen it and that Magruder
then told him that the file
had to do with legal intelli-
gence-eathering operat ions
and was not involved in
h'hisWatergate.
.SPring," 'Lofton- said,'
Mkruder again warned him
he should. not talk ? about,
"Cfrmstone." Lofton said be:
pressed 'Magruder' for fur.
tl+r explanation, but that
MOgilider again told him It.;
pertained to legal activities. '
; Mrs. Hoback, in her de-,
pesition, said she knew float-
? ing ;about any illegal activi..-
? liesroceluTing fit the Nixon'
- finance committee. -
She did tell of a staff meet-
int shortly after the five .,
q11011 who broke into the.;
Watergate had been
retted.
Addy, Who was not among)
tht original five arrested,1
got up at the meeting and
gave a pep talk, calling 111-04
break-in deplorable int-id- ?
cut" anti placing the blame--
fully on .James W. McCord
Jr, the . re-election cont-':.
mittee's security chief who ?
had been. arreSted, 41, the
Watergate, r4,
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Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100190001-6
WASHINGTON POST
8 July 1973
,
? By John Hanrahan
0.? 'Washington Post Raft Writes
Watergate conspirator E.
1-Ioward Hunt Jr., in a book
:being prepared for publica-
Atom later this year, says .
:that he proposed in 1960.
:that the CIA assassinate Cu-
ban Premier Fidel Castro as
:part of a plan to put anti-
'Castro exiles in control of
the Cuban government.
' 'Hunt, a former CIA agent, ?
isays that the ,recommenda;
.tion went to his superiors,'
Richard Bissell, chief of the ?
-CIA's Clandestine Services,
:and Bissell's first assistant, ?
Tracy Barnes, and was ap-
parently rejected.
','As the mon; hs wore on,"
Hunt writes, "I was to ask
Barnes repeatedly about ac-
tion on my principal recom-
imendation Only to be told it
was 'in the hands of a spe-
cial group.' So far as I have In the hook, Hunt says
been able to determine no : that:
coherent plan was ever de- ' 0 He hi I worked for
veloped within CIA to assas- ? Barnes as e'nef of political
sinate Castro, though it was action in in 1955 CIA, proj-
the heart's desire of many , eet that overthrew Col. .1a-
exile groups." cobo Arben ? in ?Guateinala.
A copy of galley proofs of The "Cubae project," for .
Hunt's book was obtained by ? which Hunt also served as
'The Washington Post. The . political ettion chief, was
book deals with the CIA modeled after the successful
planning with Cuban exiles . effort in Guatemala, ? Hunt
.for an invasion of Cuba?' says.
. planning which resulted in ? 0 He am Barnes met with
'the April, 1961, Bay of Pigs then White House aide Ar-
:Amphibious landing in t,hur Schlesinger Jr., and
ewhich Castro's troops routed. ' then U.N. imbassador Adlai
the invaders. E. Steven: on in the White
In his book, Hunt lauds House in early 1961. Hunt
the CIA and Cuban exiles' says the Cuban operation ?
role in the affair, but an- was disci ssed with Schle-
grily blames then President singer at ..hat time. He says
-John F. Kennedy and the Stovensee entered while
Joint Chiefs of Staff for fail- they we 'e meeting and
ing to provide the necessary I asked B: roes: "Everything
.air support which , he be- going we 1, Tracy?" This in-
heves could have brought dicated I Hunt that Steven-
Victory to the invaders, son was tware of the .Cuban
*4' Hunt, who has written sev7 plans in advance, Hunt says.
eral spy thrillers under ? Be;' card Barker and
pseudonyms, fills this latest Frank eeurgis, later charged
tale with incidents and anee- as co-co ispirators with Hunt
dotes that seem aldn to the anti fe ir others in the
, Watergate affair: a briefcase I/Vetere:Ate affair, played /
-filled with $115,000 in cash; roles ir anti-Castro activity
bungle?a CIA agent loses before he Bay of Pigs oper-
a briefcase crammed with ation.
Classified documents and ? R'e .1-lard M. Nixon, in
cables; "safe houses;" clao- 1960 ae vice president,' was
destine meetings; false "'-the CI ban invasion prdject's
names. actio e officer within the
Although Hunt says at one While' Hotise and that, ac-
point in the book, "I have cording to Nixon's military
no politics," his writing pro- aide, Brig.. Gen. Robert
VideS an insight Into his Cushman, ,"Nixon wanted
,strong antiemmturfistri and 1.1011ititg to go weongi" ?
Sf
E. HOW 5R,I) HUNT
... ultimate spy thriller
his distrust ?tod Suspicion of
U.S. and Cliban liberals, as
,well as his :ear that some of
his fellow 'AA agents were
"soft on contrnunism."
? Nixon was defeated by
Kennedy in the 1960 presi-
dential race, ?a fact Hunt la7
meats, saying: 1'Unfortunate-
? ly, when I was later to'need
(him) ,. . . Nixon . . . had
been supplanted by a new
administration.'
Hunt, in his accounte Por-
trays Barker as a loyal side-
kick, calling him "eager,
efficient and completely
,dedicated ... and overall his
help was ihvaluable." Hunt
identifies Barker only as
'Bernie", in the text, but
identifies him by his true
panic in a footnote.
Prior to working on, the
Cuban project, Hunt said,
Barker had infiltrated the /
Havana police for the CIA
and later helped many refu-
gees escape from Castro's
.Cuba.
Sturgis, identified by his
alias "Frank Fiorini," served
as copilot, on a plane that
dropped anti-Ca ern leaflets
, on Havana ie late 1959,
? Hunt says.
Hunt, 1)1)11 ,1S bickering
among varietis political 'fac-
tions among the refugees
' and ,?encern among some of ,
the Cuban exile S that they
were being ."used" by the
U.S. The operation, Hunt
says, was planned entirely
by the CIA and the Joint.
Chiefs 'of ? Staff. 'Training
was assisted by the Green
Berets. As Hunt, says:
"To /paraphrase . a homily:
this was too important; to be
, left to Cuban generals."
Hunt tells of receiving a
\ brief case containing $115,- ,
000 in case from the same
finance officer with whom I
had worked during the Gua-
temalan' ? 'operation" and
passing it n to a treasurer
for theTkile group.
Fearful that "the ' next
time , 1 could be hijack-.
ed with. little trciuble," Hunt
arranged to have all fu-
ture payments "arranged
through a series of foreign
banks," ?. ?
. Hunt's fellow CIA agent,
identified only as Sam,
wasn't as lucky in avoiding
disaster, Hunt says. In a pas-
sage that sounds like it
could come from one or .
Hunt's fietioo spy thrillers,
Hunt tells of meeting with a ,
CIA security officer who.
"uneasily. told ?
iipinfew me that
4
0401 had tgal; it3
filled with classified docti-
?? m'entS had cables ..." .
. "In addition to :the possi-
ble compromise of CIA ;f
codes, t the 'security officer";
tal!i, other missing papers!.
?eave the identities of agents,'
in Cuba and the names .oel
CIA personnel around the*.
? hemisphere," Hunt writes. ?
The matter was resolved,'
Hunt writes, "by firing Sam
and making a general as-
sumption after the lapse
of a month? that ? sneak :
thieves, rather than Castro '
agents, had stolen the brief-
ease and destroyed its con-
tents when nothing.of value
,vas found."
A few days later, Hunt
says, Sam' called , and bd
-rated Hunt "for not having ' ?
stood up for him." Hunt, in' ;
turn, berated him. When,
Sam complains that the CIA,:
"treated me pretty. rough,";
, Hunt responds, in ,his best..
James Bond-ien 'style.' "Not l,
as -rough as Castro treat8..,
our, boys when he :.eatch,es',
them."
Throughout ;? his dealings
with the Cuban exiles, Hunt'
? says he' tried to play it
straight with them. The only
time he lied to' them, he
says.. were ? "on direct .or7
? tiers." Even then, he says,
"... each time I've lied I've
felt shabby about 't." ' ? .?
Hunt says in the foreword.
that his book was written in
1967 and was intended "as a .
private legacy to my
children: perhaps eventually
to be lodged in a university.
'library." ?
However, ''Hutit says, the ,
Watergate affair changed all
that and he has decided to
go public with the work. He
states:
. "In 1972 ... my name was
blazoned across the country,
in connection with the
Watergate affair, and gov-
ernment sources revealed to
the press the fact that I had
been a CIA official. Moreo-
ver, these same sources pro-
vided the ',press with dis-
torted accounts of my in- ...
volvement in the Bay of :
Pigs operation,
'This unilateral action by. ;
the government relieved me ;
of the obligation to maintain
further secrecy cOncerning:?
CIA connection and the true
role that I and others played
III
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. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100190001-6
NEW YORK TIMES
9 July 1973
Cuban.ReiJoifedly Links Fuii6.: to Mint
to
.? Special tO The New York Times
MIAMI, July. 8?The Cuban
exile leader Of the abortive
1961 Bay of Pigs invasion .has
reportedly delivered $21,000 id
"support" money for the con*
vicied Watergate burglars whn
:were from Miami. -
Manuel F. Artime, the Cuban
leader, has reportedly told the
Dade County State Attorney,
RiOard E. Gerstein, that the
money had come in. Cash either
directly or indirectly froin E.
Howard Hunt Jr., another con-
, vieted Watergate. conspirator,
Sources close to the investi-
gation told The New York
Times that Mr. Artime had tes,
tified that the money was
paSsed on to Bernard L. Barker,
Frank Sturgis, Eugenio R. Mar-
tinez and 'Virgilio Gonzalez?,-
all, 'convicted Watergate bur-
glats from ?Miami?and their
families. ? ? ' ? ( ? ?
In sworn testimony Thurs.
day before Mr. Gerstein's in-
vestigator, Mr. Artime report-
edly said that he had ? had,
frequent contacts With the five%
figures. He ;said thel
latest tobk place a week ago,
when he visited them at the
Federal Prison at 15anbury;
Conn.
Key Biscayne Meeting '
, Mr. Gerstein, whose year-
long investigation of the Miami
? aspects of the Watergate affair
first uncovered' financial links
between the break-in and the
? Committee for the Re-election.
of the President, is seeking evi-
dence that the entry was plan-
ned and approved at a Key
Biscayne meeting on March 30,
1972. The brcak-jn occurred
June 17, 1972.
. Details of the meeting, al-
legedly attended by former At-
torney General John N.
Mitchell, were described last
. month before the Senate \Nr.7
: tergate COrniffittee ' by ,Jeb
.7J-Stuert Magruder, former depu
ty director of the Commute
: for the Re-election of the Pres
Went.
Some legal experts here hay
Indicated a belief that person
involved in the Key Biscayne
I ' meeting, and others who from
, Washington allegedly ordered
the wiretapping o 'Senate
George McGovern's Miami
contacts with Hunt, who is the
e godfather of one of his children.
Barker, in his testimony be-
;fore the Senate Watergate Corn-
e mittee last month, said that
s .when he was recruited by Hunt
in April, 1971, he and Huntsaw
in Miami "two or three persons
who are. in the old Cuban Rev-
r; olutionary Council." '
Sources OoSe to Mr.' Ger-
,- stein's investigation said that
Mr. Artime had denied any
prior knowledge of the aWter-
, gate break-in. 'He reportedly
said, however, that he met Hont
later in 1971 and that Hunt,
who said ? he was working for
the White House, tried to re,
cruit him and other Cubans for
an operation in Panama: re-
lated to drug traffic.
r ' Also Met Liddy
Beach election headquarters,
could be indicated under Flor-
ida law. ,
Mr. Artime and other t u1
ad
organized the Miami
Watergate Defense Relief Fund
last' February.
At that time, the fund, ln
corporated as a Florida "chari-
table organization," opened an
account with the, Bank of
Miami and began soliciting
funds for the relief of Barker,
Sturgis, Martinez and Gonzalez.
The fund's account is said
to. be exhausted at present.
'? But sources' close to the case
said that bank records showed
that between February and,
I May, more than. $5,800 was?
deposited to the account, of,
which almost $3,600 was hi'
cash. During that period Bar-4
ker received $660 and the other,
three Cuban conspirators $425
each. ,A /total of $3,797.50 was,
paid to the Washington
firm that represents the four.:
Mr. Artime; owner of a?meatt
importing company here, was?
selected early in. 1961 repor-1,
tedly by Hunt, to lead the Bay'
of Pigs invasion force. ,
, At that time Hunt was the
'top Central Intelligence Agency
operative supervising 'the, in
vasion's planning 'and execu-
tion. Working ? for Hunt as
paymaster 'for the United'
States-supported, ? Miami-based
Cuban Revolutionary Council
*as Bernard L. Barker.. The'
? council's Military arm was the
invasion force. ? .
Mr. Artime was among the
exiles captured and jailed.','
After hit releasefrom '
' Cuban jail in December, 1962
Mr. Artime is said to 'have had
;natty personal and professional
Mr. Artime, who appeared
voluntarily and who was not
accompanied by a lawyer, said
that during one of his, contacts
with Hunt in , Miami he also
met G. Gordon Liddy, another
? convicted Watergate conspir-
' at?re
According to ? sources close
to the case, Mr. Artime. testi-
fied that he had first learned
about the Watergate break-in
from newspaper accounts. ,
. A few months later, he re-
portedly said, he and a "group
of friends" came up with a
? plan to set up the relief fund,
but in the testiniony did not
elaborate on the inception. He
is said to have consulted Hunt
abut the plan during a trip
to Washington, and Hunt is
? said to have called it a "very
,good idea.'
Shorty afterward, the sources.
'-quoted Mr. -Artime as saying,
,Hunt's wife, Dorothy, came
'alone to Miami' and told him
.that money would be provided
to, the ? fund. She is said to
have assured Mr. Artime that
the four Miamians would have'
no legal problems in Washing-
,
tori. But she reportedly said
that Barker might have some.
itrOuble in Miami , beeause of
a charge Of having falsely nO-7
tarized a signature' to cash a-.
$25,000 check that went'
through the Corhmittee for the,
Re-election of the President,:
Gerstein for Prosecutor 4
? Prosecuted by Mr. GerStein4
Barker was found guilty in the,
charge last November. ?
FolloWing Mrs. Huht's death
in an airplane Crash in Decern-,'?
ber, 1972, Mr. ? Artime visited
Hunt again in. Washington. At
that time, the sources said Mi.
Aram said, ?Hunt gave him le
Manila envelope with si2,00p
in cash. ? .?
, Earlier this year, during an-
other visit to Washington, Mr:
Artime reportedly was' told. by
Hunt that an American would
telephone him soon in Miami;
identify. himself with a code
name, .anci_arrange for' ? a new
delivery of "support" money.
? The man never called, accord-
ing to the. sources, but a few
weeks later, he found in hit
mail box three envelopes con-
taining .$3,000 each in cash.
. ?
Mr. Artime was quoted ai
Saying' that most of the $21,000
was distributed among the four
Miamians, althoogh Martinez
got less than,. the others be
cause he is not married and has
no close family.
The. sources said that in his
testimony Mr. Artime volun.
terred his own observations
t'gbout the Watergate [ break-in.,
Although he characterized'
Hunt as a good political oper.i
?ator.' he is said to have dd.:
.scribed both Hunt and Barker
as "very bad agents," and
'Added that he Would recom-
mend only Martinez for such
kali operation.
t' Mr. Artime also Was quoted '
as saying that in one message
'from prison Hunt asked himi
for advice On hew to invest'
his money. Mr.' Artime report.'
edly declined and suggested
that Hunt employ a proles-,
Oional Consulting agency,
Appr-eved-For-Releass-2091/.08/07 ? GIA-RDP77-00432R000100190091 7p _
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WASHINGTON POST
10 July 1973
'
A' Sense f eja Vu at
Watergate
Disclos i'es Raise
"We were not involved because it seemed'
to me that was a clear /notation of what our,
charter was."
' Malty( AL fleftns,teb.
"Dick helms Mas "most cooperative and;
helpful." ?
Tom ?Charlos Huston. JOi.lirth 's:,
By Laurence Stern ,
Woohlogton Post 8toff Writer
In the vernacular of Courtroom me10-',1
drama, , someone was dissembling..
It was either Richard M. Helms, the re-,
spected formed director of the Central In-,.
telligence Agency, or was it Tom Charles.;
,Huston, the White House architect of the''
controversial 1970 domestic intelligence
? The conflict was 'rooted in an appear-
'once by Helms before a closed session of ??
' the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
last February 7.
Helms was being questioned by Sen.
Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.), It had. come to,!
his attention, said Case, that in 1969 or
1970 the White House asked that all the
J national intelligence agencies pool resources;':,
,to learn all they could about the Anti-wan
.movement. ?
? "Do you know anything," he asked Helms,:
'"about any activity on the part of the CIA,'
'in ? that connection? WAS it. asked to be.-
!Mvolved?"
? 'Replied Helms: "I don't recall' whether
we were asked but we were not involved'
because it seemed to: me that was, a cleat
violation ef what our charter was."
"What would you do in a case like that?,-.
'Suppose you were?" Case persisted.'
"I would simply go to explain to the'
-President this didn't seem to be, advisable.*.T
said Helms.
"That would end RV" ?
"Well I think so, normally," Helms, eon:
eluded. . ?
? Case's prescient question was posed near-'
ly four months before the public leak, QC
.T-Iuston's memoranda describing for the first.
time the intensive domestic surveillance.
program approved and then,
allegedly, rescinded by Presi-
dent Nixon five days later.
The Huston papers impli-
cated Helms and his agency
in the 1970 intelligence plan
so directly that the word
perjury was being uttered in
Senate offices by those whO
. were privy to the secret tes-
timony given by Helms in
'February.
One of Huston's top secret
memoranda, addressed to .
? former presidential chief of
staff H. R. (Bob) Haldeman,
reported: "I went into this
exercise fearful that CIA
would refuse to cooperate.
In fact, Dick Helms was
most helpful ..."
* Huston also reported that',
top CIA officials 'joined in
Meetings with other intelli-
gence agencies to draft the
1970 intelligence report.
By the time the Huston.
documents surfaced and the
.contradiction became appar-
ent, Helms had returned to
his 'ambassadorial post in
Iran. He was never publiely
On tlitentitOot
itestions
. between his own testimony
that "we were not involved"
.and Huston's .assertion that'
:Tick Helms was' most coop.-
erative and helpful." ?
t? Yet here was compelling
'new evidence that the CIA
had been involved in domes-
tic security matters which,
by Helms' own admission,
Violated the agency's con-
gressional charter. The 1947,
National Se.ctirity Act estab-
lishing the CIA decreed that
it "shall have. no police, sub-
.poena, law enforcement
'powers, or internal security
functions."
? Incidents such as these
breed a sense of frustration, .
if not political impotence,1
among those on Capitol Hill
. who have sought to place in
.the hands of Congress the
'countervailing power .of
, oversight on CIA opera-
tions.
"The Old Boy business is
, so depressing," complained
'one senior Senate staff spe-
cialist in CIA matters. "The
Helms performance was a
, love-in when they should
have been blowing him out
of the water."
Time and.time again since
its inception 26 years ago,
'the CIA has been caught
with its cloak and dagger
showing in the wrong places
at the wrong time.
Six years ago. the agency
was rocked by its last major,
intelligence scandal?the
disclosure that it had been
secretly funding and infil-
trating student associations,
universities, labor unions,
church groups and diverse
other private organizations.
Tens, perhaps hundreds of'
millions of dollars in public
funds were distributed with-
? out public accounting to In-
fluence the views and activi-
'ties of supposedly independ-
ent organizations in the
United States and abroad.
The money was circulated
through a network of tax-ex-
empt foundations operated,
in many cases, by an influ-
ential elite of bankers, law-
, yers 'and industralists who
,provided a massiVe and re-
spectable cover.
If ever there were
- grounds for a wholesale con-
gressional review of the
, CIA's role in the public and
private business of the coun-
try, the 1967 episode would
'seem to have' provided the
,occasion.
, "I'm not at all happy'
about what the CIA has
' been doing," said then Vice
President Hubert H. Hum-
,.phrey, "and I'm sure that
out of this very singularly
disrigrocelile $,uctt.lnH 'will
wand a reformation of that
i agency."
But nothing changed basi-
cally. ? ? ? ?
. President'Johnson' ap-
pointed a study commission,
headed by then Under Sec-,
retary .of State Nicholas
DeB. Katzenbach? which re-
ported back speedily that
the CIA had been following
the orders of the National
Secbrity Council in carrAng
out the covert financing
schenie.
The Katzenbach panel
called for a modest reform.
It proposed a prohibition on
CIA funding to educational,
philanthropic and cultural
organizations such as the
ones the agency had been
,secretly funding. But it also
suggested a loophole under
_which such grants could be
made to serve "overriding
national security interests."
Helms was one of the three
panel members.
Less than a year after the
secret ? funding scandal'
broke, a group of Old Boys
met in January, 1968 under
the auspices of the presti-
gious Council on Foreign
Relations to take stock of
the :.gency's somewhat bat;
ter,A1 public position. The
el.:2 panel included the late,
CIA director Allen Dulles,
international financier C.
Douglas Dillon and two for-
'mer heads of the agency's
Plans (familiarly known as
"dirty tricks') Division.
While ,the public rhetoric
promised reform and tighter
safeguards on CIA opera-
tions, the focus of the off-
the-record discussion at the
council's New York offices
was altogether different.
This was the private diagno-
sis presented to the group
by Richard M. Bissell Jr.,
who was the CIA's chief of
covert operations during the
Bay of Pigs debacle:
"On disclosure of private
institutional support of late
it is very clear that we
should have had greater
compartmenting of opera-
tions. If the agency is to be
effective, it will have to
make use of private institu-
tions on an expanding scale,
though these relations
which have been 'blown'
cannot be resurrected.
"We need to operate un-
der deeper cover, with in-
creased attention to the use
of 'cut outs' (agency fronts)
... The CIA interface with
various private groups, in-
cluding business and stu-
dent groups must be reme-
died."
Bissell's comments were
Over ini:ntled foe miblie
ittUitillittilittilb nit ii:t
of the dIseuesion was found,
In an university official's?or
lice during a 1968 student*
,raid in Cambridge, Mass, ,
k The Issue, as privately de,'
(fined among these. blue rib-
bon members of the intelli-
gence community, was not
reform. It was how to do it
better and how not tn get
caught.
Now the agency is in hot
water again in the after-
math of thP Watergate scan-
dal, the Ellsberg affair and
the CIA's involvement with
. ITT in the 1970 Chilean;
presidential election:
For the first time the'
American public learned of
CIA "safe houses" for covert,
operations within the!
'shadow of the National Ca-.
thedral in one of Washing-
ton's prime residential dis-
tricts. There have been reve-
lations of domestic political
espionage teams composed.
of ex-CIA employes.
The agency also seems to be
a dispensing center for
' "sterile" phone numbers,
Spy cameras, mail drops,
wigs and tape recorders?no
questions asked?when ap-,
preached through proper
White House channels.
The most serious lesson of
the recent disclosures is
that the agency and the
White House national sedu-,
rity managers have not been
cured of the penchant for,.
entanglement in domestic
affairs.
, And Congress, in defer;
ence to the agency's' mys-
tique of national security un-
touchability, has been reluc-
tant to press hard questions.'
One such question might
be the role of the CIA's Do-
mestic Operations Division,.
which was created nearly 10
years ago and which has
been publicly mentioned in
the press and at least one
serious study of the CIA,
The Espionage Establish-
ment by David Wise and
Thomas Ross.
There might also be ques-
tions about the nature of
the super-secret National Se-
curity Intelligence Direc-
tives (known in intelligence
parlance as Enskids) by
which the powers of the
agency have been gradually
expanded far beyond their
original charter for foreign'
intelligence gathering.
During the confirmation
hearing last week for Wil-
liam E. Colby, the nominee
to head the agency, acting
Senate Armed Service Com-
mittee chairman Stuart
Symington (D-Mo.) asked
Colby about the NSC direc-
tives. Colby suggested that?
the matter was too sensitive
for public discussion. ?
One of these directives,
NSCID 7, empowered the
agency to question persons
within the 'United ? States
and to interviep American
trnvolnrs in CAM-
091-114 h; 100 110, 'VOA+ Mid
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Ross wrote. It also estab-
lished the basis for the CIA,
front groups and fund con-.
' chlits which were "blown" in ?
the 1967 disclosures. '
? The prevailing tone of
, Congressional oversight of.
the intelligence community
was expressed during a 1971;
debate by Sen. John C.
Stennis (D-Miss.), the senior,
congressional overseer of;
/ CIA activities.
"As has been said, spying'
I ' is spying," Stennis said.
"You have to make up your
: mind that you are going to.
I have an intelligence ageneY
, and prdtect it as such, and
shut your eyes some and
take what is coming."
In recent weeks the
agency has been subject to
heavier congressional scru? -;
tiny than ever in its history,
;as a result of the Watergate
' disclosures. Five commit
'tees, four in the Senate and
one in the House, have been,
, looking at various aspects of:
agency operations as they
related to Watergate, ITT,
,Ellsberg and the 1970 intelli-t,
I genice plan.
But a searching and sys-
?tematie examination of how0
the CIA fiinctions and how,
deeply its operations in-
trude into the internal af44
fairs of the United States'
does not seem likely to
emerge from this spate Of'
overlaping investigations.
. For those who have ovex.
the years watched the cycle ,
of exposure, public peni-
tence and demands for curb-
ing the excesses of the
CIA's covert activities there;
is a strong sense of deja vu
at the moment. The agency,
for its patt, is "toughing It;
Out" Until the clamor sub";
taides once again. -
WASHINGTON POST
7 July 1973
liBond Is Cut
1,.To $50,0
ri On -McCord
-
,.. ,
By Peter Osnos ,
ii ,Washington Post Staff Writer
-U.S. District Judge John J.
Sirica yesterday substantially
.reduced the bond , for con-
victed Watergate conspirator
'James W. McCord and granted
McCord permission to travel
anywhere in Maryland, Vir-
ginia or the District:
, Acting on a motion filed by
'McCord's lawyers, Sirica cut
tile bond from $100,000, of
!which all the money had to be
!posted, to $50,000, of which.
:only a 10 per cent deposit is
/required. As for the travel,
iMcCord had previously been
,confined to the Washington
imetropolitan?area, /
,
ram Silica did not at, however?
on McCord's motion for a new,
Srial on the ground that per.,
?jured testimony and the gov.
.ernment's withholding of .per-
ainent evidence had deprived
im of a fair trial last Jam,'
ry. ,
McCord was security, direc-
tor of the Committee for the;
Re-election of the President;
until he was arrested Inside.
the Watergate headquarters of
the Democratic National Com.,
. mittee on June 17, 1972. At the
January trial, he was con-
victed of burglary, wiretap-
ping and conspiracy.
f, Sirica postponed sentencing
of McCord in, March after Mc-
Cord said he wished to testify
, before the grand jury and the
Senate Select Committee on
he Watergate about what he'
new about the Watergate, afa
air.. McCord's testimony in
oth those forums has been
enerally credited as the first
'to link top level Nixon adinin-
4stration )and campaign corn-
tt
ittee officials to the Water.:
ate bugging and cover-up.
