ARCHIBALD COX APPOINTED PROSECUTOR FOR WATERGATE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77-00432R000100170001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 20, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 19, 1973
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP77-00432R0001001Y0001-8
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This publication contains clippings from the
domestic and foreign press for YOUR
BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use
of selected items would rarely be advisable.
25X1A
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NEW YORK TIMES
19 May 1973
Archibald Cox Appointed
Prosecutor for, Watergate
By, ANTHONY RIPLEY
Special to The New York Moms
WASHING'T'ON, May'- 18-x. 1lOt1?/Q[~e(87ju &Pi7n7 32BB49A' OQQQl&,I authority of the
quiescing on the,ElIsberg profile. So 7,
White House to plot he compromising.
 F A
,Following are excerpts from:
'a transcript of testimony by
James W. McCord Jr. on the
second day of hearings today ?
.by the Senate Select Com-
:mittee on Presidential Cam-
paign Activities into the
Watergate case:
MORNING
SESSION
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NEW YORK TIMES
19 May 1973
Excerpts From . Transcript of McCord'i T- to eon Watergate
to xne New Yore Tim" by him and by others whom
MR. DASH. Were you an:
tmploye of the Committee to
Re-elect the President?
McCORD. Yes.
Q. What position did you'
hold and what were your
duties? A. I came?aboard first
,as a security consultant part-
: -time in September of 1971.
Q. How' did you get that
'job? A. I was introduced
initially by Mr. John Caul-
field and Mr. Odle, the direc-
tor of administration,' who
testified yesterday.
Q. Under whose direction
did you work? A. Primarily
under the direction of Mr.
Robert Odle, who was my
immediate supervisor in the
committee. The responsibil-_
ity with Mr. Mitchell and his
family, I received directions
from him, from Mrs. Mitchell,
from Robert Odle and Mr.
Liddy.
Q. Did there come a time
when you worked under the
,direction of Gordon Liddy?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. What was Mr. Liddy's
position at that time? A. He
was at first from December
until about March 19-De-
cember '71 to about March
'72-general counsel for the.
'Committee to Re-elect the.
President. Thereafter he has
occupied the same position
-.-with the Finance Committee
for the Re-election of the
President.
Q. When did this arrange
ment or-i which you work
under his direction-begin,
Mr. McCord, with Mr. Liddy?
+ A. The first discussions of
the arrangements began some-
time in January, 1972. Early
January.
Q. Could you briefly state
for the committee, Mr. Mc-
Cord, what that was that Mr,.
Liddy wanted you to do?
A. Gradually. ? the discus-
sion in December, January
February of 1972 with Mr.
'Liddy, gradually developed
into more and more conver-
sation on his part with me in
the offices of the Committee
for the Re-election of the
President regarding the tech.
nical.' devices. and political
,matters pertaining. to the
forthcoming convention, and
that became apparent that he
had an interest in several
areas of intelligence gather-
ing pertaining the Democratic
party and the Democratic
convention, and in which it
was contemplated or planned
he referred to in these con-
. versations as John Mitchell;'
John Dean, counsel to the
President; Jeb Magruder then
in January the interim direc-
tor of the Committee to Re-
elect the President; in whick
it appeared that those men,
the four of them, were in the-.
-by late January-the, plan-
ning stage in which political
intelligence was to be dis-
cussed at meetings at the
Attorney General's office, Mr.
Mitchell's office, and in which
Mr. Liddy was seeking from:
me certain information re-
garding the costs and the
..types of electronic devices
that could be used in bugging.'
That the part of the.budget
proposal which he was work-
ing, working on, the second
part dealt with photography
operations, clandestine pho-
tography operations, and a
third part. dealt with the
broad area of political espi-
onage, political intelligence.
The topic of photography,
clandestine photography, in
which he was preparing the
budget and preparing to meet
with the. gentlemen I have re-
ferred to before, in planning
sessions, dealt with photo-
graphic equipment and the
cost of photographic equip-
ment and specific items of
equipment that would be used
against the Democratic party,
the Democratic hierarchy in
Washington primarily, but
also in Miami, Florida, The
electronic devices which he
referred to specifically were
of a variety of types.
Q. I am not asking specifi-
cally what the types were,
but how were they to be
'used, where were they to be
'placed from your . under-
standing?
A. The initial interests
specified by Mr. Liddy in this
regard were, No. 1, against
Mr. Larry O'Bried, then
chairman of the Democratic
National Committee in Wash-
ington, D.C., at his residence
and subsequently at his of-
fice. in the Watergate office
building. Perhaps other offi-
cers of the Democratic Na-
tional Committee. The Me-
Govern headquarters in
Washington, D.C., were men-
tioned quite early in 1972.
And there was some general
reference to the Democratic
National Convention facility
or site wherever it might be
located at this convention in
Q. All right now, Mr. Mc- .time - subsequently, he be-
Cord, in connection with this came the director of the
assignment in' which you Committee to Re-elect the
were having these discus- President - involved the
sions with Mr. Liddy, did you counsel to the White House:
come to associate yourself involved Mr. Jeb Magruder
with Mr. E. Howard Hunt, and Mr. Liddy, who was then
Bernard Barker, ' Eugenio general counsel,'at that point
Martinez, Frank Sturgis and in time of the Committee to
Virgilio Gonzales? A. Yes, I Re-elect the President and.-
did. subsequently, was the fi-
Q. And as a result of that nance committee general
association and your agree- counsel. Therefore, in my
ment with Mr. Liddy, did you 8 mind there was an absolute.
Martinez and Gonzales iile- certainty that the C.I.A. was
gaily, enter the Democratic not involved, neither did I
National Committee . head- ever receive any statement
quarters on two occasions, from any of the other code.
one on or about May 30, fondants, at any point in time
1972, ' and the other in the up to June 17 or subsequent-
early morning hours of June ly, that this was a C.I.A. op.
17, 1972? oration.
A. I did. Q. For the record, your re-
statement of your belief that
Q. ' On the first occasion on the Attorney General, Mr.
or about May 30, 1972, you Magruder, other than Mr.
installed two telephone inter- Liddy, was !hearsay based on
ception devices or wire-taps what Mr. Liddy told you and
on two office telephones, one 'Mr. Hunt? A. That,-is correct.
on the telephone of Spencer. Oliver and the other on the Q Now, Mr. McCord, did
telephone of ' Lawrence bYOU reak-ins in any other
O'Brien? break-ins or wiretaps on
A. I did. your own or with Mr. Hunt,
Mr. Lidd or such a
Reasons for His Acts the break in in Mr.rEl sberg's
Q. Will you tell the com- Psychiatrist's office? A. I did
mittee, Mr. McCord, why, not.
after a lifetime of work as a Q. Now, after your arrest,'
law enforcement officer with- which you testified to, did
out, as -you have testified, you receive any money? A.
any blemish on your career, Yes, I did.
did you agree with Mr. Liddy Q. From whom did you re-
to engage in his program,of ceive that money? A. From
burglaries and illegal wire- the wife of E. Howard Hunt,
tapping and specifically the Mrs. Hunt.
two break-ins on May 30 and Q. Can you tell us how
June 17 of the National Dem. much money you did receive?
ocratic Committee aheadquar-
tors at A. Yes, I received legal fees,
the Watergate? of $25000 for the payment;
.A. There were a number of of lawyers. I receive a con
reasons associated with the tinuation of salary from July
ultimate dicision of mine to 'through January at the rate
do so. One of the reasons, of $3,000 a month, which the
and a very important reason others were receiving as well,
to me, was the fact that the
Attorney General himself, Q. Did you have knowl;
Mr. John Mitchell, had his, edge, 'information, and belief.
at his office, had considered as to where this money came
and approved the operation, from? 'A. I was told that it
according to Mr. Liddy. came from the Committee to
Secondly, that the counsel Re-elect the President by Mrs.
for the President, Mr. John Hunt.
Dean, had participated in Q. Now, after your arrest
those ' decisions with him. and at the time of the in-
That one was the top legal dictment, after the trial or
officer for the United States during the trial, did you re-
at the Department of Justice, ceive any pressure, sugges-
and the second gentleman tions from any persons con-
the top legal officer in the cerning what you should do
.White House, and it was a about that trial with regard
matter that had currently to your plea, behavior, or
been given- _ conduct? A. Yes, I did.
Q. Did you have any Q.' Would you now please
knowledge, directly or indi- state to the committee from
rectly, that would lead you whom you received such di-
to believe or have informa rections or pressures, and
tion that the C.I.A. was in., what it was?
volved in this plan? A. Yes, it extended over a
A. I had iu t Cie contrari, period of time beginning; to
that there was no indication,' the best of my recollection,
no intelligence, no state- do late September or early
ments to me that this was a October, 1972, and it contin-
C.I.A. operation; that, quite ued through the night before
the contrary, that it was an, my conviction on Jan. 29,
operation which involved the 1973. The persons who com-
Attorney General of the municated information to me,
which I construed as political
pressure, included Mr. E.
Howard ,Hunt; Mrs. Hunt
speaking for Mr. Hunt, she
stated; my attorney, Mr. Ger-
ald Alch,?John P. Caulfield-
Q. Will you please repeat
again the name of your at-
torney that you just said?
A. Mr. Gerald, G-E-R-A-L-D,
Alch, A-L-C-H, and Mr. John
Caulfield, C-A-U-L-F-I-E-L-D,
who had originally hired me
for the position, or who had
interviewed me for the posl-
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tion with the Committee to
Re-elect the President.
Q. Now, with Mr. Hunt,
and with Mrs. Hunt, recog-
nizing .that you are dealing
with hearsay, in that you
heard that said, what another
person said, what was com-
municated to you by his
presence? A. In regard to
Mrs. Hunt or Mr. Hunt?
Q. Well, first, Mr. Hunt.
A. Conversations with Mr.
Hunt begr.n, to the best of
my recr;:ection, in late Sep-
tembe* ur early October, 1972,
whr.? I was seeing him at
tl.c courthouse on various
.retrial exercises or events,
.notions, that were trans-
piring, in-which we would
talk about various matters,
including the situation that
we were in, what the trial
appeared to be at that point
in time-that is, what the
future looked like for us; and
in telephone conversations,
with him to me.
In other words, both in
person and by telephone, Mr.
Hunt stated that the defend.
:ants were going to be pro-
vided with, given executive
clemency after a period of
time in prison, if interested,
if they pled guilty, and were
sentenced in a plea of not
guilty, that they were going
'to be given financial support
while they were in prison;
that is, their families would
be; and that rehabilitation,
not specified but rehabilita-
tion, perhaps a job, would be
provided for the men after
the release from prison.
Q. All right. Let us leave
out for the, moment' Mrs.'
Hunt. Would you now pro-
ceed to any conversations
you had leading up to con-
tacts with Mr. Caulfield and
what Mr. Caulfield did state
to you?
Q. Mr. McCord, what led
you to prepare the statement?
,Why have you prepared that
statement?
A. I prepared it, sir, for
accuracy's purpose because
of the nature of the informa-
.lion that is contained there-
in, as I have done with some
previous statements to this
committee, where I felt that
.my best recollection, as best
I can recall it, set down in
writing, would be the most
accurate way of doing it
rather than, in effect, under
the pressure of lights and
cameras and what have you,
-make statements that might
either be misconstrued or
might be inaccurate on my
part, and in order to set it
forth as briefly as I know
how.
Q. All right. NOW, will
you please read the state.
ment: and will you read it
clearly so we can all hear it-
now?
A. I will state as a pre-
liminary that the dates of
the telephone calls that I re-'
fer to in this statement are
to the best of my recollec-
tion; they may be inaccurate
by a day or two, but they are
the best recollection I have
of the dates on which the
calls occurred.
The subject
pressure on the writer to" ac=
cept executive clemency and'
remain silent.
Political pressure from the,
White House was conveyed
to me in January, 1973, by,
John Caulfield to remain
silent, take executive clem
ency by going of to prison;
quietly, and I was told that,
while there, I would receive
financial aid and later reha-;
bilitation and a job. I was'
told in a January meeting in.,
1973 with Caulfield that the
President of the United States.
was aware of our meeting,
that the 'results of the meet-
ing would be conveyed to the
President, and that at a,
future meeting there would
likely be a personal message
from the President himself. ?
' SENATOR ERVIN. I would
like to state at this point
that the testimony of Mr.,
McCord as to what was told
to him by. John Caulfield
would not be accepted in a
court of law to connect the
President with what Mr.
Caulfield was doing, but it
is admissible to show wheth-
er or not Mr. Caulfield was
a party to any agreement to
connect the President for
any information on what is
known as the Watergate af-
fair, but it is not received in,
connection to the President,
at the stage.
SENATOR GURNEY. I
think it ought'to be pointed
out at that time that-at
this time, January, 1973, it is
my understanding that Mr.
Caulfield was not in the
White House at all, but was,
employed, I think, by the
Treasury Department.
MR. DASH. That is right.
MR. DASH. His counsel has
been informed that he wants
to testify and he will accept
a subpoena.
SENATOR BAKER. The A,an-
swer is he is not under sub-
poena and my request of the
chairman is that a subpoena
be issued in standard form
,for Mr. Caulfield to testify
and that he be scheduled to
testify Immediately next suc-
ceeding this witness.
MR. DASH. This was our
understanding.
SENATOR BAKER. Mr.
'Chairman, will you take care
of that request?
-SENATOR ERVIN. Yes, I
will sign it as soon as I can
get somebody to prepare it.
MR. DASH. We have con-
tacted his counsel and have
been told by him that he is
prepared to accept the sub-
poena.
? Will you please proceed
with your reading' of the
statement, Mr. McCord.
McCORD: On the afternoon
of Jan. 8, 1973, the first day
of the Watergate trial, Gerald
Alch, my attorney, told me
that William 0. Rittman, at-
torney for E. Howard Hunt,
wanted to meet with me at
Bittman's office that after.
'Bittriman wanted to talk with'
both Bernard Barkeriand me
that afternoon.
I had no intention of ac-
~cepting - executive clemency,
:but I did want to' find out
what was -going on, and by
whom, and exactly what the
? White House was doing now.
A few days before, the White.
`House had tried to lay the
,Watergate operation ~ off on
-C.I.A., and now it was closer
that I was going to have to
find .out what was up now.'
To do so involved some risks.
To fail to do so was, in my
opinion, to work in a vacuum
regarding White House in.'
'tentions and plans, which in-
volved even greater risks, I
'felt.
Around 4:30 P. M. that
afternoon, Jan. 8, while wait-
Ing for a taxi after the court
session, Bernard Barker,
asked my attorneys and me
if he could ride in the cab
with us to Bittman's office,
which . we agreed to. There
he got out of the cab and
went ? up towards Bittman's
office. I had been under the
impression during the cab
ride that Rittman was going
'to talk to Barker and mo
jointly, and became angered
at what seemed to me to be
`the arrogance and audacity
of another man's lawyer call-
ing in two other lawyers'
clients and pitching them for
the White House.
ency. Your family will be
taken care of and when you,
get out you will be rehabili.'
tated and a job will be found
"Don't take immunity when
called before the grand jury."
MR. DASH. Now, Mr. Mc.'
Cord, did you recognize that
voice at all? Do you know
who was speaking to you on
the telephone? A. I do not
know who the man was-the
voice I heard over the tele.
phone before in previous
calls
.
SENATOR GURNEY. Would
you proceed.
A. I would be glad to.
Sometime in July, 1972,
shortly after I got out of
jail, which was in June, 1972,
about midday there was a
note in my mailbox at my.
residence and when I opened
the letter, which had not been
stamped nor sent through
the mails, it was a note from
Jack Caulfield signed "Jack".
which said, "Go to the phone'
'booth on route 355 near
your hpme," and he gave
three.. alternate times at
which I could appear at the
phone booth for a telephone
call from him.
To the best of my recollec-
tion, one of those times was
very shortly thereafter, an
hour or two later, and
another time was the next
day, and it sems to me that
the third time was the fol-
lowing evening.
Anger Was Evident ' Calls At Phone Booth
Alch saw my anger and I went to the telephone, to
took me aside for about a that telephone booth on
half-hour after the cab ar- Route ? 355, that afternoon
'rived in front of Bittman's the same afternoon, as I best
office, and let Birker go up recall, and I heard the voice
alone. About 5:00 P.M. we that I have referred to in this
went up to Bittnian's office. memorandum of today. I do
There Alch disappeared with not know the individual's
Rittman, and I sat alone in identity; he had ;n accent
Bittman's office for a period that I would refer ?.' as a
of time, became irritated, New York accent. he said'
and went next door, where that he had formerly wo. ,.:ed
Bernard Shankman and Aus? for Jack Caulfield. He sa;
tin Mittler, attorneys for me "I am a friend of Jack's, 1
and Hunt respectively, were formerly worked with him.
talking about legitimate legal Jack will want to talk with,
matters. 'you shortly. He will be in
I might add at this point, touch with you soon."
parenthetically, no knowl- I received a call subse-
edge whatever that either quently from M. Caulfield.
Bernard Shankman or Austin To the best of my recollec-
Mittler had any knowledge ti9n it came to my home first
whatever of the events which and it said, "Go to the same
I am discussing in this mem- phone booth on Route 355,"
orandum. which I did, and there Mr.
Alch finally came back, Caulfield told me that he was
took me aside and said that going overseas in a few days.
Rittman told him I would be He said, "If you have any
called that same night by a problems - if you have any
friend I had known from the problems - call my home
White House. and leave word and I will'
I assumed this would be. call you back from overseas
John Caulfield, who had orig- to your residence."
inally recruited me for the He said, "When you call
Committee for the Re-election my home ask for Mr. Wat-
of the President position. . son."
About 12:30 P.M. that same SENATOR GURNEY. Mn
evening I received a call from Watson?
an unidentified individual A.-Watson, he said. Also,
who said that Caulfield was "After my return if you ever
out of town and asked me ' need to call me at my office,"
to go to a pay phone booth he gave a number, the office
near the Blue Fountain Inn number and he said: "Simply
on Route 355 near my resi- leave word that Mr. Watson
dence, where he had a mes- Is calling."
sage for me from Caulfield- Sn it was. a n
L_.h
th
ame
at
were t
o use, illy name
about "whose word I would called and read the following and his name. I did not con-
trust regarding a White message: tact him d
i
th
ur
ng
e next 30
polio ~ro~ is 0% F08/07?PV 77-00432R0001?~k7)O0114xt heard from
a t O e e " is a long time. 9 him, to the best of my recoi-
You will get Executive clem-
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'lection, sometime in Septem -
,ber, 1972, on a Sunday after-
noon.
.,talked with him in his car,: SENATOR ERVIN. The
in his automobile. Caulfield same ruling applies so far as
advised that he had been at- John Mitchell, John Dean and
t
di
en
ng a law enforcement Magruder are concerned-
meeting in San Clemente, that is, that it does not con-
b.,,, j?~,. ~?~ ,~Cau ul- objection to meeting with
the Committee for the Re- 'him to tell him my frame of
election of the President, had i y
just finished a television ap mind but that I had no inten-
'pearance on one of the talk tion of taking executive
programs such as "Meet the clemency or pleading guilty;
Press," and . Mr. Caulfield. that I had come to the meet-
called me at home and again ing at his request and not of
asked that I go to the tele-; my own, and was glad to tell
phone booth on Route 355,', him my views.
which I did.. He stated that He said that the offer of:
he had trouble getting my !executive clemency which he
home phone number because was passing along, and of,
it was an unlisted number, support while in prison and
and he stated: "We are wor- rehabilitation and help toward
ried about you"-this is Mr. a job later, "was a sincere
Caulfield's statement --> and offer." He explained that he
he went on 'then to read ''had been asked to convey
briefly the words of a depo -this message to me and he
sition which he planned to;
give to the Democratic Na.
tional Committee-I had read ;
in the papers a few days,
before that he had been
scheduled as a witness be
fore the Democratic National
Committee-and he read the
deposition to me indicating
that this was, in effect, what
he planned to.say in the de-
position.
There was some reference
during the conversation to
something with a ? double
agent, in quotes; Mr. Clark I might explain that the
.MacGregor, as I recall, in his trial was going on during this.
;television appearance had re- period This was the first
ferred to the possibility of week of the trial which be
there being a double agent in gan on Jan. 8.
the Watergate operation and Caulfield stated that he
'the inference was that it was
Mr. Baldwin, and I told Mr. was carrying the message of:
Caulfield that, so'far as I executive clemency to me'
was concerned, whoever had' from the very highest levels'
drawn that conclusion had' of the White. House." He
drawn absolutely an erro- stated that the President of
neous conclusion, that I had . the United States was in Key
seen absolutely nothing that Biscayne, Fla., that weekendwould indicate such, 'and I had been' told of the forth.' wanted to go on the ? coming meeting with me, and
;record with Mr. Caulfield to would be immediately told of
.,,that effect. the results of the meeting.
I told the caller I would SENATOR. ERWIN. Now
not discuss such matters over that the same rule previously,
the phone. He said that Caul-. announced. This evidence is
1 field was out of town, competent to show that, if
On Wednesday evening, anything, John Caulfield did
Jan. 10, the same party, to Jo induce Mr. McCord to
the best-of my recollection, plead guilty and keep silent..-
called and told me b% phone It is not any evidence at the
!with Jack 'would want to talk present state of the hearing
with me by phone. on Thurs- that connects, that makes
?day night, the following any indication whatever
night, Jan. 11, when he got and has any revelancy as to
back into town and re-, the President.
quested that I go to the same McCORD. He further states
phone booth on Route '355 ' that "I may have a message.
near the Blue Fountain Inn. 'to you at our next meeting
He also conveyed instruc- from the President himself."
tions regarding a personal I advised Caulfield that I
meeting with Mr. Caulfield had seen the list of witnesses
on Friday night, Jan. 12. for the trial and had seen
On Friday night, Jan. 12, Job Magruder's name, appear-
,from about 7 P.M. to 7:30, ing as a Government witness.
