WIDESPREAD FEDERAL JOB CHANGES SET

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 81
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 1, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 10, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

25X1A
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CONFIDENTIAL
NEWS, VIEWS
and ISSUES
INTERNAL USE ONLY
This publication contains clippings from the
domestic and foreign press for YOUR
BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use
of selected items would rarely be advisable.
NO. 23
4 DECEMBER 1972
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CONFIDENTDAL
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WASHINGTON POST
10 November 1972
?
era!
Cha
es
By Spencer Rich
Washington Post Staff Writer
KEY BISCAYNE, Fla., Nov. 9?President Nixort.'s
plans for reorganization of the government during his
'second term may reach far beyond the top Cabinet and
White House level and affect thousands of jobs deep in
the federal bureaucracy, White House aides indicated
here today. ?
"It's very extensive, there's
no question about it," White
House press secretary Ronald Before leaving Washington,
L. Ziegler told reporters. Mr. Nixon summoned Cabinet
Ziegler also said that the officials, White House staffers
President's plans on the and other top officials to
meetings at which he remind-,
ed them their traditional res-
ignations were in order.
White House assistant H. It.
(Bob) Haldeman is said to
have reminded officials at the
Meetings that they serve "at
the pleasure of the President,"
and asked them to keep their
resignations short?not flow-
put the number of potential
forced resignations at well
over 2.000.
"whiile matter of restructur-
ing and reorganization during
the second term" will be
"quite far along by mid-De-
cember ... he will be well
along with this before the
Congress convenes."
Ziegler said that wherever
legally possible, organizational
changes will be made under
the President's own powers, ery.
without asking the assent of Mr. Nixon is said to have
Congress. thanked the officials for their
Ziegler initially announced efforts in his administration
on Wednesday that top presi- and his re-election cam-
dential appointees had been paign. He asked at least one
group for their descriptions of
the job each was doing, to-
gether with recommendations
as to how the job might 'evolve
or a description of another
post the staffer. Might want.
Leading officials have al-
ready begun requesting subor-
jobs, the changes wouldn't ex-
asked to submit pro-forma res-
ignations to give Mr. Nixon
reorganizational freedom. The
announcement had left the im-
pression that, while the Presi-
dent might be planning a
major shakeup of some Cabi-
net offices and sub-Cabinet
tend much beyond that.
However, ? Ziegler empha-
sized today that resignations
had been requested not only
of Cabinet , members and
White House staff, as well as
'sub-Cabinet-level presidential
appointees like under secretar-
ies, assistant secretaries and
some bureau chiefs, but also
"all Schedule C (personnel),
those who receive an appoint-
ment by a department head or
a Cabinet member."
There are some 1,400 to
1,800 persons In Schedule C
lobs?non-career political, pol-
icy-making and , Confidential
appointees distributed among
the departments. ,
Usually they are replaced
climates to prepare the resigna-
tion letters.
One such meeting was held'
at the State Department on:
Wednesday, where Secretary .
William P. Rogers asked that
all his top aides hand in the
fro-forma resignation docu-
ments.
Further, State Department
spokesman Charles Bray said
today in Washington that Rog-
ers had asked senior officials
for ideas on how to promote
promising younger officers to
positions of responsibility.
????, As to Rogers' own plans,
that is a matter between the
Secretary and Mr. Nixon, Bray
Said.
% Similar requests for twig.'
only when 'the Cabinet mem- /fattens were passed on by
her whn appointed t h e m other Cabinet officers to pout-
leaves or when a new Presi- teal ? appointees within ? their
dent takes office. These 1,400 ' departments.
to 1,800, coupled with direct ??:, Ziegler emphasized today
presidential appointees and , ill, at absolutely no decisions 1
White House aides who have i had yet been made on what,
been asked to leave,Apitific;evernerg afenalea W.91114 h, ,
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horganized or 'which of the
Viousands of resignation let-
ters would actually be ae-
eepted by the President .
"It goes beyond individuals.
It's a change of form," he told
teporters. "No decisions have
been made."
However, he said Mr. Nixon
fiad been meeting with top
sides on the reorganization
problem and will be meeting
again late today with two of
his top White House assist-
into, Haldeman and John Ehr-
Iichman. "He intends to go
through a very intensive as-
sessment leading to reorgani-
ation and restructuring dur-
ing the second term," said Zie-
gler.
Ziegler said that after the
President returns to Washing.
ton from his home here, he
will be holding a series of
meetings with Cabinet mem-
bers into December to get
their thinking, and then will
start formulating his deci-
sions.
"He has asked department
heads, Cabinet heads, mem-
bers of the White House staff
to provide him with their
thoughts." The objective, said
Ziegler, is more efficient gov-
ernment.
Ziegler said many of the
changes will be of a nature.
that can be put into effeet by,
the President himself, without;
requiring submission to Con-
gress, while others might re-
quire congressional assent. He
said the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget is preparing
a study to show the areas
where the President can act
by himself. "Where the Presi-
dent can within the frame-
work of existing leislation
make changes by executive ac-
tion, I assume he probably
will," Ziegler said.
He noted that Mr. Nixon
had already sent some reorg-
anization requests to Congress
two years ago. None passed.
These called for reorganiza-
tion of the Interior, Com-
merce, Labor, Housing?
Health, Education and Wel-
fare, Agriculture and Trans...
portation departments?seven
agencies in all.:?into five new,
agencies: . Agriculture, Na-
tural Resources, Community,
nity Development, ? Human Re!:
sources, Economic Affairs.
Many of the changes recom-.
mended by Mr. Nixon under
that plan were first proposed,'
two decades ago by a govern-
ment reorganization commis-
sion headed by former Presi-
dent Herbert Hoover.
On other matters, Ziegler
denied "ns a matter of absolute
fact" that General Motors
Chief Edward Cole had 'peen
offered the job of Secretary of
Defense The present Secretary
of Defense, Melvin R. Laird,
and Secretary of Housing
George Romney, are two Cabi-
net members who had long
been expected to ask that
their resignations be accepted
once Mr. Nixon was re-elected.;
The President conferred.
:
with Sen. Henry M. Jacksoni
(D-Wash.), leading to specula-
tion that it was abbut Jack-
son's becoming Defense Sec-
retary. Mr. Nixon offered Sen.
Jackson the job in 1968 and
the senator turned it down.
Jackson had left for Europe
and could not be reached for
comment.; .
' Ziegler also said there IS
"no foundation" to reports,
that former Attorney General;
John N. Mitchell had advised,
Mr. Nixon to fire the presenti
Attorney General, Richard;
Kleindienst. "As far as 1 know;
he has not talked to or con-1
: I
suited John Mitchell on thisi
, ? i
Ziegler also released a sum-i
mary of the April 1972 report'
of the Board of Visitors to thel
U.S. Military . Academy, con-
eluding, "The Academy is car-
rying out its mission in a supe-:'
nor' manner." The report re,
'commended more tenure Postt1
for Academy instructors,
adOed pay for permanent pro4
fessors, and a modern hospitall
for the Academy-.
subject," said Ziegler.
?
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WASHINGTON POST
11 November 1972
!Nixon Assessing Fi reign Policy Agencies
By Spencer Rich
Washington Post Staff Writer
KEY BISCAYNE, Fla., Nov..
10?President Nixon has begun
a major reassessment of the
functions of all U.S. foreign *
policy agencies, the White .
House announced here today. .
Deputy press secretary. Ger-'
Aid L. Warren told reporters,
, that the key question is the
interrelationship between the
State Department, which deals
with foreign policy only, and
other agencies such as the
Treasury and Commerce de-
? partments that deal primarily.
with other matters t ut also
.have considerable, influence.
over foreign policy questions. ;
, Warren said, "It's a review .
of the basic organization and i
relations ... it involves organ- ,
ization. budget, personnel?all
along the line."
Warren said Henry A. Kis-
singer. the President's assistan'
for national security, affairs,,
ha& met with White House,
:aides H. R. Haldeman and John'
? Ehrlichman "into the night":
Thursday on "the foreign pol-
icy structure." Neither Secre-
tary of State William P. Rogers',
nor any other State Depart-
ment representative was pre-
Sent.,
Kissinger, Haldeman and
Ehrlichman were part of the .
presidential party that flew .
here Wednesday for a stay of
several days at the President's.
Key Biscayne retreat.
The foreign policy review is
part of a broader reassessment
of the functions of all federal
agencies that Mr. Nixon has or-
dered to start off his second
term. "The basic thing we're
talking about is how to make
WASHINGTON POST
12 November 1972
government operate better," i
said Warren,
In order to give himself al
free hand to realign functions
and get rid of personnel un-
responsive to his policies, the
President has demanded that
?
all persons holding direct pres-
idential appointments to fed-
eral jobs, and all persons ap-
pointed to Schedule C jobs by
Cabinet and agency heads sub-
mit pro-forma resignations. -
: Warren emphasized again
that no -decisions ? had been
? -
The problem of foreign pol-
icy coordination in recent
years has been a substantial
one. Although the State De-
partment traditionally is the
arbiter of overseas and diplo-
matic policy, other agencies,
have enormous influence over
foreign policy and the White
House has increasingly taken
a direct role in foreign policy
through such powerful aides
as Kissinger, who has been the
President's chief negotiator on
Vietnam affairs.
Decisions made by the
Treasury Department on inter-1
national currency matters, by
the Commerce Department on I
trade matters, by the Arms
Control and Disarmament
Agency, the Agency for Inter-
national Development, the De-
fense Department and the Ex-
port-Import Bank may have as
much or more impact on the
U.S. image and real position
in the world as anything the
State Department does at a
given time. The ealignment
of Western currencies forced
by the United States on Treas-
? ury recommendation after the
August 1971 economic crisis,
for example, was a foreign,
policy act of the most critical
nature.
The objective of the foreign
policy reassessment, Warren
indicated, is to obtain better
coordination and execution of
broad foreign policy questions.
Warren said Mr. Nixon had
met with Haldeman this morn-
ing to discuss various matters
and had talked on the phone
with Kissinger. He said Gen.
Alexander Haig, Kissinger's
deputy who has just arrived in
Saigon, is 'expected ' be& In
'Washington "sometime this
iweekend." He refused to dis-
made yet on which of the res-
ignations would actually be ac-
cepted, or what plans for re-
organization would actually be
adopted. White House, press
secretary Ronald L. Ziegler
said Thursday' that the Presi-
dent's thinking on these mat-
ters would be "quite far along"
by mid-December.
Warren said that he couldn't
quarrel very much with news-
paper estimates that the total
of persons required to submit
Pro-forma letters of resigna-.
ton was about 2,000, although
he said this might be a?bit
high. It is estimated that at
least 1,400 to 1,800 persons',
hold Schedule C jobs alone,
Warren said letters of resig-
nation aren't being requested
of 'regulatory agency ,Appoint,
esawith fixed tenni-es, but he
believed they are being sought
from "Foreign Service officers
at home -and abroad if an-
pointed by the President" and
all U.S. attorneys.
Warren said the President
"will operate within the con-
fines of existing legislation"
and "intends to make use of
all the machinery available to
the federal government to
:make it more efficient."
Cols n lasts
atergate
By Peter
Washington Post
KENNEBUNKPORT, Maine,
Nov. 11 ? Charles W. Colson,
special counsel to President
Nixon, tonight denounced the
reporting of the Watergate
case by The Washington Post
as "unconscionable," and said
that its impact was to "erode
somewhat public confidence
In the institutions of govern-
ment,"
In a speech to the SocietY of
New England editors meeting
here, Colson said, "The charge
of subverting the whole politi-
cal process, that is a fantasy, a
work of fiction rivaling only
ost
orts
Osnos
Sts f t Wril
'Gone With the Wind' in cir
culation and 'Portnoy's Corn
plaint' for indecency."
? Colson, one of the Presi-
dealt with The Washington
"Speaks to the press. He said
that his remarks tonight were
the first he had ever delivered
to a group of newspaper edi-
The bulk of the remarks
dealt Wittli The
Post, and Colson singled out
Executive Editor Benjamin C.
Bradlee for special criticism.
He said that "Mr. Bradlee now
sees himself as the self-ap-
pointed leader of what Bos-
2
ton's own Teddy White [Theo-
dore White, author of "The
Making of the President"
hooks] describes as the tiny
fringe of arrogant elitists who
infect the healthy mainstream
of American journalism with
their own peculiar view of the
world."
Colson, as other leading Re-
publican did before the elec-,
tion, linked The Washington
Post's reporting of the we-
were its "liberal" ties to
George McGovern.
He said; "The Post, I be-
Veattittft heffteis (51 moo@
McGovern did that he was in.
deep political trouble with re-
spect to the real issues of the
'72 election. . . .
"So The Post, on its own
1
cuss the contents of a litteri
which news stories had said
Haig was carrying to South Yl
etnamese President Nguyen:
Van Thieu and said he had'
"no information" on whether
Kissinger will be leaving
shortly for Paris or Hanoi. ,
Returning to the reorganiza,e
thin theme, Warren said sto.
ries that the President's reaS-,
sessment of government func-1
tions is designed "to arrogate
more power to the President"'
aren't correct. "That's not the,
case at all," said Warren. "The'
reason for this reassessment la
to make government work bet-
ter."
Report on Academy
On . another matter, the
White House released a sum-
mary of the April 1972 report
of the Board of Visitors to the
U.S. Air Force Academy. ,?A
similar summary on the U.S.
Military Academy had been
released a day earlier. The Air
Force report called the cadet
honor code "a viable working ,
part of cadet life," but called
for care "to insure that the in-
dividual rights of cadets un-
dergoing investigation under
the honor code be scrupu-
lously protected." Higher pay,'
for permanent professors, and
improved runway and storage
areas were also recommended.,
The report also recom-
mended that if the constitu
tional amendment requiring
equal rights for women is ap-;
proved by the necessary '38
states, "the Air Force be pre-
pared to comply. . . and that
planning for the admission of
women be based on the prem.,
Ise that existing admission,
and graduation standards be
maintained."
initiative, began a daily-Page 1
attack on the administration."
He said that if McGovern
wished to raise the Water-
gate case, "then it was fair,
enough for him to talk about
t. What I do think is uncon-
scionable is the way in which
some elements of the media:
. . . reprinted and eventually
reported as fact that which
Indeed was not fact."
He said the "tragedy of The
Post's handling of the Water;
gate affair is that the net int'
pact was probably to erode-
adtrieWittit Militia Confidence in
.the inatitutions Of eflaslettlelito
and it also eroded as well the
:confidence of a lot of fair.'
'minded persons in the ()Wee;
,tive reporting of The Wash..,
ington Post."
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NEW YORK TIMES
16 November 1972
2A.
on a
By Anthony Lake
and Leslie H. Gelb
? WASHINGTON ? The hoped-for
Vietnam settlement, if it materializes,
would be a triumph of personal
diplomacy. It could only have been
accomplished by Henry Kissinger ,
working with the President alone. But,
will the President draw the wrong
lessons from this experience, as Well,
as from his Moscow and Peking "tri?
umphs," about how to make policy?
Whether or not these breakthroughs
could have been achieved in a dif-
ferent manner, the question for the
future is how they can be transformed
into the stuff of everyday poliey. This
Will require the inclusion of the for-,
eign affairs bureaucracy in the Presi-
dent's plans.
Who really knows what President
Nixon and Mr. Kissinger are up to? :
For three years, scholars, journalists,:
legislators ? and even the President's
own national security bureaucracy?
have debated? the meaning of the
Nixon Doctrine. Is it simply a guise ?
to continue the same old world-police-
man policies, a kind of cut-rate cold
war? Is it a genuine effort to redefine'
our world interests and refrain from
military involvement in the Third*,
World? Is it an attempt to construct'
a "new alliance system" based on five
major powers? If so, does it make'
any sense to expect Japan and West-
ern Europe to play the same kind of
political-military role in the world as
the United States, Russia and China?
'Who is privy to the Nixon-Kissinger
, game plan? Who can carry on and,
avoid "the petrification of the inter-
national system"?
Certainly not the State Department.
When the Russians seemed to threaten
making the Cuban port of Cienfuegos
a, base for nuclear missile-firing subs,
it was ? Kissinger who reportedly
worked out secret arrangements with
Soviet diplomats. When the SALT
WASHINGTON POST
12 November 1972
And t
hi e
ta-
By Murrey Marder
Washington Post Staff Writer
The following column ap-
peared in Saturday editions.
of The Washington Post with
several paragraphs trans-
posed or omitted. The com-
plete, corrected story follows:
"Some friction" is bound
to exist between the White
House national security ad- ,
viser and the State Depart.
Mont, President Nixon ff.
nally has said with refresh- ;
ing candor.
A degree of friction and
"competition," the President
(VI
e" the Stat' Department
talks sputtered, the President and Mr.
Kissinger stepped in to bargain di-
rectly with the Russians. The. China
gambit has been. entirely their show,
like the Vietnam negotiations. And so;
:it goes down the line with every;
major 'foreign policy issue.
? These moves may be counted as
personal successes. But what about
the professional? in the State Depart-
' ment who have to deal with these'
issues on a day-to-day basis and who'
will be around long after the '"mas-
ters" have gone? They have been left.
? out in the cold. If they are not given,
.to understand the underpinnings of:
,the Nixon-Kissinger diplomacy andaf,
they are not brought to accept its
'wisdom, they will purposefully or in-,
?advertently undermine that diplomacy,
'in the future.
? Neither is the Defense Department:
in a position to carry on. While the:
'President and Mr. Kissinger easily,
,have grasped the mantle of diplomacy
from State, they have not begun to
;exercise control over Defense. The
,time requirements for personal di-
. plomacy have 'left no time to watchl
',over Secretary Laird's department.
Military officers in Vietnam can'
: carry out sustained bombing 'raids,
over North Vietnam without apparent
;authority to do so. And believing that,
:massive spending on new weapons
systems is necessary to his foreign
policies, the President has failed to:
exercise close control over the Defense'
budget. What we' therefore appear to ?
have is the confusing prospect of a
peacetime foreign policy and a War-
'time defense budget.
' Nor is the Congress able or willing
to provide institutionalized support
.for the Nixon-Kissinger policies. The'
Congress remains a multiheaded body
with such diverse views and levers of
power that it cannot be expected to
lead. So far, the Congress has been'
awed and cowed by the foreign policy
successes of the Nixon Administration.
But underneath, many Congressmen
onse
are mistrustful. Key Congressional
committees have sought in vain to
establish regular contact with Mr.
Kissinger to find out what he is doing.',
Secretaries Laird and Rogers will not
do. Without a routine basis of consul.'
tation with the "master," irritated
Congressional leaders are bound to:
lay in wait for a foreign policy failure
on which to pounce.
It is that time of year when in the
headiness of landslide victory at the
polls, the President will let little things,',
like avoiding the "petrification" of%
the system fall through the cracks.
More than a reshuffling of Presidential,
appointees is needed. If the President.
and Mr. Kissinger believe that much,
of what they have done is worth pre-
serving, they should start institutionall;
izing their policies now. These months;
present an important opportunity to
reveal and reinforce their vision. '
At the least, key assistant secre-
taries and desk officers at the State
Department should be briefed by the.
White House on what has been with-
held from them, given a chance to
discuss the issues, and?most impor-;
tantly?drawn into implementation 0f.
the President's policies:
The President and Mr. Kissinger
should also question the assumption
that higher defense spending is neces-?
sary to a "generation of peace." In,
fact, it will undercut it. Big power
distrust thrives on spiraling defense,
'spending, as well as vice versa. While,
:the President and his adviser devote'
their time to personal diplomacy, in
creased military spending will rein-3
)force superpower suspicions and con',
fuse the American bureaucracy and'
public about their leaders' goals. '
-"Leslie IL Gelb Was director of policy.,
:planning and arms,control in the De-,
fense Department, and is now a senior
fellow at, the Brookings Institution.. ,..
.Anthony Lake worked on the staff of
.,Henry A. Kissinger.
fare in June 1970.
At the start of the Nixon
administration there was an
outside chance that the for-
eign policy-making offices
might function construc-
tively with dynamic Henry
IL A. Kissinger at the White
House and genial Bill Rog-
ers at State, if State had a
strong man to run the de-
partment with Rogers serv-
ing, as the role has been de-
scribed, as the President's
trusted chief lawyer in for-
eign affairs.
Kissinger and Richardson,;
who comes out of the Boa-,
ton brahmin strain of intel-
lectualism, respected each.
other, worked together well.
State was hopeful of devel-
oping an institutional input
in shaping policy, with no
question, of course, about
who was\ on top. The Na-
tional Oecurity 'Council web
of latithoPitv aor000 the
ernment was controlled, as
went on to say in his recent Health. Educatipn and We6-6 President Nixon intended,
1
Interview, "is not unhealthy,"
because out of constructive
competition more effective
foreign policy can emerge.
Indeed it can.
The reality, however, is
that there has been friction
without competition be-
tween the White House and
State Department for nearly
three years, The State De-
partment virtually has bean.
out of the game since Elliot
L. Richardson left se Statat,
No. 2 man to become Secre-
tary of the Department of ?
in the White House, with
Kissinger holding the
strings.
Rogers was not a nonent-
ity. Indeed, his non-ideologi-,
cal outlook on the world
probably was far more sup-
portive of President Nixon's
turnaround on U.S. policy
toward China, and the gen-
eral abandonment of "con-
frontation" in place of "ne-
gotiation," than ever has
been credited to Rogers.
The vital No. 2 post at
State vacated by Richardson,
was filled by Rogers' nomi-
nee, John N. Irwin II. Rog-
ers wanted a quiet-working
deputy; Irwin has been al-
most unnoticeable in the
post of Under Secretary. ?
Rogers often has scoffed
at the talk of "low morale"
In the State Department,
saying that has been
elairned almost since the de-
partment came into exist-
ence, That hi corred au a
Mooting', tna
point of the present dismay..
Franklin D. Roosevelt often
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24 AV vezber 1972
expressed despair with the
State Department; John F.
Kennedy called it "a bowl of
jelly," and so on.
The Nixon administration
entered office with a double
legacy of suspicion. Presi-
dent 'Nixon was Vice Presi-
dent in the Eisenhower ad-
ministration, in which Rog-
ers was Attorney General.
In 1969 State was still trying
to recover from the gaping
wounds inflicted upon It
during the Eisenhower ad-
ministration from the bu-
reaucratic terrorism of the
McCarthy era.
Still Crucial
. Rogers attempted to allay
the mutual disquiet. He
commissioned a soul-search-
ing study with the depart-
ment on the bureaucratic
couch for self-analysis. It
cencluded, among other
things, that "the role of top
leadership in stimulating
creativity is crucial." That le
still true.
The State Department to-
day has tumbled Into de-
spair. As one official said In
the depths of frustration,:
,"We are something like!
American Express?but
without its prestige."
Part of the slide was prob-
ably inevitable under Presi-
dent Nixon's style of opera-.
tion, In which "so many inie
tiatives . . . had to he tinder-
Olken at the preeldential
level.",
The President's and Rog-
ers' determination to pre-
vent, above all, any State.
news "leaks," has succeeded
admirably; the department
rarely knows anything
worth leaking. Top officials,
for example, were humiliat-
ingly unaware for years of
the secret Kissinger-Le Due
Tho talks which began in
1969; even today most do
not know what is in the
draft Vietnamese peace
plan, except for what, is in
the press.
Kissinger had told many
associates he is very seri-
ously concerned about the
need to repair this damage
in President Nixon's second
term, and to help.
"institutionalize" the future
conduct of foreign policy. It
Is ludicrous, Kissinger hair.
said, to portray him, as:
some crities do, as
"despising" the Foreign
Service, for the majority of
Kissinger's staff is drawn
from it. So everyone, pre- '
sumably, accepts the prob-
lem. All that is still needed ?
is a solution.
Ms Time &69 Look
.0 the CM
By Stephen S. Roserafeliali
MR. HELMS, director of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency, was publicly summoned to
Camp David this week to participate in what
the White House terms its "major" reassess- ,
ment of the American foreign policy struc-
ture. If his summons indicates that the
United States' large secret intelligence es-
tablishment is to undergo the same ExeCti-
tive scrutiny being accorded the agencies ,
which operate more in the public eye, then
. this is welcome and important news.
Before saying more, I should perhapS'
state that I am not one of those journalists
with a close discreet working relationship
with the CIA; for purposes of this article I
. requested an on-the-record interview with
Helms or his chosen representative and; did
not receive one.,
It would seem self-evident, however, that
is the United States moves from an era of
confrontation to an era of negotiation, from ?
? a time when Russia and Communism were
' widely perceived as terribly menacing to a .
? time when' both the country and the Ideol-
ogy are increasingly regarded as adequately
? neighborly, then the role, of the CIA has got
'. to be reviewed. .
? Now, obviously a great nation must have a
professional intelligence service. The imper- .
atives of defense, not .to say elementary prise
dence, demand it. A ease eini even be mado
that a certain kind of technological Weill-
, gence Is more essential in a period of in-
cipient detente?In order to supply policy
: makers and their publics with the assurance ,
they need in order to enter into 'new agree-
ments with old adversaries.
THE SALT-I agreement apparently is uni- ?
que in granting explicitly each side's right
to lob intelligence satellites over the other's ?
territory to count missiles, tests and so on. ?
Presumably satellites would be similarly
useful in verifying and in nourishing public
confidence in any shifts made as a result of
, the forthcoming European force reduction
talks. In all cease-fire situations, Mideast,
Indochina or what-have-you, intelligence,
can be vital.
In at least two areas, however, intelli-
gence needs review: for "dirty tricks" and
? .for its secrecy. ?
The act of 1947 setting up the CIA sped-'
. fled that, in addition to intelligence duties,
It was to perform, "such other functions" as ,
the National Security Council might direct..,
? A "plans division!' was set up in 1951. Most
CIA directors, including Helms, have come :
up through Plans. The group seems to have
.been active, and conspicuously so, through
the 1950s, toppling uncooperative govern-
ments, harassing wayward Communists,'
' etc. The whole atmosphere was permissive:
It was President who ate up the James
Bond books who let the Plans Division or-,
?...?ganize Cuban exiles (and a few Americans):
to Invade at the Bay of Pigs.
4
It is now murmured around town thateh
deputy director for Plans, an old Helm!
' matt, operates on a much tighter leash,:
(doing no mhre, it is said, than the Republee
cans are alleged to have done to the"
Democrats); that the old problems of policy'
:control and separation of intelligence from.
operations are in hand; that the small and
weak countries which once were the CIA'ife
playgrounds are no longer so vulnerable to;
its deeds.
At the same time, one hears that the Pres-,:
ident's old anti-Communist juices have not..
altogether stopped fermenting, and that he,
receives and is responsive to reports time
the Russians Still play some Pretty rottopl
tricks and, by golly, we ought to show thine
,? they can't do that to us and get away with it.,4
WHATEVER THE TRUTH, I would sub-2
mit that the time is ripe for the Congress toe
review the dirty-tricks mandate it gave to':
the CIA a quarter-century ago as the cold I;
war was beginning to dominate the Asneri-1
can outlook on the world. It is Inconsistent,e
at the least, that the State Departmentit
should now be zeroing in on measures tol
combat "international terrorism" while the
CIA retains a capacity to practice certain
forms of it. Cuba's continuing lack of loveJ
for the CIA, restated in its bid for hijacking
talks last week, underscores, the point. ? ? ?ee.
Secrecy is something else. No one who acei
cepts the need for intelligence would argtie.i
" that the whole process and products shouldi
be made public. But no one concerned with
the health of democracy can accept that con-1
dition with equanimity. The general sense o2.1
being at war with communism since World#
War II has produced a far more secretIvel
; government than we would want or tolerate%
in other times. With that sense of 'being at
' war danger fading, the rationale or spur for;.
.1 secrecy diminishes accordingly. There la fur-.1
titer the claim that. the 8(!crety
the CIA may have undermined the larger )
job of conducting a wise policy, I.e., one well
discussed and debated. ? ee
This is the principal basis on which iSente-
tor Cooper earlier this year proposed that4
the relevant act be amended to give the forei
eign relations and defense committees off,-
,both houses access to the information and4
analysis obtained by the CIA?exactly as.theq
Atomic Energy Commission has given such;
secret material for decades to the Jointe
Committee on Atomic Energy. Preclietablye
the President objected. The Foreign Rela-i
tions Committee approved 'the proposed!
amendment; the Armed Services Committeee
otherwise preoccupied, did not act on it.
Cooper is retiring but Senator Symington,,
who has his own sense of the need to assert':
the Congress' foreign policy responsibilities
and his own record of concern for Improvinge
congtessional oversight of the CIA, may be,
prepared to receive the torch! He's No. 2 on
Armed Services, too. ?