'No date has been set for his
entencing.
Sirica also yesterday denied
he American Civil Libertieg
' nion , permission to file a
rief in,suppert of McCord's
motion for a new trial. The
s,CLU said that all seven men
't onvicted in the case are enti-0
led to, a new trial because of
erjure,d ,testimony. ,In 'Janti-0
ry. ? ,
1 On another matter, Sirica
esterday granted limited lin--
unity from prosecution to
cordon ,Strachan, a fainter;
!tide to tOrmer' White HOUse
thief of, 'staff H. R:' (BO)*
paldemaii,, and , ordered Straa
than to teatify ,hefore the Sen4
4te Watergate ttonntilttme, 4' , '. '
8 tr a ch 'Mi., 72971 si -7atitiolletir
repared to testify that hra
ent Haldeman' advance plans
or the Watergate hugging
given thThlin by Rh Stuart,
agruder,`then deputy .direca
?or of the Nixon. 'campaign,
'committee. Strachan'S immt1/.
inty means that his testiinony
at the, 'Watergate hearings
tannnt be used against him,
n any future criminal trial.
li Strachan appeared in Court
)resterday, but refused to talk
?? with reporters.? He is sched.
jaled to testify in the Senate
hearings later this *nth or,
in early Atigutt. ' '
'I Meanwhile, Senate commityl'
tee sources and source's close'.
to former Attorney General
P-ohn N. Mitchell denied yes-
terday, that any request had
een made to, Mitchell to
keep his wife from accompa-
bying him ' to the hearinga
When he testifies next week. .
; A source close to the Mit-
the!! family said that there had.
been no discussion with the
,
z.nate ccimmittee about, Mrs.
? , itehell accompanying her
? ?,busband and that as of this
-time, Mrs. 'Mitchell had - no
,
plans to attend. ?
a The Arkansas Gazette, pub.'
lished in Little Rock near Mrs.'
Mitchell's birthplace in Pine
tiluff, responded yestetday to
lreports that Mrs. \ Mitchell had
,heen asked not to attend with
n editorial saying she is "just
las entitled to her wifely rights,
lis any of the others whose
husbands have been called to
;the Senate witness stand..
A "Indeed," the newspaper
lidded, "a case could be made
'that Martha is more entitled
han the others to her seat be-
hind her husband. She is, after
.1111, the only one of the wives,
'Who made her husband get out
Inf the dirty business in ,which
ao many of the highest figures
In the administration were in-
'Volved." ? ' ? .? .
? In Bangor, Me., yesterday,
Sen. William D. Hathaway CD-
Me.) said there has been suffi-
cient evidence presented to
e,the Senate Watergate commit-
to warrant. impeaehment
procoenedings ,against President
ix
? "Something could turn up
;which would throw all of
(Former White House Counsel
i;lehb) Dean's testimony out
?,the window," 'Hathaway said,
s"but it Is doubtful this could
happen." ,
Hathaway added, however,
hat his remarks shouldhot be:
4
interpreted as a stance in fa-
?a/or of impeachment because,
/the said, "I am in a position of
being one' of the jurors if it
lever gets as far as the Sen..
late." Hathaway made his corn-,
i'ments in a meeting with .the '
editors of , the Bangor Dailyi
!News. 'I
1
iJ '37119-g"
'PLUMBERS' DATA-
REPORTEDLY KEPT
FROM F.13.1. IN 1972
,
By DENNY WALSH
- Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, July 9?For
many months, two high Juste
Department officials withheld
Information from Federal liti7
reau of Investigation agents.
that would have led the agents
much earliec to the .'-"tite
House group set up to se,-,
?tinize Government leaks to
newsmen, according to sources
close to the F.B.I., Watergate
investigation.
In early July of last year,
less than a month after the
Watergate break-in at Demo-0
cratic national headquarters on
June 17, the Central Intelli-
gence Agency' fuhnished the
former acting' director of the
F.B.I., L. Patrick Gray 3d, with
documentation of the aid pro-
vided by the C.I.A. to the cadre
of White House operatives
'known as the "plumbers," the
source :Said. ?
The three Federal prosecu-
tors and F.B.I. field agents as-
signed to the Watergate case
and related ,matters , did, not
know that Mr. Gray had. this
material until it was discov.
ered in his office?safe after he
resigned as head of the bureau
on April 27.
Petersen Got Data
. Last October, Henry E. Peter-
sen, an Assistant Attorney Gen,
era!, obtained this information
from the ' C.I.A. and, , at, the
same lime, learned that Mr.
?Gray had been in possessioit
of the material for more than
three months, according to the
sources
? ? Mr. Petersen, then ,in charge
cel the Watergate investigation
'did not pass on the material to
the F.B.I. agents working or;
the case, nor did he make it
known that Mr. Gray had con-
cealed the material, even when
President Nixon nominated Mr.
'dray in February, 1973, to. be
permanent director of the bu.'
.reati.
;? Mr. Gray was not available
for comment. .When Mr. Peer-
Sen was reached through A pub-
Ilic ? information officer at the
!Justice Department, he said he
.had "no comnient." . .
1 This inkirmation was pieced
together by the New ? York
Tittles after interviews with a
'number of 'worm familisr
'With din Watnrgni.n lilvflatitta^
ition and all its ramifications
and from various public docu-
ments relating to the C.I.A.'s
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Involvement with the- Water-
gate conspirators.
The full scope of CIA. sup-
port of the "plumbers" was not
known to the F.B.I. agents in
the case until early in. May
When it came to light independ-
ently of them, during the late
stages of the trial of Dr. Daniel
Ellsberg on charges growing out
of his ? role id publicizing the
Pentagon papers. ,
The agents are knoWe to be
,angry that Mr.' Gray and Mr.'
Petersen did not share the C.I.A.1
material with them, and cow:
tend that if they haa had the
information, much of what Th
now known about the "plum-
bers," including their burglary
of Dr. Ellsberg's former psy-
chiatrist's office, would possibly
have emerged sooner. ..,?
A? key element in the rancor
"Of the agents is that part of
the material that Mr. Petersen
and Mr. Gray had, they be-
lieve, might have led them tq
knowledge of the burglary
months before it was learned by
Federal prosecutors in inter-
viewing John W. Deari 3d, form,
counsel to the President, in;
April. .
Included in the material;
turned over to Mr. Petersen byl
the C.I.A. on Oct. 24 was te
'photograph of G. Gordon Liddy,'
convicted Watergate conspira-
tor, standing in front of the
building in Beverly Hills, Calif.,
that houses the office of the
.psychiatrist, Dr. Lewis J. Field-
ing..Sources who have seen the
,picture said that a reserved
parking space marked for Dr.
Fielding could be seen in the
.background.
Both Mr. Petersen and Mr.
Gray had information ?that E.
Howard Hent Jr., one of the'
Watergate conspirators who
pleaded guilty, had requeated
that the C.I.A. have someone;
meet him upon his return from!
California on the morning of!
Aug. 27, 1971, to receive some
film from him that he wanted
processed and returned.
Developments in April and
'May of this year disclosed that
Liddy and Hunt, both part of
the "plumbers" group at the
time, had engineered the bur-
glary of De Fielding's office on
.Sept. 3, .1971, as part of a
'search for information about
Dr, Ellsberg. hunt told the
Watergate grand jury here in
May that he and Liddy went to
California in August, 1971, "to
,make a preliminary vulnerabil-
ity and feasibility study" of Dr.
Fielding's office.
He said that they "passed
through" the building in Which
Dr. Fielding had.hil office and
took some photographs "with
la very special camera."
' Mr. Gray had known since
July, 1972, and Mr. Petersen
sihce October, 1972, that the
C.I.A. had in the summer of
4971 provided Hunt with, among
other things, a commercial
Tessina camera .disguised in a
tobacco pouch. :
Records of the Beverly Hills
iPolice Department show that
the burglary was eeporied on
Sept, ,4, 1971, that a man ar-
rested on Oct 7, 1971, in eon-
18
nectiOn with a thefe froin'a
woman's purse confessed to the
burglary and that on Nov. 12,
1971, the man renounced the
confession.
Some Justite Department of-
ficials feel it , is 'convenient
hindsikht" for agents to say
they might have uncovered the
participation of Hunt and Liddy
in the burglary with the photo-
graph and other information
held by Mr. Petersen and Mr.
Gray.
"They [the agents] neVet had
a chance," a source close to
the F.B.I. investigation said.
"How can .you .say they
Wouldn't' have gotten' to ;the
burglary, when the best leads
in the Government's posses-
sion were concealed from
them?"
In testimony before' the Sen-
ate Watergate committee' two
weeks ago, Mr. Dean ,said that
Mr. Petersen once had, 'showed
him the C.I.A. material and told
him that Mr. Gray had the Same
material. , . .
? "The fact that this Material
was, in the possession of the
Department of Justice meant to
to ,me that 'it was inevitable
that the burglary of Ellsberg's
psychiatrist's office 'would be
'discovered," Mr. Dean said. "I
felt that any investigator worth'
his salt would certainly be able
to look at the pictures in th6'
files at the Department of Jus-
tice and immediately determine
the location and from there
discover the fact that there had
been a burglary at the office
that was in the picure."
,Seek to Prove Identities
? Included in the material
given to Mr. Gray last July was
a rundown on how the C.I.A.
had furnished alias documents
,to Hunt in July, 1971, in the
.name of Edward, Joseph War-
'ten, and ih the name of Edward
y. Hamilton during the more
than 20 years Hunt served as
a C.I.A. agent. It was also re-
counted in the documents
turned over to Mr. Gray how
the C.I.A. had furnished Liddy
with alias documents in the
summer of 1971 in the nettle of
George F. Leonard. .
'For six weeks to two months
following the June 17 break-in,
F.B.I. agents all over the coun-
try worked to prove to the sat-
isfaction of the prosecutors the
true identities of thepersons
who had obviously traveled
widely under those aliases. This
required the laborious compari-
son of handwriting samples and
fingerprints from hotel and airt
linerecords ? and 'the identifica-
tion of pictures . of Hunt .and
Liddy by hotel and airline 'em-
ployes. .
During much of this time,
Gray had evidence that Would
have immediately satisfied. the,
'proseeutors?the. own
.record of the help it gave to the
"plumbers." Mr. Petersen' learn-
ed in October that the acting
F.B.I .director had remained
silent. while 'supervising
agents'' tedious efforts on ,the
aliases. ? .
When Mr. Petersen received
the material from the C.I.A.,, it
included transmittals to Mr.
Gray dated July 5 and July 7,
1972. ?
-However; when the prosecu-
NEW YORK TIMES
10 July 1973
7O SPY PLAN'S END -
CALLED INFORMAL'
,pt , . ? 1 . , 1 "..)
!is. ) ? ? .. ? ,' ,e
,, ? By' MARJORIE HUNTER ' 1
itr . Speciatlo :bre New York Timok,.
Ft : WASHINGTON, July 9 '-- A
a White Rollie aide who helped
ledraft a?master 'plan in 1970 for
.
Iexpanded domestic intelligence
I?gathering indicated teday, that
President Nixon never formally
0, .
rescinded approval of the ,oper-
etion. . . .
', - Torn Charles Huston wait
quoted by Representative Lu-
cien N. Nedzi of : Michigan,
tors were finally allowed to ea
view the C.I.A. material :33 days
after Mr. Petersen obtained it,
,there'was nothing in the doctt-
moans they saw to indicate that
Flair: Gray had the same Mate-
lief, and M. Petersen did not
'menden that fact to the prose-
tutors, even 'though, he had
given 'Mr. Dean, the Presiden-
tial counsel, that infonnation
around, the tarne time, accord
'mg to Mr. bean. ' .
The C.I.A. documentation was
turned over to' Mr. Petersen in
response to a' series of questions
submitted to the agency by Earl
J. , Silbert, principal Assistant
United States Attorney in the
Disttict of 'Columbia who was
then the chief prosecutor in the
Watergate case. Richard Helms;
then director of 11,e C.I.A., ar-
iranged to turn aver the mate-
slat to Rich. e: G. Kleindienst,
,then /Went, ? General., ?
In a telephone interview, Mr.
Kleindienst said that the mate-
rial was delivered to hien in I
manila envelope and that he de-
livered it to Mr. Petersen with-
out opening it. He said. that he
never, knew what was in the
envelope. .? a
Mr. , Kleindienat.'strongly
urged the President to 'nominate
Mr. Gray to head the F.B.I. on
..a permanent basis. , ?
' The former Attorney General,.
Who stepped down :rather than
involve himself in a Watergate,
'investigation that led 'repeated-
'ly to his personal, friends and
political associates, indicated
he was not aware of Mr; Gray's
possession a the C.I.A. mater-
ial.
! Asked Why Mr. Petersen did
net give the 'material to the
F.B.I. agents in the case, Mr.'
acleidienst said: .
' "Mr. Petersen would have
!shown it to anybody, 'Pm sure,
,who he felt. should have seen
it in connection with any legit-
imate investigation. He wouldn't
'have ehown it to anybody who
'he didn't feel needed to see it. ,
. "Henry ? didn't ?secrete any-
thing' for devious reasons, nor ?
did he in any way impede the
investigation. I know Henry
Well, and I know that his only,
interest was to have a fair, in-
tensive investigation. He wasn't
Involved in a witch* hunt, but
he Was interested in anything
that bore.ort the investigation.
. Mr.' Gray . was apparently
given the C.I.A. information an
ai 'result of his Oaken- with
'Lieut. Gen. Veliiftli A. Wallet a,'
'deputy director of the iittoilla
tone? agency.
hairinata, aif 'a- Rage' Maned
;torvices subcommittee, 'as say-
ing that the intelligence agen-
cies involved were merely notie
if1ed by"' telephone to return'
'Memorandums in Which he said,,
'the,that President had ap-,
loved the plan. ' , ? .1
"So far as we could learn,
410 one at the White House
-gave formal orders to res,cind
ithe plan,"Mr. Nedzi saido,. fol-
lowing a; two-hour session in
,Which Mr, ? Husten Was que'a'
tioned 'abed:: possible invol4;.:
,itient, of the Central Intelli:;:
gence Agency in the Watergate'
r ? .
Affair. ,
?
,i. Mr., Huston declined ? to tclis:,
cuss his , testimony as he
emerged from the closed hear-
ing.
,The White House had ntk,
,8omment.
P' President Nixon, in a state,
'Meet on May?22, said he ap'-i
'prbved the intelligence gather,
ing plan in July, 1970, but that
file agencies involved were no2
'Zified five days later that the
approval had been rescinded:
'Primarily because of the Oppoa
titian of J. Edgar Hoover, then
the directot Of the Federal Bu-,
.rOau of Investigation.' ? I
1.* The master plan had called
Irer illegal breaking and enter.;
big, electronic surveillance :and
other cevert activities in an,ef-,.
ifort to stem the wave of do-
inestic disorders . on college,
campuses and in urban eras.,
P1Mr. Huston told the subeern-
anittee today that his momo-
randum, summarizing the 43-
Page report and stating 'that it
lied been approved by the Pres-
Yident, was sent 'to the F.13.14
ithe C.I.A. and other intelligence,
units of the Government on
Willy 23, 1970. He said the
memorandum had been Lap.
proved by }1.1 . R. Haldeman,
ithen the President's chief of
le5;taffil
M. Huston was quoted bY,
'IVIr, Nedzi as saying 'that, five
lidays later, lie' was'instructed
iby Mr. Haldeman to request
"the agencies to.: return their.
ieopies of the memorandum. ,
'Mr. Nedzi said that Mr. Hus-
;eon, in turn, asked an employe
lin, the White House "situation,
I:room" (a military informatiok
:and communications center) to,
*relay this message to the agen,-,,
spies. . ,
-While President Nixon , has
'Maintained that the plan "nev-
er, went into effect,' some of'
;those involved an the Water-
.;gate investigation have sug-
,sested that key elements of the
'plan may have, been adopted
two subsequent break-ins. ,
The two illegal entries in
;question were the burglary of
ithe California office of Dr.
tDaniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist
tin September, 1971, and the
,break-in at the Democratic Na-,
atienal Committee headquarters
the Watergate complex in'
!June, 1972. ?
Mia Nedzi said that Mt', Ilus-
giOn told the subcommittee to-
day that the. 11970 trinatet ohm,
did not call for tiny co.:winded
role for the CAA!
o "I got 'the iraptottaltm that,
,4-he only reason the plan wag
idrawn up %%qv; , Iwcatiqc- the
,atiroit 11011011lig
Miliito I )t)wii,.? unhappy
doz,107,111 ?hi+
iate'at
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NEWS Wilmington
13 June 1973
tting in
. It is perhaps only fair, as a counter. n
to all the bad publicity it is receiving.:
through the Watergate investigations, to ,t1
put in a good word for the Central Intel-
ligence Agency. applicability of the domino theory to
The CIA has been given a bad name Southeast Asia, the pacification pro-
by Watergate because some of its for- gram in Vietnam, and predicted that
m e r employes, and many of its the South Vietnam invasion of Laos.
techniques, were involved in various ii- would meet heavy opposition, a ?mes-
iegal activities. But the CIA in fact ? or never got.
sage the military either chose to ignore
refused to participate in the Watergate
cover-up when asked to do so by the The CIA generally gets itself in trou-
White House staff. ble when it extends its activities to
Not that the CIA did not already' operations, rather than straight intelli-
have a bad name in certain quarters gence-gathering (Chile and Cuba are the
long before the Watergate caper broke classic examples), and when it goes out
open ?. it did. It overplayed its hand in on a limb to get information that is
, Chile, financed the ill-advised Cuban in-
really not that vital.
vasion and made various mistakes in The spy satellites do a good job of
Southeast Asia. gathering information about military
. But these aberrations are not evid- :activity in the Soviet Union, for exam-
ence that the CIA is filled with bum- pie, and ? there is littl juStification for
.bling idiots, or that the CIA is un- taking the risks associated with sending
necessary. What they do suggest is that agents into that country. The same is
the agency has not always been able to' true for Western Europe and Japan and
, readjust its thinking and its policies to other friendly areas ?.plenty of infor-
the changing realities of the world. illation is available through overt
It should be noted immediately that channels. The problem is to understand
the United States must have the CIA or and evaluate it, not to get it, and covert
a similar agency. It is most important activities are of little value.
that the nation's leaders have an honest Therefore, some changes in tactics
assessment of what is happening in the are probably in order. At the same
world, and what is likely to happen. time, the CIA needs to change its view
And it is important that this intelligence of what information is most vital. It is
agency be completely independent of probably more important to the United
: other agencies, which by definition Will States today to know what the Japanese
seek information to strengthen their are up to economically than to know
own positions. what a bunch of guerillas are doing in
(The CIA with 15,000 employes,
is some South .American backwater. Pre-
not, by the way, the largest intelligence dieting economic intentions is of just as.
much value as predicting military and
agency in .the United States. Air Force
Intelligence is far larger, with 70,000 . political intentions. Too often,' however,
employes; it uses satellites to pinpoint the CIA has followed the Communist-:
.enemy Missiles and the like. Army In-
watching game that it began after
, telligence has 38,500 employes, and the World War II to the exclusion of more
eful ? . ,
National Security Agency, which is in.us tasks.
The only question is whether the' CIA
the code-breaking business, has 20,000
employes.) , can adapt itself to a new role. It is al-
Despite its well-publicized errors in ready changing?there is a sign on the
a
judgment, the CIA has a fairly good agency's headquarters now ? and its
record in making accurate, independent leaders seem willing to adapt even tfur-
assessments of political and military her. It would be most unfortunate if
situations. The CIA was critical of the the CIA got smeared by Watergate just
at a time when it is beginning to make
itself more useful than it has been in
years, ,
II
W
19
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By Milton A. Locwenthal
One reform proposal which is gain,:
ing prominence as an outgrowth of
Watergate is the deceptively simple
, notion of transforming the F.B.I. into
an independent investigatory agency
' divorced from the President and his
! Attorney General.. This is, in .effect, a
proposal to remove the F.B.I. from the
control of the elected representatives
of the people.
Such an idea appeals to our concern
OA the F.B.I. could be as severely
compromised for political purposes, as
it apparently was during the Water-
gate "cover-up." The proposal is also
attractive to our natural longing for
a kind of mechanical even-handedness
in law enforcement and a way of
. assuring that the highest officials of
? our Government. are as subject to legal.
sanctions as ordinary citizens.
Ironically, this new cult of inde-
pendence is most strongly supported
by those liberals who for so long in
toned against the independence of 1
FA-Ig,ar Hoover's 1.13.I. from the policies
of successive national Administrations.
Then it was argued that the F.B.I. was
still looking for Communists under
every bed while showing softness in
investigating violations of civil rights
--al a time when national conditions
and sentiment called for a different
kind of emphasis. Those of us who
supported this argument recognized
that law enforcement is not mechani-
cal. It necessarily involves policy deci??
sions, selectivity and value judgmenta
NEW YORK TIMES
9 JUL 1973
F. 31 Reform
which should, 'within limits, be sub-
ject to the control of the democratic
process. Oddly, many of my colleagues
who urged this position are now?glori-
lying the former autonomy of the
F.B.I., apparently forgetting the dan-
gers of the independence which they
had implored against. Could it be that
they oppose autonomy only when they
disagree with the policies of hide..
pendent officials?
Our Federal judges are appointed
- for life and are essentially independent
of electoral pressures?and we are
better off. for it. But there is a major
difference between judges and large
law-enforcement agencies. We could
hardly accent the appointment for life
terms of attorneys general, district
'attorneys or police coMmissioners any-
more' than we could accept a secre-
tary of defense or a chairman of the
Joint Chiefs who is divorced from pop-
ular control.
Autonomous judges act openly as a
check on maiority will, but they -do
not represent the threat to our' so-
ciety that is posed by independent
police forces or armies. These vast
organizations possess such great po,;
tential for massive and secret inva-
sions of democratic freedoms that we'
cannot risk their independence. We
must not let our distress over Water-
gate allow us to Ulm to "remcdies'!
that will further endanger our demo-
.
era tic. institutions. ?
This is not to say that it is incorrect
to stress the need for character and
loughmindedness in those who ad- .
minister criminal justice agencies. If
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
11 July 1973
FE End CA
Among the positive fallout from
' Watergate is a determination to
, prevent further political abuses of
two top security agencies that
, should be separate from politics ?
the FBI and the CIA.
It has turned out to be a fortu-
nate coincidence that new direc-
tors for both agencies came up for
Senate confirmation after Wash-
ington and the public had been
sensitized by the scandal to the
need for maintaining the legal and
professional integrity of these or-
ganizations.
Thus Clarence M. Kelley's Sen-
ate confirmation as the new FBI
chef was preceded by pointed
questioning on the role of the FBI
and its director. Would he make a
political speech Me the White
House? Would he give White .
House aides material from FBI
files? Would he destroy such ma-
terial on request?
20
By answering all such questions
In the negative, Mr. Kelley went
on record for a nonpolitical FBI,
He said he would not give con-
fidential, data to anyone at the
White House except the President.
He had "never bowed to political
pressure, and I don't mean to
start." He sought professionalism
at the FBI "in an atmosphere of
justice." ,
Perhaps some version of pend-
ing legislation would be useful in
spelling out FBI responsibilities
and procedures. But the com-
mitment of the director is the key
element in establishing the proper
lone for the department, and the
FBI now seems to be off on the
right foot.
Similarly, the nominee for CIA,
direeter, Wilitani i, ity, hi
being carefully questioned in the
hindsight provided by Watergate.
Before the Senate Armed Services
Committee he has gone on record
asked to shred evidence, violate the
law, or act against his own cbnscience,
any self-respecting official ;should be
expected to 'refuse or resigm. But in-
stitutional autonomy is no a guar-
antee of .personal integrity. Indeed, a
powerful, independent administrator
who lacks integrity may be tthe great-
est of dangers. * '
One major problem remains: who
investigates the President, his staff
and his Cabinet? No doubt: it: is too
much to exissa that even men of the ,
highest character will vign,rously in-
vestieate their ? "bosses." , Moreover,
we have been reminded by Watergate
that in our system of separation of
powers it is very difficult For the
legislative branch to check on wrong,,
doing by executives who ,cannot be
forced to appear before Oongress or
account to it.
One possible solution is the crea-
tion of an independent ombudsman',
agency whose sole authority would he
to investigate Government. officials.
Such an agency would have no power
over ordinary citizens but: would act
as a check on Government: operations
through investigations initiated either
by citiien complaints or by the agency
itself. Because of the 'Milted power
of the ombudsman, the risk: of its inde-
pendence might be worth taking. Cer-
tainly, it would be much preferred .to
the dangers inherent in 'canoeing the
F.B.I.?with its vast powers,' over Amer-
ican ? citizens?from' the sway of the
democratic process.
_
Milton A. Loowertlitot is 0::sociota pro-
fessor of law at John Joy 'College.
against the use of' the CIA for
domestic intelligence as being
'contrary to its mandate to seek
only foreign intelligence-. He has
called it a mistake for the CIA to
have supplied equipment used in
the Ellsb erg psychiatrist break-
in.
Thus he nailed down assurances
that anyone would have thought.
went without saying before the,
disclosures of the past year. But,
like Mr. C,olby's stated opposition
to further CIA involvement in
secret wars overseas, they are
assurances that improve the cli-
mate for keeping the CIA to its,
intended purposes.
Mr. Colby comes out of the'
CIA's so-called "department of
dirty tricks." He will need to:
convince senators that he knows
where to draw the line in this
? phase of CIA operations:
Meanwhile, the forced Of law
? and iii3P1,40 ko Woe in the
way the FBI and CIA are being
scrutinized and ? their futures
brought into line with the best
aspects of their pasts.
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LONDON OBSERVER
3. July 1973
CHARLES FOLEY, investigating in Athens, Cyprus
and Washington, finds evidence _that the CIA engi;.
peered the colonels',_coup in Greece, with dictator
Pepadopoulos as its front man?and now uses secret
-knowledge of his wartime collaboration with the
Nazis to keep. Its grip on the regime.