P.M., I met. with Caulfield at I advised him that it was
the second overlook-that is, clear then that Magruder was
overlooking the Potomac at going to perjure himself and
the parking area, for looking that we were not going to
at the Parking area on get a fair trial. Further, I
George Washington Parkway told him that it was clear
in Virginia. that some of those involved
in the Watergate case were
MR. DASH. Mr. McCord,, going to trial and others were
how did you know to go going to be covered for [I.
there? How was it arranged? was referring to John Mitchell,
A. I met with Caulfield at John Dean and Magruder) and
the second overlook on I so named those individuals,
George Washington Parkway incidentally, in the conversa-
- that is, the second one tion, and I said that this
leaving Washington and go- was not my idea of American
Uncertain About Date
I can't recall the exact date'
.was only doing what he was
told to do. He repeated this
'last statement several times
tluring the course of the meet-
ing we had then, and I'might
add during subsequent meet=
ings which he and I had. '
My response was that L
would not even discuss exec-
utive clemency or pleading
guilty and remaining silent,
but I was glad to talk with
him, so that there was no`
misunderstanding on anyone's.
nect them, legally speaking.
Ellsberg Case Cited,
McCORD. I further advised
Caulfield that I believed that
the Government had lied in.
'denying electronic intercep-
tion of my phone calls from
my residence since June 17,
1972, and that I believed
that the Administration had
also tapped the phones o#
the other defendants during
that time. I mentioned two
specific calls of mine which
I was certain had been inter..
cepted by the Government,
and yet'the Government ha i
blithely ? denied any such
tapping. These were my
words to Mr. Caulfield.
I compared this denial to
the denial that the Govern-
ment had made in the Ells-
berg case, in which for
months the Government had
denied any such impermis-
sible interception of the calls
and' yet in the summer of
1972 had finally been forced
to admit them when the
judge ordered, by court or-
der, a search of about a
dozen Government agencies,
and calls intercepted were
then disclosed.
I might state, separate
from the record at this point,
that, as I have previously
stated, I had no knowledge
whatever of any activity,
monitorially or what have
you, of Mr. Ellsberg's calls as
have previously come out, as'
have earlier come out in the
newspapers in the past few
days, It is purely coincidence
that I happen to mention the
Ellsberg case at that time. I
had been following the 'case
in the papers and I knew the
history of the case.
To go on,with the state-.
nient, I stated that if we were
going to get a fiction of a fair,
trial, through perjured testi-?
mony to begin with, and then,
for the Government to lie,
about illegal telephone Inter-
ceptions, that the trial ought
to be kicked out and we start'
.all over again, this time with
all of, those involved as de-'
fendants. At least in this.
way, "some. would not be
more equal than others" be-'
fore the bar of justice and we
would get a fair trial.
The executive clemency of-
fer was made two or three
times during this meeting; as
I recall, and I repeated each,
time that .1 would not even
discuss it, nor discuss plead-
ing guilty, which I had been
asked to do in the first tele-
phone call received on the'
night of Jan. 8, from Caul-
field's friend, whose identity
I do not know. I told him,
referring to Mr. Caulfield,
that I was going to renew
the motion on disclosure of
Government wiretapping 'of
our telephones.
I did not hear from Caul-
field on Saturday, but on
Sunday afternoon he called
and asked to meet me that
afternoon about an hour
later at the same location on
'10 George Washington Park:
way. He stated that there
was no objection to renewing
the motion on discovery of
Government wiretapping, and'
that if that failed, that r
would receive executive
clemency after 10 to 11
months. I told him I had note
asked anyone's permission to
file the motion;
+: He went on to say that,
"The ' President's ability to
govern is at stake. Another.
Teapot Dome scandal is pos-
sible, and the Government'
may fall. Everybody else is
on track but you. You are
not following the game plan,
Get closer to your: attorney.,
You seem to be pursuing
your-own course of action.
Do not talk if, called before
the grand jury, keep silent
and do . the same if called.
before a Congressional ccm-
mittee."
My response was that I felt
a massive injustice was being
done, that I was different
from the others, that I was
going to fight the fixed case,
and had no intention of either
pleading guilty, taking vxecu-
tive clemency or agreeing to
remain silent. He repeated
the statement that 'the Gov-
ernment would have diffi-
culty in continuing to be able
to stand. I responded that
they do have a problem, but
that I had a problem with,
the massive injustice of the.
whole trial being a sham, and
that L would fight ii,every .
way I know.
I should make a correction,
In the sentence I just read in
saying the whole trial being
a sham, because I did not at.
that point in time make any ,
reference at any time to
Judge Sirica to the contrary,
of his being anything but an
honest and dedicated judge,
and I do not want the sen-
tence to be misread..
He-talking about Caulfield
-asked for a commitment
that I would remain silent
and I responded that I would.
make none. I gave him a
memorandum on the dates
of the two calls of mine in
September, 1972, and Octo-
ber, 1972, that I was sure had
been intercepted, and said
that I believed the Govern-
ment had lied about them.
He said that he would check
and see if in fact the Govern.
ment had done so.
On Monday night, Jan. 15,
1973, Caulfield called me
again at the phone booth on
Route 355 near my residence,
I Informed him that I had no,
desire to talk further, that if
the White House had any in-
tention of playing the games
straight and giving us the
semblance of a fair trial they
would check into the perjury
charge of mine against Ma-
gruder, and into the existence
of the two intercepted calls
previously referred to, and
hung up.
On Tuesday evening, Caul-'
field called and asked me
again to meet him and I re-
sponded not until they had
something to talk about on
the perjured testimony and
the intercepted calls. He said
words to the effect "give us
a week," and a meeting was
subsequently arranged on Jan,
25, 1973. when he said he
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would have something to talk
about.
About 10 A.M., on Thurs-
day, Jan. 25, 1973, in a meet-
ing lasting until about 12:30
A.M.--correction, 12:30 P.M.
-we drove in his car toward
Warrenton, Va., and returned
-that is, we drove there and
returned- and a conversa-
tion ensued which repeated
the offers of executive clem
ency and. financial support
while in prison, and rehabili-
tatirn later. I refused to disc
ct':.s it.
He stated that I was "foul-
ing up the game plan." I
made a few comments about'
the "game plan." He said that.
"they" had found no record
of the interception of the two
.calls I referred tg, and said
that perhaps I'll wait until ,
the appeals. He asked what
my plans were regarding
talking publicly, and I said
.that I planned to do so when
I was ready; that I had dis-
cussed it with my wife and
she said that I should do
what I felt I must and. not.
to worry about the family.
-I advised Jack that my child-
ren were' now grown and
.could understand what I had
to do, when the disclosures
name out.
Offer of $100,000
He responded by saying
'that "you know that if the
,Administration gets its back,-
-'to the wall, it will have to
take steps to defend itself."
"I took that as a , personal
threat and I told him 'in .
response that .1 had had' a,
;good life, that my will was,
made out and that. I had,
thought through the risks
and would take them when I,
was ready. He said that if f
had to go off to jail that the
Administration would help,
with the bail premiums.
I advised him that it was;:
,not a bail premium, but,,
$100,000 -straight cash and
,that that was a problem,I
would have to worry about,
through family and friends.
On the night before sentenc-
ing,. Jack called me and said
that the Administration would
provide the $100,000 in cash
.if I could tell him how to get
it funded through an inter-
mediary. I said that if we ever,
needed it I would let him
know. I never contacted him.
'thereafter; neither have I,
heard from him. , .
That completes the state-,i
?ment.
MR. THOMPSON. Mr. Mc
Cord, I would like to limit.,
my questions to one area. i
That is what you know about
.the planning of the Water-
gate break-in. First of all, I
would like to separate what
Mr. Hunt told you someone
:said about it from what Mr.
Liddy told you someone said
about it. Did Mr. Hunt indi-
cate to you that he knew
anything about these meet-
' ings that Mr. Liddy referred
to with Mitchell, Magruder
and Dean?
A. The question is, did Mr.-
Hunt indicate -
more detail, Mr. McCord.
How many meetings did Mr:
Liddy say'there were when
the over-all surveillance oper-
ations were discussed? A. At
what point in time? ?
Q. Well, how many meet-
?ings, over all, up until June
17, did- Mr. Liddy indicate
that he, Mitchell, Magruder
and Dean, or any combing-'
tion of these people, had ta,
discuss generally?
A. --He did not say-the numb
,ber. It was stated to me in,
various and sundry meetings=
with Mr. Liddy between Jan-t
uary and June ? 17 by Mr.:
Liddy. that he had had several'
meetings with, Mr. Mitchell;
that there appeared to be
ongoing meetings with Mr..
Mitchell' from -the planning
stage until the completion of
the' plans for, the second
entry operation-on June '17;.`
that there appeared to be
continuous discussions ? be-
tween at least Mr. Liddy and
Mr. Mitchell and sometimes
Mr. Magruder, according to
statements which Mr. Liddy
made tome, and they began
with the planning and they
continued through the on-
going operation itself. The
monitoring. and the planning-
for the second operation. and
.discussions at, various stagesi
according, to Mr. :,Liddy,. of
the ,various. priorities of, the
bugging and photography;op-.
'erations, what was,.to come
first, what' was to come
second.
Held hegular Talks
Q,'Did Mrl'Liddk corpe to
`you after' each important
,Meeting. or after each meet-
ing where these plans were
discussed, and give you a
summary ' of , the 'meetings,
what was discussed and What'
the conclusions were? ?
A.. Not after-,each meeting
at all, but we would see each
other regularly , duping ? the
week. I would say not once
a day but every other, day,
most weeks, between January
.and June '17.-Sometimes he
would tell me, ,am getting
ready to go Tam ko'see the
Attorney General to discuss
this operation, . referring' -to'
the Watergate operation, to
`discuss the operations that
she had ptanged, ,,
Sometimes he would tell
,me, -have. just come back
from that operation, conclud-
ing wliat`we are going to do,
now.
Q. Were sohie'' of these
meetings, according to what
he told you, while Mr. Mitch-
ell 'was-'still. Attorney' Gen-
eral. A. Yes. ? +
Q. And some after he came
to the Committee to Re-elect?!
.A. Yes.
Q. Were. money figures
discussed? A. Oh, yes, ? ;
Q. According to what he
said-according to Mr. Liddy, ,
what -was the original pro
posed, budget. for the over-;
all' Surveillance operation?'
I assume we are talking about.
the- over-all ' operation; not
just the Watergate break-in,'
is that 'correct?
ir'' ' ' -
A. We are taking about'
Q. Yes, sir. - tut to you, and set it forth in. three 'categories-? -political
A. That he knew anything typed plan, operational plan, - exactly. the detail as best I espionage, photography op-
about the meetings? or eel ~~,,tp~`` alga s and electronic o
Q. Yes, sir. Approved ~4~t e4e 0 ft4ft41k 'l~rcSP7QQ e2~9p9,1001-pq g. p-:
w, 1~t o eat s and the on mat
A. Yes. he did. Headquarters. . 11 the meetings in a little bit figure in; February that Mr. =
Q. What did he say about,,
those meetings? Did he indi-
cate he was present at any..
of those meetings?: - ' , 'v
A. The meetings, as best I?
recall, in which these refer-
ences by Mr. Hunt took:
place, took place in Mr.
Hunt's office, in the Robert,
F. Mullen Company offices
at 1700 Pennsylvania Ave-
nue. They took place in April
and May of 1972. To the
best of my recollection, Mr.
Liddy was present in all of
the discussions.
Mr. Liddy, curing those,
discussions, as best I recall,
would raise the topic that
the planning and the progress
Q. Do you recall anything
that Mr. Hunt. said. to you,
about Mr. Colson's involve-
ment, or did you just get the
general impression. that Mr.
Colson was involved in some
way from what Mr. Hunt told'
you?
A. I ' believe, my previous
-testimony, which.I will re-
state, before. this committee,:
was to the effect .that, when
I had met,Mr. Hunt in his of-.
fices, at 1700 Pennsylvania:
`Avenue with Mr. Liddy, that
he had referred, to, his. previ-,
ous work at the White House
for Mr. Colson, referring to'
him,as his superior; that. dur-.
ing the session that Mr. Hunt,
of the operation itself was ' Mr. Liddy, and I had in Mr.
going forward, comments; Hunt's offices, Mr. Hunt had
about what Mr. Mitchell was., a typed plan that he had'
,saying to him about what, typed himself, step-by-step,'
could be done in terms. of , for the entry of the Demo-
the priorities. of the opera-., cratic National Committee
?tion; that is, which ones were :.
to be done first and second. f
Three-Way Discussions
Mr. Hunt's comments, his
exact words I cannot recall,
but his comments made 'to
me-and not to me,' made in'
three-way' discussions that:
were taking place ' during
that period of time=indi-??
cated to me that he had,
separate, independent knowl-
edge, ' perhaps from Mr.
Liddy, perhaps from other'
sources, of his own that Mr.
Mitchell and Mr. 'Dean and
,
the operations in the Attor- Q. I am sure that will need'
ney General's office to begin, to be pursued. But getting
with and that at least Mr. back' to my original point, is
Mitchell and Mr. Magruder. that innocent of knowledge
had had subsequent discus-, Mr. Hunt had.of these meet-
.sions after the first meeting, .ings we referred to, he did'
f
l'
-
the Attorney Genera
ins o
fice, and that Mr. Magruder,
and Mr. Mitchell had had dis
cussion with Mr. Liddy in;
Mr. Mitchell's offices at the
Committee to Re-elect the
President regarding the on-
going plans to carry out the.
operations.
Does this ? answer your,
question somewhat?- ' ,
Q. Well, I think it naturally
raises several other ques- Liddy, Mr. Magruder. and Mr.
tions. What did he say, as Dean and my response was
best you can recall, to indi to the effect that he. had it
sate to you that he had any,, from Mr. Liddy from what he
independent knowledge oth- told me, and- I believed also
or than what Mr. Liddy that he had this information
might have told him? ' from others,
A. It would fall into two Q. You say that you'think:
separate categories. I said, he had independent .knowl-?
one, what Mr. Liddy had told edge, and, of course, this is,a:
him before and, secondly, serious matter. I think we,
what he had learned from : have to determine whether
others. I mentioned to this: or not we are relying on Mr.
committee the name of an- Liddy or Mr. Hunt and Mr.
other individual, but I will Liddy for, this information,
not mention it at this point, which, of course, is extreme-.
.that Mr. Hunt referred to in ly ? important. information,
conversations, in which they Anything you can state that,
were talking about the Mr. Hunt told you to indicate
Watergate operations and the ? that he had any independent
planning for the operations' knowledge of these meetings,
and so on. The statement-- I think would be very rele-
Q. I think you should refer vant. You can do it now or
to the name. A. He referred. supply -- you have supplied
to the name of Mr. Colson. several memorandums that
That was interjected into the are very helpful in that re-
conversation by Mr. Hunt in gard. If you want to do that
the meetings with Mr. Liddy at a subsequent time, I think
Hunt's, that would be appropriate.
and me in his office
,
offices, at' 1700 Pennsylvania A. I would be glad to sub-
Avenue, and, specifically, mit the committee a memo-
,his hands, and his words
were, he interjected the name'
of Mr. Colson into the con-i
verration at that point, words
to the?effect, ?"I will see Col-
son." And he held' the paper,
in his hand in this sense:
From ?' that ? statement, ? .I
'drew the conclusion that he;
was going'to'see Mr. -Colson-
and discuss our giving him'
the operational plan. That is
a conclusion, but this is-also'
the words as best I recall,
with which Mr. Hunt
raised'
conversation with regard to,-
these particular '-.meetings,
'that you previously' 'referred
to, did he??
A. I believe you asked me
if he appeared to have knowl='
edge. I said he appeared to.
have knowledge of the previ-
ous meetings, of the Attor-'
ney General, in the Attorney
General's office, of Mr.,
 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100170001-8
Liddy proposed, as I saw it
.in writing,; in, a draft on his,
desk on one occasion and in
a typed memorandum, on. a,
second occasion, was approx-.
,imately...$45Q,'000, ?., , ; ,
Q. 'All right, ; according to.
him, ,.was, .that- budget ap?"
proved?` . ,
A. The Sequence of the
. eveists were that there were
planning fneetings'iniJanuary
or February or both in the
Attorney General's offices, in i
which Mr. Dean and Mr:
Magruder, Mr. Liddy, and Mr.
Mitchell discussed the origi-
nal amount; the $450,000-
,amount, and subsequently,.
approximately- 30 ,days after
the first formal meetings and
1 heard 'referred to by Mr.-
,Liddy, there was a figure
.of approximately $250,000,'
which.he said had been ap-.
t proved J or the operation.,
And he referred also* to?some t
additional funds which he'
had in the order of approxi-
mately $100,000, but that
,figure.,}:, not. ahsglutely..cer-;
`tain in my mind, with a total
of something.. around $300,;
000 or $350,000.
Q. According to him, was
;this money problem the need.
for subsequent meetings?Was
,that a concern of the people-
involved? Was. there quite a
'bit of discussion as to exactly
+how much money should be
spent on 'thi's 'project?
A. Money was a topic that
he said was discussed.. He'
,said the individual operations
,were discussed that is,.
'specifically the three part's of ?
his budget which he had pre-
pared on charts, which; he'
had .taken to at least one of
the meetings. . That, is, .the
three parts of political..es-
pidnage and photography and
so on..It was not limited, the
discussion-was not limited to
the matter of funding. My'
understanding was all aspects
of the :operation were .dis-:
cussed in those meetings by,
the four individuals.
' Q. Let me just ask you this:
Did he tell you that John
Mitchell ever told 'him that
-this budget-is just too high
and, you ? will' have ? to do it'
for-loss or something to that
extent? A. "No, he did not.
Q. Did he ever tell ? you
that they, specifically dis-
'cussed the Watergate opera-,
tion in any, of these meet-,
'ings? A. Oh, yes, sure.'
, Q..That the .Watergate
,break-in specifically was dis-
cussed? A. Very definitely, , .
Q. What did he say about
that particular. discussion?
A. It vvas a contiguous dis-'
cussion. He'sat in With Mr.
Magruder from the earliest
planning session in January
through the first entry opera-
,4:ion, Memorial-Day Weekend
and then even to the second-
operation in June, and' he
talked to me at various times.
and it was clear from what
he said that their committee
-that Mr. Liddy was .having
such , tjiectiogs-be,.. stated
they were having such meet-
ings in, which the.'Watergate
operation was'a part, of Wa-
tergate, referring to'the Dem-
ocratic National'. Committee'
'headquarters himself:'
So I'WOuld say'there'wete
many such discussions '-bye
-Mr. Liddy with me'in"which.
he stated that meetings had
occurred with Mr. Mitchell
and Magruder specifically on
this after February.
Q. You mentioned, you
mentioned I believe, that you.
had frequent -contact with'
Liddy. Did you have frequent
contact with.Mr. Magruder at'
the Committee to Re-elect?'
Q. Would you see him on
a daily basis? A. We would
,see '-each other on a daily
basis. We'would speak hello,'
exchange greetings. My point
of contact at'the committee,
was his deputy, Mr. Odle. My;
business was transacted pri-
marily with Mr. Odle, their,
offices?were adjoining.,
?r
Security-for Mitchells
Q: Their offices were close ?
together? A. So, we would
see.each other frequently in'
that sense.
Q. Just to speak, or did
you ever discuss any sub
stantive matters concerning
the re-election of the Presi-
dent or the operation of the'
Committee to Re-elect the'
President? A. We had some.,
,meetings, ' one particular'
meeting with, the Attorney
General and Mr. Magruder
lasting over an hour in which
we, discussed over-all securi-
ty 'of the committee and the
security ,of the Mitchell far
ily. ,
Q. At that time in March'
you had pretty much made
up your mind, I,assume, you,
would, if the thing was fund-.'
ed, that you would partici
pate for the reasons that you,
have given? ' ? ' .
A. The decision process, r
think,. on, my part took place'
after the 30-day delay that I
referred to here in which it
appeared that , this whole'
matter was being considered;'
reconsidered, discussed and
so ' on by Mr. Mitchell. It
was also very material to me.
that . he had considered it
while ' in the. Attorney Gen
oral's office, that the discus-
sion had taken place there:
and- he apparently had ap-,
proved it and so on, but I
had some reasons for consid-
ering the 30-day delay' im-
portant, and this was part of
my motivation.
Q. You say you saw Mr..
Liddy often and you saw Mr.
Magruder often and you had
this one meeting with the
two of them. Did anything
they said to you or did any-
thing that' you overheard
them -say to other people,
any ,telephone conversations
that you might have acci-
dentally heard indicate to
you that- what Liddy was
telling you was in fact true,
or did any of these things in
your mind -corroborate what.
Mr: Liddy was telling you?
A. About what, the meLt
ings with the Attorney Gui-
cral in leis office? Mr. Liddy
had some charts which I have
described to this committee
before, which he said cost
some $7,000 as to prepare, in
12
,which he set forth"the plans,
as I understood it, the cost of
.the operation. The fact that he-
!Would go'to so much trouble
'and to so much expense, it
was obvious to me this ;was-officially approved by some-
.body in the operation within
the committee itself and the
Attorney General in order for
that amount of money to'be
,spent, for material of this
sort, to go to that much
trouble.