A
? The CIA is out of the news these days. Itu
usually gets into the news only when it fouls'i
up. But a lot more about its place in the new;
bureaucratic and international scheme ofe
things ought to be known. Whether the-
CIA's activities are all essential and whethere
they are all organized efficiently are ques-e
tions which a responsible Congress shoulde
not want to leave to a Chief Executive hud-
dling privately out, in . the woods at Camp
David.
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;>
ter a while that it is A good
thing to enter into the life
of the republic."
A National Committee of
Action for Peace and Con-
cord, was created by the
government Nov. 3 to carry
out the government's prepa-
rations for A cease-fire.
Many of the Influential po-
intent figures in Phnom
Penh, including former Pre-
miers Sisowath Sink Matax
and Son Ngne Thanh, have
lent it at least their nominal
support, in a show of Khmer
Lon Nol issued a procla-
? matfett on Nov. 4 in which
he said that "circumstances
are favorable for a union of
hearts and spirits in the re-
public .. Let all Khmers
know that our National
Committee for Peace and
:Concord was born to wel.,!
'come everyone."'
To his critics, who in-
clude many foreign diplo-
matic observers as well as
his 'domestic opponents, this
-is typical of the lofty pro-
nouncements and ineffec.
, tual appeals that character-1
,ize the Lon Nol government;
and does little to cope with,
the reality of -'the Khmer'
'Rouge.
In their opinion, the chief;
obstacle facing the. Khmer ?
. Rouge is its own lack of co-
hesion and failure to' unite,
behind a single leader, not;
anything being done by the
Phnom Peng government.
AR viewed by these ann.
lysts, the Khmer Rolle? 10'
.'nnt A single force but cone
sist,s of Sihanoukists seeking-,
. his return from exile in Pe- .
'king, dedicated Marxist ide-
ologues trained in Hanoi,,
some genuine idealists and
anti-corruption reformers,,'
and just plain bandits.
Nevertheless, many ob.',
servers here believe the goy-
. ernment faces a formidable'
task in putting down the in- ?
surgency and regaining its
; control over the country
Side, even after North Viet-
namese troops leave. For,
one thing, there see large
of OW vottfilo, w@iiv4
ganized and following new
economic models after years
portant fighting force but of Communist occupation.
are only disorganized, noni
Accommodations, if not alli-
ances, have been made be-
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tween the rulers of these
areas and persons in govern-
ment-held areas who find
such arrangements useful..
Rubber and tobacco, for
example,, are being prod-
uced on farms in the Com-
munist-controlled areas and
marketed in cities under
government control.
In addition, the Khmer
Rouge have developed, by
some accounts, an effective
fighting force. that may he
capable of challenging the
Cambodian army on its own.
Reliable troop strength
figures are difficult to ob-
tain, but generally the
Americans estimate the
Cambodian army at 170,000,
a figure regarded by other
Western analysts as too
high. Khmer Rouge armed
strength is put at about 40,-
000. But the government's
figures include support
troops, such as transport.
and supply units, some ana-
lysts point out., while those
for the Khmer Rouge do
not, so the fighting
strengths may be more
nearly equal than the fig-
? ures indicate.
"Some of the biggest oper-
ations of this war have been
mostly Khmer Rouge," one
American said. 'The ques-
tion is whether they could
keep it up without direct
North Vietnamese support." ?
. One thing on which there'
is general agreement here
among government officials,
opposition politicians and
foreign observers is that the
prospects for a return by Si-
hanouk dwindle with each
day the republic remains in
power. But Sihanouk contin-
ues to operate a government
in exile, based in Peking,
and to shop around the
world for support for his
claim to he the legitimate
ruler of Cambodia.
This has forced the
Phnom Penh government to
open a kind of third front,
the diplomatic front, to go
with its political and mili-
tary -efforts.
Representatives of Lon
Nol's government, particu-
larly Foreign Minister Long
Borest, have been making'
intensive efforts to establish
diplomatic relations with.
countries that have no in-
trinsic importance to Cam-
bodia but do have votes in
the United Nations.
Costa Rica and El Salva-
dor recently agreed to set
up relations with the Lon
Nol government, the official
news agency announced last
week, and ? negotiations are
going on with Guatemala.
Gahnn, on the other hand,
recently recognized Siha-
nouk, an event, attribtiled by
no i,t formed ell pi nrri attel
source here to the fact that
"Sihanouk's man got there
first. Lon Nol had a men?on
his way when it was an-
nounced."
JAPAN TIMES
12 November 1972
Sol Sanders
A Sense a., Asi
iTies Between Asians, Americans Not Like13i to Lessen:
14
HONG KONG ? There is an
intimate relation between the
American presidential elections
this year and developments in
Asia ? seemingly, more por-
tentous than in past elections
over almost two decades.
It is not that the choice for
the American voters between
Mr. Nixon and Mr. McGovern
involved a make-or-break deci-
sion. Even were the outcome in
less doubt than seemed ap-
parent, the long-term itnplica-
tions of American policies and
events stretch' out far beyond
the difference between -the two
candidates dismissed in the heat
of a highly partisan debate.
Truth is that Mr. McGovern
would have found, as all opposi-
tion candidates for power in
any society or Political system,
that his alternatives once in the
saddle were a good deal narro-
wer than when viewed by' a dis-
mounted rider. That, in pert at
least, explains much of the in-
creasing conservatism of ? Mr.
,McGovern's statements as the
election deadline neared.
What is crucial for Asia is the
direction, and drift, of Ameri-
can policies which is unlikely to
be more than modulated by the
American President after the
election. And it is on that
theme ? where American pol-
icy in' Asia is headed ? that
the election milestone gives us
occasion to pause and reflect.
Perhaps one should begin
with the obvious: ?The relations
of Asians and the Americans'
are not really likely, to lessen in
the coming decades.
Controversial Position
That may come as an ex-
tremely controversial, position
.against the backdrop of the
Nixon Doctrine and' the almost
universally held thesis, both in
Asia and the U.S., that America
is withdrawing from the Asian
scene.
I say that American-Asian re-
lations will continue to be ex-
tensive and intensive because of
two situations which are vir-
tually apolitical in Origin if not
in result.
,The U.S. economy, still grow-
ing at an enormous clip (in con-
crete terms) despite its prob-
lems of balance of payments
and reordering of priorities, is
likely to continue to be all im-
portant for most Asian pr4luc-
ers. The American maw will, in
fact, chew up even more of the
world's raw Materials and oth-
er produce in the years ahead.
It is hard to see how given
any scenario in the next decade'
or so ? except total economic
paralysis or nuclear holocaust
? this factor will not' be a ma-
jor determinant in the Asian
scene.
More debatable, but I feel
equally important, is the role
the U.S. plays as the avant-
garde of modernization in the
Asian scene.
China may 'continue to, wear
the blue suits of Communist or-
thodoxy for years to come. But
for most of the Asian world,
U.S. fashions ? from clothing
to intellectual: fads .? is likely
to be the pacesetter.
? Whatever else George Mc,
Govern's candidacy was, it.was
profoundly the eXpression,
this mood. His program comes
out of those strains ot
Amen-
can history that produced the
periodic populist explosion, the
know-nothing-ism, the Bryan-
ism, the Isolationists of the
1930s. It is a full blown emel?
tional retreat from dealing with.
the cares of the non-American,
an attempt to return to home-
spin virtues of a less COM-
plicated world. Alas! That.
world no longer exists ? either
for the. Asians or the Ameri-
cans.
Hidden Persuaders
The Americans with their
vast- resources and weight in
world attitudes, for better or
for worse, are "hidden per-
suaders" on the world scene. It
is the U.S. news magazines who
have set the pattern for much ?
of what is printed today. Amer,
jean food processors are ? for
better or worse -- changing the
diets of the world. Jeans are al-
most as popular in Indonesia as
in Tokyo as in Dallas. Ameri-
can TV techniques, book pub-
lishing, physical Mobility, and
even methods of education (the
explosion of institutions of high-
er learning, textbooks, audio-
visual aids) have when not
been the pattern, the antithesis
toward which foreign education-
al and cultural programs have
worked.
The U.S. is swinging into one
of its periods of intended isola-
tionism?in a cycle as old as
the country itself. It is rein-
forced by a profound and naive
disenchantment ? with 25
years of international economic
aid giving which has produced
relatively so little, ? with the
bitter wars in Korea and Viet-
nam ? with criticism which
fluctuates from venomous ha-
tred to boisterous raillery from
"the otitsisle world.'!
U.S. Activities
Underlying all this emotional
withdrawal is the hard fact of'
the U.S. balance of payments.
which I believe is with the
world economy at least 'until'
the end of this decade. It is:
producing the kind of 'con-
straints and restrictions on
American overseas enterprise
and cultural activities that have
inhibited every other country
(save Switzerland) for most of
the post-World War II period.' :
The days of American open-
handedness for foreign cultural
subsidies, however self-serving,
are probably over ? at least
for a while.
'That means that Asia's prob-
lems are no longer the U.S.'_
?
except as solutions are products
of the pursuit ,of exclusively
American goals. Studies of
problems of population control,
agricultural productivity, re-.
medies for pollution and traffic
congestion, may lap over and
help those Asian cultures which\
can absorb them. The U.S. will,
not play a role relative to its
size and power.
It could be said that it wai
ever thus. Certainly, the results
of many of the American in-
tended solutions to Asian prob.
lems were often less than fruit-
ful.
Yet, at least for this observ-
er, it is a sobering thought that.
with the enormous problems
ahead, Asia will be facing them
with at best limited access to
American resources ? what-
ever their shortcomings hate
been in the past.
The licat.no, of thoso
hO-
got tat tons for Cambodia was
underscored last. week when
Senegal challenged the ere.
dent ials of the cm-rent gov-
ernment's U.N. delegation.
The resolution failed, hut its
Very Introduction mon0 res
minder to Cambodia?mitten
Is heavily dependent on
U.N. assistance in several
.fields?that the omena can
still be read either way.
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WASHINGTON STAR
15 November 1972
eds
By TAMMY ARBUCKLE
Star4Vm5 Speclid CmTcspondent
PHNOM PENH, Cambodia?
The war in Cambodia is go-
ing well for the North Viet-
namese, who have succeeded
in completely restoring their
Vietnam war sanctuaries in
eastern Cambodia, informed
military sources say.
The sanctuaries are now at
the same level they were in
1970 when they were invaded
by American and South Viet-
namese forces, the sources
say, and the North Vietnam-
ese military position is even
better than at that time. This
leads to the belief that the
North Vietnamese are not
presently interested in a Cam-
bodian cease-fire.
Since the allied invasion of
Cambodia the North Vietnam-
ese have gained control of
Cambodian towns such as
Stung Treng and Kratie on the
Mekong River and now control
all of the east bank of the Me-
kong River in Cambodia apart
from one or two small towns
such as Svay.Rieng where the
Cambodians are bottled up
and kept inactive.
The North Vietnamese also
hold the border areas of South
Vietnam contingous to Cam-
bodia, a bonus from this
year's communist offensive in
South Vietnam.
'Going Full Blast'
"The military situation here
Is bad," an informed military
source said "I don't like to be
pessimistic but it's difficult'
to find 'anything good. The
sanctuaries are going full
blast. The stuff is moving out
of the big rubber plantations
at Chu!) and down Highway 15
into the Seven Mountains and
other places in South Viet-
nam. It is coming from Laos
down the Meking by Kratie."
Some communist supplies
are moving even onto the Me-
kong's west bank, bypassing
Kompong T ho m, swinging
west around Phnom Penh, then
east again across the Me-
kong into South Vietnam.
Informed military sources
say the North Vietnamese are
drawing on the Cambodian
countryside which they and
their Cambodian allies control
for food to keep Cambodian
sanctuaries and the North
Vietnamese First, Fifth, Sixth,
Seventh and Ninth divisions
now mostly in South Vietnam
going.
The North Vietnamese ex-
ert salmost total control of
of East Cambodia while the
Cambodian communists in
western Cambodia feed and
support them with fuel, bat-
teries and other commodities,
informed military sources said.
Trail Terminus
"Eastern Cambodia is just
a staging area, rest and rec-
reation center and trail ter-
minus for Hanoi again,"
sources said. "All they have to
worry about are further South
Vietnamese incursions and the
South Vietnamese are too hard
pressed to do much in that
line," sources said.
North Vietnam has also been
successful in building up the
Cambodian communists in the
countryside to the point where
they can carry on much of the
war against the Cambodian
government, informed mili-
tary sources say.
It is no longer North Viet-
namese or Viet Cong units
which are cutting Cambodia's
highways, Cambodian and
other informed military sources
admit. Now the units are most-
ly Cambodian communist units
operating in battalion strength
for the first time with a few
Viet soldiers seeded amongst
them and supported by Viet
Cong heavy weapon platoons
and sappers.
Informed military sources
say the communist strategy
for Cambodia is to harass
roads and towns bottling up
Cambodian government forces
? in the towns or forcing them
to engage in useless road
opening operations keeping
them away from the country-
side. Meanwhile in the coun-
tryside the North Vietnamese
are building up local Cambo-
dian forces to fight the gov-
ernment.
Military suorces. said Com-
munists succeeded in doing
this because the Cambodian
government forces are poorly
led though composed of some
excellent fighting material'.
"They just will not get off
their butts and go out there,
get out of the towns," inform-
ed sources said.
Fighting this week In Cam-
bodia has reflected this pat-
tern. Cambodian communist
forces cut highway 4 leading
from Phnom Penh to its sea-
port Kompons Som. Cambod-
ian reds are in a good position
on the heights overlooking the
road passes and are now tying
down a considerable Cambod-
ian government force trying
to winkle them out.
Communits forces are shell-
ing the towns of Takeo and
Angtassom south of Phnom
Penh penning in their Cam-
bodian garrisons from inter-
fering with communist traffic
moving around them toward
the Seven Mountains area of
South Vietnam and tying up
Cambodian relief forces.
Garrison Encircled
This weekend a mixed Cam-
bodian Vietnamese communist
force encircled and entered
the town of Oudong 20 miles
north of 'Phnom Penh. From
what I saw they could have
enered Phnom Penh itself just
by driving down the highway.
Just, south of Oudong a Cam-
bodian villager, wet and mud-
dy stumbled out of a swamp.
He said he had. escaped from
a village just outside Oudong
and that communists encircled
the garrison and there were
no Cambodian troops between
the communists and where
we Were about 1,000 yards
further back on the highway.
The villager said commu-1
nists had arrived about one
o'clock in the morning ,thatsc
day and? about half were ,
Cambodians -and half were -
Vietnamese. They were led
by a Chinese who the villager
judged from his accent livod.
in Cambodia. They told:t.*
villager to move to the "lib-
erated areas" but he didn't
want to go and dodged into',l,
the swamps.
Coming from Phnom Penh'.
there
there were only three small
outposts on the road which
communists could probably
have bypassed. Cambodian-
armor a n d reinforcements_;
did not move in to reinforce
the area till late afternoon 12,'
hours after the attack. Cam?
-
bodian garrisons in Oudong
apparently fought back well
and by late Sunday an elite
paratroop unit arrived and
broke the communist en-s?
circlement. All these actions,'
however, are achieving their
objective of keeping the Cam-i'
bodians tied down to defend-
ing roads and towns, inform-L.
cd military sources compalin.
This pattern is likely to con-k
thine, sources say, till Hanoi'
is able to boost the Cambod-,
Ian communists up to regi-
mental size and to integrate.'
the various groups of Cambod-
ian communists, pro-Prince
Sihanouk, anti-Prince Sihan;
ouk, and Hanoi organized
forces into a single central'
force united against the Lon
Nol government. Once Hanoi"
has achieved this?a strong'
single Cambodian communist.'
force able to defeat the Cam.'
bodian government and hold
most of the territory then
North Vietnam will be inter-,
ested in a cease-fire in Cam- ?
bodia.
NEW YORK TIMES
11 November 1972
BANGKOK SAYS 'AIDES
SOLD MILK FROM U.N.
BANGKOK, Thailand, Nov. 10
Agence France-Presse)? Thai-
officials responsible for the dis-
tribution of skimmed and pow-
dered milk donated by a United
Nations agency were accused
today of selling it on the open
market.
The charge was made in a
circular issued by the Govern-
ment Health Division, inform-
ing more than 30 clinics in
Thailand that they would no
longer be receiving the milk
"because it is the only way to
prevent , health officials from
selling it for personal profit."
The milk, which is donated
by Unicef, the United Nations
Children and Emergency Fund,
totals two million pounds ad-
rivally. The bulk of it goes ,to
municipal clinics and health
stations in provincial areas. ZA
The milk is channeled through
the United States Operatibn
Mission, an arm of the Agen4y
for International Development,
for distribution through tlie
Municipal Health Division. t's,
A spokesman for Unicef bete
refused to comment pending an
inquiry. t;
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? .IIAlltrO11
N OV -1972--
PYRRHIC PLOY ?
2. KIPEEFFER
Mr. Pleifier is professor of zoology -or the University of,
Montana and a co-can/lop oi Harvest of Deem Chemical'
Warfare in Indochina (Fra Press/Macmillan). He visite(
Cambodia in 1969 and 1971 and was in Hanoi era 1970.
While on a visit to Hanoi in June 1979, my two comoana
ions and I met with Premier Pham Van Dong. During the
conversation, I asked the Premier to evaluate Nixon's in-
vasion of Cambodia which had occurred one month ear-
lier. His answer was straightforward: "It makes things
very favorable for the success of onr revolution." By
"our revolution" it suppgscd,him to mean ?the revolution
of the Indochinese people against foreign invader.
' . How well does Premier itham .Van Dong's 1970
,
ation accord with the situation of Cambodia in late 1972??
Recent dispatches from Indochini suggest that he knew
What he was talking about. Atcording to the A.P. (Sep-
tember 1), only one-thir,d of Cambodia is Still under.
"Khmer Republic" control. It has been revealed that the
Inks used in the fall offensive against the An Loc area,
(only a short distance from Saigon) came from the Chup
Rubber Plantation and nearby areas in Cambodia. These
are the very areas that President Nixon characterized
. in April 1970 as "Communist sanctuaries" that must be
cleaned out.
? Two factors have been principally responsible for the
'failure of Nixon's Cambodian policiei. First, the Presi-
dent was badly misinformed about past U.S.-Cambodian-
Vietnamese relations and about the situation on the Viet-
namese-Cambodian border prior, to the March 1970
change in the Cambodian Government. For instance, in,
his speech of April 30, 1970, announcing the U.S. ?in-
vasion of the Fishhook region of Cambodia, Mr. Nixon
stated: "Tonight American and South Vietnamese units
will attack the headquarters for the entire Communist
military operation in 'South Vietnam. This key control
center has been occupied by the North Vietnamese and
Vietcong for five years in blatant violation of Cambodia's
neutrality." Mr. Nixon, standing in front of a map of
Cambodia, put his finger on the little town of Minot as
he made this accusation. That puzzled me a great deal,
for I had spent two days in and around Mimot about
four months before the U.S. attack, and knew it to be
controlled by French and Cambodian rubber interests.
Many Europeans were working there, and some of them
(e.g., a Belgian plant pathologist) were in complete
sympathy with the American effort in South Vietnam.
These Europeans were living with their wives and chil-
dren in an environment of complete tranquillity. We
asked many of them whether they had seen any sign
of North Vietnamese or Vietcong activity and they all
answered no.
My colleague A. H. Westing and I had visited the re-
gion to inspect the damage done by a clandestine defolia;
tion' raid carried out in April-May of 1969 over almost
200,000 acres of eastern ;Cambodia. ,ccording to a letter
'received some months later from Sen. Frank Church,
,the raid was carried out by Air America, a CIA airline,
for what purposes we still do not know. After the raid,
the Olhimetat regime aaked that AIMPietili ?MOMS Viat
the region, with a view to making reparations for The
aamag. Although the U.S. Government to this day offi-
52
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tially denies having carried out this operation, it did send
a team of experts, inchnling Charles Minarik Of the Chem-
ical Warfare Laboratories, U.S. Army, into the Mimot
region-si'tortly after the raids. This team's report describes
how they were flown over the region, driven Through it,
and how they walked in it?just as Westing' and L did
some months later. It is inconceivable- to me that the
North: Vietnamese and Vietcong, who according to Isl,ixon
controlled the area, would have permitted an official:ALS.
Government team to wander through what Nixon celled
"the headquarters for the entire Communist military op-
erations in South Vietnam." After the invasion began it
was widely reported that no key control center cold
be found. Some arms caches were reportedly uncovered
and, of course, a great deal of rice. The rice did 'not
greatly surprise me, since at the time we were there, the
main occupation, in addition to tapping rubber, was har-
vesting rice.
When speaking about the Cambodian "dammunist
sanctuaries," Mr. Nixon failed to mention that, on orders
of Prince Sihanouk, troops of the Royal Cambodian
Army had in facto swept these areas about three months
,before his invasion. The troops were led by Prince Sink
Matak, a loyal American prot? and one of those later
involved in Sihanouk's overthrow. Sihanouk ordered
Matak to search out and destroy all Communist-Viet-
namese positions in Cambodia. Paul Bennett of the Cam-
bodian desk of the State Department informed me' in an
interview, March 22, 1971: "A Cambodian Army opera-
tion began in January of 1970 in a northeastern province
at approximately the time4when Sihanouk left for France
and when Prince Sink Matak was Acting Prime Minister.
They sent up a number of additional battalions among
the better troops in the Cambodian' Army,' and carried
out a series of small sweeps generally in this area. They
did have, as I recall, a number of contacts with small
V.C. and North Vietnamese units. They found and de-
stroyed a number of small supply dumps, a relatively
small campsite, but there was no major contact with the
main North Vietnamese forces." Where were the thou-
sands of North Vietnamese troops that Nixon said had
occupied the area for five years?
? , Besides bring. mistaken about the nature of the
so-called Coinmunist sanctuaries in eastern Cambodia,
Mr. Nixon grossly misrepresented the facts whew he
stated that "American policy since 1954 has been to
scrupulously respect the neutrality of Cambodia. .
North Vietnam, however, has not respected that neutral-.
ity." The defoliation'of vast sections of the rubber plan-
tations, mentioned above, was one blatant violation of
Cambodia's neutrality, and there are many others. During'
my first visit to Cambodia We inspected what was left of
Dak Dam, a little town in the central highlands just across
the border from the special forces camp at Bet Prang,
South Vietnam. Six weeks before our visit this town,
which was about a quaver mile from a Royal Camboe
dian Army antiaircraft position, had been savagely at-
tacked by U.S. fighter bombers. The' antiaircraft positiona
were destroyed, as well as a school, a hospital and' an
ambulance. Twenty-five Cambodians were killed and spy-,
oral W?tottlad titlilf3 WittlA0 gepbmd by Mti AmovIeRa
military in Saigon as having been carried out againstete
North Vietnamese gun pcsition in Cambodia. ?
Once again the goverm eerkt of Sihanouk inviteil,Mier-
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jeans to see for themselves what they had done in viola-
tion of the agreements signed to respect each other's
neutrality. American and International Control Corn-.
.mission officers visited the site and learned that all
twenty-five killed had been Cambodians and that the
attacks had damaged onlyiCambodian installations. West-
ing and I were able to verify these conclusions. 'The
Americans did Mit ?contect ?the original Saiion?assess-
ment and the report on the 13ak Dam incident is.
'classified. The State Department later apologized and
paid $400 for each Cambodian killed. This brutal attack
occurred because the Cambodians had dared to open
fire on American aircraft that were cantinually violating
the air space around Dak Dam. The Cambodians had
hit one of the American .airplanes, as they had every
right to do, and the Americans retaliated, falsely calling
it an attack upon a North Vietnamese position.
This sort of activity had been repeated many times
over the years by the Americans and their South Viet-
namese allies. A? white .paper published by the Royal
.Government pointed out that "all of the very serious in-
cidents of the past years' committed by the American-
South Vietnamese aggressive forces have been the sub-
ject of. detailed inquiry by the International Control
commission. They underline, the fact that the victims of,
these attacks have always been only Cambodians, almost'
always peasants at work. . . . No Vietcong body has
ever bccn recovered on the sites of these ground attacks
nor in the frontier villages machine-gunned, or bombed
by American aviation."
In addition to Cambodians and the International Con'-'
fro! Commission, former American officials have reported
American violations of Cambodia's neutrality. For in-
Stance, a Captain Marasco stated on a 1970 NBC tele-
vision documentary program that he had frequently sent
teams into Cambodia from a base near the Parrot's Beak.
Marasco said, "I'm sure that the CIA *and the South
Vietnamese counterpart of the CIA had intelligence agents
inside Cambodia." When I 'asked Mr. Bennett of the
State Department if operations of this sort did not violate
the neutrality of Cambodia, he answered: "I have no
comment on measures that we take to insure the safety
of our troops by finding out what threats exist." The
United States could, however, have called upon the In-
ternational Control Commission to determine what threats
existed in Cambodia to its forces in Vietnam.
? Nixon, when affirming U.S. respect 'for Cambo-
dian neutrality, failed to mention the part played by the
United States and its Cambodian friends in. the.. Match
18th coup against Sihanouk: The official U.S. line was
that it was "very surprising" when Sihanouk was de-
Posed. I learned something about the coup when 1'
.. ?
-interviewed. the preschePremier of the "Republic of?Cam:.(!
bedia," Son Ngoc Thanh, in August 1971 at his house
in?Phnoin Penh. Me had been Prime Minister of Cam-
bodia once before?when .the Japanese occupied ? the
country during World War IL) Thanh sees hitnself as
a devoted. Cambodian freedom fighter who began his
struggle against the French: That led him to collaborate
with the Japanese, and he now collaborates with the
Americans in an attempt to destroy the Cambodian mon-
archy and set up the so-called ,"Republic." Thanh organ-
ized a group of expatriate and ethnic Cambodians living
in South Vietnam and Thailand into a movement called
the Khmer. Semi.. This movement began, according to
Thanh, .as part of' the struggle against the Frepeln, but
?in..thi . late :1950s in Thailand and in South Vietnam
these' groups began to receive American support. Again
according to. Thanh, U.S. special forces began in 1958
the military training of Cambodians living .in Vietnam
53
and these Cambodians, many of them recruited from the
Khmer Serci, were organized by General Harkins in
What . was called "Mike Force,", a highly trained mobile
strike 'force. Thanh says his Khmer Serci received some'
U.S. money and all of its weapons from the United
States in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In 1965 the
Khmer Serei openly announced that it was carrying out
a struggle against Sihanouk. Despite this, Sihanouk on
January .5, 1969, granted an amnesty to all Khmer Serel.
Shortly thereafter, Thanh told me, some 200 .Kltmer?
Sere i soldiers crossed the border from Thailand and sup-
posedly surrendered to the Royal Army. qp June '12,
1969, a second- contingent of several hundred soldiers
also crossed into the northWestern pan of Cambodiaand
were incorporated like their comrades into the Royal
Army. One can. imagine that it was through the itifiltra-
tion of the Royal Army by these U.S.-trained Oambo-
dians that 'the CIA maintained contact with the 'forces
involved in the coup. These men, .actually natives of
'Thailand and South Vietnam, formed the chief line of
defense for the Lon Nol regime in-the early days of the
coup. ?
President Nixon stated that one reason tor' the
American invasion of Cambodia was that the North
Vict-
namese had carried out a massive invasion after the over-
throw of Sihanouk. He did not mention that thousands.
of ethnic Cambodians from South Vietnam, organized
as "Mike Force," were flown into Phnom Penh within
'days of the coup. It is important to realize 'that these
men were actually Cambodian-Vietnamese,' just as for-
eign to Cambodia as the North Vietnamese. This is
proved by the following situation about which I learned
during my vist in August 1971. In the days immediately
after the.coup these mercenaries were paid in Cambodian
money, but their families and ancestral homes were in
South Vietnam where the Cambodian money was worth-
less. U.S. Embassy officials in Phnoln Penh told me that
this' caused considerable trouble.
.It is obilrous. that the Americans had anticipated and
prepared, for the overthrow of Sihanouk for years, and
had developed a highly trained and mobile Cambodian
military force in South Vietnam that they could use
quickly to support the new regime?In the NBC program
featuring Marasco, the captain was asked, "Do you
think it is possible?that a man like Sihanouk could have
,been deposed by his own generals just on their own, or
have you ever thought there was some other thing in-
vowed in what happened to :Sihanouk?" Marasco: "I
don't doubt that there was some other thing involved in
his being deposed. I don't doubt ,that some other people
have had something to do with it." NBC: "Like who?"
Marasco: "Like other goyermnents, , other intelligence
organizations." NBC: "American, South ,Vietnamese,
both?" Marasco: "Both." In .my interview with him, Ben-
nett of the State Department said: "There were so-called,
, Khmer Serci groups headed by Son Ngoc 'Minh in. boll.'