IN THE tawdry :pitical 'sYmb?1ises the Illassi" Ameri-
can presence in Greece, r?-hicit
thriller that is?Gieeee .tOday, op.poncnts of the reginluntly
one consistent- motif the call 'an occupation force'
progress of George' ? Fape*:-,"" The Pentagon -prizes Greece -
an ace in the Super -Power
dopouios. He.. has ..taken 'over as
game, and Papadoboulos as the
the country, the Premiership,--man
man to guard it. He has recently
, the Regency .and Presid-' opened up .Piraeus, the port of
ency. What is the game plan Athens, as the Sixth Pieces
now for this man from no., home port, bringing ashore
where whose name is a Greek- another- 10,000 -servicemen
. -and
I equivalent- ,of John 'Smith?.: their dependa-nts. Thirteen other
Where is he leading, his hi- installations also come
jaciced nation? - ? wrapped?from nuclear missile:
bases in Crete to the major corn-
A stay in Athens has allowed munications sites of NADGE
me to: till in many parts of a.: (NATO Air Defencz Ground.
puzzle that has persisted singe Environment)?a ?100 million.
the Papadopoulos ,gang seized ' electronic chessboard' against'
power in 1967. Sothepfeces *ere the USSR. More than 12,000
found in -Cyprus. ..where -junta:
Greek. officers have had training
agents showed th:eir hand in .the .in the US, and the America!)
attempted assassination of Ara::: and Greek cominands ? are -
bishop 3t1akarios,.ohersii si,
America, chief source of power -meisted, into -an sold net-
America, chief
colonels, :7-71%.'hy be; tire..:T&lonelS.'' GreeceThe United States AdminiStra- benme America's forward base
has -,ititt 'reaffirmed
in the Middle East ?' President
tupport for.
regiele.7?s. peaks ?Witla' Nixon gave, one-_explanation :
"Without aid to Greece we
two voices. While Congress is.
, would have no viable policy to
assured that- Papadoupoulos is.
save Israel.' Or, of course, LIS
:being peedled daily to restore*at.
leait -the fOrms of democracy.- interests_ in the oil-rich Arab
-military and --diplomatic aid ha.4.: nations".. ThilS; in defiance ora
been unstirted. ? ..1) iliclering 112-57..vote in 0:ingress, he has ,
,' ordered ceaseless shipments of
, ,respectability is bestowed on hea.q.,atLitis and Phantom jets 'to
!the .regime by visiting firemen ' ' ?? -
from Vice-President Agnew to e.: on ateas, then, the gu'estion:
Maurice 'Stens, former Setretar, .is not whether the US Adminis- '
, of Commerce and chief Nixon.: ?aratioe is - Molding up
--tb;junta.., ?
the-
election fund-raiser. The Penta- 'dictatorship i,, it Is a matter - tic
gon serves as the Colonels' '' how long. it On do so in the face'
? ' Prudential,' and US the,
:of a: new:atid dsing, hatred that"
f as their economic lifejacket. rlia:s: inspired :a: ,cries of horith-?
Ambassador Henry J. Tasca ' ings egainst US terS and instal)
, cheerfully confesses: 'This is ' .lations, .,? ,,, . ,
: -. ,
the most anti-Communist group . - Among 'old hands et JUS-"
' you'll find anywhere. There is .., MAAG,, Papadopotilos, 55,
_ just no place like Greece to offer. ' jocularly, 'known as ' the first'
these facilities with the back-up ;,,CIA,gent to become' Premier
? of-the kind of Government you ?:;of ?a?EiirOpean country.' Mariy-
have got here.' 'You,' not 'we,' ?Greeks, consider this to be the:
, is the only pretence ; .,... . shrtpie truth. ?
?1 ,..,?
! The quotation conies from a The charge is that not only did
diary kept by a visiting Cot. the the CIA engineer the coup that .
gressman who was briefed at the '"brought the Colonels to 'power,.
, United States Embassy and. :, on 21 April; six years ago it.
JUSM A AG '(Joint ? US Military.. :iiiaSi?Still he concerned in stitli;;
:Aid ?Assistance Group) ?bead---nitie ?eg last month's Second
quarters. He showed me a- ?I'revolutionary 'coup soirlitch re-
. sanitised version' of his notes ? placed King COnStentine with
on US aims and military activi-, .'Papadopoulos asilead. Of, State.
ties in Greece. .At one point a . In the light of 'Watergate :ell
two-star general .is recorded as ,things are possible, but there, is
saying: 'It's the best damn NalSor some bard evidence. - For
Government since Pericles,' -. perspective, 'we must ? glance
,n/SMAAG; with its dile stun i'llaek Oh t39641. wilot (11'000111
of more than 100 top military ,Veteran?.11 era leader. George
and civil advisers, its training ..Papandreou, brought his Centre
prs-grarrirne for the Greek Army Union Tarty back to power with
and its hot line to the Peritnion, ,,5,3 ',peC?.cent of the vete. His
. 21
? - ?
1,? son, Andreas.' all ?Ainerican by
virtue of wartime service in the :
? "Navy, ' was teething ceo-
nomics
?
et, Berkeley. ,California.
:He- recovered his Greek nation-
ality join the Government',
As .Minister of 'State in charge,
ibf*.intelligenee, Andreas Papanl
, dreon vtrriS Cturiped to find that
`the Greek Secret Service, KYP,'
1?....W.,)si, reality a financial ahdr
Petnir;strative.:atipendage of the'
? CIA This, he theneht,
for man" ob;tar.10..s..to :theimew,
licentre-left.. Coalition that- :?*
was
trying' to:fOrri) a MOdern,l, and
ind--alerideritt
'Papeirdreim, Who ?vii.A fin:"
? ..1.?114,d.aft.eii .the elitti-5-15Mughr
down GoVertiment,
1, is today' a nofecor'at.aCana
dian university -but may be thee
with oh :res;sfenee'?rnissitins to
rGormany (Whore there are now
1'400.000 - ? Greeks), and 1tal.,
p;ile-smnking and . out-
spoken. he ?told mO how
. covered that the KYP chiefs had,',1
'bugged all Wnisterial converse-4
,aions; and bound them into.,
,?,.er,.1.,?nlowtes fier their Ainerf.:.:,
.
can mentors.. ? .
"SrP. disrnissed ? the .two too.
,,KYP men aorl replaced, the..ellief.
I with a reliable ./officer. General
A Pore s, 1.416 was ordered to
?protect?, the Cebinet from Sitr???'
.vealance.' .11,e came
, back aoologeticallY tn. say V he ,
conldn't do it. MI the Oflujo-
?1 Ont Affiericatt? controlled
by the CIA or Greeks under CIA ,
f supervision. There was no kind
of distinction between the.' two,
services. They duplicated func-
tions in a counterpart relation-
s a hip:, ?I ' effect, . they:, were a?
agency,:, , r??,' ? ..?
I Papandreou :tried to take the-,
v?gYP the,. hillion,dollar? CIA?,
? Midget by having its ageets paid.
rhy the ?-? Greek Treasury:* Het
L failed in; this, btit succeeded in
shifting the officer who had?beent
liaison. man . between .the - KYR!
rand ? the CIA since .1960.s ,?`
He-
was -PapadePoulos,e'ilie.
present dictator,'.'he:Said. ?!":
Soon Mr Papandreou learnt .
that his conversations (which
includd a,?? long: off;thetecord ?
italk ;with this writer) were still
being. iecorcled for the ,LIS ,Em3.
bassy. He :asked ?KYrs. new?
deputy thief to'make a thorough .
'search Of his offiee and borne for '
elettronic devices.,
'-
'It wasn't until much later
that we dischVered 'he'd simply i
planted a lot of new bugs: Lo '
and behold, we'd brought in an-
other American-paid operative
as otti4 hk said. -i ? ?
KYP i, In fact, an American
creation. It was built up aft et"
the Greek' ? civil ? war of ? 1945-4.9i
when the .US' took:' over '? from
Britain the task of crushing the,
Communists. ? ? 1.:\
Hundreds of KYP agents went
to. America . for training by the,
Office of Strategic Services and,
in successor, the CIA.:. Among'
tint)), for a &Arnim ill ,t'ehiilnpt
(411 itidttilftlq WWI Mikii(IP
dopoulos. A stringent investiga.-.
:Hon was made of his anti-Corn,,,
muniSt credentials.
??? What tlie?e cOntiine ,ha
'never been nig& public',"'bitta;?
cke
Itomrade of General Grivis,,h'en-;
'self, the wartime leader: of a,
;fanatically. anii-Corimiuntsts,pritl,"
,vate army celled 'X,I confirmed
circumstantial reports that.Papa.:
dopoulos served as a..captein in
jthe Security Battalioi*: raised'
.by the Nazis , to, bold, ? down:-
iBritish-armed ? partisans .during
the war. ,Most of their work was,
in .the Peloponnese;, ?
?dopoulos's home. ground;' 'where ;
'he .interrogated su*sbectsp:,i,
Papadopoulos::? said mvicirifor-,
mem,' Was a? ? great ? believer in ?
'Hitler's' new' ? order,'.? the, ?
iwave of ? anti-Communist eel; pg.' ,
after the civil war,, the: pasts Whs
iiwined clutc af,-,a,,-/ ? !
One ? of the sharkskin-Suited:
species of US military advisers ?
in -Athens hinted to. me, at ' a
party, when I mentioned ,Pana-?
clopoulos',s.-German background,
,that it was related to, his sub-
?
',servience to US wishes.. "George-
igives good. value,' be 'smiled,.
i:?becanse there are doeumeotst
in Washington he wouldn't liked:
let Out.'
" I recalled the story told to the
by a Harvard cltm who had come
across- ?similar,..matial.?whiler ?
,researthingiftir:;a:bonk.:? When,
Iie tried, to.,reach;;;its ;source, in(
the ,,State ,b,epartment,,, he-
crisply told te,;`,lay, eft,' rt
This expl.iin,s one curiosity; of.
the Colonel',greece, Writing int
,Tpn, ? p vER, recently after
'to fteiatance
e s.? M IA
C. . oadhease thited.
r finn(qw inteuSe offiejal. Propnaliria;
,POrtrayed .Communisin?;:as . the(
only eneinY.Greece had,diller had:,
, ? ? ..
;and . Minimised , the .yerroitl,bc
,occupation,.. .until, &on. , Nazi.,
'atrocities were seen as proteked,
by ? the Cominunists:, This re'r
writing .of history clearly :reflects
the CliCtatOr.S, c011Cp'11 at?the,,
cliillger, that thegap iii hiS,o4af.,
mography Seine day h ?
. filled in.' ,,
Not' that his patrons want to,-.
shoot holes. in . the Proyisionalj
PresidentN image, yet. As an
arniabie,..JUSMAAG... officer, put,
it : He controls the most use-
ful piece of real estate arouad,
here; a Private beach-head in the
Med and the last stop for our
. planes before Pakistan, George
may be short on charm,: but we
trust him. Well, we have to.
' Even ? after being rib-loved
from his KYP post, Colonel,'
.Papa dopoulos rema in ed ' the
CIA'sfront man. Opposition.
politicians .who sought the ear.
for the purse) of James Pott, -
CIA chief in Athens before the
Coup, were often told : .`?See.,
George--he s my boy.'
George's ' spy-work on the .
Papandreous, which portrayed
them as leftist fanatics, was a ?
factor in CIA fears that Greece
in. 1%6 was for a
ititthrivOfi
UI-f liD41.1.111g of in,:
National ?Sceurity Council in
Washington , mid-Vebruary
1967, when CIA reperts from
Athens indicated that a right- ?
Wing counter-coup was ii,,min-
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ent. The question was Should,!
the HS Embassy bp asked to
stop it ? The answer, after some:!
agonising, was no. Presidential .
adviser Mr Walt Rostow ended ?
the sssion by telling White
J-louse aides and Near-Fast ex-
perts that their non-action '
made the future course of events
in Greece inevitable. I have
confirmation of this from a
senior civilian present at the.
deliberations.
What evidence is there that
the -CIA worked behind the
scenes to promote the 1967
coup ? First, the composition of
the tiny cabal of Obscure officers
who launched it. Four of the
five chief conspirators were inti-
mately connected with US forces
or Intelligence. The fifth man,
Brigadier. Pattakos, had no
"direct CIA links, but was
brought in for the sake of 'the,
-armoured units he commanded.
The. means: employed vere
also significant. The NATO
plan Prometheus,' devised in
conjunction with , US officerS,I
was a contingency scheme', fon
'se if Greece faced an immediatei
u
'threat of war or revelution..'Ve.
(when the Colonels staged tlii
-lrevolt and flooded Athens with.
-tariks, Greece's' Us allies did not
'tit.'' No, planes took' off,' ?no
M arines' landed, no move cable
1110M:the:Sixth Fleet, which was
oft Clete. ' Greek officers who
'!felephdheid -US' colleagues were
Ord to let-natore take its course.
KYP bgent. who 'has re-
floCI to Italy ? has Cast
l'Itilther light' ori these events.
'lle.'insists that. a few key CIA'
agents in Greek uniforms backed
lap operations on the night Of the
'Coup, their task being to see that
'it was bloodless. ?
?
Since', then a suctession of US
leaders has visited Athens to
-voice oPen.hpfttoVal Of the Junta'
and its value to NATO (cities-,
tionable- -after, -the- roctessivet
purges of the armed forces).
?Secretary of "Commeree 'Stens,
who collected millions of secret
campaign dollars for Mr Nixon's
...re-election, brought a message of
a.diniration from the President.
:Secretary of State Rogers cele-
brated last Ainericati Independ-
;.ence Day with the Colonels. ?'
?His pleasure at visiting a coun-
'try where. so many principles
underlying our own Declaration
'of Independence 'had their
origin 2,000 years ago' was
','brought to a blushful climax
?when Papadopoulos lifted a glass
to Mr Nixon's enlightened
?
The high ,point of the Greco-
US wooing came with Mr
Agnew's grand tour of his ances-
tral homeland. Washington had
been surprised in 1968 when the
?:unknown Agnew was selected as-
Nixon's running mate?a sur-
prise dispelled by the discovery'
that his name was backed by the
Pappas family of Boston, one of
the most influential contributors
.to the Republican Party. Mr
.Tom Pappas, whose forbears
came from the same small vil-
lage asAgnew, is the go-between
for the Papadocracy and the
White House. He enjoys both
Greek and US citizenship and ?
?served as co-chairman of
CREEP's finance . committee..
while keeping -clear of. any
malpractice.
Mr Pappas has boasted of his'
pride in being an old CIA
hand.' He is also proud of his
?500 million investment in
Greece, a complex of .peti'o-
chemical and steel plants, oil re-
fineries and tanker fleets. He
has won the Itinta's top prize,
one pursued by rival investors
as ardently as the Holy Grail*,
the Greek 'Coca-Cola Monepoli4,
Everywhere that Silirdi -went-
in Greece, Mr Pappils.N4iit' too.,
His bulky, ? sweating figure
squeezed from the helicopter
behind the VIP. He arranged a
dinner 'for Agnew and the'
Colonels at which_the., Vice.
President exalted' the tichifaye-
meats ' of the junta and its
Stant cd-operation with US needs
and wishes.
. Mr Pappas's former staff dir-
ector at the Esso-Pappas works
in Greece, Paul Totomis, be-
came Minister of Public order
immediately after the coup. The,
junta needed a civilian tinge and
Totomis was one of the few the
Colonels could trust.
The OA' .may still consider
Papadopoulos as a itippet to be
manipulated at will. But the dic-
tator has not merely Iiifiged the
Armed Forces of 'unreliable'
,elements. be-has built. up a new,:
indoctrinated Officer corps in his ?
own image over the past six.years
?` as long as Hitler had to make
over the German Army,'
remarks a gloomy ex-Minister in
Athens.
. This ? observer, once .whole-
?h'eareedly prd-American. told Mel
',that while it might be uSeful
:the Short run for the Pentagon
tO 'tete Greece as a staging poSt
in its ventures, we must ask
ourselves about the long run-
-the kind of situation that makes
,The Vietnams of .the world.' He
believes, taVthat the Americanal
have given PapadopoUlov
another clear '-assignment: Irft
'deliver up Cyprus, now -anitide-'
SZ-111IGT0N STAR
10 July 1973
t Thew Eoe' ies
_ .
' Years ago, a furtive fellow who
worked for the Central Intelligence
Agency explained to us that security is
like an onion. You peel off the fragile-
outer skin and nothing much is ex-
posed, but the More layers that are
taken off, the close* one comes to the!
central crunch. _
That's why the CIA never adver-
tised the location of its huge headquar-
ters which Allen Dulles had tucked
away in the Virginia woods just off the
; George Washington Memorial Park-
way in McLean, and why, until just
now, the signs at the appropriate turn-
offs mysteriously read, "Bureau of
Public Roads," or "Federal Highway
Administration," or, spookiest of all,
"Fairbank Highway Research Sta-
tion."
It's why CIA employes whom one'
met at a dinner party always said they
worked "for the Federal govern-
inent," -or "the Pentagon," 'Until, 'half-
way through the artichoke, one had
forced them to come clean. It's why
CIA telephone operators traditionally
answered incoming calls with the CIA
phone number only, without revealing
the name.
Well, it's something of a relief to
find that there's now an overhead
"CIA" sign on the parkway where
pendent republic, so aS. to seture
a further base in the Near East,
and remove that bothersome
'neutralist, Makarios.- ?
For the moment, the US must
'continue to back PapadOpouloa.
Its commitment of merq.'; thoney,.:
and, principle is too gat for,:
tsudden ,change...:. Indeed, Uri
'Rogers fell over himself. atter
1
last month's coup to deny' that ,
,the US would use current NATO'
'talks 'to" influence the pcilitiCal. ,-
process in .Greece.' ' Hpw long '
this.support may..be maintained ?,
id the face of NI-la-Mil and pcilitv- .
:lar hostility .in Greece. ',,,0 ,.11,31
one'S guess?but When anfi it he
,time comes ta shed the/load, :it,
1 ,
may not he easy. .. ' .
Tap us Governinent ii'irili?eli
sha ten., its ? 'sundry ...secret.
,servicc hedtagglecl and at Odds.
jPariadopoulds used .this and the
;MATS' . revolt; to malce his first
independent asSumink
CIA approval. for the deposing
of the King.
Having got away with it, he.
will tneve tdivards his next goal'
?we may,distniss the promised-
?eleetiens as' a farce?the /life
?Presidency He hopes,.to 'rule,
,unchallenged, - as did Greece*
last* dictator,' General Metatasi
until his death in 1941. 1 ?
Meanwhile,, defence expendi-,
tire has soared. Britain, France,
and Germany compete to 'sell
hintrarins.,. Greece, superficially,
is 'thriving:' it is strangely like,
Mtissoppi's: Italy b,etwEen the..
Wars. ?''',,.. ? .i 7 1 ,'
-
And, like ' that pasteboat.a.;
Caesar, ? Papadououlos has eX-
pansionist aims. Who can tell,?
If - he is permitted to snatch,,
Cyprus, where' he may turn i
next? He is, after all, an officer
' taiied'in ;the :old sCliool- of; the,,
t M.egali idea the dream al a
, greater Greece:, .. .'y . ,,, , ::, I a?t
such a sign should be, and all those
people who used to get lost going to
the CIA, or trying not to go there, ?
should fare better now..
As for the "Fairbank Highway Re-
search Station," which we'd always
assumed was a cover, there being no ,
good reason for Alaskan research '
here, we have just talked to the chief
-of its traffic systems division, Dr. Wil-
liam Wolman, and he assures us that it !
"really exists," and that while it is a !
next-door neighbor to the CIA, its du-
ties have to do with highway research,,
not with espionage. The computerizect
program permitting certain District
buses to extend the time available to
make a green light is, for instance, a
Fairbank Station baby. ("Fairbank
was a very illustrious past member of,
the old Bureau of Public Roads,"
Wolman said.)
As for the new "CIA" sign, Wolman
said the Fairbank people have "looked.
at
at it ourselves in the past few days,
and we're satisfied. If tells the story
properly."
We recommend one addition, Under-
neath the big green-and-white CIA
marker, there should dangle a smaller
sign, advertising:
WHIS 1 ? 22
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WASHINGTON POST
.10 JUL 1973
py-Plan Mekings Seen as ay t rod over
By Susanna McBee
'Washington Post Staff Writer
Meetings instigated by
?,Firesident Nixon in 1970 that
led to an elaborate domestic
?"tirveillance plan were actu-
'ally "an effort to pressure"
:V. Edgar Hoover into beef-
ing up the FBI's intelligence
'operations, a Congressman
asserted yesterday..
f Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi (D-
iMich.), chairman of the
louse Armed Services Intel-
ligence Subcommittee, said
he drew that conclusion af-
.ter hearing 21/2 hours of
'closed testimony from Torn
Charles Huston, a former
White House aide.
Huston, now an Indianap-
olis lawyer, attended the
'meetings with representa-
tives of the FBI, Central In-
telligence Agency, and other
security units. Upon their
recommendations, he draft-
ed the plan, part of which,
he said he warned the Pres-
dent was "clearly illegal."
, Mr. Nixon, however, has
said that he approved. the
plan on July 2, 1970, and
,reseinded? it five days later
. after Hoover vehemently ob-
Jected to it. The plan called_
NEW YORK TIMES
12 July 1973
1Sen'ator' Ex-Eppoy
Asian Affairs Poitioti
7.-f for easing restrictions on
,,government-directed bur-
.glaries of "security targets,"
; opening their mail, monitor-
'inm their overseas phone
;calls, and recruiting college
:campus spies.
Asked if the meetings of
? the ad hoc Interagency
'Group on Domestic Intelli-
gence from June 5 to mid-
July, 1970, indicated that the
President had lost confi-
,
. ,,dence in the FBI, Nedzi rep-
' lied, "That wa's the impres-
sion that was created" by.
Huston's testimony.
Huston, the congressman
' reported, said that the then
White House' Chief of Staff.
, H. R. Haldeman, thought
White House officials "we're
not getting the information
they desired" from Hoover ,
, on Internal security threats.
"I still have difficulty un-
derstanding why this (ad
: hoc) committee was set up
, except to use these other
(intelligence) agenices in
handling Mr. Hoover," Nedzi
commented.
Mr. Nixon, in his 'May 22
statement on the Watergate
case, said lie called the ad
,ity BERNARD GWERTZIVIAN
. special to The plest York Times .
WASHINGTON, July 11?The I The committee action on Mr.
Senate Foreign Relations Coin- !Godley, which had the support,
mittee,today. rejected the Nixon :of members from both the Re"
Administration's. nomination of !publican and Democratic par-
an.Assistant Secretary.Of State !ties, was tantamount to reject
for East Asian' Affairs ,because
Of his close identification .With
Washington's. policies on indoL
china. " ?
.1
r. The rejection of G. McMor-
trie Godley, former Ambassador
..to Laos, was apparently the
:first such deeision by the corit,
mittee on a key nomination by
any administration. ?
By a vote of 9 to 7, the com-
mittee supported its chairman,
(J. W. Fulbright, who Moved
ithat action on Mr. Godley be
I"indefinitely postponed" ana
hat Secretary of State William
'tion of Mr. Godley as the head
of the State 'Department's bu-
reau dealing with the Far East.
What it means is that Mr.
Godley's nomination, made
public by President Nixon on
March 16, will not be recom-
mended to the full Senate for
confirmation. An individual
Senator could move to force a
vote on the nomination, but
committee staff aides said
this was highly unlikely be-
cause of the bipartisan na-
ture of the rejection.
could not remember a similar
previous situation.
P. Rogers be asked to give Mr., , In a meeting with newsmen
Godley another assignment not
. later, the Arkansas Democrat
dealing with Southeast Asia. stressed that while the corn-
At the same time, after a Mittee did not doubt Mr. God-,
long debate, the committee ap- ley's qualifications as art Am'-
proVed by a vote of 12 to it 406 that i;s4 two
the nomination of William ft? been too closely Identified with
Sullio.ln, former Deputy Assist-. -.the Indochina policy, which he
ant Secretary for East Asian' A said was "an unmitigated fail-
Affairs, to be Ambassador juke,", for the ,committee to ap-j
the Philippines.
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hoc group and attended its
initial meeting because of
campus violence and 'bom-
bings throughout the coun-
try.
" Also attending the first '
meeting were Hoover (who ,
? died in May, 1972); then
! CIA Director Richard
Helms; Gen. Donald V. Ben-
,.nett, then director of the .
Defense Intelligence Agen-
cy; Adm. Noel Gaylor, then,
head of th4 National Secu-
rity Agency; Haldeman,.
I and John D. Ehrliehman,.
who was then Mr. Nixon's.
;domestic adviser.- ,
Huston told the subcom-
mittee that when approval:
! for the plan was rescinded, '
Haldeman issued a "verbal
order" to him to contact the
. agencies and ask them to re-
turn to the White House the
. memos on the plan. Huston
? said he made the contact
through an official in the
White . House Situation
Room and that the memos ?
were returned.
Last week the White
. House declined' to say
whether the rescission order
was written or verbal.
Ncdzi's subcommittee is
looking into involvement of
rove him to a post in which.
he would have respongibility4
..for policy on Asia. , ?
.Mr.' Fulbright stressed that.
'he also favored the rejection
of Mr. Sullivan's nomination,
'but that a majority of the como
, Mittee believed that, as Am.
bassador to Manila, Mr.
. Sulhi-
van would have less over-all
responsibility and would he
"less important" than Mr. God-
ley, who succeeded him as Am-
bassador to Laos in 1969.
; Mr. Godley, a gruff, out-
spoken career diplomat, has
had a history of assignments
to difficult and, controversial
posts. In 1964 to 1966, he was
Ambassador to the Congo, now
known asZaire , during a hec-
tic time in its history. '
Both Mr. Sullivan and Mr.
Godley, during their assign-
? ments to Laos, headed an un-
usual American operation that
involved the use of Central In-
. telligence Agency commanders
.(vvith a clandestine army fight-
'ins against a mixture of Pathot
Lao and North Vietnamese
units. Both. diplomats were
called upon to aprove targets
for bombing raids against Lao-
tion territory.
Mr. Godley, who has said he
"thoroughly enjoyed" his four
Years in Laos, was often de-
scribed in 'news accounts as
more of a military commander
than a typical diplomat. He
seemed to erijoY thelPiiHjOrrient
of Om iULtwy vole lie bad tO
play in approving air strikes.
? The Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, known for its antiwar
views throughout most of the
.course of the Vietnam conflict,
foreign ii telligence-gather-
ing agencies, particularly
the CIA, in domestic affairs.
Helms, in secret testimony,
has told the Senate Foreign
Ipelations Committee that
the CIA did not spy on the
I, antiwar movement in this
country.
I But Huston wrote in one
! 1970 memo that while ? he
had expected the CIA to re-
fuse to cooperate with the
? ad hoc committee. Hems
"was most cooperative and
l helpful."
j Nedzi said yesterday that
he believes that "CIA in-
volvement was minimal." He
explained that he based his
'opinion on the fact that the
plan istelf did not seek to
? expand the CIA's domestic
role, which under the 1947
National Security Act is sup-
posed to be severely limited.
?All the plan sought to do
? was increase the CIA's sur-
veillance of Americans tray-
? cling abroad, but the agency
I already had that power,
Nedzi said. The congress-
, man said he believes the
I plan was 'never put into ef-
fect, a pont disputed by anti-
war activists. ?? ?
-indicated to Mr. Rogers last
last month that the nomina-
'dons of both Mr. Sullivan and
Mr. Godley were in jeopardy,
but Mr.?Rogers refused the offer
of Mr. Fulbright to withdraw,
'.their names, a staff aide said.
Although Mr. Godley and Mr.