1? Tells of Seeing Charts
Q. Pardon, me, did you over,
see the charts themselves? ,
? ? A. Yes, I saw the charts
when 'he brought them in
'the day 'before he said a
meeting was scheduled with
the Attorney General. He,
:pointed, to the chart and.
said, "These are for the
briefing ,with the . Attorney,
General ' tomorrow. These
.are connected.: with the pa-
pers which`.I have shown to
you the draft and the
type of budget draft that lie
had and showed to me on
aday ortwo~before. He did
not unwrap the charts them-
selves.. They were in brown
.Wrapping . paper; He said
,they had'been,prepared com-
mercially, locally - not lo=
.tally, he said they had been
prepared .commercially and
he subsequently told me that
he had been told by John
Dean to ;destroy the charts,
'and because they cost so
much he. did not plan. to do
so.
Q. - He' told you lie was us-
ing these charts in discussion
with the Attorney General'
and others? A. Correct.
Q. So far as conversations
by these 'gentlemen concern-
ing'their participation, were
there any conversations or
anything that they said that
you heard which indicated
that what Mr. Liddy said
about 'the meeting discussing
these things was true? A. By
these gentlemen you are re-
ferring. to?
Q. I am talking about Mr.
Mitchell, Mr. Magruder or Mr.
Dean. A. That is correct. They
did not discuss it with me.
SENATOR ERVIN. You
say that from after the re-
turn of the bills, every indict-
ment, in September down to
the day, last day of the trial,
that you were urged to plead
guilty and remain silent by a
number of people.' Did Mr.
Hunt ever urge you to'plead'
guilty 'and remain' silent?
That is, E. Howard Hunt?
A. The words most frequent-
ly used by Mr. Hunt with me
was that'executive clemency
would be available tome. -
Q. Yes. How many times
did he urge you to plead
guilty? That is, Hunt) A. I
mean to correct that state-
ment. I do not recall Mr.
Hunt using those words with
me to plead guilty.
Q. Did he urge you to or
not to remain silent? A. Not
in the exact words, no, sir,
Q. What words did he use
far as You A. He used words r
to the ef-
fect that-he used words
stating that "executive clem-
ency is going to be made
available to us," and he
spoke in terms as though it
already'had been committed
--I say already, already as
of the time that he first men-
tioned it to me.
Q. Now, you 'stated that
you were paid some money
through' the instrumentality'
of Mrs. Hunt, and also that
your lawyer fees were taken:
care of, as I understood you?.
Do you know who paid your
lawyer fees? , . I was told
that both monies came from
the Committee to Re-elect
.the President.
Q. Now, did your lawyer
urge you to enter a plea of
guilty? -I am talking. about
Mr. Gerald Alch. A, I do not
recall. that, no sir. '
Q. But he did go with you
to Mr. Bittman's office? A.
Yes, sir. ? ?
Q.- And Mr. Bittman, was
the lawyer for Mr. Hunt, was
he not? A. Yes, sir.
Q. And then after that, you
did not talk to Mr. Bittman
yourself? A. No. sir. ,
Q. But ' Mr. Alch 'did? A.
Yes, sir. , ?
Q, And after his conversa-
tion.-with Mr. Bittman he told
you that Mr. Dittman urged
.you to plead guilty and re-
main silent and said you
would get .executive clem-
ency? '
Clarification on Clemency
A. I will correct that, sir,
,if I left that impression. I
believe, the words were that
in the afternoon of Jan. 8,
Mr. Alcli said that Mr. Ritt-
man wanted to talk with me'
about "whose word I would
trust regarding a White,
House offer of executive
clemency" and then at the
meeting at his office Mr.
Alch came back to me after
'a meeting with Mr. Bittman
and told me that I would he
contacted by "a friend I have
'formerly known in the White
House," and contacted that
? evening. I believe that was
the substance of the conver-
sation.
Q: How long had you,
known - when did you first
know John or Jack Caulfield?
A. ' r first met him in early
t19--'early September, 1871.
I had heard of him before.
Q. Where was he working
at the time you first met
him? A. At the White House.
Q. Did Mr. Caulfield later
(have any association with
the committee? A. Yes, sir.
Q. And after -that associ-
ation did he go to one of
the executive departments?
Do you know which depart.
ment? A. I believe it was
the Treasury Department.
Q. Did you ever discuss
with Mr. Liddy the exercising
of electronic surveillance over
the offices of Senator Mus-
kie? A. Yes, sir.
Q. And --- A. I will cor-
rect that, sir. We discussed
the lease of a building. I don't
recall electronic surveillance
except in some broad general
terms this might be a future
target. There was nothing
beyond that and this was
stated in February, 1972.
Q. Now, Senator Muskie
was one of the candidates for
the Democratic nomination
for President at that time?
A. Yes, sir.
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Q. Did you. rent 'any office who is an executive director' tion of 'generally being look.' . States Government, and that
near the Muskie headquar- of the Democratic state chair- uts while we were inside. - 'the counsel to the President
ters? A. I did. men of the organization. Q. Did you employ- M4. had sat in with him during
Q. Where was this office Q. Were you specifically' Baldwin? A. Yes, I did. ', such discussions: the fact
located with reference to the instructed by someone to. Q. Did you contact him. that I was advised that it
was within the Attorney-
headquarters of Senator Mus- plant those two bugs or just. 'and ask him to come - to
kie? A. It was the next build- the O'Brien bug? Would you Washington to discuss tem-, thority General's purview authorize. such op--'
ing to Senator Muskie's office, give us some detail on that? ? porary employmgnt which , s the nah
A. Sure. Mr. Liddy had. might, ripen into permanent tional interest were -'
Another Name for Liddy ional to do so. passed along instructions, employment after the elec. ,
Q, And I believe the lease from Mr. John Mitchell. He, tion? Motivation Question
was taken in your name and set the priorities. Mr. Mitchell A. No, sir, it was not put' Q. Did you believe that?
,that- of John B.. Hayes? A. had stated priorities of the_ in that vein. I called Mr.,. A. I believed that he had
Yes, sir. installation were, first of all,- Baldwin and asked him if he the authority to do it. I be-
Q. Who was John B. Hayes?' 'Mr. O'Brien's offices and such`' were interested in a job as lieved that several things-
A. That was another name other -installations as that' a security officer for .Mrs.' not only was I told certain'
for Mr. Liddy, . might provide information of. John Mitchell, who we"d been. things pertaining to some
Q. And later,' Mr. McGov- interest to Mr. Mitchell and. asked to provide a security', matters I previously, testified
ern took over these head- to whoever else the monitor- officer for. He stated that he to this committee regarding
quarters from Senator Mus-' ing was to go to beyond r4r.' would be interested. Las' Vegas and an incident.
kie, did not he?' A, I think Mitchell. ? Talks With Baldwin- out there, but I was also
after June 17, yes sir. Q. So the Oliver phone wax' aware that many things came
Q. Was there ever any dis- bugged more or less by your' ' I asked him to come to'
over the Attorney General's
cussion between you and Mr. choice, then, as distinguished' Washington the next morn- desk that I was not privy to,
Liddy about exercising any from the O'Brien phone? ing and discuss the matters' that Mr. Liddy was not privy
kind of surveillance over, A.' No, I think the basic'. in connection with the dis- to, but which the Attorney
Senator McGovern's head- choice was this: The word.t;tg cussions which took place General was privy to, mat-
quarterO A. There cwe , sir. from Mr. Liddy was that I, that day between me and ters which might come to
Y were in 'Mitchell wanted it placed M. hen and Mr. Fred LaRue,
They through highly sensitive
the o'iation of First Street a senior official's office, if' who made the subsequent in. sources, wiretap information,
primarily. not Mr. O'Brien's office, some terview of him. which might provide a justifi-;
Q. And this room was other; in other words, two Mr. Baldwin raised the, cation for such an operation,
rented for possible use of such installations. Question of whether or not 'a beyond at
that commission, was not it? justification beyond what
Q. Now, you weren't apple- there might be employment wzs known to me.
A. 1908 K Street was, yes sir.' , hended on this first occasion, later. My statement to him I can ut it?conversel
Q. Did you ever make any ef. Memorial roughly was that the si- p y as
fort to bug Senator. Muskie's tweekend. What* .was the purpose of f the sec-, lion here at that pointoin' ive11. I knew that, I felt that
or Senator McGovern's head- and entry into the Demo- time was only through No-, the Attorney General in his
quarters?. A. Never Senator cratic Natinal Headquarters? "ember and that my ssump- position as the top legal of-
'Muskie's. Senator. McGov- A.' Mr. Liddy had told me lion was that if he did a good ficer, if this operation were
erns, there was 'a visit to -that Mr. Mitchell, John Mitch job on it, there. might be clearly illegal, would turn it
the office by me, I believe ell, liked the "lakes"; that is, something else for him but' down out of hand, that he
on two, or three occasions in .the documents that had been there Was no, promise by me'; would have no trouble mak-
toto, on one of which I had' photographed on the first en- ol:,Mr. LaRue,ahd''I;;ati sure ing a decision on the matter
.some electronic equipment ,try , into the Democratic Na- Mr..,, Baldwin, ,fbok:riG'r that immediately. I knew from
,with me but it was never in- 'tional Committee headquar- Way... previous contact with him
stalled because there were ters, and that he wanted a Did that he was a very decisive
. you supply Mr.
!other people working there Q
man, that he did not agonize
second photographic opera- Baldwin with a .38, pistol?
.at the time. over decisions, and yet ap-
tion to take place, and that That was obtained, given to
Q.' In other words, you, patently, took this one.
never found any time that :teaddition, as long as that him by Mr. LaRue, who 'had under careful consideration
the office was empty? A, team was going in, that Mr, the weapon in his office. It and considered it for some
Mitchell wanted; had passed belonged to Mr. Jack Caul-
That is correct. 30 days in making the de it,
You know who instructions to Mr. Liddy,.to fled.
Q. paid check to see what the mal- Q. Did you ever conduct 'myn,. and ,frankly, I had it,
the rent on this' office? A. functioning of the second de- electronic surveillance or m conclusion was that he
,Which one, sir? vice that was put in besides clandestine activities against 'took it as well to higher au.
Q. Up there by the Muskie Mr. Oliver's, and see what, anyone other'than the D.N.C., thority and got a final ap.
'and McGovern headquarters.. tproval from his superior he-
:A. The one at the Muskie of- the problem was because it the Democratic National Com- 'fore embarking upon this
fice, Mr. Liddy furnished the"? was one of the two things- mittee, at the Watergate com ;task.
'funds for that and furnished, either a malfunction of the plex, and the McGovern head-
' equipment or the fact that' quarters' which you have Quite candidly and quite
a cashier's check to pay for it: alread ? y frankly, .this -is exactly my
the installation of the device y described? A. No.. motivaUOn, my reason, the
AFTERNOON was in a room which was A. Mr. McCord, please'teli basic motivation of mine for
-SESSION*
surrounded by four walls. In me whether or not you knew. being involved,
other words, it was shielded, that this sort 'of activity was
was the electronic assign-- and another device installed. A. I knew certain things' tion or your basis for judg-
ment that' you had? ' He also- said Mr, Mitchell ' that came to me at the be., ment that the Attorney Gen-
McCORD. Installation of ? wanted a room bug as op- ginnig of the operation and eral must have done thate
the technical bugging devices' posed to a device on a early in the operation which Do you have any evidence
,in the Democratic National telephone installed in Mr. indicated that it might be le? or any information that- he
Committee that were Drevi-. O'Brien's office itself in order gal, may wel be legal; and I did do that?
ously authorized by the At to transmit not only tele- was so advised. A. The evidence tent the
torney General. ' phone conservations but con- Q. By whom? counsel to the President sat
Q. Did you have instruc- versations out of the room A. First of.al, if I ma in with him, on the meetings
tions as to where they should y the his ted, House both
Y itself, beyond whatever might explain, coming through Mr. thWhite House was rep-
be placed? A. Yes. be spoken on the telephone., Liddy and coming through
Where? A. In the offices. Would resented and the Attorney
Q? you describe ? my knowledge of the A
themselves in, connection for us then the responsibili torney General, and that,was General of the United States
with senior personnel officers were represented in this de.
of the Democratic National, ties, if there was an addi-.~ that the Attorney General,, cision and that this 30-day.
Committee and, specifically,. tlonal responsibility, of those first of all, had the authority delay to me, I drew the con-
Mr. Committee
telephone ex- involved in the second break- on his own signature to a elusion .that the Attorney
tension. in1 prove wiretapping within the ;General himself had con-
How many u s did you, ' A. Mr. Liddy was in over. United States for either na- ''eyed`-the decision to his-
plQt? A. mag y all charge of the operation,. tional security-reasons or for own superior for final de-
Mr.. Hunt was his assistant.' ' domestic security reasons. cision.
Q. One of them was on Mr. 'Mr.. Barker was the team Q. What was your motiva- SENATOR TALMADGE
O'Brien's telephone? A. That ca
ttai
A
f
h
.
p
n o
n y-
t
e group going Lion? Why did .you do this? one else a
was an extension of a call in. My job was that of the. A. There were several mo pproach you about
director that was identified electronic installation -and tivations, but one of the basic Mr Ca executive clemency besides"
as Mr. O'Brien's. The second the others of the group, the motivations was the fact that ulfield? A. T mentioned
was Mr. Oliver's. other Cuban-Americans, had this man, the AttorneyiGen- Mr. Hunt.
Q. The second one was functions divided into two eral, had approved it in his Q. Anyone else? A. Mrs,
where. categories; one of photo- offices over a series of meet-' Hunt conveyed a message
A. In a telephone that be-. graphing certain docume in whi e 1{~- from Mr. Hunt. She was ob.,
?longed to Mr. Spencer 01 Af p.rov'ediFort>] eleaseit266 4841i Gei~fdr~ 00010047-0064t-8peaking for any.,
couple of men had the func- to it, while he was the top one but himself. She was
`legal officer of the United 1 conveying it for him an_I. so
Q. This was your assump-
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stated. .
... Q. Anyone beside Mr. Hunt,
or Mr. Caulfield approach,
you on the question of execu-
tive clementcy? A. Yes,, sir.
Q. Who? A. My attorney,
'Gerald Alch, A-L-C-H,
Q. Do you know who ap-
proached your lawyer about
executive clemency? A. No,
sir.
Q. Your testimony is that
three different individuals ap
preached you. on ? the idea.
that you would plead guilty
and keep quiet and as a re-,
,suit thereof you could expect
executive clemency is that,
,correct? A. Yes, sir, and I be
dieve I mentioned a message
conveyed, which mentioned
executive clemency by Mr.
'Alch on Jan. 8 from another'
.individual.
Q. Who was that indivi
'dual? A. Mr. William Bittman.'
Q. Did you ever have any
-conversations with Mr. Mit-'
'chell yourself about that-ope-
ration? A. About the Water-
gate operation itself?
Q. Or any other surveillance
or espionage? A. No,. sir.
Q. How many different in-
dividuals talked to you and
purported to speak for Mr.
Mitchell about the Watergate .
operation or any other hug
'ging operation? A. Speaking
for Mr. Mitchell purportedly,
Mr. Liddy only as speaking
for Mr. Mitchell,
Q. Who else besides him?
A. And Mr. Hunt raised the
name of Mr. Mitchell in the
,context that I have testified
+to .this morning, sir.
1? Q. Both Liddy and Hunt
!told you-A. Yes, sir.
That this operation
had been approved by Mr. '
Mitchell? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Any others besides
those two? A. No, sir.
Q. You testified this morn-
lnf, about a meeting in Mr.
Mitchell's office. Was there
more than one meeting with
the Attorney General or only
,one? A. I just said there -
were more than one meeting.
? Q. In which you personally
.were involved? A. I did-not
.attend but I was told by Mr.
Liddy there was more than
'one meeting that took place..
:1 had heard him mention two
;specifically. .
Q. Did '-you yourself ever
attend a meeting in Mr.
;Mitchell's office? A. No, sir.
On any matter? A. I at.,
!tended meetings, yes, in his '
office at the Committee to
,,,Ete-elect the President when
he subsequently came over
and I visited at his offices at
' the Attorney General's office
,.at the Department of Justice
in December on another mat.
ter but not to discuss these
,-particular operations.
ENATOSR WEICKER. Did
you or the Committee to Re-
elect the President receive re-
ports from the Internal Sec.
urity Division of the Justice
Department. ? A. Yes, sir, I
did. '
Q. Was Mr. Mardian head
of. that Division? A. He had
been, sir. ' ' ' - ?
Q. Did you receive copies
of F.B.I. reports?
A. I can explain a partial
answer. to that, sir, if you
want me to, an answer that
? involves F.B.I. repotrs. '
I have raised ' with, I be-
lieve, Mr. Odle the problem.
of receiving adequate inform-
=ation concerning violence in
demonstrations that might af-
fect the committee headquart+
ers in Washington and sub-
sequently, the committee
headquarters in Miami, and I
' asked if there were any way.
in which there could be some
type of liaison to receive in-
formation from the F.B.I.
:specifically, because I knew:
that they would have inform-
ation that was not available
to us and we knew that such-
information was being made
available to other parties for;
the convention itself if it
directly affected those parties.
As.I recall, he sent?-a mem-
orandum to Mr. Mitchell ask
ing for approval of my con
tact -with that organization.
The next that I heard was
a call from Mr. Mardian in
which. he referred to that
memorandum and 'he stated
that Mr. Mitchell had given
approval to my contact to
,acquire that type of informa-
tion and that I should go to
the Internal Security Division
'.of the Department of Justice
.where such information as
,did affect, ' might affect, the
security of the committee
'would be made available to
me, some of. which was as I
have described in those re-
,ports, -yes, sir. .
Q: So you received data
from the Internal Security
Division of the Justice De-
.partment? A. I did. '
Q. And you received data
.from the F.B.I.? A. Not from
,the F.B.I. directly', no, sir.
Q. From whom +did you re-
ceive such data? A. From the
.Internal- Security Division. I'
do not believe the F.B.I. was.
:ever aware of that.
Q. You say there was a
subsequent memorandum? A.
The memorandum which Mr,,
Odle wrote on this subject I
subsequently received, which
had Mr. Mitchell's initials
on it.'
, . Q. Do, you feel or do you
.know whether or not similar
information, similar access to;
this information was given
to the Democratic party? A.'
?I' understood that they did
have through some channels
some access to information
on this type; whether it came
from that office, I do not
know.
Q. Now I would like you
to describe for me as best
you can types of information,
further detail, that you re.
ceived from the Internal Se-
curity Division. Did you re-
ceive from the Internal Se-
curity Division, for example,
or from the F.B.I. any in-
formation as it related to the
candidates of their staffs?
A. Yes, sir, there was one
such report that I do recall
specifically.
NEW YORK TIMES
19 May 1973
SYMINGTON. CITE
NEWDRTRBYC.I.
By.MARJbRIE- HUNTER .:`
.SDacial,fo.ThatiewYarkT7mes '1y!
WASHINGTON, May 18 --I;'
Senator Stuart Symington said
today that new-data just given&
the, Senate Armed Servicesz
Committee made it "even morn'
difficult -for me. 'to : visualiiai
the- the President" knew nothi'
ing, about "White House at'?
tempts to usethe Central- In'p
telligence Agency. to cover ukr?
the Watergate affair.
:The new data consist of '1,
memorandums of 'conversation's;,
that Sen. Vernon ' A. Walters "
deputy director' of '-thd C.I.Ai,4
'said' that he made. 'following;
conversations 'with; ' White:
House aides last-June; shortl~'.4
after the-break-in at the Demo
cratic '? headquarters"i at : the
Watergate complex:
Sonator' Symington declined.'
to disclose the 'exact content's'?+
of ' the memorandums . but%'
termed them "highly signifier
.cant." ' ' - , ? ,ce
He 'said -'that ? he, had sent'
copies to the, Senate selec'9
committee on Presidential cam=';
paign activities, which opened;;
a full-scale inquiry into the'
Waergate'?case yesterday, 'and`
to the United States 'Attorney';
who is also invesigating that4
case.
Testifying ; yesterday before
the ..Senate. Armed Service's
Q. Can you give me details
on that report?
A.. One such report dealt
with, as I recall, a funding
operation that was reported
in which the McGovern com-
mlttce purportedly funded a
so-called barnstorming tour
of several members.. of the
Vietnam Veterans Against.
the War on-the West Coast,
as I recall, starting from Los
Angeles, Calif., and going up
the Coast.
It came concurrently with,
some other -information that.
that same group was plan-
ning violence at the Republi-
can National Convention in-
volving danger to, threats to
life of individuals. I think
? that was succeeded very
shortly, in ' a matter of days,
by the indictment of members
of the Vietnam Veterans
Against the War at Tallahas-
see because of the violence
that they-did plan, including
a number of things that would
endanger the lives of the peo-
ple at the Republican Na-
tional Convention.
Q. Now, can you tell me
precisely as to what the
dates were in which this
type o factivity took place?
A. My best recollection
would have been within the
last two weeks of May,
1972.
Q. On how many different
occasions did you receive
this material? A. Almost
daily, sir.
Committee; .. General : Walter's
disclosed .,that. he had recently
visited the White House to talk
with-J. Fred Buzhardt Jr:, wh8.
was named recently? by Presi'
dent Nixon as special -counsels
for the,Watergate investigation,
General Walters told the
committee that; at the sugges-+
tion of Mr. Buzhardt, he had;
turned over. to the White Hous'o4
some memorandums he had'
made last June of his recollecx
tions of . conversations ? ? withi
Presidential aides. .. . I.S
. At the direction of the Armed,
Services Committee, General,
Walters retrieved the memoran4,
dums from the. White- House('
late yesterday, and. delivered,
them., to Senator Symington, ?,:
TIIe, mcmorar)dunls. are sakt
to recount,',in;yfar, moire exten-;,
;sive detait,..a:series.of.meetings
that General Walters had told
about in an affidavit presented"
earlier' this week to several'
Congressional. cpmmitlecs.