Thailand and South Vietnam operating along the borders.
There was a group of about 100 people captured in Bat-.
tambang province just over the Thai border in Cambodia,
about June or July of '1969 who were .allekedly .Khmer
Semi and recruited, as far as I know, into: the Royal
Army, conceivably even into the police*as well. . . The
special forces have for years helped train, organize and
lead irregular forces used, among others, in areas along
,the Cambodian border. Many of the Cambodians re-
cruited for this may have.'had Khmer Semi affiliations." -
On April 6, the,eltiladelphia Inquirer published an se-
count of an interview with Prime Minister Thanh,which
confirmed what he had told nlc. the previou's year. M-
cording to the Inquirer, "Beginning in 1965 the U.S.
paid millions of dollars to 'train, arm and support his
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[Thanh'sj forces, most, oi whom were recruited from
the Cambodian minority' living in South Vietnam's delta. ?
Large-scale Khmer Semi defections to the Cambodian
dovernnient were reported' in :11969 and may have been'
part of Thanh's invasion 'plan to overthrow Sihanouk. Ac-,
cording to reliable sourm, the repatriated Khmer Serei!
units were serving in the Royal Army under Lon Not and
spearheaded political demonstrations' in Phnom Penh just
before the coup. After checking , with his American
friends, Thanh committed his U.S. trained and financed
forces to the Lon Nol coup. The CIA, he said, had
Promised that the U.S. would do everything possible to.
help." .
Nixon's assertion that the United States practiced
complete respect for Cambodian neutrality does not ac-
cord with the facts. And these inaccurate interpretations.
of U.S.-Cambodian relations led to incorrect predictions
of what would happen after the coup and the American
invasion. Three major factors upset the Administration's
game plan for Cambodia. These were described to me at
.length in a June 1970 interview in Hanoi with Xeng An,
the Ambassador from Sihanouk's Royal Government of
National Union, -which now controls most of Cambodian
territory. Mr. An pointed out that the peasants had hate
a g'rent loyalty .and respect for Sihanouk because he had
kept war from their lives, They had known perfectly well
what the war was doing to the people across the border
in Vietnam. Secondly,' the Americans guessed wrong on
Sihanouk's behavior. They had expected him to retire to
France, as did the Emperor Bao .pai, the last Royal
Vietnaniese ruler.'. Instead, the Prince joined his, former
NEW YORK TIMES
28 November 1972 ?
The Vietnam Handshake
One month has elapsed since that dramatic White ?
House briefing by Dr. Henry Kissinger. "We remain con-
vinced that the issues that I have mentioned are soluble
in a very brief period of time," President Nixon's
negotiator said. "We have undertaken, and I repeat it
here publicly, to settle them at one more meeting and
to.remain at that meeting for as long as is necessary to
complete the agreement." This undertaking to the people
of the United States and of Vietnam has now been
broken. Perhaps the reasons are technical, but there are
ominous signs that more profound coniiderations may be
promoting ruinous second thoughts.
? White House spokesmen now stress the quest for "a
settlement that will last, not just for the short term but
for the long term." This smacks dangerously of the
inflated\ war aims that kept the Johnson and Nixon
Administrations fighting so intensely in Vietnam long
after knowledgeable strategists had concluded these
alms were unattainable.
Far from envisaging a disengagement of American
personnel from Vietnam, the Administration is revealed
to have embarked on a secret build-up or "civilian" per-
sonnel under Defense Department contract to "advise"
the South Vietnamese military establishment. And four ,
weeks after the White House declared that "peace is at
hand," the United States carried out two days of what
was officially described as the heaviest B-52 bombard-
P77-00432R000100020001-4
.enemies?the Indochinese Marxists?and set up the
United National Front of Cambodia and the Royal Gov-1
ernment of. National Union which he now heads. Thus;L:
American actions forced a devout Buddhist and
Communist .ruler, Sihanouk, into the hands of Nixon's I.
Indochinese enemies; and the Prince brought with ihim
thesupport of the vast majority of Cambodian peasants.' .
If the. ,Nixon :Administration had left Sihanouk' Cam- :
bodirf alone' II believe it would have been difficult, if .not
impossible, for the revolutionary forces of Indochina to.
launch the massive offensive with tanks that erupted from:
the so-called sanctuaries that- Nixon had sworn t&cleara
out. ' ? , . ? ;
The. third factor that the Americans failed to predict
correctly was the effect of inciting anti-Vietnamesil feel.:
ings among Cambodians. Xeng Ani during his interview,
discussed this point at some length, saying that it 'poses'
irreconcilable contradictions for the American policy in
Cambodia. He stressed that, in order to arouse the Cam-
bodians against the so-called Vietcong and North Viet-
namese, the U.S.-supported Lon Nol clique had needed .
to arouse them against Vietnamese in general. To' expect
then that they would welcome the Saigon Vietnamese as
liberator's from the Communist Vietnamese 46's quite is--
rational, as events of recent months have shown. Pitched
battles have been, fought between Cambodian .troops and
their so-called South Vietnamese-Saigon allies. And, the
relationship between the Saigon regime and the Phnom
Penh regime grows increasingly strained.
All of this must now be known to. the Nixon Adnaln-
lstration, and that, probably, is why we hear so little to?
day.about?Cambodia. ' ""? ?
ment of North Vietnam of the whole war.
Pressing the advantage which he has apparently
gained in the past month of jockeying, President Thieu
has sent a special envoy to meet Mr. Nixon this week,
after which he is to accompany Dr. Kissinger to the
renewed dialogue with Hanoi's Le Due Tho next week.
Among the "clarifications" the United States0 is re-
portedly seeking from North Vietnam is a specific pledge
to withdraw some of its troops from the South after the
cease-fire, thus soothing one of President Thieu's deepest
fears. From the start, Dr. Xissinger's critics and sup-
porters alike spotted the absence of any visible con-
cession by Hanoi on this point as a critical element in
the give-and-take that had gone into the basic accord;
if it is being injected as a new element at this stage,
what is left of the whole tissue of understanding?
' It seems impossible to doubt, from the statements of
both sides, that Dr. Kissinger and Le Duc Tho reached'
,a handshake agreement a month ago to end ten years of
war in Vietnam; the White House disclosed this tentative
? accord just before the American Presidential election.
As every collective bargainer knows, the whole concept
of negotiation is built on mutual respect for the integrity
of such agreements, whatever minor difficulties may '
attend their translation into formal contract language.
If a veto by President Thieu is leading to United States
insistence on renegotiation of one or more of the most
fundamental clauses in the agreement, the promised light
at the end of the tunnel may once again be receding
Into dim shadow.
54
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? TUE WASHINGTON POST
-11-1) ?
fer.,
Sunday, Nov. 26,1972
?
By Don Oberdorfer
Washincton Post Foreign Service
SEOUL?Two decades af-
ter American troops fought
and died to save it from
Communist el orninatio n,
South Korea has taken a
sharp turn toward one-man
rule and an authoritarian.
political System. .
Presient Park Chung
Hee's decision, formally vali-
dated this Tuesday by 91.5.
per cent of the votes cast in
an elaborately organized
and orchestrated national
referendum, was motivated
by a large number of ele-
ments aside from Park's de-
sire to stay in power.
The decline of American
involvement in Asia, the
high-level negotiations be-
tween North Korea and
South Korea, declining pa-
tience with the political op-
position and the National
Assembly, an economid scare
due to a recent recession
and his own spartan view of
what South Korea should be
like?these factors all ' ap-
pear to have had a part in
Park's decision to take the
political system into his own
hands through martial law
and push through funda-
mental constitutional_
changes. ?
Pax* calls the new system
"Korean democracy." But
just as GI's of 1950-53 would
hardly recognize today's Ko-
rea as the threadbare and
woebegone country they
knew in those days, they
would probably blink and
scratch their heads at the
political setup being labeled
"democracy."
As sketched out in pro-
nouncement and propoaal,
the new order is a split-level
affair. Foreign businessmen
and tourists, whose invest-
ment-a' and purchases are es-
sential to the swiftly devel-
oping economy, are prom-
ised unimpaired and even
enhanced freedoms.
As one of the innumerable
handouts for foreigners,
printed in English and Japa-
nese, put it this week: "Dear
visitors: Please feel free
wherever you travel in the
? country under martial law.
The warmer welcome and
the better service await
(sic)."- -------
South Korea is, and prob-
ably will continue to be,
heavily dependent for its
prosperity and growth on in-
teraction with the world .
outside. ?
At the atm(' time, the the,
oretical and constitutional,
underpinning of the pre-
vious system of limited dem-
ocratic government has been
abandoned. Park can be
elected forever by an easily-
r.,
ham
itagen d..L.ark's
llie in 09-alth
controlled 'National Reuni-
fication Council" of more
more than 2,000 supposedly
non-political persons. More-
over, he can appoint one-
third of the National Assem-
bly and name a supreme
court to decide the most im-
portant cases brought be-
fore the judiciary. . ? -
'Efficient Rule'
In the opinion of knowl-
edgeable sources, Park has
been actively considering
the scrapping of the old con-
stitution and the creation of
a stronger and more "efffi-
cient" rule since at least the
midde of last year, shortly
after his inauguration for a
third term in office. Quiet
study missions are said to
have been dispatched to Tai-
wan, Indonesia, Thailand,
Cambodia, South Vietnam
and the Philippines to look
over their constitutions and
political systems.
Park's decision to move
on Oct. 17?instead of in Do-
cember as the U.S. embassy
had expected?was evi-
dently precipitated by two
major events: the draft of
a Washington-Hanoi peace
agreement and North Ko-
rea's anger at South Korean
criticism of the high-level
talks on reunification be-
tween the two governments.
- On Oct. 8, North Vietnam
presented a drastically altered
peace proposal to presiden-
tial assistant Henry Kissin-
ger in Paris, and by Oct. 12
the substance of a Vietnam
peace agreement had been
virtually agreed to. It is
quite likely that South Ko-
rea, with some 40,000 troops
still on duty in Vietnam
learned of the developments
Within a day or two.
The implications for Seoul
would have been two-fold:
first, that the US. troop
withdrawal from Indochina
? and ultimately from Ko-
rea as well ? would come
even earlier than
inticipated; second, that
U.S. policymakers and the
American public would be
much too consumed with the
Vietnam peace issue ? in
addition to the presidential
. elections ? to pay much at-
tentien to goings-on in Ko-
rea.
The second important
event took place on Oct. 12
at the truce village at Pan-
munjom, whera south KO=
roan CIA Chief Lee HuRak
met North Korean Deputy.
Premier Park Sung-Chul for
the first high-level North-
South talks since the dia-
logue between the two Ko-
55
rean governments was made
public July 4.
Acrimonious Meeting
According to a source who
has seen the still-secret tran-
script of the session, it was
a vely acrimonious meeting
"a very, heated argument
went on for just about the
entire session," the source
said. .
The North accused the
South of fomenting anti-
Communist propaganda in
the South Korean press, and
the South accused the North
of antiPark broadcasts and
editorials in official organs.
Ironically, in view of later
event, CIA Chief Lee con-*
tended that the government
in the South had no authority
to tell the press what to re-
port under a limited consti-
tutional system. North Ko-
rea wasn't buying this.
There is no indication, ac-
cording to the same source,
that the South Korean side
informed the North Korean
side at the Oct. 12 meeting
that martial law and a politi-
cal change were close at
hand. While the implications
of this meeting are still un-
clear, the conclusion in
some sophisticated circles is
that Park and his aides real-
ized future progress in the
North-South talks probably
would be slow indeed, and-
that the talks might even
break down.
The governments main
selling point for the new
"Korean democracy" has
been the need for strength
to compete with the North
during the quest of unifica-
tion. Should the North-South
dialogue lose its lustre, the
new martial law regime
would be harder to justify
to the people in the South
and to the world. * -
Once Park and his small
inner circle of advisers had
made the decision to move
quickly, the organs of gov-
ernment planning went into
high gear. Military plans for
martial law were dusted off
and changed to fit the occa-
sion. The working draft of
the proposed new constitu-
tion was quickly reviewed
and prepared for publica-
tion. Even Park's address to
the nation announcing mar-
tial law, the suspension of
the old constitution and the
other sweeping measures
was pro-recorded on tape.
Elaborate Scenario
Ati elaberate scenario o_f
who was to be told what and
when was drawn up and put
Into effect. U.S. Ambassador
Philip Habib was called in
25 hours in advance to get
the word. At the same time,
? . the Chairman of the joint
, chiefs of staff gave the word
tto the U.S. military com-
mander in Korea, Gen. Don-
aid Bennett.- .
The -move from an Ameri-
can:oriented constitutional
democracy (at least in
theory) to an autocracy with
democratic trappings was to
take place in stages betwee+
mictOctober and the end of
the year. The critical period
would be between the Oct.
17 announcement and the
Nov. 21 referendum to ap-
prove the constitution, and
every precaution was taken
to insure a good result.
All political activity was
theoretically banned under ?
? the martial law decree, and
? for the opposition this meas-
. ure was strictly enforced. '
? Ordinary citizens were tried
and convicted at publicized
courts.:martial for spreading
"rumors" against what the
government designated the
"0 ct ober Revitalization"
plan. -
Even the green-and-white
wrappers of "Eunha Su (Ga- -
loxY) cigarettes produced by
the state cigarette monopoly
were imprinted with the slo?-?
gan?"October Revitaliza-
tion?Let's Plant Korean-
Style Democracy. In ,Ctur ,
SoiL"? *
? Under ? these ' circum-
stances, the question -was
not whether the referendum
would pass, but how big a
margin it would command.
The 91.5 per cent margin of ,
last Tuesday was about 6
per cent more than the 85 _
per cent target mentioned in
advance by som., govern. '
ment .officials. The turnout
of more than 90 per %ant of.
the eligible voters, beyond
most ekpectations, '-as ,
aided 'by :.a- massive caes: ,
paign to get out the vote. * '
,"The National Conference
for Unification" to pick the
president will be elected by ?
mid-December, with agents
of. the state playing an im-
portant screening role. This
group in turn will elect
Park for a six-year term be-
fore' Christmas. Park is
scheduled to be inaugurated
about Dee. 27 as president
for a six-year term* under
the rew regime.
The United States, which
had been projecting ?a grad-
ual withdrawal of troops
from South Korea 'in line
with a Korean army mauler-
Maiden pregfatit, Mg go
given no hint of a change in
schedule. The Park govern-
ment wants the 40,000 'U.S.
troops to remain as long as
possible. ? ? - ? ? a . -
Nor is there a. sign Of
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major change in the military-
economic aid, credit con-
sessions and GI spending
which brought South Korea.
aid and earnings of more
ethan $650 million from the
U.S. government last year-
-a Major chunk of the coun-
try's $8 billion ? Gross Na-
tional Product.
: As Korean sources close
to Park tell it, the govern
-
? ment was well aware that
U.S. troop strength and U.S.
aid would be declining over
the months to come, and
that the United States
would be moving into a pas-
sive rather than an active
role in Asia. a-:. _
NEW YORK TIMES
28 November 1972
as Peace
. At Hand?
By Torn Wicker
No matter what happens after the
Indochinese peace ? talks resume on
Dec. 4, it now seems reasonably clear
that Dr. Henry Kissinger had little
basis for his statement on Oct. 26,
twelve days before the election, that
"peace Is at hand," subject only to a
few minor details of negotiation. lie
had, it is clear, no real agreement with
Hanoi and Saigon on encling the war;
no such agreement seems to exist a
month later; and it is highly question-
able whether either Dr. Kissinger or
President Nixon could have believed
on Oct. 26 that they actually had
reached an agreement that would
bring what Mr. Nixon called that night
In Ashland, Ky., "peace with honor
and not peace with surrender."
Quite obviously, there can be no
cease-fire in South Vietnam until the
Saigon Government agrees to a cease-
fire, for the simple reason that that
Government has in its army a million
men, armed to the teeth by the United
States. In the final analysis, the only
way Washington can impose a cease-
fire on that Government and that
army is by threatening to cut off their
military supplies.
Is that a serious proposition? After
having for four years maintained the
war, at a cost of 20,000 American
deaths, billions of American dollars,
and incalculable Indochinese casual-
ties, all for the stated purpose of giv-
ing the Saigon regime a "chance" to.,
survive, is it really conceivable that
Mr. Nixon is now prepared to ask
Congress to shut off military support
to that regime--thus throwing an
"ally" to the Communists, even though
Mr. Nixon has said repeatedly that it
he did that, a gigantic bloodbath
would ensue and world peace would
be threatened?
Yet, as recently as this weekend,
President 'Flu's controlled new.
? paper, Tin Song, said in Saigon that
before there can be a cease-fire, North
? Vietnam must withdraw its troops
from South Vietnam, the demilitarized
zone?in effect, a national border?
JAPAN TIMES
10 November 1972
Vietnam Under Coaition Gov'
By ROBERT S. ELEGANT
Los Angeles Times
SAIGON? The war in Viet-
nam will end shortly. but the
struggle will continue ? the
struggle to unite all Vietnam
under a totalitarian regime.
The struggle the Communists
have waged for 27 years.
Hanoi has just reaffirmed its
determination to fight in its
comments on the secret talks
that led to the North Vietnam-
.ese-American draft. agreement.
The Communists have in-
variably used "united front" or
,"coalition" governments as the
first, decisive step toward seiz-
ing all power. No less an an-
thority on revolutionary strate-
gy than Chairman Mao Tse-tung
of the Communist Party of
China laid down the tactics in
one of his most widely read
? works. "On Coalition Govern-
ment."
The United States is with-
drawing from direct in-
volvement in Vietnam. The de-
cision is wise from the Ameri-
can point,of view ? and prob-
ably unavoidable.
If America has not attained
-every last one of its national
objectives, it has equally not
acceded to ?Hanoi's long-stand-
ing demand that America make
itself responsible for delivering,
South Vietnam to harsh, author-
itarian rule. But America would
be unwise if it deluded itself
that the draft agreement ac-
complishes more than ending
American intervention with
relative grace, while starting a
new phase in the unrelenting
military and political battle for
control of the South's 17,500,000
people.
Hanoi declared recently its
intention of "accelerating the
struggle on the military, politi- and language 27 years ago.
cal, and diplomatic fronts until
the lofty objectives ? liberating
the South, protecting and build-
ing the socialist North, and ad-
vancing toward peacefully unit-
ing the country ? are
achieved."
In Hanoi's lexicon, liberation
means imposing its own rule,
af ter destroying "decadent,
bourgeois democracy." Clearly,
the objective has not changed,
only the means.
Hanoi no longer demands
that, as President Nixon put it,
"we withdraw and destroy the
Government of the Republic of
Vietnam as we go."
A "coalition government," ex-
cluding the present Saigon re-
gime, will not be created simul-
taneously with the ceasefire. In-
stead, Saigon will rule its areas
and the Viet Cong theirs, while
a 'council on national reconcilia-
tion and accord plans elections
to choose a new government.
The tripartite council will rep-
resent Saigon. the Viet Cong,
and the amorphous "neutralist"
faction.
The term, "coalition govern-
ment," anathema to Saigon, did
not appear. Nonetheless, Mab's
"On Coalition Government," a
report to the seventh congress
of the Communist Party in
April 1945, is the surest guide to
Hanoi's strategy and objectives.
Despite differences between Pe-
king and Hanoi. Mao's revolu-
tionary manuals are read avid-
ly in North Vietnam.
The political conditions Hanoi
faces in 1972 closely resemble
the conditions Mao faced in
1945. Besides, the negotiating
tactics and even the language
Hanoi now employs are almost
identical with Chinese tactics
As the war in the Pacific was
ending, Mao faced the chal-
lenge of winning political victo-
ry in China. The Nationalist
Government ruled much larger
territories and commanded
much more powerful armies
than did the Communists. Mao's
solution was a coalition govern-
merit?which
-
menl?which would shOtly be-
come a Communist government.
As the the big war in Viet.:
nam draws to a close. Hanoi
must win political victory over
a regime that controls 90 per
cent of the population and de-
ploys troops outnumbering the
Communists several times. The
North Vietnamese have chosen
the same solution.
In-1945, Mao made almost the'
same proposal Hanoi has? now
advanced. The Nationalist Gov-
erntnent was to join a tripart-
ite, united-front alliance that
would prepare for a 'coalition
government.
But Mao told the secret party.
session: "The politics of new
democracy . . . consists in Over-
throwing external oppression
and internal feudal, fascist
oppression and then set=
ting up not he old democracy
but a political system which is
a united front of all demo- ?
cratic classes, . . . This is-
our minimum program, against
our future or maximum ?pro-
gram of socialism and commu- ,
nism . . . (every Communist i
will fight for two clearly de-
fined objectives) the new de,m0-1
mettle revolution now and So-
cialism and communism In 'the'
future. . . ."
Mao's proposal was not., ac-,
cepted. Instead, he fought al-
most five years longer to win
military victory.
must be re-established at the 17th
parallel, and the role of the National
Council of Reconciliation and Concord
?envisioned in the Kissinger-Le Due
Tho draft accord?must be more
clearly defined. These are merely the
central issues of the war; if they have
to be settled before Saigon agrees to
a cease-fire, then it follows that on
Oct. 26 the Nixon Administration did
not really have an agreement for a
cease-fire that depended only on the
? working out of a few details.
As another example, Dr. Kissinger
said that the release of American
prisoners of war by Hanoi was not
dependent on the release of political
prisoners by Saigon. This seemed to be
confirmed in a statement by Xuan
Thity, a principal North Vietnamese
?negotiator. Yet, since then, the North
ilaWspaper,
Nhan Dan, has asserted just the oppo.
site view, and the North Vietnamese
summary of the draft accord (with
which Dr. Kissinger said he had "no ernment sources insist that Dr. Kissin-
complaint") declared that "the return gera failure to secure an agreement
of all captured and detained personnel for North Vietnamese withdrawal
of the parties shall be carried out
simultaneously with the U.S. troops'
withdrawal."
Since many political prisoners held
by Saigon would be an important part
of the so-called "third force" supposed'
to be included in the National Council
. of Reconciliation and Concord, is it
realistic to suppose that Hanoi agreed
to leave them to the mercy of Saigon?
In any case, it is a legitimate question
whether Dr. Kissinger was entitled to
speak as specifically on the matter as
he did on Oct. 26.
By far the major question concerns
the status of North Vietnamese forces
In South Vietnam. The summary of the
draft accord with which Dr. Kissinger
had "no complaint" on Oct. 26 does
not mention a withdrawal of North
Vietnamese forces; evety commentator
pointed raft that Oita WAS. 4 Miller
American concession, Yet, Saigon
patently is unwilling to accept this
arrangement; and some informed Gov-
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caused Washington?not just Saigon?
to pull back from accepting his draft
accord with Lo Duc Tho. To have
accepted that draft, they say, would
have given Hanoi what it had sought
all along?an American withdrawal
from the battlefield, while Hanoi was
left free to settle Indochinese military
and political affairs in direct and un-
impeded struggle with Saigon.
Now it is being asserted in Washing-
ton, through studied leaks and calcu-
lated statements, that the American
side is pressing for further concessions
only in order to be able to tell Saigon,
honestly that further concessions can-
not be had; even if that were .true,
however, it still implies that on Oct. 26
there was no real basis for asserting
that only a few unimportant details
stood in the way of a peace which
was "at hand." ?
On that date, Dr. Kissinger?who
was just back from Saigon?must have
known that President Thieu did not
accept the most important parts of the
draft accord; he could hardly have
been justified in asserting, therefore,
that only a few minor details remained
to be worked out with Hanoi; and if it
finally turns out that the central issue
of the renewed negotiations is the
withdrawal of North Vietnamese
forces, the real question' will be
whether President Nixon himself ever
accepted the Kissinger-Le Due Tho
draft accord, which was supposed to
havOatasot tilmt peace was at hand.
WASHINGTON POST nie,tho. 28, 1972
Only Japan Remains
? ollni noes Top?q,illog,
One by-One
? By Richard Holbrooke .
. HONG KONG?Where have all, the domi-
noes gone? Toppled rightward one by one,
tclimaxed in the last two months by?the proc-
lamation of martial law in Korea and the.
Thillipines. ? ? ?
, In September President Marcos- moved -in
the Phillipines. A month later,- President
,Park, feeling restricted by his Own cOnstitit-
tion, which limited him to 'three terms. as
The writer is managing editor of
Foreign Policy.
'President, suspended the National Assent-
bly, rewrote the constitution, and last week
had the people of Korea certify his decision
In a referendum.
Korea and the Phillipines?two countries
where the American role has been enormous
in the last twenty years--thus joined Thai-
land, Cambodia, South Vietnam and Indone-
sia as members of that growing group of na-
tions that arc coming under stronger milt-
tary,rule. In the entire East Asian area, only
'Japan retains an essentially democratic goy-,
? ernment. ?
-AND ALL THIS, of course, as Asians viewr
what they believe is an historic turning
point in America's role in Asia?its impend-
ing withdrawal from Indochina, and its
%opening of China. Where once we stood in
'Asia for' the gradual building up of strong
"democratic institutions" to combat Chinese
and Russian Communism (hence the peren-
nial bureaucratic- 'rhetoric about "nation-
building"), now America is seen differently:
ler, less concerned with building a certain
type of government in Asia, much mere in-'
:terested in creating mutually acceptable ar-
rangements with its.prime adversaries.
This perception seems correct, and is rela-
ted to the striking decline of democracy in
%East Asia. In Vietnam's wake, we have lost
/most of our unfortunate missionary zeal in
Asia, our feeling that we had a responsibil-
ity not only to undo colonialism but also to
. build democratic societies. And, at the same
time, our ability to influence events also de-
clined.
Thus, when Marcos moved in Manila, we
restricted ourselves to an official statement'
which amounted to "no comment." When
:Park acted in Korea, we "disassociated" 'our-
selves from his action.
But what could we have-done?
' Intervention in the internal- affairs of
other countries, which was once an Ameri-
can commonplace in ,East Asia, has acquired'
a bad name in recent years in the U.S. Al-
though there arc still sortie people who ad-
vocate U.S. action to promote democracy in
? such countries as Korea,/ our track record
has been spotty at best and includes the old
intervention that makes new intervention
almost impossible. Our competence at that
. sort of thing is not proven; on the contrary..
FURTHERMORE, the potential American
influence (which was never as large as
Asians, who saw the CIA in every rumor and
57
plot, believed) is declining rapfdly.,Ironically?
in the case of Korea, our earlier succesSfa
aid efforts have made a far easier for their,
chief beneficiary, President Park, to igurire.
:any suggestions we might want to malce..
American aid, once vit.( natty I he sole aup-1
port, of the Korean economy, has dropped.
off sharply, and is no longer necessary to,
the continued viability of that country. Nor,
do they even need our troops at this lime,
although their continued presence has some
value in the larger game going on between,
North and South Korea.
For many. years, it was a standard liberal
-belief that we should support democracies
-and oppose. , dictatorships. Our - supportive;
role in right-wing countries, like Spain and,
Taiwan, and right-wing causes; like the cov.
ert support to the 1958 revolt against Sti-,4
karno in Indonesia, understandably'ytoseti
American liberals, and became scrinus,po
'ical issues in the years before Vietnam,
Yet at the time we tended to overlookor,a0
least underestimate, the risks involved 'in!,
strong action taken to promote democracy
in countries of different traditions. Those 4
risks, we ultimately learned. could lead usi
into inv)ossibly complicated roles in the
ob-
?scurc and incomprehensible politics of cottn,:i
tries like Laos, South Vietnam, and Korea.,
And once into such sl,uations,Where
had influence 1;11. not cc.rol, the problems,i
would multiply, and extrication would be-
come constantly more difficult.
Also, we could reap grave disappontment,5
when nr.0 like Park and Mareos .and even ;
Thieu, rinsed to play any longei the
rules or the democratic game that we. ?;.,0:10
urged on them.
For the concerned American liberal, all,.
this has posed very difficult problems. On
one hand, we have supported and promoted
tiemocracy in Asia, sometimes -with success.,)
Its decline, even if accompanied by a rising
economy, will certainly mean a loss of per-i
sonal freedom for many Asians.
ON THE OTHER HAND, our influencel
:and our competence in restoring or preserv-
ing democracy are extremely limited. ? Our,
entire value system, in' win& we 'presumed:,
to know what form of lovernment was rigtit
; for other countries, seep3 now a product of
another age. No one who ;las served in Asia',
should feel comfortable again,' when consid-
ering the value of American adi cc, particu?