'Sullivan were nominated to
their posts in March, the com-
mittee did not hold hearings
until May 9 and 10. At that
time, both men underwent ex-
tensive questioning, and both
supported the Administration's
'policies in Indochina. Mr. Ful-
bright said then that, while he
respected thcm, he ,was "dis-
turbed" that they had been so
i
deeply involved n the Asian
policy and were to be re-
assigned to the area.
'Mr. Sullivan was recalled
for, questioning before closed
doors of the committee today.
He .was given what Senator
Jacob K. Javits, Republican of
New York, called "a grilling."?
Late this afternoon the com-
mittee reconvened and, in sec-
ret voting, Mr. Fulbright pro-
posed that action on both Mr.
Sullivan and Mr. Godley be "in-
definitely postponed." After sev
Oat objections were raised, Mr.
Vulbright withdrew?his motion,
and the votes were taken sepa-
rately on the two men.
Mr. Sullvian's nomination
was supported, with Mr. 'Ful-
bright, and Senator Stuart Sym-
ington, Democrat of Missouri,
? and Senator George McGoverm
Democrat of BOuth Dakota, lit
aid hi the Itirhi:4 ,Mto,
? On the vote on Mr. Godley,
Mr. Fulbright was joined by
the fallowing senators opposing
the nomination:
Senator Frank Church,.
23
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t
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Democrat of Idaho; Senator
Symington; Senator Claiborne
Pell, Democrat of Rhode Island;
Senator Edmund S. Muskie,
Democrat of Maine; Senator Mc-
Govern; Senator Clifford P.
,Case, Republican of New Jersey;
? Senator Javits, and Senator
!Charles H. Percy, Republican
of Illinois.
. Vote a Bitter Defeat
? The vote was a bitter defeat
fOr the Administration. It was
unexpected, since throughout
the long delay in action on' the
? two men, Senete sources kept
easerting that eventually both
t' would be reported out,
favorably.
There ; was no immediate
comment from, the State De
partment or the White House.
Mr. Godley, acting eel the
assumption that he would be
? confirmed by the Senate, had
bee'r, working in his sixth-floor
office as Assistant Secretary-
designate. The latest edition of
the State Department telephone
book, published in May, listed
him as Assistant secretary.
Originally, the committee had
: also delayed action on Graham
; A. Martin as Ambassador to
South Vietnam, citing his for-
mer experieneb as Ambassador
,.t? Tailand and some reports
; linking him to recommenda-
tions for' secret funding by
the C.I.A. to aid the Christian
Democrat party while he was
;Ambassador to Italy.
, But last month, after the
'Administration pleaded that all
, Ambassador was needed in Sai-
gon, the committee approved
? Mr. Martin's nomination and
?1ie was confined by the Senate,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
28 June 1973
National security'
By David Mitch
In the wake of Watergate, Congress.
almost certainly will be looking into
the subject of national security. And it
may be time to recognize ? although
few may be ready to admit it ? that
national security investigations, in
practice, often boil down to a question
of whose ox is being gored.,
There are several reasons for this::
? People disagree markedly on the
degree of threat posed to this country
by foreign agents and any domestic
converts they use; what most of us
regard as our civil "rights" are
usually hopelessly, intertwined with]
our sense of what is correct politi-
callyi. and there is a natural instinct
not to want our political beliefs in-
veetigated.
Congress is interested now for two
reasons: because a team of in-
telligence gatherers operating out of
the White House on a national secur-.
ity mission ? the "plumbers" who
peed to find out who leaked the
Pentagon papers to .the New York'
Times and ? why ? got too extra-
curricular in the political realm;
and because it has been revealed
that President, Nixon in 1970 appar-
ently attempted a major overhaul of
national security practices. All the
major intelligence agencies were in-
volved. .
The President was opposed, as
everyone now knows, by FBI director
J. Edgar Hoover, who almost over-
night became a darling of the very
liberals who in the not so distant past
so heavily criticized him for alleged
"repressive" measures in this very
field of national security.
Similar questions came to a head in
the V's, what with the abundance of
causes, of ten abused and deformed to
the extent : the democratic process
was threatened by violence in the
streets.
Recall what the FBI was accused of
in the '60's when civil rights was a
hotter topic than if is now. Those who
wanted instantly to transform the
South into a haven of political rights
bitterly criticized the FBI for not
assuming a crusading posture in
regard to new civil-rights laws. From
the other side, those who opposed
change in the South criticized the FBI
for doing too much int the way of
active law enforcement.
Not being a national (or secret)
police force, the ,FBI had to walk a
thin line of investigating but lint
outwardly enforcing. It had to hi-
veetigate violations. But it did more,
24
.......
too. It infiltrated the Ku Klux Klan so
heavily ? 2,000 informers ? that the
laWbrea.kers were eventually afraid
to do anything.
The extremists' were sure their
rights were being abused: But it was a
question of seettrity for the oppressed.
And so it seems that what is a
question of security for one man is a
case of political suppression to an-
'other.
: At a symposium held at Princeton
.two years ago, when ? disgruntled
:liberals were eomplaining about FBI
inquiries Into certain new left ele-
ments, Arthur Schlesinger Jr. asked
if they weren't glad the Ku Klux Klan
was immobilized by the FBI in the
.'60's. The replies were mostly mea-
:sured silences. ?
Recently this reporter interviewed
a group of FBI and CIA sources who
'were involved in national security
work in 1970 when the ill-fated 1970
;study of expanded domestic in-
; telligence gathering was spawned. To
a man they are highly embarrassed:
? about the manner in which their
?
; professional problems are surfacing
' as the Watergate spillway continues
; to gush. They also are concerned that',
abuses of their functions by a few will
!cause a general carelessness about
' national security questionsoYet they
badly want the work kept in .profes-
,,
* sional channels, as it has not been.
? It all makes ? one wonder if the
!lawlessness that has grown in this
country since the mid-'60's ? one only
need look at the statistics ? is not the
. basic cause of the Watergate morass.
This doesn't excuse anyone for mis-
deeds, especially those close to the top
of the power structure, but 'neither
should it make it easier to neglect the
essential watchfulness required' to
preserve the order so necessary to a
free, democratic society.'
Hopefully Congress will forget par-
tisan politics, and make some general
allowances for the past, as it reviews
the subject that is always so delicate
in a free and open society ? national
security. To find the' wisdoni to nevi-
gate gray, fog-hound areas, a nation
? Must lift its head above the mists of
politics into a higher 'consensus that
America does .have a noble destiny
that must be protected.
David Mulch ,is chief of the
illonifor's Chicago bureau.
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VEA REMEIG
30 JUN 1973
Making Mischief Abroad
,US and ITT in Chile
against Allende was studied at least twice by the
; White House. ?
The .report is the basis for legislation designed to
?
outlaw such private alliances between the US govern-
by Tad Szulc
ment and American corporations which is being intro-
duced by Senators Church, Symington, Muskie, Case
and Percy. The wording of the bill leaves no lout ?
what the subcommittee had in mind after discow? ing
the Mrs $1 million offer to the CIA. It thus provici,s-
that "it is unlawful 'for any citizen or resident of the
United States to offer to make, or to make, a con tribu-
tion to any agency of the United States or officer; em-
ployee, or agent of the United States for the purpose of
; influencing the outcome of an election for public office
in another country." Another section declares it to. be
. "unlawful for any officer, employee, or agent of the
; United States 1) to solicit any citizen or resident of the
!United States to contribute to, or make an expenditure
in support of, any candidate or political party, directly ?
; or? indirectly, for the purpose of influencing the out-
come of an election for public office in a foreign coun-
try, or .2) to accept a contribution from any citizen or
tion groups to stage revolutions and coups ireful or to resident.of the United State for such purpose."
interfere in local elections has been widely suspected The ITT's attempts to involve the White House and
for nearly 20 years though it could never be precisely ' the CIA in the attempts to intervene in Chilean politics
documented. Thus the United Fruit Company was be- have been generally known since Jack Anderson, the
lieved to have worked hand in hand with the. CIA M syndicated columnist, published early in 1972 internal
organizing the 1954 "rebel" invasion of Guatemala ! ITF documents bearing on the proposed anti-Allende
(where the company had important holdings) to oust
conspiracy. Until' the subcommittee investigation:,
the leftist President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman. The corn-
! pany's Boston he,adquarters, as I still vividly recall, .however, the assumption was that FIT was the "ag-
gressive" party and the administration remained
was at the time an excellent source for newsmen in fol- passive, virtually ignoring the company's entreaties.
lowing almost on an hourly basis the progress of the
W?invasion. 'hat emerges from the subcommittee's report and
In 1964 a number of US companies operating in : other information from sources close to the inVestiga-
Brazil were thought to have secretly contributed funds ' : lion is that the Nixon Administration was profoundly
?with the CIA's knowledge?to the Brazilian ?Insti- . involved in this whole process in 1970 despite official
lute for Democratic Action (IBAD), a civilian rightist !claims of US neutrality in the Chilean elections. Infor-
group that played an important role in triggering the . ?illation developed by the Senate investigators thus
military revolution against President Joh.o. Goulart, a , ; shows that Chile was the Subject of a meeting in June
highly incompetent and corrupt leftist. Later that same i 1970 of the top-secret "Forty Committee" in the
year the ITIT provided funds (as did the US govern- ? White House. The "Forty Committee" is the National
ment) to campaign against Allende in his first but un- Security Council's organ in charge of studying and ap-
; successful bid for Chile's presidency. proving plans for covert action abroad by the CIA and
But the first lime that this kind of activity could fully other US intelligence agencies.
be documented and made part of official reeord was
Thi g committeei presided over by Henry A.
t the March hearings (by the subcommittee on
" ' Kiscinger, the Ptesident's special assistant for national!'
national corporations of the Senate Committee on ;Ion:
tity affairs,' and iits membership includes the
Foreign Relations). on MI' and Chile. A lengthy sub- .1
'chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, the deputy secre.
? committee report, issued this week, describes in ,
?-y of Def4nse6tfie deputy secrettary of State, the.
detail the contacts betweenJhe Nixon administration ?
tectof o Centrahintellitence and, until last year, the
and FIT during 1970 aimed first at defeating Allende
. attorney ge?Ierahl It is interesting to note that in .the ;
and; later, at keeping him from being confirmed by
- sti' Mater 1970i. when the Nixon administration' at.; ;
..the Chilean parliament. ? ? tempted to put into effect ,its secret domestic
The central points in the report are sworn testimony genre plan, John Mitchell was attending the meetings
that M' offered the CIA $1 million in 1970, for anti- ' ;61 th
e rorty Committee" in 'his capacity as attorney
Allende operations, that while the agency rejected the, ;.genetal, At) reqUired, Other top officials may be invited
offer it subsequently suggested to the,ITT its own plan ,Iti Sit In On krn, Mingo of the "Potty Committee:"
for cieating economic chaos in Chile, and that action The Netiatip otautitimittetes roport tiold that,at least
2S:
: The Senate may soon be moving to break the long..:
, standing shadowy alliance between big American cor-
porations and the Central Intelligence Agency . and
? other United. States government organs for carrying
out covert interventions in the domestic political af-
:fairs of foreign countries. As an outcome of hearings
, held last March by a special Senate subcommittee on ?
the joint involvement of the White House, the CIA, the
State Department and the International Telephone and !
Telegraph Company in secret efforts to block the 1970,
election of Chile's Socialist President Salvador Allende !
Gossens, a bill is being introduced this week to declarel
such alliances illegal and punishable by imprisonment
and fines. ?
That US corporations have cooperated in varying
degrees in the past with the CIA and foreign opposi-
IA.R.DP-77-00432R000100190001-6.
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three conversations, on Chile .were held between
Richard Helms, then CIA director, and John McCone,
a former CIA director and currently an ITT director.
Accoiding ci testimony by McCone in executive ses-
sion, he had expressed fears of a victory by Allende? I.
rrr has iniiportant investments in Chile, 'including
the local itelephOne company ?and? asked Helms
'1whether the US intended to Intervene in the election
to encourage the support of one of the candidates who?
stbod for the principles that are basic in this Country."
"Mr. "Helms tbld Mt. McCone that the matterhad -
been considered by the 'Forty Committee," the sub-
;committee reported. i"Helms. indicated that some
'minimal eyort would be mounted which 'could be
managed within the flexibility.of the CIA budget,' that
is without 4eekind additional] appropriated funds. Mr.
Helirts wavety pessimistic about the chances of Mr.I
(Jorge) Alessandri and was ,of the personal .opinion
that Dr. Aliende would win. This opinion was con-
trary to the: official reports Of the, US Embassy. Based
upon polls ;commissioned or undertaken by the CTA,,
the 'Embassy was reporting that Alessandri would win:
a plurality." Alessandri was the independent ,
date backed by rightist Chilean groups, and ITT's ?
hopes were,ridi rig on him. .
Acord int; to subcommittee sources, the "minimal
effort" promised McCone by Helms after the June
meeting, at the White House was an expenditure
of $.100,00(1 in CIA 1 funds to assist anti-Allende
news media. !
It was also )1elms, according to the subcommittee,
who, in response ,to McCone's request, arranged for a
meeting between FIT President liarold S. Gene
and William V. Moe, the chief of western hemisphere
division of the CIA's directorate of plans, the agency's
clandestine Operation? branch. H 'MI's at this Meeting
in July; 1970 that Gerken Made the $1 million offer
to the CIA (4s he had also done in 1964) and Brbe turned
it down.
If, indeed, the CIA and the rest cdthe administration
-
remained relatively Unresponsive to ITT pressure dur-
ing the summer, this attitude changed after Allende
won tht! lariOst:nuMber or, votes in a three-cornered
election 'On iSeplenthel- 4. BeeauSe he failed to obtain:
a clear Majoi,ri1y0 latiwts4r, the Chilean parliament had
:to choose between him and Alcssandri, the runner-up.
To force the choice of Alessandri thus became
strategy of both rIT and the CIA.
second meeting.? or, the 'Tort), Committee" on
'Chile was held on September 14 or] 5, according to
,vestigation sources, and there the administration,toch
matters into its own hands? The 'subcommittee rep4t.
'said that "on, September 29, for the first time in die,
, course of the contacts between FIT and the Uniteld
States government, the government took the initiative.
? Mr. Broe, at the instruction of CIA Director. Richard
.Helms, called M r. Gerrity inN.ew Yor'le?and arranged to.
meet 'him there."
.Ned Gerrity is an ITT vice president and, according
to' the subcommittee, "Mr. Broe proposed a plan to ac-
celerate economicshacts in Chile as a means of put ti4
pressure on Christian ; Democratic Congressmen to
,vote ligtithot Dr. All doterin any ev@tit tr weaken Pied
Allende's position in case he was elected."
The subcommittee report said that Charles A. Meyer,
26
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then assistant Setretlry of State for inter-American
affairs, testified that "shortly after; the September 4..
election, the Forty Committee, at a meeting which he
attended, met for the express purpose of discussing
US policy in connection with Chile; bur he refused. to.
inform the Committee wthit precisely was said at the
meeting, what decisions; if any, were taken and What
instructions were communicated to Mr. (EdWard)
Korry, the US Ambassador in Chile."
"Because 'neither Mr. Meyer .nor 'Mr. Korry Would
communicate to the Subcommittee, the content of the
instructions which Mr. Korry received, and because,
.the State Department would not permit the Subccini.
mince to have access. lo the cable traffic between the
US Embassy in Santiago and. the State Departmentit
is not, possible to determlne ;whether Ambassador
}Corry did in fact receive a cable, vhi'ch, in substance,
authorized 'him in tile name of the Pre.sident to Jo
everything possible, short of a Dominican Republic
type intervention, to stop Allende from being elected
President or Chile," the report said. It added that 'Mr..
Korry did testify, however, that immediately after
Allende won a plurality in the popular election ... he
Sent' a ten-pointeable to the State?Department indicat-
ing that an Allende presidency .would not be in thl
best interests of the US." ,
The subcommittee said that, contacts between the.
CIA's Broe, and, top rer officials confirmed well into
'October. as the agency's plan to disrupt the Chileain
economy remained under discussion. Cu riou sl)
eVer, the ITT thought the plan wat Unworkable
Tr ? 'I
his is a fair recital of the 1970 events and the record.'
shows* that in the end the US abstained from rash
actions although it used its influence to destroy Chile's
, international credit standing. But the subcommittee's
report raised a major question concerning US policy-
making processes in the light of the power exercised
by the "Forty Committee." Put another way, the clues-
, tion ?just as relevant today as it was in 1970?is
whether the "Forty Committee" grants broad policy
mandates to the intelligence community and leaves it
free to implement them so that the blame for failures
of specific projects would be laid to the CIA's door?
not the President's,
Commenting on the t hilcan episode, the subcom-
mittee said that it cannot determine whether Helms'
instructions to 13 roe to propose economic chaos meas-
? tires to ITT officials "were a direct outcome of the 'Forty.
Committee' meeting." "It is clear, however," the report
said, "that Mr. Broe's proposal of concrete measures,
designed to create economic difficulties in Chile
was in striking contrast to the pre-September US Gov-
ernment policy of allowing events in Chile to follow
their natural course without substantial interference
from the US Government." It describes as "weak" the
testimony by Assistant Secretary Meyer that Broe's
"economic chaos" proposals were a "policy option"
and not a "change in, policy."
The subcommittee asked these luestions: "With
what detail are instructions of the 'Forty Committee'
communicated to the CIA? Is the 'Forty. Committee'
informed in ntivntwo of the aindiliities
Agency cOntemplates using in carrying out an assign-
ment? Specifically, in this case, Was it informed by the
CIA that in carrying out a. mandate to explore means of
?
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influencing the political situation in Chile, use of US
companies was contemplated and specific proposals
were being made to a particular corporation? Was the
benefit to be potentially gained, weighed against its
overall negative consequences for US business abroad
by the 'Forty Committee'? Or was Helms merely given ?
a general indication of what was desired, to be imple- .
mented as he saw fit?
"Did the 'Forty Committee' consider the conse-
quences which would have ensued in the event that
the plan to create .or accelerate economic chaos in Chile
had been successful? It had been the custom in Chile
for the Congress to confirm as president the winner Of
a plurality in the popular election. There was ample
evidence that an attempt to interfere with this custom
would have lead to bloodshed and, possibly, civil war
. . . Did the members of the 'Forty Committee' .ade-
quately consider the possibility that, once having.
launched the US down the road of covert intervention,
_
PENTHOUSE
July; 1973,
'1 I :' ? f 't,
j
?
The rulers of the State are the only ones who should have the privilege of lying, either
at honls Or'abroad; they may be allowed to lie for the good Of the state,
1.1? --Plato The Republic, Book Three
. ,
It's a little frightening. The machine can listen to what you're saying and tell, with
'a high degree of reliability, whether or not you are lying. It's called the Psychological
Stress Evaluator, and it is, in effect, a lie detector. Unlike the polygraph, it needs
no physical connection to the subject; therefore it can be used without his knowledge.
It works.from recordings of his voice, so anything on tape, sound track or phonqgraph
record is fair .game for the machine. It is the first lie detector that can be used on
a dead man.
Early this year, one of these instruments came into my hands. I resolved to use
It to probe one of the darkest mysteries of recent history, the assassination of President
John F. Kennedy. I set about collecting every recording I could lay my hands on
of anyone who had any direct knowledge of the affair. Soon I had Compiled the tape-
recorded testimony of twenty-two persons?eyewitnesses. Dallas policemen, the
pathologist who conducted the autopsy, members and staff of the Warren Commission,
Jim Garrison, Clay Shaw, and even Earl Warren.
I ran the tapes through the PSE systematically, taking each controversial point in
turn. Did the rifle which 6elonged to Lee Harvey Oswald kill President Kennedy?
Was Oswald the killer? Were others involved? What of those mysterious autopsy photo-
graphs which the Warren Commission never saw?do they support the Commission's
llone-gunman, single-bullet theory? And what about the warren Commission itself?
Did its members conspire to cover up the truth?
Slowly a picture emerged. It is blurred, and it is not .the picture I expected. Not
all the details are there, but I guarantee this: you May believe the lone-gunman theory
of the Warren Report, or you may believe the' government-cons'piracy theory of Mark
Lane, Jim Garrison and others, but either way you are Wrong.
The PSE is not a crystal ball. It was invented as an-interrogation aid, a fUnction
It performs well. To my knowledge, this was the first instance of its use as a tool
for historical research. To understand what I did with the PSE, one should know some-
thing about the device itself.
I first heard of the Psychological Stress Evaluator last 'yea?, when I met two of
Its inventors, Allan D. Bell. Jr., and Charles A. McOuiston. Bell and McOuiston, both
former lieutenant colonels, retired from Army intelligence several years ago to form
a company called Dokter Counterintelligence and Security. Inc. It was a logical second
career for the two men. Both are experts in the technology of espionage. Either orie plonng its use as a defense against skyjack-
could pick Um lock on your front door in fess time than it lakes you to find your ing and telephoned bomb threat, and as
a
key, Colonel Bell %%tart a Black Belt in karate, is an accomplished sworcIsiticin and means of speeding up customs inspec-
small-arms expert, and hat a dOzen inventions to his credit, horn ahlibugging devices Lions. Some doctors and psychiatrists are
, p'.
to a aiitilrituriPari roltrodol tamern. Colonial McQuiston Is one of the foremost potvgrtioii Using PSEs to studyatient6 Physical and
mho ftiti WNW-inn! COin111140E! 43
1 ens In tnal,/.0.1a opeClatIal la radio anti autlIO SW4?1140160, dad h itAkattalil
,ve liwn?ii00 &QOM n primmi
?1?y George O'Toole
nr3
11E11 [2111:MME
: other, more direct, measures might become necessary
to insure the desired result: stopping Allende tIom
becoming President of Chile?"
The subcommittee's final recommendation wasIhat
?
"the time is ripe for an in-depth review by thd..,ap-
; propriate congressional committees of the decision ?
making process in the authorization and conduCt of .
CIA clandestine operations." ?
There is a bizarre ,footnote to this whole story. The,
, CIA's director last March, Dr. James M. Schlesinger,
authorized Broe, his chief of clandestine operations' in
Latin America, to testify before the subcommittee only
after Senator Church,. its chairman, warned him that
i otherwise the record would show ITT'S involvement
t alone and thus possibly prevent it from collecting US
government. insurance for the nationalization of the
telephone company in Chile. As it happened, however,.
the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the gov-
ernment's investment insurance agency, turned down
ITT's claim anyway. Poetic justice?
The PSE grew from an effort to improve
the polygraph. Standard polygraphs '
measure four variables: pulse, blood pres-
sure, respiration and perspiration. Some
also measure additional physiological vari-
ables. The more variables .measured, the
more reliable the polygraph.
Bell and McQuiston discovered that the
frequencies composing the human voice
are not fixed; they shift very slightly from
eight to fourteen tim..z?s every second. But
when the speaker is under stress, this nor-
mal frequency modulation disappears.
What remains are the pure component fre- '
quencies of the voice. And a strong indica-
'Lion that the speaker is lying.
The two men developed a device to
detect this phenomenon and planned to use
It as an additional "channel" on the poly-
graph. Then they discovered that the new
variable was so reliable and accurate a
measure of psychological stress there was
really no need to measure the other poly-
graph variables.
Freed from the necessity of strapping the
Subject into a chair, stretching a pneumo-
graphic tube across his chest, gluing elec-
trodes to his palms, and clamping his arm
with a blood-pressure cuff, the PSE proved
to be much more versatile than the poly-
graph. Because it can work from a tele-
phone or tape recorder, the PSE can be
used without the knowledge or even the
physical presence of the subject.'
I asked Colonel Bell to tell me about some
of the things the PSE was being used for,
especially cases in which a conventional
polygraph couldn't be used. He mentioned
that the police in Howard County, Maryland,
have been using the PSE for two years; they
have had great success in establishing the
innocence of suspects who were afraid to
sobmit to a polygraph examination because
of that machine's forbidding aspect.
Bell went on to describe some of his
invention's other uses, actual or potential.
Dektor and the Federal government are ox-
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group that investigates UFO reports, is the "outside issue." !thought he did. Very good, said Kradz. bid
now using the PSE to interview witness?s Most people, Kradz pointed out, have : I notice anything else *about the interroga-
in UFO sightings. .
, some sort of deep secret they don't want ! tion? Well, yes; there was this business
tasked Bell if he would lend me a PSE known. When faced with a polygraph exami- 1 about the ring. Perhaps the suspect had
to experiment with, in order to write a piece nation, a person may be more concerned stolen it. Kradz smiled. No, the kid hadn't
about the device. He agreed, with two con- that this outside issue may come to light ? taken the ring, but he was gays i-le had
clitions. First, I must take Dektor's three-day than he is about the actual substance of exchanged rings with another guY:floOody
course in operating the instrument; second, the interrogation. This can produce irrele- knew about it. The kid didn't reallji expect
' t PSE I must review my vent stress in some of his answers, and mis- to be asked about it. because Kradi had
alterg .
interpretation of its output with his staff, in I lead the examiner. Therefore it is is neces-
the interest of accuracy. This seemed rea- . sary for the examiner to interview the sub-
' sonable, so I agreed. ject before the examination, go over all of
The course was held in the meeting room the questions he intends to ask. and assure to give some thought to what I might do
of a Holiday Inn in Falls Church, Virginia. the subject he will ask only these questions. witii the PSE. I was particularly interested
b lb' I ter when ,
gone over all the questions with him. Still,
when the ring was mentioned. he panicked.
By the third day of the course. I had begun
The eight other students were employees a ,
of customers who had purchased the Iran my first real interrogation tape. '
device. These included a private detective ; . ? The interrogation always includes the
'agency in Pennsylvania, a New York chain ' question, "Are you afraid That I will ask you
. store, and the security service of an East about something we have not discussed?-
. African country. The instructor was Mike A negative answer with no sign of stress
Kradz, a criminologist and retired police eliminates the outside-issue problem. Also,
officer. Kradz projects the iough-cop the examiner always asks some innocuous
questions, such as, "Do you like the color
image, but he is a living rebuttal to the Po- '
lish joke. There is nothing about forensic blue? subject's
in order to observe the ?
science, from fingerprints to polygraphy, on general state of tension. And thereis always
? one "red-herring" question. ?
in the fact that the device works horn a tape
recording. Sound-recording technology is
almost a century old (Edison invented the
phonograph in 1877), and an enormous
emu!. n of history is stored on phonograph
records, sound tracks, and tape and wire
recordings. I thought how many press con-
ferences, interviews and public pronounce-
ments are stored away in the film and tape
archives of the world, and how many CILICS-
lions could be settled if we knew for certain
that the speaker had told the truth. However,
which the man is not an expert.the ? ?
? The red herring is used to identify since interrogation with a PSE seemed to
The first morning of the course was
"guilt complex responder." Such a person
devoted to the physical operation of the require such an elaborate and structured
shows stress when he respond's to any situation, I wondered if it could be used
PSE. The device is used in conjunction with
'accusatory question. The examiner may
, a Uher tape recorder, which has four speeds
ask, "Did you steal the watch?" when?it is
and can be manually wound back to locate
money, not a watch, that is missing. A
' a particular point on the tape. The testimony
stressed denial will alert the examiner, who
to be evaluated is recorded at a tape speed
carefully compares this response to the
of 71/2 inches per second, then played back
stress produced by questions about the
and stopped at the beginning of the utter-
missing money.