In that'affidavit, he told of
meetings at which three top
White - House aides.. ? H.. RV
jHaldemari, john D. Ehrlich-
nian and 'John- W.? Dean 3d?
attempted to persuade the
C.I.A. to cover up the Water-
gate affair. , - M
The general cited -meetings
at which he said the C.I.A. had
be,en,? asked to persuade thd
Federal Bureau of Investiga.,
tion - to halt aninquiry into
Nixon campaign funds that had
.been "laundered" through aq
,Mexico. City bank and laten
used, at least in part, .to fi
nanca: various : undercover ac-4
tivities by the Presidential Reh
election committee. ? j!
He also told of. ,being asked'
by Mr.?Dcan to pay the salaries,
ancl bail: of .the men caught'
in the-'Watergate ;burglary, lit,
an apparent effort to. make thy:
crime seem to -be a legitimate!
national?seduritymattet; .ft
. He 'said that his agency had:
rejected' both overtures. ? 116'
also said that he had sug.1
gested 'to Mr. Dean:that thosri
responsible for the 'Watergate
affair be dismissed. ? ?
. Senator, Symington said ye -
terday, - before receiving the
memorandums of conversation,.
,that it appeared clear to- him,t
that there had been a."high;
level" -attempt by- the White'
House' to involve -the C.I.A. il*
-covering up the Watergate. - ?`4
. He also -said yesterday that;
General. Walters -and other,
presnt and past C.I.A. officials
had. testified that they did not,
know if President Nixon knew
of the attempted cover-up o1
the Watergate affair. - . . &~
However, Senator Smyington,
added -then: "It's hard for n'c
to visualize that. the President;
knew nothing' about this."
In his satement today,. the
Senator. hinted-but. did not!
say-that there may have been
.material in the Walters meth;
orandums indicating that White,
House aides, had specifically.,
said that ;their requests fors
C.I.A. help were. being malt'
with full knowledge of th~
President.-
Meanwhile - two 'other Cot>4
gressional committees have a. .
nounced plansto inquire fuF-t
ther?into possible C.I.A. invol-
vement in ?the..Watergate 'al
fair. . ? . ' . a
Senator John L. McCiellac
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100170001-8
Demgcrat? of Arkansas, an',,, in the White House, these (D-i.C.) looking into the
pounced that an'Appropriatiogs sources noted, that the CIA CIA?Watergate ties at this
subcommittee that be heads acquiesced in White House point. ~Ervin's current posi-
had'invited.' four former Whit% demands that ' it provide tion is that the subject is
House?aipes-Mr. Haldeman, .. $ technical _ assistance to'
Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Dean ands Watergate conspirators E:
David R. Young Jr.-to. testify, Howard Hunt Jr. and G:
about their alleged demands foci Gordon Liddy during 1971.
gate and,Pen,tago .papers cases White House pressure on,
C.I.A. officials,. in the., lasthe CIA to become impli-:
week, have, told -various Con" Bated in the national secu-
,gressional committees that *i2; rity investigation and, later,
was Mr..Young, who had esker the Watergate cover-up, is
,the agency.?to prepare a."par-- the subject'of four separate
sonality, assessment" ; on D ~ congressional investigations.',
;Daniel Ellsberg, who later watt CIA witnesses, including
,indicted 'on charges 'involving; former director Richard M.
his copying and making public Helms and his successor,
the Pentagon papers. 'James R. Schlesinger, have ?
WASHINGTON POST
20 May 1973
Lie Test Used.
On Defense,
GA Officials
By 1-riurencc Stern
Washinatott Post staff writer
High officials of the Pen-
tagon, CIA and State Dc-
1.partment were subjected to
rlie detector tests during a
:1971 White house investiga
ttion of news leaks on U.S.-
Soviet arms limitation talks,
a senior government official
disclosed yesterday.
The attitude of the White
house at the time was de-
scribed as "almost para.
foie."
This was during the pe-
riod that the Nixon adminis-
tration ordered wiretaps on
the phones of National Secu-
rity Council staff members
and newspaper reporters,
measures )which are now be-
ing investigated by acting
FBI Director William D. ?
Ruckelshaus.
It has previously been ac-
knowledged by Secretary of
State William P. Rogers that
a few - perhaps "three or'
four" - State Department
,
officials were given poly-'
graph tests in the fall of
1971.
But the pervasiveness of
the polygraph testing of sen-
ior government officials had
not been hinted at in the-
earlier disclosure.
The White House investf--
,gtation, it was authorita-
tiitely reported, was tightly
c*ntralized in the White
house and bypassed the nor-
mal security operations 'of
the agencies most directly
concerned with the leaks.
The newspaper stories
tlmt triggered the extraordi-
nary White House measures,
according to the sources.
dealt with U.S. missile capa-
bilities and the American
not central to the Watergate
investigation.
On balance, however, con-
gressional scrutiny of the
CIA has suddenly gone from
famine to feast, a situation'
probably unprecedented in,
the 26-year history of rela-
tions between the agency
and Congress.
i, - Helms goes before what'
promises to be a grueling
session of the 'Senate For-
eign Relations Committee
Monday,. where he will be
questioned closely on discre-
pancies between, his testi-
mony earlier this year and
surfaced in the past week.
'Several members of the
committee are known to be
deeply angered at Helms'
prior disclaimers of agency
involvement with Hunt,.
Liddy and the Watergate
,case., There has been' talk:
within the committee of
transmitting the earlier
.Helms testimony to the Jus-,
tice Department for possible
action.
Questions about the CIA's
,implication' in Watergate
and other domestic. opera-
tions were raised at Helms'
nomination hearing early
this year and two subse-
quent Foreign Relations
'Committee sessions on Feb.
7 and March 5, both closed
proceedings.
Several" committee mem-
bers feel that Helms was
,less than truthful in his all!'
swers-or,.at best that he'
was responding to the com-
mittee on the narrowest
..grounds of technical truth
(the spy paraphernalia was'
for the Ellsberg break-in
and Helms apparently did
not accede to the massive
White House pressures to
become implicated in the
Watergate cover-up, and
said nothing of either
episode) to speak of the
massive White House pres
sures on himself and subor-
dinates to become impli-
?cated in the case.
Some members, of the
committee are of a mind to
censure Helms. Others with
closer ties to the intelli-
gence establishment, such as
Sen. Stuart Symington (D-
Mo,), are more 'sympathetic.
One of the innumerable
.CIA colleagues of Helms
put the dilemma of the for-
mer CIA director in this
manner: .
"Dick was under no moral
compulsion to conceal the
White House involvement
'because of any special rela-
tionship with the President.
He was summoned to Camp
'David to see the' President'
last December and fired
without advance notice. The
;Preside nt'patted him on the
back and said, in effect,.
'You did a great job but I
don't want you around any
more.,
"It all becomes a private
.judgment on how one. be-
haves, I don't see -how some-
one who has lived in the dis-
cipline of the government'
for nearly 40 years. can
change overnight."
Spetltl to The New York Ttmee
WASHINGTON, May, 18-- all other relevant matters to
-Following is the text of a the United States attorney's
-statement by John J. Caulfield office and have been ques.
-read to newsmen by Mr, Toned on two occasions . by.
Caulfield in the office here -investigators from the Senate
select committee.
his attorney, John P. Sears:- .
? Mr. McCord has been, and
I have briefly reviewed Mr. continues to be, a personal
McCord's statement before friend of mine. Even though
the Senate-select committee I may disagree with certain
and while it does not full aspects of his statement and,
reflect my best recollection y. testimony, I am sure he has
of the events which took tried to recall our conversa.
place between he and I dur-' tions fully and fairly, as I
ing anuary of this year, it is have. I shall be happy to
true that I met with Mr. Mc- testify before the Senate com-
Cord on three occasions in mittee when called and hope
January and conveyed to him' that my testimony will prove
certain messages from a high helpful to the committee,
White House official. I have , I will have no further com-
fully disclosed my past asso- ment until I testify before
ciations with Mr. McCord and the Senate committee.
nuclear first-strike capabil- member.
'ity. Approved Per f elmsee2l?D15108t07 : Ci -RDP77-00432R000100170001-8
It was in the context of gate investigating commit-
tliis "tremendous concern" tee of Sen. Sam J. Ervin Jr.
.told various congressional,
committees that the White
House requests were made
with a clear suggestion of
presidential sanction.
Top presidential aides H,:
R. (Bob) Haldeman, John D.'
Ehrlichman and former
White House counsel John-
WsDean III, were all named
as ' having demanded the
agency's participation in the .
successive security and
cover-up operations.
By statutory charter the
agency is proscribed from;
carrying out domestic sur
veillance, police and inter-,
nil -security functions.
.sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-
Wash.) said yesterday that'
the?, congressional inquiries
into CIA involvement in
Watergate will precipitate a
constitutional confrontation'
between the White' House
and Congress on the issue of
exebutive privilege..
"It's headed for a' show-
clown," Jackson said in an
interview with United
Press International. The
'crunch will probably come,
he predicted, with the ex-
pected refusal by Ehrlich-
,man and Haldeman to tes-
tify before the congressional
.committees of inquiry. In
that event the courts would
have to rule on contempt ci-
tations for the former White
House aides. ,? .;
Jackson is `a-'member?;of*
the'Senate Armed Service's'
Committee, which is 'con-
ducting one of the Capitol
Hill inquiries. Separate in-
vestigations are in progress
in the Senate Appropria-
tions and Foreign Relations
Committees and a House
subcommittee on intelli-
gence operations. . '
Only the Senate Joint CIA
Oversight Committee, which
was specifically charged
with reviewing CIA opera-
tions, has not gotten into
the act. It has been dor-
mant, without having met
for more than 15 months.
It has been in its 'coma-
tose state since the Senate
agreed to add Foreign Rela-
tions Committee Chairman
J. W. Fulliright (D :irk.), a
 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100170001-8
WASHINGTON POST
20 May 1973
Stung
Of Watergate in Staff Wiretap
Anguished Adviser Fights Stain
By Murrey Marder
Washington Post Staff Writer
For presidential adviser, Henry A. Kissinger this is,
one of the most anguishing periods in his skyrocketing.,'
career.
' The odd mixture of problems that ensnared him last',
!week were bizarre in global terms.-The challenges this
time to the preeminent world power broker (lid notj
-`-conk from Moscow, Peking;' see how he can step down'
for even Hanoi, but frofn, now, although he has spo-
Washington. ken publicly as well as pri-
vatcly of doing so at the ap-
Kissinger was struggling propriate time.
'to preserve his credibility in; Although the White
a dispute over the wiretap. Ilouse affirmed that Presi-
;ping of his National Secu-.! "legal" wiretaps on the NSC 17
,rity Council staff that,! staff and of newsmen to
threatened to splash him Block national security
with the stain of Watergate. leaks, Kissinger was left fac-
;At the same time
24
a
to 0
, 'vote in the Senate Appropri-
aitons Committee against
further U.S. bombing in
Cambodia put him into talks
to salvage the splintered Vi-
etnam cease-fire with the
weakest bargaining hand
,that Kissinger ever has been
dealt in a major negotiation.
There is no sign that it is
ing accusations of moral ob-
loquy for complicity in a
"dirty" business, plus
charges from unnamed FBI
sources that Kissinger per-
sonally initiated some of the
wiretaps-which he denied.
In discussions in the
White House early last week
with Gen. Alexander M.
-the negotiating task in Paris Haig Jr., President Nixon's
that' most troubles Kis- replacement for staff chief
singer. nevertheless. In.' H. R. (Bob) Haldeman who
stead. Kissinger is described
Phy close associates as dis-
mayed that he is now be.'
tcomin.g besmirched, totally
;unjustifiably, he and his as-
,sociatcs insist, by what he
ipublicly described on April
23 as "the atcfulness of
events and the tragedy that
has befallen so many peo-
ple" in the Watergate se-
quence. Kissinger expressed
alarm tit^a that "an orgy of
recrimination" may sweep
the country and undermine
the great. stake of the world
In the stability of the United
States. lie was calling then
for "compassion" - for oth-
ers in the White House.
Th4 wiretapping contro-
versy over his NSC staff
resigned in the Watergate
furor, Kissinger reportedly
offered to resign if the Pres-
ident believed that Kissing-
er's moral authority was im-
paired.
Kissinger is reported to
have been reassured that
the President still needed
him very much. Moreover, it
is evident that if Kissinger
were to resign at this time
that would imply parallel-
ism with the ousters of
Haldeman and domestic af.
fairs adviser John D. Ehrl-
ichman, with whom Kis-
singer has had a strange as-
sociatc-rivalry relationship
since he has been in the
White House. A Kissinger
resignation, therefore, could
that now has leaped into the -appear to plunge him deep.
headlines caused Kissinger into the Watergate scandal.
last week to anguish more Ilaig, for many years Kis-
personally than ever about singer's deputy on the Na-,
his own stake and reputa. tional Security Council
Lion, on an issue of pro- staff, last week appealed to
priety in which he pleads at least several newspaper
innocent. columnists in Kissinger's be.
During the past week Kis- half. Haig urged them to
singer emotionally had told distinguish clearly between
old friends here and abroad Watergate and the 1D69.71
that he has been considering wiretapping, in which other
resigning from his powerful sources ' report that Haig
White House post if he himself was much involved
could think of a way to Ile in forwarding names to the
so decently, without jeop-
ardizing everything he has The wiretapping of NSC
helped to build during his staffers, Haig is known to
extraordinary white I-iouse have told newsmen, not only
career. Kissinger is reported was "legal." but was vital to
to have said that he cannot preserve national security,
Above all, Haig is said to
have emphasized that equat-
ing Watergate and the dis
similar wiretapping could,
not only undermine Kis-
singer personally, but would
endanger high national in-
terests. Kissinger will be a
major figure in the Wash-
ington visit next month
scheduled for Soviet leader
Leonid I. Brezhnev, and Kis-
singer unquestionably is the
foremost strategic planner
for all American foreign pol-
icy.
' Other White. House staff
members, including Kis-
singer himself, similarly un-
derscored to newsmen the
stakes involved in what
some described as an
"unthinking escalation" of a
minor dispute.
Beyond these considera-
tions, Kissinger also has
told old friends that he is
uncertain about the implica-
tions of President Nixon's
announcement oil May 10
that John B. Connally will
become a part-time presi-
dential adviser on foreign as .
well as domestic affairs.
For a year or more it has
been an -open secret in
Washington that Kissinger
regarded his intricate diplo-
matic style of operalion, and
the former Treasury St-ci?c.
taty's tough, freeboutiii
style, as totally incoiotiati?
ble.
It should be emphasized.
nevertheless, that there is
no current evidence whatso?
ever that Kissinger is actu?
ally on the verge of resign.
?ing.
His friends stress that
Kissinger has gone through
similar "anguishing" so-
7
quences before in which he
has talked about choosing
an appropriate time to re-
sign, when he could si 'p out
of the White House with his
prestige high and his accom-
plishments undimmed.
Some of his closest admir-
crs urged him to do so when
he completed the Vietnam
cease-fire negotiations at the
end of January.
At that time Kissinger's
prestige was at its peak,
with the Vietnam ceasf,-fire
on paper and unchallenged,
and with global successes in
Peking and in Moscow fes-
tooning the Kissinger -cc.
ord.
Now, once again, it iti Kis-
singer's personal relation-
ships in the White House,
and his own prestige and au-
thority, rather than interna-
tional challenges, that trou-
ble him most.
His task in Paris is no
simple one. in the Indochina
negotiations, as One dilrlo?
that characterized the siloa-
tion, "Kissinger has a souls
and a carrot to bargain with
-but he cannot be certain
he can deliver either one."
The stick is the threat, re.
nowed yesterday by Presi-
dent Nixon, that the United
States will not "stand by
and permit the settlement
reached in' Paris to be sys-
tcinatically destroyed ... "
The carrot is postwar Amer-
ican reconstruction aid , to
North Vietnam, pledged in
the Vietnam agreement. But
Congress holds blocking
power on the threat and the
enticement, and Congress is
now turning a stonier eye
on all presidential power.
At week's end in Paris,
Kissinger was trying to fend
off alternating questions
from newsmen about the
status of the Indochina talks
and persistent demands for
further explanations about
the Wiretapping Of associ-
ates on the NSC staff.
To Kissinger's old adver-
sary, North Vietnam polit-
buro member Le Due Tho,
that could have supplied rea-
son enough to smile in the
photographs taken at inter-
vals during the new talks,
no matter how the negotia-
tions were going. Kissinger
was smiling also, noted
newsmen who were given
little else to record. But Kis-
singer had little to smile
about when he left Washing-
ton for Paris.
Kissinger may ultimately
emerge from the Paris nego-
tiations with eS1ough success
in patching up the Incho-
china cease-fire accord to
bring hint even more inter-
national acclaim.
It he sloes, ninny admirers
are convinced, the contro-
versy over the Wiretapping
dispute will he relegated to
an insignificant incident in
the spectacular Kissinger.
career, '
But others in Washington,
including supporters of Kis-
singer's global accomplish.
ments, question that as-
sumption.
The "dam has now bro.
kcu" on a more searching
examination of all relation-
ships inside the White
Ilouse, including Kissinger's
powers, as a result of tho
Watergate scandal, it is'now
argued by many veterans of
power politics in Washing-
ton. .
One Senate source said
yesterday that when the
normally conservative Sen-
ate Appropriations Commit-
tee unanimously joined in
turning on President Nix-
on's Cambodian bombing
policy, the message was that
"the old magic is gone" for
the Nixon administration's
foreign policy establish.
ment.
As the Watergate inquiry
unfolds, Kissinger'.(; excep-
tional authority, across tho
entire bureaucratic struc-
ture of national security,
can also' come under more
skeptical scrutiny than ever.
Kissinger's position in the
power structure inside the
Approved For Release 2001./08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100170001-8
 gpproved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010017000i8
White House was unique to
start with in January, 1969.
He came in as an outsider to
the Nixon loyalists, indeed a'
suspect outsider. The intel-
lectuals he brought with him
into the White I-louse were
even more suspect.
As a foreign policy ad-
viser to New York's Gov.
.Nelson Rockefeller, Mr. Nix-
oil's rival for the Republican
presidential nomination,
Kissinger automatically was
a member of the "enemy
camp" inside the GOP. He
also was known to have
made personally caustic re-
marks about Mr. Nixon dur-
ing the 1968 Republican Na-
tional Convention in Miami,
reportedly saying at one
point, "lie is not fit to be
President."
President Nixon, however,
had high regard for Kissing-
er's brand of strategic
thought in his probing writ-
ing on nuclear strategy.
Once in the White House,
Kissinger's abilities soon ca?
tapitlted him into,a position
?of eminence that both
brought him acclaim and
cast him into a posture of
increased rivalry with the
original loyalists on the
White House staff.
In order to survive the in-
ternal bureaucratic rival-
ries, former' associates say,
Kissinger was compelled to
make compromises. One ex-
WASHINGTON POST
19 May 1973
Torn Braden
wand
ample of these compromises,
it is now said, was the White
House decision to wiretap
Kissinger's NSC associates.
A half-dozen contradictory
versions are now circulat-
ing in Washington about ex-
actly what happened to pro-
duce the wiretap' order, in-
cluding 'several competing
versions attributed to Kis-
singer himself."
Kissinger has told some
friends that initially he
flatly refused to go along
with the wiretapping, it was
ordered over his adamant
opposition, and he was com-
pelled to go along. Accord-
ing to other accounts, Kis-
singer was not reluctant in
agreeing to the order, but
was carried along with the
"panic" generated in the
White House by "massive"
leaks of security informa-
tion to the press.
:,There are still other ver-
sions that Kissinger himself
was suspicious about his col-
leagues, not primarily on se-
curity grounds, but for what
they were saying to out-
siders about him.
Still another explanation
offered is that the Halde-
man-Ehrlichnian branch of
the White House staff was
at least equally concerned
with imposing "political loy-
alty" on Kissin;;ci?'s staff
and that the wiretapping
served a convenient dual
purpose.
While Kissinger has said
he was not responsible for
putting any names on the
tapping lists, several un-
named 1'131 'sources, resent-
ful over what they regard as
an attempt to shift responsi-
bilil.y to the bureau, have
charged that Kissinger and
Haldeman personally put
names on the list by tele-
phone or oral instructions.
Ilaig, described by-sonic
cx-NSC staffers as ? the tor-
pedo" in tile. NSC'staff, is
;reported to have been, a
zealot in this and other dis-
ciplinary practices.
Very early.. in the Kis-
singer operation, it is, said
that I Haig developed h 1 s
own special alignment willi
t h e Ilaldetnan-Ishrlichnuut
branch which Helped it)
build his prestige with 1'rc?;-
ident Nixon, catnpultiu;g
Haig from a colonel to. a
four-star -general during the
Nixon administration.
Others, however, r e ga r d
Haig's earlier functions on
Kissinger's NSC staff in part
'as a major ,and very neces-
sary bridge between Kissin-
ger's intellectuals and the
tough - in i n d e d managerial
'class in the White house.
Tales of back-biting, dupl-
icity and niisrcpresentatiou
inside the NSC staff, and be-
tween the NSC staff and
'other offices in the White
House, are cascading around
Washington, now that "the,
dam has broken." Kissing-
er's own veracity Is being
challenged, as well as his
morality.
Kissinger's own stature,
and methods of operation,
are unique in Washington.
