MEMORANDUM TO (Sanitized) FROM DONALD H. STEININGER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00514R000100220008-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 17, 2003
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: July 31, 1972
• Content Type: MF

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3 1 JUL 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
We have reviewed your draft memorandum concerning the
improvement of US understanding of the Soviet military R&D
effort and we do have some substantive comments and as you
will see some disagreements with you on the matter. Let me
take these up in two parts.
First, you have focused on NIE 11-12-72 as a basis for
coming to some of the conclusions you have drawn. However,
it seems to us that one must look at a broader range of
publications to make such an assessment, particularly in view
of the fact that NIE 11-12 was consciously limited in scope so
as not to duplicate NIE 11-2, 11-3 or 11-8. It may also be
less clear or descriptive than one would like it to be from a
strictly editorial point of view. As is stated in the Terms
of Reference and in the Introduction, NIE 11-12 was intended to
cover a narrow range of problems stemming from the costing
estimates put out by DDR&E; it was never to explore all aspects
of our knowledge of Soviet military R&D. Partly for this
reason, but primarily because it was time to have a more com-
plete community review, the SIC early this year decided to
proceed with an update of its January 1967 study on the scope
and direction of Soviet military R&D. This study is well on
its way to completion. In light of this, I.'do not think we
should base any conclusions about the state of our knowledge
or the capability of our analytical resources on the content
of NIE 11-12. If there are some conclusions to be drawn-'it
would seem desirable to wait at least until the SIC study
becomes available and base any conclusions on.a review of it,..
NIE 11-12, 11-8 and 11-3.
Second, even after we see the SIC report,-there is no
doubt in my mind that it will be evident that there are many
things about the Soviet military research and development
program that we do not understand.. Even then, however, it will
not be clear that this means that we need to increase our
analytical or collection resources against the problem, or
that we need to organize in some different way to attack it.
Indeed, it may be that our lack of understanding is the result
of inadequate data which we do not have the technical know-how
collect, or which are not normally subject to clandestine
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collection. With regard to your conclusion that "nowhere in
the US intelligence organizations is there a specific group
of analysts with the required interdisciplinary skills
dedicated to integrating our intelligence, and estimative
experience in an overall attack on the Soviet military R&D
problem," it is our organizational intent here that this
particular task is inherent in the OSI and FMSAC missions;
indeed, it is the primary purpose of these organizations to
perform just the job that you have described. Of course, it
is possible that this capability can be improved and that there
are data collection capabilities which we have not discovered
which should be exploited. Before you come to that conclusion,
however, let me invite you to spend some time with Don
Chamberlain, Dave Brandwein and their people to get a feel for
the scope of our activities, the people we have involved, the
data that we think we need, and the collection capabilities
that are available.
In general, then, for reasons inherent in the discussion
above, I do not believe we should establish the task force you
suggest at this time.
Donald H. Steininger
Assistant Deputy Director
for
Science and Technology
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ILLEGIB
20 July 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science & T y
lrec or of National Estimates
SUBJECT: Improving U.S. Understanding of Soviet
Military R&D
1. Reference is the attached draft memorandum for the DCI,
subject as above. This memorandum has been discussed with Mr.
Tweedy who has deferred judgment on sending it forward to the
DCI pending your comments on the proposal.
2. Early receipt of such comments would be appreciated.
25X1
ie ,
Attachment:
Draft memo as stated
CF (4) ' a: or .Nara)
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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Improving U.S. Understanding of Soviet
Military R&D
1. The basic premise of this memorandum is that there is
need for an increase in the U.S. intelligence effort devoted to
acquiring an understanding of the Soviet military research and
development program. The draft NIE 11-12-72, "Soviet Military
Research and Development," 27 June 1972, clearly indicates the in-
adequacies of our knowledge of present and probably future Soviet
military R&D. Considering the importance of R&D in the weapons
field to future U.S. security and policy interests, an improved
analytic and perhaps collection effort appears to be needed.
2. The draft NIE, for instance, notes on page 27 that:
"They (the Soviets) have never deployed a weapon
system which took full advantage of what we estimated
was the state-of-the-art in their technology at the
time the weapon system was developed."
3. Questions immediately arise as to the correctness of
our estimates of their "state-of-the-art" and, more importantly,
as to Soviet R&D practice and philosophy and the economic,
institutional and cultural variables to which the R&D program
may be sensitive.
4. In view of the key impact which Soviet military R&D can
have on the future security of the United States, it is imperative
that this country have as clear an understanding of the Soviet
program as is possible. At present, however, nowhere in the U.S.
intelligence organizations is there a specific group of analysts
with the required interdisciplinary skills dedicated to integrating
our intelligence and estimative experience in an overall attack
on the Soviet military R&D problem. Inputs for such papers as
NIE 11-12-72 come from a variety of production offices working on
different aspects of the problem.
5. The end result is far from a sophisticated, coherent
evaluation of the nature of Soviet military R&D, the patterns of
institutional behavior involved, and the political and economic
factors which importantly affect R&D decisions. Such an evaluation
is essential, however, if the directions in which Soviet R&D is
headed are to be identified and the resultant weapon systems
anticipated. -,,
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6. It is recognized that much of the necessary raw information
is not available and one of the tasks is to investigate whether
there may not be ways to acquire more of the information that is
needed. Considering the intimate relationship between
our understanding of Soviet military R&D and the effectiveness of
the SALT arrangements, provision of additional resources to attack
this problem may be warranted.
7. I propose that a task force be established under the aegis
of the DD/S&T or the DD/1-to:
a. Determine the extent to which manpower and other
resources currently are being devoted to analysis and
production on the Soviet military R&D problem throughout
the intelligence community.
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accomplishment of needed tasks.
c. Identify any subject areas in which additional
collection action is needed.
d. Weigh the advantages of the establishment of a
special full-time, interdisciplinary research unit to be
responsible for integrating all U.S. knowledge of Soviet
military R&D activities and developing such analytical techniques
and approaches as are needed for projection of likely future
Soviet programs in the military R&D field.
e. Providing such a special research unit is considered
necessary, recommend its community-wide composition and
organizational location.
8. It is suggested you approve the foregoing and set a
i November deadline for completion of the task force report.
Bronson Tweedy
D/DCI/IC
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