? larly political advice. And our national in-1
terest-7?whatever that is?does not seem
rectly threatened by the unfortunate events;:
. in Thailand, Korea, the Philippines. . ,
So the classic liberal position c: the lest;-
20 years?support democracy an oppose'
rightwing regimes?a position over which
r- great domestic debates were once fOught,i.
has been swept aside by the harsh new realiA
ties in Asia, and elsewhere. Intervention in
support of democracy would have very limit
Red success in Asia, and virtually no sup-
: port at home. .
Yet open embrace of such distastefult
:events and regimes is unacceptable. So, wet
? seem reduced to private lan:4:ntations. pub.,
lie "no comments," and a scare, for a better"
definition of our role in post-Vit.- nam Asia.)
?It will take time?and I hope ,a
tional debate?to define that role: Ni.,,lne7
should view the recent setbacks to den'.'-"
racy in this part of the world without co.i.4
cern, regret, and alarm. And yet it seetne - ?
clear that American intervention is no,
longer possible, and, what is more impor-]
tant, not at all desirable.
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WASHINGTON POST
22 November 1972
Vie! d7" Zorza
Rif
ker0Or t
Interest 8viets
'TIM KREMLIN is trying
to find out what truth there
is in the Washington stories
. of a falling-out between
President Nixon and Dr.
Kissinger over the Vietnam
peace settlement. Soviet
agents in Washington have
been making discreet inqui-
ries about the. report, which
first appeared in an ultra-
conservative Washington
weekly, Human Events, and
was then briefly reproduced
in The Washington Post.
Human Events said that
Kissinger had tried "to
foist" the Paris agreement
on Mr. Nixon. There fol.
lowed "a bitter dispute"
among top officials and sec-
ond thoughts "even in the '
White House," about the
agreement Kissinger had ne-
gotiated, the paper said. The
Washington Post, however,
reported that White House
officials had scoffed at such
rumors.
Faced with a White House
mystery, Soviet analysts
would attempt the kind of
exercise that the CTA makes
to find out what goes on' in
the Kremlin. Only Soviet of-
ficials call it Washingtonol-
ogy, not Kremlinology.
KISSINGER' 14AD SAID
that only "minor" issues re-
. mined to be resolved. But
Mr. Nixon spoke later of
"central" issues. Kissinger
had said that only one more
negotiating session would
suffice. But the White
House spokesman later
spoke of several. Was there
a genuine disagreement in
the White House, the Krem-
lin would ask, or had Mr.
Nixon simply changed his
mind?
Washingtonology, when
practiced from a Spviet van-
tage point, has ohe advan-
tage. It is not limited to
Washington information,
but ean be supplemented
with insights from the other
side of the fence. Why, for.
instance, did Hanoi press
for an immediate cease-fire
some time before the
election? "You'll have to ask
, Hanoi," said Kissinger.
The answer is not simply
that Hanoi thought it could
get better terms before the
election than after. Once
? Hanoi had. decided, by late
summer, to accept Mr. Nix-
011'q major demands, it con-
centrated its efforts on the
next most important negoti-
ating objective; to prevent
the rearming of the South ,
Vietnamese forces to the
point where they could 'he414
come a threat to the regime ;
in the North. '
Mr., Nixon called it "Viet-:'i
namization," but a SaigOrC
army made strong enough to,'!
defeat the Communists hi.'
,the South might also, Hanoi
would have reason to fear,
? be capable of marching .on.
the North. Mr. Nixon kept
telling Hanoi that it must''
choose between "Vietnam',
zation," thus subtly rede-
fined, and a "negotiated set-
tlement," also redefined- to''
include major Communisti
concessions.
MOSCOW AND PEKING'
got the message, and kept.!
urging it on a reluctant'
Hanoi. After the election,,
.they would have argued,.,
even this choice might dis-'
appear, because Mr. Nixon
would no longer be under
.pressure to seek a settle;,
ment. Hanoi accepted. the "
bargain. The Paris agree:.-
ment stipulated that the
flow of American arms Was,
to end on November 1 ,
and, with it, the threat of
Vietnamization. "
So the reason why liana
had been pressing for an iti.
mediate cease-fire, even be-
fore the election, was to
avert a massive last-minute
surge in the flow of arms
which would nullify its con!,
cessions. When Mr. Nixon
rejected the Paris draft, and'
used the time thus gained to
do the very thing which..
Hanoi had paid so dearly to :
avert, the Communist
claimed that they had been
cheated out of the bargain, ,
they made in good faith. '
' The reason why Moscow
wants to know whether Kis-
singer intended this all
along, or was overruled by
Mr. Nixon, or whether, per-
haps, it was a last-minute
twist forced on the White ?
House by a genuine change ,
in circumstances, far tran-
scends in importance the im-
mediate issue of peace in
Vietnam, important as that
is.
What Moscow' is askingis .
whether it can trust Mr.
Nixon in the "era a negotia-
tions," arid whether it can
really march arm-in-arm. ,
with him toward the "goner-
at poem" The White
House cannot afford to
leave the Kremlin with the
wrong inlpression.
CD 1972. Victor zerzu,
THE WASHINGTON POST
A 22 Friday, Nov, 24, 1972
China Lifts
Lia dab' 011
Bo'oJk Read
By Jean Leclerc du Sablon
Acetic? France Prc3sa
PEKING?After protesting
to university authorities, stu-
dents at Shanghai University
Teachers' College have ob-
tained the right to read for-
eign books, including Euro-
pean and American literature
of the 18th and 19th centuries,
the People's Daily reported.
The newspaper said that
Profesiors of the Chinese de-
partment of the college had re-
quested 18th and 19th century
European and American nov-
els for the college library, and
this request prompted "serious
discussions" in the university.
After the discussions among
atudents and professors, how-
ever, the People's Daily said
the conclusion was reached
that "It is acceptable that
readers should read certain
Ideas that are erroneous or
contain poison seeds." ?
Observers in Peking said
this thirst for reading among
Chinese students seemed to
mark an important new stage
in university life after the
Cultural Revolution.- T h e y.
added that, during the last
two years, university libraries
had seemed to concentrate oh
lending political and technical
books, and that access to. clas-
sical or foreign literal ere had
aeemed to be more limited..
During the past year, how-
ever, foreign classics have
been reappearing on library
shelves. This was seen as part
of a general trend toward
more cultural freedom, and
the fact that the right to read
such books was reaffirmed in
the People's Daily gives it an
official sanction. .
The report in the People's
Daily on the discussions was,
carried on a page devoted to
university problems. "Certain
icomrades suggested that the
books should be acquired; oth-
ers resolutely opposed thila
arguing that the reappearance
of those books would be a sign',
of restoration," the newspaper
said.
"Restoration" appeared to
refer to the previous policy of
allowing students access to
Western literature, a policy,
dramatically changed by the
purge of Western books and,
Ideas during the Cultural Rev-
- -olution. - . - ?
It said that "leadeV com-
rades were very worried" by
the fact that new stu4nts?
young workers,' peasarks and
soldiers enrolled in the univer-
sity through reforms applied
after the Cultural Revolution
?"were formulating new read-
ership requests at the library.".
It described the library offi-
cials as "indecisive," and said
some "even tried to hide the,
books."
Protesting students said
that "the activities of the li-
brary must be, actively placed
In the service of the prole-
tarian revolution in teaching
Not to open books, or to run
away from contradictions, is
the same thing as refusing to,
eat for fear of choking," thd
newspaper said.
"University and library Inv
thorities were profoundly std.!
prised by the students' eriti:
eism," the paper said.
They cautioned that "On the
one band, we must trust most
of the worker, peasant and sol-
dier students?they are capa-
ble of judging for themselves;
But at the same time,'we must
understand that they are still
young and some of them are
In danger -of being influenced
or corrupted by poison seeds."
The reforms adopted at the
university were aimed, the
newspaper said, at guiding stu-
dents' reading and makin
those who borrowed books
"unsystematically" realize that
"reading books is not a ? form
of mental recreation." Stu-
dents are also encouraged to'
write commentaries on what
they read, the paper said. ,
The University library con-
tains more than 400,000 vol-
umes, and the average dailY,
borrowing rate is 500 books,
according to the People's
Daily report. On some days as
many as 1,500 books will be'
borrowed. The newspaper de-
scribed these figures as higher
than before the Cultural Revo-
lution.
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BALTIMORE stm
13 November 1972
13y.Product of Delente
The Nixon Thaivi U.S. Reif-dims with E stern Europe:
By JOSEPH R. L. STERNE
Under the protective cover of
American-Soviet detente, relations
between the United States and
'Eastern Europe are relaxing and
improving.
This is a delicate diplomatic busi-
ness, given the Kremlin's hyper-
sensitivity about political develop-
ments within the Warsaw Pact
area: On all too many occasions,
the world has seen how the Rus-
sians react if they feel their hege-
mony is threatened in the satellite
states on their western border.
Therefore, the fact that Ameri-
can tics with Poland, Hungary,
,Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria. and even
East Germany are on the upgrade,
right across the board, must be
rated one of the quieter achieve-
ments of President Nixon's foreign
policy.
0 0
To create the right atmosphere
for this relaxation required more
than a one-shot journey to Moscow
and a series of American-Soviet
?accords that gave Eastern Euro-
pean regimes added room for man-
euver. The Russians first had to be
convinced how much Mr. Nixon's
approach to East-West affairs had
evolved since the rollback, libera-
tion posturing of the early Dulles
years.
In successive State-of-the-World
messages and no doubt in private
communications, the President sig-
naled the Kremlin that he was will-
ing to accept the status quo in
divided Europe. This did not mean
he Would condone the Warsaw Pact
invasion of Czechoslovakia, an
event that chilled East-West rela-
tions five months before he, took ?
office. Nor did it imply he would
cold-shoulder Romania's attempts
to improve its links with the West
?????
much faster than the Kremlin de-
sired.
But it did show that Mr. Nixon,
like Chancellor Willy Brandt in
Bonn, had come to accept the par-
adox that the Iron Curtain could
become more permeable only
through acknowledgment of Soviet
dominance to the east of it.
In this context, it is interesting
to note how the President dealt with
Eastern European .affairs in his
1971 and 1972 foreign policy reports.
"While the countries of (Eastern
Europe) are in close proximity to
the USSR, they also have historic
ties to Western Europe and the
United States," he said in the first
of these messages. "We will not
exploit these ties to undermine the
security of the Soviet Union. We
would not pretend that the facts
of history and geography do not
create siecial circumstances In -
Eastern Europe. We recognize a
divergence in social, political and
economic systems between East
and West."
0 0 0.
It is difficult to imagine a state-
ment that could have been more
reassuring to the Russians. It came
at a time when the Russians were
stalling on the Berlin accord, the
ice-breaking document in East-
West relations that had been signed
one year later when Mr. Nixon
gave his 1972 foreign policy assess-
ment. As a result, the President
evidently felt lie could direct his
calls for accommodation more
pointedly toward the Eastern Euro-
pean capitals.
Listen to these remarks in his
message of last February: "We do
not want to complicate the difficul-
ties of East European nations' re-
lations with their allies; neverthe-
less, there are ample opportunities
for economic, technical and cultural
cooperation on the basis of recipro-
city. The Eastern European coun-
tries themselves can determine the
pace and scope of their developing
relations with the United States."
In May, only three months after
those words were uttered, Mr. Nix-
on made the first presidential visit
in history to Poland as he headed
home from the Moscow summit.
0 ?
His appearance coincided with
the signing of a consular agreement
that the U.S. had sought for 10
years as a protection for American
citizens. While no specific trade
deals were completed, a bilateral
commission was set up and nego-
tiations were launched that could,,
in time, bring Poland the U.S. cred-
its, trade and technology it so eag-
erly desires. The Warsaw regime
has made a good-faith gesture by
opening talks on the partial repay-
ment of bonds sold by the non-
communist government In pre-war
Poland to hundreds of Americans
of Polish origin.
The Nixon trip to Warsaw was
followed by Secretary of State Rog-
ers'? July journey to Hungary,
where relations have been grim
since the 1956 uprising, and by Mr.
Ftsogers' conversations last month
with the foreign ministers of Czech-
oslovakia and Bulgaria.
The U.S. made headway with all
three governments in its quest for ?
consular treaties and, in return,
opened trade talks that could lead
eventually to the granting of
most - favored - nation commercial
arrangements?a top-priority mat-
ter for these economically deficit
nations.
Hungary. responded to Washing-
59
ton's efforts by agreein 'to nego-
tiate on a settlement orAmerican
war-damage and nationalization
claims. Bulgaria, a nation long '
content to stay deep in, the Soviet
shadow, agreed to send a deputy
prime minister to the U.S: next ,
year. Washington is waithing for
a less repressive political mood in, 1
Prague.
American relations With 'East
Germany will have to remain in
official abeyance until Bonn nor-
malizes its relations with East Ber-
lin and the two Germanys. enter
the United Nations. However.,It Is
now only a matter of time ,before
the United States and East, Ger-
many recognize one another and
begin the process of developing po-
litical, cultural and trade arrange i.
-
ments. In the meantime,, both
countries are exchanging visitors
at a cautiously faster pace.
? ? ?
While American-Soviet detente N
the major factor in Mr. Nixon's
policies toward Warsaw Pact na-
tions, there are other influences as
well.
One Is the approach of 'a Con:
ference on European Security and
Cooperation where the West will
try to encourage independent Im-
pulses on the part of Eastern Euro-
pean nations. Another is the con-
cern Washington shares with Soviet
bloc nations about restrictive trade -
policies of the Common ;Market. ,
Finally, there has been a change;
a two-way change, in the feelings
between the Communist reghties of
Eastern Europe and 'millions of
Americans of Eastern European
ethnic origin. While ideological hos-
tility remains, it is gradually being
overtaken by a resurgence of na-
tional sentiment that cannot fail
but make ,reconciliation
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NEW YORK TIMES
18 November 1972 ?
Bal rice of
Wi arut
I
? By .Anthony Lewis
' LONDON, Nov. 17 ? The Russian
State Choir performed the other night
hi the Queen Elizabeth Hall, London.
On the pavement outside there was a
counter performance: Victor YOran, a
Soviet Jew in exile, played works for
unaccompanied cello by Bach and Ravel.
Mr. Yoran was protesting the
refusal of Soviet authorities over the
last three years to let his wife, his
son and his mother join him in Israel.
.Others with him carried signs cori-
.demning the treatment of Jews in the
.U.S.S.R., for example the dismissal of
.24 Jewish musicians from the Moscow
-Radio Orchestra after one sought a
permit to leave for Israel.
The incident evoked a disparate
-memory. One of the most bizarre
moments in the 1972 Republican con- _
,vention came during a film on the ;
accomplishments of President Nixon..
When he was shown with Leonid
trezhnev of the U.S.S.R., the hall
in Miami burst into the loudest
'applause of the evening.
The applause was doubtless for the
.idea of d?nte rather than the person
Df Brezhnev. Still, it was remarkable
.to see thousands of Republicans
applauding at the burly image of the
Soviet Communist party leader, the
imposer of a head tax on Jewish emi-
grants, the author of the formal doc-
trine that the Soviet Union may sup-
WASHINGTON POST p
11 November 1972 ,1'103
press freedom in any Socialist country.
The delegates' enthusiasm for
friendship with the most powerful
Communist countries contrasted with
_their equally strong support for con-
tinued American air and naval assault
on one of the smallest, North Vietnam. '
Then Mr. Nixon, in his acceptance ?
speech, made a tender reference to
little Tanya of Leningrad, whose fam-
ily died during the German blockade;
he said nothing about the hundreds of
thousands of Vietnamese Tanyas and
other innocents killed, wounded and
made homeless by his bombs.
.IIow does one explain the difference
in American attitudes toward Commu-
nism in Moscow and Hanoi?
Has Russian Communism been
smoothed into something more con-
genial? Hardly. The persecution of dis-
senters, more cruel than of Jews, is
too well known to need rehearsing?
the punishment in mental hospitals
and labor camps. One savage recent
example is the death of the 35-year-
old poet Yuri Galanskov in a camp
this month. He was known to have
severe stomach ulcers; but when his
mother brought honey for him last
June, camp authorities barred it, say-
ing he was not sick but was "just a
hooligan who shirks his work."
Or perhaps we could say that the
Soviet Union does not invade other
countries, as North Vietnam did the
South in the spring offensive. But that
"invasion" was part of a war in what
had been one country for many hun-
dreth of years and is still regarded
as such by most Vietnamese. The
Soviet Union only a few years ago
brazenly invaded a totally foreign
country, Czechoslovakia. Have we for- .
gotten already?
No, the reason for the difference in
attitudes is plain enough. The Soviet
Union is big, powerful and dangerous
to the United States. North Vietnam is
small, weak and no danger whatever
?a country we can afford to abuse.
Power is a reality in the world, and
it is necessary wisdom for the United
States to recognize that. We have no
effective power to help the Czechs and
would not improve things by delusions
to the contrary. D?nte with the,
soviet Union, as in the SALT agree-
ment, serves important purposes what-
everthe nature of Soviet society.
The question is whether the reality
of power ev :Ades more human con-
cerns in foreign policy. Henry Kissin-
ger might well say yes; he might
indeed regard anyone who asked .such
question as a sentimentalist. But
Americans still do have to live with
their foreign policy, so they ought' to
iyiderstand its human consequences.
A world balanced among the strong
May have ,grave consequences for the
Areak. That is because the balance is
essentially an agreement by the power-
ful to let each other have their own
Way in their own spheres.
Andrei Sakharov, the great Russian
"dissenter, said in a recent interview
that things had grown worse in the
U.S.S.R. since Mr. Nixon's visit 'to fl
Moscow: "The authorities seem more
impudent because they feel that with
d?nte they can now ignore Western
public opinion." Limits on American
influence in Soviet affairs may be an '
inescapable part of great-power agree-
ment. But it does not follow that we
must cease to care about what we do
'ourselves, in our wort'.
lropovich: The Discord of Ddeute
On Nov. 1, on the basis ,of his personal reply,
-Thiel 'College .in Greenville,. Pa., announced that
the great Russian cellist Mstislav Rostropovich was
-to perform ti ere. on Nov. 16, and to receive an
honorary degr.,,e. But yesterday the Soviet Embassy
.in Washington: offering the patently phony excuse
.that Mr. Rostropovich's schedule was full, told
Thiei that the lcellist and his wife, soprano Galina
Vishnevskaya, 'Prouldn't come. Obviously, he is be-
ing humiliated', and caged by his government for
his long and I onorable record of standing up for
human rights in the Soviet Union. Ilk statement
in defense of Nobel laureate Alexander Solzhenit-
syn a year 'agt..- is perhaps the best publicized part
of that record.
There is, to sure, nothing new in the Krem-
lin's treating i most distinguished citizens in this
barbarie fasliliti. However, there is something new,
mid sonintillip. extremely, disturbing, in the con-
text of this last repression. Within the last year,
Soviet-American relations have notably improved:
They aro "the ..)est yet," the Soviet ambassador ob-
served the otter evening. President Nixon cam-
paigned effecti:/ely .for re-election on his contribu-
tion to this .ad;,ance in Soviet-American relations.
Political and sti.alegie dialogue is proceeding, trade
is expanding, ,be atmosphere is bright. The ques-
tion forced by the Restropovich ban is whether
all of these considerable advantages are to be
gained by a sellout of the values in which this na-
tion, at least, kisupposedly believes. Does Moscow
intend to use Soviet-American
Approved For Reiease zu
American concern for violations of human rights- 't
in the Soviet Union? -? The issue, we submit,
to the heart of the purpose and meaning of detente,-,;
and of American public support for it.,
At the May summit in Moscow, furthermore, Mr
'Brezhnev agreed with Mr. Nixon on a set of "Basic,
Principles of Mutual Relations." Principle No. 9 ,
states: "The two sides reaffirm their intention to ,
deepen cultural ties with one another and to en-
courage fuller familiarization with each other's,
cultural values. They will promote improved con;
ditions for cultural exchanges." A case can be made i
that the leash on Mr. Itostropc.vich does indeed ,
familiarize the United States with official Soviet
cultural values, but this can hardly be what the
Nixon-Brezhnev declaration , had in mind. H Mr.
Nixon means to have the "Basic Principles" re-
garded as more than a scrap of paper, then he can
hardly fail to take appropriate official cognizance ?
of an act which Is ii transparent violation of
We would prefer to believe that the Rostropovich
affair is the result not of a personal intercession''
by Mr. Brezhnev but of one of those bureaucratic'
tradeoffs ? something for Moscow's ideological.
hardhats?that are not entirely Unknown in Amer-
ican politics either. Fortunately, there is still time
arid polities' room ror the Miter low.ieval and
Informal Soviet Embassy ban to be set aside. Mr.
Nixon, himself an earlier recipient of a Thiel lion-
orary degree, by the way, and Mr. Brezhnev, by all
administration accounts a broad-minded man intent
on detente, surely have a common interest in 60
As-?1515MtA3iiktittPrel s'J 200bels-41 to Thiel.'
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WASHINGTON STAR
12 November 1972
CARL T. ROWAN
25 Years for Trans:706n Prat Madness to Sanity
Out of Bonn comes the al-
most incredible announcement
that West Germany and East
Germany will treat each other ?
civilly, and as two separate,:
respectful states.
This is especially astonish-
ing to anyone aware of the
. many times during the last,
quarter-century when rivalry,
between the two Germanies
threatened to plunge the world
Into nuclear war.
I remember a badly shaken
John F. Kennedy returning
from a Vienna meeting with
Soviet Premier Nikita IChru;
shchev, rushing desperately
to beef up U.S. conventional
military forces after the Rus-
shins jolted him with an ulti-
matum about Berlin.
Kennedy would not have be-
lieved that passage of another
decade could bring the kind of
detente we now see.
Then there are the Koreas.
Talking to each other for a
change. Making noises sug-
gesting that, despite the ob-
stacles of willful, power-loving
men at the top of each govern-
ment, the same kind of thaw
Is in the cards for them.
A f ter the investment of
scores of thousands of U.S.,
WASHINGTON STAR
13 November 1972 '
RAY CROMLEY
Europ
There is growing alarm
within the Nixon administra-
tion over, the economic pro-
grams of our West European
allies.
What bothers the Nixon
men deeply is a program now
being worked out in the Euro-
pean Common Market which
aims eventually at a bloc of 60
countries, each giving the oth-
ers trade preferences and dis-
criminating against the prod-
ucts of the United States and
other nonmember lands.
The first step aims at bring-
ing in a group of Mediterra-
nean lands. Quiet behind-
the-scenes talks are going_
ahead on this first-step pro-
gram now despite some con-
cerned effort on the part of
special U.S. trade representa-
tives to stem the tide.
This system of protection
and discrimination would, of
course, put the United States
at a severe trade disadvan-
tage. Worse yet, the Nixon ec-
onomic-trade specialists here
fear, it would set off a/ race
Chinese and Korean lives and
many billions of dollars in that
? fratricidal conflict, the pas-
sions now wane somewhat.
? Then there is the People's
? Republic of China. In the first
? years of this last quarter-
? century even a word or ges-
, tyre of civility by an Ameri-
can was political suicide. The
United States was caught up
? in mean recriminations over
"who lost China" to the Com-
munists. Emotionalizing over
China's involvement in the,
? Korean war replaced any log-
ical thinking about what must
? be the ultimate place in world
society of a country inhabited
by more than a fifth of the
world's people.
Only after more than two
decades, when only rabid
American conservatives were
still spleenful in their view of
? Peking, was it possible for a
? Republican president to open
a new dialogue and set about
normalizing relations with
China.
We look back at the hours
, wasted in angry rhetoric hurl-
ed at China in the United Na-
tions, in Congress, in U.S.
? political campaigning, and re-
call how the bitter insults were
? duplicated in Peking, and eve
' shake our heads in sardonic
laughter.
Now there is Indochina.
Another of those quarter-cert..
turylong abominations. Peace
may not be nearly as close
at hand as the American
people have been led to be-
lieve, but it seems clear that
"reconciliation and concord"
, among the people of Vietnam
is under way.
And once again we shall
shake our heads in wonder-
ment that we sacrificed so
. many American lives, helped
snuff out so many Asian lives,
dropped so many bombs and
destroyed so many people and
'things, only to see the princi-
pals to the conflict shako
hands and take the more ra-
tional route of negotiations.
Maybe there is a lesson in
all this. Perhaps, just as
nature establishes a nine-
month gestation period? for
humans and a 645-day period
for elephants, a 25-year period
Is required to convert Interna-
tional madness to sanity.
The lesson, then, would be
that utter restraint is called
for by the rest of mankind
while Combatants ? are-- given
time. to. come back to their
senses.
, You think of the many times
when the U.S. and Night ,
could have gone to war per.
the Germanys?and shu er.
You think how, inviting
was for the United States to
take rash action after the
seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo. -
or North Korea's shooting
down of our EC-121 aircraft, ?
or the many periodic out-
bursts of violence in the do-
'militarized zone between the'
two Koreas. And you sigh in
relief.
This is not to suggest that
there will not be more killing
in Indochina or more crises in
Europe. An observation of
the current state of mankind ,
suggests that it is folly to ex-
poet lasting peace?or even a
generation of it.
But it may be that if the .
great powers keep their cool,
these regional and internal
squabbles need not blow -up
into massive conflagrations. ?
. And who knows but what man ;
might cut the period of transi-
tion from madness to sanity '
? from 25 years to 20, Or even ?
to 10?
r e Bloc Bother IJIX?
worldwide to set up competing
protectionist trade blocs. This
development would knock the
props out of the free trade
policies which American Pres-
idents ? Republican and Dem-
ocrats alike ? have pushed for
the past two decades. However
inconsistent our other policies
from time to time, both politi-
cal parties have united on the
necessity for cutting trade
barriers as a stimulus to pros-
perity.
The growth of these protec-
tionist blocs might make it
very difficult Indeed for the
United States to recover from
Its unfavorable balance of
trade unless Washington too
resorted to stiff import con-
trols and set up an internation-
al preference bloc .of its own.
The Europeans tell Nixon's
protesting representatives that
the Tieing tide of UM, teolitio.
logy Is forcing them Into Ode
protectionism.
The U.S. technology base is
too strong, and growing too
rapidly, they claim, for Euro-
peans to compet e. First
there's the vast U.S. market
itself, which sparks new tech-
nology and offers the opportu-
nity for profitable exploitation
of new developments. Then
there's the worldwide spread
of U.S. companies which en-
ables this country to learn
quickly, and to rapidly take
advantage, of technological
improvements wherever
they're developed. The finan-
cial strength of these interna-
tional U.S. concerns provides
them with the necessary capi-
tal to put these advanced tech-
nological discoveries into use
with amazing speed, the Euro-
pean Common Market men
say. As a result, they claim,
Europe must in self-defense
expand its own base. Thus the
plan for a 60-country alliance.
But the Europeans are in-
creasingly worried about
Am eric an countermoves.
Tiiny'vo mod W fflhtiWfl to
end the war in Viet Nam and
to build relations with the
Communist lands and thus
ease the cold war. Now that
President Nixon is following
this advice, they're worried
their plans for discrimina4g
against the United States 'may.
drive this country, into eco-
nomic alliances with Russia
and China, and cause Wash-
ington to direct U S. inveSt-
ment and developmeat aid ern;
phasis to Southeast Asie and
the Far East in the next dec-
ade, leaving West Europe
(with its heavy need for? ad-
vanced technology, invest-
ment) somewhat out' !.:1 the,
cold. ?
' The dilemma of the Europe- .
ans is clear and sharp. They
need U.S. advanced technolo-
gy, yet they want to be free Of
this dependence. They want to
discriminate against the Unit-
ed States economically, but
not so sharply the United
States will react strongly
enough to injure their cconp-' '
mies.
Thdlit fetirN 1110
the U.S negotiators some' le-
verage. This problem has no
solution so dramatic as the
Moscow and Peking visits. But,
it will occupy Nixon for some
years to come. ?
61
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Newsweek, November 279 1972
ad raze . $v
3 0 1-
py Weathe
rt?- or once, Henry Kissinger's timing was
off. Even as the President's national
security adviser was deeply immersed in
a final round of Vietnam peace talks,
the U.S. foreign policy establishment was
about to shift its attention to a different
part of the world. "Nineteen seventy-
three will be the year of Europe," Ad-
ministration officials say?and to prove it
they have scheduled a mind-boggling
series of European negotiations that, in
a quieter way, promise to have as great
a global impact as Mr. Nixon's dramatic
trips to Peking and Moscow in 1972.
It all begins this week when the U.S.
will join 33 other nations in Helsinki
for a preliminary round of talks on the
question of European security. At the
same time, the U.S. and Russia will meet
in Geneva to begin the second phase
of talks on limiting strategic weapons.