An acknowledged 'cgonla
niac," and sometimes even
he adds, "paranoic," he has
been able to keep a foot
in the camp ofthe cloves as
well as the camp of the
hawks. His supporters range
from Sen. Barry Goldwater
(R?Ariz.) to numerous power-
ful members of the so?cailed
Eastern liberal press.
While Kissinger has had
crashing fallingoui.s with
members of tile acadvillic
community, notably over
President Nixon's 1.971) C'anl-
hodiall invasion order, his
(Iramal'c stit?c''sses in Fol'.
eign policy have repaired
Neatly of the
eSil'a ll )?:^1110111.5.
To diplomatic adversary
Le Due Tho as well as the
leaders in Pekin? and Mos-
cow, it must sc?cnl' ludicrous
that a wire'auntng 'nwitlrni
could so wound a man with
Kissinger's power. Ills pow-
er is inescapably dcrivrllk'c;
it is lodged in Ihe !'resi-
dent. Whatever it east tlp
in the supercharged aMmos-
phcre of the Watergate in-
vestigations carries some
risk of touching Kissinger,
rotecting the innocent
In the unfolding of any scandal,
there is a seemingly inevitable mo-
ment when Investigation and factual-
minded comment give way to sancti-
monious self-righteousness. It is a dan-
gerous moment because the next step
is abdication of responsibility in blan-
ket Indictment and bootless breast
beating.
In the Watergate affair, we may be
witnessing that moment right now.
Thus, If Henry Kissinger and his for-
mer assistant, Gen. Alexander Haig,
are considered to have been
"compromised" by the Watergate,
what Is the next step?
someone in his office was telling re
Why, of course: Kissinger is "on
can he be said to be
about actual discussions at "compromised"? sense
trial"; Haig has "dirty hands"; govern- porters
compromised"? He did not accuse
ment is "corrupt," and what we need
Halperin; he defined Halperin's duties.
meetings in which decisions on policy Halperin; toward Vietnam, North 'Korea and Is-
now is to "change the whole spirit.".
Was this wrong?
rael were made. Kissinger refused to There
Such comment strikes me as being
must be some point at which
much more akin to the creek bed and
are conducting government
say who made the decision to wiretap those who in order to find out where the leaks
a total immersion than it Is to the
may be permitted to go about the busi-
were coming from. He admits that he
prosecution of guilty men.
ness without being suspected of engag-
did not object to the decision. i
ng in a plot to disrupt an election, spy
And yet such comment is.current in
That points to the President. If Mr.
this city as the disclosure that Kis-
upon the opposition or raise and dis-
Nixon did make the decision to put
burse illegal funds. I
singer read wiretaps on his own em-
ployees gets headlines almost as large taps on people in the White House, it If everybody is "compromised" by
as those which greeted the first revela- was not one of his historic firsts. the Watergate, then nobody is comp*ro-
tions by James McCord. Moreover, it was not only 1ega1; it Imondsand deceit and will o es.
Are we so engrossed in scandal that was reasonable. I-low else could he stop
we have lost any sense of distinction the leaks? 'Moreover, to attack MMMr. cape public stigma in the kind of "orgy
'beteen scanda an
d_$evet it~ent ,.~ do~a i~q q>%~ i en { ~ re ~n 1oZt_'9a ainst which Kis
ggest est th th pf YA ?h{0cf e~ @ lon~fit/~se' fi.3 fa'h`~ t v4Jihldlwna~l~c rlme, 1
singer sitting in his office poring over
wiretaps on his own associates Is a
pretty one. But it ought not to shock
those who have been around Washing-
ton very long, or those who have any
sense of what the words "national se-
curity" mean. Is the government to
have no secrets? Is there no recourse
against those who sit at meetings in
which strategy is planned and outlined
and then telephone reporters to tell
them what went on?
That was the reason why the whe-
taps were authorized. Kissinger did
not authorize them. He refused to re-
quest them. But he suspected that
for the Watergate whleh his recent ref-
erence to the threat of "mob violence"
suggests that he Is looking for.
Gen. llaig's testimony at the Daniel
Ellsberg trial seems even less repre-
hensible. What did Haig do? The pros-
ecution at the trial asked him to ap-
pear and to testify as to his duties and
as to the exact nature of the duties of
Dr. Morton Halperin, one of the em-
ployees on the National Security Coun-
cil staff who had been wiretapped.
Haig and Kissinger xiet to decide on
the limits of Raig's testimony. Haig
appeared; answered questions truth-
fully and went his way. In what possi-
17
 I WASHINGTON PO 5pproved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100170001-8
22 May 1973
iselosed on U.'
emo by' Walters
By Laurence Stern
Waahtnuton Post Staff Writer
The deputy director of the Central I Intelligence
i Agency has made a written allegation that White House
chief of staff H. R. (Bab) Haldeman told him "it is the.
President's wish" that the CIA seek to block an,im-
portant phase of the Watergate investigation.
Gen. Vernon Walters made this assertion in a mem
orandum he wrote shortly
after a White House meeting
ion June 23, 1972, between
himself and Haldeman, presi-
dential aide John D. Ehrlich-
man and CIA Director
Richard Helms.
This disclosure was mlide
yesterday by Sen. Stuart
Symington (D-Mo.) in the
course of a Senate Foreign'
Relations Committee hear.
ing to question Helms on
'pressures by White House
aides on the CIA to help
cover up the Watergate
trail.
It was the most direct
allegation by a high-ranking
.government official indicat-
ing presidential involvement
in efforts to impede the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investiga-
tion's inquiry into the
,Watergate case.
Walters in previous state-
ments and Helms yesterday
provided details of the re-
quests by Haldeman and
,other White House aides to
have the CIA intercede with
,the FBI in calling off inves-
tigation of the "laundering"
of Watergate funds through
a Mexican bank account.
It has already been dis-
closed that some $100,000 in
.Nixon re-election funds
were passed through a Mex-
ico City bank and ended up
In the safe of Maurice H.
Stans to finance Watergate
.and other operations in the
'1972 campaign.
Symington interrupted
the questioning of Helms
yesterday to drop his bomb-
shell. which was based on
one of 11 still-secret memos
written by Walters in the
'course of the White House-
CIA contacts.
In his memo on the June
23 meeting, Symington rela-
ted, Walters reported that
"Mr. Haldeman turned to
General Walters and said,
'It Is the President's wish
that you go to see Mr.
Gray.' "
Walters was to tell acting
FBI Director L. Patrick
Gray III that any investiga-
tion into the Watergate
scandal's Mexican connect.
tion would jeopardize CIA'.
operations. It was clear
from the testimony that
Helms' authority as CIA di-
rector was bypassed by the.
White House aides in their
demand that Walters convey
the proposal to Gray.
Walters had served as a
translator to President Nixon
on foreign trips both during
his vice presidential and pres-
idential terms and the two
men were considered friends.
Within an hour after the
June 23 meeting the deputy
CIA director was given an
appointment with' Gray.
Walters relayed to Gray the
concern of "senior White'
House officials" that the
Mexican investigation would
jeopardize CIA activities, ac-
cording to Walters' own tes-
timony.
After 6'onsultation with-
Helms, however, the CIA-
.took the position that the
FBI inquiry would in no
way jeopardize CIA activi-
ties in Mexico. The agency,
in effect, turned down the
White House request.
Helms testified yesterday
that he had no independent
recollection of the Halde-
man remark but he did not
take issue with Walters'
memorandum on the June'
23 meeting, which was called
by Haldeman six days after
the Watergate break-in.. '
Helms did recall a Halde-
man 'statement that "the op-
position" was "capitalizing"
on the Watergate episode.
Haldeman, Helms recalled,
"also made an incoherent
statement about the Bay of
Pigs investigation" at the
time. The former CIA direc-
tor said he told the White
House aides he had no inter-
est in the Bay of Pigs.
"I did not have any, idea
of what the Mexican investi-
gation was about," Helms
testified. He said he then
took the position with Wal-
ters that there was no CIA
involvement in the case.
Asked why neither he nor.
Walters went directly to the
President about the inci-
dent, Helms said:
"My total preoccupation
was in keeping the CIA
uninvolved in the matter. I
was successful in doing that
so far as I was concerned .
. I wanted to stay as the
head of the agency to keep
,it out of it (the Watergate.
scandal). It is always a ques-.
tion of moral judgments and
I was doing the -best I could
do." .
Yesterday's hearing also
raised publicly, for the first.
time, the question of.
whether Helms was replaced
as CIA director in reprisal
for his refusal to cooperate.
with the White House staff
in the alleged cover-up ef-
fort.
Asked directly by Sen.
Charles H. Percy (R-I11.)
whether there was any con-
nectiori between his depar-
ture from the agency and
his refusal to cooperate In,
the cover-up, Helms replied:
"I don't know. I talked to
the President and I think
our conversation is privi-
leged. At no time in that
conversation was Watergate
or anything else men-
tioned."
Helms was summoned to
Camp David by the Presi-
dent several weeks after the
'1972 election and informed
.he was being replaced as di-
rector. One close and long-
standing associate of Helms
in the agency and one sena-
tor Close to the case claim
that Helms was summarily
fired without advance no-
tice.
In only one remark yester-
day did Helms reveal what
colleagues describe as his
personal bitterness over the
sudden wrench in his life-,
long CIA career.
"Giving assistance to the
presidency," he said, "has
not been 'a crime until rela-
tively recently."
Yesterday's hearing at
times took on the aspect of
a rite of personal vindica-
tion for Helms, with half a
dozen senators praising him
for his refusal to give in to'
the White House pressures.
"I think this country is in
mortal danger when the Se-
~cret Service or the FBI are
used for political purposes
or there is a prostitut-
ing of the professional serv-
ices of the CIA," said Sen.
Hubert H. Humphrey (D-
?Minn.). -I appreciate your.
and General Walters' readi-
ness to stand up to the pres-
sures."
"I am convinced when the
full story is known," Sym-
ington told Helms, "we will-
all agree that the career
professionals of the two
agencies - Helms of the
CIA and Hoover of the FBI
- did all they could to pre-
vent efforts to undermine
the things we all stand
for . ,. You stand high as
public servants."
Several senators , took
Helms to task for denying,
in prior appearances before
the committee this year, any
agency involvement with
Hunt as well as failing to dis-
close the White House pres-18 vited to testify.
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sures on the agency. The
most ' forceful complaints
came from Foreign Relations
Committee chairman J. W.
Fulbright (D-Ark.) and Sen.
Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.).
Helms insisted, though, that
-his answers were truthful in
the context of the questions.
In any event the complaints
subsided In the general swell
of praise for Helms and his
deputies in turning down the
White House proposals for
CIA' involvement in Water-
gate.
During the morning-long
questioning Helms was
asked about earlier White
House efforts, during 1971,
to get CIA assistance In the
,investigation of Pentagon
.Papers defendant Daniel
Ellsberg as well as a series
of news leaks on national se-
curity issues.
He testified that former
National Security Council
staff aide David Young told
him that the requests to the
CIA for internal security as-
sistance were hacked by na-
tional security adviser
Henry A. Kissinger, as well
as Ehrlichman, in 1971,
The CIA did provide-re-
luctantly, as Helms put it-
the Ellsberg profile. It also
made available disguise kits
and other paraphernalia to
Watergate conspirator E.
Howard Hunt in July, 1971,
without knowing the pur-
pose of the equipment.
White House aide Ehrlich-
man requested that the CIA
provide the assistance to
Hunt for an undisclosed
purpose. The mission turned
out to be the burglary of the
office of Ellsberg's psychia-
trist, Dr. Lewis Fielding, of
Beverly Hills, Calif., in Sep-
tember, 1971.
Helms said he ordered the
help to Hunt terminated
when he learned that the
ex-CIA agent had requested,
the detailing of a CIA secre-
tary from Paris to his own
operations.
"I told Cushman It was go-
ing too far," Helms testified.
"We were being used in this'
situation. I told him to call
Ehrlichman and have it
stopped." Gen. Robert ? E.
Cushman at the time was
deputy CIA director.
In a related development
yesterday, Sen. John L. Mc-
Clellan (D-Ark.), chairman
of the Senate Appropria-
tions Subcommitttee on In-
telligence Operations, an-
nounced that his panel has
called Walters to testify on
Wednesday and Gray on
Thursday. The subcommittee
is looking into the CIA's
role in Watergate and the
Pentagon Papers case.
McClellan also said Hal-
deman and Ehrlichman have
agreed to appear May 30, and
that Young and former
White House counsel John
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I BALTIMORE SUN
23 May 1973
Tex[
e
Washington Bureau of The Sun
in
,,,Washington - President Nixon's state-
mnt yesterday regarding the 'Watergate..
scprtdal:
.-Allegations surroupding the Watergate
,fair have so escalated that I feel a
^.,urther statement from the President is
required at this time.
"""A climate of sensationalism has devel.
'oped 'in which even second- or third-
'hand hearsay charges are headlined as
Tact and repeated as fact.
." Important national security operations
"which themselves had no connection
with Watergate have become entangled
dn. the case.
,.*'As a. result, some national security'
nformation has already been made pub-
lic through court orders, through the
s'dbpoenaing of documents and through
testimony witnesses have given in judi-
cial and congressional proceedings.
Other . sensitive documents are ' now
threatened with disclosure.
;,,,,Continued silence about those opera-,
'tions would compromise rather than
protect them, and would also serve to
;perpetuate a grossly 'distorted view-
Which recent partial disclosures have
P.,given-of the nature and purpose of,
;those operations.
:.The purpose of this statement is three-
fold:
, k.First, to set forth the facts about my
own relationship to the Watergate mat-
Second, to place in some perspective
,some of the more sensational-and inac-
;gwrate-of the charges that have filled
the headlines in recent days, and also
some of the matters that are currently,
;being discussed in Senate testimony-and,
, isewhere.
Third, to draw the distinction'between
,,national security operations' and the
;;Watergate case. To put the other mat-
4ers in perspective, it will be necessary
to describe the national security opera
tjpns first.
In citing these national security mat-`
this, it is not my intention to place a'
? national security "cover" on Watergate,
but rather to separate them out from
-Watergate-and at the same time to
TYplain the context in which certain
Actions took place that were later mis-
construed or misused.
Long before the Watergate break-in,
three important national security opera-
otions took place which have subse-
jluently become entangled in the Water-
ate case.
The first operation, begun in 1969, was
ea program of wiretaps. All were legal,
Mader the authorities then existing. They
Were undertaken to find and stop serious
National security leaks. The second operation was a reassess-
ment which I ordered in 1970, of the
adequacy of internal security measures.
;Phis resulted in a plan and a directive
Ito strengthen our intelligence operation.
Whey were protested by Dir. Hoover, and
as a result of his rotest the were not
p
residen't's stateent on
i~nl security-
anent in 1971, of a special investigations
snits in `the White House. Its primary
tilsion was to plug leaks. of vital
security information. I also directed this
roup to prepare an accurate history of
lertain crucial national security matters
'which occurred under prior administra
ions, on which the government's re-
cords were incomplete.
the background'of these three
^'ierations initiated in my ad.-
L,' ;,,id-1969, my administration had
-begun a number of highly sensitive
;foreign policy initiatives. They were
:aimed at ending the war in Vietnam,
achieving a settlement in the Middle
:East, limiting nuclear arms, and estab-
!lishing new relationships among the
great powers.
These'involved highly secret diplo-
macy. They were closely interrelated.
Leaks of secret information about any
one could endanger all.
Exactly that happened. News accounts
appeared in 1969, which were obviously
based on leaks-some of them extensive
and detailed-by people having access
to the most highly classified security
materials.
There was no way to carry forward
these diplomatic initiatives unless fur=
ther leaks could be prevented. ' This
required finding the source of the leaks.
In order to do this, a special program
of wiretaps was instituted in mid-1969
and terminated in February, 1971.
Fewer than 20 taps of varying duration,
were involved. They produced important
leads that made it possible to tighten
the security of highly sensitive materi-
als.
I authorized this entire program. Each,
individual ? tap was undertaken in ac-'
cordance with procedures legal at the.
-time and in, accord with long-standing
. precedent.' '
The persons who were subject to these
wiretaps were determined through coor-
t dination among the director of the FBI,.
my assistant for national security of
fairs,' and the attorney general. Those
wiretapped were selected on the basis of
access to the information leaked, mate-
rial in security files, and evidence that
developed as the inquiry proceeded.
Information thus obtained was 'made
available to senior officials responsible
for national security matters in order to.
curtail further leaks. ,
1970 INTELLIGENCE PLAN
In the spring and summer. of 1970,
another security problem reached criti-
cal proportions. In March a wave of
bombings and explosions struck college
campuses and. cities. There were 400
bomb threats in one 24-hour period in
New York city. Rioting and violence on
college campuses reached a new peak'
after the Cambodian operation and the
tragedies at Kent State and Jackson
State.
put into effect.
Approv }ed For Rel e1 b9PP08 tA10ol CLk 3= 1st'uf &ll "short of our
~rF~l7t-004
The third operation was the establish- 'nearly 1,800 campus demonstrations t i t. needs. needs. In July, 11970,
h
i
, and nearly 250 cases of arson on campus. 19
Many colleges closed. Gun battles be-
tween guerrilla-style groups and police
were. taking place. Some of the disrup-
tive activities were receiving foreign -
support. ' ' .
Complicating the task of maintaining
security ' was the fact that, in 1966,
certain types of undercover FBI opera-
tions that had been conducted for many
years had been suspended. This also had
substantially impaired our ability' to'
collect foreign intelligence information.
At the same time, the relationships'.
between' the FBI and other intelligence
agencies had been deteriorating. By
May, 1970, FBI Director [J. Edgar] Hoo-
ver shut off his agency's liaison with the,
CIA altogether. , , , . ?
On June , 5, 1970, 1 met with the
.director -of the FBI [Mr. Hoover], the.
director of the Central Intelligence
Agency [Richard Helms], the director of
the Defense Intelligence Agency [Gen.
Donald V. Bennett] and the Director of
.'the National Security Agency - [Adm.
Noel Gayler].
.Need for better Intelligence
We .discussed the urgent need for
better intelligence operations. I ap-
pointed Director Hoover as chairman of
an ' interagency committee to prepare
recommendations.
On June 25, the committee submitted
a report which included specific options'
for expanded intelligence operations,
and on July 23 the agencies were noti-
fied by memorandum of the options
approved. After reconsideration, how-
ever, promoted by' the opposition of
Director Hoover, the agencies were noti-,
lied five days later, on July 28, that the
approval had been rescinded. The op-
tions initially approved had included
resumption of certain intelligence opera-
tions which had been suspended in 1966.
These in turn had included authorization
for surreptitous entry-breaking and en-
tering, in effect-on specified situations
related to national security.
Because the approval was withdrawn
before it had been implemented, the net
result was that -the plan for expanded
intelligence activities never went into
effect.
The documents spelling out this 1970
plan are extremely sensitive. They in-
clude-and are based upon-assessments
of certain foreign intelligence -capabili-
ties and procedures, which of course
must remain secret. It was this unused
plan and related documents that John
Dean removed from the White House
and placed in a safe deposit box, giving,
.the keys to Judge Sirica. The same
plan, still unused, is being headlined
Coordination among our intelligence
av
ng earlier discontinued the FBI's
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liaison with the CIA, Director Hoover
ended the FBI's normal liaison with all
other agencies except the White House.
To help remedy this, an Intelligence
Evaluation Committee was created in.
December, 1970. Its members included
representatives' of the White House, CIA,
FBI, NSA [National Security Agency],
-the Departments of Justice, Treasury,
and Defense, and the Secret Service.
The Intelligence Evaluation Commit-.
tee and its staff were instructed to
improve coordination among the intelli-
gence community and to prepare eval-
uations and estimates . of domestic
intelligence. I understand that its activi-
,ties are now under investigation. I did
,not authorize nor do I have any knowl-
edge of any illegal activity by this
Committee. If it went beyond its charter
:and did engage in any illegal activities,
{ it was totally without my knowledge or
authority.
UNIT .
. The". unit operated under extremely.
tight security rules. Its existence and
,functions were known only to a very few
persons at the White House. These in-
{eluded Messrs, [H. R,] Haldeman, Ehr-
lichman and John W. Dean [3d].
At about the time the unit was ere-
ated, Daniel Ellsberg was identified as,
the person who had given the Pentagon,
papers to The ? New York Times. I told
Mr. Krogh that as a matter of first
.priority, the unit should find out all it
could about Mr. Ellsberg's associates
and his motives. Because of the extreme
gravity of the situation, and not then
'knowing what additional national secrets
Mr. Ellsberg might disclose, I did im-
press upon Mr. Krogh the vital impor-
,tance to the national security of his
.assignment. I did not authorize and had
;no knowledge of any illegal means to be
used to achieve this goal.
However, because of the emphasis I
put on the crucial importance of protect-
ing the national security, I can' under-
stand how highly motivated individuals
could have felt justified in engaging in
specific activities that I would have
disapproved had they been brought to
my attention.
Consequently, as President, I must
and do assume responsibility for such
actions despite the fact that I at no time
approved or had knowledge of them.
I also assigned the unit a number of
other investigatory matters, dealing in'
.part with compiling an accurate record
of events related to the Vietnam war, on
which the government's records were
,inadequate (many previous records hav-
;ing been removed with the change of
'administrations) and which bore directly
on the negotiations then in progress.
Additional assignments included tracing.
down other national security leaks, in-
cluding one that seriously compromised
the U.S. negotiating position in the.
SALT talks.
The work of the unit tapered . off
around the end of 1971. The nature of its
work was such that it involved matters
that, from a national security stand-
point, were highly sensitive then and
remain so today.
These intelligence activities had no
connection with the break-in of the Dem-
ocratic headquarters, or the aftermath.