"ance in question. The recorder is slowed
That night the class was given tapes of
to 15/16 inches per second and played. The
real police interrogations. In most cases,
sound, no longer recognizable as a human
Kradz was the examiner; and in every case.
voice, is a long, low rumble.
he knew the background and resolution of
The PSE itself is built into an attache case.
the matter. One case I was assigned con-
The case opens to reveal a chart drive, sim-
liter to an electrocardiograph, and a number cerned a young man accused of stealing
money from his father's store,. Kradz started
? of buttons and knobs. A single cable con-
! by asking the."outside-issue ' question. No.
nects the PSE to the tape recorder:
the young man replied, he was not afraid
As the tape recorder reels slowly turn, Kradz would ask?him a question they hadn't
and a rumble issues from its speaker, the discussed. Then the following exchange
PSE stylus dances back and forth across took place: ?
' the moving chart paper, leaving behind a "Do you live in Howard County?"
, ragged trail. Then the recorder is stopped, "Yes."
! the chart paper is stopped, and that's all "Do you suspect someone of havihg taken
there is to it. The result is a strip of paper the money?"
with a squiggly line. The rest is up to the "No."
"Are you wearing a white shirt?"
"Yes."
"Do you know who took the money?"
"No." .
stalks of different heights sticking up (and : "Are you wearing a ring?"
down) at irregular intervals. But add some "Yes."
stress, and that hedge begins to look
"Did you take the money?"
trimmed. The greater the stress, the
"No."
,II hoped that Jim Garrison would prove that
smoother the shape. If the subject was There were a few red-herring questions he had solved the mystery. He didn't. Time
'experiencing the hard stress which accom-
panics deception, the over-all outline of the passed, public interest waned. and the
to check for the guilt complex response. : p
; The questions about wearing a white she,
figure tends to take on a rectangular shape, , details of the controversy dimmed in my
and a ring and living in Howard County h,-I.:
mind, leaving only a dull residue of doubt.
.a concertina as seen by the player. Kradz
showed slide after slide of charts made dur- been included to measure the background
I had .despaired of ever learning the truth.
Now I knew what to do with the PSE.
ing actual police interrogations. He told us'
stress elicited by irrelevant issues.
i I ran the tape and charted it on the PSE
. It was all there: the statements made
the background of each case and pointed , before television cameras by eyewitnesses,
out the tell-tale signs of deception, when-
All bit two of his responses were on-
. . stressed. The question about suspectine policemen, medical examiners, members
ever they were present.
w
That night each student took a PSE back
; who took the money produced enough of the Warren Commission. Somewhere in
'
to his room to practice operating it. Some ,
stress to indicate deception. The other a network-television vault were the sound
q
. coordination must be learned to betorne " 'tracks, with the tiny, inaudible variations in
1 question which produced stress was, Are
you wearing a ring?" In tact, his yes to that voice frequency that could settle once and
. facile in handling the recorder and the PSE.
i was accompanied by such stresn as I had for all the question, "Did Oswald, acting
; but clearly the difficult part of Mu courflo seen only once or twice in the class slides, alone, shoot and kill John F. Kennedy?"
? would be learning how to read and interpret 1
Then ext morning Kradz called on me. My immediate problem was getting
the charts. Did the suspect take the money, he asked. access to the recordings. I was certain the
The next day we learned the theory of
I,...said I didn't think so. Kradz nodded. Did television networks would. have them. bu
polygraph interrogation, which applies to _.,e suspect who took the money? Yes, 1 I wasn't sure exactly what to ask for. There
the PSE. There is, first of all, the matter of,
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' human eye and brain.
On the afternoon of the first day, Kradz
showed us what to look for. The unstressed
voice looks like an untrimmed hedge, with
the way I had hoped, as a tool for historical
research.
During the lunch break I took Kradz aside
and asked him. Could the PSE be used out-
side interrogations, where the speaker was
telling what may or may not have hap-
pened? Yes, he said, the PSE could be used
for that. Where there was no stress, I could
be confident that the speaker was telling
:the truth. However, when I did find stress,
?I had to bd very careful about reaching con-
clusions about its cause; it could result from
something other than deception. But if I
found a stress pattern in , the testimony of
!several witnesses to the same event. I would
!very probably have uncovered deception.
? Encouraged, I reviewed the list of recent
' mysteries. Watergate was, of course, the
first to come to mind. The Ti'I affair was
?also of recent interest. The Kent State inci-
i dent had never been fully cleared up. But
one subject seemed to loom above all the
rest?the assassination of John F. Kennedy.
Like many others, I have found it difficult
to believe the Warren Report, When Mark
Lane's book came out. I read it carefully.
I read much of the other criticism of the
Warren Commission's findings. The more
I read, the more I doubted the official ac-
count of what happened that day in Dallas.
I waited for the real story to emerge. It didn't.
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Must be thousands of hours of sound
. recordings relating to the assassination.
Where, among all this talk, was the critical
? testimony?
I started digging and soon discovered '
the existence of a group called the National
Committee to Investigate Assassinations, ,
located in Washington, D.C. I called the
number listed in the telephone directory
and was soon speaking to Bob Smith, the
Committee's Research Director. I told Smith
that I was a writer and wanted to do a piece ?
on the John F. Kennedy assassination. I
asked him for an interview, and he agreed.
We met in the offices of Bernard Fenster-
?wald, a successful criminal lawyer. and
,
Director of the Committee, in a modern
office building a few blocks from the White
House. Fensterwald is a small, dapper man
with a thin beard. ? Smith is a lean, intense
chain smoker. Both mee appeared to be
in their forties.
"Before we begin," I said, "I think I should
mention that I, used to work for the CIA."
? I have run across it often, the theory that
the CIA killed Kennedy. It seems absurd
to me, and I (10(11 believe it. I worked there
for three years and never saw or heard any-
thing suggesting the Agency was involved
in the assassination. I never met anyone
,there I thought capable of doing it. Still,
' I have learned through bitter experience of
the suspicion which attaches to former in-
telligence officers. Epidemics of paranoia
tend to accompany us through life. I thought
I'd better get that issue out of the Way.
Smith. and Fensterwald exchanged
glances and smiled. Fensterwald told me?
that they did not necessarily believe the CIA
assassin theotry, and they certainly didn't'
mind talking to a former Agency employee.
.Relieved. I began. to outline my project.
I asked if they had heard of the PSE. Both
men were dimly wkare of it. I described.
the device and Started to detail the way it
could, be used as a research tool. They im-
niediately understood what I was proposing
and were tremendously enthusiastic. Yes,
they said, there were many key statements
on tape somewhere, and they wOuld be glad
to compile specific references for me..
Furthermore, they could, in some cases,
provide me with the tape.iThey said they
would be in contact when they had some-
thing for me, :-
While I was waiting, t experimented with
the PSE.I I telephoned a friend and told him
about the device. I asked if he was wilfing.
to play it little game to test it eut, and he.
reaped. lid picked a number between one
owl teu.i I asked him, "Is the number one?"
"Is the number two?" and so on, and he
cm ,'ered no each timet, I recorded his
i
responses, ran them through ,the PSE and
called' t im back. 'The number he picked,
(told hi n', was five. ? ,
He w4s dumbfounded. He had not hoard,
of the M:-. and had thought I might be con-
1
coctingisome elaborate joke at his expense.
But when I called back and correary,k1.0-;,
? tified thf number he had picked, he realized I
I vies sr, rious, And tie was shockc.,d.:'
I' pl4ed the Itiame galle. several timeS!
with oth.:as and did not 'always have sirnitar,;
8t1CCOS. With, Bernard Fenstorwald,.1
,able only to narrow the answer down to.twO4
number,;, one of which turned out to be tor-,
Irect, With others I have been completely
unable to identify the right number. The ?
29
problem with this game is that the player
knows that it is just that. He knows, that I
?know he is lying, it is a socially acceptable
situation, and there is nothing at stake. The
stress which accompanies real deception
Is not always present..
, I obtained a tape recording from CBS
,News of a portion of a Sixty Minutes program
. in which Mike Wallace interviewed Clifford
Irving. The interview took place during the
height of the controversy, while Irving was
still claiming to have gotten Howard
Hughes...life story through a series of inter-
Mews with the billionaire. It was a consum-
mate job of lying, embellished with such
convincing details as Irving's disagreement
with his colleague Susskind about whether
Hughes kept his organic prunes in a paper
or a plastic bag. Sixty Minutes re-ran the
segment after Irving's confession because
the man's sheer virtuosity as a prevaricator
was amazing. l, was interested in the inter-
view for a different reason: at the height
of the Controversy., trying had been given
a polygraph examination and had passed
it. (wanted to see if the rran who had beaten
the conventional lie detector could also
beat the PSE.
I selected a point, in the interview.at which
Mike Wallace suggested that Irving had riot
interviewed Howard Hughes, but had hap-
pened on some transcripts of Hughes. state-
ments. Irving asked how he could have hap-
pened on themaWallace rejoined, "Where
did you happen;on those transcripts?" Irv-
ing replied, "I got the transcripts from
Howard Hughes.". I charted this statement
on the PSE.
It was a perfect example of total stress,
horizontally blocked, with the smooth,
"trimmed-hedge" wave form. Clifford Irving
was a master liar, and he had beaten the
polygraph, but he would have been caught
by the PSE.
A few days after our first meeting, I
received a call from Bob Smith, He had
turned up a few things for me. ( visited him
at the Committee's office in downtown
Washington. He gave me a tape rec'erding
and a typewritten transcript. The recording
was the Louis Lomax television program of
Sunday, October 16, 1906. Wesleyt.?riebier,
a member of the Warren Conimission's staff,
was the guest. The transcript was of a CBS
News television program entitled The War-
ren Report, which had been.broadcast in
(our one-hour segments on -June 25, '26, 27
and 28, 1967. I .
? I.
I examined the trans' cript. The pregrams
had been narrated by Walter Crorrkite and
tion of the studio audience. Given his highly
emolional state, he did not seem a 'very.
promising subject for the PSE. Nonetheless.;
I decided to give it a try.
Charting a tape with the. PSE is a long
and tedious process, and it was impractical
to chart the entire prograrn. I ran some of
Liebler's statements which were noWn dis-
pute and discovered, as had exOecteci,
a. great deal of stress. He was pretty
charged up.
Most of the exchange between Liebler,
Lomax and the audience Was argumenta-
tive and did not deal with specific factual
points. (found two key statements by Lieb-
ler, though,-and I charted them. ,
The first statement, in response tea ques-
'lion bytomax, was, "I have no dob6t about
the conclusions of the [Warren] Report."
Plenty of stress was evideht, but not much
, snore than in other, statements.
The second statement related to those
Warren Commission documents which were
not ineluded in the Report?they were
locked .up in the National Archives, Lomax
asked Liebler if there wee anything in the
documents which would alter Liebler's
opiriion. Taken literally, it was a strange,
question, since Liebler had seen the docu-
ments and, if they would alter his opinion,
they would already have done so. Lomax
probably meant to ask if the, .docurnents
would conflict with the cdnclusions of the
Warren Report. Whatever Liebler thought
the question meant, he answered quickly,
"Oh, none., mane at all." the PSE showed
much mode stress here thin during any .9f
Liebler's other statements i ?
It was all pretty confuseti and fuzzy, and
it didn't telt me more than I'dalroady know,c1;
Wesley Liebler was pretty upse( when ,
appeared on the Louis 1..0maX program. I
hoped that the CBS tape would yield rnre?
enlightening res'ults..
I finally received a !dell from CBS s
Washington office sayir,10 the tapes Ii d
arrived. I broke a few tr;a(fic ?Oro g
there, to pick up the ;tapes and :re.tritning
to my apartment. I 00 alreudy snlectod tj
points I ?..vanted?to check from trandeript
of the program. I mounted the first tape ow
,the recorder, ran it 'down to the', first point
of. interest, and, turned oh the E.
For the next three days bed ,nighti,,I
charts. When I finitshed. I had ,pi
boxier:tie, m kitchen I loef4was arikte pLia'p
in chart paper, jtItit:1,ified,..a mucli clears:.'r
idea of what cud 001 did. nel happ0h,;101.
day in Dallas.l. ; I ? I.!.
Before I describe my results, I feel that
.other CBS newsmen, They reviewed every I must of ler tho reaciOr a few comments:and.
major Ooint of controversy that had been Iwords of cautio:
seised by the .criliCs of the Warren Report.' 1. Although the PSE is a well-established
'interviewing eyewitnesse., Dailas. n011ee-: interrogation aid, it has not been validated
men, medical ex'pniir,,,,,ri.:, bpjlt.Mic speeiak as a tool for historical research. Even though
ists and manVethe'rs wiio'li.:id some insidri. experts, familiar with the machine believe
'knowledge ?lithe, Assassination of John FI, that it can be uied in this way, my project
For l
Kennedy.. wha II 1?160, in mind. it was, was the first attempt to do so.
,a gold mine. I telepheneci CBS and learned, 2. It is easier to demonstrate with the PSE
that I cotild gut a copy ot the program s, that a speaker ,is telling the truth than to
soundtrack if I wduld pal) for the dubbing , show he is lying. Stress can be caused by
charges. I told them to g0 ahead, . ' things other than deception; but the ob.
.Next I played the Lorriax-Liebler tape.: sence of stress is an extremely reliable.
Apparently Mark Lane had been on an . indication of truthfulness. 01 course, the
earlier Lomax prograrh, and now Liebler
was on to rebut him. I didn't need the PSE
to know that Liebler wat stressed. He ,
seemed very agitated, anti his breathing ,
audibly indicated his tensidh. He was angry
about the things Lane had said, the ques-
tions Lomax was asking him, and the mac.
absence of stress does not prove that a
statement is true, only that the speaker
. believes it to be true.
3. Although I found 'a great deal of stres0
in the testimony of the assassination lapoSi
iryno single instance can I say that the
dividual was lying. point this out not Only
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o protect myself frOm libel suits but be-
ause I am not morally certain any one indi-
idual was not telling the truth.
4. Nonetheless, stress in the testimony
of many witnesses to the same event makes
the mathematical probability overwhelming
Mat at least some of them were lying.
These points could not be better illus-
trated than they were by the Jim Gar-
rison-Clay Shaw Affair.
Garrison, it may be recalled, was the New
Orleans District Attorney who, in 1967,
claimed to have solved the Kennedy assas-
sination. He presented an elaborate case
against a local businessman, Clay Shaw,
and others, as members of assassination
conspiracy. In one of 'the hour-long ?pro-
grams, CBS intervieped Garrison, Shaw,
and two other people involved in Garrison's
allegations. ? .
In his interview, Garrison was hostile and
did not make many firm, factual statements
I cduld lest Cvith the PSE. However, he did
say, "There's no question about it [that he
knew how, the, assassination had been car-
ried out] , we know the key individuals
involved ... there is no question about the
lad! [the conspirators] were there [in Dealy
Plaza]." The PSE showed good to hard
stress on each of these statements. I also
ran a noncontroversial ,statement of Gar-
rison's as e control: "Oswald was not killed
inere [at the movie theater where he was
suestecl) r and found no stress. Garrison's
:!:ircnients about his case against Clay
etireeety indicated deception. ,
fec4 tl ran some statements by Clay Shaw
. a/del his involvement iresuch a conspir-
acy, and denying ever knowing or meeting,
ee Harvey Oswald. I al.go ran a control ,
etatement. Shaw turned out to be heavily
stressed throughout.
? This was not particularly surprising, The.
elan had!been accused of conspiring to
murder the President of the United giates
Old wae being interViewed about it befere',
:eleeisior,i cameras. He would have td ha.ve.
ri a pretty cool customer. not to show,'
.i lot of stress, even if ne, were telling the
Oomplcte, truth.
Hndnt that both Garrison and Shaw
u.owed ?tress was not air encouraging
development. Of course, both men could
be lying. Garrison might have found some
valid evidence linking Shaw to the assassi-
nation and then, in the time-honored tradi-
tion or prosecutors, invented the rest of his
case. But Shaw's stress could easily be the
result of his predicament, and Garrison's
might also be the result of some outside
issue. The situation was ambiguous.
I ran the testimony of Lee Odom. Odom,
a Dallas blisinessinan, was attempting to
explain the mysterious coincidence .of the
post office box numbers. It seems that the
Dallas post office box number 11906
appeared in the notebOoks of both Clay
Shaw and Lee Harvey Oswald. In his tes-
timony, Odom stated that he could not
account for the number appeearing in
Oswald's notebook, he knew how it got into
Shaw's. It was Odom's box number, and
he had given it to Shaw, whom he'd met
by chance on a business trip to New
Orleans. The PSE showed hard stress dur-
ing his statement, No unrelated control
statement was available for me to run for
comparison.
This didn't really clear things up. There
were several obvious alternative explana-
tions for Oclom'S stress. For example, there
30
had been a number of rather unsavory State of Illinois, ran ballistic tests en belllet
allegations in the press about Clay Shaw,' fragments found in the presidential Itinqii
unrelated to the Garrison charges! Odom sine, and on the intael bullet found by
may have felt extremely uncomfortable linson. Nicol testified that both the intact:
about linking himself to this man in anyway. bullet and the bullet' fregmente had been
The coincidence of the box numbers fired by the Mannlicher-Ceircaney:Fle, too:
t
'seemed very SUSPICIOUS, but Bob Smith of was apparently telling the truth.' '
the Committee had pointed out to rn'e that ,Deputy Constable SeymOur WeitaMari 91,f
both Shaw's and?Osviald's notebookl were the Dallas police claimed that h4'.rdu'act:'
'filled with numbers, so the chance of such 'Oswald's Mannlicher,Cartano ortl16,e
a coincidence was not that remote. -11loor ef the Texas School B4OokDeQ*Ositcey."
. ?
Howe.ver. on the day.ef thfJ ASS*:1S.-inalferP;
At this point I began to wonder if the tele
vision camera was the "outside issue" in lei had told th6.prItAs. that INnIle I10.4110
a
eyery case. Perhaps just being on television was a German f\Auser.
he signed an affidavit, to that effectillut an,
will so thoroughly rattle the averege person
that, lying or not, he!is going to show stress the CBS tapes he testified that he had been.
on the PSE. I Check0c1 this eutrbY recording mistakee about that point. that it hail really
and charting a number of people on tele. been Oswald's rifle. The PSE showed con-
vision programs?public ollicials?, men ift siderable stress in his statements
the street. even witnesses to a particularly Patrol an Gerald L. Hill testified that he
gruesome accident, 'Theme was occasional found three spent bullet hulls or the floor
stress, but it never reached' tile high level beneath the window from which the fatal
I was finding in the assaesination tapes. shots allegedly were fired. The PSE showed
I also re3alled something Oise which put hard stress in his statements.
my mind to r'st Qn this point: thcePSE had
been used,to analyze tire statements of con-
testants on the teloVisitan Iplograrh To Ted; Oswald to the assassination. The PSE sub-
The Truth, and identified "the teal Mr. So. stantiated the testimony that Oswald owned
and-so" with an accuracy bf better than 94 a rifle and that the evidence supplied to
percent. The problem ObviOtisly was not the a ballistics expert indicated this rifle was
television camera. the murder weapon. However, the PSE did
I ran the testimony of William Gurvich on not substantiate the controversial claims of
the PSE. Gurvich had been Oarrison's chief Dallas police regarding Ilse discovery of
aide in the investigation of Clay Shaw until this evidence.
he resigned, charging Garrison with wrong- ? The hospital employee was apparently
doing. He said, "The truth at I see it is that telling the ,truth when he recounted finding
Mr. Shaw should neve r have been arrested.", the bullet on a stretcher at Parkland Hospi-
? He was asked if Garrison had known of cer- tat, but many critics have charged that the
? lain illegal and unethical methods Gurvich bullet had been deliberately planted there.
had alleged were being used by Garrison's 'This is the famous "single bullet" which the
staff. He answered, "Yeah, pi) course he did. Warren Report says passed through the
He ordered it." There was no stress in Mr. bodies of both the President and Governor
Gurvich's statements. The PSE showed that 'Connally, and then lodged in Connally's
he believed what he 'was saying. , wrest. Several researchers have tried to
repeat this, firing the same type of bullet
Obviously I did not have enough tes- into the wrist of a cadaver. The bullets never
timony from a large enough number of wit- remained perfectly intatt, as the one found
nesses to create a detailed picture of the on the stretcher; they became twisted lumps
Garrison-Shaw affair, but it seems probable of lead and copper.
that, at the very least, Garrison did not have The second link between Oewald and the
much of a case against Shaw (a view later assassination is the Charge that he killed
held by a New Orleans jury) and likely that Officer Tippitt, a Dallas policeman; while
Shaw was completely innocent of complic- fleeing from the scene of the first shooting.
ity in the assassination. The lesson of this A number of eyewitnesses have testified
episode is twofold. First, stress in any one that they saw O'swald shoot Tippitt, and one
person's testimony does not prove decep- of them, Domingo Benavides, was inter-
lion. Second, given enough testimony by viewed on the CBS tapes. He was asked
djfferent Witnesses, the PSE Can arrive at if there was any doubt in his mind that
the truth.' Oswald was the man he saw shoot Tiepin.
The first person I ran on the PSE who had He replied, "No., sir, there was no doubt
any direct knowledge of the assassination at all." There was absolutely no stress in
was Oswald's widow, Marina. Unfortu- his statement. He was telling the truth.
nately, only one of her statements was on The killing of Officer Tippitt by Oswald
the CBS tapes?that Oswald had Owned a has fueled the fires of controversy over the
rifle. The PSE said she was telling the truth. Warren Report. Tippitt was far from his usual.
The rifle had been one of the major points beat when he was shot. Some witnesses
of controversy raised by critics of the War- have alleged that Tipoitt and Oswald were
ren Report. The debate centered on two seen together in Jack Ruby's nightclub.
points: whether the Mannlicher-Carcano They theorize that the three men were part
alreged to have belonged to Oswald was of an assassination conspiracy., and that
the rifle found by the Dallas police in the Tippitt had been sent to silence Oswald,
Texas School Book Deposildry, end whether but had been beaten to the draw.
that particular gun could haVe been the ritur- The Dallas police radio dispatcher,
der weapon. '
Officer Murray Jackson, was asked if h
bn the tapes, :Darrell C.j Torrillrfsen, an thought Tippitt knew Oswald. "No," he
employee of Parkland HeOpital, testified replied, "I don't think he knew Oswald." Did
that he had found a rifle bttllOt on a OtrurChni- Iticksott khow Ceeenlii? "No,' lieeteierest-
' which he believed bed carried. Governor Jackson, didn't either.' he PSE E..hcroied
Connally. There was no stress in his state- heavy stress in both statements.
ment. The PSE said he was elling kilo truth. Perhaps the greatest source of con-
Dr. Joseph D. Nicol, Suberintendent of troyerny over the WanCn Report in it's claim
the. Bureau of Criminal Investigation tor the that alt.the stiot,.,,..,,re fired by or,: i,unman.
The rifle was one of the principal points
used by the Warren Commission to link
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Some eyowitriosses!nlaim to hive heard The President's. body was flown to the back of the President's head was an
shots and seen gun, moke in the 'area of ! Washington, D.C. There, approximately entry wound? "There is absolutely no doubt,
"
a low hillock ahead and to the right of the ! eight hours after the shooting, an autopsy sir. Again stress, but again moderate.
presidential motorcade. This hillock has was performed at Bethesda Naval Hospital.. Altogether, how many wounds Were
comre to be known as "the grassy knoll. Because of the tracheostomy, the nature of there? "There were two wounds of entrance
One of these witnesses was a railroad ? the neck wound could no longer be ob-, and two of exit." At this point the stress be-
came hard.
And where were the entry wounds lo-
cated? "Posteriorly, one low in the right
posterior scalp, and one in the base of the
' neck on the right." Hard stress again.
Could he'be absolutely certain that what
he said was an entry' wound was,, in fact,
that. "Yes, indeed we can." Hard stress.
The interview with Humes was one of the
longest and most detailed on the CBS
tapes, and I charted most of ir with/the PSE.
It was clear to me that he be!leyed much
of what he Was saying, but the fr. ! e'ient flick-
erings of moderate stress and the'e..easion-
al flashes of hard stress. suggested ilezrhe
wasn't nearly as confident of his testimuey
as he claimed to be. As Dr. Perry had
pointed out, sometimes it's not easy to tell
an entry wound from an exit wound. ,
The interviewer asked him one good "hot-
torn line" question:
"Do you have any different conclusion,
any different ideas. any different thoughts
worker named S.14 Holland, s,vho observed secved and was, at first, overlooked. Later,
the scene from an overpass near the knoll, after consulting the Dallas doctors, the
The PSE confirmed that he thought he had Bethesda pathologists cdncluded that it
seen a puff of smoke 'on the knoll, but it was an exit wound. The autopsy report
could not support his claim that he had stated that there were two entry wounds,
heard a shot from that direction. ; one low in the rear scalp and one at the
Another witness, Charles Brehm, was' right base of the neck; and two exit wounds,
quoted by Mark Lane as having said that the throat wound and a large irregular
he had seen a portion of the President's ' wound on the right side of the head.
skull flying back over the left rear end of , The confusion was compounded when
? the limousine. Lane offered this as evidence two FBI agents present at the autopsy
; of a shot from the grassy knoll. On the CBS isreported that a wound had been found in
; tapes. Brehm stated heatedly that he had , the President's back, and that no cone-
been quoted out of context, and emphatic- sponding exit wound had been located..
ally denied that any shots had come from ' Diagrams made during the autopsy seemed
the knoll. Despite his emotional state, there to confirm this, showing the lower of the
was almost no stress in this statement. two entrywounds to be below the shoulders,
Officer Jacks of the Dallas police, who not at the base of the neck. What became
? was riding in the limousine of Vice- of the bullet? The agents reported that
President Johnson, denied that any of the , Bethesda doctors thought the bullet had
. shots had come from the direction of the dropped from the wound when the Dallas
? grassy knoll. The PSE turned up a fair de- ' doctors attempted external heart massage.
gree of stress. But this was the shot that the CommiSsion.
iThree witnesses, Mrs. Caroline Walther, , claimed had passed through Kennedy and ,I now, after seeing (the autopsy photographs)
, .
Arnold Rowland and Howard Brennan, : 'struck Governor Connally. again, than you had at that time?" -
claimed to have seen gunmen in the win- ' X-rays and color photographs of the au- "No," replied Captain Humes, "we think
; dovvs of the Texas School?Book Depository ' topsy were made. The brain was removed 'they bear up very well, and very ?closely,
; building. Mrs. Walther said she saw two : from the bodyeBrain and skin tissue slides ' our testimony before the Warren Commis-
men, one armed with a rifle, the second Were prepared for microscopic examine.- Sion."
with a shorter gun. Rowland told the Warren' ' tion. Remarkably, the Warren Commission,The stress was hard.