Then, after the first of the year, East
and West will tackle the thorny problem
of how to reduce military forces in Cen-
tral Europe. And to cap it all off, next
summer will usher in the vitally impor-
tant "Nixon round" of meetings on Euro-
pean trade. "Fasten your seat belts," one
Western diplomat said last week. "It's
going to be a bumpy Europe for the
next four years."
Indeed it is. During his second term
in office, Mr. Nixon is widely expected
to pursue a radically new kind of policy
toward Europe. Essentially, there will
be two major themes. First, the Presi-
dent intends to treat both his old ad-
versaries in the East and his old friends
in the West with equal toughness. Sec-
ond, he plans to use the economic might
of the U.S. as his chief weapon in deal-
ing with Europe?East and West. What
all this means is that the U.S. is ready to
launch its most ambitious diplomatic
offensive in Europe in the past two
decades. Below, NEWSWEEK examines the
main issues and the likely outcome of
this European strategy:
DEALING WITH OLD ADVERSARIES
Since 1964, the Soviet Union has been
clamoring for a Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).
Moscow's hope is to obtain the seal of
diplomatic approval on the postwar sta-
tus quo?a divided Europe in which Rus-
sia can exercise hegemony over the East-
ern portion while penetrating the West
politically. The West has been wary,
but sonic months ago?after the Soviets
offered concessions guaranteeing West-
ern rights in Berlin?the U.S. gave its
nod. Still, there was one hitch. The
Nixon Administration insisted that sep-
arate talks be held simultaneously on
mutual and balanced reduction of East-
ern and Western forces ? in Europe
(MBFR)?a hard-nosed bit of bargain-
ing that Moscow reluctantly accepted.
The opening of the Helsinki talks on
European security represents something
of a diplomatic victory for the Russians.
But the Western delegations, and par-
ticularly that of the U.S., have no inten-
tion of letting the Soviets get their own
way in the Finnish capital. The major
Ahead
wrangling will come over the agenda of
the full conference. The Russians would
like the preliminary session in Helsinki to
do no more than establish a vague
agenda and set a date for the conference.
But the U.S., with the support of its
NATO allies, means to bold out for a
meaningful agenda that could lead to-
ward concrete agreements. "We don't
want to spoil their party," said an Ameri-
can diplomat in Moscow. "But we do want
it to produce something more tangible
than pious propaganda declarations."
Along with its Western allies, the U.S.
will make it plain that the "inviolability
of European borders," about which the
Russians are expected to make much
fuss, should also apply to the countries
of the Eastern bloc?a slap at the so-
called Brezhnev doctrine of "limited
sovereignty" that permits Moscow to
interfere in the internal affairs of its sat-
ellites. The West may even demand
that the Russians discuss such embar-
rassing questions as the free flow of in-
formation and people and exit visas for
Soviet Jews. And while the Russians hope
to drive wedges between the U.S. and
its allies, Washington believes it can en-
courage a certain degree of independ-
ence on the part of the Eastern Euro-
peans. In exchange for support in the
agenda battle, the U.S. is said to be pre-
paring to offer huge American invest-
ments to the Eastern Europeans. "In the
end," remarked one American official,
"the Soviets may kick themselves for
having thought up such a conference."
Balanced: The U.S. is expected to
take the same tough line in the MBFR
talks. Moscow will argue that cuts should
be made on a man-for-man, tank-for-tank
basis. But since the forces of the Warsaw
Pact outnumber NATO's 1 million to
500,000?and since Soviet troops in East-
ern Europe would be moving back a mere
500 miles into their own country while
U.S. troops in Germany would withdraw
aeross the Atlantic?the U.S. will argue
for a "balanced" reduction in forces. This
means the Soviet Union will be asked to
cut its troop strength by a greater per-
centage to make up for its geographic
proximity to Western Europe.
Despite all the possible pitfalls in these
complex negotiations, high U.S. officials
are confident that Washington is dealing
from diplomatic strength. "The Soviets
need us more than we need them," says
one U.S. expert. "They know the tech-
nology gap between the U.S.S.R. and
the rest of the world is widening and
they also need to acquire marketing and
management skills. We can give them
those things in exchange for a more lib-
eral attitude toward East Europe and for
a reasonable approach to troop reduc-
tion. That's what d?nte could be about
?if they play their cards right."
NEGOTIATING WITH OLD FRIENDS
As seen from Western Europe, the
whole question of European security and
force reductions is a two-edged swoid.
The West Europeans are concerned that
62
'the Nixon Administration will use the
threat of a drastic and unilateral reduc-
tion in U.S. troop strength in Europe to
get the members of the expanded Com-
mon Market to lower their, barriers to
U.S. trade. Fearing a crisis in EEC-U.S.
relations, the Europeans 'point to Mr.
Nixon's recent statement that lp will
take action to insure "that the W., can
continue to get a proper break our
trading relations with other nations..,
Although the President did not liame
the "other nations," he is known to he
exercised over the system of trade prac-
tices being constructed by the Common
Market. A tariff wall around the Market
was one thing and it was understandable
that Europe's former colonies in Africa
would get preferential trade treatment.
But then came the concept of "reverse
preferences," whereby the former col-
onies pledged themselves to give EEC
bidders preference in investment proj-
ects in their area. Next, the EEC began
to expand the concept of preferential
'trade treatment to huge areas outside
its traditional zones of concern. Special
deals were made for the import of citrus
fruit from Spain and Israel and the talk
in Brussels began to turn to the possibili-
ty of associate membership in the EEC
for Mexico and Singapore. At this point,
the Nixon Administration trade experts
blew up. "If the EEC keeps this up,' said
one, "they will have a system that effec-
tively fences out all competition from the
U.S. and Japan."
Rivalry: What moves the U.S. will
make to counter the EEC remains to
be seen. But it seems likely that next
summer's "Nixon round" of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade will be
a lively one, with the U.S. pushing hard
for clearer rules governing trade be--
tween the U.S. and the EEC. Some Eu-
ropeans, however, fear that the U.S. in-
tends to go even farther than that in its
trade rivalry with the EEC. "The U.S. is .
planning a major trade offensive in the
Eastern European countries," insists one
EEC official. "They will try to set up au-
tomobile plants there, taking advantage,
of the cheap labor, and flood the EEC:
countries with Eastern-made cars with
good old American names."
Unless some way is found to head off
a full-fledged trade war between the,
U.S. and the EEC, the former allies:
might find themselves in a bitter rivalry.
for the available energy resources in the'
world. So far, the Nixon Administration:.
has talked tough but done little to estab-
lish a high-level dialogue with the EEC:
about these problems. And many diplo-
mats on both sides of the Atlantic are,
fearful that the economic difficulties ?
could one day lead to a political confron-
tation between the U.S. and Western
Europe. "Nixon," says one European,
may go down in history not just as the .
President who normalized relations with
China and Russia but as the man respon-
sible for the U.S. and Europe breaking
their bonds and going their own ways."
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MANCHESTER GUARDIAN
4 NOV 1372.
.VAJ1 t
e fault
e CIA?
?
? i
-Walter Schwarz, New Delhi, on the genesis'
of an Indian myth
What goes wrong in India used
to be blamed on the British, or
the failing monsoons, or the
Pakistanis, or ? the pro-Chinese
Communists. Now, suddenly, it's
? the CIA.
In the last few weeks Mrs Gandhi
and her top party officials have
named the CIA as responsible for
riots in Delhi and Bihar, language
disturbances in Assam, student
demonstrations in Punjab and
Kerala, unrest in Kashmir, hostile
processions in West Bengal and,
most sinister of all, the emergence
of a grand alliance among opposi -
tion parties.
The fashion was born in Sept-
ember when the Congress Party
President, . Dr Shankar Dayal
Sharma, said at a press confer-
ence that "the CIA is creating
conflict in my country and using
its stooges for making peaceful
demonstrations violent."
Whether this was the opening
shot in a deliberate campaign to
make India spy-conscious is not
clear. Perhaps having come out
with it, Dr Sharma could not dis ?
own it, and his Prime Minister
could not disown hi in. Perhaps it
was such a popular thing to say
that Dr Sharma went on saying it
and the others joined in.
Whatever the reasons behind
the timing, it is fairly clear that
Mrs Gandhi, Dr Sharma, and a
great many other Indians believe.
the charges to have more than a
grain of truth.
What Dr Sharma thinks the CIA
has in mind was explained at his
next press conference. It meant
"to show after all that India is
not strong, but economically weak
and politically disjointed and Mrs
Gandhi's victory only an accident."
For her part Mrs Gandhi said she
agreed there was a "cult of
violence" and that this was
fomented by "foreign Powers which ,
hate to see India strong." More
specifically, she said the CIA had
"lain dormant" during the Bangla -
desh war "because the people
were united." Its activities had
now been "revived." .
After this stamp of approval,
Chief Ministers and Party bosses
all the .way from Kashmir to
:Kerala came out with what the
CIA had been doing to rock their
'particular boats. , 'Phe ? Chief
Minister of Punjab found the CIA
behind the demonstrations of the
ultra -right-wing Alkali Dal Party,
while his colleague hi West Bengal
singled out the pro -Chinese Com -
munist Party as the ? agency's
stooges.
Nobody offered evidence. It is
not Up to us to prove it but it is
up to the CIA to disprove it,"
said Mrs Gandhi haughtily.
This remark provoked Mr Rogers
into raising the whole matter with
India's Foreign Minister in Wash -
ington. Mrs Gandi now explained
that she had meant that the CIA's
doings were already well enough
documented up and down the
world.
The Americans reacted quietly..
The Embassy in Delhi put out a
two-line statement calling Dr
Sharma's original attack "out-
rageous and totally devoid of fact."
Then it kept quiet, waiting for the
storm to blow over. Mr Rogers
assured Mr Swaran Singh that no
CIA activities were harmful to
India.
Sceptics in Delhi put the whole
thing down to political manoeuvr-
ing. "Methinks the lady protests
too much," said the Indian
Express, while the Hindustan
Times found it "difficult to resist
the feeling that the Congress
Party is casting about desperately
for allies and scapegoats for its
relatively poor performances in
the economy."
It was indeed a time of food
riots after a drought, and of mount-
ing popular exasperation over
rising prices and corruption. The
Congress Party was about to hold
its annual committee meeting,
where the leadership was expected
to be attacked from within by the
left wing. And both Left and Right
opposition parties were planning
nation-wide demonstrations. As a
scapegoat and a diversion, the
*CIA filled the bill.
Politics may account for the,
timing of the anti -CIA campaign.
But the proposition that the United
States is actively interested in
preventing India from becoming
strong is very widely accepted ?
and Mrs Gandhi is clearly among
the believers. For most Indians
the final doubts were. dispelled
:luring the Bangladesh .war, when
toe Seventh Fleetfcarrier appeared
in the Bay of Bengal.
The correspondence columns of
Delhi newspapers have been less
sceptical than the editorials.
Among scores of irate anti -CIA
letters the least violent was 'from
a kind sohl who sought to excuse
the Embassy for its denial on the
grounds that AmeriePu Ambas
sadors never knewwhat the CIA.
was up to. '
.The American role here has.
been an object lesson in how to ?
: give aid 'and win enemies. In the ?
last twenty years India got more
'than ten thoUsand million dollars' .
worth of American aid ? more ?
than from all other countries put,
63
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together. In one drought after
another, American surplus wheat
and rice staved off famine. The
"green revolution" which has
begun to make India independent
of food imports was partly financed
by American dollars, as was nearly
every branch of education, welfare,
industry, and development.
The dependence bred resent-
ment. And now that the aid has
been cut off as a result of the war
with Pakistan, there is fresh
resentment. A veteran of the Con-
gress ?Party's freedom struggle
and now one of Mrs Gandhi's
senior colleagues assured me that
"Americans are far more arrogant
than the British ever were. Aid
was for their own benefit, not
ours." This minister said he saw
a pattern running through all the
riots which suggested to him that
the CIA was master-minding them.
The wheat and rice used to be
paid for in rupees which were
banked here for American use.
Some of the money went on
internal aid projects. A lot of it
paid for the hugely staffed diplo-
matic and aid missions here ?
and also paid the expenses of an
army of visiting American
scholars. These scholars did much -
to lengthen the CIA's shadow het
because they were always going ?-
off to sensitive border areas like
%Vest Bengal or Assam to write
their theses. Some who were not
CIA did not help matters by
publicly declaring that the CIA
had "approached" them.
The American profile has now
been drastically lowered. Even
before the war the food stopped
coming in because 'it was not
needed. The war stopped all aid
not tied to projects ? which stilt
leaves about a hundred million
dollars a year coming in. The.
Indians themselves have put a
stop to the wandering scholars by
insisting that they operate in the
framework of a local university.
No doubt the CIA is still here,
though perhaps it has pruned its
numbers as drastically as the US
Aid Mission has. The embassy still
lists 108 diplomats in Delhi (the
British 51, the Russians 67). The
American mission includes a
"defence supply representative"
and two assistants, though no
American arms have arrived here
for many months. (An embassy
spokesman said these people are
being phased out.'!)
In addition to fact-finding, the
CIA may well give funds to
political parties and individual
political friends, just as . the
Russians are widely assumed to
finance the pro-Moscow Com-
munists and the Chinese to help
their own faction. But the notion
that the CIA organises food riots
and student demonstrations has
yet to be proved, or even made to
sound plausible.
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CBRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
11 November 1972
\h/ 90 ITC
-
f
\
CD
Ion
By John K. Cooley
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
Cairo
President Sadat feels obliged to continue
relying on Soviet military and economic aid,
partly because the British and French Gov-
ernments refused to deliver to Egypt their
advanced Anglo-French Jaguar fighter
plane, it has been learned here.
Failure of the former Egyptian war min-
ister, Lt. Gen. Muhammad Saddek, to obtain
the planes may have been one reason for his
resignation or dismissal by President Sadat
last month, some qualified Egyptian observ-
ers believe.
Cairo sounded out the London and Paris
governments about purchasing the Jaguar
before President Sadat removed Soviet mili-
tary advisers from Egypt last July, these
sources say.
Request repeated
The request was repeated in more fortnal
fashion after the Soviet departure and new
Soviet refusals to supply the advanced MIG.
23 fighter-bomber. After the request had
moved up to the highest levels of both
governments, secret British and French
Cabinet decisions rejected it for reasons that
have not veen made public.
What General Saddek and Egyptian Air
Force commander, Maj. Gen. Hosni Emba-
rek, evidently hoped was to obtain credit
purchases of an entire Western-supplied
defense system. This would have involved
delivery of several squadrons of both the
training and tactical-strike version of the
Jaguar, as well as an integrated air-defense
system of a type similar to that used by
NATO in Europe.
Retraining involved
This would have meant phasing down
Soviet help, five to six years of retraining the
Egyptian armed forces, and new Western
options to Egypt for purchasing other mili-
tary equipment as well, it is understood. The
Jaguar, developing Mach 1.7 speed at about
33,000 feet altitude, has shorter range and
lighter payload than Israel's U.S.-supplied
Phantoms, and lower ceiling and speed than
the Soviet MIG-23. But it is comparable with,
pt to
WI
NJaylefr,
and some experts think superior to, the MTG.
21, the Soviet-supplied standard aircraft of
the Egyptian and Syrian Air Forces.
Israel claimed shooting down two Syrian
MIG-21's in an air and artillery battle
continuing through most of the day Nov. 10.
Syria claimed it shot down four Israeli planes
of unspecified type and admitted losing two of
its own. Israel denied losing any of its
aircraft, in the first air battle on the Israel-
Syrian front since Sept. 8.
Appearance of Syrian MIG-21's in combat
was thought by some Arab observers to be
evidence of new Soviet deliveries to Syria.
Syria has mainly used the slower and much
older MIG-17's and occasionally MIG-19's in
past fighting.
Final rejection
A final Anglo-French rejection of the
Egyptian request for Jaguars was one reason
for Egyptian Prime Minister Aziz Sidky's trip
to Moscow Oct. 16-18. During this trip Mr.
Sidky was again told that Moscow could not
presently supply the MIG-23.
Careful observers of the Egyptian scene
believe the Sadat government's desire for an
advanced air combat system ? whether the
MIG or the Jaguar ? is a quest for a prestige
symbol proving that at least one big power
has confidence in Egypt.
Israel in better shape
It is, however, not a sign that President
Sadat really wants full-scale resumption of
hostilities to expel Israeli troops from Sinai.
Either the MIG-23 or the Jaguar system
would require many years more of rigorous
training. Egypt is estimated to have one
trained pilot for each of the Soviet-made
front-line combat planes it possesses, while
Israel has more like three trained pilots for
every aircraft.
General Saddek's successor as War Min-
ister, Lt. Gen. Ahmed Ismail, has quietly
notified Western governments that the Egyp-
tian Army command will never again allow
Russian advisers to get key command. and
advisory posts in the Egyptian armed forces.
This was accepted as tacit reassurance
that in case of a Soviet-Western confrontation
in Europe or elsewhere, Soviet personnel or
units in Egypt could not act against Western
forces in the Mediterranean.
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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
28 November 1972
e
By David Winder
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
United Nations, N.Y.
Nobody here expects the Middle East peace
dove to be released during this week's
General Assembly debate.
If it is to be released at all, it will come next
year with some possible American initiative
for an interim agreement.
One informed observer typified the rather
languid attitude of the United Nations these
days when he said: "People are waiting for
the UN General Assembly session to fade into
history; are waiting for the turn of the year to
come and then they can look at the problem
again."..
There is considerable expectation that
after President Nixon has shaken down his
new Cabinet some time in the new year, the
administration will be forthcoming with
some kind of partial agreement between
Israel and Egypt for the reopening of the Suez
Canal.
No other peace plan ? not withstanding the
UN's traditional role here or increasing
European desires to play a settlement role ?
is envisaged yet.
As one European diplomat put it, "Nobody
wants to cross wires with the Americans."
Debate due for scrutiny
The debate will be watched for any signs of
flexibility in the parties' approach to any
possible negotiations.
As far as the UN is concerned, Israel is
expected to take an even tougher position.
For some time how there have been veiled
warnings about the relevance of Security
Council Resolution 242.
Israel probably will let it be known that if it
is pushed around too much at the UN, it may?
drop altogether its interest in 242 as a basis
for any future settlement.
This 1967 resolution is considered the
central core for any peace settlement since it
was found acceptable to both the Israelis and
the Egyptians. It calls for Israeli withdrawal
from occupied territories and Egypt's re-
spect for safe, secure, internationally recog-
nized boundaries.
Israel's unsympathetic attitude to the UN ,
is well known, and Western observers feel
that in spite of official Israeli denIals
Foreign Minister Abba Eban's absence from
this year's Middle East debate typifies
Israel's back-of-the-hand attitude to the UN
these days.
Willingness indicated
However, Israelis are thought to be respon-
sive now to some diplomatic prodding from
the United States.
In principle at least, Israel has been,
making such sounds as to suggest a willing-
ness to make concessions. But the concern
here is that Israeli concessions inevitably
would be at a pace not only of their own ,
choosing but also at a pace unacceptable to
the Arabs.
ve may not ugiter
Thus any American calls for major Israeli
concessions such as vacating the Suez Canal
east bank and the reopening of the canal itself
could come up against stiff Israeli resistance.
The other vexing problem for Middle East
specialists is that both Egypt and Israel have
of late been indulging in a game of diplomatic
hide and seek. In short they are never
simultaneously interested in seeking the
same objectives at the same time.
? Israel for instance now appears more
interested in an interim arrangement pro-
vided there are no pre-conditions. Egypt,
which had earlier professed an interest, cold
shoulders this approach now.
Officials disappointed
Much of Egypt's disenchantment with the
? American formula is directly attributable to
Cairo's sour feelings about Washington.
One observer here said: "The Egyptians
are bitterly disappointed with the fact that
the Americans showed no response to the
expulsion of the Russians. They desperately
wanted some gesture to show appreciation."
This perhaps explains Egypt's more than
usual preoccupation with a UN-type settle-
ment based on Security Council Resolution
242.
Middle East peace watchers here hope that
whatever resolution is approved in the 'com-
ing debate will not be so tough as to present
obstacles to the peacemaking processes they,
see as inevitably restarting in the new year.
RICHMOND NEWS LEADER
11 Nov 1972
Garbo and Insults:
Relations between India and the
United States turned sour last year
when the Nixon Administration sided
with Pakistan in the short-lived Indo-
Pakistani War. Even so, the United
States had so long. supported India's
"experiment in democracy" that most
observers felt that after a reasonable
cooling-off period, the giant . of the
West and the giant of South Asia
'would soon be smiling at each other
once again.
Not so. Under the peace-loving,
iron-handed rule of Prime Minister In-
dira Gandhi, India has created a cult
of anti-Americanism that would do
any two-bit African or Latin American
country proud. According to Indian of-
ficials, the United States is respon-
sible for just about every ill imagi-
nable, except perhaps the circum-
stance that Mrs. Gandhi wasinot born
a boy. Leading .the list of American
bad guys is the Central Intelligence.
Agency, that fascist-loaded organiza-
tion which preys on poor, defenseless
nations at every opportunity.
Indeed, Indian Communists now
?
HINDUSTAN TIMES
2 November 1972
Mody says he
is CIA agent
Hindustan Times Correspondent
NEW DELHI, Nov. 1 ? "I
am a CIA agent." With this
Inscribed on a large bronze
badge hung around his neck,
the Swatantra Party Prest.
dent and MP. Mr Piloo Mody,
was today seen going round ,
the Central Hall of Parlia-
ment.
Mr Mody said he intended
to wear the badge during the
forthcoming session of Parlia-
ment if for no other reason,
at least to provoke the Gov-
ernment which had suddenly
discovered the dangerous act!-.
vities of the CIA.
As the idea caught on, Mr
Mody said he had no doubt
there would be a mad rush
for the badges, particularly
among the student community.
His concern was whether
those who might take to this
trade would be able to pro-
duce an adequate number of
badges to meet the demand.4:
claim that the United. States will post
Ambassador Carol Laise from Nepal
to New Delhi as part of an expanded
CIA sabotage effort. Wife of that well-
known CIA operative, Ambassador to
Vietnam Ellsworth Bunker, Miss Laise
was described the other day as a
"CIA Matt Hari," whose appointment
.to New Delhi would be "another insult
. . to India"?an insult, no doubt,
akin to the U.S. cutoff of aid to India :
following the December hostilities. ,
. In fact, Indian ant-Americanism
has grown in direct proportion to the
number of days during which India
has been forced to struggle on without
sugar from Uncle Sam: fewer dollars, If
more Charges of CIA interference. So
all the United States needs to do is to'start providing providing fjnancial , support
.again, and Miss Laise will not have to; -.-
? worry about being compared to Greta
Garbo..
Then again, Mrs. Gandhi probably
.would claim, even as she stuffed her
-piggy bank, that the Nixon Adminis-
tration was trying to Insult her with ;
money.
6)
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WASHINGTON POST
19 November 1972
Gen .0 Amin Gqi, a Different Blessage
5q7PTINh Aid: An
tr, 0
Eleettion Deeclition
By Jim
KAMPALA?Although the election has
passed, an apparent attempt by the Nixon
administration to use the executive branch
to bolster the President's margin of victory
continues to have impact in the deeply trou-
bled East African country of Uganda.
The effort involved a decision by the State
Department to deceive the American public
about its intentions to continue financial aid
to the regime of President Idi Amin in the
wake of Amin's sympathetic mention of Hit-
ler's method of dealing with Jews last Sep-
tember.
After its spokesman, Charles Bray, told
newsmen in Washington that a development
loan to Uganda was being held up as a result
of American displeasure with Amin, the de-
partment cabled instructions to American
Ambassador Thomas P. Melady in Kampala
to tell Amin that Bray's straightforward?as-
sertion had been "misinterpreted".
Melady, who had beseeched Washington to
continue aid, was also instructed to assure
Amin that there was no connection between
technical delays that had developed on the
loan and Amin's statement on Hitler. ,
After Amin ignored Melady's plea that
this assurance should be kept secret and re-
leased it through the Uganda Press, Bray
evaded direct comment on the conflicting
American positions In Washington and Kam-
pala. ?
But he election is over now and the im-
pact of Jewish votes on foreign Policy may
have lessened. The United Stoles is clearly
pushing ahead with plans to provide more
than $6-million in aid to Amin's government,
which has shown no sign of responding to
any American attempts to moderate Amin's
nation-destroying excesses.
Moreover, the aid is being channeled to a
government that with every passing day ap-
pears to be less able to provide its share of
the money and government manpower
needed to administer aid projects.
,. Amin has allowed his army to slaughter
off thousands of soldiers from tribes antag.
onistic to his rule and has apparently en- ?
cour-aged his security forces to eliminate
many of the country's best educated men,
whom he feared as a threat. The death toll
since Amin took power in 1971 includes
three Americans.
Government ministers and civil servants,
whom Amin publicly ridiculed last week as
"weak" and "i tile" now refuse to make even
minor decisions for fear of attracting the
general's attention and losing either their
jobs or their lives.
The two loans the United States is on the
verge of formally awarding to Uganda are,
for building teacher training institutes and
for an animal husbandry project. The fact
that they are relatively small does little to
mitigate their psychological importance, es-
pecially In a time when aid is hard to come
by in general and especially in Africa, where
a number of other governments have shown
themselves capable of administering such
loans diligently.
They will also follow a statement by .Amin
last week praising the ? Palestinians for the
intelligence they have shown. in hijacking
planes. Tire United States, which has put it-
self at the forefront of the campaign against
Approved For Release 2001
110aglana
international terror-lam, is not taken note
of the new Amin statement.
One of the two principal argun'q.nts that
'emerge from discussions with those here
who support going ahead wii.h the loans are
that they were originally offered several
,years ago, before Amin ousted President
Milton Obote.
There is a "moral obligation" on the part
of the United Staes to go ahead with the aid,
this argument holds. Only a few minor tech-
nical details of signing the loans have been
delaying them.
The second is that by continuing aid the
United States will have more influence with
Amin and be in a better position to protect
the 700 or so American diplomats, aid tech- ,
nicians, missionaries and businessmen who .
have stayed on in Uganda.
The implication of this argument is that it
might be dangerous to displease Amin by
stopping the loans. The Americans who have
chosen to stay on are in effect hostages.
Britain, which currently has about 3500 ,
citizens living in Uganda (more than 4000 ?
Britons have quietly filtered out of the coun-
try in the past few months) uses the same
argument for its attempts to stay on good
terms with the erratic Amin.
Amin is set to take over Um tea estates of
28 British farmers in the Fort Portal area of
Uganda next week, The clear signs here are
that Britain has decided not to make an
issue of this, even if Amin offers little or no
compensation, as he did ?ot to the 42,000
Asians he has just expelled.
While publicly hinting that Its policy to- ?
yard Amin is based on fear for its nationals
still there, Britain is known to have con-
veyed to the United States its private view
that any possible alternatives to Amin are so
much more frightening that the West
should continue to try to, work with him.
The 'alternatives prestimahly are soldiers
In ihn ranks bclow And n, who appear to be
the only force capable of ending his rule.
This is perhaps more than any other sin-
gle factor the crux of the matter. For all of
his erratic behavior and vitrolic words on.
the Middle East, Amin has not struck at .
strategic Western interests in Uganda,
which because of its proximity to Kenya and
Zaire and to the Nile is strategic country, by
A Wean policy standards,
'rwo aid hums will probably have little ef-
fect in protecting the 300 American mission-
aries who undoubtedly will, want to see their
missions through under even highly danger-
ous conditions, from Amin's violent soldiers.'
But they could help protect broader political
interest.
Diplomats in east Africa. already talk of
the danger of the new interest shown ?in
!. Uganda by Somalia, a major Russian aid ,
client.
-Just as South Africa and Rhodesia have
profited politically from Amin's irresponsi-
bility, there will be American political
forces that will want to deny American aid
and support to Amin because his is a black
government. But there are far more compel-
ling and valid reasons for re-examination of
a policy of cagerly providing loans that will
give a boost. to man who has engineered an
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CHICAGO TF,roliliE
1 9 NOV 1372
ky? f???
s.. BY PHILIP CAPUTO
? Rome Correspondent
ChicangiTribune Press Service
ROME, Nov. 18?The riddle
Of the Red Arrow remains - Un-
solved.
? Red Arrow is a freighter
that sailed three months ago
from the northern Italian port
of La Spezia bound for the Li-
byan capital of Tripoli. ?
..The merchant ship carried
_110 armored personnel carri--
era and tanks, all manufac-
tured by Italian arms comp-
Inca, when it cast off.
? Their olive-drab color had
been changed to beige for des-
ert camouflage. The ams
were destined for the army of
,Col.. Moammar Kadati, the
Libyan president who has
emerged as the most militant
of Arab leaders:
The riddle posed by the de-
parture of the weapons is this:
Is Italy becoming a major
source of Libyan arms and is
it seeking a greater role in the
Middle East?