I considered it my responsibility to'
:see that the Watergate investigation did
not impinge adversely upon the national
security area. For example, on April
18th, 1973, when I learned that Mr.
Hunt, a former member of the special
investigations unit at the White House,
was to be questioned by the U.S. attor-
ney, I directed Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral [Henry El Petersen to pursue
every issue involving Watergate but to
confine his investigation to Watergate
and related matters and to stay out of
national security matters.
Subsequently, on April 25, 1973,-Attor-
ney General (Richard G.] Kleindienst
On Sunday, June 13, 1971, The New
'York Times published the first install-
ment of what came to be known as "the
Pentagon papers." Not until a few hours
before publication did any responsible".
government official know that they had ,
been stolen. Most officials did not know
they existed.' No senior official of the
government had read them or knew
with certainty what they contained.
All the government knew, at first, was
that' the papers comprised 47 volumes
'and some 7,000 pages, which had been
taken from the sensitive files of the
departments of State and Defense and
the CIA, covering military and diplo-
matic moves in a war that was' still.
going on.
Moreover, a majority of the docu-
ments published with the first three
installments in the Times had not been
included in the 47-volume study-raising
? serious questions about what and how
much else might have been taken. There
was every reason to believe this was a
security leak of unprecedented propor-
tions.
It created a situation in which the
ability of the government to carry on
foreign relations even in the best of.
circumstances could have been severely
compromised. Other governments no
longer knew whether they could deal.
with the United States in confidence.
Against the background of the delicate
negotiations the United States was then
involved in on a number of.fronts-with
regard to Vietnam, China, the Middle
East, nuclear arms limitations, U.S.-
Soviet relations, and others-in which
,the utmost degree of confidentiality was
vital, it posed a threat so grave as to
require extraordinary actions.
Therefore, during the week following
the Pentagon papers publication, I ap-
proved the creation of a special investi-
gations unit within the White House-
which later came to be known as the
"plumbers." This was a small group at
,the White House whose principal pur-
pose was to stop security leaks and to
investigate other sensitive security mat-
ters. I looked to John Ehrlichman for
the supervision of this group.
Egil Krogh, Mr. Ehrlichman's assist-
ant, was put in charge. David Young
was added to this unit, as were E.
Howard Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy.
informed me that because the Govern-
ment had clear evidence that Mr. Hunt
was involved in the break-in of the
office of the psychiatrist who had
treated Mr. Ellsberg, he, the Attorney
General, believed that despite the fact
that no evidence had been obtained from
Hunt's acts, a report should neverthe.
less be made to the court trying the
The burglary and bugging of the Dem-
ocratic National Committee headquar-
Ellsberg case, I concurred, and directed'
that the information be transmitted to
Judge Byrne immediately.
WATERGATE
I had no inkling that any such illegal
activities had been planned by persons
associated with my campaign: if I had
known, I would not have permitted it.
My immediate reaction was that those
guilty, should be brought to justice and,
with the five burglars themselves al-
ready in custody, I assumed that they
would be.
Within a few days, however, I was,
? advised that there was a possibility of
"CIA involvement in some way.
It did seem to me possible that;
because of the involvement of former
CIA personnel, and because of 'some of
their apparent associations, the investi-
gation could lead to the uncovering of
covert CIA operations totally unrelated
to the Watergate break-in.
In addition, by this time,: the name of .
Mr. Hunt had surfaced in connection
with Watergate, and I was alerted to thq
fact that he had previously been a
member of the special investigations
.unit in the White House. Therefore, I
was also concerned.that the Watergate
investigation might well lead to an in-
quiry into the activities of the special
investigations unit itself.
In this area, I felt it was important to
avoid disclosure of the details of the
national security matters with which, the
group. was concerned. I knew that once
the existence of the group became
known, it would lead inexorably to a
discussion of these matters, some of
which remain, even today, highly sensi-
tive.
I wanted justice done with regard to
Watergate; but in the scale of national
priorities with which I had to deal -
and not at that time having any idea of
the extent of political abuse which Wat-
ergate reflected - I also had to be
deeply concerned with ensuring that
neither the covert operations of the CIA
nor the operations of the special investi-
gations unit should be compromised.
Therefore, instructed Mr. Haldeman
and Mr. Ehrlichman to ensure that the
investigation of the break-in not expose ,
either an unrelated covert operation of
the CIA or the activities of the White
House investigations unit - and to see
that this was personally coordinated,
between General [Vernon A.] Walters,
the Deputy Director of the CIA, and Mr.
[L. Patrick] Gray 3d of the FBI. It was
certainly not my intent, nor my wish,
that the investigation of the Watergate
break-in or of related acts be impeded
in any way.
On July 6, 1972, I telephoned the
Acting Director of the FBI, L. Patrick
Gray, to congratulate him on his suc-
cessful handling of the hijacking of a
Pacific Southwest Airlines plane the'
previous day. During the conversation.
Mr. Gray discussed with me the prog-
ress of the Watergate investigation, and
I asked him whether he had talked with
General Walters. Mr. Gray said that he
had, and that General Walters had as-
sured him that the CIA was not. in-
volved. In the discussion, Mr. Gray
suggested that the matter of Watergate
might lead higher. I told him to press
ahead with his investigation.
It now seems that later, through what-
ever complex of individual motives and
ters came as a complete surprise to me. 20 possible misunderstandings, there were
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100170001-8
apparently wide-ranging efforts to limit
the investigation or to conceal the possi-.
ble involvement of members of the
administration and the campaign com-
mittee.
I was not aware of any such efforts at
the time. Neither, until after I began my
own investigation, was I aware of any
fund raising for defendants convicted of
the break-in at Democratic headquar-
ters, much less authorize any such fund
raising. Nor did I authorize any offer of
executive clemency for any of the de-
fendants.
In the weeks and months that followed
Watergate, I asked for, and received,
repeated assurances that Mr. Dean's
own investigation (which included re-
viewing files and sitting in on FBI
interviews with White House personnel)
had cleared everyone then employed by
the White House of involvement.
In summary, then:
1. I has no prior knowledge of the
Watergate bugging operation, or of any
illegal surveillance activities for politi-
cal purposes.
2. Long prior to the 1972 campaign, I
did set in motion certain internal secu-
rity measures, including legal wiretaps,'
which I felt were necessary from a
national security standpoint and, in the
climate then prevailing, also necessary
from a domestic security standpoint.
3. People who had been involved ink
the national security operations later,,
without my knowledge or approval, un-
. dertook illegal activities in the political
campaign of 1972
4. Elements of the early post-Water-
gate reports led me to suspect, incor-
rectly, that the CIA had been in, some
,way involved. They also led me to
surmise, correctly, that since persons
originally recruited for covert national
security activities had participated in
Watergate, an unrestricted investigation
of Watergate might lead to and expose
those covert national security opera-
tions.
5. I sought to prevent the exposure of
these covert national security activities,
while encouraging those conducting the
investigation to pursue their inquiry
into the Watergate itself. I so instructed
my staff, the attorney general and the
acting director of the FBI.
6. I also specifically instructed Mr.
Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman to en-
sure that the FBI would not carry Its
investigation into areas that might com-
promise these covert national security
activities, or those of the CIA.
7. At no time did I authorize or know
about any offer of executive clemency
for the Watergate defendants. Neither,
did I know until the time of my own
,investigation, of any efforts to provide
,them with funds.
CONCLUSION
With hindsight, it is apparent that' I
should have given more heed to, the
warning signals I received along the
way about a Watergate coverup'and less'
to the reassurances.
With hindsight, several other things
Iso become clear:
With respect to campaign practices,
and also with respect to campaign fi-
nances, it should now be obvious that no
campaign in history has ever been sub-
jected to the kind of intensive and
searching inquiry t)1&p4Vcbted FQQrelgele
on the campaign waged in my behalf in
Accompanying statement
by the President
I" Recent news.accounts growing out of testimony in the Watergate investi-
gations have given grossly misleading impressions of many of the facts, as.
they relate both to my own role and to certain unrelated activities involving
national security.
Already, on the basis of second-and third-hand hearsay testimony by per-
sons either convicted or themselves under investigation in the lase, I have
Jound ound myself accused of involvement in aetivitiI never ' heard of until.'
I read about them in news accounts.
These impressions could also lead to a serious misunderstanding of those'
national security activities which, though totally unrelated to Watergate, have
'become entangled in the case. They could lead to further compromise of
. sensitive national security information.
6. It was not until the time of my own investigation that I learned of the
break-in at the office of Mr. [Daniel] Ellsberg's psychiatrist, and I specifically
authorized the furnishing of this information to. Judge [W. Matthew]
Byrne, [Jr.].
7. I neither authorized nor encouraged subordinates to engage in illegal
or improper campaign tactics.
implicate'the CIA in the Watergate matter.
In the accompanying statement, I have set forth the facts as I know them'
as they relate to my own role. ' ' .
With regard to the specific allegations that have been made, I can and do
state categorically: '
1. 1 had no prior knowledge of the Watergate operation.
2.1 tools no part in, nor was I aware of, any subsequent efforts that may
have been made to cover up Watergate. ?
3. At no time did 7 authorize any offer of executive clemency for the
Watergate defendants, nor did I know of any such offer.
4. 1 did not know, until the time of my own investigation, of any effort
to provide the Watergate defendants with funds.
5., At no time did I attempt, or did I authorize others to attempt, to
.elected to do.
I will not abandon my 'responsibilities. I will continue to do the' job I was
that executive privilege will not be invoked as to any testimony concerning
possible criminal conduct or discussions of possible criminal conduct, in
the matters under investigation. I want the public to learn the truth about
Watergate, and those guilty of any illegal actions brought to justice.
In the accompanying statement, I have sought to provide the background
that may place recent allegations in perspective. 1 have specifically stated
1972.
It is clear that unethical, as well as
illegal, activities took place in the
course of that campaign.
None of these took place ? with my
specific approval or knowledge. To the
extent that I may in any way have
contributed to the climate in which they.
took place, I did not intend to; to the
extent that I failed to prevent them, I
should have been more vigilant.
It was to help ensure against any
repetition of this in the future that last
week I proposed the establishment of a
;top-level, bipartisan, independent com-
!mission to recommend a comprehensive
reform of campaign laws and practices.
Given the priority I believe it deserves,
such reform should be possible before
Ithe next congressional elections in 1974.
It now appears that there were per-
1sons who may have gone beyond my
,directives, and sought to expand on my
efforts to protect the national security.
operations in order to cover -up any
involvement they or certain' others
might have had in Watergate. The ex-
tent to which this is true, and who may
have participated and to what degree,
are questions that it would not be proper
ito address here. The proper forum for
settling these matters is in the courts.
To the extent that I have been able to
determine what probably happened in
the tangled course of this afffair, on the
basilM'"ts- c '-PL
i5d evi' aence th 0 32F
have seen, it would appear that one 21
factor at work was that at critical points
various people, each with his own
perspective and his own responsibilities,
saw the same situation with different
eyes. and heard the same words with
different ears. What might have seemed
insignificant to one seemed significant
to another; what one saw in terms of
public responsibility, another saw in
terms of political opportunity; and
mixed through it all, I am sure, was a
concern on the part of many that the
Watergate scandal should not be allowed
to get in the way of what the adminis.
ration sought to achieve.
The truth about Watergate should be
brought out-in an orderly way, recog-
nizing that the safeguards of judicial
procedure are designed to find the truth,
of to hide the truth.
With his selection of Archibald Cox-
who served both President Kennedy and
President Johnson as Solicitor General
-as the special supervisory prosecutor
for matters related to the case, attorney
general-designate (Elliot L.) Richardson
has demonstrated his own determination
to see the truth brought out. In this
ffort he has my full support.
Considering the number of persons
involved in this case whose testimony
might be subject to a claim of executive
privilege, I recognize that a clear defini-
tion of that claim has become central to
the effort to arrive at the truth.
k6wingglceirto Wltive privilege will
any testimony.
concerning possible criminal conduct or
 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100170001-8
discussions of possible criminal conduct,
in the matters presently under investi.
gation, including the Watergate affair'
and the alleged cover-up.
I want to emphasize that this state-
ment is limited to my own recollections
of what I said and did relating to
security and to the Watergate. I have
specifically avoided any attempt to ex-;
plain what other parties may have said
and done. My own information on those
NEW YORK TINES'
23 May 1973
other matters is fragmentary, and to'
some extent contradictory. Additional
information may be forthcoming of
which I am unaware.
It is also my understanding that the
information which has been conveyed to
me has also become available to those
prosecuting these matters. Under such
circumstances, it would be prejudicial
and unfair of me to render my opinions
Ion the activities of others; those judg.
ments must be left to the judicial pro-
'cess, our best hope for achieving the just
I
result that we all seek.
As more information is developed, I
have no doubt that more questions will
be raised. To the extent that I am able,
I shall also seek to set forth the facts as
known to me with respect to those
Excx,nn-N From Transcr.pt df Testimony
Senate Group'
Investigatihg Watergate 11 Speclat to'the New Ycrh Time, f1Cld
story
d so knew. t
WASHINGTON, May 22- This letter was couch
v
e
he
old
either
'Following 'are excerpts from in strong language because it correct it or I would do so.
a transcript of testimony to. seemed to me at the time that With the letter to Caulfield
,ings on the Watergate case
by the Senate Select Com-
ntittee on Presidential Cam-
paign Activities:
MORNING
SESSION
James W. McCord Jr.
McCORD. One of the state-
ments that we did not get
into on the last meeting, I
think primarily because of
the factor of time, was a
memorandum which I had
written to the committee
dated May 4, 1973, the sub-
ject of pressure on the de-
fendants to blame the Water-
gate operation on C.I.A. and
other matters. I am prepared
.to go into that statement at
,this time. If it has your ap-
prova 1.
SENATOR BAKER. Thank
you very much. Is that letter
a part of the record?
[At this point McCord read
into the record the memoran-
dum to the committee charg-
ing pressures on the defend.
ants to put the blame on the
Central Intelligence Agency
for the Watergate operation.
The text was printed in The
New York Times of May 9.]
McCORD. I have a further
addition relevant to that in
the statement which I could
read at this time.
The topic of it is the De-
cember, 1972, letter to John
'Caulfield This letter is relev-
ant to the May 4, 1973, memo
submitted to Senate Water-
gate committee and the Fed-
eral grand jury, on the sub-
ject of pressure to place the
blame on C.I.A. for the
'Watergate operation.
A letter was written to
John Caulfield during the
week of Dec, 25, 1972. Ref-
erence to this letter appeared
in the press last weekend.
And geared-speaking of my
own feelings and at the time
the letter was written-and
geared because of what ap-
peared to me to be a ruthless
attempt by the White House
to put the blame for the
Watergate operation . on
C.I.A., where it did not be-
long, I sought to head it off
stood..Thc letter read in sub-- toyfalsely - -au lay the1Watergate du ciiort;
stance as follows, to the best operation off on CIA. In the
of my memory:. telegrams and letter to Hunt
"Dear Jack: I am sorry to and the others in December,
have to write you this letter. 1972, that I have just re-
If Helms goes and the Water- ferred. to, I was trying to
gate operation is laid at head off an effort to falsely
C.I,A.'s feet, where it does to lay the recruitment of the-
not belong, every tree in the Cubans off on the writer
forest will fall: It will be a which would, in turn, shift
scorched desert., The whole the focus of he trial off of
matter is at the precipice those formerly connected
right now. Pass the message, with the White House, name
that if they want it to blow, ]y, Liddy and Hunt, than
they are on exactly the right from those who in effect had
course. I am sorry that you actually , recruited them,
will get hurt in the fallout." namely Mr. Hunt.
The letter was unsigned. Newspapers over the week-
Sirica Statement Cited ? end have also referred to
Now, the above letter to some calls to some local em-
ba
i
ss
es. I will try to explain
Caulfield brings to mind an-
those in the statement that I
other set of communications will read at this time.
of mine on Dec. 6, 1972. On ` In July, 1972, Mrs. Hunt
Dec. 4, 1972, Judge Sirica had told me that Paul
had stated in open court that
the jury in .January, 1973, O'Brien, attorney for C.R.P.,
would want to know who had told her husband that
had hired the men for the, when the Watergate case
Watergate operation and broke in June, the Commit-
why, tee for the Re-election of the
On December 6, 1972, The President told O'Brien that
Washington Star carried an the Watergate operation was
article which appeared to me a eC ferr o oration. I believe
to be an Administration- I referred to this in the ear-
plantedstoryansweringJudge her statement. She said that
Sirica's query stating that Howard Hunt had exploded
"reliable sources state that at this and told O'Brien that
McCord recruited the four not this was not true; that it was
Cubans and that they be- not a C.I.A. operation.
lieved that they were work- told A me few that the days later Mrs. Hunt
ing for the President on an yeas were now C.R.P. law-
extremely sensitive mission." yers now reporting
This was untrue. that the Administration was
J1p-1 VU w me io oe that-Liddy had stolen $16,-
laying the groundwork for- a 000 and had bribed Hunt
false claim at the trial that and McCord to perform the
I was the "ringleader" of the operation. I told her that it
Watergate plot. This would looked like they were now
draw attention away from changing their cover stories,
Hunt and Liddy, and I believe referring to the Administra-
possibly away from the tion, and I would not sit
White House, since both of still for either false story,
them had formerly worked at and I shortly wrote my attor-
the White House and I had ney, Gerald Alch, repeating
not. this information and setting
That same evening Dec. 6, forth these same views of
1972, 1 sent telegrams to Wil- mine.
Liam 0. Bittman, attorney for In September, 1972, the in
Hunt, and Bernard Barker's dictments came out and no
residence in Miami, Fla., stat one was being indicted
ing that the story was untrue among the higher-ups, so
as they both knew, and I there looked like a further
asked for comments by re-
cover-up to me.
turn mail from Bark
r
l
er
a
l
-av is, .,eptcmuer ana vc-
tober, 1972, there began to 22
be a series of telephone
anomalies on my phone that
indicated to me that the
phone had been tapped.
In an effort to test the
truthfulness of the Govern-
ment on a forthcoming mo-
tion for disclosure of wire-
tapping of the defendants'
phones in the Watergate
case, including my own, I
made two calls in September
and October, 1972, to two
local embassies. On Oct. 10,
1972, 1 asked for the filing
of a motion for Government
disclosure of any intercep-
tions and two weeks later
the Government came back
with a denial, of any, saying
a search of Government rec-
ords had been made. I knew
that that two weeks was too
short a time to search 12 dif-
ferent Government agencies
for such records, and be-
lieved the Government was
not telling the truth.
Sees Mitchell. Sanction
There is an attachment to
this, The New York Times of
today's date. The title of the
article "Warning Against
Blaming of C.I.A. Laid to Mc-
Cord."
Continuing on a separate
subject in a statement. The
topic of this merandum is
,sanction of the Watergate
operation.
John Mitchell, by virtue of
his position as Attorney Gen-
eral of the United States, and
John Dean, by virtue of his
position as counsel to the
President, by their considera-
tion and approval of the
Watergate operation, in my
opinion, gave sanction to the
Watergate operation by both
the White House and the At-
torney General's offices.
I had been accustomed to
working in an atmosphere
where such sanction by the
White House and the At-
torney General, was more
than enough. As with White
House staffers, it was not my
habit to question when two
such high offices sanctioned
an activity-it carried the
full force and effect of Presi.
dential sanction.
For the preceding 30 years
I had been working in an en-
vironment where, if there
were ever any question of the
legality of a matter or an
activity, it would always be
sent to high legal officials for
a legal decision on the mat-
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100170001-8
 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100170001-8
ter; where, if they sanctioned
it, that was sufficient.
I can elaborate on this an-
other way. Left alone, I
would not have undertaken
the operation. I had plenty
of other things to do in con-
nection with my security
:-',)rk at the Committee to Re-
elect the President.
Liddy wanted help. He
came to me seeking that help,
with the word that it had the
approval of the Attorney Gen-
eral and the counsel to the
President. He said that it was
part of the C.R.P. mission, in
order to obtain the informa-
tion regarding not only polit=
ical intelligence but also re-
garding violence-oriented
groups who would be plan-
ning violence against the
committee in Washington,
and later at the August con-
vention site, thereby endan-
'goring the lives and property
of the committee and its per-
sonnel. My mission was pro-
tection of such lives and
property.
Worried by Bloodshed
'Uppermost in everyone's'
minds at that point in time,
and certainly in mine, was.
the bloodshed which had oc-
curred at the 1968 Democratic
Convention in Chicago, and I
constantly sought intelligence
from any source which might
help forewarn us and help us
avoid in 1972 that danger to
the lives of our people.
In 1969 we had seen the
bombing of the Capitol Build-*
ing itself. In May, 1972, we
had seen the bombing of the
Pentagon with the equivalent
of 18 sticks of dynamite. In
February, 1972, there were.
four pipe bombs emplaced at'
a police station in Manches-
ter, N. H., one of which went
off prematurely, and mangled
the arm of the young.man
who had reportedly emplaced,
them.
Caught with him was a
young lady who had in her
possession four letters which
said, "We have just bombed
the offices of the Committee
to Re-elect the President in
New Hampshire." Found in
her apartment were the mak-
;ings of other pipe bombs. It
was clear to me and to others
that the intentions of the two
were to go on from the police
station and drop off other
bombs at the C.R.P. offices in
Manchester, where there had
been demonstration and trou-
ble a few days before. ,
Only their arrest pre-
empted that action. A few
days later in Oakland, Calif.,
another pipe bomb was em-
-placed on the first floor of
the Republican county head
quarters and blew out all of
the windows and damaged a
pillar to the building. Al-
ready in February there was
a pattern then of bombings
beginning to develop against
the committee and against
Republican offices.
Subsequently, in Austin.