Commission he had seen two men, one an'
! never asked to see any of this evidence, Arlen Specter, one of the Warren Comrriis-
; elderly Negro, in the window Oswald is 'relying instead solely on the testimony of sion's principal investigators, also spoke on
! alleged to have fired from, but on the CBS' , Captain James J. Humes, one of the the CBS tapes. He said that the case against
tapes he claimed he had seen an armed ? pathologists who conducted the autopsy. Oswald fitted together very well, and that
, man at a different window. The Commission . ' Even more incredible is the disappearance seldom could one find among actual crim-
: relied hciavily'on the testimony of Brennan, ; ' of the brain, the slides, and some of the inal convictions a case equally persuasive.
, who claimed to have seen a gunman in the . photographs, which were alleged to have I 'He added that there was no foundation for
. "Oswald window" actually firing the last of been turned over to the National Archives 'the charge that the CommisSion had been
'the shots. The PSE showed hard stress in : ' by the Bethesda Naval Hospital. , formed to whitewash the facts.
. the testimony of all three witnqsses. Both Dr. Perry and Captain Humes were ' The PSE said he was telling the truth.
The PSE analysis of the eyewitnesses' ? . interviewed on the CBS tapes. Perry was John McCloy, a member of the Warren
testimony regarding the source of the shots!! asked about the throat wound he'd seen ! Commission, said much the same thing,
, is ambiguous. It supports Holland's claim ! , when the Prsident was brought to Parkland i and added that he had seen no credible
. to have seen a puff of smoke on the knoll, ' Hospital. His answer seemed ' evasive: He
. evidence to contradict the findings of the
and Brehm's denial that any shots came neither confirmed nor denied that he had Commission. The PSE backed him up on
from that direction, and it raises serious ; thought it w?as an entty wound, talking in- this, but it failed to do so when, speaking
,doubts about all other claims and counter- , stead about the difficulty of making such of the Warren Report, he said, "There was
claims, This contradiction seems to result ' ' a determination and the fact that his atten- nothing fraudulent about it." Here the PSE
. . .
; from the notorious unreliability of eyewit- ! lion had boon devoted to saving the Piest-
' nesses, perhaps compOunde.ci by a fair I I dent's life. Then the interviewer asked him
i directly whether he had thought at the time
' amount of fabrication. Deception, if it is ; ' . ? . . .
showed hard stress.
If Specter and McCloy were as confiden
as the PSE shows them to be in the truthful
present here, may have been motivated
.thal it was on entry wound. Actually, I clidn I ness of the Warren Report, what could be
merely by a desire for attention. Or the.r really give it much thought." he replied. Ho fraudulent about it? Perhaps the Snipping
? e ;
may have been darker reasons, showed hard stress on the PSE. Unfortu- , off of a few loose ends, the suppression
There is, however, other evidence and ! nately, he made no other definite statement, of a few pieces of inconvenient evidence
testimony thatcould shed son no th,-.;ht on the :about the nature of the wound, which conflicted with a version of events
existence, number and location of asses- j The interview with Captain Humes was ' they believed to be essentially true.
!sins other than Oswald. This bring:; us to more informative. Just before the interview,?, The one man who could be expected to
,perhaps the most dubiow; and controversial in 1967, Humes had re-examined the aUtop- have the most informed opinion regarding
element in the Warn?n Commission's ver- Isy photographs and X-rays, and he dis- the work of the Warren Commission is'
,nion of the event? the autopsy cussed them at length on the CBS tapes. former Chief Justice Earl Warren himself.
;
Within minutes after the shooting, Ken-
The diagrarris drawn during the autopsy,' He had declined to be interviewed on the
nedy had been rushed to th emergency
he said, had not been intended to precisely CBS program in 1967, but he did appea
' e
room at Parkland Hospital, where. Dr. Mal-' . represent the location of the wounds. How- on television in May, 1972, in an interview
colm Perry tried to save his life. The physi-
ever, he now produced a sketch which, he which was part of a series calledThe Bran
Ir cian saw that the President had suffered said, did ;epresent these locations accu- 'deis Television Recollections. Bob Smith o
.rately. The interviewer asked, Your re-
?,' a massive head wound and a smaller wound
, in the throat. Perry performed a tracheos- examination of the photographs verify that
tomy, cutting throUtiN the throat wound in the wounds were as shown here?"
arl fitiOrririt to ?pea a breathing passage. "Yes, slr," he rdplied, Na girde70,
Afterward, when hope for the President had WOW thoro any wounds other than one
been abandoned, Perry met with the press at the base of the neck and one up in the
, and declared that the wound in the front skull? "No, sir, there were not." Moderate
of the neck had been an entry wound. stress, not enough to suggest deception.
.31 Was there any doubt that the wound at
the Committee provided me with the tape
The interview was an hour long, but the
Kennedy assassination and the Warren
Corrirdiesien bame tip onIV hhod, The itit@Fr-
viuwer, Abikm Sachar, Chancellor of Bran-
deis University, was friendly and deferen-
tial. I charted some of Warren's remarks
unrelated to the assassination and found
that he was generally unstressed. Sacha
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aised the subject of the Commission
bliquely, and Warren volunteered several
rather lengthy statements about it
Warren said that immediately after the as-
sassination there were two theories, one that ?
Khrushchev and Castro were behind the ?
killing, the other that a group of right-wing
Texas oilmen were responsible. He said:
"We explored both of those theories for
ten months and found no evidence that
either of them was involved in it:"
The PSE showed hard stress. .
He continued:
" ... we found no evidence of any kind
that there was any conspiracy."
Again there was stress, and particularly
hard stress on the words no evidence."
"I have read everything," said Justice
Warren, "that has come to my notice in the
press, and I read some of the documents"
that have criticized the Commission very
severely, but I have never found that they
have discovered any evidence of any kind
that we didn't discover and use in determin-
ing the case as we did."
Hard stress once again. The word "never"
was a perfectly "trimmed hedge."
"I have found nothing since that time,"
he continued, "to change my view, nor have
I heard of anything that has changed the
view of any member of the commission
since that time."
The stress was hard. As I had now come
to expect, the word "nothing" seemed a
particularly beautiful example of stress.
Another word seemed to show even more
stress: "member." Could he have been
thinking of someone in particular? On Janu-
ary 19, 1970, Senator Richard B. Russell,
a member of the Warren Commission, re-
vealed that he had never believed that Lee
Harvey Oswald acted alone.
I had charted the last of the assassination
tapes. Of course, these few thousand feet
of recording tape are only a small fraction
of the relevant testimony recorded and
stored away in the archives of television
news departments. There is, for 'example,
Lee Harvey Oswald, as he was led through
the Dallas police station, denying that he
had killed the President. There are state-
ments by Marina Oswald, Jack Ruby and
by others.
I pave no doubt that with these- tapes,
a Psychological Stress Evaluator, and time
to work on them, a very detailed picture
of the assassination of John F. Kennedy
could be reconstructed, a picture that might
even reveal the identities of the assassins
and their co-conspirators. I hope that sooner
or later someone does this. I have gone as
far as the private resources of a free-lance
writer permit.
What, given the.sample of testimony I
have processed with the PSE, can I say
about the assassination?
We should first examine the testimony in
which no stress was found, since it is almost
certain that these people were telling the
truth as they saw it. This strongly.suggests
the following:
1. Oswald owned a rifle. ?
2. A bullet fired from that rifle was found
on Governor Connally's stretcher at Park-
land Hospital.
3. Bullet fragments alleged tO have been
found in the presidential limousine also
came from Oswald's rifle.
4. At least one eyewitness believes he
saw gunsmoke on the grassy knoll, but
another is equally certain no shots came
from that direction.
5. 'Oswald shot and killed Officer Tippitt.
6. At least one member of the Warren
Commission and one member of the Com-
mission's staff really believe in the validity
of the Warren Report.
the very sinister implications of the very
: existence of deception among policemen;
;government officials and Commission
; members. The question remains; drd such
! deceptien exist or was the stress found by
: the PSE the result,?in every case, (Wan out-
,
side issue?
7. Jim Garrison had little or no case ? Obviously, whenoVer sireSs Is fund by
against Clay Shaw. the PSE and cannot be cross-checked by
Almost all of this tends to support, in one a structured interrogation, SOMe prObability
way or another, the Warren Report. tint now must be accepted that thlt stress is:caused
let's look at the testimony that is called Into. by an outside issue. Wo study has yerbeen
question by the PSE: . conducted to establish what this probability
1. The claim that Oswald's rifle 'was might be, but let us pick, for the', stake of
found in the Texas School Book Depository.: pdiscussion, a figure that may seem ridicu-
2. The claim that bullet hulls matching , lously high-70 percent. In other Words, we
Oswald's rifle were found in the same place.
3. The claim that one gunman was seen
in the "Oswald window" of the Dallas Book
Depository.
4. The claim that two gunmen were seen
in this window.
5. The claim that a gunman was seen
in a different window of that building,
6. Another claim that no.shots came from
the grassy knoll, and a claim by the witness
who saw the gunsmoke oh the knoll that
he also heard a shot from that direction.
7. A claim by a Dallas policeman that
neither he nor Officer Tippitt knew Oswald.
8. The claim by the pathologist?the
Warren Commission's only source of infor-
mation about the autopsy----that the X-rays
and autopsy photographs support his tes-
timony before the Commission.
9. The claim by a member of the Warren,
Commission that there was nothing fraudu-
lent about the Warren Report.
10. The claim by Earl Warren that the
Commission found no evidence of a con-
spiracy; that none of the Warren Report's
critics over found anything the Commission
are assuming that 70 percent of the times
the PSE finds stress in testimony, it results
from soriething other thah lying.
Wm, let's ignore the deception indicated
iri the testimony of the eyewitnesses; even
if present, it might have resulted from mere
desire for attention. That leaves eight "in-
siders" who have demonstrated stress when
making statements supporting the Warren
Report: the Dallas policemen Hill, Jacks;
Jackson and Weitzman; the medical exam-
iner, Captain Humes; Commission staffer
Wesley Liebler; Commission member John
McCloy; former Chief Justice Earl Warren.
Assuming that there is a 70 percent
chance that any single instance of stress
is "outside issue," what is the probability
that all eight instances are due to factors
other than deception? Elementary proba-
bility theory tells us that ft is .seven-tenths
raised to the eighth power, or approximately
6 percent. ? '
? ' In other words, even making some fairly
conservative assumptions, there is a 94 per-
cent chance that at least one of these eight
men is lying. '
hacl missed; that he had found nothing since My own personal opinibn? I don't know.
the publication of the Report to change his 11 remember the young man with the ring.
view; and that he knew of no Commission He said he was wearing it, and he was,
member who had ever changed his mind , but tie stressed. He stressed not because
about their conclusions.
I he was lying, but because there was some-
thing about that .ring that really bothered
If we 'accept that each instance of stress him, something he didn't Want the world to
'indicates deception, an interesting and ' know. Perhaps that is also true of these men
unexpected possibility emerges: ! who, in one way or another, learned some
part of the truth about the assassination of
John F. Kennedy. ?
'I suppose I'M not absdlutely sure even
of that. When I first met Bob Smith of the
Committee, I asked him if there was any
one thing the government could do to clear
up the mystery. Yes, he replied, the one
thing that would help More tharp anything
'else would be to make aVAilable the phy
cal evidence ? the detailed FE3I lab r
ports, the x-rays and autopsy photograph
the microscopic slides, ;the blood:1,1am(
clothing, yes, even the Firesiclunt's brti
wherever it has been hidden. These things,
he said, would go far toward anSwering the
questions about what actually happened
that day in Dallas. Maybe they would even
confirm the Warren Repo&
So when I say I'm not absolutely certaie
these men are conceatihg .sOrnething,:l
mean I can think ofsom6thin9 that could
conceivably;chango,Ty mind. That is, If the
government would open all its flies on this
matter to us and we are ,,%/ron'9
Oswald was involved in some way in the
assassination. if only as a fall guy. Some of
the Dallas police force may have been in-
volved, planted the evidence that impli-
cated Oswald, and covered up the fact that.
there was a conspiracy. The medical exam-
iner believed his own testimony to the War-
ren Canmission, but later had doubts. The
Commission found evidence of a conspir-
acy but didn't believe it, so they covered
it, up in order to present a tidy package to
the public. Later, at least one memb'er of
the Commission changed his mind, but
since he didn't knbw what really did hap-
pen, he decided to say nothing. So there
was conspiracy in Dallas, and in Washing-
ton nothing worse than blundering.
I could say all this with certainty if I knew
that stress always equals deception. Unfor-
tunately, I do not know that. But the PSE
analysis of the assassination tapes has
generated a staggering amount:of fresh
doubt regarding the Warren Report. This
doubt rises not only from specifio points ?we, the ocopie wao lea ypliatpTh tia
'the PSE has called Into question, but from. believe we haven't yet hoard the full account
of (ho events of Novembef 22, 1963.
32
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Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010019.0001-6'
WASHINGTON POST
3 June 1973
This is ?tie of a series of occasional
articles on the world's energy problems.
? , By David B. Ottaway
and Ronald KoVen
Washinston Post Staff Writers
After having pressed during the past'
' year for a common front with Western.
Europe and JaAn to meet the current
energy crisis, the United States nowl.
appears to have growing doubts that"
such an approach is feasible or desir-
With less than 10 days to go before..
,a? critical meeting of the major Oil-
consuming nations .in Paris, the U.S.
government has so far failed to do ,
more than dratv up a restricted list ofi,
.areas in'which some cooperation might ?
be possible.
On the key issues of dealing with ,
,spiraling oil prices and of interna-.;
:tonal sharing of the evailable? oil in
-times of emergency, the U.S. govern
enent has no concrete proposals toe,
present to the conference. .
,!?,, The irony of the situation is that '
Washington, which had been stressing '
t4tte urgency of establishing a'common
policy, seems to be playing for time
while administration energy planners
figure out where American interests:
.really lie. .
The upshot may well be what Under.
:Secretary of State for Economic Af.
'fairs William J. Casey has called "an
s?
onereasing Balkabization of the -oil i
'.market" as each cOuntry seeks itsi
own private oil preserves.
. There is a real danger that, ee.:.
decisions are put off and deadlines
,for studies on both sides of the AV
lantic are ,pushed back, the competi-
tive scramble may come and go before:
. governments have even drawn upe
?their plans for cooperation:
Solutions that seemed self-evident;
as recently as two months ago now.
seem, under closer scrutiny, to pose
as many problems as they may solve.1
The resulting internal debate among ,
U.S. policy planners has left the Nixon.
administration with no clear policy.
. Middle-level officials who once had ,
a clear run of U.S. oil policy have
been, displaced since the energy short-
age has become a pressing political'
issue. White House national security
adviser Henry A. Kissinger and See.;
retary of the Treasury George Pe
Shultz are currently grappling with,
the complex issue.
While the middle-level officials had
relatively clear ideas, and even de-
tailed proposals, about U.S. oil Pc licy,
their top-level successors are only
;beginning to think the question.
through as they engage in a process,
of self-education.
r. "We should not minimize the issues;
we face in considering cooperatitte
.measures" with Europe luid Japan;
Under 80crutflo, fiorioy mount!), Wink
, fieth, V?
y, Among the questions he
Ilisted were whether Wash-
'e1iilgton is ,ready to accept
33
"binding arrangements? with
rEurope for sharing oil
t ?
im-
polts in an emergency,
bethether Americans are ready
tto accept transatlantic petrol-
eum rationing ? and whether
U.S. business is ready to
ishare its fuel-industry patents
'and technology with foreign
;Ina tions.
A "We have not even fin-
:Ished inventing the ques-
tions" about dealing with
.:.tthe energy , crisis, said one
?Ttop-level government , ad-
..
eviser. , ? ,
As for earlier govern-
mental consideration of
'forming .what, Walter, Levy,
ipossibly the, top American
private oil consultant, hat'
'called. a. "countervailing
Power" to the oil-producers
icartel (OPEC?the Organie
lation . of Petroleum Ex-'
;porting Countries); most top
U.S. oil officials have eon;
;eluded that such a "con-
rob ta tion organization"
!would be eouterproductive.
117 Instead, U.S. officials are
ie ?
vtalking at least as much;
'about how to establish co-
.6perative relations with the
oil-producing nations as
1,11t,ith our fellow consumers:
Jong Deadline ?
The Europeans are in no
:better shape than the
Americans. A recent ses-
sion of the energy ministers
of the nine-natien European
Economic Community failed!
to agree on a common poP
ley. They set Dec. 31 as a
deadline for drawing up a
plan for a community oil
market. At the earliest, pro-
posals will be set before the
Ministers in the autumn.*
e Henri Simonet, the Come
Mon Market's energy com-
missioner, who is just fin-
ishing a round of talks with
'Washington officials, con-
.cluded that the Americans
'are "quite far away" from
establishing a petroleum
!foreign policy. "I simpose
they are probably in the
'tame state as we are," he
This week, the State De-
partment's top oil exPert,
'James E. Akins, said that
:the United States, in an of
fort to avert cut-throat com-
petition for exclusive oil
supplies, had turned down a
Saudi proposal last fall for.
"special relationship, The
Arnericans also asked the,
tleepetititt tuit.l anitittpta0 to,
shun similar . offers, he.
eodded, '
The U.S. effort failed,
':.!Akins said, and "The scram4
ePle started,anYway." Ameris
,
an compenies .are also 1n-
volved, he said.
Starting, a year agp, th6
iUnited 'States twice issued'
fitrgent calls at meetings- of
the Organization ler Leo-,
Vomid Cooperation Mid Dee,
iyelopment, the 20-nation,
lelub of this world's incluse
Oialized nations, for the es-.:
,f,,ablisliment of close coov
4eration in petroleum policy.:
`.t. Saudi Petroleum Minister
Sheikh Zaki Yemeni de-
emunced what he took to be.
t American plan as a call,
Ifor economic "war." Backipg
off, American officials said
that 'Yemeni had misunder-
stood the most militant poe-
sition expressed in America:
?an oil consumers' cartel to?
deal directly with OEC?as
representing *U.S. policy.
Nevertheless, ' President
Nixon dispatched former'
'Commerce Secretary Peter
'G.. Peterson to Japan and
'Europe as a special ambas-
sador to explore prospects
for policy coordination..
In testimony before Con-
' gress this week, , Deputy-
'Treasury Secretary William.
E. Simon indicated -U.S. of;
'ficial reluctance to make
any speedy commitments to
its European and Japanese,
partners.
' For examPle, on the ques-
tion of emergency oil shar-
ing, he said, "If we should
agree to serious negotia-
lions with European mem-
bers of the OECD over a
sharing formula, these ne-
gotiations can he expected
to be diffieult and pro-
tracted."
A major dilemma for the
United States is whether I.o
include American domestic
petroleum reserves in ant'
common oil pael.
U.S. government staff
studies have shown that the
United States?still the
world's largest oil producer,.
although its production is
not increasing?would prole-
ably lose more oil than it
would. gain in any sharing
formula likely to be accepta-
ble to the other industrial-
ized nations. Except for the
North Sea area now under
development, neither Eu-
rope nor Japan has any sub-
etantial oil sources to share.
If Arab MI to the West
were cut iit, the United
States could therefore he
huh to (4011.1161de u
tilsproportioratte Moro ofovo
,eryone's oil rations.
American reluctance may
'stem from a growing aware-
ness that the United States
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is in the best pesition!to do'
It alone in any oil scramble.
Not only does it have itd
own domestic oil production
and the 'as ? yet untapped,
Alaskan deposits, it Meet haS
it- preponderant Pdpitiori.
with, the top three fe;i1-ex-'
porting. nations?Saudi Ara-
bite ,Iran and Venefuela.
American companies gee the
major producers in Saudi
Arabia and Venezuela and
share the wealth with . the
'British in Iran. Washington
exercises the preponderant'
foreign political influence in
'all three.
The United States is eon-
,sidering its own plans lee-
Stockpiling a 90-day oil sure
.ply against an emergency, .at?
an estimated cost of about
$3 billion. Stockpiling is one,
of the issues that Washing-
ten says it is ready to dise
'cuss with OECD nationi,.
most of which alreadY have
'their .own stockpiling plans. '?
., The other major topic' at
'the forthcoming OECD oil
committee meeting in mid.'
,Jtme is expected to be joint'
plane for international coop-
' eration in research and de-
velopment of alternatives to
:oil.
But U.S. officials see ere
-way of coming to grips with
what is perhaps the most in-;
'tractable issue of all?the :
ever-rising price of oil. Inde-
pendent American oil corn-,
panics are in the forefront.
? of the scramble to sew up
oil at almost any price.
In the past three years,;
the price of oil eas doubled,'
and it may aim-e than dou-
ble again to $10 a barrel or
more by 1980. But in a world
sellers' market, U.S. and Eu-
ropean officials doubt that
prices can be held . down
evere if hiddingC among con-
sumers is eliminated. None
'seriously ?believes that an,
?oileconsumers organization
could stand up to the steady
OPEC demands for ever
higher prices.
In 1980?when most esti-
mates are that the United
States will be importing
about half of a total oil con-
sumption of around 26 mil-
lion barrels a 'day?it is cal
ciliated that every one.rinilar,
inereasC in the price of a
barrel of oil would add $7
billion to America's foreign
011 bill.
Deigns' Heeretury
flittl. tide, ell lie
ports aro eapeeted to eetwo'
about 33 per cep!. of our In
tat eonsumptiou
.Slate's Akins suggest:f1 tru4
week that this Wein !Tech
90001-6
^
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50 per cent even befcire 1980.
?by 1976. According to Si-
mons, U.S. payments for for-
!eign oil should reach about
$7 billion this year, $10 bil-
lion in 1975 and $17 billion
by 1980.
; Nor do U.S. planners see
precisely how the oil con-
suming nations, widely ? di-
vergent in their interests
and their internal economic
Organizations, can mesh',
their policies. Some coun-
tries, like France and Italy,':
,have government-directed'
tell industries, while others,..1
like the United States, have,
thus far largely left thei
making of oil policy to pri-
vate companies.
e Even the interests of pri-
vate companies have often
?been widely divergent. Oil-
producers like Iraq and Iran-
; have been vety successful in
playing the members of oil-
company consortiums off
? against each other. In Libya,
where American companies':
now face the threat of na-
tionalization, the big, estah-.
lished oil companies like
?Exxon fear that the ,small
U.S. independent companies
will cave in and make sepa-
irate deals
-
The European nations,
suspicious of the motives be-
hind American calls for co-
, operation, point out that the
Anglo-American companies.
dominate the international.
oil industry. So long as
there was plenty of oil to goS
'around, this was tolerable to
the Europeans. With short- .
nges looming, however, they
inevitably suspect that the
major companies will be
forced to supply their own
countries first in any emer-
gency.
Jean Leclerc', a Common.
Market energy expert, re-
cently remarked, "Any car-
tel we formed would he un-
der American controls."
Such distrust is mutual. One
?American official said, "The
"Europeans don't want us to
make special relationships,
but they don't want to fore-
go any special relationships
of their own."
Atkins test i fled, 'The Eu-
ropeans don't like seeing us
in the market competing for
the avellnliie energy. They
wanted us to find more
sources at home."
U.S. , officials oft en rite
the French deals to buy pe-
trine= directly from Iraq
behind the back of the West-
ern consm tium to which
they belonged after most
Western oil holdings were
expropriated last year.
Inside the Common Mar-
ket, the French accuse .13rit-
ain, West Germany and the
Netherlands of wanting to
?
come to terms with the
, ideas of jnyest ine their
sUnited teat en twee borm,p tuna hi Ailieelim.
d there is an agreed European e There has also been a..
community oil 'policy. The multiplication of statements -
French favor establishment that Washington wants coop-
of a centralized community eration, not confrontation,
54
petroleum marketing orga-'
nization, a - supranational'
,agency that would regulate
exports and imports and ,
!perhaps make direct deals',
'with the oil-producing na-
tions. ,
Such an organization.'
could severely restrict the
freedom of action of such
,major companies as British:
?Petroleum and Royal Dutch
'Shell and could also dis-
place the positions of the
major American firms in.
the European market.
One of Europe's worries,
Commissioner Simonet said,
.is that if there is no control
of exports from the Com-
mon Market, U.S. companies
will buy up Middle East
crude oil imputed for refin-
ing on the Continent. 1-Te
said that there are already
large American gasoline
pm 'bases in France, Italy .
and the Netherlands.
Distance From Israel ?
Perhaps the overriding
European objection to tying
themselves up to the Ameri-
cans is U.S. hacking for Is-
rael in the Middle East
Britain, France and Italy
.have grown more distant
from Israel in their drive ? to
'secure assured sources of !
Arab oil. They argue that
any Arab oil embargo would
more likely be aimed
against the United States
than against Europe or .Ja-
pan.
Therefore, any oil-sharing
alliance under which a boy-
cott of one is seen as a boy-
cott of all would serve pri:
manly as an oil insurance
policy for the United States. .
The Japanese seem to be
the only ones who know ex-
actly what they want and
are going all-out to get. it.
They have told the Arebs
that Japan rejcas a constim.:
era' organization. While pro-
fessing the need for cooper-
ation among the industrial
oil consumers, the Japanese,
have been feverishly staking'
out their own exchreloo
sources up and down the
Persian Gulf and elsewhereee
Although no (Jeer ei.J.S,s
policy line has been set out,
there has been a definite
change in tone ,toward the
'oil-producers, especially Sa-
udi Arabia, which is widely.
regarded as holding the key
to an adequate U.S. oil sup-
ply in the coming decade. -
? Significantly, the United:
States has announced, over,
strenuous Israeli objections,
? its willingness to sell the
? Saudis the ? most advanced
war planes available to Is-
rael.
There has been a multipli.
cation of welconiing official
statements about Saudi
With the Arab all-producers.? e.
In private conversation,.
U.S. officials now place
new stress on the need for
."understanding" of the Arab,:
nations' needs and psychol-e
ogy. There is talk of a new
kind of foreign-aid apnroacht
? for countries that do not.
*need U.S. money grants but
do need American technole,
,Ogy and know-how, to de-
velop their societies.
. Although U.S. officials,
?still say for the record that.,
"special relationships" with
the producing ,nations may 2
be destructive of consumer-
nation unity, nevertheless
WASHINGTOM MST
7 JUil 1973.
, '!
there is inefeisind evidence
' that the Americans are now7
quietly exploring such rela-
\Hons. Akins testified thee".
the United States had told.-
the Saudis they can get eq.
,erything they want frorn th
iUnited Sates "without a for!es::
Mal special relationship." ??,?e
In a hint that Washingtoriq
.1S already thinking beyond ?
focusing its efforts on coo*
eration with Europe and tlat,i
pan, Deputy Secretary Sfel ?
-iet?
mon said that, if those arease;
will not agree to eschew spelt'
cial deals with the produc-
ers, then, "Obviously, ?if thee ,
world disagrees, we 'will.