Secrecy Shrouds 'Affair
: Indications are that the an-
swer is yes, but exact details
are hard to come by. The Red
Arrow affair, as it is some-
times called, is shrouded in
Secrecy and obscured by infor-
mation that is a stew of facts,
half-truths, and falsehoods.
About all Italian officials are
tivilling to say is that Italy
ranks fifth among European
arms exporters, having sold
$23.5 million worth in the
1960s, and that the heart of the
arms industry is La Spezia,
where 13,000 civilians are em-
ployed by arms makers.
? Anyone who tries to obtain
. more than that is likely to end
up feeling like a charaCter in a
bad foreign intrigue novel.
.! For example, a source who
delivered a four-page memo-
randum on the arms deals
asked that the memo be shred-
ded and 'burned after it Was
read.
of Red rrodlo
rnthlp Libg?
r` Friend May Saffer ?
?
"If it should fall into the
wrong hands, my friend might
be hurt," he explained.
!,Diplomals, politicians, and
arms merchants who were in-
terviewed abruptly ended the
Conversation whenever the
Libyan affair was mentioned.
They gave replies such as, "It
is a delicate matter. I can't
discuss it," or "I'm not au-
thorized to make any state-
ments, and don't tell anyone
you even talked to mc."
The reason for all this cloak-
and-dagger rests in Italy's
percarious political situation
and in the bitterness which
many Italians feel toward Ka-
deli.
Shortly after he overthrew.
the government of King Idris,
in 1970, Kadafi expelled 30,000
Italian settlers from Libya and
confiscated their property.
"He even ?expelled the
dead," said one right-wing
Italian, explaining that Kaden
'sent the bodies of Italians bur-
ied in Libya back to their
homeland.
?? Libya had been under
Rome's rule from 1911 to 1913.
The expulsion enraged. con-
servative Italians, who refer
to the Moslem leader as "the
lunatic of Tripoli." They form ,
a Powerful bloc in the current I
government, which is a coali-
tion of centrist and right-wing
elements. Consequently, Rome
is maintaining a lid of secrecy
on its Libyan foreign policy to !
avoid another political crisis
in .a country where political I
event.
crises are almost a daily('
The Red Arrow shipment !
was first revealed by II Seco- '
16, the semiofficial voice of the
S. I. Italy's n e o -Fascist
party. The Foreign and De-
fense Ministries admitted that
armored personnel carriers
were among the-cargo but de-
nied allegations that the ship
also carried 30 Leopard tanks,
which are built by Oto-Melara,
one of the country's largest
arms manufacturers.
Informed sources said the
government's statement was
substantially correct, altho a
highly-placed military source
said that about eight tanks of
a different type?probably
American-style M-47s?had
been loaded on the Red Arrow.
Question Is Tabled
The press reports produced
excited reactions from right-
wing politicians, who brought
the matter up to Parliament,
which promptly tabled the
question for an indefinite pe-
riod. -
Some Italian officials ex-
plained that the arms deals
were strictly between Libya and
private companies, a doubtful
hypothesis. One Oto-Melara ex-
ecutive said recently, "Even to
buy a nail we must request
authorization from the govern-
ment." ?
The affair 'remained quies-
cent until last week, when Il
Secolo and other newspapers
reported that the government
planned to supply Libya with
G-91Y fighters, and advanced
aircraft manufactured by the
Fiat Company in Turin.
Knowledgable sources tend to
discount this charge, tho they
are maintaining a wait-and-see
attitude.
Privately, right-wing sources
said that, in addition to fight-
ers, shipments 'of -helicopters,
tanks, and small arms are be-
ing readied for Kahn's army.
Moreover, a well-informed
American with Libyan con-
tacts said Italy is also consid-
ering a contract to supply Lib-
ya with 105 mm. artillery
pieces.?
Reports Called Fonndless
All this was described by the
Defense Ministry as "absolute-
ly without foundation."
In attempting to learn if the
information is indeed ground-
less, one finds himself .enve-
loped by the mystery-cloaked
world of international arms-
selling and faced with contra-
dictory statemetns. One execu-
.
67
iiVC of Oto-Melara said all. the
,reports were false, but his
boss indicated they were par-
tially true. ?
The latter then . said, "I
would like to tell you what I
know, but I am Chained by
secrecy."
It should be explained that /I
Smolt) is not noted fur its ac-
curacy, eke *a pt in military
matters.,
"If you want to know what's
going on with the military and
arms shipments, they're the
People to see," said an Israeli
source. ?
' Why Arm Poe?
The question some. Italians
are asking is why their gov-
ernment is arming its arch-
foe, Kadafi. A northern indus-
trialist provided this explana-
tion: ?
"Armaments must be -updat-
ed . . . they become obsolete
. However, for certain pur-
poses, they are still excellent.
This explains the conktant
coming and going here of; for-
eign uniforms and gentlemen
wearing turbans. In La Spezia,
they are no longer a curiosi-
ty."
?
- Other sources say that dis-
posing of army surplus is not -
the only reason for the appear-
ance of turbaned gentlemen ,in
.La Spezia. The other reason,
they say, is oil.
The voyage of the Red ar-
row followed the signing of an
agreement between the Libyan
government and ENI, the Ital-
ian-state-owned oil company.
In exchange for drilling rights,
ENT was to provide Kadafi's
government with 51 per cent
of all profits.
? The sources say that !arms
were included in the exchange.
"No, Leopard tanks haven't
been sent to Libya?not yet,"
said an Israeli official. "But
there isn't any doubt that Italy
has sent arms to Libya and is
catering to Libya in exchange'
for the oil concessions to
. ENI." ?
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To support this vieW,. they
cite the recent appearance of
Libyan Prime Minister Adbel.
?Jallud in Italy and France.
Jallud spent last week in Par-
is, where he offered the
French government oil conces-
W.A.SliliNGTON POST
sions and asked for arms in
return. The French accepted
the offer.
The French government, ,
Paris sources said, is "preoc-
cupied with Italy," and knows
that "the Italians have agreed
to sell tanks to Libya." , ?
ir Mr: evil's)? Nov. 29, :972
MacGregor ht Rit desia
What in blazes is Clark. MacGregor, recently Mr.
Nixon's re-election chairman and now a 'United
Aircraft executive, doing in Rhodesia declaring
that* Washington may soon recognize the white-
minority-ruled state?the very .state which, in the
considered judgment of the international 'com-
munity, illegally .broke away from Britain in 1965?
The State Department at once denied that the
U.S. had such "plans," but those familiar with the
ways of Washington will find it hard not to pay
heed to the remarks or the well-placed Mr. Mac-
Gregor.
Mr. MaeGregor'S statement raises the question of
whether he is doing a political job for the admin-
istration by flying a trial balloon. If so? the balloon
deserves to be shot down promptly. The United
States should not be considering recognizing Rho-
desia, and thereby conferring on Salisbury and on
Salisbury's racial policies a significant new mantle
of respectability, at this time.
The timing is particularly 'important. For rea-
sons of their own, the British and Rhodesian gov-
ernments seem to be edging towards reconsidera-
tion of a formula for a legal British grant of in-
dependence in return for some prospects of Rho-
desian progress towards majority rule?the formula
rejected in 1971 but one for which no non-violent
alternative has since been posed. Just ,as the
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
13 November 1972
EcaLo y H
Keny
ern
111
si
By David Winder
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
United Nations, N.Y.
The successes of the Stockholm environ-
ment conference are being dampened by the
controversial decision of the UN General
Assembly to site an environment secretariat
In Nairobi, Kenya.
On paper the decision to base this 23-man
secretariat in Africa appears to have over-
whelming support. But the conspicuously
high number of Western abstentions is a clear
Indication that the largely cooperative spirit
that marked Stockholm has somewhat dimin-
American Congressional decision last year to
im-
port Rhodesian chrome gave help and heart to
those who did not want to hold Salisbury even
to faint standards of racial justice, so a similarly
negative and anti-black effect would be imparted '-
by an American decision to recognize Rhodesia now.
Should American' policy be guided by American ?
standards of racial equality or, more bluntly, by .a
political regard for the sensibilities of those Amer-
icans?black and white?who are offended by Salis-1 ?
bury's racial practices? Mr. Nixon's own standards.
for relations with white-ruled African stateS? ex-?. ?
plicitly grant that race should 'be' considered. The
President believes, he has said, that the United I
States should encourage "communication" between
the races in Africa and 'between African and Ameri-
can peoples. In fact, the proper question is not. ?
whether but how race should be factored in. ',Tom- :
munication" can have both positive and negative:1
aspects, depending on the situation. In this situa- .
tion, "communication" ? meaning recognition ?
could give?white supremacists in Salisbury a major
boost at a critical period in their deliberations with
other political elements in Rhodesia and with the
British. This is exactly the wrong time for the
United States to start such "communicating" with
Rhodesia.
ished in the follow-through at UN headquar-
ters.
Fundamentally there was a pull between
Western countries, which, for reasons of cost
and logistics favored a European secretariat
and the "third world," demanding a bigger
piece of the UN action.
By acting in concert, the Group of 77, as the
underdeveloped world is known ? even
though its membership is well above 77 ?
succeeded in having the first major global
UN body located outside the industrialized
Western world.
It remains to be seen whether the initial
advantage of winning broader environment
support among developing nations will out-
weigh the logistical objections to siting the
UN environment secretariat in Nairobi. Cer-
tainly before Stockholm, support for the
conference among developing nations was
hardly enthusiastic.
One danger of Nairobi as some en-
vironmentalists see it is that there may be
some push now to emphasize development
rather than environment.
Poorer countries have long had their
suspicions that the Western countries that
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have "made it" are anxious to impose
enviromental controls at a time when the
poorer countries seek rapid industrialization
and development to catch up.
Such concern ? lest development be given
priority over the environment ? is still
academic, however.
A more pressing concern Is the political
fallout, if not in Western Europe, then cer-
tainly in the United States.
The U.S., which has voted $100 million to
the environment fund, voted against the
Nairobi decision even though it subsequently
pledged its support.
The problem as seen here is not with the
administration but with the mood of Con-
gress. Few UN delegates need to be reminded
that U.S. House ?Appropriations Committee
member John J. ftooney, an arch foe of the
UN, insisted on the withholding of U.S. funds
for the International Labor Organization.
While many Western diplomats concede
NEW YORK TIMES
9 November 1972
it ?
an
Si
By Hilary Ng'weno
NAIROBI, Kenya?There are no sim-
ple moral answers to the question
of the plight of Asians currently being
evicted from Uganda. Certainly, Presi-
dent Idi Amin and his military govern-*
ment are exhibiting a racism toward
Asians which makes nonsense of much
of Africa's righteous stand against the
racist white minority governments of
southern Africa. There are grounds for
. genuine concern for the safety of any
: Asians left in Uganda.
Yet it is hypocritical of the world
to try and look at this problem in
? isolation from its historical and inter-
national implications. The fate of Brit-
ish Asians in East Africa was put in
Jeopardy first not by anything any
African government did but by the
cumulative decisions of various Brit-
ish governments, starting with racially
discriminatory colonial laws which
placed the economies of East 'African
nations into foreign, essentially Asian
hands, and ending with the disgrace-
ful passage by the British Labor Gov-
ernment in 1968 of a law barring the
entry of nonwhite British citizens into
Britain.
Admittedly the British in their rac-
ism have not been as crude as Presi-
dent Amin and his soldiers. They have
not rounded up the Asians in their
midst, dispossessed them, abused them,
stripped them of their dignity and
threatened their very lives. But then
it has not been necessary. It has all
been done for them by the Ugandans..
It is pointless for Britain to try and
remind Uganda of her reepotleibIlltita
0 Uganda residents, whether citizens
Or not, when Britain herself has in
the lest five years been busy trying
the need for some geographic distribution of
UN agencies, there is concern among them
. and environmentalists lest a Nairobi-based
secretariat with coordinating-agency respon-
sibilities be too isolated from European-
based UN bodies. There are other logistical
questions.
Says one key environmentalist,_ not at-
tached to the UN, on the possibilities of
enlisting experts: "If you want a good man,
and a good man is going to be pretty busy,
and it's the best part of a day to get him there
and the best part of a day to get him back, not
to speak of the jet-lag aspect, then the whole
logistical problem becomes grossly aggra-
vated."
African countries in turn say opposition to
their site is primarily politically motivated
and that the time when industrialized coun-
tries could act as if the African countries
were colonies and decide for them has
passed.
Racism
to evade her own responsibilities to-
ward British citizens. Altogether there
are still more than 100,000 British citi-
zens of Asian origin in East Africa,
The British Government, until the.
Uganda crisis, had insisted on taking
them into Britain at the rate of three
thousand entry vouchers a year. Even
assuming that each voucher repre-
sented five entries, this would mean
that it would take more than seven
years for all British Asians in East
Africa to be absorbed into Britain.
A convenient timetable for Britain,
but hardly one which took into con-
sideration any of the wishes of the
East African nations concerned. And
a timetable which was in effect a uni-
lateral British interference in East
African affairs. For what Britain was
telling East African governments was:
"Sorry, old chaps; we know the Asians
are our problem, but you've got to
take care of them until we are ready
to take care of them and that may ,
not be for another seven or so years."
Given such arrogance on the part of
Britain, it is a wonder that no crisis
in relations between Britain and her
former East African territories erupted
earlier than the current Uganda crisis.
For this the British and the world
can thank not the statesmanship of
British leaders but rather the maturity
'and patience of the governments of
Kenya and Tanzania.
The real tragedy of Uganda is not
the Asian problem, for that is Britain's
tragedy rather than Uganda's. The real
tragedy Is that President Amin has
been able in a very short time to un-
leash pent-up racist' feelings among
the public which observers of the
tigantlau wino bed thought won) MIA ?
and gone. These racist feelings have
provided the military government of
Uganda, with a base for popularity
69
which it badly lacked and need-ed. But
they will not solve 'any of the prob-
lems Uganda is faced with. I
The Asians have been odd-men-out
in East Africa. They are hated because
they are thought to be industrious,:
wealthy, clannish; because they do,:
, not mix with Africans; because they '
cheat and bribe to advance their busi-
ness; because they are smarter than ,
Africans; because they are different;
because they are Asian. But they will
sooft be gone from the Ugandan scene:,
The African will remain, and it is
only then that the full scope of the
Ugandan tragedy, will be realized.
Already a number of prominent
Ugandan Africans have disappeared.
The former Chief of Staff in the Obote
Government and one-time Uganda
High Commissioner to Ghana, Briga-
dier Opoloto, has not been heard of
for months. The Chief Justice, Mr.
Kiwanuka, is gone. So is the vice ,
chancellor of the country's only uni-
versity. Disappearance as announced
by the Government of Uganda is a,
euphemism for all kinds of things,
including murder at the hands of
soldiers. Because of the pervading in,
security and terror most of Uganda's
Intellectuals would dearly like to leave
the country if they could do so with-
out arousing the suspicions and anger
of the trigger-happy army.
The long-term prospect for the coun-'
try is bleak. Economically the current
Asian crisis is disastrous for Uganda.
The xenophobia which President Amin.
has aroused among average Ugandans
is bound to boomerang, with painful
consequences for everyone. That is the
real tragedg of Uganda,
Hilary Ng'weno is a journalist and
former editor of The, Daily Nation,
Nairobi.
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THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW'
Nov-Dec 1972
'
The capabilities for conducting effective intelligence gathering and paramilitary
operitions have long been. essential tools in the conduct of national policy.
Unfortunately, however, certain misconceptions regarding the manner and circum-
stances in which they can be employed arose in this country after World War II and-
led directly to setbacks like the Bly of Pigs: Rather than shunning the possibility of
using covert operations in the ,future to gain policy objectives, experiences like the
Bay of Pigs merely underline the fact that policyrriakerprraust be educated as to what
Is possible, and the responsibility for this lies with' the career intelligent* community.
6 .
CASE S
F
A lecture delivered
by
, Professor Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr.
Y *
I think that the usual caveat is
necessary before I get into the subject at
hand. What I am about to say today are -
my personal views; they do not repre-
sent the official CIA view nor the
official U.S. Government view. This is
an after-action reporoon an episode in
our history which engendered perhaps
the most intense emotions and public
reaction we have seen since World War
President Kennedy in the aftermath
of the Bay of Pigs made the comment
that "Victory bas a hundred fathers;
. defeat is an orphan." I would simply say
that as Inspector General of the CIA at
the time, I was probably in charge of
the orphanage.
There is a very specific definition of
covert operations. In the broad litera-'
ture of intelligence, covert operations
are about as old as espionage, which has
been called the world's second oldest
profession. To be properly considered
covert, an operation Must be designed in
such a way that it can easily be dis-
avowed by the originating government.
The hand of the sponsor must not be
visible.
Covert operations, on the other
hand, must not be confused with irregu-
lar warfare. An example of irregular
warfare that has received recent world-
wide attention is the operation in Laos.
Everybody On both Sides knows who is
doing what to whom; the aid and assis-
tance is obvious. That is irregular war-
fare. A covert operation, however, to be
totally covert must be so clandestine, so
well hidden, that its true sources may
never be specifically proven. Guesses, al-
legations, speculations may be made in
I ?
the public media, but no proof or verifi-
cation is permissible -if the operation is
,to be properly considered covert.
At this point in our discussion I
believe it will prove .helpful to simply
list some of the questions that must be
asked before a covert operation is,
properly undertaken.
O Can it be done covertly? Can the
role of the sponsoring government be
sufficiently concealed at each step so as
to avoid disclosure and. thus either
failure or a diplomatic setback for the
sponsor? And if the cover of the opera-
tion is destroyed at any stage, are
alternative measures or withdrawal pos-
sible?
.0 Are the assets available to do the
job required? Are the indigenous per-
sonnel available who are secure and in
the proper place to do the work re-
quired? If not, are there those available
who can be put into place? .
O Are all of the assets of the spon-
soring government being used? Can the
operation be controlled? Will the in-
digenous forces being used respond to
direction or are they likely to go off on
their own? Will they accept cancellation
of the operation at any time?
8 If it *succeeds or fails, will they
maintain silence? The maxim "Silence is
golden" has never been fully accepted in
this country, but it is still worth asking.
Also, can it be handled securely within
the sponsoring government?
O Finally, and vthis is perhaps the
most imp'ortant question the Onited
Otate0 must eels, Is the Soh wowth the
potential gain? Has there been a true
evaluation of the chance of success or
failure by ?an objective 'group not di-
\
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rettly or emotionally involved with its
Implementation? Do the policymeiters
hive a realistic understanding ,of" the
. operation?
These are some of the basic questions
Iwhich must he asked -prior. to,,the
' mounting of any clandestine or covert
operation.
, BeCoie turning to the case Siudy
itself, a brief review of recent Cuban
history is appropriate. Fidel Castro
landed in eastern Cuba in 1956 with
what turned out to be 12 men. He
gathered forces in the Sierra Maestra irt
, 1956 and 1957. Even more important;
' however, was the growth of anti-Batista
groups in the cities of Cuba among the,
middle class, the professionals, and the
elite. It was the erosion of Batista's vital'
ipolitical support in the cities which led:
!directly to his downfall. The guerrillas
in the countryside served merely as a
catalyst in this process. And eventually,
on 1 January 1959, Castro stepped into
the vacuum left by the fleeing Batista.
. A fact which many people do not
seem to recall was that despite our
misgivings about Fidel Castro, and the
U.S. tGovernment, did have them, we
recg'?ized ....his government fairly
promptly. The first cabinet of the Cas-
tro iegime 'Was probably one of the
? finest in Cuban history. It is worthy to
note, however, that-very few, of the new
Cabinet members stayed very long.
In addition to recognizing Castro, the
United States continued its subsidy of
Cuba's sugar, crop which at that time
amounted to approximately $100 mil-
lion. The three major U.S. oil companies
doing business in.. Cuba advanced him
$29 million because his treasury was
bare when he took over. Batista and his
cohorts had sees to that. Castro was not
invited to the United States on an
official trip, but he came here unoffi-
cially to attend a meeting of the Ameri-
can Society of Newspaper Editpts in
Washington, and he did have an inter-
view with the then Vice President of the
? United States, Richard M. Nixon. Then,
one by one, the men around Castro
began dropping off.. He speedily ex-
propriated U.S. property worth $968
million. Even his closest barbados- the
bearded ones-that had been with him
in the hills started to turn against him as
he appointed more and more Commu-
nists, and by the middle of 1960 it
became obvious that the United States
wee not *rig GO be able to d@ intOititeie
with Fidel. This, I might say, was a very
? great shock to Americans. Cuba was a
country that we regarded as our pro-
tege. We had helped liberate it from
Spain; we had assisted it through the
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' birth pangs of becoming a nation; we
had helped it achieve independence. We
had looked at it as one of our offspring,
but perhaps we were ? guilty of having
looked after it too closely and in too
patronizing a manner.
It was in 1960 that President Eisen-
hower, based upon advice of his most
? senior advisers, made the decision that
we should try to do to Castro what he
had done to Batista. Here is the germ of
the first mistake-no one seriously
studied the question as to whether this
? was possible. Most of the anti-Castro
? people had left Cuba; they. were pouring
into Florida and if there ivat a resistance
to Fidel Castro, it was mostly in Miami.
One of the realities of life was that Fidel
Castro had shown unique abilities, to-
.gether with his brother Raul, Che Gue-
vara, and others, in developing a militia
and armed forces of some consequence.
Further, they succeeded in establishing
one of the better intelligence services in
Latin America. It was learned at a very
early date that agents sent into Cuba
spent more time trying to survive than
carrying out their assignment. When this
happens to clandestine agents, the situa-
tion is obviously quite serious.
President-elect Kennedy was first
briefed on the Cuban operation on 17
November 1960. The basic concept was
to recruit exiles, send them in by ones,
twos, and teams to develop the basic
ingredients for overthrowing a govern-
lir!) t: an intelligence network first, and
!ii '? sabotage nets, units for psychologi-
cal warfare, and finally guerrilla bands-
hopefully all sufficiently independent to
be watertight and operable.
It should be noted that these clandes-
tine operations in 1960 were successful
only to a degree. There were many
brave Cuban exiles who volunteered
even though they knew full well that
anyone suspected of active opposition
to the Castro government in Cuba faced
the prospect of a firing squad. Anybody
caught landing on the shores of Cuba,
? either by airdrop or by maritime opera-
tion, could hardly expect alemency
from the new Cuban authorities.
On 29 November 1960 President-
elect Kennedy was given a briefing at
lenOth on a new approach to the Cuban
problem. It had become fairly apparent,
under pressures of external events, that
perhaps there was not going to be
sufficient time to build up a large
enough underground in Cuba to do to
Castro what he had done to Batista.
'Castro was moving .closer and closer to
becoming a full member of the Soviet
bloc, and the Soviets were sending
increasing amounts of military equip-
ment to Cuba- Cuban pilots had been
.1
sent to Eastern Europe for training, and
Moscow as supplying or planned to
supply aircraft. The Russians y.vere also
supplying or planning to supply ad-
vanced Patrol boats which would make.
? maritime infiltration difficult, if not'
impossible. Those, were grave 'concerns'
because'it was felt that the 'pressures of
time might soon eliminate any possi-
bility of building up any clandestine
operation. One cannot reasonably take
slow aircraft in against jets, for if their
air defense was at all adequate, C-47's
and the like would Surely be shot down
while trying to get agents and supplies
in. Further, one cannot infiltrate a
hostile coast if the opposition maintains
extensive patrol activities in the sur-
rounding waters.
? Rather than trying to build clandes-
tine nets all over Cuba-particularly in
the cities with guerrilla forces sup-
? porting from the Escambrays and Sierra'
-Maestra-it was proposed that a more
i.substantial force be landed in order. to
seize a beachhead.' It was hoped that
support from popular resistance within
Cuba or perhaps, more importantly,
that support from defections within
Cuba's militia and armed forces would
materialize, thereby contributing signit-
candy to the anti-Castro forces momerie:
turn and help assure their victory
through more conventional military
means.
On examination of what the biogra-
phers of President Kennedy have writ-
ten, it can be concluded that the Presi-
dent never really fully understood that
this proposal entailed a military opera-
tion in the true sense of the word.
Instead of an assault landing consisting
of some 1,500 men, President Kennedy
seemed to think this was going to be
some sort of mass infiltration that
Would perhaps, through some mystique,
become quickly invisible.
Two major plans were considered.
The original plan was directed at cap-
turing the small town of Trinidad on the
south coast. Intelligence available indi-
cated it was fairly lightly held. There
was an airstrip nearby, but perhaps most
importantly, it was at the foothills of
. the Escambray Mountains, and the.
brigade, if it got into trouble, could
head for the hills and theoretically live
off the land. When this plan was re-
viewed by the JointiChiefs of Staff and
others, the reaction was that the capture
of a town would be too visible and
create excessive "noise." Therefore an-
other locality should be picked which
.
would not be quite as conspicuous.
The second plan was to land at the
Bay of Pigs. Since the area was sparsely
populated, the proposed lahding would
71
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not involve capturing a town. The in-
terior was swampy, and there was a
limited road network. The area posed
problems for the brigade; but it was.
,hoped that it would pose more prob-
lems for the defending forces, particu-
larly if the airborne men captureti a
crossroads and blocked-off the incoming
Castro forces, and the brigade with their
large tanks and fairly heavy hand-carried
guns could establish a beachhead. ?'D
Plans envisioned two air raids which,
in fact, were very critical factors to the
potential success of the landing. It is not
known whether the President examined
in any depth the concept of the air raids
or the attention they would attract. The'
initial raid was designed to take place at
D minus 2 and was directed at knocking
out the Castro air force and particularly,'
if possible, the Castro tanks. B-26 air-
craft were to be flown by Free Cubans
based in Nicaragua. This would allow
the Cuban exile pilots approximately 20
to 30 minutes over target area. This
strike was to be followed at H-hour by a
second strike with the objective of
destroying whatever remained of Cas-
tro's ait..,forces. It was anticipated that
the first ,wtnke, ?would be noticed ? not
only inSuba, 'but elsewhere. Therefore,
a light deception plan was conceived
whereby one of the B-26's returning
from the strike would?land at Key West
and the pilot would announce he was
one of the group of Cuban pilots who
had decided they had enough of Castro,
were leaving the Cuban Air Force, and
had dropped some bombs on the way
out. There was hope that this would
provide sufficient cover for at , least a
few days until the operation was.
mounted, at which time I presume it '
was thought that either the cover would
not be necessary or simply be merged.
into the whole operation itself. .
In mounting' such an operation, it
was necessary to first train those rujio
were to take part in it. There were more
than adequate resources of Cuban man-
power available in the exile colonies in ,
Florida and elsewhere. There was one
exceedingly difficulCpolitical problem
however, that being the strong desire
not to use any Batistianos-people who
had been prominent in the Batista mili-
tary forces or close to Batista himself.
This almost automatically eliminated
anybody that had had any experience
with the Cuban Armed Forces.
The recruiting in Miami was done
under goldfish bowl circumstances.
There were 113 Cuban exile groups.
Some of them' were significant and some
of them were insignificant, but they
were all active, they were all vocal, and
. ? -
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they were all there. It was most daficult
/or the State Department, the CIA, the
Attorney' General, General, and others iavoived
to persuade the Cubans to .work to-
gether in a cohesive organization Simply
because many of them did not want to
work together due, to prior political
associations.
The system of recruiting was done as
clandestinely as possible. The recruits
? were then taken to the deactivated Opa
? Locke Naval Air Station and were flown
out "covertly" to Guatemala where a
wealthy landowner had made a sizable
portion of his mountainous finca avail-
able for training. A training base had
been hacked out of the wilderness. The
President of Guatemala, Ydigoras, was
aware of what was going on and co-
operated fully. President Somoza of
Nicaragua provided the airfield for the
B-26?s.
In retrospect, it might., have been
wiser to have trained everybody in the
.United States where they could have
been isolated somewhere in the vast
reaches. ? of a Fort Bragg' or. a Fort
Benning. Latin America is not an easy
place to do such training because in
countries the size of Guatemala or
Nicaragua nearly everybody knows what
is going on. As early as 30 October 1960
an article appeared in the Guatemalan
paper La Nora which described a mili-
tary base in the mountains designed to
train men for an invasion of Cuba. This
was when the cover started to Oravel.
Paul Kennedy of The New York Times,
a very astute journalist whose circuit ran
. from Mexico City to Panama, was not
fair behind La Flora in producing a story
on the base?who was there, what they,
were doing, and what they were going
to do. The discussioins' in Miami were
such that in his book Schlesinger quotes
three separate newsmen who upon re-
turning from Miami were able to de-
scribe exactly what was going on with-
out being specific as to where the
landing was going to be made, or when it
was going to be made, but that there
was going to be a landing, that it was
going to be against Cuba, and that it
involved a great number of the exiles. .