Tex., the offices of Senator
Tower were destroyed by a
fire bomb which, I believe, as
theological threat, but' of a
realistic threat of violence,
and I wanted advance notice
from anywhere I could re-
ceive it, of action planned
against us of this sort-ad-
vance notice, advance warn-
ing, so we could take meas-
ures to protect against it and
protect our people's . lives.
Property could be replaced..
Florida Indictments
Questions were -on my,
mind like, who are these,
people who bombed in New:
Hampshire, in Oakland, the
Pentagon building, the Cap=
ital. Building; how are they
funded; who are they work-
ing with? Is anyone in col-
We certainly had sufficient
indications that violence-ori-
ented groups were out to en-
danger both life and prop-
erty. With some 250,000 dem-
ostrators planning to go to
the convention in early 1972
and there were statements
that some would be out to
commit violence. The ques-
tions were, who are such
people, who is funding them,
encouraging them, who is in'
.'collusion with them, what
are they planning next and
where? Are any of them be-
ing supported and encouraged
by any staff members of the
McGovern committee or
D.N.C.?
I had no indication what-
ever that Larry O'Brien or
Senator McGovern had either
ing them or funding them? any knowledge of or part in
.The Vietnam Veterans such-just the contrary,. I
against the War was one vi- was completely convinced
olence-oriented group that that they did not. But' l was
was already saying in the. not so sure that, without
spring of 1972 that they their knowledge, other staff
were going to cause destruc
tion to life and property at,
the August Republican con-.
vention, using, in their own
words, their own bodies and
weapons as the spearhead of
the attack there-these are
their exact words, and some,
of them have since been in
members might not be work-
ing behind their backs to
quietly encourage groups
.such as V.V.A.W. McGov-
ern's early political base was
with some of the radical
,groups.
My questions were, what
was the extent of such en-
dieted in Tallahassee, Fla.;, couragement, if any, and
with additional plans , 'to how far did it go? Did they
damage the life and property, let such groups use their
in the convention. . telephones and work in their
Later in the summer of offices? There were' indica-
.1972 the V.V.A.W., did, in tions in the summer of 1'972
fact have offices in the that such groups actually did
D.N.C. in Washington, as I just that in California and
.understand. I had also re- in D.N,C. headquarters, in'
ceived information from the Washington.
Internal _Security Division in My next statement has to
dividuals in Florida planned
to forge college press creden-
tials to get into both the
Democratic and Republican
convention sites, and blow up
the communication centers of
both parties there and cause
havoc on the convention
floor.
Now, we also had word telligence advisory commit-
from C.R.P. sources alleging tee." I now assume that this
that the McGovern commit- was the Intelligence Evalua-
tees had "a pipeline" direct- tion Committee, referred 'to,
ly into the offices of the Com-? I believe, in The New York
mittee to Re-elect the Times of. May 21, 1973.
President in Washington; ? I have previously submit-
allegedly, they were feeding led a tape to the Senate
out. on a regular basis, policy Watergate committee which
position papers, i.e., plans and ? I believe, contains material
strategy, which were rather ? which was the product of
important to the success of that, committee, and which
obtained from the evalua
a candiriate's cam
ai
n If +1-
p
g
other other side is reading your
poker hand, he can negate
your plans.
We had word that one of
the volunteers at the Com-
mittee to Re-elect the Pres-
ident the sources of that commit-
had,. in fact, prior to
coming aboard the commit- tee.
tee, threatened the life of Robert Mardian, during a
John Mitchell and of other `brief conversation in June
persons. This was at about '1972, stated that he was
the same time Governor Wal- going to be "in charge of
lace was almost killed in an intelligence operations at
assassination attempt. There Miami during the conven.
were numerous threats in tion." He did not elaborate
writing and by phone against further.
John Mitchell and his wife. The next item is headed
One such call came to the "Las Vegas' Matter," whic?
unlisted telephone of ILIrs was referred to in the e-
Hank Greenspun, editor of
The Las Vegas Sun.
Liddy said- that Attorney
General John Mitchell has
told him that Greenspun had
in his possession blackmail
type information involving a
Democratic candidate for
President, that Mitchell want-
ed that material, and Liddy.
said that this information was
in some way racketeer-re-
lated, indicating that if this'
candidate became President,'
the racketeers or national
crime syndicate could have
a control or influence over
him as President. My inclina-
tion at this point in time,
speaking of today, is to dis-
believe the allegation against
the Democratic candidate re-
ferred to above and to be-
lieve that there was in real-
ity 'some other motive for
wanting to get into Green-
spun's safe.
Liddy told me one day in
February, 1972, that he was
going out to Las Vegas, and
might need my help if there.
was an alarm system in the
offices, when an entry opera-
tion was mounted to enter a
safe in Greenspun's offices to
get. the information. A few
days later Liddy told me that
he had been to Las Vegas
and looked over the offices
and that there was no such
alarm system, and r ,' serv-
ices were not nee::ad.
Subsequently in ai,?. 't
April or May, 1971, Liddy to,~
me that he had again been to
Las Vegas for another casing
of Greenspun's offices, Liddy
said that there were then
plans for an entry operation
to get into Greenspun's safe.
He went on to say that, after
the entry team finishes its
work, they would go directly
to an airport near Las Vegas
where a Howard Hughes
plane would be standing by
to fly the team directly into
a Central-American country.
so that the team would he
out of the country before the
break-in was discovered. '
Around the same time
Liddy made this last state-
ment to me about the How-
ard Hughes plane, Hunt told
me in his office one day that'
he was in touch with the
Howard Hughes company
atnd that they might he need-
ing my security services after
the election.
He said that they had quite
a wide investigative, and se-
curity operation and asked
me for my business card and
asked if I would he interest-
ed. I said I would like to
know more about what was
involved, gave him a card,
but never heard from him
again on this subject. How-
ever, I did read in the news-
papers after July 1, 1972, that
Hunt had apparently handled
a Howard Hughes campaign
donation to the Committee to
Re-elect the President some-
time in 1972. Gordon Liddy
told me in February, 1972,
that he, too, had handled a
Mitchell at their apartment vious testimony on Friday. Howard Hughes campaign
and got her greatly upset, as In January or February, check, a donation to the 1972
campaign. This is the extent
it would any woman because 1972. Gordon N AA- told
me
--e- ??~?., , , ,uuii cuun That completes my pre.
the concern was not -of a peared then no longer safe. with casing the office of 23
visory committee I previ-
ously referred to in the C.I.A.
memorandum, which I re-
ferred to Mr. Robert Mardian.
In May, 1972, Robert Mar-
dian had told me that -he,
John Mitchell, Robert Halde-
man and John Ehrlichman
were key members of an "in-
Security Division of the De-
partment of Justice, a con-
tact established through Mr.
Robert Mardian, in May 1972.
I have no *knowledge of
 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100170001-8
pared statement and I will be
glad to answer any questions.
SENATOR BAKER. Mr. Mc-
Cord, speaking of electronic
surveillance, do you know, of
or did you ever investigate
the bugging of Republican
headquarters of the Commit-
tee for the Re-election of the
President headquarters-here;
New York, or elsewhere?,
A. Yes, sir,
Q. Would you describe that.
,for the committee? A. It was
?a? regular' Ongoing activity at.
the offices in Washington and
at the New York arm of the
Committee for the Re-election
of the President, which was
,referred to 'as the November
Group. They had offices, I
believe, on Park Avenue in
New York.
Signs of Illegal Acts
Q. Did you `discover any
incident of that sort? A. There,
was one incident on June 16
.of some concern at the New ,
York office of the Committee
for the Re-election of the
President, There had been
earlier signs of possibly some
illegal activity at those offices
prior to June 16 which I could
describe, if you would like.
Q. I would like.
A. On the afternoon of
June 16, 1972, about mid=
afternoon, I received a call
from the head of the office
of the November Group in
,New York City, who stated
that he and his entire office
staff were quite concerned
about an incident that had
just occurred. He went ahead
to relate that one of the sec-
retaries at the office had re-
ceived a call from a male
'individual in Los Angeles,
Calif., and that she had im-
mediately told that party that
she would call him back on
the WATS line, which is a.
leased line, call him hack on
that line and immediately did
so. ,
And during the conversa-
tion that the two of them
had, about a few minutes
into the conversation there
was a click over the phone
which was heard by her and
by the male on the other end
of the line, and . what ap-
peared to he a tape record-
ing was played over the
telephone line which was, as
she described it when I talked
with her, an anti-Nixon and
antiwar harangue.
Q, Were there other inci-
dents of telephone tapping
against the Republican Na-
tional Committee or the
C.R.P. or any other Republi-
can-affiliated groups brought
'to your attention or which
you investigated?
A. There were two earlier
occasions at the November
Group offices when I was
called to the November Group
offices from Washington in
which they had highly sus-
picious telephone anomalies;
as it is known. Telephone
conversations within the
office itself when another
person picking up a tele-
phone extension on a differ-
ent line, for example, not
connected with the one in
which the call was being
made, could overhear the
conversation that was going
on. Other strange anomalies,
clicks and so on, of a wide
variety that. indicated some
problems. in the telephone
ara.
:Source of Taps Unknown.
Mr. McCMord, I am not
trying to create the impres-
sion that, because there were
apparently taps in the Repub-
lican phones, that that justi-
fies taps on the Democratic
phones. I coo not believe that
but I am 'anxious to know
your state of mind and the
reason and rationale for your
security operations, 'includ-
ing the break-in into the
Watergate,
Now, my final question in
that respect is, did you ewer
discover the source or re-
sponsibility for any of these
efforts at electronic inter-
ception on the Republican
operations?
A. No, sir.
Q. You recognize the term
Gemstone?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Can you describe for us
what it means?
A. That term I first heard;
first read about in the news-
paper itself referring to, ac-
cording to the newspaper ac-
counts, referring to-it as a
code name for the monitor-
ing, the typing of final mon-
itoring logs of report or logs
'coming out of. the National
,Democratic Committee. I did
not as such know it during
the operation but I know
something about- the nature
of the paper that it was on.
I think that code name had
some reference to that.
Q. Where is the informa-
t.ion that you gained? Is it in
.the Gemstone file? Does the
U.S. Attorney's office have it?
Where is it? A. The material
which I had received from-
Mr. Baldwin was doing the
monitoring, Alfred Baldwin-
was turned over, all of it, to
Mr. Liddy, Gordon Liddy.
SENATOR TALMADGE:
Mr. McCord, among other
things in your testimony this
morning, you . stated that
many efforts were made to
persuade you or to coerce
you to state that the bugging
.operation on the Demcratic
National Committee was
it C.I.A. operation. Will you
state the individuals who
urged you to do that? One
you stated was Mr. Hunt. Am
I correct?
A. Sir, I believe I will cor-
rect that impression if I left
it. I had heard from Mr.
Bernard Barker specifically
that Mr. Hunt had brought
pressure to bear upon Mr.
Barker and the Cubans to
use as their defense that this
was a C.I.A. operation. Mr.
Hunt did not directly put
that pressure upon me.
Others did.
Q. Barker reported to you
that Hunt had urged you to
do so, is that correct? A.
That is right.
Q. Barker, as I understand
it, was one of the peope in-
volved in the Watergate op-
eration, was he not? A. Yes,
sir.
Q. Barker, I believe, has
been granted immunity and
has not been convicted. Is
that correct? He pled guilty
and was convicted? A. Yes,
sir.
Q. Now, who else besides
Barker was involved in urg-
'ing you to blame this on the
C.I.A.? You stated two other
names. I think one of them
was Bittman and the other'
one was named Alch? A. Yes,
sir, I referred to conversa-
tions with Mr. Gerald Alch
and Mrs. Hunt.
Q. Now, who is Mr. Alch?
A. He was my defense attor-
ney through the. trial in Jan-
uary, 1973, whose services I
had engaged at that time.
Q. All right, now. Mr. Alch
and who else urged you' to .
do that? A. I believe I have
stated in my testimony that
stories were circulating earli-
er stemming out of the Com-
mittee for the Re-election of
the President that the com-
mittee lawyers themselves
had been told that early in
July . . .
Seeks Source of Pressure
Q. Let's get specific now.
I don't want stories circulat-
ing. I want to name the days,
names, and places. That 'is
evidence. Rumors are not. A..
Yes, sir.
Q. And I believe in your
own testimony in chief, the
memorandum you read, you
also referred to a man by the
name of Bittman, did you
not? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, who is Mr. Bitt-
man? A. Bittman is the at-
torney, William 0. Bittman,
the attorney for E. Howard
Hunt, one of the other de-
fendants.
Q. All right, did he have,
any connection with the Gov-
ernment in any way or any.
connection with the Republi-
can National Committee or.
the Committee to Re-elect the
President?
Q. What I am trying to get
at is the source of this pres-
sure that you have contended
was brought upon you to
blame this on the C.I.A. Thus
far, you have not connected
that either with the Commit-
tee to Re-elect the President
or the White House or any
other 'individuals, to my
knowledge. One was your
-own lawyer, one was engaged
in the crime with you, and
the third one was the lawyer
for Mr. Liddy, was it-Bitt-
man?
A. Mr.- Hunt.
Q. He was Mr. Hunt's law-
yer. And those three individu-
als are the only ones that
urged you to blame this on
the C.I.A. Is that a fair state-
ment? A. Yes, sir, that is es-
sentially correct.
Q. So no one else anywhere
whatever urged you to blame
it on the C.I.A. except these
three individuals, is that cor-
rect? A. None that I can re-
call at this time, no, sir.
Q. Now, did Mr. Barker
or the other of the so-called
Cuban Americans ever come
to you during the trial and
tell you that they had been
offered executive cemency by
offered executive clemency 24
by Mr. Hunt? A. Yes, sir.
Will you describe the atti-
tude and demeanor at that
time? .
A. Yes, sir, Mr. Barker spe-
cifically-I can recall speci-,
fically during the first week
of the trial and beginning on
the first day, on Jan, 8, Mr.
Barker came to me in the,
corridor outside, I believe,
the courtroom of the U.S.
District Court building in
Washington during breaks in
the court. proceedings and
proceeded to relate to me the
pressure which he said was
being imposed upon him and
upon the other men who were
defendants - Mr. Sturgis,
Mr. Gonzalez, Mr.'Martinez-
pressure that he stated was,
stemming from Mr. Hunt and
other unnamed individuals,
to plead guilty and to go off
to jail or prison and ulti-
mately to receive executive
clemency and to receive fi-
nancial support for their fam-
ilies while they were in pri-
son and promises-and he
stated- promises were made
that they would be given help
in obtaining a job or "rehabi-
litation" at the prison. Mr.
Barker spoke to me several
times during that week re-
garding that particular pres-
sure upon him which he de-
scribed as intense.
He stated first that he was
planning not to plead guilty
and then subsequently, as
the days progressed during
the week itself, he began to
tell me what he was think-
ing more and more seriously
about it, and as I recall,
about Wednesday of that
week, roughly, in that week
sometime, lie seemed to have
his mind made up that he
would go ahead and accede
to the pressure and plead
guilty, and he put it in just
about those words, and to
accept the executive clem-
ency.
He was not the only one.
His family, his wife and his
'daughter, related the same
pressure to me, sometimes in
his presence. '
Q. Did any of the other
so-called Cuban Americans
besides Mr. Barker relate sim-
ilar pressure? A. Yes, sir, all
of them, ,
Q. Every one of them?,
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, did Mr. Hunt or
Mrs. Hunt ever give you any
information that they were
sent to you by the Commit-
tee to Re-elect the President
or the White House or any-
body to do this? A.Executive
clemency?
Q. Yes. A. Yes, sir.
Q. Will you relate that?
A. Yes, sir, during the
meetings, personal meetings
and telephone meetings, be-
ginning in July, 1972, con-
cerning money beginning in
October, 1072, concerning ex-
ecutive clemency-the term
"executive clemcnsv" I first
heard, I believe, from 'Mr.
Hunt in early October-late
September or early October-
when I would see him at the
courthouse or when he would
call me by telephone.
"T"hereafter, he subsequent-
ly mentioned it in almost
every call. His wife referred
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to it. In substance, what they
were saying 'was that the
defendants were being prom-
ised executive clemency if
they went off to prison and
,had to serve time. Some-
times the word "executive
clemency" would be followed,
or accompanied by other.
statements about financial
support and rehabilitation.
Q. Did Mrs. Hunt state
who gave her authority to
make such.a promise? A. My
recollection of her conversa-
tions were that she was say-
ing that she was transmitting,
this word to me from her;
husband. She did not specifi
tally mention that I can re-
call now who gave it to him..
I can draw only one conclu-'
sion as to where it came
from, because-
Q. She did not state the
source of her authority to,
make that promise, though?
A. I can't recall such state-
ments on her part.
Q. Who did she say she
was in communication with?
A. With the attorneys for the
Committee to Re-elect the
'President, the attorneys for
the committee.
Q. Who specifically? More
than one individual is in-
volved with the committee.
I want you to name specific
names if you know.
A. She stated that she her-
self was in communication
with Mr. Kenneth Parkinson,
one of the attorneys for the
Committee to Re-elect the
President. She stated that her
husband, Mr. Hunt, had been
in touch in July with Mr.
Paul O'Brien, also an attorney.
with Mr. Parkinson for the
'Committee to Re-elect the
President,
SENATOR. GURNEY. Did
they [the other defendants]
ever tell you who was apply-
ing pressure to them?
A. 'My recollection is that
they stated Mr. Hunt. There
was some, I have a vague
recollection that the names
of, it was put in the same
context that Mr. Barker did
that others were doing so.
That is a very vague recol-
lection. I _ can be sure only
about the name of Mr. Hunt.
Q: Well, now, let's take
them one by one. When and
where did. Martinez say to
you that pressure was being
applied to him?
I A. In the corridors of the--
I believe it is called the-out-
side the ceremonial court-
room of the District Court
Building in Washington, D. C.,
to the best of my recollec-
tion, an at least each of the
first four days , of the trial
beginning on Jan. 8, during
breaks in the court session.
Q. And in these conversa-
tions, what names did Mar-
tinez mention? A. Mr. Hunt.
Q. Did he mention any
others? A. No, sir.
Q. What about Sturgis?
A. If I may explain, usu-'
ally Mr. Martinez and Mr.
Gonzalez were together dur-
ing these conversations and
the conversations were in the
retirement. That is, a person
once retired, can he recalled,
and I said, yes, he can, and
he said, - "Well, you can
ostensibly, we could use as
our defense you could osten-
sibly have been recalled to,
the C.I.A. to undertake the
Watergate operation, could
you not," and I said it is
technically possible or words
to that effect. That he said
if so, then, my personnel rec- -
ords at C.I.A. could be doc-
tored to reflect such a re-
call, and this is my best recol-,
lection of the exact words.
Q. Well, now, who was go-
ing to do that?
A. He did not say.
Q. Did you ask him?
A. No. I was listening to
the rest of the story. I want-
ed to hear the rest of the
statement out. He said that
Schlesinger, the new director
i,f C:T A whncn nnnninfmnnf
National Committee or Mc-'
Govern headquarters. Where
did you receive that informa-
tion? A. I do not recall the
source of it now, except that.
it came to me some time dur-
ing the Summer of 1972.
Q. When you say in the
summer of 1972, was it be.
Sore June 17? A. No, sir.
i . Q. After June 17? A. Yes,
sir. '
Q. How many times were,
you personally in contact.
with Robert Mardian? A. I
can recall two of three times.
Q. Was this at the time
that the Internal Security Di-
vision or at the time lie had
left that division and was.
working for- the Committee
to Re-elect the President?.
A. Only after lie had come
to the Committee to Re-elect
the President.
could be subpoenaed and SESSION
would go along with it, that MR. DASH. I think that
was his quote. ~ one of the areas that .has
Q. Did he offer any t not been covered is the role
Mr. Bence aSchlesinger he knew that of the person who was on
would "go the other side of the wiretap
along with it"? A. No, sir. which you installed in May,
A. Go on. the end of May, 1972. Now,
A. went on to mention did you employ Mr. Baldwin,
some testimony. He did but
have any paper with him Mr. Alfred Baldwin, for that
but
he went on to mention some purpose? testimony by Mr. Gary Bit.' McCORD. did.
tenbender, and he recited Q. What . was Yes, I particu-
-
testimony that he said Bitten- lar assignment with regard
bender had given in which to monitoring the wiretap?
Bittenbender purportedly A. His asssignment was to
claimed that I told him the listen on a ' radio receiver
day of 'the arrest that the that received. the transmis-
Watergate operation was a sions from the Democratic
C.I.A. operation. My response. National Committee tele-
was that, if such a statement phones in which the elec-
had been made, it was per- tronic devices had been in-.
jured testimony or a false stalled in connection with
statement, the two dates of Memorial
Q. Why did he bring that Day weekend and June 17,
up, do you know? A. I can 1972?
give you an impression if Q. In
,you want an impression. "as he recording what he was
Q. Yes. A. Which was that, hearing? A. He was listening
and that impression stems with headphones to the
from what I later saw in his conversations that were
office, which was a written being transmited and would
statement - my impression take down the substance of
was that he had received ac- the conversations, the time,
cess to some type of inter- the date, on the yellow legal-
view with Mr. Bittenbender sized scratch pad, and then
in which such a statement ultimately would type them
was obtained, perhaps by the up' a summary of them by
Federal authorities in some time, chronological summary,
case. and turn that typed log in
Q. Go on. A. He said he to me and I would deliver
could be interviewed-cor- them to Mr. Liddy.
rection. He went on to men- Q. Did you deliver them
Lion the name of Mr. Victor to Mr. Liddy directly? A. Yes.