.heve to revise our plans." ? .;
th
Ti-marre:
.117orchvide Shoirt ttap..e
By Ronald Koven
and David 13. Ottaway
Washineton Post Staff Writers
,` This is one of a series of
,occasional articles on the
. ?world's energy problems.
While Congress debates
who is responsible for the
closing of 2,000 gas stations
across the land and farmers
cry that there is not enough
fuel to, move their tractors
this summer, U.S. policy
?planners are worrying that
the worst is yet to come?an
absolute worldwide shortage
of oil.
No one disputes that there
is an abundance of oil in the
ground to meet the indus-
trial world's enormous and
growing appetite for energy
?at least foe- a while.
, The nagging question is
whether those who have the
oil will produce it, mainly to
.'please the United States,
whose wasteful ways the
world is coming to resent.
There are growing indica-
. e.
lions that the answer might
well be "no."
In the words of Deputy
Treasury Secretary William
E. Simon, chairman of the
Nixon administration's Oil
Policy Committee, "The
Producing countries will
Produce their reserves, or
Conserve them, to the extent
that they consider it to their
economic and political ad-
'yantage to do so.
The United Stales, whose
6 per cent of the world's
population now consumes 33
Per cent of its energy,
suddenly emerging As the
leading importer of oil, des,
tobilleitte the iiitt?Pnationnt
pet rtity u in ii a
As James E. Akins, the
State Department's top en-
ergy specialist testified to
the Senate ,Foreign Bela-
lions Committee recently,
"The United States alone,
through its increased im-
ports, is creating a new de-
ronnd for oil each year
equivalent to the entire'
production of Algeria (1.1*
million barrels a (lay) or ap-
proximately half that of
Libya, or Nigeria."
America's traditional for-
eign oil providers?Canada
.and Venezuela?have deter-
'mined that their reserves
are relatively limited. They
are turning their backs on
America's calls 'for help
with its energy problem to
concentrate on their own na-
tional interests.
? Other countries which
' earlier looked as if they
might be a big 'help, such as
' Indonesia and Nigeria, DOW
appear small factors in the
,chaneing world oil supply
situation.
-The only country capable
? of meeting?the world's grow-
ing needs is Saudi Arabia,
which sits on at least a quar-
ter of the earth's' proven oil
reserves, hut has only 4.5
Million souls to provide for.
Not only is the economic
incentive for the Saudis to
expand their production
limited (they now hold more
than $3 billion in monetary
reserves), hut they are corn-
ing tinder increasing politi-
cal pressure from their Arab
brothers to refrain from
bailing the Americans out.
"When we talk about one
oil needs, we're talking ?
about one country?Saudi
Arabia," said Rep. John C.
Culver (D-Iowa), chairman
of the House Foreign Eco-
nomic Policy Subcommittee.
? The implicatiohe of this
rui; frtht are
nine to let tolosii mitt141111IC
account he ton U.S. officials,
But Washineton ienrieed a
Saudi Invitation last fall to
' eetahlish a special nit re/a-
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Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100160001-8'
tionship. and the In i
Is no longer open.
After a decade during
Nvit oil producing capacity
exceeded the need by about
no per cent, world supply
and lemand is now in 'Joe.,
.tieally perfect balance. If
one producer, even an only
moderately important one
like Libya (2.2 million bar-
rels a (lay), turns off its oil -
tap, a world shortage will be
upon us.
Jo 1972, the world prod-
'wed 52.9 million barrels a
'clay and it consumed 52.7
million barrels, leaving ,
practically nothing for in-
ventories.
Until the turn of the dec-
ade. America's profligate ?
ways were no real problem. :
Until 1970, America prod-
uced as much oil as it con-!
? sumed?a policy David Free-
man. head of the Ford Foun-
dation's energy policy re-
search project, has de-
scribed as "Drain America
.First."
Now, in a world of shert-:
age. there may be a theoreti-
cal alternative to oil in the
mountains ? of coal in this '
.country which would he
enough to cover U.S. energy
needs for 500 years.
But American society has
become addicted to oil and
gas, which account for more
than three quarters of all
U.S. current energy con-
sumption. to ? maintain its
chosen lifestyle of cleaner.
industrial smokestacks and'
vehicles powered by the in-
ternal combustion engine. It
is hard to conceive a shift
back to the age of coal.
which for a start Would ,
force abandonment of our
self-imposed clean-air stand-
ards.
In effect, while waiting
for , the tardy atom and
other Buck Rogers alterna-
tives to start producing
much of 'our energy in the
mid-1980s, the United States
Is stuck on oil (already 44
per cent of all U.S. energy ?
consumption and rising) and
must count on foreigners to
supply it.
There is no spare produc-
ing capacity in the United
Stales. Alaskan oil, when it
is finally extricated from its
current judicial quagmire,
will do little more than
make up for the decline in
the lower 48 states' prod-
uction, according to the Na-
tional Petroleum 'Council.
Last year, 'the United
States imported 27 per cent
of the oil it used and ex-
pects to bring in 33 to 35 per
cent this year, according to
. official forecasts.
By 1980, most. estimates
Industry, university and gov-
ernment?ale that the
United States will need to .
ifiiii6N1 half or more tit its
total needs. one respected
view is that this may happen
as early as 1976.
The usual estimates are '
that the United Slates im-
ported about 15 per rent of
Its petroritiin products from
the unstable Arab world and '
Iran in 1972-2.1 per cent of !
its total energy consump-
tion.
? But that statistic vastly
,understates the importance
of Middle Eastern imports,
since at least a third of pe-
troleum refined in the Car-
ibbean for the U.S. market
originates in the Middle
. East. but is classified as
'Latin American oil.
A more accurate view can ?
he had from a look at the
percentage of unrefined oil
imported directly into the
United States. Using the
U.S. Bureau of Mine's fig-
ures, Arab and Persian
crude oil represented 28.6 ,
per cent of U.S. imports last
year.
The Arab world and. Iran
already produce 42 per cent
; of the world's 'oil, and they
hold two-thirds of the 670
billion barrels of proven re-
serves. The trend is toward
ever-increasing dependency
on Middle East; oil, at least
through 1980 or ? 1985. In
seven, years, according to.
conserv a t ire- estimates by
the U.S. government, a third
to a half of total U.S. oil im-
ports will he from the Arab
world and Iran.
It is estimated that one ?
out of five barrels of oil
then used in the United
States will be coming from
Saudi Arabia alone. The.
Saudis are expected to pro-
vide three-quarters of the
growth in Middle East pe-
troleum production from
?here on in. ,
A country by country
analysis shows there are no
viable alternatives to Arab
, oil.
Iran, the only non-Arab
source in the Middle East,
has been playing on U.S. ,
fears to present itself as a
potential replacement. But
the shah's own announced
plans are that Iran will im-
: pose a plateau on prod-
uction in 1977 so as not to
deplete his country's dwind-?
Jog reserves too fast.
Iran is now producing
about, 5 million barrels a
day and will peak out at 8 to ,
9 million barrels. Most of
'that oil is already committed
to Western Europe and .Ja-
pan and could not he shifted .
to the United States in a
4"4r1sis,:ex.eePt' it the' extiense,
. of . America's allies, :" ? ? ;
Iraq is ,the Arab World's,
sleeper?its vastly underesti,
mated reierveS are: second;;
only ? to Saudi Arabia's. But
the (Mord of Iraq's ? rill im;
dustry highly uncertain.:'
Some oil leconeixiists believe
that eout4ey could step up:
production; front its current
stagnating! 1.5 million barrels:
a day to ag nitich as 5
3$
?Approved -For-Release-2004/08107-4 CIA-RDP-77--00432RG0 GI-Oal_90001,6. _ -
The 'political instability that,
has traditionally been a ma-
jor obstacle to expansion of
Iraqi production, however,'
raises Orions question&
about. getting much oil from ,
there. 1 ? , .
Otitside[ the .Arab world,
i Nigeria isithe only non.Corn.?:`,
Intuits, et untry where oil
,productim is now Mmes....
ing significantly, with expcc-,,':
tations of exiSals of 2,4 mil-
lion ; barrels daily by 1975..'.
The :,West African country.?:
has ;suddenly become ex-'.
trernely important to the:
United States,,This however,:
IS a jmssing phase. America's,.
voluminous needs will ? out,'
strip: the limited capacity of
Nigeria's fields, Some of the,
older ones are already declin-
ing in production: - ?
; Many , energy. planners
have been Palled by mirages
of great oil bonanzas outside:::
the Middle East, especially in
? the seabed in pines as; near
to, home as the Long Island':
. and New Jersey' coasts and as,
far away, as the China Sea.,;
No actual drilling . has/!,
taken place In any of these;
offshol?e sit i's. The evidence;
is that they. are potentIally,'.
rich in oil. ;but many past,
'explorations' have provert!.
the nuist geologically prom;
ising areas to he dry hales....
The likelihood Is high: that:
most of the world's eaSy-tb-;,
exploit shallow-water off-
shore oil, like' Yetiezticia't
,;Lake NI aracaibo ..: and ',.- the'',
,.
., ?
,fAini Phabi, Marine:Areas:1h.,
1 the, Persian Gulf, ; have:, ale,'
readly been found.. ?
I! Flout if a gigantic offshore
rot)v,nol ks'ere to lie rouhd,
?
0NouitiN: it would ahnciO,
ift",??ritiody.he far more?cosi'ly
,
.; and di (Reid( them extractirig
the oil frOm time sands Of Sit:,,.:
:mill Arabia, where -a barreF,
of On costs ' 8 tr?10-cents to:.
.; produce at .the;i'll,vellheaci,..",,
, From discovery ..1A.full,sealei.
;produclioo,inveiveS ,a MittO:
Mum lead tirne:.of five yoni*
eVen tinder t.he'-:? best. :go nd i4
trans.' ? ? ? .'''''
' ? The troubles the ,Europet:
ans' hme,eneotintcred io the,.
North ?Sea' are, an object-lea7,
sor' for many ..pursute's Of
fon s' oil ? rushes. Deep in .
soi ) le of the world's stormi?
est waters, North Sea oil is
'proving tote a costly enter-
pi-Iso.? Destruction by wind
? and waves -of oil rigs worth
:millions. of dollars is a com-
mon occurrence. There have
been innumerable dry holes
at $3 million each. The Brit-
.ish government 'estimates
:North Sea production by 1980
at 2 million barrels a clay?
*only enough to cover Eu.
lope's annual growth In de-.
,mand for perhaps two years. ?
' Closer to home, oil al."
chemists are dreaming up
schemes to turn rocks, sand.
'and tar Into bidet: tibltl, be,
dflMitig their ftmliongatil
with fantastic estimates of
. such' deposits as the Atha-
basca Tar Sands In northern
Alberta (:100 billion barrels),
*the oil. shale deposits of the'
Rocky Mountains (1.7
tril-
lion barrels) and, the On.
noco oil tar belt 'in north.'
,eastern Venezuela (700 bil-
lion barrels). '
' These latter-day Mellen-
Ists have successfully
'developed the technology Of
extracting the' otl.. What;
they often fail to say, how.;
'ever, is that the investments -
In time and money are so ;
'high as to represent major
obstacles for private: Indus-
. try alone ?at least $5
lion In Venezuela find $6 bit--
? lion in Canada. The ilcad
times make major, oil prod-
?uction unlikely in the ?ern:.
'dal decade before , us, if-
.. then.. Extraction- of . more;
Jhan JO percent of the oil in.
: place under any ? these:.
..schemes is highly doubtful..::.
Not only are' these plans
farfetched from. ,0
/deal viewpoint,' but, they do'
not,' deal with the', political':
irealities of mounting
American nationalism L:
Canada and Venezuela.
,. The turning 'point InCtin
-
adianAinerican economic::
relatitins may: already ?have.:
come In March of this 3?ear,.
when Canada's NatiOnal En-,
orgy Board announced
"temporary" limit on crude
oil exports to the , United,
States of a little more than
'1,2 million barrels , a day,
turning down applications
for 'another 50,000 1-iftrrels..; -
:Last ? Thursday, ,???';:?similar"
',II?ealPararY9 ? restrictionS,
were placed on Canadian ex,,
ports to the United?Slates of,
??gasoline and , home heating
nil atter ?.U.S.
'gasoline jumped:.froM.409:
:barrels in January to, iUbre:,,,'
(bait 500,000 in May, tbretitr-j,
,cning to draw all el Canada's
own supply.
Canadian officials cite: the
French proverb, "Nothing is
so Inst jig; as the temoorarY."
'-.1'he Energy' ,Boar'd 'Judi.-
: ties its actions under a strict
intrepretation 'that its res-
ponsibilities require it to
? keep in reserve enough to
cover Canada's energy
needs for 25 years.
' Canadian officials here
: point out that Canada's
production from its estah-
.11shed oil fields is expected
to peak in three years and
that exploration on Canada's .
vast northern frontiers has
so far turned up large' gas
deposits but relatively little
From the frontier areas,
where. the ? expectation is
that nil will eventually be
discovered in sizable qutinti-
ties, the surpluses would
' normally go to the Allied-,
can market. But there are
influential voices
i'8totd In riniatith ii1-1011
Erie Kieeci116', economics pro-
fessor at McGill University
and a former federal Cabi-
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100190001-6
net minister, who .questions;
whether it is in Canada's in;
teresi to invest the huge.
. sums reqseired to develop'
t the north primarily for the.
benefit of the Americans
"We reject continental-
ism," says one high-level
Canadian official, "The idea
is unacceptable to Canada.
You know What happens to,
little guys." ?
This seems to be partly an;
expression of pique over the:
. American failure to reply to-:!
a Canadian offer in Mareh.
:1972 for a joint Trans-Cana-.;
'dian Pipeline to carry .0i1;
,from Alaska's. North.
?and Canada's promising
:nearby Mackenzie Illveri
Delta area to the American:.
:Midwest.
. This alternative tei*.the;,:
'Trans Alaska Pipelinee;Veas;
- ?
offered, according to sr' latet7.
:letter from Canadian-,
Ern-
ergy Minister Donald S.
;Donald to' U.S. Interior Sees:,
;rotary Rogers C. MortOne
"enhance the energy seeut
'lily of your country."
But, Mel/wield warned, if
? the nil transportation proto
lem from Alaska were "not
solved with reason and wis,
:dom by us tbday," then;' It
"could produce difficult in
'fluences in Canada-UnlIW.
Strays relations."
Eleven months, later,
'February. 1073, McDonald
smaimishly told the House .ci(
? Commons that be
; not had a xeply. from Mor-,,
Jon and that Canada has "mil
'Intention Of 'renewing 'its..
represent ation,
In retrospeet, the failtire,?
to take up the Canadian Of-
fer may turn' nut to be a ma-
jor missed opportunity 'sec-
. 'ond only to the fallUre to re.
; spend to the Saudi offer.
The prospect is that Can.
ada in the foreseeable fu-.
ture will remain - e static
source of oil for the United
States. Even the present 1.2
million barrels of crude a
day that the United States
gets from Canada overstates
Its importance in the Ameri-
can import picture. A large
? amount of Canadian petro-
leum shipments to the U.S.
Midwest represent oil freed
for export by major Imports.
of Venezuelan oil to Cane-
da's energy-poor eastern
. coast. Much of the petto,
? leum products the United
, Stales buys from Canadian
refineries, moreever, are roc-
. :essed from Middle Eastern
and Venezuelan crude.
; As for Veneztiela, tradi-
tionally the largest ekporter
of nil to the United States
and once Virtually an Attica.
can economic colony, its cur-
'rent approach towiulti helping
the "Giant of the North" is
demonstrated .by what hap.
pa nod teat viol% Por teelinieel
reasons, Venezuela's prodtip-
lion dropped by 9 per cent,
while its oil revenues in.
, creased by 11 per eent, (hanks
etia. ever higher world prices,'
This, Venezuelan Officials
is ;fine with . theme
,They are mainly concerned
with 'maintaining their coull,.
:?jrs"sjpisoine.', They do not
1.YOrryi'about'; whether the:
United ; States will ? getA:
'enough oil. . ? '
. ?
The ? Veneztielaiv?attitOe.,
iciNitaTd:..30110116an hopes of
getting a great deal Of Se4.
cure.; Western Ii'llerriistihere
in the futurC is reflected,,1
in one offielliPs'words; '? ;
e not. ,.\"e,itezstislan pnl
icy to Increase Preducticint'
::?:_ahrtintly. We Want Wilde;
gradual grOwthi',', ; st lot of ;
energy is 1.10114?0 : Waeted In
'America. We; don't Want to
,waste?oer I ' i
, To U.SeSeeritirtry Of State
.William P. IlOgersl recelit ?
invitation to 0e,
,latis to prociticel'ineq for till
ma rket,::. ihvsiqmu fIO
fact , 'cnide6: ?
HVC40Z1101a 1V111 ,:not join aid ?
)
mad race of pe,Pciticlion.'
.`.. 'When ? ;,'Amerieenst talk''
about getting liI Venezup..,!,
lans.note that in 1.1130 71;
d11,01,1fl'I'l he svOld's Oil glut',
the effect of US, geverte.
Ment -policies ;was to draw
private Amyl-h.:an oil in vest.
meat away from Veneviele
to the Middle East. As a re-
sult, there has been practi-
cally no oil exploration in
Venezuela for more than a
decade.
U.S. companies have been!
told that their Venezuelan ,
concessions will not he re-
newed after they expire in
1983. This expression of eco-
nomic nationalism has cast a
pall over new investment
?
plans, includinel thisse toe
the development of the Ori-?
noco River oil tar belt.
During his recent Latin
American tour, Rogers of-
fered a 'long-term arrang-
meat that would facilitate
the mobilization of the nec-
essary capital and technol-
ogy, and establish stable
trading arrangements" for
the hard-to-extract Orinoco
oil.
, However, with Venezuela
now immobilized in cam-
. paignine for its presidential
? election in December, no
Venezuplan leader is pre-
pared to risk a response to
the Yankee offer.
Both major political par-
ties in Venezuela have made
it clear that the days of pri-
vate oil concessions are over
?and that the government
will insist on controlling any
new oil ventures.
Venezuela's contribution
to America's energy needs is
not likely to rise much be-
yond the 1.6 million hart els
. a :day of both crude and re-
fined polo-demo it tiow pro-
vides. Venezuelan oil speciel-
ists indicate that it should
take two or three' years for
their country even to get back
'to its 1971 production level
and that future production
La-
creases will he kept to a 2 In
4 per cent annual range.
"Venezuela realizes that
oil is a non-renewable re-
source," was the way one '
Venezuelan specialist sum- .
marized his government's at-
titude.
. For the United States and
the world, then, Saudi Ara-
bia is, in James Akine'
phrase, the "swing pro-
ducer." It Is the country
whose prnduction is expand- ?
? ing the most rapidly.
It went from 6.5 million
barrels a day in January In
9 million dnily this moot;,,
'fulfilling Its expansion ohms
six months ahead ni sched-
ule.
In other werds, Saudi Ara-
bia has folded more than
"awe her Libya" to world oil
1'1'0'111(0(m so far thk year
and will add still another
Libya some time in 1975.
The world's energy plan-
ners are banking on Saudi '
? Arabia's meeting its an-
nounced Plan of 20 million
barrels a day by 1980. But
Arab world pressures have
been growing steadily on
the Saudis to curb their
production growth unless
Washington changes its pro.
Israeli policies, in the Mid-
dle East.
Speaking in Beirut last
week. Nadir!) Pachachi, 'for-
mer head of the Organiza-
tion of Petrnieum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) and still .
an influential figure in Arab
oil politics, said that to
produce a severe American
shortage within a year the
Arab countries need only
"refuse to Increase prod-
uction."
In the past few months,
Cairo In particular has been
bearing down on the Saudis
to use their new-found oil le-
verage to force an American
policy shift.
On May 3, King Yokel de-
livered a lecture to. the pres-
ident of the Arabian Ameri-
can Oil Co. (Aramco), the
U.S. consortium producing
practically all of Saudi Ara-
bian oil. Aramco President
Frank'Jungers cabled home
to the American parent com-
panies a detailed summary
leisars description of the
pressures he is feeling and
of his attempt to transfer
some of that pressure to the
oil industry so that it would
In turn place pressure on
the U.S. government.
The king stressed that he
Is "not able to stand alone
much longer" in the Middle
East as a friend of America,
Jungers reported. Feisal
said every Arab country hut
bin In "MOO tttlfltltd rni4
Ameeleen .Intereate" and
of opinion that was now run-
ning so heavily against.
America," Jungers cabled.
The- report of Feisal's plea
continued:
"He stated -that it was up
; to those Americans and
American enterprises who
were friends of the Arltis
and who had interests in the
area to urgently do sritne-4
thine to change the pitstpro
of the US(; (United States
?
government I' He said a Om-
ple disavowal of Israeli Ppli?
. cies and actions by the UV:
would go a long way towpd
quieting the current. net i?
American feeling, lie kilt
emphasizing that it was' up
to us as American business
and Americans friends to
? make our thoughts and ac-
tions felt (-prickly."'
? Abandoning.: their previ-
ous low profile,. American
oilmen have been doing just
what Feisal asked?offering
to testify before' Congres-
sional committees, button-*
holing State Department
policy makers, even taking
their case to the White
House.
Armco officials are un-
derstood to he worried that
their ambitious expansion
plans will be curbed. U.S. in-
tellieence analyses are al-
ready said to he based on
the assumption that Saudi-
Arabia will only he willing
to expand production to 15
on limo barrels a day, rather
than 26 million.
There are also reports.
that some influential mem-
bers of the Sludi royal fam-
ily are arguing within the
government that their coun-
try does not need the extra
revenue and. that it would
better serve Saudi interest
at home and abroad to
freeze petroleum production
at present levels.
Saudi Petroleum Minister
Shcika Zaki Yamani, who
brought a similar message
.to Washineton in April, is
understood to be arguing
for continued expansion.
This position, however, may
prove increasingly untena-
ble in a country that stands
to earn around $5 billion in
oil revenues this year and
was only able to spend 60
per cent or its *2.4 billion
budget laseyear.
Already, as a result of
growing political pressures
at home and an smbietions
U.S. response, the Saudi
government has backed off
its offer of last fall to prn-
vide the United States with
a guaranteed large oil sup-
ply in return for preferen-
tial treatment in the Ameri-
can market.
Perhape the heat elutited
Afeneieati iult dipintiterS'
to convince, the etatidis to do
the United States ? the
"favor," as .5.11111Ant calls it,
of expanding its oil prod-
that even in Saudi Arabia,
"it would he snore and,more
difficult to hold off the tide 3-6
APProved-For-Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100190001-6
? ---.______
o
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100190001-6
uction is to stress the tacit.
U.S. role as Saudi Arabia's
great-power protector
against major aggression.
Washington's 'problem : is
the tension between Ameri-
ca's position as the tacit pro- !
lector of Israel and as the
tacit protector of Iran, Saudi
Arabia's main rival in the
Persian Gulf. Walking care-
WASHINGTON POST
11 July 1973
6'7-1
LiL
fully among all those (mien-
fiat contradictions is not a
task for narrowly' defined oil
diplomacy, but for Kissinger- ?
style global thinking.
? In the most concrete ex-
pression so far of the new
- American awareness of the
need to placate the Saudis, ,
the Slate Department. an- '
flounced U.S. willingness to
on
Locillee t
By Jim Hoagland
. Washington Post Foreign Service
1 DHAHRAN, Saudi Arabia
midnight sky glows in
? lerce red hues here at the
? ?size of the world's largest!
_ail field, where American '
ompanies are racing to esca-
.ate production needed to
:ill spiraling global energy
lemands.
? The dancing, hissing natu- '
al gas flares that burn in
he horizon ripple in the de-
ert wind. ?
. Across the Arabian Penin-
ula 1,000 miles away, Saudi
krabian merchants sweep
ato Americhn banks in Jed-
lah each morning with huge
; acks of 100 rial notes, each
',qual to $25. A tidal wave of
ioney is rushing into the
ieuntry as more oil pours
In his modest, green-tiles,
; oofed summer palace in the
'nountain town of Tail, King
,raisal receives visitors with
, in elegant politeness, stand-
.ng as they enter and shak-
;tig hands with them.
Rapidly and perhaps some-
vhat reluctantly becoming
sne of the most powerful
eaders in the Arab world,
Paisal quickly shows that he
's spending much of his
.lme brooding about the.
win flows of oil and money
Ind their impact on the en-
Are Middle East.
Suddenly, Saudi Arabia_
las shifted from being seen
is the West's main hope for
Diving the energy crisis to
'icing another unpredictable.
factor In the volatile world
of oil and politics.
"The United States cannot
take us for granted any
longer," a Saudi leader, who
was educated in the United
States and describes him-
self as pro-American, said
strongly. "Cooperation has
to work both ways."
' The four large American
petroleum companies that
yoitithi oporato kitON Ore
pushing ahead with a crash
expansion program around
Dhahran that could thrust
Saudi Arabia beyond the
United States and the Soviet
sell Saudi Arabia a "limited
. number" of the coveter!
1Phantom fighter-bomber, the
!same plane that is the pride
of the Israeli air force and
that has been the symbol of
Israel's special relationship
with America.
Israeli Defense Minister.
? Moshe Dayan called (he
American offer to the Saus
dis A case of "oil and sympa-
thy." A few days later,.
! Prime Minister GnIda Melr
; put things firmly in perspec-
tive:
"Let me tell you some,
thing that we Israelis have
arainst Moses. He took us 41)
years through the desert
: order to bring us to the onr,
spot in the Middle East that,
has no oil."
Union as the wo id's largest
petroleum producer in four
years.
Increasingly, however, ,
:company officials wonder if
they will be allowed to use
, the new facilities they are,
frenetically installing at the
rate of $500 million a year.
.Specific warnings by the Sa-
udi petroleum and foreign
ministers and a more gen-
eral declaration to this cor-
respondent by King Faisal
last week,have make it clear
! that Saudi Arabia is seri-
ously considering blocking.
future oil production in
:creases because of what is:
seen here as all-out Ameri?:
ean support for Israel.
, A Saudi decision to freeze'
:production at current levels
could create Chaos in an en-.
ergy-hungry world, and com-
,`petent Saudi ,officials pre-,
diet that the psychological:
impact of such an announce-h'
ment would drive already
rising oil prices upward,
even more sharply over-'
night.
The open discussinn - of
such a possibility by the
Saudis already amount S to a,
major policy setback for the,
Nixon administration in the
Middle East.
An unstatea but priority
aim of the administration,
has been to keep America's
growing need for Arab oil.
and its support for Israel
separated, or, as a member
of the Washington foreign,
policy community put it re-
cently, "on two separate
tracks." The pronounce-,
ments of Saudi leaders are
' the first serious merging of
the two tracks.
They also signify Saudi
,Arabia's new awareness of
Its growing power. Amass-
ing foreign currency re-
serves at a rate of $100 mil-
lion a month faster than it
can spend them, this nation
of about 5 million people IS
Isolationism and is cau-
tiously emerging as a 'major
? force in international, Arab
world and Persian Gulf poli-
ties
0
"All the Arabs know that
It is in the hand a this gov-
ernment alone to `get the
West to behave' as they tell
'us again and again,"/ a key.