The operation was exclusively under
the direction of the Central Intelligence
Agency. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were
asked if they would provide'evaluations
first of the feasibility of the plan and
secondly of the quality of training.
They also, of course, provided upon
request both supplies that were neces-
sary and manpower to assist in training
and administration. But the Joint Chiefs
of Staff 'were not easponoibin 'NI?' the
plan. It was not their plan, and the
postoperation blame that was placed on
them was put on them by others run-
ning for cover. It was a CIA operation.
Frequent meetings with the President
from January through March and peri-
odic progress .rep-orts were wed to keep'
the President informed. As the evidence
of apparent Russian assistance to Cuba
continued to grow, pressure was put on
the President to mount the operation.
Let me also note that there was a very
considerable Cuban lobby operable. The
Cuban exiles had considerable money.
Many of them were apparently wise
enough to have kept the bulk of their
wealth in the United States prior to
1959. They were, acquainted with
Americans and the ' American political
system, and a steady stream of them
descended on Washington to urge
greater U.S. action' in support of the
exile movement up to and including a
.,full-scale invasion of' Cuba by the
United States.
During this period a serious conflict
'arose within the exile training camp as a
result of some of the Batistianos being
brought into the' brigade. These former, ,
members of Batista's 'army were profes-
sional military men whose talents were
judged to be useful to the operation. A
mutiny occurred,' however, which
quickly became known to the rest of
the world. Twelve Cubans were arrested
and incarcerated,' and the entire affair
was written up in the press.'
With a brigade of 1,453 trained
Cubans in being, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff assessed both the Trinidad plan
and the Bay of Pigs plan as being
1
don fail. One of the aspects of the
postoperation' inspection was specifir
cally directed to the question of
whether any of the U.S. personnel told
the Cubans that U.S. military forces
:would back thorn up. That, I 'weluld
submit to you, is almost an imposqe
question to answer. If you are training a
group of men to go into battle, you
aren't saying, "Okay fellows, go ahead,
but if you don't make it, it's rough." As
, an instructor you would give your
, trainees every bit of encouragement,
and if you say something like, "We're
behind you all the way," does that
mean that you are committing U.S.
military forces? The best available evi-
dence indicated that no U.S. national
who was involved in training, assisting,
or direction of the Cubans over prom-
ised U.S. military assistance, but obvi-
ously they were not discouraging the
Cubans. On the other hand, the Cubans
to a man as well as the Cuban Revolu-
tionary Council, expected that should
the brigade falter, U.S. Marines would
pour out of Guantanamo, airborne units
, would be dropped, and it would be over
'aleotit that:? ?
As to President Kennedy's inten-
tions, however, there can be no ques-
tion. The President frequently. reiterated
his statement' that no U.S. personnel.
feasible. The U.S. military personnel
who reviewed the brigade described
them as well trained and , capable of
doing their job. Here we run into what
will perhaps throughout history be the
most controversial part of the opera-
tion: I label it what the Cubans thought,
what the Americans thought, and what
Castro thought. ?
There are no available figures on
Castro's intelliaencethe
United States. However, given the great
number of Cubans in this country, he
undoubtedly had a fairly complete in- :
formation flow from not only our press
and radio, but from his own sources of
information as 1/11. Castro was highly
nervous in the spring of 1961, tesay the
least. He was aware that an operation
was being mounted. He was not aware
of its size or whether U.S. forces would
be involved. 14e feared the latter greatly,1
without question.
The and-Castro Cubans in exile, on
the (atheeliin, were eowingeci thee the,
United States q wduld not let the opera-
would be involved, that he wanted no
Americans on the beach, that there
would not be any commitment of U.S.
forces behind the Cubans, that this was
4
to be an exile operation.
The allegation has been made that
"the operators" deceived the President.
That is not correct. "The operators"
principally involved were Allen W. Dul-
les, Gen. Charles P. Cabell, and Richard
Bissell. They are all men of honor and
integrity. They were all very much
involved in the operation. They wetse,all
reasonably convinced that it would suc-
ceed or had a good chance of success.
Mr. Dulles has been quoted by both
Schlesinger and Sorenson as telling the
President that he thought that this
operation had a better chance of success
than the Guatemala operation. Perhaps
he did not tell the President the Guate-
mala operation only succeeded by the
narrowest of margins. This was to be-a
very close matter and entirely different
from the operation against Arbenz, who
had but a very limited force to support
him as opposed to Castro whose
200,000-man army and militia were
rapidly increasing In both quality and
strength.
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The method by which the President
was oriented on the operation has been
described as a series of meetings where
? three or more of the operators mould
brief the President on the ?latest.develop-
? ments. The President would have one or
two of his personal staff with him, the
Secretary of State, and any others he.
.deemed necessary'. There would be no
papers left; there were no .staff papers
circulated. The operation was very
closely held within the U.S."Govern-
'Monday morning and asked whether the
President could supply some U.S. mili-
tary assistance, specifically sotto 'aircraft
from the carrier Boxer to come in and.
cover the landing. The President turned'
it clown. ?
The' landing went in as scheduled. Of
the five battalions?I would call them
.teinforced companies?that landed, only
one landed in the wrong place;'it hit a
reef. The rest got ashore, and the tanks
got ashore. The airdrop was successful,
and then Castro's jets appeared: two Sea
Furies and three P:33's. Two of the
principal landing Ships, one containing
the bulk of the ammunition, were sunk.
The others were driven away, not to
return. And from ithat moment on, the
operation was doomed.
The brigade fought brilliantly. They
probably took 10 to 1 casualties from
the other side. But it was 1,453 men
against 20,000 with another .80,000 in
Terve. Not only were Castro's planes
available, but all of his tanks started to
move south from Camp Libertad out-
side of Havana. Despite the Most strenu-
ous efforts to essist ,the brigade and to
get them additional. ammunition, they
could not win against such odds l By
Wednesday it was all over as the brigade-
was out of ammunition..
At a meeting Tuesday night in the
White House, after a congressional re-
ception, the situation was described to'
the President. He authorized two un-
marked planes from the Boxer to' fly
high cover in support of the 13-26's, but
they were not to engage in hostilities
unless attacked. There was a mixup in
time. The B-26's arrived an hour before
the Boxer planes; four of the .B-26's
were shot down, and among the men
lost was an Alabama Air National
Guardsmen crew who had volunteered
to substitute for the Cuban pilots, who
were exhausted. ? ?
The President was under the impres-
sion initially that the H-hout airstrike
was actually going to be made from the
beachhead. But, of course, the airstrip
ment. Similarly, it was very closely held
within the CIA. ? ?
Many aspects Of the 'operation were
well done. The 13-26 strike on. D minus
2, despite having to operate at maxi-
mum range, was successful. It did .
manage .to damage the Castro air force;
but the quality of the Castro air force
had been underestimated. The Sea
Furies were known to be there 'and were
considered dangerous, but the, P-33's,
which were ignored or -were not 'con'-
sidered to be dangerous, did prove to be ?
one of the more decisive elements.
The cover on the D mirrui 2 airstrike;
mentioned before, Was ripped off in a
matter of minutes. Circumstances had
this event occur on the same day that an
actual pilot in the Castro air force
defected and landed in Jacksonville. The
press was all over both Cuban planes
instantly. The Foreign Minister of Cuba
in the United Nations denounced the
.United States for open attack on Cuba.
'The U.S. Ambassador to the, United
Nations; Adlai Stevenson, had not been
thoroughly advised on the operation. He
had been given what was later described
as a rather vague briefing of the ,opera-
tion. Ambassador Stevenson immedi-
lately denied U.S. complicity, and prac-
tically before the words were out of his
?mouth it was fairly obvious that they
were not true. This then created a rising
crescendo of concern on the part of the ?
President, Secretary of State, and ,
Others. On Sunday night?the landing ,
was to be made on Monday morning?
the President cancelled ?The H-hour
strike. The 3-26's were already warmed
up and ready to take off from Nicaragua
when the word came in to cancel.
0 General Cabell, Acting Director of
the CIA at the time, was given permis-
sion to appeal to the President who was
at Glen Ora in Middleburg, Va. Cabell
decided not to appeal, but after going ?
back to the operational headquarters
and seeking advice from a representetive
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he eelled
the President in 'Middleburg at 4:0 a.m.
?'
was never secured to that degree, and
the concept of eight 13-26's bombing
from the beachhead was simply not
feasible. Also, there was no reserve
available to reinforce the, brigade, and
the rationalization that once the beach-
head was securad then Cubans could
pour in from Florida and that'assistance
would come from the United States and i
Latin American countries was not valid. ?
The NW Itev@h4tieherY *tuna, !
which had been held incommunicado up
to the time of the landing, was taken to
Washington to see the President. They
'sited if they, could'
be immediately rat
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to the beachhead?three of them had:
; sons with the br;gade?but by then the,
operation had failed.
, Now let us look at why the Bay Of
Pigs landing failed. Why did we mount it
in the first place? We mounted it for a!
political objective, to -get lid of e gov-1
ernment that we disliked intensely that
had cropped tip near our soutWrn
shores. We mounted it with the thought
that the objective would be accom-
plished by a covert operation when we
did not want to use our conventional
forces. We had not been able to get rid
of Castro by diplomacy, and our in-
creasing economic pressure was not
proving to be any more effective. All
i intelligence reports coming from allied
sources indicated quite clearly that he ,
was thoroughly in command ofMa.,
and was supported by most of the!
people who remained on the island. !
About 2 weeks before the operation,1
the President had. announced that the I
? United States would not intervene in I
Cuba. Nevertheless, shortly before the
landing, the Castro security forces
rounded up approximately 200,000
Cuban' and put them in concentration
camp. 'These people whose commit-
ment the Castro regime suspected were
precisely the elements in Cuban society
upon which the success of the landing
depended. ?
What we were really trying to do was ?
to do something inexpensively that we
did not want to do the bard way.
Affecting this choice was a mythology
about covert operations that had arisen
after World War II. The brilliant exploits
of the French Resistance, of the Danish
Resistance, of, the Italian partisans, of
Tito's partisans, of some of the opera-
tions behind the' Japanese lines in
Burma all helped create a belief that
you could accomplish with covert
operations what one did not wish, to do
,by conventional or overt means. Simi-
larly, the operations in Iran and Guate-'.
male had been vaguely alluded to and
written about without ever the full
details of the opdations being exposed
either -in the government or elsewhere.
These added to the mythology' that
there was some mystique by which you
could use a clandestine organization to
neatly and cheaply remove most any.
dictator 'you wished. This is inaccurate
and dangerous. A clandestine or covert
operation can be used to support mili-
tary operations and can be used when
you de not want to eommit regula9
forces. Such operations must be used
however, with the knowledge that if
unsuccessful .there will come a time
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4
o'when you have to end the support and be briefed on it, and was turned down.
lose the indigenous forces-as well as Arthur Schlesinger says that he too
your integrity-perhaps never to be ne- wrote a memorandum that was, oppos,ed
gained.. ? to *the operation after he had learned ,
In looking back over both the about it. But these documents were not
;planning and execution of the Bay of given much weight. .
Pigs landing, several important lessons
The. question of whether the same
can be derived-the most vital in which*
organization collecting intelligence
arises , from the operators' fa 'Lire to
should be permitted to conduct covert
secure accurate intelligence. In:ccurate
intelligence was the basis for t1': Bay of operations has provoked continuing
debate in the intelligence community
disaster. There is no othei place to
put the blame for that tha l on the over the years. It was a question which
?
was addressed when the, National Se-
was a totally erroneous tin ; te of the
quality of Castro's fighting fc ces, a lack before Congress. It is a qbestion which
of realism in evaluating the potential has frequently come up, and it is cer-
, resistance, and therefore as i corollary, tainly one that is worthy of note.
? .a. lack of realism in esti itating the Within an organization such as CIA, it is
e number of forces required tc lo the job. 'possible to compartmentalize it so that
There was a lack of kno ,,edge about the intelligence evaluators ate separated
Castro's control in Cuba even though' from the collectors, but in this instance
.. i W ?
the British and French ti telligence re. ?
And then, finally; the covertness or . Belgian Croix de Guerre, and the European
ports were available on ti i subject. . .
... e lacic of visibility of the operation must Theater Ribbon with five battle stars.
! Organizationally, a lace part of CIA be examined. It lost all of After the war he returned to the U.S.
'its veils, all
was excluded. from the ; peration. The ?News as an editor of World Report Magazine.
five, before it was ever mounted. By the In 1947 he went to work for the Central
present Director of thc .:entral Intelli-
B11061RAPHiRC SUMMARY ,
Lyman B. Kirk- '
, patrick, Jr., was born
, in Rochester, N.Y.,
educated' -in public
schools there an0 at
Deerfield Acade'n,nr,
Deerfield, Mass., /i5nd
graduated from the
Woodrow/ Wilson
School of Public and
International Affairs of Princeton 'University
in 1938.
After graduation he worked for the U.S.
News Publishing Corporation in Washington,
D.C., as an editor and personnel director. In
1942 he joined' the Office of Strategic Ser-
vices and served in Europe with that organiza-
tion and as a military intelligence officer on
the staff of Gen,. Omar Bradley's 12th U.S.
Army Group where he was the 0-2 briefing
officer. He left the military service with the
rank of major, and for his service received the
Legion of Merit, Bronze Star, French and
'time the landing took place, it, was well ? Intelligence Agency where he served hi a
gence Agency, Richard ? elms, who was known .an operation was being ar
viety of positions, including Division Chief, '
, then Chief of Operatic;; for CIA, was mounted. It was. well 'known who As si/Int-
sito the Director, Assistant Director,
involved. It was well known that it was
not involved in the cn' -nation. It was anspector?Genecal, and from 1962 to 1965
'
handled in a separate c :mpartment, and totally and.completely supported by the ? ,was Elcccutive Director-Comptroller. In Sep-
tember 1965 he resigned from CIA to accept
an appointment on the faculty of Brown
University in Providence, Rd., as Professor of
Political Science and "University Professor. ,
Professor Kirkpatrick was the occupant of the ?
Chester W. Ninths Chair of National Security
and Foreign Affairs at the Naval War College
during the 1971-72 academic year and has
since returned to the faculty of Brown Uni-
versity.
In 1960 he received the National Civil.
Service League annual award as one of the 10
outstanding career employees of the Federal
Government. In 1964 he received the Presi-
dent's Award for. Distinguished Service, the
highest award that can be given u civilian in ,
the Federal Service.
He is the author of The Real CIA, pub-.
lished by Macmillan in January 1968, and
Captains without Eyes, published by Mao..
mitten in 1969, numerous articles, rakd has
contributed to the Encyclopaedia Britannica
itearbook.
a very great portion the expertise in United States. And at some point along
the agency was exch tied. In like man- the line somebody' somewhere around
ner, the bulk of the n. litary expertise of the President should have said, "Mr.
the Pentagon was excluded because ? President, this is going to create one hell
of a lot of noise. It is going to be very
obvious that we're behind it. If it
succeeds, great; if it fails, we are in for
deep trouble." Obviously most people
thought it was going to succeed. In fact,
most of those talking to the President
thought it was going to succeed. .
Also, trying to mount an operation
of this magnitude from the United
States is about as covert as walking nude
across Times Square without attracting
attention. (Although, I must say that
the latter is becoming more of a possi-
bility every day.) In retrospect, the use
of the U.S. bases would have been more
feasible because we did have the capa-
bility for controlling access to a sizable look on them as some type of easy ,
geographical area. We could have, iso- , device whereby one can simply reach
lated the brigade'; even the training of out and press a button and bang, a
the B-26 pilots could have been done in ? resistance group comes up and suddenly
the United States; and perhaps, only an enemy is destroyed. The obligation
perhaps, it could have been done with- for destroying this myth lies with the
out having been disclosed, career personnel.
knowledge of the 01' retion was handled
on such a close ba.;is within the Joint
Staff. ?
Now when I say that the bulk of the
CIA was excluded, I mean that the
operators running the operation were
:assessing and evaluating the intelligence,
not the intelligence directorate, where it
should have been done. Much of the
intelligence came from the Cuban re-
sistance, which was not always an objec-
tive intelligence source, and, as later in
the missile crisis, their reports had to be
scanned and evaluated based upon other
information.
The White House advisers have noted
? in their books that nobody in the White
House was really being critical about the
operation. They assumed that the Presi-
dent was accepting the advice of quali-
fied experts, and therefore they were
unwilling to submit themselves to being
.the opposition to the operation. To my
knowledge only two docuinents were
written in the Federal Government
Policimakers must be educat&I as to There was nothing more secret about
opposing the operation, one by Chester what is possible. I think they will be in the Bay of Pigs than about nuclear:
Bowles the then Under Secretary of 'the future. The shock to President weapons. Yet it was handled as though
,
State?; who had, inadvertently heard Kennedy was great and he blamed the it was so sensitive that people who were
about the operation and opposed it. CIA, but ha blamed Me military jot ea , tiontati with the higheet sands of the
Roger Hilsman, then Assistant to the much. The latter was misplaced. Never- government could not be trusted vilah
theless, it is very important that policy- it.
Secretary for Research and Intelligence,
makers 'be educated as ,to what covert The staff work must be complete.
? also heard about the operation, asked to
operations can do; or cannot do and not Periodic assessments must be made, and
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, these, in turn, must be reviewed in the
most tough, highly critical, and objec-
tive manner. There must be those 'that
are going to say "no" or at least express
all, the warnings and let the President
know the dangers that he is taking:
While no one questions the absolute
authority of the President. to make
policy and to insure that it is properly
implemented, the locus for the conduct
of the operation is important. It should
be at a much lower level of government.
Having covert operations. run out of the
White House or even out of the Office
of the Secretary of State or the Secre-
tary of Defense makes absolutely no
sense whatsoever in any society.
If the President males the policy, get
rid of Castro, that is about the last he
should hear of it. If something goes
'wrong, he can fire and disavow, which is.
what a President should, do, not . ac
knowledge and accept blame. Of course,
I am being critical of the President, but
I think that this is essential in this area.
Mi. Dulles, incidentally, after the failure
of, the Bay of Pigs, as he had done
previously when the 1/..2 went down
over Russia, said to the President, "If
you wish, I will go." He was a very wise
and able man, and he recognized that
when an intelligence failure takes place,
the first expendable person is the direc-
tor of the operation;
There is a further corollary to.what I
have said thus far; a US. controlled
intelligence base must be in existence.
In this case it. would have meant an
intelligence network operating in Cuba
which was knowledgeable, controlled,
and reliable. There was no such network'
in Cuba at the time. Instead there were
scatterings of intelligence nets. The in-
formation, to a large degree, was con-
trolled by Cuban exiles who, of course,
wanted us to go into Cuba. It was not a
U.S. controlled intelligence base:
My final comment is that the Bay of
Pigs experience does not mean we,
should forget covert operations as a tool,
for implementing national policy. In
fact, that is the last thing it means. We
Would continually examine the concept
and doctrine and reevaluate all Covert
operations and irregular warfare activi-
ties, keeping the capability in being. .As
has been the case with' our Military
forces,. when a war is over, our immedi-
ate instinct is to demobilize; the same is
true in intelligence. But the capability
for mounting a covert operation is an
onoadingly inipotnant capabilitY to
our government to have. It may not be
'used but, like certain military capabili-
ties in peacetime, the expertise should
be available and ready if needed.. .1
NEW YORK TIKES
19 November 1972
The -
Cub if
nnection
By James Reston
WASHINGTON?For the first time
in many years, the United States and
Cuba have a common problem, which
may lead to reappraisal of the rela-
tions between the two countries.
President Nixon doesn't want Ameri-
can commercial airplanes to be hi-
jacked to Havana and Fidel Castro, ac-
cording to the Swiss, doesn't want
them to land there, and this is now
under the most careful if oblique dip-
lomatic discussion.
Mr. Nixon's problem is very simple.
?He wants secure, on-time air traffic
within the United States and abroad,
but the American air traffic is not se-
cure, it is not on time, for passengers
are subjected to security baggage
checks at every airport, ,primarily for
fear of criminals who regard Cuba as
a sanctuary.
, Fidel Castro's problem is a little
more complicated. He is waging an
ideological war against the United
States and Latin America, and vice
versa, but most of the Americans who
,hijack planes are not Communists
seeking sanctuary in Cuba but ordi-
nary criminals stealing planes, de-
..
manding millions in ransom money,
and hoping to get both the money and
freedom when they land in Havana.
On the testimony of Swiss officials,
who represent the United States in
Havana, this is not what happens.
They say that the Cuban Government
is not sympathetic but very tough on
the hijackers, who are, jailed under
very severe circumstances.
According to the Swiss diplomats,
the Cuban Government is not only
WASHINGTON
"The skyjacking
problem has forced
the U.S. and Cuba to
begin talking again."
tough on the hijackers, but suspicious
that thou ,hijaeklrig operations may
be used' by the United States as a
means to spy on what's going on in
Cuba.
: Accordingly, Castro is not sending
back the hijackers to the United States
75
because he suspects them of subver-
sive intelligence activities against Cuba,
and he is keeping them in jail because ;
'he doesn't trust, them, even, if they
'have Communist backgrounds.
Also, Castro, again according to the
Swiss, is holding the ransom money ;
.that.lands in Havana with the hijack-i
??ers; not because he wants ,to help the:
,hijackers but because the U.S. Trees:,
:ury impounded between $60 milli*, and $70 million in Cuban assets wheVf
Washington broke diplomatic relations t
with Havana, and he wants to use this
hijack money to get the $60 mhhlih,
,
to $70 million back.
What troubles officials here in-'
' Washington is that one of these hi- ?
:jackings to Cuba may end in a disaster'
and that the American people, ,alreaay
inconvenienced by baggage checks and
long delays in air travel, may then
' revive the Cuban crisis by demanding '
that action be taken against the
Havana sanctuary. ,
; The Nixon Administration, annoyed';
as it is 'by Castro's anti-American prop- ..
' aganda and subversion in Latin Amer."
?ica, would prefer to leave bad enough ,
'alone, and let Castro suffer in Isola-
tion with his own economic failures
-at home.
But this will, not, be easy if Cuba
'continues to be a sanctuary for sky-
'jackets. The United States has been
_paying little attention to Latin America'
in the last few years. Meahwhile, the'
Soviet Union has established a keep-
out doctrine iri" Eastern Europe and ?
:China will be doing much the same in "
Southeast Asia, while,the United States
? no longer, tries to apply the Monroe
:Doctrine in Cuba.
According to onq diplomatic report,
the Cubans may plit the latest three
American skyjackers on public ,
'partly to keep the diplomatic situation
from deteriorating any further, and ?
,partly to discourage hijackers from
'landing there.
In any event, the skyjacking problem
'has forced Washington and Havana to
'begin talking again about the future, .
though indirectly through the Swiss
'Government, but while everybody.,
,denies it, these indirect talks could
:lead on to a new accommodation with -
Havana as they did last year between
.Washington and Peking.
President Nixon' is very cautious
about these things, but it is awkward
for him to explain why he wants to .
reach an understanding With Brezhnev
in Moscow and Chou En-hal in Peking
but won't even talk to Castro in Cuba.'
:This is undoubtedly why, after the
_most private talks with the Swiss in
Washington and Geneva, 'Secretary of
State Rogers has made clear in public
that the United States now wishes to,
try to reach an accommodation with
Castro on this entire problem.
Accommodations between nations
, come about in strange ways as was
'obvious last year in the Kissinger visit
fa Pekitift.
has now forced Washington and Ha-
vana to talk again, however indirectly,
and it could result in a new appraisal
of President Nixon's relations with
Latin America, .which by his own
admission is long overdue.
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WASHINGTON POST
17 November 1972
? Accommodation With Cuba?
Accommodation with Cuba could begin, Latin
hand John Plank speculated presciently in 1969,
"with a serious bilateral United States-Cuban dia-
logue about the hijacking problem, a matter of
concern to both Castro and us and whose resolution
would, immediately and tangibly benefit both
parties." This is the larger significance of Havana's
and .Washington's newly expressed interest in a
hijacking dialogue. Handled properly, it could lead
through cultural exchanges, claims settlements,
trade talks and political relations?the familiar
Tout?to an American detente with the only Com-
antmist state (Albania aside) still out in the cold.
. Bat given Fidel Castro's suspicions, not to say his
political investment in portraying the United States
as a devil, our manner in dealing with Havana is
crucial. We do not stress this point only because
.Mr. Nixon last week gratuitously observed that he
anticipated no change in Cuba's policy and, there-
fore, no change in his own. The success, which is
to Say the potential, of the hijack dialogue is at
stake. Cuba has asked to discuss not only the hijack-
ing ,of American planes to Cuba but the hijacking
o CUban boats to the United States and what it
believes to be the closely .related issue of the
"illegal" flight of Cubans by means not involving
hijacking (by private boats, for instance). The State
Department has responded positively but, in ac-
cordance with past policy, only to the offer to
ditctiss takeovers of American planes.
We assume this response was a bargaining posi-
tion, ? not a final position, because "the hijacking
problem" cuts both ways. For the United States its
essence is safety in the skies. For Cuba its essence is
the security of the Castro government: By prevent-
ing its citizens from departing?last year Havana
halted the six-year airlift that had brought a quar-
ter of 'a million refugees to Miami?Cuba means to
give them no real alternative but to accommodate tci
Communist rule.
It could well be that a warmer Political atmo-
Sphere would make negotiation of both halves of
the problem easier. The fact remains that the Amer-
ican interest in coping with plane hijacking until
? now has been subordinated to its interest in making
life a bit more difficult for Fidel Castro.
Perhaps Castro was looking anyway for a face-
RE W YORK TIMES
1 8 NOV 1,972
saving way to start coming in from the cold. Per-
haps the Russians, tired of the cost and nuisance.
of supporting Cuba, gave him a nudge. At any rate,
the last two hijackings have been notably different
from most of the earlier ones;. the last two plainly.
have. involved a large degree of. criminality and
sheer danger. Mr. Castro seems to have understood,
that the surge of American concern over the two'.
hijackings gave him a certain oponing that ho
not have or need when hijackings were the stuff
of bad TV jokes. We think that, in his offer to
bargain, he ought to be presumed serious until
proven not so.
We would further argue that It is not only the
link between Americans' safety in the skies and
Castro's legitimacy that should incline the United.
States to bargain seriously with Cuba. If President
Nixon can deal directly with Moscow and Peking,
why should the smallest and weakest of the Com-
munist states alone be held at arm's length? In the.
dozen Castro years, the hemisphere has seen that
neither the man nor his doctrine nor his disciples,
certainly not his example in Cuba, has excited.
"revolution" anywhere beyond his borders. Castro
himself now makes no more than a ritual appeal for
the cause which a few fearful Americans, but virtu-
ally no realistic Latins, identify with his name. Nor
in a period of detente with the Soviet Union, and of
intercontinental and submarine-launched missiles,.
does it make political or military sense to overdo,
the old worry that Moscow will make Cuba a "base.",
In reaching out to Cuba, there is a certain prob-
lem in resassuring those American allies who, either
in response to American entreaties or for reasons
of their own, supported the political and economic
boycott of Havana which the United States or-,
ganized a decade ago. But just last June at the.
Organization of American States, no fewer than -
seven Latin states declared that each country should
make up its own mind on Cuba. Some particularly.
insecure or repressive Latin governments may need'
some special handholding. But surely that problem;
is manageable.
. To be sure, Fidel Castro remains a very tough and
fractious fellow to deal with. We would be the last
to say, however, that he's too tough for Richard
Nixon.
:CoLAa MYSTERY: inoTaPiT'leTe1jor )low : to the Peruvian ; nornal. range, forcing
awaythen-t3t teN'iCC economy. . . I;alciovies and curtailing
of Economic Research and oh-I The C. I. A. also discovered l sharply. .
pERu3s miclloviEs I tamed today by The New York', that the vagaries of the current' n o'm'Peenr ounv i aFnis
Ninocal l d thise N a v epdhaed.
i !Times, reported that the warm' are .already having an impact on
. because it usually appears off
'current, known as "Elnino de worldwide prices of fish-meal-
; their shores during the holiday
Agency Takes Up a Problem :Navedad' ("Christmas Child")
. based livestock feeds. and, con-
I season," the C.I.A. said..
had sentiently, on cattle and poul'-
t anchoviesBut this year when an ex-
of Sea Currents and Fish ....
their feeding grounds and be.: try prices. It may even hurt cellent fishing season had been
,,yond the reach of Peruvian fish-. commodity dealers in the Uni- expected, the Humboldt Current
ing fleets. . . I ted States and West Germany. twos particularly weak, "allow-
The C.I.A. explained that an-.