Marchetti, who he referred to. Q. Now, did there come a
as writing a book about time when you were deliver-
C.I.A., and he said we could ing those- logs that they
subpoena Marchetti and have were retyped? A. I know of
him testify about customs at least one instance in
and traditions of C.I.A. agents which that occurred because
in case they are arrested, or I saw them being retyped.
caught,. wherein they are Q. what was the purpose
trained to deny any connec- of retyping the log? Did Mr.
tion with C.I.A. Liddy explain that to you?
SENATOR WEICKER. Mr. A. I believe some general
explanation, did you actually re- , in substance,
ceive any F.B.I. reports while that he wanted there in a
a, the Internal Security Divi?? more final complete form
sicn? A. I saw some material for discussion with Mr.
lse
that a?:: a attributed to the Mitchell and whoever else
F.B.I. I c:id not take any with received them.
me, I made extracts of some Q Now, who did this re-
typing? A
Sally Harmon
.
y,
form of something like a And his response was, "Yes, of the material that was
shown to me. who was the secretary to Mr.
three-way discussion between I think so," and he proceeded Liddy at the Committee for
me, Mr. Martinez and Mr. to discuss, to ask some ques- Q. You have indicated re the re-election of the Presi-
Gonzalez. Mr. Sturgis I tion of xe sal n e
would say. mentioned Agprol~l clrt 4qt cd2t9~ ' D8/O ra 4 Jt'7t ", Q0010 0001-8
or twice ihat week. The oth-
ers mentioned it, I would
say, the first four days of
the first week of the trial.
Q. But none of these men
ever mentioned any other
name other than Mr. Hunt?
A. No sir.
Q. And none of them ever
either mentioned or specu-
lated who was giving Hunt
the authority to apply this
political pressure or. offer of
executive clemency'to all of
you?
A. No, sir. There, the
focus of their concern was
it was in terms of what
should they be really doing
about it and what concern
they had if they- did not do
it or, if they turned it down,
,what would be their future,
what was going to happen
during the trial, so there
wasn't much at all in the
way of who was doing it and
where it came from. Our
general context of our dis-
cussion was that everybody
'understood that there was
only one place that execu
tive clemency can stem
from, so nobody had any
reason for discussing it.
Statements `Shocking'
Q. You mentioned in the
statement about the C.I.A.-
at least the statements were
certainly very shocking.
They involve a new man'
coming on beard the C.I.A.;
a change from Mr. Helms to
another man and the fact
that the new man could be,'
could work with and dealt
with, and your records might
have been able to have been.
doctored, all in this -so-called
C.I.A. cover-up.. Would you
go into that at more length.
Where did you get this in-
formation?
A. What I transmitted to
you, sir, and this is the
source of it, were the words
as I best recall it transmit-:
tcd to me, communicated to
me, by Mr. Alch in the two
'meetings that I referred to,
one at the Monocole Restau-
rant here in Washington,
near a couple of blocks from
here about, on 'Dec. 21, and.
the second-
Q. Who is us? Did lie have
someone else with him? A.
Well, lie had Mr. Bernard
Shankman, my local attor-
ney. He did not, meet with
us.
Q. Now, would you recall
again what he said specifi-
cally about the C.I.A.?
A. I stated as I best recall,
that he had just come from
a meeting with William O.
Bittman, attorney for Mr.
Howard Hunt. He stated that
he had a suggestion concern-
ing what I use as my de-
fense during the trial, which
was that I use as my defense
that the Watergate operation
was a C.I.A.' operation. I do
not recall exactly what I
said in response except to
say something to the effect
that you are my attorney,
what is your counsel on this,
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without going into any of
the contents, what a log
would be, what actually
would be entered on the log
which Mr.' Baldwin would
first type and then he re-
typed uy Miss Harmony?
A. It would be similar to
any other telephone conver-
sation that one person might
make to another beginning
with a statement on the log,
of the time of the call, who
was calling who; a summary,
of what was said during the
conversation itself, including
names of persons who were
mentioned that Mr. Baldwin.
apparently believed were of
:sufficient signifiance to set
forth in the log. '
Q.. [Would it] he true that
anybody reading would have
no difficulty knowing it [the
!log] came from a telephone,
conversation? A. That is cor-'
John J. Caulfield
CAULFIELD. My duties at,
that time [April, 1969] con-
sisted of being a White House
'liaison with a variety of law
enforcement agencies in the
Federal Government, through
arrangements worked out,
,with Mr. Ehrlichman, M.
Herbert Kalmbach and An-
thony Ulasewicz. Mr. Ulase-
wicz retired from the New
York` City Police Department
and was paid on a monthly
basis by the Kalmbach law
firm, that employment corn-,
mencing on July 9, 1969.
During the next three
years, first en orders from.
,Mr. Ehrlichman and later in
some instances, on orders
from Mr. John Dean, Mr.:
Ulasewicz, under my super-'
vision, performed a variety'
of investigative functions, re-,
porting the results of his
findings to the White House.
through me. I do net fully,
recall all of the investigations
performed in this fashion but
have available a list of those
which I do recall if the com-
mittee wishes to examine it.
In July of 1970 Mr. John
Dean became counsel to the
President and Mr. Ehrlich-'
man was named to the po-
sition of Presidential assist-
ant for domestic affairs.
Thereafter I worked directly,
for Mr. Dean, but on occa-
sion, Mr. Ehrlichman contin-
ued to call upon me directly
for investigative work in-
'volving the services of Mr.
Ulasewicz.
In the spring of 1971, 1-
began to notice that, for
,some reason, the amount of
investigation work handled
by Mr. Ulasewicz through me
had diminished. Much of the
talk around the White House
was beginning to center more
and more on the 1972 Presi-
dential election and I began
to examine ways in my mind
in which I might become in,
volved. Since I had performed
security duties in the 1965
election campaign, and real-
ized some of the security de-
mands of a Presidential cam-
paign, I wished to become in-
volved in the security area
of the campaign.
Toward the end, I com-
posed a memorandum sug-
gesting that an outside se-
curity capability be formed
to handle the demands of the
1972 campaign. Such an or-
ganization would have a
capability to perform various
secuirty functions to ensure.
the' security of the traveling
staff, the Committee to Re-'
elect the President headquar-
ters, the convention site and'
would employ various guards
and security people. In short,,
1 was suggesting the forma
tion of a capability to cover
all the security needs of a
Presidential campaign. The
name I gave to this suggested ,
operation was "sandwedge."
Proposal Turned Down
Ifurther suggested that I
,leave the White staff and set.
up its security entity, if it
'were approved, and suggested
a budget of approximately
,$300,000 to $400,000. I gave
'the memorandum to Mr. Dean
and got the strong impression
from him that it went to
higher levels, but I have no,
knowledge of who saw it.
I was disappointed [when]
my memorandum [was] re-
fused. I next spoke with Mr.
Dean concerning abtaining a
position as a personal aide
to John Mitchell when he be-
came campaign director. Mr.
Dean agreed to ask Mr.
Mitchell if such a position
was available. He did so and,
on Nov. 24, 1971, he accom-
panied me to an interview at
Mr. Mitchell's office.
I explained to Mr. Mitchell
that what I wanted was a
position similar to that oc-
cupied by 'Dwight Chapin in
relation to the President and
that, in a ddition to handling
the kinds of activities that .
Chapin handled-for the Presi-
dent, I could be of value to
Mr. Mitchell as a bodyguard.
Mr. Mitchell listened to what
It had to say but was non-'
committal as to walit status
.1 would occupy with him. He
said, however, that we would
"get that all straightened out
when I arrived at the re-
election committee."
He was unsure as to when
he would join the re-election
committee but that it would
,be sometime in January or
February of 1972. I left his
office and walked back to the
Whiete House by myself. Mr.
Dean remained and as I was
walking through Mr. Mit-
chell's outer office I.noted
Mr. Gordon Liddy sitting with
Mr. Dean, evidently waiting
to see Mr. Mitchell.
Ultimately, ra the first of
March, 1972, 1 went to the
re-election committee to com-
mence my duties there. It
soon became clear to me
that Mr. Mitchell regarded
me only as a bcdyguard
which was not what I had
had in mind at all. During
March I took two trips with
Mr. Mitchell outside of
Washington, one brief one to
New York City and the other
to Key Biscayne, Fla. Since
Mr. Mitchell regarded me as
his personnel bodyguard I
carried a revolver in my
briefcase.
Mr. Fred LaRue had joined
us in Florida after our ar-
rival, and upon my departure
he asked that I leave my
revolver in his possession
,since Mrs. Mitchell would
"feel better" if there were a
revolver on the premises. I
gave my revolver to him.
On April 28 I started work-
ing for the Treasury Depart-
ment and then became a
staff assistant to the Assist-
ant Secretary of Treasury for
Enforcement and on July 1,,
1972, I became acting as-
sistant director for enforce-
ment Bureau of Alcohol, To-
bacco and Fire Arms.
Anonymous. Letter
In July of 1972, after [Mc-
Cord's] arrest, I had Mr.
Ulasewicz call his home and
tell him to-go to a designated
public telephone booth near
his house where I would be
calling him. I called him at
that public telephone and
simply asked him if there was
anything I could do for him
-or his family at- this time of
personal difficulty.
I did not see 'or hear from
Mr. McCord again until I re-
ceived an anonymous letter
at my home in December of
1972. It was typewritten, a
note of approximately two
paragraphs in length and,,to
the best of my knowledge
said, "Dear Jack-I am sorry
to have to tell you this but
the white House is bent on
having 'the C.I.A. take the
.blame for the Watergate. If
they continue to pursue this
course, every tree in the
forest will fall and it will be
a scorched earth. Jack, even
you will be hurt in the fall- '
out."
In early January of 1973,-
I was attending a drug con-
ference in San 'Clemente,
Calif., when I received a tele-
phone call in my I}otel, room
from John Dean. He asked
tha tI go outside the hotel
and call him back from a.
public telephone, which I
did. He told me that he had
.a very, important message
which he wanted me to
deliver to James McCord,
that Mr. McCord was ex-
pecting to hear from me- and
McCord would understand
what the message referred,
to. He said the message con-
- sisted of three things:
1. "A year is a long time";
2. "Your wife and family
will bo taken care of";
3. "You will be rehabili-
tated with employment when
this is all over."
I immediately relaized that
I was being asked to do a
very dangerous thing and I
said to Mr. Dean that I did
not think it was wise-to send
me on such mission since Mr.
McCord knew, as many
others did, that I had worked
closely with Mr. Dean and
Mr. Ehrlichman at the White
House and therefore it might
be quickly guessed that any
messages I was conveying
were probably from one of
the two.
The reason I raised this
question with him was be-
cause, frankly I did not wish
to convey the message. Mr.
Dean asked if I could think
of any other way to do it and
I suggested that i
could get Mr. Ulasewicz to 26 which his freedom could be
convey the message over the.
telephone anonymously, stat-
ing the message came from
me. Mr. Dean felt this would
'be all right, so I hung up the
telephone and called Mr.
Ulasewicz in New York.
He did not wish to convey
the message at first hut I
convinced him to do it. merely
as a matter of friendship to
me. Mr. Ulasewicz called Mr.
McCord's hame and, presum-
ably, delivered the same mes-
sage which Mr. Dean had
given to me. He then called
me basic, in California, and
reported that he had deliver-
ed the message and Mr.
McCord's attitude had been
one of satisfaction. '
Meeting at Parkway
I called Mr. Dean and told
him that the message had
been delivered by Mr. Ulase-
wicz and that Mr. McCord
had seemed satisfied.
The next day 'I received
another telephone call front
Mr. Dean at my hotel `in
which he said that Mr.
McCord wanted to see me as
soon as I got back. I obect-
ed to seeing Mr. McCord,' but'
finally Mr. Dean got my con-
currence to do so. I was not
instructed to say anything
more than what had been in
the message to him,
Mr. Ulasewicz had con-
veyed instructions to Mr.
McCord for holding our
meeting on Friday night, Jan.
12. At approximal;cly 7 P.M.
that evening I met with Mr.
McCord at the second over-
look on the George Washing-
ton Parkwa
'
y.
I said, "I guess you re-
ceived the message then?"
Mr. McCord then said words
to the effect, "Jack, I am dif-
ferent from all 'the others.
Anybody who knew me at
the C.I.A. knows that I al-
ways follow my own in-
dependent course. I have
always , followed tile, rule
that if one goes (I took this
to mean going to jail) all
who, are involved must go,
People who I am sure are in-
volved are sitting, outside
with their families. I saw a
picture in the newspaper of
some g who I ant sure was
involveduysitting with his fam-
ily., I can take care of 'my
family. I don't need my Joes,
I want my freedom."
I stated that I was only
delivering a message and had
nothing to do with its formu-
lation or had no control over
what was being done.
I did say that the "people"
who had asked me to convey
,the message had always been
honorable toward me and
"sncere offer."
He asked me who I was
speaking with at the White
House and I said I could
not reveal any names but
that they were from the
"highest level of the White
House."
He continually said that all
he was interested in was his
freedom and that he was not
pleased that others who he
felt had been involved were
not suffering the conse-
quences that he was. in the
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obtained and asked me if I
could convey his plan to the
collie at the White House
with whom I was talking.
His plan, simply, was as
follows: On two occasions,'
one in September, 1972, and
the other in October, 1972,
Mr. McCord told.me that he
had called telephone num-
bers at foreign embassies in
Washington and he stated he,
was sure these embassies
were subjects of national se-
curity wiretaps. On both oc-
casions he had stated' that
he was a man involved in
the Watergate scandal and,
without giving his name, had
inquired as to the possiibility
of acquiring visas and other
traveling papers necessary to
travel to these.foreign coun-t:
tries.
Report Made to Dean
It was Mr. McCord's the
ory that if the Government
searched its wiretap records
it would find records of these
two calls. Meanwhile, Mr.
McCord and his attorneys,
would make a motion in
court, aimed at dismissing
the case against Mr. McCord .
'because of the use of wire-
tap evidence by the prosecu-
tion.
At no time in our first'
meeting (to I recall saying
anything about the President
but I specifically renewed the
offer of executive clemency,
as indicated above and re-
ferred to it as coming from
He said words to the ef-
fect, "No, don't do that. Say
that it comes from way up
at the top."
At the meeting with Mr.
Dean he also impressed upon
me that this?was a very grave
situation which might some-
day threaten the President, .
that it had the potential of
becoming a national scandal.
and that many people in the
White House were quite con-
cerned over it. Mr. Dean said
that none of the other then
defendants in the Watergate
burglary "were any problem,"
.and that Mr. McCord "was
not cooperating with his, at-
torney."
At no time, either before
or after this meeting with Mr.
Dean, did I ever speak to any
other White House officials
about this offer of executive
clemency. I specifically never
spoke to the President of the
United States and have no
knowledge of my own as to
whether he personally had
endorsed this offer or, indeed,
whether anyone had ever dis-
cussed it with him.
Second Talk Set Up '
Since I had worked exten-
sively for Mr. Dean and Mr.
Ehrlichman and had formed
an impression that Mr. Dean
rarely made decisions on
matters of consequence with-
out speaking to Mr. Ehrich-
man, my guess was that
when Mr. Dean referred to
"high White House officials"?
h
t l
t
t M
eas
e a
mean
r.
"tile highest levels of the
White House." At some point Ehrlichman. I know that he
in the conversation Mr. Mc- was in conversation with
someone about my contacts
Cord said to me, 'Jack, I with Mr. McCord since, when
'didn't ask to see you." This I was in his office on Jan,
understanding me since since from my Mr. Deanclear. 13, he received a telephone
nder call and I heard him say,
that McCord had specif- '"I'm receiving a report o
ically asked to see me. g
In any event, I called Mr. on that the right other now" he party
Dean on Friday night, Jan.,
I . then called
?12, and reported that Mr: At any rate, ate, end.
McCord did not seem inter-. Mr. McCord and arranged a
ested in, accepting the offer meeting -with him, again at
made in Mr. Dean's original the second overlook of the
message to him, that Mr. George Washington Parkway
McCord wanted his imme- early in' the afternoon on
diate freedom and that he, Sunday, Jan. 14. On this oc-
Mr. McCord, felt that he-had casion we both got out of
:a way to obtain that free- our cars and walked down
a path from the overlook
dom, toward the Potomac River.
The following clay I sa\v This meeting lasted only 10
:Mr. Dean in his office in the to 15 minutes. I did most of
,White House and explained the talking. I told Mr. Mc-
to him Mr. McCord's sugges- Cord that the White House
tion for obtaining his free- was checking into, the wire-
doni, as Mr, McCord had de- tapping situation and that I
scribed it to nie. Mr. Dean had been asked to impress
said, "Well, I'll check on upon him once again that the
that." He then turned the offer of executive clemency
conversation back to the of- was a sincere and believable;
:for of executive clemency. To offer coming from the very.
'the best of my knowledge highest levels of the White.
he said, "Jack, I want you to Hose
'Was refusing to cooperate.
At no time on this occa-
sion or on any other occasion
do I recall telling Mr. McCord
to keep silent if called before
the grand, jury or any Con-
gressional committees.
Calls McCord Adamant
Later on Sunday I tole-?
phoned Mr. Dean to report on
my?meeting with Mr. McCord.
I told him that in. my opinion,
McCord had absolutely no
'interest in the offer of ex-
ecutive clemency. I told Mr.
Dean that Mr. McCord was
still adamant in his belief
that the White House had the
power to have the charge's
against him dismissed if it
would merely pursue the
wiretaps which he ' had
mentioned.
Mr. Dean said that I should
tell him that there wash t.
much likelihood that any-
''thing would he done about
the wiretap situation and, in
response to my comments
about McCord's refusal to
consider executive clemency,
he said something like, "Well,
what the hdll.does he,know,
On Tuesday, Jan. 16, I
again called [McCorrll in at-
tempt to meet with hin], and
'he again was highly irritat;vl
about the White I loos, '.:
failure to (to something, about
the wiretap situation and.
,again mentioned Mr: Ma-
gruder. I said I would
ay1 lnoga aaglml wlnbut
something for him "in It
week or so."
wiretaps and I might have
Subsequently I called,him
and arranged to meet with
him akain, the exact date of
this meeting being unsure in
my mind. We again met at
the overlook on the George
Washington Parkway. He got
into my car and we drove out:
the parkway, pursuing a
course in the general direc-
tion of Warrenton, Va.
I gave 'him my private tele-
phone number at the Treas-
ury Department and told him
that if he or his wife ever
wanted me to do anything
for them, they should feel
free to call. I told McCord
that if he or his wife should
decide to call nie, to simply
use the name "Watson" and
I would know who it was.
Frankly, this was merely a
WASHINGTON POST
24 May 1973
Tass Summarizes
Nixon Statement
that we are checking on these ?imong the reasons why Ibe, Y
MOSCOW, May 23 (AP)
wiretaps but this time im- lieved that such a commit- Tass published a brief
press upon him as fully as ment would he kept were
you can that this offer of that the White House offi- summary today of Piesi?
executive clemency is a sin- cials with whom ' I was in 'dent Nixon's Watergate
cere offer which conies from. contact were extremely con- statement and focused on
the very highest levels of the corned about the Watergate
White House." burglary developing into a Mr; Nixon's claims that he
I said, "I have not used major scandal affecting the had nothing to do with the
anybody's name with him, do President and therefore such affair.
you want we to?" a promise would not be given The Watergate scandal
He said, "No, I don't want lightly. I told him that the has been virtually ignored
you to do that but tell him White House officials with
that this message conics, from whom I was talking were in the Soviet press, ap-
the very highest levels." complaining because they did parently in an effort to
device to save me from any
possible embarrassment.
I do not have a specific
recollection as to how it:
arose, but I believe he asked
me if lie was still the only
one of the Watergate de-
fendants that the White
House was concerned about. .
I said that I thought lie was,
but that I had no knowledge
'of what relationship existed
between the White House
and the other Watergate de-
fendants. lie said the Cuban
defendants were quite nerv-
ous and in his opinion might
make a. statement at, any
time and that I "could pass
that along for whatever It
was worth."
I again asked if there was
anything I could do for hint.
He said one thing that I
could do was to see whether
bail money could be raised
for him pending an appeal in
his case. I said I would check
into this.
Toward the end of our con-
versation, realizing that he
definitely was going to make
a statement on the Water-
gate burglary at a time of
his choosing and that such a
statement would in all prob-
ability involve allegations
against people In the White ,
House and other high Admin-
istration officials, I gave him'
what I considered to be a
small piece of friendly advice.
I said, words to the effect
'that, "Jim, I have worked
with thecs people and I know'
them to be as tough-minded
as you and 1, When you make
your stactmen don't under-,
estimate them. If I were in
your shoes, 1 would probably
be doing the same thing."
I later called Mr. Dean and
advised him of Dr. McCord's
request for bail funding and
he said words to the effect
A hat, "Maybe we. can handle
that through Alch." ,
Sometime later, Mr. Dean
cited me and asked nie to tell
McCord that the bail money
presented too many problems
and that maybe consideration
could be given to paying pre,
miums. I later called McCord
and reported this. His reac-
tion was, "I am negotiating
with a new attorney and
maybe he can get it handled."
This is the last convers,i-
tlnn i have laud to Unto with
.lunurrt Mt'('urtl,
avoid embarrasing Mr.
Nixon at a time when he
is to meet next month
with party leader Leonid
I. Brezhnev.
The government news
agency quoted Mr. Nixon
as saying the Watergate
disclosures "came as a
complete surprise to me.
I had no inkling that 'any
such illegal activities had
been planned by persons
associated with my cam-
paign. It I had known. I
would not have permitted
I tell said, "Do
him it you co want me
to tell 7 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100170001-8
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