Saudi policymaker said.
The other major factor in,
'the new Saudi willingness to'
tie oil to politics is the grow-
jug
, realization here that this
desert kingdom's still devel-
oping economy cannot absorb
:the enormous revenues that
increased production and '
higher oil prices are bring-
:ling. Given its conservative
'investment policies and the
present uncertainty of inter-
national monetary condi-
tions, top Saudi officials feel
,that production above the 8
million barrels a day figure
of May is wasteful for them.\
The Saudis have passed
this message to Washington .
through a number of chan-
nels. They have not made
it clear exactly what they'
want in the way of a change;
in American Middle East
policy.
But a series of conversa-
tions with Cabinet-level offi-
cials over the past week did
indicate that the Saudis feel
? they need some public sign
'of American willingness to
consider ,the Arab cause
-more 'seriously, esbecially in
areas like voting in the;
United Nations Security Coun-
cil.
? "We are not asking for
the destruction of Israel,"
said a Saudi minister. "We'
want.,a reasonable policy to
?bring'a settlement."
? / Other Saudi leaders stress
that their government has:
been "disappointed and em-
barrassed" by the Nixon ad-
'ministrations failure to
move on the diplomatic
front, while stepping up new
military aid to Israel, de-
spite -what Saudis ? insist
were clear promises of a
shift in the Middle East af-
ter President Nixon's re-
eieetion 140 1114F,
The underlying suggestion
is' that the Saudis went out,
on a limb by counseling re-
straint. on other Arab coun-
tries, especially Egypt, on
the basis ofe
an(D:Octed.
American shift that-has not -
materialized.
Previously undisclosed
production statistics for this
year underscore the West's
increasing dependence on
Saudi Arabia, which has oil
'reserves estimated by the
Saudi government at 156 bit- ,
'lion barrels, 22 per cent of
,the non-Communist world's
total proved oil reserves.
In May, production by Ar,
*time?, the operating com-
pany for Exxon, Standard
Oil of California, Texaco
and Mobil, soared above 8
million barrels a day. If oil
industry estimates of Soviet'
production are accurate, S'. ;di
Arabia has quietly surpassed
, the Soviet Union as the .
'world's second largest produc-
er by a small margin:
Sand storms in 'the,
?Persian Gulf hindered ship
-loading in June and pro-
duction slipped back to 7.2
million barrels a day for
the month, even with the oil
port closed 49 per cent of
the time. This was the origi-
nal target -figure for ?.verage
production by Aramco in 1973.
Since production usually
rises more sharply in the
second half of the year, it
will easily be exceeded?if,
Saudi Arabia permits the in-
creases. In the first week of
July, Aramco says its prod-
uction was running at 8.6
; million barrels a day. U.S.'.
production is less . than 10
million barrels daily.
In six months, Saudi
Arabia has increased its total',
crude oil production by '40,
per cent. Arranco's esti-
mated capital budgets of
$500 million for 1974 and
1975 indicate that the com-
pany plans at least a 20 per
cent increase in production
In each of those years, mean--
ing that, by the end of 1975,
the company sees a world-
wide market for Saudi pro-
duction of 0 nilliltilIPiifttcla
daily.
This month, 500,000 barrels
of Saudi oil will be import-
ed into North America. In-
- dustry sources predict that
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the United States will need ,
to import five times that.
figure by 1975 to keep pace
with growing energy de-
'mends.
At . current production,
Saudi Arabia will earn more ,
than $4 billion in oil rev-
enues this year, a 30 per
cent increase from last year.
At least $1 billion will be '
added to Saudi Arabia's
present foreign exchange
holdings of $3 billion.
The rush of new oil rove-
nue into Saudi Arabia hau
stunned even Saudi financial
managers, who until a few
months ago were predicting
that their sparsely populated
country, which has few tale-
phones and long-distance
highways, and insufficient
numbers of schools, would
be able to spend enough of
the revenue to make oil pro-
duction increaseo , worth-
while.
Faisal, who sees a long-.
term danger to the intensely
conservative Saudi society
from too much easy money,
has resisted large-scale so-,
cial welfare programs and
bureaucracies such as those
that have helped other gulf
states soak up their oil
'money.
? 'the national development
budget has spurted from vile
tually zero four years ago'
to $3 billion in the last fis-
cal year. But only 62 pan
cent of the development
funds could actually be
spent last year.
"We don't have enough con-
tractors to do what we can
budget, and what we want to
do," Hisham Nazir, president
of the government's Planning
Organization, said. "There
aren't enough contractors in
the world.'
Nazir's organization Is draw-
ing up a new five year eco-
nomic plan to begin in 1976.
It will calf for $40 billion to
$50 billion total expenditures.
The budget figures assume
that Saudi oil production will
Increase only by 10 per cent
annually in the future.
"Saudi Arabia must draw a
firm policy on oil production,"
said Nazir, one of five key
officiale named by FaAal to
the newly formed Supreme'
Petroleum Council. "The pol-'
icy will have to put an end to
waste" brought about by over-
production, which adds to
Saudi internal inflation and
the piling up of devaluing,
dollars.
"We have to strike a bal-
ance between competing
factors that include our de-
velopment requirements,
prolonging our national oil
reserves over the longest
period, the absorptive ca-
pacity of our economy, the,
accumulation of monetary,
reserves that decline in val-
Ate while prices for oil rise,
and world enemy eequire-
went ed"
' A. Saudi Cabinet minister'
explained: "We have found
that the maximum revenue
we can usefully absorb is
brought in by production of
7 million barrels a day.
Anything we produce Over
that harms our. own inter-
ests, by keeping price's'
; down and by disturbing our
economic balance.
"We are prepared to go
out of our way and produce
more. But we have to have
'a reason."
The Petroleum Council
Which clearly mixes foreign,
?and oil policy interest, will,
recommend Saudi Arabia*
-first national petrolivan poli-
cy to Faisal. The debate._
over freezing production at:
,current levels is expected to'
go on for some 'months,'
while the Saudis look for
signs ? of a change in Wash-
ington.
Saudi officials stress that
In their view they are not
:talking about "using oil as
a weapon," as mole militant'
Arab states have demanded..
: There are no suggestions
here of a complete oil cutoff
to Western countries similar
to the one that was briefly:
'tried in 1967.
But if Arab-Israeli fighting',
should resume, these same
,officials make clear, Saudi,
oil would be immediately
:cut off. "If there is a battle,
we are in it," said one au-
thoritative source. "People
had better understand that
now.
' One suggestion that will.
reportedly surface in the Pe-'
troleum Council involves
freezing production at this
year's original target figure,
'7.2 million barrels a day, for
the rest of this year and
1974. This would have an es-
pecially sharp impact on the
.oil companies, who would
,.see the return on their mas-
sive new investment. de-
layed.
The Saudi Finance Minis- ,
try, which faces difficult de-
cisions on -the accumulating
revenue increases, is reli-
ably reported to be pushing
, hard for a production
'freeze. So is the Foreign
j\linistry, which must bear
..the brunt of Arab Criticism
int Saudi Arabia's tradition-
ally close ties to the United
'States.
Saudi, Arabia's new activ-;,
'fpin Arab' affairs was un-
derscored last week when ,
the kingdom granted the
Arab Socialist Beath govern- .
'Anent in Syria a $24 million ,
development loan. ?
? Top aides credit Faisal, 67,
with having dissuaded
.Egypt'e President Anwar Sa-
dat from launching a mili-
tary strike into the Israeli-
occupied Sinai Peninsula in
early June, and a top envoy,
ewas to he. 'dispatched to
e Cairo this week to assurc
Sada of continued Saudi It-
MrtiltIbt 1414Niort
?stays out of the .propoied-,1,
merger that Libya's fire,
'brand young leader, Col. ?
Muammar Qaddafi, is push-"
ing.
' Saudi officials are diplo-
matically vague when asked :
what first sstep the United'
States could take to evi-
dence.a change toward the
"evenhanded" policy Faisal
called for last week.
"The puzzle is what is it
that our American friends
want," said Foreign Minister
rOmar Saqqaf. "Why is the.
help
help always - for Israel? ? ,
There are more than 2.5 mil-
lion Palestinian people et-
ther in refuge (abroad) or
, under occupation....
"If people think this quese
tion is going to be as it is
now forever, they are
wrong," he added. "We are
'friends with the United
, States. We want to be
; friends. But there is always
a limit."
WASHINGTON POST
12 July 1973
p ?
77-?71 (Thi c'T1
s1.-1 0 o 1.
h
By David B. Ottaway
I 'WashInaton Coat Staff WrIter
Japan and European nations ca's oil production in a corn-
0
it L[,Rellze
have raised serious objections
to a recent U.S. proposal for
an oil sharing errangetnent in
times of emergency, raising
fresh doubts' about the possi-
bility for cooperation among
ethe major oil-consuming na-
tions.
Under Secretary of State
William J. Casey told a House
'subcommittee yesterday that
the U.S. govcsament proposed
in June before the 23-nation
Organization of Economic Co-
? operation and Development a
; sharing scheme involving only
I the world's imports trans-
ported over international
waters.
Japan imports nearly all of
Its oil and Europe more than
70 per cent, while the United
States currently depends on
'imports for only 33 per cent of
its total needs. Thus, the U.S.
plan amounts to asking Eu-
rope and Japan to accept a far
larger cut in their total oil
supplies than the United
j.States' would incur in any
' emergency. ,
Casey said Japan had made
a counterproposal at the, same
OECD meeting in Paris that
the United States include its
entire domestic production in
any sharing arrangement, a
position the European coun-
tries are understood to have
supported.
But Casey indicated that the
U.S. government strongly Op-
posed the inclusion of Amen-
mon oil pool.
Although he admitted under
questioning front Rep. Lee H.
Hamilton (D-Ind,), chairman
of the 'House Near East 'Sub-
committee, that the U.S. posi-
tion was a "considerable com-
plication" in efforts to, reach
an agreement, the under sec-
retary said he thought there
was still a "pretty , good
chance" of the United States,
Europe and Japan cooperating
on an emergency oil-sharing
plan.
Casey also told the subcom-
mittee that he did not find a
e"threat" in King Faisal's re-
cent warning that Saudi Ara-
bia's close cooperation with
the United States was endang-
ered by Washington's policy of
strong support for Israel.
Saudi officials have been
hinting recently that Saudi
Arabia, the key country in
meeting the industrial world's
growing 'energy needs, may
limit its oil production if the
U.S. government does not fol-
low a more "evenhanded and
just policy" in the Middle
East. ?
Casey disclosed that Wash-
ington is planning to send it
mission to Saudi Arabia this
summer to discuss what role
American companies and the
U.S. government could play in
helping the Saudis develop
their economy.
But he excluded any possi-
bility of the two countries
signing a government-to-gov-
ernment agreement for oil
supplies, saying that Washing-
ton believed such accords
were "counter-productive."
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WASHINGTON STAR
8 July 1973
By Andrew Borowiec
Star-News Special Corrrspandent
BEIRUT ? Arab sheiks,
potentates and economists,
? are all trying to come up
with a formula to turn their
oil into a major pressure
weapon aginst the United ;
States. ?
The ultimate objective is
to force America to aban-
don its unconditional sup- ,
port of Israel and helo re- ?
draw the map of the Mid-
dle East.
As usual, the Arabs are
torn between the practical
and the emotional aspects ?
of their struggle against
Israel and its powerful:
American backer. But in
the torrent of words and,,'
amidst confused and often,
quarrelsome meetings, an
embryo strategy has begun
to emerge.
? It is called "selective,
sanctions." In a nutshell, it
means that the Arabs will
continue to pump oil but
increases in shipments will ?
be applied selectively to
countries friendly to the
? Arab cause. Conversely,
staunch friends of Israel,
. such as the United States,
will be punished by produc-
tion freezes and possibly
reductions in supplies.
, All this is still basically
on paper and a number of
observess remain skeptical
about the extent of Arab.
unity and effectiveness in
this field. But a number of
American diplomats and oil
experts in the Middle East
are worried.
MOST ARABS have little.
'doubt that the United States
has no Middle East policy of
its own but merely backs
'Israel's strategy, which has ?
been that of defiance of the
widely dispersed and con-.
stantly feuding 120 million
Arabs.
"Indeed, we and Israel
have a perfect entente,"
said an American diplomat
in this Arab capital. "We
even fight their (the Israe-
lis') battles for them ? such'
as helping to get Jews out of
Russia.,"
This diplomat was seri-
ously concerned about the
possible effectiveness of a
concerted action by such
oil-producing states as Sau-
, di Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain
all conservative counj
.tries. Another American
,expert, however, feels that
?"people have been crying
wolf for 25 years" and that;
no concrete Arab measures'
,are in the offing.
' He pointed out that de-,1
,spite the Arab clamor for
anti-U.S., sanctions, the;
expansion of oilfields in:
such Arab countries as',
''Saudi Arabia and Iraq was'
continuing Saudi Arabia,
'alone, plans to increase its
present production of 7.2
million barrels a day to. 20i
million barrels by 1980.
This will be the year in
which the United States is
expected to rely on Middle
Eastern oil for 50 Percent of
its consumption. Can Saudi
Arabia, which relies 'on.
American arms and possi-
ble protection in case of,
'conflict with "revolution-s
ary" states, turn off the'
:tap?
IF ONE LISTENS to var-:
.ious Saudi and Kuwaiti
statements, this is very
much in the cards. Yet the
Arab record on this and
other issues has been that of
confusion and contradic.
-tion. Money pouring into
Arab ,coffers has failed to
serve Arab political objec-,
tives in concrete terms.'
While capable of creating
'havoc in money markets,
this accumulated mass of
gold and Western currency
has yet to harm Israeli and
American interests in the
Middle East.
As with almost every-
thing, the Arabs do not ap-
pear to be in a hurry. They'
point out that the oil con-i
sumption of all industrial.'
ized countries is rising.
steadily ? 8.7 percent an..
nually in the United States
alone, which is higher than
anywhere else in the world.
They stress that 60 per-,
cent of the world's known
reservers are in the Middle'
East (including Iran) and.
'that sooner or later any,
country wishing to keep its
'industrial machinery going'
has to pay more attention to.,
Arab views and desires. ,
Meanwhile, money contin-
ues to, flow into Arab banks;
and private vaults. The oil
income of the Arab etititv,
tries has already topped $10
billion and is expected to
reach $40 billion dollars by
1980 ? the expected energy
crisis year in the United
,States.
-Approved-
- 1.1 ! ! ; !
It is no secret that Saudi
Arabia is on its way to accu-
mulating staggering mone-
tary reserves, expected to
surpass those of the United
States and Japan combined,
. WILL THIS mass of
money be used toward a
cohesive plan likely to fos-
ter the Arab cause? Or will
it continue to be dissipated
in grants for grandiose proj-.
.ects, arms and other ex-
penditures that have yet to
increase the Arab World's'
military prowess or eco-
. nomie situation?
, No ready answers are
available. But discarding.
the passionate outcries of
,such Arab hotheads as LA-:
.bya's Col Muammar Kazza?-?
Ii, there are some very lev-:
el-headed efforts to make
Arab oil a powerful political(
weapon.
For example, Nadim
?Pachahi, former secretary
general of the 11-nationi
;Organization of Petroleum',
Exporting Countries,
:(OPEC) urged the organi-
zation's Arab members to
freeze their crude produc-
tion at its present levels'
until America shows a more
balanced Middle Eastern
.policy.
Said Pachahi:
"In the present'seller'S
,market for crude oil, there
is no need for Arabs to
threaten to stop the flow of
oil altogether, thereby cut-
ting off their noses to spite
their faces.
"All they (the. Arabs),
would have to do is to re-
frain from increasing pro-
duction. This would be
sufficient to cause a world-
'wide supply crisis in a very
.short period of time."
In Egypt, Dr. Issam Ed-
din el-Hinawi, a professor of
that country's National
Research Institute, suggest-
ed that Arab strategy,
'should be based on control-
39
? 1111A
lilt the flow of oil to the
West.
, He proposed the creation
?,of a "strategic materials1
office" that would be at-
tached to the Arab League.' ;
This proposal was echoed
to some extent by Saudi
Arabia's influential oil min-
ister, Sheik Ahmed Zaki
Yamani, who would like to
exploit the international
concern caused by the ener-
gy crisis.
NEEDLESS TO SAY, the
Arab moves are being
watched carefully by Israel,
which is trying to reassure
the United States that all
these plans, suggestions
and schemes are far from.
beipg concrete. ?
Said the Israeli Jerusa-
lem Post in a recent editori-,
al:
"It is no coincidence that
the Arab states advocating
the use of oil as a political
weapon are those who do
not possess oil, led by
Egypt which is permanently
,short of funds.
? "American public opinion
would be well advised to'
take all these factors into
consideration so that when
gasoline rationing may be-
come necessary, anger and
frustration will be directed
' where it belongs and not at
? Israel.
"Serious questioning of
how America is to maintain
her present position as a
superpower must lead to
planning for alternative
Sources of energy and new
sources of oil not subject toj
Arab pressure and de-
mands," the newspaper.
concluded.
Not many American oil
experts in this part of the,
world agree with this view.
'According to one of them,
"Israel is not likely to be
harmed by the looming en-
ergy crisis. But I am worry-
ing about ' the United
'States."
000400190001
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10101973 TitE WASHINGTON POsT
Peterson Urges Cooperation
By Hobart Rowen
Waghington Post Start Writer ?
Energy will be sail an
'overwhelming an d compli-
cated issue for the United,
States over the next decade
, that the nation must not
risk "going it alone," says
Peter G. Peterson, former
Commerce Secretary and
recently special ambassador
for President Nixon.
In an interview, Peterson'!
? now a senior partner in
the investment firm of Leh-
man Brothers of New York
said that the whole en-
ergy question should be part ,
of any summit meeting';
scheduled later this year.
Peterson has just com-
pleted a confidential report
for the President on inter-
national trad e, security,'
monetary, and energy prob.:'
:hems. It is titled "The Year
of Our Friends ?The Year
of Europe and Japan and
' Canada."
, The way Peterson sees it,
the failure to cooperate
with Japan and Europe and
the Mideast on the use of
energy might result in "can-
nibalism," driving oil prices
out of sight. And each dol-
lar per barrel increase in ,
the price of oil, he calcu-
lates, would add about $4
billion to $5 billion to the
annual 'U.S. import bill and
$15 billion to $20 billion ts,
the world's by 1980.
The frightening prospect that
he draws is that by 1980, the
'United States will be shelling
out some $25 billion for for-
:Oen oil, seriously aggravating
'the balance of trade and pay-
bents. What this would do to
dollar already weakened in
the eyes of the world's busi-
nessmen and traders is any-
'one's guess. R,epeated devalua-?
tions, he adds, are no answer
because all . major industrial,
nations are in the saute boat.
Another major reason for
Cooperation is that the oil
,companies themselves won't
be able to resist the demands
13., the oil-cartel producing
eciuntries for price increases.
.4 And above all, Peterson in-,
ists, unless some sensible ap-
proach to the energy problem
Is worked out, it will get inter-
mingled with the tricky Mid-
e:ast political conflict and
cause major security prob.
.1 Peterson's report to the
resident has. not been made
public, but it is clear that he
tinks that energy is the corn-
Mon element among America's
$any international problems.
0 The President recently ap-
Pointed cornier Gov. John A.
15ove of Colorado as his new
Gni man on energy problems,
but so far, the administra-
tion's focus has been on the
domestic use side of oil, and
Ms; not boon flitaneted at the
international problem. But he resources are finite, may de-
reveals that presidential aide cide not to increase prod-
Beery Kissinger is showing uction so rapidly. And in any
'weep interest" in the interne- ;event, the Middle East coun-
.
tonal aspects of the energy
problem.
The way Peterson sees it, 'a
first element of a cooperative
4pproach with the Japanese
and the Europeans would deal
with such things as temporary,
shortages, which can be met
ly stockpiling for emergen-
cies. Rather, than confront thg-
Mideast countries, he opts for,
cooperation; thus avoiding
hat is recommended bY
, any others?a buying consor:
9urp. Such a "draconian ap.
*oach" would be a last resort:,
e also advocates a massive'
Project on energy research,
ebniparable in magnitude to
the Apoilo program, to de-
itelcip new sources from nu-
fusion, solar energy, and
inything else that .ccitnes
al4ng.
14: Another cooperative, area
Would be conservation, possi-
' Y higher taxed on automo-
*le horsepower 'arid study of
iOulation standards for new
cbnstruction that would pre-
vent the waste of energy.
A horrible example often cited
!the new World Trade Cen-
t0 in ' lower Manhattan. The
4Arin towers of that edifice are
Said to have an efficiency re-
ad for their heat use of less
thlin 10 per cent.
t he international monetary
cbinplications of the energy
problem are among the most
intriguing. Peterson says that
by 1930, the dollars pulled in
by the oil producing countries
will be, according . to a .con-
servative estimate, about $50
billion to $75 billion, corn-
pared with about $25' billion in
1975.
lie cautions against taking
Precise estimates too seriously
because the volume of oil im-
port and price are necessarily
conjectural.
?, The Saudi Arabia govern;,
merit alone will be earning
about $30 billion by 1980, or 40.
per cent of the total of the
producing countries. This com-
pares with $8 billion in energy
receipts by Saudi Arabia by
1975. Iran would pick up about
$15 billion compared with $5
billion in 1975.
In terms of American de-
pendance MI North Africa and
Middle East oil, Peterson's es-
timates are that by 1980 our
Imports from that part of the
world will account for 20 to 40
per cent of our total oil use.
That compares with only 2 per
cent in 1U70. Western Europe,
Japan, and the rest of the free.
world, already heavily depend-
ent on the Middle East, will be
even more so: ? .
, .
'Peterson's figures assume
that the Middle East countries
will continue to be attracted
by higher prices, increase
their production, and sell the
West all the on It wants to
buy.
; :But the Middle East coun-
tries, knowing 1.1151 their oil
liries broadly suggest?that un-t Meetings this year: "'
less there is a solution to the Underlying Peterson's sense
of urgency is the fact, he feels
'isfactory to them, they May
? Arab-Israeli conflict more 'sat-
that the oil-producing coun-
tries have alternative ways
an.
not cooperate with the West at 'Clif reaching their objectives.
Peterson recognizes thes ; rl'hey can restrict production,
ei
?or emphasize their own longer-
ui problems. He made the point; the. interview that many AT term domestic objectives.
; ?
abs want to be treated as re-
sponsible members of the Lam.
ily of nations.
.What Peterson recommends
IS a, recognition of Arab de-
Mends for treatment as an
'equal partner in the interna-
tional syst em.
lie would establish an eco-
116one o,veluoinenc commis-
sion for the Mideast to help
plan major new projects of all
kinds in conjunction with the
Arab countries. He would also
do things to assuagethe Arab
ego. Example: he would send
Senior ambassadors to the 'oil
producing countries and try to
attract Arabs to international
institutions such as the IMF.
Meantime, he thinks the
United States should give
' more study to ways in which
? the excess funds-,.-
,he calls them "petro dollars"
?can be soaked up. Anticipat-
ing' that there will be large
amounts of Arab capital flow-
ing In all directions, the
United States ought to have a
-policy on whether to encour-
age or limit investments in
particular industries,'
, In the delicate area of Arab-
Israeli relationships, Peterson
observes that the United
States will be under great
pressure to differentiate its
policies from those of the?
state of Israel. He is careful
tto say that we should not re-
, duce our political'support of
Israel or make Itrael the
'scapegoat because of our
',needs for new sources of?en-
,ergy. On the other hand, he
!thinks there is a 'need to un-
derstandi the Arab view that
'American policy too often
sounds like an echo of Israeli
policy. ? ?
One of Peterson's main
arguments is . that time is
short for handling the energy
problem. In the course of his
survey of the situation for the
President, he found that the
Europeans and the Japanese
look to the United States for
leadership. He would get an
Immediate start on the Stock-
piling and researching pro-
blems by setting up task
forces.
He would buttress this with
a small team of' experts drawn
,from various U.S. agencies
'who would visit each Mideast
country to sound out the
potential degree of coopera-
,tion and their spetific deve-
,lopment needs. In terms of
,structure, Peterson would set
up a high level position, a
president i a I ambassador at
large for international energy
policy,
The Peterson timetable
would call fin' a new inter
national eto
trny itiblitittion to
p1 nd nn e implentent tint ens
operative proposals along with
an agreement on a broad set
of principles of cooperation, emphatically. "It is tied to
by the,time of President A IN trade, money, politics and
Nixon's proposed sum mit1f-tv everything else,"
The financial side' of the'
energy problem, of course,
;exacerbates the intrinsically
sticky question of the weak-
ness of the dollar, and pros-
pectiv.e international moil-
tary reform.
t In Peterson's view, a re-1
formed international monetary'
? ?system is farther off than meat.
.iofficials in the U.S. govern-,
ment have been hoping, partly
because of the "petro-dollar:!
problem.
-, The Europeans Peterson,
talked to' in the course Of re-
porting for the President want'
a resumption of convertibility
of the dollar. But the United
'states can't even think of con-
vertibility while the dollar is
weak and the balance of pay-
ments still in a big deficit. '
In his travels abroad for
the President, Petersen found
'that some Europeans are se-
riously ? worried by the pro-
poSal made last.year by Tress-
airy Secretary George Shultz
that would key 'balanee of
payments adjustments to the
'level of 'reserves on a more
or less automatic 'basi
Some important Europeans
'appeared not to understand
the Shultz proposal.
The Europeans, 'are afraid
,that large speculative flows,
;that affect reserves would
cause unwarranted changes
In their exchange rates. They
say quite vigorously that they
won't tolerate what they view
as a threat to their own ,ex.?
ports and full employment
possibilities.
Perhaps even' more serious,
,Peterson believes, is the
.European view that the United
:States has ulterior motives.
Some Europeans charge that
the United States would use
-capital outflows to depreciate
the dollar and thus shift to
them the burdens of our do-
mestic policies. ?
Moreover, for all of the
talk of increased exchange
rate flexibility; Peterson
quotes at least. one influen.'
tial European, French Fi-
nance Minister Valery
Gis-
card d'Estaing, who suggested
again that exchange rates:
shouldn't change , more fre-
quently than once every three
or four years. That is a far
cry from the kind of flexibility
that Shultz, Peterson, and
many others feel is Crucial to
'a reformed monetary system;
Nonetheless, Peterson wants
the United States to push
? ahead for an. agreement on
general principles and interim
rules.
. But . none ' of these things,
Petersonconcltidea, will mean,
mhcli finless we rket IA handle
,tm ,4 1'.11 tit,i0liMloet$!t,tib.
thri tortuously , UiI 8lt4 04110,
Iota. "Energy le the iiey In.
ternational issue for 6 far'
ahead as we can see," he says
_
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100190001-6