" Inasmuch as the processing' ling the Nino to last longer
chovies thrive in the cool waters
of the anchovies into fish meal than usual," the memorandum
is Peru's foremost manuf of the north-moving Humboldt actur- .continited.
' .
frig act way ? providing cm. Current.Every t enin m r, ' By June, 1972, the C.I.A. re-
ployment Ole tens of thonsands Win" c,Orrents llin,Ye't?inuth tin ti od, the tnittittlYSt (PAW' "itiot
tor workers aboard the fishing In faullIerll PORI. Put by WIWI' fallen to only about 10 per
boats and in coastal factorieS they arc Pushed away by the cent of normal." .
Humboldt Current.
But every seven years the Peru had expected an outptft
and supplying 30 per cent of.
the country's foreign exchange of two million tons of fish
earnings?the unustfally early warm currents. for unknown meal this year,, hut at the
end of August the stocks had
? By TAD SZULC
Spo!..1111 to The New York Tants
WASHiNGTON, Nov. 17?The
Central Inielligenee Agency's.
thirst for tvorldwide intelligence
has turned to Perittliot
no-
chovics and a "IIIVAPEkalS"
warm current. In the Pacific that
made the fish disappear this
year.
' A lengthy classified Weill-
arrival of the current is a ma-1 reasons, push far south of their
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fallen to 325,000 tons and all
exports were banned despite
major export commitments.
The C.I.A. study concluded
that following the subsequent
ban on all fishing, "the fleet
and fishmeal plants will lie
idle for many months and un-
employment will swell."
The memorandum warned
:that many fish-meal companies
'might collapse "if not kept
afloat b y new government
loans" and unless the Peruv-
tian Government ? allowed "the
'least efficient firms to go under
JAPAN TIMES
17 November 1972
Churchme
Assail
By MAJORIE RYER
While assuming their debts and
offering other jobs to their
workers."
Furthermore, the C.I.A. said,
Peru's revolutionary military
government had relied heavily
on fish-meal sales to cover the
import requirements for its
five-year development plan.
which includes .oil and copper
ventures and manuTacturing.
Because Peru held large fish-
meal stocks from last year's
production, the C.I.A. said, she
still may earn $270-million from
these exports in 1972. Last yea
sales brought'. $330-million.
L1Tru
Washington Post
WASHINGTON ? A World
Council of Churches (WCC) re-
port charges that the present
government of Uruguay has en-
gaged in "widespread violation
of basic human rights," in-
clueing both physical and psy-
chological torture of political
prisoners, in its current efforts
to wipe out Tupamaro revolu-
.tionaries. ?
' A State Department ; official
who conferred recently with the
three-man team which compiled
the report said that the church-
men drew a grimmer picture of
the situation in Uruguay than
was generally reflected in diplo-
matic sources.
? "They portray a deeper area
of concern than I was aware
of," said Charles A. Meyer, as-
sistant secretary of state for in-
ter-American affairs.
The churchmen say in their
report that "thousands" of
Uruguayan citizens have been.
arrested and held in-
communicado without trial
since April 15, when the Urugu-
yan congress approved a 30-day
"internal state of war" against
the Tupamaros.
"Persons arrested and held
indefinitely are presumed to be
guilty of subversion and pos-
sible complicity with the Tupa-
maro urban guerrilla movement
and are subjected to military
justice which is very slow (only
three military judges in the
country) and from which there'
is no appeal, the report says.
The 'report cites "impressive
evidence" of the use of torture
by both police and the military.
While such measures are "pur-
portedly aimed at the Tupa-
maros," the churchmen charge,
talk
they are "in fact extended
widely to broad segments of the
population for political rea-
sons."
The World Council of
Churches ?report was compiled
by three U.S. churchmen who
spent five days in Uruguay in
June investigating. They,. are'
Dr. William P. Thompson, chief
executive officer of the United
Presbyterian Church, the Rev.
Dr. Eugene L. Stockwell, assis-.
tent general secretary of the
World Division of the United
Methodist Board of Missions,
and the Rev. Dr. Thomas J. Lig-
gett, president of the United
,Christian Missionary Society of
the Christian Church (Disciples
of Christ).
The latter two are former
missionaries in Latin American
and speak fluent Spanish.
In their report they note,
"strong suspicion that military
and police assistance given to
Uruguay 1(by the United States)
helps to buttress the repression
01
. ? .
Dr. Stockwell said in an inter
view that during their visit to
the State Department the
churchmen urged "immediate
cancellation of all, police and
military aid to Uruguay as a
minimum" and consideration of
ending economic aid as well. -
. H i s impression that .."we
. didn't get very far" in that
request appeared to be borne
out by the State Department's
Meyer. ??1
While stating that, "any pre-.
gram we have anywhere is sus.
ceptible to constant re-eval.
uation," he said of the U.S.-fun-
ded police training program:
Still believe in a program de.
Signed to teach police efficien-
cy, ? in the best sense of that
word, which includes moder-
titian,"
77
NEW YORK TIMES
19 November 1972
An penTog to. C ba ?
Now that President Nixon has opened up a speaking
relationship with Communist China, developed a commer-,
cial and economic detente with Communist Russia and::
indicated a policy of peace and reconstruction for Come
rnunist North- Vietnam, it would logically follow that he
miss no opportunity to begin what may well be the most '
touchy of all such maneuvers ,vis-A-vis the Communist
world: an unfreezing of United States relations with
Cuba. Although in comparison to China, Russia or' even 4
Hanoi, Castro's Cuba is not much More than a roaring
mouse, it is still?geographically, politically and emo-
tionally?a major disturbing factor in the foreign policy
spectrum of the Americas, particularly of ' the United ;
'States.
That opportunity to embark on a new policy?despite ,.
the President's rigidly adamant position toward Cuba
expressed in a newspaper interview only a few days' '
ago?may be nearer than anyone had hitherto dared tri,
believe. Ironically, it is the 'recent criminal hijacking- ,
of two American planes to 'Cuba that has, presented both
the Cuban and United States Governments with the
chance to test each other's desire to push, if ever so.
slightly,
slightly, against the immense barriers that still separate
them.
In reaction to these two hijackings?of an Eastern
'Airlines 727 on Oct. 29 and a Southeni Airways DC-9
Nov. 12?the Cuban Government has' now specifically;I.,'
suggested the opening up of bilateral negotiations to
deal with the problem, at the Same time alleging in its
usual florid language that the United States had started
It all by permitting a succession of "hijackings" of Cubart,-.,
vessels by Cuban exiles, defectors and refugees operating '
out of Florida.
0 *
Nevertheless, it is apparent from the Cuban statement
that Dr. Castro is ready and even anxious .to work out '
an agreement on the hijacking issue; and 'it is equally
apparent from Secretary of State Rogers' unusually warm,'
and personal response that the United States wants to
do so too?whether directly or through third parties.
If this opening is achieved, it would indeed represent a
particularly high order of statesmanship on, the part of
both the United States and Cuba to move on to other,:
things.
It simply makes no sense any more?and President,?
Nixon as the supreme pragmatist surely perceives this ,
too?to persist in a pOlicy, of diplomatic and economic
quarantine against Cuba 1.hat.Wai itAked by 'the Orgaril-:
zation of American States nearly a decade ago under
totally different circumstances from those of today.
Peru renewed ties with Cuba in July. More recently,,
four Caribbean nations?Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and
Trinidad-Tobago?have decided to seek "the early estab-
lishment Of relations with Cuba, whether, economic or
diplomatic?or both." Ecuador and Panama are consider
Ing doing likewise. Chile had breached the O.A.S.
nomic embargo even before the election of a Marxist
President, Salvador Allende, insured the resumption of ,
full ties. Mexico never adhered to 'the O.A.S. boycott, and
Canada, which now has a permanent observer at the
0.A.S., has always maintained relations with the Castro
regime.
It is obvious that Washington will have increasing
difficulty maintaining the O.A.S. quarantine. No dramatic
Initiative is called for; merely quiet communication to
06 whin' Attietleati COVOttithelite Mit WItOillflann to ,
ready to consider negotiating with Havana on broadOP
issues than hijacking, and a relaxation of the O.A.S. boy-
cott.
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WASHINGTON POST
14 November 1972
To Curb HU=
gem, Inu,prove TeS With Havana
Somehow passing the hijack screening, three
armed men boarded and commandeered a Southern
Airways jet in Birmingham Friday, picked up $2 mil-
lion in ransom at one stop, forced the pilot to take
off at another although the FBI had shot out the
plane's tires, wounded the copilot, and finally landed
on foam in Havana. The public should learn at once
what flaw in the hijack screening let the three
board. The FBI must explain why it took the con-
giclerable risk of starting to shoot. The media must
ask themselves whether, by their play-by-play re-
porting of the 29-hour, 4,000-mile adventure, they
did not scare or embolden the hijackers to act more
rashly than they otherwise might. It seems a mir-
acia no one was killed.
In the end, however; hijacking comes down to
what the .hijackers do in the end. No one can safe-
ly- predict what angry and unbalanced men will do.
But one can say that, if hijackers knew they had no
haven, it could not fail to affect?their calculations.
For hijackings in the Western hemisphere, of course,
the cominonest haven sought is Cuba.
Now, Fidel Castro has been far from all bad on
the matter. He has quietly shipped some Amen-
an hijackers hijackers back :through Canada and made life
go miserable for others that they have tried to de-
part. Cuba's ideological compulsion to remain open
to political seulmates, however, and the notion still
afloat that Cuba is about the only place to go, have
drawn hijackers to Havana nonetheless. The past
weekend's incident followed by only two weeks the
flight to Cuba by a group including two Washington
men linked to a. double murder in an Arlington
bank.- One hopes Cuba will return all criminal hi-
jackers.in due time, but the fact Is the problem of
keturn would not keep arising if planes Were not
hijacked and directed there in the first place.
NEW YORK TIMES
30 November 1972
f'
0
The plain requirement is a known public firm
guarantee of no haven for criminal hijackers in --
Cuba. There is only one effectiVe way to secure
such a guarantee and that is for Cuban-American
political relations to be normalized. Good sense and
the whole drift of international affairs commends
.such a development anyway. It becomes increas-
ingly an anachronism in a time of detente for Wash-
ington and Havana to remain at political sword
points. Hijacking provides what should be the
clinching argument?a good non-political argument,
at that.
From President Nixon, however, comes the stiff,
stale old diplomacy. He told The Washington Star-
News last week there would be "no change what-
ever" in his Cuban policy "unless and until?and I
do not anticipate this will happen?Castro changes
his policy toward Latin America, and the United
States." Why is Mr. Nixon so hard-nosed? These
days his administration neither tries to demon-
trate Castro is "exporting revolution" nor contends
Cuba is lending itself to intol,erable Soviet military
purposes. Officials pressed to justify the Nixon
policy are reduced to citing harsh boilerplate rhet-
oric sounded by Castro in such unlikely precincts as
Bulgaria. President Nixon, as sore reports say,.
may indeed have it in mind to improve relations
with Cuba?the Florida vote is in?but evidently he
wants Fidel to come to him on hands and knees.
Negotiating, it's called.
It's an attitude as unworthy of a great nation as
it is unnecessary for a re-elected Chief Executive. ;
Mr. Nixon insists he's deeply concerned about both
promoting detente and eliminating hijacking. But
here he has the chance to serve the two goals and
he turns the other way.
it Is All in the Eyes
By Louis Wolf Goodman
NEW HAVEN, Conn.?If one were
to rely solely on U.S. coverage or
news from Chile for an understanding
of current developments in that coun-
try, it would not be unreasonable to
conclude that the Government of Sal-
vador Allende is vastly unpopular, ille-
gitimate, incompetent and repressive.
One could further conclude that the
Chilean left has been held in check
only by the strength of the . army
. rather than a commitment to democ-
racy. Such conclusions are fundamen-
tally erroneous and based upon a
superficial understanding of the eco-
nomic nod political struggles wog
wititytt 1111(1 pro. nod onll-liinioroment
fOret`!I In Chile. In our Julhunetit, tim
U.S. press fosters misconception about
Chile:
0 That the Allende Government is
vastly unpopular in Chile. This asser-
tion is a clear example of a class bias
in press reporting. Information um*.:d
by foreign correspondents in Chile
tends to represent more accurately the
attitudes of the upper class and seg-
ments of the middle class than those
or the working or popular classes. A
September 1972 survey of Greater
Santiago commissioned by the oppo-
Lition-controlled weekly, Emilia, gives
evidence about Government support
*which differs from the view in the
U.S. Press.
These results indicate that close to
60 per cent of Santiago's population
looks favorably on the present Govern-
ment's performance, a majority feel
that the strategies of the opposition
era liannfill, Mid mrtpantile avonid
vole for Allendo Imlay (U; per rent)
than (lid in Saiithip,o in 1970 (34 per
cent). Equally important, this survey
shows that Santiago's small upper-
income group overwhelmingly opposes
Allende's Popular Unity coalition, the
of Lu
A- 11,, 1
middle class is divided and the lower
class is enthusiastic. Moreover,
Greater Santiago always trails the
provinces in support for Socialist can-
didates. No mention of the above '
findings was made in the U.S. press
despite the wide discussion they re-
caved in Chile:
0 That Allende's efforts to move
the country toward Socialism are taus.;
Ing widespread economic chaos and
hardship.
Allende was elected on a platform ,
that explicitly rejected the moderate
reform path of development which
characterized the previous Christian
Democratic administration. The elec-
toral support received by the. left was
hardly an overwlieltning, Mandate. but
it gtive pnpulan unity till-4 tIllpoiltinity
to ?novo tho Oat lm
Any suelt Junior change will protiii?a.
dislocations. One question that must
be asked is where in the social struc.
tore these dislocations have been
concentrated?
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In Chile, the greatest economic dif-
ficulties are being felt by those who
have benefited most under capitalism,
i.e., the upper and middle income sec-
tors. There are shortages of consumer
goods. It is now more difficult for the
relatively comfortable sectors of the
population to maintain their patterns
of consumption. Last December's
"March of the Empty Pots" was essen-
tially a protest by middle- and upper-
class housewives who found it diffi-
cult to obtain certain desired goods
in their own neighborhood stores.
Similarly, strikes by shopkeepers in
the central business district and work
stoppages by professional people are
middle-class protests. These store
owners and professionals do not
WASHINGTON STAR
23 November 1972
By JEREMIAH O'LEARY
Star-News Stria Writer
QUARRY HEIGHTS, Canal
Zone ? Granted a respite
from extinction by President
Nixon himself, the U.S. South-
ern Command is understanda-
bly sensitive about its unique
status as the world's most
top-heavy military organiza-
tion.
Southeam, as the Army,
Navy and Air Force area com-
mand is called, has never been
short of critics, largely be-
cause it is basically a paper
organization with no less than
13 flag officers in relation to a
few thousand troops in the
Canal Zone and a few hundred
? officers and men in the mili-
tary advisory groups in 16 Lat-
in countries.
Critics in the past have
charged that there were too
many generals and admirals
for so insignificant a force;
that the advisory groups in the
e various Latin countries served
very little purpose for their
?? cost; that nothing was accom-
plished here that could not be
done as easily and less expen-
sively from the Pentagon.
? Some new assessments are
now bring made in view of
some changes.
The military groups have
been reduced from 17 to 16 by
Ecuador's request for depar-
ture of the U.S. group there,
and the number of officers and
men in the groups has been
pared from about 800 to less'
the n400.
Troops more Qualified
The U.S. armed forces ap-
serve the poor,- nor do they want the
Government to continue its efforts to
control distribution for the well-being
of low-income sectors. While it is un-
doubtedly true that these groups have
experienced restrictions on consump-
tion and wealth, others have clearly
benefited.
The opposition labels restrictions on
the accumulation of wealth and prop-
erty as attacks on democratic free-
doms. Certainly it has been the Gov-
ernment's aim to undermine the eco-
nomic base of the monied classes, but
It has respected the fundamental po-
litical right of dissent by legal means.
In every case of nationalization,
intervention, or purchase of major in-
terest by the Government in private
companies, the administration has'
used only legal means and controls
authorized by already-existing (al-
though sometimes obscure) laws.
Chile's central importance today is '
that it is the first nation to attempt ?
a Socialist democracy. This is a test
of the strengths and limitations of
democracy as a political framework
and Socialism as an economic system..
_
Louis Wolf GOOdnian is tissistant pro-
fessor of sociology at Yale. The article.;
was written with the assistance of
Jose Luis Rodriguez, Brian Smith, Van
Whiting and David Apter, members of
the Chilean Study Group.
pear to have improved the
quality of the in-country per-
sonnel. Four years ago, many
troops assigned to the groups
came with little or no knowl-
edge of Spanish or Portuguese,
and often were picked without
special qualification. Today,
all of the personnel mist have
a language competency of "3"
on a scale of "5" ? iii other
words, modest fluency.
In the 1960s, the groups
were caught up in the Ken-
nedy administration's policy
, of democratizing Latin Amer- ?
ica, a lofty aim they did not
seem able to achieve. Even
so, the policy existing tended
to isolate the group, personnel
from politically ambitious
military figures in the host
countries.
Military procurement has
undergone a drastic change
affecting the groups' role. In
post-World War II years, all
of Latin America acquired
surplus U.S. materiel from
, uniforms to aircraft, from
weapons to naval vessels. It
was automatic and expected.
Gradually, the United States,
becoming involved in the
Vietnam wars took the view
that the Latins needed only
security equipmetn because
they faced no serious external
threat that the United States
would not handle for them.
The United States cut back
drastically on what planes;
ships and weapons were
available for Latins.
New Sources Found
The Latins reacted by sim-
ply going shopping elsewhere
for their hardware. The
French, Germans, Swedes,
0
Dutch and British, 'in ?iarying
degrees, began flooding Latin
America with salesmen and
the Latins began spending
their money on sophisticated
Mirage jets, A MX tanks, Ger-
man patrol boats and oven
reconditioned British aircraft
carriers. ?
By 1968, the U.S. advisory
groups had nothing to sell or
grant, little influence on the
Latin officer corps and the
quality of their intelligence
function was inferior to that
available in other embassy of-
fices.
New Rationale
Today, the war in Vietnam
is nearly finished as far as the
United States is concerned
and, while there are still close
restrictions on what Latin ar-
mies can buy, Washington's
policy is no longer, to try to
steer, influence and cajole
Latin capitals. Washington
takes the more practical view
that as long as the Latins are
going to buy arms, they might
as well get them from the
United States.
Given the changed world sit-
uation, differences in U.S. poli-
cy, and the facts of life about
Latin America today, there
are those who conclude that
the small but better-trained
U.S. military groups be main-
tained as points of contact
with the Latin military.
The number of flag officers
remains high in Panama head-
quarters of Southcom, and
there are two or three gener-
als stationed in Brazil and Ar-
gentina. Proponents of the
present structure say the Unit-
79
cd States needs officers of '
general or admiral rank to
deal with their Latin oppo-
sites, since Southeom ls
charged not only with defense
of the Panama Canal but also
with coordinating U.S. ,
tary activities ? including
military aid ? throughout,
Central and South America.
Critics continue to charge
that Southcom is a navy with-
out vessels and an army with-
out troops ? a full-fledged
area command with a brass
staff just as rank-heavy as the
other seven regional world4
wide commands of the De- ;
fense Department. These flag
officers are expensive to ,
maintain with their staffs and
privileges.
Obviously, critics say, any,:
major military threat against
Panama's canal would be
countered by naval, air,'
ground or missile forces from
the United States proper. The
193d Infantry Brigade here ;
can protect the canal against
any local threat, they say, and
any attack on the canal by a
world power would mean
World War III.
Approved For Release--2001/08/07-:-CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4
Approved For Release 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100020001-4
THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, NOVEMBER 29,1972
Bra.).zi easants Find Their4-
?rsens
1.0
By MAR VINE 110WE
Sptci al tn. thttNe Ynric TItnes
ESCADA, Brazil. Nov. 16
On some days the people on the
sugar plantation called Provi-
dence have nothing to eat, but
like most farm workers in Bra-
zil's impoverished Northeast,
they appear resigned to their
empty live.
Attempts at modernization
and industrialization have not
solved the basic problems of
the important sugar industry
but only aggravated the situ-
ation by increasing unemploy-
ment.
The Most Rev. Helder Ca
-
mare:, the outspoken Archbish-
op of Olinda and Recife, de-
plores what he describes as
"the subhuman" condition of
the rural workers, who lack de-
cent. housing, clothing, food,
schools or hope. "If something
is not done to better their con-
dition, inevitably there will be
ferment," he has warned.
The situation of the sugar
cane workers is worse than it
was a decade ago because their
pay has lost more than half its
purchasing power, according to
the Rev. AntOnio Melo, one of
the most vocal advocates of
agrarian reform in the North-
east. "erate existence because they
Flight to the Cities are told they have been saved."1
"People are leaving the coun- For lack of any alternative,
tryside for the cities, but they some 150,000 peasants are
are going into the slums, not bound to the sugar plantations
into industry," said the priest, of the Northeast in the hot, hu.
who is director of the Agricul- mid coastal area.
tural School of Escada.
The school, run by the Feder-
al Government, is a ray of hope
amid the quiet desperation that
characterizes the life of the
' cane fields at age 8, 'lire deter- the same time more enterpris- in an interview.
mined to escape to a better life. mg businessmen in southern
"I want to be a farm techni- Brazil started a sugar industry
clan and take my father away that rapidly outstripped the
from the plantation," said 16-
year-old Manuel Jorge Tatares,
whose father earns less ? than
the minimum wage of $1 a day nineteen-sixties the Peasant
to support 12 children. Leagues gathered a signifi-
cant movement to change rural
institutions, but they were
i?cruehed in the 1064 take-over
j by the present military govern-
The Need for Reform
Northeast in productivity.
The workers suffered most
in the decline. In the early
Life is Increasingly difficult
for Maria do Carmo da Con-
ceictio, who lives with her hus-
band and five children in two
rooms in a row of wretched
shacks- on Provielence Planta-
tion here. The children cannot
go to sehool because they don't ! The Government has been
have shoes or clothes. aware for some time that re-
A Consoling Creed
form is necessary in the North-
east hut seems uncertain how
"We can't cat meat any more to go about it. in the mean-
because dried beef has gone time subsidies are paid to the
from 33 cents to $1.85 and my 'producers to hold the industry
husband only earns $5 a week
working in the cane fields," she together.
When Juscelino Kubitschek
said. "Some days we all go hun-1 was President he set up the
gry because there's nothing to
eat. All we have is the strength
of God." ?
Such fatalism is widespread
among ? the cane workers ac-
cording to a Recife. University and irrigation, but the sugar
Superintendency for the Devel-
opment of the Northeast in
1959, spurring the establish-
ment of light industries as well
as hydroelectric projects roads
sociologist, who explained: problem was barely touched.
"The Pentecostal Church has Father Melo got support in
gotten a strong hold among the 1963 for a sugar cooperative
hopeless Peasants who can that appears to be a valid if
costly and limited .attempt to
improve, the life of the cane
workers. The 490 members
'earn three times more than
.wortters on the plantations, ac-
cording to the priest. Each re-,
Se.veral agencies have been
set up to bring about land re-
form but are bogged down in
orebanizational problems and
landowners have openly op-,
posed the efforts. A senater
declared that the workers in
the Northeast did not knew
how to farm and were not
ready for agrarian reform. Some
warkere fear that they ree,
lose their jobs.
All large owners must sub-
mit reports on the use of their
and by Dec. 31. Unused hold-
ings are to be put up for sale,
preferably to the workers al-
ready on the land, who will
receive financial aid.
The Sugar ,and Alcohol Insti-
tute, which buys sugar from
the mills and resells it on the
domestic market and abroad,
has embarked on a plan for
reorganization of the industry.
R. Parry Scott of the Insti-
tute of Latin American Studies
at the University of Texas, who
has been engaged in social re--
search here, commented: "It is
highly questionable that the
present processes of moderni-
zation of the Northeast Brazil-
ian sugar industry will contrib-
ute to a bettering of the situa-
tion of the rural worker in the
near future."
Many workers have solved
the problem by going to the
cities. Recife, more than any
other Northeastern city, has
ceived 25 acres and credit for
The industry, founded by the acquired the problems of the
Portuguese settlers in the 16th planting at the outset, and sev- sugar industry, according to its
century, was hurt by competi- eral have been able to buy Mayor, Augusto Lucena. Of its
Lion from the West Indies. andtrucks, donkeys and cattle,
population of 1,3 million, twice
,Cuba in the 19th century. It "We have tried to convince that of two decades ago, 40
sugar workers. Most of the 150 forced large owners to set 1-1P the Government that agrarian per cent are unemployed or
boys at 1111 school, who gerter- ,sugar mills, but they failed to reform is not only necessary underemployed, with serious;
ally sterted working In the ,Iteep up with technology. I..", but possible," Father Melo said problems of infant mortality,'
malnutrition, sanitation, hous-
ing and schooling.
NEW YORK TIMES
12 November 1972
moy MT) 1,
it r
, n 11r.
l'4;;;;,.?".11
es-eni to Tht tit w York Ttro,si
UNITED NATIONS, N. Y.,
Nov. 11 ? Panama, unhappy
March when it will be the in August was to reject the
Panama delegate's turn to be $1.9-mil1ion annuity the Unit-
president of the Council for the ed States pays Panama so that
month. the "entire world" should
Itroed Topic Likely know that the zone had not
It is anticipnted that Pane- been bought, ceded or leased!
tria will offer some broad topic but was being "occupied at-
for the Council session, such bitrarily."
as measures to enhance peace United States authorities
in Latin America. But Mr. Boyd have acknowledged the legiti-
said: "Not to talk about the macy of some of Piinama's
with United States negotiating Canal Zone would he like go- grievances, and have offered
terms for revising the 1903 ing to church and not praying.' to make conceesions in a new
Panama Canal Treaty, is press- Negotiations between 'the treaty, saying they are ready
ing for a Security Council two countries bogged down for negotiations whenever Pan-
seven months ago en a new ama signals.
treaty to replace the 69-year- However, the United States
old pact under which the Unit- Says that a public and prob-
ed States built the canal and 'ably rancorous , debate would
was given jurisdiction in the tend to "freeze" pOrttilOVIS tnd
10-milc-wide strip "in perpe- would set s dangerous prece
tuity." -
dent of mine the Security
. There has been increasing Council as a bargaining tool
friction in recent years over in influencing, bilateral nego-
the powers exercised by the tiations.
United States in the Canal It also is simeested by diplo-
Zone, where 40,000 Americans mete here (hat the meeting
live-13,000 of them military could become an exercise to
personnel?and where courts embarrass the United States.
an the police, school and There is the chance that Cuba,
stores and all facilities are run though not a member of the
the Ameeteert aiithorities, eetmell, wi4coMP i?ft prof-get
Brig. Gen. Omar Torrijos against the American naval
Herrera, who has been the rut- base at Guantanamo or renew
ing force in Panama for four her charges that the United
years has in the past threat.- States keeps a "colonial" grip
ened to "march into the zone." on Puerto }co. Both issues,
the Council members come in His first act after his election have been heard many times
Approved For Release 2001/08/078.(bIA-RDP77-00432R00010002000174 _
_ . _
meeting in Panama to present
her grievances.
Aquilino E. Boyd. Panama's
chief delegate, hes flown home
to report that the majority of
the Council's 15 members have
told him the.y were favorably
inclined toward a session in
Panama. The United States is
not.
lie plans to return. with A
fOrMal I and an offer
to share the costs of the meet-
ing unless his Government is,
persuaded that it would be
wise to resume private negotia-
tions with Weshingten Ai* fop
8o a public debate.
Diplomats here see re-
ssumption of the negotiations as
unlikely nt the moment and ex-
pect Panama: to propose that
but airing them in i Latin-1
American setting would be dd.!
ferent.
Americans who have fo1.
lowed the Panama develop-
ments also believe that it could
wind up antagonizing Admin-
istration and Congressional
leadere--the very parties Pan-
am hopes to influence by call-
ing attention to her long-
standing grievancts.
Disagreeing, Mr.' Boyd says
that a Council debate would
not interfere with the talks be-
twcen Panama snd the United
States, and that the presence
of the "world community in
Panama would help public
opinion to appreciate the in-
equities Panama has endured."
He said he had received fa-
vorable response for a Coun-
cil meeting in Panama "in
principle" from Foreign Min-
ister Andrei A. Gromyko of
the Soviet Union and Foreign
Minister Maurice Schumann of
Prance, and that the idea wn?
APPFPved by Yugoslavta. In-
dia and the three African court-
tries on the Council.